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The Yogācārabhūmi against Allodoxies (*paravāda*): 1. Introduction and Doxography*

INTRODUCTION

The role played by the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra (hereafter YBhŚ; around 300 CE?) in the intellectual history of Indian Buddhism – both “Śrāvakayānist” and Mahāyānist – can hardly be overestimated. In addition to witnessing the rise of several key idealistic doctrines, this bulky treatise covers the most important topics of Buddhist theory and practice – path structure(s), meditation, language, ontology, psychology, etc. – and served as a basis for all later developments within the Yogācāra schools.¹ Decisive as the YBhŚ’s contribution to doctrinal elaboration may be, however, this treatise (and especially its “Basic Section,” the *maulī bhūmiḥ*) also contains invaluable testimonies concerning the history of Indian Buddhist philosophy. The Tattvārthapaṭala of the Bodhisattvabhūmi argues at length against a Madhyamaka-like conception of emptiness and develops original views on language, superimposition and ultimate reality.² The *hetuvidyā* section (HV) of the Śrutamayī Bhūmi contains what might be the earliest extant Buddhist theoretical attempt at defining basic “eristic dialectical” categories, including those that are known as “epistemological.”³ Last but not least, the Savitarkasavicārādibhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi (YBh) provides us, in its *paravāda* (“allodoxy”) section,⁴ with a fascinating outline of early Buddhist philosophy *in concreto*. This section is remarkable in several respects. First, contrary to the Brahmajālasūtra (BJSū) and the Śrāmanyaphalasūtra (ŚPhSū), it does not limit itself to listing (and condemning)

* Most sincere thanks are due to Johannes Bronkhorst, Hugo David, Martin Delhey, Yasutaka Muroya, Isabelle Ratié and Vincent Tournier. I would also like to express my gratitude to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for correcting my English.

¹ For a detailed bibliographical survey of the YBhŚ, see Delhey 2013.

² See Frauwallner 1994: 270-279, Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 322-323, Willis 1979 (with caution!), Takahashi 2005 (in Japanese). See also below, §2.2.13 and n. 148.

³ See Wayman 1958, Yaita 1999, Todeschini 2011 and Eltschinger 2012a.

⁴ YBh 118,1-160,9, YBh_{MS} 33b5-44a5, YBh_{Tib} D60b2-81a1/P71a3-93b4.

false views *qua* false views in a doxographical manner, but provides sophisticated arguments against each of them. Second, contrary to the overwhelming majority of prior and contemporary Buddhist polemical works, which focus on coreligionists' views (the *pudgala*, the existence of the three times, etc.) in an Abhidharma-like manner (notably by resorting to the *yuktyāgama* methodology),⁵ this section targets, by means of reason(ing) (*yukti*) alone, the most prominent representatives of third- to fourth-century Indian philosophy: early Sāṅkhya (*satkāryavāda*), (Vaiśeṣika?) atomism, Brahmanism (self, creator God, ritual violence, etc.), the Buddhist *sarvāstivāda*, Jainism as well as several allodox views already mentioned in the BJSū (eternalism, annihilationism, etc.) and the ŚPhSū (Jainism, Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist “nihilism,” etc.). Third, the *paravāda* section addresses non-Buddhist practices and institutions (ritual, purity, caste-classes, etc.) in addition to purely theoretical tenets, and thus it echoes, for example, Aśvaghoṣa's way of submitting both philosophical doctrines (early Sāṅkhya, self, creator God, etc.) and religious practices (asceticism, Vedic ritual) to sustained critical examination (*parīkṣā*).⁶ Fourth, the *himsādharmavāda* and *agravāda* sections explicitly allude to the *kaliyuga* in order to account for allegedly aberrant Brahmanical practices and discourses, thus witnessing a fairly early Buddhist reception of the *yuga* cosmological and apocalyptic scheme.⁷ But in spite of these and many other interesting features, the *paravāda* section of the YBh has not yet received the scholarly attention it undoubtedly deserves. Of the sixteen allodoxies successively dealt with in this passage, only two (*hetuphalasadvāda* and *abhivyaktivāda*) have been (studied, edited and) translated in their entirety so far;⁸ as for the *ātmavāda*, the *īśvarādikarṭṛvāda*, the *śāśvatavāda* and the *nāstikavāda* sections, they have been treated, but only in part.⁹ In other words, most of the YBh's sixteen allodoxies remain unstudied, and no overview of the entire section has ever

⁵ See Eltschinger 2012a: 439-452. The present author subscribes entirely to the following remark by Albrecht Wezler (Wezler 1985: 14): “For this literature [i.e., early Buddhist literature, VE] is characterized by the fact that most, if not all, debates carried on in the texts start from and centre around internal Buddhist or even Hīnayānistic differences of views and Abhidharma points of controversy. In Buddhist literature it is only gradually that heterodox doctrines are taken notice of.”

⁶ See Eltschinger 2013a: 168-169.

⁷ On the *kaliyuga* in Buddhist literature, see Eltschinger 2012b: 68-72 (§2.4.1-2).

⁸ See respectively Furusaka 2001 (in Japanese) and Mikogami 1969; on these two sections, see also Wezler 1985.

⁹ See Shukla 1967, Hayashima 1991 (in Japanese) and Eltschinger – Ratié 2013: 79-82, n. 111 (*ātmavāda*), Chemparathy 1968: 86-89 and 94-96 (*īśvarādikarṭṛvāda*), Mikogami 1967 (in Japanese) (*śāśvatavāda*) and Schmithausen 2000: 254-259 (*nāstikavāda*).

been attempted. The present paper aims at presenting the sixteen allodoxies and the doctrinal patterns underlying the entire *paravāda* section. A forthcoming essay will focus on the *hiṃsādharma* and *agravāda* sections, providing them with a new edition, English translation and doctrinal study.

1. NESCIENCE, FALSE VIEWS, PHILOSOPHY

1.1. The Viniścayaśāstra (VinSg) of the YBhŚ and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh) regard the speculative (*vi-* or *pari-kalpita*) form of the personalistic false view (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) as the source of the non-Buddhist philosophers' mistaken opinions (or false views, *dr̥ṣṭi*) about the self (*ātman*).¹⁰ According to later Buddhist intellectuals such as Dharmakīrti, the personalistic false view (especially in its innate or natural [*sahaja*] form) is nothing but nescience (or ignorance, *avidyā = ajñāna = moha*). As a consequence, the Buddhist epistemologists hold erroneous philosophical opinions to be the outcome of nescience and therefore detrimental to salvation.¹¹ Although the YBh, like most Abhidharma works, does not uphold this doctrine,¹² it does at least indirectly relate mistaken philosophical opinions to nescience, for the *paravāda* section starts with the following statement:

What does the determination of discourse (*prajñapti*) with reference to improper reflection consist of? Here [is] a summary. (1) The effect in the cause, (2) manifestation, (3) existence of past and future, (4) self, (5) eternal[ity], (6) action, (7) God, etc., (8) violence, (9), finite[ness]-and-infinite[ness], (10) eluding, (11) causeless[ness], (12) annihilation, (13) non-existence, (14) superior[ity], (15) purity, (16) auspicious things – the allodoxies indeed [amount to] sixteen.¹³

¹⁰ See VinSg 112b6-113a1 and AKBh 290,19-21 in Kritzer 2005: 292-293; see also Eltschinger 2009: 172-173, Eltschinger – Ratié 2013: 16-18. According to the VinSg passage, the **parikalpitā satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ* characterizes the allodox philosophers (**anyatīrthya*); according to AKVy 463,17-18, the *vikalpītā satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ* is the one fancied by substantialist (*ātmavādin*) philosophers such as Kapila and Ulūka, i.e., in Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika circles.

¹¹ See Eltschinger 2014: 247-328.

¹² See Eltschinger 2014: 267-271. The basic idea is that since the false views are “associated” (*samprayukta*, AK 3.29c) with nescience, they cannot be identical to nescience. According to Schmithausen (1987: II.517), “the Yogācāras, like the Sarvāstivādins ..., usually distinguish clearly between *avidyā/moha/ajñāna* and *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi/ātmadr̥ṣṭi*.” See, however, YBh 204,1-212,4 and Eltschinger 2014: 295-297. While relying on and developing the ideas of the Prātibhāsamutpādasūtra of the Saṃyuktāgama, the YBh (like Vasubandhu later!) comes very close to regarding nescience as identical to the personalistic false view. See also below, §1.2.

¹³ YBh 118,2-6 (YBh_{MS} 33b5-6, YBh_{Tib} D60b2-3/P71a3-5): *ayoniśomanaskāraprajñaptivyavasthānaṃ¹ katamat | tatrodānaṃ – hetau phalam abhiviyaktir atītānāgatāstītā | ātmā ca śāsvataṃ karma īśvarādi vihiṃsatā // antānantam ca vikṣepo ahetūcchedanāstītā | agrāṃ śuddhiś ca maṅgalyaṃ paravādā hi² ṣoḍaśa //*. ¹vyavasthānaṃ YBh_{MS}: ^ovyavasthāpanaṃ YBh. ²paravādā hi YBh_{MS}: paravādās ca YBh.

The sixteen allodoxies (*[śoḍaśa] paravādāḥ*)¹⁴ thus seem to be the paradigmatic discursive outcome of improper reflection (*ayoniśomanaskāra*).¹⁵ But improper reflection is traditionally regarded as being in a relationship of either causality or identity with nescience.¹⁶ The YBh is no exception to this. Consider the following passage:

What does ignorance about the past consist of? It is the [kind of] ignorance that [is particular] to the [person] who improperly considers the past conditioning factors [while wondering:] “Did I exist in the past or did I not exist in the past? Who was I, how was I?” What does ignorance about the future consist of? It is the [kind of] ignorance that [is particular] to the [person] who improperly considers the future conditioning factors [while wondering:] ‘Shall I exist in the future or shall I not exist in the future? What shall I be, how shall I be?’ What does ignorance about internal [factors] consist of? It is the [kind of] ignorance that [is particular] to the [person] who improperly considers his conditioning factors to be a self. What does ignorance about external [factors] consist of? It is the [kind of] ignorance that [is particular] to the [person] who improperly considers to be his own the external conditioning factors which are not included among [entities constituting] living beings.¹⁷

¹⁴ YBh 118,5, 118,6, 160,8. To the best of my knowledge, the YBh provides neither an analysis nor an explanation of the compound *paravāda*, translated here as “allodoxy” (on this expression, see Scherrer-Schaub 1991: xli, n. 63). I take *para* to be used here in the same sense as its Pali equivalent in the BJSū (DN I.3 and passim; see below, §1.3 and n. 36), i.e., to refer to a representative (*śramaṇa* or *brāhmaṇa*) of any non-Buddhist group and/or doctrine. In this sense, *para* is very close in meaning to (*anya*)*tīrthya/tīrthika*, the “allodox” (rather than heterodox/“heretic”) teacher, but insists on its function as an at least virtual opponent. The author(s) and/or compiler(s) of the YBh was/were probably aware of the problem raised by the presence, among the sixteen allodoxies, of the obviously Buddhist (*ihadhārmika*, Tib. *chos ’di pa*) *sarvāstivāda*. See below, §2.2.3, and also §2.2.13 for a Buddhist (Mahāyānist) version of “nihilism.” On issues of orthodoxy, heterodoxy/heresy and allodoxy within Buddhism, see also Eltschinger – Ratié 2013: 65, n. 57.

¹⁵ The concluding stanza of Dharmakīrti’s PV 1, viz. PV 1.340, reveals very similar ideas: *vedaprāmāṇyaṃ kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ snāne dharmecchā jātivādāvalepaḥ | santāpārambhaḥ pāpahānāya ceti dhvastaprajñāne pañca liṅgāni jāḍye ||*. “[Believing in the] authority of the Veda, claiming something [permanent, God or the self,] to be an agent, seeking merit in ablutions, taking pride in one’s caste, and undertaking penance to remove sin, these are the five signs of complete stupidity devoid of any discrimination.” Translation (slightly modified) Eltschinger – Krasser 2012: 77-78. The echo is all the more striking that, with the exception of *vedaprāmāṇya*, all of Dharmakīrti’s “signs” already occur in the *paravāda* section of the YBh: *kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ* (note the similarity in wording) \approx *īśvarādīkartṛvādaḥ* and *ātmavādaḥ* (see below, §2.2.4 and 2.2.7; on the two traditional interpretations of Dharmakīrti’s *kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ*, see Eltschinger – Krasser 2012: 77, n. 171), *snāne dharmecchā* \approx *śuddhivādaḥ* (see below, §2.2.15), *jātivādāvālepa* \approx *agravādaḥ* (see below, §2.2.14), *santāpārambhaḥ pāpahānāya* \approx *pūrvakṛtāhetuvādaḥ* (see below, §2.2.6).

¹⁶ See Eltschinger 2014: 289-292.

¹⁷ YBh 204,2-13: *pūrvānte ’jñānaṃ katamat | atītān saṃskārān ayoniśaḥ kalpayataḥ kiṃ nv aham abhūvam atīte ’dhvany āhosvin nāham abhūvam atīte ’dhvani | ko nv aham abhūvam | kathaṃ vābhūvam iti yad ajñānam | aparānte ’jñānaṃ katamat | anāgatān saṃskārān ayoniśaḥ*

As we can see, ignorance is defined in terms of improper reflection on existing factors, but also, at least as far as the last two definitions are concerned, in terms of false views: false view of a self (*ātmadr̥ṣṭi*) and false view of what (supposedly) belongs to a self (*ātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*). Presenting the sixteen allodoxies as the *definiens* or paradigmatic instances of improper reflection is tantamount to regarding them as the most significant discursive expression of nescience. Although, to the best of my knowledge, the *paravāda* section never explicitly refers to the sixteen allodoxies as false views, there are good reasons to interpret them in such a way.¹⁸

1.2. Indeed, a majority of the YBh allodoxies can be subsumed under one or more of the five types of false views.¹⁹ Substantialism (*ātmavāda*)²⁰ obviously belongs to, and nearly exhausts, the first of these *dr̥ṣṭis*, that is, the personalistic false view (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) defined as “the false view of a self or the false view of what [supposedly] belongs to a self.”²¹ Eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*) and annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*) are the defining instances of the second type of *dr̥ṣṭi*, the false view that consists of grasping the (two) extremes (*antagrāhadr̥ṣṭi*): “Falsely viewing as lasting or as annihilated the very entity acknowledged as [being] a self is [what we call] the false view consisting in grasping the [two] extremes, because one grasps the extremes of eternal[ity] and annihilation.”²² “Extensionism” (*antānantikavāda*, Rhys Davids) very likely belongs to the same category.²³ As for “nihilism” (*nāstikavāda*), it most certainly qualifies as an equivalent of the third false view, i.e., the *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, which is traditionally accounted for as “the false view [consisting in claiming] that [something] does not exist”²⁴ – “[and] indeed, this false view is negative, whereas the other [four]

kalpayataḥ kiṃ nv ahaṃ bhaviṣyāmy anāgate 'dhvany āhosvin nāhaṃ bhaviṣyāmy anāgate 'dhvani | kiṃ bhaviṣyāmi kathaṃ bhaviṣyāmitī ajñānam | adhyātman ajñānaṃ katamat | pratyātmikān saṃskārān ayoniśa ātmato manasikurvato yad ajñānam | bahirdhājñānaṃ katamat | bāhyān asattvasaṅkhyātān saṃskārān ātmīyato 'yoniśo manasikurvato yad ajñānam |. See also Schmithausen 1987: II.518 and Eltschinger 2014: 295-296, n. 179-181.

¹⁸ On *dr̥ṣṭis* and their various classifications, see *Traité* I.422-424; see also below, n. 56.

¹⁹ On this fivefold classification, see AKBh 281,16-282,12 and *Kośa* IV.15-19.

²⁰ For convenience's sake and before defining them in a systematic way (see below, §2), I allow myself to provide, whenever possible, the YBh allodoxies with short and admittedly caricatural labels.

²¹ According to AKBh 281,19: *ātmadr̥ṣṭir ātmīyadr̥ṣṭir vā satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ |*.

²² AKBh 282,2-3: *tasyaivātmābhimatasya vastuno dhruvadr̥ṣṭir ucchedadr̥ṣṭir vāntagrāhadr̥ṣṭiḥ | śāśvatocchedāntagrahaṇāt |*.

²³ *śāśvata/aśāśvata* and *anta/ananta* belong to the MPPU's fourfold classification of *dr̥ṣṭis*. See *Traité* I.423.

²⁴ According to AKBh 282,4: *nāstīti dr̥ṣṭir mithyādr̥ṣṭiḥ |*.

are positive.”²⁵ Leaving the fourth *dr̥ṣṭi* provisionally out of consideration,²⁶ let us take a look at Vasubandhu’s explanation of the fifth, viz. the *śīlavrataparāmarśa*:

Falsely viewing what is not a cause as a cause [and] falsely viewing what is not a [genuine] path [towards salvation] as a [genuine] path [towards salvation] is [what we call] attachment to practices and observances. For example, [Śiva] Maheśvara is not the cause of the [different] worlds, but one [nonetheless] views it, [or] Prajāpati, or another one, as [their] cause. [Practices] such as [voluntarily] entering fire or water [so as to die] are not the cause of heaven, but one [nonetheless] views them as [its] cause. Mere practices and observances as well as [things] such as the knowledge of Sāṅkhya and Yoga are not a [genuine] path to salvation, but one [nonetheless] views them as a [genuine] path [to salvation].²⁷

At least four of the YBh’s allodoxies unambiguously fall under this heading: “creationism” (*īśvarādikartṛvāda*),²⁸ doctrine of ritual violence (*himsādharma-vāda*), doctrine of purity (*śuddhivāda*) and doctrine of *fas* and *nefas* (*kautukamaṅgalavāda*). Six allodoxies find almost no place within this fivefold classifi-

²⁵ AKBh 282,5: *eṣā hy apavādikānyās tu samāropikāḥ* |.

