

## Determination (*adhyavasāya*) in Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhi*

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The problems centering around the term *adhyavasāya*<sup>1</sup> have recently been important examples of a very thorough investigation (McCrea and Patil 2006) into the opposing forces of traditionalism and innovation that governed the course of discussions in Indian Buddhist philosophy. That investigation was mainly concerned with Jñānaśrīmitra's use of that term, and with the background that usage has. In this paper, much narrower in scope, I want to scrutinize the epistemological function or functions this term denotes within the context of the *apoha* theory of Ratnakīrti.

The investigation of this function is interesting also in the context of the present volume, since it is precisely about this function of cognition that Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti opposed a Kashmiri viewpoint, that of their fellow Buddhist scholar-monk Dharmottara. What is presented in the following is a first step towards a proper understanding of that dispute.

It is obvious that most of Ratnakīrti's texts have a very strong dependency on the works of his teacher Jñānaśrīmitra.<sup>2</sup> It might thus be in order to give, first, an overview of the material background that supports the text of the *Apohasiddhi* (AS), and then say a few words about the relationship that Ratnakīrti sees his texts as having to those of his teacher.

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I would like to thank the Austrian Academy of Sciences for supporting the research for my PhD thesis, a result of which is this article, with a DOC grant. The Austrian Science Fund (FWF) sponsored National Research Network S98, "The Cultural History of the Western Himalaya" (<http://www.univie.ac.at/chwh/>), I thank for financing my attendance at the conference where I could read the paper that became this article. Helmut Krasser and Parimal Patil I would like to thank for their help in improving this article.

<sup>1</sup>*adhyavasāya* is usually translated into English as "determination", e.g., in McCrea and Patil 2006: 305.

<sup>2</sup>Already remarked by Thakur (1951: 28), and corroborated by many later studies, e.g., Lasic 2000b: 20.

## 1 Material Background of the AS

The AS was written by the Buddhist monk and scholar Ratnakīrti. He was a pupil of Jñānaśrīmitra, one of the most prominent figures of Indian Buddhist philosophy to appear in the late 10th to early 11th century.<sup>3</sup> This means one can assume that Ratnakīrti was at least slightly junior to his *guru* Jñānaśrīmitra. This again lets a *floruit* between 1000 and 1050 CE seem most likely.

The AS or “Proof of Exclusion” is one in a series of treatises that seem to share the common feature of being compendiums of works of Jñānaśrīmitra.<sup>4</sup> The AS is eleven pages long in the *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ* (RNĀ); the *Apoḥaprakarana* (AP), Jñānaśrīmitra’s text on the same subject, occupies thirty-one pages in the *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali* (JNĀ). Far more than one half of the AS is composed of passages taken practically verbatim from the AP.<sup>5</sup> Whether this means that more than one half of its content is also found in the AP can of course be seriously answered only after both texts have been thoroughly analysed. Before this has been achieved it seems advisable to refrain from deciding the nature of the relationship between Jñānaśrīmitra’s and Ratnakīrti’s works in anything but a material fashion.<sup>6</sup>

Although the AS itself does not contain a statement concerning why it was written, two other works, the *Sarvajñasiddhi* (SJS) and *Īśvarasādhana-dūṣaṇa* (ĪSD), both of which seem just as indebted to Jñānaśrīmitra as the AS, contain explanations. One is:

Disregarding the strength of irrepressible opponents, through the full development (*prauḍhi*) of true knowledge (*pramā*) the omniscient one, the single eye of the world, arose. And the majesty with regard to this [subject, omniscience,] is [that] of my revered teacher, the chief mountain in the land of residence

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Frauwallner 1931, Thakur 1975a: 15, Kajiyama 1998: 9, Mimaki 1992, and the introductions to Lasic 2000a and Lasic 2000b on the dates of, and relationship between, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. for example the observations in Thakur 1975a: 11ff., or Steinkellner 1977.

<sup>5</sup>At least 145 lines out of a total of 265 in the critical edition of the *Apoḥasiddhi* I prepared (Mc Allister 2011) are identical to passages in the AP.

<sup>6</sup>This caution might seem a little contrived. But I believe it should be taken seriously in order to see any differences between the texts of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. See Lasic 2000b: 21 f. for examples of these differences.

of the all-enlightened one. But this compendium [is] mine, the obeying Ratnakīrti's, who fears that extensive treatise.<sup>7</sup>

Thakur's assessment is that "Ratnakīrti has summarised the works of his *guru* in many cases and the debt has been eloquently acknowledged. ... It must, however, have to be admitted that the treatment of the disciple is more concise and logical, though not as poetical and elaborate as that of his spiritual father." (Thakur 1975a: 12) Bearing in mind that a summary need not be a disinterested or objective restatement of that summarized, this is indeed how Ratnakīrti presents his work, and should thus be used as the simplest hypothesis in explaining the relationship of their texts.

