

Part 1 – Translation

Moreover, in holding such a view, the Jaiminīyas compromise their own position with their own assertion,¹ for

[Vedic] words do not [themselves] declare: “This is our meaning, not this.” This meaning [which Vedic words have] must be postulated by humans.² The latter are possessed, however, of [moral defects] like desire.³ ⁴Besides, how is the distinction made that among [such humans] one knows what [the meaning of the Veda] really is, the other doesn’t?⁵ Why isn’t there for you in some way some [other person who is] knowledgeable [of the meaning,] given that he is as human as the [other] [i.e., Jaimini, etc.]? (PV 1.312–313)

These Vedic words surely do not cry out like this: “Come you revered Brahmins, this is to be grasped as our meaning, not something else.” [Such Vedic words] simply fall upon the ear, without an association with a particular meaning being manifest. For these [words] one person postulates a certain meaning, another another.⁶ ⁷But words have no natural restriction by which they favor one meaning, not another. They are simply seen as referring to this or that due to convention. It is not right that one⁸ totally ignorant [person] afflicted by [moral] defects can explain what [the meaning] of these [Vedic words] really is, their

¹ See above, pp. 15–17 and nn. 33–36.

² I.e., by the Mīmāṃsakas (PVT *Ñe* D45b4/P52a2 = PVSVT 584,27).

³ As a consequence, the meaning postulated (*kalpita*) by these human beings is not a *pramāṇa* (PVT *Ñe* D45b4/P52a2–3 ≈ PVSVT 584,28; Vibh 404 n. 1).

⁴ The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now objects that only such persons as Jaimini know (*vet-tr*) the meaning of the Veda (PVT *Ñe* D45b4–5/P52a3 ≈ PVSVT 584,29).

⁵ Explanation, PVT *Ñe* D45b5–6/P52a4–5 = PVSVT 585,8–10: *nātra kiṃcit kāraṇam asti mīmāṃsakasya / puruṣatvāviśeṣāt / sarvo vā veti na vā kaścid iti bhāvaḥ /*. “The Mīmāṃsaka lacks any criterion (*kāraṇa*) for this [distinction], because [these persons] do not differ as to [their] humanity: either all [of them would] know [the meaning], or none [of them]. Such is the sense.”

⁶ As a consequence, there can be no ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) of the meaning of the Veda (**vedārtha*; PVT *Ñe* D46a4/P52b4 ≈ PVSVT 585,21–22).

⁷ The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now objects that words and their meanings have a natural (*svābhāvika*) relation, so that Vedic words are restricted (*pratiniyama*) to one meaning (*ekārtha*; PVT *Ñe* D46a4–5/P52b4–5 ≈ PVSVT 585,23–24).

⁸ I.e., Jaimini or Śabarasyāmin (PVT *Ñe* D46b2/P53a2 = PVSVT 585,30–31).

restriction to a meaning being [in general] unknown because they refer to [something] supersensible, [and] not another. But if this [person and] no other knows [the meaning of the Vedic words] due to some superiority, e.g.,⁹ of the intellect or the sensory faculties, where does his superior knowledge of the supersensible come from? ¹⁰Likewise, why is some other [person]¹¹ who can perceive things beyond the reach [of ordinary cognition] in [terms of] space, time, and nature considered impossible? ¹²[Among] the “proofs” [brought forward] to discard these [other superior beings],¹³ there is indeed none which does not apply to this one [too, whom you accept]. ¹⁴Just as the [latter] is distinguished [through his ability to know the supersensible] in spite of there being these “proofs,” so should all others be [distinguished]. Therefore [in this matter], non-commitment [to a particular person as the authority regarding the meaning of the Veda] alone is justified.

¹⁵If [you hold that] that one knows the meaning [of the Vedic words] whose [explanatory] statements are consistent with

⁹ Besides *buddhi* and *indriya*, the commentators add, as an explanation of *°ādi*, repeated practice (*abhyāsa*; PVT *Ñe* D46b3/P53a4 = PVSVT 586,9-10; PVV 404,9).

¹⁰ Introduction, PVT *Ñe* D46b4-5/P53a6 = PVSVT 586,13: *bhavatu vā jaiminiprabhṛtiḥ puruṣo 'tīndriyārthasya vettā* /. “Or, let there be a human being, such as Jaimini, who knows something supersensible.”

¹¹ According to PVT *Ñe* D46b5/P53a6-7 ≈ PVSVT 586,13-14, “likewise” (*tathā*) should be understood as, “like Jaimini, etc.” (*jaiminyādivat*), whereas “some other [person]” (*anyo 'pi*) should be interpreted as “the superior person(s) recognized by [followers of other traditions] such as the Buddhists (*puruṣātīśayo bauddhādyabhimataḥ*).”

¹² Introduction, PVT *Ñe* D46b6/P53a8-b1 ≈ PVSVT 586,15-16: *so 'py atīndriyārthadarśy astv itīśyatām / na ced abhimato 'pi jaiminyādir mā bhūt / yataḥ*... “[You] ought to admit that the one [accepted by another tradition] must also perceive the supersensible. If not, even the [one] recognized [by you as superior, i.e.], Jaimini, etc., cannot be [held to perceive the supersensible], because...”

¹³ See p. 17 n. 37.

¹⁴ The following is said on the hypothesis that the Mīmāṃsaka, going against his own arguments (*sādhana*, so-called proofs, such as *puruṣatva*), accepts that people such as Jaimini perceive what the meaning of the Veda really is (*vedārthatattva*)_{PVT} or are different from, say, Buddhist authorities_{PVSVT} (compare PVT *Ñe* D47a1-2/P53b3-4 and PVSVT 586,21).

¹⁵ The Mīmāṃsaka now turns from *atīndriyadarśana* to another criterion in order to argue for Jaimini’s authoritative *vedārthajñāna*. Jaimini and others discriminate (*vi-vecana*) the meaning of the Veda only when they make statements (*vacana*) that are

valid cognition, [we would reply that this is not the case,] for there can be no valid cognition of transcendent [things]. (PV 1.314)

Suppose the following [be urged]: We do not commit ourselves to someone's explanation [of the Veda] on the ground of his authority as a person, but because [his explanation] is consistent with other valid cognitions. Among all the numerous expositors [of the Veda,] we assent to the one who makes [the meaning] coincide with valid cognitions such as perception. [Answer:] This is not [the case], because the other means of valid cognition do not function with regard to supersensible [things] such as *adṛṣṭa* [i.e., merit and demerit]. It is indeed just because of the unavailability of those [other means when it comes to supersensible matters] that scripture is required in order to cognize them; for otherwise,¹⁶ one would not cognize [such things] when other means of valid cognition do not function, even though this [scripture] is available. And since one would cognize [these] things through these [other means of valid cognition] alone, scripture would not be a means at all. Objection: One does not cognize supersensible [things] through any of the other [means of valid cognition] alone.¹⁷ ¹⁸[Answer:] How

consistent with valid cognition (*pramāṇasaṃvādin*; PVSVT 586,26, to be compared with PVT *Ñe* D47a4/P53b6–7; PVT *Ñe* D47a4–5/P53b7–8 = PVSVT 586,28–29).

¹⁶ I.e., if, even with regard to something which is accessible to scripture (*āgamagamyā*), it were only on the grounds of a statement's consistency with other valid cognitions that one ascertained (*niścaya*) the meaning, then... (PVT *Ñe* D47b3–4/P54a8–b1 ≈ PVSVT 587,19).

¹⁷ I.e., independently of scripture (PVT *Ñe* D47b6/P54b4 = PVSVT 587,23), but rather, through perception, etc., as accompanied by scripture (*āgamasahita*; compare PVT *Ñe* D47b6–7/P54b4–5 and PVSVT 587,24). This is of course reminiscent of Bharṭṛhari's reservations about inference. VPR 1.30–32, 34: *nāgamād rte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate / iṣṭān api yaj jñānaṃ tad apy āgamapūrvakam // dharmasya cāvya-avacchinnāḥ panthāno ye vyavasthitāḥ / na tāṃ lokaprasiddhatvāt kaś cit tarkeṇa bādhathe / avasthādeśakālānāḥ bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu / bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā // ... yatnenānumito 'py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātrbhiḥ / abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathavopapādyate //*. "And without *āgama*, reasoning cannot determine merit; even the knowledge of seers presupposes *āgama*. And no one can by means of reasoning invalidate the paths of merit which have been determined without interruption, because they belong to ordinary knowledge. Since things can have different powers due to differences regarding conditions, places, and times, their knowledge (*prasiddhi*) is extremely difficult to obtain through inference ...

[can something like heaven be] called “supersensible” and [at the same time be] the object of [means of valid cognition] such as perception?¹⁹ Objection: Yet even with regard to their own objects, these [means of valid cognition] are effective only in dependence on scripture.²⁰ [Answer:] There would [then] be no [inferential] cognition of fire, etc., on the basis of a [logical reason] such as smoke without scripture [as its support]! Objection: One certainly does not seek after another means

Even something that has been inferred with [great] effort by skillful experts in inference is demonstrated [to be] otherwise by other more skillful ones.” Note also VPV 89,2-6 ad VPR 1.32 (quoted in Akamatsu 2010: 187): *tatra rūpasāmānyād aparhṭabuddhiḥ parokṣaviśeṣo durjñānaṃ bhedaṃ arvāgdarśano darśanamātreṇāgamayam āgamaiva prapadyate / kālabhedād api / grīmahemantādiṣu kūpajalādīnām atyantabhinnāḥ sparśādayo drśyante / tatra sūkṣmam avasthānaviśeṣaṃ prākṛtam aprākṛtagamyam āgamacakṣur antareṇāpratyakṣam anumānamātreṇānīcītaṃ kaḥ sādhayitum asammūḍhaḥ prayatate /* “The ordinary man (*arvāgdarśana*), misled by external resemblance, is unable to see the difference and can see it only with the help of tradition. Similarly, properties of things change with time. The temperature of the waters of a well and the like is very different in summer and winter. Which intelligent man would try to demonstrate, by mere reasoning, this subtle difference in nature, imperceptible to the ordinary man, unascertainable by inference and incomprehensible except through knowledge derived from tradition?” Translation Iyer 1965: 44. See also Akamatsu’s (2010: 188) comments on this passage. On Bharṭhari’s views on inference, see e.g. Iyer 1992: 84–86, Aklujkar 1989, Houben 1997: 322–327 and Akamatsu 2010. Note also the following passage of Pakṣilasvāmin’s NBh (3,11–12): *kaḥ punar ayaṃ nyāyāḥ? pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam / pratyakṣāgamāśritaṃ cānumānam / sāvīkṣā /* “But what is this ‘reasoning’? The examining of an object through the means of knowledge; and inference depends upon perception and scripture. This is [what is meant by] ‘analysis.’” Translation Perry 1997: 451. On Pakṣilasvāmin’s problematic assertion and its ideological background, see Perry 1997: 450–452; on Uddyotakara’s, Vācaspati’s, and Udayana’s comments on NBh 3,11–12, see Perry 1997: 452–457.

¹⁸ Introduction, PVT *Ñe* D47b7/P54b5: *ji skad du brjod pa na śin tu lkog tu gyur pa’i don la yan mñon sum la sogs pa’i ’jug par ’dod pa ma yin nam /* “[But] in so speaking, don’t [you] accept that [*pramāṇas*] such as perception also function with regard to something supersensible?”

¹⁹ I.e., either something is the object (**viśaya*) of perception, etc., and it is not transcendent (**atyantaparokṣa*), or it is transcendent, and *pramāṇas* such as perception do not apply to it. As a consequence, there can be no consistency with other *pramāṇas* in the case of something transcendent (PVT *Ñe* D48a1-2/P54b6-7).

²⁰ As a consequence, scripture is the main epistemic requirement (**prādhānya*; PVT *Ñe* D48a3/P55a1).

of valid cognition when scripture applies;²¹ however, whether scripture applies is in itself not known.²² [Answer: If that is so,] how does the addition of this scripture enhance these [means of valid cognition] which are capable of establishing [supersensible things] by themselves? [If] on the other hand, a [means of valid cognition is by itself] incapable [of establishing them], it will surely not prove that scripture applies [to supersensible things] either. How indeed does another [means of valid cognition] establish the fact that scripture applies, which, as it relates to supersensible things, is supersensible [itself]? In this way, however, something other [than authorlessness] should be the definition of scripture,²³ for

[from all this] it follows that a [Vedic] statement that has been sanctioned²⁴ by a [person] whose statements are [otherwise] consistent with valid cognitions is scripture. [In that case] the [Veda's] authorlessness [turns out to be] useless. (PV 1.315)

If, even though the account of scripture [as authorless] should remain the same, it is due [only] to valid cognitions that a scripture is scripture with regard to a certain [meaning], [then] the consistency of [its] statements with valid cognitions should be the definition of scripture, not not being composed by a human being (*apurūṣakriyā*). [This is so] because, though the [authorlessness of the Veda] is the same for all the meanings [taught by human interpreters], one [still] cognizes [the correct meaning only] on the ground that it is not negated by valid cognitions; for even though this [authorlessness] is given, you do not accept

²¹ For otherwise, scripture would lose its independent effectiveness with regard to its own object (**svaviṣaya*; compare PVT *Ñe* D48a5/P55a4–5 and PVSVT 588,11–12).

²² I.e., one does not know whether its application to something supersensible is reliable or not; therefore, one seeks after another means of valid cognition in order to evaluate (**parīkṣā*, **vicāra*) a particular application (PVT *Ñe* D48a5–6/P55a5–7).

²³ For those who claim that one should adopt ($\sqrt{\text{grah}}$), among many interpreters (*vyākhyātr*), the teaching (*bhāṣita*) of the one who agrees (*saṃsyandayati*) with *pramāṇas* such as perception (PVT *Ñe* D48b3–4/P55b5–6 ≈ PVSVT 588,21–22).

²⁴ *kṛta* is explained as *saṃskṛta* (PVT *Ñe* D48b5/P55b7–8 = PVSVT 588,23–24). PVT *Ñe* D48b5/P55b8 ≈ PVSVT 588,24–25: *vacanasya ca saṃskāras tadarthasya pramāṇānugrhitatvakyāpanam /*. “And to sanction a [Vedic] statement is to declare that its meaning is supported by the *pramāṇas*.” See also Vibh 404 n. 5.

[that one cognizes the correct meaning²⁵] in another case, [where the meaning is] inconsistent with valid cognitions.

Furthermore,

if [in fact] there were knowledge of something transcendent without scripture [then] it would be admitted [by you] that there is someone who knows supersensible things. (PV 1.316)

If it is accepted that [one] human being [such as Jaimini] has true knowledge of a transcendent thing (*parokṣa*) without depending on scripture, [then] it would be admitted that there are [other] human beings who [, just like Jaimini,] perceive supersensible things, ²⁶because [any] valid cognition, insofar as it is dependent on perception, is impossible without a [prior] perceptual cognition of those [things].²⁷ It is indeed because other means of valid cognition are impossible, since perception does not function with regard to those [supersensible things], that scripture is a means of valid cognition for cognizing [things] which are not the objects (*ālambana*) of these [other means of valid cognition]. But since the functioning of other means of valid cognition [with regard to supersensible things] implies (*anvākarṣati*) a [prior] perception, a superior person should not be excluded. Therefore, [you have to agree that] other means of valid cognition do *not* function with regard to supersensible [things. And] because he does

²⁵ Or: “you do not accept [that the scripture makes something known correctly]” (PVT *Ñe* D49a2/P56a6).

²⁶ The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that interpreters such as Jaimini do not teach the meaning of the Veda on the basis of their perception of it, but on the basis of an inference (*anumāna*; compare PVT *Ñe* D49a5-6/P56b4-5 and PVSVT 589,19-20). According to Karṇakagomin, PVSV 166,21-22 is an answer to this objection (*tan na / yataḥ*). But according to Śākyabuddhi, PVSV 166,21-22 completes the first part of the answer, which must be supplied as follows (PVT *Ñe* D49a6-7/P56b5-6): *de ni ma yin te / gal te dbaṅ po las 'das pa'i don de ni mñon sum gyis mthoṅ bar 'gyur ba de'i tshe de sñon du soṅ ba can gyi rjes su dpag pa de la 'jug par 'gyur ro // ci'i phyir ze na*. “This is not [the case, for only] if he had seen this supersensible meaning through perception would inference, which presupposes this [perception] (*tatpūrvaka*), apply to it. – Why?”

²⁷ According to PVT *Ñe* D49a7/P56b6-7, °*tad*° = *atīndriya* (in the genitive case: *tasyā-tīndriyasya*); but according to PVSVT 589,21, °*tad*° = *pratyakṣa* (in the instrumental case: *tena pratyakṣeṇa*).

not, for this very reason,²⁸ comprehend which particular meaning the [Vedic] scripture refers to, this Jaimini [whom you are always talking about] or another [person, such as Śabara],

filled with [moral defects] such as desire, does not know the meaning of the Veda himself, nor [does he know it] from another [person], nor does the Veda [itself] make [its meaning] known.²⁹ [So] how is there comprehension of the meaning of the Veda? (PV 1.317 = PVin 2.35)

Since no human being has overcome the confusion which is due to [moral] defects, as an expositor [of the Veda] he does not know the supersensible restriction [of Vedic words] to a particular meaning by himself. Nor does another [person] teach him [this restriction], either, for there would be the same [undesirable] consequence for this [other person] too [, namely, he too would be incapable of knowing supersensible things, due to moral defects]. Indeed, a blind [person] does not find the way when led by [another] blind [person]! Nor does the Veda disclose its own meaning itself,³⁰ for it would follow that [Jaimini's or someone else's] instruction would be useless.³¹ Therefore, this verbal goitre³² [that we call the Veda] whose meaning has not been compre-

²⁸ I.e., because the other means of valid cognition do not function with regard to supersensible things (PVT *Ñe* D49b4/P57a4-5 ≈ PVSVT 589,30).