²⁶ The very name of allodoxy no. 14, *agravāda*, echoes an important definitory feature of false view no. 4, viz. *dr̥ṣṭiparāmarśa* (“attachment to false views”). AKBh 282,6-7 defines it in the following way: *hīne ’gradr̥ṣṭir dr̥ṣṭiparāmarśaḥ | kiṃ hīnam | sarvaṃ sāsravam | āryaiḥ prahīnatvāt | tasyāgrato grahaṇaṃ dr̥ṣṭiparāmarśaḥ* |. “Falsely viewing what is inferior (*hīna*) as superior is [what we call] attachment to false views. – What is [called] inferior? – Whatever is impure, because it is abandoned (*prahīna*) by the noble ones. Grasping it as superior is [what we call] attachment to false views.” As we shall see, the YBh’s *agravāda* indeed consists in the Brahmins’ regarding themselves as superior to the other caste-classes on account of genealogical and/or biological arguments/criteria (see below, §2.2.14). However, Buddhist “egalitarianism” certainly does not amount to putting the (purely conventional and arbitrary) socio-religious hierarchy upside down by making the Brahmins inferior to the other caste-classes – which ought to be the case if the YBh’s *agravāda* were really to match the definition of the fourth false view. Or could/should we understand: “Falsely viewing what is inferior [or equal] as superior ...”?

²⁷ AKBh 282,7-10: *ahetau hetudr̥ṣṭir amārge mārgadr̥ṣṭiḥ śīlavrataparāmarśaḥ | tadyathā maheśvaro na hetur lokānām | taṃ ca hetuṃ paśyati prajāpatim anyam vā | agnijalapraveśādayas ca na hetuḥ svargasya tāmś ca hetuṃ paśyati | śīlavratamātrakaṃ sāṅkhyayogajñānādayas ca na mārgo mokṣasya tāmś ca mārgaṃ paśyati* |. One could also translate the compound *agnijalapraveśādayaḥ* (AKBh_{11b} 230b1: *me dañ chur ’jug pa la sogs pas*; AKVy 450,27 [*jalāgnipraveśādibhiḥ!*]) does not explain the compound), e.g., as “[practices] such as fire [sacrifice] and ablutions.” On *śīla* and *vrata*, see below, §2.2.15, and ADīp 231,11-16 (note ADīp 231,9 *agnijalapraveśādu* and ADīp 232,3 *agnijalapraveśādayaḥ*).

²⁸ According to the AK(Bh), claiming the existence of a creator God is also to be subsumed under false views no. 1 and 2, i.e., *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* and *antagrāhadr̥ṣṭi*, “for whoever views God, [or] Prajāpati, or [yet] another one, as the cause [of the worlds], this [person] believes it to be permanent, one, self and agent ...” (AKBh 282,12-13: *yo hi kaścid īśvaram prajāpatim anyam vā kāraṇaṃ paśyati sa taṃ nityam ekaṃ cātmanam kartāram abhiniviśya ...*). Note also AK 5.8a-c: *īśvarādiṣu nityātmaviparyāsāt pravartate | kāraṇābhiniveśaḥ*. “The belief [that] God, etc., [are] the cause [of the worlds] owes its existence to the [two] wrong notions of permanence and self.”

cation of *dr̥ṣṭis*: the Sāṅkhya *satkāryavāda* (*hetuphalasadvāda*), the doctrine of manifestation (*abhivyaktivāda*), the Buddhist *sarvāstivāda* (*atītānāgatadravyasadvāda*), Jaina determinism (*pūrvakṛtahetuvāda*), “eel-wriggling” (*amarāvīkṣepikavāda*) and fatalism (*ahetuvāda*). Note, however, that at least two of these are explicitly referred to as false views in the HV: as we shall see, the *hetuphalasadvāda* (as well as, at least partly, the *abhivyaktivāda*) is nothing but the *vārṣaganyadr̥ṣṭi*; as for the *ahetudr̥ṣṭi*, it is recorded here as an independent type of false view.²⁹

1.3. The *paravāda* section of the YBh confessedly draws upon the BJSū of the Dīrghāgama in its doxographic account of at least five allodoxies: eternalism, “extensionism,” “eel-wriggling,” fatalism and annihilationism.³⁰ At the same time, eleven of the YBh allodoxies have no equivalent whatsoever in the BJSū. Whereas some of them can be traced in the ŚPhSū,³¹ others would certainly appear anachronistic at the time in which the *sūtra* was composed and/or compiled (4th to 3rd century BCE?): this is especially true of the Sāṅkhya *satkāryavāda* as it finds expression in the *hetuphalasadvāda*, the (Sāṅkhya and Vaiyākaraṇa?) doctrine of manifestation, the (Vaiśeṣika?) atomism of the *śāśvatavāda*, and the Buddhist *sarvāstivāda*. Is it possible to say that the *paravāda* section of the YBh can be satisfactorily interpreted as an updated version of the BJSū (and the ŚPhSū)? In my opinion, the conspicuously different polemical strategies and purposes exhibited by the two texts make this hypothesis very unlikely. Let us have a closer look at the BJSū. The reason for the Buddha’s preaching this well-known *sūtra* is Suppiya’s and his disciple Brahmadata’s disagreement about the Buddha, the law and the community. The two ascetics “giv[e] utterance to views in direct contradiction one to the other,”³² with Suppiya criticising them and Brahmadata praising them. Their argument comes to be known to the Buddha, who thereupon warns the monks “[not to] bear malice, or suffer heart-burning, or feel illwill”³³ when he, and/or the law, and/or the community

²⁹ See below, n. 56. As a doctrinal addition to Vārṣaganya’s *satkāryavāda*, the *abhivyaktivāda* can be regarded as belonging to the *vārṣaganyadr̥ṣṭi*; as an erroneous account of causality, however, it could be said to instantiate the *viśamahetudr̥ṣṭi*.

³⁰ The expression *yathāsūtram* occurs whenever the YBh description is indebted to the *sūtra* (see YBh 138,4, 148,3, 150,1, 150,7 and 151,3).

³¹ This is the case of (parts of) the YBh account of eternalism (see below, §2.2.5), Jainism (§2.2.6), annihilationism (§2.2.12) and “nihilism” (§2.2.13). Important Sanskrit sources are the Pravrajyāvastu (PrV) and the Saṅghabhedavastu (SBhV) of the Mūlasarvāstivādinaya (see below, n. 76, 85, 86, 89, 122, 135 and 146).

³² DN I.1 and I.2: *aññamaññassa ujuvipaccanīkavādā*. Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 2.

³³ DN I.3: *na āghāto na appaccayo na cetaso anabhiraddhi karaṇīyā*. Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 3.

come to be criticised by outsiders (*para*). For “if [the monks], on that account, should be angry and hurt, that would stand in the way of [their] own self-conquest,”³⁴ and they would show themselves incapable of judging whether the critique directed against them was well said (*subhāsita*) or ill said (*dubbhāsita*).³⁵ The Buddha then gives the following advice to the attending monks:

But when outsiders speak in dispraise of me, or of the law, or of the community, you should unravel what is false and point it out as wrong, saying: “For this or that reason this is not the fact, that is not so, such a thing is not in us, and such a thing is not found among us.”³⁶

This sounds like an invitation to (dispassionately) defend the Buddha, the law and its community by means of arguments. But what behaviour should one adopt regarding opinions that, albeit not directly critical of Buddhism, stand in overt contradiction to its theoretical and practical tenets? Should monks argue against them as well? Certainly not, for,

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans ... continue addicted to such low conversation as these: Tales of kings, of robbers, of ministers of state; tales of war, of terrors, of battles; ... speculations about the creation of the land or sea, or about existence and non-existence – Gotama the recluse holds aloof from such low conversation.³⁷

The Buddha abstains not only from taking part in soteriologically irrelevant discussions, but also from indulging in debate and polemical speech:³⁸

³⁴ According to DN I.3: *tatra ce tumhe assatha kupitā vā anattamanā vā tumhaṃ yev’assa tena antarāyo*. Translation (modified) Rhys Davids 1899: 3.

³⁵ The same is true of an outsider’s praise of the Buddha, and/or the law, and/or the community. For the same two reasons, the monks “should not, on that account, be filled with pleasure or gladness, or be lifted up in heart” (according to DN I.3: *tatra tumhe na ānando na somanassaṃ na cetaso ubbillāvitattaṃ karaṇīyaṃ*; translation Rhys Davids 1899: 3).

³⁶ DN I.3: *mamaṃ vā bhikkhave pare vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ dhammassa vā vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ saṃghassa vā vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ, tatra tumhehi abhūtaṃ abhūtaṃ nibbeṭhetabbhaṃ: iti pi etaṃ abhūtaṃ, iti pi etaṃ atacchaṃ, n’atthi c’etaṃ amhesu, na ca pan’etaṃ amhesu saṃvijjati*. Translation (modified) Rhys Davids 1899: 3. The same is true of an outsider’s praise (DN I.3): *mamaṃ vā bhikkhave pare vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ dhammassa vā vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ saṃghassa vā vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ, tatra tumhehi bhūtaṃ bhūtaṃ paṭijānitabbaṃ – iti p’etaṃ bhūtaṃ, iti p’etaṃ tacchaṃ, atthi c’etaṃ amhesu, saṃvijjati ca pan’etaṃ amhesūti*. “When outsiders speak in praise of me, or of the Doctrine, or of the Order, you should acknowledge what is right to be the fact, saying: ‘For this or that reason this is the fact, that is so, such a thing is found among us, is in us.’” Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 3.

³⁷ DN I.7-8: *yathā vā pan’eke bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā ... te evarūpaṃ tiracchānakathaṃ anuyuttā viharanti – seyyathīdam rājakathaṃ corakathaṃ mahāmatthakathaṃ senākathaṃ bhayakathaṃ yuddhakathaṃ ... lokakkhāyikaṃ samuddakkhāyikaṃ itibhavābhavakathaṃ – iti vā iti evarūpāya tiracchānakathāya paṭivirato samaṇo gotamo ti*. Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 13-14.

³⁸ See Collins 1982: 127-131 and 139-141, and Eltschinger 2012a: 432-439.

Whereas some recluses and Brahmans ... continue addicted to the use of wrangling phrases: such as – “You don’t understand this doctrine and discipline, I do.” “How should you know about this doctrine and discipline?” “You have fallen into wrong views. It is I who am in the right.” “I am speaking to the point, you are not.” “You are putting last what ought to come first, and first what ought to come last.” “What you’ve excogitated so long, that’s all quite upset.” “Your challenge has been taken up.” “You are proved to be wrong.” “Set to work to clear your views.” “Disentangle yourself if you can” – Gotama the recluse holds aloof from such wrangling phrases.³⁹

And indeed, one looks in vain for any argument against any of the sixty-two false views expounded at length in the *sūtra*. Instead of arguments, the *sūtra*’s presentation of each (group of) false view(s) is introduced by the following statement:

There are, brethren, other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise. These things the Tathāgata, having himself realised them and seen them face to face, hath set forth.⁴⁰

Similarly, each account ends with a similar statement to the effect that the Buddha is beyond disputes and views:

Now of these, brethren, the Tathāgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond ...; and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them.⁴¹

To put it briefly, if the sixty-two false views are to be dismissed by the monks, it is not on account of ad hoc arguments spelt out by the Buddha, even less on account of arguments which they would be requested to develop on their own,

³⁹ DN I.8: *yathā vā pan’ eke bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā ... te evarūpaṃ viggāhikakathaṃ anuyuttā viharanti – seyyathīdam: na tvaṃ imaṃ dhammavinayaṃ ājānāsi, ahaṃ imaṃ dhammavinayaṃ ājānāmi, kiṃ tvaṃ imaṃ dhammavinayaṃ ājānissasi – micchāpaṭipanno tvam asi, aham asmi sammāpaṭipanno – sahitam me, asahitan te – purevacanīyaṃ pacchā avaca, pacchāvaca-nīyaṃ pure avaca – aviciṇṇan te viparāvattaṃ – aropito te vādo, nigghāto’si – cara vādappamokkhāya, nibbeṭhehi vā sace pahosīti – iti vā iti evarūpāya viggāhikakathāya paṭivirato samaṇo gotamo ti.* Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 14-15.

⁴⁰ DN I.12: *atthi bhikkhave aññ’eva dhammā gambhūrā duddasā duranubodhā santā paṇītā atakkāvacarā nipunā paṇḍitavedanīyā, ye tathāgato sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti.* Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 26.

⁴¹ DN I.24: *tayidaṃ, bhikkhave, tathāgato pajānāti – ime diṭṭhiṭṭhānā evaṃgahūtā evaṃparāmaṭṭhā evaṃgatikā bhavissanti evamabhisamparāyā ti. tañ ca tathāgato pajānāti, tato ca uttaritaraṃ pajānāti, tañ ca pajānanaṃ na parāmasati, aparāmasato c’assa paccattaṃ yeva nibbuti viditā.* Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 37.

but due to the Buddha's own rejection of them while experiencing extra-ordinary cognitive attainments.

1.4. In sharp contradistinction to this, the *paravāda* section of the YBh (1) develops ad hoc arguments against each of the sixteen views, (2) never alludes to the Buddha or any kind of supernatural cognition, and (3) never resorts to scripture (*āgama*) as a means of proof (even when the opponent is a fellow Buddhist, as in the case of the *atītānāgata-dravyasadvāda*).⁴² The YBh's presentation of each allodoxy is twofold: first comes a doxographical account based on the opponent's putative scripture(s) and reasoning(s), followed by a polemical part generally introduced by the formula: *sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ*, "The [proponent of this allodoxy] ought to be answered as follows (/ ought to be told what follows)." The stereotyped formula for scripture is: "What does scripture consist of? By means of the continuous tradition and the transmission of a [textual] corpus [to this effect], it has come down to those [who think and speak thus] that [...]."⁴³ And the formula introducing reason(ing) is as follows:

What does reason(ing) consist of? For instance [here in the world, (a certain/)] this ascetic or (a certain/)this brahmin is a reasoner, an investigator who remains on a level that belongs to ratiocination, which is based on one's own wit, [which is] ordinary and pervaded with [philosophical] investigation. The following occurs to him.⁴⁴

⁴² See below, §2.2.3, however.

⁴³ YBh 119,5-6 (YBh_{MS} 34a2, YBh_{Tib} D60b7/P71b2-3): *āgamaḥ katamaḥ | tatpratisamyuktā nuśravaparamparāpiṭakasampradānāyogenaiśām āgatam bhavati ... iti ||*. ¹*o*pratisamyuktā^o YBh_{MS} (cf. also Wezler 1985: 4): ^opratiyuktā^o YBh. My translation reads the compound *anuśravaparamparā-piṭakasampradāna* as a *dvandva* (cf. YBh_{Tib} *thos pa gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa dañ sde snod byin pa*). But as A. Wezler (1985: 6) remarks, it can also be analysed as a *karmadhāraya* (Wezler [1985: 5] rightly translates: "[their own] textual transmission which consists in an uninterrupted series of [acts] of oral instruction [given by a guru and heard by a disciple]"). Abbreviations for the formula are: *āgamaḥ pūrvavad draṣṭavyaḥ* ("Note that the scripture [relied upon] is as above," YBh 120,17, 124,1), or: *āgamaḥ pūrvavat* ("The scripture [relied upon] is as above," YBh 129,10, 143,6, 144,11, 151,4-5, 152,2, 158,3-4, 159,17-18).

⁴⁴ YBh 119,7-9 (YBh_{MS} 34a2-3 [nearly illegible], YBh_{Tib} D60b7-61a1/P71b3-4): *yuktiḥ katamā | yathāpi tat sa¹ eva śramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā tārṅkiko bhavati mīmāṃsakas tarkaparyāpannāyāṃ bhūmau sthitaḥ svayamprātibhānikyāṃ pārthagjanikyāṃ mīmāṃsānucaritāyāṃ | tasyaivaṃ bhavati |*. ¹*yathāpi tat sa* YBh_{MS} (cf. also Wezler 1985: 5): *yathā sa* YBh (YBh_{Tib} simply reads: *'di ltar* [^{*}*yathā*]). Abbreviations for the formula are (the expressions in brackets are not found in every occurrence of the shortened formula): *yuktiḥ katamā | yathāpīhaikatyaḥ svayam eva tārṅkiko bhavati mīmāṃsaka iti | pūrvavad vistarāḥ | tasyaivaṃ bhavati |* (YBh 120,18-19), or: *yuktiḥ katamā | yathāpīhaikatyas tārṅkiko (mīmāṃsaka) iti pūrvavat | (tasyaivaṃ bhavati)* (YBh 125,3-4, 129,10-11, 143,6-7, 144,11, 151,5, 152,2-3, 158,4-5 [with *iti vistarāḥ*], 159,18).

This formula, the origin of which is to be sought in the BJSū,⁴⁵ can be found elsewhere in the YBhŚ. This is most conspicuously the case in the Bodhisattva-bhūmi, where the (duly expanded) formula characterizes the intellectual inclinations and practices of those, most certainly Buddhists but also non-Buddhists, who construe a purely rationally based level of reality.⁴⁶ It is to be noted that the *paravāda* section of the YBh does not criticize its opponents' scriptures and reason(ing)s separately, but jointly, thus reflecting the by then common idea that reason(ing) and scripture, far from possessing distinct material jurisdictions, cooperate with equal right and strength in demonstrating one and the same point.⁴⁷

1.5. The aim of the *paravāda* section of the YBh is to criticize sixteen allodoxies regarded as instances of incorrect reflection or, to put it in other words, as false views originating from nescience. For all this, however, the section lacks any statement to the effect that neutralizing these wrong beliefs might be soteriologically beneficial or even relevant. These allodoxies are initiated and/or defended by (groups of) ascetics and brahmins (and at least twice by coreligionists) who are presented as reasoners (*tārkika*) and investigators (*mīmāṃsaka*). They are attempting, according to the BoBh, to make their points on the basis of scripture and reason(ing), that is, by depending on the (three) means of valid cognition or *pramāṇas* (a term that, to the best of my knowledge, never occurs in this technical sense in the entire *paravāda* section). This section's critical stance and methodology are best reflected in its concluding statement:

⁴⁵ DNI.16, 21, 23, 29: *idha bhikkhave ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā takkī hoti vīmaṃsī. so takkpariyāhataṃ vīmaṃsānucaritaṃ sayampaññānaṃ evam āha. "In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his own sophistry."* Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 28-29.

