

References to Pericles in Philodemus' Papyri

1.

In a paper read during the 18th International Congress of Papyrology (Athens 1986)¹, Marcello Gigante underlined “la sensibilità storica e l’impegno storiografico di Filodemo”², against Cicero, who reproaches the Epicureans for being silent about history in their works. But Cicero’s charge³ is false, as a glance at the *Index* of Sudhaus’ edition of *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* by Philodemus⁴ shows.

In my paper I shall examine the references to Pericles in Philodemus’ papyri; he is one of the most frequently mentioned historical figures, but some passages are not always completely preserved and clear.

2.

I shall deal first with the papyri *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς*. P.Herc. 1506 contains the first draft of a book of *Rhetoric* (the *subscriptio* is *Φιλοδήμου ἢ Περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἢ ὑπομνηματικόν*), probably the third one, whose definitive edition is preserved in P.Herc. 1426, as it is clear if we compare the surviving parts of the latter with the last columns of the former. The Stoic Diogenes of Babylon thought that both an orator and a statesman must have a philosophical education, that is to be a follower of Stoicism; on the contrary, according to Philodemus, sophistic rhetoric cannot make good statesmen.

In col. XXI 15–30⁵ Philodemus says that Pericles was a skilful orator and a good statesman with many good qualities, and although it is true that he received the necessary education, nevertheless he was not a pupil of Stoic philosophers: ὅθεν μὲν ἢ καλῶς προστήσασθαι τὸν ῥήτορα τῆς πατρίδος, ἢ κἂν ἔχη τὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἢ ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας λέγουσιν.⁶ Περὶ κληῆς τοίνυν, ὃν [ἔ]φη ἢ ἀνεκ[κ]τότατον γερονέ[ναι] ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ῥητό[ρων], καὶ ἢ Ἀναξάγορου καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἤκουσεν φιλοσόφων, οἷς⁷ μὲν ἴσως παρέβαλε, Στωϊκοῖς δ’ οὐδ’ ἀμ[μ]ῶς ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ] ἢ τὰς ἐναντίας ἐσχηκ[ό]σιν ἢ δ’ ὄξας ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀλιγ[ων]· μόλιον δὲ κ[α]τὰ Διογ[έν]ην ἢ⁸ Στωϊκῆ ποιεῖ πολ[ί]τας ἀγα[θ]οῦς (“Whence they say that the orator will not govern his country successfully without philosophy, even if he has experience. Now Pericles, who, as he said, had been the most tolerable of orators, heard both Anaxagoras⁶ and certain other philosophers — perhaps he was their pupil — and yet they were certainly not Stoics, but even held opposite views about the universe. But according to Diogenes, only Stoicism makes good citizens”). It is noteworthy, I think, that this seems to be the only passage in Greek literature in which Pericles is called ἀνεκτός.

In col. XXII 4–8⁷ there could also be a trace of Pericles’ ἀνεκτότης⁸, even if only α and an uncertain ν survive of the word ἀνεκτόν.

In col. IX⁹, an argument full of gaps, directed against Diogenes of Babylon, Philodemus seems to reply that some famous figures (Themistocles and Pericles are among them) were successful statesmen and orators without studying Stoic philosophy.

¹ *Filodemo e la storia*, in: *Proceedings of the 18th Internat. Congr. Papyrol.*, Athens 1988, vol. I, 153–165 (= *Altre Ricerche Filodemee*, Napoli 1998, 27–43).

² P. 153 (= *Altre Ricerche*, p. 27).

³ *De fin.* II 21, 67: *numquam audivi in Epicuri schola Lycurgum, Solonem, Miltiadem, Themistoclem, Epaminondam nominari, qui in ore sunt ceterorum philosophorum omnium.*

⁴ Vol. II, Lipsiae 1896; Sudhaus had published vol. I in 1892 and a *Supplementum* in 1895.

⁵ II 226f. Sudhaus (= Diog. Bab., *SVF* III 125).

⁶ In P.Herc. 1114, fr. VII (II 299 Sudhaus) we read an uncertain Περικληῆς ἐ[λέ]γετο ἀκού[ειν] Ἀ[ν]αξ-αγόρ[ου].

⁷ II 227 Sudhaus.

⁸ The text is very uncertain, but one can partly restore it by P.Herc. 240, fr. IX.

⁹ II 212 Sudhaus.