²⁹ I.e., when one listens to it (*śrūyamāṇa*) independently of someone's instruction (*upadeśam antareṇa*; PVin_{ms} 71b4).

³⁰ I.e., independently of someone's instruction (*upadeśanirapekṣa*; PVT *Ñe* D50a4/P57b7 = PVSVT 590,19-20).

³¹ I.e., all humans would grasp the meaning of the Veda merely upon hearing it (**śra-vaṇamātrena*; PVT *Ñe* D50a4-5/P57b8-58a1).

³² As a lump of flesh (*māṃsapiṇḍa*) located between the neck and the head (*ghātāmas-takayor madhye*), is called an excrescence or goitre (*gaḍu*), because it is useless (*niṣ-phala*), the Vedic word too is like a goitre, because it is useless, since it is of unknown meaning (*aparijñātārtha*; PVT *Ñe* D50a5-6/P58a2-3 ≈ PVSVT 590,22-24). According to the *Bhāskarī* (I.98,9), however, *gaḍu* (in fact: *antargaḍu*) refers to a *kubjapṛṣṭhastho māṃsapiṇḍaḥ*, a lump of flesh located on the back of a hunchback; in the ĪPV (I.64,10) a Buddhist opponent compares the permanent self (*ātman*) to a hunchback's hump in that it only results in speculative weariness (*kalpanāyāsamā-traphala*) but brings nothing. See Ratié 2006: 51 n. 31. The (generally pejorative) expression *śabdagaḍumātra* is commonplace in Indian philosophy. See, e.g., ĪPVV I.62,16, AJP I.323,11 (accusing a statement very similar to PVSV 39,6-8 of being *śab-*

hended, is in this way³³ a veritable splinter. Fixed by the ligaments of bad doctrine and [extremely] difficult to remove, it causes pain.³⁴

Therefore, what valid cognition is there that the [Vedic] statement [which is ordinarily taken to mean] “One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra” doesn’t mean “One should eat dog meat”?³⁵ (PV 1.318 = PVin 2.36)

A [Vedic] sentence such as “One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra” is neither [inherently] close to nor remote from any

daḡaḡumātra); see also MBh II.37,17. Note that *gaḡu* may also refer to a tumor. In this sense, it occurs in the famous maxim (*nyāya*): *gaḡupraveṣe 'kṣitāarakavinirgamaḡ* (“going out of the pupil of the eye when the tumor enters,” Franco 1987: 392–393 n. 137), which, according to Franco, is an equivalent of “falling from the frying pan into the fire.” See, e.g., AJP I.56,6, TUS 148,12 (Franco 1987: 149), HBṬĀ 368,1.

³³ I.e., because one doubts (*saḡśaya*) whether its meaning is this or that (PVT *Ñe* D50a6/P58a3–4 ≈ PVSVT 590,24).

³⁴ Difficult to remove even for a compassionate being (*[mahā]kāruṇika*) who would be eager to do so (PVT *Ñe* D50a7–b1/P58a4–6 ≈ PVSVT 590,25–26), it causes pain to those who put their faith in it (*tadabhiprasanna*; PVT *Ñe* D50a7/P58a4 = PVSVT 590,24–25), or who adopt the Veda (*aḡgikṛtaveda*; PVT *Ñe* D50a7/P58a4 = PVSVT 590,25).

³⁵ PV 1.317–318 are quoted in NM II.220,4–5 and 10–11. PV 1.318 recurs in a slightly different form (*pāda c: jinaḡ sarvajña ity evaḡ*) in TS_K 3527/TS_S 3526. *agnihotraḡ juhuyāt svargakāmaḡ* is featured by Śabarasvāmin as an example when discussing the problem of how the meaning of a Vedic sentence is derived from the meanings of its words (ŚBh I.110,5 ad MīSū 1.1.24); here, it is not clear that he actually intends to refer to a particular Vedic passage. When discussing the *injunction* to perform the *agnihotra*, however, ad MīSū 1.4.4, he cites *agnihotraḡ juhoti svargakāmaḡ* (ŚBh II.285,1). The Vedic passages that come closest to this are TaitS 1.5.9.1 (*agnihotraḡ juhoti*), KāṭhS 6.3 (*payasāgnihotraḡ juhoti*), and MaitS 1.8.6 (*yad evaḡ vidvān agnihotraḡ juhoti*). (Garge 1952: 102 considers the *Maitrāyaṇi* passage, not TaitS 1.5.9.1, as providing the originative injunction, because the latter does not deal primarily with the *agnihotra*; KāṭhS 6.3 is evidently a *guṇavidhi*. For a helpful discussion of Śabara’s rather imprecise method of citing Vedic passages in general, see Garge 1952: 39–45.) See also ŚBh III.497,2–509,6 ad MīSū 2.2.13–16. Various other authors, both Mīmāṃsaka and non-Mīmāṃsaka, cite *agnihotraḡ juhuyāt (svargakāmaḡ)* as the paradigm of a Vedic injunction; see MNP 16,3–17,6; AS 32,1–7; NV 254,4 ad NSū 2.1.59 (*agnihotraḡ juhuyāt*); etc. On this injunction and its interpretation in Mīmāṃsā, see below, pp. 135–140.

[particular] meaning;³⁶ [hence] we do not see any distinctive property [of the sentence which would determine] that its meaning is that one should pour ghee, etc., into a certain element [i.e., fire] in a way that is admissible [to Brahmins], but not that one should eat dog meat.³⁷ Objection: This consequence is similar for any [scriptural statement, whether it is authorless or not]: Do people nowadays follow the meaning of statements whose [original] expounders are no longer living (*pa-rokṣa*) according to the [original] intention, or rather a contrary [meaning]? [Answer:] No [, we do not have the same consequence in every case], for a tradition is made possible by [the fact that] a teacher may reveal his own intention [to his contemporaries, and they in turn reveal it to others, etc.]. Indeed, this is not possible in the case of words that lack an [original] expounder. And speaking with the intention of having people understand, [the teacher] follows the common usage of ordinary conventions. For this reason also, the meaning of this [kind of scripture] is established, [but] not [that] of authorless words, for in their case, there is no desire of anyone [to communicate].³⁸ Moreover, learned people apply themselves to [things which are] to be obtained and avoided and their causes³⁹ by following reasoning alone, not by

³⁶ Because the hypothesis of a real (*vāstava*) relation between words and meanings has been refuted earlier (see above pp. 10–12, and PVSV 172,15–16 below, p. 58; PVT *Ñe* D50b3/P58b1 = PVSVT 591,10).

³⁷ For a parallel passage, see TS_K 2774/TS_ś 2773 and TSP_K 735,19–736,3/TSP_ś 891,20–892,12.

³⁸ In PVSV 167,16–21, Dharmakīrti has argued that the consequence is not the same for any scriptural statement, i.e., that it is possible to know the meaning of a scripture of human origin (*pauruṣeya*): (1a) because of the possibility of a tradition (*sam-pradāya*) and (1b) because of the teacher's compliance with ordinary linguistic conventions (*saṅketānupālana*; PVT *Ñe* D51a4–5/P59a7–8 ≈ PVSVT 591,29–31). PVSV 167,21–23 provides a second argument to the same effect: (2) one can ascertain (*niścaya*) the meaning of a scripture of human origin by following reasoning (*nyāyānusāreṇa*; compare PVT *Ñe* D51a5/P59a8 and PVSVT 592,6).

³⁹ I.e., what is to be avoided (*heya*) is suffering (*duḥkha*), and its cause consists in acts and defilements (*karmakleśāḥ*); what is to be obtained (*upādeya*) is liberation (*mokṣa*), and its cause consists in the knowledge of true reality (*tattvajñāna*; PVT *Ñe* D51a6–7/P59b1–3 ≈ PVSVT 592,8–9).

[listening to] just the talk [of their predecessors];⁴⁰ and so the consequence is not similar. But we shall explain this⁴¹ in due course.

⁴²Objection: Isn't it the case that such a thing as the arrangement of the world, even though it is not an object [accessible] to reason,⁴³ is known [by you Buddhists] from the statement of a person which must be assumed [to be true, on the basis of his reliability in regard to other

⁴⁰ At least according to Śākyabuddhi and Kaṇṇakagomin, Dharmakīrti alludes here to the champions of practical rationality (the so-called “practically rational persons” [*prekṣāpūrvakārin*]), the Buddhists (*bauddha*; PVT *Ñe* D51a6/P59a8-b1 = PVSVT 592,7), for “even if the words [of their scriptures] can be [as] polysemic [as those of the Veda], the Buddhists (*saugata*) determine, for [their] scriptures, only [such] a meaning [as is] rational (*yuktiyukta*) [and] serves a human goal, [but they do] not [ascertain it] merely by [resorting to] the teaching of other [persons].” (PVT *Ñe* D51a7-b1/P59b3-4 ≈ PVSVT 592,9-13; see also Vibh 406 n. 2: *etad uktaṃ bhavati / anekārthatvasambhave 'pi śabdānāṃ yuktiyuktaṃ puruṣārthopayoginam evāgamārthaṃ niścinvanti saugatā na paropadeśamātreṇa /*.) For a parallel passage, see TSPK 735,22-23/TSPs 891,23-892,4 (*tatra nyāyam evānupālayantaḥ saugatāḥ sudhiyaḥ pravartante na pravādamātreṇa /*); on the Buddhist epistemologists’ “rhetoric of reason,” see McClintock 2010; on practical rationality, see McClintock 2010: 58-62 and Eltschinger 2007b.

⁴¹ I.e., that rational persons proceed towards scripture (*āgame pravartanam*) by following reasoning (*nyāyānupālana*; PVT *Ñe* D51b1-2/P59b5-6 = PVSVT 592,14). We are not aware of any subsequent statement of Dharmakīrti to this effect. But one may think of PV 2 as a whole, and especially PV 2.29-33 (see Eltschinger 2001: 110-114).

⁴² The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now objects that if the ascertainment of a scripture’s meaning (*āgamārthanīścaya*) follows reasoning alone, there cannot be any ascertainment regarding the transcendent things dealt with in scripture (PVSVT 592,16-17, to be compared with PVT *Ñe* D51b2-3/P59b6-7).

⁴³ Śākyabuddhi and Kaṇṇakagomin refer here to Buddhist cosmology as it appears, e.g., in AK 3.45 (which they quote): *tatra bhājanalokasya sanniveśam uśanty adhaḥ / lakṣaṣoḍaśakodvedham asaṅkhyāṃ vāyumaṇḍalam //*. “Here is how it is thought that the receptacle world is arranged: at the bottom there is a circle of wind, immeasurable, with a height of sixteen hundred thousand leagues.” (Pruden 1988-1990: II.451, translating La Vallée Poussin 1980: II.138). Other instances of things that are not accessible to reason (because they are beyond reach in terms of space, time, and nature, *deśakālasavabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa*) include the desirable and undesirable results of intentions such as giving and injury (*dānahiṃsādicetanānām iṣṭāniṣṭaphaladānādi*), i.e., karmic retribution (PVT *Ñe* D51b3-4/P59b7-60a2 ≈ PVSVT 592,17-22).

things]?^{44, 45} [Answer:] No, because [we have] no confidence [in such a person].⁴⁶ It is indeed not the case that, since [a person has been observed] not to err with respect to a certain [matter], everything [that person says] is like that [i.e. true, and this for two reasons: first], because one observes that [people who are known to be reliable in regard to a certain thing do in fact] err [in regard to other things]; and [second,] because a concomitance between the [verbal] activity of this [allegedly superior person] and reliability is not established.⁴⁷ ⁴⁸Beyond that, the [aforementioned] definition of scripture has been accepted for lack of [any other] recourse.⁴⁹ There is [indeed] no ascer-

⁴⁴ I.e., if someone's statement concerning things that are not accessible to perception and inference proves to be reliable (*avisamvādin*), then one may assume (*sambhāv-yate*) that this person's statement regarding the third order (*tr̥tīyasthāna*) of things, viz., transcendent things, is veracious (*satyārtha*, PVT̥ *Ñe* D51b5/P59a2-4 ≈ PVSVT̥ 592,23-24).

⁴⁵ Consequently, the Buddhists, too, learn about transcendent things from the statements of a person whom they merely trust, and thus do not deal with the meaning of their scriptures by following reasoning alone. Therefore, it is the case that the same consequence (see above, PVSV 167,14-16) applies to them (PVT̥ *Ñe* D51b5-6/P60a4-5 = PVSVT̥ 592,24-26).

⁴⁶ Dharmakīrti now argues that one cannot ascertain (*niś√ci*) someone's reliability (*samvāda*) in regard to something transcendent on account of his reliability in regard to things accessible to perception and inference (PVT̥ *Ñe* D51b7/P60a6-7 and PVSVT̥ 592,28-29).

⁴⁷ Consider the following argument (PVT̥ *Ñe* D52a2-3/P60b1-2): "With regard to something supersensible also, the verbal activity of this superior person, because it is his verbal activity, is reliable, like [his] verbal activity regarding things that are accessible to the [ordinary] *pramāṇas*." Here, the concomitance between the properties "being reliable" (*probandum*) and "being this person's speech" (*probans*) cannot be established for want of a valid cognition that excludes (*bādha*) the presence of the *probans* (here: "verbal activity") in cases dissimilar to the *probandum* (here: "not being reliable"; PVT̥ *Ñe* D52a3/P60b3-4 = PVSVT̥ 593,12).

⁴⁸ The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now objects that in PV 1.215, Dharmakīrti himself accepts a definition of scripture (*āgamalakṣaṇa*) that makes the scripture's partial reliability (*ekadeśāvisamvādana*, i.e., in regard to empirically accessible things) a reason for its overall reliability (i.e., in regard to transcendent things as well; PVT̥ *Ñe* D52a4/P60b4-5 ≈ PVSVT̥ 593,12-15). On Dharmakīrti's doctrine of scriptural authority, see below, pp. 83-118; see also PVSV 173,26-174,2 below, pp. 63-65.

⁴⁹ According to Dharmakīrti, people eager to engage in religious practice (*pravṛttikāma*) cannot live without resorting to scripture (PVSV 108,2-5) because of their co-

tainment [of supersensible things] from [scripture thus defined, and] this is the reason why [we have] also stated [above] that scripture is not a means of valid cognition.⁵⁰ Since the meaning of authorless words [can] be known neither from tradition, nor from reason, nor from the [ordinary] world,⁵¹ it is [only] proper [to say] that there is no cognition [of the meaning] in this case. Objection: In their case too,

ordinary parlance, which is [commonly] established, (PV 1.319a = PVin 2.37a)

is the cause of [our] cognition [of the meaning].⁵²

[Answer:] What [human being] is there in this [world able] to perceive supersensible things, who [could] discriminate the [proper] meaning of [Vedic] words which have multiple meanings?^{53,54} (PV 1.319bcd = PVin 2.37bcd)

gnitive limitations. Now, according to PVSV 108,5–6, if someone is to act according to scripture (*āgamāt pravṛttau*), he would do better (*varam*) to follow a scripture whose statements about empirical matters, at least, have proved to be veracious (PVṬ *Ñe* D52a4–5/P60b5–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 593,15–16). See the references provided above, n. 48, and PVSV 174,1 below, p. 64.

⁵⁰ See below, pp.102–105.

⁵¹ Not from tradition, because there is no preceptor (*daiśika*) at the beginning of a tradition (PVṬ *Ñe* D52a6/P60b8 = PVSVṬ 593,19); not from reason, because the *pramāṇas* do not function with regard to something transcendent (PVṬ *Ñe* D52a6–7/P60b8–61a1 = PVSVṬ 593,20); and not from the world, because there is no concern with following ordinary linguistic conventions (PVṬ *Ñe* D52a7/P61a1–2 ≈ PVSVṬ 593,20–21).

⁵² I.e., the cause of our ascertainment (*niścaya*) of the meaning of the Veda (PVinṬ_{ms} 71b6). And indeed, according to the Mīmāṃsaka opponent, neither is dog meat (*śva-māṃsa*) the thing signified (*vācya*) by the word *agnihotra*, nor is eating (*bhakṣaṇa*) the meaning of *juhuyāt* (PVinṬ_{ms} 71b6). Or, according to Manoranthanandin (PVV 405,20), the word *agni* ordinarily refers to something capable of burning (*dāhā-disamartha*), whereas *hotra* (*havana*) points to pouring ghee, etc. (*ghṛtādiprakṣepa*) into fire.

