1. Power, Authority and Social Order

The present state of knowledge suggests that in many Islamic societies the exercise of power was of a merely indirect nature. Until the mid or late nineteenth century, authority was often delegated to and mediated by local elites. The latter sought to maintain influence through accumulating rents in land tenure arrangements. The Islamic Orient shared this feature with other agrarian settings such as Qing China, Tokugawa Japan, the Russian Empire, Java and the Habsburg monarchy.[1] Historians concerned with Islamic history sometimes point to the longevity of the building blocks of Islamic societies, especially patterns of patronage and related practices like mediation and rent tenure.[2] Based on this state of knowledge, the following chapter outlines the concept of Social Order, a novel approach that integrates various theories, which I intend to employ throughout this thesis. Of course, I did not visit the archives with a ready-made conceptual prism in mind through which I read and interpreted the sources, nor did I develop the concept from scratch. The Social Order approach is owed first to the nature of chronicles like Qāżī Wafā's *Tuḥfat al-khānī* or Mullā Sharīf's *Tāj al-tawārīkh*, and second to our current state of knowledge. This knowledge and the insights gained from the first rounds of archival work and consecutive chronicle reading provided fruitful impulses for a discussion that took place within the research project *Local Governance and Statehood in the Āmū Daryā Borderlands*. Thus historical research and theoretical pondering benefitted one another.[3] One of the results of the discussions with my colleagues was that neither the

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[1] C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914. Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), 27–28.

[2] Concerned with the Buyid period, Mottahedeh speaks about an "amazingly resilient social order" (Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership*, 5). In their works on the disposition of social order during the Middle Ages, Lapidus and Paul point to the durability of phenomena like patronage and brokerage. Some of these institutions continued to exist well into the late nineteenth century (Lapidus, *History*, 8; Paul, "Forming a Faction," 533–34).

[3] At this point I would again like to thank my colleagues from the project group, especially Conrad Schetter and Katja Mielke, who engaged with me in fruitful conceptual and theoretical discussions.

classical Weberian state (*Anstaltsstaat*)[4] nor Max Weber's ideas of power are applicable to the time and the geographical context I am going to deal with. The result of these debates was a joint working paper on dimensions of social order. In this paper, the authors aim to draft the Social Order concept as an analytical framework for a comprehensive understanding of political processes and outcomes.[5] As I have shown in my introduction, historians like Hodgson, Mottahedeh and Lapidus also operate with the term "social order" or "Islamic social order." In addition, the notion of social order epitomizes the overall object of sociological research. Yet it has hitherto not been elaborated as a coherent analytical tool.[6] Instead, the topic of order is discussed from different angles by many theorists. Hence the concept proposed by the authors of the working paper is not entirely new. It has been inspired by various scholars belonging to different schools of thought, like Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann.

In the next three sections I will briefly outline the conceptual framework of my thesis. The first section will introduce the cornerstones of the concept and its guiding premises. Subsequently I will discuss the dimensions of power and authority and how they are related to social order. Here I will detail concepts of power proposed by Norbert Elias, Michael Mann, Michel Foucault and others.[7] Their ideas were fruitful insofar as they emphasize the relational aspect of power. In order to ground my historical analysis, I go a step further and enrich the approach with concepts like patronage, mediation and gift giving. While the first two phenomena mirror our current state of knowledge, the latter has entered the scholarly debate just recently and first came to my attention when consulting Bukharan primary sources.

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[4] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1972), 29–30, 254, 419.

[5] Katja Mielke, Conrad Schetter and Andreas Wilde, "Dimensions of Social Order. Empirical Fact, Methodological Concept and Boundary Notion," *ZEF Working Papers* 78 (April, 2011): 2–8, http://www.zef.de/fileadmin/webfiles/downloads/zef_wp/wp78.pdf.

[6] The topic of social order reflects one of the fundamental issues in the social sciences and figures prominently in the works of Emile Durkheim (1984, 1992, 1993), Max Weber (1980/1921) or Pierre Bourdieu (1979). Talcott Parsons' work (1951) on social system theory was largely motivated by the question: How is social order possible and why is it that we have order and not chaos? "To a certain extent all schools share the normative presupposition that vests desired societal relations and outcomes with order, and tend to interpret dysfunctions as manifestation of disorder" (Mielke, Schetter and Wilde, "Dimensions," 7).

[7] Mielke, Schetter and Wilde, "Dimensions," 8–12.

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL ORDER: GUIDING PREMISES AND CORNERSTONES

The Social Order concept is based on several premises: firstly, it rejects the Hobbesian notion of human beings as wild animals in need of the Leviathan to protect them against themselves. Instead, it assumes that human beings are social beings and do not exist and act alone but interact with each other. The proposed approach also deviates from rational choice theories and the concept of the *homo oeconomicus*. Without denying that human behavior might be purposive, it follows the idea that individuals are not only driven by self-interest and wealth maximization, but also try to attain identity and gain legitimacy in ways that are socially constructed and valued.[8] Secondly, social order persists and a certain degree of structuredness prevails, though single structural patterns like kinship or statehood might gradually change. Thirdly, the reality as we perceive it is socially constituted; social order is the structuring device for processes and realities that are constantly being (re-)constructed by its individual or collective protagonists.[9] Fourthly, power plays a crucial role as an ordering force. "Power orders the order" and reproduces itself on a permanent basis.[10] In addition, power and order should be conceptualized in relational terms rather than as an object to be possessed.[11] Let me propound a working definition of social order:

> Social order is an *empirically observable fact* and continuum of social structures providing a meaningful framework for social interaction, which imposes itself as "reality." This realty is socially constructed by human actors who, pursuing their goals

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[8] Ibid., 9 footnotes no. 11, 12; Manoj Srivastava, "Moving beyond 'Institutions Matter'. Some Reflections on how the 'Rules of the Game' evolve and change," *Crisis Discussion Papers* 4 (London: LSE Crisis States Development Research Centre, 2004), 18–20, http://eprints. lse.ac.uk/28357/1/dp04.pdf.

[9] Mielke, Schetter and Wilde, "Dimensions," 5–6. According to the methodological premise, the Social Order approach is a framework that fosters an understanding of the relationship between worldviews and institutions and political processes rather than a new theory (ibid., 6).

[10] Popitz, *Phänomene der Macht*, 2nd ed. (2009; repr., Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck] 1992), 218.

[11] Mielke, Schetter and Wilde, "Dimensions," 6; Michael Mann, *Geschichte der Macht*, vol. I: *Von den Anfängen bis zur Griechischen Antike* (Frankfurt a. Main/New York: Campus Verlag, 1990), 20; Norbert Elias, *Was ist Soziologie?* (Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 151–52; Michel Foucault, *Analytik der Macht*, ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald (Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005), 258, 252.

> and interests, are integrated in power relations and manifold interdependences. Social order is a dual phenomenon that can be grasped as a structuring and structured characteristic of all human (social) interaction. At the same time, social order is thought of as *an analytical framework*, which is applicable to a range of contexts. However, it should not be applied indifferently but to fields of research dealing with politics, political structures and processes, and their outcomes in past and present. These processes and outcomes can be best understood by looking at worldviews (*Weltanschauung*, *Weltsicht*). The latter are conceptualized as the power-driven interplay of institutions and cognitive factors. On the one hand, worldviews appear to be the embodiment of social order (*das Körper gewordene Soziale*), which structures realities in different temporal and spatial contexts. On the other hand, worldviews are recursively restructured by these processes and their outcomes.[12]

According to this definition, the "social" does not refer necessarily to the productive "good" outcome of human interactions contrasting with a bad outcome resulting from non-social behavior. At the same time, all human interaction and even the daily conduct within the arena of relationships is political. This political connotation stems from the fact that all human relationships are imbued with power. The authors of the working paper assume as empirical fact(s) that different social orders exist and overlap in time and space, thus putting actors in different contexts (e.g., urban neighborhoods, bazaars, Sufi brotherhoods, villages, the military or the palace of the ruler).[13] As an analytical tool, the Social Order concept can be employed to trace worldviews and institutions at various spatial and temporal scales.[14] Providing a deeper understanding of meanings, political

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[12] Mielke, Schetter and Wilde, "Dimensions," 5, 7–8.

[13] Ibid., 8. This meant that in Bukhara and other regions of the Islamic Orient, and probably in many other parts of the world too, an individual was seldom exclusively connected to one social context or group (Manz, *Power, Politics and Religion*, 277–80). Cases in point are the members of the religious establishment. Many of the Naqshbandī, Sayyid Atā'ī and Kubrāwī sheikhs acted as judges and even as military commanders (Robert McChesney, "Central Asia. vi. In the 10th–12th/16th–18th Centuries," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, V, 177). Others were engaged in overland trade. An interesting example is Rajab Bēg Dīwānbēgī, an influential government official who at the same time possessed one of the biggest caravanserais in nineteenth-century Bukhara (Yelizateva Nekrasova, *Die Basare von Buchara. Das Antlitz einer Handelsstadt im Wandel*, trans. Michael. Kemper and Anke von Kügelgen (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch/Anor 2, 1999) 44–45).

[14] In contrast to the social system theory of Parsons, Luhman and others, the Social Order approach suggests that horizontal equality among social "systems," or, more appropriately, orders is possible. Thus order does not necessarily consist of sub-systems or "orders" of second and third order (Mielke, Schetter and Wilde, "Dimensions," 8).

processes and dynamics in contexts that radically differ from the industrialized world, the Social Order approach assumes a relational perspective and proposes that interaction results from the coordination of institutions and mental cognitive schemes.[15]

INSTITUTIONS

The following section draws on the ideas and theories of the new institutionalism.[16] This strand of thinking is grounded in the idea that human interaction is shaped by institutions, which are crucial for economic growth and well-being.[17] Hodgson remarks that institutions "enable ordered thought, expectation, and action by imposing form and consistency on human activities."[18] Thereby the term itself "captures some of the meanings of 'order'."[19] Looking at Bukhara, this concept of institutions applies to patronage, gift giving, mediation, the periodic distribution of *iqṭāʿs*, the appanaging of geographical spaces, military slavery and a range of other practices.

The process during which norms and institutions are set up is called institutionalization. This process is linked to perceptions that a rule is legitimated,[20] obedience is rewarded and deviance sanctioned.[21] Berger and

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[15] Ibid., 8–14.

[16] The new institutionalism divides into three different branches: the rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism (for details see Srivastava, "Moving beyond," 11–21).

[17] Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies* XLIV (1996): 936–50; John L. Campbell, "Recent Trends in Institutional Political Economy," *The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 17, no. 7/8 (1997): 18–31; Anna Orrnert, "Missing Pieces. An Overview of the Institutional Puzzle," *Public Administration and Development* 26 (2006): 449–55, doi:10.1002/pad.431/pdf.

[18] Geoffrey Hodgson, "What are Institutions?" *Journal of Economic Issues* XL, no. 1 (2006): 2.

[19] Richard Swedberg, *The Max Weber Dictionary* (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 185.

[20] Hartmut Esser, *Soziologie: Spezielle Grundlagen*, vol. 5: *Institutionen* (Frankfurt a. Main/New York: Campus Verlag, 2000), 303.

[21] Ronald L. Jepperson, "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, ed. W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio (London/Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 145.

Luckmann compare a long sequence of routinization, habitualization, reciprocal typification and final institutionalization visible through the material expression of relevant activities with a slow construction of society based on a web of institutions.[22] As cornerstones of society, social institutions are constantly produced and reproduced. Their presence and genesis are described as immediate products of human activities.[23] Often they are also described as "the rules of the game," a term coined by Douglas North.[24]

Many authors explain the importance of institutions by pointing out their "functions." Firstly, we have the *reduction function*, according to which the parameters for social production establish stable criteria by which actors are able to anticipate the future and act accordingly.[25] Reducing uncertainty, complexity and risk arising from incomplete information on the behavior of the individual, institutions make things predictable.[26] They structure human life so that it is "made up by routines in which the matter of choices appears to be regular, repetitive, and clearly evident, so that 90 percent of our actions do not require much reflection."[27]

Secondly, institutions are important because of the *orientation function* that suggests that they set the parameters for individual orientation and collective order.[28] Furthermore, they contribute to the prevention or correction of errors so that high transaction costs are avoided and problems for collective action, which are caused by narrowly interested human motivation, are solved.[29] Thirdly, institutions have a *regulating function* that is crucial for processes of distribution within society because institutions determine and structure the access to resources. It is precisely due to the regulation function that the strength and authority of actors depend on the

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[22] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City/New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966), 50–56.