**1.1 Manuscripts** There are six manuscripts of the AS that I am aware of, five of which are at the moment available.

1. One manuscript (Ms. Collection Number 4711) in the Collection of the Asiatic Society in Kolkata: its script is characterized as Bengali of the 12th century.<sup>8</sup>
2. One manuscript that was in Haraprasāda Shāstri's private possession: this manuscript can not be located at the moment. Together with the aforementioned manuscript, this was edited in Shāstri 1910.
3. The Patna manuscript: it was discovered by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in *Āva lu ri phog* in 1934 (the pictures were taken in 1938). It was the basis of the editions in RNĀ<sub>1</sub>, RNĀ<sub>2</sub>. The script used is usually dated to the 11th to 13th century.<sup>9</sup>
4. Three manuscripts from the Nepal German Manuscript Preservation Project: no edition using these has been published yet.

<sup>7</sup>SJS<sub>2</sub> 31.24ff.

durvāraprativādivikramam anādṛtya pramāpraudhitaḥ sarvajño jagadeka-  
cakṣur udagād eṣa prabhāvo 'tra ca |  
saṃbuddhasthitimedinīkulagirer asmāguroḥ kin tv ayaṃ saṃkṣepo  
mama ratnakīrtikṛtināḥ tadvistaratrāsinaḥ ||

Cf. Bühnemann 1980: 90. Also see Thakur 1975a: 12f.

<sup>8</sup>This is catalogued in Shāstri 2005: entry 34, p. 32.

<sup>9</sup>Cf. Bandurski 1994: 19–21; 59, fn. 176.

## 2 The *apoha* Theory and *adhyavasāya*

The<sup>10</sup> most typical schema of means of valid cognitions and their corresponding objects in the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition is this:

1. Perception (*pratyakṣa*) has as its object a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), that is, a real—momentary and causally efficient—thing.
2. Inference (*anumāna*) has a commonness that things share, a universal (*sāmānya*), which is not taken to be a real thing, as its object.<sup>11</sup>

It is important to understand that the *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya* are two completely different things, especially as regards their ontological status—one is a particular point-instant, the other a construct of conceptual cognition. But, as shown by Dharmakīrti for the glow of a jewel,<sup>12</sup> they do have a special relationship that is relevant for the distinction between true and false cognitions: both can be true cognitions in virtue of making a particular known, perception directly and reasoning in such a way that effective activity can be directed towards a particular.

One of the main difficulties encountered when adopting this very rigid distinction is to explain how it is possible to bridge the both ontological and epistemological gap that it produces: how can the cognition of something that is unreal—a universal, the object of reasoning—have any bearing on the cognizer's interaction with real things? One piece of the puzzle posed by this question is called *adhyavasāya*, or determination. It is a term commonly appearing in Buddhist explanations of the *apohavāda*.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup>Much of the material in this and the following sections found its way into Mc Allister 2011: 5.3.

<sup>11</sup>Cf. Steinkellner (1967b: 92, fn. 25) or McCrea and Patil (2006: 305 f.) for a concise discussion of the two means of cognition and their objects, and of the problems involved. Dharmottara famously subverted this clear distinction, cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 325, fn. 64.

<sup>12</sup>Cf. PV 1 43.2–8. This example occurs also in other works of Dharmakīrti, cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 309 f. and the references to these other passages. The example shows that a conceptual cognition is always mistaken in taking its content as corresponding to fact, even though it can be unmistakable in that its content leads it to successful behaviour with regard to real things. The perceived shine is taken to be either a jewel or a lamp. This is entirely wrong since it is only the shine that appears, not a jewel or a lamp itself. But it can be correct in the second sense if it leads someone thinking “Ah, a jewel!” to a jewel and not to a lamp. If it turns out to be the shine of a lamp, it is wrong in both senses.

<sup>13</sup>For a detailed discussion of the evolution of this concept see McCrea and Patil 2006, and for their critique of, amongst others, Katsura 1993, see McCrea and Patil 2006: 318 ff.

**2.1 Theory of Exclusion (*apohavāda*)** This theory was first advanced by Dignāga (480–540 CE),<sup>14</sup> and prominently received and probably reworked in Dharmakīrti's (600–660 CE) PV 1. It is considered the central element of “Buddhist Nominalism.”<sup>15</sup> The important thing to understand for the line of argument pursued here is that “exclusion” (*apoha*) was, amongst other things, a device to make do without real—i.e., existing—universals.<sup>16</sup>

The idea is that instead of a really existing universal inhering in two things, the commonness that these two things have is defined as their common and similar difference from things that do not have this difference. In other words, the positive feature that some Non-Buddhists said is shared by things is interpreted as a negative feature, a mere similar difference that is shared between two things:

PV 1 38.9–10 (Text SECTION 3.8 on page 296): It was explained what a commonness is like: that things unmixed [with each other] are not mixed with one [other] thing is the sameness of the things different from that.

