

### 3. Figurations of Power in Eighteenth-Century Transoxania

The political order established by the Chingizid dynasties and their Uzbek supporters underwent an incremental change. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, this process gained speed after the takeover by the Tuqay-Timurids around 1600, and accelerated in the time of Subhān Qulī Khān (r. 1680–1702) and his successor ‘Ubaidullah Khān. By 1711, the appanages had dissolved into a setting not unlike other Turko-Mongol empires.

This chapter tells the (hi-)story of eighteenth-century Mā Warā’ al-Nahr and the various shifts of power, the ups and downs of an ongoing political game. It starts with the events under the late Tuqay-Timurids and continues through the conquest by Nādir Shāh and its consequences up to the establishment of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān as new king. Since we still know very little about Central Asian history beneath the level of the rulers, I endeavor to write a local history, or rather, local histories of Bukhara and its dependencies. In doing so, I adhere to Beisembiev’s dictum that eighteenth-century Central Asian history should be explored “as the interrelations of different Uzbek and other tribal groups and clans controlling definite sedentary economic zones.”<sup>1</sup>

To overcome the dynastic focus of the sources, I will read them against the grain. The emphasis will be on the relationship between the kings and the tribal groups they sought to control and balance. Further attention will be paid to the relations among the amirid elite and the typical forging and breaking of alliances. By capturing the careers of individual chieftains, I hope to create an understanding of the interdependencies between the various actors and groups involved. Given the fact that most of the tribal groupings tried to attach themselves to the court or to form larger alliances, which often cut across the established groups and affiliations, the following narrative will shift between summary analyses of career paths and conceptual reflection. Detailed passages from the sources revealing fine-grained structures shaping events, situations and particular patterns of behavior will be interlaced with the text to substantiate my argumentation. To this end, I will take a look at power negotiations and negotiation

---

<sup>1</sup> Beisembiev, “Unknown Dynasty,” 20.

interfaces, tribal councils and assemblies, as well as patterns of conflict and distribution of resources.

### THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THE LAST TUQAY-TIMURIDS

In the time of ‘Ubaidullah Khān II, centrifugal dynamics gave rise to a number of *amīrs* who strove for more independence. These processes speeded up in the time of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān. The following list gives an overview of the protagonists in the first three decades of the eighteenth century:

- **‘Ubaidullah Khān b. Subhān Qulī Khān** (r. 1702–11); king of Transoxania, who led a major campaign to Balkh in 1707 and was assassinated at the climax of an amirid conspiracy in 1711. Throughout his short reign, he faced severe challenges by several ambitious *amīrs* for more independence at home and against his attempts to reconquer Balkh. In the end, this ruler lost the support of the urban population and the influential Jūybārī *khwājas*.
- **Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān b. Subhān Qulī Khān** (r. 1711–47); younger brother of ‘Ubaidullah Khān and last active Tuqay-Timurid ruler. From 1721 onward, he was confronted with a rebellion by Rajab Khān in Samarqand. Afterward, he became increasingly dependent on the Manghit *amīrs* and a court faction called the *ahl-i mahram*.
- **Rajab Khān** (d. 1727–28); also known as *khān* of Samarqand, was a relative of the famous Khiwan ruler Abū’l-Ghāzī Khān and himself lived in Miyānkāl. In 1722–23 he was installed as new Chingizid king by a coalition of Uzbek tribes from Miyānkāl and eastern Transoxania.
- **Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī b. Ghāzī Bī Yūz**; first governor of Ūrā Tippa and later of Samarqand. In 1702 he was appointed to the rank of *atālīq* and also accompanied the king on his campaign to Balkh in 1707. He was one of the most important *amīrs* in the time of ‘Ubaidullah Khān but later disappears from the historical accounts.
- **Ma’šūm Ḥājī b. Ādīna Muḥammad Ḥājī Sarāy** (d. 1714); began his career in the time of Subhān Qulī Khān and acted first as *parwānachī*. In 1117/1705–06 he was appointed *dīwānbēgī*. From 1707 onward, he held the prestigious post of *atālīq* but fell from royal grace and was dismissed immediately prior to his death.
- **Ibrāhīm Bī b. Rustam Bī Kīnakās** (d. 1730–31?); appears first as *mīrākḥūr* and one of the leaders of the powerful *ūng wa sāl* tribes. In 1711 he was promoted to the post of *dīwānbēgī* but was dismissed in 1714. Two years later, he was appointed to the rank of *atālīq* and again dismissed in 1719. Afterward, he enthroned Rajab Khān as independent ruler in Samarqand and joined forces with other tribes.
- **Farḥād Bī Ūtārchī** (d. 1721–22); was an influential chief of the Khīṭā’ī-Qīpčāq with a stronghold first in Charkhīn near Samarqand, and later in Qarshī and

Samarqand. Since 1711 he had shifted his loyalty to and from the court several times. In 1719 he was appointed to the rank of *atāliq* but fell victim to a conspiracy two years later.

- **Khudāyār Bī b. Khudāy Qulī Bī Manghit** (d. 1716); was first governor of Shahr-i Sabz and appointed *parwānachī* in 1706. In 1711 he again became governor of Shahr-i Sabz but was continuously opposed by some of the *ūng wa sūl* tribes, especially the Kīnakās, so that he soon retired to Chirāghchī. In 1714 he received the post of *atāliq* but was dismissed about two years later.
- **Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī b. Khudāyār Bī Manghit** (d. 1744 or 1745); made a career under Abū'l-Faiḥ Khān and acted first as *qurchībāshī*. In 1716–17 he was promoted to the post of *parwānachī*. After demonstrating his loyalty to Abū'l-Faiḥ Khān during a rebellion in 1719, he received the post of *dīwānbēgī*. After 1721–22, he consolidated his position as *atāliq* and protector of the king.
- **Khwāja Bāltū Sarāyi** (d. 1711); chief eunuch of 'Ubaidullah Khān's mother and in charge of the royal treasury. In 1709 he initiated a currency depreciation together with Mihtar Shaḥfī, triggering riots in the capital. Two years later he was beheaded in the course of the plot against 'Ubaidullah Khān.
- **Khwāja Ulfat Sarāyi** (d. 1747); chief eunuch of the royal harem after 1715. He was an influential leader of the *ahl-i maḥramīya* ("the Confidants") of Abū'l-Faiḥ Khān and de facto in charge of the government of Bukhara.

These actors were all part of the dramatic power struggle unfolding toward the end of Subḥān Qulī Khān's long reign. The late Tuḡay-Timurids ruled in an eventful time. Their realm was often shaken by rebellion. Unruly nomads like the Qazāq and the Qalmāq posed periodic threats at the fringes of Mā Warā' al-Nahr.<sup>2</sup> 'Ubaidullah Khān's reign was dominated by constant efforts to reconquer Balkh south of the Oxus. But these intentions were frustrated by the Uzbek chiefs and a number of rebellions in the provinces. Especially the *ūng wa sūl* tribes of Shahr-i Sabz often revolted against the king and impeded his military enterprises.<sup>3</sup> In 1709, a revolt of several Uzbek tribes in Samarqand and riots shaking the capital after a depreciation of the Bukharan currency, the *tanga*, caused further cracks in the king's authority.<sup>4</sup> His court chronicler also criticizes the growing influence of 'Ubaidullah Khān's

<sup>2</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 144a–b, 147b; Semenov trans., 163, 166; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 285b; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 16b–17a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 183b–189b; Ya' qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 2b–3a.

<sup>3</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 33b, 35b, 73b, 76a–b, 81a, 90a, 134a passim; Semenov trans., 49, 51, 87, 89, 94, 103, 152 passim.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 139b–141a; Russian text, 158–59.

mother and his chief wife, Bībī Pādīshāh.<sup>5</sup> Having lost the support of his *amīrs* and the influential Jūybārī *khwājas*, ‘Ubaidullah Khān was assassinated on Muḥarram 28, 1123/March 18, 1711.<sup>6</sup> Just before the king’s death, the *amīrs* placed his brother Abū’l-Faiẓ Sulṭān on the throne.<sup>7</sup>

#### THE MAJOR POWER SHIFTS UNDER ABŪ’L-FAIẒ KHĀN

Under Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān, the dissolution of the Tuḡay-Timurid realm continued. Simultaneously, the offices of *atālīq* and *dīwānbēgī* became subject to an intense rivalry similar to the development in Balkh in the past decades. The following sequence illustrates the quick change in the figurations of power in Transoxania between 1711 and 1722:

- 1 After the enthronement of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān in 1123/1711, Ma‘šūm Bī Sarāy remained *atālīq*. Coming from Shahr-i Sabz, his son-in-law Ibrāhīm Bī Kīnakās became *dīwānbēgī*, while Khudāyār Bī Manghit was granted the post of new governor of Shahr-i Sabz.
- 2 In 1126/1714–15, Ma‘šūm Bī and his Kīnakās in-law were deprived of their posts and retired to Qarshī and Shahr-i Sabz. Khudāyār Bī Manghit was appointed to the rank of *atālīq*. In 1127/1715, Ni‘matullah Bī Naymān was awarded the post of *dīwānbēgī*.

<sup>5</sup> In its description of the influence of women at the Bukharan court, Amīn Bukhārī’s account is strongly colored. Criticizing these tendencies, he states that the king and his wife were inseparable. He even took her on hunting expeditions (*shikār*) and visits to holy shrines. On the occasion of public holidays, the queen mother allegedly demanded that the *amīrs* pay their respects to her, and she even arrogated to herself regulation of the government and interrogations (Amīn Bukhārī, ‘*Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 205a–b; Semenov trans., 228).

<sup>6</sup> ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s assassination, which is depicted as martyrdom, is the subject of a detailed passage extending over a large number of folios. The story ends with the sepulture of the king (Amīn Bukhārī, ‘*Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 219b–246b; Semenov trans., 244–511). The author of the ‘*Ubaidullah Nāma* also tells us that the initial steps for the plot were taken on Muḥarram 27, 1123/March 17, 1711 (ibid., fol. 225a; Russian text, 250–51).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., fols. 226a–b; Russian text, 252; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 288a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 132a–b, 133b. According to Ṭāli‘, the conspirators paid homage and performed the invocation for Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān. In this version it seems that Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān was part of the conspiracy. This is underlined by the fact that in return for homage, the newly inaugurated *khān* “assured that group [of conspirators] of royal favors, and, every hour of hopelessness, made them confident by the means of personal audience.” (Ṭāli‘, *Tārīkh*, fols. 6a–b; Semenov trans., 17).

- 3 In spring 1128/1716, Ibrāhīm Bī Kīnakās and his ally Khwāja Qulī Bī Qaṭaghān assumed the position of *atālīq* and *dīwānbēgī* respectively. Together with his followers and allied *amīrs*, Khudāyār Bī Manghit retreated to Qarshī, where he died shortly after his arrival.
- 4 On Rajab 4, 1131/May 23, 1719, an attack on the royal palace launched by Ibrāhīm Bī Atālīq and his Kīnakās followers failed. Subsequently, Khwāja Qulī Bī Qaṭaghān was promoted to the office of *atālīq*.
- 5 Just eight days after his appointment, Khwāja Qulī Bī fell victim to a conspiracy instigated by courtiers and other *amīrs*. His estates (*amlāk*) were confiscated by the royal *dīwān*. Subsequently, Farhād Bī Ūtārchī was appointed *atālīq* in his stead and Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Manghit received the office of *dīwānbēgī*.
- 6 In 1134/1721–22, some courtiers and other Uzbek *amīrs* hatched a plot against Farhād Bī Atālīq and put him to death. Subsequently, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī was appointed *atālīq* instead. Qutluq Bī Sarāy assumed the office of *dīwānbēgī*.

The changes in the composition of government coincided with open revolts of this or that faction and continued warfare. This development reached a first peak with the rebellion of Ibrāhīm Bī Kīnakās and an assault on the citadel of Bukhara in May 1719.<sup>8</sup> Subsequently, Mā Warā' al-Nahr was ravaged by an uprising in Samarqand, where the opponents of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān recognized another Chingizid by the name of Rajab Khān as legitimate king. This revolt soon spread throughout Miyānkāl. In 1723 the rebels knocked on the door of Bukhara but were eventually defeated and retreated to Samarqand.<sup>9</sup> The next year witnessed the joint attempt of the Samarqand alliance and Qazāq tribes to conquer Bukhara. Driven out of their traditional settlement area at the southern edge of the Great Steppe by the advancing Qalmāq, the Qazāq devastated Transoxania in the following years, during which time they and their Uzbek colleagues laid waste to the environs of Samarqand and the Miyānkāl up to Bukhara.<sup>10</sup> Other areas like Shahr-i Sabz must have suffered destruction to a similar extent.<sup>11</sup> After the end of the Qazāq raids, the Ming ruler of Khoqand, Raḥīm Bēg, making use of the momentary state of weakness and confusion, invaded the region of

<sup>8</sup> Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 97b–114b; Semenov trans., 47–61; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 42b.

<sup>9</sup> Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 93; Holzwarth, "Relations," 195.

<sup>10</sup> These developments were studied in detail by Wolfgang Holzwarth ("Relations," 194–98). See also Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, 16b–17a; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 2b–3a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 183b–189b.

<sup>11</sup> Kāzim, *Ālamārā*, III, 1105.

Samarqand and the eastern parts of Miyānkāl. But his expansive policy remained unsuccessful in the end.<sup>12</sup>

## MUHAMMAD RAḤĪM BĪ YŪZ OF ḤIṢĀR

### *The Historical Background of Ḥiṣār*

The region of Ḥiṣār is a remarkable exception in Transoxania because of its relative remoteness, its geographical distance from Bukhara and mountainous terrain, which made it difficult to control for the central power. As a distinct sphere of authority, Ḥiṣār's influence occasionally extended across the Āmū Daryā and also included parts of Kunduz and the plains of Qaṭaghān. Sometimes the region was considered part of Balkh. Therefore, it is worthwhile briefly shedding light on the history of Ḥiṣār. In 1504, Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān was conquered by Muḥammad Khān Shībānī, who ceded it to the two brothers Ḥamza Sulṭān and Mahdī Sulṭān. Both had played a significant role in the initial conquest of Mā Warā' al-Nahr by Muḥammad Khān Shībānī. Later he was also involved in the first Uzbek inroads into Ḥiṣār, the region in the south-eastern corner of Transoxania, where Timurid factions continued to struggle against the Uzbek invaders.<sup>13</sup> In 1504, Ḥamza extended his influence to Badakhshān and other regions south of the Oxus.<sup>14</sup> After a brief Timurid interlude in 1511—Ḥiṣār was reconquered by Bābur—it came under Uzbek rule once and for all. Henceforth the region was politically separated from central Mā Warā' al-Nahr, and, as Davidovich has shown, even the monetary policy, including the forms and intensity of the use of coin regalia, was completely different.<sup>15</sup> In the following decades, Ḥiṣār was

<sup>12</sup> While in the *Mazhar* the Khoqand ruler appears as Raḥīm Bēg Qūqānī (Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 48b–49a), in the *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh* he is alternately named 'Abd al-Raḥīm Bī b. Shāhrukh Bī Ming and Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān (Muḥammad Hakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 643; II, 4–5).

<sup>13</sup> Initially, the two brothers helped secure the submission of Karmīna. Afterward, Ḥamza Sulṭān was rewarded with the governorship of Qarākūl. But since he proved unpopular with the people, he was soon removed from there (see Thomas Welsford, "Rethinking the Ḥamzahids of Ḥiṣār," *Asiatische Studien—Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft/Études asiatiques: Revue de la Société Suisse – Asie* 65, no. 3 (2011): 800–01).

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 802.

<sup>15</sup> Davidovich, "The Monetary Reform," 148.

governed by the sons of Ḥamza Sulṭān and Mahdī Sulṭān,<sup>16</sup> who are described as the Ḥiṣārī *sulṭāns* by McChesney.<sup>17</sup> They established themselves as local leaders over a semi-independent principality but also furnished troops for military campaigns.<sup>18</sup>

In the middle of the sixteenth century, the region was ruled by Tīmūr Aḥmad b. Ḥamza Sulṭān, who later allied with the Kuchkonjids of Samarqand during the first major war of succession in 1550–80.<sup>19</sup> In 1574 Ḥiṣār was conquered by ‘Abdullah Khān, who gave the area to one of his cousins.<sup>20</sup> During the first intra-dynastic war in the 1550s, the local leadership split into two factions. The first faction supported ‘Abdullah Khān, while the second one acted in the name of Aḥmad, one of the descendants of Tīmūr.<sup>21</sup> Later, when the Tuḡay-Timurids had consolidated their position in Transoxania, the local *amīrs* turned to a scion of the Ḥiṣārī *sulṭāns*, Maḥmūd Sulṭān. This man had been driven out of Dehnau earlier and eventually fled to Ḥiṣār when his allies and administrators from the local Mīng tribe helped the Tuḡay-Timurids take possession of Balkh. Afterward, Maḥmūd Sulṭān disappeared from the political scene.<sup>22</sup>

### *The Predominance of the Yūz Amīrs*

As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the ascent of the Yūz tribe in Ferghana, Ūrā Tippa and Ḥiṣār took place in the second half of the seventeenth century. Although a nineteenth-century source lists prominent Yūz *amīrs*, such as Qulīka Bī, Khūshīka Bī, Yābuka Bī and others, the *bīs* of the tribe became more tangible during the time of Subḥān Qulī Khān. Amīn Bukhārī’s *‘Ubaidullah Nāma* refers to only two paramount Yūz leaders

<sup>16</sup> For details see Bregel, “Ḥeṣār,” 304; Davidovich and Mukhtarov, *Stranitzky*, 24–25; Welsford, “Rethinking,” 804–05.

<sup>17</sup> The so-called Ḥiṣārī *sulṭāns*, or more correctly the Bakhtyarid Shibaniids, were one of two non-Abu’l-Khairid lineages in sixteenth-century Mā Warā’ al-Nahr. Since they were also Chingizids, their right to the *sulṭān* title was always acknowledged (McChesney, “Central Asia,” 178. For their origin and background, see Welsford, “Rethinking,” 798–801).

<sup>18</sup> Shāh Muḥammad b. Ḥamza Sulṭān was killed during the Uzbek siege of Herat in 957/1556–57 (Bregel, “Ḥeṣār,” 304).

<sup>19</sup> McChesney, “Central Asia,” 181; Welsford, “Rethinking,” 815.

<sup>20</sup> Bregel, “Ḥeṣār,” 303.

<sup>21</sup> Davidovich and Mukhtarov, *Stranitzky*, 25–26. For further details regarding inner dynastic splits among the Ḥiṣārī leadership, see Welsford, “Rethinking,” 818–20.

<sup>22</sup> McChesney, “Central Asia,” 184–85.

during the reign of Subḥān Qulī Khān, Khūshīka Bī and Ghāzī Bī.<sup>23</sup> Khwājā Qulī Bēg Balkhī mentions a campaign led by Khūshīka Bī Atālīq to Khurāsān in 1102/1690–91.<sup>24</sup> Ghāzī Bī's son, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Yūz, assumed a prominent position at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Our chronicler mentions him as commander-in-chief (*amīr al-umarā*) and *atālīq*. Together with Khūshīka Bī, he was outstanding for his loyalty to Subḥān Qulī Khān and “had turned life into the pathway for the royal steed.”<sup>25</sup> Another prominent Yūz *amīr*, Fāzil Bī Dīwānbēgī, was known as a troublemaker who headed several rebellions before he received the governorship of Samarqand in 1109/1697–98.<sup>26</sup>

Although our main source claims that during Subḥān Qulī Khān's reign, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Yūz served as governor of Ūrā Tippa,<sup>27</sup> the series of official documents from this region suggests frequent shifts of gubernatorial authority. According to one of the documents dating from 1091/1680, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī was either governor of Ūrā Tippa or wielded great influence there.

“Oh [God]! His Majesty, the regnant *khān* by divine law

Nizām al-Dīn Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, my words: During this time I granted all my amirid favors to the ‘Refuge of Guidance’ knowing about sanctity, the most honored ‘Arch-Pole’ Khwāja Mūsā Khwājā endowed with augmenting honor by bestowing upon him the water share of two days and two nights, [including irrigated] land and *lalmī* land in the area together with Tah Dah [near] Jaukandak in the Year of the Monkey. They must take the transfer of the aforementioned water share by Ḥājī Mullā Muḥammad to the aforementioned ‘Place of Refuge’ seriously and as obligatory. They shall give the revenue and grain arising from the aforesaid water to the attendants and servants of the aforementioned *khwāja* and shall not embezzle and hide anything! They shall take this as an obligation not to be neglected! Nobody shall interfere for whatever reason. They shall treat it as an estate belonging to the *īshān* and there is no need for new orders every year. Rajab 1091/July–August 1680”<sup>28</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 20b; Semenov trans., 35.

<sup>24</sup> During this campaign, which was sanctioned by a *fatwā* issued by the Transoxanian ‘*ulamā*’, Khūshīka's troops allegedly raided the environs of Mashhad and Nīshāpūr and returned with rich booty (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 282a).

<sup>25</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 20b; Semenov trans., 35.

<sup>26</sup> Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fols. 282b, 284b–285a. See also below.

<sup>27</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 45b; Semenov trans., 61.

<sup>28</sup> Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, doc. 13; Russian trans., 24–25; facs., 97. In Central Asia there was a general distinction between rain-fed land and agriculture called *lalmī*, and irrigated land designated *ābī* or *jū’ī* land. The two categories were also differently taxed (see A. A.

This is the first of a series of documents confirming the landed property and the water share of Khwāja Mūsā, a Sufi dignitary enjoying the continued favor of the Bukharan rulers and the Yūz governors.<sup>29</sup> The document highlights patterns of local governance but also reflects the formal style of administrative orders. Although the letter was issued in the name of the *khān*, there can be no doubt that it was Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī who granted favors to a local Sufi *pīr*. At the same time, it instructs local representatives to cede and distribute the income in kind generated by the tax-privileged land grant among the followers of the *khwāja*. Given the continued confirmation of land and water titles held by this illustrious figure and his descendants, it is likely that the Yūz leaders were disciples of the *khwāja* family.<sup>30</sup>

Unfortunately, the letter does not show any title held by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī but *nizām al-dīn*—“order of religion”—nor does it explicitly indicate his governorship (*ḥukūmat*) in Ūrā Tippa. The next letters published by Mukhtarov were issued in 1682 and 1685 by another *amīr*, a certain Murād Ṭāy.<sup>31</sup> Addressed to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Yūz, a second document issued by the ruler himself dates from 1105/1693–94 and informs him about the activities of the renegade *amīr* Fāzil Bī Yūz,<sup>32</sup> who together with some allies had retired to the fort of Dabūsī:

“Oh God—Glory be to Him! Abū’l-Muzaffār Sayyid Subḥān Qulī Muḥammad Bahādur Khān our words:

The ‘Refuge of Amīrhood,’ ‘the Loom of Authority,’ the strongly trusted pillar of the empire showing exuberant loyalty, the charity-waking devotee and sincere well-wisher, Raḥīm Bī, who was exalted by infinite royal favors, may know: The countenance of his

---

Semenov, “Ocherk pozemel’no-podatnogo i nalogogo ustrojstva Bukharskogo khanstva,” in *Trudy sredne-aziatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, Serija II. Orientalia, vypusk 1 (Tashkent: Izdatel’stvo Sredne-aziatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1929), 35. Tah Dah was a village near Jaugandak that was ceded together with arable plots.

<sup>29</sup> The documents confirming the land and water rights of the *khwāja* date back to the years 1094/1682–83, 1097/1685–86, 1107/1695–96, 1126/1714–15 and 1144/1731–32, but there are also some undated letters (Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, docs. 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22; facs., 98, 99, 101–04, 107, 208).

<sup>30</sup> There were other *khwājas* and *tshāns* who also received land and water shares in the same period. These estates were usually exempted from taxes (Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, 7).

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, docs. 12, 13; Russian trans., 26–27, 28; facs., 98–99.

<sup>32</sup> Not to be confused with his namesake, Fāzil Bī, the Yūz ruler of Ūrā Tippa in the middle of the eighteenth century!

fidelity and trust is completely evident in the mirror of [our] illuminated mind. Since he had the disposition of fidelity to us, nothing else has become known to us than the words of devotion and sincerity [written] on the page of his thought. [...] Beforehand, we had sent a letter that Fāzil Bī, Ūz Tīmūr Bī and ʿUghma Bī had chosen the path of pride and bigotry. With all malice, they had [nurtured] among each other the intention of discord, which has by no means been clear to us. It was merely at their mutual advice, which is indeed a sign of stupidity, that they have assembled at one place and the signs of their ingratitude became evident to us. It came to our illuminated mind that in the world of mankind this way of foolishness solely befalls imprudent people. Therefore, the first time we sent ‘the Asylum of Magisterial Dignity,’ Katta Khwāja Naqīb to admonish them, but they did not become companions. The second and third time we sent the Jūybārī and Naqshbandī Khwājas, the repositories of instruction, Ākhūnd Mullā Muḥammad Sharīf and Ḥājī Sheikh Ḥabībullah, but whatever they advised, [the said *amīrs*] did not understand at all! Having returned to the quest for discord, Fāzil Bī’s depravity and short-sightedness was clear to these faithful men from the very beginning. How intrepidly had Khūshīka Bī Atālīq—whom God has taken into His mercy—performed during our reign? We had the same expectation with regard to Fāzil Bī, but he acted in contradiction to what was desired of him and we did not know at all for what reason he had chosen this way. The following are the signs of their malignity: Although to this very time nothing has been shown by us other than kindness and favor, they have written messages to Ūrgenchī [Ārang Khān] and Baqūpa out of stupidity and thoughtlessness, but these letters were somehow obtained [and came to our attention]. Now they have retired to the *qal‘a* of Dabūsiya and wander around the desert of penitence. Still that sincere friend [Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī] who is our good, loyal *āqsaqāl* having always known [the meaning] of allegiance very well and whose comprehension we always assert, belongs to the same tribe. It is certain that if a message is sent by these unfortunate men or if they dispatch somebody telling words of disparity, he will not accept it! He knows their malevolence very well. This is what has happened and nothing more. Every time they send a message, he shall of course not agree [with them]. The year 1105/1693–94”<sup>33</sup>

This official letter addressed to the Yūz leader illustrates how much a ruler depended on the support of his *amīrs*, particularly in critical situations.<sup>34</sup> The message also shows what was expected of those enjoying royal favors and how many efforts were made to bring the black sheep back into the fold. The message went astray. Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Yūz together with Allah Birdī Bī Ming rendered assistance to the king in order to expel the Khiwan ruler

<sup>33</sup> Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, doc. 14; Russian trans., 30–31; facs., 100–01.

<sup>34</sup> The rebellion was led by the governor of Samarqand, Fāzil Bī Yūz, and the *amīrs* Ūz Tīmūr Bī Parwānachī Qaṭaghān and ʿUghma Bī Parwānachī Yābū. After suffering several defeats, they retreated to the fortress of Dabūsiya in Miyānkāl, and from there they invited the Khiwan ruler Ārang to take action and intervene on their behalf (Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, *Tadhkira*, 206; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fols. 282b–283a; Burton, *Bukharans*, 350–51).

from Mā Warā' al-Nahr.<sup>35</sup> According to Balkhī, the Yūz *amīr* was also instrumental in securing control over the fortress of Dābūsī.<sup>36</sup> In this context, he is mentioned as Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Mīrākhūr Yūz and governor (*hākīm*) of Āq Kūtal<sup>37</sup> east of Samarqand.<sup>38</sup> In the following time, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his relatives seem to have consolidated their grip at least in the Sir Daryā region. Whether he and his colleagues assumed permanent gubernatorial authority in the town of Ūrā Tippa cannot be clarified on the basis of the existing material. The fact that Allah Birdī Bī Ming issued an official letter in 1107/1695<sup>39</sup> may be seen as a sign of a shift of certain power positions (probably the governorship) between the Ming and the Yūz.

By 1702–03, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī served as governor of the important city of Samarqand and was said to have been particularly influential among the Qazāq and the Qaraqālpāq of Khojand, Āq Kūtal, Tashkent up to the region of Sairam, Turkistān, the Ulugh Tāgh and Kabīr Tāgh.<sup>40</sup> This led

<sup>35</sup> Burton, *Bukharans*, 335. Prior to this time, Khūshīka Bī Yūz also rendered vital assistance to Subḥān Qulī Bī by fighting against the Khiwan forces on several occasions. In 1688 Khūshīka Bī led a campaign to Bīshkent in the east. In October 1690 he also engaged in expeditions to Marw (ibid., 342, 346–47).

<sup>36</sup> Dabūsīya (also spelled Dabūsī/Dābūsī) is located east of Karmīna on the Nahr-i pay Canal (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 41–42). Later this town was overshadowed by Żiyā al-Dīn, which became the administrative center of the province of the same name (Barthold, *Turkestan*, 97).

<sup>37</sup> The Āq Kūtal (White Pass), also called Īlān Ūtī Pass, is a strategic passage between Samarqand and the Great Steppe, separating the Zarafshān Valley from Jizakh, Ūrā Tippa and Khojand. Located two hours east of Samarqand, it formed an extremely narrow gorge which was said to teem with snakes. This earned the pass the name Snake Pass. Many travelers passing through in the nineteenth century called it the “Gateway of Tamerlane” (Heinrich Moser, *Durch Central-Asien. Die Kirgisensteppes, Russisch-Turkestan – Bochara – Chiwa, das Turkmenenland und Persien* (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1888), 104–05; Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 341). The Īlān Ūtī Valley is also mentioned in other sources (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 222b; *Ẓafarnāma*, 142, 177). For another detailed description see Holzwarth, “Relations,” 182–83, footnote no. 18.

<sup>38</sup> According to Balkhī, the rebel leaders and local notables went to the Yūz *amīr* and later surrendered to the king. During the act of submission, they enjoyed the intercession and protection of Maḥmūd Bī Qaṭaghān (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 283a).

<sup>39</sup> Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, doc. 15; Russian trans., 32; facs., 102. See also Egani and Chekhovich, “Regesty,” doc. 50; Russian trans., 38.

<sup>40</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaiddullah Nāma*, fol. 20b; Semenov trans., 35.

Beisembiev to speak of a hegemony of the Yüz leader in these regions,<sup>41</sup> but his influence was probably rather loosely defined and based on the usual ties of allegiance and exchange. As we have seen, at least during Subhān Qulī Khān's reign, there are signs that the governorship of Ūrā Tippa and the adjacent region shifted between various protagonists. It was only at the beginning of the eighteenth century that Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's prestige and relationship with the tribes of Ferghana and the Sir Daryā region earned him a favorable position in 'Ubaidullah Khān's *Herrschaftsverband*.<sup>42</sup> The chronicler of this king portrays him as a distinct and trustworthy man and as a good well-wisher of the ruler.<sup>43</sup> In 1702 he was confirmed in his position as the most senior leading *amīr*, commander-in-chief and *atālīq*, while his brother Abūl Bī gained the post of governor of Samarqand.<sup>44</sup>

### *Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Yüz and the Events in 1705*

In autumn 1116/1704, 'Ubaidullah Khān, persuaded by his *amīrs*, went to Samarqand where he was seated on the *kūk tāsh*.<sup>45</sup> On this occasion, the representatives and leaders of the Uzbek tribes of Zāmin, Ūrā Tippa, Shash, Ferghana, Khojand, Andījan, Tashkent, Āq Kūtal, Sairam und Turkistān rushed to Samarqand and attended the king. At the same time, bands of "base people," who had blocked the trade routes to Ferghana and Turkistān, soon disappeared. All those molested by rebellious Uzbek tribes, especially the Yüz, calmed down because of the royal presence.<sup>46</sup> By this time, Ḥiṣār

<sup>41</sup> Beisembiev, *Ta'rikh*, 10.

<sup>42</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, 21a; Semenov trans., 35.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 37a; Russian text, 52.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 28b–29a; Russian text, 43–44.

<sup>45</sup> Muḥammad Amīn gives a Friday in the month of Ṣafar in 1117/May–June 1705 as the beginning of a campaign to Balkh, which 'Ubaidullah Khān broke off a bit later. In Jumāda II of the same year/September–October 1705, he embarked upon his journey to Samarqand. Yet the birth of his son, 'Abdullah Sultān, after the journey to Samarqand is dated to Sunday, Dhū'l-Ḥijja 11, 1116/April 5–6, 1705 (Muḥammad Amīn, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 32a, 39a, 42a; Semenov trans., 48, 54, 57). I guess that the attempted first campaign to Balkh and the subsequent journey to Samarqand took place in summer and autumn 1116/1704. The prince was born in the spring of the next year.

<sup>46</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 39b–40a; Semenov trans., 55.

was ruled by Khālī Bī Mīrākhūr, a son of Khūshīka,<sup>47</sup> while Ūrā Tippa was governed by Āq Būta Bī b. Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī.<sup>48</sup>

Since the *‘Ubaidullah Nāma* furnishes a fine grid of data on the circumstances in the Ḥiṣār Valley, it is worth focusing a bit closer on a series of events around the year 1705 echoing local dynamics and interdependent chains of action.

Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī had long cultivated an enmity with Ūtikān Bī Dādkhwāh, the chief of the Marqa branch in Upper Ḥiṣār. According to Amīn Bukhārī, the conflict escalated in the time of Subḥān Qulī Bī when Ūtikān’s son clandestinely made off with Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s bride just before the wedding night.<sup>49</sup> This bride capture sparked a local feud that was to last for the next sixty or seventy years. When taken into royal service, the *atālīq* made use of the first opportunity to draw his master’s attention to the situation at Ḥiṣār, where the Yūz had split into the sections of the Shādī and the Marqa. Given the fact that Ḥiṣār customarily belonged to the principality of Balkh, it comes as no surprise that ‘Ubaidullah Khān was ready to intervene by putting some of his contingents under the command of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī. The Yūz chief underlined the urgency of the campaign by pointing out Ḥiṣār’s strategic importance as the gateway (*darwāza*) to Mā Warā’ al-Nahr.<sup>50</sup> For ‘Ubaidullah Khān it was a good opportunity to demonstrate his supremacy over the Balkh ruler, Muḥammad Muqīm Khān, only one year after his own enthronization and to snatch Ḥiṣār away from him.<sup>51</sup>

Accompanied by other Bukharan *amīrs*, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī led the Bukharan troops to Ḥiṣār, where the Shādī Yūz gathered around their leader

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., fol. 46b; Russian text, 62. For further details of this rebellion, see Burton, *Bukharans*, 332–36. On the life and fate of Āq Būta Bī, see Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 1–3.

<sup>48</sup> This is confirmed by two official letters addressed to Nizām al-Dīn Muḥammad Āq Būta dated to the time after 1701 (see Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, docs. 16, 17; Russian trans., 33, 34; facs., 102–03).

<sup>49</sup> Ūtikān’s son abducted the bride with her obvious consent and by a trick. According to Amīn Bukhārī, this event visibly took its toll on Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, who did not speak to anyone about his feelings for a long time (ibid., 45b; Russian text, 61). According to Teufel, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s son was the man harmed by the bride capture rather than the *atālīq* himself (Teufel, “Quellenstudien,” 272, footnote no. 1).

<sup>50</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 44b–45a; Semenov trans., 60.

<sup>51</sup> In the seventeenth century, Ḥiṣār was ruled by Tuqay-Timurid princes who were mostly subordinate to the appanage *khāns* of Balkh (Bregel, “Ḥeṣār,” 304).

Khālī Bēg Mīrākhūr and cheered upon the arrival of the enforcement.<sup>52</sup> Backed by the Bukharan contingents, the Shādī Yūz immediately decided to attack Ūtikān's small fortress Mughūlān located north of the Kāfirnihān River.<sup>53</sup> On their way they destroyed a local shrine, plundered the population in the surroundings of the *qal'a* and wreaked havoc on the irrigation channels. Yet we are also informed that the Bukharan *amīrs* disliked Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and were not very interested in rendering assistance to him. Finally, they left the environs of Mughūlān and pitched their camp at a distance of one *farsakh*. They only resumed the siege when learning that the Yūz chief would not urge or punish them.<sup>54</sup> The positions of the various Bukharan *amīrs* and their contingents before the different gates of the fort are illustrative as they represent a kind of figurative map, on which the web of mutual allegiances can be charted:<sup>55</sup>

- 1 Eastern gate: Muḥammad Ma'ṣūm Bī Dīwānbēgī and the Sarāy;
- 2 Northern gate: Ūz Tīmūr Bī and Khudāyār Bī together with the Qaṭaghān and the Manghit;
- 3 Western gate: Ibrāhīm Bī Mīrākhūr Kīnakās and Ṣadīq Bī Iṣhik-Āqābāshī.<sup>56</sup>

In this situation the Qaṭaghān Uzbeks of Kunduz and Kulāb under the command of Maḥmūd Bī Atālīq launched a battle against the Bukharan troops in Ḥiṣār.<sup>57</sup> Amīn Bukhārī's narrative is interesting as it breaks down to the individual level by informing about the conditions in the besieged fort and how a local actor got embroiled in the struggle for power and the

<sup>52</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fols. 46b–47a; Semenov trans., 62.

<sup>53</sup> Unfortunately I was not able to locate Mughūlān on the map. According to the chronicler, the fort was situated at the small creek Yankāb/Chinkāb (?) north of the Kāfirnihān (ibid., fols. 46b–47a; Russian text, 62).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., fols. 47a–48a; Russian text, 62–63.

<sup>55</sup> McChesney also refers to this phenomenon in connection with the Uzbek siege of Herat in 1587–88. In the respective sources the city gates are only described to point out the position of the influential military leaders (Robert McChesney, "The Conquest of Herat 995–6/1587–8: Sources for the study of Ṣafavid/Qizilbāsh-Shibānid/Uzbek relations," in *Études Safavides*, ed. J. Calmard (Paris/Tehran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 1993), 84–91).

<sup>56</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fol. 48a; Semenov trans., 63.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., fols. 48a–b; trans., 63–64. According to Yūsuf Munshī, the Qaṭaghān and Dūrmān troops acted on the instruction of Muḥammad Muqīm Khān, the ruler of Balkh, and on Shawwāl 7, 1115/February 12–13, 1704, set out for Ḥiṣār (Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, *Tadhkira*, 321–22).

manipulations of either side. One of the local *khwājas* by the name of ‘Abd al-Raḥīm, who sided with the Bukharans out of fidelity to the king, established contact with the besiegers and told them to maintain the siege since Ūtikān and his followers would soon give up resistance. Unfortunately there is no further information about the *khwājas* of Moghūlān or other influential *khwājas* in the towns of Ḥiṣār.<sup>58</sup> One can only speculate about the motives of Khwāja ‘Abd al-Raḥīm for siding with the Bukharans. It may have been the prospect of becoming installed as a governor of the town once the troops had withdrawn. Whatever the reason, when Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Yūz showed the message to his colleagues, they secretly informed Ūtikān about the betrayal of Khwāja ‘Abd al-Raḥīm. Shortly thereafter, the latter was put to death by the Marqa leader himself in spite of his sincere attachment (*ikhlēṣ*) to the *khwāja* family.<sup>59</sup>

Having dealt a resounding defeat to a hostile Dūrmān detachment,<sup>60</sup> Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī sent his *amīrs* to persuade the enemy to swear a new oath of allegiance to the king. But following the secret advice of one of the Bukharan commanders, the Marqa chief only pretended to accept the offer, and after spending a few days fortifying his *qal‘a*, he demanded the withdrawal of the troops. Seeing that further attacks on Ūtikān’s stronghold would not be crowned with lasting success, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī ordered the retreat from Mughūlān. While most of the Shādī Yūz retired to Dūshanba, the *atālīq* and his troops went to Ḥiṣār further in the south. Upon their arrival, he summoned his commanders and the local elders (*kalānān*) for a *kinkāj* at the town of Ḥiṣār.<sup>61</sup> Enraged by the Bukharan activities, some

<sup>58</sup> We are relatively well informed about the *khwāja* families in Jizakh, Ūrā Tippa and other towns of the upper Sir Daryā basin (see below). But the sources available to me make no mention of *khwāja* lineages in Upper Ḥiṣār.

<sup>59</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 48b–49a; Semenov trans., 64.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 49b–50a; Russian text, 65. For information on the Dūrmān tribe see Karmysheva, *Ocherki*, 107–08.

<sup>61</sup> The contradictions in Amīn Bukhārī’s account lead Teufel to conclude that Ūtikān was not besieged at Mughūlān but at Ḥiṣār (Teufel, “Quellenstudien,” 275, footnote no. 1). He also refers to Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, whose work is perhaps not the most reliable source for the developments north of the Oxus. This author only tells us that the Bukharan troops engaged in a campaign to the *wilāyat* of Ḥiṣār where they besieged Ūtikān (Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, *Tadhkira*, 321). In all likelihood, the troops, including the leaders of their local Yūz allies, withdrew to the town of Ḥiṣār, whereas the bulk of the Shādī forces went to Dūshanba as suggested by the text. In Ḥiṣār they pitched their camp

people rushed into the assembly and complained about the measures of the *atālīq* and his partners, saying that everything in the region had been more or less fine until the advance of the alien troops. The government forces would do better to take the needs of the local populace into consideration! When the locals stated they would not leave the troops and the commanders until they arranged a settlement of the conflict on their behalf, the *amīrs*, who felt embarrassed, started replying in a severe and rude manner. One thing led to another, the Ḥiṣārī took up sticks and stones and finally robbed their erstwhile supporters, who rescued themselves when things were looking grim.<sup>62</sup>

Following his failed attempt to subdue his local adversaries with outside assistance, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī escaped to Samarqand.<sup>63</sup> Afterward he continued to act in the service of the court and on numerous occasions rendered military assistance to the ruler and his retinue. During the Balkh campaign taking place in 1707, he was one of three *atālīqs* in ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s camp and commanded the center (*qūl*) of the Bukharan army.<sup>64</sup> After the end of this expedition, the Yūz leader disappears from the accounts. It is possible that he died sometime after the expedition to Balkh.<sup>65</sup>

### *The Rule of Āq Būta Bī*

Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s possible death quite apart, the Yūz remained strong in the east with the descendants of Khūshīka Bī in Ḥiṣār and Āq Būta Bī, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s son, in Khojand. Unfortunately, we only have a few scattered pieces of information provided by Khoqandian sources and some

---

inside the town, perhaps in one of the suburbs, where the *kinkāj* took place and the *atālīq* made his suggestion to protect this town from possible attacks.

<sup>62</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 50a–54a; Semenov trans., 65–68; Davidovich and Mukhtarov, *Stranitzy*, 33; Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 64. According to Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, it was not the Shādī Yūz who defeated the Bukharans but Ūtikān Dādkhwāh, who was supported by Maḥmūd Bī Qaṭaghān (Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, *Tadhkira*, 323; see also Teufel, “Quellenstudien,” 275–76, footnote no. 1).

<sup>63</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 54b–55a; Semenov trans., 69.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 118b; Russian text, 235.

<sup>65</sup> Sometimes the chroniclers pass over the death of prominent *amīrs* and leave their end uncommented. Cases in point are Bēg Muḥammad Bī Dürmān and Ūz Timūr Bī Qaṭaghān (see *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*), ‘Abd al-Satār Bī Baḥrīn and Khwājā Yār Bī Ūtārchī (e.g., in the *Tuḥfat al-khānī*). Often the *amīrs* just disappear from the narrative or are replaced by their sons.

Bukharan documents shedding light on the situation in Ūrā Tippa and Khojand in the 1720s and before.

Some undated official documents suggest that Āq Būta Bī ruled over a larger area consisting of Ūrā Tippa, Khojand and the so-called Chahārṣada Andakān (Yām, Zāmin, Khawāṣ and Jizakh).<sup>66</sup> In a letter of appointment issued by ‘Ubaidullah Khān, Āq Būta Bī is mentioned as *qūshbēgī* and governor of the region.<sup>67</sup> A second document issued by Abū’l-Faiz Khān in 1126/1714–15 also addresses him as *qūshbēgī*.<sup>68</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān tells us that after marrying a daughter of Shāhrukh Bī Ming (d. 1134/1721–22), Āq Būta Bī sent for his brother-in-law Raḥīm Khān (r. 1721/22–1734), the ruler of Khoqand, ceded the government to him and abandoned himself to pleasure and delight. When his warriors went over to Raḥīm Khān, an attempt by Āq Būta Bī to arrest and kill him failed. Five hundred Qirghīz (Qirghiz) warriors pursuing them were utterly defeated at the banks of the Sir Daryā, “the water of which turned ruby red like pure wine.” But although both reconciled, Āq Būta Bī turned away from ‘Abd al-Raḥīm who, alerted beforehand, entered the citadel of Khojand and put his Yūz in-law to death.<sup>69</sup> According to Beisembiev, these events took place in 1138/1725 when Raḥīm Khān with twenty thousand soldiers entered Khojand and imprisoned Āq Būta. In the following year, the Ming leader also occupied Ūrā Tippa.<sup>70</sup> Yet an official document issued by Muḥammad Āq Būta in 1144/1731 with respect to the legal status of the property of Khwājā Mūsā Khwājā’s offspring raises some doubts about the accuracy of Beisembiev’s data.<sup>71</sup> According to this document, Āq Būta Bī was still alive in 1731. Thus it was not until 1731 or 1732 that ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Bī Ming overran Khojand and Ūrā Tippa. As the writer of the *Mazhar al-aḥwāl* describes, a considerable

<sup>66</sup> The first documents issued by Āq Būta Bī are undated. Mukhtarov fixes the dates around the year 1701 (Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, docs. 16, 17; Russian trans., 33–34; facs., 102, 103).

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 18/Russian trans., 35; facs., 104. See also Egani and Chekhovich, “Regesty,” Russian trans., 41.

<sup>68</sup> Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, doc. 20; Russian trans., 38; facs., 106. See also Egani and Chekhovich, “Regesty,” Russian trans., 42.

<sup>69</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 1–3; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 48b.

<sup>70</sup> Beisembiev, *Ta’rikh*, 11, 92.

<sup>71</sup> Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, doc. 21; Russian trans., 39; facs., 107; Egani and Chekhovich, “Regesty,” Russian trans., 42. In some of the documents the favored dignitary is called Khwājā Mūsā Khwājā, in others simply Khwājā Mūsā Khwājā.

part of the local Yüz and Qırq nomads (*il wa bāy-i Yüz wa Qırq*) were then resettled from Jizakh to Samarqand. In spite of a sudden retreat of the Ming ruler due to the resistance put up by tribal forces loyal to Bukhara,<sup>72</sup> Khoqandian forces soon attacked Samarqand and the Yüz a second time.<sup>73</sup>

#### Nİ‘MATULLAH BĪ NAYMĀN OF TIRMIDH

As already discussed in the previous chapter, the Naymān had their stronghold in Tirmidh, where they lived as neighbors of the Qungrāt. Their future leader Ni‘matullah Bī Tūqsāba (d. 1719) belonged to the following of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Yüz, who, when taken into royal service as *atālīq* in 1702, recommended sending the young Naymān *amīr* as governor to Tirmidh. In connection with his gaining this important governorship we read that a rebellion of local Qungrāt tribes broke out in 1703. At the same time, Ni‘matullah Bī ceded the *qal‘a* of Tirmidh to his father-in-law Shādmān Bī Yābū, a brother of Tuḡhma Bī (d. 1109/1697–98), whom we already know as a rebel leader in Miyānkāl and Samarqand.<sup>74</sup> Simultaneously, he himself took up residence in the smaller *qal‘a* of Darf, where most of his Naymān tribesmen lived.<sup>75</sup> But this step, which is attributed to his young age and inexperience, had far-reaching consequences because Shādmān Bī sided with Maḥmūd Bī Qaṭaghān, the most influential *amīr* in Balkh.<sup>76</sup> When the Balkh

<sup>72</sup> The Uzbek alliance that backed the Bukharan *khān* consisted of Qungrāt, Yüz and Sarāy contingents. The Qungrāt furnished ten thousand and the Yüz twelve thousand soldiers (Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 49a).

<sup>73</sup> This campaign ended with the assassination of Raḥīm Bī (Bēg) Khoqānī, who was soon replaced by his brother ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī (Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 50a–b). Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān attributes the sudden retreat of the Ming leader to a severe illness and his subsequent death to disrespect toward Sheikh Qathum b. ‘Abbās Raż when visiting the shrine of the saint (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 5).

<sup>74</sup> Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fols. 282b–283a, 284b–285a.

<sup>75</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 56a–b; Semenov trans., 70–71.

<sup>76</sup> Maḥmūd Bī had become one of the most powerful Uzbek *amīrs* dominating the region of Balkh in the time of Subḥān Qulī Khān. From his seat in Kunduz, he also tried to extend his grip to Badakhshān, a mountainous region extending to the limits of Chitral (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 283b). In the course of time he was able to form a counterweight to his rivals, the Ming Uzbeks, who had their lands west of Balkh. After Muqīm Khān’s death in 1707, he called himself Maḥmūd Bahādur Khān. But his time as supreme ruler of Balkh was not very long; in 1707 he was driven out of the city by a Bukharan army under the command of ‘Ubaidullah Khān. Maḥmūd Bī lost his life in an earthquake in Badakhshān (Balkhī,

army denuded the surroundings of Tirmidh, Ni‘matullah Bī informed the king in the hope of enlisting the aid of the Bukharan troops.<sup>77</sup> Receiving the message about the latest events, ‘Ubaidullah Khān said:

“Well, to confer the duties of elders (*kalānān*) on young men and to lay the burden of a male camel on a *lūkuja* is far from the right way. It is evident that Ni‘matullah belongs to those who are not adorned with the experiences of the days passing in this kingdom! He has not experienced the cold and the hot days, the ups and downs of time and has not borne the world full of troubles. [...] Is it worth a woman he loves that he cedes to the enemy such an important fortress, which is the gateway of Mā Warā’ al-Nahr? Shādmān Yābū himself is a destructive mischief-maker deprived [of the access to] the court of elevated dignity because of his bad actions. [...] Was it not his brother Ṭughma Yābū who offered the royal mind that he fix the banner of insurrection (*fitna*) in Transoxania during the reign of our illustrious father?”<sup>78</sup>

In this extract the linkage of leadership with a certain age, wisdom and experience becomes obvious. Likewise, individual feelings and interests were secondary to the condition of the kingdom in its entirety. The following months were characterized by a bloody tug of war between tribal forces in the opposite camps of Balkh and Bukhara. Besides the Bukharan forces backing the Naymān leader, we find the Qungrāt chiefs Shīr ‘Alī Bī and ‘Āshūr Bī in support of Maḥmūd Bī and his army composed of Qaṭaghān and Dūrmān contingents. The major battlegrounds were the settlements of Darf, Shīrabād and Pāshkhūrd north of Tirmidh. When ‘Āshūr Qungrāt, who had hitherto merely shifted his position between the two sides, jumped ship by joining the Bukharan troops at Darf, a stalemate was established between Maḥmūd Bī and the pro-Bukharan forces. In Dhū’l-Ḥijja 1116/March–April 1705, things changed again when ‘Ubaidullah Khān sent a detachment led by Ḥayyit Bī Qipchāq, who was soon defeated and put to death by the Qaṭaghān *amīr*. Having demonstrated his military strength in the region, Maḥmūd Bī finally left Tirmidh and took some of Shīr ‘Alī’s Qungrāt followers with him.<sup>79</sup>

In summer 1118/1706, ‘Ubaidullah Khān summoned his troops for a campaign to Balkh, an undertaking that would eventually fail to materialize due to a lack of support on the part of the powerful *ūng wa sūl* coalition of

---

*Tārīkh*, fol. 287a; Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 1b; see also McChesney, *Waqf*, 160–67; Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 70).

<sup>77</sup> Amīn Bukharī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 57a–b; Semenov trans., 71–72.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 58a–b; Russian text, 72–73.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 59a–69b; Russian text, 82–83.

Shahr-i Sabz and a plague of flies and other vermin bothering the troops at Nasaf.<sup>80</sup> The siege of Shīrābād was likewise lifted and the troops withdrew to Bukhara.<sup>81</sup> Afterward, Ni‘matullah Bī continued to serve in the Bukharan army. In 1707 he fought on the left wing during the siege of Balkh, for which he was rewarded with the title of *dādkhwāh*.<sup>82</sup> His troops also joined the ruler during his stay at Samarqand in spring 1709. On this occasion, Amīn Bukhārī tells us about a conflict between the Naymān and the Sarāy led by Muḥammad Ma‘šūm Bī Atālīq.<sup>83</sup> It flared up one night when most of the Uzbek warriors were engaged in festivities and many of them were drunk. Although the author does not give any details about the reasons for this dispute, it seems likely that it was set off by an argument between two or several soldiers belonging to the two tribes. Whatever triggered this conflict, the situation soon escalated and became violent. In the end, the camp turned into a scene of tumult, during which two Naymān men were killed and a number of Sarāy warriors badly injured. When they saw their dead comrades lying in a pool of blood, the Naymān soldiers turned to their leader, who immediately convened his Qungrāt and Naymān troops demanding blood revenge for the murders. On the part of the Sarāy, Ma‘šūm Bī was soon informed about the events and the approaching advance of the tribes of Tirmidh. Meanwhile, an outcry of indignation arose from his followers, lamenting that although two Naymān soldiers had been killed, the six injured persons on their side would soon pass away. Besides, they could not stand the arrogance and domination of Ni‘matullah Bī Dādkhwāh.<sup>84</sup>

The chain of events starting from this incident documents the generation of power on a micro level and gives a good insight into the contemporary thinking and the role of local worldviews. Moreover, the unfolding course of

---

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., fols. 74a–b, 81a–b; Russian text, 87–88. Amīn Bukhārī tells us that the troops were troubled not only by the beginning heat of summer but also by swarms of aggressive flies, the bites of which were as painful as those of scorpions (ibid., fol. 81b; Russian text, 94).

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., fols. 80a–82a; Russian text, 93–94.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., fols. 111b, 125a; Russian text, 127, 142.

<sup>83</sup> According to an official document on a land purchase, in 1106/1695 Muḥammad Ma‘šūm Ḥājī b. Ādīna Muḥammad Ḥājī sold a big plot of land in the village of Tipsak in the *tūmān* of Shaudār near Samarqand to Allah Birdī Bī Parwānāchī Ming (Chekhovich, *Dokumenty k istorii agrarnykh otnoshenii*, doc. 15, 78–80; Russian trans., 80–83). If we believe Amīn Bukhārī, Ma‘šūm Bī and Allah Birdī Bī were friends (Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 21b–23a, Semenov trans., 36–37).

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., fols. 148b–149a; Russian text, 167–68.

events documents the strong interdependences between the interacting parties and the protagonists. First, Ma‘šūm Ḥājī, a very experienced *amīr*, retired to the privacy of his tent and thought:

“Ni‘matullah is a foolish and ill-behaving man throwing himself into danger. During royal receptions and assemblies of the *amīrs* he mostly behaved in a stubborn and disobedient manner in front of the elders [council members]. He dared to react with impudence toward the nobles of the army by putting forward words that were far removed from courtesy [...]. In such a time when it was not approved of, this obstinate man has clothed the mob of the Naymān and the Qungrāt with coats of mail and moved into the first place of that *qaum*.”<sup>85</sup>

These sentences show the thought pattern of an individual actor, here the *atālīq*, and his hypothesis about the world and the behavior of another protagonist. Moreover, they reflect certain norms rooted in the contemporary worldview: first and foremost, the norm of seniority. This is not the first time that the author of the *‘Ubaidullah Nāma* directly or indirectly refers to the youth and the corresponding inexperience of the Naymān leader, whom he characterizes as a norm violator. Placing emphasis on his brazen and impudent behavior, Ni‘matullah is explicitly accused of having violated the social hierarchy at the court on a number of occasions. When Ma‘šūm Bī Atālīq discussed the problem with his followers, the younger members of the Sarāy community urged him to take action by pointing out that they could no longer bear Ni‘matullah’s prevailing upon them. When the leaders of the army increased the pressure on the *atālīq*, Ma‘šūm Bī gave way on taking action and suggested turning first to the king for a solution. Only in the case of continuing misbehavior on the part of Ni‘matullah Bī, could they reach for their weapons.<sup>86</sup>

Upon learning about these occurrences, ‘Ubaidullah Khān sent mediators instructed to bring the Naymān leader to the camp of the *atālīq*, where he was to formally apologize for his behavior. But Ni‘matullah Bī did not react as was expected of him and insulted the king:

“Taking a rest on the cushion of paradise, that foolish ‘hero’ slumbered on the thorns of discontent! In the current spring, the rose-buds with a thousand tongues are making fun of his displeasing activities, which are enough to make you weep. He imagined pleasure

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., fol. 149b; Russian text, 168.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., fols. 150a–b; Russian text, 168–69.

born in the spring, and while the nightingale is singing about the impropriety of his conduct, he takes it for an amorous *gulbāng*.<sup>87</sup>

Following this indecorous faux pas, the intermediaries, the other chiefs and the entire army were fearful of the king's reaction and refused to appear for the Friday *kūrnish*. Many *amīrs* apparently suspected they would have an easy job with the king because of his weakened health.<sup>88</sup> When 'Ubaidullah Khān instantly demanded that all the soldiers and commanders appear for the salutation, the troops refused and remained in their camps, but the Naymān leader quickly led his retinue to the palace and paid homage to the ruler. Shortly thereafter, the army was on the brink of open rebellion, whereas the king took measures for his personal safety in the *arg* of Samarqand.<sup>89</sup> Both sides, 'Ubaidullah Khān, who had failed to bring about a successful resolution of the conflict, and the Uzbek soldiery were caught in a vicious spiral of mistrust driven by interdependent and mutually reinforcing effects of power. It was in fact the king's failure to settle the Naymān-Sarāy dispute that caused his authority to show the first cracks. Instead of creating an image of himself as a successful mediator between his *amīrs*, the king had become an active party in the escalating tribal conflict. The disobedience of his *amīrs* and their reluctance to pay homage to 'Ubaidullah Khān were also due to his weak physical health in the aftermath of a serious illness that befell him earlier during his stay in Samarqand.<sup>90</sup> This development reached its peak when he sent a message informing his mother in Bukhara about the situation. On arriving there, the messenger opened the letter and learned about the state of affairs. Afterward, the news of the imminent rebellion spread throughout the capital like wildfire, inducing the city elders to fortify the city quarters (*gudhars*) and to prepare everything for a possible siege.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., fols. 151a–b; Russian text, 170. See also Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 67. A *gulbāng* is the sound of the nightingale.

<sup>88</sup> 'Ubaidullah Khān was ill with fever after taking up quarters in the village of Chaghar (?), which was the residence of the descendants of Khwāja 'Ubaidullah Aḥrār, because the citadel of Samarqand lay in ruins. The chronicler attributes the fever to the king's omission to ask the Aḥrārī *khwājas* for permission to reside there. The royal quarters were then moved to Samarqand, and the Sufi sheikhs as well as the entire population prayed for the health of the king. But 'Ubaidullah Khān had shown signs of physical weakness and delicateness on other occasions (Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 128b–130a, 146a–147b; Semenov trans., 147–48; 165–66).

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., fols. 151b–152b; Russian text, 170–71.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., fols. 146a–147b; Russian text, 165–66.

This development was fueled by rumors that the king had ordered the assassination of his younger brother, Abū'l-Faiẓ Sulṭān.<sup>91</sup> Finally, the city commander Khudāyār Bī Manghit summoned his Dūrmān colleague from the neighboring *tūmān* of Qarākūl, while the nomads outside the capital brought their families to safety within the city walls.<sup>92</sup>

When the hostilities threatened to turn into open war, the conflict was solved through the mediation of two Naqshbandī dignitaries with excellent ties to both sides, the king and the *amīrs*. Finally, the king gave way and sent Ni'matullah Bī as governor to Tirmidh.<sup>93</sup> In 1710 Ma'ṣūm Bī and Ni'matullah Bī were reconciled by royal commands.<sup>94</sup>

In 1127/1715 the Naymān leader was promoted to the post of *dīwānbēgī* and right hand of his friend Khudāyār Bī Atālīq.<sup>95</sup> Later he was also involved in the conflict between the Kīnakās leader Ibrāhīm Bī and the Manghit *atālīq*.<sup>96</sup> In 1717 he accompanied the deposed Khudāyār Bī on his way to Marw and Balkh, and from there made it to his traditional stronghold Tirmidh. Shortly thereafter, his Naymān were forcefully expelled from their original habitat by the Qungrāt, whereupon Ni'matullah Bī first escaped to Balkh and later to Qarshī, where he stayed with the friends and followers of Khudāyār Bī and Farhād Bī Ūtārchī.<sup>97</sup> In 1718 he assisted Farhād Bī during his unsuccessful siege of Karmīna.<sup>98</sup> When his patron Farhād Bī was appointed new *atālīq* in 1719, Ni'matullah Bī gained the important governorship of Samarqand. He died there of tuberculosis about six months

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., fols. 153a–b; Russian text, 171–72. According to the chronicler, 'Ubaidullah Khān feared that Khudāyār Bī could enthrone Abū'l-Faiẓ Sulṭān with the help of other discontented *amīrs*.

<sup>92</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 153b–154a; Semenov trans., 172–73; Chekhovich, "K istorii," 67.

<sup>93</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 158b–160a; Semenov trans., 177–79; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 287b; Chekhovich, "K istorii," 68.

<sup>94</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 173b–174b, 180b–184a; Semenov trans., 194–95, 201–04.

<sup>95</sup> According to Ṭālī', Ni'matullah Bī received this post after the intercession of the *ahl-i mahram* and his personal friend, the eunuch Khwāja Farhang Sarāyi (Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 36a; Semenov trans., 39). Balkhī claims that the Naymān *amīr* was appointed *dīwānbēgī* already in 1124/1713–14 (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fols. 291a–292b).

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., fols. 37a, 38a, 39a; Russian text, 40–42.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., fols. 39b–40b; Russian text, 42–43.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., fols. 41a–b; Russian text, 43.

later. According to Ṭāli', he was buried next to his father, 'Abd al-Karīm Bī, who had been killed in Samarqand in the time of Subhān Qulī Khān.<sup>99</sup>

### IBRĀHĪM BĪ KĪNAKĀS OF SHAHR-I SABZ

#### *The Ūng wa Sūl Tribes and the Aulād-i Rustam*

It is certain that the possession of a major part of the fertile Qashqa Daryā Valley earned the Kīnakās and their *ūng wa sūl* companions an influential position in Transoxania. Traversed by rivers and fertile irrigated areas and connected to Tirmidh and the Oxus basin through strategically important mountain passages, the region formed a suitable and ideal habitat with manifold possibilities to gain access to the urban centers Samarqand and Bukhara.<sup>100</sup> Among the *aulād-i* Rustam, who were part of the local leadership of Shahr-i Sabz, Ībrāhīm Bī figured most prominently,<sup>101</sup> though he seems to have been in the shadow of Khudāyār Bī Manghit for a long time. Being older and more experienced, the Manghit chief also acted as one of the leaders of the tribes of Shahr-i Sabz.<sup>102</sup> Bearing the title of *mīrākhūr*, Ībrāhīm Bī on many occasions proved to be a rather unreliable *amīr*, who more than once refused to support the king. This flamboyant figure was a skillful and ambitious tactician pursuing his political goals with utmost determination. Later he was to become the major antagonist of the Manghit and their protégé, Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān.

In the *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, the *ūng wa sūl* tribes, and particularly Ībrāhīm Bī, are depicted as a major source of trouble, a force impossible to tame. This picture materializes at first glance. But there is a strong bias against the tribes of Shahr-i Sabz in this chronicle. On many occasions, we gain the impression that other *amīrs*, by referring to the disobedience of the *ūng wa sūl*, sought a pretext to avoid campaigning in Balkh. At the same time, they

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., fols. 120a–b; Russian text, 66. According to another source, Ni'matullah Bī stayed in Balkh until 1132/1719–20. That year he was summoned back to mediate between the Qungrāt and the Naymān in Tirmidh. After the conflict had been settled, he returned to Bukhara and died a little later (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 293a).

<sup>100</sup> The ideal geographic location of the valley had also fostered the rise of the ruling Turko-Mongol elite since the early fourteenth century (Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 92–93).

<sup>101</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 34a, 78a, 182b; Semenov trans., 50, 91, 203.

<sup>102</sup> See the section on Khudāyār Bī Manghit below.

might have had their eye on Shahr as a future home, an attractive and comfortable valley, well protected by mountains and deserts, and therefore wanted to eliminate their foes. It is telling that other *amīrs* purposefully pushed the king to intervene there and punish the local tribes. Unfortunately we have no other Transoxanian sources from that time that could provide a corrective to the picture drawn by Amīn Bukhārī.<sup>103</sup>

Thus the sequence of events unfolding in the time of ‘Ubaidullah Khān can only be reconstructed from the vantage point of Amīn Bukhārī. In late spring 1117/1705, the tribes of Shahr-i Sabz for the first time refused to join the Bukharan army on its way to Balkh.<sup>104</sup> A little later, Ibrāhīm Bī belonged to a group of Bukharan chiefs undermining all efforts to subdue the Marqa leader of Ḥiṣār.<sup>105</sup> In Rabī‘ I 1118/June–July 1706, the *ūng wa sūl* Uzbeks again attracted the attention of ‘Ubaidullah Khān, whose other *amīrs*, unwilling to go to Balkh, suggested an expedition to Shahr-i Sabz.<sup>106</sup> The rebels only gave in when the king dispatched Khudāyār Bī, who promised to bring them to the royal camp.<sup>107</sup> Although the *aulād-i* Rustam put on the robes of honor granted by the king, they did not attend the army for the next Balkh campaign because of their allegiance to Maḥmūd Bī Qaṭaghān.<sup>108</sup> When the ruler wanted to go to Balkh a few months later, his commanders brought up the matter of punishing the tribes of Kish once again.<sup>109</sup>

In Dhū’l-Ḥijja 1118/February–March 1707, ‘Ubaidullah Khān entered Shahr-i Sabz together with his troops without facing resistance. On this occasion, some chiefs of the *ūng wa sūl* received provincial governorships (*ḥukūmat-i wilāyatī*). At the same time, however, many inhabitants of Shahr petitioned the king about the oppression of the men belonging to Ibrāhīm Bī.

