

Eli Franco

Towards a Reconstruction of the Spitzer Manuscript – The Dialectical Portion*

In 2000, I completed a DFG (German Research Council) research project aimed at editing the fragments of the so-called Spitzer Manuscript (= SHT 810). In a follow-up project, again funded by the DFG, I undertook the task of partially reconstructing and interpreting the fragments, concentrating on the cluster of fragments that represent the last part of the manuscript, from fol. 369¹ up to fol. 414. This portion can be divided into two parts, of which the first part contains a discussion of Abhidharma topics.² I have already attempted to reconstruct the beginning of this discussion that extends from folio 369 to 376 in a contribution to the Minoru Hara Felicitation Volume.³ The topics dealt with are Abhidharma topics that were controversial among the various schools of Conservative Buddhism. In the initial part of the discussion the author considers the question of whether the four noble truths are completely understood gradually or at once and argues for the former alternative (*anupūrvābhisamaya*). In the subsequent chapter he concerns himself with another well-known question, namely, whether consciousness is luminous by nature (*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*). A third chapter addresses a less familiar topic, namely, whether the Buddha is part of the *saṅgha* or, perhaps, whether the Buddha is perceived through the *saṅgha*. The fourth and fifth chapters treat the topics of *cittaviprayukta/samprayukta-jñāna* and the Kāśyapīya theory of *karman*, respectively.⁴ The discussion on the Abhidharma topics continues up to fol. *383r3

* I am deeply indebted to Karin Preisendanz for her thoughtful and accurate comments.

¹ This folio formed the starting-point for the reconstruction because its transcript is the first item in Moritz Spitzer's Nachlass. — One of my main purposes in editing the Spitzer Manuscript was to rescue from oblivion Spitzer's precious transcriptions of fragments that were lost during World War II; cf. Franco 2000a.

² It is not clear where this discussion begins; most of the manuscript may have treated Abhidharma and related topics.

³ Cf. Franco 2000b.

⁴ These were not discussed in the above-mentioned paper (n. 3).

(cf. p. 201). From this point onwards until the end of the manuscript I have identified a portion devoted to dialectics.⁵ This portion consisted, I believe, of at least three or four chapters, and it is my purpose in this paper to attempt a partial reconstruction and interpretation of it.

Unfortunately, the beginning of the discussion, that is, most of the first two lines (fol. *383r3-v1), is lost, and thus the initial formulation of the positions of the opponent and the proponent is missing. Two terms that recur throughout the discussion are present already in the first lines: *asmatpakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*, but there is no clue as to what the thesis and the antithesis consisted in. A third term that also occurs very frequently is *vipakṣa*, which I consider to refer here to a counter-example,⁶ although a concrete counter-example has not been preserved in the fragments. There is only a single fragment among those that belong to the present context, though not the immediate context, from which a concrete thesis could perhaps be derived, namely, frg. 110 (= fol. *389(?); cf. p. 208): lines 110r3 and 110v1 mention *sarvvamastitvābhāva*.⁷ Because this seems to be the opponent's position one could assume that the proponent's thesis is that everything exists (*sarvam asti*). However, although such an interpretation can not be ruled out completely, I think that it is improbable. Although a relatively large number of fragments of this discussion remains, the topics of the thesis, antithesis and counter-example are never even alluded to, and one would expect their for-

⁵ One can clearly discern the conclusion of the Kāśyapīya chapter on the recto of *383 and the introduction of a new topic on the verso; the small fragment on the right can be allocated to the same leaf because the Kāśyapīya theory of *karman* is discussed on one side and the new topic on the other. The original distance on the leaf between the text of the two fragments must have been considerable because on the verso the missing portion in line 3 covered text-sections no. 4 and 5; only the initial word *nimitta* remains of section no. 4, and of no. 5 only the numeral.

⁶ It is not entirely clear to me what *vipakṣa* precisely means in this context. Most probably it was not used in the sense established later on in the framework of the *trairūpya* theory (note also that the term *sapakṣa* never occurs) even though this theory is known already to the author of the Tarkasāstra (TŚ). For the meaning of counter-example cf. *pw* s.v.

⁷ Note that the reading is uncertain and that one should perhaps read *sarvvamastitvābhāva*; cf. 110r3: |||[*pra*]*tipakṣābhāvā*<*t*> [*sa*]*rv(v)amas(t)itv[ā]bhāvah kiṃ prāp(t)aṃ [p](rat?)i(pakṣa?)*, 110v1: |||[*prati?pa*]*kṣābhāvā*<*t*> *sa(r)v-v[ā]st(i)tvābh(ā)va[h] k(i?)n vijānīmah ya[sya]* + +. For a discussion of this fragment cf. below, p. 181f.

mulation in this case. I suggest, therefore, that the content of the thesis and counter-thesis was indeed not formulated. In other words, what the opponent in fol. *383v ff. claims is that a thesis is automatically invalidated by the very existence of its antithesis. If this suggestion is accepted, then it may be reasonably assumed that the discussion in the Spitzer fragments runs along similar lines as those preserved in chapter 1 of the Tarkaśāstra (TŚ).

Before continuing with the discussion itself, I would like to point out a very peculiar stylistic characteristic that is conspicuous both in the Spitzer fragments and in ch. 1 of the TŚ, namely, the use of indirect speech. Of course, indirect speech is not unheard of in Classical Sanskrit – Speijer even gives a remarkable example from Kālidāsa where *iti* is used to conclude indirect speech⁸ –, but it is quite rare, and not only in philosophical texts. It is to Tucci's credit that he did not shrink from keeping the indirect mode in his retranslation of the TŚ into Sanskrit:⁹

TŚ 3.10-11: *mama vacanam anyāyyam*¹⁰ *iti ced bhavatocyate, tato bhavān ajñā iti spaṣṭam.*

TŚ 4.15-16: *tasmān mama vacanam anyāyyam iti ced bhavatocyate tad ayuktam.*

TŚ 5.5-6: *yad bhavatoktaṃ mama vacanam anyāyyam iti tal lokaviruddham.*

Similarly, in the Spitzer fragments *asmāt* always refers to the proponent's position, even in statements of the opponent, and even when such statements are concluded with *iti*:

Fol. *383v2 (without *iti*): ... *pratipakṣasadbhāve 'smātpakṣānupapattir iṣṭā.*

Fol. *385v1 (with *iti*): *tatra yad iṣṭam asmāt*¹¹ *pakṣā*<*ā*>*bhāvānt*¹² *svapakṣā-siddh[i]r iti tan [n](a).*

⁸ Cf. Speijer 1886: 383, § 494, Rem. 2: “Çāk. I *jñāsyasi kiyaḥ bhujō me rakṣati maurvīkiṇāṅka itī* (you will know how mighty my arm is to protect, etc.).”

⁹ Cf. Tucci 1929b.

¹⁰ What Tucci translates as *nyāyya* and *anyāyya* may have well corresponded to constructions with *(an)upapatti*, as found in the Spitzer fragments.

¹¹ Throughout the fragments mentioned in the present paper one has to read *asmāt* instead of *asmāt*.

¹² Read *-bhāvāt*.

Fol. *385v2 (without *iti*, but *iti* being implied): *tasmāt prāg asmātpakṣābhāvan ta[n n](a)*.

Fol. *385v2: *tatra yad iṣṭam virodhād asmatpakṣābhāva iti tan na*.

The first chapter of the TŚ has been hitherto almost completely ignored. I am not aware of any publication touching upon this chapter since Tucci published his translation in 1929,¹³ and Tucci himself did not pay much attention to it.¹⁴ The reason for this neglect may be that the chapter upholds a position that is seemingly quite absurd. The text begins abruptly as follows (3.3-5): “If you think that our statement is inappropriate, your statement too is inappropriate. If your statement is inappropriate, then our statement is appropriate.”¹⁵ Just as in the Spitzer fragments, it is never specified which concrete statement is appropriate and which is not. Indeed, this does not seem to matter. Rather, the author may be concerned here with the relationship between statements as such: any two statements that stand in contradiction or opposition to each other would do. The author of the TŚ argues that his statement is appropriate just because it is a statement. E.g. 4.11-12: “Furthermore, if our statement [would be] inappropriate, it would not be a statement at all. If it is a statement, it is not at all inappropriate.”¹⁶ Similarly, he argues that his statement is appropriate just because it exists: “If there is a statement / if the statement exists, then it is known [to be] appropriate.”¹⁷ Even inappropriate statements are said to be intrinsically (*svataḥ*) appropriate: “Furthermore, what is inappropriate is appropriate by itself (*svataḥ*). Therefore, what is inappropriate does not exist.”¹⁸ In the same manner the author argues:

¹³ Cf. Tucci 1929b.

¹⁴ He mentions it neither in Tucci 1929a nor in the introduction to the translation in Tucci 1929b. Basically he devotes only a single sentence to this chapter (notes p. 1): “This chapter contains an example of the illogical refutation, *anyāyakhāṇḍana* or *ayuktakhāṇḍana* or *-dūṣaṇa* ... The *dūṣaṇa* is chiefly based on sophistical arguments, the non-validity of which can be easily recognized. It may be considered as an exemplification of *chala* ...”

¹⁵ (*śāstram āha*) *bhavān manyate 'smadvacanam anyāyyam iti ced bhavato 'pi vacanam anyāyyam. yadi bhavadvacanam anyāyyam, tadāsmadvacanam nyāyyam.*

¹⁶ *kiṃ cāsmadvacanam anyāyyam iti ced, vacanam eva na bhavet. vacanañ cen naivānyāyyam.* Cf. also TŚ, p. 5.16-17, etc.