In cols. III 32 – IV 10¹⁰ it is emphasized that orators need education, and Pericles and Demosthenes are examples of γενναίοι ῥήτορες who received a philosophical education: the former was an ἀκουστής τῶν καθ' αὐτ[ὸν] σοφῶν, the latter Πλάτωνι [καὶ Εὐ]βουλίδει λέγεται [πα]ραβεβληκέναι.

A passage of P.Herc. 1004 also seems to deal with the same subject. This papyrus was attributed to *Rhetoric* by Comparetti¹¹, and it could be the ninth book, according to Francesca Longo Auricchio¹². In col. LVI 5–13¹³ Diogenes of Babylon wants to prove that a philosophical education is necessary to an orator and a statesman, and cites Pericles and Demosthenes as examples: τοὺς ἐ[πι]σημ[ο]τάτους τ[ῶ]ν ἐμ[π]ράκτων ῥητόρων δι[ὰ τὴν ἐμ]φαινομένην ἐκ τῶν φι[λο]σοφῶν συν[ε]ργ[ί]αν ἡχθ[αί] παρ' αὐτῶ[ν] ὥ[σπερ] Περικλέα καὶ τινὰς ἄλλους ἄρχον[τας καὶ] Δημοσθένην (“... that the most notable of the practical orators, thanks to the evident cooperation of philosophers, have been guided by them, like Pericles and some other statesmen and Demosthenes”). Diogenes is referring to the well known relations between Pericles and Anaxagoras on the one hand, Demosthenes and Plato on the other¹⁴.

3.

There are some passages of P.Herc. 1506 which are mostly not well preserved, where Pericles is cited in a discussion on the definition of rhetoric. In col. XXXIV 9–30¹⁵ three pairs of orators are mentioned: Pericles and Themistocles, who are πολιτικοί¹⁶, even if κ[α]ὶ τότε κ[α]ὶ νῦν ἀκρό[τα]τοι νοοῦνται [κα]ὶ λέγονται (i. e., ῥήτορες); Isocrates and Matris, who are sophists (that is, epideictic orators); Demosthenes and Callistratus, who are orators οἱ λέγονται τὴν πολιτικὴν κεκτῆσθαι δύναμιν. I think that Matilde Ferrario is right, when she writes¹⁷ that here the polemic is against a presumably Epicurean opponent, who is not able to distinguish between politics and rhetoric and between political rhetoric and sophistic rhetoric.

In fr. XV¹⁸, whose text is very doubtful, it seems that two groups of orators are mentioned: Odysseus, Nestor, Solon, Themistocles and Pericles would be set against Callistratus and, perhaps, Antiphon¹⁹.

In col. XI 22–30²⁰ Philodemus probably cites Pericles, Callistratus and [τοὺς λ]οιποὺς τῶν [πολιτικῶ]ν ῥητόρων as orators who cannot be judged by the technical treatises which [τινες] ἀνέγραψαν ὁμωνύ[μ]ως προσαγορευόμενοι ῥήτορες. In my opinion, this means that statesmen can be good orators, but they certainly differ from the sophistic orators, so that one must judge them by different criteria.

4.

In three passages Pericles is mentioned together with Callistratus and Demosthenes in a discussion on the qualities of rhetoric and the relation between rhetoric and philosophy. P.Herc. 1004, col. XXVII 6–12²¹: οὐ γὰρ ἢ οἴδ[α]μεν οὐδ' ἐπεγ[ινώ]καμεν [πρ]ὸ Περικλέους καὶ [Καλλι]στράτου καὶ [Δημοσθέ]νου καὶ τῶν [ὄ]μοίων περίτρανον εἶ[ναι] ἢ μὴ τ[ῆ]ν δεινότη[τ]α πε[ρί]τρανον λέ[ξε]ι (“For we do not know of, nor have recognized, anyone very clear before Pericles, Callistratus, Demosthenes and such people, unless he will call cleverness clarity”). Two characteristics of good rhetoric are mentioned, περίτρανον and δεινότης: the first word seems to occur only here²², instead of ἐνάργεια/ἐναργές, which are commonly

¹⁰ II 205f. Sudhaus (cols. III 33 – IV 4 are restored by P.Herc. 1633, fr. VI, lower part).

¹¹ D. Comparetti, G. De Petra, *La Villa ercolanese dei Pisoni. I suoi monumenti e la sua biblioteca*, Torino 1883, Napoli 1972, 77, n. 5.