⁴⁶ BoBh_r 86,4-8 / BoBh_w 37,22-38,1 / BoBh_d 25,15-19: *yuktiprasiddhaṃ tattvaṃ katamat | satāṃ yuktārthapaṇḍitānāṃ vicakṣaṇānāṃ tārkikānāṃ mīmāṃsakānāṃ tarkaparyāpannāyāṃ bhūmau sthitānāṃ svayamprātibhānikyāṃ pāthagjanikyāṃ mīmāṃsānucaritāyāṃ pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamam pramāṇam niśritya suviditaniścitajñānagocaro jñeyam vastūpapattisā-dhanayuktyā prasādhitaṃ vyavasthāpitaṃ idam ucyate yuktiprasiddhaṃ tattvaṃ |. "What does reality established by means of reason(ing) consist in? [It is the level of reality that belongs] to [those] wise [persons] who are experts in reasoned matters, sagacious, reasoners [and] investigators [who] remain on a level that belongs to ratiocination, which is based on one's own wit, ordinary and pervaded with [philosophical] investigation; [this kind of reality consists in] something cognizable that is the object of a well-examined and ascertained cognition, [something] that is demonstrated and determined by [that type of] reason(ing) which proves by means of arguments on the basis of a means of valid cognition, [viz.] perception (/ the perceptible), inference [and] trustworthy scripture. This is what [we] call 'reality established by means of reason(ing).'*"

⁴⁷ See Eltschinger 2013b: 77-81.

Thus [it appears that] these sixteen allodoxies are entirely unreasonable once they are evaluated by means of a/(the) twofold (*dvayābhīnirhāra*) [type of] reason(ing) consisting in a [critical] examination.⁴⁸

The author(s) and/or compiler(s) of the *paravāda* section thus regarded it as a *parīkṣā*. In Buddhist literature at least, a *parīkṣā* consists in the critical examination (or evaluation), by means of reason(ing) (identified or not to the means of valid cognition) and/or scripture (provided the opponent belongs to the same confessional denomination), of an opponents' theoretical and/or practical tenets in order to assess their rationality and, further, the soteriological relevance of the system as a whole (note that a *parīkṣā* does not necessarily entail, and in actual fact rarely entails, a systematic exposition of the examiner's own tenets [*svamata*]). A difficult point remains, however: what does *dvayābhīnirhāra* (obviously a *bahuvrīhi* compound, loosely translated above as “twofold”) mean in the present context? Or: what does “two(fold)” refer to in the (very literal) expression “the accomplishment/realization⁴⁹ of which is two(fold)”? I am inclined to understand “two(fold)” as pointing to *āgama* and *yukti*, and to interpret the whole expression as: “the accomplishment/realization of which is twofold [i.e., bears on the scriptures and reason(ing)s relied upon by each opponent],” and less literally as: “that is to be carried out in a twofold way [by submitting each opponent's scripture and reason(ing) to the test].”⁵⁰

2. THE SIXTEEN ALLODOXIES

2.1. Commenting on the above-mentioned summary (*uddāna*),⁵¹ the YBh provides the following explanation:

These allodoxies [amount to] sixteen, i.e.: (1) the doctrine [according to which] the effect [pre-]exists in [its] cause, (2) the doctrine of manifestation, (3) the

⁴⁸ YBh 160,8-9 (YBh_{MS} 44a5, YBh_{Tib} D80b7-81a1/P93b3-4): *itīme śoḍaśa paravādā dvayābhīnirhārayā¹ parīkṣāyuktyo² paparīkṣya sarvathā na yujyante* |. ¹*dvayābhīnirhārayā* YBh_{MS}, YBh_{Tib} (*mñon par bsgrub pa rnam pa gñis*): *abhīnirhārayā* YBh. ²*parīkṣāyuktyo*^o em. YBh_{Tib} (*brtag pa'i rigs pa*): *parīkṣāyuktyo*^o YBh, YBh_{MS}.

⁴⁹ On *abhīnirhāra*, see *BHSD* 52f., Schmithausen 1969: 168 (n. 187 and 191) and Deleau 2006: II.477 (n. 31).

⁵⁰ One might, of course, think of this expression as pointing to an examination carried out by means of both scripture and reason(ing) – in line with the argumentative method that is most typical of Buddhist scholasticism (see, e.g., Cox 1995: 14-15 and Eltschinger 2013b: 81-83). However, (1) the Buddhists were perfectly well aware of the fact that quoting Buddhist scriptures was useless against outsiders; (2) to the best of my knowledge, the *paravāda* section does not criticize any allodoxy on the basis of *āgama*.

⁵¹ See above, §1.1 and n. 13.

doctrine [according to which] the past and the future exist as [real] substances, (4) the doctrine of the self, (5) the doctrine of eternal[ity], (6) the doctrine [according to which present suffering] has past deeds as its [sole] cause, (7) the doctrine [according to which entities] such as God are agents, (8) the doctrine [according to which ritual] violence is a [religious] duty (/ is righteous), (9) the doctrine of finite[ness]-and-infinite[ness], (10) the doctrine of “eel-wriggling,” (11) the doctrine [according to which things are] without a cause, (12) the doctrine of annihilation, (13) the doctrine of the [universal] deniers, (14) the doctrine [according to which the brahmins are] the best [caste-class], (15) the doctrine of purity, and (16) the doctrine of festivals and auspicious things.⁵²

As this outline makes clear, most *vādas* are purely philosophical and/or doctrinal perspectives on the world (*loka*) and the self (*ātman*), which they envision in terms of etiology (manifestation, creation, fatality), cosmology (eternality vs. annihilation, non-existence), ontology (time, substance, atoms), eschatology (*karman*), ethics and soteriology (hedonism, purity, rituals, observances); some of them are more concerned with pragmatic attitudes (such as the “eel-wrigglers” systematic recourse to equivocation); others appear to provide socio-religious practices with discursive legitimations (ritual violence, social hierarchy). Note that epistemological issues and/or methodology are conspicuously absent. This sketchy account also reveals that the YBh deals with topics and opinions rather than with schools and systems (the only names explicitly alluded to are *nirgrantha* and *vārṣaganya*). To be sure, the classical religious-philosophical “schools” of classical Indian philosophy (whose formative period often coincides with the gradual composition and compilation of the YBhŚ) are (already) discernible: Sāṅkhya (*hetuphalasadvāda*, *abhivyaktivāda*), Vyākaraṇa² (*abhivyaktivāda*), Vaiśeṣika³ (*śāśvatavāda*), a form of Mīmāṃsā⁴ (*hiṃsādharmavāda*), Sarvāstivāda (*atītānāgatadravyasadvāda*), Jainism (*pūrvakṛtāhetuvāda*), Mahāyāna (*nāstikavāda*) and maybe Ājīvikism (*ahetuvāda*). But in the YBh, as in the BJSū (contrary to the ŚPhSū), doxography is topical, not

⁵² YBh 118,8-12 (YBh_{MS} 33b6-34a1, YBh_{Tib} D60b3-5/P71a5-8): *ṣoḍaśa ime paravādāḥ | tadyathā | hetuphalasadvādāḥ | abhivyaktivādāḥ | atītānāgatadravyasadvādāḥ | ātmavādāḥ | śāśvatavādāḥ | pūrvakṛtāhetuvādāḥ² | īśvarādikartṛvādāḥ³ | hiṃsā⁴dharmavādāḥ | antānantikavādāḥ | amarāvīkṣepikavādāḥ⁵ | ahetuvādāḥ | ucchedavādāḥ | nāstikavādāḥ⁶ | agravādāḥ | śuddhivādāḥ | kautukamaṅgalavādāś ca ||. ¹°*gatadravya*° em. YBh: °*gataḥ dravya*° YBh_{MS}. ²°*hetuvādāḥ* YBh_{MS}: °*hetusadvādāḥ* YBh. ³°*kartṛvādāḥ* em. YBh: °*kartṛkavādāḥ* YBh_{MS} (this reading is equally good; but YBh_{MS} 40a4 reads °*kartṛvādāḥ*). ⁴°*hiṃsā*° YBh_{MS}: °*vihīmsā*° YBh. ⁵°*vikṣepikavādāḥ* YBh_{MS}: °*vikṣepavādāḥ* YBh. ⁶°*nāstikavādāḥ* YBh_{MS}, YBh_{Tib} (*med par smra ba dañ*): °*nāstikavādāḥ* om. YBh (does YBh_{MS} 34a1, in spite of the *akṣara*’s dissimilarity with other °*kya*°, read °*nāstikya*°? Whatever the case may be, YBh_{MS} 42a4 clearly reads °*nāstika*°).*

“denominational.”⁵³ The following provides a doxographical survey of the YBh’s sixteen *paravādas*.⁵⁴

2.2.1. The first allodoxy,⁵⁵ which has no equivalent in the BJSū and is expressly ascribed to the proto-Sāṅkhya authority Vārṣagaṇya,⁵⁶ is nothing but *satkāryavāda*, i.e., the doctrine according to which an effect (pre)exists in its cause: “Permanently [and] for a permanent time, constantly [and] for a constant time, the effect does exist in [its] cause.”⁵⁷

⁵³ On doxography as a literary genre, see Halbfass 1988: 349-368, Qvarnström 1999 and Gerschheimer 2007.

⁵⁴ This survey is based on the doxographical accounts inserted (as the contents of *tasyaivaṃ bhavati*, “So he thinks,” “This occurs to him”) between the initial formula (*yathāpīhaikatyaḥ ...*) and the presentation of each opponent’s scriptures and reason(ing)s (on this structure, see above, §1.4). These accounts differ significantly in terms of length and doctrinal details, and therefore so do my presentations, especially in cases where (1) the allodoxy has already attracted modern scholarly attention (allodoxies 1, 2, 4 and 7), (2) the YBh does not improve on the BJSū (allodoxies 5, 9, 11, 12), and (3) I intend to provide a future detailed study (allodoxies 8 and 14). To put it otherwise, the importance of these doxographical sketches is not proportional to the respective allodoxies’ historical and/or philosophical significance. In each case, I have tried my best to check the Sanskrit text edited (pioneeringly) by Bhattacharya (1957; YBh) against the so-called “Patna” manuscript (on the basis of Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s and Tucci’s photographs; YBh_{MS}) and the Tibetan version of the YBh (YBh_{Tib}). I have not consulted the Chinese translation of the YBh.

⁵⁵ *hetuphalasadvāda* in YBh 118,13-120,11 (YBh_{MS} 34a1-b2, YBh_{Tib} D60b5-61b4/P71a8-72a7). On this allodoxy, see Seyfort Ruegg 1962, Wezler 1985 and Furusaka 2001 (in Japanese).

⁵⁶ YBh 119,2 (YBh_{MS} 34a2, YBh_{Tib} D60b6/P71b1): *tadyathā vārṣagaṇyaḥ*¹ | *vārṣagaṇyaḥ* em. YBh, Wezler (1985: 5): *vārṣagaṇya* YBh_{MS}. “I.e., Vārṣagaṇya.” The name Vārṣagaṇya occurs elsewhere in the YBhŚ, viz. in HV 99/2*,14-16: *tadyathā satkāyadr̥ṣṭim ucchedadr̥ṣṭim ahetudr̥ṣṭim viśamahetudr̥ṣṭim śāśvatadr̥ṣṭim vārṣagaṇyadr̥ṣṭim mithyadr̥ṣṭim iti* | “For example, the personalistic false view, the false view of annihilation, the false view of causeless[ness], the false view of a wrong cause, the false view of eternal[ity], the false view of Vārṣagaṇya, [and] the erroneous false view.” For a translation of the whole passage, see Eltschinger 2012a: 457-458; on the different meanings of *tadyathā*, see Wezler 1985: 4; on Saṅghabhadra’s allusions to Vārṣagaṇya, see La Vallée Poussin 1937: 112-113.

⁵⁷ YBh 119,1 (YBh_{MS} 34a1, YBh_{Tib} D60b6/P71a8-b1): *nityaṃ nityakālaṃ dhruvaṃ dhruvakālaṃ vidyata eva hetau phalam iti* | Note also YBh 119,9-16 (YBh_{MS} 34a3-4, YBh_{Tib} D61a1-4/P71b4-8): *yebhyo bhāvebhyo ye bhāvā utpadyante te teṣāṃ kāraṇatvena prasiddhāḥ prajñāpyante ca | na tadanye*¹ | *tasya ca phalasyārthe phalārthibhir upādīyante*² *na tadanye* | *ta eva ca teṣu teṣu kṛtyeṣu viniyujyante na tadanye* | *tebhyas ca tat phalam utpadyate na tadanyebhyaḥ* | *atas tat phalaṃ tasmim asti*³ | *anyathā hi sarvaṃ sarvasya kāraṇatvena vyavasthāpyeta* | *sarvam upādīyeta* | *sarvaṃ kṛtye viniyujyeta* | *sarvataḥ sarvam utpadyeteti* | *sa*⁴ *prajñaptiś copādānataś ca kṛtyavinīyogataś cotpattitaś ca nityakālaṃ hetau phalaṃ paśyati*⁵ | *na tadanye* em. YBh, Wezler 1985: 5, YBh_{Tib} (*de las gžan pa dag la ma yin no*): *tadanye* YBh_{MS}. ²*phalārthibhir upādīyante* YBh_{MS}: *phalārthibhir apy ādīyante* YBh, Wezler 1985: 5. ³*tasmim asti* YBh_{MS}, Wezler 1985: 5 + n. 7, YBh_{Tib} (*de la [las DP] yod do*): *tasmimś tasmim* YBh. ⁴*sa* YBh_{MS}, YBh_{Tib} (*de*): YBh, Wezler 1985: 5 om. *sa*. ⁵*paśyati* YBh_{MS}, Wezler 1985: 5: *paśyanti* YBh. “Those things out of which [certain] things originate, [but] not things different from them, [being] recognized as their cause(s), are designated [as their causes]; and [it is these things, and] not things other than they which are appropriated (/clung to) by those who want to have [their] effect for the sake of this

2.2.2. As pointed out by Wezler, this first allodoxy is very likely associated with the second one, i.e., the doctrine of manifestation,⁵⁸ since Vārṣagaṇya's claim that an effect always preexists in [its] cause probably had for its doctrinal corollary the idea that there is no causation proper, but only manifestation. And indeed, this is the very content of the second allodoxy: "It is [inasmuch] as [they are] existing [in their causes] that entities are manifested, not produced."⁵⁹ How is it, then, that the doctrines of *satkāryavāda* and manifestation came to be expounded separately as the subject matter of two distinct allodoxies? According to Wezler, it is very likely "that he [= the author of the YBh, VE] felt prompted to deal with it [= the doctrine of manifestation, VE] separately because a very similar doctrine was adhered to by a distinctly different group, viz. grammarians or philosophers of language."⁶⁰ This is corroborated by the answer of the YBh itself: "[The proponent of the doctrine of manifestation is] this very advocate of a result that [pre]exists in [its] cause, and [also] the advocate of the [permanent] characters of verbal sound (*śabdalakṣaṇavādin*)."⁶¹ The identity of the latter – Wezler's "grammarian or philosopher of language" – is difficult to determine with certainty. Suffice it to say that according to him, the characters (*lakṣaṇa*) of verbal sounds are fixed or established (*vyavasthita*) in their use (? *yathaiva prajñaptam*); verbal sounds are permanent (*nitya*) and manifested through pronunciation (*uccāraṇa*).⁶² According to whether *śabda* is

effect; and [it is] these very [things, and] not any other, [which] are [also] employed [by them] for particular different purposes. And out of them this effect originates, [but] not out of [things] different from them. Hence this effect exists [already] in that [cause]. For otherwise everything could be established as the cause of everything, everything would be appropriated/(clung to) [by people who want a particular effect], everything would be used for a [particular] purpose, [and] everything would originate out of everything. In this manner he [i.e. the upholder of this doctrine] regards the effect [to exist] through perpetual time in the cause, [viz.] viewed from the standpoints of [its] designation, of the appropriation/(clinging), of the use [one makes of the cause] for a [particular] purpose, [and] of the origination." Translation (slightly modified) Wezler 1985: 5-6.

⁵⁸ *abhivyaaktivāda* in YBh 120,12-122,11 (YBh_{MS} 34b2-35a2, YBh_{Tib} D61b4-62b5/P72a8-73b3). On this allodoxy, see Mikogami 1969 and Wezler 1985: 10-13; see also Muroya 1996.

⁵⁹ YBh 120,14 (YBh_{MS} 34b2, YBh_{Tib} D61b4/P72a8): *vidyamānā eva bhāvā abhivyaajyante' notpadyante* | ¹*abhivyaajyante* em. YBh, Wezler (1985: 10): *abhivyaajyate* YBh_{MS}. Interpreted without any reference to *satkāryavāda*, this passage could also be translated as follows: "Entities, [since they] do [permanently] exist, are manifested, [but] not produced."

⁶⁰ Wezler 1985: 11.

⁶¹ According to YBh 120,15 (YBh_{MS} 34b2, YBh_{Tib} D61b4-5/P72b1): *tadyathā sa' eva hetu-phalasadvādī śabdalakṣaṇavādī ca* | ¹*sa* em. YBh, Wezler (1985: 10): *sata'* YBh_{MS}.

⁶² See YBh 122,7-11 (YBh_{MS} 35a1-2, YBh_{Tib} D62b3-5/P73b1-3): *yathā hetuphalābhivyaaktivāda evaṃ śabdavādo*¹ *'py ayujyamāno draṣṭavyaḥ | tatrāyaṃ viśeṣaḥ | śabdavādī*² *vyavasthitam śabdalakṣaṇam*³ *paśyati yathaiva prajñaptam | tasya vyavasthitasya punaḥ punar abhidhānayogeno ccāraṇād abhivyaaktivir iti paśyati | yenā'syaivaṃ bhavati – nityaḥ śabda iti* | ¹*śabdavādo* YBh_{MS}, YBh_{Tib} (*sgra smra* ba): *śabdābhivyaaktivādo* YBh. ²Note YBh_{Tib} *de la sgrar smra ba'i bye brag ni*

conceived of as unitary phonemes (*varṇa*) or as meaningful units such as words (*pada*) or phrases (*vākya*), this description may be taken as pointing to linguistic theories foreshadowing those of classical Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa (Bhartṛhari), respectively.