¹⁷ TŚ, p. 4.24: *yadi vacanam asti tadā nyāyyam iti jñāyate.*

¹⁸ TŚ, p. 3.5-6: *kiṃ ca yad anyāyyam tad etat svato nyāyyam, tasmād yad anyāyyam tan nāsti.*

What is inappropriate does not appear. Is a statement different or not different from the absence of appropriateness? If it is not different, the statement too is absent. Thus, how could you say that my statement is inappropriate? If it is different, then the statement is appropriate.¹⁹ Thus, how could you say that my statement is inappropriate?²⁰

One could elaborate further, but the above suffices to make the argument clear. Now, whoever the author of chapter I of the TŚ may have been, his stand seems to appear as that of an opponent in the Spitzer fragments. Of course, I do not intend to imply a direct connection and claim that the author of the fragments knew the TŚ. However, the opponent in the Spitzer fragments clearly argues along lines similar to those of the proponent in the TŚ.

The discussion in the fragments is quite lengthy and contained at least twenty-two steps presented as corresponding text-sections. In fact, probably thirty-seven or more steps are enumerated in the manuscript. It is to be noted, however, that this enumeration is continuous for *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta*; up to step six *pūrvapakṣa* statements seem to be numbered, from step seven onwards *siddhānta* statements.

Fol. *383v (p. 201)

[1] The purport of the first line is not clear to me. In the second line the opponent's position is referred to, namely, if the counter-position exists, it is desired/maintained that our position is inappropriate²¹ (presumably because it is contradicted by the counter-position). As mentioned above, although the past participle *iṣṭā* must have referred to the opponent as its logical subject, the pronoun *asmad* refers to the *siddhāntin* (*pratipakṣasadbhāve 'smatpakṣānupapattir iṣṭā*).

Text-section [2] is largely missing. Working backwards from section [3], I assume that [2] must have contained a thesis (*pratiṣṭhā*), formulated by the proponent, to the effect that the opponent's position is inap-

¹⁹ That is, presumably, because it is different from absence of appropriateness it is identical with presence of appropriateness.

²⁰ TŚ, p. 3.11-12: *yad anyāyyaṃ tan nirābhāsam. vacanam nyāyābhāvād bhinnam abhinnaṃ vā? abhinnaṃ ced vacanam api nāstīti mama vacanam anyāyyam iti bhavatā katham ucyate? atha bhinnam, tato vacanam nyāyyam iti mama vacanam anyāyyam iti katham bhavatocyate?*

²¹ As mentioned above (n. 10), I assume that *upapatti* and related forms are used in the same meaning as **nyāyya* and related forms in the TŚ.

propriate. The opponent must have replied that this thesis leads to a consequence that is unacceptable to the proponent.

[3] If (the consequence pointed out in [2]) is not desired/maintained (by the proponent), then the initial position (of the proponent) is abandoned (*atha neṣṭam seyaṃ pratijñāhāniḥ*).

Text-sections [4] and [5] are not preserved.

Fol. 384r (p. 202)

[6] (If both our position and the counter-position exist, the statement of the reason²² for either one) is not conclusive. Because there is a contradiction (with the counter-position, our position) is inappropriate (*anaikāntikaṃ khalv a[pi] + + + + .. virodhād anupapa(tt)[i](h)*).

[7] If both our position and the counter-position have real existence (*(asmat)pakṣapratipakṣasadbhāve*) (connected with a contradiction), the counter-example with respect to our position is inappropriate. How is it (therefore known that our position) is (in)appropriate? The same reason applies indeed also to the counter-example with respect to our position.

[8] Because (both positions are) connected with a contradiction (*(viro)[dha]yuktatvāt khalv apy*) the counter-example with respect to our position (is equally connected with a contradiction and therefore inappropriate; thus) “Surely, sir, you have become someone who does what he dislikes!” (*nanu bhavāṃ yad<d>veṣī tatkārī samvṛtta iti*). – The opponent wishes to establish the existence of his position, but with the present argument the inappropriateness of his own position and example is established.

[9] An inadmissible consequence occurs with regard to the counter-example with respect to our position (*prasaṅgaḥ khalv asmatpakṣavi-pak(ṣ)e p[ra]saktah*).

Fol. 384v (p. 203)

[10] Similarity is said to be the proving factor²³ and for us there is a (proving) similarity to (our) position, but according to you it is not

²² The word *anaikāntika* often qualifies *hetu*; however, since *hetu* is masculine, *anaikāntikaṃ* in fol. 384r1 may have qualified a neuter noun such as *hetuvacana*.

²³ On proof by means of similarity and dissimilarity cf. Upāyahṛdaya (UH) chapter 4, esp. p. 26.7f: *eṣāṃ viṃśatividhānām [praśnottarānām] sāro dvividhaḥ*.

desired/maintained that your own position is inappropriate due to the (ensuing) contradiction (*sādharmyaṅ khalv api sādhamkam abhidhīyate asti ca no pakṣasādharmm(y)an na ca te virodhāt svapakṣānupapattir i[ṣ]t[ā]*).

[11] And when there is (no condition/cause, **nimitta*), there is no result/nothing conditioned (*naimittika*). And according to you the counter-example with respect to our position is not inappropriate (i.e., the condition, *nimitta*, to declare our position to be inappropriate, the appropriateness of the counter-example with respect to our position,²⁴ is not absent[?]). Therefore, our position too is not inappropriate (inasmuch as according to us it is not the case that there is no appropriateness of the counter-example with respect to your position [i.e., the condition is not absent] and therefore not the case that there is no inappropriateness of your position [i.e., the conditioned is not absent][?]) ((*nimittā?*)*bhāvāc ca naimittik[ābhā?]vo bhavati* ◊ *na ca te 'smatpakṣavipakṣānupa[pa](t-tir asti tasmā?)* [*d a*]*smātpakṣānupapattir api nāst(i)*).

[13] (=12?)²⁵ [Our position disproves the other position but not vice versa(?)]

[13] Because of the similarity as regards the contradiction (*virodhasādharmyād*)²⁶ it is not established (that both are incorrect / do not exist[?]).

vaidharmyaṅ sādhamryaṅ ca. sajātīyatvāt sādhamryaṅ vijātīyatvād vaidharmyam. arthasya hi tatsamāśrayatvāt te viṃśatidharmān vyāpnuvataḥ (sic! read vyāpnutaḥ). kiṃ sādhamryam. yathā kleśakṣayo nirābhāsa eva, ākāśabhāvo 'pi nirābhāsa iti sādhamryam. kiṃ vaidharmyam. yathā nirvāṇam akṛtakatvān nityaṅ tathā sarve saṃskārāḥ kṛtakatvād anityāḥ. iti vaidharmyam.

²⁴ One could construe a similar argument by assuming that the *vipakṣa* itself, rather than the appropriateness of the *vipakṣa*, is the condition for the inappropriateness of the opponent's position.

²⁵ Either "13" in fol. 384v3 stands for "12" or "13" in 385r1 stands for "14." I assume that the former is the case because otherwise not only "13," but also "14," "15" and "16" on *385r would have to be corrected. Alternatively, one could consider that after turning the leaf the scribe could no longer see the previous number and thus mistakenly repeated it. This would presuppose that the scribe of the present manuscript was not copying the numbers, but inserting them as he went along.

²⁶ If I understand correctly: because both positions are similar inasmuch as they stand in contradiction (to each other). Less probable, but not impossible is an interpretation of the compound as a *samāhāradvandva*: "because of similarity (which proves my statement) and contradiction (which disproves yours)."

Fol. *385r (p. 204)

The pot and the mat (are said to be similar,²⁷ but) by means of the faculty of sight [one observes that] there is a distinction (between them) ((*gha?*)*takaṭay(o?)ś cakṣuṣā tayor vv[i]śe[ṣa]*).

[14] All things in this world stand in contradiction to each other (*sarvvaṃ khalv apīdaṃ parasparaviruddhaṃ*) (but this does not prevent them from existing together at the same time. Therefore, the contradiction of a thesis does not imply that it does not exist). If you say (that all things existing in this world are) not different (from each other) (*atha nānnyan tvayoktaṃ*) (and for this reason they do not contradict each other and exist together, then your thesis is not) appropriate.

[15] (The counter-example does not cause) the inexistence of (our) own position. Indeed, how is it possible to maintain that something does not exist because it is contradicted? For the counter-example consists in a contradiction with our position (not in the destruction of its existence) (*svapakṣābhāvaṃ kh(alv api) ||| (vi)rodhād abhāva iti kutaḥ virodho hy asmatpakṣeṇa vipakṣah*).

[16] It has been said by us (that all things contradict each other[?]). If something different is said by me, both (my position and the counter-position would) not be appropriate. (But because my position is) appropriate (by similarity[?]), there is a contradiction (only) for you (*uktaṃ khalv apy asmābhi .. ||| ktaṃ | yadi cānnyam mayā ||| (u)bhayānupa[pat](t)i[r] |||.. [y]opapatti ||| [ra]s te virodha iti*).

[17] In establishing that our position does not exist you (maintain that it is) different (from your position. Thus, you presuppose that it exists[?]) (*asmātpakṣābhāvopapādāne khalv api bhavān abhipravṛ[tā]m anyas.e/o|||*).