¹² CErc 26 (1996) 171.

¹³ I 350f. Sudhaus (= Diog. Bab., *SVF* III 104).

¹⁴ See Pl., *Phaedr.* 269e–270a; Plut., *Per.* 4ff. and *Dem.* 5; Diog. Laërt. III 47; Cic., *Or.* IV 15, *Brut.* XXXI 121 and *De or.* I 19, 89 and III 34, 138; Quint. XII 2, 22.

¹⁵ II 233f. Sudhaus.

¹⁶ In Sudhaus' edition, at l. 13f. we read πολιτ[ικ]οὺς [λέγει καθ]ὰ καὶ Φωκί[ωνα] (“he means statesmen like Phocion”), but the correct reading is [καθ]ὰ καὶ Σωκρ[άτης], as M. Ferrario already read (CErc 13 [1983] 111, n. 57): another λέγει is understood, and the meaning is “just as Socrates says”.

¹⁷ *Atti XVII Congr. Intern. Papirolog.*, Napoli 1984, 492.

¹⁸ II 201 Sudhaus.

¹⁹ Today only the letters ὄντα are legible, which have been restored [Ἀντιφ]όντα. According to Ferrario (*Atti* [v. n. 17], 499), natural eloquence would be set against the great political rhetoric, marked by technical elements.

²⁰ II 215 Sudhaus. The text is partly restored from P.Herc. 1633, fr. III (upper part).

²¹ I 336 Sudhaus.

²² It does not seem to be used by other authors, except Plut., *De lib. ed.* 4A, and [Antig. Car.], *Mir.* 45; M. Aurel. VIII 30 uses περιτράνω.

used; δεινότης means “cleverness” also in other passages of Philodemus' *Rhetoric*²³, while it seems to mean “intensity” in Demetrius Rhetor, *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας*²⁴.

In P.Herc. 1004, col. LXXIII²⁵, an opponent, who wants to condemn sophistic rhetoric, says²⁶ that “the whole structure [of rhetoric] consists of falsehood, so that it must be obviously avoided by a lover of truth”. Philodemus replies²⁷: ἐἴς γ' ὁ δὲ τὴν σοφιστεῦ[ου]σ[α]ν ἀφείς, εἰ καὶ περὶ ταύτης ἐδυνάμην τι λείγειν, καὶ τὰς τέχνας [τὰς] | Ἀριστοτέλους — τὴν Περι¹⁰κλέ[ους] καὶ Καλλισ[τρ]ά[του] | καὶ Δη[μοσθένους] ῥ[η]τορείαν] (“But, leaving out sophistic rhetoric, even if I could say something about it, and the τέχνας of Aristotle²⁸ — the oratory of Pericles, Callistratus and Demosthenes ...”).

In P.Herc. 1078/1080, fr. VII²⁹, lines 7–17, Pericles, Callistratus and Demosthenes are mentioned in the discussion on the disadvantages of rhetoric, with a comparison between rhetoric and philosophy (in favour of the latter, of course). Philodemus says: αἱ δ' ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ φυσικαὶ πᾶσι τοῖς καθαριωτέροις ἀνθρώποις εὐπό¹⁰ριστοι τῶι [γέν]ει γ' εἰσ[ί]ν, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνους τοῖς Περικλεῖ | καὶ Καλλιστράτῳ καὶ Δη[μοσθένει] παραπλησίοις, | ὥστε τῆς δυνάμεως εἰ¹⁵κείνης πόσω βελτίων | [ἢ] τὸν [δ]ρον διδάσκουσα | τῶν [ἐπιθ]υμητῶν (“The necessary and natural desires are the easiest to satisfy for all the more respectable men, not only for those who are almost equal to Pericles, Callistratus and Demosthenes; consequently, how much better is rhetoric than philosophy, which teaches the limit of what is desired”).

5.

In three more passages Pericles is mentioned together with Themistocles. P.Herc. 1004, col. C³⁰, is unfortunately full of gaps: in my opinion, both Sudhaus' and Mayer's³¹ reconstructions are based on so few certain letters that they cannot be plausible.