<sup>103</sup> Dropping the collective designation *ūng wa sūl*, the authors of the *Tārīkh-i Abū’l-Faiḏ Khān* and the *Mazhar al-aḥwāl* characterize the Kīnakās in similar terms as a rebellious and even oppressive element (Tāli’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 34a, 99a; Semenov trans., 38, 49; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 41b).

<sup>104</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 33b–35a.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 45b–54a; Russian text, 61–69. During the siege of the fortress of Moghulān, Ibrāhīm Bī commanded the troops in front of the western gate (*ibid.*, fol. 48a; Russian text, 63).

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 76a–b; Russian text, 89. On this occasion we see Ibrāhīm Bī among other leaders of the *ūng wa sūl* like Ṭughma, Sulṭān, ‘Abd al-Ṣamad and Khwāja Birdī Kīnakās, Tangrī Birdī Juyūt, Dūst Qarā, Qāsim Bahādur, Īr Naḏar and others.

<sup>107</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 78a; Semenov trans., 91.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 81a; Russian text, 94; see also McChesney, *Waqf*, 163.

<sup>109</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 90a; Semenov trans., 103.

Reacting to these complaints, the king ordered the execution of the local *dīwānbēgī*, who was seen as the cause of Ibrāhīm Bī's tyranny.<sup>110</sup> A few weeks later, the *ūng wa sūl* Uzbeks joined the Bukharan troops near Balkh. The chronicler refers here particularly to their numerical strength and speaks of "innumerable legions."<sup>111</sup> In order to channel their destructive power, they were ordered to raid Kunduz, the seat of Maḥmūd Bī Qaṭaghān. As an eyewitness of this campaign, our author again points to the cruelty of the raiders, "hurling the fire of tyranny and injustice on the harvest of quiet of the Muslims."<sup>112</sup>

During the siege of Balkh, a part of the *ūng wa sūl* defected and went over to Maḥmūd Bī, who instructed them to fight against the Bukharan troops. Other *ūng wa sūl* leaders like Khudāyār Bī Manghit, however, retained their loyalty to 'Ubaidullah Khān. In the course of the following battle, the Bukharans utterly defeated their enemies and took many of them prisoner.<sup>113</sup> In the aftermath of the conquest, 'Ubdaidullah Khān reallocated a number of governorships in return for military merits and transferred the governorship of Shahr-i Sabz to Farhād Bī Ūtārchī.<sup>114</sup> Unfortunately, we do not learn what happened when the Kḥiṭā'ī-Qipchāq made their bid for Kish. But since our sources continue referring to this area as the home of the Kīnakās and other tribes, the attempt to remove the notorious *ūng wa sūl* from their habitat must have failed.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., fols. 91a–92a; Russian text, 104–05; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 116b. Unfortunately, the source does not name the *dīwānbēgī*.

<sup>111</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 103b; Semenov trans., 118.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., fol. 109a; Russian text, 124. The chronicler states that he witnessed the cruelty of the *ūng wa sūl* himself and felt regret for having participated in the mission to Kunduz (ibid., fol. 110a; Russian text, 125).

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., fols. 114a–117a; Russian text, 130–33. According to our source, the leaders of the *ūng wa sūl* who had gone over to Maḥmūd Bī tried to hide in Balkh after the capture of the town by Bukharan troops. But all of them were pursued and imprisoned. Amīn Bukhārī mentions Ṭughma, 'Abd al-Ṣamad, Khwājān Bīrdī and Muḥammad Quḷī Manghit as tribal leaders captured in Balkh (ibid., fol. 121a; Russian text, 138). According to another author, Rustam Bī's sons were allegedly killed after the decisive battle and the occupation of Balkh by Bukharan troops (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 287a).

<sup>114</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 125a; Semenov trans., 142.

*From Mīrākhūr to Atālīq: The Ascent of Ibrāhīm Bī*

During the reign of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān, Ibrāhīm Bī became one of the most influential amirid forces in Transoxania. With his rise to prominence, the enmity between the Manghit and Kīnakās tribes comes to the attention of the historian. However, it does not become clear what precisely triggered this conflict between the two groups. We only learn about the governorship of Shahr-i Sabz, which was disputed between the Manghit and the Kīnakās leaders. The *aulād-i* Rustam seem to have been the major destructive element in the area, at least this is the picture evolving from the sources.

What is also crucial is the meteoric rise of Ibrāhīm Bī and his constant commuting between Bukhara and Shahr-i Sabz. Within ten years, he moved around between the capital and his stronghold several times. In the capital he acted as a guardian of the last Tuqay-Timurids, and in Shahr he simply played the role of an antagonist. Much of the confusing to and fro of that period was determined by his ambition to dominate the *khān* and curb the power of his Manghit foes. In the following I will recapitulate the milestones of Ibrāhīm Bī's remarkable career:

- In 1711, Ibrāhīm Bī was promoted to the rank of *dīwānbēgī* through Muḥammad Ma'šūm Bī Atālīq Sarāy.
- In 1714–15, Ibrāhīm Bī Dīwānbēgī was dismissed together with his father-in-law and retreated to Shahr-i Sabz for the first time. From there, he started opposing Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and his Manghit supporters.
- In early 1717, Ibrāhīm Bī and his Qaṭaghān allies entered the capital and expelled the Manghit forces. Afterward, he assumed the position of *atālīq*. The next two years were spent fighting the Manghit and their Khiṭā'i-Qipchāq supporters.
- In 1719, Ibrāhīm Bī Atālīq led his Kīnakās warriors in an attack on the royal palace of Bukhara in order to bring Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān under his control. When the attempt failed, he again escaped to Shahr-i Sabz from where he organized resistance.
- In December 1722, Ibrāhīm Bī and his followers enthroned Rajab Sulṭān, a Chingizid of Khwārazmian background, as new *khān* of Samarqand.
- In spring 1723, the Kīnakās chieftain and his Chingizid overlord launched a campaign against Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān. Their army overran Miyānkāl up to Karmīna and entered the oasis of Bukhara. But they were beaten back by the Manghit and their allies under the leadership of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī.

In the time of 'Ubaidullah Khān, Ibrāhīm Bī held the rank of *mīrākhūr*. Although he was one of the leaders of the powerful *ūng wa sūl*, he seems to

have been in a mere subordinate position, overshadowed by Khudāyār Bī Manghit and his own father-in-law, Maʿšūm Bī Sarāy.

It was right after the death of the king in 1711 that Ibrāhīm Bī b. Rustam Bī was called to Bukhara by Maʿšūm Bī, who arranged his appointment to the prestigious post of *dīwānbēgī*.<sup>115</sup> In the next two years, he profited greatly from the position of his father-in-law, who enjoyed a high reputation and was entrusted with the “rending and mending of the dependent dominion” (*ratq u fatq-i wilāyat-i marhūn*).<sup>116</sup> Since the sources only provide information from the vantage point of the Bukharan court, we do not learn much about the circumstances in Shahr-i Sabz during the next two years. Ṭālīʿ only says that the conflict between the Kīnakās and Khudāyār Bī continued.<sup>117</sup> In 1124/1713 the governor of Samarqand, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Dūrmān, was unable to curb a rebellion of the Kḥiṭāʿī-Qipchāq and eventually called on Sulṭān Tūqsāba, the brother of Ibrāhīm Bī, for help. But as the Kīnakās troops soon began to harass the urban population, they were finally driven out and withdrew to Shahr-i Sabz.<sup>118</sup>

After an unsuccessful campaign against the Kḥiṭāʿī-Qipchāq leader Farhād Bī in 1126/1714–15, the relationship between the Bukharan court on the one hand and Ibrāhīm Bī and his Saray in-laws on the other suddenly changed.<sup>119</sup> In Mullā Sharīf’s version, the *atālīq* was dismissed shortly after the end of the expedition because of a lack of confidence and loyalty.<sup>120</sup> Ṭālīʿ attributes the dismissal to Maʿšūm Bī’s failure to secure control over Karmīna and his illness, which was due to his addiction to opium.<sup>121</sup> The removal of the Sarāy leader and his son-in-law triggered a first rebellion of Kīnakās warriors, but troops loyal to the *khāqān* attacked Ibrāhīm Bī’s estate

<sup>115</sup> Ṭālīʿ, *Tārīkh*, fols. 31b–32a; Semenov trans., 36; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 137b–138a. Balkhī mentions him as Ibrāhīm Bī Parwānachī (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292a).

<sup>116</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 138b.

<sup>117</sup> Ṭālīʿ, *Tārīkh*, fol. 33b; Semenov trans., 37.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., fol. 34a; Russian text, 37; Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 114.

<sup>119</sup> Ṭālīʿ, *Tārīkh*, fols. 34b–35a; Semenov trans., 38–39.

<sup>120</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 140b.

<sup>121</sup> Ṭālīʿ, *Tārīkh*, fols. 34b–35a; Semenov trans., 38–39. According to yet another version, Maʿšūm Ḥājī Atālīq was dismissed and sent to Qarshī already in 1124/1712–13, meaning at least three years earlier than suggested by Ṭālīʿ. In this account, Maʿšūm Ḥājī’s dismissal came after an intervention by Khudāyār Bī Dīwānbēgī Manghit and Niʿmatullah Bī Naymān, who allegedly identified him as ʿUbaidullah Khān’s murderer (*qātil*) and demanded that he be exiled from the court (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fols. 291b–292a).

in the Khwāja Bāzār quarter of Bukhara. He and his allies withdrew from Bukhara to Qarshī shortly thereafter.<sup>122</sup>

It is difficult to establish an exact and consistent chronology for the following events. Especially with regard to Ibrāhīm Bī's whereabouts directly after his dismissal, the sources offer inconsistent pieces of information. According to Ṭāli', the Kīnakās chieftain escaped immediately to Kish.<sup>123</sup> At the same time, however, the governorship of Shahr-i Sabz seems to have been in the hands of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Manghit.<sup>124</sup> In this version, it was not until 1129/1716–17, the year Ibrāhīm Bī assumed the atālīqate, that the Kīnakās forces drove out the Manghit and gained possession of Shahr-i Sabz once and for all.<sup>125</sup> Mullā Sharīf reports that after his dismissal in 1714–15, the former *dīwānbēgī* retired first to Qarshī, where he established himself as an independent and oppressive ruler, "raising the banner of wickedness."<sup>126</sup> According to this account, the Kīnakās leader acted as a ruthless tyrant, whose "hand of oppression and transgression [plagued] the inhabitants of Qarshī," so that the king dispatched his officials to bring the rebel to heel.<sup>127</sup> Mullā Sharīf states that Ibrāhīm Bī captured Shahr-i Sabz later from the relatives of Khudāyār Bī, who then withdrew to Chirāghchī at the southwestern edge of Shahr-i Sabz halfway to Nasaf.<sup>128</sup>

Despite these inconsistencies, it is certain that the Kīnakās leader was out of royal favor and left Bukhara. Yet the contact with the court was not totally cut off, because his brother Sulṭān Tūqsāba (d. 1719) belonged to the retinue of the new *atālīq* Khudāyār Bī. In early 1127/1715, Ibrāhīm Bī was confronted with attempts of the government to curb his activities either in Shahr-i Sabz or in Qarshī.<sup>129</sup> Sulṭān Tūqsāba accompanied the troops to

<sup>122</sup> See also Chekhovich, "K istorii," 71. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ṭāli' informs us that Ibrāhīm Bī's wife came to Qarshī after the death of her father, Ma'sūm Bī Ḥājī Sarāy, in order to claim her inheritance, but went to her husband in Shahr-i Sabz shortly after (Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 36a; Semenov trans., 39). According to Mullā Sharīf, the Kīnakās *amīr* remained in Qarshī (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 141b).

<sup>123</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 35b; Semenov trans., 39.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., fol. 39b–40a; Russian text, 42.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., fols. 39b–40a; Russian text, 42.

<sup>126</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 141b.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., fol. 141b.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., fol. 142b. Ya'qūb offers yet another version, according to which just the positions had shifted: Khudāyār Bī was called to Bukhara where he received the post of *atālīq*, whereas his rival Ibrāhīm Bī became governor of Shahr-i Sabz (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 35b).

<sup>129</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 36b; Semenov trans., 40; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 142a.

facilitate the negotiations with his brother. After more than two weeks of fighting, Ibrāhīm Bī was offered the governorship of Samarqand, but he refused because it was the home of the Kḥiṭāʾī-Qipchāq.<sup>130</sup>

In the next two years, the surroundings of Shahr-i Sabz developed into a Kīnakās stronghold, a center of rebellious activities and a sanctuary for unruly tribal leaders. For example, in Ramazān 1128/August 1716, Khwāja Qulī Bī Qaṭaghān, who was known for his transgressions, escaped from an angry mob of people to Shahr-i Sabz.<sup>131</sup> In early 1717 the Kīnakās and their allies attacked Bukhara with only two thousand warriors, expelled their enemies and occupied strategic positions.<sup>132</sup> Having established control over the capital, creating a *fait accompli*, they suggested the ruler send their enemies to Mecca.<sup>133</sup>

It seems that this sudden shift of power came at the right time for Abūʾl-Faiẓ Khān and his confidants, who wanted to curtail the growing influence of the Manghit leader. It is also possible that the Tuqay-Timurid court appealed to the Kīnakās chieftain and summoned him and his troops to the capital. After his appointment to the post of *atālīq* in 1717,<sup>134</sup> Ibrāhīm Bī summoned his protégés from Shahr-i Sabz and granted them a range of key positions. Mullā Sharīf states that many of his clan members willingly entered Ibrāhīm Bī's service.<sup>135</sup> Sultān Bī, for example, was appointed

<sup>130</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 36b; Semenov trans., 40. In Mullā Sharīf's version Ibrāhīm Bī accepted the offer and went to Samarqand, but he retreated to Shahr-i Sabz because the city was the original habitat (*waṭan-i aṣlī*) of the Kḥiṭāʾī-Qipchāq (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 142b).

<sup>131</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 39a–40a; Semenov trans., 42–43.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 39b–40a; Russian text, 42. The circumstances of this major shift of power are less clear than Ṭāli' suggests. While he assumes that the Kīnakās occupied Bukhara and forced their enemies to withdraw, Mullā Sharīf states that Ibrāhīm Bī and his ally just returned to the Bukharan court where they pronounced their enmity with the four *amīrs* (*umarā-yi arbaʿa*): Khudāyār Bī, ʿAbdullah Bī Qushbēgī, Niʿmatullah Bī Naymān and Bēg Ughlī Bī Parwānāchī. (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 142b–143a). Dating this shift of power to 1127/1715, Balkhī says that the Kīnakās chief gathered seven to eight thousand horsemen, a figure that seems exaggerated, entered Bukhara at night and drove out his rivals. Afterward he was appointed *atālīq* (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292a).

<sup>133</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 39b–40a; Semenov trans., 42; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292a. Mullā Sharīf is of the opinion that the decision to send the Manghit leader to perform the *hajj* in Mecca was due to the influence and persuasiveness of Khwāja Qulī Bī (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 142b–143a).

<sup>134</sup> According to Yaʿqūb, Ibrāhīm Bī received the post of *atālīq* after the death of Khudāyār Bī Manghit (Yaʿqūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 2a).

<sup>135</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 145b.

*qūshbēgī*, while his ally Yaḥyā Khwāja Jūybārī was installed as the new *sheikh al-Islām*. A third group of beneficiaries were the Qaṭaghān nobles.<sup>136</sup>

The next two years are not well covered by the *Tārīkh-i Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān* and the avatar version furnished by Mullā Sharīf. According to the chronicler of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī,

“after Ibrāhīm became *atālīq*, the tyranny and oppression of the people in the dominion of Bukhara by the Kīnakas constantly increased. At every station and every place where the Kīnakas, who had joined the army of Ibrāhīm Atālīq, dismounted, they looted the houses of the subjects. They captured their livestock and engaged in iniquitous activities.”<sup>137</sup>

It is possible that Muḥammad Amīn wants to portray the enemies of his master as brutal oppressors. But the molestations suffered by the populace at the hands of the Kīnakās warriors are also confirmed by other sources.<sup>138</sup>

The relationship of Ibrāhīm Bī and his allies with the court changed again in May 1719, when they received orders to launch a campaign against the Kḥitāʾī-Qipchāq.<sup>139</sup> As has been discussed in the previous section, in the meantime their Turkomān allies from the banks of the Āmū Daryā had failed to expel Farhād Bī’s forces from Qarshī. Instead of setting out for Samarqand, the two *amīrs* retired to the tomb of Bahāʾ al-Dīn Naqshband, where they cooked up their plan.<sup>140</sup> Since they considered their forces not strong enough to defeat their enemies, they remained in the environs of Bukhara, where two thousand Kīnakās, Manghit and Juyūt arriving from Shahr-i Sabz began to molest the population.<sup>141</sup>

<sup>136</sup> Ṭālīʾ, *Tārīkh*, fol. 41a; Semenov trans., 43. Khwāja Qulī Bī’s appointment is not mentioned explicitly, but he appears afterward as *dīwānbēgī* in the text (see Ṭālīʾ, *Tārīkh*, fols. 97b, 117a).

<sup>137</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Maẓhar*, 41b; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292a. Muḥammad Amīn and Khwājam Qulī Bēg spell it “Kīnakas/Kīnagas” (کینکس).

<sup>138</sup> Ṭālīʾ, *Tārīkh*, fol. 42b; Semenov trans., 45; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 141b.

<sup>139</sup> While Ṭālīʾ gives the year 1131/1718–19 as the date of these events (Ṭālīʾ, *Tārīkh*, fols. 96b–97b), Balkhī dates the whole story to 1129/1716–17 (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 192a).

<sup>140</sup> According to Balkhī, “Ibrāhīm selected one thousand chiefs and nobles of the tribe (*aʾyān-i ulūs wa amīrzādagān*) as well as [his] sons and his brother Sulṭān Qūshbēgī to guarantee the *khān*’s safety, and moved to the tomb of Ḥaẓrat Khwāja-yi Buzurg” (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fols. 292a–b).

<sup>141</sup> Ṭālīʾ, *Tārīkh*, fols. 97b–98b; Semenov trans., 47–48. It is not clear why the Manghit, who had already resettled in Qarshī and Chirāghchī, should have had a motive to participate in these activities on the side of their enemy. It is also possible that not all the Manghit clans supported Khudāyār Bī and Ḥakīm Bī. Some of them had probably stayed in Shahr-i Sabz and allied with the Kīnakās.

“Imposing tyranny and oppression on the subjects, that bold tribe reached out the hand of extortion to the property, the families and the wives of the subjects. When the subjects came and told that blind man [Ibrāhīm Bī] that [the Kīnakās troops] had opened the hand of occupancy over their families and wives, that unjust man did not listen. He caused trouble to the subjects [and told them] that [his men] did so because they were unmarried. In this manner he committed acts of cruelty and injustice.”<sup>142</sup>

The Kīnakās launched an unsuccessful attack on the royal palace shortly thereafter.<sup>143</sup> In Ṭāli‘’s view, the Kīnakās chief planned to depose Abū’l-Faiḏ Khān but his suggestion met with no approval from his brother Sulṭān Bī,<sup>144</sup> who played an ambiguous role in the following events. According to the *Mazhar al-aḥwāl*, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Manghit and Sulṭān Bī wanted to intercede on behalf of the inhabitants of Bukhara when the city notables, enraged at the conduct of the Kīnakās, assembled at the Lab-i ḥauḏ-i dīwānbēgī at the center of the capital, but the Manghit *amīr* returned to Bukhara after the negotiations had failed.<sup>145</sup> On the arrival of the two *amīrs* at Ibrāhīm Bī’s headquarters outside the capital, they saw how “the Kīnakās people had cast the woolen carpets and cloths of the subjects on their horses and carried off the livestock of the subjects.”<sup>146</sup> Afterward, Sultan Bī and some of the Kīnakās leader’s sons attacked the *arg* of Bukhara but were repulsed by the courtiers.<sup>147</sup> Against the backdrop of the previous years, it sounds reasonable that Ibrāhīm Bī wanted to remove the ruler either to usurp the throne himself, or more probably and due to the impact of the Chingizid constitution, to install a new ruler supposedly easier to manipulate.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., fols. 99a–b, Russian text, 49.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., fols. 97b–114b; Russian text, 47–61; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 42b; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 146b–151b. See also Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 115–16.

<sup>144</sup> Ṭāli‘, *Tārīkh*, fol. 98b; Semenov trans., 48–49. The Russian envoy Benevini presents a somewhat different version. In his opinion, in 1718 the ruler and his courtiers took the initiative by inviting three hundred Uzbeks (the author does not mention particular tribal affiliations) to a large banquet where they killed all of them in the hope of undisturbed rule (Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Report dated 08-04-1726], 126–127).

<sup>145</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 41b–42a.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., fol. 42a.

<sup>147</sup> Ṭāli‘, *Tārīkh*, fols. 100b–114b; Semenov trans., 50–61; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 42a–b; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 149a–152a.

*The Rebellion of Rajab Khān (1721–1728)*

After his unsuccessful attempt to replace Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān, the previous cycle of action repeated itself; Ibrāhīm Bī again retired to his stronghold.<sup>148</sup> But it was not until the violent death of his successor, Farhād Bī Atālīq, in 1134/1721–22 that he considered his forces a match for Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and his Manghit protectors.<sup>149</sup> In Rabī' I 1134/December 1722, he and his followers made Rajab Sulṭān—a descendant of the Chingizid line of Khwārazm—the new *khān* in Samarqand.<sup>150</sup> Rajab Sulṭān's mother belonged to an influential local lineage of Aḥrārī *khwājas* and his family had lived in Miyānkāl since the time of 'Abdullah Khān. He himself had lived in Chahār Bāgh near Samarqand.<sup>151</sup> The enthronization of Rajab Khān followed the Chingizid procedure: the candidate was placed on a white carpet and was seated on the green stone, the *kūk-tāsh* (also called *sang-i sabz*, *sang-i kabūd*), by local notables and members of the religious establishment like Pādishāh Khwāja, a local Aḥrārī sheikh.<sup>152</sup>

Although the following rebellion began in his name, he was a mere figurehead for the Kīnakās and their allies. Claiming that the Kīnakās leader

<sup>148</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 116a, 121a; Semenov trans., 62, 66–67; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 152a. See also Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 93; Bregel, "The new Uzbek states," 393; Holzwarth, "Relations," 193.

<sup>149</sup> According to Balkhī, Ibrāhīm Bī sent messengers to the Kḥiṭā'ī-Qipchāq and forged an alliance with them (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 293b).

<sup>150</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 43a; Semenov trans., 69; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 293b. Rajab Khān was a cousin of the Khiwan ruler Shīr Ghāzī Khān (Bregel, "Central Asia vii. In the 12th–13th/18th–19th Centuries," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. V, 193). The date of his coronation is unclear. Ṭāli' gives two different dates: first Rabī' I 14, 1135/December 23, 1723 (Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 43a; Semenov trans., 69), and second Rabī' I 10, 1134/December 19, 1722 (Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 124a; Semenov, "Predislovie," in *Istorija Abulfeiz-khana*, 155, footnote no. 156). Yet although the days and dates given by the author for the year 1134/1722 are largely incorrect, in contrast to the dates given for 1135/1723, the majority of historians give the year 1722 as the beginning of the rebellion (Barthold, *Gesammelte Werke*, 101; Chekhovich, "K istorii," 71; Bregel, "The new Uzbek states," 393; Bregel, "Central Asia," 193; Holzwarth, "Relations," 193; Sela, *Ritual and Authority*, 46). For other versions see Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, 293b; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 10a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 160b; Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 93.

<sup>151</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 124a; Semenov trans., 69; Holzwarth, "Relations," 193, footnote no. 71.

<sup>152</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 43a; Semenov trans., 69. For other versions see Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 10a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 160b; see also Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 93; Bregel, "The new Uzbek states," 393). For a detailed description of the *kūk-tāsh*, see Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, II, 443; Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 254–55.

brought Rajab Khān under his control, Balkhī assigns an even more passive role to the Chingizid.<sup>153</sup> Ibrāhīm Bī was filled with the idea of taking revenge for the ignominious defeat in Bukhara two years before.<sup>154</sup> On that occasion, three hundred Kīnakās had been killed, among them close relatives of Ibrāhīm Bī such as his brother Sultān Bī Qūshbegī and two of his own sons.<sup>155</sup>

From his domicile in Kish, Ibrāhīm Bī was able to build a large alliance consisting of the Kīnakās, the Kḥiṭāʾī-Qipchāq, some of the Yetī Ūrūgh and Qungrāt.<sup>156</sup> At the same time, he resorted to a well-proven strategy and gathered his friends and followers in Shahr-i Sabz. Ibrāhīm's allies were Niyāz Bī Qaṭaghān, the former governor of Karmīna, Bēg Ughlī Bī Baḥrīn, Yaḥyā Khwāja Jūybārī, who returned from Khwārazm and married a daughter of Ibrāhīm Bī, and finally Khwājam Yār Bī Ūtārchī, who went to Shahr-i Sabz after the assassination of his father, Farḥād Bī Atālīq, in 1134/1721–22.<sup>157</sup> Backed by this broad coalition, Ibrāhīm Bī mounted a campaign in spring 1722.<sup>158</sup>

<sup>153</sup> Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 293b.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 293a.

<sup>155</sup> Ṭālīʾ, *Tārīkh*, fols. 113a–b, 115b; Semenov trans., 60, 62; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 43a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 151, 152a; Yaʿqūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 2b. For these events see also Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 71.

<sup>156</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 43b. See also Holzwarth, “Relations,” 193, footnote no. 71.

<sup>157</sup> Ṭālīʾ, *Tārīkh*, fols. 120a, 121b, 123a–b; Semenov trans., 65–68.

<sup>158</sup> Our main source gives inconsistent dates for the rebellion of Rajab Khān. At first, it suggests that the rebellion began in spring 1135/1723 with forays of the Yetī Ūrūgh in Ghijduwān (Ṭālīʾ, *Tārīkh*, fol. 52b; Semenov trans., 76). The dates of the following events are given correctly, but the text breaks off before reporting about the decisive battle (Ṭālīʾ, *Tārīkh*, fols. 93b–94a; Semenov trans., 45, 111). Later we read about the preparations for the battle on Saturday, Ramaḥān 30, 1134 (*ibid.*, fols. 136b–137a), but this date is incorrect since Ramaḥān 30 was either Monday, July 13 or Tuesday, July 14, 1722. Ramaḥān 30, 1135/July 3, 1723, however, was indeed a Saturday. In Semenov's translation the second date is not mentioned. While Mullā Sharīf just borrowed the incorrect date (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 161a, 182a), Qāzī Wafā states that the rebellion began with violent encounters at Hazāra south of Karmīna in 1134/1722, but the major army led by Rajab Khān and his allies approached Bukhara the next year (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 10a–11b). Balkhī dates the beginning of the rebellion to 1134/1722–23 (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 293b).

In a relatively short time, the troops of the Samarqand coalition captured the entire Miyānkāl up to Karmīna and Nūr.<sup>159</sup> After the occupation of Hazāra on the southern bank of the Zarafshān River by the troops of Muḥammad Hakīm Bī Atālīq,<sup>160</sup> the army of Rajab Khān and Ibrāhīm Bī entered the Bukharan oasis from Ghijduwān in the north. But in spite of their numerical strength, they suffered a decisive defeat on Ramazān 30, 1135/July 3, 1723, at Wābkent in the *tūmān* of Khitfar<sup>161</sup> north of the capital.<sup>162</sup> Subsequently, Ibrāhīm Bī once again withdrew to Shahr-i Sabz and continued to host the enemies of the government.

In the year of Rajab Khān's defeat and the eastward retreat of his legions, the Qazāq, driven out of their pasturelands by the Qalmāq, entered Transoxania.<sup>163</sup> Forming an alliance with Rajab Khān and Ibrāhīm Bī, who were fortifying Samarqand when the newcomers arrived,<sup>164</sup> the Qazāq undertook devastating raids deep into the Bukharan heartland.<sup>165</sup> Underlining the dramatic character of these events, the Bukharan sources claim that the invaders from the Great Steppe raided the fertile Miyānkāl for about seven years, bringing about destruction on a massive scale and a loss of arable

<sup>159</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḥzar*, fol. 43b; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 293b.

<sup>160</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 65b–68a; Semenov trans., 87–88; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 10b–11a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 166a–168b.

<sup>161</sup> Qāzī Wafā erroneously locates the town of Wābkent in Khitfar, but in fact it is in the *tūmān* of Kāmāt.

<sup>162</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 89b–93b, 125b–160a; Semenov trans., 107–37; Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḥzar*, fol. 44a; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fols. 293b–294a; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 12b–16a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 173a–182a. The numbers of the troops supporting Rajab Khān vary in the sources. Often the authors give inflated figures. Ṭālī' puts the figure at only 30,000 warriors (Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 70a; Semenov trans., 90). Muḥammad Amīn and Qāzī Wafā give a number of 70,000 soldiers (Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḥzar*, fol. 43b; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 15b), Balkhī gives an exaggerated figure of 200,000 (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, 293b), and Mullā Sharīf estimates 80,000 warriors (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 161a).

<sup>163</sup> Chekhovich, "O nekotorykh," 88; Holzwarth, "Relations," 194. Balkhī reports that after the defeat of the Qazāq by Qalmāq forces, allegedly one hundred fifty thousand Qazāq families moved to Samarqand (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 294b).

<sup>164</sup> Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 295b; see also Holzwarth, "Relations," 194.

<sup>165</sup> The Uzbek chiefs of the Samarqand region activated their traditional regional networks of trade relations and the contacts they had developed with the Qarāqalpāq and Qazāq (Holzwarth, "Relations," 196). For the Qazāq raids see also Barthold, *Gesammelte Werke*, 101; Chekhovich, "O nekotorykh," 88; Chekhovich, "K istorii," 72.

land, especially in the environs of Samarqand.<sup>166</sup> But according to Wolfgang Holzwarth, earlier accounts suggest a greater role of the Uzbeks in that drama.<sup>167</sup> The results were famine, a general inflation of the grain price and the depopulation of entire regions.<sup>168</sup> Benevini mentions that in the early 1720s, the city of Bukhara was “half depopulated and ruined by Uzbek attacks.”<sup>169</sup> According to Ya‘qūb, Samarqand became totally depopulated, and in Bukhara only two city quarters remained inhabited.<sup>170</sup> In that period, more than twelve thousand inhabitants of Samarqand migrated to India.<sup>171</sup>

The joint military actions of the Samarqand alliance and the Qazāq continued between 1723 and 1727–288.<sup>172</sup> At the same time, the Qalmāq under their leader Tsevan Rabtana attempted to forge a counter coalition with the Bukharan *khān*. The first attempts to coalesce go back to the year 1723, when the Qalmāq ruler dispatched an ambassador to the Tuqay-Timurid court,<sup>173</sup> offering military support in return for the revenues of Samarqand. According to Benevini, the Qalmāq envoy also stated that after taking Khojand further in the east by force, his master threatened to capture Samarqand,

“and should he find any apposition [sic] from the Khan, he would not spare even Bukhara, and, after slaughtering or chasing away the Khan with the Uzbeks, he would give the

<sup>166</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 48a; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 294b; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 17a–b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 184a–190a; Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 2b–3a. See also Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 93; Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 393; Chekhovich, “O nekotorykh,” 88.

<sup>167</sup> Holzwarth points out that in retrospect early Manghit chroniclers played down the role of the Uzbeks during that time while augmenting the part of the Qazāq as the main cause of the ruin of Transoxania (Holzwarth, “Relations,” 205–06).

<sup>168</sup> Qāzī Wafā particularly reports about a sharp rise in the price of grain and flour in that period. This resulted in a severe famine (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 17a).

<sup>169</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Rep. dated 08-04-1726], 124. See also Holzwarth, “Relations,” 205.

<sup>170</sup> Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 2b–3a. See also Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 93–94; Chekhovich, “O nekotorykh,” 88; Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 72–73; Bregel, “Central Asia,” 193.

<sup>171</sup> Beisembiev, “Migration,” 35.

<sup>172</sup> The troops of Rajab Khān had never attacked Bukhara directly. In late August 1724, when the opponents of the Bukharan ruler threatened to attack the city, they suddenly retired to Samarqand because some of the Uzbek forces had deserted Rajab Khān. In early 1725, Qazāq warriors blocked the road and looted travelers in the environs of Samarqand (Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Rep. dated 16-03-1725], 88; Holzwarth, “Relations,” 194–95).

