French family policy: long tradition and diversified measures

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Abstract

In France, the intervention of the state in the private sphere has long been accepted as legitimate. The current French family policy is the result of a compromise between the objectives of raising fertility, providing income support to families and promoting the work-family balance. Thus it includes a wide range of measures based on a variety of ideological standpoints. It combines measures encouraging women’s employment with others in favour of large families. Recently, employers have been encouraged to implement family-friendly policies of their own. Since the state family policy is already quite comprehensive, their participation is rather low. This long-term ‘mix of tools’ is likely to be a factor behind the current high fertility in France, but the number and the complexity of family policy measures make it very difficult to quantify their overall effect on fertility.
1 Introduction

Because of the variegated nature of its family policy, France does not fit easily into the classification of western welfare systems. Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) classifies European countries into three groups according to the organisation of their welfare systems. The Nordic countries have universalistic state policies that promote the independence of individuals and social equality; the state is the main welfare provider (socialist or universalistic welfare regimes). English-speaking countries promote market-based individualism; families and the market provide the welfare (liberal welfare regimes). In conservative welfare regimes, (including France and Germany) policies are geared at preserving the status quo and traditional family forms; they mostly depend on the family to provide welfare. Mediterranean countries are like conservative states but have a stronger family bias. However, in other classifications which we describe below, France is considered closer to the Nordic countries than to Germany.

Feminist researchers consider the interaction of two types of relations within the family when classifying European welfare policies, namely partnership and parenthood (Neyer 2003). Gornick et al. (1997) focus on the impact of social policies on female employment. They group France, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Sweden as countries where social policies help women to remain in the labour force after they have a child. In Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, family policies force women to exit the labour market until their children go to school. In the United Kingdom, family policies provide limited support and the ability of mothers to stay in the labour force depends on individual capacities. Anttonen and Sipila (1996) distinguish different types of state child care policies: the Scandinavian model (universal policies aimed at promoting gender equality); the southern European model (limited supply of state care services); France and Belgium, with extensive state support for families but no support for gender equality; the Netherlands and Germany, where child care is still provided by parents who benefit from state support schemes; and the British system, in which state help is mostly directed towards ‘problem cases’.

Hantrais (2004) puts the relation between family and state into three categories. In her classification, the Nordic and French-speaking countries are ‘defamilialised’ (strong state support for the care of family members); the English and German-speaking countries and the Netherlands are ‘partially familialised’; and the southern countries are ‘familialised’. McDonald (2006), simplifying matters even further, defines two groups of countries. The first includes the countries of southern Europe and the German-speaking European countries where “there is a strong, traditional value that family and state are separate entities and that families should support their own members” (ibid, p. 11) and where fertility levels are below 1.5 children per women. The other group includes all English-speaking, Nordic, French- and Dutch-speaking countries, where gender equality is
higher, there are family-friendly institutional arrangements and fertility levels are higher than 1.5.

The multi-faceted French family policy may explain these various classifications. This article gives an overview of that policy. It first provides a presentation of its evolution over time. It then describes the different measures implemented and actors involved. Finally, it examines the impact of French family policy on fertility and female employment. In this article, we shall consider family policies in a broad sense, in that we include social and public policies which may help families raise their children and which, in the long run, contribute to maintaining high fertility. Indeed, some measures relating to such matters as education or housing, which were not designed to help families to have children, in fact do have an impact on fertility.

2 A long tradition of family policy

French family policy is the result of the centuries-long political will of an early-formed central state to affirm itself against the power of the Catholic Church (Commaille and Martin 1998; Commaille et al. 2002; Strobel 2004). By regulating the family sphere, the Republican state sought to beat the Church on its preferred ground and affirm its own power. These efforts were aided at the end of the 19th century by a strong pronatalist movement that stemmed from the early end of the historical fertility transition in France and the country’s defeat in the 1870 war against Germany (Rosental 2003). The family policy that was finally implemented after World War Two was a compromise between a Catholic vision of the family and more progressive ideals of social equality. For example, the entire policy was based on the male breadwinner and female caregiver pattern, but the development of kindergartens, introduced at the same time, was meant to promote equal opportunities among French children. Family policy has always been a tool for regulating women’s place between the private and work spheres and has been connected with employment policy (Commaille et al. 2002). From the 1930s to the 1960s, this policy reinforced the pattern of the non-working mother, because family allowance was paid from the first child onwards when the woman did not work. The policy was adapted further in the 1980s to accommodate the massive influx of women onto the labour market. Collective and private care arrangements were developed for children under three, which helped women to reconcile family and work with almost no increase in men’s participation in child care.