[23] Ibid., 57–58.

[24] Douglas C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3–4, 25.

[25] Esser, *Soziologie*, vol. 5, 5–6.

[26] Esser, *Soziologie,* vol. 5, 9; North, *Institutions*, 3–4, 20, 25; Karol Sołtan, "Institutions as Products of Politics," in *Institutions and Social Order,* ed. Karol Sołtan, Eric M. Uslaner and Virgina Haufler (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 57.

[27] North, *Institutions*, 22.

[28] Esser, *Soziologie*, vol. 5, 14–15.

[29] Sołtan, "Institutions," 49, 57.

institutional framework of society. Hence institutions appear as resources per se because of their organizational power.[30]

WORLDVIEW(S)

In the following I will briefly highlight the importance of mental cognitive structures that the authors of the Social Order concept have included under the umbrella term "worldview."[31] The concept of worldview is derived from different authors like Bourdieu (*habitus* concept), Giddens (*structuration* theory), Berger and Luckmann (*symbolic universes*); Berger (sacred canopy) Arthur Denzau and Douglas North (*shared mental models*).[32]

The worldview is a conglomerate of historical relations that are expressed in the form of mental and physical schemes of perception, evaluation and action in the minds of humans.[33] As a generating principle it operates in a twofold way, first as *modus operandi*, the structuring structure that determines the way to act. Permanently creating improvisations and manifold spontaneous social practices, the *modus operandi* is the product of an individual's (hi)story and forms "congealed individual experience." At the same time, it is a *modus operatum*, a structured structure expressed in institutionalized practices and habits.[34] Institutions are in fact an inseparable component of the worldview and should not be conceptualized independently. Using the term habit, which is akin to Bourdieu's *habitus*, William James notes that

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[30] Gerhard Göhler, "Politische Institutionen und ihr Kontext. Begriffliche und konzeptliche Überlegungen zur Theorie politischer Institutionen," in *Zur Eigenart politischer Institutionen. Zum Profil politischer Institutionentheorie*, ed. Gerhard Göhler (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994), 22.

[31] Mielke, Schetter and Wilde, "Dimensions," 9–12.

[32] In the methodological outline of his *History of Islamic Societies*, Lapidus also points to mental-cognitive dimensions, though he does not reflect further on this insight. He argues that "an institution encompasses at once an activity, a pattern of social relations, and a set of mental constructs" (Lapidus, *History*, xix).

[33] Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc C. Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie* (Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1996), 44. See also Srivastava, "Moving beyond," 20–21.

[34] Pierre Bourdieu, *Die feinen Unterschiede*. *Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft* (Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982), 175, 585, 617, 727–34; Beate Krais and Gunter Gebauer, *Habitus* (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2002), 5–6, 23; Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 63.

> "[h]abit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance […]. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing."[35]

The worldview is not only the material of social reality;[36] as a mental and cognitive framework of boundaries and limitations, it creates enabling and constraining devices implying red lines that cannot be ignored or overcome. It is exactly within these limits that actors are creative.[37] The impact of worldviews should not lead us to deny or ignore agency. Forming a structuring mechanism that works from within human beings, the worldview is neither wholly individual nor does it totally determine behavior. By integrating past experiences, it enables the actors to solve an infinite number of tasks and represents the individualized collective that is continuously reshaped, remodeled and maintained by ongoing socialization processes.[38] As a product of history, it is in itself durable but not invariable or static. This means that it forms a relatively open and fluid web of dispositions, which is permanently confronted with new conditions and experiences.[39]

Several authors note that the mental schemes are not only products of incorporated historical experiences but also a stock of practical knowledge enabling the actors to cope with the routines of social life.[40] As a result, humans can anticipate the future that befits them because they have internalized the objective possibilities in the course of a long conditioning process. Bourdieu states that the dialectics of subjective expectations und objective chances is effective everywhere in the social universe. And it is this dialectics that engenders an adaptation of the expectations to the objective chances.[41] But neither this knowledge, which is practical in nature,

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[35] William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 3 vols. (Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 1982), I, 125–26.

[36] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 35.

[37] Pierre Bourdieu, *Die Verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht* (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 1992), 33; Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), 160–70.

[38] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 39.

[39] Ibid., 167–68.

[40] Giddens, *Constitution*, 4; Bourdieu, *Die feinen Unterschiede*, 727; Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 63–67.

[41] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 163–64.

nor the structural principles making up the worldview are accessible to the consciousness of the actors. It is wholly transcendent to human beings.[42] As a consequence, the corpus of social practices is taken for granted. By following mental schemes, individuals actively proceed to incorporate social structures but at the same time produce the social universe. The result and cause of these twofold structured and structuring processes is a socially constructed, meaningful world, a world of the *sensus communis*.[43] From this point of view, the notion of irrationality does not bear critical examination. Certain behavior might seem irrational solely from the perspective of a worldview that did not produce it![44]

Social Order and Inertia

According to the results of laboratory experiments, humans are capable of cognitively processing information more accurately and effectively if it matches pre-existing mental schemes.[45] The worldview is only able to incorporate facts and experiences for which it possesses a "connector." Its available structure excludes the possibility of incorporating everything.[46] This implies that individuals are likely to recognize possible alternatives for behavior, but if they fall beyond the limits of social appropriateness they are refused as viable choices.[47]

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[42] Giddens, *Constitution*, 4–5, 45–46; Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 39–40. Applying the term thinking, Durkheim states that it is not directed towards the past and not even towards the present, but it solely copes with the future. Its task is not of a speculative but only of a practical nature. Therefore, action takes shape in the mind and becomes apparent in the whole being in advance (Emile Durkheim, *Schriften zur Soziologie der Erkenntnis*, ed. Michael Bischoff and Hans Joas (Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993), 68).

[43] Bourdieu, *Die feinen Unterschiede*, 729–30; Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 52–58, 62. See also Durkheim, *Schriften*, 139–40.

[44] George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good," *American Anthropologist* 67, no. 2 (1965): 4.

[45] Paul J. DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," *Annual Review of Sociology* 23 (1997): 269–70. If the concept of the mental scheme should prove its relevance, it seems reasonable to assume that the worldview not only represents an edifice of ideas, but has a substantial and material equivalent in the human organism (Krais and Gebauer, *Habitus*, 64).

[46] Krais and Gebauer, *Habitus*, 64.

[47] Campbell, "Recent Trends," 28.

Against this background, the following statement by Evans-Pritchard, who conducted field work in Southern Sudan in the 1930s, becomes wholly comprehensible:

> "I was once discussing the Shilluk with a Nuer who had visited their country, and he remarked, 'They have a big chief, we have not. This chief can send for a man and demand a cow or he can cut a man's throat. Whoever saw a Nuer do such a thing?'"[48]

This short episode shows fundamental differences between the social life of the Shilluk and that of the Nuer. In addition, it suggests that what is right among the former may be wrong among the latter. As the final leading question of the Nuer informant reveals, at the time of the talk he saw the lack of central authority as a normal characteristic of his own social world. He could not even think about real subjection and subordination.

The durability of social institutions becomes understandable in light of Bourdieu's work, who speaks here of the inertia effect depending on the distributive attributes of the worldview. For example, the aristocratic image of sports like horse riding, golf or tennis, may even continue when the overall conditions with respect to the material access to these disciplines have changed.[49] The persistence of worldviews can be explained on the basis of their inherent logic. The genesis of the socialized biological individual, and with it the conditions for the emergence and acquisition of generative preference structures, are highly complex. Bourdieu assumes even an irreversibility of these generating processes since all stimuli and conditioning experiences are at every moment perceived through categories that have been constituted by past experiences. As a result, and as shown by the example of the Nuer, humans often prefer original, early choices and the categories evolving from them.[50] This holds true for behavioral attitudes, the set of possible choices actors have at hand, but also for tastes and postures.

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[48] Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer. A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People* (1968; repr., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940,), 182. The Shilluk are neighbors of the Nuer and the Dinka. In contrast to the latter, the Shilluk were organized in a politically centralized kingdom (ibid., 5).

[49] Bourdieu, *Die feinen Unterschiede*, 334.

[50] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 168. See also Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 108.

QUESTIONS OF POWER AND AUTHORITY

The student of power and power relations may be confused by the great variety of sometimes vague definitions.[51] Unfortunately, power lacks a common verb form, a fact that is at least partly responsible for common notions that it is "a mysterious property or agency resident in the person or group to whom it is attributed."[52] The scientific debate on power and authority is very much dominated by Max Weber and the question of how to translate his vocabulary. His translators have mostly used the term "domination" for the German *Herrschaft*, a solution born of the distinction between "authority" (German *Autorität*) and "domination," "dominion" or "rule" (*Herrschaft*).[53] But since "domination" is not widely used in social science discourse in the English language, I will limit myself to usage of the terms "authority" and "rule."[54]

Weber defines power as "the probability of imposing one's will in a social relationship against resistance, regardless of the base on which this probability rests."[55] Accordingly, authority or rule (German *Herrschaft*) is

> "the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons. 'Discipline' is the probability that by virtue of habituation a command

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[51] See here Heinz-Jürgen Niedenzu, "Machtprozesse in herrschaftslosen Gesellschaften. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der sozialen Evolution," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 15, no. 4 (1990): 3–4; Norman Uphoff, "Distinguishing Power, Authority and Legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at his Word by using Resources-Exchange Analysis," *Polity* 22, no. 2 (1989): 295–96.

[52] Dennis H. Wrong, *Power. Its Forms, Bases and Uses* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 3.

[53] The German term *Herrschaft* can be translated in a number of ways ranging from authority and command, dominion, domination, mastery, leadership to rule, lordship, sway, sovereignty, governance. Although in the sections on the types of authority, Weber himself suggests *Autorität* (authority) as an equivalent for the German word *Herrschaft* (rule, dominion) by inserting the former in parentheses (Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 122), in the chapter "Soziologie der Herrschaft" he conceptualizes *Autorität* in terms of "command and duty to obey" (*Befehlsgewalt und Gehorsamspflicht*). He also defines *Autorität* as a legitimating reason for *Herrschaft* (see ibid., 542, 550; Max Weber, *Politik als Beruf. Gesammelte politische Schriften* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1968), 5).

[54] See also Wrong, *Power*, 36–37; Uphoff, "Distinguishing Power," 300.

[55] Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 28.

> will receive prompt and automatic obedience in stereotyped forms, on the part of a given group of persons."[56]

Weber also describes authority as a special kind of power (*Sonderfall von Macht*).[57] Yet his dominance of the scientific discussion contributes to the tendency to define power in terms of intent or will, as the capacity to achieve desired outcomes, while the relational aspect often escaped attention.[58] Although other authors like Heinrich Popitz follow Weber's understanding of authority as institutionalized (legitimated) power,[59] there has been much critique of his concept. In Popitz' view, Weber does not manage to conceptually frame the relationships between those exercising power and the dependents.[60] Heinz-Jürgen Niedenzu points to two general problems: first, the Weberian notion of power remains too amorphous. It does not connect the varying degrees of power to the means or instruments on which the possibility to enforce one's will is actually based. Second, and more important, Weber's concept of power cannot be grasped empirically because the interaction relationship is seen as a formal pattern determined by interests. Thus the relational aspect of power is less pronounced, while the focus on order and ordering is limited to institutionalized power (authority).[61]

Apart from these conceptual questions, there have been strong reservations about the unquestioned application of the Weberian concepts to Islamic contexts on the part of social historians and experts on the region.[62] In contrast to the resulting tendency to view power in negative, constraining terms, this section stresses its enabling dimension. Referring to the

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[56] Ibid., 28, 122. English translation taken from Max Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology,* ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 53.

[57] Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 541; see also Uphoff, "Distinguishing Power," 315.