<sup>173</sup> Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 295b. For a detailed investigation see Holzwarth, “Relations,” 196.

country to its ancient rulers, putting on the throne a Ciagatai, as it was at the time of the Great Tamerlane.”<sup>174</sup>

Holzwarth points out that the Bukharan-Qalmāq correspondence continued well into the year 1727 and ebbed away when the Qalmāq were successfully beaten back by their Qazāq rivals.<sup>175</sup>

To sum up the events of that turbulent period, Transoxania’s economy suffered greatly from the rebellion. Especially in the Miyānkāl, formerly cultivated tracts of land returned to a natural state of swamps and grazing grounds.<sup>176</sup> The Russian envoy Benevini describes the circumstances at the end of 1724 as follows:

“[...] I was relieved by receiving the orders from my Imperial Court, which had been sent to me with a Bashkir named Molla Maksud. I did not receive the orders by him personally, but through another man sent by him, for he was caught by the Karakalpaks beyond the aforementioned Syr river. That same man was also attacked on the way near Samarkand [...] by the Kazakhs, partisans of Regeb Khan, and he was lucky enough to save his life and the letters, sewed in a ragged shirt, being otherwise completely naked. [Still], as far as I could see, I did not have any permission to go back, neither could I find a way which was without danger, since everywhere around Bukhara there were nothing else but wars and great disorder.”<sup>177</sup>

Rajab Khān died in 1140/1727–28 for unknown reasons.<sup>178</sup> The Qazāq left the region somewhat later after a two-month siege of the capital.<sup>179</sup> Afterward, Ibrāhīm Bī’s last but unsuccessful attempt to patronize another

<sup>174</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Perevod s zhurnala italienskogo], 96. Translation taken from Nicola Di Cosmo, “A Russian Envoy to Khiva: The Italian Diary of Florio Benevini,” in *Proceedings of the XXVIII. Permanent International Altaistic Conference* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1989), 89.

<sup>175</sup> Holzwarth, “Relations,” 196–97.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 208–09.

<sup>177</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Perevod s zhurnala italienskogo/Rep. dated 1725—transmitted by Peter Soforov], 95; translation taken from Di Cosmo, “A Russian Envoy,” 87.

<sup>178</sup> If we believe Muḥammad Amīn, Rajab Khān died in the same year as Qurbān Mīrākhūr, the second son of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī, who was killed in 1140/1727–28 in Bukhara (Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 40a, 47b; see also Holzwarth, “Relations,” 195, footnote no. 84).

<sup>179</sup> In retrospect Bukharan authors refer to the decisive impact of destiny and the bravery of the Bukharans (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 17b–18a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 198a–b). According to Kāzīm, the Qazāq left Mā Warā’ al-Nahr due to a smallpox epidemic among their troops (Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, III, 1105). For the whole Qazāq-Bukharan encounter and the involvement of the Jungars, see Holzwarth, “Relations,” 194–98.

Chingizid, a certain Ghāzī Khān, documents the continued importance of the Chingizid dispensation. After the end of the Qazāq presence, the Shahr-i Sabz ruler went to Qarshī where he made peace with Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī, who conferred the governorship of Samarqand upon him.<sup>180</sup>

In Bukharan accounts, Ibrāhīm Bī appears as the most enigmatic and influential amirid figure of his time, though the portrayals are rather negative. Inspired by Ṭālī's account, Mullā Sharīf describes him as an "adverse and narrow-minded tyrant" who did not know what loyalty is. His followers and associates are likewise condemned for their tyranny and brutality toward the subjects.<sup>181</sup>

Unfortunately, the sources tell us very little about the following events. According to the *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, Raḥīm Khān, the son of Shāh Rukh Bī, the first ruler of the Ming dynasty in Ferghana, came to Shahr-i Sabz when he mounted a campaign to Samarqand shortly after the end of the Qazāq raids. According to Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, at that time a certain Ḥakīm Būkrī Bēg, a brother or son of Ibrāhīm Bī, acted as local governor and arranged a marriage alliance with the Ming leader.<sup>182</sup> Walking in his predecessor's footsteps, Ḥakīm Bēg Kīnakās managed to win the Sarāy as allies for his new overlord, whom he instigated to invade the Miyānkāl. In this way he wanted to resume the war against Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān.<sup>183</sup>

#### FARHĀD BĪ ŪTĀRCHĪ OF SAMARQAND

In the previous sections we encountered the Kḥiṭā'ī-Qipchāq and their leader, Farhād Bī, on various occasions. Traces of the Kḥiṭā'ī-Qipchāq appear in the accounts dating back to Subḥān Qulī Khān. At that time, Khwāja Qulī Bī Ūtārchī, the governor of Samarqand, had risen in rebellion against the Bukharan ruler. He played a key role during the attacks by

<sup>180</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḏhar*, fols. 47b–48a; see also Holzwarth, "Relations," 195.

<sup>181</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 145b–146a. This is also confirmed by an earlier source reporting about the tyranny of the followers of Ibrāhīm Bī (*zulm-i kasān-i Ibrāhīm Mīrākhūr*) in Shahr-i Sabz in 1118/1706–07 (Amīn Bukhārī, *Uбайдullah Nāma*, fol. 92a; Semenov trans., 105).

<sup>182</sup> Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, vol. II, 4–5. Muḥammad Amīn writes that Ḥakīm Bēg was a son of Ibrāhīm Bī (Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḏhar*, fol. 48b).

<sup>183</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḏhar*, fols. 48b–49b. According to the *Tārīkh-i shāhrukhī*, Samarqand was taken by 'Abd al-Raḥīm Bī either in 1142/1729 or in 1145/1732 (Beisembiev, *Ta'rikh*, 11, 92).

Anūsha in 1683–84 and was reported to have invited Khiwan troops to invade Bukhara.<sup>184</sup> But another source from the same period denies his alliance with Anūsha and relates instead that he wanted to prevent a counter offensive by the Bukharan troops. Irrespective of these contradictions in the narratives, the Khiṭāʾī-Qipchāq seem to have played a decisive role in Anūsha's third campaign, which ended with the occupation of most of Miyānkāl and finally the capture of Samarqand on Shaʿbān 5, 1095/July 18, 1684.<sup>185</sup>

Next we come across another member of the noble Ūtārchī lineage, Farhād Bī, whose career has been thoroughly explored by Holzwarth.<sup>186</sup> This *amīr* may have been a son or grandson of Khwāja Qulī Bī.<sup>187</sup> He began his career in the time of ʿUbaidullah Khān. His base was a small local fortress near the village of Charkhīn on the outskirts of Samarqand.<sup>188</sup> In 1119/1707, Farhād Bī participated in the conquest of Balkh, commanding a contingent of Khiṭāʾī-Qipchāq warriors and a corps of the king's Qalmāq bodyguard. Subsequently, he received the governorship of Shahr-i Sabz (*ḥukūmat-i wilāyat-i Kish*) in return for his military assistance.<sup>189</sup>

The data provided by the *ʿUbaidullah Nāma* sheds light on the identification of tribal interests with particular localities and the available power sources in the aftermath of the Balkh campaign. But it also shows how events taking place in an area far away from their habitat affected the Khiṭāʾī-Qipchāq:

“On his arrival [at the habitat of his tribe], Farhād Bī spread the glad news with regard to such a region and the pastures and meadows of that fresh land. The *qaum* of the Khiṭāʾī-Qipchāq, which spent its life in poor conditions because its tribes were dispersed

<sup>184</sup> According to Burton, it is not known why Khwāja Qulī Bī sided with Anūsha, but he had the support of the entire Khiṭāʾī tribe (Burton, *Bukharans*, 331).

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, 332–34. McChesney says that the city was taken on Shaʿbān 5, 1096/July 7, 1685 (McChesney, “Central Asia,” 191).

<sup>186</sup> Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 109–18.

<sup>187</sup> In Holzwarth's view it is possible that Farhād Bī was a son of Khwāja Qulī Bī (Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 110, footnote no. 46), but we lack evidence from the sources. Eighteenth-century Bukharan accounts do not make mention of Farhād Bī's ancestors.

<sup>188</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fols. 41b–42a; Semenov trans., 57; Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 110. This place was located three hours west by south in the suburbs of Samarqand. The small fort Rabāʾī Charkhīn was built by ʿAbdullah Khān (r. 1581–98), the nearby village bore the same name (Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 330).

<sup>189</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fols. 100a, 125a; Semenov trans., 114, 142; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 126b; Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 111.

throughout all dependencies, had pinned their hope on such a well-fortified home [for a long time]. The nobles of the tribe (*kalānān-i qaum*) cheered, spread the message and gathered their troops in the area of Pul-i Mīrzā [...] where they held the remaining *kinkāj*. They said: ‘We must think carefully because we know the *ūng wa sūl* tribe ourselves. Having excelled at resistance and rebellion in this area, [its tribesmen] are troubled by confusion. Now they consider [Shahr-i Sabz] their stronghold, and although it was just yesterday that every one of them was injured by the tormenting sword of the king and most of their leaders perished and lost their life, it seems impossible that their remaining forces will give up their home so easily. We should not consider it [to be an easy task] and the troops we have now mobilized are nothing more than the tax on the number of cattle in comparison to the unlimited number of troops at their disposal.’ Raising his head, Farhād Bī said: ‘Whatever is pretended by the *āqsaqāls* with all these controversies, explain more!’ The group [of nobles] replied: ‘Finally, the fear lies with the capturing of Shahr-i Sabz, which has been granted as a reward for the loyalty of the *amīr*. [It was the plan] raised in his benevolent mind, that we are able to fulfill the obligation and to forcefully take this area. If we conquer this region from this obstinate tribe, just as the *amīr* himself is worthy of this pleasure and once received great honor by advancing things amidst companions and adversaries in accordance with the will of the king. God prevent that these people round our neck with a winding-sheet like a boar hit by an arrow. We think they will show boldness and vigor to injure the troops with the evil eye! How can our people accomplish this thing among those tribes? [...] If the *amīr* acts on our advice, we will delay the expedition. The number of *Khiṭā’ī-Qipchāq* is not inconsiderable here in this region. It should be the right way to appoint some young fighters in agreement with the guardian [Farhād Bī] and to gather the small and the big people of the *Khiṭā’ī-Qipchāq* tribe. We will equip them with arms and take action to prepare this campaign.’ When Farhād Bī heard these words [...], he said: ‘It is not suitable that such a multitude of miscellaneous, improper words are issued from your group! You have apparently not yet forgotten the blows and damages you once faced from the *ūng wa sūl*! What kind of people are the *ūng wa sūl* that you give fear and dread access to your hearts? The ruler of this kingdom expects something else from me and you. Now we shall take possession of the *yūrt* of Shahr-i Sabz [and afterward] we will take care of other affairs!’ Farhād Bī said this so that this group willy-nilly lent an ear to what that keen *amīr* had in mind.”<sup>190</sup>

As Holzwarth argues, this account points to the pastoral economic interest of Farhād Bī and his tribal following.<sup>191</sup> Moreover, it mirrors the conditions of authority within the *Khiṭā’ī-Qipchāq* tribe and the dynamics resulting from the “ordering of affairs” by appointing loyal followers to prestigious posts in the aftermath of a campaign. The resulting developments are a case in point as they show how closely aspects of order and conflict are intertwined. It is

<sup>190</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 132a–134a; Semenov trans., 152–53. See also Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 112.

<sup>191</sup> Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 111.

also remarkable that the appointment led to two rifts or conflicts, first in a more subliminal form at the inner-tribal level, as the exchange of words between the Khiṭā'ī chief and the elders betrays. Although Farhād Bī had summoned the other elders of his tribe near Samarqand, the corporate element in this scene did not determine the outcome of the council. The advice of the *āqsaqāls* was not binding and his tribesmen consented in spite of reservations. In addition to his harsh reaction, we see that by no means all tribal elders were present at that *kinkāj* since the tribe was too widely scattered. The second conflict was more severe, albeit short in nature. The Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq leader urged the elders and his tribesmen to take action against the tribes of Shahr-i Sabz, which were well prepared for the following encounter. Farhād Bī and his associates failed to take possession of Shahr-i Sabz.<sup>192</sup> But in spite of this, the Khiṭā'ī leader was promoted to the post of *parwānachī* a little later.<sup>193</sup>

According to Ṭāli' s account of the shift of the atālīqate in 1711, Farhād Bī was among the first paying respect and homage to the new ruler, Abū'l-Faiḡ Khān.<sup>194</sup> He was one of the main beneficiaries of this change and received the governorship of Samarqand,<sup>195</sup> where—in the opinion of the chronicler—he soon “set the houses of the populace on fire,”<sup>196</sup> and “closed the gate of justice in front of the subjects of that dependency to open the door of tyranny and oppression.”<sup>197</sup> Since more and more messages about his ruthlessness reached the court, in early 1713 the soldiery gathered in Bukhara and decided to remove him from office. In his place they installed Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Dūrmān as new governor, but he failed to establish himself because the region was the home (*khāna*) of the Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq. When he brought in the Kīnakās, who likewise started molesting the

<sup>192</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 134a–b; Semenov trans., 152–53. See also Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 112.

<sup>193</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 173a; Semenov trans., 193; Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 112.

<sup>194</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 12a; Semenov trans., 21; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 132a. According to Ṭāli', Farhād Bī Parwānachī belonged to a group of *amīrs* who objected to 'Ubaidullah Khān's plan to go to Balkh (Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 8a).

<sup>195</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 33b; Semenov trans., 37; see also Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 114.

<sup>196</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 33b; Semenov trans., 37.

<sup>197</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 139a.

people,<sup>198</sup> the Samarqandīs petitioned the court several times, but their requests were of no avail. The situation further escalated and ushered in a big upheaval and the expulsion of the Kīnakās. Finally, the *khwājas* and *qāzīs* of the city came to the governor and brokered an agreement. But nonetheless, the hostilities in the region continued as Farhād Bī carried on his activities from his fortress Katta Qūrghān.<sup>199</sup>

In 1126/1714 the Bukharan ruler besieged the Khiṭā'ī chief with the assistance of other tribes from the area like the Yetī Ūrūgh.<sup>200</sup> At the same time, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Dūrmān, the governor of Samarqand, set out on an unsuccessful attempt to subjugate Farhād Bī's ally, Ḥaqqnazar Khiṭā'ī.<sup>201</sup> Henceforth the Khiṭā'ī forces were bound at all the places and fortresses they had taken so far. However, when Ma'sūm Bī Atālīq sided with one of the in-laws of the Khiṭā'ī leader, the siege of Katta Qūrghān was lifted and the Bukharan troops withdrew.<sup>202</sup> In Mullā Sharīf's opinion, the sudden withdrawal was due to their defeat by Ḥaqq Nazar Khiṭā'ī.<sup>203</sup>

Notwithstanding the previous developments and the many setbacks he had suffered at the hands of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān, Farhād Bī's relationship with the Bukharan court improved after the dismissal of Ma'sūm Bī and his son-in-law in 1127/1715. Since he cultivated a close friendship (*dūstī*) with Khudāyār Bī Manghit, the Khiṭā'ī chieftain was one of the main beneficiaries of the shift of power in 1714. In the following year he was

<sup>198</sup> Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 33b–34a; Semenov trans., 38; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 139a; Chekhovich, "K istorii," 70; Holzwarth, "Uzbek State," 114.

<sup>199</sup> Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 34a; Semenov trans., 38. Mullā Sharīf confirms that Katta Qūrghān west of Samarqand was Farhād Bī's stronghold, from where "he followed the path of plundering" (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 139a).

<sup>200</sup> Katta Qārghān is located five hours, eight *farsakhs* (48 km) west of Samarqand. In the early nineteenth century, it consisted of a mud fort and a walled village (Mir Izzetullah, "Travels," 330). For a detailed description of this town in the second half of the nineteenth century, see Lehmann, *Reise*, 99–100; Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, II, 451–55; Radloff "Serafschanthal," 431–36.

<sup>201</sup> The governor of Samarqand eventually escaped to Bukhara via Shahr-i Sabz (Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 34b; Semenov trans., 38; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 139b–140a).

<sup>202</sup> According to Tāli', Bāy Muḥammad, the father-in-law of one of Farhād Bī's sons, persuaded Ma'sūm Bī to raise the siege and to take his sons into service (Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 34b–35a; Semenov trans., 38–39). Mullā Sharīf only gives a summary of these events, saying that Ma'sūm Bī and Bāy Muḥammad Bī Sarāy considered Farhād's defeat to be to their own disadvantage (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 139b).

<sup>203</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 140a.

promoted to the governorship of Qarshī.<sup>204</sup> But according to the *Tāj al-tawārīkh*, Farhād Bī joined the besiegers of Qarshī in their struggle against Ibrāhīm Bī at the hint of his friend Khudāyār Bī and was granted royal favor in return.<sup>205</sup>

Farhād Bī's loyalty to the court was however of mere ephemeral nature. With the deposal of Khudāyār Bī Manghit in 1128/1716, he retained his connection with the court for a while. But after the death of the Manghit *amīr*, his attitude toward Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān soon changed. In 1129/1717 he conquered Samarqand and installed Bāqī Bī Qipchāq, one of his fellow tribesmen, as new governor of Qarshī.<sup>206</sup> According to the *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, the local *amīrs* appointed Īshān 'Abd al-Shahīd Khwāja b. 'Abd al-Majīd Khwāja as new governor of Samarqand. But after a while, a conflict evolved between the governor and Farhād Bī. Finally, the Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq *amīr* prevailed and put the *khwāja* to death.<sup>207</sup> Another author attributes the new Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq campaign to a lack of pastures (*tangī-yi chirā-gāh*). In their quest for new grazing grounds, they caused severe damage to the local agriculture in the vicinity of Samarqand and Qarshī.<sup>208</sup> As we will see below, this pattern was repeated three decades later in the 1740s and even in the 1820s.

The following campaigns launched by the associates of the new commander-in-chief, Ibrāhīm Bī, against the Khiṭā'ī chieftain met with rather modest success; the Turkomān allies of the Kīnakās were only able to establish a hold on the small town of Kasbī in Nasaf. Similarly, Farhād Bī could not extend his sphere of influence beyond his fortresses in Samarqand, Qarshī and Katta Qūrgān. Backed by his new allies, the Yetī Ūrūgh, Farhād Bī besieged Karmīna in 1130/1718–19 but withdrew to Samarqand after fifteen days.<sup>209</sup>

The next shift of power occasioned Farhād Bī's promotion to the office of *atālīq* after the Kīnakās attack on the royal palace at the beginning of Rajab

<sup>204</sup> Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 37a; Semenov trans., 40.

<sup>205</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 142a.

<sup>206</sup> Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 40b; Semenov trans., 43; Mullā Sharīf, fols. 143b–144a. See also Holzwarth, "Uzbek State," 114.

<sup>207</sup> Hakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, vol. II, 9. These events are not confirmed by the *Tārīkh-i Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān* or the *Tāj al-tawārīkh*.

<sup>208</sup> Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292a. See also Holzwarth, "Uzbek State," 114–15.

<sup>209</sup> Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 41a; Semenov trans., 43; Holzwarth, "Uzbek State," 115.

1131/May 1719.<sup>210</sup> As a result, the administration opened up for Farhād's allies: Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī b. Khudāyār Bī was awarded the office of *dīwānbēgī*; Bēg Ughlī Bī Baḥrīn, the Yetī Ūrūgh chieftain, assumed the governorship of Karmīna; Nī'matullah Bī Naymān was appointed governor (*ḥākīm*) of Samarqand.<sup>211</sup>

The next two years continued with mutual hostilities between the amirid factions. Very similar to the efforts of Ibrāhīm Bī to defeat Farhād Bī three years before, the campaigns of the Kḥiṭā'ī chief had no lasting success.<sup>212</sup> In 1134/1721–22, he fell victim to a plot hatched by the courtiers and slaves of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān.<sup>213</sup> Shortly thereafter, we find his son Khwājām Yār Bī among the associates of Rajab Sulṭān and Ibrāhīm Bī.<sup>214</sup>

In the *Tārīkh-i Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān*, Farhād Bī is portrayed as a tyrant in the manner of Ḥajjāj (*Ḥajjāj-i zālīm*) and a man without blessing (*mard-i bī-baraka*).<sup>215</sup> Ṭāli' mentions that he imposed daily payments on the inhabitants of Samarqand, while his Uzbeks carried away everything they could find.<sup>216</sup> In another folio the chronicler states that Samarqand, reminiscent of the high paradise, had become like the barren desert of the Judgment Day due to the tyranny of the Qipchāq tribe.<sup>217</sup>

<sup>210</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 120a; Semenov trans., 66; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fols. 292b–293a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 155a.

<sup>211</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 120a; Semenov trans., 66; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 155a–b.

<sup>212</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 120b; Semenov trans., 66; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 157b; Holzwarth, "Uzbek State," 117.

<sup>213</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 121b–122a; Semenov trans., 67. Balkhī dates Farhād Bī's assassination by Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān's entourage to 1133/1720–21 (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 293a; see also Holzwarth, "Uzbek State," 117, footnote no. 76).

<sup>214</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 66a; Semenov trans., 87. According to Balkhī, the murder of Farhād Bī triggered unrest among the Kḥiṭā'ī-Qipchāq (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 293a). In another version, after the assassination of his father, Khwājām Yār Bī pleaded to Īshān Ṣūfīullah for help and intercession with the ruler. Shortly thereafter, he must have joined Ibrāhīm Bī and Rajab Khān (Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 42b–43b).

<sup>215</sup> Al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf al-Saqāfī (41/661–95/714) was one of the most famous and able governors of the Umayyads. He was notorious for his brutality and oppression, especially during military campaigns (A. Dietrich, "Al-Ḥadjdjādī b. Yūsuf," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., III, 39–43).

<sup>216</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 122a; Semenov trans., 67; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 42b; Holzwarth, "Uzbek State," 117.

<sup>217</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 43a; Semenov trans., 69.

## KHUDĀYĀR BĪ AND THE RISE OF THE MANGHIT

In contrast to the chroniclers writing in the early nineteenth century, the late seventeenth and eighteenth-century sources give a clearer and more detailed picture of the events surrounding the rise of the Manghit. One of the first pieces of documentary evidence of the activities of Khudāyār Bī Manghit is a document about a land purchase dating back to 1699. It records the early financial transactions and purchase of land in the Tagāb area of Shahr-i Sabz.<sup>218</sup>

“[...] but it was thereafter in the month of Rabī’ II 1111/1699 that they truly, correctly and lawfully acknowledged that his Excellency, the ‘Asylum of Sayyidhood,’ the much respected essence of the *sayyid* family, descending from the Prophet, Amīr ‘Abd al-Qayyūm Sheikh al-Islām, and the son of the deceased, pious Khwāja Ḥasan Sheikh al-Islām sunk in mercy and blessed with remission, lawfully declared: ‘According to the legal selling and buying of estates, I have sold the entire amount of one hundred *man* of land, which is by conjecture my own property (*milk-i khāliṣ-i khwudam*) located in the village of Kabkān belonging to the Tagāb of the Kish River, to the ‘Refuge of Amīrhood,’ the revered Khudāyār Bī, the son of the ‘Asylum of Condoning,’ the deceased sublime ‘Firdaus Makān’ Khudāy Qulī Bī. [...]’<sup>219</sup>

The document continues with a detailed description of the location of the plot and its boundaries, the price of one thousand six hundred *tanga* and the terms of the transaction. Besides the purchase of land in the best location of the fertile area, the document provides evidence that Khudāyār Bī was influential already in the time of Subḥān Qulī Khān. Moreover, it says that his father, Khudāy Qulī Bī, was not alive any longer in 1699.

According to Amīn Bukhārī, in 1702 Khudāyār Bī, the first Manghit *amīr* whose personality is easier to grasp on the basis of our sources, was designated governor of Shahr-i Sabz, an area where he possessed a considerable portion of land.<sup>220</sup> In the following time he appears as one of the leaders of the *ūng wa sūl* Uzbeks and was occasionally engaged in military expeditions. In summer 1118/1706, Khudāyār Bī was promoted to the prestigious rank of *parwānachī* and sent to his tribesmen in order to obtain their support for the *khān*’s Balkh campaign in return for a generous

<sup>218</sup> *Tagāb* is the Persian word for alluvial zones that were of particular importance because of the uninterrupted water supply throughout the agricultural cycle. The *tagāb* was usually rich in grass and water.

<sup>219</sup> Chekhovich, *Dokumenty*, doc. 16, 84–85; Russian trans., 85–86.

<sup>220</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 29a; Semenov trans., 44.

royal pardon. But his mission was not very successful for reasons I have already described.<sup>221</sup> In 1707 he participated as one of the commanders of the *ūng wa sūl* in the expedition to Balkh. During the major assault on the city, Khudāyār Bī was in command of the right wing (*ūng*) of ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s army.<sup>222</sup> In 1709 he acted as the head of the *ūng wa sūl* (*sardār-i firqa-yi ūng wa sūl*) and was responsible for the security of the royal palace (*arg*) in Bukhara when his overlord stayed at Samarqand.<sup>223</sup>

According to the *Tārīkh-i Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān*, the Manghit *amīr* belonged to a group of *amīrs* constantly objecting to ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s plan to visit Balkh.<sup>224</sup> Although he was among the first to perform the *bay’a* to Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān in 1711,<sup>225</sup> Khudāyār Bī, who had aspirations to the office of *atālīq* and commander-in-chief, was made governor of Shahr-i Sabz.<sup>226</sup> Ṭālī’ describes how Khudāyār Bī Manghit and his son Muḥammad Ḥakīm Qūrchībāshī went there and started to fight against the Kīnakās tribes.<sup>227</sup> According to Ya‘qūb and Mu‘īn, the local tribes (*īlāt*) opposed this appointment and refused to recognize the authority of the Manghit chief.<sup>228</sup> He therefore retreated to Chirāghchī, located at the southwestern fringe of Shahr-i Sabz. But as the Qarā Manghit and the Kīnakās allied against Khudāyār Bī and complained about him at the court, Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān allegedly exiled the Manghit leader to Iran, where he lived in Nīshābūr. In Ya‘qūb’s view, the Manghit chief was summoned back after a while at the initiative of Ibrāhīm Bī and died in Chirāghchī.<sup>229</sup>

<sup>221</sup> Ibid., fols. 77a–79a, 81a; Russian text, 90–92.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid., fol. 118b; Russian text, 135.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid., fols. 153a–b; Russian text, 171–72.

<sup>224</sup> Ṭālī’ mentions Khudāyār Bī Dīwānbēgī, Farhād Bī Parwānachī, Bēg Ughlī Bēg (Bī?) Dādkhwāh Bahrīn and Khwāja Qulī Bī Qaṭaghān as being the first to congratulate and salute the new ruler (Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 8a; Semenov trans., 18).

<sup>225</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 12a; Semenov trans., 21; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 132a.

<sup>226</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 31b–32a; Semenov trans., 36; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 138a.

<sup>227</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 32a; Semenov trans., 36; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 138a; Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 35a.

<sup>228</sup> Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 35a–b; Mu‘īn, *Tārīkh*, fol. 28a. See also von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 224.

<sup>229</sup> Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 34b–35a. The author dates Khudāyār Bī’s death to the year 1131/1718–19 (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 2a). Mu‘īn does not give any details and only tells us that the Manghit leader died in Chirāghchī (Mu‘īn, *Tārīkh*, fol. 28a). On the inconsistencies regarding the governorships and the lack of biographical data for the

The *Tārīkh-i Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān* provides a more detailed account, according to which the enmity between him and his Kīnakās adversaries continued for the next two years.<sup>230</sup> In 1126/1714 Khudāyār Bī took the opportunity and entered the city of Samarqand when it was abandoned by the local governor because of the Kḥiṭā'ī-Qipchāq rebellion described in the previous section. Yet the Manghit chief left the city when Farhād Bī approached Samarqand, having been successful in preventing the occupation of his fortress by Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān. Given the friendship between Khudāyār Bī and Farhād Bī, the sudden withdrawal of the Manghit leader was probably due to a common deal. Shortly thereafter, the latter was summoned to Bukhara and appointed *atālīq* at the initiative of Khwāja Qulī Bī Qaṭaghān and a part of the soldiery.<sup>231</sup> When Khudāyār Bī went to Bukhara to perform the *kūrnish* and take the seat of commander-in-chief (*ūrūn-i 'umdat al-umarā'ī*), his son Muḥammad Ḥakīm Qūrchībāshī remained as governor in Shahr-i Sabz,<sup>232</sup> or, depending on which version of these events, in Chirāghchī.

Khudāyār Bī's following campaigns against the Kīnakās were not crowned with lasting success, though in 1127/1715 he managed to install Farhād Bī Ūtārchī as new governor in Qarshī.<sup>233</sup> According to Mulla Sharīf, the Manghit were driven out of Shahr-i Sabz by Ibrāhīm Bī shortly thereafter and retreated to Chirāghchī.<sup>234</sup> But in Ṭālī's view, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī b. Khudāyār Bī Atālīq remained for the time being governor of Shahr-i Sabz.<sup>235</sup>

In 1128/1716 things changed again to the detriment of the Manghit. As their Kīnakās adversaries gained the upper hand, Khudāyār Bī took refuge in the *madrasa* Mīr-i 'Arab and was later removed from his post and instructed

---

Manghit chiefs in Tuqay-Timurid and Manghit accounts, see von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 224.

<sup>230</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 33b; Semenov trans., 37–38.

<sup>231</sup> According to the information given by Ṭālī', Khudāyār Bī withdrew to Shahr-i Sabz and received the appointment two months later on the initiative of Khwāja Qulī Bī and other commanders (ibid., fol. 35a; Russian text, 39). In Mullā Sharīf's version, Khudāyār Bī's appointment was instigated by a group of court attendants (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 140b). In another, albeit very unlikely version, Khudāyār Bī went to Bukhara just a year after Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān's enthronization to congratulate the new ruler and demanded the dismissal of the old *atālīq*, Ma'sūm Ḥājī (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 291b).

<sup>232</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 141b.

<sup>233</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 36b–37a; Semenov trans., 40.

<sup>234</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 142b.

<sup>235</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 39a; Semenov trans., 41.

to go to Mecca. But instead of performing the pilgrimage, he stayed in the region, moving from one place to the other. Accompanied by his companion ‘Abdullah Qūshbēgī, the Manghit leader went first to Marw and then to Balkh. There he stayed a few days at the court of the Chingizid ruler Sanjar Sulṭān. Finally, both men traveled via Tirmidh to Qarshī, where they remained under the protection of Farhād Bī. However, Khudāyār Bī died after a few days.<sup>236</sup> According to Ṭāli‘, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī and his relatives were driven out from Shahr-i Sabz by 1716.<sup>237</sup> As already mentioned, the different authors give varying dates for the withdrawal of the Manghit from Kish and also different dates for the death of Khudāyār Bī.<sup>238</sup>

### *The Career of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī*

In 1129/1716–17, Khudāyār Bī’s son Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī was summoned to Bukhara and promoted to the prestigious office of *parwānachī*.<sup>239</sup> He owed his appointment to the initiative of Sulṭān Tūqsāba Kīnakās, who was a friend of the Manghit *amīr*.<sup>240</sup> This promotion was the starting point of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī’s rise. As for many other Uzbek chiefs, the next crucial point in his career came with the Kīnakās rebellion in early Rajab 1131/May 1719.<sup>241</sup> In this delicate situation, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī decided

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., fols. 39b–40b; Russian text, 42–43; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 143b. For a slightly different version of these events, see Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292a.

<sup>237</sup> Ṭāli‘, *Tārīkh*, fol. 40a; Semenov trans., 42–43.

<sup>238</sup> According to the *Tārīkh-i qipchāq-khānī*, for instance, Khudāyār Bī was still alive in 1132/1719–20. That year he was allegedly summoned from Balkh to Bukhārā on the initiative of his son Ḥakīm Bī Dīwānbēgī and installed as governor in Qarshī but passed away a little later. But this version is not confirmed by other sources and therefore unlikely (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 293a).

<sup>239</sup> In the *Tārīkh-i amīrān-i manghitīya* Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī is designated *dādkhwāh* (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 2b).

<sup>240</sup> Ṭāli‘, *Tārīkh*, fol. 40b; Semenov trans., 43. According to Mullā Sharīf, it was Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān who wanted to appoint the Manghit chief to this post. The chronicler also remarks that Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī was initially not interested in linking himself to the royal court because of his row with the Kīnakās (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 144b). In Ya‘qūb’s version, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī held only the rank of *dādkhwāh* in the service of the last active Tuqay-Timurid king (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 2b).