⁵³ I.e., whose specific meaning is doubtful (*āśaṅkyamānārthaviśeṣa*) because it is not restricted to a single meaning (*ekārthapratīnyama*; PVṬ *Ñe* D52b2/P61a4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 593,26–27). Here, Dharmottara refers to the well-known example of the nine meanings of the word “cow” (*gośabdasya navārthāḥ pratītāḥ*; PVinṬ_{ms} 72a3). On this example, see AKBh 80,28–81,3: *tad yathā gaur ity eṣa śabda navasv artheṣu kṛtāvadhīḥ / vāgdighbhūraśmivajreṣu paśvakṣisvargavāriṣu / navasv artheṣu medhāvī*

Indeed, such ordinary [linguistic] practice is not due to an authorless relation between word and meaning, but to convention⁵⁵ – just like the [linguistic] practice of the Pāṇinīyas, etc., [regarding words like *vrddhi* or *guṇa*] is due to the convention [fixed long ago] by [Pāṇini,] the founder of their science – because it depends on instruction.⁵⁶ ⁵⁷Instruction, indeed, is not justified in the case of such an authorless [relation], since no one knows the [meaning of a Vedic word], because it is supersensible, [and] because if it were sensible, it would follow that it would be cognized of itself [i.e., without any instruction], like visible form, etc. And there can be no confidence in⁵⁸ the instruction of arbitrary⁵⁹ human beings [about supersensible matters], because one cannot establish the reliability [of their instruction] by [verifying that they are] teaching truthfully. Objection: Like the Veda, an authorless expla-

gośabdam upadhārayed iti //. “For example, the word ‘cow’ has been assigned to nine meanings [, as it is said]: ‘The wise should consider the word ‘cow’ [as being used] in regard to nine meanings: speech, region, land, light and diamond, as well as cattle, eye, heaven, and water.’” Note also Yaśomitra’s (AKVy 183,16–17) comment on *tad yathā gaur ity eṣa śabdo navasv artheṣu kṛtāvadhiḥ: etena saṅketāpekṣaḥ śabdo ‘rthaṃ pratyāyayati /*. “Thus [it is only] in dependence on a convention [that] a word communicates a meaning.”

⁵⁴ I.e., there is no person (such as Jaimini or Śabaravāmin) able to discriminate (**vivecana*) the proper meaning of the Vedic words, which are not preceded by a speaker’s intention (PVT *Ñe* D52b3–4/P61a6–7, to be compared with PVSVT 593,27–28).

⁵⁵ Defined as the communication of an intention (*abhiprāyākathana*; PVT *Ñe* D52b4/P61b1 = PVSVT 594,8). See below, PV 1.327 and PVSV 172,19–24, and Eltschinger 2007a: 134–143.

⁵⁶ On Pāṇini (and Piṅgala) in Mīmāṃsā, see ŚBh on MīSū 1.1.5/1.63,5–66,2, ŚBh 42,16–44,12. See also Biardeau 1964: 157–159 and D’Sa 1980: 95–96.

⁵⁷ In PVSV 168,9–11, Dharmakīrti has argued that if ordinary linguistic practice also (*laukiko ‘pi vyavahāraḥ*) were established naturally (*nisargasiddha*), it would not require another person’s instruction (*paropadeśa*). But it actually requires it. Therefore, it is due not to an authorless relation between words and meanings, but to convention. In PVSV 168,11–15, Dharmakīrti now explains why no one can know the meaning of the Veda through conventional linguistic practice (**sāmayikaśābdavyavahāra*; PVT *Ñe* D52b6–7/P61b3–5, to be compared with PVSVT 594,12–14).

⁵⁸ I.e., no ascertainment (*niścaya*) of the meaning of the Veda through... (PVT *Ñe* D53a4/P62a3 = PVSVT 594,25).

⁵⁹ Because, due to their being overcome by defilements such as desire (*rāgādyabhibhava*), those teaching the meaning of the Veda (*vedārthopadeṣṭṛ*) lack any correct knowledge (*samyagjñāna*; PVT *Ñe* D53a3–4/P62a2–3 ≈ PVSVT 594,24–25).

nation of it has also come down [to us] through an unbroken tradition, [and it is] by means of this [explanation that] the meaning [of the Veda] is established. [Answer:] This [explanation] also, being verbal in nature, [is confronted with] the same question [as the Veda]: How is its meaning known? A human being [founding a tradition] can indeed impart ostensibly (*śṛṅgagrāhikayā*) the meanings of words, for which he himself has fixed conventions, to someone who is not yet (*tāvāt*) familiar [with them]. Therefore, there is a means of gaining access to the meaning of words having an author. An authorless word, however, does not do this, and nobody can know the restriction of the relation [of the word] to a certain [supersensible meaning]. Therefore, [there can be] no cognition of its meaning at all. Moreover, the Veda or its explanation [, even though authorless, still] follows an uninterrupted tradition taught by one human to [another] human. Thus in this case too, an oath (*samaya*) [swearing that it is true] is all you have to fall back on.⁶⁰ For one observes that the destroyers of scripture falsify [it] either out of pride, or due to hostility towards its doctrines (*darśana*),⁶¹ or out of sheer malevolence in order to humiliate those who adhere to them (*pratipanna*), or for some other reason. Moreover, out of attachment to your own theory you have forgotten the color of your [own] face (*mukhavarna*)⁶² now that it comes to (*atra*) [determining the meaning

⁶⁰ Because there is no *pramāṇa* enabling one to ascertain (**niścāyakapramāṇa*) its meaning (compare PVT *Ñe* D53b4/P62b6 and PVSVT 595,17–18). *samaya* is explained as *śapathādi* in PVT D53b4/P62b6–7 ≈ PVSVT 595,18. On the Indian oath, see Hara 1991; on the juridico-philosophical use of the oath, see Eltschinger 2007a: 302 n. 339.

⁶¹ Out of pride, as the Sāṅkhyasiddhānta was altered (*anyathāracana*) by Mādhava, the destroyer of Sāṅkhya (*sāṅkhyānāśaka*; PVT *Ñe* D53b5–6/P62b8–63a1 = PVSVT 595,21–22; on Mādhava as a *sāṅkhyānāśaka*, see Hattori 1968: 134 n. 4.16 and 155 n. 5.40); due to hostility, as the enemies of the Mahāyāna (*mahāyānavidviṣṭa*) composed (pseudo-)Mahāyānasūtras expounding a counterfeit Mahāyāna (*mahāyāna-pratirūpaka*; PVT *Ñe* D53b6/P63a1–2 ≈ PVSVT 595,22–23).

⁶² So that you are now looking for (*pra√arth*) the ascertainment of the meaning of the Veda from humans who, according to your most characteristic doctrine, are tarnished by defilements such as desire (*rāgādimalina*; PVT *Ñe* D54a1–2/P63a5–6 = PVSVT 595,29). Skt. *svam eva mukhavarnam* is rendered *bdag ñid kyis khas blaṅs pa* in PVSVTib D361a2/P528b3–4 and PVT *Ñe* D54a1/P63a5, and explained by the synonymous *svābhyupagama* in PVSVT 595,28–29: “the color of your own face,” viz., your most characteristic tenet, which Dharmakīrti gives in PVSV 169,1–2.

of the Veda, namely, the idea that] since a human being afflicted with [moral defects] such as desire, may also speak what is false, his speech is not a means of valid cognition. Why don't [you] consider⁶³ whether this [falsehood] is present or not in this [tradition of exegesis] too? [For,] due to being afflicted [by moral defects] this very [person] teaching the Veda or the meaning of the Veda may also teach falsely. ⁶⁴Indeed, we hear from certain people⁶⁵ that there are certain Vedic schools which have reappeared after nearly dying out – even today, some have very few reciters.⁶⁶ [Therefore, those who teach and recite the Veda now may very well do it falsely] for, like the [schools which now have only a few reciters, those schools] which have numerous reciters could have somehow declined at a certain time [in the past], since one can suppose that [the reciters] grew again in number due to [their] confidence⁶⁷ in a person esteemed [to be an authority]. And [thus, there is doubt about their reliability for three reasons: First,] because those who restored [the Vedic schools which had declined], having sometimes forgotten the recitation [which they had] learned, could have taught it falsely on account of such [motives] as fear that they would lose the esteem (*sambhāvanā*) of others;⁶⁸ and [second,]

⁶³ I.e., without partisanship for Jaimini, etc. (**jaiminyādīpakṣapāta*; PVT *Ñe* D54a3–4/P63a7–b1).

⁶⁴ In talking, in PVSV 169,4–15, about the demise of Vedic schools (*śākhā*), Dharmakīrti provides additional reasons for distrusting (*āśaṅkākaṛaṇ[āntar]a*) traditional Vedic exegesis (PVT *Ñe* D54a5/P63b3 ≈ PVSVT 596,11).

⁶⁵ I.e., from Jaimini, etc., according to Śākyabuddhi (PVT *Ñe* D54a5/P63b3), or from Yājñavalkya, etc., according to Kaṛṇakagomin (PVSVT 596,11–12). However, there is no mention of such a thing in either the MiSū or the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*.

⁶⁶ PVSVT 596,14–15 adduces the *Āhūrakas*, etc., as an example. *Āhūraka* seems not to be attested as a designation for a Vedic school/recension, but according to AVP 49.2,1, the *Āhvarakāḥ* form one of the twenty-four divisions (*bheda*) of the Yajurveda.

⁶⁷ I.e., due to the fact that they acknowledge his (personal) authority (*prāmāṇya*; PVT *Ñe* D54b2/P64a1 ≈ PVSVT 596,20–21). See also below, p. 48 n. 69.

⁶⁸ I.e., of other reciters who have placed their faith in them (*tadabhiprasanna*; PVT *Ñe* D54b5/P64a6 = PVSVT 596,28). Their fear can be expressed as follows: “If I didn't at least (*api*) teach [something] otherwise [i.e., falsely, rather than saying nothing at all], they [would] immediately lose [their] confidence in me as someone who is trustworthy” (PVT *Ñe* D54b5–6/P64a6–7 ≈ PVSVT 596,29–30: *yady aham anyathāpi nopadiśeyaṃ nūnam ete mayy āptasambhāvanāṃ jahātīti /*). (I.e., if I don't fake it, I'll

because, due to [their] confidence in the [person believed to be an authority], his devotees [could have] practiced (*pratipatteḥ*) [his recitation] carelessly, for one observes [nowadays] that among the many reciters [of the Veda, recitation] practice [proceeds] mostly because of a person who is esteemed [as trustworthy];⁶⁹ [and third,] because deception can arise somehow⁷⁰ from that [sort of person] also. Furthermore, we hear that your own [tradition] regarding the [interpretation of the Veda has] also [consisted in] a succession of human expositors [at times] limited in number. Since among them, one could also have been either hostile, ignorant, or malevolent, there can be no confidence [in your explanation of the Veda].

Therefore, the meaning of the Veda [can be] established neither through an authorless explanation nor through ordinary [linguistic] practice, which is conventional. [Ordinary linguistic practice cannot establish it for two reasons: first,] because even if [Vedic words] were not conventional, words are seen to have various meanings in [ordinary linguistic] practice; therefore doubt [about the meaning] would not cease for any [word],⁷¹ for [even in the case of Vedic words] one observes that a certain [word] of uncommon meaning or an uncommon [word] has [to be] explained anew.⁷² ⁷³[Second,] because, whatever

lose their trust!) Additional motives include pride, hostility, and malevolence (see above, PVSV 168,24–26; PVT *Ñe* D54b6/P64a7–8 ≈ PVSVT 596,30–31).

⁶⁹ I.e., because of a person whose personal authority (*puruṣaprāmāṇya*; PVSVT 597, 11–12) is acknowledged by the reciters, or due to their confidence in a human being who is or has become an authority (**pramāṇabhūtapuruṣa*; PVT *Ñe* D55a1/P64b2–3). On *pramāṇabhūta*(*puruṣa*), see Krasser 2001.

⁷⁰ I.e., because of motives such as a teacher's fear of losing the esteem of others (PVT *Ñe* D55a2–3/P64b4–5 ≈ PVSVT 597,15).

⁷¹ The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that only ordinary (*laukika*) words are polysemic (*nānārtha*), not Vedic ones (PVT *Ñe* D55b1/P65a5–6 = PVSVT 597,26).

⁷² As a consequence, one may again wonder whether the interpreter teaches the correct (*yathāsthita*) meaning of these Vedic words or an erroneous (*viparīta*) one (PVT *Ñe* D55b2–3/P65a7–8 ≈ PVSVT 597,28–30).

⁷³ The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that, since Vedic words do not generate the cognition (**pratīti*) of their meaning if they are used in a way contrary (**anyathā*) to the desired meaning (**abhimatārtha*), they have only one meaning (**ekārtha*). In other words, these words behave differently according to whether they are used to designate a desired (**iṣṭa*) or undesired (**aniṣṭa*) meaning (PVT *Ñe* D55b5–6/P65b3–4, to be compared with PVSVT 598,12).

meaning [the word] may be employed for, all [words, both ordinary and Vedic,] generate the understanding [of a meaning] indifferently (*avaigunyenā*) according to a convention, since there is no difference⁷⁴ between [meanings which are] desired and undesired [for followers of the Veda].⁷⁵ Who among average human beings, who do not perceive the supersensible, could discriminate for [Vedic words which are in themselves] indifferent with regard to all meanings, the one [correct] meaning, whose connection [with the word] is supersensible, so that (*yataḥ*) the understanding could arise from the [ordinary] world? Moreover, even the [Mīmāṃsaka] himself does not comply with common usage⁷⁶ in every case, because

words such as⁷⁷ *svarga* and *urvaśī* are seen to express an unconventional meaning (PV 1.320ab = PVin 2.38ab)

when [they] are interpreted by him. According to ordinary parlance (*iti lokavādaḥ*) heaven is the abode of special beings (*puruṣaviśeṣa*) superior to [ordinary] human beings, a place of divine pleasure, offering abundant enjoyments, [while] the one called *Urvaśī* is a nymph residing there. How can the [Mīmāṃsaka], disregarding this [ordinary parlance and] proposing a totally new (*anya*) meaning,⁷⁸ set up common

⁷⁴ I.e., no difference in generating the understanding (*pratīṭijanana*; PVT *Ñe* D55b6/P65b5 = PVSVT 598,13).

⁷⁵ Because no words are either inherently close to or remote from any particular meaning (*pratyāsattiviprakarṣābhāvena*; PVT *Ñe* D55b6/P65b5 = PVSVT 598,13). See above, p. 41 n. 36.

⁷⁶ So that one could gain access to the meaning of the Veda through commonly established linguistic practice (compare PVT *Ñe* D56a1/P65b8–66a1 and PVSVT 598,17–18).

⁷⁷ Additional words with unconventional meaning include *nandanavana* (Tib. *dga' ba'i tshal*, i.e., *nandana-vana*, “[Indra’s] pleasure grove;” PVT *Ñe* D56a2–3/P66a2 = PVSVT 598,19).

⁷⁸ According to ŚBh V.72,6–7 on MīSū 4.3.15 as well as ŚBh V.179,11–180,5 on MīSū 6.1.2, *svarga* is to be defined as happiness or delight (*prīti*; see below, pp. 139–140 n. 78; cf. Eltschinger 2007a: 244 n. 130). As for *urvaśī*, it is explained by Dharmakīrti’s commentators as a piece of wood used for kindling fire (*araṇ*) or as a vessel (*pātrī*; PVT *Ñe* D56a4–5/P66a5–6 ≈ PVSVT 598,25–26; PVV 406,9; note that PVinT_{ms} 72a has only *araṇī*). The *apsaras* *Urvaśī* is prominent in Vedic and Hindu mythology. Dharmakīrti must have been familiar with the story of *Urvaśī* and her human consort, king *Purūravas*, which is told in the HV (App. I.6 [found in some

usage as the criterion in the case of other words [such as *agnihotra*]? Objection: Since in the case [of words such as *agnihotra*] there is no contradiction [of the postulate of the common meaning], we accept

mss. after HV 21.10 of the critical edition]) and various *Purāṇas*, and which is the theme of Kālidāsa's drama the *Vikramorvaśīya*; it goes all the way back to RV 10.95 and ŚB 11.5.1. Other stories of Urvaśī – about her seducing Ṛṣyaśṛṅga and attempting to seduce Arjuna – are found in the *Mahābhārata* (Hopkins 1974: 162). A reference to *urvaśī* as *araṇi* remains to be traced in the Mīmāṃsā literature. Nevertheless, one may guess that Dharmakīrti was aware of Mīmāṃsā explanations of the mantras to be applied during the kindling of the fire by friction (*agnimanthana*) in the Soma sacrifice, namely, *agnér janītram asi vṛṣaṇau stha urvāśy asy āyūr asi purūrāvā ghṛtenākté vṛṣaṇam dadhāthām* (TaitS 1.3.7.1h–l; for the corresponding *brāhmaṇa* see TaitS 6.3.5.2–3) (also: *agnér janītram asi vṛṣaṇau stha urvāśy asy āyūr asi purūrāvā asi*; MaitS 1.2.7; *brāhmaṇa* MaitS 3.9.5). The *adhvaryu* priest mutters, “Thou art Urvaśī,” while picking up the lower *araṇi* and, “Thou art Purūravas (or: Āyus),” while picking up the upper. In other words, Urvaśī is taken by the ritualists to refer, not to a heavenly nymph, which is the common meaning of the word, but to one of the kindling sticks! See also VādhŚSū 5.2.1.4 (Voegeli 2010: II.24), BaudhŚSū 20.27; BhārŚSū 7.9.13–15; ĀpŚSū 7.12.13–14; VaikhŚSū 8.5, 10.10. For a discussion, see Voegeli 2010: I.165–167; see also Gonda 1988: 229 (VājS 5.2c and ŚB 3.4.1.22). We are not aware of any identification of *urvaśī* with a *pātrī* (a kind of dish by which the *adhvaryu* brings the *idā* portion of the *paśupuroḍāśa* to the *brahman* priest, or to the *āgnīdhra* priest, according to Voegeli 2010: I.173). *nandanavana*, the other example mentioned by Karṇakagomin and Śākyabuddhi of a word used by Mīmāṃsakas in violation of its common meaning (see above, p. 49 n. 77), poses a special problem, because not only is there no known Mīmāṃsā treatment of it but it does not occur in any Vedic mantra, either. In epic and later literature it is the name of the pleasure grove in Indra's city where gods and saints dwell (MBhār 1.84.17, 3.78.3, 12.329.19; see Hopkins 1974: 141). It seems relevant to mention here that it was a general principle of Mīmāṃsā that proper names in the Veda do not refer to “non-eternal” entities; there is “merely a similarity of sound” of some words in the Veda (Śabara mentions *babara prāvāhaṇi* and *kusumavinda auddālakī*) to proper names (MīSū 1.1.31, *paraṇ tu śrutisāmānyamātram*). They, in effect, refer to concepts. It is possible that *urvaśī* was explained in this way as well by some Mīmāṃsakas. Yāska gives etymologies of *urvaśī* at Nir 5.13: *uru abhyaśnute, ūrubhyām aśnute, urur vā yaśo 'syāḥ*, “She ranges widely, or she pervades with her thighs, or her desire is extensive.” Whether Dharmakīrti had in mind this kind of explanation of *urvaśī* or, as his commentators imply, the explanation about Urvaśī rubbing together with Purūravas (as one of the kindling sticks), he must have thought it was a good joke! See also below, pp. 126–127.