P.Herc. 1050 contains the fourth book of *On death*; in col. XXIX 2–10 Philodemus says that it makes no difference whether a man dies of an illness or in battle: θαυμαστὸν δ' εἰ κ[αὶ] τ[ο]ὺς ἐν παρατάξει μόνον ἀποθνήσκοντας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἱ μεταγενέστεροι λαμ⁵πρόν τι π[ε]πραχέναι, Θεμιστοκλέα δέ, | ὃν φησι Θουκυδίδης νόσωι τελευτήσαι, | καὶ Περικ[λ]έα καὶ μυρίου[ς] ἄλλους τῶν | ἀοιδίμων οὐ νομίζουσιν καὶ φυσικώτερος ἐξ[η]κότας Ἐπίκου[ρ]ον καὶ Μητρό¹⁰δωρον (“It is amazing if posterity too supposes that only those who died in battle did something splendid, while they do not think the same about Themistocles — Thucydides says that he died of an illness —, Pericles and countless other famous men, even those who lived more according to nature than others, Epicurus and Metrodorus”). As regards Themistocles, Philodemus is referring to a passage in the first book of the *Histories*³², in which Thucydides writes that the Athenian statesman νοσήσας τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον; as for Pericles, in Plutarch³³ we read that he died of the plague. Here Philodemus puts two great figures of Greek history on a level with the founder of the Epicurean school and his favourite pupil as examples of men whose life is worthy of praise even if they did not die in battle.

²³ P.Herc. 1015/832 (II 20, 14 and 33, 7 Sudhaus), with πολιτική; P.Herc. 1506 (II 244, 35 and 246, 18 Sudhaus), with τοῦ λόγου / ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.

²⁴ *Passim*.

²⁵ I 361f. Sudhaus.

²⁶ Ls. 1–4.

²⁷ Ls. 4–17.

²⁸ Philodemus is probably referring to Aristotle's works on rhetoric: besides *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς*, Aristotle wrote *Γρόλλος* (frgs. 37–38 Gigon), *Τεχνῶν συναγωγή* (frgs. 123–134 Gigon) and *Τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγή* (frgs. 135–151 Gigon).

²⁹ II 150 Sudhaus. According to Sudhaus (I, pp. XII, XL–XLII) and G. Cavallo (*Libri scritte scribi a Ercolano*, Napoli 1983, p. 39), this papyrus contains parts of the same book preserved in P.Herc. 1669; see T. Dorandi, *ZPE* 82 (1990) 86.

³⁰ I 377 Sudhaus.

³¹ A. Mayer, *Aristonstudien*, *Philologus*, Suppl. XI (1907–1910) 540: See also I. ab Arnim, *De Aristonis Perpatetici apud Philodemum vestigiis*, Univ. Progr. Rostock 1900, 11.

³² 138, 4.

³³ *Per.* XXXVIII.

P.Herc. 1669 contains a book of *Rhetoric*, perhaps the tenth, according to Longo Auricchio³⁴. In col. XXVI 5–19³⁵ the discussion concerns the question of whether virtue can be taught: ἀλλὰ ἢ τούτων ἄκαιρος μὲν ἢ παλρεμβολὴ τοῦ μὴ διδασκτὸν ἢ εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐ μὴν ἢ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀ[ρ]ετὴν οὐκ εἶναι διδασκτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε Σωκράτης ἐκ τοῦ μήτε Θεμιστοκλέα μήτ' Ἀριστείδην μήτε Περικλέα δεδυνῆσθαι³⁵ τοὺς υἱ[ο]ύς, οἳοί πε[ρ] ἦσαν αὐτοί, κατ[α]σκευάσαι. διὰ δὲ ταύτου συναχθήσεται καὶ τ[ὸ] ἢ μὴδὲ τ[ῆ]ν σοφιστικὴν [ρ]η[τορικὴ]ν διδασκτὴν εἶν[αι] (“But the insertion of these arguments to the effect that virtue cannot be taught is untimely. Not only so, but, what is more, Socrates showed that in fact political virtue cannot be taught, citing the examples of Themistocles, Aristides and Pericles, who were not able to make their sons the same kind of men as they were. And by the same reasoning one can prove that not even sophistic rhetoric can be taught”). In my opinion, here Philodemus argues against his opponents’ ambiguity as regards virtue: when they say that ἀρετὴ μὴ διδασκτὴ ἐστίν, they mean philosophical virtue, while Philodemus thinks that πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ cannot be taught and proves it by referring to Socrates, who clearly means political virtue when he says³⁶ οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι διδασκτὸν εἶναι ἀρετὴν. More than once Socrates cites Pericles and Themistocles as examples of statesmen who οὐδένα πάποτε βελτίω ἐποίησαν οὔτε τῶν οικείων οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων³⁷ (see Plato, *Prot.* 319e, *Alc. I* 118d-e, *Men.* 93e).