Fol. *385v (p. 205)

([18]) When this (identity between my position and yours[?]) is inappropriate, how is it possible that because both are obtained (my position does not exist[?])? Indeed it is not the case that because one thing does not exist another thing comes about. Thus, what is desired/maintained by you, namely, “because our position does not exist, the own (i.e., the opponent’s) position is established,” is not (appropriate). (*[ta]c cānu-*

²⁷ Perhaps they are similar inasmuch as they are both perceived by means of the faculty of sight.

papa[nnañ kutah ubhayap]rā[p]tatvā[n n]i ||| na khalv apy abhāvād bhāvā[n]taram abhinirvarttate ∅ tatra yad iṣṭam asmātpakṣ<ā>bhāvānt svapakṣāsiddh[i]r²⁸ iti tan [n]. ..|||).

([19]) It is desired/maintained (by you that our position becomes in-existent because of a contradiction). Therefore, it is not correct that our position did not exist before (the contradiction arose).²⁹ (Thus, the previous existence of our thesis) would be appropriate. In this case, what is desired/maintained (by the opponent, namely) “because of a contradiction our (i.e., the proponent’s) position does not exist,” is not (the case) (*r <i>ṣṭā*³⁰ *tasmāt prāg asmātpakṣābhāvan ta[n n]. ||| + papattiḥ syāt tatra yad iṣṭam virodhād asmatpakṣābhāva iti tan na*).

The discussion continues at least up to text-section [22], but could have in fact extended much farther. Two of the fragments which are contained in frame 137 and which I could join digitally seem to belong to the present context, and may bear the numbers 36 and 37. Under the assumption that the numbering is continuous, and allowing for the treatment of four to five text-sections per side in this discussion, this would imply that this combined fragment belongs to ca. fol. *388 (cf. p. 207). Even though the numbers on the leaf are hardly legible and the discussion on identity and difference could have been taken up in a different context as well, the probability that this fragment belongs to the present context remains considerably high. Already in fol. *385r the issue of identity and difference has been raised; the same issue is also apparent in fol. 386v and in other fragments that in my opinion belong to this chapter, notably in frg. 110 (part of fol. *389(?), cf. below, p. 208).

Unfortunately, too little remains of folios 386-*388 to allow for reconstruction of the discussion. One can clearly see, though, that the issue

²⁸ Read *svapakṣāsiddhir*.

²⁹ Note that if my interpretation is correct, *abhāva* would have been used in the neuter here. Alternatively one could read *-ābhāvān* and construe the compound with *prāg*: “Before the inexistence of our position ... (it is established that it was not in-existent[?]).”

³⁰ According to Schwarz – Pfeiffer 1978 the only possible word that ends in *raṣṭa* preceded by a vowel is *niraṣṭa*, which does not seem to make sense here. However, since the leaf is broken just above the *r*, *ri* is a possible reading. In view of the subsequent *prāg* the possibility of *upariṣṭā<t>* suggests itself, but it seems more probable to me that one simply has to read *-r iṣṭā*.

of identity and difference is discussed in relation to that of similarity and dissimilarity, but the details elude me. However, I believe that it is not incidental that chapter I of the TŚ also contains a discussion on the identity and difference of the position and the counter-position. This strengthens my assumption that closely related ideas are presented in both texts. Thus, chapter I of the TŚ probably provides a glimpse of the discussion in the Spitzer fragments. In the following, I translate only the beginning of the discussion in the TŚ on the basis of Tucci's translation (5.18f.):

What has been said by you, namely, that my statement is different (from yours[?]) because it is at variance,³¹ that [will] now be settled/determined after investigating [it] together with you. If someone would voice a different [statement], then a fault would be his. [Conversely] your thesis differs from our thesis. If this [statement] of yours has been voiced, then [a statement] different [from mine] has been voiced. Therefore, it is you who commits a fault. If your object (i.e., the referent of your statement) is different from what is said by us, then the fault of being different is yours, and not mine. If [your statement] is not different, then it is exactly identical with my position. Thus, there is no difference. If it is said that my [statement] is different, this is false. And something different is not different from something different.³² Thus, there is no difference (*ananyatva*). If something different is different from something different, it would not be something different, just as a man who is different from a cow is not a cow. If something is different from [the point of view of] a different thing, then [because the different thing would not be different, it] would be one [with the other thing]. If [it is] one [with it], [it is] not different [from it]. Thus, why is it said [by you that my statement] is different [from yours]? And therefore, this [statement of mine] is appropriate. Thus, relying on an appropriate [statement] I debate with you. Therefore, I say [it] differently. If there would be no difference between the two of us, then there [would be] no debate with you, but I [would] state exactly your object (i.e., the same referent as that of your statement).³³

³¹ Note that the content of this statement was not formulated earlier on in the text.

³² The author seems to treat the qualification "different" as a quality of things. Just as one may say that something blue is not different from another thing which is blue, something different is not different from another thing which is different.

³³ *yad (bhavat)oktaṃ mama vacanam anyad viśaṃvādītīvād iti tad idam idānīṃ bhavatā sārđhaṃ vicārya nirdhāryate. yadi kaścid anyad vadet tadā tasya doṣaḥ syāt. bhidyate bhavataḥ pratiḥjñāsmatpratiḥjñātaḥ. atha tad bhavataḥ svoktam. tadānyad uktam. tasmād bhavān eva doṣam āpadyate. yadi bhavadartha 'smaduktād anyas tadā-*

Before moving on to the next group of fragments, which must belong to the following chapter, I would like to address two more fragments. It seems that the Spitzer Manuscript contained some kind of appendix or a digression belonging to the discussion above because a number of fragments are preserved that must be related to that discussion, but cannot be integrated into it, especially in view of the enumeration found on them. Frg. 110, for instance, where the words *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa* etc., occur very frequently, contains the number 2 on both sides. This number cannot be part of the previous enumeration because “2” already occurs in fol. *383v3. I would, therefore, suggest that the text of frg. 110 came after the above discussion and thus could be assigned to fol. *389(?) (cf. p. 208).

If frg. 110 belongs to fol. *389(?), the reconstruction can be pushed a step further and frgs. 448+99³⁴ assigned to fol. *390(?) (cf. p. 209). In this combined fragment the recto and verso can be recognized by the numbers 4 and 5. Frg. 60 (not reproduced below) may also be taken into consideration; it clearly belongs to the present context and seems to form the right end of a leaf which I cannot further determine.

Concerning the content of the leaves *389(?) and *390(?), in frg. 110r1, text-section 1, the proponent argues against the *pūrvapakṣa* tenet that something exists only because it is not contradicted (*(pratiṣe?)dhāt*³⁵ *kiñcid astīti yad iṣṭam tan naḥ*). In frg. 110r2, text-section 2 or 3, he seems to argue that (the existence of a counter-position does not always invalidate a position. There are untrue or false) counter-positions and the fact that the existence of this (false counter position) is appropriate does not invalidate the truth (*(p)[r](a)tipakṣo 'py astīti na ca tad-bhāvopapattau satyānupapattis*). The third line perhaps presupposes that the opponent's position leads to the absurd consequence that any-

nyatvadoṣo bhavata eva na tu mama. yadi nānyat, tarhi matpakṣatulyam eva, tena nāsty anyatvam. athocyate mamānyad iti tan mīthyā. anyac cānyasmān nānyad ity ananyatvam. yady anyad anyasmād anyat, tato 'nyan na bhavet. yathā manuṣyo gor anyo na gaur bhavati, yady anyad anyasmād anyat, tadā tad ekaṃ bhavet. yady ekaṃ tato nānyat, tat kim ucyate mamānyad iti. ataś caitan nyāyyam iti. ahaṃ nyāyyam avalambya bhavatā vivāde. tasmād anyathāhaṃ vadāmi. yady āvayor bheda eva na syān na tadā bhavatā vivādo 'haṃ tu bhavadartham eva vadāmi.

³⁴ The sign “+” indicates that two fragments could be joined.

³⁵ I conjecture an additional negation, i.e., *apratīṣedhāt* or similar; in view of the preceding discussion one would rather expect *avirodhāt*, but the little stroke before *dhā* is incompatible with *ra* and compatible with *ṣa*.

thing and everything could exist because it lacks a counter-position. If the opponent denies that, i.e., if it is not the case that everything exists because it lacks a counter-position, what is the consequence? (His initial position is abandoned[?]) (*[pra]tipakṣābhāvā<t> [sa]rv(v)amas(t)itvābhāvah kiṃ prāp(t)aṃ [p](rat?)i*).³⁶

In frg. 110v1 this could be further elaborated: if the opponent argues that everything that does not have a (real or true?) counter-position exists, and therefore it is not the case that everything exists, do we then know which position has (such a true/real counter-position) (*(prati?pa)-kṣābhāvā<t> sa(r)vv[ā]st(i)tvābh(ā)va[h] k(i?)n vijānīmah ya[sya]*)? Further (frg. 110v2), a counter-position also has its own counter-position.³⁷ (Thus, the counter-position of the counter-position would annul the counter-position) (*(abh?) [ā]vas tasmā(t) pratipakṣatpratipakṣo 'py asty evam api pratipa(kṣa)*). Consequently (frg. 110v3), the initial position would be established because owing to the absence of the absence there is true existence (*abhāvābhāv<ā>d dhi sadbhāvah*).