[it].⁷⁹ [Answer:] No, because in the case [of words such as *svarga* and *urvaśī*] a contradiction of the [common meaning, which is] something supersensible, is not established, [and] because in the other case [i.e., in the case of words such as *agnihotra*, the fact that it] is not contradicted is hard to grasp.⁸⁰ Even if the attainment of heaven by [performing] the Agnihotra were contradicted [by other *pramāṇas*], this [expositor of the Veda] would not even notice it due to [his] dullness. Moreover, contradiction and non-contradiction are [nothing but, on the one hand,] the occurrence of a means of valid cognition which negates [something, e.g., non-perception,] and [, on the other hand,] the [occurrence] of a means of valid cognition which establishes [something, i.e., perception or inference]; but neither of these is admitted [as possible] in the case of something supersensible. How, then, could one ever understand [that a Vedic word has the commonly accepted meaning or some other meaning] due to them?⁸¹ ⁸²And it is not the case that there is no contradiction [of the commonly accepted meaning] just due to the

⁷⁹ On the other hand, since there is a contradiction of the common meaning in the case of words such as *svarga* and *urvaśī*, we don't accept it (PVT *Ñe* D56a7/P66a8–b1 ≈ PVSVT 598,30–31).

⁸⁰ In the case of words such as *svarga* and *urvaśī* one would require a *pramāṇa* that opposes (*bādhaka*) the common meaning (PVT *Ñe* D56b1/P66b3 ≈ PVSVT 599,8) in resorting to another meaning, viz. non-perception (*anupalambha*; PVT *Ñe* D56b4 [with no equivalent in P66b6] = PVSVT 599,14). In the case of words such as *agnihotra* one would require a *pramāṇa* that establishes (*sādhaka*) the common meaning (compare PVT *Ñe* D56b2/P66b4 and PVSVT 599,9–10), viz., perception or inference (PVT *Ñe* D56b4/P66b6 = PVSVT 599,14–15). But since these words refer to supersensible things and no *pramāṇa*, negative or positive, functions with regard to such things (PVT *Ñe* D56b5/P66b7–8 ≈ PVSVT 599,16–17), a contradiction can be neither established nor ruled out.

⁸¹ I.e., that *svarga* and *urvaśī* do not have the commonly established meaning (*aprasiddhārtha*) because of a contradiction (*virodhavaśāt*), and that *agnihotra* has the commonly established meaning (*prasiddhārtha*) because of non-contradiction (*avirodhavaśāt*; compare PVT *Ñe* D56b6–7/P67a1–2 and PVSVT 599,18–19; PVT *Ñe* D56b6/P66b8 = PVSVT 599,18).

⁸² The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that non-contradiction does not consist in the operation (*vṛtti*) of a positive *pramāṇa* (which, he seems to agree, is impossible in regard to the supersensible realm), but just in the occurrence (*pravṛtti*) of a statement of the *agnihotra*, termed “scripture” (*āgamasāñjīta*), as expressive (*vācaka*) of the commonly established meaning (PVT *Ñe* D56b7–57a1/P67a2–3 ≈ PVSVT 599,20–22).

occurrence of the [Vedic] statement [in the case of *agnihotra*], for [that⁸³] would follow in the other case as well [i.e., in the case of words such as *svarga* and *urvaśī*].⁸⁴ [Furthermore, your] scripture [called the Veda] is [supposedly] authorless [but it does not reveal its own meaning by itself; on the contrary, you say] its meaning is established through the [ordinary way of] talking. But if in [following the latter you] are concerned about contradictions, then there can be no confidence in [any part of that] scripture.⁸⁵ For even if this [scripture] is [authorless], the meaning [of *svarga* and *urvaśī* understood by you] is unlike [the commonly accepted one]; therefore, another [word such as *agnihotra*] too can be suspected [of having a different meaning], for there is no *pramāṇa*.⁸⁶ [Objection:] When [you] state that one can conceive the [Vedic statement] “One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra” as enjoining⁸⁷ (*deśanā*) that one should eat dog meat, [we reply that] this is not [the case], because this [statement] is repeated in [exactly] this way in other passages [of the Veda itself]. [Answer:] No, because, the meaning of this [statement occurring in other passages] not being comprehended [either], the conjecture that [these] other [Vedic] passages also have such a meaning cannot be excluded. If this authorless multitude of words had a known meaning in one particular [passage], then one could indeed understand the meaning [of these other passages] from that. But since, even though there are so many of them, all these [words remain] completely obscure, they are fixed [in their meaning] arbitrarily. Therefore,

⁸³ I.e., non-contradiction with the commonly established meaning (PVT *Ñe* D57a1-2/P67a4-5).

⁸⁴ Because one observes that in common usage (*loka*) words such as *svarga* and *urvaśī* are employed to refer to a specific place (*sthānaviśeṣa*) and a specific nymph (*apsaroviśeṣa*). Since that is the same for *agnihotra* – it is commonly used to refer to a sacrifice – one should adopt (*parigraha*) the commonly established meaning either for both – i.e., *svarga/urvaśī* and *agnihotra* – or for neither (PVT *Ñe* D57a2-3/P67a5-6 = PVSVT 599,24-26).

⁸⁵ Because with regard to something supersensible it is impossible to ascertain either a contradiction or the absence of one (PVT *Ñe* D57a4-5/P67b1 ≈ PVSVT 599,29-30).

⁸⁶ I.e., there is no *pramāṇa* allowing one to adopt (*grahaṇa*) the commonly established meaning in this case (PVT *Ñe* D57a7-b1/P67b5-6 = PVSVT 600,14-15).

⁸⁷ On *deśanā/codanā*, see Gnoli 1960: 170 n. ad line 6.

in the case of other [explanatory] statements of this type,⁸⁸ the conjecture ought to be exactly the same (PV 1.320cd = PVin 2.38cd)

as for the sentence “One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra.”⁸⁹ Moreover,

common usage is human parlance (*nṛṇām vādaḥ*); and this [parlance] is not accepted [by you] as a *pramāṇa*. But on the other hand it is from that that one gains access to the meaning [of the Veda]. Why [do you both] approve and disapprove of this? (PV 1.321 = PVin 2.40)

What is called common usage is nothing other than the way humans talk; and since [they are] filled with [moral defects] such as desire, and by nescience, all people make statements whose truth cannot be assumed.⁹⁰ Therefore, their talk is not a *pramāṇa*.⁹¹ Indeed, [the fact that there are] many [people who conduct themselves in a certain way] is worthless [as an argument], if there is not even one [person among them] who acts correctly, just like [incest does not become acceptable just because all] Persians misbehave with [their] mothers.⁹² [But]

⁸⁸ I.e., in similar statements that serve as explanations (*vyākhyābhūta*) of phrases (*vākya*) such as *agnihotram juhuyāt* (PVT *Ñe* D57b5/P68a5 = PVSVT 600,27–28).

⁸⁹ Between PV 1.320 (= PVin 2.38) and PV 1.321 (= PVin 2.40), PVin 2 has one stanza with no equivalent in the PV. PVin 2.39 (see Steinkellner 1979: 74): *aprasiddhārthayogasya tatprasiddhiprasādhane / nāsiddhārthaḥ svayaṃ śaktas tulyaparyanuyogataḥ //*. “[An additional Vedic passage, being] of unknown meaning [also], is by itself [i.e., independently of any human intention,] incapable of establishing that common usage [as the meaning] of a [statement] with an unknown connection with its meaning, because the same question [would arise regarding this additional passage too, namely, How does one ascertain its connection to its meaning?].” For Dharmottara’s commentary on this stanza, see PVinT_{ms} 72b1–2/PVinT_{Tib} Dze 228b6–229a1.

⁹⁰ For analyses of the compound *asambhāvanīyāthātathyavacanāḥ* (called a *’bru mañ po’i sñiñ po can gyi ’bru mañ po pa’o*, i.e., a **bahuvrīgharbhō bahuvrīhiḥ*, PVT *Ñe* D58a3/P68b5), see PVSVT 601,16–17, and especially PVT *Ñe* D58a2–3/P68b3–5.

⁹¹ The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that since these people are many (*bāhulyāj janasya*), their talk (*tatpravāda*) is a *pramāṇa* after all (PVT *Ñe* D58a4/P68b6–7 = PVSVT 601,20).

⁹² On this and similar statements regarding Persians, see Eltschinger 2007a: 312 n. 377, Silk 2008a and 2008b.

since, on the other hand, it is from the speech of those very human beings that the imperceptible (*parokṣa*) meaning is arrived at, how can this [ordinary speech] be simultaneously approved and disapproved of?

But if [you see] no reason to ignore common usage and postulate [another meaning], what reason [do you have] to adopt it, given that common usage is not a *pramāṇa*? (PV 1.322 ≈ PVin 2.41)

Objection: Using [words] in another [meaning] contrary to the [meaning] obtained [from common usage] is justified [only if] one observes an advantage [in the uncommon meaning] and a defect [in the common one]. [If this is not the case,⁹³ then [we] follow common usage. [Answer:] No, because the obtaining [of a meaning] is defined as the occurrence of a *pramāṇa* [which establishes it. But] for the [Mīmāṃsaka], who does not set up common usage as a *pramāṇa*, the understanding [of the meaning obtained] by means of this [common usage] is a haphazard grasping (*yatkiñcanagrahaṇa*) indeed, because [by rejecting common usage] he [in effect] prohibits [the meaning] from being obtained according to a rule (*nyāyāt*).⁹⁴ Since the way [your] own and [your] adversary's conceptions [of the meaning⁹⁵ are arrived at] is the same [as regards its arbitrariness] in both ways [i.e., whether one preserves common usage or not],⁹⁶ what is [this] privilege [given] to common usage? Moreover,

it is precisely because of common usage that ^{PVSV}this^{PVSV} doubt regarding the ascertainment of the meaning of words has

⁹³ I.e., if, as in the case of words such as *agnihotra*, one observes neither a defect in the commonly established meaning nor an advantage in the unconventional one (*aprasiddha*; PVT *Ñe* D58b3-4/P69a7-8 ≈ PVSVT 602,11-12).

⁹⁴ Consequently, since the meaning arrived at is devoid of any *pramāṇa* (**niṣpramāṇaka*), the meaning of words such as *agnihotra* can only be postulated arbitrarily (*icchayā parikalpanīyah*; compare PVT *Ñe* D58b6-59a1/P69b5-7 and PVSVT 602,19-21).

⁹⁵ For the Mīmāṃsaka the meaning of words such as *agnihotra* consists in a burning substance, etc. (*dahanadravyādi*), whereas for his adversary, it consists in the eating of dog meat (*śvamāṃsabhakṣaṇa*; PVT *Ñe* D59a1-2/P69b7-8 ≈ PVSVT 602,22-23).

⁹⁶ I.e., in both cases, the adoption (*parigraha*) of the meaning is made arbitrarily for want of any *pramāṇa* (PVT *Ñe* D59a2/P69b8-70a1 = PVSVT 602,23-25).

arisen, for in that [common usage] words [like *agni*] are seen to have various meanings.⁹⁷ (PV 1.323 = PVin 2.42)

It is not the case that one can ascertain the one [correct] meaning [of Vedic] words from common usage, for it is precisely due to it that doubt arises, because words [like *agni*] are seen to have various meanings in the world. But common usage (*pratīti*) is ordinary parlance, [and] it is due to this [ordinary parlance that words] have various meanings. Therefore, one is not justified in restricting [Vedic words] to a single meaning on the basis of it.

Because it is not impossible that an utterance of itself possessed of various capacities, [could refer] otherwise [than to

⁹⁷ Between PV 1.323 (= PVin 2.42) and PV 1.324 (= PVin 2.45), PVin 2 has two stanzas that have no equivalent in the PV. PVin 2.43–44 (see Steinkellner 1979: 75–76): *na yuktibādhā yatrsti tad grāhyam laukikam yadi / grhyate vātaputriyaṃ kiṃ na yuktyā na bādhitam // āgamārthāśrayā yuktir atyakṣeṣu na cetarā / tadarthasyāpratiṣṭhānād yukter atra na sambhavaḥ //*. “[Objection: Only] this [ordinary meaning] is to be adopted for which there is no invalidation by reasoning [i.e., by the *pramāṇas*]. [Answer:] If [only] the ordinary [meaning that is not invalidated by reasoning is to be adopted], why is the swindler’s [speech] not adopted [as long as it is] not invalidated by reasoning? [Moreover, the kind of] reasoning [that operates] regarding imperceptible [things] is [that] based on [a *trairūpya* derived from] the meaning of scripture, and not the other [kind, i.e., the kind whose *trairūpya* proceeds by the force of something real. But] since the meaning of this [scripture remains] unestablished, reasoning is impossible here.” For Dharmottara’s commentary on these two stanzas, see PVinṠ_{ms} 73a1–6/PVinṠ_{Tib} Dze 229a6–b4 and PVinṠ_{ms} 73a6–b3/PVinṠ_{Tib} Dze 229b4–230a1. The kind of reasoning alluded to here, i.e., the *āgamārthāśrayā yuktiḥ*, is of course the scripturally based inference (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*) of PV 1.215/PVSV 109,1–3 (see Eltschinger 2007a: 105–109), PV 4.48–51 and 106–108 (see Tillemans 2000: 78–82 and 147–153). See below, pp. 111–115. All the elements that constitute such an inference, including the three characteristics of the logical reason, are based on scripture (*āgamasiddha*, NBṠ 81,19; see also NBṠv 130,1–3 and PVV 410,18–411,1; see Moriyama, forthcoming). Note that PVin 2.44cd resorts to the two successive uses or stages of reasoning that apply in the exegesis of “ordinary” treatises (*śāstra*): “Indeed, the entire meaning of a treatise must be determined by reasoning. And once the meaning of the treatise has been determined [by reasoning], scripturally based reasoning proceeds by resorting to the meaning [as it is] known from other passages [in the same treatise]” (PVinṠ_{ms} 73b1–2/PVinṠ_{Tib} Dze 229b6–7: *yuktyā hi sarvaḥ śāstrārtho^a vyavasthāpaniḥ / vyavasthite ca śāstrārthe yuktir^b āgamāśrayā^c pradeśāntaraprasiddhārthāpekṣayā pravartate /*. ^a PVinṠ_{Tib} *bstan bcos thams cad kyi don [*sarvaśāstrārthaḥ]*; ^b PVinṠ_{Tib} *rjes su dpag pa [anumānam]*; ^c PVinṠ_{Tib} *luṅ gi don la brten pa [*āgamārthāśrayam]*).

the desired meaning], there must necessarily arise doubt for those who do not see any restricting [factor].⁹⁸ (PV 1.324 = PVin 2.45)

This is an intermediate stanza.

Therefore, Jaimini, when explaining [the Veda], attributes a single [desired] meaning to words whose [proper] interpretation (*arthavibhāga*) is unknown, [a meaning] whose connection [with the word] is super-sensible [and] whose ascription is without foundation;⁹⁹ [in this way,] it is just his own conception which he formulates in this guise [i.e., in the guise of the Veda itself].¹⁰⁰ Thus, we do not see how he differs from other founders of religions.¹⁰¹ For to say [that the Veda,] which [in fact] lacks the capacity to express that [desired] meaning, [expresses it] by [falsely] ascribing that [capacity] to it, amounts to nothing more than one's own assertion. Somebody who does that only brings to light his own bad breeding,¹⁰² for

[Asked about the way to Pāṭaliputra,] one [person says,] “This post says that this is the way,¹⁰³” [whereas] another [answers,] “[The post can't say anything,] I myself say [that this is the way].” One should inquire [whether there is any] difference between the two. (PV 1.325 = PVin 2.46)

⁹⁸ I.e., any *pramāṇa* establishing (*sādhaka*) the object to which this utterance is restricted (*pratiniyataviṣaya*; PVT *Ñe* D59b1/P70b2 = PVSVT 603,16–17). PVinT_{ms} 74a1 explains: *niyāmakaṃ hetum apaśyatām*, and Manorathanandin (PVV 407,8–9): *anekārthasyaikavṛttiniyamakāraṇam apaśyatām*.

⁹⁹ I.e., devoid of any *pramāṇa* (*niṣpramāṇaka*; PVT *Ñe* D59b3/P70b4–5 ≈ PVSVT 603,20–21).

¹⁰⁰ I.e., by referring to the Veda (*vedopakṣepa*), saying that it is the Veda that says so (PVT *Ñe* D59b4/P70b6 = PVSVT 603,22–23).

¹⁰¹ Because the founders of religions (*tīrthakara*) say honestly (*nirvyājam*) that they are speaking on their own (*svayam*; PVT *Ñe* D59b4/P70b6–7 ≈ PVSVT 603,23–24).