2.2.3. The third allodoxy, the “doctrine [according to which] the past and the future exist as [real] substances” (*atītānāgatadravyasadvāda*), stands out as the only one which is both characteristically Buddhist (it is nothing but *sarvāstivāda*) and explicitly associated with Buddhist co-religionists (*ihadhārmika*, Tib. *chos 'di pa*).⁶³ The introductory formula has been reworked accordingly:

For example, here [in the world], a certain ascetic or a [certain] brahmin or a [certain] representative of this religion [i.e., a Buddhist,] improperly holds such a view, such a discourse: “The past exists, [and] the future [also] exists. Just as the present, it exists perfectly in its character (*lakṣaṇena pariniṣpannam*), as a [real] substance, not as a [mere] designation.”⁶⁴

According to this teaching, the past and the future exist in (much) the same way as the present: far from being mere verbal and/or conceptual designations (*prajñapti*), they exist in a way that is not liable to further analysis and does not depend on anything else: they exist as real substances.⁶⁵ Just as the historical Sarvāstivādin(-Vaibhāṣika), the YBh’s representative of the *sarvāstivāda* allo-

⁶³ *'di yin te (*tatāyāṃ viśeṣaḥ śabdavādinah?)*. ³*vyavasthitaṃ śabdalaṣṣaṇaṃ* YBh_{MS}: *vyavasthitaśabdalaṣṣaṇaṃ* YBh. ⁴Note YBh_{Tib} *des na (*tena)*. “Just as the doctrine [according to which there is a] manifestation of the effect out of [its eternal] cause, the doctrine of verbal sounds must be considered incorrect. Here is the difference [between the two]: the advocate of verbal sounds considers the character of verbal sounds to be fixed (/established) in the very way in which it is [verbally and intellectually] designated, [and] he considers this fixed (/established) [verbal sound] to be manifested again and again thanks to [its] being pronounced through (°*yogena*, Tib. *tshul gyis*) [articulated] speech, so that he thinks as follows: ‘Verbal sound is permanent.’” The exact meaning of *lakṣaṇa* and *prajñapta* remains unclear to me.

⁶³ *atītānāgatadravyasadvāda* in YBh 122,12-129,4 (YBh_{MS} 35a2-36a4, YBh_{Tib} D62b5-65a3/P73b3-76a7).

⁶⁴ YBh 122,13-123,1 (YBh_{MS} 35a3, YBh_{Tib} D62b5-6/P73b4-5): *yathāpīhaikatyaḥ śramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vehadhārmiko vā punar ayoniśa evaṃdr̥ṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī | asty atītam asty anāgamam | lakṣaṇena pariniṣpannam yathaiṃva pratyutpannam | dravyasan na prajñaptisat |*.

⁶⁵ On *sarvāstivāda*, see La Vallée Poussin 1937 and Willems – Dessein 1998: 16-35. For a short outline of the *sarvāstivāda* doctrine and arguments, see AK 5.25: *sarvakālāstitoktatvād dvayāt sadviṣayāt phalāt | tadastivādāt sarvāstivādā iṣṭāḥ*. “All [three] times exist, because [the Blessed One has] said [so], because [awareness arises in dependence on] two [conditions, viz. the object and the eye], because [awareness can only have] a real object, [and finally] because of the result [of past action]. Because of [their] claim that [all] this exists, [they are] acknowledged as *sarvāstivādas*.” On the distinction between *dravyasat* and *prajñaptisat* in the context of the three times controversy, see especially La Vallée Poussin 1937: 9, 28-29, 47-50.

doxy claims scriptural support – which is nothing other than misinterpretation of the Buddhist scriptures according to the author(s) and/or compiler(s) of the YBh:

For what reason does he hold such a view [and] such a discourse? – Due to [both] scripture and reason(ing). – What [does] scripture [consist of in the present case]? – This must be seen as [in the] above [cases]. Now as for the representative of this religion [i.e., the Buddhist], he improperly conceives the *sūtras* (*sūtrānta*),⁶⁶ [saying] for example, “Everything exists, i.e., the twelve [sensory] bases [exist];⁶⁷ the twelve [sensory] bases exist in their character.” He improperly conceives what the Blessed One has said, for example, “Past action exists,”⁶⁸ [or,] as [another] example, “Past corporeality exists,” [and so on] until “Future awareness (*vijñāna*) exists”^{69, 70}

⁶⁶ On the scriptural sources of *sarvāstivāda*, see La Vallée Poussin 1937: 54-73 (past and future *rūpa*, p. 54; past action, p. 54-55; future *vijñāna*, p. 59). See also above, n. 65, and below, n. 68-69.

⁶⁷ Note YBh_{Tib} D62b7/P73b6: *skyed mched bcu gñis po thams cad yod de*. “All twelve [sensory] bases exist.”

⁶⁸ Often quoted in this connection is the *sūtra* (belonging to the Saṃyuktāgama according to AKVy 473,16) that was preached by the Buddha (in Nālandā? AKVy 473,15-16) to the Laguḍaśikhīyaka *parivrājakas* (supposedly the murderers of Āryamaudgalyāyana, AKVy 473, 16-17). See, e.g., AKBh 299,9-10: *yat karmābhyatītaṃ kṣīṇaṃ niruddhaṃ vigataṃ vipariṇataṃ tad astīti* |. “That action which is past, exhausted, destroyed, gone, transformed, it does exist.” See also TSP 518,13 and, for a longer quotation, La Vallée Poussin 1937: 54-55. For the argument underlying this, see, e.g., AKBh 295,21-296,1: *yadi cātītaṃ na syāc chubhāsūbhāsya karmaṇaḥ phalam āyatvāṃ kathaṃ syāt | na hi phaloṭpattikāle vartamāno vipākahetur astīti | tasmād asty evātītānāgataṃ iti vaibhāṣikāḥ* |. “And if the past did not exist, how could the result of good or bad action exist in the future? For when the result arises, the cause of [this] retribution is no [longer] present. Therefore, it is the case that the past and the future exist, say the Vaibhāṣikas.” See also La Vallée Poussin 1937: 77-82.

⁶⁹ Translated according to YBh_{Tib} D62b7/P73b6: *’das pa’i gzugs ni yod do zes bya ba nas | ma ’oñs pa’i rnam par ’ses pa’i bar du yod do* ||. Often relied upon in this connection is a *sūtra* quoted at length in AKVy 468,29-469,4: *rūpaṃ anityam atītānāgataṃ | kaḥ punar vādaḥ pratyutpannasya | evaṃdarśī śrutavān āryaśrāvako ’tīte rūpe ’napekṣo bhavati | anāgataṃ rūpaṃ nābhinandati | pratyutpannasya rūpasya nirvide virāgāya nirodhāya pratīpanno bhavati | atītaṃ ced bhikṣavo rūpaṃ nābhaviṣyan na śrutavān āryaśrāvako ’tīte rūpe ’napekṣo ’bhaviṣyat | yasmāt tarhy asty atītaṃ rūpaṃ | tasmāc chrutavān āryaśrāvako ’tīte rūpe ’napekṣo bhavati | anāgataṃ ced rūpaṃ nābhaviṣyan na śrutavān āryaśrāvako ’nāgataṃ rūpaṃ nābhinandīsyat | yasmāt tarhy asty anāgataṃ rūpaṃ | tasmāc chrutavān āryaśrāvako ’nāgataṃ rūpaṃ nābhinandati | pratyutpannaṃ ced bhikṣavo rūpaṃ nābhaviṣyad iti vistarāḥ* |. “Past and future corporeality is impermanent, not to speak of present [corporeality]! The learned noble hearer who sees in this way neither depends on past corporeality nor desires future corporeality. [On the contrary,] he is acting for the sake of disgust, detachment [and] destruction of present corporeality. If, O monks, past corporeality did not exist, the learned noble hearer would not be independent with regard to past corporeality; but because past corporeality exists, the learned noble hearer is independent with regard to past corporeality. If, O monks, future corporeality did not exist, the learned noble hearer would not desire future corporeality; but because future corporeality exists, the learned noble hearer does not desire future corporeality. If, O monks, present corporeality did not exist,

2.2.4. In contrast to *sarvāstivāda*, the fourth allodoxy is ascribed to “an allodox [teacher] external to this [religion],”⁷¹ i.e., to non-Buddhist philosophers only. Such is, to abbreviate, the “doctrine of the self” (*ātmavāda*),⁷² the allodoxy dealt with most extensively in the *paravāda* section: “A self, or a [substantial living] being, or a life principle, or a soul, or a person truly and definitely [exists].”⁷³

2.2.5. The fifth *paravāda* consists in the “doctrine [according to which the self and the world are] eternal” (*śāśvatavāda*, i.e., eternalism).⁷⁴ Together with its numerous subtypes, this doctrine is dealt with at considerable length in the BJSū.⁷⁵ Basically, the eternalists are those who believe that “eternal are the self and the world: neither produced nor produced by [something] produced, neither created nor produced by creation, indestructible, steadfast as a mountain peak, as a firmly fixed pillar.”⁷⁶ The BJSū continues:

etc., etc.” On this *sūtra*, see also AKBh 295,9-12, TSP 505,24-26, La Vallée Poussin 1937: 54 (and n. 1 for further references).

⁷⁰ YBh 123,2-125,2 (YBh_{MS} 35a3-4, YBh_{Tib} D62b6-63a1/P73b5-7): *kena kāraṇenaivaṃdr̥ṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī | āgamato yuktitaś ca | āgamaḥ katamaḥ | sa pūrvavad draṣṭavyaḥ | ihadhārmiko vā punaḥ sūtrāntān ayoniśaḥ kalpayati | tadyathā | sarvam astīti dvādaśāyatanāni | dvādaśāyatanāni lakṣaṇato vidyante | tadyathāsty atītaṃ karmety uktaṃ bhagavatā | tadyathāsty atītaṃ rūpam asty anāgataṃ yāvad vijñānam |*. Immediately after this, YBh_{Tib} D63a1/73b7 reads: *tshul bzin ma yin par rtog go*, “He improperly conceives,” the object of which is *bcom ldan 'das kyis 'di lta ste* [...] *'di lta ste* [...] *žes gsuñs pa la*, “What the Blessed One has said, i.e. [...], i.e. [...].” My translation conforms to the structure of the Tibetan rendering.

⁷¹ According to YBh 129,7 (YBh_{MS} 36a5, YBh_{Tib} D65a3/P76a7-8): *tadyatheto bāhyas tīrthyah.*

⁷² *ātmavāda* in YBh 129,5-137,8 (YBh_{MS} 36a5-38a7, YBh_{Tib} D65a3-69b1/P76a7-81a4). See Shukla 1967, Hayashima 1991 (in Japanese) and Eltschinger – Ratié 2013: 79-82, n. 111.

⁷³ YBh 129,7-8 (YBh_{MS} 36a5, YBh_{Tib} D65a3-4/P76a8): *satyataḥ sthītiā ātmā vā sattvo vā jīvo vā poṣo vā pudgalo veti*. Note that, between *jīvo vā* and *poṣo vā*, YBh_{Tib} reads *skye ba po'am* (**jantur vā?*), and between *poṣo vā* and *pudgalo vā*, *skyes bu'am* (**pumān vā?*); an equivalent of YBh_{Tib} *yod do* (**asti*) is missing in the Sanskrit.

⁷⁴ *śāśvatavāda* in YBh 137,9-142,9 (YBh_{MS} 38b1-39b4, YBh_{Tib} D69b1-71b7/P81a4-83b5). Note that the *śāśvatavāda* section divides itself into a *tajjīvataccharīravāda* (editor’s subtitle; YBh 139,17-140,5) and a *anunitatvavāda* (editor’s subtitle; YBh 140,6-142,6). See Mikogami 1967 (in Japanese).

⁷⁵ See DN I.13-17.

⁷⁶ YBh 137,11-12 (YBh_{MS} 38b1, YBh_{Tib} D69b2/P81a5-6): *śāśvata ātmā lokaś ca | akṛto 'kṛtakṛtaḥ | anirmīto 'nirmānakṛtaḥ | avadhyaḥ | kūṭasthāyī | iṣikāsthāyī sthītaḥ |*. My translation is indebted to that of Rhys Davids (1899: 28; DN I.14: *sassato attā ca loko ca vañjho kūṭaṭṭho esikaṭṭhāyīṭṭhito*). According to the PrV and the SBhV, this doctrine is held by Ajita Keśakambalin (see Vogel 1970: 27-33); the formula is the same in SBhV II.224,2-4 (Meisig 1987: 152, with *iṣīkāvad avasthītāḥ*) and PrV 15,17-20, except that it bears not on the self and the world, but on the seven elementary bodies (*sapta kāyāḥ*), viz. earth body (*pṛthivikāya*), water body (*apkāya*), fire body (*tejahkāya*), wind body (*vāyukāya*), pleasure (*sukha*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and life (*jīva*[*jīva*]). Note that DN I.56-57 (see Rhys Davids 1899: 74) ascribes this doctrine to Pakudha Kaccāyana.

[A]nd that though these living creatures transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another, yet they are for ever and ever.”⁷⁷

But as the YBh has it, in sharp contradistinction to the BJSū,⁷⁸ eternalism is further divided into several subtypes,

i.e., those who profess eternal[ity] and those who are partly eternalists, those who speculate on the past or those who speculate on the future, those who profess [that the soul is] conscious [after death], those who profess [that the soul is] unconscious [after death], and those who profess [that the soul is] neither conscious nor unconscious [after death].⁷⁹

Leaving the partial eternalists out of consideration,⁸⁰ the eternalists divide themselves into those who speculate on the past (*pūrvāntakalpaka*)⁸¹ and those who speculate on the future (*aparāntakalpaka*).⁸² According to Yaśomitra, the numerous eternalists of the *pūrvāntakalpaka* type have the following in common: their views arise in conformity with their vision of previous existences,⁸³

⁷⁷ DN I.14: *te ca sattā sandhāvanti saṃsaranti cavanti upapajjanti. atthi tveva sassatisamaṃ*. Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 28.

⁷⁸ According to DN I.30, the *pūrvāntakalpakas* include the *śāsvatavādins* (DN I.14-17, see below, §2.2.5), the *ekatyaśāsvatikas* (DN I.17-22, §2.2.5), the *antānantikas* (DN I.22-24, §2.2.9), the *amarāvikkṣepikas* (DN I.24-28, §2.2.10) and the *ahetusamutpattikas* (DN I.28-30, §2.2.11). According to DN I.38, the *aparāntakalpakas* include the three views on immortality (*sañjñin* [DN I.30-32], *asañjñin* [DN I.32-33], *naivasañjñināsañjñin* [DN I.33]), the *ucchedavādins* (DN I.34-36, §2.2.12) and the **dr̥ṣṭadharmānirvānavādins* (DN I.36-38, §2.2.15).

⁷⁹ YBh 137,12-138,3 (YBh_{MS} 38b1-2, YBh_{Tib} D69b3-4/P81a6-7): *tadyathā śāsvatavādina ekatyaśāsvatikāś ca pūrvāntakalpakā aparāntakalpakā vā¹ sañjñivādino² ’sañjñivādino naiva-sañjñināsañjñivādinaś ca* |. ¹YBh_{Tib} reads *dañ* (*ca).

⁸⁰ See DN I.17-22. DN I.17: *santi bhikkhave eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā ekaccasassatikā ekacca-asassatikā, ekaccaṃ sassataṃ ekaccaṃ asassataṃ attānañ ca lokañ ca paññāpentī catuhi vatthūhi*. “There are, brethren, some recluses and Brahmans who are Eternalists with regard to some things, and in regard to others Non-Eternalists; who on four grounds maintain that the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly not.” Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 30.

⁸¹ DN I.12-13: *santi bhikkhave eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā pubbantakappikā pubbantānudiṭṭhino, pubbantaṃ ārabha anekavihitāni adhvuttipadāni abhivadanti atthādasahi vatthūhi*. “There are recluses and Brahmans, brethren, who reconstruct the ultimate beginnings of things, whose speculations are concerned with the ultimate past, and who on eighteen grounds put forward various assertions regarding it.” Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 26-27.

⁸² DN I.30: *santi bhikkhave eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā aparantakappikā aparantānudiṭṭhino, aparantaṃ ārabha anekavihitāni adhvuttipadāni abhivadanti catucattārisāya vatthūhi*. “There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who arrange the future, whose speculations are concerned with the future, and who on forty-four grounds put forward various assertions regarding the future.” Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 43.

⁸³ According to AKVy 448,4-5: *pūrvajanmadarśanānusāreṇa ya evaṃ utpannadṛṣṭikāś te pūrvāntakalpakaḥ śāsvatavādino bahavas tatroktāḥ* |. Here, *tatra* = *brahmajālasūtre* (AKVy 448,2-4). Yaśomitra provides the following explanation (AKVy 448,6-11): *ihaikatyaḥ śramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vāraṇyagato vā vṛkṣamūlagato vā śūnyāgāragato vā ātaptānvayāt prahāṇānvayād bhāvanānvayād bahulīkārvayāt samyanmanasikārvayāt tadrūpaṃ sāntaṃ cetaḥsamādhiṃ*

and indeed, the BJSū's exposition of the Eternalist false view exhausts itself in accounts of myriads and aeons of past lives. As for the Eternalists whose speculations concern the future, they divide themselves into the following subtypes: those who believe in the self's conscious (*sañjñin*) immortality, those who believe in the self's unconscious (*asañjñin*) immortality, and those who believe neither in the self's conscious nor unconscious (*naivasañjñināsañjñin*) immortality.⁸⁴

2.2.6. As for the sixth allodoxy, it is explicitly associated with the Nirgranthaś, ⁸⁵ i.e., with Jainism.⁸⁶ The YBh's intricate presentation of this allodoxy, insisting as it does on intention (*abhiprāya*), might echo (and even deride?) the Jains' well-known interest for speech modalities. Whatever the case may be, this presentation focuses on the Jaina conception of salvation in its relationship with *karman*:

[In the statement,] “Whatever this human being experiences,” what is meant (*abhiprāya*) is “suffering.” [In the statement,] “Having former deeds for its

spr̥ṣati | *yathā samāhite citte viṃśatiṃ saṃvartavivartakalpān samanumarati* | *tasyaivaṃ bhavati* | *śāśvato 'yam ātmā lokaś ceti* | *tad evaṃ sarva evaite pūrvāntakalpakāḥ śāśvataṃvādinaḥ*. “Here [in the world], a certain ascetic or brahmin being in the wilderness, at the root of a tree, or in a solitary abode, due to zeal, due to abandonment, due to [mental] cultivation, due to repeated practice, [and] due to correct reflection, reaches up to such a peaceful mental concentration that, [his] mind [being] thus concentrated, he recollects twenty devolutionary and evolutionary [cosmic] periods. The following occurs to him: ‘Eternal are this self and this world.’ Such are then all the eternalists who speculate on the past.” This formula is, of course, closely related to ŚPhSū passages such as DN I.81-82; see Meisig 1987: 346-347 and below, n. 105.