Another<sup>17</sup> important aspect of universals is that many of them can qualify a single thing (green-ness, apple-ness, fruity-ness, wormy-ness). Additionally, two things can have more than one such similar difference from a third thing, thus allowing them to be grouped into multiple categories. In this way, it is possible to group things into more than one class: for example, things that soothe fever, things that can be used for building a

<sup>14</sup>All dates are according to Steinkellner and Much 1995, unless otherwise noted.

<sup>15</sup>“Buddhist Nominalism” is now a heading in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, cf. Dunne 1998.

<sup>16</sup>Cf., e.g., Pind 1999: 319, Bronkhorst 1999. A very succinct definition of the *apoha* theory is given in Katsura 1986: 172, referring to a conversation with Prof. Steinkellner in 1980 as its basis: “The fact that Dharmakīrti applies the principle of *anyāpoha* beautifully to the theory of causation in the *Hetubindu* [...] indicates that it is a sort of “working hypothesis,” [...] which is equally applicable to many problems of ontology, epistemology and logic.”

<sup>17</sup>The textual basis for this paragraph is mainly PV 1 40.22–42.1, translated, e.g., in Vora and Ota 1980: 16 ff. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article to give a detailed argumentation as to how the various functions ascribed to a real universal were explained by exclusion (*apoha*). Accessible and reliable discussions that such a presentation could start from are found in Kajiyama 1998: section 27, “Refutation of a universal”, 126 ff., and Taber 1998.

house. At the same time, these things can be of the same class—plants for example—as well as completely different individual things. These functional requirements of the universal, basically that of one universal in many particulars and many universals in one particular, are, broadly, reducible to saying that the various aspects, parts, or properties of a unique thing can be designated by words:

PV 3<sup>a</sup> 167ab (Text SECTION 3.9 on page 296): “Which part of a referent<sup>18</sup> does a word express?” [you ask]. To this [question], “exclusion from others” is said [in answer].

**2.2 *apoha* as the Referent of Words** As seen in the verse just quoted, Dharmakīrti maintained that the referent of a word is exclusion. For the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition this amounts to saying that it is the referent for all cognitive states concerned with concepts. This is, for example, clearly said by the most authoritative author of this tradition in the following half-verse:

PV 3<sup>a</sup> 183ab (Text SECTION 3.6 on page 295): Words designate a commonness, and conceptual constructions have the same referent [as words].

It is thus obvious that these conceptual states are all qualified by having the same sort of object: something that can substitute for a real universal or commonness.

**2.3 Ratnakīrti’s Definition of the Word Referent** Ratnakīrti’s well known central definition of the word referent in the AS runs:

AS<sub>3</sub> 56.5 (Text SECTION 3.1 on page 294): The referent of words is a positive element qualified by the exclusion from others.

The main questions to be answered in order to understand this definition are the following four:<sup>19</sup>

1. What does it mean to talk about the referent of a word?
2. What is the *vidhi* or positive element?

<sup>18</sup>The Sanskrit term I translate by referent is *artha*. Other viable translations include object and meaning. More often than not it has to be decided according to context which of these is most suitable. In this article I will try to make do with referent.

<sup>19</sup>The most thorough going study of Ratnakīrti’s *apoha* theory is Patil 2003. Here, a similar strategy of explanation is followed.

3. What is this *vidhi*'s qualification, *anyāpoha*?
4. In what sense is the *vidhi* qualified by *anyāpoha*?

**2.3.1 Referent of a Word** What is meant by “referent of a word” is not explicitly discussed in the AS, but what was just shown for Dharmakīrti holds true for Ratnakīrti. The scope of this term is to be understood as including all objects of conceptual cognition, i.e., all *sāmānyas* or universals.<sup>20</sup>

One passage in which this can be seen to be an implicit assumption is the following, answering an objection by Vācaspatimiśra:

AS<sub>3</sub> 59.21–25 (Text SECTION 3.2 on page 295): Also what Vācaspati said: “Particulars qualified by a class are the range of objects for words and concepts. . . .”, has been refuted by just this[, i.e., what was said before]. For, if it is only the form of the particulars that, even though an additional class is thrown in, is differentiated from what belongs to another class, then how should differentiation from non-that[, i.e., *anyāpoha*, exclusion from others,] be avoided for those that become the objects of words and concepts precisely through that form?

As this is not the place to discuss all the difficulties involved in correctly understanding this passage, it must suffice to point out that Ratnakīrti here equates verbal and conceptual cognitions as far as their objects are concerned in the phrase: “. . . those that become the object of words and concepts . . . .” It seems very improbable that, unless he endorses the position that they are truly equal with respect to their objects, he would here argue by force of this equality without any concessive qualification and then not touch on the subject again for the rest of the AS. In line with this reasoning, conceptual and verbal events will be taken to have the same sort of object in the AS.