¹⁰² Because he is like a person who would indicate a wrong way (*lam log pa*) in order to mislead a group of persons having lost their way (*lam draṅ po*; PVT *Ñe* D59b7–60a1/P71a3–4).

¹⁰³ I.e., indicates the way in the guise (*vyājena*) of a post that actually lacks the capacity of speaking (PVT *Ñe* D60a2/P71a5–6 = PVSVT 604,12–13).

One indicates [the way] by ascribing [expressiveness] to the post which is devoid of intention, exertion,¹⁰⁴ and speech, and (*vā*) [another indicates the way] independently.¹⁰⁵ When it comes to following their statements, there is no difference [between them] except for the slowness (*pratipattimāndya*) of the stupid [person who fails to understand that the former is speaking “in the guise of the post”].

Moreover, if [a given Vedic word really] were restricted to a single meaning, Jaimini would know it.

[But] where does ^{PVSV}this very^{PVSV} restriction to illumining a single meaning come from for a ^{PVSV}word^{PVSV} which is capable of [referring to] any [meaning]? (PV 1.326ab ≈ PVin 2.47ab)

Indeed, there is no meaning of a word that is restricted [to it] by nature, because it is suitable for any [meaning],¹⁰⁶ and because if it were not suitable [for any meaning], humans could not [arbitrarily] apply [it] or no longer apply [it] to something. For it would not be under [their] control, since it would never lose this [nature of *not* being suitable for *any* meaning].

¹⁰⁷Or, by whom [are] supersensible [things such as semantic restrictions] known in the absence of a statement of the speaker’s intention? (PV 1.326cd = PVin 2.47cd)

¹⁰⁴ Intention is defined as the resolve (*cetanā*) to do this or that; exertion, as the effort (*prayatna*) that follows (*pūrvaka*) such an intention (PVT *Ñe* D60a3/P71a8 = PVSVT 604,16–17).

¹⁰⁵ I.e., without resorting to the post (*sthāṇunirapekṣa*; PVT *Ñe* D60a4/P71b1 = PVSVT 604,19).

¹⁰⁶ According to Dharmakīrti’s doctrine of *yogyatā*, any word is suitable (*yogyā*) for any meaning whatsoever. On *yogyatā*, see Tillemans 1997 and Eltschinger 2007a: 134–138.

¹⁰⁷ Dharmakīrti now provisionally accepts (*bhavatu vā*) that Vedic words are restricted to a single meaning (*ekārthanīyama*; compare PVT *Ñe* D60b3/P72a3 with PVSVT 605,11–12). In PV 1.326cd, Dharmakīrti conflates two Mīmāṃsā doctrines into one argument. Even if natural semantic restrictions exist, they are supersensible; now, the Mīmāṃsaka rejects the possibility that humans perceive supersensible things (PVSVT 605,12–13). Moreover, these semantic restrictions are authorless according to Mīmāṃsā; therefore, they do not originate from an original speaker’s (*vaktr*) intention (*abhiprāya*), the announcing (*kathana*) of which provides the only clue to

In the case of a word pronounced by a person with a certain intention, he might indeed at a certain time communicate¹⁰⁸ that [intention] to a certain [hearer]; therefore, one could very well understand the semantic restriction (*arthaniyama*) of [those] words [which are] preceded by a speaker's intention. But in the case of an authorless [word], how could [this] semantic restriction be cognized, even if it exists? For [Vedic words] do not have a specific nature;¹⁰⁹ or, if they did, it would follow, if it were perceptible, that it would be cognized by itself. [And] if it were imperceptible, it could not be known by anybody, either. And there is no difference [i.e., no specific nature at all], for words are never [inherently] close to or remote from any meaning.¹¹⁰ Therefore,

the speaker's intention is the cause of PVSV these^{PVSV} [words'¹¹¹ being restricted [to a single meaning, and] the convention [is that which] reveals this [intention].¹¹² [Since] an authorless

understanding the meaning (PVSVṬ 605,14-15). Unless otherwise stated, subsequent occurrences of "(speaker's) intention" translate the Sanskrit term *vivakṣā*.

¹⁰⁸ I.e., teach that this or that is intended (*vivakṣita*) as the meaning (*vācya*) of the word he uses (PVT *Ñe* D60b4-5/P72a5 ≈ PVSVṬ 605,17-18).

¹⁰⁹ I.e., Vedic words do not have the nature of being restricted to a single desired (*abhi-mata*) meaning, the cognition (*darśana*) of which nature would bring about the understanding (*pratīti*) of the desired meaning (*iṣṭārtha*; PVT *Ñe* D60b6/P72a7-8 ≈ PVSVṬ 605,20-21; or, according to PVinṬ_{ms} 74b1: the cognition of which would enable one to know the word's restriction to its meaning [*yaddarśanād arthaniya-mapratītiḥ syāt*]). Dharmakīrti uses a *reductio ad absurdum* (PVT *Ñe* D61a1/P72b2 ≈ PVSVṬ 605,26) to disprove such a nature, first by considering the hypothesis that this nature is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*), i.e., that its cognition does not depend on instruction (*upadeśanirapekṣa*; PVT *Ñe* D60b7/P72b1 = PVSVṬ 605,23), and second, by considering the hypothesis that it is imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*) to persons of limited cognitive ability (*arvāgdarśana*; PVT *Ñe* D61a1/P72b2 = PVSVṬ 605,24-25; PVT *Ñe* D60b6-7/P72a8-b1 = PVSVṬ 605,21-23).

¹¹⁰ See above, PVSV 167,11, and p. 41 n. 36.

¹¹¹ I.e., of these words that are inherently suitable for any meaning, or naturally (*svabhāvatas*) the same (*tulya*) for all meanings (*sarvārtha*; PVT *Ñe* D61a2/P72b4 = PVSVṬ 605,28-29).

¹¹² I.e., it is due to a convention that one understands that a certain person intended a certain meaning (*ayam arthas tena vivakṣita iti*; PVT *Ñe* D61a2-3/P72b5 ≈ PVSVṬ 605,30-31). According to Dharmottara (PVinṬ_{ms} 74b3-5, to be compared with PVinṬ_{Tib} Dze 230b8-231a1), a speaker "conventionalizes" (*saṅketayati*) that very meaning (*abhidheya*) which he intends; those instructed (*vyutpanna*) at that time

[word] lacks this [intention], how does it have a single meaning? (PV 1.327 = PVin 2.48)

[It is] indeed due to the speaker's intention [that] a word is restricted to a [certain] meaning, not its nature, for the [word] is the same for every [meaning] since it lacks a relation to anything. [Words] are not even restricted to designating that to which [they do have] a relation, otherwise all words would designate the vocal organs.¹¹³ Therefore, in order to reveal the speaker's intention, a convention is made, which is defined as the communicating of an intention. But in the case of an authorless [word, there is] neither a speaker's intention nor, [precisely] because of the lack of anyone's intention, a convention [for revealing it].¹¹⁴ Thus [there is] neither restriction [to a certain meaning,] nor [could there be] knowledge of it [if there were one].

If [one were to accept] a natural restriction, [then a Vedic word] could not be connected again by the [speaker's intention] with another [meaning]. (PV 1.328ab = PVin 2.49ab)

If [one were to accept that] a word is joined with meanings due to its very nature, independent[ly] of [any] convention, [then the reply] to

will instruct their own pupils (*svāśiṣya*) in turn, and those pupils their pupils, and so on. In other words, whether it is a matter of a scripture that has been created (*kṛtrīma*) or ordinary linguistic transactions (*lokavyavahāra*), one can know that there is a semantic restriction due to an uninterrupted scholarly tradition (*āmnāyāviccheda*). On convention, see above, pp. 13–15, and Eltschinger 2007a: 134–143.

¹¹³ Dharmakīrti accepts only two types of relation (*pratibandha*): identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*). That words are not the nature (*rūpa*) of objects and that objects are not the nature of words has been explained in PV 1.229cd and PVSV 114,25–27 (see Eltschinger 2007a: 253–254 and n. 159). But words are not the cause of their meanings, either, no more than meanings are the cause of words. Rather, words are related to the causal complex that gives rise to them, which includes the speaker's intention (which is why, according to passages such as PVSV 113,25–114,3, 118,14–17 and 120,2–6 [Eltchinger 2007a: 140–142], PV 2.1c2–2 [Katsura 1984: 219], and PVin 2.1–7 [Steinkellner 1979: 73–73], one can *infer* the meaning or cause, i.e., the speaker's intention, from the word or effect), as well as the places of articulation (*sthāna*) and organs (*karāṇa*) involved in the utterance of sounds (PVT *Ñe* D61a5/P72b8–73a1 ≈ PVSVT 606,14–15). See also PV 1.336–337/PVSV 175,10–24 below, pp. 73–75, and p. 73 n. 155.

¹¹⁴ See above, pp. 13–15.

this has [already] been stated:¹¹⁵ Since [there is] no [real] relation, [there is] no restriction. Moreover, if the relation between signified and signifier were natural, [a word] could not be employed again arbitrarily according to the speaker's intention.¹¹⁶

And a convention would be useless. (PV 1.328c = PVin 2.49c)

Indeed, a specific nature accessible to the senses does not need anything like an explanatory rule¹¹⁷ to be cognized (*svapratīti*), just like a specific [instance of] blue, etc. On the contrary, [those things] the cognition of which depends on this [sort of thing] do not have the nature of something real (*vastusvabhāva*), but are conventional, like the insignia of a king, etc.¹¹⁸ And that which is conventional cannot be restricted by nature, for it exists [merely] according to [one's] wish. ¹¹⁹Therefore,

¹¹⁵ See PVSV 172,19-20, above, p. 59.

¹¹⁶ I.e., the eye (*cakṣus*), which is naturally restricted (*svabhāvato niyataḥ*) to revealing visible things/colours (*rūpaprakāśana*), cannot be used (*ni√yuj*) to reveal sounds (*śabda*). Now, a word is used arbitrarily (*yatheṣṭam*), and therefore is not restricted by nature (*svabhāvaniyata*) to revealing a certain meaning, like a hand-gesture (*hastasañjñā*; PVT *Ñe* D61b4-5/P73b3-4 ≈ PVSVT 606,29-31).

¹¹⁷ Explanation, PVT *Ñe* D61b6-7/P73b6-7 = PVSVT 607,11: *paribhāṣā saṅketaḥ / ādiśabdāt saṅketasmṛtyādīparigrahaḥ /*. This is the only occurrence of *paribhāṣā* listed in Ono et al. In Pāṇini a *paribhāṣā* is a rule that explains how rules of the grammar are to be interpreted, hence a "metarule." Thus, A 1.1.68: *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāsamjñā*. The word itself is generally to be understood when mentioned in a rule (not its meaning), except in the case of a technical expression (such as *gha*, which stands for the affixes *tara* and *tama*, A 1.1.22). There are some fifty such *sūtras* identified in A. Insofar as a *paribhāṣā* clarifies the meaning of a rule or an element of a rule that would not be evident otherwise it can be considered a statement of a convention. For an overview of the use of *paribhāṣās* in Vyākaraṇa see Devasthali 1969 and Cardona 1980: 167-170.

¹¹⁸ Additional instances of purely conventional things include hand-gestures (*hastasañjñā*; PVT *Ñe* D62a1-2/P74a1-2 = PVSVT 607,15-16). See also above, p. 60 n. 116.

¹¹⁹ The Mīmāṃsaka opponent now claims that, although the specific nature (*svabhāvaviśeṣa*) of a Vedic word is naturally (*nisargata eva*) restricted to its meaning, this nature is revealed by a convention (*saṅketa*; PVT *Ñe* D62a3/P74a3-4 = PVSVT 607,19-21). This claim comes very close to the Mīmāṃsaka and Vaiyākaraṇa (but at least partly also Vaibhāṣika) doctrine according to which the relation between word and meaning, though real and permanent (be it just *sāṃvyaavahārikanitya*), must be learned by a convention. Note that for Kumārila, it is not always learned from the di-

[when it comes to] the specific nature [which is supposedly restricted to a single meaning] –

how could it be that [it] is necessarily revealed (PV 1.328d = PVin 2.49d)

by a convention? There is no constraint (*noparodho 'sti*) that this convention, which exists [merely] according to one's wish, be made with regard to the [desired meaning] only [and] not with regard to another one. And there is no necessity that this [convention], which is made by human beings according to their wish, [should] reveal only that nature [which is restricted to a certain meaning and] not another one.

In this [convention], where there is arbitrariness, how can there be necessity? Thus, the convention cannot bring to light just a desired capacity [of the Vedic word and no other]. (PV 1.329 = PVin 2.50)

This is an intermediate stanza.¹²⁰

¹²¹For which reason, probably (*kila*)¹²² [– that is, in light of all of the above –] another [philosopher] has said that just as a [Vedic] sentence,¹²³ such as [the one to the effect that] fire re-

rect statement of a convention, but also from the observation of linguistic behavior. See PV 1.227cd/PVSV 113,14–23 (Eltschinger 2007a: 246–248) and Eltschinger 2007a: 122–134.

¹²⁰ This closes Dharmakīrti's examination of the doctrine of authorlessness as the definition of scripture (*apauruṣeyatvam āgamalakṣaṇam*, PVT *Ñe* D62a6–7/P74b1 = PVSVT 607,29), which began at PVSV 112,6. See above, pp. 18–21.

¹²¹ In PV 1.330–335/PVSV 173,16–175,10, Dharmakīrti criticizes another definition of scripture (*āgamalakṣaṇa*), viz., the reliability of one part (*ekadeśāviśaṃvādāna*) of the scripture as a criterion of its overall truth (PVT *Ñe* D62a7/P74b1–2 ≈ PVSVT 608,12). On the identity of his mysterious opponent, see above, pp. 18–21. For a (short) parallel passage, see PVin 2 72,10–11 and Steinkellner 1979: 77–78.

¹²² According to PVT *Ñe* D62a7/P74b2 = PVSVT 608,13, the word *kila* expresses (*dyotaka*) lack of intention (*anabhiprāya*), i.e., the *apauruṣeyatvavādin's* being forced to change his definition of scripture. This is, at least, the way PVT *Ñe* D62b2/P74b5–6 ≈ PVSVT 608,17 account for PVSV 173,16 (*parityajya*): *yathoktadoṣopahatatvāt*, “reeling from the aforementioned errors.”

¹²³ For an earlier occurrence of the Vedic statement *agnir himasya bheṣajam* (“Fire is a remedy for cold”), see PVSV 152,1–4, where the context is similar; see also PVSV 173,18–19 and PVT *Ñe* D62b1/P74b3–4 = PVSVT 608,13–14. The statement can be

moves cold, is true, any other one [, such as “One should perform the Agnihotra,”] is like this [i.e., true], because it is a part of the [same] Veda.¹²⁴ (PV 1.330)

But another [theorist], renouncing the definition of scripture as [that which is] authorless [because of a similar criticism, and] wishing to prove the authority of the Veda in another way, says, “[Those] Vedic sentences for which there is no cognition [on the part of Buddhists as being true] are [in fact] true, because they are part of the [same] Veda, just like the sentence ‘Fire is the remedy for cold,’ etc.” The [argument] of this [adversary]

is [an inference of the type known as] *śeṣavat*, like [the inference that something has a certain] taste [as other fruits] from having the same color and like [the inference that something is] cooked [from being] in one [and the same] pot.¹²⁵ This type of [inference] has been rejected by the Logician¹²⁶ because it deviates [from the property-to-be-proved]. (PV 1.331)

traced back, at least in part, to TaitS 7.4.18.2 (where *agnih* is not mentioned but might be the answer to the riddle [*kīṃ svid dhimāsya bheṣajām?*] posed by the text – which is incidentally the interpretation of BaudhŚSū 15.28 [*agnir himasya bheṣajam*]) and ŚB 13.2.6.12, and to Śrautasūtra literature (see e.g. ĀsvŚSū 10.9/2b and ŚāṅkhŚSū 16.5.4). The statement is quoted in NV 255,1 ad NSū 2.1.60. As an additional example of such trivially true Vedic statements, PVT *Ñe* D62b5/P75a1-2 = PVSVT 608,22-23 quote: *dvādaśa māsāḥ saṃvatsaraḥ*, “Twelve months are a year,” which already appears in NV 254,1. The source of this statement must be KāthS 19.8, 19.9, 19.9, and 29.8. Note, however, that the KāthS reads *dvādaśamāsaḥ saṃvatsaraḥ*, “A year has twelve months.” In ŚV *codanā* 121-122ab, Kumārila also criticises the *ekadeśāvisamvāda* argument; see Kataoka 2011a, n. 377.

¹²⁴ In this argument, *īdṛśam* – “is like this,” i.e., true – is the property to be proved (*sādhya*, or **sādhanaphala*; PVT *Ñe* D62b1/P74b3 ≈ PVSVT 608,14-15), *satyaṃ yathāgniḥ śītanodano vākyam* is the example (**dr̥ṣṭānta*; PVT *Ñe* D62b1-2/P74b4), *vedai-kadeśatvāt* is the reason (*hetu*; PVT *Ñe* D62a7/P74b2-3 = PVSVT 608,15). For other formulations of the argument, see PVSV 175,2-4 and PVT *Ñe* D67a6-7/P81a3-4 ≈ PVSVT 614,11-13, as well as PVinT_{Tib} *Dze* 231a1-b3 (PVinT_{ms} 75a is unfortunately missing!).

¹²⁵ On the second example, see PV 1.13d = PVin 2.65d, PVSV 10,15-17 ≈ PVin 2 92,4-6 and Steinkellner 1979: 114 and n. 434.