In frg. 448+99 (= fol. *390(?)r2), text-section 5, the Siddhāntin concedes that his statement may be false, but probably denies the opponent's thesis nevertheless. Although the arguments are not preserved, the Siddhāntin may well have replied that just as the existence of a position does not imply that it is true, the falsity of a position does not imply that it does not exist. This concession, however, is only provisional (*yadi khalv api = yady api*) and on the verso the Siddhāntin concludes text-section 5 with the statement that what he has said is appropriate (*[ta]smād upapannaṃ yan mayoktaṃ*). In the line previous to this statement the topic of identity and difference is taken up again. It has to be noted that a number of other fragments also preserve discussions involving the pair *anya* and *ananya*, some definitely belonging to other parts of the manuscript, others probably to the present context. One of them is frg. 676 (cf. p. 209) which may even have been part of the present leaf and could be tentatively placed to the left of frg. 448+99. It also contains the number 5, with the result of two “5”s and the same problem as posed by the two “2”s on fol. *389(?). The details, however, remain unclear to me and I cannot determine if the enumeration is perhaps duplicated according to *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta*.

The next chapter in this dialectical portion of the manuscript began, I believe, with an enumeration of the topics relating to debate similar to

³⁶ Read perhaps: *pratiññāhāniḥ*.

³⁷ I tentatively read *pratipakṣapratipakṣo*.

the enumerations at the beginning of the Nyāyasūtra (NS) or in the Carakasamhitā (CS), Vimānasthāna (hereafter Vi) 8.27. Of this enumeration only a small fragment remains (frg. 71a), which I want to assign to fol. *391 or *392 for the reasons indicated below (cf. p. 210). The enumeration may have been preceded by a short introduction praising the merits of debate, similar to the introduction to the Upāyahr̥daya (UH). In frg. 71b, which may have been a part of the recto, I read in line 2 somewhat tentatively *ṣaḍaṅgavide*.³⁸ This could refer to some benefit “for the one who knows the six members [of debate?]”.³⁹

In the next line (frg. 71b3) there is probably a reference to the opposite case, i.e., that of ignorance of the mere convention for the employment of the members of debate (///*samayamātrāpari[jñā](na)*///). Similar statements can be found in UH which contains an eightfold distinction of debate according to its essential elements: “If someone would listen to (i.e., study) this eightfold debate, but would not understand its meaning/purpose, there would be doubt [for him] in respect to all debates. If someone would understand this eightfold matter, he would surely become able to understand all the ‘properties’ of debate.”⁴⁰

Turning to the other side of the leaf, in the first line one can read quite clearly *prayojana* and most probably also *pratijñā*. *prayojana*, it may be reminded, appears in the enumeration of the topics relating to debate in the CS and the NS,⁴¹ in both lists after *saṁśaya*. And indeed what is left of the previous word in this line is at least compatible with the word *saṁśayah*. In the second line of the fragment, two more topics are mentioned: *ananubhāṣā*, which is included according to the NS and the TŚ in the points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), and *kālātīta*, which,

³⁸ Cf. frg. 71b2: ///(*ṣa?*)[*ḍa*]ṅgavide ko bhavaty apa .[*e*]///.

³⁹ The interpretation of “member” as “member of debate” may be too speculative, but it is clear from the other side of the leaf that the context is that of debate. — HV, p. 1*, contains a sixfold division of *vāda*, but there *vāda* is not used in the sense of “debate,” but of “utterance.”

⁴⁰ Cf. UH, p. 4.14-17: *yadi kaścīd etam aṣṭavidham [vādam] śr̥ṇuyād arthan tu tasya nāvagacchet tadā [tasya] sarveṣu vādeṣu saṁśayo bhavet. yadi kaścīd etam aṣṭavidham artham pariḷānīyān niyatam eva sarvavādadharmāvagame samartho bhavet*. The eight elements or properties of debate are (UH, p. 5-12): *dṛṣṭāntaḥ siddhānto vākya-praśaṁsā vākya-doṣaḥ pramāṇaṁ prāptakālavākyaṁ hetvābhāso vācchalam*. Some of these topics are also dealt with in the Spitzer fragments, cf. below p. 210-211.

⁴¹ Cf. also VP 1.

according to the NS and the UH, is one of the *hetvābhāsas*. The proximity to *ananubhāṣā*, however, makes it more probable that *kālātīta* was here included in the *nigrahasthānas*, just as in the CS, Vi 8.57.

After the enumeration each topic must have been shortly defined or explained. The explanation was introduced in a typically Abhidharmic manner with the interrogative *katama*. Again only one quite small fragment (frg. 93, cf. p. 210) from this section is identifiable in which two more topics, *arthāntara* and *apārtha*, are discussed. Fortunately this fragment bears the folio number [3]93. Accordingly, frg. 71 that must have preceded⁴² this discussion because it contained the enumeration of the topics relating to debate, can be assigned to folio *391 or *392; it cannot be placed earlier in the manuscript because, as shown above, the previous chapter must have extended up to ca. fol. *390.

Frg. 117b mentions another *nigrahasthāna*, namely, *pratiññāvīruddha*, and may also belong to the present context, but it seems more probable to me that it belongs to the next chapter.⁴³

It can be assumed with reasonable certainty that three more fragments belong to the same context. In frg. 672a (cf. p. 211) *vādacchala* “deceit in debate”⁴⁴ is mentioned. The CS and the UH distinguish between *vākechala* and *sāmānyacchala*; NS 1.2.11 distinguishes between three types, the two just mentioned and *upacāracchala*. The Spitzer fragments must have contained a somewhat similar division because two small fragments (frgs. 695 and 742, cf. p. 211) mention *vākchala*.

Yet another fragment that could belong to the present context is frg. 156. It is quite large in terms of the Spitzer fragments, and I even succeeded in “pasting” another small fragment (frg. 177) to it (cf. p. 212). Nevertheless the fragment remains obscure to me. On side a it is stated that “therefore, there is no *prakaraṇa*(?) (subject matter?); when there

⁴² It is clear from the divergent size of the *akṣaras* that the two fragments cannot belong to the same leaf.

⁴³ Cp. frg. 117b2: |||(prati)[j]ñāvīruddhaṃ punaḥ yo nityaṃ śabdaṃ .. +||| with TŚ, ch. 3, p. 35.3f.: 3. *pratiññāvīrodhaḥ. hetupratiññāyor vīrodhaḥ pratiññāvīrodha ity ucyate. pravādī prāha. nityaḥ śabdaḥ. kasmāt. sarvasyānityatvāt. ākāśavat. iti sthāpīte 'paraḥ prāha bhavatoḥ sarvam anityaṃ tasmān nityaḥ śabda iti. atha śabdaḥ sarvasminn antarbhavati na vā. sarvasminn antarbhavati cet. sarvasyānityatvāc chabdo 'py anityaḥ. sarvasmin nāntarbhavati cet tadā sarvam ity asiddham. kuta iti cet. śabdasyāsaṅgrahāt. hetuvacane pratiññāhāniḥ. pratiññāvīvacane ca hetuhāniḥ. tasmād bhavato 'rtho 'siddhaḥ. iyaṃ pratiññāvīrodhanīgrahasthānāpattir ucyate.*

⁴⁴ Or perhaps “deceit, debate”

is no *prakaraṇa* there is no debate and when there is no debate [it is not correct to say:] there is [no]⁴⁵ doubt” (/// + .r. + *jyate tasmāt prakaraṇā-bhāvah prakaraṇābhāve kathābh[ā]vah kathābhāve saṃśaya[bh].*///).⁴⁶

Side b, which may well be the recto side of the leaf, begins with what may be the end of a statement which denies the statement that doubt is established (///[d] *uktam siddhah sa(m)śaya ity etan nāsti* 4 || *anavasthānāt** | [c/bh].///). This side ends with the statement that “then there is no doubt; when there is no doubt [it is not correct to say] that there is doubt in respect to sound (namely, whether it is permanent or not) (/// (*asiddhah(?) sa*)[m](*śa*)*yah* ◊ *na tarhi saṃśayah asati saṃśaye śabde saṃśaya ity eta[n n].*///). In the first line one of the typical stylistical characteristics of the text can be observed, namely, the so-called *vārttika*-style, in which the argument is first expressed or captured by means of a single key-word (here the word *anavasthānāt*), and then elaborated upon. The topic of doubt continued to the first line of the subsequent leaf where the stock example of doubt (“Is it a man or a trunk?”) is clearly formulated. Already in line 2 the topic of *pramāṇa* is discussed and we find the remnants of the well-known question how, if everything is established by *pramāṇas*, the *pramāṇas* themselves are established. If they are established by other *pramāṇas*, an infinite regress (*anavasthā*) would result. In line 3 one can observe the alternative explanation, namely, that the *pramāṇas* establish each other, e.g., tradition is established by analogy, analogy (by inference, inference by perception, and perception by tradition).⁴⁷ For these arguments the parallels in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (VV) (e.g., 32, 51⁴⁸) are well known. On side a, which I consider to be the verso, one can discern the opinion that the *pramāṇas* are capable of establishing themselves as well as their objects, just as a lamp is capable of illuminating itself

⁴⁵ I conjecture an additional negation because I consider this statement to represent the position of an opponent who claims that doubt does not exist or that doubt is impossible. Some five centuries later the sceptic philosopher Jayarāsi also argued that doubtful cognitions do not exist; cf. Franco 1994: 132ff.

⁴⁶ It is interesting to note that *prakaraṇa* and *saṃśaya* appear next to each other in the list of *jāti*s in NS 5.1.1; however, *prakaraṇa* does not seem to be used as a *jāti* here.