⁸⁴ DN I.30-31: *santi bhikkhave eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā uddhamāghatanikā saññivādā, uddham āghatanā saññiṃ attānaṃ paññāpentī soḷasahi vatthūhi*. “There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who hold the doctrine of a conscious existence after death, and who maintain in sixteen ways that the soul after death is conscious.” Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 43-44. DN I.32: *santi bhikkhave eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā uddhamāghatanikā asaññivādā, uddham āghatanā asaññiṃ attānaṃ paññāpentī aṭṭhahi vatthūhi*. “There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who hold the doctrine of an unconscious existence after death, and who maintain in eight ways that the soul after death is unconscious.” Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 45. DN I.33: *santi bhikkhave eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā uddhamāghatanikā n' evasaññināsaññivādā, uddham āghatanā n' eva saññiṃ nāsaññiṃ attānaṃ paññāpentī aṭṭhahi vatthūhi*. “There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who hold the doctrine of an existence after death which is neither conscious nor unconscious, and who maintain in eight ways that the soul after death is neither conscious nor unconscious.”

⁸⁵ YBh 143,4 (YBh_{MS} 39b6, YBh_{Tib} D72a4/P84a2): *tadyathā nirgranthāḥ* |. The YBh's doxographic account (see below, n. 89) is adopted from texts such as SBhV II.226,4-8 (Meisig 1987: 160) and PrV 19,13-19, which explicitly describe the doctrine as being that of the teacher Nirgrantha Jñātiputra (see Vogel 1970: 35), i.e., the historical Jina.

⁸⁶ *pūrvakṛtahetuvāda* in YBh 142,10-144,5 (YBh_{MS} 39b4-40a4, YBh_{Tib} D71b7-72b6/P83b5-84b5). Cf. SBhV II.226,10-12: *evam eva mayā bhādanta nirgrantho jñātiputraḥ sāndṛṣṭikam śrāmaṇyaphalam pṛṣṭaḥ pūrvakṛtahetutām eva vyākāṣīt* |. “Thus, O Lord, when I [= King Ajātaśatru] asked Nirgrantha Jñātiputra about the actual result of religious life, he explained that [this also] has merely past deeds as a cause.”

cause,” what is meant is “Having sinful [deeds] for its cause.” [In the statement,] “Because past actions come to an end by means of asceticism,” what is meant is “by means of bodily exertion belonging to this very life.” [In the statement,] “And because new actions are neutralised by the dam of non-performance,”⁸⁷ what is meant is “of bad [actions].” [In the statement,] “In such a way [there will be] no instreaming⁸⁸ [of *karman* into the soul] in the future,” what is said (*ucyate*) is “by being good exclusively, [there will be] no instreaming [of *karman* into the soul] in the future.” [In the statement,] “Due to [there being] no instreaming, *karman* is exhausted,” what is meant is “[one’s] sin.” [In the statement,] “Due to the exhaustion of *karman*, suffering is exhausted,” what is meant is “both what has former deeds for its cause and what inflicts injury in this very life.” [In the statement,] “By the exhaustion of suffering, one puts an end to suffering,” what is meant is “to what continues in another existence.”⁸⁹

⁸⁷ YBh_{MS} and YBh read *akaraṇasamudghātāt*, rendered in YBh_{Tib} (D72a2) by *mi bya ba dai chu lon gyis dag pa* (the Peking edition [83b7] reads : ... *chu lon gyi dag pa*). The Tibetan translation, and especially the presence of Tib. *chu lon* = Skt. *setu*, is easily explained by taking into account the parallel text of SBhV II.226,6 (Meisig 1987: 160) and PrV 19,16, which read *akaraṇasetusamudghātaḥ* and *mi bya ba 'i chu lon gyis bzlog par bya ba*, respectively.

⁸⁸ I tentatively render (*an*)*avasrava* (Pali [*an*]avassava [see below, MN I.93 in n. 89]) in the Jaina sense of material *karman* particles streaming into (and attaching to) the soul. The Tibetan translators likely attempted to distinguish this Jaina meaning from the specifically Buddhist one by translating Skt. (*an*)*avasrava* by Tib. *ñes 'dzag (tu mi 'gyur ba)* instead of the usual *zag pa (med pa)*.

⁸⁹ YBh 142,12-143,4 (YBh_{MS} 39b4-6, YBh_{Tib} D72a1-4/P83b6-84a2): *yat kiñcid ayam puruṣa-pudgalaḥ pratisamvedayata¹ iti duḥkham ity abhiprāyaḥ | pūrvakṛtāhetukam iti pāpakāhetukam ity abhiprāyaḥ | paurāṇānāṃ karmaṇāṃ tapasā vyanṭibhāvād iti dṛṣṭadhārmikeṇa² kaṣṭhenety abhiprāyaḥ | navānāṃ ca karmaṇāṃ akaraṇasetusamudghātād³ ity akuśalānāṃ ity abhiprāyaḥ | evam āyatām anavasrava⁴ iti | ekāntakuśalatayā⁵ yatyām anavasravā⁶ ity ucyate | anavasravāt⁷ karmakṣaya ity pāpasyety abhiprāyaḥ | karmakṣayād duḥkhakṣaya ity pūrvakṛtāhetukasya ca dṛṣṭadharmopakramikasya⁸ cety abhiprāyaḥ | duḥkhakṣayād duḥkhasyāntakriyā⁹ bhavatiṭi anyajanmaprābandhikasyety abhiprāyaḥ | .¹pratisamvedayata em. YBh: pratisamveyata YBh_{MS}.²dhārmikeṇa YBh_{MS}: °dharmikeṇa YBh. °samudghātād em. YBh (142, n. 10), YBh_{MS}: samud-dhātād YBh (see also above, n. 87); on °setu°, see above, n. 87. °anavasrava YBh_{MS} (cf. SBhV II.226,6-7 [Meisig 1987: 160]), YBh_{Tib} (*ñes 'dzag tu mi 'gyur ro*): *anāsrava* YBh. °ekāntakuśalata-yā° em. YBh_{Tib} (*gcig tu ñes par dge ba ñid yin pas*): *ekāntakuśalatā ā°* YBh, YBh_{MS}. °anava-srava em. YBh_{Tib} (*ñes 'dzag tu mi 'gyur ba*): *anāsrava* YBh_{MS}. YBh. °anavasravāt YBh_{MS} (cf. SBhV II.226,7 [Meisig 1987: 160] and below, MN I.93), YBh_{Tib} (*ñes 'dzag med na*): *anāsravāt* YBh. °dharmopakramikasya YBh_{MS}: °dharmaupakramikasya YBh (see also YBh 143,12, 143,13, 143,15, 143,17). °kriyā em. YBh, YBh_{Tib} (*mthar byed par 'gyur ro*): °kra°yā YBh_{MS}. This passage is nearly identical to the description of Nirgrantha Jñātiputra’s teaching as it can be found in SBhV II.226,4-8 (Meisig 1987: 160) and PrV 19,13-19 (see Vogel 1970: 35). The doxographical account of DN I.57 (see Rhys Davids 1899: 74-75) is entirely different. A somewhat similar passage can be found, however, in MN I.93, where it is put into the mouth of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta himself: *atthi kho vo nigaṇṭhā pubbe pāpaṃ kammaṃ kataṃ. taṃ imāya kaṭukāya dukkarakārikāya nijjaretha; yaṃ pan 'ettha etarahi kāyena saṃvutā vācāya saṃvutā manasā saṃvutā taṃ āyatim pāpassa kammaṃ akaraṇaṃ; iti purāṇānāṃ kammānaṃ tapasā vyanṭibhāvā navānaṃ kammānaṃ akaraṇā āyatim anavassavo, āyatim anavassavā kammakkhaya; kammakkhaya dukkhakkhaya; dukkhakkhaya vedanākhaya; vedanākhaya sabbam dukkham nijjiṇṇaṃ bhavissatīti*. “Nigaṇṭhas, you have done evil actions in the past; exhaust them with the*

As I understand it, this short description of Jainism focuses on the Jaina distinction between warding off (*saṃvara*) new *karman*, i.e., preventing new *karman* from streaming into the soul, and cancelling (*nirjarā*) past *karman*, i.e., destroying *karman* that has already streamed into the soul.⁹⁰ According to the YBh's Nirgranthas, past actions (*pūrvakṛta*, *paurāṇakarmān*, and the resulting *karman* stuff adhering to the soul) can be cancelled, i.e., destroyed (*vyantībhāva*), by present-day (*dr̥ṣṭadhārmika*) asceticism (*tapas*) or bodily exertion (*kaṣṭa*).⁹¹ As for present actions, one should abstain from performing (*akaraṇa*) inauspicious (*akuśala*) acts and limit oneself to performing exclusively auspicious and moral ones (*ekāntakuśalatā*); this will prevent the instreaming of bad *karman*, which in turn will exhaust *karman* and put a final end (*antakriyā*) to every form of suffering: that which is caused by former (bad) actions (*pūrvakṛtahetuka*), that which harms in this very life (*dr̥ṣṭadharmopakramika*), and that which prolongs itself into future existence (*anyajanmaprābandhika*). According to this depiction of Jainism, suffering would be entirely and exclusively determined by (sinful/bad) past deeds⁹² – whence, in my opinion, the name of the allodoxy itself.

2.2.7. Next comes allodoxy no. 7, the “doctrine [according to which] a [Person] such as God [is] the agent” (*īśvarādīkārṭvāda*),⁹³ i.e., the doctrine of “those

performance of piercing austerities. And when you are here and now restrained in body, speech, and mind, that is doing no evil actions for the future. So by annihilating with asceticism past actions and by doing no fresh actions, there will be no consequence in the future. With no consequence in the future, there is the destruction of action. With the destruction of action, there is the destruction of suffering. With the destruction of suffering there is the destruction of feeling. With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted.” Translation Nāṇamoli – Bodhi 2001: 188; on this passage, see Gombrich 1994: 1089-1090.

⁹⁰ See TASū 1.4: *jīvājīvāsraṅgābandhasaṃvaranirjarāmokṣās tattvam* |. “Soul, inanimate [things], inflow [of karmic matter], bondage, warding off [the inflow of new karmic matter], wiping out [already existing karmic matter] and liberation, [these are] the [seven] fundamentals.” See Jacobi 1906: 293. TASū 9.1-3: *āsravanirodhaḥ saṃvaraḥ | sa guptisamīdiharmānupreṣṭāparīṣahajayacāritraih | tapasā nirjarā ca* |. “The cessation of the inflow [of karmic matter] is warding off, [and] this [is achieved] through the [threefold] regulation [of body, speech and mind], caution, [observance of ethical] duties, reflection, the endurance of difficulties, and [right] conduct. [As for] wiping out [already existing karmic matter, it is achieved] through asceticism.” See Jacobi 1906: 534. According to TASū 10.2 (see Jacobi 1906: 542), *saṃvara* is equivalent to *bandhahetvabhāva*, “the absence of the causes of bondage.” See also Frauwallner 1956: 283-285.

⁹¹ On *tapas*, see TASū 9.19-46 (Jacobi 1906: 537-540).

⁹² YBh 143,19: *api tv aṣṭy ekāntena pūrvakṛtahetukam duḥkham*. “On the contrary, suffering exclusively has former deeds for its cause.”

⁹³ *īśvarādīkārṭvādaḥ* in YBh 144,6-145,18 (YBh_{MS} 40a4-b3, YBh_{Tib} D72b6-73b6/P84b5-85b5). See Chemparathy 1968: 86-89. According to Chemparathy (1968: 87), the YBh's target is, first and foremost, *īśvara* as an *adhiṣṭhātṛ* or “director”; its critique of *īśvara* as a creator God is but an extension of the critique of *īśvara*'s “directing activity.”

who profess a wrong cause such as God” (*īśvarādiviṣamahetuvādin*).⁹⁴ According to these “creationists” (whose main argument in favor of the existence of God is, according to Chemparathy, strikingly similar to the one formulated in NSū 4.1.19⁹⁵), “whatever this human being experiences, all this either has God’s creation for its cause or has another Person’s creation for its cause.”⁹⁶ Their purpose is to demonstrate that “that he who, [be it] God or a [Person] other than him, [is] the agent, the maker, the creator [and] (like?) the father⁹⁷ of [all] entities, [really] exists.”⁹⁸ This allodoxy having been dealt with by Chemparathy, I allow myself to turn directly to doctrine no. 8.

2.2.8. The next allodoxy pertains to Vedic ritualism, more precisely to the “doctrine [according to which ritual] violence is a [religious] duty (/ is righteous)” (*hiṃsādharmaṃvāda*).⁹⁹ Since this eighth allodoxy will be dealt with extensively in the second part of this essay, suffice it to quote the YBh’s short doxographic account:

[This doctrine consists in believing that] taking [a living being’s] life[, something that occurs] within sacrifices [and is] accompanied by the injunction [associated with] a [ritual] formula, leads all [the following living beings] to heaven: the one who sacrifices, that which is sacrificed and those who attend him(/it/them). For what reason does [this ascetic or this brahmin] hold such a view, hold such a discourse? This [is] a doctrine that violates the established rule(/obligation);¹⁰⁰ [it

⁹⁴ YBh 144,9-10 (YBh_{MS} 40a4, YBh_{Tib} D73a1/P84b6): *tadyatheśvarādiviṣamahetuvādinah¹ | .¹⁰viṣama^o em. YBh_{Tib} (*mi mthun pa*): ^oviṣaya^o YBh, YBh_{MS}?. On *viṣamahetu* as one of the YBh’s false views, see above, n. 56.*

⁹⁵ See Chemparathy 1968: 88-89.

⁹⁶ YBh 144,8-9 (YBh_{MS} 40a4, YBh_{Tib} D72b7-73a1/P84b5-6): *yat kiñcid ayaṃ puruṣapudgalaḥ pratisaṃvedayate sarvaṃ tad īśvaranirmāṇahetukaṃ vā puruṣāntara¹nirmāṇahetukaṃ veti. ¹⁰āntara^o em. YBh, YBh_{Tib} (*gžan*): ^oānta^o YBh_{MS}.*

⁹⁷ Note YBh_{Tib} D73a4/P85a2: *pha lta bur gyur pa*.

⁹⁸ YBh 144,15-16 (YBh_{MS} 40a6, YBh_{Tib} D73a3-4/P85a1-2): *asti sa yaḥ¹ kartā sraṣṭā nirmātā pīṭrbhūto bhāvānām īśvaras tadanyo veti | .¹sa yaḥ em. YBh_{Tib} (*gañ [...]* *de*): *sa kaścīt* YBh, YBh_{MS}. The syntagm *sa yaḥ kaścīt* is certainly possible, but YBh_{Tib} has no equivalent of *kaścīt* (generally rendered in Tibetan, as in *yat kiñcid ... sarvaṃ tad = gañ ci yañ ruñ ste de dag thams cad*; see above, n. 96).*

⁹⁹ *hiṃsādharmaṃvāda* in YBh 145,20-147,13 (YBh_{MS} 40b3-41a3, YBh_{Tib} D73b6-74b6/D85b5-86b6).

¹⁰⁰ To the best of my knowledge, *utsaṃstha* is not attested. *MW* 1121b provides the following meanings for *saṃsthā*: “established order, standard, rule, direction,” and “obligation.” Note the expressions *saṃsthāṃ vyati+kram* (or: *pari+bhid*) in the sense of: “to transgress or break an established rule or obligation.” I am inclined to read *utsaṃstha* along these lines, on the model of *utsūtra* (*MW* 182b: “out of rule, deviating from or disregarding rules of [policy or grammar]”), with *ud* in the sense of “over, above (as implying separation and disjunction), out, out of, from, off, away from, apart.” Note that, for *saṃsthā*, *MW* 1121c also records the following uses: “killing, killing of the sacrificial animal”, and especially “a complete liturgical course, the basis or essential form of a sacrifice.”

has been] fixed (/settled) by rogues(/trickiness)¹⁰¹ but [has certainly] not [been] established in [due] consideration of reason(ing). When the *kaliyuga* is at hand (/ imminent / has come), the brahmins who wish to eat meat indulge in this [ritual violence, thus] transgressing the brahmins' ancient [religious] duty.¹⁰²

2.2.9. The doctrine of the “Extensionists” (Rhys Davids; Pali *antānantika*) of the BJSū¹⁰³ forms the subject matter of allodoxy no. 9, “the doctrine [according to which the world is] finite, or [rather] infinite[, etc.]” (*antānantikavāda*).¹⁰⁴ The YBh’s account of this set of doctrines, which relies on and refers to the BJSū, is rather terse:

By basing himself on [purely] mundane [forms of] meditation,¹⁰⁵ [a certain ascetic or brahmin] dwells with the notion that the world is finite (*antika*), [or] with the notion that it is infinite (*anantaka*), [or] with the notion of both (*ubhaya*), [or] with the notion of neither of them (*nobhaya*). [And here it goes] in full [detail] exactly as in the *sūtra*: He holds such a view, holds such a discourse, “The world is finite,” until “[The world is] neither finite nor infinite.”¹⁰⁶

A few explanations might be useful: The proponent of the first view considers that, since the world is finite, “a path could be traced round it.”¹⁰⁷ As for the representative of the third opinion, i.e., that the world is both finite and infinite, he believes that the world is “limited in the upward and downward directions, but infinite across.”¹⁰⁸ Finally, note that the conclusions arrived at by the pro-

¹⁰¹ Cf. *BHSD* 522a, where *śaṭha* is also attested in the meaning of the abstract noun *śāṭhya*.