¹²⁶ I.e., by Ācārya Dignāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PVT *Ñe* D63a1-2/P75a7-8 ≈ PVSVT 608,25-26) when criticizing the deviating character (*vyabhicāra*) inherent in the Naiyāyikas’ *śeṣavadanumāna* (PVT *Ñe* D63a3/P75b1-2 = PVSVT 609,7-8).

This kind of inference was declared to be not [really] a proof by the master [Dignāga] himself in pointing out the deviating character of the Naiyāyikas' *śeṣavat*-inference, like the [so-called] proof that fruit [one has not tasted] has the same taste [as fruit one has tasted] because it has the same color, and the [so-called] proof that rice grains one has not observed are cooked, like those which one has observed, because they are in one [and the same] vessel. And the manner in which this [*śeṣavat*-inference] is not a proof has [already] been stated earlier.¹²⁷ ¹²⁸And [true,] we have stated this definition of scripture [too].¹²⁹ How-

See PS 2.28b and PSV_K 115b2–4, PSV_V 33a1–2 ad loc. in Horst Lasic's provisional Sanskrit reconstruction: *śeṣavaty api ced vatiḥ / śeṣavaty api ced vatiḥ kriyate – śeṣeṇa pratyakṣeṇa tulyo viśayo yasya, taj jñānam śeṣavad iti, tad api vyabhicārān na pramāṇam. na hy avaśyaṃ rūpasāmy(amātr)ād rasādi tulyaṃ bhavati. evaṃ śeṣavaty api vatir na yujyate*. On Dharmakīrti's definition of the *śeṣavadanumāna*, see below, n. 127, pp. 102–105, and Steinkellner 1979: 114–116 n. 436.

¹²⁷ I.e., in PV 1.14 = PVin 2.66 and PVS_V 10,19–23 ≈ PVin 2 92,7–12 (PVT *Ñe* D63a5–6/P75b5 = PVS_VT 609,11–12; see Steinkellner 1979: 114–116): *kiṃ punar etac cheṣavat / yasyādarśanamātreṇa vyatirekaḥ pradarśyate / tasya saṃśayahetutvāc cheṣavat tad udāhṛtam // sa tasya vyatireko na niścita iti vipakṣe vṛttir āśaṅkyeta / vyatirekāśādhanasyādarśanamātrasya saṃśayahetutvāt / na sarvānupalabdhir gamikā /*. “But what does this [inference] ‘with a remainder’ consist in? The [reason] whose absence [in the dissimilar instances] is established by mere non-cognition is named ‘with a remainder,’ because it is a cause of doubt. Since the absence of this [reason in the dissimilar instances] is not ascertained, one may suspect that it occurs in the dissimilar instances, for mere non-cognition, which does not [successfully] prove absence, is a cause of doubt. [Indeed,] not every [kind of] non-perception is conclusive.” In light of this definition, the parallel discussion in PVin 2 72,10–11 makes it very clear why the argument of Dharmakīrti's opponent must be termed *śeṣavat*: *ekadeśāvisaṃvādanam apy āgamalakṣaṇam āhuḥ / tad vipakṣe 'darśanamātrād avyabhicārāsiddhyāniścitartham /*. “[Certain theorists] claim that the reliability of one part [of a scripture] is the definition of scripture. [But] since non-deviation [can]not [be] established through the mere non-cognition [of the reason] in the dissimilar instances, this [argument] is uncertain.” See Steinkellner 1979: 77–78 and nn. 251–253.

¹²⁸ The opponent now objects that Dignāga, in PS 2.5ab, has also made use of partial reliability (*ekadeśāvisaṃvādana*) as a definition of scripture (PVT *Ñe* D63a6/P75b5–7 ≈ PVS_VT 609,12–16). On PS 2.5ab and Dharmakīrti's interpretation of it, see below, pp. 85–100.

¹²⁹ I.e., Dharmakīrti has indeed at least implied that the definition of scripture consists in partial reliability (*ekadeśāvisaṃvādirūpam āgamalakṣaṇam*) in his explanation of PS 2.5ab (see above, n. 128), stating that “this human being cannot live without re-

ever, this [is justified only] if, for every object capable of being examined, there is correctness (*viśuddhi*) of positive and negative assertions by appropriate means of valid cognition.¹³⁰ [And] even if there is no necessary relation between words and [their] meanings [, which would ensure the validity of scripture], it is better that a [person] act in [a state of] doubt [when it comes to matters relating to worldly prosperity and salvation]; for [scripture] may occasionally be reliable in this case.¹³¹ But in the opposite case,¹³² a human being who has observed a conflict with a means of valid cognition would not [be justified] in act-

sorting to the authority of scripture” (PVSV 108,2-3: *nāyaṃ puruṣo ’nāśrityāgama-prāmāṇyam āsitum samarthah*; PVT *Ñe* D63a6-7/P75b7-8 ≈ PVSVT 609,16-19). On PVSV 108,2-3 and Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of PS 2.5ab, see below, pp. 85-100, and above, pp. 18-21. In PVSV 173,26-174,2, Dharmakīrti is going to show that his own and his opponent’s accounts of *ekadeśāvisaṃvādana* are methodologically very different; for Dharmakīrti’s version is not based on the truth of scripture about a single trivial matter (*atyantaprasiddhaikaaviśayasatyatāśraya*; PVT *Ñe* D63a6-7/P75b7-8 ≈ PVSVT 609,16-19).

¹³⁰ I.e., according to PV 1.215 and PVSV 108,16-109,4, by perception and the two types of inference. The establishment of a positive assertion (*vidhisiddhi*) functions as follows: That which is recognized (*abhimata*) as perceptible (*pratyakṣaviśaya*) in the treatise (*śāstra*) under consideration must indeed be perceptible, e.g., cognition (*buddhi*) as understood in Buddhist doctrine (*bauddhasiddhānte*); that which is recognized as an object of an inference based on the reality of entities (*vastubalāyātānumānaviśaya*; *āgamānapekṣānumānaviśaya*) must indeed be inferable by an inference of that type, e.g., the Truth of Suffering (*duḥkhasatya*); that which is recognized as an object of a scripturally based inference (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*; see Eltschinger 2007a: 105-109, and Moriyama, forthcoming; see also above, p. 55 n. 97) must indeed be inferable by an inference of that type. The establishment of a negation (*pratiśedhasiddhi*) functions as follows: That which is recognized as not being the object of perception, an “objective” inference, or a “scriptural” inference must be imperceptible, non-“objectively” inferable, and non-“scripturally” inferable. (PVT *Ñe* D63b1-4/P76a2-6 ≈ PVSVT 609,22-27.) See below, pp. 86-87. For a translation of PV 1.215/PVSV 108,16-109,4, see Yaita 1987: 7-8, Dunne 2004: 362-363, and Eltschinger 2007a: 221-224.

¹³¹ I.e., in the case of scripture that has not been observed to err (*adrṣṭavyabhicāra*) in regard to empirically verifiable matters (PVT *Ñe* D63b5/P76a7-8 ≈ PVSVT 609,29-30). See PV 1.213 and PVSV 107,19-108,6 (Yaita 1987: 6-7, Dunne 2004: 361, Eltschinger 2007a: 217-220) and above, pp. 43-44 n. 49.

¹³² I.e., in the case of a scripture that can be proved not to possess the aforementioned reliability in regard to empirically verifiable matters, i.e., the necessary correctness (**viśuddhi*; PVT *Ñe* D63b5-6/P76a8-b2).

ing. But he who, pointing out that the statement (*abhidhāna*) that fire – an object [accessible] to ordinary persons – has the capacity to eliminate cold, is veracious, declares the entire treatise [known as the Veda] to be veracious, though it is mostly incorrect due to [its] being contradicted by the means of valid cognition even in regard to something that can be determined – [such a person’s audacity knows no bounds].

[The Veda] says that a permanent soul is the agent [of action], [indeed] that there are permanent entities, [and] that supersensible [things] are sensible. [It declares] a wrong cause, a wrong duration as well as a [wrong] cessation of entities, or [puts forward yet] other [things] whose possibility¹³³ (*gocara*) is excluded by the two means of valid cognition or contradicted by inference based on scripture. He who would pretend that [such a treatise] is veracious without having set aside [its] contradictions and without exhibiting the purpose of the treatise, would surpass an unchaste woman in audacity.¹³⁴ (PV 1.332–334)

The Veda declares that a soul (*pums*), which neither loses its former nature nor assumes a new one, [i.e., which is permanent] is successively the agent of [good and bad] deeds and the experiencer of the fruits of [those] deeds. [It is supposedly the experiencer] due to being the inherence cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) [of pleasant and unpleasant sensations,] and [the agent] due to assuming the supervision (*adhiṣṭhāna*) [of bodily actions], etc.¹³⁵ And this has repeatedly been shown

¹³³ *gocara* is explained as *avakāśa* in PVT *Ñe* D64a5/P77a2 ≈ PVSVT 610,22–23.

¹³⁴ For a parallel passage, see TS_K 2775/TS_§ 2774 and TSP_K 736,4–18/TSP_§ 892,13–893,10.

¹³⁵ Although Dharmakīrti’s intention in PV 1.332a and PVSV 174,14–16 remains unclear, these two passages seem to target primarily Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika ideas regarding the self. (1) The concept of inherence cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) is at home in Vaiśeṣika, as is the description of the self as a *samavāyikāraṇa*. On the *samavāyikāraṇa* in general, see VSū 1.1.14 and DPŚ 91 (Miyamoto 2007: 26); on *samavāya* and *samavāyikāraṇa* in connection with the self, see VSū 10.1 (*ātmasamavāyaḥ sukhaduḥkhaḥ*) and especially DPŚ 10 (Miyamoto 2007: 10: **ka ātmā? yo buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnasaṃskāradharmādharmaṇaṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ jñānotpādanalakṣaṇaṃ sa evātmā* / “What is the self? The self is that which is the inherence cause of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, residual traces, merit, and demerit, [and which is] characterized as producing cognition”). Here is the

Vaiśeṣika's classic statement regarding the inference of the self (VSū 3.2.4): *prāṇā-pāṇanimesonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnāś cety ātmaliṅgāni* /. "The marks of the self are breathing in and out, closing and opening [the eyes], life, the movements of the mental organ, and the transformations of the other sense organs; pleasure and pain; desire and aversion; and effort." (On this *sūtra* see, e.g., Preisdanz 1994: 263–274 and Oetke 1988: 319–322 and 334–340.) Now, Praśastapāda seems to divide these inferential marks into two categories: those that allow one to infer the self as a supervisor (*adhiṣṭhātr*) and those that are the marks of a property-possessor (*guṇin*), i.e., an inherence cause. Here are Praśastapāda's remarks as regards the first inference (PDhS 15,8–10): *śarīrasamavāyiniḥhyām ca hitāhitaprāptiparihārayogyābhyām pravṛttinivṛttibhyām rathakarmaṇā sārathivat prayatnavān vighraṣyādhiṣṭhātānumīyate, prāṇādibhiś ceti*. "[The self] is inferred [as] the body's supervisor endowed with effort from the undertaking [of action] and abstaining [from it], which inhere in the body [and] are suitable for obtaining what is useful and rejecting what is harmful, just as a chariot-eer [is inferred] from the action of the chariot. And [the self is also inferred thus] through breath, etc." (See Oetke 1988: 279, arguments no. 3 and 4.) And here are his views regarding the second inference (PDhS 16,3–4): *sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣa-prayatnāś ca guṇair guṇy anumīyate*. "And [the self] is inferred [as] a property-possessor from the properties that are pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort." (See Oetke 1988: 280, argument no. 9; to be compared with NSū 1.1.10: *icchādveṣa-prayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam* /. "The marks of the self are desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, [and] cognitions.") Thus, whereas the first inference (→*adhiṣṭhātr*) seems to be concerned with the self as an agent (*karṭr*) inasmuch as it presides over bodily actions, the second one (→*guṇin*, i.e. *samavāyikāraṇa*; note VSū 1.1.5: *buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnāś ca guṇāḥ* /, and VSū 1.1.14: *kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam* /) seems to deal with the self as an experiencer (*bhokṭr*) inasmuch as it experiences pleasure and pain, but also – and this has eschatological consequences – merit and demerit (*dharmādharma*, see PDhS 16,7–8: *tasya guṇā buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharma*°, and DPŚ 10, quoted above). In other words, the self is an agent in that it supervises bodily action and an experiencer in that it is the inherence cause of pleasant and unpleasant sensations as well as merit and demerit. (2) While explaining PVSV 174,14–16, Karṇakagomin quotes three half-verses that recur at the beginning of Śāntarakṣita's examination of the Vaiśeṣikas' and Naiyāyikas' conception of the self as well as in Prajñākaramati's BCAP. Here are TS_{K/S} 171–173: *anye punar ihātmānam icchādīnām samāśrayam / svato 'cidrūpam icchanti nityam sarvagataṃ tathā // śubhāśubhānām kartāraṃ karmaṇām tatphalasya ca / bhoktāraṃ cetanāyogāc cetanaṃ na svarūpataḥ // jñānatnādisambandhaḥ karṭṛtvaṃ tasya bhāṇyate / sukhaduḥkhādisamvittisamavāyas tu bhokṭṛtā //*. "However others admit that the self is the substrate (*samāśraya*) of desire, etc., while not consisting of consciousness by itself, that it is permanent and omnipresent, that it is the agent of acts [both] good and bad, and the experiencer of the fruit of these [acts and, finally,] that it is conscious due to its association with consciousness, but not by nature. Its con-

nection with cognition, effort, etc., is called its agency, whereas the inherence of the awareness of pleasure, pain, and so forth [in the self] is [its] being an experiencer.” Prajñākaramati introduces the two stanzas of the TS he quotes (= TS_{K/Ś} 171–172) as follows (BCAP_{Sh} 327,7–13/BCAP_{LVP}: 295,17–23): *tatra naiyāyikās tāvan nityam^a sarvagataṃ pratiprāṇibhinnam acetanam^b cetanāyogāt tu cetanam sukhādiguṇādhāraṃ śubhāśubhkarmakartāraṃ tatphalopabhoktāraṃ paralokinam cātmanam icchanti / naiyāyikavad vaiśeṣikā api / tad uktam /*. ^a *nityam* BCAP_{LVP}: *nitya*- BCAP_{Sh}; ^b *pratiprāṇibhinnam acetanam* BCAP_{LVP}: *pratiprāṇibhinnacetanam* BCAP_{Sh}. “In this regard, first of all the Naiyāyikas admit that the self is permanent, omnipresent, distinct according to each living being, not conscious [by nature] and yet conscious because of [its] association with consciousness; [it is] the substrate (*ādhāra*) of the properties pleasure, etc., the agent of actions [whether] good or bad, the experiencer of the fruit of these [actions], and it transmigrates to another world. Like the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas too [admit this]; this has been said in [the following two stanzas].” As we can see, both Śāntarakṣita and Prajñākaramati hold these ideas to be common to Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. These conceptions form the background of Karṇakagomin’s explanation (PVSVT 611,7–12) of PVSV 174,14–16: *kena prakāreṇa bhoktā kartā cety āha / pūrvakarmajanitasukhaduḥkhādisamvittim prati samavāyikāraṇabhāvenātmā karmaphalānām^a bhoktā^b / tad uktam – sukhaduḥkhādisamvittisamavāyas tu bhoktrteti / śubhāśubhakarmakarāṇe jñānaprayatnādikaṃ praty adhiṣṭhānabhāvenātmā karmaṇām^c kartā / tad uktam – jñānatnādisambandhaḥ^d kartṛtvam tasya bhānyata iti / ādigrahaṇād / jaḍarūpasyāpy ātmanas cetanāyogena bhoktrtvam gṛhyate / tad uktam – bhoktā ca cetanāyogāc cetanam na svarūpata iti /*. ^a *karmaphalānām* em.: *karma phalānām* ed.; ^b *bhoktā* em.: *bhoktāḥ* ed.; ^c *karmaṇām* em.: *karmaṇā* ed.; ^d *jñānatnādisambandhaḥ* em.: *jñānādisambandhaḥ* ed. “[In order to explain] in what way [the self] is an experiencer and an agent [Dharmakīrti] says [that] the self is the experiencer of the fruits of actions insofar as it is the inherence cause with respect to the awareness of pleasure and pain, etc., which result from previous actions. This has been said in [the following stanza]: ‘Whereas the inherence of the awareness of pleasure, pain, and so on [in the self] is [its] being an experiencer’ (= TS_{K/Ś} 173cd, above). [And] the self is the agent (*kartr*) of actions insofar as it assumes the supervision (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of cognition, effort, and so on in the performance of acts that are either good or bad. This has been said in [the following half-verse]: ‘Its connection with cognition, effort, etc., is called its agency’ (= TS_{K/Ś} 173ab, above). And because of the word ‘etc.’, [we should] understand that the self is an experiencer although its nature is insentient, due to its association with consciousness. This has been said in [the following half-verse]: ‘And [that] it is the experiencer [and, finally,] that it is conscious due to its association with consciousness, but not by nature (= TS_{K/Ś} 172cd, above).’” Note, however, that Śākyabuddhi (PVT *Ñe* D64b3–6/P77b1–5) favors another explanation: *de la sems las byuñ ba bsod nams dañ bsod nams ma yin pa de’i ’phrod pa ’du ba can gyi rgyu ñid kyis byed pa po yin te / blo bdag la ’du ba dañ ldan pa ñid kyi phyir ro // lus dañ ñag gi las byin gyis brlabs (D: P rlobs) pa’i no bo byed pa po yin te / bdag ñid kyis brlabs pa’i lus dañ ñag dag ni rañ gi bya ba rnam la ’jug pa’i phyir ro // ... de*