6.

I end my paper by discussing some passages in which Pericles is mentioned as an example for different reasons. P.Herc. 1008 contains *On vices* book X, which deals with arrogance. From col. X 10 onwards Philodemus sums up an otherwise unknown work, Ἐπιστολικά περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας, by Ariston (perhaps the Peripatetic Ariston of Keos), and quotes a great part of it almost literally³⁸.

In the first part Ariston gives some advice on how to rid oneself of arrogance and illustrates it with historical anecdotes; Pericles is one of the protagonists. In col. XI 24–33 Ariston³⁹ seems to say that not only when someone considers the periods of good luck, but also in the opposite case his attitude must be well-balanced³⁰, ὡς καὶ Περικλῆς ταπεινοῦ μένους μὲν ἐξῆρεν Ἀθηναίους, μεγαλαυχουμένους δὲ ἢ σ[υνέ]στ[ειλ]ε (“just as Pericles raised the Athenians when they were humbled, but he humbled them when they boasted”). Pericles is mentioned as an example of an even-tempered man, who is able to influence the mood of his fellow-citizens. This side of Pericles’ character was already known (see Thucydides II 65 and Plutarch, *Per.* XV).

We could see a hint at the success of Pericles among the people also in P.Herc. 1004, col. CV 7–14, according to Sudhaus’ text [καὶ] ἢ γὰρ εἰ δ[ὲ] τὰ νόμιμα Περικλή[ς] ῥα[ι]δίως ἐπειθεν, ἢ⁴⁰ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλος ἐξῆς δημοκοποῖτο, τὸ δ’ ἀπ[ὸ] φιλοσοφίας οὐδ’ ἂν προσδ[έξ]αιτο, μᾶλλον δ’ οὐδ’ ἂν ἐχούτο δῆμος⁴⁰; unfortunately, in this passage⁴¹ there are many gaps and the reconstruction is uncertain, especially in lines 7–11.

³⁴ CErc 26 (1996) 170f. She bases her opinion on the following considerations: in the *subscriptio* of P.Herc. 1669 Tiziana Di Matteo saw traces of the book’s number which probably belong to a I; the first half of this papyrus was written by the same scribe who also wrote P.Herc. 1004 (therefore, the latter precedes the former); the book preserved in P.Herc. 1015/832 is the eighth — Longo Auricchio read a not complete but certain H in its *subscriptio* —, and in Dorandi’s plausible reconstruction of Περὶ ῥητορικῆς (ZPE 82 [1990] 71–73) this book precedes the book which is preserved in P.Herc. 1004 because of its content. I 261 Sudhaus.

³⁵ I 261 Sudhaus.

³⁶ Pl., *Prot.* 320b.

³⁷ Pl., *Prot.* 320a. Cf. *Grg.* 515c-d.

³⁸ From the style one can see that in cols. X 10 – XVI 27 Philodemus is not reporting his own ideas (infinite sentences with the subject implied are used); but also cols. XVI 29 – XXIV are not entirely by Philodemus, as we can see from the words φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστων (col. XVI 34), which are recalled in col. XXIV 17 by φησὶν, whose understood subject is Ariston (J. Rusten, *Theophrastus, Characters*, Cambridge, London 1993, 182, thinks that in this section “interspersed with the character descriptions are Philodemus’ tedious and contorted analyses of the disadvantages of each trait”).

³⁹ As a matter of fact, Ariston is speaking here, as I said before, but I think that we can consider this and the other historical references as made by Philodemus himself, because not only the subject, but also the lively style of Ariston’s book is congenial to him.

⁴⁰ I 380 Sudhaus.