This long history of considering family policy enabled the government to react swiftly to women’s entry into the labour force by designing new policy measures. The current policy is the result of a century-long battle, fuelled by pronatalism, between the conservative supporters of family values and the promoters of state-supported equality between individuals.
The current French family policy is the result of a compromise between various political trends and thus includes a wide range of measures based on a variety of ideological standpoints. Up to 2007, the yearly Conférence de la famille was the place where new family policy measures were set out. Extensive dialogue with family movement associations, social protection bodies, union and management representatives and experts preceded this conference. Religious institutions played a rather minor role. In 2008, the new French government has declared its intention to replace it by a new Haut conseil de la famille with a prominent role given to family movement associations.

This intervention of the state in the private sphere has long been accepted as legitimate. The state is perceived as the main stakeholder responsible for children (Letablier et al. 2003). The consensus on the importance of state intervention goes beyond the political divide between right and left. However, there are divergences. Left-wing parties want family policy to be directed towards the poorest and to adapt to changes in the family behaviour. Considerations of gender equality have recently been advanced. Right-wing parties exhibit their pronatalist views more openly. Family policy should allow women to both raise their offspring and have more children. Moreover, right-wing parties advocate universal coverage for family policy, which should be distinguished from social policy.

In spite of a relatively high level of fertility in France compared with other European countries, the pro-birth tendency is still present in the political arena. It is more present in right-wing parties, but it is also deeply rooted in some left-wing parties. This tendency expresses both family and collective morality and is more rationalistic than religious (Büttner et al. 2002). Its supporters are still anxious about the insufficient replacement of generations and call for increased support for families, particularly large families (Godet and Sullerot 2006; Franco 2006).

Current concerns have gradually shifted from the number of births to reconciling work and family (Ministère de la famille 2005). Family policy is designed to encourage mothers’ ‘free choice’ to continue to work or to stop working to raise their children. The idea is that women should not be penalised, whatever their choice, and that public policies should help women to have the desired number of children.

### 3 Mix of tools

France has a rather generous and diversified family benefit system. Public expenditure for families is quite high. According to Eurostat data, it was 2.8 per cent of the GDP in 2003, which is higher than the EU-25 average (2.1%), behind only Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Luxemburg and Germany. However, the Eurostat nomenclature does not take into account all benefits for families (such as the tax reduction system called quotient familial described below or early
schooling). Including fiscal support for families, the state contribution is estimated to be 3.6 per cent of the GDP. Hence, France may be seen as the European country with the most substantial family policy (Adema and Ladaique 2005).

The originality of French family policy is that it mixes pro-birth objectives and objectives of family assistance (Hantrais and Letablier 1996). This compromise between promoting families versus promoting the work-family balance and women’s employment has repercussions for the types of measures offered to families (see Appendix for a summary of legal family benefits).

3.1 Measures encouraging women’s employment

Since the 1970s, a whole range of facilities, services and allowances linked with working status have accompanied increasing female participation in the labour force. First, the early socialisation of children through crèches and écoles maternelles or nursery schools has been encouraged. The number of crèches has increased since 1983. Crèche fees are means-tested and parents may also claim tax deductions. Unlike in northern European countries, this type of care is available immediately after the end of maternity leave, i.e. from when the baby is two or three months old, and the hours covered are extensive: on weekdays from 7:00-8:00 to 18:00-19:00. The école maternelle is a specifically French institution created in 1881 and enlarged during the 1970s and 1980s, during which period the number of places doubled. This service is available from the age of two; it is free of charge and of high quality. The stated objective of this form of early collective socialisation is not to allow women to combine motherhood and work but to ensure equal opportunities for all children, whatever their social class, in accordance with the French Republican secular tradition. Nevertheless, in practice, this service greatly helps mothers to reconcile family and work. The hours covered by the service are long: School hours are from 8:30 to 16:30 for children aged 3 to 12 and care facilities are provided before and after school hours from 7:00 to 8:30 and from 16:30 to 18:00-19:00. 17 per cent of all children aged two to six use these facilities after school. Moreover, care facilities and school meals are available during lunch time. Wednesday is a school-free day, but ‘leisure centres’ take over. In 2002, 37 per cent of all children aged two were enrolled and 97 per cent at age three, despite the fact that this schooling is not compulsory (Blanpain 2006).