¹⁰² YBh 145,20-146,4 (YBh_{MS} 40b4-5, YBh_{Tib} D73b6-74a1/P85b5-8): *yajñeṣu mantravidhi-pūrvakāḥ prāṇātipātaḥ | yaś¹ ca juhōti yaś ca hūyate ye ca tatsahāyās teṣāṃ sarveṣāṃ svargaga-manāya bhavātīti | kena kāraṇenaivaṃdr̥ṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī² | utsaṃsthavāda eṣa śaṭhaviṭṭha-pito no³ tu yuktim abhisamīkṣya vyavasthāpitaḥ | kaliyuge pratyupasthite brāhmaṇaiḥ pauraṇaṃ brāhmaṇadharmam atikramya māṃsaṃ bhakṣayitukāmair etat prakalpitaṃ⁴ ||. ¹yaś YBh: *kaś* YBh_{MS}: ²*aivaṃdr̥ṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī* em. (cf. YBh 123,2, 151,4, 152,1, 155,11): ³[*ai*]vandr̥ṣṭir bhavātīti evaṃvādī YBh_{MS}: ⁴*aivaṃdr̥ṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī bhavātīti* YBh. ³no YBh_{MS}: *na* YBh. ⁴*prakalpitaṃ* YBh_{MS}: *pratyupakalpitaṃ* YBh.*

¹⁰³ See DN I.22-24.

¹⁰⁴ *antānantikavāda* in YBh 148,2-16 (YBh_{MS} 41a3-6, YBh_{Tib} D74b6-75a5/P86b6-87a6).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. DN I.22: *idha bhikkhave ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā ātappam anvāya padhānam anvāya anuyogam anvāya appamādam anvāya sammāmanasikāram anvāya tathārūpaṃ ceto-samādhim phusati yathā samāhite citte ... lokasmiṃ viharati*. “In the first case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman, by means of ardour of exertion of application of earnestness of careful thought reaches up to such rapture of heart that he, rapt in heart, dwells in the world” Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 36. For a Sanskrit parallel of this formula, see above, n. 83.

¹⁰⁶ YBh 148,3-5 (YBh_{MS} 41a4, YBh_{Tib} D74b6-7/P86b6-8): *laukikadhyānaśaṃsrayeṇānti-ka¹śaṅjñī lokasya viharaty anantakasaṅjñī ubhayaśaṅjñī nobhayaśaṅjñī | yathāsūtram eva vi-stareṇa | evaṃdr̥ṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī antavāṇī loko yāvan naivāntavān nānanta iti |*. ¹*āntika*^o YBh_{MS}: ^o[*ā*]ntaka^o (YBh_{MS} according to Bhattacharya 1957: 148, n. 2): ^oānta^o YBh.

¹⁰⁷ DN I.22: *parivaṭṭamo*. Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 36.

¹⁰⁸ DN I.23: *uddhamadho antasaṅgī ... tiriyaṃ anantasaṅgī*. Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 36.

ponent of the fourth view, i.e., that the world is neither finite nor infinite, is based not on mundane forms of meditation, but on ratiocination (Pali *takka*, Skt. *tarka*) and investigation (Pali *vīmaṃsā*, Skt. *mīmāṃsā*).¹⁰⁹

2.2.10. The representatives of allodoxy no. 10 are the four types of *amarāvikkhepikas* of DN I.24-28.¹¹⁰ This designation, which seems to occur only in the BJSū and the YBh,¹¹¹ is mysterious with regard to both its historical reference and wording. Following Buddhaghosa's interpretation of *amarā* as a type of fish known for being nearly impossible to catch,¹¹² Rhys Davids translates "who wriggle like eels,"¹¹³ "eel-wobbler, one who practices eel-wriggling."¹¹⁴ This, of course, analyses the compound as only involving positive terms: *amarā-vikkhepika/vikṣepika*. YBh_{Tib}, however, consistently reads *lha mi spoṅ ba*, i.e., **amara-avikkhepika/avikṣepika* ("[s]he who does not reject the immortal [gods]," cf. the YBh's **amarāñāṃ viśuddhāñāṃ devāñāṃ*; note also that Tibetan *lha* usually renders Sanskrit *deva*), and "(pure) immortal god(s)" indeed seems to reflect the YBh's interpretation of *amara* (so that the second member of the compound must be affected with the privative prefix *a-*).¹¹⁵ But what could be the meaning of *avikṣepika* in such a case? If I understand the YBh's explanation correctly (which I am not sure I do), the *amarāvikkhepikas* promise (**prati+jñā*) not to reject the gods (**aham amarān na vikṣipāmīti pratijñāya* [/ *vayam amarān na vikṣipāma iti pratijñāya*?]), but as soon as they are asked about good and evil, which, being [the questions] of the gods themselves, cannot be eluded (**akṣepya, akṣepaṇīya*?), they resort to equivocation,¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁹ See DN I.23 (Rhys Davids 1899: 36) and the formula quoted above, n. 45.

¹¹⁰ *amarāvikkhepikavāda* in YBh 149.2-150.4 (YBh_{MS} 41a7-41b4 [nearly illegible], YBh_{Tib} D75a5-b7/P87a6-88a1). YBh_{Tib} D75a5-6/P87a6: 'di lta ste | lha mi spoṅ ba bzi po rnam te | (**tadyathā catvāra amarāvikkhepikāḥ*) | "i.e., the four *amarāvikkhepikas*." This part of the YBh_{MS} being illegible, I adopt the only wording found elsewhere in the manuscript (see above, n. 52), i.e., °*vikṣepika* (rather than Bhattacharya's °*vikṣepa*), which has the additional merit of matching the Pali form of the name. Note that if both the DN and the YBh accounts of the *amarāvikkhepikas* present four types of representatives, the two texts' descriptions of each type vary in their details. For a short reference to the *amarāvikkhepikas*, see Solomon 1978: 682-684.

¹¹¹ Taking exception of a short and stereotyped allusion at MN I.521.

¹¹² SuV I.115: *amarā nāma macchajāti, sā ummujjananimujjanādivasena ... gahetuṃ na sakoti*. "We call *amarā* a kind of fish; this [fish] cannot be caught due to its [constantly] rising up [out of water], diving [into water], etc.;" cf. CPD I.394.

¹¹³ Rhys Davids 1899: 37.

¹¹⁴ PED 73b. Note the lexicographers' caution: "*amarā* (?): a kind of slippery fish, an eel (?)."

¹¹⁵ The meaning "immortal" seems to be favoured in DA I.212 (*na maratīti na ucchijjati*. "It does not die, i.e., it is not annihilated.").

¹¹⁶ This is Rhys Davids' (1899: 37 and *passim*) fine rendering of *vācā-vikkhepaṃ āpajjanti*. Note that "equivocation" is not to be understood in the sense of a logical fallacy, but in the sense of "to avoid committing oneself in what one says: speak evasively" (*Webster's* 769b).

i.e., verbally elude/avoid (*vācā vikṣepaḥ*) the questions by various means. This is how the YBh introduces the tiny section devoted to the *amarāvikṣepikas*:¹¹⁷

As for these, when [they are] asked questions about the path to elevation (**abhyudayamārga*), about good and evil (**kuśalākuśala*), about the path to the *summum bonum* (**niḥśreyasamārga*), about suffering (**duḥkha*), [its] origin (**samudaya*), [its] cessation (**nirodha*) [and] the path (**mārga*) [leading to its cessation, although they] promise(/swear) not to reject the gods[, they nonetheless resort to equivocation, and this] on [matters] concerning which the question asked, [being that] of the pure (**viśuddha?*) immortal (**amara*, **amṛta?*) gods (**deva?*), cannot(/must not) be rejected (**akṣepya*, *akṣepaṇīya?*); they equivocate (**vācā vikṣipanti?*), with regard to those who ask [them] questions², by way (**nayena?*) of withdrawing (**pratisamharaṇa?*) in one way or another (**anyenānyam*) or of imitating the questioner (**prāśnikānuvidhāna?*). Among them (**tatra*), one (**eka*) equivocator (**amarāvikṣepika?*) is simply (**eva*) ignorant (**avyutpanna*). The second one (**dvitīya*) imagines himself to be knowledgeable (**adhigatābhimānika?*).¹¹⁸ The third one (**tṛtīya*), [albeit] learned (**vyutpanna*), is uncertain (**aviniścita?*). [As for] the fourth one (**caturtha*), he is simply (**eva*) of feeble knowledge (**mandajñāna?*) and bewildered (*momuḥa*). Among them the first one, frightened by [his] fear of speaking what is false, frightened by [his] fear [that his own] ignorance [might be discovered], does not clearly answer: “I don’t know” (*na jānāmi*). The second one, [...] frightened by [his] fear of the joinder of issue (*paryanuyoga*, Rhys Davids), frightened by [his] fear of speaking what is false, frightened by [his] fear of a false view, does not clearly answer: “I am knowledgeable” (*adhigatavān asmi*, Tib. *bdag gis śes so*). The third one, frightened by [his] fear of false view, frightened by [his] fear of speaking what is false, frightened by [his] fear of the joinder of issue, does not clearly answer: “I am uncertain” (*anirñīto ’smi*). [All] these [three], withdrawing [as they do] in one way or another (*anyenānyam*), fall into equivocation (*vācā vikṣepam āpadyante*) in this case also. [As for] the fourth one, frightened only by [his] fear of the joinder of issue, he does not clearly answer: “I am bewildered” (*momuḥo ’smi*) although he is entirely (*sarveṇa sarvam*) unfamiliar even with the [very] letter of [the expressions] (/ incapable even of formulating [the words]) “Path to elevation,” “Path to the *summum bonum*.” [He does not clearly answer: “I am bewildered,” but] he simply questions [his] interlocutor (*para*). By doing this (*tadanuvidhānatas*), he falls into equivocation.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ YBh_{MS} 41a7-8 (the first half of the passage translated hereafter) being illegible, it has been omitted by Bhattacharya. My translation relies exclusively on the sometimes puzzling YBh_{Tib}. YBh_{MS} 41b1-3 is legible (and edited by Bhattacharya). This is the reason why, in n. 120 below, the first part of the passage appears in Tibetan and the second part in Sanskrit.

¹¹⁸ Tib. *mñon pa’i ña rgyal can* corresponds to either Skt. *abhimānin* (see, e.g., YBh 154,8) or Skt. *abhimānika* (see, e.g., YBh 153,1).

¹¹⁹ The meaning and value of *rañ gis rtogs pa la ’jigs pa yod de* remain unclear to me.

¹²⁰ YBh_{Tib} D75a6-b1/P87a7-b2: *de dag kyañ mñon par mtho ba’i lam dge ba dañ mi dge ba dañ | ñes par legs pa’i lam sdug bsñal dañ kun ’byuñ ba dañ ’gog pa dañ lam las dri ba dris na | bdag ni lha mi spoñ ba yin no sñam du | dam bcas nas | gañ du ’chi ba med pa rnam par dag pa’i lha rñams kyi dri ba dris pa | spañ bar bya ba ma yin pa (P : D par) der de dag dri ba dris pa rñams la | tshig gis gñan dañ gñan du ruñ skur (em.: D bskur : P sku) ba dañ | phyir rgol ba dañ*

Are the YBh's *amarāvīkṣepikas* sceptics, or simply agnostic(ist)s?¹²¹ In my opinion, they are neither – at least not without strong qualification. This is because those who adopt this attitude (rather than doctrine) seem neither to uphold the theory that certain knowledge is impossible, nor to affirm their lack of knowledge about the things they are asked about. Be they ignorant (type 1), pseudo-learned (type 2), uncertain (type 3) or bewildered (type 4), what they have in common is fear (of being wrong and therefore criticised, of regret, etc.). It is out of fear alone, and not on account of any self-conscious philosophical (absence of) position, that they avoid committing themselves verbally and ... “wriggle like eels.”

2.2.11. As its allodoxy no. 11, the YBh takes over the DN's “Fortuitous-Originists” (*adhiccāsamuppanika*, Rhys Davids) or “partisans du hasard” (*ahetusamutpannika*, La Vallée Poussin),¹²² calling their standpoint the “doctrine

mthun par byed pa'i tshul gyis spoñ bar byed do || de la lha mi spoñ ba gcig ni blo ma byañ ba kho na'o || gñis pa ni rtogs pa'i mñon pa'i ña rgyal can no || gsum pa ni blo byañ ba rnam par ñes pa ma yin pa'o || bñi ba ni šes pa 'zan ciñ šin tu rmoñs pa kho na'o || 'Here begins the Sanskrit as edited by Bhattacharya (YBh 149,3: *mandamomuha eva* |). YBh 149,3-10 (YBh_{MS} 41b1-3 [nearly illegible!], YBh_{Tib} D75b1-5/P87b2-7): *tatra*¹ *prathamō mṛṣāvādabhayabhīto*² *'jñāna*³ *bhayabhītaś ca spaṣṭam na vyākaroṭi na jānāmīti | dvitīyaḥ paryanuyogabhayabhīto*⁴ *mṛṣāvādabhayabhīto mīthyādr̥ṣṭibhayabhītaḥ spaṣṭam na vyākaroṭy adhigatavān asmīti | tṛtīyo mīthyādr̥ṣṭibhayabhīto mṛṣāvādabhayabhītaḥ paryanuyogabhayabhītaḥ spaṣṭam na vyākaroṭy anirñīto 'smīti*⁶ *| te tatrāpy anyenānyam pratisamharanto*⁷ *vācā vikṣepam āpadyante | caturthaḥ paryanuyogabhayabhīta eva*⁸ *sarveṇa sarvam abhyudayamārgo niḥśreyasamārga iti vyañjanamātrakuśalo 'pi*⁹ *spaṣṭam na vyākaroṭi momuho 'smīti | sa param eva sampr̥cchati | tadanuvidhānato vācā vikṣepam āpadyate |* ¹*tatra* em. YBh, YBh_{Tib} (*de la*): YBh_{MS} om. *tatra* (according to Bhattacharya). ²*mṛṣāvādabhayabhīto* em. YBh, YBh_{Tib} (*brdzun du smra bas 'jigs śin 'dzem pa*): YBh_{MS} *mṛṣāvādato* (according to Bhattacharya). ³Note YBh_{Tib} *mi šes pa yod pas* (**ajñānabhāva*?) for *ajñāna*⁶. ⁴Between *gñis pa ni* (*dvitīyo*) and *brgal žin brtags pas 'jigs śin 'dzem pa* (*paryanuyogabhayabhīto*) YBh_{Tib} reads *rañ gis rtogs pa la 'jigs pa yod de*. ⁵*mṛṣāvādabhayabhītaḥ* em. YBh_{Tib} (*brdzun du smra bas 'jigs śin 'dzem pa*): YBh_{MS}, YBh om. *mṛṣāvādabhayabhītaḥ*. ⁶YBh reads *aham adhigatavān asmīti*, which does not correspond to YBh_{Tib} *bdag ni ñes pa ma yin no žes*; in YBh_{MS} (hardly legible), the sequence does not exceed six *akṣaras* (with an initial *a* and a final *smīti*), which I am inclined to read as *anirñīto 'smīti*. ⁷*pratisamharanto* em. YBh: *pratisamharanto* YBh_{MS}. ⁸*eva* em. YBh_{Tib} (*ñid*): *evaṃ* YBh (YBh_{MS} illegible). ⁹*mātrakuśalo 'pi* YBh_{MS}, YBh_{Tib} (*tsam la yañ [...]* *mī mkhas pa*): *mātrakuśalo 'pi* YBh.

¹²¹ The doctrinal/philosophical and historical identity of the *amarāvīkṣepikas* must of course be clearly distinguished from their description by the Buddhists. Whereas these (unanimously deprecatory) descriptions do not, in my opinion, fit the bill of scepticism, the following statement by Nāṇamoli and Bodhi (2001: 1283, n. 755) nonetheless might be true: “It is quite possible that the ‘eel-wrigglers’ were a class of radical sceptics who questioned the entire prospect of apodictic knowledge about ultimate issues.”

¹²² See DN I.28-30 (Rhys Davids 1899: 41-43), AKBh 281,11-13 (*Kośa* IV.14) and AKVy 449,16-17. It is to be noted that the YBh's *ahetuvāda* applies to the world and the self, not to eschatology and soteriology, a feature that distinguishes it from the teaching ascribed to Maskarin Gośālīputra / Makkhali Gosālīputta, one of the six rival teachers of the Buddha and the alleged

[according to which the self and the world are] without a cause.”¹²³ The YBh’s doxographic account is as follows:

[Since it is elaborated] on the basis of meditation and on the basis of ratiocination,¹²⁴ this [doctrine] too must, according to the [Brahmajāla]sūtra, be known as [being] twofold. For what reason does [the ascetic or brahmin who upholds this doctrine] on the basis of ratiocination see [things] in this way, [i.e., that]¹²⁵ the self and the world [have] arisen without a cause? To sum up, [this is because,]¹²⁶ having perceived that the immeasurable¹²⁷ diversity of entities both internal and external does not presuppose any [underlying] intention(/purpose), and having perceived that causes are sometimes without a result, [he perceives] that winds sometimes blow fortuitously [and] sometimes do not blow, that rivers sometimes flow fortuitously [and] sometimes do not flow, that trees sometimes bear flowers and fruits fortuitously [and] sometimes bear neither flowers nor fruits, etc.¹²⁸

founder of Ājīvikism. To be sure, the canonical descriptions of his teaching begin with *nāsti hetur nāsti pratyayaḥ* (SBhV II.221,29 [Meisig 1987: 136], PrV 12,12-13 [rgyu med rkyen med do], Vogel 1970: 23) / *n’atthi hetu n’atthi paccayo* (DN I.53, MN I.407 and 516, SN III.210), but this applies to living beings’ defilements (*saṅkilesa*) and purification (*visuddhi*). What Maskarin/Makkhali teaches can be superficially described as predestination, determinism or fatalism (*saṃsāravissuddhivāda* and *niyatīvāda*). Such is, in conclusion, Maskarin Gośālīputra’s teaching (MN I.407): *n’atthi balaṃ n’atthi viriyaṃ n’atthi purisatthāmo n’atthi purisaparakkamo, sabbe sattā sabbe pāṇā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā avasā abalā aviriyā niyatisaṅgatibhāvaparīṇatā chass’evābhijātsu sukhadukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvedentīti*. “There is no power, no energy, no manly strength, no manly endurance. All beings, all living beings, all creatures, all souls are without mastery, power and energy; moulded by destiny, circumstance, and nature, they experience pleasure and pain in the six classes.” Translation Nāṇamoli – Bodhi 2001: 513. See also SBhV II.222,5-9 (Meisig 1987: 136), PrV 12,23-13,5 and Vogel 1970: 24-25.