⁴⁷ If I understand this fragment correctly, line 3 on side b would read: *pratyakṣād anumānam, anumānād aupamyam, aupamyād aitihyam.*

⁴⁸ It has to be noted that this parallel does present completely identical argumentation; in the Spitzer Manuscript each *pramāṇa* seems to be established by a single other *pramāṇa*, whereas in VV 51 each *pramāṇa* is established by the three others.

as well as its object (i.e., one does not need an additional lamp to see a lamp). This argument too is well known from VV 33, NS 2.1.19, etc.⁴⁹

It is customary for the topic of *pramāṇas* to be dealt with in the context of debate, but we cannot automatically assign all such fragments to the present context because the topic of *pramāṇas* was discussed at least twice in the text: once in fols. ca. 133-134 (cf. Franco 2001) and once here in the vicinity of fol. *395 (i.e., before fol. 398 but after fol. 393). (This could be a further indication that the manuscript contained two or more works and was in fact a compilation.) The larger fragments seem to belong to the former passage. If one relies on external criteria such as the height of the fragments and line spacing, only two fragments (frgs. 474 + 63) concerned with *pramāṇas* can be assigned with reasonable certainty to the present context.

The text has certainly recognized (in both passages) the validity of four *pramāṇas*, namely, perception, inference, verbal testimony and analogy or comparison. It is interesting to point out that in terminology it seems to follow the same tradition as that of the CS: the word *aupamyā* appears in three fragments (frgs. 85b2, 132b(1)²⁵⁰ [both not reproduced below], 474b3 and probably also in frg. 63b3 [cf. p. 213]) whereas the word *upamāna* is never mentioned in the Spitzer fragments.⁵¹ Similarly we find the word *aitihya* (frg. 63b3), but not *śabda* in a context where it clearly refers to *śabdapramāṇa*. It is difficult to ascertain whether the order in which the *pramāṇas* were presented and discussed was the same as the one in the CS, that is, with *aitihya* appearing before *aupamyā* (cf. CS, Vi 8.27). A small fragment (frg. 136b5, cf. p. 214) seems to discuss *aupamyā* on one side and *sādhana*, the next topic in the text, on the other. This could indicate the same order as that of the CS, and in this respect the text would differ both from the NS and from the UH which recognize the same four *pramāṇas*, but present and discuss analogy

⁴⁹ For a more detailed discussion of this fragment and its implications for the alleged relationship between Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas, cf. Franco forthcoming.

⁵⁰ Numbers in brackets refer to the sequence, from left to right and top to bottom, of multiple fragments kept in the same glass-frame; the positions on sides a and b are numbered separately. When two numbers are given separated by “/”, the first number indicates the position of the fragment on side a of the frame, the second number its position on side b.

⁵¹ Of course, it is impossible to ascertain whether the UH used *upamāna*, as translated by Tucci, or *aupamyā*.

before verbal testimony.⁵² However, in frg. 63b3 I suggest the reading *(au)pamyād aitihyam* and in frg. 474b *(au)pamyam ai(tihya-)*. This would indicate the opposite order.

Turning to the individual *pramāṇas*, there is one small fragment (frg. 592, cf. p. 214), which could belong to either of the two passages, that seems to mention the terms *avya<pa>deśya* and *(a?)vyabhicārin*. Of course, one is tempted to assume that the fragment refers to two of the characteristics of perception as enumerated in NS 1.1.4. However, a note of caution needs to be added here, not only because the reading is not absolutely certain, but also because the two words are not found next to each other and are not even on the same side of the leaf. Also, this is the only occurrence of these two terms. The compound *vyavasāyātma* does not appear in the extant fragments; the word *vyavasāya* occurs several times but nowhere in apparent relation to perception. The proximity of the words *avyabhicārin* and *acakra*⁵³ indicates that the text used the famous case of a circle of fire as an example for false perception or sensory illusion. Several fragments (notably frgs. 340 and 602, not reproduced below) actually mention *alātacakra*, but I could not determine their place in the text.

Further, there is some probability that the word *indriyārthasannikarṣa* or a similar expression containing the word *indriya* was part of the definition of perception. First, there is a fragment (frg. 132(2) reproduced and discussed in Franco 2001) explaining how the senses are inferred. However, I am quite certain that this fragment belongs to fol. 133 and that the example was used to illustrate inference, i.e., that this fragment was not part of a discussion on perception. The same holds good for two relatively large fragments that deal with comparison and will not be presented here. There is only one fragment that I am quite certain belongs to the present context, namely, frg. 136(3/5) (cf. p. 214; side b must be recto). It is a very small fragment, but crucial for the determination of the structure of this part of the text because it indicates that the discussion on analogy was followed immediately by the discussion on formal proofs in debate.⁵⁴ The latter discussion must

⁵² Cf. NS 1.1.3ff.; cf. also UH, p. 13.3-4: *atha katividhaṃ pramāṇam. caturvidhaṃ pramāṇam. pratyakṣam anumānam upamānam āgamaś celi.*

⁵³ Frg. 592ba probably states that a non-circle, i.e., a firebrand, is determined falsely to be a circle of fire when it is whirled around: *|||acakraṃ tu ca[kkra]|||*.

⁵⁴ At the risk of making an unproven generalisation I would say that the word *gavaya* in philosophical texts is used most commonly, almost exclusively, in the context of comparison. Cf. also Verpoorten 2001.

have formed a new chapter, perhaps the last chapter in the manuscript.

A relatively large number of fragments concerning the topic of proof have been preserved. Mostly they are quite small and hardly anything can be understood from them except that the subject matter concerns the question of whether sound is permanent or impermanent, and that the latter thesis is endorsed because sound is perceptible by means of the senses. However, it is possible to rearrange some of the fragments in their original order in reliance on two parameters, namely, the pagination and the numbers that mark the sections of the discussion. It is fortunate that Spitzer's transcription of fol. 409 is preserved because it is the only fragment that allows us to coordinate folio numbers with numbers of text-sections. Cardinal to the following arrangement is the assumption that the present chapter could not have begun before fol. *397. If my allocation of the fragments preserved of the previous chapter entailing their placement after fol. 393 is accepted, this assumption is reasonable.

fol. no.	section no.	frg. no.
398		136(1/3)
399		136(4/1)
400/401(?)		197
402		147
403		148
404		149+151
405 ⁵⁵		n25(1) ⁵⁶
40(7) = 40*8 ⁵⁷		n25(2)

⁵⁵ Frg. 660 probably also belongs to this leaf.

⁵⁶ Numbers after "n" refer to the corresponding page in Spitzer's Nachlass. If more than one fragment is transcribed on the same page, the fragments are distinguished by numbers in round brackets.

⁵⁷ Spitzer's brackets around the number 7 must indicate that the reading was uncertain. On account of the evidence provided by other leaves belonging to this context, 408 seems a more probable reading to me.

fol. no.	section no.	frg. no.
409	29	n26
410		83
411		842+847
414		618

Relying on frg. n26 that preserves both folio number and section number and assuming ca. three text-sections per leaf in this discussion, one may allocate some fragments that preserve only section numbers as follows:

*406(?)	17	136(5/2)
*407(?)	22	19
40*8(?) ⁵⁸	26	n36
40*8(?)	(2)7(?) ⁵⁹	659
409	29	n26
410(?)	33	128(4/2)
*412(?)	38	770
*413(?)	43	25 ⁶⁰

⁵⁸ The fragments bearing the text-section numbers 26 and (2)7(?) (cf. the next note) probably belong to the same leaf as frg. n25(2), i.e., form the left end of fol. 40(7) = 40*8(?), cf. below.

⁵⁹ The allocation of this fragment and the reading of its section number are only tentative. The section number is uncertain for two reasons. First, what remains of the unit's digit is so little that the reading "7" is far from being definitive; second, only a tiny stroke remains from the ten's digit so that the number may have been 17, 27, 37, etc. "17" can be excluded because it is preserved in frg. 136(5/2), and the sign for "30" would usually, but not always, be placed a bit lower. The assumption of "27" is problematic because sections 28 and 29 would have to be very short in this case, but there is no reason to assume that all sections were of equal length. The occurrence of the word *āśraya* in both fragments, presumably at the end of line 2 and in the middle of line 3, tips the scale in favour of "27," but at the same time nothing seems to speak against the assumption of "47" or "57," etc.

⁶⁰ Frgs. 41, 53 and 142 probably belong to the same leaf as frg. 25.

The above assignment of the fragments is problematic for the following reasons. Frg. n25(1) belongs to fol. 405; therefore frg. 136(5/2) (containing section number 17) would have to belong to fol. *406. Frg. 19 (containing section number 22⁶¹) would therefore have to belong to fol. *407 and the remnant of fol. 40(7) be identified as part of fol. 40*8 (together with frgs. n36 and 659); if the top left part of “7” or “8” would have been missing, it would have been impossible to distinguish between the two numbers. However, the resulting allocation not only goes against Spitzer’s tentative reading of “40(7),” but would also leave very little room for section 28, starting on frg. 659 at the very end of fol. 40*8(?) according to my reconstruction of this leaf, and section 29, which is concluded at the very beginning of fol. 409. If my allocation of frg. 659 and with it the conclusion of section 27 is accepted, less than a line would be left for sections 28 and 29. If my inclusion of frg. 659 in this leaf is rejected owing to the uncertainty of the reading of “27,” about a line each would be available for sections 27, 28 and 29.