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<sup>20</sup>Cf. also Patil (2009: 198), speaking about Ratnakīrti and the theory of exclusion: “I will argue that although he presents this theory as a theory of semantic value — that is as a theory of what our words are about—it is best understood as a theory of mental content—that is, as a theory of what our thoughts are about and what our actions are directed toward.” Also see the considerations in Patil 2009: 208–211.

**2.3.2 *vidhi*—The Affirmative Element** The next constituent which needs to be understood in Ratnakīrti's definition of the word referent is the positive or affirmative element, *vidhi*. At the end of the section in the AS dealing with a Non-Buddhist's assumption that a real universal is the referent of words, Ratnakīrti says:

AS<sub>3</sub> 65.15–20 (Text SECTION 3.3 on page 295): In this way therefore, only a positive entity is the referent of a word. And [with] this [positive entity] an external object and a cognitive form are meant.

Amongst these [two, there is] no affirmation [or] negation of the cognitive form in reality or in a relative sense, because of the fact that [it] is understood through the perception self-consciousness, and because there is no determination [of the cognitive form]. Neither is there in reality a negation or affirmation of an external [thing], because it does not appear in verbal apprehension. For this [reason] then, there is in reality inexpressibility of all phenomena, because there is no determination [or] appearance [of them]. Therefore, there is conventional affirmation and negation of the external only, because otherwise there is the unwanted consequence of ending common activity.

According to this passage, the cognitive form is neither affirmed nor negated in reality, nor even only conventionally: this means that what is called the cognitive form, the form present to a mind cognizing the thing of which the form is taken to be present, does not become the object of active engagement aiming at either achieving or avoiding it. Or, to put it differently, activity never takes that cognitive form, which is present to it, as its intended object. Two reasons are given for this:

1. A cognitive form is directly present to the mind in the mode of self-awareness, which has the nature of perception, and not of conceptual cognition. It is therefore a particular, and can, since it is momentary, not become an object of any sort of activity.
2. And the second reason that there is no activity directly aiming at the cognitive form is that there is no determination of it. This is the first function of determination that becomes clear, even though



it is only a negative one: the cognitive form is **not** what there is a determination of.<sup>21</sup>

The external object, the second aspect of the *vidhi*, is neither affirmed nor negated in an absolute way, i.e., as a real thing or particular. So there is no conceptual cognition of the external object as it really is because it does not appear in verbal cognition, since, as was outlined above, it is only for perception that an external and real thing can become the direct object.

But it is the object of conventional affirmation or negation. In this case the external object is not the particular, but the thing a person thinks is external, e.g., something that has duration like a cow or even a real commonness instantiated in two things. This imagined external thing can be acted towards in a conventional way, i.e., through ignorance about the existential status of the object one is actually acting towards.

These two aspects of the positive element are not to be seen as distinct parts that it is composed of:

AS<sub>3</sub> 60.20–23 (Text SECTION 3.4 on page 295): And by the word “positive element” an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according to determination, and according to manifestation a cognitive form [is meant]. Amongst these, the external object is defined as that to be expressed by a word only because of determination, not because of a particular’s appearance [to the mind], since there is no manifestation of an evident particular that is limited as to space, time and condition, as there is in the case of perception.

This passage shows that the *vidhi* is not a composite of the two parts, cognitive form and external object, but rather that it must be seen under two different aspects (“... according to determination ... according to manifestation ...”) that let the same *vidhi*, or positive element, become an object of awareness in two different ways which accord to two different modes of awareness that it can be present in, determination and manifestation.<sup>22</sup>

The above passage also states that the external object is expressed by a word only because of a determination as external. This shows a second function that determination has in the AS, that of externalisation, by

<sup>21</sup>This is shown rather clearly also in the *Citrādvaitaprahāśavāda* 133.29 f. (CAPV).

<sup>22</sup>Cf. also Patil 2003: 240 f., 2009: 224 ff.

which the positive element that is the referent of words is externalised and understood, or rather misunderstood, as existing in the world as a real thing.

**2.3.3 *anyāpohaviśiṣṭa*** So, presupposing the above two sides of *vidhi*, the affirmative element, what can be said about its quality, the exclusion from others?

As already analysed by Patil (2003: 231 ff.), exclusion is presented by Ratnakīrti both as a quality of the positive element, and as a capacity of conceptual awareness.

In the passage AS<sub>3</sub> 59.15–20 (see SECTION 3.5 on page 295), grasping exclusion as a quality of the cognitive form is stated to be a capacity (*śakti*) that conceptual awareness has. These two aspects, being the qualifier of something and being a capacity, are presented alongside a comparison of two types of negation that can be brought to bear on the perceptual as well as the conceptual cognition of absence.<sup>23</sup> The structure of the example is the following:

1. *prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*: grasping absence in a non-implicatively negating form.<sup>24</sup>
  - a) For perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*) this is the capacity to produce a concept of absence (*abhāvavikalpotpādanaśakti*), i.e., what is meant by “perception of non-x” is the capacity to produce the conceptual cognition “There is no x there.”
  - b) For the concept of a positive element (*vidhivikalpa*) this is the capacity to allow (or bestow) activity in conformance with the grasped absence (*tadanurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśakti*), i.e., what is meant by “conceptual cognition of non-x” is the capacity that a

<sup>23</sup>Whilst the perceptual grasping of an absence is a special case of perception, the conceptual grasping of absence is not a special case of conceptual cognition. For the object of conceptual cognition is always *anyāpoha*, cf. SECTION 2.2 on page 284.