[58] On the critique of common concepts of power, see Giddens, *Constitution*, 15.

[59] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 232.

[60] Ibid., 233; Niedenzu, "Machtprozesse," 4.

[61] Niedenzu, "Machtprozesse," 4–5. Many discussions also revolved around Weber's *Herrschafts* typology: traditional, charismatic and rational authority/rule (see Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 124–42).

[62] Hodgson and Paul express reservations about an uncritical application of Weber's terminology, in particular the category of "patrimonial authority" or patrimonialism evoking clichés about despotic rule in the Orient (Hodgson, *Venture*, I, 35; Paul, "Herrschaft und Gesellschaft," 173–74). For another critique of the unquestioned use of the Weberian framework, see Edmund Burke III, "Review of *A History of Islamic Societies* by Ira M. Lapidus," *Journal of Middle East Studies* 25, no. 2 (1993): 330.

structuring force of power, the authors of the paper on social order argue that power yields extraordinary heuristic value concerning the situational manifestation of the interplay between cognitive patterns and institutions. It also offers suitable answers to the questions of social change.[63] In the next sections, I would like to highlight different concepts of power and its relational aspects.

The Omnipresence of Power in Human Relations

Several authors emphasize that power is an omnipresent ingredient in all human relationships. Popitz, for example, postulates that power is a human product, an omnipresent core element of human sociation. Even the most basic human relations, like those between parents and children, are characterized as power relations.[64] Great significance is therefore attached to power because it plays a crucial role as the binding glue of society.[65] Arguing in a similar vein, Foucault claims that a society without power and power relations would resemble an abstraction. Power relations do not embody an additional structure parallel to society, but are rooted in the social nexus.[66] Interlinked with existing relations, power imbues and is embedded in social structures and arrangements.[67]

According to Mann, power is not to be seen as a human goal but merely as a means to achieve this goal. Only if power proves to be relevant in reaching particular outcomes, will the agents strive for it. The demand and quest for power arises only in the course of the satisfaction of needs.[68] Norbert Elias states that for a comprehensive approach to the phenomenon one has to get away from the common understanding of power as an isolated object. Instead of a substance, the sociologist should see power as a relationship between two or more humans.[69] Nobody holds power solely for himself/herself. It emerges when people encounter each other and act in

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[63] Mielke, Schetter and Wilde, "Dimensions," 14.
[64] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 15–17.
[65] Ibid., 234.
[66] Foucault, *Analytik*, 258.
[67] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 233–34.
[68] Michael Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 21.
[69] Elias, *Was ist Soziologie?*, 151–52; Wolfgang Sofsky and Rainer Paris, *Figurationen sozialer Macht. Autorität, Stellvertretung, Koalition* (Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994), 9, 11; Wrong, *Power*, 2; Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 20; Foucault, *Analytik*, 252.

concert and it disappears as soon as organized groups disintegrate and the protagonists disperse.[70]

Hence the phrase "You have power" may be valuable in a political sense but it is not suitable for a historical analysis,[71] and so questions like "Who has power?" are inappropriate. One cannot exercise power, only authority, through the possession or control of certain power means or the skillful utilization of specific power techniques. The exercise of power is only mediated by behavior and the action of the self, influencing the action of the other. As the cause and product of itself, power is not global or massive, diffuse or concentrated, but exists in relationships.[72] For an actor it is only possible to acquire power means, namely resources (e.g., money, land, military means such as weapons and also relationships with other people) that are used with more or less skill, more or less determination, and more or less luck.[73] The only condition that is inevitable for the emergence of power is a social connection,[74] which is formed because there are actors who only act in order to achieve something, and because they are social beings not to be reduced to single individuals living in isolation.[75]

Following these premises, Foucault suggests not analyzing power in its regulated and legitimated forms working in its center but grasping it in its most regional and local forms. Instead of the question of sovereignty, we should be concerned with the ramifications and capillaries of power. This implies a close look at those contexts where it embeds itself in institutions, in techniques and instruments.[76]

Power in networks

Since the nation state has exerted a tremendous influence on modern science, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sociologists

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[70] Sofsky and Paris, *Figurationen*, 9.

[71] Michel Foucault, *Mikrophysik der Macht. Über Strafjustiz, Psychiatrie und Medizin* (Berlin: Merve Verlag, 1976), 114.

[72] Foucault, *Analytik*, 112–13, 255.

[73] Uphoff, "Distinguishing Power," 320. See also Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 21; Giddens, *Constitution*, 16; Foucault, *Analytik*, 114; Foucault, *Mikrophysik*, 114–15.

[74] Sofsky and Paris, *Figurationen*, 9.

[75] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 40; Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 46–50.

[76] Foucault, *Analytik*, 112–14.

and historians often explain social dynamics by placing the main focus on the condition of states. This corresponds to the conceptual focus of conventional theories, no matter whether system theory, Marxism, structuralism, or functionalism and so on, that tend to describe society as a totality.[77]

The concept proposed here helps explore the organization and distribution of power. Not static and closed systems, objects or attributes form the subject of research but relationships and processes. Referring to Talcott Parsons, Wrong points out that social relations and the interaction between human agents have constitutive effects as they lead to the build-up of complex networks composed of multiple ego-alter relationships.[78] According to Foucault, power works and circulates within chains of relations and webs. It constitutes networks, coating the entire social order.[79] Following this insight, he suggests that instead of a unified structure regulated by one singular power, society should be conceived as an archipelago of different spheres of power.[80] The tendency to weave one overall network evolves from the sociability of humans and their corresponding need to institutionalize social relations.[81] The existence of a network of power relations is not a social or natural fact but a product of permanent institutionalization that is important for the production and reproduction of durable and useful linkages procuring the access to material and symbolic profits. The network of relations is the outcome of individual and collective "investment strategies" that are consciously or unconsciously directed towards the creation and maintenance of social relationships promising immediate advantages.[82] However, it is the regulation and steering of such a network that gives the impression or illusion that power can be

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[77] Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 14–15; Giddens, *Constitution,* 24; Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 37.

[78] Wrong, *Power*, 69. Durkheim also notes that humans are integrated into giant networks of social relations (Durkheim, *Schriften*, 50).

[79] Foucault, *Analytik*, 114–15; Foucault, *Mikrophysik*, 115; Byung-Chul Han, *Was ist Macht?* (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 2005), 45.

[80] Foucault, *Analytik,* 224–25. Foucault also proposes using the plural form "powers" (ibid., 224).

[81] Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 14–16, 34–35. See also Durkheim, *Schriften*, 50–51.

[82] The terms strategy and investment are here not meant for pure profit maximization as suggested by economic theories, reducing societal exchange to dimensions of self-interest and utility. With this, all other forms of social exchange are understood as non-economic, altruistic relationships (see Bourdieu, *Mechanismen*, 50–51).

gained and possessed like an object. But power can only be possessed insofar as it enables the actors to reach their goals, to demand obedience from subordinate actors of a network, to have control over certain means of power and to use them for leading a group of people.

Wolfgang Sofsky and Rainer Paris operate with the term *figuration*, a concept that was coined by Elias, meaning interdependencies between actors and groups of actors who are engaged in an ongoing game.[83] Opting for an image of humans as *Homini aperti*, Norbert Elias focuses on the question of "how and why the perspectives of individual players intermesh to create a game which no single player can control."[84] Although Sofsky and Paris differentiate between *power figurations* and *social figurations*,[85] for our purpose such a distinction makes little sense. I prefer to follow Elias' concept, defining a figuration as a network composed of a multitude of interrelated players. This network can be enlarged by an indefinite number of actors and parties. A change of one relationship in such a web potentially engenders the modification of all other relationships. This concept allows for an investigation of the dynamics typical of power processes from the viewpoint of the social relationship itself rather than from that of the power instruments.[86]

The forging of coalitions is determined by several factors. Here, not only one's own strength is decisive but also the situational applicability of resources that one party or partner controls. In the concrete situation of alliance-making very few of the potential allies really know how the trumps are distributed. The choice of allies is not so much determined by real strength and abilities as by the power that is taken for real by the future partners. Coalition-building thus rests on images of power; everyone participating in the negotiations can present himself in a way different from his real attributes. These images of power form a "panorama of figurations" that can be termed the field of power, within which a game for advantageous positions, power and power means takes place.[87] Within this field each

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[83] Elias, *Was ist Soziologie?*, 172–75.

[84] Translation taken from Norbert Elias, *What is Sociology?*, trans. Stephen Mennell (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1978), 127.

[85] Sofsky and Paris, *Figurationen*, 23.

[86] Ibid., 13–14.

[87] Ibid., 282–83. According to Bourdieu, the field of power expresses itself as a "meta-field," which sounds at first similar to Sofsky and Paris. But Bourdieu links his ideas on the field of power to his general theory of the fields, which I do not adopt here (Pierre

figuration represents a strategic position for the political game. It is decisive insofar as it assigns the chances and options for advantages, victories and defeats. In the field of power, the players identify their positions, their advantages, and also the strongest and the weakest among potential allies. This measuring of power has a reinforcing feedback effect on the actors as it projects a cognitive map of power, or more precisely, of power figurations. The need for a coalition results from this map that is the cognitive echo of the field of power.[88] The structure of the field, however, should not be confused with the networks. The field is a space of objective relations between positions defined by their rank in the distribution of power and power sources. This structure determines the possibility or impossibility of the emerging of the exchange traffic, through which the networks manifest and perpetuate themselves.[89]

The concept of power proposed here has an explanatory value as it offers a possible answer to the question of social change. According to Mann, the driving force of history lies not so much in the institutionalization as in the restless urge of humans to create networks of power relations.[90] Here I argue that both are highly interwoven and in fact depend on each other. Thus it does not make sense to separate the forging of network relations and institutionalization. Men further develop their networks to reach their goals, and, in doing so, leave the previous stages of institutionalization behind.[91] This means that a particular social practice or norm will continue to bear significance for the entire social fabric until the figurations change to an extent that it does not fit the actual social conditions any longer. In other words, an institution loses significance when humans drive the institutionalization process to a point where a rule of the game does not fit the game and its constellations anymore. A social rule will eventually be abandoned when the loss of legitimacy attached to it reaches the surface of discursive consciousness. Only if the majority of a collective becomes aware of the meaninglessness of a practice against the backdrop of changed figurations of power, will it become outdated.

Bourdieu, "Das Feld der Macht und die technokratische Herrschaft," in *Die Intellektuellen und die Macht*, ed. Irene Dölling (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 1991), 67–100).

88 Sofsky and Paris, *Figurationen*, 283.

89 Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 145.

90 Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 35.

91 Ibid.

Starting out from the idea that power takes the form of relations forming extended networks and interdependent groups of people, it seems convenient to connect it to the term *Herrschaftsverband*. According to Weber, the *Herrschaftsverband* "exists insofar as its members are subject to domination by virtue of the established order."[92] In the most widespread English version of Weber's *Economy and Society*, the term *Herrschaftsverband* is translated as "ruling organization," that is, the staff carrying out the rules prescribed by and inherent in a particular order. Yet the Weberian concept not only pertains to modern organizations but also to much smaller, more conventional associations like households.[93] I therefore suggest interpreting the term as broadly as possible by following Parsons' translation.

> "A social relationship which is either closed or limits the admission of outsiders by rules, will be called a 'corporate group' (*Verband*) so far as its order is enforced by the action of specific individuals whose regular function this is, of a chief or 'head' (*Leiter*) and usually also an administrative staff. These functionaries will normally also have representative authority. The incumbency of a directing position or participation in the functions of the administrative staff constitute 'governing authority' (*Regierungsgewalt*). This may be appropriated, or it may be assigned in accordance with the binding rules of the association according to specific criteria and procedures. It may be assigned permanently, for a term, or for dealing with a specific situation. 'Corporate action' is either the action of the administrative staff, which by virtue of its governing or representative authority is oriented to carrying out the terms of its order, or it is the action of the members as directed by the administrative staff."[94]

There are two problems with Weber's ideas of a *Herrschaftsverband*, which are rooted first in his above-mentioned definition of authority and second in the fact that he tends to conflate this concept with his *Anstaltsstaat*. Although Weber also mentions clans, households, gilds or workers' councils, in the same breath he refers to the state as the most common and dominant form of a *Herrschaftsverband*. In his *Economy and Society*, particular attention is paid to the role of force as the ultima ratio for the maintenance of order(s). In addition, he also points to an administrative staff

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[92] English translation taken from Weber, *Economy and Society*, 53.