If, on the other hand, one accepts Spitzer’s reading of 40(7), together with my allocation of frg. 659 containing the section number 27, then frg. 19 (containing section number 22) would have to belong to fol. *406 and frg. 136(5/2), containing section number 17, to fol. 405. However, Spitzer read the number 405 on frg. n25(1) which does not seem to belong to the same leaf as frg. 136(5/2): frg. 660 seems to belong to the same leaf as frg. n25(1) (in both the topic of *avivaditahetu* is discussed), but cannot belong to the same leaf as frg. 136(5/2) because the line spacing of the two fragments diverges significantly; further, both frgs. 660 and n25(1) seem to have had only two lines of writing whereas frg. 136(5/2) has three lines. Therefore, it seems to me that the identification of 40(7) as 408 is more probable.

I suggest calling the chapter following the one on the topics relating to debate “*sādhana* and *upālabha*,” not in an attempt to reconstruct its putative title, but simply to convey its subject matter. Similar discussions are known from the TŚ (ch. 2), the NS (section 5.1 on *jāti*), the CS (Vi 8.36 on *uttara*), etc. In the following reconstruction I rely especially on the TŚ, which displays the strongest similarity to the Spitzer fragments, because the fragments, albeit numerous, are very difficult to interpret on their own.

The initial proof which recurs throughout the discussion is: *anityaḥ śabdaḥ, aindriyatvād ghaṭādivat*. “Sound is impermanent because it is

⁶¹ The reading “23” is also possible.

perceptible by means of the senses, just like a pot.”⁶² It is interesting to note that the common reason for impermanence in the later period, *kṛtakatva*, never occurs in the fragments, but this absence may well be accidental because so much of the discussion is missing. There is some indication that a reason such as *kṛtakatva* was employed by the author because fol. 398r3-v1 must have contained a definition of, or at least a statement about, a cause (... *kāraṇam u[kta]ṃ*||). Further, the word *praya[tna]* in fol. 403v1 is almost certainly part of a compound such as *prayatnaja*, *prayatnānantarīyaka* or a similar expression. This points to the fact that causality was discussed in this chapter. The word *dakṣiṇa* in fol. 402v2 probably refers to the right horn of a cow (cf. also *yathā na gaur*⁶³ in fol. 403r2). The argument is familiar from other sources and must have run as follows. The opponent interprets the word *hetu* as referring to a cause rather than to a reason (i.e., a material cause rather than an epistemological cause that reveals or makes something known) and argues that if this cause exists before what is to be proved (i.e., before its effect), it would not be a cause of anything and does not prove anything. If it exists after what has to be proved (i.e., after its effect), what is to be proved is already established without it. If the two exist at the same time, they are not in a relation of cause and effect, just as the left and right horns of a cow are not the cause of each other:⁶⁴ *prativādī prāha. kiṃ hetuḥ sādhyāt pūrvam paścād yugapad vā? yadi tāvad dhetuḥ prāk sādhyam ca paścāt tadāsati sādhye, hetuḥ kasya sādhakah? atha paścāt, sādhyam ca prāk, tadā siddhe sādhye kiṃ hetunā? atha yugapat tadāhetuḥ. yathā yugapatsadbhāvād goḥ śṛṅge dakṣiṇam vāmaṃ vā parasparotpādake ity ayuktam. tasmād yaugapadyam cet tadā hetutvāsambhavaḥ.*

In fol. 404r1 (cf. p. 216) the opponent seems to argue that in some cases one and the same entity is seen to be all-pervading, for instance, ether. From this it may follow that whatever is one and all-pervading is permanent (*kvacic caikaṃ sarvagataṃ dr̥ṣṭam yathākā[ś](aḥ)*).⁶⁵

⁶² Cf. e.g., TŚ, p. 27.19-20: *kiṃ ca śabda 'nityaḥ. kutaḥ. aindriyakatvāt. ghatādivad iti sthāpīte* Note that the Spitzer fragments consistently have *aindriyika* whereas in the dictionaries only *aindriyaka* is recorded.

⁶³ It is also possible to read *gaur[a](va)*, but this reading is certainly less probable here.

⁶⁴ Cf. TŚ, p. 18, §6. The opponent's statement is preceded by: *ahetukhaṇḍanam. traikālye hetor asambhava ity ahetukhaṇḍanam ucyate.*

⁶⁵ The defenders of the thesis that sound is permanent, notably the Mīmāṃsakas, often argued that sound, being a quality of permanent ether, must itself be

In fol. 404v1 another familiar criticism, which consists in denying the similarity between sound and a pot construed by the proponent, is encountered ((*ya*)*d uktam ghaṭasādharmy[ā]d anityaḥ śabda [i]ti tan nāsti*). The opponent may have mentioned certain properties that are not common to sound and a pot, and claimed thereby that the example is not appropriate. For instance, the pot is corporeal, baked, perceptible by means of the sense of sight, etc., all properties not found in sound.⁶⁶ In fol. 404v2 the opponent probably uses the same argument, but from the opposite angle. This time he affirms that there is a similarity between sound and a pot, and derives some inadmissible consequence from this similarity ((*a*)*tha manyase asti ghaṭasādharmyaṃ śabdasyeti prāp-tam an[ya]...*). For instance, if the proponent argues that sound is impermanent because it is perceptible by means of the senses / is produced / is produced by effort, just like a pot, the opponent could retort: If sound is impermanent because of its similarity to a pot, then sound is permanent because of its similarity to ether. The similarity consists, for instance, in the fact that they are both incorporeal.⁶⁷ The proponent's reply to these objections did not survive; he may have answered that the similarity is not based on any property whatsoever, but on the relevant property of being produced or being perceptible by means of the senses.

In fol. 405r1 (cf. p. 217) the proponent seems to affirm that (similarity or a common property?) exists and asks rhetorically why (it) should not

permanent. For instance TŚ, p. 23.20f.: *nityaḥ śabda ākāśasamāśritatvāt. ākāśo nityaḥ. yat kiñcid ākāśasamāśritaṃ tan nityam. yathā paramāṇoḥ pārimāṇḍalyam. paramāṇur nityaḥ pārimāṇḍalyam ca paramāṇusamāśritam, tasmāt pārimāṇḍalyam nityam. śabdo 'pi tadvad ākāśasamāśritatvān nityaḥ.* "Sound is permanent because it is supported by ether. Whatever is supported by ether is permanent. [Consider] for instance, the spherical form of an atom. The atom is permanent and the spherical form is supported by the atom. Therefore, the spherical form is permanent. Sound too, in a similar manner, is permanent because it is supported by ether."

⁶⁶ Cf. TŚ, p. 14.9-10: *ghaṭo mūrtas tasmād ghaṭo 'nityaḥ śabdā tu nityaḥ*; TŚ, p. 15.1-7: (*śāstram āha*) *śabdo 'nityaḥ prayatnenotpannatvād ghaṭavad iti śabdasyā-nityatā. pratīvādī prāha. bhavān chabdasya prayatnenotpannatvād ghaṭasādharmyaṃ sthāpayati. asti punas tadvaīdharmyam. pakvatvam apakvatvam, cākṣuṣatvam a-cākṣuṣatvam ityādi. evaṃ ghaṭaśabdayoḥ pratyekaṃ viśeṣaḥ. śabdāḥ prayatnenot-pannatvān nityaḥ, ghaṭas tu prayatnenotpanno 'py anityaḥ. tasmāc chabdo nityaḥ.*

⁶⁷ Cf. TŚ, p. 12.14-19: *śabdo 'nityaḥ prayatnotpannatvād yathā ghaṭaḥ prayat-notpannaḥ. utpannaś ca vinaśtaḥ. śabdo 'pi tatheti śabdo 'nitya iti sthāpīte pratīvādī prāha. yadi ghaṭasādharmyāc chabdo 'nityas tadākāśasādharmyāc chabdo nityaḥ syāt. tataś cākāśavac chabdo nitya iti. [atra] sādharmaṃ amūrtatvam.*

exist elsewhere (... *astīti kasmān na bhavaty anyatra*). This is not so, presumably says the opponent: What has been stated in this respect, namely, that there is a similarity between sound and a pot, is not (correct) (*n[ā]tra yad uktaṃ ghaṭasādharmya(m) śabdasyeti tan nā[s](t)i*). In fol. 405r2 the opponent may argue that owing to the alleged similarity to a pot sound would also have to be seen.⁶⁸ The argument could have run as follows: The pot is seen by means of the sense of sight, but sound is heard by means of the sense of hearing; thus, how could the two be similar just because they are perceptible? If they were similar, then sound too should be visible, and being visible it should be seen.⁶⁹

In the next discernable argument (in fol. 405v1) the opponent seems to claim that if a reason is disputed (*vivaditahetu*), this is enough to invalidate a position. Unfortunately it is not clear in precisely which way the reason is disputed. One possible way to dispute it would be to argue that permanent things, such as universals, are also perceptible by means of the senses. Alternatively, if the reason would be “because it is produced,” one could dispute it, as the Mīmāṃsakas often did, by claiming that sound, being permanent, is only revealed or manifested in various places at various times.⁷⁰ That is, the Mīmāṃsakas may accept the general statement that whatever is produced is impermanent, but they deny that sound is produced. Another way to dispute the reason would be to argue that it is not the case that whatever is produced is destroyed because absence (*abhāva*) is produced at a certain point in time and from that time onwards it continues to exist forever.⁷¹

The Siddhāntin questions the assertion that a thesis or a position is not established because it is disputed (*kasmād vivaditahetuprāptatvād an-*

⁶⁸ This is only a tentative suggestion because the grammatical subject of *drśyeta* is missing; however, it has to be a masculine noun qualified by *āpanno*. Further, I would like to read *-m āpanno* and assume that the preceding missing word in the accusative refers to a property that implies visibility, e.g., *cākṣuṣatvam āpanno drśyeta*.