<sup>24</sup>The terms *prasajya* and *pariyudāsa* have long been the subject of discussions; see, for example, the thorough account given in Staal 1962. Cf. Kellner 1997: 92, fn. 135, for further literature on the topic. I will use implicative and non-implicative negation for *pariyudāsa* and *prasajyapratīṣedha* respectively. One way of making sense of this distinction is: “This is a non-red apple.”, which implies that the subject is an apple, and “This is not a red apple.”, not implying that the subject is an apple at all.

**Table 10.1** Grasping and knowing absence

	<i>prasajya</i>	<i>paryudāsa</i>
object of <i>abhāvapratyakṣa</i>	<i>ghaṭābhāva</i>	<i>bhūtala</i>
object of <i>vikalpa</i>	<i>agavāpoḍha</i>	<i>buddhyākāra</i>
cognitive function	<i>adhyavasāya</i>	<i>pratibhāsa</i>
classification	<i>śakti</i>	<i>niyatasvarūpasamvedana</i>

concept of the positive element has by which it makes activity possible.<sup>25</sup>

2. *paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*: grasping absence in an implicatively negating form

- a) This grasping is the same, an awareness of something with a fixed own form, *niyatasvarūpasamvedana*, for both perception and the conceptual awareness of a positive element.

This comparison is not easy to make sense of.<sup>26</sup> I will try and argue that it corresponds to the schema shown in TABLE 10.1.

The two main problems that need to be solved in this passage are the following:

1. How is the absence in the two cases relevantly similar—how is it useful to compare the perceptually cognizable absence of a pot on a perceived stretch of floor with the conceptually cognizable absence of something not being not that, i.e., its quality “the exclusion from others”?

<sup>25</sup>The relevant example (AS<sub>3</sub> 59.19 f.) is that someone is told “Tether a cow!”, and tethers a cow, but not a horse. “Tether a cow!” generates a conceptual cognition of cow, which in turn is the awareness of the absence of non-cows that makes activity with regard to *any* cow possible.

<sup>26</sup>It seems that Patil (2003: 232, 2009: 213) translates and discusses only the first part of the example (*prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*). The only detailed scholarly discussion of the corresponding passage in the AP is in Akamatsu 1983: 56–7. Katsura (1986: 174) notes that the context in which this comparison appears in the AP might be based on the *Hetu-bindu* (HB; Chapter V: *anupalabdhihetu*). The reason he gives is that Jñānaśrīmitra cites a HB passage there (cf. Katsura 1986: 174; 180, fn. 20), apart from the obvious fact that clearly the grasping of absence in perception is *anupalabdhi*. But the *prasajya-paryudāsa* distinction in the HB is interpreted by Steinkellner (1967b: 167, n. 6) as follows: “Dabei wird nicht etwa die Erkenntnis an sich negiert (kein *prasajyapratishedha*...), sondern nur, daß sie die intendierte Erkenntnis sei, ausgeschlossen.” This does not seem to correspond to the distinction as it is made here: it is the perception itself that is either implicatively or non-implicatively negated, and not the absence that it lets the subject cognize.

2. What is the relationship between the non-implicative and implicative negation: is each just possible and sometimes the one and at other times the other will have to be applied in the analysis of these cognitions, or are they somehow interdependent?

What seems clear is that the absence which is grasped both by perception and conceptual cognition can be grasped in two forms: as non-implicatively and implicatively negating that which is present to cognition, i.e., an empty piece of floor or the cognitive form.<sup>27</sup> In the case of conceptual cognition, the absence which is cognized is *anyāpoha*, exclusion from others, e.g., non-cows. In the case of perception, it is the non-existence of something in a specific, perceptually cognized place, e.g., on a stretch of floor.

There are at least two ways of interpreting these statements: either both forms of negation can occur or both must occur so that a perceptual and conceptual cognition of absence is such a cognition of absence. I would like to argue for the latter option: both in perception of absence and in the conceptual awareness of absence, which means in every conceptual awareness, given that its object always is other exclusion (*anyāpoha*, cf. SECTION 2.2 on page 284), an *abhāva* is involved, both in the implicatively negating form as well as in the non-implicatively negating form.