to be incorrect.¹³⁶ And [the Veda also states] the permanence of certain entities, [which] is incorrect, because a non-momentary [entity] violates the criterion (*dharma*) of something real.¹³⁷ [Moreover, the Veda

bžin du las kyi 'bras bu bde ba dan sdug bsñal dag gi 'phrod pa 'du ba'i rgyu ñid kyi phyir za ba po yin te / bde ba dan sdug bsñal ba dag ni bdag dan 'du ba dan ldan pa ñid kyi phyir ro // bde ba (P: D lus) dan sdug bsñal sgrub par byed pa mñon par 'dod pa dan / mñon par 'dod pa ma yin pa'i yul rñams byin gyis brlabs pa'i ño bo'i phyir za ba po yin no. "Here, [the self] is an agent (**kartr*) inasmuch as it is the inherence cause (**samavāyikāraṇatvena*) of mental [factors] (**caitta*, **caitasika*) such as merit and demerit, [and this] because cognition (**buddhi*) inheres (**samavāyin?*) in the self. [And the self] is an agent in assuming the supervision (**adhiṣṭhānabhāvena*) of corporeal and verbal actions (**kāyavākkarman*), because [, insofar as they are] supervised by the self, body (**kāya*) and speech (**vāc*) proceed (**[pra]vr̥tti?*) to their own [characteristic] actions (**svakriyā?*) ... Similarly, [the self] is an experiencer (**bhoktr*) because it is the inherence cause of the pleasant and unpleasant results of actions (**sukhaduḥkhakarmaphala*), [i.e.,] because pleasure and pain (**sukhaduḥkha*) inhere (**samavāyin?*) in the self. [The self] is an experiencer because it assumes the supervision of [psycho-physical activities with regard to those] desirable and undesirable things (**viśaya*) that are the means of realizing (**sādhana*) pleasure and pain." Thus, according to Karṇakagomin the self's being an agent is to be explained in terms of *adhiṣṭhāna*, whereas its being an experiencer is to be accounted for in terms of *samavāyikāraṇa*. But according to Śākyabuddhi, the self's being an agent and the self's being an experiencer are *both* to be explained in terms of both *samavāyikāraṇa* and *adhiṣṭhāna*. (Although he does not allude to *adhiṣṭhāna* in this context, Uddyotakara too accounts for both *kartr̥tva* and *bhoktr̥tva* in terms of *samavāya* in NV 337,14–15 ad NSū 3.1.6: *kiṃ punar idaṃ kartr̥tvaṃ kiṃ vā bhoktr̥tvaṃ iti jñānacikīrṣāprayatnānāṃ samavāyaḥ kartr̥tvaṃ sukhaduḥkhasaṃvit-samavāyo bhoktr̥tvaṃ.* "[But] how (*kim*) [to account for the self's] being an agent, and (*vā*) how [to account for its] being an experiencer? The inherence of cognition, desire to act, and effort is [the self's] being an agent; the inherence of the awareness of pleasure and pain is [the self's] being an experiencer." For other statements regarding the self as an agent due to its *adhiṣṭhāna*, see SK 17 and ŚV *ātmavāda* 76.

¹³⁶ I.e., by Dharmakīrti (*śāstrakāra*) himself while demonstrating the impossibility of causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāvāsambhava*) for permanent things, and by his coreligionists (**svayūthya*, most probably Vasubandhu) in their own treatises (**svaśāstra*; compare PVT *Ñe* D64b6/P77b6–7 and PVSVT 611,17). For references to Dharmakīrti's PVSV and PVin 2 as well as Vasubandhu's KSP and more ancient Yogācāra and Sautrāntika sources, see Yoshimizu 1999. See also below, n. 137.

¹³⁷ I.e., causal efficiency (*arthakriyāvirodha*). According to Dharmakīrti (see, e.g., PV 1.166ab and PVSV 84,5–6) to be a real entity (*vastu*) is to be causally efficient (*arthakriyāsamartha*). Something non-momentary (*akṣaṇika*) could not have any causal efficiency (because it could not produce an effect either successively or at once

says that things which are] indeed strictly imperceptible, such as universals,¹³⁸ are perceptible, and [declares] a wrong origination, duration, and cessation of entities: [Indeed, it proclaims that something] which initially is not an agent [and which, being permanent,] cannot receive [any] new property (*viśeṣa*), can generate [an effect] through dependence on [something] else;¹³⁹ [that something] whose nature is no [longer] to be brought about since it has [already] been completed [by its own causes can] last by virtue of a substratum [upon which it depends];¹⁴⁰ and [that entities] perish due to a cause,¹⁴¹ etc. [The Veda states] yet other [things] which are contrary to what is established by perception and inference and are negated by inference based on scripture, such as the capacity of the Agnihotra and [ablutions] to purify one of sin, etc.¹⁴² [He who,] failing to set aside the contradictions of the

[*kramayaugapadya*]), hence it could not be something real (PVT̄ *Ñe* D64b7–65a1/P77b7–78a1 ≈ PVSVT̄ 611,19–21). See Yoshimizu 1999.

¹³⁸ For additional examples of (pseudo-)things erroneously held to be perceptible by Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika authors, see PVSV 108,22–24 and Yaita 1987: 8, Dunne 2004: 362–363, Eltschinger 2007a: 222–223 and n. 25; see also PVT̄ *Ñe* D65a1/P78a1–2 = PVSVT̄ 611,21–22, and above, p. 20.

¹³⁹ I.e., a cooperating factor (*sahakārin*; PVT̄ *Ñe* D65a3/P78a4–5 = PVSVT̄ 611,26).

¹⁴⁰ That which depends on nothing (*sarvanirāsaṃsaya*; *thams cad la ltos pa med par grub pa*) cannot last (*sthāna*) by force of something else (*anyabalena*; compare PVT̄ *Ñe* D65a5/P78a7–8 with PVSVT̄ 611,29–30). See SPV 270,5–8 on SP 3cd (*saṃś ca sarvanirāsaṃso bhāvaḥ katham apekṣate*; see Vibh 410 n. 8): *yod na yañ kun la rag ma las te / rañ gi ño bo thams cad skeyes pa bltos pa med pa'i dños po bltos pa gañ gis na 'brel par 'gyur ba ji ltar bltos pa yin /*. “Wenn [das betreffende Ding] dagegen etwas Seiendes ist, durch welche Bedingtheit kann dann ein vollkommen unabhängiges Ding, d.h. (ein Ding), das seinem ganzen Wesen nach entstanden und daher nicht bedingt ist, verbunden sein; wieso kann es bedingt sein?” Translation Frauwallner 1934: 284.

¹⁴¹ I.e., due to a cause of destruction (*vināśahetu*; PVT̄ *Ñe* D65a6/P78a8–b1 = PVSVT̄ 611,31). According to Dharmakīrti destruction is without a cause (*nirhetukatvaṃ vināśasya*; PVSVT̄ 612,6) or incompatible with the fact of having a cause (*rgyu dañ ldan pa ñid du 'gal ba*; PVT̄ *Ñe* D65a6/P78b1). On Dharmakīrti's *vināśitvānumāna*, see Sakai 2011.

¹⁴² This refers back to PVSV 109,1–3 (see Yaita 1987: 8, Dunne 2004: 363, Eltschinger 2007a: 105–109 and 223, and below, pp. 77–78 nn. 172 and 174). If a given treatise teaches that sin or demerit (*adharmā*) consists in defilements such as desire (*rāgādirūpa*) and the actions born of them (*tatprabhavaṃ karma*), it cannot prescribe practices such as the *agnihotra* and ablutions (*tīrthasāna*) as means of eliminating

pramāṇas in the entire body of the treatise¹⁴³ [and] failing to exhibit [that it has] the properties of a [sound] treatise,¹⁴⁴ viz., [its] expressing [internal] consistency, appropriate means, and a human purpose,¹⁴⁵

demerit or increasing merit (*dharmavṛddhi*; PVT *Ñe* D65b2/P78b6, to be compared with PVSVT 612,10). For such practices, since they do not counteract the causes (*nidāna*) of demerit (especially nescience [*avidyā*]), cannot remove it; and since they do not consist in the the absence of greed (*alobha*) or the actions born of it, they cannot increase merit (PVT *Ñe* D65b3–5/P78b6–79a2 ≈ PVSVT 612,11–15). Looking for this kind of internal contradiction (*pūrvāparavirodhacintā*) is the only thing a cognitively limited person (*arvāgdarśin*) can do to assess the statements regarding supersensible matters of the treatise under scrutiny. This is what Dharmakīrti calls an “inference based on scripture” (*āgamāpekṣānumāna*, see above, p. 55 n. 97). On Dharmakīrti’s threefold analysis, see above, p. 64 n. 130, and below, pp. 86–87 and n. 15.

¹⁴³ I.e., in regard to matters (*vastu*) taught by the treatise, which are threefold (*trividha*): those that bear on perceptible things, those that pertain to things “objectively” inferable, and those concerning things “scripturally” inferable (PVT *Ñe* D65b5/P79a2–3 = PVSVT 612,16–17). Dharmakīrti’s notion of *pratisamādhāna* (PVSV 174,25; see also PVT *Ñe* D64a7/P77a5–6 = PVSVT 610,27–28 and PVT *Ñe* D65b5–6/P79a3 = PVSVT 612,17) is likely to echo the VY’s *codyaparihāra*. According to Vasubandhu an apt commentator of the Buddhist sūtras (*sūtrārthavādin*), after having indicated the purpose (*prayojana*) of the sūtra, provided a summary (*piṇḍārtha*) of it, explained the meaning of the words (*padārtha*), and explicated the connection (*anusandhi*) of its various parts, should formulate hypothetical objections and *refute* them (*codyaparihāra*; see Cabezón 1992: 237–238 n. 16, Skilling 2000: 318–319, and Verhagen 2008). What Dharmakīrti’s opponent fails to do is to refute the objections raised against the Veda by the application of *pramāṇas*.

¹⁴⁴ I.e., the properties which are causes of one’s engagement with a treatise (*śāstre pravṛtṭyaṅgabhūtā dharmāḥ*; PVT *Ñe* D65b6/P79a3–4 = PVSVT 612,17–18). These three properties (see below, n. 145) constitute the purpose of the treatise (*śāstrārtha*) alluded to in PV 1.334b (PVT *Ñe* D64a7–b1/P77a5 = PVSVT 610,28–29).

¹⁴⁵ This refers back to PV 1.214 and PVSV 108,6–16; see Yaita 1987: 7, Dunne 2004: 361–362, and Eltschinger 2007a: 102–104 and 220–221. Here, Dharmakīrti formulates the three properties that a treatise must possess in order to be qualified for the evaluation of its reliability (< *parikṣādhiḥkṛta*), namely, (1) internal consistency (*sambandha*, *sambaddhatā*, *saṅgatārthatā*), i.e., the mutual subordination (*aṅgāṅgībhāva*) of its statements, or the fact that its statements (*vākya*) converge towards a single meaning (*ekārthopasaṃhāra*, *mīlana*; PVT *Ñe* D65b6–7/P79a4–5 ≈ PVSVT 612,19–20); (2) the existence of appropriate means (*anugūṇopāya*) for attaining its purpose, such as the cultivation of selflessness (*nairātmyabhāvanā*, TSP_K 877,24–25/TSP_S 1062,21–22; PVT *Ñe* D65b7/P79a5–6 = PVSVT 612,20–21); (3) the indication of a human purpose (*puruṣārthābhīdhāyakatva*), such as heaven (*svarga*), liberation (*apavarga*), worldly prosperity (*abhyudaya*), or the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*;

[and even] wishing to prove, just by [resorting to] the [occasional] truthful indication of something trivial, that the Veda which says these things is equally faultless when it comes to [those] profundities which can scarcely be penetrated by great insight – he surpasses the unchaste woman in audacity. There was (*kila*) a certain unchaste woman who was reproached by [her] husband after catching [her] in the act of adultery (*vipratipattisthāna*). She answered him: “Behold, mothers,¹⁴⁶ the faithlessness (*vaiparītya*) of [this] man! Rather than putting his trust in me, [his] lawful wife,¹⁴⁷ he puts it in those two water-bubbles he calls his eyes! Though I was propositioned by this old, one-eyed vil-lage wood gatherer,¹⁴⁸ I never (*na*) had sex [with him]. Indeed, because I am attached to [your] beauty and virtues, I [only] love [you, this] young man who is chief among ministers.¹⁴⁹” Of this sort¹⁵⁰ is [our adversary’s] inference, by means of the statement that fire counteracts cold, that [the Veda] is also reliable with regard to the imperceptible, even though it is seen to be contradicted by the means of valid cognition!¹⁵¹

PVṬ Ṇe D65b7–66a1/P79a6 = PVSṬ 612,21–22). See also PVṬ Ṇe D66a1–3/P79a7–b1 = PVSṬ 612,24–27.

¹⁴⁶ For an explanation of the form *mātaḥ* (= *mātarah*), see PVSṬ 613,12–17.

¹⁴⁷ According to PVṬ Ṇe D66a7/P79b7–8 ≈ PVSṬ 613,17–18, *dharmapatnī* is to be analyzed as follows: *dharmasya sādhanabhūtā patnī dharmapatnīti madhya[ma]-padalopī samāsaḥ*^a /. ^a PVṬ reads *mar gyi bum pa zes bya ba la sogs pa lta bu’o* after *samāsaḥ*, i.e., **tailaghaṭa ityādivat*. “A wife who is the means of accomplishing duty is a lawful wife. [This is] a compound that omits the middle word, PVṬlike *tailaghaṭa*_{PVṬ}.”

¹⁴⁸ “Old” (*jarat*) points to the lack of vigour (*vayovaiḥkalya*); “one-eyed” (*kāṇa*), to ugliness (*vairūpya*, because the eye is the supreme locus of beauty, *paraṃ rūpasthānam cakṣuḥ*); “of the village” (*grāmya*), to the lack of qualities such as skillfulness (*vaidagdhyaḍigunaivaikalya*); “wood gatherer” (*kāṣṭhahāraka*), to poverty (*dāridrya*; PVṬ Ṇe D66b2/P80a2–3 = PVSṬ 613,20–22).

¹⁴⁹ “Beauty” (*rūpa*) points to elegance (*prāsādikatva*); “virtues” (*guṇa*), to skillfulness, etc. (*vaidagdhyaḍi*); “young man” (*dāraka*), to vigour (*vayas*); “chief among ministers” (*mantrimukhya*), to power (*aiśvarya*; PVṬ Ṇe D66b5–7/P80a7–b1 ≈ PVSṬ 613,28–614,7).

¹⁵⁰ I.e., like the unchaste woman’s reply (PVṬ Ṇe D67a5/P81a1 = PVSṬ 614,8–9).

¹⁵¹ PVṬ Ṇe D67a7–b4/P81a4–b2 ≈ PVSṬ 614,14–19: *tatra dharmapatnīsthāniyo ve-daḥ / vipratipattitulyaṃ nityasya puṃsaḥ kartrtvādyabhidhānam / netratulye pratyakṣānumāne / na ca dṛṣṭavyabhicārāyāḥ patnyā vacanaṃ garīyas tasya puruṣasya*

¹⁵²If [the entire Veda] were to be established as a means of valid cognition in this way, then what in this [world] would not be a means of valid cognition? Indeed, for [any] person who says lots of things there is [at least] one veracious [statement]. (PV 1.335)

Just as always (*atyantam*) saying what is true is extremely difficult,¹⁵³ so also is always saying what is not true. In that case, if due to the fact

yena [sva]yaṃ vipratipattiṃ dr̥ṣṭvāpi svadarśanam apramāṇikṛtya tasyā vacanaṃ yathārthaṃ kuryāt / evaṃ vedoktārthabādhakayoḥ pramāṇayor aprāmānyaṃ kṛtvā na vedasya patnīsthānīyasya dr̥ṣṭavyabhicārasya vacanād atyantaparokṣaṃ pratipadyemahīti / “Here, the Veda is represented by the lawful wife. To claim, for example, that a permanent soul is the agent [of deeds], is similar to the crime [of adultery]. As for [the two *pramāṇas*] perception and inference, they are similar to the [husband’s] eyes. And it is not the case that for this man the words of [his] wife whose transgression [he has] witnessed (*dr̥ṣṭa*) are of greater weight [than his own eyes], so that, even though he has himself witnessed [her] crime, he should disregard the evidence of his own vision (*svadarśanam apramāṇikṛtya*) and consider her words veracious. Thus, we cannot, considering the two *pramāṇas* that contradict the things said in the Veda to be invalid (*apramānyaṃ kṛtvā*), know that which is transcendent from a statement of the Veda – [here] representing the wife – whose unreliability has been [duly] witnessed.” See also Śākyabuddhi’s additional explanations in PVT *Ñe* D67b1–3/P81a5–8. Earlier in this passage Śākyabuddhi already provided a lengthy explanation of Dharmakīrti’s intention; see PVT *Ñe* D66b7–67a5/P80b2–81a1. One can understand Dharmakīrti’s image as follows: (1) The husband’s eyes catch the wife in *flagrante delicto*. ≈ The two *pramāṇas* find the Veda to be mistaken. (2) The wife replies, in order to deny her guilt: ≈ (The opponent has) the Veda answer, in order to deny its erroneousness: (3) I wasn’t unfaithful to you, don’t trust your (“water-bubble”) eyes. ≈ The Veda isn’t wrong, don’t trust your *pramāṇas*! (4) Since everybody admits that one cannot have sex with a stupid, poor, ugly old man, what I say is true, I wasn’t unfaithful to you. ≈ Since everybody admits that fire is a remedy for cold, what the Veda says is true, not erroneous. (5) In the same way as I am truthful on this point, I am to be trusted when I say that I love you, who are young, handsome, talented, and rich. ≈ In the same way as the Veda is truthful about empirical matters, it is to be trusted when it concerns transcendent things.