France dedicates only one quarter of its family expenditure to in-kind benefits and the share of cash benefit has grown over the years. As child care facilities are costly and in order to create employment, private systems that are more individualised and flexible have been developed. Subsidised childminders, allowances and tax deductions have become new tools of family policy. Since 1980, an allowance paid to families with children under three (and then six) years old who are cared for at the home of a registered childminder has significantly
reduced child care costs. In 1986, another allowance was introduced for families
who employ nannies to look after their children in the family home. Moreover,
parents could deduct half of the cost incurred from their income tax. Some 70 per
cent of the total cost of child care may be covered (Fagnani 1998). Moreover,
families who employ someone to look after their children after school or on
Wednesdays may claim tax deductions with the chèque emploi service universel,
a pre-financed voucher to simplify formalities when employing home help
services. Finally, according to a recent survey on child care, on weekdays, 61 per
cent of all children under three years of age are cared for mainly by their parents,
21 per cent by subsidised childminders, 10 per cent in a crèche, seven per cent by
their grandparents or family and one per cent by nannies at home (Blanpain 2006;
Ruault and Daniel 2003).

In 1994, family policy came to a crossroad. The family policy reform, which
had been implemented in a context of high unemployment, had the opposite
intention of creating incentives to leave the labour force. The allocation parentale
d‘éducation (APE) was designed to allow one of the parents (in practice, mothers)
to devote themselves entirely to bringing up the newborn child until its third
birthday. For a period of three years after a birth of order 3 or more, parents who
stop working to raise their youngest child receive a fixed amount of money.
Parents who decide to work part-time receive a partial allocation. This allocation
has existed since 1985, but before 1994 it was available only after the third child.
In 1994, it was made available to parents of a second child. The goal was mainly
to reduce public expenditure. This reform had a great impact on the number of
recipients, which tripled in three years, to about 500,000 (of whom only 2 per cent
are fathers). In 2004, all existing infancy benefits were unified into a single one:
the prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant (PAJE). The APE was replaced by the
complément libre choix d’activité of the prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant
(PAJE) and was made available for the first child for six months after birth.¹ Even
if the take-up rate has not reached the level of northern countries, it is quite high:
10 per cent after a first birth, 30 per cent for second births and 39 per cent for
births of order 3 and over (Mahieu 2005). The take-up rate for part-time parental
leave is rather low: five per cent, 20 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. The
amount of this leave benefit is much lower than the minimum wage and is not
proportional to the income gained before birth (see Appendix). A debate arose
regarding the need to encourage high-income men and women to take the leave
and to reduce its negative effect on the career path. So, since 2006, parents of at
least three children have been able to choose between a one-year leave with a
higher benefit and a three-year leave with lower benefit.

¹ Both eligibility criteria and benefits remained unchanged, except for mothers of a first child.
3.2 Measures encouraging large families

Besides the aim to reduce tensions between work and family, several measures have been designed to reduce the cost of children since the end of World War Two. As in southern countries, these allowances are directed specifically towards families with three or more children (Breton and Prioux 2005). They vary with the age of the children. Universal family benefits are available, but in France they are only granted from the second child onwards and are progressive. For instance, the allowances paid for families that have three children are 2.3 times higher than those for families that have two children, and 3.6 times higher for families with four children. Several means-tested allowances are also available, e.g. the core allowance of PAJE for families that have at least one child under three. The complement familial is substituted for these allowances for families that have at least three children when the youngest reaches the age of three. A means-tested allowance is granted to single mothers until the youngest child reaches the age of three. On the other hand, a special tax rule called quotient familial favours families that have at least three children and pay tax. The French tax system is not individual-based but family-based and from the third child onwards each additional child counts as one tax unit (instead of one half), which leads to significant tax deductions. This is a purely pro-birth measure.2