In the perception of an empty floor, for example, the absence (*abhāva*) of *all* things not on the floor becomes known in a non-implicatively negating way. Correspondingly, in the conceptual awareness “cow” the non-implicatively negating absence (*abhāva*) of *all* things that aren’t cows becomes known for the appearing cognitive form (*ākāra*). In both cases this is a non-implicative negation, i.e., a negation that, in the case of perception, can potentially be expressed as “It is not the case that anything is here on the floor.”, and in the case of conceptual cognition can lead to activity directed towards anything of which it is true that it is not a non-cow. In other words, in the case of the perception of the empty floor, this grasping of a non-implicative absence or negative constituent, which explains the adjective “empty”, is traceable only as a capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of absence: “There is no pot, no carpet, etc. on the floor.” In the

<sup>27</sup>The absence of the pot in some place is the standard example of non-perception, used, e.g., in HB 23\*22, as well as in AS<sub>3</sub> 60.10. That it is the cognitive form, *buddhyākāra*, that is present in conceptual awareness is apparent from, e.g., AS<sub>3</sub> 65.16, translated in SECTION 2.3.2 on page 286.

case of conceptual cognition, the grasping of a non-implicatively negating element, the *anyāpoha*, becomes apparent only in the cognition's capacity to lead to an act with regard to what is in accordance with it—that is, in the example, some cow.

According to Ratnakīrti's comparison, an absence is grasped also in the form of an implicative negation. The result of this is the same for perception and conceptual cognition: the awareness of something with a fixed own form, *niyatasvarūpasamvedana*, meaning the awareness of a particular. In the case of the perception of an absence, the awareness of absence is identical with the awareness of the presence of another thing. It is implicative negation or absence in that it is the affirmation or presence of some other positive thing, in this case a particular piece of floor. In the case of conceptual cognition, which always has absence or the exclusion from others as its object, it is the *buddhyākāra* that is qualified by absence in an implicatively negating manner, the cognitive form which is a particular that is present in any given awareness event.

This example is relevant in the analysis of determination because it corresponds to a fundamental distinction that Ratnakīrti sees in how objects are present to, or accessible by, cognition: manifestation and determination, the former being, at least as far as conceptual cognition is concerned, the grasping of absence or exclusion in an implicative manner, the latter the understanding of absence or exclusion in a non-implicative manner.

The absence in a non-implicatively negating form is determined, and the absence in an implicatively negating form is grasped—both in the perception of absence and in conceptual awareness. For it is a particular that is manifest and grasped in perceptual awareness,<sup>28</sup> and it is an *ākāra* that is directly manifest and grasped in conceptual awareness.<sup>29</sup> This is one of the aspects of the *vidhi*. From the side of determination however, it is commonness as a “genericized-particular” (Patil 2009: 259, fn. 32) that is determined in perception, and thus makes activity possible with regard to

<sup>28</sup>About this there is no dispute, and so it is not something that needs to be expressly proven. This seems to be the argument in AS<sub>3</sub> 60.19–20.

<sup>29</sup>This is, in my opinion, implied in the argument given at AS<sub>3</sub> 65.16: there is no activity with regard to the cognitive form, because it is known through the form of perception that is self-awareness. I am here supposing that Ratnakīrti held a notion of self-awareness very similar to that explained in Kajiyama 1998: 47: self-consciousness is “[a kind of] indeterminate knowledge free from fictional constructs and unerring . . .”

it (one activity being the formation of the concept “No pot here.”), and it is an external object that is determined on the grounds of the appearing *bud-dhyākāra* in the case of conceptual cognition. Here another central aspect of determination becomes apparent: it is responsible for the successful activity with regard to real things.

Consequently, the exclusion from others that qualifies the positive or affirmative element is

1. the capacity in a conceptual cognition to make action that accords to expectation possible in so far as this exclusion is understood as a non-implicatively negating element, and
2. a quality of the cognitive form in so far as it is grasped as an implicatively negating element.

The second point can be understood as founding the quality or aspect “exclusion” on the ontological level, because it states that the reason exclusion is cognized when a word is understood is that that word is defined as referring to something, a cow particular, in so far as it is differentiated from non-cows (cf. Text SECTION 3.5 on page 295).

On Ratnakīrti’s explanation,<sup>30</sup> this does not present more problems than the explanation of reference as a word’s referring to a real commonness: in that case too, the word referent is supposed to be a specific commonness, not a particular itself or a commonness as such (as opposed to cowness, the specific commonness).

The question remains how Ratnakīrti’s definition of the referent of a word as “affirmative element characterized by the exclusion of others” should be understood as a whole. It is with regard to the relationship of the positive and negative aspect involved in this definition that the above differentiation between the capacity aspect and the quality aspect of exclusion from others comes into meaningful perspective.