⁶⁹ Cf. UH, p. 26.15-17 (which, however, does not contain the above *prasaṅga*): *sādharmyadūṣaṇam icchataivaṃ vaktavyam. rūpaṃ cakṣuṣā dr̥ṣṭam, śabdā tu śravaṇena śruta itī, kathaṃ tayoh̄ sādharmyam.*

⁷⁰ Cf. TŚ p. 21.3f. There the discussion is characterised as *saṃśayakhaṇḍana*.

⁷¹ Cf. TŚ p. 27.11: *aparaṃ ca sahetukatvāc chabdo 'nityaḥ. vastu sahetukaṃ cet tadānityam itī jñeyaṃ ghaṭādīva itī sthāpīte. pratīvādī prāha. asmīn arthe saṃśayaḥ. kasmād itī cet. ghaṭotpādaḥ sahetuko 'nityaḥ. ghaṭadhvaṃsas tu sahetuko nityaḥ. śabdasya sahetukatvāc chabde saṃśayotpattiḥ. sahetukaghaṭotpādaḥ anityaḥ sahetukaghaṭadhvaṃsavan nityo vā. asad etat khaṇḍanam. kasmād? yady asad dravyaṃ nityam ucyate danḍāghātavinaṣṭavastūnām api nityatāpattiḥ.*

upap(a)[nn]...). Further, he seems to deny that the reason is disputed,⁷² or better, that if having an undisputed reason were the criterion for a correct thesis, sound would be indeed impermanent (*(a)vivaditahetutve saty anitya eva śabdaḥ syāt*). The purport of the argument is probably that a position should be considered valid not just because for some reason or other its reason is not disputed, but because its reason is valid.

The next sentence (fol. 405v2) reads in Spitzer's transcription *prāptam aviva⁽⁷³⁾ditahet)ūprā[pt] |||*. In my opinion, *hetū* should probably be emended to *hetu*. To be sure, the reading *hetū* is not impossible. In spite of the neuter singular *prāptam*, *avivaditahetū* may well be a masculine dual: *prāptam* could govern a subsequent sentence whose subject or direct object is *avivaditahetū*. In this case, one could understand that as a result of the opponent's contention there would also be two undisputed reasons (one advanced by the proponent, the other by the opponent?). However, by analogy (and in opposition) to the previous line which reads *vivaditahetuprāptatvād anupap(a)[nn]...*, I prefer to read here *avivaditahetuprāptatvād (*upapannam)*. It may be reminded that the distinction between short and long *u* is not always maintained in the manuscript.

In fol. *406(?)r(?)1 (= frg. 136a(5)1, cf. p. 218) we find the stereotypical expression *atra viśeṣahetur vācyaḥ*. The structure or purport of the phrase is clear, but unfortunately not its precise content. The proponent may accuse the opponent of making an unreasonable exception for his thesis, i.e., all things are impermanent because of a certain property, but for some reason, claims the opponent, sound forms a special case so that (*yat*) it is permanent even though it possesses this property; the reason for such a partial distinction should be stated. I tentatively assume that the property in question is *aindrīyikatva*. The second line would support this assumption and the remnants of the fragment do not point at another property. Cf. also the following argument in the TŚ, which, however, is not identical to the one in the Spitzer fragments:

Furthermore, if [the following] is being established [by the proponent] "Sound is impermanent. Why? Because it is perceptible by means of the senses, like a pot etc.," the opponent retorts: Here too doubt is

⁷² In fol. 405v2 I read *(a)vivaditahetutve*. The negation *a-* was presumably present at the end of the previous line.

⁷³ This bracket is struck out.

possible. If [something is] perceptible by means of the senses like a universal, then [it] would be permanent. If sound is perceptible by means of the senses, then, like a universal, it is permanent. If it would not be permanent like a universal, then it would not be impermanent on account of the example of the pot.⁷⁴

Fol. *406(?)r(?)2 contains the beginning of another argument (*athasa[t]sv apy anyeṣu śabdānityatv[a/ā] .e ...*) which states that even when other (reasons?) are present for the impermanence of sound In the next line it is implied that the opponent's position leads to an infinite regress which, of course, is not acceptable. If the opponent denies the infinite regress, an undesired consequence, which unfortunately is not specified in the fragment, would arise⁷⁵ (*na caitad iṣṭam. atha nā[na]-vashāvashitā seyaṃ prasaṅgavi ...*).

In text-section 18 (fol. *406(?)v(?)1) the opponent claims that there is no example (*anudāharaṇāt*). The argument could have been that if sound is the same as a pot, then sound becomes nothing but a pot and thus the latter cannot be used as an example (*chabdo ghaṭo bhavati tat saty evam udāharaṇābhāvaḥ prāptaḥ*). If sound is not the same as a pot (*atha na śabdo ghaṭaḥ*), the latter can also not be used as an example.

Of the next leaf I could identify only a small fragment (frg. 19, cf. p. 219) that bears the section number 22 (or perhaps 23).⁷⁶ Although the subject matter is evident (i.e., again the similarity between a pot and sound), not enough of this fragment remains to justify even a tentative suggestion of an argument.

In the next leaf (fol. 40*8(?)) consisting of frgs. n25(2), n36 and 659, cf. p. 219-220; for the combination of these fragments cf. p. 220) the oppo-

⁷⁴ Cf. TŚ, p. 27.19-23: *kimca śabdo 'nityaḥ. kutaḥ. aindriyakatvāt. ghaṭādivad iti sthāpīte, pratīvādī prāha. atrāpi saṃśayasambhavaḥ. yady aindriyakaḥ sāmānyavat tadā nityatāpattiḥ. yadi śabda aindriyakaḥ tadā sāmānyavan nityaḥ. yadi sāmānyavan na nityo bhavet, tadā ghaṭadr̥ṣṭāntenānityo na bhavet. Cf. also TŚ, p. 35.16-17, which illustrates *pratiññāsamnyāsa: nityaḥ śabdaḥ. kutaḥ? aindriyakatvāt. yathā sāmānyam aindriyakam nityaṃ ca. śabdo 'py aindriyakatvān nityaḥ.**

⁷⁵ This is only tentatively suggested because *prasaṅga* appears as part of a compound and cannot be the subject of the sentence, referred to by the feminine *sā*.

⁷⁶ The assumption of "23" is less probable because usually the last stroke of "3" goes in the opposite direction. That is, in "2" the first stroke goes from left to right and the second stroke from right to left; in "3" the first two strokes are written from left to right and the third stroke from right to left. Here, however, the second stroke seems to have been written from right to left.

nent argues on the first line of the recto that even if the impermanence of sound were established by its similarity with a pot, (nevertheless its dissimilarity with permanent things) is not established because ..., and (thus) the impermanence of sound is not established. What has been said, namely, impermanence of (sound) because of the similarity to a pot ... (*yady api ghaṭasādharmyāt siddham cchabdānityatvam ||| dhya-tvād⁷⁷ asiddham asiddha(ṃ) ca śabdā[ni](t)[y](a)[tv](aṃ) yad ucyate ghaṭas[ā]dh[a](r)my(ā)[d] (a)n(i)ty ...*). On the same line a new argument begins (= text-section 24/25[?]), encapsulated in the word *guṇavaidharmyāt**. If I reconstruct this argument correctly, it refers to different types of qualities, especially in view of their mutual contradiction and possible destruction. The speaker seems to distinguish between *virodhagūṇa* and *bhāvagūṇa* and claim that (only) these two types of *guṇas* may be impermanent (*iha⁷⁸ virodhagūṇabhāvagūṇānām anityatvā⁷⁹ bhavati*). One kind of destruction occurs because of a quality contradictory to another quality, for instance, the destruction of warm temperature by cold temperature. The second type of destruction of *guṇas* seems to be due to the destruction of its support (*āśraya*). Thus, when a pot is destroyed, its qualities, such as colour and form, are destroyed with it (... *guṇavināśo bhavati yathā ghaṭavinā(śo) ...*). In the case of sound, however, none of these two kinds of destruction can take place. There is no cause (such as anti-sound) that stands in contradiction to it, and its support cannot be destroyed because ether is permanent (*na ca śab[d]as[y]a viro[dh](a)[k]āraṇam asti kiñcin nāśraya?n?i ...*).

The word *pravṛtṭiprasaṅga* (fol. 40*8(?)v1) contains text-section 27 in a nutshell. It is difficult to determine in what sense the word *pravṛtṭi* is used here. Perhaps it refers to a continued activity. The proponent argues that if sound were permanent it would have to continue, i.e., continue to exist, as long as the activity which is its cause continues to exist because things to be realised by activity continue to exist as long as this activity is present, just as illumination continues to exist as long as a light is present (*pravṛtṭiprasa(ṅgā)t | yadi kvacid aindriyikam y ||| [2] (pravṛ?)ttisadbhāvāt pravṛttisāddhyānām ārtthānām sadbhāv[o] ||| pradīpasadbhāve prakāśasadbhāvah*). Perhaps the proponent claims that the presence of a light too should be considered as a continued

⁷⁷ Perhaps one should conjecture *sādhyatvāt*.