[93] Swedberg, *Dictionary*, 187. For the whole discussion regarding the English translation of the term *Herrschaftsverband*, see ibid., 187–89.

[94] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York/London: The Free Press & Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1947), 145–46. Keith Tribe translates *Herrschaftsverband* as a "group body," meaning "a banded-together group of people" (Swedberg, *Dictionary*, 189).

or the corporate group functioning as an administrative body, and a given territory providing the spatial frame for its authority. This causes Weber's readership to equate authority, and particularly the *Herrschaftsverband*, with the state, while other modes of order and authority disappear from the readers' sight.[95] All this may have been caused by the long and complicated publication history of Weber's major work.[96] Although Weber is not aware of non-institutionalized forms of power, I consider his basic ideas of the *Herrschaftsverband* as a corporate group of people to be a fruitful element that helps approach power manifest in networks. With his definition in mind, I will make use of the term *Herrschaftsverband* throughout this book as a figuration or network composed of a multitude of relationships and alliances, grouped around a leader who governs and steers the corporate group to solve tasks and problems and to achieve certain goals.

Institutionalization Processes

The question of how a *Herrschaftsverband* comes into being is closely related to the accumulation of power and its purposeful use by human agents. Employing the theoretical ideas of Heinrich Popitz, this section will explain the different phases and types of the institutionalization. In his work "Phenomena of Power" (*Phänome der Macht*), Popitz describes the institutionalization of power as "the consolidation (*Verfestigung*) of processes that are constitutive for the coexistence of humans."[97] This explanation is reminiscent of Foucault, who speaks of power mechanisms having their own process paths and solidity (*Festigkeit*).[98] According to Popitz, institutionalization processes are unlikely to be reversed. "They are in principle adjusted to produce durable structures, reliability and consistency."[99] This reminds us of the above-described ideas of institutions

[95] Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 29–30.

[96] The problems with the passage on the *Herrschaftsverband* may have resulted from the fact that his major work was published posthumously, probably in a way not intended by the author. Weber had left scattered manuscripts and notes, which were collected after his death in summer 1920 and published under the title *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. In the course of its long publication history, the text of this work was restructured several times, which may have added to the problem of reading and understanding his ideas.

[97] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 234. See also Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 50.

[98] Foucault, *Analytik*, 115.

[99] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 234.

and worldviews. Thus as an interplay of structuring and structured processes, the worldview is the source and driver of the institutionalization of power (order and ordering) but also its result.

Mann and Foucault stress two additional, albeit different aspects of the institutionalization of power relations. Mann claims that institutionalization is necessary for the proper achievement of collective goals. This implies an inherent tendency toward social stratification, which in his view is an institutionalized aspect of social life.[100] Denying the existence of a fundamental principle of power penetrating society down to its smallest capillaries, Foucault pays attention to various forms of power and introduces his idea of "governing" that takes place in different but interdependent contexts of society. He also emphasizes the importance of techniques and mechanisms of power, which he terms strategies. The latter come into play in moments of conflict, which always go hand in hand with the establishment of power relations.[101]

According to Popitz, the institutionalization of power is characterized by three tendencies. First, a growing de-personalization: power assumes a transpersonal character and does not hinge on individuals having the say. Secondly, we see an increasing formalization, implying specific modes, rituals and regularities, which are crucial for the exercise of power. The third tendency can be circumscribed as an integration of existing power relations in a comprehensive order.[102]

For the institutionalization process, Popitz proposes an ideal typical model of five different stages:

1 Occasional or sporadic power
2 Standardizing of power
3 Positioning of power[103]
4 Emergence of an institutionalized structure of positions
5 Authority in the form of statehood

[100] Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 23.
[101] Foucault, *Analytik*, 260–62.
[102] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 233.
[103] Popitz uses here the German word *Positionalisierung* (ibid., 244–45), which is difficult to translate.

In the first phase, the exercise of power is limited to a few situations. There are several preconditions for power to reach the next level of institutionalization. First, there must be sufficient power means, which should not be used up too fast. Second, power must be exercised repeatedly.[104] It is not enough to assert oneself in only one or two situations. Thirdly, those in authority have to extract goods and services from the subjects permanently. Fourth, the "power holder" must be able to hold and bind the subject(s) to himself.[105]

Only when these preconditions are all fulfilled, does the institutionalization enter the second phase: the social superior normalizes the behavior of the dependent inferior. Henceforth the dominant person is able to put in his or her claims, which are enforced by the threat of sanctions and punishment. This means that regular patterns of behavior are ensured in similar or the same situations. At this point Popitz argues that "the adjustment and standardization of situational behavior can be achieved because the subjects cannot elude the 'space of power' (*Machtraum*)."[106]

Power is further consolidated in the third phase, when particular "functions of standardizing power" become removed from persons. This goes hand in hand with the transfer of a position from one person to another. On the one hand, "power assumes a supra-individual aura" visible in clothes and rituals. On the other, there is a strong desire to pass the dominant position on to an heir. The positioning of power is completed in the next step, the imposition of permanent succession rules, which, according to Popitz, embodies "the risk threshold" of this stage of the process.[107] If this obstacle is overcome, power reaches a more supra-personal level, though it still hinges on persons.[108]

The fourth phase of the institutionalization can be described as the emergence of an arrangement of positions around a ruler like a chief, lord or king. These positions are held by members of his following, the *Herrschafts-verband*. Such an entourage takes shape when the commitment to the power center is of a more durable nature and when the followers can be constantly

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[104] See also Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 50, 53–56.
[105] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 236–38.
[106] Ibid., 239.
[107] Ibid., 244–45.
[108] Ibid., 257.

supported with resources.[109] Provided that control over territories and a peasant population is established, an institutionalized structure of positions emerges. "Conversely, the dominance over wide tracts of land is only possible with an apparatus of power."[110] A crucial point is the organization of the group based on the division of labor, the possibility of which increases the longer the entourage exists. At this point, the institutionalization of power reaches a decisive stage.[111] With regard to internal differentiation, Mann says that in spite of the division of labor implying a specialization of functions on different levels of social integration, there is a group at the top in charge of the order of things.[112]

> "[With the] consolidation of the division of labor within a following, […] the functionaries of authority become exchangeable, but the function of authority remains. […] Finally, with growing division of labor, authority is increasingly integrated in a social order and simultaneously adapts it to its own structure. What counts and what does not, largely matches the reproduction conditions of the apparatus of authority."[113]

Popitz observes a striking growth in power here; the intensity and prevalence of its effects increase. In this phase of the institutionalization, the need for supplies on the part of the followers further forces the ruler and his retinue to stabilize their power base. Without such a measure, power positions would lose their supra-personal character.[114] Henceforth the organization and division of labor require coordination and elements of control, implying an "inherent tendency of distributive power."[115] Distributive power means social stratification, which is in itself an institutionalized aspect of social life.[116] But even if the power gaps have been consolidated, it would be inappropriate to act on the assumption that processes of power accumulation come to a standstill or reach a finite stage. Every social order should be conceived as a system in flux, within which structuring or ordering power is constantly reproduced.[117]

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[109] Ibid., 255.
[110] Ibid., 258.
[111] Ibid., 256.
[112] Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 22.
[113] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 256–57.
[114] Ibid., 257.
[115] Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 22.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 217–18.

The institutionalization of power culminates in the final stage, where the conventional *Herrschaftsverband*, or, in Popitz' words, the framework of positions around a ruler, becomes transformed into a state based on the principles of the Weberian institutional state.[118] According to Weber, the territory and the monopoly on the use of force, which is claimed by the state, and an administrative staff are decisive criteria for statehood.[119] In such an order, norm setting, dispensation of justice and law enforcement rest with the state. As a result of successful disempowerment, the institutionalized state is and has been able to completely remove competing powers and power centers, including regional and local potentates. And in spite of the fact that in many states the institutionalization remains incomplete, leaving niches for alternative concentrations of power(s), central institutions and agencies are still important because they regulate, organize and steer the order of things.

With his model suggesting several degrees or stages of the institutionalization of power, Popitz' ideas go beyond those of Weber[120] and leave space to think about non-institutionalized forms of power (stage one: sporadic power), which can be observed, for example, in egalitarian societies (e.g., groups of hunters and gatherers) lacking social stratification.[121] Having studied these simple or "acephalous societies," as they are often called, anthropologists like Evans-Pritchard, Christian Sigrist and others repeatedly emphasize the existence of order without authority. In such contexts, power is manifest in differentials that bear significance in certain situations (e.g., in times of war by certain leaders or warriors). Such inequalities are reflected

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118 Ibid., 258.

119 Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 822–23.

120 In his *Economy and Society* Weber generally neglects non-institutionalized forms of power (power without authority). He writes: "'Herrschaft' in ihrem allgemeinsten, auf keinen konkreten Inhalt bezogenen Begriff ist eines der wichtigsten Elemente des Gemeinschaftshandelns. Zwar zeigt nicht alles Gemeinschaftshandeln herrschaftliche Struktur. Wohl aber spielt Herrschaft bei den meisten seiner Art eine sehr erhebliche Rolle […]. Ausnahmslos alle Gebiete des Gemeinschaftshandelns zeigen die tiefste Beeinflussung durch Herrschaftsgebilde. In außerordentlich vielen Fällen ist es die Herrschaft und die Art ihrer Ausübung, welche aus einem amorphen Gemeinschaftshandeln erst eine rationale Vergesellschaftung entstehen lässt, und in anderen Fällen, wo dem nicht so ist, ist es dennoch die Struktur der Herrschaft und deren Entfaltung, welche das Gemeinschaftshandeln formt und namentlich seine Ausgerichtetheit auf ein 'Ziel' überhaupt erst eindeutig determiniert" (Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 541).

121 Niedenzu, "Machtprozesse," 4, 8–9.

first and foremost by differences in age, sex, physical abilities and social prestige. However, even in acephalous contexts there is a certain potential for power to become institutionalized, for instance, through better organization skills and/or the accumulation of power sources (e.g., property).[122]

During his fieldwork in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (in the 1930s), Evans-Pritchard noticed that the Nuer had no government or any form of central authority. Focusing on their lineage system and processes of fission and fusion,[123] he describes their society as a state of ordered anarchy.[124] This term was later adopted and stressed by Sigrist.[125] In his study on the Yukpa, a tribe of Carib Indians in the border area between Colombia and Venezuela, Ernst Halbmayer observes traditional leaders (*uatpü*) being devoid of any means of coercion to impose sanctions or enforce their will. Thus they exercised power (tactical and interpretative power) only on specific occasions and without institutionalized structures of authority.[126] During the integration of the tribe into the Venezuelan state and Christian missionary activities, community structures including centrally appointed *caciques* were established by the government. Yet the latter, although endowed with legitimated positions, lack any internal power base and thus exercise authority without power.[127] A final example of power without authority is the San Pedro prison in La Paz, Bolivia. Here David Skarbek identifies mechanisms of order (ordered anarchy) established without the interference of the Bolivian state or any other agency. There are no guards enforcing order inside the prison or bars to block cells. But still, there is a prison economy functioning with property rights that exist among the inmates, as do markets, shops and restaurants.[128] There are a number of positions such as

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[122] Ibid., 10. See also Popitz, *Phänomene*, 187–97.

[123] Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 139–50.

[124] Ibid., 5–6.

[125] Christian Sigrist, *Regulierte Anarchie. Untersuchung zum Fehlen und zur Entstehung von politischer Herrschaft in segmentären Gesellschaften Afrikas* (Frankfurt a. Main: Syndikat, 1979).

[126] Ernst Halbmayer, "Von der herrschaftslosen Macht zur machtlosen Herrschaft. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der 'machtlosen Leader' bei den Yukpa," *Sociologus* 53, no. 1 (2003): 88–93. A similar phenomenon of chiefs who did not wield authority was observed by Evans-Pritchard among the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 172–74).