¹²³ *ahetuvāda* (so YBh_{MS} and above, n. 52; *ahetukavāda* YBh) in YBh 150,6-18 (YBh_{MS} 41 b4[-7 fully illegible], YBh_{Tib} D75b7-76a6/P88a1-8).

¹²⁴ See DN I.28-29 and I.29 respectively.

¹²⁵ I understand *ahetukam utpanna ātmā lokaś ca* as the object or content of *paśyati*, i.e., as: *ahetukam utpanna ātmā lokaś ceti*. Neither YBh_{MS} nor YBh_{Tib} reads (*)*iti*.

¹²⁶ At the end of the passage, instead of *ity evamādi*, YBh_{Tib} D76a2/P88a4 reads *la sogs pa snañ ba’i phyir ro* (without an equivalent of *iti*). My translation is based on YBh_{Tib}.

¹²⁷ YBh_{Tib} D76a1/P88a2 ([*dños po*] *tshad med pa* [*rnam pa sna tshogs*]) allows for several interpretations of *aparimāṇaṃ* in (*bhāvānām*) *aparimāṇaṃ* (*vaicitryam*): (1) as an epithet of *vaicitryam*; (2) as a substantive (see *MW* 51c s.v. “immeasurableness” and *BHSD* 45a s.v. “high number”), with the following translation: “(perceiving) the immeasurableness (/ high number) [and] diversity of entities”; (3) as an epithet of *bhāvānām* (in which case *aparimāṇaṃ* should be emended into *aparimāṇānām*).

¹²⁸ YBh 150,6-12 (YBh_{MS} 41b4-5, YBh_{Tib} D75b7-76a2/P88a1-4): *so ’pi dhyānasamṃśrayeṇa tarkasaṃmīśrayeṇa ca dvividho yathāsūtram eva vedītavayaḥ | kena kāraṇeṇa tarkasaṃmīśrayeṇaivaṃ paśyaty ahetukam utpanna ātmā lokaś ca | samāsenānabhisandhipūrvakam ādhyātmi-kabāhyānām bhāvānām aparimāṇaṃ vaicitryam upalabhya | hetūnām caikadā vaiphalyaṃ¹ upalabhya | akasmād ekadā vāyavo vānty ekadā na vānti | akasmād ekadā nadyaḥ syandanty ekadā na syandanti | akasmād ekadā² vṛkṣāḥ puṣpanti phalanty ekadā na puṣpanti na phalanṭīty evamādi |*. ¹*vaiphalyaṃ* YBh_{MS}, YBh_{Tib} (‘*bras bu med par*): *vaicitryam* YBh. ²*ekadā* em. YBh_{Tib} (*res ’ga*) [YBh_{MS} illegible]: *eke* YBh.

2.2.12. Next comes – this is allodoxy no. 12 – the “doctrine of annihilation” (*ucchedavāda*, or simply annihilationism), which is dealt with at some length in the DN.¹²⁹ And indeed, the *paravāda* section’s account of annihilationism would certainly remain unintelligible without the help of the BJSū:

As long as the self – corporeal, coarse and composed of the four elements – lasts, endures [and] keeps itself alive, it experiences diseases, abscesses(/tumors), pains(/torments)[, fever and sorrow(/torture)]. And when, after death, the body (*ātman*) is annihilated, perishes, ceases to be, then¹³⁰ the self (*ātman*) is [definitely] cut off. In the same way, [the self that is] divine [and] belongs to the sphere of desire, [the self that is] divine [and] belongs to the sphere of [subtle] corporeality, [the self that is] incorporeal [and] reaches up to the plane of the infinity of space, [and so on] up to [the self that is incorporeal and] reaches up to the plane of neither ideation nor non-ideation[: all of them are definitely annihilated after death]. The [whole] development is exactly as in the [Brahmajāla]sūtra.¹³¹

Explaining the identity of these annihilationists, the YBh simply says: “i.e., the seven [types of] annihilationists.”¹³² This is a clear reference to the BJSū, where *ucchedavāda* is introduced as follows:

There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who are Annihilationists, who in seven ways maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being.¹³³

The doctrine upheld by the first type of *ucchedavādin* closely resembles the one presented first in the YBh:

Since, Sir, the self has form, is built up of the four elements, and is the offspring of father and mother, it is cut off, destroyed, on the dissolution of the body;

¹²⁹ *ucchedavāda* in YBh 150,19-151,17 (YBh_{MS} [41b7, illegible]-42a4, YBh_{Tib} D76a6-b7/P 88b1-89a3). See also DN I.34-36.

¹³⁰ My temporal interpretation of the syntactic correlation *yataḥ ... iyatā* is based on YBh_{Tib} D76a7/P88b2: *nam ... de na*. It might provide a Sanskrit parallel to the Pali formula *yato ... ettāvātā* (DN I.34 and *passim*; see below, n. 134 and 160). Is *iyatā*^o to be emended into *iyatā ā*^o?

¹³¹ YBh 150,21-151,3 (YBh_{MS} [41b7, illegible]-42a1, YBh_{Tib} D76a6-b1/P88b1-4): *yāvad ātmā rūpy audārikaś cāturmahābhūtikas tiṣṭhati¹ dhriyate² yāpayati tāvat sarogaḥ saganḍaḥ saśalyaḥ³ | yataś cātmocchidyate vinaśyati na bhavati paraṃ maraṇād iyatātmā samucchimno bhavati | evaṃ divyaḥ kāmāvacaro divyo rūpāvacaro ’rūpy ākāśānantyāyatanopago yāvan naiti vasaññānāsaññāyatanopagaḥ | yathāsūtram eva vistaraḥ |*. ¹Here begins YBh_{MS} 42a1 (still hardly legible). ²*dhriyate* em. YBh: *dhriyate* YBh_{MS}. ³After *saśalyaḥ* (*zug rñu dañ bcas pa*), YBh_{Tib} reads *rims dañ bcas pa yoñs su gtuñ ba dañ bcas pa*, which Bhattacharya reconstructs as *sajvaraḥ saparitāpaḥ*; YBh_{MS} lacks any equivalent of these two words.

¹³² YBh 151,3 (YBh_{MS} 42a1, YBh_{Tib} D76b1/P88b4): *tadyathā saptocchedavādinah* |. Note YBh_{MS} *sapta ucchedavādinah* and YBh_{Tib} *chad par smra ba bdum po*.

¹³³ DN I.34: *santi bhikkhave eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā ucchedavādā sattassa ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ vibhavaṃ paññāpentī sattahi vatthūhi*. Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 46.

and does not continue after death; and then, Sir, the self is completely annihilated.¹³⁴

And this come very close to the teaching ascribed to the allodox teacher Pūraṇa Kāśyapa in the SBhV and the PrV, or to Ajita Kesakambalin in the Pali canon.¹³⁵ The second type of *ucchedavādin* disagrees, claiming that the self is not completely annihilated upon the dissolution of the body, but that there is a “further self” (*añño attā*), “divine, corporeal, belonging to the plane of desire, feeding on solid food,”¹³⁶ which is completely annihilated only at the end of this form of existence. And the next five types of annihilationists also continue this way, each dissenting with the preceding one, looking for ever more ethereal forms of the self’s existence before its final destruction: (3) a further self that is “divine, corporeal, made of mind, with all its major and minor parts complete, not deficient in any organ”;¹³⁷ (4) a further self that, “by passing beyond ideas of corporeality, by the dying out of ideas of resistance, by paying no heed to ideas of difference, conscious that space is infinite, reaches up to the plane of the infinity of space”;¹³⁸ (5) a further self, “which having passed beyond the plane of the infinity of space, knowing that awareness is infinite, reaches up to the plane of the infinity of awareness”;¹³⁹ (6) a further self, “which by passing quite beyond the plane of the infinity of awareness, knowing that

¹³⁴ DN I.34: *yato kho bho ayaṃ attā rūpī cātummahābhūṭiko mātāpettikasambhavo kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati na hoti paraṃ marañā ettāvata kho bho ayaṃ attā sammā samucchinnā hotīti*. Translation (slightly modified) Rhys Davids 1899: 46.

¹³⁵ SBhV II.221,4-8: *ihaiva jīvo jīvati | sa pretyocchidyate vinaśyati na bhavati paraṃ marañāt | cāturmahābhautikāḥ puruṣasya samucchrayaḥ | yasmin samaye kālaṃ karoti tasya pṛthivyāṃ pṛthivikāya upaiti | apsv apkāyaḥ | tejasī tejahkāyaḥ | vāyau vāyukāyaḥ | ākāśa indriyāṇy anuparivartante |*. “Life is lived only here, thereafter one is cut off; one perishes and does not (re)appear after death. Man’s body is composed of four gross elements: when he fulfills (his) time, his earth body is dissolved into earth, (his) water body into water, (his) fire body into fire, (and his) wind body is dissolved into wind; (his) senses return to the atmosphere.” Translation Vogel 1970: 21-22 (translating the parallel passage in PrV 11,10-15). DN I.55 ascribes this doctrine to Ajita Kesakambalin; it is anonymous in MN I.515 and SN III.206-207 (see Vogel 1970: 20-21, n. 5). Note that this is only a part of the doctrine ascribed to Pūraṇa Kāśyapa in the Sanskrit sources and to Ajita Kesakambalin in the Pali sources; its first part is the subject matter of the YBh’s *nāstikavāda* (see below, §2.2.13).

¹³⁶ DN I.34: *dibbo rūpī kāmāvacaro kabaliṅkāhārahakkho*. Translation (modified) Rhys Davids 1899: 46 (11).

¹³⁷ DN I.34: *dibbo rūpī manomayo sabbaṅgapaccaṅgī ahīnindriyo*. Translation (modified) Rhys Davids 1899: 47 (12).

¹³⁸ DN I.34: *sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamma paṭighasaññānaṃ atthagamā nānatthasaññānaṃ amanasikārā ananto okaso ti ākāśānañcāyatanūpago*. Translation (modified) Rhys Davids 1899: 47 (13).

¹³⁹ DN I.35: *sabbaso ākāśānañcāyatanāṃ samatikkamma anantaṃ viññānaṃ ti viññānañcāyatanūpago*. Translation (modified) Rhys Davids 1899: 48 (14).

there is nothing, reaches up to the plane of nothingness”;¹⁴⁰ (7) a further self, “which by passing quite beyond the plane of nothingness, realises ‘This is good, this is excellent,’ and reaches up to the plane of neither ideation nor non-ideation.”¹⁴¹ This is as high as the self may exist on the Buddhist “cosmo-meditational” scale, and it is doomed to definitive annihilation once this one and only existence is over.

2.2.13. The YBh turns next to “nihilism” or, rather, to the “doctrine of [universal] denial(/non-existence),” which constitutes allodoxy no. 13:¹⁴²

[This ascetic or brahmin] holds such a view, such a discourse: “There is no giving, there is no sacrificing,” and so on and so on until: “[There is] no *arhat* in the world.” Or, he holds such a view, such a discourse: “Everything is non-existent in every regard.”¹⁴³

As pointed out by Schmithausen, this passage (as well as the entire *nāstikavāda* section) hints at two distinct versions and even layers of “nihilism.”¹⁴⁴ Expounded first is “the traditional, canonical ‘nihilist’ view denying [the moral value and transcendent effect of] gift, sacrifice, etc.”¹⁴⁵ The items whose existence are denied by this traditionally minded *nāstika* (in YBh 152,5-153,2) include giving (*datta*), sacrificing (*iṣṭa*), oblation (*huta*), good action (*sucarita*), evil action (*duṣcarita*), the result, viz. the maturation of good and evil actions (*sucaritaduṣcaritānām karmaṇām phalaṃ vipākaḥ*), mother (*mātr*), father (*pitṛ*), an “apparitional” being (*sattva upapādukaḥ*), and *arhats* in the world (*loke ’rhanṭaḥ*). Here again, the YBh’s account is clearly indebted to canonical sources (such as the ŚPhSū and its dependences) describing the doctrine of the

¹⁴⁰ DN I.35: *sabbaso viññānānañcāyatanam samatikkamma n’atthi kiñcīti akiñcaññāyatanūpago*. Translation (modified) Rhys Davids 1899: 48 (15).

¹⁴¹ DN I.35: *sabbaso akiñcaññāyatanam samatikkamma santam etaṃ pañitam etan ti nevasaññānāsaññāyatanūpago*. Translation (modified) Rhys Davids 1899: 48 (16).

¹⁴² *nāstikavāda* in YBh 151,18-155,5 (YBh_{MS} 42a4-43a1, YBh_{Tib} D76b7-78a7/P89a3-90b5). The compositional structure and parts of the *nāstikavāda* section are dealt with in Schmithausen 2000: 254-259.

¹⁴³ YBh 151,19-21 (YBh_{MS} 42a4-5, YBh_{Tib} D76b7-77a1/P89a3-4): *evaṃdr̥ṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī | nāsti dattaṃ nāstīṣṭam iti | vistareṇa yāvan na loke ’rhanṭi iti | evaṃdr̥ṣṭir vā punar¹ bhavaty evaṃvādī | sarvaṃ sarvalakṣaṇena nāstīti | .¹vā punar YBh_{MS} (nearly illegible), YBh_{Tib} (*yañ*) (see Schmithausen 2000: 257, n. 45): YBh om. *vā punar*.*

¹⁴⁴ According to Schmithausen (2000: 258), the exposition and critique of the “Mahāyāna ‘nihilist’ view” is a later addition to the text: “[T]he [*nāstikavāda*] passage *originally* consisted of a treatment of the canonical ‘nihilist’ view only, and ... the second, Mahāyāna ‘nihilist’ view was *added later*.” In Schmithausen’s (2000: 263) opinion, this addition took place “after or at least towards the very end of the compilation of the *Mau[ḥi] Bh[ūmiḥ]*, but before the compilation of *Vin[iścaya]S[āṅ]g[rahaṇī]* had started.”

¹⁴⁵ Schmithausen 2000: 257.

teacher Pūraṇa Kāśyapa (or, according to Pali sources, Ajita Kesakambali).¹⁴⁶ As for the second type of “nihilism,” Schmithausen labels it “Mahāyāna ‘nihilist’ view.”¹⁴⁷ This version of *nāstikavāda*, which is already systematically criticised in the Bodhisattvabhūmi,¹⁴⁸ arises from one’s misinterpretation of the Mahāyāna (*prajñāpāramitā*) *sūtra*’s teachings on emptiness, essencelessness and ineffability.¹⁴⁹

2.2.14. The next allodoxy (no. 14) pertains to the caste-classes (*varṇa*) and the brahmins’ claims to socio-religious superiority (*agravāda*):¹⁵⁰

Brahmins are the best caste-class; [any] other caste-class is inferior. Brahmins are the white caste-class; [any] other caste-class is black. Brahmins are pure; non-brahmins are not. Brahmins are the sons of Brahman, [his] legitimate

¹⁴⁶ SBhV II.220,26-221,4 (Meisig 1987: 126): *nāsti dattam | nāstīṣṭam | nāsti hutam | nāsti sucaritam | [nāsti duṣcaritam] | nāsti sucaritaduṣcaritānām karmaṇām phalavipākaḥ | nāsty ayam lokah | nāsti paralokah | nāsti mātā | nāsti pitā | nāsti sattva upapādukaḥ | na santi loka ’rhanataḥ samyaggatāḥ samyakpratipannā ya imaṃ ca lokam paraṃ ca lokam dṛṣṭa eva dharme svayam abhijñāyā sāksātkṛtvopasampadya pravedayante – kṣīṇā me jātir uṣitaṃ brahmacaryam kṛtaṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparam asmād bhavaṃ prajānīma iti* |. “There are no alms; there is no offering; there is no burnt-offering. There is no good conduct; there is no bad conduct; there is no fruit or fruition of acts of good conduct and bad conduct. There is no hither world; there is no thither world. There is no mother, there is no father. There is no spontaneously generated being. There are in the world no Arhats – rightly gone (and) rightly walked – who in this life, having through their own higher knowledge experienced and accomplished the hither world and the thither world, declare: ‘Rebirth is spent for us; we have practised holy conduct; we have done what was to be done; we know no other existence than this.’” Translation (slightly modified) Vogel 1970: 21 (translating the parallel passage in PrV 10,15-11,9). See also DN I.53, and cf. above, n. 135.

¹⁴⁷ Schmithausen 2000: 258.

¹⁴⁸ See BoBh_T 99,6-102,6 / BoBh_W 46,7-48,6 / BoBh_D 31,10-32,21. He who defends a *durgrhītā śūnyatā* (“misunderstood emptiness,” in contradistinction to the *sugrhitā śūnyatā* or “well-understood emptiness”) is termed a *nāstika* in BoBh_T 100,1 and 2. His “nihilism” consists in viewing true reality (*tattva*, the BoBh’s *vastu[mātra]*) as nothing but designation (*prajñaptimātra*).

¹⁴⁹ YBh 153,2-6 (YBh_{MS} 42b2-3, YBh_{Tib} D77b3-4/P89b7-90a1): *kena kāraṇenaivaṃdṛṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī – nāsti sarvaṃ sarvalakṣaṇeneti | ye te tathāgatabhāṣitāḥ sūtrāntā gambhīrā gambhūrābhā¹ nirabhilapyadharmatām ārabhya | tān yathā² bhūtam aprajānataḥ | ayoniśas ca dharmalakṣaṇaṃ vyavasthāpayato nāstidṛṣṭir utpadyate | yenānyaivaṃ bhavati – nāsti sarvaṃ³ sarvalakṣaṇeneti* |. ¹*gambhūrābhā* YBh_{MS} (precisely: *gambhūrā ābhāḥ*): *gambhūrābhāsā* YBh. ²*tān yathā*^o YBh_{MS}, YBh_{Tib} (*de dag yaṃ dag pa ji lta ba bzin du*): *nānyathā*^o YBh. ³*sarvaṃ* em. YBh: *sarvaḥ* YBh_{MS}. “For what reason does [the nihilist] hold such a view, such a discourse, [i.e.,] that everything is non-existent in every respect? In him who does not correctly understand those profound [and] profound-looking *sūtras* (*sūtrānta*) that [have been] preached by the Tathāgata with reference to the fact that [all factors] have an ineffable nature and in him who improperly determines the [true] character of the factors, the false view of [universal] non-existence (*nāstidṛṣṭi*) arises so that the following occurs to him: ‘Everything is non-existent in every respect.’”