3.3 A new contributor: the employers

Some companies’ practices may also be considered as ‘family policies’. In France, government family policies and the Labour Law entitle employees to certain basic rights—such as maternity or paternity leave, parental leave, three days of leave to care for a sick child each month—to help them reconcile work and family life. These rights are reinforced in some cases by collective labour agreements or by the civil-service statutes. Recently, employers have been encouraged to implement their own family-friendly policies, either directly or via a works council. For instance, the ‘family tax credit’ was introduced on 1 January 2004 with the aim of encouraging companies to implement child care provisions. This tax credit represents 25 per cent of the amounts spent, up to a maximum of €500,000 per year and employer, for the creation of day care centres for employees’ children aged under three, training employees on parental leave, supplementary payments for paternity, maternity, parental or sick child leave and

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2 Income tax is not paid by individuals but by households. The members of the household sum their incomes and the tax rate is computed from the ratio of the total income to the number of tax units (parts). For a married couple, each spouse counts as one unit, the first and second children as half a unit and all subsequent children as one full unit each. Unmarried couples cannot merge their incomes and tax units; the children living with the couple must be attributed to one of the two partners. Lone parents (but not unmarried couples) are allowed to count each child as one full unit.
payment of employees’ exceptional child care expenses due to unforeseeable work commitments outside normal working hours. However, in 2005, a year after the introduction of the ‘family tax credit’, only one per cent of all establishments that had not yet offered day care places were planning to do so in the future (Lefèvre et al. 2007).

Another measure implemented recently to develop employers’ participation is related to the creation of the chèque emploi service universel. Companies are encouraged to finance these on behalf of their staff in whole or in part and are, as a result, granted payroll and other tax reductions.

According to a recent study on French employers’ practices directed towards families, employers’ family-friendly policies most often take the form of financial support rather than benefits in kind (Lefèvre et al. 2007). Occasional benefits and services are much more common than those granted on a regular basis. Corporate day care centres are still very rare, for example, despite the fact that employers attach importance to the provision of child care. Some employers nonetheless offer a certain degree of flexibility in working hours or agree to informal arrangements, often on a case-by-case basis. A wide range of benefits is offered by public-sector companies and the civil service, often targeting families with children. In the private sector, the measures implemented, if any, mainly concern financial support and less family-oriented benefits such as insurance fund contributions.

### 3.4 Other social policy measures

Other social policy measures, which do not directly target ‘family’ or ‘maternity’ risks, create transfers for households according to their composition. For instance, the situation of the family has been taken into account in housing policies since 1948 (Aglietta et al. 2002). Some basic welfare benefits also take into account the number of children.

French family policy is a mix of many tools: No fewer than 28 different measures are aimed at the family (Aglietta et al. 2002; Godet and Sullerot 2005; Algava and Bressé 2005). It combines ‘horizontal’ redistribution towards families that have the same income (from people living alone or with no children to families in order to ‘compensate’ for the cost of childrearing and let them have the same standard of living) with ‘vertical’ redistribution aiming at diminishing social differences (Bechtel et al. 2005a).

The number and the complexity of family policy measures make an evaluation almost impossible, because the specific effect of each measure is mixed with other effects. All in all, the government adapts policy measures or creates new ones (each year, a specific announcement is made at the Conference de la famille). French family policy gives the impression that the state helps all families, irrespective of their way of life and their standard of living. In 1997, the then socialist government decided to introduce means-test family allowances. In
practice, this involved only 2 per cent of households in the highest income bracket, but there was wide opposition to this measure on the grounds that the allowances had to remain universal. In 1998, the government made the allowances universal again, but restricted the advantage gained from the Quotient familial. In purely financial terms, the two measures were very similar, but the latter was well received, because it limited an income tax reduction, while the former had been refused, because it went against the dogma of universal family allowances.

However, in the long run, the net level of allowances has fallen over the years, due to inflation and increasing expenditure on the elderly (Thélot and Villac 1998), despite the fact that in recent years new measures were implemented which compensate for this decline (Bechtel et al. 2005b). The pro.birth objective is weaker but still present. Unlike in Scandinavian countries, the objective of gender equality is rather low on the agenda. Family policy is only directed towards mothers, because reconciling work and family is women’s business (Commaille et al. 2002). The goal of gender equality within the family was not raised until very recently. The ‘socialist’ population policy in 1997-2002 aimed to introduce a ‘feminist’ family policy that would help both parents to reconcile work and family. This took the form of statutory paternal child care leave in 2002. This measure is rather timid (its maximum duration is 11 days) but has been a success: Right from the beginning, 60 per cent of all fathers took this leave (Bauer and Penet 2005).