[127] Halbmayer, "Von der herrschaftslosen Macht zur machtlosen Herrschaft," 96–97.

[128] David B. Skarbek, "Self-governance in San Pedro," *The Independent Review* 14, no. 4 (2010): 578–81.

representative, treasurer, health secretary and others. Although the section representatives mediate in conflicts and also have the power to send offenders into isolation, no dominant figure or group has evolved to enforce his/its will on weaker groups of inmates.[129]

These examples show that "one can have power without authority and, conversely, there can be authority with little if any power."[130] As Uphoff puts it, persons or actors devoid of authority may control a range of resources (e.g., legitimacy, status, prestige, services) to exercise power,[131] even though their power may be limited to certain occasions. But persons in authority may have very little power, particularly if they lack a power base (resources).[132]

In the following section, I will stress the argument that irrespective of the legitimacy ascribed to an individual's authority, the institutionalized power structures, the basic framework of authority, is legitimated in itself because it is immanent in the socially constructed reality.

Symbolic Power

Bourdieu notes that power is the outcome of structured and structuring processes causing the coordination between practices and mental structures to have a political function.[133] To put it differently, the political nature of social order rests on the dialectics between mental schemes (*modus operandi*) and institutionalized practices and relationships (*modus operatum*). The latter can be seen as institutions or instruments of authority rooted in worldviews. This means that power structures interaction and shapes worldviews, which are at the same time manifestations of power. This is well in line with Foucault's argument suggesting that power only exists in the form of action located within a wider sphere of possibilities, and resting on more durable structures. The exercise of power cannot be grasped as a relationship between individual actors or collective partners but as a form of influence acting back upon others, or rather, upon their behavior.[134]

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[129] Ibid., 575–76.
[130] Uphoff, "Distinguishing Power," 315.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Uphoff uses the term "nominal authority" (ibid.).
[133] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 32–33.
[134] Foucault, *Analytik*, 252, 255.

The mental schemes provide a common pool of basic perceptional patterns expressed in pairs of opposite words used by humans for the classification and evaluation of things, for example high and low, simple and complex, heavy and light, right and left. This network of opposite word pairs forms a canon of truisms that are binding and powerful because the entire social order is on their side.[135] Offering guidelines and theses for social behavior, the classification schemes enable the evaluation of things like right or wrong behavior. The patterns of perception and even the canon of truisms are to be observed in all societies,[136] even in acephalous societies.[137] Utilizing the term symbolic power, Bourdieu states that the power subjects apply the opposite classification schemes (the canon of truisms) to the objects of the natural and social world,[138] but also to the power relations at the very moment the action is conducted. They enable us to take immediate and fast action. Due to their universal character they surpass the slow course of things that would impede our actions if we followed pure sensual perceptions.[139] The consistent application of the classification schemes drives the institutionalization process: in acting, people follow cognitively entrenched rules and norms, but simultaneously the course of action engenders the ongoing embeddedness of social order in human minds and bodies.[140] In other words, "social classes and the hierarchical subordination and superordination of people always exist twofold: in practice [institutions; structures of authority) and as mental cognitive schemes [views]."[141] Hence, "power is not an inherently noxious phenomenon, not just the capacity to say no; nor can domination be transcended in some kind of putative society of the future."[142]

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[135] Bourdieu, *Die feinen Unterschiede*, 730–31. See also Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, "Über einige primitive Formen von Klassifikation. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung von kollektiven Vorstellungen," in *Schriften zur Soziologie der Erkenntnis*, ed. Emile Durkheim and Hans Joas (Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993), 169–256.

[136] Giddens, *Constitution*, 29. See also Durkheim and Mauss, "Primitive Formen," 169–256.

[137] Regarding the notion of right—*cuong*—among the Nuer, see Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 162–69, 171.

[138] Bourdieu, *Die feinen Unterschiede*, 748–54.

[139] Durkheim, *Schriften*, 81; Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 51.

[140] See also Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 160; Foucault, *Analytik*, 74–75, 115.

[141] Bourdieu, *Mechanismen*, 20.

[142] Giddens, *Constitution*, 32.

Power is also symbolic in the sense that it unfolds on the level of meaning and recognition rather than on that of physical force. It exists as long as it is able to procure recognition for itself. This means that the actors are connected through accepted complicity because the power structures are embedded in the worldview of the ruler and the ruled.[143] Bourdieu calls this effect of power the *doxa*, a subconscious approval of the power structures. Due to the habitualizing effects of power, the authority relations and the principles for categorizing and classifying things, the whole social order is perceived as something natural.[144] This is confirmed by Khanikov's experiences in mid-nineteenth-century Bukhara:

> "[h]e [the European] finds it difficult to understand things as they are; much appears strange, obscure, nay, incomprehensible to him, which, though he cannot comprehend it, is true, perfectly natural, and the direct consequence of the order of things existing. […] If you are compelled to put some questions to him [the native] about his own land, its curiosities will appear to him so ordinary, and so little interesting, that he will either not remember them, until you mention them yourself […]"[145]

To achieve a common understanding of social reality, human beings transmit an exterior and objective reality that defines what is real for them. Society owes its coerciveness not so much to its mechanisms of social control as to the power to constitute and to impose itself as reality.[146]

The worldview is also expressed in a variety of "body techniques". This term has been coined by Marcel Mauss, who describes it as the social dimension of the habitus.[147] As such it pertains to the different ways human beings make use of their bodies, for example the position of arms, legs, hands and so on. Body techniques are abilities conditioned by a lengthy learning or education process, in the course of which humans learn how to conduct activities (e.g., swimming, walking, reading and writing, eating, riding, etc.). The way we act and use our bodies also varies from society to society and relates to education, fashion and expedience.

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143 Bourdieu, *Mechanismen*, 82.

144 Bourdieu, *Die feinen Unterschiede*, 734–35, 749; Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 61–62, 76, 83.

145 Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, v, vii.

146 Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy* (Garden City/New York: Anchor Books, 1969), 11–12.

147 Marcel Mauss, *Soziologie und Anthropologie* II: Gabentausch, Soziologie, Psychologie, Todesvorstellungen, Körpertechniken, Begriff der Person, trans. E. Moldenhauer et al. (München/Wien: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1975), 202.

Every technique has its own specific form and must be learned in the course of a gradual process. In a nutshell, power takes the form of habits that inscribe themselves in human bodies. Education is the most important component in the acquirement of body techniques. The child imitates acts that are promising and encouraged by those who have authority over him or her. This means that the behavior is dictated from outside or above. We are dealing with a biological procedure having an impact on the body. The individual adopts the sequences of motion from the behavior that is practiced by others together with him or her.[148] Thinking in a similar direction, Foucault postulates that power goes through the human body. Thus humans are the bearers and transmitters of power and not simply its targets.[149] Once the conditioning process is completed, it is almost impossible to change the way humans use their bodies. Hence body techniques are expressions of the individual and collective practical rationality of humans.[150]

I would like to explain the symbolic dimension of institutionalization with an example borrowed from Heinrich Popitz:[151] In a reformatory lives a group of thirteen boys aged between fourteen and fifteen. In the course of time, a sub-group consisting of four boys takes the lead. One of them is the "boss." A second sub-group of three boys serves the former as a kind of auxiliary force. The rest of the boys are bossed around by the "chief" and his staff. After a while, the divisions of power within the group become visible. The power of the first group is based on a sophisticated system of redistribution based on an invention. Each boy receives two slices of bread for breakfast. If they were hidden and saved, they could later be soaked in water and pressed into a kind of durable zwieback. With the help of its staff, the power center around the "boss" collects one of the two slices per day from the six remaining boys. Two pieces of bread are reserved for the "boss," his companions gain one each; the last piece is divided and distributed to the task force. The individual shares in tasks and duties are distributed according to a similar allocation formula. Special talents for unpleasant tasks and duties developed and scapegoats were step by step identified and, depending on the mood of the "boss" and his assistants, punished. Disobedience committed by

148 Ibid., 203.
149 Foucault, *Analytik*, 114–15.
150 For the phenomenon of body techniques, see Mauss, *Soziologie und Anthropologie* II, 199–206.
151 Adapted from Popitz, *Phänomene*, 216–21.

the six oppressed boys was sanctioned through deprivation of necessary things, for instance the duvet. In extreme cases, the punishment was carried out at night and all the others were forced to participate. In the course of time, the stratification within the group stabilized. The internal hierarchization within the power center may have been the result of the slow expansion of its power.[152] It is remarkable that after a while the system of redistribution worked on its own, a specific power order (*Machtordnung*) emerged within the group of youngsters. The mechanism of collection of resources, allocation and sanction became increasingly reliable. Force was only employed to eliminate occasional nuisance and trouble.[153] As time passes, the power-driven system of allocation established in the reformatory will be acknowledged by all group members. The only precondition for acknowledgement is that the duration and order assume a primary importance for the formation of consciousness and shaping of opinions among the boys. The order thus established offers security,[154] or more precisely, reliability of expectations. All members of the entire group know how to behave; things become increasingly predictable. Even the members of the oppressed and underprivileged group will come to terms and arrange themselves with the situation. From a certain point in time, they know what to do and what to avoid because the existing order of things is reliable for them too. Finally, they recognize the value, the advantages of this order. For their survival, the six remaining boys will not only fear the regime of the chief and the norms of the order imposed by him, but they will internalize them. They become accustomed to the power order thus established and ready to maintain it.[155] In other words, the norms of this order become embedded in their worldview. As Popitz postulates,

> "the internal recognition of a power order on the part of the oppressed and underprivileged is a secondary *power process* [*Machtprozess*], a process of safeguarding and

[152] Popitz speaks here about repercussion of the power expansion (Popitz, *Phänomene*, 217).
[153] Ibid., 218.
[154] Popitz speaks of *Ordnungssicherheit* if duration and order assume fundamental importance for the creation of awareness among the proponents of any power order (Popitz, *Phänomene*, 223; see also Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 91).
[155] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 221–24. Michael Mann terms the condition under which the masses keep quiet and give up resistance "institutionally encircled" (Ger. *Institutionelle Vergatterung*) (Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 25).

> 'consolidating' power relations that is directed against the 'obvious' interests, and can—without doubt—take place also against the initial will of the majority."[156]

Those of the boys who deliver resources—in this case slices of bread—are, according to Popitz, not only objects of the exercise of power, but provide the power center with the necessary means to steer the behavior of others, including their own behavior. The auxiliary force also contributes by obeying the instructions of the leader, and simultaneously gives him the opportunity to control others too through a staff in charge of the "levy." In this manner, and by reacting obediently, each of the two sub-groups arranges for the acquiescence of the respective other group. At the same time, the power center pushes the two groups into opposed domains of interests, thus causing a division of the boys. The power means (i.e., goods and services), which are necessary for continued repression, are provided by both sub-groups and channeled through this sophisticated system of social power.[157]

As a consequence, and provided that their authority is institutionally anchored in the norms and values of the social collective, a few individuals at the top are able to bring the majority to comply with their orders and to follow them.[158] Yet although the subordinated collaborate in being ruled, the dispositions and boundaries of their worldview, inducing them to "secret approval" of the power structures, are the incorporated effect of being ruled.[159] Therefore the institutionalization of social practices helps power achieve a quasi-objective meaning, in that the emerging relations and positions of power continue to exist independent of those exercising authority.[160] As a consequence, the social order surrounding us existed prior to our birth and will exist after our death. The course of life of the single individual resembles just an episode or story, which is located in the objective history of every social order.[161]

As power constitutes and nests within the truisms described by Bourdieu, it forms a continuum of reference and a meaningful horizon steering the process of action and understanding effectively. In this respect it is

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[156] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 222. Own translation, markings in the German original.
[157] Ibid., 219.
[158] Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 23.
[159] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 46.
[160] Popitz, *Phänomene*, 4.
[161] Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 56–57.

qualitatively distinct from force, which is in fact meaningless.[162] The production of meaning through power explains why every verbal act is an act of power, and even language with its system of codes and signs is a visible manifestation of power. For this reason, politics is inseparably interwoven with language and acts of speech. The worldview finds its practical expression also in discourses. All communicative relations are power relations and the spoken word contributes to the creation of the meaningful social universe.[163]

Authority and Social Order

As a special case of power taking on different forms according to situation and context, authority should be seen as a central form of organization crucial for the maintenance of social life. There may even be competing groups and networks (*Herrschaftsverbände*) conducting ordered and ordering action. Dependent on permanent action and exchange as its fundamental base, authority epitomizes a mechanism of coordination. It provides solutions for collective problems with respect to allocation and efficiency.[164] At the same time, authority is a power structure, the meaning and results of which affect society in its smallest units and capillaries. Moreover, it is a strategic situation that has been consolidated between opposing protagonists, agents and parties over long historical periods.[165]

As a social mechanism of coordination, authority is an asymmetric structure for the distribution of rights to act.[166] The structure of the distribution of these rights and different kinds of resources given at a specific moment in time corresponds to the immanent structure of the social world.[167] Authority relations owe their legitimacy to the fact that they enter

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[162] Han, *Was ist Macht?*, 38–40, 54–55.