<sup>241</sup> Ṭāli‘, *Tārīkh*, fols. 97b–118a; Semenov trans., 48–64; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 147b–152a.

to retain his loyalty to Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and organized the resistance against the enemies.<sup>242</sup>

Subsequent to the defeat of the rebels and the assassination of Khwāja Qulī Bī Qaṭaghān,<sup>243</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī was appointed to the office of *dīwānbēgī*.<sup>244</sup> After Farḥād Bī's death in 1131/1721–22, he received the rank of *atālīq* and commander-in-chief (*amīr al-umarā*). According to Ṭālī', the Manghit chieftain was forty-five years old when he was promoted to the second rank in the established hierarchy.<sup>245</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī's chronicler, Muḥammad Amīn b. Mullā Nūr Muḥammad, devotes an entire chapter to the character of his patron, whom he praises as a “benefactor” (*walī-ni' mī*) and “pillar of the kingdom” (*'umdat al-mulk*).<sup>246</sup> Drawing a picture of the perfect, religiously versed gentleman, he extols his patron for his laudable character, particularly the observance of religious duties.<sup>247</sup> He also praises his farsightedness, his sagacity and ingenuity.<sup>248</sup> In Qāzī Wafā's work, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī is only referred to as the “great commander” (*amīr-i kabīr*).<sup>249</sup> He was the first *amīr* of the new generation of Uzbek chiefs to gain the *atālīqate*, and was the first who never changed sides or withdrew his allegiance to Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān.

The different sources largely agree that the Manghit chief played a pivotal role during the rebellion of Rajab Khān and the Qazāq raids. He is portrayed as protector of the royal throne (*ḥāmī-yi aurang-i kayānī*)<sup>250</sup> and as a skillful military tactician who inflicted a series of resounding defeats on the enemies of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān. For example, he took the town of Hazāra located opposite Karmīna on the southern bank of the Zarafshān in the early

<sup>242</sup> Ṭālī' describes how the servants of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān informed the population by screaming from the battlements of the royal *arg* that the Qaṭaghān and Manghit were loyal to the king. In the same breath they gave orders to the populace to attack the Kīnakās in the city (Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 116a–b; Semenov trans., 62–63; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 149b; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 2b).

<sup>243</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 117a–119b; Semenov trans., 63–65; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 155a.

<sup>244</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 120a; Semenov trans., 66; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 155a–b.

<sup>245</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 122b; Semenov trans., 67; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 158a. Balkhī dates Ḥakīm Bī's promotion to the rank of *atālīq* to 1133/1720–21 (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 293a).

<sup>246</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 3a.

<sup>247</sup> See chapter The Order of Things/The Chronicles as Snapshots of Social Order.

<sup>248</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 27b–28a.

<sup>249</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 14b, 26a, 29a, 29b, 30b, 35b, 36a, 38a passim.

<sup>250</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 48b; Semenov trans., 73.

phase of the rebellion.<sup>251</sup> The battle scenes described in the chronicles show that the *atālīq* indeed acted as the protector of the Tuqay-Timurid monarch during this critical time. On behalf of the latter, he led a heterogeneous army composed of Manghit, Sayyid Atāʾī, Sarāy, Dürmān, Qaṭaghān, Khiṭāʾī, Qalmāq and Turkmen contingents.<sup>252</sup> In this situation and in spite of alleged numerical inferiority, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī proved himself a loyal servant of the Chingizid king and organized an effective defense. Reinforced by Burqūt, Turkomān Yūzī and Qungrāt contingents, on Ramaẓān 30, 1135/July 3, 1723, his army dealt a final blow to Rajab Khān.<sup>253</sup>

Since the sources only summarize the events surrounding the Qazāq forays taking place in the next five to seven years,<sup>254</sup> we do not gain any detailed information about Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī's role during that time. According to his chronicler, he participated in campaigns against the Qazāq. In 1140/1727–28, he used a conflict between the population of Qarshī and the local Qipchāq community to interfere in the affairs of Nasaf. Together with the populace, he and his vassals managed to expel the Qipchāq from Qarshī and replaced them with his own tribesmen. Subsequently, he installed two of his followers as governors there.<sup>255</sup> Not long after, however, he was removed from the capital by the king and his intimates and withdrew to Nasaf. According to the *Tāj al-tawārīkh*, the intimates of the ruler complained that Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī had interfered in the collection of revenues. They accused him of not having paid attention to the other

<sup>251</sup> Ibid., fols. 65b–68a; Russian text, 87; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 43b; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 10b–11a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 162a–168b.

<sup>252</sup> Ṭālīʾ, *Tārīkh*, fols. 80a–89a; Semenov trans., 98–107.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid., fols. 90a–93b, 133a–160b; Russian text, 108–11, 117–37; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 44a–b. For the battle between government troops and the contingents of Rajab Khān, see also Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 12a–16a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 173b–182a.

<sup>254</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 16b–18a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 183b–190a; Yaʿqūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 2b–3a. See also Bregel, “Central Asia,” 193; Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 393; Ivanov, *Vosstanie*, 33.

<sup>255</sup> Muḥammad Amīn devotes several folios to the conflict between the Qipchāq and the people of Qarshī. The problems started when the governor, Bāqī Bī Qipchāq, was killed by some of his brothers. Subsequently, and in spite of mediation attempts by several *amīrs* and religious authorities, the series of disputes did not end. During the conflict, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī resettled his fellow tribesmen there. The Qipchāq were finally removed from Qarshī and the city was ceded to ʿArab Bī and Badal Dādkhwāh (Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 45b–47a).

appointees and of having acted alone with sole authority in the ordering of the affairs of the kingdom.<sup>256</sup>

#### THE YETĪ ŪRŪGH, THE QATAĞHĀN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR KARMĪNA

So far I have explored the actions and strategies of the tribes dominating Transoxania in the first half of the eighteenth century—the Manghit, Kīnakās, Yūz and Khitā'ī-Qipchāq. This section focuses on the smaller tribal formations featuring prominently, albeit less dominating in the sources: the Yetī Ūrūgh, who inhabited wide tracts in the western part of the Miyānkāl, and the Qatağhān, who were much more dispersed. Both groups, however, were locked in the prevailing, though shifting figurations of power and at times also in a myriad of local conflicts, which developed particularly between 1714–15 and 1722. Local *amīrs* such as Bēg Ughlī Bī Baḥrīn, 'Abd al-Karīm Bī Baḥrīn and Khwāja Qulī Bī Qatağhān competed for the possession of Karmīna, an important fortress marking the entry to the oasis of Bukhara, and the rank of *parwānachī*. Depending on the political circumstances and the major shifts of power, both the town and the title frequently changed hands. Although the two factions tended to constantly adjust their ties with the court, thus replacing one another at regular intervals, they were not able to unseat each other on a permanent basis. When one group entered the service of the king, the other group typically withdrew its loyalty and joined the rebels. A brief overview of the major events in the conflict of that period is given below:

- In 1715, Bēg Ughlī Bī Baḥrīn replaced Khwāja Qulī Bī Qatağhān as *parwānachī*. This resulted in a break in the friendship (*dūstī*) between the two men. Khwāja Qulī Bī now joined the opponents of Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān in Shahr-i Sabz.
- In 1716, Ibrāhīm Bī Kīnakās and Khwāja Qulī Bī Qatağhān managed to oust their rivals and established themselves in Bukhara. As a result, Khwāja Qulī Bī was promoted to the rank of *dīwānbēgī* and Niyāz Ḥājī Qatağhān received the governorship of Karmīna. Simultaneously, the Yetī Ūrūgh around Bēg Ughlī Bī joined the rebels under Farḥād Bī. Approximately two years later they assisted him in the siege of Karmīna.
- In spring 1719, Khwāja Qulī Bī abandoned his former ally Ibrāhīm Bī and was rewarded with the post of *atālīq*. He was killed in a palace conspiracy shortly thereafter. Now Bēg Ughlī Bī Baḥrīn was reappointed to the rank of *parwānachī*

<sup>256</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 193a–b.

and also became governor of Karmīna. Niyāz Ḥājī Bī Qaṭaghān withdrew to Shahr-i Sabz, where he joined the coalition of Ibrāhīm Bī.

- Not long after his appointment, probably in 1720, Bēg Ughlī Bī was dismissed and replaced by ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī Baḥrīn. As a consequence, he escaped to Shahr-i Sabz and coalesced with Niyāz Bī and Ibrāhīm Bī. He died soon after his arrival at Shahr-i Sabz.
- After the death of Bēg Ughlī Bī Baḥrīn, ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī Īshik-Āqābāshī entered the rebel camp of Ibrāhīm Bī and Rajab Khān, thus challenging the ruler of Bukhara. He also dismissed the mediators sent by Abū’l-Faiḏ Khān.

From this chronology we see that whenever one group was able to attach itself to the court or the ruling coalition, this was to the detriment of the other faction. During the reign of ‘Ubaidullah Khān, there seems to have been a certain balance between the two groups, which did not play any leading role in the ongoing competition at the amirid level. At that time, the Yetī Ūrūgh were led by Bēg Ughlī Bī Dādkhwāh and Dūst Muḥammad Īshik-Āqābāshī b. Shīr Ghāzī Bī. The latter is to be found among the group of conspirators responsible for the assassination of ‘Ubaidullah Khān in 1711.<sup>257</sup> The Qaṭaghān, on the other hand, were headed by Ūz Tīmūr Bī and Khwāja Qulī Bī. The first was a commander and the senior leader of the Bukharan branch of the Qaṭaghān. In 1702 he gained the governorship of Nasaf,<sup>258</sup> where he had already bought land in the time of Subḥān Qulī Khān.<sup>259</sup> In the following years, Ūz Tīmūr Bī participated in all major campaigns of his overlord. During the expedition to Balkh in 1707, he appears as *dīwānbēgī* and commander of a larger tribal contingent composed of his Qaṭaghān colleagues and the *ūng wa sūl* troops.<sup>260</sup> Afterward, he received the governorship of Qarshī in exchange for his service.<sup>261</sup> Since Ūz Tīmūr Bī suddenly disappears from the political scene, he possibly died prior to ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s assassination in 1711. One of his sons by the name of Shāh Muḥammad Dādkhwāh is mentioned by Ṭālī.<sup>262</sup>

<sup>257</sup> The other conspirators were Lang Muḥammad Murād Turkomān, Mihtar Kābulī, Qilich Dīwāna and Jaushan (Jawush?) Qalmāq (Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 11a; Semenov trans., 21).

<sup>258</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 29a; Semenov trans., 44.

<sup>259</sup> Chekhovich, *Dokumenty*, doc. 18, 90–91; Russian trans., 91–93.

<sup>260</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 48a, 79b–81a, 108a–109b, 113a–115a, 118b; Semenov trans., 63, 92–94, 123–25, 129–31, 135.

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 29a; Russian text, 44.

<sup>262</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 54a–b; Semenov trans., 78.

Khwāja Qulī Bī b. Khūshhāl Bī Dīwānbēgī, an illustrious personality bearing the title of *mīrākhūr*,<sup>263</sup> was also among the opponents of ‘Ubaidullah Khān. When he offered allegiance to the new ruler,<sup>264</sup> he was promoted to the post of *parwānachī*.<sup>265</sup> One of the documents from the time of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān gives evidence of a huge land grant to him in the form of several arable plots, making up more than five hundred *ṭanāb* dispersed over different locations in the *tūmān* of Sāmchan north of the capital.<sup>266</sup>

The conflict between the Yetī Ūrūgh and the Qaṭaghān set in under Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān. In the following time, the position of both groups and their rivalry were largely determined by the power shifts between the major factions vying for political influence and control over resources. While the Qaṭaghān led by Khwāja Qulī Bī aligned themselves with Ibrāhīm Bī, the Yetī Ūrūgh, aiming to be on the winning side, constantly shifted between the changing coalitions of the Manghit, Khiṭā’ī-Qipchāq and Kīnakās.

Bēg Ughlī Bī’s initial attitude toward the new ruler Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān is not really clear. Although he was one of the chiefs opposing ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s plan for a new Balkh campaign,<sup>267</sup> a fact that led them to shift their allegiance to the Tuḡay-Timurid ruler,<sup>268</sup> he does not seem to have benefited much from Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān’s ascent. Up to the expedition against the Khiṭā’ī-Qipchāq in 1126/1713–14, during which the Yetī Ūrūgh rendered useful assistance, the latter and the Qaṭaghān were loyal to the king.<sup>269</sup>

<sup>263</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 66b, 108b, 114a–115a, 173a; Semenov trans., 80, 124, 130–31, 193. During the rebellion in 1693–94, Khūshhāl Bī Mīrākhūr appears among renegade *amīrs* siding with the ruler of Khwārazm (see Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 282b).

<sup>264</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 8a, 12a; Semenov trans., 18; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 132a. There is not much known about Khwāja Qulī Bī’s background. His father Khūshhāl Bī (this time as bearer of the *mīrākhūr* title) was among a number of top officials rebelling against Subhān Qulī Khān and the *atāliq* of Balkh, Maḥmūd Bī Qaṭaghān, in summer 1105/1694. The other *amīrs* were Ṭughma Bī Yābū, Fāzil Bī Dīwānbēgī Yūz and Ūz Tīmūr Parwānachī Qaṭaghān. The Khwārazmian ruler Ārang (r. 1688–94) used this opportunity to invade Bukhara. When he was defeated in a battle taking place on Muḥarram 3, 1106/August 24, 1694, the Qaṭaghān, who had taken refuge in Dabūsī in Miyānkāl, gave up (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fols. 282b–283a; Burton, *Bukharans*, 350–52).

<sup>265</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 31b; Semenov trans., 36.

<sup>266</sup> Chekhovich, *Dokumenty*, doc. 25, 116–20; Russian trans., 120–24.

<sup>267</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 8a; Semenov trans., 18.

<sup>268</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 219b, 222a, 225b–226a; Semenov trans., 244, 247, 251; Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 11b–12a, 16b; Semenov trans., 21–22, 25.

<sup>269</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, 34a–b; Russian text, 38.

Following the unsuccessful siege of Katta Qūrhān, Khwāja Qulī Bī and his soldiers stood up for the removal of Ḥājī Ma‘šūm Bī from the office of *atāliq* and the promotion of Khudāyār Bī Manghit.<sup>270</sup>

However, in 1127/1715 the Qaṭaghān chief was deprived of his rank when he opposed the appointment of Farhād Bī Ūtārchī to the governorship of Qarshī, which was considered one of the centers of Qaṭaghān interest. Up to this point, Khwāja Qulī Bī was a close friend of Bēg Ughlī Bī Baḥrīn, but when the latter replaced him as *parwānachī*, their companionship came to an end.<sup>271</sup> The Qaṭaghān *amīr* then broke off his relationship with the court and joined the opponents of the king together with his relatives.<sup>272</sup> In 1128/1716 he persuaded Ibrāhīm Bī to lead an *alamān* against their common enemies in Bukhara.<sup>273</sup> After the following shift of power in favor of the “Shahr-i Sabz alliance,” the Qaṭaghān nobles replaced the Yetī Ūrūgh leadership at the court. As a result, the governorship of Karmīna was given to Niyāz Ḥājī, a relative of Khwāja Qulī Bī.<sup>274</sup> He himself was promoted to the rank of *dīwānbēgī*.<sup>275</sup> These events provoked the Yetī Ūrūgh to join the opponents of the Tuqay-Timurid king. In the next two years, Khwāja Qulī Bī and his allies were engaged in endless expeditions against the enemies of the government. Taking the side of Farhād Bī, the Yetī Ūrūgh provided useful support during his siege of Karmīna in 1130/1717–18.<sup>276</sup> Yet the situation eased somewhat

<sup>270</sup> Ibid., fol. 35b; Russian text, 39.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid., fol. 37a; Russian text, 40; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 142b.

<sup>272</sup> Ṭāli‘, *Tārīkh*, fols. 37b, 39a–b; Semenov trans., 40–42; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 142b.

<sup>273</sup> The Turkic word *alamān* designates an irregular group of raiders, consisting of tribal contingents difficult to control. The *alamān* were often employed in the aftermath of sieges and campaigns to rob the enemy (Doerfer, *Elemente*, II, 119; Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 25).

<sup>274</sup> Balkhī mentions a Shāh Niyāz Qaṭaghān, who in 1107/1795–96 pledged allegiance to the ruler of Khwārazm, whereupon the Friday prayer was read in the name of the latter (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 284a). Yet it cannot be ascertained whether this actor is the man mentioned by Ṭāli‘.

<sup>275</sup> Ṭāli‘, *Tārīkh*, fol. 41a; Semenov trans., 43. The author of the *Tārīkh-i qipchāq-khānī* dates the comeback of the Qaṭaghān *amīr* and his allies to 1127/1715 (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292a).

<sup>276</sup> Ṭāli‘, *Tārīkh*, fol. 41a; Semenov trans., 43; Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 115.

when Khwāja Qulī Bī and his partners negotiated an agreement with the Khitā'ī leader.<sup>277</sup>

During the Kīnakās rebellion of 1719, the Qaṭaghān chief moved with extreme caution because for a long time it was not really clear which side would gain the upper hand. Remarkably, neither Khwāja Qulī Bī Dīwānbēgī nor his Qaṭaghān troops participated in the attack on the citadel. When he recognized the defeat of his allies, the *dīwānbēgī* dropped his former ally and joined Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Manghit.<sup>278</sup> Soon after, Khwāja Qulī Bī became *atālīq* but could not enjoy the fruits of his efforts for long. Together with other Qaṭaghān nobles he was assassinated at the hands of conspirators, the slaves and eunuchs of Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān as well as Muḥammad Ḥakīm and other *amīrs*, just fifteen days after his promotion.<sup>279</sup>

After the removal of the Qaṭaghān from the administrative helm, the pendulum of power swung back to the Ye'ī Ūrūgh, who moved in to replace their rivals. Bēg Ughlī Bī was appointed *parwānachī* and governor of Karmīna once again, while his foe Niyāz Bī Qaṭaghān escaped to Shahr-i Sabz.<sup>280</sup> The following months were spent with punitive campaigns against Shahr-i Sabz and the Turkmen of the Labāb region. The Ye'ī Ūrūgh chief could not enjoy his rank for long; he was dismissed as governor of Karmīna and replaced by his nephew 'Abd al-Karīm Bī Baḥrīn. His removal from office brought Bēg Ughlī Bī into direct opposition to the royal court, causing him to side with his former enemy Niyāz Ḥājī.<sup>281</sup> According to Mullā Sharīf, his dismissal was the result of his tyrannical behavior and the fact that he began to harass the inhabitants of Karmīna.<sup>282</sup> The split within the Baḥrīn reflected the friction between the Shahr-i Sabz alliance and the king. In the following time, local tensions and the contest between the major players were mutually dependent. At the same time, the various interconnected cycles of violence and conflict repeated themselves, as 'Abd al-Karīm Bī

<sup>277</sup> The appointment is not explicitly mentioned, but the Qaṭaghān leader figures as *dīwānbēgī* in the *Tārīkh-i Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān* (see Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 97b, 117a; Semenov trans., 47–48, 63).

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 116b; Russian text, 63; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 149b.

<sup>279</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 117a–119b; Semenov trans., 63–65; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 42b; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, 292a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 154a–155a.

<sup>280</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 120a–b; Semenov trans., 65–66; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 155b.

<sup>281</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 121b; Semenov trans., 67.

<sup>282</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 157a–b.

soon began to oppress his internal rivals in Karmīna.<sup>283</sup> Furthermore, the Burqūt and their close allies, the Turkomān Yūzī, joined the forces of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and assisted them against the forces of the Samarqand *khān*.<sup>284</sup>

Bēg Ughlī Bī, however, passed away shortly after his dismissal,<sup>285</sup> and his nephew 'Abd al-Karīm Bī Īshik-Āqābāshī joined the alliance around Ibrāhīm Bī. Ṭālī' attributes this development to Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī's appointment to the post of *atālīq* and the decision of the latter to entrust the Turkomān Yūzī and the Burqūt with a campaign against Karmīna. At the same time, all mediation efforts of the court failed. Although 'Abd al-Karīm Bī received and hosted the envoys in his stronghold,<sup>286</sup> he began to argue in inconsiderate language, saying:

“He has not granted the *dīwān* office (*manṣab-i dīwānī*), which is considered to be the orbit of the kingdom. Having ignored [the consequences], this infirm [king] has placed it on weak shoulders and handled the burden of authority like an ignorant fool! My son is like a flaring fire, so he must bless him with the post of *tūqsāba*.”<sup>287</sup>

'Abd al-Karīm Bī also demanded a gift (*an'ām*) of ten thousand *ashrafi* to raise auxiliary troops for assistance on behalf of the court. In early 1723, the Yetī Ūrūgh raided Ghijduwān and nearby Waghānzī.<sup>288</sup> A little later their leader installed mobile forces (*īlghār*) in the smaller *qal'as* Hazāra and Uzūlashkent near Karmīna.<sup>289</sup> The rest of the events is well recorded. The Baḥrīn leader and his associates remained part of the Samarqand coalition, but suffered severe setbacks and lost their fortresses south of the Zarafshān.<sup>290</sup> In 1723 they again suffered a decisive blow when their enemies “hung the skull of the white Baḥrīn demon ... on the saddle-

<sup>283</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 123a–b; Semenov trans., 68.

<sup>284</sup> Ibid., fols. 66b–68a, 157a–b; Russian text, 87–88, 135.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid. fol. 123a; Russian text, 68.

<sup>286</sup> According to Ṭālī', 'Abd al-Karīm Bī followed the custom of the meeting and conversation and guided every one of the mediators to their places. “He pulled the golden ring of admonitions out of the ear of obedience,” and passed the valuable sword granted by the king to one of his followers before the eyes of the envoys (Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 50b; Semenov trans., 74–75). See also Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 161b.

<sup>287</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 51a; Russian text, 75.

<sup>288</sup> Ibid., fol. 52b; Russian text, 76.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid., fols. 60a–b; Russian text, 82; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 10a–b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 162a–b.

<sup>290</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 61b–68a; Semenov trans., 83–89; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 11a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 163a–168b.

straps.”<sup>291</sup> Soon after, Niyaz Hājī, the last influential Qaṭaghān *amīr* in Transoxania, was imprisoned and killed, while the traces of ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī are lost in the mists of history.<sup>292</sup>

#### THE AHL-I MAḤRAMĪYA: EUNUCHS, SLAVE SOLDIERS AND ASTROLOGERS

The secondary literature places emphasis on the growing strength of the Uzbek chieftains, suggesting that the last Tuqay-Timurid rulers were weak marionettes and putty in the hands of the *amīrs*. Although there is certainly a kernel of truth in this assumption, the next sections take a more balanced view, based on the data furnished by early eighteenth-century Bukharan sources. The reader of Tuqay-Timurid and early Manghit chronicles comes across a prominent group of courtiers who exerted a considerable influence on ‘Ubaidullah Khān and even more so on Abū’l-Faiḥ Khān. In the *Tārīkh-i Abū’l-Faiḥ Khān*, this faction is designated *ahl-i maḥram* or *ahl-i maḥramīya*, “the confidants.”<sup>293</sup> Unfortunately, the sources provide merely insufficient and fragmentary information on the emergence of this faction, a fact that only allows us to draw inductive conclusions. When paying homage to the king in 1722, this group was led by several actors: first, Hājī ‘Abdullah Bī Qūshbēgī, an influential Qalmāq commander; second, the Qalmāq corps (*sipāh-i Qalmāq*); and third, the chief eunuch (*khwāja kalān*) Ulfat and a certain Bāqī Bī Qūshbēgī.<sup>294</sup> The *ahl-i maḥramīya* therefore apparently consisted of Qalmāq and other soldiers of slave origin usually led by a *qūshbēgī*, and eunuchs functioning as guardians of the royal harem and household. This faction may have included other elements as well, but they are not specified in the sources. A group of astrologers, for example, also enjoyed the trust of the rulers.<sup>295</sup> The confidants formed a counterweight to the Uzbek aristocracy, the members of which are described as seal-bearers

<sup>291</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 157a; Semenov trans., 134.

<sup>292</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḥzar*, fol. 44b. The last information we gain from the *Tārīkh-i Abū’l-Faiḥ Khān* is that he was able to escape to his fortress with a broken shoulder after suffering defeat in the final battle (Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 161a; Semenov trans., 138).

<sup>293</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 140b, 147a, 148a–b, 151a, 154a passim; Semenov trans., 122, 126–27, 129, 132 passim. Balkhī also uses the term *maḥramīya* (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fols. 288a, 292b).

<sup>294</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 86a–87a; Semenov trans., 104.

<sup>295</sup> It does not become clear whether the astrologers belonged to the *ahl-i maḥram* or not.

(*ṣāhib-i muhr*) or “pillars of power/authority” (*arkān-i daulat/arkān-i salṭanat*).<sup>296</sup>

In the following I will investigate these three groups in the final phase of Tuḡay-Timurid rule: the court eunuchs, the Qalmāq bodyguard and the astrologers. The main argument is that the confidants of the ruler were part of tripartite alliances involving the court and at least two other Uzbek groups. Being very active players, they drew considerable advantage from their connections to urban notables and extended trade networks.

### *The Role of Eunuchs in Islamic History*

The development under the last two or three Tuḡay-Timurid sovereigns is somewhat reminiscent of Safawid Persia or other empires of the Islamic world. Keeping eunuchs—superintendents and guardians of the harem (*ḥarīm*)—was a long-established custom that can be traced to ancient (pre-Islamic) times.<sup>297</sup> This practice continued in the early Islamic period, the permanent demand for eunuchs now being satisfied by a supply from outside the Dār al-Islām or from its geographic and religious fringes. The unquestioned acceptance of the harem system, linked to the possession of eunuchs, rendered their service indispensable and superseded the barriers that prevented the practice of castrating slave boys within Muslim society itself.<sup>298</sup> By the time of the Abbasids, it was the norm to employ eunuchs as palace servants and harem attendants. In the early tenth century, the number of palace eunuchs possessed by Muktafi (r. 902–08) and Muqtadir (r. 908–32) has been estimated at ten thousand and eleven thousand respectively.<sup>299</sup>

<sup>296</sup> Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 113a; Semenov trans., 59–60; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 107b, 108b, 140b, 280b, 321a, 380a, 387a, 397a passim.

<sup>297</sup> David Ayalon, *Eunuchs, Caliphs and Slaves* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1999), 13. The Achaemenids as well as the Sasanians valued eunuchs for their trustworthiness (for further details see Muhammad Dandamayev, “Eunuchs i. The Achaemenid Period,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, IX, 64–65; A. Kolesnikov, “Eunuchs ii. The Sasanian Period,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, IX, 65–66).

<sup>298</sup> Lutz Richter-Bernburg, “Castration,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, V, 70.

<sup>299</sup> The small local and regional courts imitated this practice. At most of the local courts, the eunuchs were black slaves imported from Africa, but there were also white eunuchs—Slavs and other people from the South Russian and Siberian steppes—known as the Ṣaqābila, Turks and Indians (C. Edmund Bosworth, “Eunuchs iii. The Early Islamic Period,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, IX, 66).

In many cases, eunuchs loyally served their masters, who themselves were sometimes of slave origin, and there were influential eunuchs who even had other eunuchs in their service.<sup>300</sup> The academic discourse revolves around the place of the castration (*khwāja kardan/khiṣāʾ*) and the question of who actually carried out the operation.<sup>301</sup> Ayalon suggests that it was mostly done outside the borders of Islam, and mainly by non-Muslims.<sup>302</sup> According to Michael Mann, in the course of the eastward expansion, Christian armies brought slaves from Slavic Europe to the slave marts of Verdun where they were castrated. Providing they survived, the new eunuchs were transported via the usual routes (Marseilles) to Constantinople and Cairo.<sup>303</sup> Bosworth argues that it seems reasonable that the operation was done in slave marts of those regions forming entrepôts of the slave traffic, for instance Transoxania.<sup>304</sup> But Lutz Richter-Bernburg says that the removal of the genitalia was regularly practiced in the capital Baghdad by the early eleventh century, and in the fourteenth century also in Cairo, though in the eyes of many jurists there was no doubt about its illegality. At the same time, castration had been part of the social reality from pre-Islamic times and was frequently inflicted as an extra-legal punishment.<sup>305</sup>

In medieval times, eunuchs were employed as harem attendants, court servants and even for military purposes.<sup>306</sup> Since they did not pose a threat to established dynasties, eunuchs were popular and often entrusted with important administrative tasks. This does not however mean that they were not involved in conspiracies or the assassination of kings. In addition to

---

<sup>300</sup> David Ayalon, *Eunuchs, Caliphs and Slaves* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1999), 36.

<sup>301</sup> On details concerning the operation in different Islamic sources, see *ibid.*, 304–15.

<sup>302</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>303</sup> Michael Mann, “Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel im Indik, 16. bis 20. Jahrhundert,” in *The Working Paper Series of the Graduate Center Humanities and Social Sciences of the Research Academy Leipzig* 3 (Leipzig, 2009), 16.

<sup>304</sup> Bosworth, “Eunuchs,” 66. Eunuch slaves from the Byzantine Empire, Armenia and the Khazar region may have been castrated in their homelands, but especially slaves of Turkic origin were deprived of their genitalia within the borders of Islam (C. E. Bosworth, “Ghulām ii. Persia,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., II, 1082). See also R. Brunschvig, “‘Abd,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., I, 32. Slave boys were usually castrated before they reached the age of puberty (Ayalon, *Eunuchs*, 303–04).

<sup>305</sup> Richter-Bernburg, “Castration,” 70–73.

<sup>306</sup> In the time of the decline of the Samanid dominion, the sources report the case of Fāʾiq Khāṣṣa, a eunuch general of Turkish origin (Bosworth, “Eunuchs,” 66; Ayalon, *Eunuchs*, 255–56).

military and administrative duties, eunuchs and other slaves commonly served as status symbols indicating the social rank of their possessors. This explains why in the eighteenth to the end of the nineteenth century, the number of eunuchs and slaves constantly increased.<sup>307</sup>

In the early modern period, eunuchs served at the courts and palaces of the Safawids, the Mughals and the Ottomans. As an important source of political authority, the harem in Safawid Iran increasingly interfered in the administration and in the succession struggles from the time of Shāh ‘Abbās (r. 1588–1629) onward. Slaves were not only recruited for the military but were promoted to positions within the royal household and the administration.<sup>308</sup> According to Roger Savory, late Safawid kings like Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusain (r. 1694–1722) were very weak and pliable because of their socialization in the harem.<sup>309</sup> This thesis, however, is increasingly questioned by other scholars.<sup>310</sup>

In the Safawid period, emasculated slaves were designated *khwāja sarāy* (pl. *khwāja sarāyān*), bearing the honorific title *muqarrab al-khāqān* (“Intimate of the Emperor”) because of their special proximity to the ruler and his family. Besides black eunuchs, Shāh ‘Abbās had also incorporated castrated Georgian slaves into his entourage. This policy aimed at strengthening the position of the ruling dynasty and curbing the influence of the Qizilbāsh leaders. Not surprisingly, seventeenth-century Persian sources reveal a growing prominence of eunuchs occupying key positions and administrative offices at court.<sup>311</sup> Under the Safawids, the eunuchs were the keepers of the treasury and the guardians of the royal household. In fact, the

<sup>307</sup> Mann, “Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel,” 16.

<sup>308</sup> The Safawids may have adopted this system from the Ottoman “cage” system instituted under Selīm II (1566–74). In the time of the last active Safawid ruler, Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusain, much authority rested with the women of the harem and the court eunuchs (Roger M. Savory, “Şafawids i. Dynastic, political and military history,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., VIII, 769–71).

<sup>309</sup> Savory, “Şafawids,” 771.

<sup>310</sup> Referring to Kaempfer’s account of Persia, Stefan Brakensiek, for example, says that the argument linking the harem socialization of the future king to the political system is not very plausible (Stefan Brakensiek, “Politische Urteilsbildung zwischen Empirie und Tradition. Der Persien-Bericht des Engelbert Kaempfer 1684/85,” in *Engelbert Kaempfer und die kulturelle Begegnung zwischen Europa und Asien*, ed. Sabine Klocke-Daffa, Jürgen Scheffler and Gisela Wilbertz (Lemgo: Institut für Lippische Landeskunde, 2003), 114).

<sup>311</sup> Kathryn Babayan, “Eunuchs iv. The Safavid Period,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, IX, 67.

post of keeper of the royal treasury was reserved for the most senior black eunuch.<sup>312</sup> Some of the European travelers were struck by the large number of eunuchs in the service of the court and at the houses of noblemen.<sup>313</sup> This is also confirmed by indigenous sources. According to Rustam al-Ḥukama, for instance, Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusain had one hundred white and black eunuchs, who announced the curfew for the male population when the ruler visited other places.<sup>314</sup>

At the Mughal court in India, the *Khawāja sarāyān* enjoyed special privileges and a high reputation as confidants of the rulers. Administrative offices and responsibilities were conferred on them, and some were granted important governorships and other positions.<sup>315</sup> For example, Bābur's eunuch, Khawāja 'Anbar, acted as governor of Delhi. Akbar's eunuch, Phūl Mālik—also known as I'timād Khān—was entrusted with restructuring the finances after the fall of the Sūrī Empire. In 1576 he was appointed governor of Bhakkar. I'tibār Khān Khawāja Sarāy, the senior eunuch of Jahāngīr, was in 1622 placed in charge of the citadel of Agra and the royal treasury.<sup>316</sup> In view of the fact that in Mughal India the *khawāja sarāyān* bore the title *khān* and commanded Turkic, Afghan and Rajput troops, Nath concludes that the men holding this position were not necessarily castrated.<sup>317</sup>

In her excellent study on power relations in the Ottoman Empire, Jane Hathaway explores the role of eunuchs, called *Kızlar Ağası* (Arab. *Āghā Dār al-sa'āda*), as members of “households.” The term “household” is understood here as “conglomerations of kinship and clientage ties,” serving as major loci of political and economic life in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>318</sup> There

<sup>312</sup> Ibid.