⁴¹ This is Hubbell’s translation (H. M. Hubbell, *The Rhetorica of Philodemus*, Trans. Connect. Acad. of Arts and Sciences 23 [1920] 340): “For even if Pericles easily persuaded the people to do what was lawful, another would

P.Herc. 1007 contains the second part of *Rhetoric* book IV, as we read in its *subscriptio*. In col. VI^a 7–25⁴² Pericles is one of those who employed a correct style without studying rhetoric. Philodemus disputes his opponent's opinion, that “before rhetorical treatises were written and throve no fault of style was considered”⁴³, [ὄστ]ε μη[δ]ὲ Περικλέ[α] | μηδὲ τὸν | Στεφάνου Θουκυδίδην μηδὲ τὸν Ὀλόρου τήν | γ[ε] | π[ρ]ό[χ]ειρον ἐκπεφευ[γέ]ναι καχεξίαν τῆς ἐρ²⁰μενείας, ἀλλὰ μ[ηδ'] ἐπιτεθωρηκέναι· τάχα γὰρ ἐ[πι] | τούτων κατήρχθαι | [τις] ἐρεῖ τὰς διατριβάς, ἰσ[χυκ]έναι δὲ οὐδεὶς μὴ τε²⁵λ[έ]ω[ς] ἀ]ναισχυντῶν (“so that neither Pericles nor Thucydides the son of Stephanus⁴⁴ nor Thucydides the son of Olorus escaped the common bad style of expression nor examined it carefully, because rhetorical studies had begun in their time, but only who is completely shameless will say that they were thriving”). According to Philodemus, avoiding stylistic faults does not depend on rhetorical treatises, and so there is no difference between people who lived before the introduction of rhetorical studies and people who lived later⁴⁵.

P.Herc. 1425 contains the fifth book of *On Poems*. In its last columns Philodemus wants to refute various δόξαι on poetic excellence, which Zeno of Sidon listed without naming their authors. The seventh δόξα concerns the imitation of Homer and similar traditional poets: only he who imitates Homer and other good poets can be a good poet. Philodemus replies⁴⁶: [δικαιοσ]ύ[νην] | γέ τοι φήσε[ι] τις εἶναι τὴν | Ἄριστείδου μίμησιν | καὶ χρηστότητα τὴν Φωκί[ω]ν[ο]ς καὶ [σοφ]ίαν τὴν | Ἐπικούρου καὶ πολιτικὴν μὲν τὴν Περικλέ¹⁰ους, ζωγραφίαν δὲ τὴν Ἀπελλέους, καὶ περὶ τῶν | ἄλλων ὁ[μοί]ω[ς], ἀντιστρόφως δ' ἐπὶ [τ]ῶν κακίῶν (“And someone will say that justice is the imitation of Aristides, and goodness that of Phocion, and wisdom that of Epicurus, and the science of politics that of Pericles, and painting that of Apelles, and similarly for the other virtues, and inversely for vices”). According to Philodemus, what his opponent says, that qualities and vices are identified with people who have them, is γελοῖον. Once more, Pericles is mentioned as an example of statesman κατ' ἐξοχήν.

7.

As we have seen, in Philodemus' works Pericles occurs both as a statesman and as a good orator; along with Demosthenes and Themistocles he represents great political rhetoric, and he was successful in politics and rhetoric not only because he was a pupil of some philosophers, like Anaxagoras, but especially for his natural qualities.

not in turn succeed in currying the favor of the mob, and the populace would never endure philosophy”. M. Ferrario (CErc 10 [1980] 108) paraphrases the text as follows: “Pericles did not succeed for his philosophical instruction, and people would not have endured another man who had delivered philosophical speeches”.

⁴² I 188 Sudhaus.

⁴³ Ls. 9–12, 13–15: πρὸ τῶν ῥητορικῶν |¹⁰ διατριβῶν μηδ[ὲν] βε[β]λέφθαι τ[ῶν] | πληνμελημάτων τούτων — π[ρ]ὶ[v] ἰσχ[υ]σ[α] | τὰς ῥητορικὰς διατρι[β]ῆ[ς].¹⁵

⁴⁴ It is a slip for Melesias, as Hubbell already noted (p. 299).

⁴⁵ Cols. VI^a 25 – VII^a 6 (I 188f. Sudhaus). On cols. VI^a 7 – VIII^a 21 (I 188–190 Sudhaus) see M. Gigante, CErc 1971 cit., p. 65f., and *Proceedings Athens* (v. n. 1), p. 161f. (= *Altre Ricerche*, p. 39), where he points out that H. Homeyer (*Lukian, Wie man Geschichte schreiben soll*, München 1965, 80) misunderstands this passage when she speaks of Philodemus' admiration for Thucydides.

⁴⁶ Col. XXXIV 3–14 Mangoni.