[163] Bourdieu, *Mechanismen*, 28, 81–85. See here also Foucault, *Analytik*, 252–53; Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction*, 35–39; Han, *Was ist Macht?*, 39.

[164] Andrea Maurer, *Herrschaft und soziale Ordnung*: *kritische Rekonstruktion und Weiterführung der individualistischen Theorietradition* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999), 14, 20.

[165] Foucault, *Analytik*, 263.

[166] Maurer, *Herrschaft und soziale Ordnung*, 20.

[167] Bourdieu, *Mechanismen*, 50.

the worldview and make it the embodiment of social order.[168] This distribution structure does not need any legitimation because it imposes itself in its entirety as the natural order of things on the actors' understanding of their everyday world.[169] Only the persons making use of the strategies and instruments in the field of governance have to legitimize themselves and their authority.

Provided that the structures of authority are rooted in the worldview of a given group, a few people at the top of the *Herrschaftsverband* will be able to induce its members to constant compliance with the orders issued.[170] The dominating position of those in authority is due to their low number and their ability to organize themselves. In doing so, they use the above-mentioned strategies in order to effectively ensure joint action in a very short time. The ability to keep the resistance of those subject to authority at the lowest possible level is also important.[171] The masses keep quiet firstly because of their subconscious approval of the power structures, as noted by Bourdieu, but also because they lack the collective organization needed to behave in another way. They comply because they are integrated in collective and distributive power organizations that are controlled and ruled by others.[172]

Legitimacy refers to the justification and rightness of action consisting in the feeling of being in the right or within the framework of norms that make up the worldview.[173] Hence legitimacy depends on how action is conducted by those in command as well as on the norms to be followed and whether the norms and institutions enacted by the ruler and his retinue still match the cognitive schemes and the actual figurations of power.[174] The perception of a norm as being legitimated rests very much on the discursive consciousness implying that even a practice that is not really legitimated anymore can still be valid or a part of the worldview. It only loses significance when it enters the discursive consciousness of the actors involved, for instance in times of

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[168] German *das Körper gewordene Soziale* (Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 209).

[169] See here the discussion in the section on symbolic power.

[170] See above.

[171] Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 548.

[172] Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 23.

[173] Bourdieu, *Die feinen Unterschiede*, 359.

[174] Weber defines legitimacy as a conviction on the part of persons subject to authority that it is right and proper and that they have some obligation to obey, regardless of the basis on which this belief rests (see Uphoff, "Distinguishing Power," 301).

contest or conflict, or when a shift in the figurations of power causes a norm to be disputed.

On the other hand, the successful exercise of authority derives from the frequent implementation of the distribution of interests and power in the *Herrschaftsverband*. The existence of a particular authority, or more appropriately, the position of a person in authority, depends on practical issues like the satisfaction of interests as well as on the solution of initial problems —such as allocation and distribution—and in what way the person in command is able to guarantee the supply of resources.[175] However, the terms interest or strategy should not be mistaken as utilitarian or intentional. Due to the habitualizing effect of power, the power structures are removed from consciousness. Interest and strategy do not mean the intentional and planned pursuance of consciously defined goals. These are regularities forming the basis of objectivized courses of action. The latter are coherent and socially intelligible configurations, though they do not follow consciously defined rules and do not steer for a target planned in advance by a strategist. This means that interests and interest structures are to a large degree institutionally predefined. Human beings care about future results only insofar as they are rooted in the everyday reality they are dealing with, because the worldview induces them to look after their (institutionally predefined and socially constructed) interests and to pursue their respective goals.[176] Marcel Mauss points out that

> "[i]n earlier civilizations, one had interests but they differed from those in our time. There, if one hoards, it is only to spend later on, to put people under obligations and to win followers. Exchanges are made as well, but only of luxury objects like clothing and ornaments, or feasts and other things that are consumed at once. Return is made with interest, but this is done in order to humiliate the original donor or exchange partner and not merely to recompense him for the loss that the lapse of time causes him. He has an interest but it is only analogous to the one which we say is our guiding principle."[177]

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[175] Maurer, *Herrschaft und soziale Ordnung*, 20.

[176] Rejecting the narrow interpretation of the term interest, Bourdieu often uses the term *illusio* or *libido* instead. In doing so, he breaks with the conventional theories and views that do not recognize the varying forms of non-material profit (Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 48).

[177] Marcel Mauss, *The Gift*: *Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies* (London: Cohen & West, 1954), 73.

PATRONAGE, GIFT EXCHANGE AND MEDIATION

In the previous sections, I detailed the conceptual framework of this book by looking at various power concepts, which, despite their differences, have much in common. The most striking commonalities are the relational understanding of power and the blend with social constructivist theories. The most insightful premise can be summarized as follows: order and reality are socially constructed by humans who purposefully institutionalize power relations. In doing so, they build networks and cement their interdependence.

In the following I will link the concept of Social Order to the state of knowledge discussed in the introduction. As we have seen, historians identified patronage as a very dominant feature of Islamic societies. The same holds true for anthropologists working on the Mediterranean context, and political scientists who produced a great number of studies on clientelism. This wave of interest reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, only to ebb away in the following decades. But in spite of this immense output of patronage studies, the aspect of power was rarely touched upon.[178] One of the few exceptions in this respect, Alex Weingrod recognized the interwovenness of patronage and power. Referring to the shortcomings of the debate,[179] he argued in favor of "processual studies," "abstracting underlying social processes that emerge from the interactions of persons who join together or who are brought together as they pursue their own goals and interests."[180] This is very much in line with the concepts of power and order outlined above.

I would like to put forward several arguments: first, patronage, mediation and also gift giving are forms of congealed power and cognitively

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[178] Patronage studies fall into two groups: first, those undertaken by social and political scientists focusing on the national level and elites (patrons). Here the major interest was to show the functions of clientele networks and how they were embedded in political systems. Paying more attention to the clients' perspective, the second group consists of anthropological studies focusing on patron-client links in the rural context (see Alex Weingrod, "Patronage and power," in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977), 41, 48).

[179] Social and political scientists tended to treat power almost as a residual category, while emphasis was placed on the organization of clienteles rather than on the actual exercise of power. In such a reading, power remained an underdeveloped category, and its use was not linked to social processes. In anthropological studies, power did not figure as an analytical category at all (ibid., 42–48).

[180] Ibid., 48.

entrenched institutions (structures) of authority. As such, they are cornerstones of local social order(s). Second, patronage consolidates normatively and becomes a crucial element of a power order that is perceived as natural by its protagonists. Third, patronage, mediation and gift exchange can serve as strategies to build extended personalized networks; and as part and parcel of the institutionalization processes, they tend to be inert and durable. This means that this kind of social arrangement is transpersonal and cross-situational. Patron-client relations and the practices involved are temporally and structurally embedded in extensive contexts. They have their own history and process paths that structure situations given at present. Put in historic-genetic perspective, their institutionalization contributes to the establishment of a structure of mutual commitments. This leads to the consolidation of power asymmetries and the "cognitive embeddedness" of reciprocity in worldviews.[181] The latter are responsible for the establishment of "social certainties" and standard conformity.[182]

PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS

The patron-client link is a social arrangement that represents a specific mode of regulation of social order.[183] It is an interpersonal relationship and societal mode of organization.[184] According to Ernest Gellner, patronage is a form of power that often offends both our egalitarianism and our universalism because patrons and clients are generally unequal.[185] This clearly fits into the power concept outlined above, but also alludes to typical features of this kind of relationship, inequalities between the actors and parties involved; and these asymmetries are often seen as normal or natural. In the secondary literature on patron-client bonds, the reader comes across the term patronage, which is "the complex of relations between those who use their influence, social position or some other attribute to assist and protect others, and those

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[181] See Niedenzu, "Machtprozesse," 5.

[182] Popitz also refers to the reducibility of the efforts in connection with the standardization of behavior by the power wielder. He argues that only standardized behavior and services can be coordinated (Popitz, *Phänomene*, 239–40).

[183] S. N. Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger, "Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22, no. 1 (1980): 49.

[184] Weingrod, "Patronage and power," 41.

[185] Ernest Gellner, "Patrons and Clients," in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977), 1.

whom they so help and protect."[186] Hence patron-client ties are always power relations involving an inferior and a superior party. To exercise patronage means to exert authority over a range of clients. Foster coined the term asymmetric dyad, which can be defined as the most basic or the smallest social element.[187]

Rolf Pflücke argues that the asymmetry is the immediate result of the reciprocity norm itself.[188] Reciprocity of influence—the defining criterion for the social relationship—"is never entirely destroyed except in those forms of physical violence which … treat the power subject as no more than a physical object."[189] But this, according to Michel Foucault and Georg Simmel, would be the end of the social relationship.[190] If the patron could simply issue commands, there would have been no reason to cultivate a clientele. For a personal following to be mobilized on the patron's behalf, a certain level of reciprocity is always required.[191] In this sense, asymmetry or inequality is nothing unnatural but exists in almost every interaction between humans. It is inherent in the chain of giving and taking, within which both sides alternately pass the role of the superordinate and subordinate to one another.[192] René Lemarchand and Keith Legg see in the asymmetry even the medium that simultaneously separates and unites patrons and clients. Social differences usher in different roles because of anticipations related to mutual rights and duties.[193]

Patron-client relations are a universal social phenomenon that is of course not restricted to Bukhara and the adjacent areas. The concept of "patronage"

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[186] Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10, no. 4 (1968): 377.

[187] George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract: A Model for the Social Structure of a Mexican Peasant Village," *American Anthropologist* 63, no. 6 (1961): 117; Gioia Weber Pazmiño, *Klientelismus. Annäherungen an das Konzept* (Zürich: ADAG, 1991), 20.

[188] Rolf Pflücke, *Beiträge zur Theorie von Patronage und Klientel*: *Ein vergleichende Soziologie der Gefolgschaft* (Heidelberg: Werner Blasaditsch, 1972), 75–76.

[189] Wrong, *Power*, 10. See also Sofsky and Paris, *Figurationen*, 21.

[190] Foucault, *Analytik*, 225; Georg Simmel, "Forms of Domination," in *Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings*, ed. Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (London/New York: Macmillan et al., 1964), 125.

[191] James Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation?," in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977), 22.

[192] Wrong, *Power*, 10.

[193] René Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development," *Comparative Politics* 4, no. 2 (1972): 152.

can be traced back to antiquity. The Latin word *patronus* means representative or protector.[194] The term however is related to the word *pater*—the father caring for his children out of paternal love and affection.[195] Opposite the *patronus* stood the *cliens/clientis*, his protégés who were committed to fidelity, service and obedience. Both sides were bound to each other by reciprocal acts of giving and taking. The patron granted protection, judicial representation and advocacy before the court, while the clients were committed to financially contributing to the dowry of the patron's daughters or to the payment of ransom when his relatives were captured. In this relationship, both sides were bound together by concrete duties. The concept of "clientship" describes the clientele and the relationship between the protégés and their patron; it afforded them a protected status like *Schutzverwandtschaft* (protective kinship).[196] The connection to the family of the protector was established by adoption, through which the clients became family members in a ritual sense.[197]

Irrespective of the theoretical differences, all authors agree on the prominence and striking relevance of reciprocity in almost all human affairs.[198] So important is this norm in shaping human interaction that some scientists spoke of *Homo reciprocus* or *Homo reciprocans*.[199] As Richard Thurnwald puts it, this norm is not only psychologically rooted in the character of human beings; it is the most powerful driving force behind all

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[194] In the Roman Empire, protectors acted on behalf of individual persons and groups but also represented entire cities, provinces and regions before the senate (Karl Ernst Georges, *Kleines Lateinisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Hannover/Leipzig: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1909), 2039).