4 Impact of family policy

4.1 Effect of family policies on fertility

Family benefits reduce the cost of having children; hence, one may expect a positive relationship between family policy and fertility. Measuring the impact on fertility is complex and very sensitive to the method and data used (Hoem 2008). One can measure the short-term effects of policies, whereas long-term trends are more difficult to evaluate. These long-term trends rather depend on a favourable context for families than on specific family policies. Studies generally find that direct cash benefits are positively related to fertility but that the effect appears to be small (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Ekert-Jaffé 1986). For instance, French family benefits are estimated to increase fertility by 0.2 children per woman on average (Blanchet and Ekert-Jaffé 1994). The targeting of family allowances on families with three or more children also has a clear effect on the progression to third births and the timing of births in France (Ekert-Jaffé et al. 2002; Breton and Prioux 2005), but the effect is small. Moreover, family policies tend to erase the fertility differential by social class (Ekert-Jaffé et al. 2002).
The changes in the rules concerning the APE, particularly its extension to parents of two children in 1994, may be viewed as a sort of ‘natural experiment’ regarding the impact such an allowance has on fertility and women’s professional activity. The direct impact on fertility has been very limited, while the effect on female participation in the labour force has been large. Estimated by the ‘difference in difference’ method, estimates give the following orders of magnitude, for some 200,000 women with a full-time allowance: Around 100,000 women would have stopped working in any case after the birth of their second child, even without the APE, and the annual number of births may have increased by some 12,000 because of the change in behaviour due to the APE (Piketty 2005), i.e. 1.6 per cent of yearly births. This effect is smaller than current fluctuations from one year to another. Using a micro-simulation model, Laroque and Salanié (2004) also conclude that financial incentives play a rather modest role in fertility decisions. They estimate that the extension of the APE to second births has caused parity 2 births to increase by 11 per cent, but has caused parity 3 births to fall by around three per cent. However, their model does not take into account timing effects and probably overestimates the impact in the long run. Between 1994 and 2000, the number of births in France increased by 63,000, from 711,000 to 774,000, and the change in the APE is surely not the cause of such a large change.

4.2 Impact of the 1994 child care allowance reform on participation in the labour force

The 1994 reform led to a large decline in young mothers’ participation in the labour force. Participation on the labour market has decreased rapidly for mothers of two children who have at least one child under three (within three years, the activity rate fell from 69 per cent in 1994 to 54 per cent in 1997, i.e. the level observed 15 years earlier). It is estimated that this leave has been an incentive to withdraw from the labour force for at least 112,000 women per year (AfS 1998; Piketty 2005). Nevertheless, on average, job breaks are relatively short. Half of all parity 1 mothers who stop working return after 18 months and half of all mothers of parity 2 or 3 do so after two years. Mothers who had their first child after 1994, and were not directly affected by the APE reform, tend to stop for shorter periods than older women. Those who had a third child after 1994, equally unaffected by the change, were more likely than preceding cohorts to return to work when the APE ceased, or even earlier. Conversely, among those who had their second child after 1994, the cohort trend of a rapid return to work was neutralised by the change in family policy. Some of these mothers now wait until the child is three (end of APE and enrolment in nursery school) before returning to work. After three years, they are now more likely to return than the preceding cohorts (Pailhé and Solaz 2006).
Less educated women, who have insecure jobs, poor working conditions or unfavourable work schedules are more likely to leave the labour force after the birth of a child. A combination of factors affects the decision to leave the labour force. Although women’s wages, and to a lesser degree those of their partners, play a role, the worsening of working conditions and employment opportunities has greatly contributed to the success of the 1994 child care allowance reform (Marc 2004). Parental leave is taken under duress for a large share of women: one half of all mothers who took paid parental leave stated that they would have preferred to keep on working if their working conditions had been different or if child care had been available (Méda et al. 2003).

The concern about the risk of greater difficulties in finding work after this period of three years (Bonnet and Labbé 1999) has not been borne out. Women who take parental leave are at risk of unemployment when they return to the labour market because of their low level of education, not because of their having taken parental leave. Nevertheless, ceteris paribus, women who return to work after parental leave find less qualified jobs than women who did not take such a leave (Algava and Bressé 2005).