<sup>313</sup> There were about three thousand eunuchs in the service of the monarch, while the nobles and even wealthy people also maintained staffs of eunuchs, whose purchase price was extremely high. The majority of eunuchs in Safawid Iran were white; they came from the Malabar coast and the Bay of Bengal in India (Brunschwig, “‘Abd,” 36; Babayan, “Eunuchs,” 68).

<sup>314</sup> Rustam al-Ḥukamā calls the eunuchs *āghā* (Birgitt Hoffmann, *Persische Geschichte 1694–1835 erlebt, erinnert und erfunden. Das Rustam at-tawārīḥ in deutscher Bearbeitung* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1986), 240–41).

<sup>315</sup> R. Nath, “Mughul Institution of Khawājahsarā,” *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society* 41, no. 1 (1993): 2–4.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid., 2, 4.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>318</sup> Jane Hathaway, “Eunuch Households in Istanbul, Medina and Cairo during the Ottoman Era,” *Turkica* 41 (2009): 291.

they served as masters and guardians of the royal harem at the Topkapı Palace. According to Hathaway, from the late sixteenth century onward, imperial princes were not sent to the provinces to learn statecraft, but kept in the harem under the influence of eunuchs. In that period, some of the eunuchs formed an alliance with the mother of the Sultan (*valīde sultān*). One case in point was the eunuch Yūsuf Āġā, who was allied with the mother of Sultān Mehmed IV (r. 1648–87). During his long career, Yūsuf Āġā was closely linked to his master's favorite concubine and also acted as a superintendent of extensive *wāfs* in Mecca and Cairo.<sup>319</sup> One of the most prominent examples of powerful eunuchs in the Ottoman era was Beshir Āġā, the chief of the imperial harem.<sup>320</sup> Hathaway also points to the close clientage ties between various eunuch personalities, and the support several influential eunuchs enjoyed during their rise.<sup>321</sup>

*The Khwāja Sarāyān in Late Tuqay-Timurid Bukhara*

Similar to their Safawid neighbors to the southwest, the late Tuqay-Timurid rulers had manifold commercial, religious and political interests and held command over a heterogeneous mix of Turkic and non-Turkic tribal, Persian-speaking Tajik, and *ghulām* (slave) troops.<sup>322</sup> In Transoxania the origin of institutionalized eunuchhood is difficult to trace. Unfortunately, this aspect goes unnoticed in the secondary literature, nor do primary sources like the *Tadhkira-yi muqīm-khānī* provide any precise information about the king's decision to put the princes under the tutelage of eunuchs.<sup>323</sup> The royal harem and the courtiers and slaves attached to it might have played a certain role throughout the Tuqay-Timurid era and even before. Holzwarth mentions

<sup>319</sup> Ibid., 292–93. In Ottoman Egypt the senior black eunuch was *mutawallī* of the *awqāf al-haramayn* in Mecca and Medina (Jane Hathaway, “The Role of the Kızlar Ağazı in 17th–18th Century Ottoman Egypt,” *Studia Islamica* 75 (1992): 141).

<sup>320</sup> See Jane Hathaway, *Beshir Agha. Chief of the Ottoman Imperial Harem* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005).

<sup>321</sup> Hathaway, “Eunuch Households,” 294–95.

<sup>322</sup> On the development and the role of the *ghulāmān* in the final phase of Safawid rule, see Andrew J. Newman, *Safavid Iran, Rebirth of a Persian Empire* (London/New York: Tauris, 2006), 8, 52–53, 118–20.

<sup>323</sup> The sources provide no information about the origin of the eunuchs; they were perhaps Persians or Qalmāq. Chekhovich only refers to ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s attempt to replace the *amīrs* with non-tribal elements possessing good connections with the bazaar (Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 68).

a poem by Turdī Farāghī, who strongly criticized the growing influence of ladies and eunuchs at the court of Subhān Qulī Khān.<sup>324</sup> Most of the later sources do not explicitly mention the beginning of this development, but Mullā Sharīf tells us that

“Sayyid ‘Ubaidullah Sultān and Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān were like shimmering pearls far away from and relieved of the compulsion of government affairs and the artificial ways of grandeur due to their youth in the casket of the high women chambers.”<sup>325</sup>

This statement recalls the Safawids and later Ottomans, whose princes had been confined to the harem where they were exposed to the influence of their companions and tutors.<sup>326</sup> In Bukhara the eunuchs of the royal palace assumed a greater role during the reign of Subhān Qulī Khān or perhaps even in the time of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Khān. Their ascent may have begun when the kings realized their own weakness vis-à-vis the Uzbek *amīrs* and ambitious heirs-apparent in Balkh. There are instances of harem servants taking on greater responsibilities when Subhān Qulī Khān confined the princes to the citadel of Balkh’s inner city. One of them, a certain Mauzūn Sarāyi, who is described as an intimate friend of Abū’l-Manṣūr (d. 1683), actively took part in a conspiracy to place his favorite on the throne.<sup>327</sup> The following events leading to the final secession of Balkh were mainly dominated by rival *amīrs*. Although Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī describes how the crown prince Muḥammad Muqīm was placed under the supervision of teachers and masters, he does not explicitly mention eunuchs.<sup>328</sup> Yet a short time after Muḥammad Muqīm’s appointment, the Ming leader ‘Ādil Bī

<sup>324</sup> Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 101, footnote no. 19. McChesney makes mention of a eunuch by the name Khwāja Farhang, who at some point in his career acted as *mīrāb* in the Hazhdah Nahr canal system in Balkh. In one of the *waqf* documents dating back to the 1660s, he appears as a donor to villages on the Siyāhgird Canal, including conferring their water rights to the ‘Alid shrine in Mazār-i Sharīf (McChesney, *Waqf*, 122–23).

<sup>325</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 108b.

<sup>326</sup> Mullā Sharīf points to ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s preference for the company of women and eunuchs (ibid., *Tāj*, fol. 128b).

<sup>327</sup> It is not certain whether Mauzūn Sarāyi, who is not named *khwāja*, was a eunuch (Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, *Tadhkira*, 196). McChesney views this man as an ordinary servant and says that servants usually were not seen to have sufficient motive themselves for such a crime. Since we cannot prove whether this figure was a tutor or just a simple servant, it is possible that the assassination was instigated by Abū’l-Manṣūr himself (McChesney, *Waqf*, 153).

<sup>328</sup> Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, *Tadhkira*, 216–23.

put the prince's eunuch Khwāja Irādat Sarāyi and ‘Abd al-Razāq Dastārkhwānchī Qalmāq, another of his confidants, to death.<sup>329</sup>

In the Bukharan sources from the first half of the eighteenth century, the palace eunuchs are—like at the Mughal and the Safawid courts—designated *khwāja sarāyān*, literally “Masters of the Palace.”<sup>330</sup> This term harks back to the Arabic *ustādh* as a mark of honor in the sense of teacher or tutor.<sup>331</sup> With their appointment as tutors of the princes, Subhān Qulī Khān opted for a shift of strategy to establish more control and prevent the loss of authority that was looming ever larger on the political horizon, at least in the long run. This step was in all likelihood inspired by the Safawid example, or else it was simply a strategy that was common in the wider region to limit the influence of strong tribal leaders or ambitious heirs.<sup>332</sup>

After Subhān Qulī Khān's death, the influence of the *ahl-i mahramīya*—and especially the palace eunuchs—increased as they maintained a close relationship with the new ruler. The first eunuch we come across is Khwāja Dilāwar Sarāyi, who announced his master's last will concerning the succession to the throne because “he had precedence over the other harem servants (*sarāyān*).”<sup>333</sup> On this occasion, a secret council of leading *amīrs* took place, where Ūz Tīmūr Bī Qaṭaghān suggested forcefully removing the *khwāja sarāyān* since “of late they extended the hand of command in this kingdom so that the thorn of their importunity became entrenched in the verdant field of the army and the subjects.”<sup>334</sup> This advice met with resistance from other members of the council. One of the objecting *amīrs* said that

“although these diabolical men were only a small bunch of people, a chain of societal relations with city dwellers and people from the steppe (*silsila-yi tanāsub-i jam‘iyatī az*

<sup>329</sup> Ibid., 271.

<sup>330</sup> The singular form is *khwāja sarāyi*. Sometimes we also read *khwāja kalān*, meaning senior eunuch. Sarāyi is not to be confused with the Sarāy, an Uzbek tribe dwelling south of Qarshī.

<sup>331</sup> Ayalon, *Eunuchs*, 39–40; Brunschvig, “‘Abd,” 33, 36.

<sup>332</sup> Babayan, “Eunuchs,” 67. The Safawid ruler Shāh ‘Abbās also created special *ghulām* corps composed of non-Qizilbāsh troops of Armenian, Georgian and partly Persian origin to form a counterweight to the Qizilbāsh forces (Newman, *Safavid Iran*, 52–53; Savory, “Šafawids,” 769–70).

<sup>333</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 8b; Semenov trans., 19.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid., fol. 9a; Russian text, 20.

*shahrī wa ṣahrā'ī*) connects [them] like the necklace of the Pleiades to the orbit of Saturn.<sup>335</sup>

This passage needs further explanation. First, we see that the Uzbek *amīrs* disliked the *khwāja sarāyān*. Second, the scope of their societal relations forestalled any action against them. The reference to Saturn is significant here because in astrology this planet is usually associated with misfortune and negative characteristics.<sup>336</sup> As a consequence, the *amīr* rejects any action against them. It is specifically the dense network of relationships they were embedded in, or, as the source puts it, the chain of relationships with the urban populace (*shahrī*) and nomads in the steppe (*ṣahrā'ī*) that made the eunuchs a small but dangerous group of actors. Since the *khwāja sarāyān* were responsible for the *dīwān*, it is conceivable that some of them were in touch with a range of people of different origin. In the sources, it appears that the eunuchs of Bukhara commanded an extensive network of relationships, which were instrumental for reaching their goals. Their friends and followers, like wealthy landowners, major craftsmen, caravan traders, moneylenders and perhaps also tribal chieftains, often reacted to the financial needs of the ruler by lending money to the royal treasury.<sup>337</sup>

<sup>335</sup> Ibid., fol. 9b; Russian text, 20–21.

<sup>336</sup> Saturn (Arabic *Zuḥal*; Persian *Kaiwān*) is associated by astrologers with misfortune and seen as a planet whose activities cause coldness and dryness. Saturn symbolizes evil and in certain constellations brings bad luck in the form of destruction, tyranny and depravity. As such Saturn stands for a range of negative attributes like greediness, which is also ascribed to the *khwāja sarāyān* as one of their general characteristics, intransigence, ingratitude and other bad qualities. According to the gender scale used in astrology, Saturn is a man but more often a eunuch. Saturn is diurnal, unpleasant and bitter. The planet is often described as extremely acidic, caustic and stinking. With its symbolic color black, which is sometimes intermixed with gold or yellow, Saturn symbolizes darkness (Abū'l-Raiḥān al-Bīrūnī, *Kitāb al-taḥfīm li awwā'ili ṣanā'ati'l-tanjīm* [The Book of Instruction in the Elements of the Art of Astrology], trans. R. Ramsey Wright (London: Luzac & Co. 1934), 231–38).

<sup>337</sup> Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 48. According to Dale, there are a number of reasons for believing that the petty principalities of southern Central Asia (Bukhara, Khiwa and Balkh) were solicitous of merchants since they probably generated a high percentage of their income (Dale, *Indian merchants*, 38).

*Khwāja Bāltū*

Three eunuchs were of special importance: first, the chief eunuch (*khwāja kalān*) Khwāja Bāltū (d. 1711), enjoying personal closeness and permanent access to the ruler. The second in command were Khwāja Daulat Sarāyi (d. 1711) and Khwāja Nihāl (d. 1711), who are both described as *pīr-i ghulāmān*.<sup>338</sup> They were said to be religiously devout men affiliated to Sufi brotherhoods and disciples of the influential Naqshbandī Sheikh Ḥabībullah (d. 1111/1699–1700).<sup>339</sup> Khwāja Daulat, for instance, had endowed the shrine of Bībī Zūdmurād (?) with a *madrasa* and a mosque.<sup>340</sup> Thus at least some of the eunuchs were part of widespread and influential Sufi communities and networks.

As the confidant of the queen mother, Nūr Khānum,<sup>341</sup> Khwāja Bāltū Sarāyi enjoyed the trust of the ruler and played an influential role at court. In

<sup>338</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 252b; Semenov trans., 282.

<sup>339</sup> Sheikh Ḥājī Ḥabībullah was a Naqshbandī sheikh and founder of the Mujaddidi community in Transoxania. According to DeWeese, his activities took place in a period of competition between local Central Asian Sufi communities and sheikhs “imported from abroad.” The Tuqay-Timurid *khāns* deliberately supported the latter to counter established Naqshbandī families such as the Jūybārī and the Dahbīdī. According to hagiographic sources, he opposed the vocal *dhikr* entailing practices of *raqs* and *samā’*. When his activities provoked riots by his opponents in Bukhara, Sheikh Ḥabībullah was rescued firstly by divine favor materializing in a vision of Khwāja Aḥrār and other Naqshbandī dignitaries, and secondly by Bībī Pādishāh, the chief wife of the future king ‘Ubaidullah Khān (Devin DeWeese, “‘Dis-ordering’ Sufism in Early Modern Central Asia: Suggestions for Rethinking the Sources and Social Structures of Sufi History in the 18th and 19th Centuries,” in *History and Culture of Central Asia*, ed. Bakhtiyar Babadjanov and Yayoi Kawahara (Tokyo: TIAS—Department of Islamic Area Studies, 2012), 262–65). Hagiographic sources reveal that Sheikh Ḥabībullah was a *murīd* of Muḥammad Ma’šūm-i Sirhindī b. Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1079/1668). But we do not learn where precisely he was initiated into the Mujaddidiya circle. Mīr Ḥusain b. Shāh Murād, the author of the *Tārīkh-i khumūlī*, titles him the *mujaddid* of the beginning twelfth Islamic century (Anke von Kügelgen, “Die Entfaltung der Naqshbandīya Muḡaddidiya im Mittleren Transoxanien vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ein Stück Detektivarbeit,” in *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia*, vol. 2: *Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations*, ed. Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper and Allen J. Frank (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1998), 113–15, 142.

<sup>340</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 253b; Semenov trans., 283; Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 32a–b; Semenov trans., 36.

<sup>341</sup> In the *Tārīkh-i Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān*, ‘Ubaidullah Khān is described as a rose from the rose garden of Nūr Khānum, and a cypress from the garden of Subḥān Qulī Khān (Ṭālī’,

1120/1708–09, he was plagued by financial worries because the royal treasury, which he was in charge of, was heavily in debt to wealthy people.<sup>342</sup> This is hardly surprising, since ‘Ubaidullah Khān had to satisfy the demands of a variety of people. Particularly the Balkh campaign earlier in 1707 had caused immense expenditure.<sup>343</sup> When they realized that the taxes (*kharāj*) would never suffice to service the loans or to take out new credits,<sup>344</sup> Khwāja Bāltū and his colleague Mihtar Shafī‘ came up with the idea of a currency depreciation. By lowering the assay value of the *tanga*<sup>345</sup> and the proportion of silver in the coins, they hoped for a glut of money to fill the royal treasury.<sup>346</sup> This step gave rise to a wave of unrest and dissatisfaction. The populace and particularly the traders in the Bukharan bazaar gave vent to their displeasure and turned to Ma‘šūm Bī Atālīq for help. Amīn Bukhārī reports that at the same time, the merchants closed their shops in the bazaars of the capital and that “the gates of commercial

---

*Tārīkh-i Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān*, fol. 23b). Semenov erroneously translates Nūr Khānūm as Nādir Khān (Semenov trans., 30).

<sup>342</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 138a; Semenov trans., 156. Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 115a, 117a, 123a.

<sup>343</sup> In the course of his campaign, ‘Ubaidullah several times granted opulent rewards to his *amīrs* and ordinary warriors for their services (Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 32a, 72a, 127a; Semenov trans., 48, 85, 145).

<sup>344</sup> For the practice of land taxation in the Islamic east, see A. K. S. Lambton, “Kharāj ii. – In Persia,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., IV, 1034–53. For the tax system in the late Emirate of Bukhara, see Semenov, “Ocherk pozemel’no-podatnogo i nalogogo ustrojstva Bukharskogo khanstva,” 3–54.

<sup>345</sup> The *tanga* was a silver coin minted by the Tuqay-Timurids throughout the seventeenth century. In Transoxania, the silver currency had been originally based on the *tanga-yi shāhrukhī*, a fifteenth-century Timurid unit. Besides the *tanga*, golden coins (*tilā*, *ashrafī*) and small copper coins (*pūl*) also circulated in Bukhara (Boris D. Kočnev, “The Last Period of Muslim Coin Minting in Central Asia (18th–Early 20th Century),” in *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, ed. Michael Kemper, Anke von Kügelgen and Dmitriy Yermakov (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1996), 432–33; Dale, *Indian merchants*, 29; Lehmann, *Reise*, 29; for more details on the weight of Shibanid silver coins, see Davidovich, “The Monetary Reform,” 156–61).

<sup>346</sup> In the source we read about the *chau*, which basically means paper money, and its introduction. But here it means the reduction of the silver proportion in the coin alloy (see also Teufel, “Quellenstudien,” 308, footnote no. 1). The silver coins issued by Subhān Qulī Khān contained less than 30% silver. Under his successors this standard decreased further so that the *tangas* had low purchasing power and were inconvenient for big trade operations (Kočnev, “Muslim Coin Minting,” 433).

transactions (*mu'āmalāt*) were closed."<sup>347</sup> Finally, the ruler's palace guard put an end to the riots by making an example of some of the protesters, who were executed.<sup>348</sup>

Some of the Bukharan authors attribute the deterioration and implicitly also the final collapse of Tuḡay-Timurid rule to the harmful influence of the eunuchs. Being contemptuous of them, Amīn Bukhārī, who very much adopts an amirid vantage point, puts it as follows:

“Throwing the king off from the right way, those diabolical men [sang after] the melody of the *rubāb* and played upon the *ṭanbūr*. On the occasions of the noble assembly, they talked about vicious games and made jests of buffoonery. [...] Furthermore, low people and false rumors found their way to the royal service. The sons of villagers and scale owners asked for access to noble ranks and offered unsuitable, terrible and seditious words during the conversations with the king. Those base people lodged appeals with the king about the commanders and the soldiery. [...] When the king became accustomed to and preferred the companionship of those mean, dog-like men worthy of being stoned, he abstained from assemblies with his revenue-collectors and wise people. Being welcomed by those ignoble individuals, he deviated from the right way, while his benevolent mind turned away from the commanders and the soldiery.”<sup>349</sup>

This statement suggests a growing influence of the eunuchs, which, through network lines, extended to Bukharan villages and the bazaar, as the reference to the sons of village people and scale owners reveals. The description in the next section by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ṭālī’, the chronicler of ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s brother and successor Abū’l-Faiḏ Khān, who had good and close relations with the eunuchs, illustrates that the *khwāja sarāyān* indeed linked the city elders of Bukhara, urban notables and the leading craftsmen in the bazaars to the ruler. The extract cited above, however, reflects the criticism of the author, attributing the decline of ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s authority to the increasing influence of the eunuchs and other court servants.

By 1710–11, this state of affairs and the mutual mistrust between the king and his entourage on the one hand and the Uzbek soldiery on the other came increasingly to a head. In the end, the *khwāja sarāyān*, and particularly Bāltū Sarāyī, started complaining about the tyranny of the Uzbeks vis-à-vis the subjects and their unquestioned dominion over the soldiers. Finally they

<sup>347</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 139b; Semenov trans., 158.

<sup>348</sup> Ibid., fols. 139b–141a; Russian text, 158–59. The results of the currency depreciation were analyzed by Chekhovich, who adopted a Marxist approach to interpret the material (Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 65–66).

<sup>349</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 201a–b; Semenov trans., 222–23.

confiscated the agricultural estates and pensions of the Uzbek troops, “constructed new mills and spoiled the land of the Muslims.”<sup>350</sup> The reference to the new mills gives a hint of the distribution of resources among the non-Uzbek followers of the eunuchs, a step that was considered unjust and against the well-proven practice favoring the tribal elite. This development went so far that—according to the chronicler—they allegedly considered the pensions and estates of the soldiery, which were usually recorded in fiscal inventories, their own and even destroyed the inventories.<sup>351</sup> Being extremely incensed, Amīn Bukhārī goes even further, saying:

“They installed the Hindus as rulers over the Muslims and in commercial transactions created one torment for the believers after another! When for instance a Muslim was slightly tardy in these transactions, the Hindu caused the steed of insurrection to run over the Muslims and nobody had the opportunity to ask how and why. When a conflict occurred between a Hindu and a Muslim, they supported the Hindu and did not entrust [the case] to a *sharīʿa* court, and on the order of Bāltū Ṭabarāyī increased the oppression of the Muslims. When the people reported and petitioned to the sublime ruler, the slaves put it in another way into the king’s ear so that the Muslims nolens volens demanded from God true justice from the *pādishāh* and the punishment of these malevolent unbelievers.”<sup>352</sup>

<sup>350</sup> Ibid., fol 203a; Russian text, 225.

<sup>351</sup> Ibid., fol. 203a; Russian text, 225; Holzwarth, “The Uzbek State,” 101.

<sup>352</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fols. 203a–b; Semenov trans., 225–26. See also Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 50. In the past, there was a group of Hindu merchants in almost every Central Asian town. Amīn Bukhārī, for instance, not only refers to Hindus in Bukhara, but also to a local Hindu community living in Balkh (Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fol. 121b; Semenov trans., 139). From the sixteenth to eighteenth century, most of the Hindu merchants originated from Multan in the Indus Valley. In 1736 there were around 300 Multani families living in Bukhara and engaged in commercial activities, e.g., caravan trade, money-lending and usury. In seventeenth-century Transoxania, the Hindu community enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy; for example, they had their own representative (*kalāntar*, *āqsaqāl*) who was appointed by a royal order. When in the last quarter of the eighteenth century the Punjab became the battleground between Hindus and Sikhs, Multan lost its preponderant economic position and the Multani merchants shifted their commercial base to Shikarpur near the Bolan Pass (Dale, *Indian merchants*, 57, 131; see also Muzaffar Alam, “Trade, State Policy and Regional Change: Aspects of Mughal-Uzbek Commercial Relations, c. 1550–1750,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 37, no. 3 (1994): 203, 205, 219; on the role of Multan in the seventeenth century, see Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 74–83). Therefore most of

Adopting the perspective of the Muslims, here especially the Uzbeks, the author explains the common resentments toward the Hindu merchant community. Although not explicit with respect to a deal between the eunuchs and the Hindu merchants and moneylenders, the passage indirectly suggests such a connection. It seems evident that the *khwāja sarāyān* dealt with the Hindus on a regular, perhaps even daily basis, as they had to negotiate the conditions for the credits the ruler needed to satisfy amirid demands. The harsh complaints of the author suggest that the chief eunuch may have made certain concessions to the moneylenders in return for better credit conditions or longer durations of the loans. Besides, the passage gives us an idea of where the most influential eunuch originated from; the nisba *ṭabarāyi* may indicate Persian origin. Thus he probably came from northern or northeastern Iran.<sup>353</sup>

Not surprisingly, amirid resentments with respect to the increasing prestige of the eunuchs and their retinue form a recurrent strand in the last sections of the *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, contrasting very much with the account of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān’s chronicler. Apart from the authority wielded by the palace *khwājas*, the author complains about the growing influence of ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s mother and his chief wife, Bībī Pādishāh. He also alludes to the fact that it was the queen mother who vested her eunuch Khwāja Bāltū Sarāyi with so much authority that he became the top administrator of the kingdom.<sup>354</sup> Amīn Bukhārī concludes that this

---

the Hindu merchants in Bukhara were only known as Shikarpuris in the nineteenth century (see Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 184–86; Olufsen, *Emir*, 296–97).

<sup>353</sup> The nisba *ṭabarāyi* probably signifies persons of Persian origin. In his description of the campaigns of Sulṭān Muḥammad Tīmūr and ‘Ubaidullah Khān to Khurāsān, Khwāndamīr mentions a certain Bābā ‘Ishqī Ṭabarā’ī, who fell into the hands of the Uzbeks and was eventually put to death (see *Lughatnāma-yi Dehkhudā*; <http://www.loghatnaameh.org/dehkhodaworddetail-d5da023759f34d6a8f91aec242cb270b-fa.html>).

<sup>354</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 204b–205b; Semenov trans., 227–29. Similarities can be observed under the Mughals in eighteenth-century India. According to Maḥmūd al-Ḥusainī, the young and inexperienced ruler Aḥmad Shāh b. Muḥammad Shāh (r. 1748–54) conferred the administration and government on Jāwid Khān Khwāja Sarā, whom he called Nawāb Bahādur. As “superintendent of the court and point of reference for the small and the big people,” this man assumed great authority. Enjoying the trust of the king’s mother, Nawāb Qudsiya, he rose to prominence and controlled all important administrative affairs, pushing leading *amīrs* like Nānā Bāba Wakīl al-Salṭana and Abū’l-Manṣūr Khān Nīshāpūrī out of the government. Later the *khwāja sarā* persuaded the ruler to exile his enemy Abū’l-Manṣūr Khān. However, Jāwid Khān hatched a conspiracy

development reached the point where the relationship between the king and his Uzbek *amīrs* further deteriorated and the mutual trust and loyalty between them completely vanished. In this situation, the promotion of his *ghulām bacha* Tūra Qulī to the prestigious rank of *qūshbēgī* was the final straw.<sup>355</sup> But still the tribal leaders and notables kept quiet and at the end of 1710 even appealed to the king's mother and his wife to dissuade the ruler from his idea of a new Balkh campaign.<sup>356</sup>

### *Conspiracies and the End of Khwāja Bāltū*

When in 1710 the end of 'Ubaidullah Khān's reign began to loom larger, a harem conspiracy was busted. According to the sources, two eunuchs, Khwāja Daulat Sarāyi and Khwāja Naṣrat Sarāyi (*ṭabarāyī*), together with a certain Jaushan Qalmāq had cooked up a plan to kill the king. This episode shows the rifts within the harem, which was not a homogenous block but probably split into several factions, all of which were highly engaged in daily politics.<sup>357</sup>

As the confiscation of the estates and pensions of the Uzbek *amīrs* illustrates, the *khwāja sarāyān* and the other members of the *ahl-i mahramīya* sought to extend their influence at the expense of the amirid elite. Their growing influence had already caused an alienation of the tribal commanders since the late days of Subhān Qulī Khān. But when the ruler promoted one of his favorites to the post of *qūshbēgī*, and to cap it all pursued his plan for a new expedition, the *amīrs* took action and hatched a plot. On Muḥarram 28, 1123/March 18, 1711, 'Ubaidullah Khān was killed

---

against the *amīr* that eventually failed. He was later killed by Abū'l-Manṣūr and his supporters (Maḥmūd al-Ḥusainī, *Tārīkh-i aḥmadshāhī*, ed. Sarwar Humāyūn (Peshawar: Dānish khaparandūya īolana, 1379/2001) 145–48). See also G. S. Cheema, *The Forgotten Mughals, A History of the Later Emperors of the House of Babar (1707–1857)* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), 236–39, 253–55.

<sup>355</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 206b–209b; Semenov trans., 230–33.

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 215a; Russian text, 239.

<sup>357</sup> Khwāja Daulat Sarāyi was temporarily arrested and his property confiscated. But later he and his colleague were pardoned at the intercession of the king's mother (*ibid.*, fols. 210a–212b; Russian text, 233–36). According to Ṭālī', in winter 1710–11 Khwāja Bāltū informed his master 'Ubaidullah Khān about Khwāja Daulat's alleged involvement in this plot. The author portrays Khwāja Daulat as a wise and "ascetical man removed from all evil annoyances" and concludes that it was indeed a calumny thrown upon him (Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 5a–b; Semenov trans., 16–17).

by rebellious Uzbeks who also looted the royal treasury and abducted the women of the harem.<sup>358</sup> This time, the eunuchs and other courtiers were the first victims when khanly authority shifted to Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān.<sup>359</sup> Demanding revenge for the past and the confiscation of their property, the *amīrs* and their retinues now pillaged the estates of the eunuchs and the *shāgird pīsha*.<sup>360</sup> The new *dīwānbēgī*, Ibrāhīm Bī, claimed the property of Khwāja Daulat and Khwāja Nihāl prior to their death and became very rich.<sup>361</sup>

Irrespective of the annihilation of the most influential slaves and eunuchs of 'Ubaidullah Khān, the old court faction was soon replaced by "the confidants" of the new ruler, who had enjoyed the same education as his ousted brother. This shows that the *khwāja sarāyān* and the *ahl-i maḥram*—as they were called by Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān's chronicler—were not a temporary phenomenon but a small and well-entrenched elite involved in daily politics. Subsequently we observe the rise of three prominent figures at the court: Khwāja Farhang Sarāyi, the new senior eunuch, Mihtar 'Ibādullah, the majordomo of the royal household, and 'Abdullah Bī Qūshbēgī, who is styled "intimate of the royal majesty" (*muqarrab al-ḥaẓrat al-khāqānī*).<sup>362</sup> The *khwāja kalān* was one of the key figures in the palace. He wielded considerable authority and may have influenced the ruler's decision to appoint his personal friend, the Naymān leader Ni'matullah Bī, the former governor of Tirmidh, as new *dīwānbēgī* in 1714. Beyond this, Khwāja Farhang Sarāyi mediated the marriage of Ni'matullah Bī to a daughter of 'Abdullah Bī Qūshbēgī.<sup>363</sup> As this eunuch suddenly disappears from the scene, he may have been deposed at the next change of government that occasioned a dismissal of 'Abdullah Bī and Ni'matullah Bī from their posts in 1716. But he may also have been overtaken by natural death.

<sup>358</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 243b–244a; Semenov trans., 271–72; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 288a.

<sup>359</sup> Khwāja Bāltū was the first to be put to death by the conspirators entering the harem. Three months after the death of their master, two other eunuchs, Khwāja Daulat and Khwāja Nihāl, were sent to Mecca but killed as soon as they left Bukhara and arrived at Qarākūl (ibid., fols. 252b–254a; Russian text, 281–84; Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 11b, 32a–b; Semenov trans., 21, 36; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 131b–132a).

<sup>360</sup> For the *shāgird pīsha* see below.

<sup>361</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 252b; Semenov trans., 282.

<sup>362</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 31b; Semenov trans., 36.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid., fol. 36a; Russian text, 39.

*Khwāja Inṣāf and Khwāja Ulfat*

Admittedly, at the beginning of the century the *ahl-i maḥramīya*—and especially the palace eunuchs—had suffered several blows and it had been the Uzbek leaders who eliminated them. But in the course of time, they learned from earlier experiences and developed ingenious strategies by starting to exploit inter-amirid rivalries. The *khwāja sarāyān* knew that for their own survival they had to protect the king by reducing the influence of the *amīrs*. The *ahl-i maḥram* not only looked with suspicion on the Uzbek office bearers, they indeed consolidated the position of their royal protégé by playing the tribal coalitions off against one another. By employing this strategy, they became important players moving from the edge of the political field toward the center. Alternately giving support to different Uzbek factions, they fomented inter-amirid and tribal conflicts and carried out an effective policy of divide-and-rule. Thus the influence of the eunuchs was too often solely interpreted as weakness and decline or, depending on the source, as a sign of despotism and decadence.<sup>364</sup>

From 1719 onward, the *khwāja sarāyān* and the Qalmāq slaves played a crucial role in plots directed against ambitious Uzbek leaders. In doing so, they became skillful players in the field of power, which up to this point was marked by a lot of lateral movement (particularly among the *amīrs*) but also by permanent horizontal shifts and a quick restructuring of the dominant formations. The alliance maintained by the Tuḡay-Timurid court was one of a relative superiority resting on the rank of the Chingizid king. Its maintenance and survival from the viewpoint of the central hub—the court—depended on the timely realization of possible shifts of other alliances and loyalties, palace intrigues and rebellions. What the courtiers had definitely learned from earlier mistakes was that their fate depended too much on the goodwill of the *amīrs* and that both their position and their survival were at stake with every change of government. Now they were constantly looking for potential protectors for themselves and the king. But every time the respective *atālīq* and his associates became too strong or showed their own ambitions, the courtiers dropped their supporters and called on another coalition. This strategy brought about the consolidation of the *ahl-i maḥram* to the detriment of the Uzbeks.