[195] Pflücke, *Beiträge*, 10.

[196] Georges, *Wörterbuch*, 479.

[197] Pflücke, *Beiträge*, 15–17.

[198] Bronislaw Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (London/Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1926), 25–27; Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Principle of Reciprocity," in *Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings*, ed. Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (London/New York: Macmillan et al., 1964), 75; Richard C. Thurnwald, "Gegenseitigkeit im Aufbau und Funktionieren der Gesellungen," in *Reine und angewandte Soziologie. Festgabe für Ferdinand Tönnies zu seinem 80. Geburtstage am 26. Juli 1935*, ed. Albrecht Gerhard (Leipzig: Hans Buske Verlag, 1936), 277; Lemarchand and Legg, "Political Clientelism," 156.

[199] Alvin W. Gouldner, *For Sociology. Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 226; Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," *American Sociological Review* 25, no. 2 (1960): 161.

forms of society and all institutions.[200] Mauss states that reciprocal exchange is a multi-facetted means to pursue "self-interest"—here in a non-economic sense—to conform to social and moral norms, and to fulfill obligations to others. Similarly, Scott talks about a widely shared moral sentiment.[201] Thus, reciprocity appears as the social imperative that underpins individual action and helps sustain the social world as a whole.[202]

With regard to the respective obligations of patrons and clients, we often read that the patrons grant protection, goods and favors in return for loyalty, particular products and certain services.[203] Although the transactions may vary considerably, they imply mutual benefits for both sides. The extent of the exchange depends however on the context as well as on the influence of the patron and the needs of the clients.[204] To put it more specifically, the patron's services consist first of economic assistance (e.g., provision of jobs and credits, assistance in case of urgent need and financial aid for the poor), second of brokerage (placement, mediation of conflicts), and third of other services (execution of judicial and bureaucratic affairs, intercession with God or praise in public).[205] The services of the clients are verbal—public commendation, appraisal and devotion in relation to the patron, and acquisition of information—as well as economic in nature. The latter comprise delivery of natural products, manual work, farm labor, recruitment of other clients and so on.[206]

Weingrod formulated the thesis that the greater the resources controlled, the more powerful the patron becomes.[207] Although it becomes clear that for their survival the clients depend much more on the patron than the patron on

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[200] Thurnwald, "Gegenseitigkeit," 290, 293. Alvin Gouldner argues that "the norm of reciprocity may be conceived of as a dimension to be found in all value systems and, in particular, as one among a *number* of 'Principal Components' universally present in moral codes" (Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity," 171, marking in the original).

[201] Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation?," 27.

[202] Mauss, *The Gift*, 73. See also Eyton Bercowitch, "The Agent in the Gift: Hidden Exchange in Inner New Guinea," *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 4 (1994): 498.

[203] Anthony Hall, "Patron-Client Relations: Concepts and Terms," in *Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism*, ed. Steffen W. Schmitt et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 510; Eisenstadt and Roniger, "Patron-Client Relations," 49.

[204] Lemarchand and Legg, "Political Clientelism," 155.

[205] Pflücke, *Beiträge*, 29; Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation?," 23.

[206] Weber Pazmiño, *Klientelismus*, 52–53.

[207] Weingrod, "Patronage and power," 42.

his clients,[208] this "Big Men" theory obstructs the view for a deeper understanding of patron-client ties. For example, clients may have considerable advantages vis-à-vis outside patrons because of their knowledge of local ways to achieve things.[209] The client is not at all a helpless subject exposed to the will of the patron. Far-reaching and total subordination would instead cancel the reciprocity.[210] Moreover, it is the norm of reciprocity that prevents men from abusing their superiority and precludes the emergence of relationships of pure exploitation and coercion.[211]

Generosity, Reciprocity and Gift Giving

The topic of generosity represents a regular trope in Bukharan historiography. Let me explain this with an example: In the year 1706, the Tuqay-Timurid king ʿUbaidullah Khān conducted a campaign to Balkh. Before the army's departure, the king showered his soldiers with gifts, especially money. The scene of lavish giving is described in a chronicle dating from the early nineteenth century[212] and serves Mullā Sharīf, the author, as a template to depict other acts of generosity occurring in the context of Amīr Ḥaidar's enthronization in 1800. The subsequent round of appointments is guided by reciprocal exchange and appears to have confirmed a clientelistic ethos.[213] In the *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, a work dating from the early eighteenth century, we read that the ruler supplied his men with gifts particularly before military encounters like that in Balkh.[214] Mullā Sharīf certainly consulted this chronicle for his own work. He copied and

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208 Weber Pazmiño, *Klientelismus*, 33; Pflücke, *Beiträge*, 104.

209 Anthony Galt, "Rethinking Patron-Client Relations: The Real System and the Official System in Southern Italy," *Anthropological Quarterly* 47, no. 2 (1974): 187. Paine argued against a strong dichotomy or separation between the two categories patron and client (Robert Paine, "A Theory of Patronage and Brokerage," in *Patrons and Brokers of the East Arctic*, ed. Robert Paine (Newfoundland: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1971), 9).

210 Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation?," 22.

211 Gouldner, "Reciprocity," 174. Arguing from the perspective of social system and functional theories, Gouldner states that the norm of reciprocity serves "to inhibit the emergence of exploitative relations which would undermine the social system …" (ibid.).

212 Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 114b–115a.

213 Ibid., fols. 458a, 459b, 475a–477a passim.

214 Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fols. 32a, 72a, 217a–b; Semenov trans., 48, 85, 242.

embellished the passages describing gift giving ceremonies at ʿUbaidullah Khān's court and used them for his own descriptions. Concerned with seventeenth-century Transoxania and the Uzbek elite, McChesney also notices the importance of this practice.[215] The *Mihmān-nāma-yi Bukhārā* by Faẓlullah b. Rūzbihān Khunjī (1455–1521), a chronicle dedicated to the ruler Muḥammad Khān Shībānī (r. 1501–10), describes royal banquets with tablecloths full of sumptuous food and the distribution of bowls brimming with gold and silver coins, weapons, coats of mail and precious horses. All this was distributed among Ḥamza Khān, the elite corps (*mardum-i khāṣa*), the royal bodyguard (*chuhra wa īkchīyān*) and other followers worthy of being gifted.[216]

Given this highly repetitive pattern, it is justified to ask what caused the durability of gift giving. Was it a simple strategy to ensure or "buy" the loyalty of retainers? Does self-interest play a decisive role? Or is the phenomenon driven by other aspects?

Paying attention to the relationship between people and objects by focusing on the theories of Marcel Mauss, this section argues that in contrast to transactional theories,[217] exchange and gift giving should be understood in social rather than in pure economic terms. As will be shown in one of the following chapters, the topic of lavish giving forms a recurrent strand in the chronicles, yet self-interest and economic considerations can be ruled out as a primary motive behind the exchange.

Representing relational terms, the words item and object embody dispositions of relations and express a specific relationship between a person and a thing. And it is precisely because of their relational character that mobile objects and goods serve as means of social communication, as gifts

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[215] Robert D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia. Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480–1889* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 115.

[216] Ursula Ott, *Transoxanien und Turkestan zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts. Das Mihmān-nāma-yi Buḫārā des Faḍlallah b. Rūzbihān Ḫunjī – Übersetzung und Kommentar* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Klaus Schwarz, 1974), 201, 289–90.

[217] The most prominent advocate of a transactionalist interpretation of gift exchange is Bronislaw Malinowski. Concerned with the Melanesian setting, he details his ideas on exchange relations and other institutions in his book on the Western Pacific (see Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific. An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea* (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1932). His interpretations were however strongly questioned by Marcel Mauss, who emphasized the social dimension of gift exchange in his oft-quoted work *The Gift*.

or commodities.[218] Marcel Mauss developed a theory entailing three components: first, the receiving of things, second, the reply in the form of gift giving, and third, the acceptance of offered gifts. Mauss talks here of a "total prestation," in which the entirety of society and its institutions—of a judicial, religious, economic, esthetic and morphological nature—find expression.[219] According to this understanding of the gift, the meaning of which differs from the common usage, a gift is any object or service, utilitarian or superfluous, transacted as part of social relations.[220] Mauss' theoretical assumptions are based on people, objects, and social relations, as well as on the question of how they are made and remade, understood and re-understood in everyday social interaction. A gift is not simply a material object, but is made up by the relationship within which the exchange occurs.[221] Exchange is probably the most crucial way of expressing that one cares about somebody else and "means giving to another what that person wants and needs, but with the understanding that the other will do the same."[222]

Since a gift mediates and facilitates a relationship between individuals, its value does not necessarily result from its utility. The value can neither be objectivized through a quantum of working time to be invested in the production of an object nor through the complexity of the production process. Value is by no means an inherent characteristic of objects but a result of social conventions.[223] For example, in the tropical archipelagos of the South Pacific, many objects were highly valued in spite of their low economic value.[224] In the Bukharan context, we find the customary robe, the *khalʿat*, to be one of the most valuable and prestigious gifts reflecting the social status of its recipient. With regard to the highly developed gift system

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[218] Karl-Heinz Kohl, *Die Macht der Dinge. Geschichte und Theorie sakraler Objekte* (München: C. H. Beck, 2003), 118–20.

[219] Mauss, *The Gift*, 3–5, 36–37, 77; Mauss, *Soziologie und Anthropologie* II, 16–27. Bourdieu also adopts Mauss' ideas on the total social phenomenon and calls for a total sociology (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthroplogie*, 49–50).

[220] See also James Carrier, "Gifts, Commodities and Social Relations. A Maussian View of Exchange," *Sociological Forum* 6, no. 1 (1991): 122.

[221] Ibid., 121–22.

[222] See Bercowitch, "The Agent in the Gift," 503.

[223] Kohl, *Die Macht der Dinge*, 128.

[224] The people of Tahiti and the Marquesas Islands regarded red-colored feather ribbons as highly valuable. One could get large quantities of food and other products in return for these ribbons in spite of their low economic value (Kohl, *Die Macht der Dinge*, 127).

in Polynesian and Melanesian societies,[225] Mauss reaches the conclusion that the objects of exchange are never separated from the individuals engaged in transactions but constitute a community and alliance that are almost indissoluble.[226]

In his *Great Transformation*, Karl Polanyi argues that as a rule, the economy of humans is submerged in their social relations. As social beings, humans act to maintain their social standing, social claims, and social assets. Material goods are only valued to the extent that they serve this end. This means that the processes of production and distribution are not linked to specific economic interests but geared to a number of social interests, which differ from society to society. The economic system, however, runs on non-economic motives. "This attitude is reinforced by the frequency of communal activities such as partaking of food from common catch or sharing in the results of some far-flung and dangerous tribal expedition."[227] Thus the morality inherent in gift exchange is not solely commercial, while each of the objects of mutual giving and taking has a virtue of its own causing it to be given away and demanding a counter gift.[228] This argument was proven by child psychologists. In experiments, an insignificant toy of little use acquired great value in the eyes of the children as soon as one of them started playing with it. But when all the others also wanted to play with it, the child who discovered the toy refused to give it up because the desire of the others rendered the object valuable; its social value thus went far beyond its basic utility. The child possessing the toy gave it to another child to strengthen their already existing friendship or to establish a new friendship. Very often the act of giving followed the social hierarchy; the child with the highest standing in the group received the coveted object, but as soon as it ceased playing with the toy, all others lost interest in it. The former object of desire was cast aside and lost all its significance.[229]

Similar to Bourdieu, Mauss critically reconsiders the concept of utilitarian interest as stressed in transactional thinking:[230]

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[225] See Malinowski's results on the *kula* cycle (Malinowski, *Argonauts*, 81–104. Mauss, *The Gift*, 18–31; Mauss, *Soziologie und Anthropologie* II, 40–59).