5 Conclusion

The continuing increase in the French TFR since 1995 may not be simply related to one specific policy measure. Fertility rates at ages below 25 are currently stable, which could be related to the stable age at the end of studies since 1995 (Durier 2006), while fertility rates at higher ages are still increasing at the same pace. In any case, since 1975, the overall level of fertility has been almost stable (Toulemon et al. 2008). The French family policy, by contrast, changes continually. On the one hand, most measures are price-indexed, so their weight in the GNP is structurally decreasing; on the other hand, new measures are introduced yearly, and the Conference de la famille is organised explicitly to emphasise the fact that the state wants to help the families by showcasing new measures that are implemented (Bechtel et al. 2005b). This long-lasting ‘mix of tools’ is very likely related to the current high fertility in France, but it is very difficult to quantify its overall effect on fertility.

References


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Appendix

Table A1: Legal family benefits in France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Child age eligibility conditions</th>
<th>Means-tested</th>
<th>General rules</th>
<th>2006 monthly individual amount</th>
<th>Total 2005 amount (in million €)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family allowance (allocations familiales)</td>
<td>0 to 20</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Only dependent children are taken into account: no benefit when the child earns a minimum personal income. Lump-sum benefit. No benefit for the first child. Extra benefit for children aged over 11 and over 16.</td>
<td>117 € for two children, 150 € per additional child</td>
<td>11,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic allocation</td>
<td>7th month of pregnancy to age 3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>First pillar of the prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant (PAJE). Includes a one-time payment at the 7th month of pregnancy and a monthly allowance from birth until the 3rd birthday of the child. Only 10 per cent of all families are excluded by the means test.</td>
<td>841 € (one-time payment), 186 € (monthly allowance)</td>
<td>3,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery benefit (complément de libre choix du mode de garde)</td>
<td>0 to 6</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Second pillar of the prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant. Compensation for parents who entrust their children to nurses, either at home or at the nurse’s home. The benefit is paid per child for out-of-home nursery and per family for at-home nursery. The amount of the benefit decreases with family income (three thresholds) and is half for children aged 3 to 6.</td>
<td>From 553 € to 763 € for out-of-home nursery; from 421 € to 632 € for at-home nursery (children aged under 3)</td>
<td>3,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental leave benefit (complément de libre choix d’activité)</td>
<td>0 to 1 or 0 to 3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Third pillar of the prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant. Allowance for parents who partially or totally stop working to look after their children of parity 2 and over. For parity 3 and over, parents may choose between a one-year high amount benefit or a three-year low amount benefit. Adjusted for parents who change from a full-time to a part-time job. Recipients of basic allowance get a reduced amount of benefit. Subject to conditions on past occupation.</td>
<td>1 year: 578 € (with basic allocation) 746 € (without)</td>
<td>2,739</td>
</tr>
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### Table A1 (continued)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>General rules</th>
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<th>Total 2005 amount (in million €)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary family benefit (complément familial)</td>
<td>0 to 20</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Supplementary allowance for families with three children or more. Cannot be received concurrently with basic allocation. Around 20 per cent of all families are excluded by the means test.</td>
<td>153 €</td>
<td>1,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New school year benefit (allocation de rentrée scolaire)</td>
<td>6 to 17</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>One-time allowance paid at the start of the new school year to families for each child going to school. Around 50 per cent of all families are excluded by the means test.</td>
<td>268 €</td>
<td>1,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familial support benefit (allocation de soutien familial)</td>
<td>0 to 20</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Allowance for persons who take care of a child when one parent or both parents are missing. In the case of a divorced parent, it serves as an advance on maintenance allowance.</td>
<td>82 € (one missing parent), 110 € (two missing parents)</td>
<td>1,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lone-parent benefit (allocation de parent isolé)</td>
<td>0 to 3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Minimum income, e.g. differential allowance: the amount is calculated as the difference between the maximum amount of this lone parent benefit and all the personal incomes of the single parent.</td>
<td>736 € for 1 child, 184 € for each additional child (maximum amount)</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternal leave benefit (congé de paternité)</td>
<td>Birth</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Wage compensation for fathers (with an income ceiling) who take a maximum of 11 days leave at the birth of a child.</td>
<td>Average daily wage, with an upper limit of 69 € a day</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Caussat (2006).