**2.3.4 Relationship *anyāpoha* and *vidhi*** A distinctive feature of Jñānaśrīmitra’s and Ratnakīrti’s version of the *apoha* theory is the stress they lay on the simultaneous cognition of the two parts of the word referent, ex-

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<sup>30</sup>Cf. AS<sub>3</sub> 60.1–11. On my understanding, the point of the arguments given there is to show that *anyāpoha* does not lead to any worse logical problems than the assumption of a really existing universal.

clusion and the positive or affirmative element (cf., for example, AS<sub>3</sub> 59.7–19).<sup>31</sup>

To illustrate this, Ratnakīrti gives the following example:

AS<sub>3</sub> 59.11–15 (for the Sanskrit text, see SECTION 3.7 on page 296): Therefore the cognition of that excluded from others is called a cognition of a cow. And even if an expression does not have a representation of the words “excluded from others”, nevertheless there is no non-cognition at all of other exclusion, which is the qualifier, because the word cow is founded only on that excluded from non-cow. As the appearance of blue is unavoidable at that time when there is the cognition of a blue lotus because of the word *indīvara*[, i.e., blue lotus,] which is founded on a blue lotus, so also the appearance of the exclusion of non-cow is unavoidable, because it is a qualifier, in the same moment as there is the cognition of cow from the word cow which is founded on that excluded from non-cow.

From this passage it follows that the cognition “cow” is equivalent with the cognition of that excluded from others: non-cows in this example. In other words, the positive element, *vidhi*, is that excluded from others, *anyāpodha*, due to having exclusion, *anyāpoḥa*, as its qualifier. The point of the example is that the cognition of “blue lotus” is impossible without the qualifier “blue” being cognized in the same moment as “lotus”. This means that what can be understood as the *vidhi*'s quality, exclusion from others, is essential to it in the sense that it can not be grasped or cognized without it. Understanding the word “cow” is simultaneous to, and inseparable from, understanding “not non-cow.”

The question that this analysis leads to is the following: given that the positive element is both present in the mode of appearance and determination (cf. SECTION 3.4 on page 295), is its qualifier, the exclusion from others, also present in both modes?<sup>32</sup> I think that on the background of the arguments above, this can be answered with a yes. It is with respect to

<sup>31</sup>Cf. Patil 2003, and—given the reasonably probable similarity of the AS to Jñānaśrī-mitra's AP—also McCrea and Patil 2006, as opposed to the discussions in Akamatsu 1986 and Katsura 1986. See also Patil 2009, especially chapter 5.

<sup>32</sup>This is not supported in the place where a direct clarification could have been given by Ratnakīrti, SECTION 3.4 on page 295: “And by the word positive element an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according to determination, and according to manifestation a cognitive form [is meant].” Here Ratnakīrti qualifies

the implicative and non-implicative modes of absence that it can be made sense of how differentiation qualifies and is present in every event in the sphere of conceptual awareness, both in the direct grasping of an *ākāra* by self-awareness and in the generalizing determination of an object of activity.

Accordingly, the main constituents of the “complex entity” (coined in Patil 2003: 230) that is the referent of words, the *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ*, might be analysed as follows:

The positive element (*vidhi*) both appears and is determined. Appearing, it is the cognitive form qualified by the exclusion from others in the manner of an implicative negation. Determined, it is the cognitive form qualified by the exclusion from others in the manner of a non-implicative negation. It is in this latter sense that determination, which also involves externalisation, makes action according to an expectation possible.

**2.3.5 Conclusion** The main characteristics of determination according to Ratnakīrti can therefore be listed as follows:

1. There is no determination of the cognitive form (item 2 on page 286).
2. Determination performs an externalisation in the context of conceptual cognition (SECTION 2.3.2 on page 287).
3. Determination construes the positive element’s exclusion from others as a non-implicative negation (item 1 on page 292).
4. Determination (thus) is a function that allows conceptual cognition to prompt activity towards an external object, finally leading—if not mistaken—to the desired effect (SECTION 2.3.3 on page 292).

### 3 Text Passages

**3.1 AS<sub>3</sub> 56.5** *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ*. (Translated in SECTION 2.3 on page 284)

only the determined aspect of the positive element, the external object, as distinguished from that of another nature, but not the cognitive form. On the other hand, if it were not the case that differentiation from others would qualify the cognitive form also, it would be hard to see how Ratnakīrti separates his view from that of the affirmationist (*vidhivādin*). Cf. Akamatsu 1986 for the description of their view.