[226] Mauss, *The Gift*, 31; Mauss, *Soziologie und Anthropologie* II, 59.

[227] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York/Toronto: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1944), 46.

[228] Mauss, *The Gift*, 37; Mauss, *Soziologie und Anthropologie* II, 59.

[229] Kohl, *Die Macht der Dinge*, 128–29.

[230] Mauss, *The Gift*, 73; Mauss, *Soziologie und Anthropologie* II, 134–35.

> "It is only our Western societies that quite recently turned man into an economic animal. But we are not yet all animals of the same species. In both lower and upper classes pure 'irrational' expenditure is in current practice: it is still characteristic in some French noble houses. *Homo oeconomicus* is not behind us, but before […] For a long time man was something quite different; and it is not so long now since he became a machine—a calculating machine."[231]

Taking a look at the history of mankind and the development of ancient societies, Polanyi postulates that in non-industrial settings, a "marketless and gainless economy" is a mere function of social organization. The best example of such a trade without economic profit is the Melanesian *kula* cycle. In contrast to the modern capitalist setting held together by a market economy, ancient societies, no matter whether tribes, city-states, and ancient despotic or feudal empires, were integrated by reciprocity and redistribution that formed part of the political regime.[232] Within that framework of reciprocity, redistribution and householding with production for use and not for profit, "the orderly production and distribution of goods was secured through a great variety of individual motives disciplined by general principles of behavior." While material gain was not so much in the foreground, custom, law, magic and religion induced the individual to comply with those rules of behavior.[233]

To sum up, in eighteenth-century Transoxania reciprocity-based relations were constitutive for the social and political economy. Such relations were however largely underpinned and driven by non-economic social motives. The bazaar economy tended to be enmeshed in social relationships. Giving freely to satisfy social interests was acclaimed as a high social virtue. In other words, economic (exchange) relations were interwoven with politics and social relations.[234] Unlike the Western industrial setting, where commercial interests and notions of generosity are clearly separated, in Transoxania gift giving was an act of power. It was therefore informed by expectations and had a political connotation. Therefore, gift horses, swords or robes of honor were status objects that were valued and appreciated in both social and economic terms. In the case of a robe, the social value may have overshadowed its material value.

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[231] Mauss, *The Gift*, 74; Mauss, *Soziologie und Anthropologie* II, 135.
[232] Polanyi, *Great Transformation*, 49, 52.
[233] Ibid., 55.
[234] Ibid., 49.

MEDIATION AND BROKERAGE

Since patron-client relations are strongly interrelated with mediation and brokerage, the following part is devoted to brokerage and the patterns of mediation. Marsden defines brokerage as a process "by which intermediary actors facilitate transactions between other actors, lacking access to or trust in one another."[235] Boissevain is of the opinion that "a social broker places people in touch with each other either directly or indirectly for profit. He bridges gaps in communication between persons, groups, structures and even cultures."[236] In most of the publications, brokerage is defined as the medium facilitating the flow of resources and exchange. Any brokered exchange involves three parties or actors, two of whom are the actual parties engaged in the transaction, while the third person acts as intermediary or broker.[237] Very often, the intermediary plays the role of a patron or semi-patron, a "go-between" who maintains a personal relationship with his followers and connects them with a stronger actor at a higher level of the social hierarchy.[238] The real value of such an intermediary lies in his ability to influence the ultimate source of power.[239] From the perspective of the less influential followers, the intermediaries appear as "gatekeepers" in that they largely dominate the paths linking the local infrastructure of the village to the superstructure of the outside urban world."[240] In contrast to Foster, who does not differentiate between the terms broker and patron, Scott makes a clear distinction between them:

> "Acting as a 'broker' or 'middleman' […] means serving as an intermediary to arrange an exchange or transfer between two parties who are not in direct contact. The role of middleman, then, involves a three party exchange in which the middleman functions as an

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[235] Peter V. Marsden, "Brokerage Behavior in Restricted Exchange Networks," in *Social Structure and Network Analysis*, ed. Peter V. Marsden and Nan Lin (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), 202.

[236] Jeremy Boissevain, *Friends of Friends. Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 148.

[237] Roger V. Gould and Roberto M. Fernandez, "Structures of Mediation: A Formal Approach to Brokerage and Transaction Networks," *Sociological Methodology* 19 (1989): 91.

[238] George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan, II: Patron-Client Relationship," *American Anthropologist*, *New Series* 65, no. 6 (1963): 1292.

[239] Ibid.

[240] Michael Kenny, "Patterns of Patronage in Spain," *Anthropological Quarterly* 33, no.1 (1960): 18.

> agent who does not himself control the thing transferred. A patron by contrast, is part of a two-person exchange and operates with resources he himself owns or directly controls. Finally, the terms 'middleman' and 'broker' do not specify the relative status of the actor to others in the transaction, while a patron is by definition of superior rank to his client."[241]

The middleman can be compared with a physical lever serving the transmission of force and power from one point to another and bridging the gap between his client and a higher standing human or even superhuman being.[242] But at the same time, a broker is a buffer between those whom he connects. The bridge of contact thus provided leads a dual existence, it unites and separates.[243]

Boissevain coined the term social entrepreneur, somebody forming a link at which networks intersect. To move on and to operate a network of multiple social ties, the social entrepreneur innovates to gain access to resources and to handle them on behalf of himself and his clientage. Yet a broker is also a professional manipulator of people and information. He provides a communication channel used for his own purposes.[244] The role of brokers depends on different aspects: first, the structure, content and centralization of a social network including the regular flow of resources, and second, the willingness to manipulate information.[245] However, the broker does not simply manipulate others for profit. He does so because the specific attributes of a broker ascribed to him by the majority of society and his role and tasks are institutionally predefined. This also means that the typical role characteristics of power brokers (e.g., the manipulation of information and even other people for personal profit) formed part of the historically developed practical knowledge of the actors. The image of the middleman making use of certain strategies on behalf of his clientele became not only widespread but, as the "sediment of history" and accumulated experience, embedded in the worldview of the actors.

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241 James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 1 (1972): 95.
242 Weber Pazmiño, *Klientelismus*, 35, 39.
243 Ibid., 38–39.
244 Boissevain, *Friends of Friends*, 147–48.
245 Ibid., 153–54.

CONCLUSION

Although I have started this book with a conceptual chapter, the preceding sections are a mere product of research on Transoxanian sources combined with a screening of the secondary literature. The Social Order concept is thus to a large extent informed by the material discussed in the following chapters. As a heuristic tool for the investigation of historical processes, this concept was constantly adapted to the material and not vice versa, the material to the concept. I have chosen the various approaches, concepts and theories introduced here because they fit the insights gained from the sources as well as our current state of knowledge.

The approach outlined in the previous sections is not to be mistaken as a fully fledged theory that can be applied like most standard theories today! Instead of streamlining my material according to any theoretical straitjacket, I prefer to allow the sources to speak for themselves and draw conceptual conclusions from detailed descriptions. Providing an analytical background folio, the Social Order concept potentially enhances the understanding of historiographical texts compiled in non-European settings. As a research tool, it can be used as a lens enabling the reader to see more than the virtual chaos (*harj wa marj*) revealed by the chronicles at first glance.[246] Offering some new perspectives on seemingly conventional topics, the Social Order approach will help shed fresh light on a number of little-known narrative sources and other archival material. Besides, this concept will enable me to overcome the scenarios of decline dominating the bulk of secondary literature, especially the works of Soviet scholars. It will also serve as a useful corrective to Marxist theories placing emphasis on the class struggle and ideologically loaded concepts such as feudalism, which will not be further discussed. Following David Sneath's critique of structural functionalist models of segmentary kinship society, and the dichotomist notions of a kin-organized tribal society versus states,[247] I have also chosen to abandon other well-trodden paths of historical investigation. I will therefore leave aside tribes, states and inter-state wars as criteria for my analysis. But as tribal groups do appear in some of the chronicles, I will take

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[246] On the notion of chaos and anarchy (*harj wa marj*) in the historiographical sources, see The Order of Things/The Portrayal of Order and Concluding Remarks/ The Addes Value of the Social Order Concept.

[247] David Sneath, *The Headless State. Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society and Misinterpretations of Nomadic Inner Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 2–5.

them as given and treat them as networks of interdependent people loosely defined by kinship and held together by constant processes of mutual exchange.

This study will dispense with conventional structuralist and also system theory. For their survival, human beings must forge relations with others, but they do not need social totalities. I therefore follow Mann's basic assumption that humans are social but not societal beings,[248] who are integrated in interdependent and overlapping networks. The latter are relatively open and have the potential to integrate other individuals and groups. Last but not least, their agency results from the fact that they are integrated in such social arrangements and figurations. Nobody lives and acts alone, all of us and our actions are related to others.

A large part of the present chapter has been concerned with questions of power and authority. There has been an ongoing debate on the question of how to distinguish power from authority.[249] But in my view such a differentiation is of little practical relevance, particularly for the investigation of orders dominated by authority relations, which are always power relationships. Put in a nutshell, power is a structuring/ordering force irrespective of the degree of its institutionalization. Therefore I suggest separating the two terms for reasons of definition only. Power shall be understood as the potential to utilize strategic options and unequal opportunities in order to exert influence in a social relationship. This potential is based on power differentials that bear significance in certain situations. Authority shall be defined as a special kind of power. A relationship of authority (*Herrschaftsverhältnis*) exists if the asymmetric structure of interaction turns into a congealed structure of social interaction that is normatively reinforced and consolidated in positional terms.[250]

At this point, I want to put forward the following assumptions. First, patronage is a specific mode of authority (institutionalized power) immanent in social realities and produced by local worldviews. Second, it was an integral element of social order in Transoxania and therefore seldom questioned by individual actors. Third, patron-client ties were pervasive and buttressed Transoxanian societies on different spatial and temporal scales of social integration. Together with norms such as reciprocity, seniority and

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248 Mann , *Geschichte*, I, 34.

249 See for example Upphoff, "Distinguishing Power," 315–20.

250 See Niedenzu, "Machtprozesse," 5–6.

generosity, they were rooted in local worldviews, which found expression in constant exchange processes leading to the loop-up of personalized networks.

The concept of Social Order will be employed in four consecutive steps. In the following chapter (2. Historical Overview), I will attempt to identify local worldviews and the major institutions of what McChesney termed "steppe society practice."[251] These traditions of authority corresponded to a decentralized system of government that continued to exist until the early nineteenth century. Based on the secondary literature, this outline will be embedded in a historical overview of the developments in Mā Warāʾ al-Nahr after the Mongol conquest up to the beginning of the eighteenth century. Next (3. The Figurations of Power), I will look at the institutionalization process during the first half of the eighteenth century. The major focus will be on interdependent processes of power accumulation by various actors and groups that formed the local elite. As will be shown, eighteenth-century Transoxania witnessed the disintegration of the *Herrschaftsverband* led by the Tuqay-Timurids and the corresponding, albeit slow loss of Tuqay-Timurid power. At the same time, we will see various power shifts and the rise of new elites that were involved in an ongoing struggle for power. In a third step (4. The Order of Things), I will explore patron-client relationships, mediation and gift exchange. This chapter will be framed by the question of how authority relations and acts of power were described in the chronicles. In my attempt to answer this question, I will follow Weingrod's suggestions and conceptualize patronage in ceremonial terms as a highly stylized and ritualized set of performances. This perspective allows me to focus on "a kind of 'micro politics' in which, over time, recurrent or characteristic social processes can be perceived."[252] In the final chapter (5. Social Order on Different Scales), I will investigate social order in various interrelated social contexts such as the royal palace, the military, missions headed by foreign diplomats and travelers, and Bukharan villages. The resulting narrative will highlight the significance of established power structures to come up with some answers regarding the question of social change.

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[251] McChesney speaks of steppe political ideals, practices and traditions, and sometimes also steppe ideals of state (McChesney, *Waqf*, 47–49, 51).

[252] Weingrod, "Patronage and power," 48.