¹⁵⁰ *agravāda* in YBh 155,6-156,17 (YBh_{MS} 43a1-7, YBh_{Tib} D78a7-79a5/P90b5-91b5).

[sons], born of [his] mouth, born of Brahman, created by Brahman. [Brahmins are] Brahman's retinue(/associates/companions).¹⁵¹

The issue of the brahmins' monopoly over whiteness and purity is reminiscent of a MBh passage in which Patañjali mentions a light-colored (*gaura*) complexion and pure conduct (*śucyācāra*) as characteristic marks of brahmins.¹⁵² As for the brahmins' genealogical claim that they go back to the (mouth of the) primordial Brahman itself, or to Prajāpati, it is well attested (and duly criticised) in numerous Buddhist sources, such as the Karmavibhaṅga, the Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna, the Kalpadrumāvadānakalpalatā and the Vajrasūci.¹⁵³ Strangely enough, the YBh ascribes this fairly common doctrine to the brahmins belonging to (/ living in) the *kaliyuga*,¹⁵⁴ a fact to which I shall come back in some detail in the second part of the present essay.

2.2.15. Allodoxy no. 15 consists in the “doctrine of [personal] purity” (*śuddhivāda*)¹⁵⁵ and belongs to two different groups, “i.e., those who profess *nirvāṇa* in this very life and those who profess [personal] purity through [bathing in certain rivers' holy] water.”¹⁵⁶ Whereas the first doctrine is nothing but a substantialist version of hedonism and the four Buddhist *dhyānas*, the second divides itself in turn into the opinion according to which purity(/purification) consists in ablutions (*snāna*), and the opinion according to which it consists in religious vows and observances (*vrata[samādāna]*):

[This ascetic or brahmin] holds such a view, such a discourse: “And when (*yatas*) the self is liberated, [when it has] obtained mastery over the mind, [when it

¹⁵¹ YBh 155,8-10 (YBh_{MS} 43a1-2, YBh_{Tib} D78a7-b2/P90b6-7): *brāhmaṇā¹ agro varṇaḥ | hīno 'nyavarṇaḥ² | brāhmaṇāḥ³ śuklo varṇaḥ | kṛṣṇo 'nyo varṇaḥ | brāhmaṇāḥ śudhyante nābrāhmaṇāḥ | brāhmaṇā brahmaṇaḥ putrā aurasā mukhato jātā brahmajā brahmanīrmitā⁴ brahmapārśada itī |*. ¹*brāhmaṇā* em. YBh_{Tib} (*bram ze rnams*): *brahmaṇā* YBh_{MS}, *brāhmaṇo* YBh. ²*'nyavarṇaḥ* YBh_{MS}: *'nyo varṇaḥ* YBh. ³*brāhmaṇāḥ* YBh_{MS}, YBh_{Tib} (*bram ze rnams*): *brāhmaṇaḥ* YBh. ⁴*brahmanīrmitā* YBh_{MS} (cf. Bhattacharya 1957: 155, n. 2), YBh_{Tib} (*tshaṅs pas sprul pa'o*): *brahmanīrgatāḥ* YBh.

¹⁵² See MBh I.411 and Halbfass 1991: 355-356. The passage is discussed by Dharmakīrti's commentators Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin (respectively PVT *ñe* P27b5-6 and PVSVT 558,17-19; see Eltschinger 2000: 111 and n. 302). In another passage (PVT *ñe* P45b1-2 = PVSVT 578,21-22), the two commentators explain *śauca* as follows: *śaucaṃ dvividham | bāhyam āntaraṃ ca | bāhyaṃ snānādi | āntaraṃ steyādinivṛttiḥ*. “Purity is twofold, viz. external and internal. External [purity consists of practices] such as ablutions. Internal [purity consists of one's] abstaining from [immoral actions] such as theft.”

¹⁵³ See Eltschinger 2000: 48-55.

¹⁵⁴ According to YBh 155,11 (YBh_{MS} 43a2, YBh_{Tib} D78b2/P90b8): *tadyathā kaliyugikā brāhmaṇāḥ |*

¹⁵⁵ *śuddhivāda* in YBh 156,18-159,10 (YBh_{MS} 43a7-44a1, YBh_{Tib} D79a5-80a7/P91b5-93a2).

¹⁵⁶ YBh 158,2 (YBh_{MS} 43b3, YBh_{Tib} D79b3/P92a4): *tadyathā dṛṣṭadharmanīrvāṇavādina udayasuddhyādivādinaś ca |*

has] obtained mastery over application (*yoga*), [when it is] in full enjoyment and possession of the divine five strands of sensual pleasures, [when it] plays, rejoices [and] amuses itself, [then] it is pure on account of the purity of obtaining *nirvāṇa* in this very life. And when [the self] enters into and abides in the first meditation (*dhyāna*), which is dissociated from sensual desires (*kāma*), dissociated from [all] inauspicious sinful factors, accompanied by deliberation and examination, born of dissociation [and consisting of] joy and ease, [and so on] until: enters into and abides in the fourth meditation, [then] it is pure on account of the purity of obtaining the supreme *nirvāṇa* in this very life.” [Or,] for example, here [in the world], a certain [person] holds such a view, such a discourse: “He who bathes in the Sundarikā river eliminates all his sins.” [And] just as [it is with bathing] in the Sundarikā [river], so [it is with bathing] in the river[s] Bāhuhā, Gayā, Sarasvatī [and] Gaṅgā. In this [case (?), this person] thinks [himself to be] pure by bathing in water. [Or else,] for example, here [in the world], a certain [person] thinks [himself to be] pure by [following] the observance [of behaving like] a dog, by [following] the observance [of behaving like] a cow, by [following] the observance of oil and powder (?), by [following] the observance [of going] naked,¹⁵⁷ by [following] the observance [of smearing one’s body with (?)] ashes, by [following] the observance of bodily exertion, by [following] the final (?) observance: [this person] thinks [himself to be] pure by practising such observances.¹⁵⁸

According to the BJSū, there are five types of *dr̥ṣṭadharmanirvāṇavādins*; proponents (2) to (5) criticize each preceding one (i.e., proponents [1] to [4])¹⁵⁹ for

¹⁵⁷ Or should we understand: “by [following] the observance of the Jainas”?

¹⁵⁸ YBh 157,1-158,2 (YBh_{MS} 43b1-3, YBh_{Tib} D79a5-b3/P91b5-94a4): *evaṃdr̥ṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī | yataś cātmā muktaś¹ cittavaśitāṃ cānuprāpto yogavaśitāṃ cānuprāpto divyair pañcabhiḥ kāmaguṇair samarpitair samanvaṅgībhūtaḥ kr̥ḍati ramate paricārayati | sa dr̥ṣṭadharmanirvāṇaprāptisuddhyā śuddho bhavati | yataś ca viviktaṃ kāmair viviktaṃ pāpakair akuśalair dharmair savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekaṃ sapr̥ṭisukhaṃ² prathamam dhyānam upasampadya viharati | yāvac caturthaṃ dhyānam upasampadya viharati | sa paramadr̥ṣṭadharmanirvāṇaprāptisuddhyā śuddho bhavati | yathāpīhaikatya³ evaṃdr̥ṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī | sarvapāpāny asyāpaharati⁴ yo nadyāṃ sundarikāyāṃ snāti | yathā sundarikāyāṃ evaṃ bāhuhāyāṃ gayāyāṃ sarasvatyāṃ nadyāṃ gaṅgāyāṃ | sa tatrodakasnātreṇa⁵ śuddham manyate | yathāpīhaikatyaḥ kukkuravratena śuddham⁶ manyate | govratena tailamaṣivratena⁷ nagnavratena bhasmavratena kaṣṭavratena niṣṭhāvratenety evaṃbhāgīyair vratasamādānair śuddham manyate |* ¹muktaś em. YBh_{Tib} (*grol ba yin la*): *muktiḥ* YBh_{MS}; *muktiṃ* YBh. ²savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekaṃ sapr̥ṭisukhaṃ em. YBh, YBh_{Tib} (*rtog pa dan bcas dpyod pa dan bcas śiñ dben pa las skyes pa ’i dga ’ba dan bde ba can*): YBh_{MS} om. ³yathāpīhaikatya em. YBh_{Tib} (*’di ltar ’di na la la*): *yathāpi tad* YBh_{MS}, YBh. ⁴āpaharati em. YBh, YBh_{Tib} (*sel bar ’gyur ro*): *āharati* YBh_{MS}. ⁵snātreṇa YBh_{MS}; ⁶snānena YBh. ⁶śuddham em.: *śuddhiṃ* YBh_{MS}, YBh (My interpretation, which applies to the two other occurrences of *śuddham* [with *śuddham* in YBh_{MS}], relies on Renou 1930: 502 [§370]; *śuddhim* and even *śuddhaḥ* seem equally possible). ⁷tailamaṣivratena YBh_{MS}, YBh_{Tib} (*’bru mar dan sre mog gi [D : P mo ’i] brtul žugs*): *nakulavratena* YBh.

¹⁵⁹ With the following words (DN I.36 and 37): *atthi kho bho eso attā yaṃ tvaṃ vadesi. n ’eso n ’atthīti vadāmi. no ca kho bho ayaṃ attā ettavatā paramaḍḍiṭṭhadhammanibbānappatto hoti.* “There is, Sir, such a self as you describe. That I do not deny. But the self does not by that alone attain to the highest *nirvāṇa*.” Translation (slightly modified) Rhys Davids 1899: 50 and 51.

believing in a version of *nirvāṇa* in this life that is too coarse. According to the first, “whenever the self, in full enjoyment and possession of the five pleasures of sense, indulges all its functions, then ... the self has attained, in this very life, the highest *nirvāṇa*.”¹⁶⁰ The second proponent rejects this opinion on the grounds that

sensuous delights are transitory, they involve pain, their very nature is to fluctuate. And grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and loathing arise out of their inconsistency and change.¹⁶¹

According to him, *nirvāṇa* in this life is nothing but the first *dhyāna*. The third disagrees: since the condition that characterizes the first *dhyāna* still involves deliberation (*vitarka*) and examination (*vicāra*), it is gross (*audārika*), so that liberation in this very life rather consists in the second *dhyāna*. Against this opinion, the fourth argues that the second *dhyāna* entails joy (*prītigata*) and the mind’s pleasurable excitement (*cetaso audvilyam*), which are gross, and advocates the third *dhyāna* as corresponding to *ḍṛṣṭadharmanirvāṇa*. However, says the fifth proponent, the third *dhyāna* is still too coarse inasmuch as it “involves a constant dwelling of the mind on the ease it has enjoyed”,¹⁶² according to him, the supreme *nirvāṇa* in this life coincides with the fourth *dhyāna*. Such is the scriptural background of the first part of allodoxy no. 15, i.e., *ḍṛṣṭadharmanirvāṇavāda*. As for its second part, viz. *udakaśuddhyādivāda* (which in turn divides itself into the doctrine of ablutions and the doctrine of observances), it has no equivalent in the BJSū.¹⁶³

2.2.16. The sixteenth and last allodoxy consists in “the doctrine of festivals and auspicious things” (*kautukamaṅgalavāda*),¹⁶⁴ which the YBh ascribes to *gā-*

¹⁶⁰ DN I.36: *yato kho bho eso attā pañcahi kāmaguṇehi samappito samaṅgibhūto paricāreti, ettāvātā kho ... ayaṃ attā paramadīṭṭhadhammanibbānaṃ patto hotīti*. Translation (slightly modified) Rhys Davids 1899: 49-50.

¹⁶¹ DN I.36: *kāmā ... aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā, tesam vipariṇāmaññathābhāva upajjanti sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā*. Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 50.

¹⁶² DN I.37: *tattha sukham-iti cetaso ābhogo*. Translation Rhys Davids 1899: 51.

¹⁶³ On *vrata*, note AKBh 282,18-20, apparently quoting from the Jñānaprasthāna (see *Kośa* IV.20): *yad ayaṃ puruṣapudgalo goṣīlaṃ samādāya vartate mrgaṣīlaṃ kukkuraṣīlaṃ sa tena śudhyati mucyate sukhaduḥkhaṃ vyatikrāmati sukhaduḥkhavyatikramaṃ cānuprāpnoti* | “By following the conduct of a cow, the conduct of a wild animal, the conduct of a dog, this human individual purifies [himself], liberates [himself], overcomes pleasure and pain and obtains the [definitive] overcoming of pleasure and pain.” On *go-* and *kukkura-vrata*, see Anālayo 2009: 7. On *snāna*, see *Kośa* III.135, n. 2, and Eltschinger 2007: 108, n. 126.

¹⁶⁴ *kautukamaṅgalavāda* in YBh 159,11-160,7 (YBh_{MS} 44a1-5, YBh_{Tib} D80a6-b7/P93a2-b3). *maṅgala* plays an important role in Aśoka’s rock edict no. 9, where according to Bloch (1950: 113, n. 2), the word refers to a “cérémonie magique, notamment pour l’interprétation des présages.” According to this edict, ordinary people practise such ceremonies on the occasion of

ṇitikas, i.e., to “arithmeticians” (*MW*) versed in astronomy/astrology and concerned with rituals.¹⁶⁵ Here is what they claim:

There is no realisation of [one’s] wishes when the sun, the moon, a(the) planet(s), a(the) star(s), a(the) lunar day(s) are unpropitious, but (*ca*) one’s wishes are realised when they are propitious, and [it is] with a view to this [that] he(/one) worships the sun, etc., and [that] he(/one) engages in(/arranges) [things such as] fire oblations, muttered prayers, new and full moon ceremonies (*darśapūrṇa*), jars, fruits of the wood-apple tree and conch-shells.¹⁶⁶

I have to postpone any statement concerning the identity of these *gāṇitikas* (“mathematicians,” “astronomers,” “astrologers”?). Is our text’s insistence on sun-worship a clue pointing to the so-called Maga brahmins, a famous representative of whom may have been the great sixth-century astronomer Vārāhamihira?¹⁶⁷

illnesses (*ābādha*), weddings (*āvāhavivāha*), births (*putralābha*), etc.; see Bloch 1950: 113-117. The word *maṅgala* also occurs, e.g., in MDhŚ 2.34, where it refers to an “auspicious ceremony” (Olivelle 2005a: 96) of the same kind as a Brahmanical consecratory rite or sacrament ([*śarīra-*] *saṃskāra*); as an example, Medhātithi (ManBh I.127,29, reading *maṅgalya*) alludes to *pūtanāśa-kumikaikavṛkṣopahārādī*, “[things] such as an oblation, at an isolated tree, to [*mātr*s attendant on Skanda such as] Pūtanā and Śakunikā” (?). As already noted by Bronkhorst (2011: 16-17 and n. 23), *maṅgala* occurs in BC 1.83, where Aśvaghoṣa refers to Śuddhodana’s “sacrifices to the gods together with incantations, oblations and other auspicious rites” (*japahomamaṅgalādyāḥ ... devatejyāḥ*; translation Johnston 1936: II.18), and in GDhSū 11.17 (see Olivelle 2005b: 208).

¹⁶⁵ YBh 159,16 (YBh_{MS} 44a2, YBh_{Tib} D80b2/P93a4-5): *tadyathā gāṇitikāḥ* |.

¹⁶⁶ YBh 159,13-15 (YBh_{MS} 44a2, YBh_{Tib} D80b1-2/P93a3-4): *āditycandragrahanakṣatra¹ti-thivaigunyeṇa manorathānām² asiddhir bhavati | tadānugunyeṇa ca manorathasiddhiḥ | sadadarthaṃ cādityādīpūjāṃ prakalpayati | homajapa³darśapūrṇakumbhabilvaphala⁴śaṅkhādīṃś ca⁵ pratyupasthāpayati |* ¹*grahanakṣatra*° YBh_{MS}, YBh_{Tib} (*gza’ dañ rgyu skar*): °*graha*° YBh. ²*manorathānām* em. YBh: *manorathanām* YBh_{MS}. ³*japa*° em. YBh_{Tib} (*bzlas brjod*): °*japā*° YBh_{MS}. ⁴*bilvaphala*° em. YBh, YBh_{Tib} (*bil ba’i ’bras bu*): °*vilva*° YBh_{MS}. ⁵*ādīṃś ca* YBh_{MS}: °*ādīn* YBh. The interpretation of the compound °(*japa*)*darśapūrṇakumbha*° (YBh_{MS} °*japādarśapūrṇakumbha*°) is made very problematic by its Tibetan translation (YBh_{Tib} D80b2/P93a4: [*bzlas brjod dañ*] | *rtsā da rbha* (P: D *dar ba*) *dañ* | *bum pa gañ ba*), which seems to reflect the following wording: °(*japa*)*darbhapūrṇakumbha*°, viz. “(muttered prayer,) *darbha* grass, full jar.” At first sight, the reading °*darśapūrṇa*° seems to better fit the obviously ritual (and calendarian/astronomical) context of the description. However, both *darbha* (a type of sacrificial grass) and *pūrṇakumbha* (“a cup filled with holy water and used at the consecration of a king,” *MW* 642b) seem to fit the bill too.

¹⁶⁷ See Bronkhorst’s forthcoming “Who is a Brahmin?”, section no. 2, “Brahmins of foreign origin: the Magas,” with a reference to Biswas 1949.

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- YBh_{MS} Yogācārabhūmi (“Patna” manuscript). See Delhey 2013: 508-509, and Sferra 2008: 41.
- YBhŚ Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, Tibetan version. D no. 4035-4042, *tshi, dzi, wi, źi, zi, 'i*; P. no. 5536-5543, *dzi, wi, źi, zi, 'i, yi*. See also BoBh, HV and YBh.
- YBh_{Tib} Yogācārabhūmi, Tibetan version. D no. 4035, *tshi* 1b1-283a7; P no. 5536, *dzi* 1-332a2.