⁷⁸ *iha* may refer to the general state of affairs, meaning “here, in this world.”

⁷⁹ Read *anityatvaṃ* or *anityatā*.

activity, and when this activity as cause is present, there is continued activity in the form of the presence of illumination. Thus, when there is presence of ether as the cause of sound, this presence should also be considered as a continued activity effecting the continuation of sound. However, this would result in the presence of sound even long after the drum, etc., has been played. This goes against our experience because the flow of sound today is not apprehended (tomorrow) (*sāpi pravṛtṭiḥ pravṛttau sety am[i?] . . . ||| [dbh]āvah prasaktas [t]. ||| [3] . . . yam adya śabdapravṛtṭir iyaṃ na gṛ[h]yat[e] [te?] |||*).

The third line contains the expression *madhyagrahaṇa*, which is recorded by *MW* and *Apte* in the sense of “the middle of an eclipse.” I cannot accommodate this sense into the present context. The expression could refer to perception of sound in the middle between its place of production and place of extinction or to perception of the middle part of a word.

Practically nothing remains of text-sections 28 and 29. In section 30, which may have continued up to fol. 409v1 (cf. p. 221), the topic of similarity is taken up again. The first word of this section, which was probably its keyword, reads in Spitzer’s transcription *[s](ā)dha(r)m-y(a)bh[ā]v[ā]*, but because the reading (*a*) is uncertain both *sā-dharmyābhāvā(t)* and *sādharmyābhāvā(t)* are possible. In view of the next two lines these two possible readings may be understood as implying either that sound is similar to non-perceptible things or that it is not similar to perceptible things. Subsequently (fol. 409r2) the opponent may have asked rhetorically: There is no (similarity between sound and perceptible things). How could (sound) be perceptible by means of the senses? How ... (*na<ā>sti kutah p[u]na[r] ain[dr]iyikatvaṃ kasmā |||*). In 409v1 the proponent probably summarizes the opponent’s position or states its implication: You think that there is a similarity (of sound) with what is not being perceived (*(a)nupalabhyamā[n](am?) [s](ā)[dh](ar)[m]y(a)[m]*⁸⁰ (*a*)*st[ī]ti manyase |||*).

Fol. 409v2 may belong to text-section 31. There is not much to go by except the word *vikalpa* which, if one may rely on a passage in the TŚ which also seems to use this word, could suggest an option of two opposing alternatives derived from the same reason. *vikalpakhāṇḍana* is explained in the TŚ as the counter-establishing of dissimilarity in the

⁸⁰ Read *anupalabhyamānasādharmyam* or perhaps *anupalabhyamānena sādharmaṃyam*.

case of similarity.⁸¹ If the proponent establishes that sound is impermanent because it is produced by effort like a pot, the opponent retorts that the two are also dissimilar and thus sound is permanent because it is produced by effort, whereas the pot is impermanent although it is produced by effort.⁸² This argument could easily be applied to the reason *aīndriyikatva* which is used here. If this section continues to the next leaf (410r2), the word *viṣama* could indicate the proponent's possible response, namely, that according to the opponent all things which are perceived by means of the senses are impermanent except sound which is supposed to be permanent, and that thus a reason for this unevenness should be stated.

Fol. 410v1 (cf. p. 221) must belong to text-section 32 or 33. Here it is denied that the perception of the Self is a sensory perception (*hy*⁸³ *āt-m(a)pratyakṣa[m](in)[dr](i)ya(?)*|||). The relevance of this statement to the subject matter is obvious. If the *ātman* which is eternal is perceived by means of the senses, the reason *aīndriyikatva* cannot establish the impermanence of sound.

Text-section 34 was perhaps summarized by means of the word *anyābhāvāt*, but this is not specific enough to gain further insight into the opponent's argument in this section. About fol. 411 (p. 222) nothing meaningful can be said except that the discussion on the similarity and dissimilarity between sound and a pot continues. The details, however, cannot be reconstructed. A small fragment (frg. 770, cf. p. 222) that bears the section number 38 and probably belongs to ca. fol. *412 may contain the remnants of a summarizing keyword on the other side, namely, |||*[kā]sābhāvāt**. This may be conjectured as *vikāśābhāvāt**. In view of the subsequent fragments 25, 41, 53 and 142, which I assign to fol. *413, it seems quite possible that the identity of the opponent has changed already in frg. 770: while the opponent seems until now to have been a Mīmāṃsaka, the opponent in these fragments where transformation (*vikāra*) is prominently mentioned seems to be a Sāṃkhya. This fits well with the conjectured *vikāsa* which, together with *saṅkoca*, is often used as an example for transformation.

⁸¹ TŚ, p. 14.24-25: *sādharmye vaidharmyapratyavasthānaṃ vikalpakhaṇḍanam ucyate*.

⁸² TŚ, p. 15.3-7 quoted in n. 66 above.

⁸³ I assume that the sentence started with *na hy*. Otherwise the statement would be a *pūrvapakṣa* statement.

In frg. 25a2 (cf. p. 223), some product of transformation is stated to be impermanent, not permanent.⁸⁴ In 25b2, text-section 44 probably starts with the keyword *prakṛtivikārā(t)*. The Sāṃkhya may argue that sound is only a material transformation of *prakṛti* which is eternal; assuming that there is no ontological difference between the basic matter and the various forms it takes, one can assert that sound too is permanent. At this point the Sāṃkhya theory of *satkāryavāda*, even if the term had not yet been coined, was probably considered. The Sāṃkhya would argue that sound already exists in and is not really different from the eternal primordial matter (cf. *tasmān na vyatirikto* in frg. 53b, cf. p. 224). A discussion of what it means to be destroyed in the Sāṃkhya sense may have followed.

It is difficult to determine how much farther the discussion with the Sāṃkhya extended. What remains of fol. 414 (cf. p. 224) is too small to allow determination of a specific opponent or a specific argument. Unfortunately, the remaining fragments of the manuscript do not allow for further reconstruction of the dialectical portion.

Finally, it may be mentioned that a number of fragments relating to the topic of formal proof in debate could not be assigned by me to their original place in the manuscript. They certainly belong to the chapter on *sādhana* and *upālambha*, but they bear no clues as to folio number or text-section number. Therefore, they are neither discussed here nor reproduced below; they are frgs. 12(4), 24, 117, 150, 153, 216, 307, 431, 442(1), 533, 597, 605, 624, 663, 667, 676(?) (perhaps belonging to the chapter on sophistical debate partially reconstructed above) and 759.

Bibliography

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| CS | <i>The Caraka Saṃhitā of Agniveśa</i> , ed. G. Pandeya. [KSS 194]. Varanasi 21983. |
| Franco 1994 | E. Franco, <i>Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief</i> . A Study of Jayarāśi's Scepticism. Delhi 21994. |
| Franco 2000a | Id., The "Spitzer Manuscript" – Report on Work in Progress. In: <i>Abhidharma and Indian Thought</i> . Essays in Honour of Professor Doctor Junsho Kato on His Sixtieth Birthday. Tokyo 2000, p. 562-544 (= [49]-[67]). |

⁸⁴ This statement must apply to sound (*śabda*), but "*śabda*" being a masculine noun the statement may be general: Whatever is a product of transformation is impermanent.

- Franco 2000b Id., Lost Fragments from the “Spitzer Manuscript”. In: *Harānandalaharī*, ed. R. Tsuchida – A. Wezler. Reinbek 2000, p. 77-110.
- Franco 2001 Id., Fragments of a Buddhist *Pramāṇa*-Theory from the Kuṣāṇa Period. *Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai Fellowship Newsletter* 4 (2001) 2-12.
- Franco forthcoming Id., A Note on Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas. Forthcoming in: Tachikawa Felicitation Volume, ed. S. Hino – T. Wada.
- HV Hetuvidyā-section of the Yogācārabhūmi. In: H. Yaita, Yugaron no immyō: bonbun tekisuto to wayaku. *Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūjo Kiyō* 15 (1992) 505-576.
- NS Nyāyasūtras. In: W. Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtra's*. Leipzig 1928.
- pw* O. Böhtlingk, *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch in kürzerer Fassung*. Bd.1-7. St. Petersburg 1879-1889.
- S. Files containing black and white photographs of the Spitzer fragments and preliminary transcripts provided by D. Schlingloff to M. Spitzer in the 1960's.
- Schwarz – Pfeiffer 1978 W. Schwarz – O.E. Pfeiffer, *Rückläufiges Wörterbuch des Altindischen. Reverse Index of Old Indian*. Wiesbaden 1978.
- Speijer 1886 J.S. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*. Leiden 1886.
- TŚ Tarkaśāstra, in Tucci 1929b.
- Tucci 1929a G. Tucci, Buddhist Logic before Diñnāga. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1929) 451-488.
- Tucci 1929b Id., *Pre-Diñnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*. [GOS 49]. Baroda 1929 (repr. Madras 1981).
- UH Upāyahr̥daya, in Tucci 1929b
- Verpoorten 2001 J.-M. Verpoorten, Le bestiaire des philosophes indiens. *Acta Orientalia Belgica* 14 (2001) 67-100.
- VP F. Tola – C. Dragonetti, *Nāgārjuna's Refutation of Logic (Nyāya)*. *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*. Delhi 1995.
- VV K. Bhattacharya, E.H. Johnston and A. Kunst (ed.), *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (Vigrahavyāvartanī)*. Delhi 1978.