<sup>364</sup> Teufel, “Quellenstudien,” 349–50; Chekhovich, “O nekotorykh,” 86; Semenov, “Predislovie,” in *Ubaidulla-name*, 6.

Finally, a relatively small but well-organized and experienced group of actors compensated for its military inferiority, obvious lack of power sources and possibilities for negative sanction by constantly developing a range of alternative strategies. Yet these strategies were not the result of a carefully designed plan but the outcome of a longer conditioning and learning process. This means that playing off several factions and actors was a practice entrenched in contemporary worldviews, no matter whether of the eunuchs or other actors.<sup>365</sup> After all, other actors like the Yetī Ūrūgh leaders or the Qaṭaghān *amīrs* also applied this strategy and played the more powerful factions off against one another. Caution was the dictate of the moment in a social environment characterized by intrigues and mutual suspicion. The balancing of different groups, coalitions and interests was absolutely essential and often resembled a high-wire act because the cooperation with one or another tribal coalition and the timely hatching of plots was inevitable for the survival of the court clique. And it is exactly for this reason that we can explain the long reign of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān.

The next influential eunuchs, acting as grey eminences in the background, were Khwāja Inṣāf and Khwāja Ulfat. The first started his career under Subhān Qulī Khān and was probably involved in the education of his later protégé, Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān.<sup>366</sup> After the end of his predecessors, he continued his career in the service of the court. Tāli' devotes several pages of his work to him and endows him with favorable characteristics. Khwāja Inṣāf is extolled as a top official and "administrator of the royal government" and as an "intimate of his majesty" (*muqarrab al-ḥazrat*), as "successful due to his enlightened mind," as "concerned with the well-being of the subjects" (*fuqarā-parwar*) and as "a jewel illuminated with an equable character."<sup>367</sup> This portrayal may be seen as evidence of a close and friendly relationship between the author and the *khwāja*. The chronicler sketches the scope of Khwāja Inṣāf's responsibilities as follows:

---

<sup>365</sup> After the unsuccessful attack on Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān's citadel by Kīnakās troops in 1719, the courtiers worked in favor of Khwāja Qulī Bī Qaṭaghān's appointment as new commander-in-chief but had him killed shortly after his promotion. In 1134/1721–22, they hatched a further plot and instigated other *amīrs* to take action against Khwāja Qulī Bī's successor, Farhād Bī, who was eventually killed (see sections on Farhād Bī and the Qaṭaghān in this chapter; see also Holzwarth, "Uzbek State," 117).

<sup>366</sup> Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 74a–b; Semenov trans., 93–94.

<sup>367</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 72a; Russian text, 92.

“Since the *khwāja* took care of the protection of the citadel and the city when it was emptied by the troops in such a [good] manner, no hot or cold wind molested its inhabitants. With the onset of night, he ordered the people of the city to be stalwart and ready on the buttresses and the fortifications as steadfast and patrolling observers. With the onset of day, he summoned the notables (*a’yān va ashraf*) and told them: ‘Oh people responsible for the fortification, you should attend to your protection, defense and [mutual] support! We have also ordered a corps [of soldiers] to orbit around the city and your families like a butterfly around the torch of the fortress. You should be vigilant and prudent. If the enemy intends [to occupy] the city, we seek protection from God! Blow the brain of the enemy’s belligerent head with stones and cordon off the alleys with wood, while five to six persons take care of the protection of their families.’ The *khwāja* issued the command that about two hundred commanders of the *mihtar kalān* Mihtar ‘Ibādullah should patrol inside the city and two hundred persons outside. And even Nizām al-Dīn ‘Awāz Bī Parwānachi Kirāyit b. Shāh Bēg Dīwānbēgī did nothing without consulting the *khwāja*. [...] At night the *khwāja* put on the mantle like in the morning, and, with a staff at hand, he kept away the lords of sleep and the veil of quiet and did not disturb his eyesight until day.”<sup>368</sup>

The eunuch obviously provided a crucial link between the palace administration and the city notables, who were responsible for the protection of their quarters and alleys (*kūcha*) that also possessed some facilities for defense. Moreover, it shows how limited the resources of the government were and that its agents needed the cooperation of local representatives in recruiting the personnel for and organizing the defense of Bukhara. The eunuch himself only acted as a supervisor in this regard. In the course of time, Khwāja Inṣāf assumed the role of a city patron. He saw to the laying of the major streets in Bukhara and initiated “the construction of bridges crossing canals like graceful brows.”<sup>369</sup>

Nevertheless, the influence of the chief eunuch, Khwāja Ulfat, by far exceeded the strength of his colleague. Khwāja Ulfat is portrayed as “one who loves the king” (*muḥibb-i shāh*), as “one who has access to the sacred women’s apartments” (*maḥram-i ḥarīm-i muḥtaramān*) and as one of the leaders of the *maḥramīya*.<sup>370</sup> Like in the time before, the *khwāja kalān* acted as chief minister (*wazīr-i a’zam*) with access to the royal treasury and participated in all major consultations. Besides, he served his master as a skillful advisor and accompanied him during military campaigns and

<sup>368</sup> Ibid., fols. 72b–73b; Russian text, 92–93.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid., fols. 72b–73b; Russian text, 92–93.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid., fols. 102a, 118b; Russian text, 51, 64.

battles.<sup>371</sup> In 1131/1719 he was actively involved in the deadly conspiracy against the Qaṭaghān *amīr* Khwāja Qulī Bī Atālīq, and may have likewise played a role in the plot leading to the murder of Farhād Bī Atālīq Ūtārchī in 1134/1122–21.<sup>372</sup> Later the senior eunuch was the major interlocutor of the Russian envoy, Florio Benevini, whom he rescued by putting in a good word for him several times.<sup>373</sup> After all, Khwāja Ulfat acted as a middleman between Benevini and Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān. The fact that in his letters the envoy pays particular attention to his encounter and “friendship” with the minister, whereas the Uzbek office holders appear as a more or less colorless gray mass hostile to him, underlines the growing influence and crucial position of the chief eunuch at court.

The important role of Khwāja Inṣāf and Khwāja Ulfat, who are portrayed as eunuchs holding sway over the government (*khwājahā-yi bar daulat ṣāhib-i ikhtiyār*),<sup>374</sup> reminds us of the somewhat similar examples in Safawid Iran and Mughal India. As has been discussed before, around 1730 Khwāja Ulfat and other confidants of the king advised their master to remove the last influential *atālīq*, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī, from the capital and exile him to Qarshī.<sup>375</sup>

Depending on the perspective, the portrayals of the eunuchs by the different chroniclers vary greatly. While Ṭālī' extols them for their loyalty and administrative skills, Qāzī Wafā, whose work reflects the perspective of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and the Manghits, adopts more the hostile attitude of Amīn Bukhārī. Instead of using the epithet *ahl-i maḥramīya*, he describes its members as “court slaves” (*ghulāmān-i darbār*), as “servants and domestics”

<sup>371</sup> Ibid., fols. 47a, 69b, 87a, 93a, 102a–b; Russian text, 51, 72, 89, 105, 110.

<sup>372</sup> Ṭālī' explicitly mentions the *khwāja kalān* in connection with the plot against Khwāja Qulī Bī (ibid., fol. 118b; Russian text, 64). The plot against Farhād Bī was hatched by a group of conspirators just called the people of the city (*mardum-i shahr*), indicating their non-Uzbek background. It is thus likely that Khwāja Ulfat took part in this plot (Holzwarth, “The Uzbek State,” 117; see also Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 121b; Semenov trans., 67).

<sup>373</sup> Benevini describes Khwāja Ulfat (here Khoja Ulfet) as “chief eunuch” (*nachal'neyskii evnukh*) and “first court minister” (*pervoj pridvornoj minister*). According to him, the eunuch several times played down false accusations and saved the envoy of Peter I from imprisonment (Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Rep. dated 08-04-1726], 119–20). For details see Benevini, *Poslannik* [Perevod s zhurnala italianskogo/Rep. dated February 1725 – transmitted by Peter Sofolov], 97–98; Di Cosmo, “A Russian Envoy,” 89.

<sup>374</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 69b; Semenov trans., 89.

<sup>375</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 18a–b.

(*‘abīd wa ḥasham*) and as “slaves and attendants” (*mawālī wa khadam*),<sup>376</sup> terms solely referring to their formal slave status.<sup>377</sup> In addition, he places emphasis on their greediness and aim to collect the treasures and wealth of the subjects.<sup>378</sup> Finally Wafā concludes that

“the slaves and attendants of the court prevailed in all major and minor affairs of the kingdom and their authority constantly increased. Every one of them opened the knot of consideration with regard to the arranging of the affairs of the kingdom with the fingernails of bigotry. When according to the verse—“The decline of the government is due to the prevalence of the mean”—new ruptures found their way into the kingdom with every breath, the foundations of the empire suffered immense destruction and the pillars of power were ruined. While the soldiery in the desire for gold and silver destroyed the tottering royal treasury, and the monarch, spreading out the carpet of pleasure, abandoned himself to luxury and delight, [...] the slaves of the sublime court were attentive to the bazaar of dominion and authority by adorning the shops of tyranny in every corner of Bukhara and its dependencies.”<sup>379</sup>

Interestingly, Mullā Sharīf, writing in the early nineteenth century, largely follows the account by Ṭālī‘ and portrays Khwāja Ulfat as “the intimate of the king,” the “manifestation of mercy and favor of God” and “the graceful slave.” In addition, he writes the following eulogy on the eunuch:

“He appreciated the fortune of each of the two palaces  
 He was the treasure of generosity and the mine of benefits  
 Although he was only a slave for the king  
 The meaning of eunuchhood was valuable  
 By his beneficence the world became so pleased  
 Like Ayāz his future life became praised and joyful<sup>380</sup>  
 The *khwājas* remained under the obligation of dirhams  
 From that benevolence he [Ulfat] won the ball of felicity

<sup>376</sup> The term *khādim* (خادم)/pl. *khadam/khudām* (خدم/خدام) has different meanings: one is that of a domestic servant or slave. Depending on the context, the word also means eunuch.

<sup>377</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 19a, 41a, 50b.

<sup>378</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 18b.

<sup>379</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 18b–19a.

<sup>380</sup> Ayāz was the favorite slave of Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghazna and possessed an eloquent and sweet expression. His death is dated to 449/1057–58 by Ibn al-Athīr (P. Hardy, “Ayāz,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., I, 780).

One becomes cheerful like the hearts from his gifts

Through charitableness his name remained in the world!"<sup>381</sup>

Throughout the 1730s, the chief eunuch continued to act as trustee of the ruler and keeper of the royal treasury. During this period, Khwāja Ulfat retained his rank as a minister wielding sole authority in the capital.<sup>382</sup> In this position, and similar to his colleague Khwāja Inṣāf, he was entrusted with the guardianship of the citadel in the absence of the king.<sup>383</sup> This is also reminiscent of the practice observed in the Safawid Empire, where the chief eunuch was put in charge of the capital when the ruler conducted military campaigns.<sup>384</sup> In 1745 the eunuch was sent as a messenger to the Iranian court at the explicit request of Nādir Shāh because he was the protégé (*tarbiyat yāfta*) of the Transoxanian king, the “trusted person of the government” (*i‘timād al-daula*) and the “keeper of his secrets” (*ṣāhib-i asrār*).<sup>385</sup> Later, after the ascent of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, Khwāja Ulfat acted as middleman between the court and some of the other *amīrs*. For instance, he arranged the reconciliation of Tughāy Murād Bī Burqūt and the Manghit leader.<sup>386</sup>

### *The Āltūn Jilau and Shāgird Pīsha*

Military slavery had a long tradition in Muslim polities and can be traced back to the ninth century, when the Abbasids recruited guards and armies of slave soldiers (*ghilmān*) personally committed to the caliphs. The purpose of creating such slave contingents was to strengthen the central power through forces free of local or regional affiliations and connections. Later in the tenth

<sup>381</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 302a. Similar to this eulogy, the Hindi poet Kekshavdas praises Jahāngīr’s eunuch, I‘tibār Khān Khwāja Sarā, in his work *Jahāngīr Jas Chandrikā* (Nath, “Khwājahsarā,” 4–5).

<sup>382</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 129b.

<sup>383</sup> In autumn 1737, Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān had appealed to Ilbārs Khān (r. 1728–40) for military assistance while being besieged by Iranian troops in Qarshī. But the Khiwan ruler opted to occupy the Transoxanian capital when he recognized the defeat of the Bukharan army at Nasaf. Exercising full authority, the *khwāja kalān* was assisted by the *qūshbēgī* in his negotiations with Ilbārs Khān. In this situation, the *khwāja kalān* took measures for the fortification of Bukhara against a possible Khiwan assault (Kāẓim, *Ālamārā*, II, 596).

<sup>384</sup> Babayan, “Eunuchs,” 67.

<sup>385</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 58b.

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 71b.

century, many of the *ghilmān* were placed under the command of eunuchs. It was not until the reign of the caliph al-Muqtadir (r. 908–32) that the slave guards began to interfere in the administration and the succession.<sup>387</sup> In the eastern domains of the caliphate, military slavery became widespread from the tenth century onward. “The advantage of slave troops lay in their lack of loyalties to anyone but their master and the fact that they had no material stake in the country of their adoption.”<sup>388</sup>

Local dynasties like the Saffarids and the Samanids were reported to have maintained personal bodyguards composed of several thousand slaves (*ghilmān-i khawāṣ*) to counterbalance the weight of the *dihqān*. The Turkish dynasties of the eleventh and twelfth centuries made use of slave elites as a more reliable instrument than their tribal troops.<sup>389</sup> The Safawids likewise recruited *ghulām* or *qullar* corps of Armenian, Georgian and Circassian origin.<sup>390</sup> These contingents were designated *ghulāmān-i khāṣa-yi sharīfa*. But *ghulām* were not only recruited for military purposes, they were also appointed to positions within the royal household and the administration.<sup>391</sup>

In late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Bukhara, the Tuḡay-Timurids primarily bought and trained Qalmāq slaves for their personal bodyguard, called *qalmāqān-i khāṣa-yi sharīfa*.<sup>392</sup> But the epithet *āltūn jilaw/āltīn jilaw* (“the Golden Reins”) was more common. In the time of the great Uzbek revolts, and especially during the Qazāq rebellion in the 1720s, the Tuḡay-Timurid king relied increasingly on the military pillar of the *ahl-i mahram*, particularly his Qalmāq slave contingents who protected the *arg* of Bukhara and were also stationed in Chahār Jūy, the most important gateway to Transoxania.<sup>393</sup>

<sup>387</sup> D. Sourdel, “Ghulām i. – The Caliphate,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., II, 1079–80.

<sup>388</sup> Bosworth, “Ghulām,” 1081.

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*, 1082–83.

<sup>390</sup> Newman, *Safavid Iran*, 52–53. Chardin numbers the slave soldiers in the service of the Safawids at ten thousand (Bosworth, “Ghulām,” 1083).

<sup>391</sup> Savory, “Safawids,” 769.

<sup>392</sup> Many rulers in the wider region maintained a bodyguard of Qalmāq slaves and freedmen. According to Kāzīm, the Khiwan ruler Abū’l-Ghāzī Khān, for example, had inherited five hundred Qalmāq slaves from his father (Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, III, 934).

<sup>393</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 248b; Semenov trans., 277; Tāli’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 31b, Semenov trans., 36; Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, 292b; Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal], 120. See also below.

According to Burton, Qalmāq slaves were purchased in Khwārizm and nomadic encampments visited by merchants. Other slave marts were to be found in Tara, Astrakhan and Tobol'sk.<sup>394</sup> Qalmāq slaves were purchased for several reasons: they were put to work in private households and girls were bought for the harem, where some of them could wield considerable influence through their sons.<sup>395</sup>

From the time of 'Ubaidullah Khān onward, the contingent of Qalmāq warriors became one of the military pillars of the *ahl-i mahramīya*. Although 'Ubaidullah Khān himself stated he had armed the Qalmāq slaves,<sup>396</sup> it was probably his father, Subhān Qulī Khān, who instituted the *āltūn jilau*. According to Amīn Bukhārī, however, the Qalmāq were in the service of the king's chief wife. Criticizing their growing influence, he states that the Qalmāq and slaves (*qalmāqān wa ghulāmān*) of Bībī Pādishāh "opened the hand of oppression and injustice in the kingdom so that the inhabitants of the city and the steppe became fatigued."<sup>397</sup> Although the names of Qalmāq soldiers mentioned in Amīn Bukhārī's account indicate their Sunnite upbringing, and some of them were religious men designated *hājī*,<sup>398</sup> he also describes them once as "infidel slaves" (*ghulāmān-i kāfirī*).<sup>399</sup> This may be seen as a reference to their Buddhist or other origins.

In addition to the Qalmāq warrior slaves, we come across a contingent of non-tribal elements, mostly Persians and a few Russians, who appear under the label *shāgird pīsha*.<sup>400</sup> This term also occurs in letters from nineteenth-

<sup>394</sup> According to Burton, Bukharan merchants tended to declare between one and seven slaves. These were men, adolescents, children and infants. The price for Qalmāq slaves could vary between six and twenty-five rubles for an adult, and between three and twenty-three rubles for a child (Burton, *Bukharans*, 380).

<sup>395</sup> For example, Abū'l-Manšūr b. Subhān Qulī Khān (d. 1994/1683) was one of the heirs of Balkh in the early 1680s. Since his mother was a Qalmāq, one source accuses him of having favored the Qalmāq over all others and of having appointed slaves to important offices (McChesney, *Waqf*, 154; Burton, *Bukharans*, 330).

<sup>396</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 231a; Semenov trans., 257.

<sup>397</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 204b–205a; Russian text, 227–28.

<sup>398</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 17a, 29b, 151a, 170a, 192b, 248b; Russian text, 30, 169, 212b 277.

<sup>399</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 18a; Russian text, 31.

<sup>400</sup> It is not clear if they were officially regarded as slaves. According to Khanikov, the *shāgird pīsha* was a non-tribal corps of warriors composed of Tajiks, immigrant Persians and freed slaves (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 235). However, Burnes reports that this contingent consisted of mixed tribes from Bukhara (Burnes, *Travels*, II, 374; see also Holzwarth, "Uzbek State," 103–04, footnote no. 23).

century *inshā'* collections.<sup>401</sup> In the nineteenth century, they acted under the direct command of the *amīr* and were often employed as guards.<sup>402</sup> In contrast to the Qalmāq slaves, who were of Mongol origin, the *shāgird pīsha* lacked a tribal background. While the Qalmāq were originally pagan nomads who were later converted and educated as Muslims, the religious status of the *shāgird pīsha* is difficult to discern. Benevini mentions approximately thirty Christian soldiers in the time of Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān.<sup>403</sup>

The sources give varying numbers of military slaves or freedmen that were part of the *ahl-i maḥram*. Often operating with inflated figures, Kāẓim says that three thousand Qalmāq slaves of the *āltūn jilau* served Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān in the battle of Qarshī in 1737.<sup>404</sup> Benevini gives a number of only three hundred fifty Qalmāq slave warriors and one hundred fifty so-called “khazanates,” soldiers of Russian origin.<sup>405</sup> Amīn Bukhārī and Khwājam Qulī Bēg Balkhī allude to Russian slave guards (*ūrūsān*) in charge of the gate of the citadel and the royal palace of Bukhara.<sup>406</sup> This is confirmed by Philipp Effremov, who mentions a contingent of Russian soldiers clandestinely dispatched by the Russian envoy, Alexander Bekovich-Cherkasskij, in 1714 to serve the Bukharan ruler. According to Effremov, Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān conferred great responsibilities upon his Russian guard and became totally dependent on it. Later in the 1720s, the support of the

<sup>401</sup> In these documents they are described as regularly paid warriors serving alongside the Uzbek troops in local garrisons (Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. nos. 7, fols. 4b–5a; 31, fol. 13a; 52, fol. 19a; 94, fols. 39b–40a; 131, fol. 59a; 148, fols. 67a–b passim). In the *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, they appear as recipients of royal gifts that were distributed prior to military expeditions (Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fols. 32a, 72a; Semenov trans., 48, 85).

<sup>402</sup> Vjatkin, “Karshinkij okrug,” 15–16; Holzwarth, “Uzbek State,” 103–04, footnote no. 23.

<sup>403</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal], 125. Amīn Bukhārī makes mention of a certain Jamāl Urūs, whose name indicates a conversion to Islam (Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fol. 17b). The name is missing in Semenov’s translation.

<sup>404</sup> Kāẓim, *ʿĀlamārā*, II, 595. Qāẓī Wafā reports that on this occasion the Turkmen contingent was commanded by Tāsh Muḥammad Kāfir Qushbēgī. This designation refers indeed to the pagan origin of the commander (Qāẓī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 29a).

<sup>405</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal], 125.

<sup>406</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fol. 226a; Semenov trans., 252; Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 68. According to Balkhī, Russian guards (*ūrūsān-i ḥāris*) were instrumental in securing the palace gate against the Kīnakās onslaught in 1719 (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 292b).

Russian bodyguard allegedly was essential in defending the capital against the Qazāq threat.<sup>407</sup>

In Benevini's view, the Qalmāq slave warriors were the last hope of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān, who had difficulties in keeping the Uzbek leaders at bay.<sup>408</sup> According to our Bukharan main source, the palace slaves and servants protected the king in all situations. In 1719 they actively prevented Ibrāhīm Bī and his followers from capturing the royal palace.<sup>409</sup> We are informed that on this occasion, the Qalmāq slaves took up position at a tree that marked the outer limit of the harem,<sup>410</sup> up to which *the ahl-i mahramīya* were permitted to move. Shortly after that, we find them engaged in defending the *arg* against the rebels. The author praises the bravery and boldness of the servants and palace slaves in view of being outnumbered by three hundred Kīnakās warriors and vividly describes how the latter were "plucked like cotton." Apart from this information, we learn that many of the *ahl-i mahram* were children (*pisar bacha*) between fourteen and fifteen years old.<sup>411</sup> This permits the conclusion that not all, but probably a large number of slaves was purchased at a young age and later raised under the supervision of the eunuchs and the *qūshbēgī*.

Besides their duties as protectors of the king, the Qalmāq played a pivotal role in military campaigns. For example, they participated in the siege of Balkh in 1707.<sup>412</sup> In 1722–23 they besieged the small fortress of Uzūlashkent that was in the hands of rebels siding with Rajab Khān. Interestingly, the garrison of this strategic post acted under the command of Tāshī Qalmāq, one of the slaves belonging to Niyāz Ḥājī Qaṭaghān.<sup>413</sup> Thus we find Qalmāq slaves or former slaves on opposite sides. Subsequent to the occupation of

<sup>407</sup> Effremov, *Devjatiletnee*, 37–38.

<sup>408</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal], 125.

<sup>409</sup> Ṭāli' gives a list of prominent names comprising Bāqī Qūshbēgī, Hādī Bahrīn Dastārkhānchī, Ya'qūb Kutwāl, Tāsh Muḥammad Shukūrchī, Abū'l-Qāsim Bēg (Qūrchī), Allah Birdī Dastārkhānchī, Ṭughma Bēg, Farhād Bēg (Āftābchī), Shighāy Bēg and other servants and members of the Qalmāq corps (*jamā'a-yi Qalmāq*) of the ruler (Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 102a–b; Semenov trans., 51).

<sup>410</sup> According to a nineteenth-century visitor, the *haram* inside the royal citadel (*arg*) was completely walled off by gardens and trees (von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 257).

<sup>411</sup> For the whole episode see Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 102a–113a; Semenov trans., 51–59; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 148b–149a, 152a.

<sup>412</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *Uбайдullah Nāma*, fol. 100a; Semenov trans., 114.

<sup>413</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 60b–61a; Semenov trans. 82–83; Muḥammad Amīn, *Maẓhar*, 44a. According to the *Tāj*, Tāshī Qalmāq was a famous warrior (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 162b).

Uzūlashkent and Hazāra by the troops of the government, the Qalmāq contingents were among the forces paying homage to the ruler immediately before the decisive encounter with the enemy took place.<sup>414</sup> Hence the king was not the only person in possession of Qalmāq slaves, although his personal bodyguard was the largest body of slave warriors under the command of a single individual. It was very common to own one or more Qalmāq slaves and many *amīrs* purchased them at slave marts. For example, Allah Birdī Bī Mīng, who for a time served as governor of Samarqand, was finally killed by his own slave. Another example was the Naymān leader Ni‘matullah Dādkhwāh, who owned a Qalmāq slave by the name of Farhād.<sup>415</sup>

One of the last references to the *āltūn jilau* is made by Kāzim. He reports that when in 1747 the followers of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī arrested Abū'l-Faiḥ Khān, some Qalmāq slaves undertook a last attempt to enlist the help of the Qizilbāsh by informing their commander, Biḥbūd Khān, about the death of Nādir Shāh. But this attempt to beg the support of the Iranians remained unsuccessful.<sup>416</sup>

### *The Qūshbēgīs: Slave Commanders and Freedmen*

There are many indicators showing that the *āltūn jilau* acted under the command of the *qūshbēgī-yi kull*, who was likewise a Qalmāq.<sup>417</sup> Yet it does not become clear in the sources whether these men were slaves or freedmen. Since some of them, especially ‘Abdullah Ḥājī, acted on a par with the *amīrs*, I surmise that at least some of the *qūshbēgīs* enjoyed the status of free men who remained in the service of their former master. The bearers of this title are often styled favorites or intimates of the emperor (*muqarrab-i khāqān*). The rise of Qalmāq men to this position began already under Subḥān Qulī Khān and caused tensions with the established Uzbek leadership. For example, the closeness (*tagharrub*) to the ruler enjoyed by a certain Bulāq Qūshbēgī Qalmāq triggered a rebellion of Uzbek chiefs (*sarān*

<sup>414</sup> In contrast to the Uzbek tribes, “the Confidants” were almost the last in the chain of tribal forces saluting Abū'l-Faiḥ Khān but came before the Turkmens of the frontier region (Ṭāli‘, *Tārīkh*, fols. 86a–87a; Semenov trans., 104).

<sup>415</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 23b, 181b; Semenov trans., 38, 202.

<sup>416</sup> Kāzim, *‘Ālamārā*, III, 1122.

<sup>417</sup> The *qalmāqān-i khāṣa-yi sharīfa* also played a role during the siege of Balkh in 1707 (Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 100a; Semenov trans., 114).

*wa sar-hangān-i ūzbēkīya*) in the capital in 1105/1693–94.<sup>418</sup> Amīn Bukhārī mentions that a certain Tūrā Qulī Bī Qūshbēgī, a *ghulam bacha* and one of the favorites of ‘Ubaidullah Khān, received a house close to the royal palace upon his appointment. This man exercised great authority, since he was so highly trusted that he had the right to the *kūrnish* any time he wanted.<sup>419</sup> Other Qalmāq slaves in the service of the royal harem also began to wield considerable authority during ‘Ubaidullah’s reign,<sup>420</sup> a development that was not appreciated by all actors. Having been close to some *amīrs*, Amīn Bukhārī sharply criticizes their growing influence at court and attributes the alienation between the Uzbek soldiers and the ruler, and hence ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s final assassination, to this tendency.<sup>421</sup>

A Qalmāq by the name Jaushan was actively involved in the later conspiracy and belonged to the group responsible for the murder of the king.<sup>422</sup> Afterward, this individual was awarded the post of *qūshbēgī*, which was crucial insofar as he acted as one of the leaders of the *ahl-i maḥram*.<sup>423</sup> Others, like Aflātūn Qūrchī, tried to protect the ruler in view of the conspiracy leading to his end in 1711.<sup>424</sup>

After the deposal of Jaushan Qalmāq, the position of *qūshbēgī-yi kull* was given to ‘Abdullah Bī Ḥājī.<sup>425</sup> This illustrious man had already served as *qūshbēgī* after ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s enthronization in 1702 and participated in

<sup>418</sup> Alienated by the rise of Būlāq Qūshbēgī Qalmāq and Khwājam Birdī Dādkhwāh Qipchāq, the leaders of the Qaṭaghān, Yābū and the Yūz gathered their followers (*ahālī wa mawālī*) and attacked one of the city gates of Bukhara. In this conflict, the ruler was supported by young Qipchāq men (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 282b).

<sup>419</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 192a, 193b–194a; Semenov trans., 212, 214–15; Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 69; Bregel, *Administration*, 10. Ṭālī’ also mentions Tūra Qulī Qūshbēgī Qalmāq as one of the intimates of the ruler (Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 12a–b; Semenov trans., 22).

<sup>420</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 204b–205a; Semenov trans., 227–28.

<sup>421</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 204b–205a, 207b–209b; Russian text, 227–28, 231–33.

<sup>422</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 6b, 10b, 24a; Semenov trans., 17, 21, 30; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 131b, 136a. In one source, this actor is also called “Jaushan-i Tūra-kush,” Jaushan the Tūra killer. In 1702, he was entrusted with the murder of Prince Asadullah Sulṭān, one of the brothers of ‘Ubaidullah Khān (Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 17b; Semenov trans., 30).

<sup>423</sup> After the coronation of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān in 1711, other confidants of ‘Ubaidullah Khān were also arrested (see Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 32b; Semenov trans., 37).

<sup>424</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 21b–22b; Russian text, 29–30.

<sup>425</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 33a; Russian text, 37.

a number of campaigns. Toward the end of ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s reign, ‘Abdullah was promoted to the rank of *qūshbēgī* and *mīrāb* of Balkh.<sup>426</sup> Before his reinstatement as *qūshbēgī* of Bukhara, he had served as governor of Chahār Jūy. In 1716 he left the capital together with his ally Khudāyār Bī after the Kīnakās took over the government and went first to Marw and then to Balkh, turning from there toward Tirmidh. After a few days ‘Abdullah Bī accompanied the Manghit leader to Qarshī, where both stayed with the Khitā’ī-Qipchāq. Shortly thereafter, he failed to bring Bukhara into his fold but was reinstated after the removal of Ibrāhīm Bī and the death of Khwāja Qulī Bī in 1719. Afterward, ‘Abdullah Bī actively participated in the campaigns against Rajab Khān and succumbed to the wounds he had suffered during the battle of Hazāra in 1723.<sup>427</sup>

Apart from ‘Abdullah Bī, the *ghulamān* of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān mostly held low positions in the prevailing hierarchy; many of them were appointed to posts like “keeper of the tablecloth” (*dastārkhwānchī*), “musketeer” (*qūrchī*, *qūrchībāshī*) or “keeper of the ceremonial parasol” (*shukūrchī*).<sup>428</sup> But some were awarded the rank of *dīwānbēgī* supervised by the senior eunuch.<sup>429</sup> Other Qalmāq were promoted to the rank of governor. Muḥammad ‘Alī Ḥājī Qalmāq, for example, was governor of Chahār Jūy when Subhān Qulī Khān appointed his grandson Muqīm Sulṭān as new heir-apparent and appanage *khān* of Balkh in 1697.<sup>430</sup> According to Benevini, the ruler stationed one hundred fifty Qalmāq soldiers in Chahār Jūy to protect the Bukharan frontier post against possible Uzbek encroachments.<sup>431</sup>

<sup>426</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 29b, 192b; Semenov trans., 45, 212–13. The citadel and garrison of Balkh had been conferred on a Qalmāq already by Subhān Qulī Khān. One of the sources mentions Bāṭir Mutājī Mīrāb Qalmāq as protector of the citadel (*muḥāfiẓ-i arg*) (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fol. 284a).

<sup>427</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 31b, 40a, 41a, 55b, 63b–65a; Semenov trans., 36, 40a, 78, 85–86.

<sup>428</sup> The designation of the various offices does not always prescribe fixed duties and tasks of the office bearers.

<sup>429</sup> Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 12a, 117b; Semenov trans., 22, 63–64. One person is named Jilaudār Dīwānbēgī, who is described as one of the servants of the *khwāja kalān*. Another member of the *maḥramīya* awarded this title was *dīwānbēgī* Tāsh Muḥammad Shukūrchī (ibid., fols. 131b–132a; trans., 116).

<sup>430</sup> The governor received the prince with all honors, presented some gifts (*pīshkash*) and arranged everything for a feast (Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, *Tadhkira*, 266).

<sup>431</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal], 125; see also Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuhfa*, 47.