**3.2 AS<sub>3</sub> 59.21–25** *yad apy avocad vācaspatih—jātimatyo vyaktayo vikalpānām śabdānām ca gocarah. ... tad apy anenaiva nirastam. yato jāter adhikāyāḥ prakṣepe 'pi vyaktīnām rūpam atajjātīyavyāvṛttam eva cet, tadā tenaiva rūpeṇa śabdavikalpayor viśayībhavantīnām katham atadvyāvṛttiparihārah.* (Translated in SECTION 2.3.1 on page 285)

**3.3 AS<sub>3</sub> 65.15–20** *tad evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ. sa ca bāhyo 'rtho buddhyākāras ca vivakṣitaḥ. tatra na buddhyākārasya tattvataḥ samvṛtyā vā vidhiniśedhau, svasaṃvedanapratyakṣagamyatvāt, anadhyavasāyāc ca. nāpi tattvato bāhyasyāpi vidhiniśedhau, tasya śābde pratyaye 'pratibhāsanāt. ata eva sarvadharmāṇām tattvato 'nabhilāpyatvam, prati-bhāsādhyavasāyābhāvāt. tasmād bāhyasyaiva sāmṛttau vidhiniśedhau, anyathā samvyavahārahānīprasaṅgāt.* (Translated in SECTION 2.3.2 on page 286)

**3.4 AS<sub>3</sub> 60.20–23** *vidhiśabdena ca yathādhyavasāyam atadrūpa-parāvṛtto bāhyo 'rtho 'bhimataḥ, yathāpratibhāsam buddhyākāras ca. tatra bāhyo 'rtho 'dhyavasāyād eva śabdavācyo vyavasthāpyate, na svalakṣaṇaparispṛṅhyā, pratyakṣavad deśakālāvasthānīyataprayaktasvalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt.* (Translated in SECTION 2.3.2 on page 287)

**3.5 AS<sub>3</sub> 59.15–20** *yathā pratyakṣasya prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇam abhāvavikalpotpādanaśaktir eva, tathā vidhivikalpānām api tadanurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśaktir evābhāvagrahaṇam abhidhīyate. paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇam tu niyatasvarūpasamvedanam ubhayor aviśiṣṭam. anyathā yadi śabdād arthapratipattikāle kalito na parāpohaḥ katham anyaparihāreṇa pravṛttiḥ. tato gām badhāneti codito 'śvādīn api badhnīyāt.* (Discussed in SECTION 2.3.3 on page 288)<sup>33</sup>

### 3.6 PV 3<sup>a</sup> 183ab

*sāmānyavācīnaḥ śabdās tadekāṛthā ca kalpanā.* (Translated in SECTION 2.2 on page 284)

<sup>33</sup>*prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇam* is corrected against “*abhāva-agrahaṇam*” AS<sub>3</sub> 59.16, also noted in Patil 2009: 213, fn. 40 and considered in Patil 2003: 246, n. 14. All the manuscripts used for the critical edition also read “*grahaṇam*”.

**3.7 AS<sub>3</sub> 59.11–15** *tasmād goḥ pratipattir ity anyāpoḍhapratipattir ucyate. yady api cānyāpoḍhaśabdānullekha uktas tathāpi nāpratipattir eva viśeṣaṇabhūtasypohasya. agavāpoḍha eva gośabdasya niveśitatvāt. yathā nīlotpale niveśitād indīvaraśabdān nīlotpalapratītau tatkāla eva nīlimasphuraṇam anivāryam, tathā gośabdād apy agavāpoḍhe niveśitād gopratītau tulyakālam eva niveśitād ago’pohasphuraṇam anivāryam.* (Trl. in SECTION 2.3.4 on page 293)

**3.8 PV 1 38.9–10** *uktam yādrśam sāmānyam—asaṃsr̥ṣṭānām ekā-saṃsargas tadvyatirekiṇām samānateti.* (Translated in SECTION 2.1 on page 283)

**3.9 PV 3<sup>a</sup> 167ab** *śabdo ’rthāṃśam kam āheti tatrānyapoha ity ucyate.* (Translated in SECTION 2.1 on page 284)

## Abbreviations

- AP** Jñānaśrīmitra. “Apoḥaprakaraṇa”. In: JNĀ,; 201–232.
- AS<sub>3</sub>** Ratnakīrti. “Apoḥasiddhi”. In: RNĀ<sub>2</sub>, 58–66.
- CAPV** Ratnakīrti. “Citrādvaitaparakāśavāda”. In: RNĀ<sub>2</sub>, 129–144.
- HB** Dharmakīrti. “Hetubindu”. In: Steinkellner 1967a, 29–99.
- ĪSD** Ratnakīrti. “Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa”. In: RNĀ<sub>2</sub>, 32–57.
- JNĀ** Jñānaśrīmitra. “Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali”. In: Thakur 1987.
- PV 1** Dharmakīrti. “Pramāṇavārttike Prathamah Paricchedah”. In: Gnoli 1960, 1–176.
- PV 3<sup>a</sup>** Dharmakīrti. “Pramāṇavārttika III [kk. 1–319]”. In: Tosaki 1979. Vol. 1.
- RNĀ<sub>1</sub>** Ratnakīrti. “Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali”. In: Thakur 1957.
- RNĀ<sub>2</sub>** Ratnakīrti. “Ratnakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ”. In: Thakur 1975b.
- SJS<sub>2</sub>** Ratnakīrti. “Sarvajñasiddhi”. In: RNĀ<sub>2</sub>, 1–31.

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