¹⁵² In PV 1.335 and PVSV 175,7–10, Dharmakīrti points out another fault in his opponent’s argument (PVT *Ñe* D67b4–5/P81b2 = PVSVT 614,20).

¹⁵³ According to Śākyabuddhi (PVT *Ñe* D67b6–7/P81b5–6) Dharmakīrti says “extremely difficult” (*atiduṣkara*) and not “totally impossible” (**atyantāsambhava*), because always saying what is true can indeed be achieved by those who have eliminated all the obstructions (**prahīnasarvāvaraṇa*) and by those who have completely incorpo-

that [just] one statement [made by a person] is somehow¹⁵⁴ reliable, the rest of his statements, which are vast in number, were like that [i.e., reliable, then] there would be no person who would not be trustworthy.

¹⁵⁵Moreover,

This audible sound (*dhvani*) [which rests and originates] in the speaker is neither the nature nor the effect of the entities [expressed by it].¹⁵⁶ Now, apart from these two [logical reasons] there is nothing [else that might come into consideration] that does not deviate. (PV 1.336)

First, speech is not the nature of the [things] signified [by it], nor is it their effect, either; for it exists merely due to the speaker's intention even when these [things] are absent. Now, there is no other [kind of logical reason] for something [than these two] that does not deviate. And since, there being a deviation, a [word] could also occur otherwise (*tato 'nyathāpi*) [i.e., in the absence of that which is signified by it], the

rated compassion (*sñiñ rje goms par gyur pa can*, **karuṇāsātmibhūta*), i.e., Buddhas and higher Bodhisattvas.

¹⁵⁴ I.e., according to PVT *Ñe* D68a1/P81b7–8 = PVSVT 614,26–27, “after the manner of the crow and the palm-fruit,” (*kākatāliya*; see Monier-Williams 1963: 266^s s.v.), i.e., completely accidentally.

¹⁵⁵ In PVSV 175,10–176,12, Dharmakīrti leaves the question of *ekadeśāvisaṃvādāna* and returns, first (PV 1.336–338/PVSV 175,10–176,4), to the issue of the relation between words and meanings introduced at PV 1.213/PVSV 107,19 (see below, p. 75 n. 162), and second (PV 1.339/PVSV 176,5–12), to the issue of non-perception which provided the original impetus for his excursus on scriptural authority (PVSV 107,14–176,4; see below, p. 75 n. 162). According to Dharmakīrti (see above, PVSV 172,20–22 and p. 59 n. 113) a relation between word and meaning could only consist in their identity (*tādātmya*, *tādrūpya*, *tatsvabhāvatā*) or in one's causing the other (*tadutpatti*), for something makes something known (*gamaka*) only if it has the same nature as that thing or is produced by it (*tatsvabhāvas tajjanyo vā san*), but not otherwise (*nānyathā*; PVT *Ñe* D68a3/P82a2–3 = PVSVT 615,10–11).

¹⁵⁶ I.e., the audible sound, which has the speaker (*vaktṛ*) for its cause (*nimitta*; PV 1.336b *vaktari* is analyzed as a locative indicating the *nimitta*, PVT; note also PVT *Ñe* D68a4/P82a4 = PVSVT 615,13: *yasmād vaktari [s]ati dhvanir bhavati*), is related to the speaker's intention only (*icchāmātrapratibaddha*); it does not depend on the entities signified (*vācyavastu*) by it (compare PVT *Ñe* D68a5/P82a4–5 with PVSVT 615,14–15).

understanding of the [thing signified] cannot be due to the presence of that [word].

Objection: ¹⁵⁷[Words are indirectly the effects of the things signified, for] the occurrence¹⁵⁸ of [these] signifiers is caused by the perceptual cognition of the [things] signified. (PV 1.337ab)

Suppose the following [be urged]: Speech is indeed an effect, because the signifier occurs due to the perceptual cognition of the [thing] signified [, which in turn gives rise to the intention to express it. To this, we answer:] If it were so,

how could this [occurrence of an utterance] present [, according to the scriptures considered,] mutually contradictory meanings concerning one [and the same thing]?¹⁵⁹ (PV 1.337cd)

If [there were] such a restriction that a word does not occur without the thing signified, [then] an utterance occurring in different doctrines would not attribute¹⁶⁰ contradictory natures [such as “permanent” and “impermanent”] to a single entity. It is indeed impossible that one [and the same entity such as a] sound could be [both] permanent and impermanent without [alternative] modes of being.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ The opponent now admits that there can be neither identity nor *direct* causality between words and meanings, but contends that an *indirect* causality (< *pāramparyeṇa vacanam arthakāryam*) between them obtains. Thus, signifiers being the indirect effects of things signified, the former still make the latter known (*gamaka*; PVT *Ñe* D68b2–3/P82b3–4 ≈ PVSVT 615,24–25). This indirect causality is accounted for as follows: thing signified (*vācyārtha*) → perceptual cognition (*darśana*) of it → speaker’s intention (*vivakṣā*) → signifier (*vācaka*; PVT *Ñe* D68b3–4/P82b5 ≈ PVSVT 615,26–28).

¹⁵⁸ I.e., either in the form of physical production (*utpatti*), as a Vaiśeṣika or a Buddhist would conceive, or in the form of manifestation (*abhivyakti*), as a Mīmāṃsaka or a Grammarian would contend (PVT *Ñe* D68b3/P82b4 = PVSVT 615,25–26).

¹⁵⁹ I.e., it couldn’t, for it would have to have the same meaning (*ekārtha*) in all the doctrinal systems (*sarvapravāda*) considered (PVT *Ñe* D68b5–6/P82b8 = PVSVT 616,11).

¹⁶⁰ On *upasaṃhāra* employed in a sense approximating *samāropa* (PVT *Ñe* D68b7/P83a2 = PVSVT 616,14–15), see BHSD 142^{ab} s.v. *upasaṃharati* and *upasaṃhāra*.

¹⁶¹ I.e., “without another aspect” (*prakārāntareṇa vinā*; PVT *Ñe* D69a1/P83a4 = PVSVT 616,16). According to Śākyabuddhi (PVT *Ñe* D69a1–2/P83a4–6) if one said “perma-

¹⁶²Therefore, scriptures necessarily related to entities are not in any way established for the [person] engaged in [religious] practice. How [then could this person ever] ascertain something through them? (PV 1.338)

It is the ignorant person who looks at scripture as a means of valid cognition in order to put into practice its teachings [, and this for two reasons: first,] because [those] who have thoroughly understood the truth¹⁶³ do not [need to] resort to the instruction [of others any longer]; and [second,] because the ignorant person cannot discriminate human beings whose [mental] qualities are inaccessible to the senses [and therefore he cannot recognize a trustworthy person].¹⁶⁴ Someone

ment” with reference (*rjes su 'jug pas*) to the existence of a permanent aspect (**nitya-prakāra*) and “impermanent” on the basis of (**apekṣya*) a momentary phase (**kṣaṇa*), then there would be no fault; but to assert opposed properties (**viruddha-dharma*) without alternative modes of being (**niṣparyāyam*) is contradictory in regard to one and the same thing.

¹⁶² After his long excursus on scriptural authority (PV 1.213–339/PVSV 107,14–176,4) Dharmakīrti now returns to the issue at stake in PVSV 107,14–25 (Yaita 1987: 5–6, Eltschinger 2007a: 217–218). In PV 1.199 and PVSV 101,23–102,8 (≈ PVin 2 65,1–9, see Steinkellner 1979: 62, Yaita 1985: 215–214) he had shown that the silence or non-operation (*nivṛtti*) of the three means of valid cognition (*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āgama*), i.e., mere non-perception (*anupalabdhimātreṇa*; PVSV 101,23; cf. *pramāṇa-trayanivṛttilakṣaṇā 'nupalabdhiḥ*; PVSV 176,7), does not allow one to establish the non-existence of an entity. In PVSV 107,14–17, an opponent attacks this conclusion and contends that the silence of scripture *does* allow one to establish the non-existence of an entity because scripture covers (*vy√āp*) all that exists. In PVSV 107,17–19, Dharmakīrti summarizes his previous arguments and then says (PV 1.213; for PVSV 107,22–25 [≈ PVin 2 66,4–7] thereon, see Yaita 1987: 6, Eltschinger 2007a: 218, and Steinkellner 1979: 65): *nāntariyakatā'bhāvāc chabdānām vastubhiḥ saha / nārthasiddhis tatas te hi vaktrabhiprāyasūcakāḥ //*. “Due to the absence of a necessary relation of words with things, one [can]not establish [i.e., ascertain] any object through them [i.e., words], because they [merely] indicate the speaker’s intention.”

¹⁶³ I.e., those who know the true nature of entities (*padārthānām aviparitaṃ rūpaṃ*) and thus have thoroughly understood ultimate reality (*adhigataparamārtha*; PVT *Ñe* D69a5–6/P83b2–3 ≈ PVSVT 616,25–26).

¹⁶⁴ I.e., a cognitively limited person (*arvāgdarśin*) cannot distinguish (< *vibhāgakriyā*) whether someone is omniscient (*sarvajñā*) or not, or whether someone says what is true (*avitathābhidhāyin*; PVT *Ñe* D69a6–7/P83b3–4 ≈ PVSVT 616,28–617,12). As a consequence, since he cannot ascertain this omniscient or veracious person’s speech as being scripture (*āgamatvena*), this *arvāgdarśin* cannot engage in religious practice (PVT *Ñe* D69a7/P83b4–5). This refers back to PV 1.218–219 and PVSV

who sees that statements occur even in the absence of the desired meaning must indeed be beset with doubt – [asking himself,] “Is it true or not?” – even in the case of the discourse of people whose utterances have not been observed to deviate [from the truth]. Therefore, the [ignorant person] cannot ascertain anything by means of someone’s statement.

Therefore,¹⁶⁵ the non-existence of an entity [to be negated] is not established by the silence of [scripture] either. (PV 1.339ab)

[You] have stated [above] that non-perception defined as the silence of [scripture] proves non-existence. For everything falls within the scope of scripture, so that if something exists it will refer (*vr̥tti*) [to it] in a reliable way.¹⁶⁶ ¹⁶⁷[To this we reply:] Even if everything falls within its scope, this [ascertaining the non-existence of something] would be the case [only] if [scripture] were [indeed] silent when something does not exist. But that is not the case.¹⁶⁸ [Thus we have] stated that the [person] who wishes to engage in [religious] practice cannot establish [anything] through it [i.e., scripture].

Therefore, it is not established that non-perception results in the ascertainment [of something] as non-existent. (PV 1.339cd)

109,24–110,15, where Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the contents of other persons’ mental streams (*santāna*) are neither within the scope of (ordinary) perception (since they are supersensible) nor inferrable from physical and verbal behaviours (*kāyavāgvyavahāra*, since human beings are often seen to deliberately behave in a deceptive way). See Yaita 1988: 434–435, Akimoto 1993, Dunne 2004: 366–368, and Eltschinger 2007a: 92–96 and 227–230.

¹⁶⁵ I.e., because of the impossibility of any ascertainment (*aniścaya*; PVT *Ñe* D69b3/P84a1 = PVSVT 617,20–21).

¹⁶⁶ See above, p. 75 n. 162.

¹⁶⁷ Rather than repeating the arguments put forward in PVSV 102,2–8 (e.g., the argument that scripture does not deal [*aviṣayikaraṇa*] with matters not related to human goals [*puruṣārthāsambaddha*] and thus does not embrace all possible objects), Dharmakīrti here provisionally accepts that everything falls within the scope of scripture (PVT *Ñe* D69b5–6/P84a4–5 ≈ PVSVT 617,26–28).

¹⁶⁸ Because scripture also exists (*vr̥tti*) independently of real entities (*vastv antareṇa*; PVT *Ñe* D69b7/P84a6–7 = PVSVT 618,6).

Therefore, the non-existence of [things] beyond the reach [of ordinary cognition] cannot be ascertained even if all three means of valid cognition [should] fail to operate.

¹⁶⁹[Believing in the] authority of the Veda,¹⁷⁰ claiming something [permanent] to be an agent,¹⁷¹ seeking merit in ablutions,¹⁷² taking pride in one's caste,¹⁷³ and undertaking penance

¹⁶⁹ Having shown throughout PV 1 that non-Buddhists (*tīrthika*) only talk nonsense (*ayuktābhīdhāyitva*), Dharmakīrti concludes the work by pointing out, in a merely indicative way (*dīnmātram*), the five principal signs of their stupidity (*jāḍya*; compare PVT *Ñe* D70a2-3/P84b1-2 with PVSVT 618,12-13). That Dharmakīrti alludes to only five signs is a synecdoche (**upalakṣaṇa*), for the signs of the stupidity of the outsiders are innumerable (**aprameya*; PVT *Ñe* D70b6/P85a8-b1, to be compared with PVSVT 619,7-8).

¹⁷⁰ As the Brahmins do, thus revealing their own ignorance (**ajñāna*; PVT *Ñe* D70a3-4/P84b3-4). For grammatical explanations of the compound *vedaprāmānya*, see PVT *Ñe* D70a4-5/P84b4-6 = PVSVT 618,15-17.

¹⁷¹ The words *kasyacit kartrvādaḥ* can be interpreted in at least two ways. Śākyabuddhi interprets *kasyacit* as **ātmāder nityasya* (PVT *Ñe* D70a5/P84b6), thus understanding *kartr* as “agent” (see above, PV 1.332a and PVS 174,14-16; see above, pp. 65-66): “claiming something [permanent] to be the agent [of deeds].” As for Karṇakagomin, he interprets *kasyacit* as *naiyāyikādeḥ* (PVSVT 618,18) and *kartr* as “creator” (*īśvaras tattvādīnāṃ karteti*; PVSVT 618,18): “someone’s claiming that there is a creator [god].”

¹⁷² Merit (*dharma*) consists in the absence of attachment (**sneha*), hostility (**dveṣa*), and error (**moha*), as well as the physical and verbal actions born of these mental factors (*tajjanitaṃ kāyavākkarma*). Now, ablutions consist in mere contact with water (*jalasaṃśleṣamātralakṣaṇa*) and thus cannot bring about merit (PVT *Ñe* D70a6-b1/P84b8-85a1 ≈ PVSVT 618,20-23). Although Dharmakīrti implies a critique of ablutions along these lines in PVS 109,1-3 (see Yaita 1987: 8, Dunne 2004: 363, Eltschinger 2007a: 105-109, 223, and above, pp. 69-70 n. 142), Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin (ibid.) refer back to the “detailed refutations” (cf. *vistareṇa nirākṛtaḥ*) of *tīrthasānanāvāda* by Ācārya Vasubandhu (in AKBh 282,8-9?) and other Buddhist masters. See La Vallée Poussin 1980: III.135 n. 2 and Eltschinger 2007a: 108 n. 126 for references.

¹⁷³ I.e., though devoid of qualities such as morality (*śīlādiguṇavaikalye 'pi*), someone takes pride in his caste by saying, “I am a Brahmin” (PVT *Ñe* D70b1/P85a1-2 ≈ PVSVT 618,24). Note PVT *Ñe* D70b2-3/P85a2-4 ≈ PVSVT 618,25-28: [*tathā hi brāhmaṇatvasāmānyam gr̥hītvā^a jātivādāvalepaḥ syāt / brāhmaṇena pitrā brāhmaṇyā garbhe ya utpādas taṃ vā samāśritya / tatra vastubhūtasāmānyaniśedhān na pūrvāḥ pakṣaḥ / nāpy uttarāḥ / brāhmaṇabrāhmaṇīśārīrayor aśucisvabhāvatvena śarīrāntarād aviśeṣāt /*. ^a According to PVT *de ltar na bram ze ñid kyi spyi gzuñ nas*.

to remove sin,¹⁷⁴ these are the five signs of complete stupidity devoid of any discrimination.¹⁷⁵ (PV 1.340)

“Indeed, one could take pride in one’s caste either by accepting the universal ‘Brahminhood’ or by appealing to one’s birth from a Brahmin father in the womb of a Brahmin woman. Among these [two possibilities] the first hypothesis is excluded (*na*), because real universals have been refuted [in the section devoted to *apoha*]. Nor is the second [hypothesis] sound, because the bodies of the Brahmin male and Brahmin woman do not differ from [any] other body in being of an impure nature.” On Dharmakīrti’s critique of caste, see PVSV 157,9–18 and Eltschinger 2000: 103–115; on the two arguments of Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin, see Eltschinger 2000: 139–140.

¹⁷⁴ I.e., tormenting one’s own body (*śarīrapīḍana*) by practices such as fasting (*anaśānādi*; PVT *Ñe* D70b4/P85a5–6 = PVSVT 619,1). The stupidity of these undertakings is like that of ablutions (see above, p. 77 n. 172). The root cause (*nidāna*) of all evil (*pāpa*) consists of greed, hostility, and error (*lobhadveṣamoha*), which are mental factors. Undertaking physical penance (*santāpārambha*) is not contradictory (*aviruddha*) to these factors (i.e., to the causes of evil), hence it cannot purify one from evil (*pāpaśuddhi*; PVT *Ñe* D70b4–5/P85a6–7 ≈ PVSVT 619,2–4).

¹⁷⁵ I.e., devoid of rational knowledge (*nyāyānusārījñānarahita*), viz., of any knowledge that derives from the force of the *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇabalaṃ vijñānam*; PVT *Ñe* D70b5–6/P85a7–8 = PVSVT 619,5–7).