*The Court Astrologers*

A third group of influential persons enjoying court patronage needs to be mentioned here: the astrologers of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān. Like many of their forbearers, the late Tuqay-Timurids strongly believed in the influence of the stars and celestial constellations on human affairs. The astrologer (*munajjim*) used to observe the stars scientifically for the benefit of his master.<sup>432</sup> The *munajjim* fulfilled three functions. First, he answered questions with regard to the everyday activities of his clients and their outcome. Second, he had to distinguish the auspicious and inauspicious astrological signs and constellations, the opportune and inopportune hours for specific actions, all interpreted in terms of the sun's position in the zodiac signs and the mansions of the moon. And third, the astrologer had to study the omens to predict the future of the newborn after birth. The appointment of court astrologers can be traced to pre-Islamic (Sasanian) times. At the Abbasid court, astrologers were promoted to advise and accompany the caliphs,<sup>433</sup> and even after the Mongol conquest, some of the rulers showed a keen interest in astronomy and astrology.<sup>434</sup>

The Tuqay-Timurid and early Manghit rulers also kept a group of mullahs engaged in the interpretation of the stars and their constellations in the zodiac. One of them was 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ṭāli', the author of the *Tārīkh-i Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān*, though he was to complain once about not having enjoyed proximity to the ruler and his immediate circle.<sup>435</sup> His chronicle teems with references to specific constellations of the planets and their influence on the future course of events.<sup>436</sup> The source also names several other astrologers: Mullā 'Abd al-Laṭīf, Mīr Mūsā Munajjim and Mullā Saif

---

<sup>432</sup> Astrology is often called *aḥkām al-nujūm* (see T. Fahd, "Nudjūm (Aḥkām al-)," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., VIII, 105–08). Accordingly, the designation *aḥkāmī* was applied in the methods of reasoning to the process of deducing unknown states from known astronomical data (T. Fahd "Munādjim," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., VII, 558).

<sup>433</sup> Fahd, "Munādjim," 558.

<sup>434</sup> See George Saliba, "Horoscopes and Planetary Theory. Ilkhanid Patronage of Astronomers," in *Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan*, ed. Linda Komaroff (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2006), 357–68. See also Sela, *Ritual and Authority*, 11–12, footnote no. 29.

<sup>435</sup> See Semenov, "Predislovie," in *Istorija Abulfeiz-khana*, 5–6; Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 71a; Semenov trans., 90–91.

<sup>436</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 42a–b, 47a–b, 70b–71a, 159b; Semenov trans., 44–45, 72, 90–91.

al-Dīn.<sup>437</sup> In addition, the author mentions himself as the mathematician Khwāja ‘Abd al-Rahmān who worked together with ‘Aṭār and Maulāna Saif al-Dīn.<sup>438</sup>

With regard to the rebellions of the Uzbek tribal leaders, Ṭālī‘ states that the era of the Uzbeks would probably soon come to an end. Moreover, his statements on certain constellations give an insight into his ideas on the course of history, since he directly relates the constellation of specific planets to the rise and fall of dynasties and the beginning and end of epochs:

“[A]ccording to the rules of astrology an epoch does not last longer than two hundred and fifty years. Correspondingly, one cycle is at the highest conjunction when a triad of heavenly signs changes. Every twenty years the conjunction (*qirān*) occurs between the two planets Saturn and Jupiter, which are considered the most sublime and highest stars. Since at the ascent of the Shibanid dynasty in 908/1501–02 the two stars were in conjunction within the triad of Aries, Leo and Sagittarius (*muthalatha-yi ātashī*) and the zodiac of Sagittarius, the era of the Chaghatayids had come to its end and the epoch of the Uzbeks began. Now we are in the year 1135/1722–23, the next conjunction will be in 1155/1742–43 when both planets unite in the zodiac of Virgo and the heavenly triad changes from that of fire to the earthly triad of Taurus, Virgo and Capricorn (*muthalatha-yi khākī*). Henceforth there are only twenty years left; when they conjoin in the sign of Virgo then nothing will happen, and if they do not, He will erase this tribe and give the kingdom to somebody else! God knows best that in the year of the dog, on the fourteenth day of the month of Sha‘bān the conjunction takes place.”<sup>439</sup>

<sup>437</sup> Ibid., fol. 70b; Russian text, 90.

<sup>438</sup> Ibid., fol. 47b; Russian text, 72.

<sup>439</sup> Ibid., fols. 42a–b; Russian text, 44–45. “Conjunction [*al-qirān*] occurs between two or more planets when they meet at one point within the length of a sign. The conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter which occurs once every twenty years is the *qirān* par excellence ‘muṭlaq’ and is known as the lesser conjunction. If this be studied in relation to the mean rate of progress of the planets, it will be found that the next conjunction will take place in the 9th sign from that in which it last occurred, and thus the situations of consecutive conjunctions proceed in the same triplicity for 12 times, after which conjunction occurs in another triplicity. For example, if the first conjunction takes place in Aries, the second will be in Sagittarius, the third in Leo and the fourth in Aries. After the twelfth conjunction has taken place which occurs in Leo, the next meeting occurs in the triplicity of Taurus, the first in Taurus, the second in Capricorn, the third in Virgo, and so on for 12 times. The change of triplicity to triplicity takes place in 240 years and is known as the middle conjunction or transfer of the passage to the new group of signs (*intiqāl al-mamarr*) [...]” (al-Bīrūnī, *Kitāb al-taḥfīm*, 150–51). On the meanings of the different triangles (fire, air, water, earth) see Kūsyār Ibn Labbān, *Introduction to Astrology*, ed. and trans. by Michio Yano (Tokyo: ILCAA—Institute for the Study of Languages and

This explanation of past and future events on the basis of planetary constellations gives an indication of the belief of the author, his master, and of the wider audience in that period. Interestingly, there are two additional notes on the margin written by the possessor of the manuscript. This reflects not only the importance of interpreting the signs of the stars but also a retrospective discussion by two contemporaries concerning the right time of the conjunction. The first note states that regarding its place and time, the Bukharan astrologers were wrong because some of their calendars were adulterated. Accordingly, the conjunction should have occurred in the sign of Libra (*mīzān*), but God had done well and it all took place in Virgo (*sunbula*) in 1216/August–September 1801. Referring to a work titled *Tārīkh-i jūdat-i afandī raushan*, the second note insists on the adequacy of the calculations done by the Bukharan astrologers and states that the conjunction in fact took place in the fiery triangle. This would be verified by the work *Tārīkh-i shāhjahānī*, the author of which used the horoscope of the star of Tāhira and Tā'us, though 'Uthmān Afandī reached his conclusion by using a Frankish astronomical chart.<sup>440</sup>

Apart from the explanations of the chronicler concerning planetary constellations, the source also gives a concrete instance of the consultation of astrologers by Uzbek *amīrs* before a decisive victory of troops loyal to Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān in 1135/1723. On Sha'bān 11, 1135/May 16, 1723, all the *amīrs*, the eunuchs and ministers held a *kingāsh* and decided to launch an attack against the forces of the Samarqand *khān*.<sup>441</sup> Mullā 'Abd al-Laṭīf and his colleague, Mīr Mūsā Munajjim, fixed the hour before the prayer as a fortunate time to set out for Miyānkāl. Yet some of the astrologers like Mullā Saif al-Dīn and Ākhund Ḥusain had serious objections to this plan, maintaining that the hour named would bring calamity. Referring to the charts showing the position of the moon, Ākhund Ḥusain quoted a book about the contingencies of royal journeys and told the *amīrs* and ministers that twenty-one out of forty-three conditions regarding the journeys of kings

---

Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1997), 15, 37, 39. See also al-Bīrūnī, *Kitāb al-taḥfīm*, 230, 259.

<sup>440</sup> Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 42b. Some of the notes and observations on the accuracy of planetary constellations that we find on the margin of the manuscript may have been added by Mīr Muḥammad Ṣadiq, the son of the last Manghit ruler 'Ālim Khān, who was the owner of the manuscript (see Semenov, "Predislovie," in *Istorija Abulfeiz-khana*, 7).

<sup>441</sup> Ṭāli' lists the Baḥrīn, the Khīṭā'ī-Qīpchāq and the Kīnakās as supporters of Rajab Khān (Ṭāli', *Tārīkh*, fol. 70a; Semenov trans., 90).

were connected to the horoscope and the position of the planets. According to his calculations, the star calling for a journey was on the seventeenth degree in the sign of Virgo, while the moon, which is considered to be “Galen, the physician of the firmament,” would be on the thirteenth degree in Libra. And since the moon was on its wane, the aforementioned Mullā had consulted one of his astrological books. He concluded that it was not a fortunate moment for a campaign because the zodiac of Sagittarius was on the wane and the fourth house would never be suitable for traveling. In addition, Jupiter was not in a good position and there were other calamities connected with such an enterprise. But describing himself as a low petitioner, the chronicler regretfully remarks that he himself unfortunately neither enjoyed proximity to the celestial court nor did he have “well-wishing consorts” (*maḥārim-i khairkhwāh*), so “he was unable to reach the illustrious threshold.” Finally, the courtiers and *amīrs* delivered a conform and suitable statement from the astrologers to the king and got ready for the campaign.<sup>442</sup>

Astrologers were of course needed in many other situations. In 1121/1709–10, ‘Ubaidullah Khān consulted his astrologer, Mullā Ya‘qūb, to find out an auspicious hour for the appointment of his favorite, Tūrā Qulī Qalmāq, to the post of *qūshbēgī*.<sup>443</sup> When on Dhū al-Ḥijja 11, 1116/April 5–6, 1705, the king’s chief wife gave birth to a son, the naming of the child ‘Abdullah Sulṭān was done on the basis of astronomical charts and planetary constellations.<sup>444</sup> Kāzim also reports other cases when the king and his entourage sent for astrologers. In 1737, before the decisive battle against Iranian troops at Qarshī, Abū’l-Faiḥ Khān consulted his *munajjimīn*, who did not give permission for the major attack on the enemy for six days.<sup>445</sup>

<sup>442</sup> For the whole episode see Ṭāli‘, *Tārīkh*, fols. 70b–71b; Semenov trans., 90–91.

<sup>443</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 191a–b; Semenov trans., 210–11.

<sup>444</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 43b; Russian text, 59.

<sup>445</sup> Abū’l-Faiḥ Khān consulted the astrologers immediately after arriving at the fortress of Qarshī, while the enemy encamped in close sight of the town. Just before the beginning of the battle, some of the Qizilbāsh were worried about the approaching encounter, perhaps because the Turanian ruler had not given the order for six days (Kāzim, *‘Ālamārā*, II, 591). By the middle of the nineteenth century, the art of casting horoscopes was still widespread. Nevertheless, there was only one astrologer in Bukhara, a mullah whose duty was to calculate the favorable moment for actions of the *amīr*. But according to Khanikov, the calculation of the eclipse of the sun or moon was forbidden because the predictions of the astrologer had turned out to be false (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 273–74).

## THE JŪYBĀRĪ KHWĀJAS

*The Jūybārī Family in History*

The last societal group worth mentioning are the *khwājas* of Jūybār, who had been aligning themselves particularly close to the ruling dynasties for centuries. They belonged to the Naqshbandīya, a Sufi brotherhood tracing itself back to Muḥammad Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband (718–91/1318–89).<sup>446</sup> As a prominent group of the religious establishment, the Jūybārī *khwājas* have attracted far more scholarly interest than, for instance, the Uzbek tribal leadership. Thanks to the works of Ivanov and Schwarz, we are comparatively well informed about their history, economic conditions and social status from the time of Shībānī Khān onward.<sup>447</sup> This scientific interest arose from the close relationship between the *khwājas* and the Shibanid rulers, a connection that continued into the Tuqay-Timurid time, as well as from the rich hagiographic tradition.<sup>448</sup> In this section, I will briefly highlight the political activities of the Jūybārī *khwājas* in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Since an exploration of hagiographic works would go beyond the purpose of this study, I will limit myself here to the current state of knowledge and the few descriptions in the court chronicles.

Although the Jūybārī sheikhs came to prominence in the sixteenth century, their rise took place against the backdrop of closer relations being established between the Naqshbandī *khwājagān* and the Transoxanian rulers since the Timurid period.<sup>449</sup> According to Paul, this tendency began in the eleventh century. Prior to that period, Sufis and ascetics stayed out of

<sup>446</sup> For the life of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband see Hamid Algar, "Naqshband," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd. edn., vol. VII, 933–34.

<sup>447</sup> P. P. Ivanov, *Khozjajstvo dzhubarikh shejkhov: K istori feodal'nogo zemlevladienija v Srednej Azii xvi–xvii vv.* (Moscow/Leningrad: Izdat. Akademija Nauk, 1954); Schwarz, *Unser Weg schließt tausend Wege ein*.

<sup>448</sup> Schwarz talks about a "hagiographization" of the local historiography from 1500 onward (Florian Schwarz, "Ohne Scheich kein Reich. Scheibaniden und Naqshbandis in der Darstellung von Maḥmūd ibn Walī," in *Annäherung an das Fremde. XXVI Deutscher Orientalistentag vom 25. bis 29. 9. 1995 in Leipzig*, ed. Holger Preisler and Heidi Stein (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998), 259).

<sup>449</sup> See here Paul, "Scheiche," 278–321; Jürgen Paul, *Die politische und soziale Bedeutung der Naqshbandiyya in Mittelasien im 15. Jahrhundert* (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991; Manz, *Power*, 209–44).

worldly matters.<sup>450</sup> In the time before Tīmūr, sheikhs were religious specialists. Their worldly role consisted in the representation of the urban populace. It was only under Tīmūr that they assumed the role of spiritual mentors of rulers.<sup>451</sup> Besides, they were sought out because of their ability to tell the divine will due to their contacts to the supernatural realm.<sup>452</sup> In 1379–81 Tīmūr visited the sheikhs of Tāyābād and Turbat-i Sheikh Jām to enlist their endorsement for his campaigns against Herat.<sup>453</sup> In his youth, he also adhered to prominent Sufi sheikhs, “courting their favor and attributing his successes sometimes to their intercession.”<sup>454</sup>

This connection was strengthened in the time of Abū Sa‘īd, who generously granted patronage to the *khwājagān*. The relations between him and Khwāja ‘Ubaidullah Aḥrār (1404–90) are well documented by the sources.<sup>455</sup> Due to his influence among the nomads, Khwāja ‘Ubaidullah Aḥrār acted as a power broker in the alliance with the Uzbeks, which helped Abū Sa‘īd gain the throne in 1451. In Paul’s opinion, Khwāja Aḥrār used the politics of protection to transform the Naqshbandī *ṭarīqa* into the nucleus of a faction (*tāyifa*), around which all of his economic and political activities were organized. In a time of permanent warfare, the most diverse groups of people, ranging from tenants and townspeople to craftsmen and merchants, were linked to this faction, which can be termed an extended patronage network.<sup>456</sup> Apart from mediating between the Timurid contenders, there are numerous stories of how Khwāja Aḥrār acted on behalf of settled peasants and townspeople.<sup>457</sup>

In spite of the increasing tendency to royal patronage of Sufi sheikhs, Schwarz rejects the notion of the Naqshbandīya as an uninterrupted successive chain of the *khwājagān*.<sup>458</sup> There were many local Sufi cults and

<sup>450</sup> Paul, *Herrscher, Gemeinwesen, Vermittler*, 208–09.

<sup>451</sup> Paul, “Scheiche,” 306.

<sup>452</sup> *Ibid.*, 290, 306.

<sup>453</sup> Manz, “Tamerlane and the Symbolism of Sovereignty,” 112.

<sup>454</sup> *Ibid.*, 117; Roemer, “Tīmūr in Iran,” 52; Paul, “Scheiche,” 296–313. Ibn ‘Arabshāh cites Tīmūr saying that he owed his fortune to the intercession of three sheikhs: Shams al-Dīn Kulāl, Zain al-Dīn Khwāfī and Sayyid Baraka. As Paul indicates, Tīmūr must have meant Zain al-Dīn Abū Bakr Tāyyabādī since Khwāfī lived in the time of Shāh Rukh (Paul, “Scheiche,” 297–98).

<sup>455</sup> Schwarz, “Ohne Scheich,” 261.

<sup>456</sup> Paul, “Forming a Faction,” 534.

<sup>457</sup> *Ibid.*, 539–40.

<sup>458</sup> *Ibid.*, 259.

shrines enjoying the patronage of the rulers. Thus Central Asia, and especially Mā Warā' al-Nahr, only at first glance appears to be the land of the Naqshbandīya, because there were many other Sufi communities.<sup>459</sup> Nonetheless, the former dominated the religious scene and impressed its seal on other groups.<sup>460</sup> In other regions and periods, sheikhs and saintly families who did not stand in the Naqshbandī tradition likewise entertained close relations with kings of different dynasties.<sup>461</sup> Later, under the Shibanids and the Tuqay-Timurids, the Naqshbandīya managed to consolidate its position and enjoyed the benefits granted by the rulers, including *waqf* endowments, the control over *maktabs* and *madrasas*, and also positions within the craftsmen's communities. Rulers like 'Ubaidullah Khān were followers of Mīr-i 'Arab, Sheikh Jalāl or Makhdūm-i A'zam. His son 'Abd al-'Azīz was not only a devotee of Ḥaẓrat-i Naqshband and Sheikh Jalāl, he also consulted Sufi sheikhs on administrative affairs. At times, some of the *khwājas* were richer than the *khāns*.<sup>462</sup> Under the Tuqay-Timurids, the influence of the religious establishment increased further; for example, the ruler Imām Qulī Khān (r. 1612–42) ordered the construction of the dervish-dominated Shīrdār *madrasa* at the Rīgīstān in Samarqand.<sup>463</sup> 'Ubaidullah Khān also showed signs of piety. He visited a number of local shrines after his enthronization in 1702. In Ghijduwān he visited the tomb of Khwāja Jahān and en route had a close look at the conditions in the nearby *tūmān* of Kāmāt. Subsequently, he performed the *ziyārat* at the shrines of Sufi saints like Šūfī Chūbīn, Khwāja 'Ārif Rīwgaragī and others, all of them in the surroundings of the capital. This *ziyārat* tour took about one week.<sup>464</sup>

The strength and standing of the *khwājas* was based on their influence among the people. Often they tried to gain popularity through charitable

<sup>459</sup> Schwarz points to the 'Azīzān dignitary Qāsim Sheikh, who was particularly close to 'Abdullah Khān. This ruler constructed a convent (*khānaqāh*) for him in Karmīna (ibid., 263). For other influential Sufi groups in Transoxania, see Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 91–149.

<sup>460</sup> Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 91. Schwarz also gives a profound overview of the various Sufi brotherhoods and traditions that existed parallel or closely connected to the Naqshbandīya from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries (ibid., 92–149).

<sup>461</sup> The sheikhs of Jām in Khurāsān, for example, had close relations with the Seljukids, Ilkhanids, Karts and Timurids (Manz, *Power*, 224).

<sup>462</sup> Haidar, *Medieval Central Asia*, 213–14.

<sup>463</sup> Adsheed, *Central Asia*, 155–64. According to other sources, it was Yalangtūsh Bī Ālchīn, an influential *amīr*, who commissioned the construction of the Shīrdār *madrasa* along with that of the Ṭīlākārī *madrasa* (McChesney, "Amirs," 55).

<sup>464</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 18b–19a; Semenov trans., 31–33.

deeds.<sup>465</sup> Their philanthropic acts, like the construction of irrigation channels or the building of *madrāsas* and *khānaqāhs*, are carefully recorded.<sup>466</sup> Besides, the religious nobles sought to monopolize both the internal and external caravan trade by providing capital and by sending their relatives and representatives as merchants as far as Moscow and other places.<sup>467</sup>

The eponymous founder of the Jūybārī *khwāja* family, Khwāja Muḥammad Islām (d. 1563), better known as Khwāja-yi Jūybārī, traced his origins to Khwāja Naqshband through Khwāja Aḥmad Kāsānī, better known under the epithet Makhdūm-i A‘zam (d. 1549), and other prominent *khwājagān*.<sup>468</sup> Khwāja Muḥammad Islām looked back on an illustrious career and also a prominent ancestor, Abū Bakr Sa‘d, whose grave was in Sumītan, the place of the famous necropolis Chahār Bakr.<sup>469</sup> Even in the early nineteenth century, the court chronicler of Amīr Ḥaidar remembers the life and *silsila* of Khwāja-yi Jūybārī:

“The world-conquering king and Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction, the ruler of the lands of Mā Warā’ al-Nahr and Khurāsān, His Majesty ‘Ubaidullah Khān, sojourning in paradise, had a bond of discipleship and singularity, religious dependence and fidelity with the leader of the *sayyids*, the ‘Refuge of the Governors’, the ‘Pillar of the Nobles’ and ‘Essence of the Saints’, the ‘Pole of the Poles’ and ‘Glory of Mankind,’ Īshān Khwāja Muḥammad Islām, the guide to the right way to salvation endowed with princely virtues and known as *khwāja kalān-i Jūybārī*, may his beloved grave be pure and sanctified. His magnificence, wisdom and victory over the enemies of prosperity, fortune and enduring might became so favorable to His Majesty the pious *khān* that in the course of ages and until the Day of Resurrection, the traces of his charities and the signs of his public foundations have become the surety for the hopes and fates and benefited women and

<sup>465</sup> In the sixteenth century, some of the Samarqand-based Aḥrārī sheikhs donated land in the *tūmān* Shaudār (see Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 46–48).

<sup>466</sup> Haidar, *Medieval Central Asia*, 216.

<sup>467</sup> Haidar, “Urban Classes,” 26.

<sup>468</sup> Robert M. McChesney, “Jūybārīs,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica* XV, fasc. 3, 262.

<sup>469</sup> Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 195, 198–99. Literally meaning “the four Baksr,” the family necropolis of the Jūybārī *khwājas* is located about five kilometers outside the Shīrgarān Gate of Bukhara (for further details see G. A. Pugachenkova, “Chahār Bakr,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica* IV, 788; Yelizaveta G. Nekrasova, “The burial structures at the Čor-Bakr necropolis near Bukhara from the late 18th to the early 20th centuries,” in *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, ed. Michael Kemper, Anke von Kügelgen and Dmitriy Yermakov (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1996), 369–84; Bakhtyar Babajanov and Maria Szuppe, *Les inscriptions persanes des Chār Bakr, nécropole familiale des khwāja Jūybārī près de Boukhara* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 2002).

men, wild beasts and birds, the hungry and the transients in the lands of Iran and Turan, in the cities as well as in the deserts. They have become the subject of good remembrance, praise and invocations, and the good reputation of that source of beneficence and favors will always be remembered by the nobles and the commoners (*khawāṣ wa 'awām*) until the Day of Judgment. They all received the support, the affective attention and impact of the sacred spirits of that *murshid* being aware of God, that intimate of the palace of the unquestionable and doubtless Lord, that possessor of sacred ranks [and performer] of high miracles, that *sayyid* with proper descent and son of a highly regarded *mujtahid*. From both sides his parents beyond reproach and the 'Luster and Brightness of the Eye' are the two *imāms*, the two *mahdīs* and *mujtahids*,<sup>470</sup> Abū Bakr Sa'd Sumītanī and Abū Bakr Faẓl b. Imām Ja'far Bukharī. These two saints from the famous and purified Chahār Bakr in the *wilāyat* of Bukhara are the light of life and the source of fortune and eminent glory, the essence of superfluous blessings [from the hands] of both Zahrā and Ḥusain. May God the Almighty be satisfied with them! According to the contemplative education of the aforesaid distinguished man, they received the title of protégés [enjoying] the favor of the monarch of the thorough mystical union and the mercy of the fourth companion, Ḥaẓrat-i Murtaẓa 'Alī, may God grant him honor. They received sight to behold the acceptance of affiliated children (*qabūl-i farzandī*) and the fortune of excellence from Khwāja Yaḥya, the great *khalīfa* of Sayyid Amīr Ḥamza b. Sayyid Amīr-i Kalān. May God sanctify both of them! They have an apparent link to and are guided to God by the great 'Defender of the Nobles,' the sublime 'Sheikh of the World,' Makhdūm-i A'zam Maulāna Khwājagī Aḥmad Kāsānī Dabhdī. He was connected to Maulānā Muḥammad Qāẓī, who was connected to the 'Treasury of Secrets in Company of God' Khwāja Nāṣir al-Dīn 'Ubaidullah Aḥrār, who was connected to Maulānā Ya'qūb Charkhī, who was connected to Ḥaẓrat Khwāja 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Aṭṭār who was connected to the pious ornament, the defender of the glory of the poles and the sublime *ṭarīqa*, the Sunni rules of the house of the Prophet and the *ṣaḥābas*, may they be pleased by God the Munificent, the preserver of the conditions of the Sunna and good manners, the possessor of the holy souls and angelic talents, the sublime *murshid* of high aspiration Khwāja Bahā wa'l-Ḥaqq al-Dīn Naqshband, may God sanctify him."<sup>470</sup>

Larded with epithets and pious language, this extract details the religious and spiritual connections and ancestors making up his *silsila*, but also the real progenitors of Khwāja Muḥammad Islām. According to the text, the Jūybārī family was deeply embedded in Naqshbandī traditions,<sup>471</sup> a fact that still deserved attention and required extraordinary language skills of its author. Besides, the passage links the family to Bukhara and Chahār Bakr. The

<sup>470</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 481a–482a.

<sup>471</sup> One of the progenitors of the Jūybārī *khwājas* is named wrongly in the text. Instead of Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. Sa'ād, whose name is mentioned in the secondary sources (see Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 198; Nekrasova, "Čor Bakr," 371; McChesney, "Juzmandūn," 94), Mullā Sharīf calls him Abū Bakr Faẓl b. Ja'far al-Bukhārī (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 481b).

narrative continues with the privileges of the sheikhs; for example, the seats of honor that distinguished them from other members of the religious elite, the ranks and positions they held over generations, and their close relationship with the Transoxanian rulers, described as deep and sincere attachment or loyalty (*ikhhlāṣ-i kull*).<sup>472</sup> The social standing and power of the Jūybārī *khwājas* received a considerable boost through the connection between ‘Abdullah Khān II and Khwāja Muḥammad Islām.<sup>473</sup> At the same time, we see close family ties between the Khwājas of Jūybār and the ruling Abū’l-Khairid clan through marriage alliances that enhanced the standing of both sides, a trend that continued also under the Tuqay-Timurids.<sup>474</sup> From the late sixteenth century on, the center of the Transoxanian Naqshbandīya shifted from Samarqand, headquarters of the Aḥrārī and Dahbīdī sheikhs, to Bukhara,<sup>475</sup> from where they started their economic expansion. Their commercial activities probably began with the seizure of the *waqf* property when they gained the guardianship of the tombs in Chahār Bakr.<sup>476</sup> Later Khwāja Muḥammad Islām and his son, Khwāja Sa‘d, engaged in substantial commercial activity, including the purchase of land near Bukhara. Since this is not the place to discuss the extensive real estate empire of the Jūybārī sheikhs, I refer to the works of Ivanov, Schwarz and McChesney.<sup>477</sup> Although the sheikhs had property in other Central Asian oases, in Marw and even in Khurāsān,<sup>478</sup> their core estates were located in the Bukharan oasis, where they “were concentrated along the city canal (Rūd-i Shahr-i Bukhārā) in the immediate environs of the city of Bukhara and along the road to Samarqand, to the northeast.”<sup>479</sup>

<sup>472</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 482b–483a. For the notion of *ikhhlāṣ* see next chapter.

<sup>473</sup> Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 202–04; Schwarz, “Ohne Scheich,” 263; Nekrasova, “Čor Bakr,” 372–73. The relationship between ‘Abdullah Khān II and Khwāja Muḥammad Islām is also described in the *Tāj al-tawārīkh*. Here we read that ‘Abdullah Khān visited the sheikh as he was a disciple of the family of the ‘Pole of Time’ (*quṭb-i zaman*) (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 72b).

<sup>474</sup> Babajanov and Szuppe, *Les inscriptions persanes*, 28–29. See also the family trees in the same secondary work (*ibid.*, 128–31).

<sup>475</sup> Schwarz, “Ohne Scheich,” 263, 265.

<sup>476</sup> Nekrasova, “Čor Bakr,” 371.

<sup>477</sup> Ivanov, *Khozjajstvo*, 18–22, 51–68; Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 53, 57, 203; Schwarz, “Bukhara and its Hinterland,” 80–87; McChesney, “Juzmandūn,” 93–112.

<sup>478</sup> Ivanov, *Khozjajstvo*, 51–52, 56.

<sup>479</sup> Schwarz, “Bukhara and its Hinterland,” 84. The Jūybārī *khwājas*’ estates included cultivable land, gardens, farm buildings, private houses and water tanks, for example in

*The Jūybārī Khwājas in the Early Eighteenth Century*

Early eighteenth-century Bukharan historiography makes only a few references to the shifting fortunes of the Jūybārī family. It is said that ‘Ubaidullah Khān initially maintained close relations with the *khwājas*. This is underlined by the appointment of one of the Jūybārī sheikhs to the post of *sheikh al-Islām* directly after his inauguration as new *khān* in 1702.<sup>480</sup> Unfortunately, the court chronicler does not mention the name of the new spiritual head of Bukhara. The next time the *khwājas* appear is in the context of the military expedition to Balkh in 1707. Following the occupation of the city of Balkh, the king appointed a certain Qāzī Yūsuf Jūybārī to the post of secretary in the chancellery of Bukhara (*munshīgarī-yi Bukhārā*).<sup>481</sup> Yet toward the end of his reign, a rift appeared in the amicable relations between the king and the sheikhs of Jūybār. Amīn Bukhārī is indignant about the king’s brash and improper conduct vis-à-vis the descendants of Khwāja-yi Jūybārī and interprets this as a breach in the long-standing close relations between them and the ruling house. The king is even said to have looked down on them with contempt.<sup>482</sup> The last straw was the confiscation of their ancestral land property (*milk-i maurūthī*), which was at least in part conferred on the soldiers. Despite their holding land documents and titles dating to the time of former kings, the ruler did not heed those claims and land rights. He even had his men arrest and enchain some of the sheikhs.<sup>483</sup> From the sources it does not become clear whether the Jūybārī family sided with the murderers of ‘Ubaidullah Khān, as suggested by Devin DeWeese in one of his recent articles.<sup>484</sup> The chronicler only writes about the presence of Jūybārī *khwājas* during the funeral of the king.<sup>485</sup>

The *Tārīkh-i Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān* reports about the involvement of one of the Jūybārī sheikhs, named Muḥammad Yahyā Khwāja b. Muḥammad

---

the village of Juzmandūn, one of the suburban villages of Bukhara (see McChesney, “Juzmandūn,” 98–100).

<sup>480</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 29a; Semenov trans., 44. According to the *Tāj al-Tawārīkh*, the Jūybārī sheikhs, together with other spiritual authorities leading the funeral cortege of Subḥān Qulī Khān, walked right in front of Subḥān Qulī Khān’s casket (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 109b).

<sup>481</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 125b; Semenov trans., 143.

<sup>482</sup> *Ibid.*, 206a; Russian text, 229.

<sup>483</sup> *Ibid.*, 206a–b; Russian text, 229–30. See also Teufel, “Quellenstudien,” 331.

<sup>484</sup> Devin DeWeese, “‘Dis-ordering’ Sufism,” 265.

<sup>485</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 245a; Semenov trans., 273.

Ḥāshim Khwāja Jūybārī,<sup>486</sup> in the political upheavals following the death of ‘Ubaidullah Khān. Having aligned himself with the Kīnakās leadership in Shahr-i Sabz, this man maintained a wide radius of action and movement leading him as far as Khiwa. He profited in several ways from his alliance. First of all, his allies afforded him shelter, especially since he had been at odds with his family after a dispute among the Jūybārī *khwājas* that happened when he was fifteen years old.<sup>487</sup> From that time on, he must have been living in Shahr-i Sabz. When Ibrāhīm Bī received the atālīqate in 1716–17, Yaḥyā Khwāja assumed the position of *sheikh al-Islām* in spite of his young age.<sup>488</sup> After the events in 1719, the young man left Bukhara and went to Ūrganch with a group of Qaṭaghān nobles. Later he returned to Shahr-i Sabz, where he married a daughter of Ibrāhīm Bī.<sup>489</sup>

From the source it becomes apparent that Yaḥyā Khwāja was considered a “black sheep” by the rest of the Jūybārī family, who had obviously broken with the young man a long time ago. There are no signs that the *khwājas* supported the Samarqand alliance around Rajab Khān. When reports about Yaḥyā Khwāja’s arrival at Jūybār reached the royal palace, the supporters of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān were afraid that the sheikhs might possibly defect or open the city gates for the enemy. Therefore Yaḥyā Khwāja’s father, Ḥāshim Khwāja, was brought to the palace and questioned together with a large number of his family members who, acting as intercessors, just confirmed their loyalty to the ruler.<sup>490</sup> This episode shows the continued influence of

<sup>486</sup> Muḥammad Ḥāshim Khwāja b. Muḥammad ‘Abīd Khwāja was linked to the Tuqay-Timurids through numerous marriage alliances. He himself was married to ‘Ā’isha Bānū Khānim (d. 1753), a daughter of Subḥān Qulī Khān. Another Tuqay-Timurid princess was married to his first brother, Muḥammad Qāsim Khwāja. According to the family tree provided by Babajanov and Szuppe, Muḥammad Ḥāshim Khwāja’s nephew Raḥmatullah Khwāja was married to ‘Afifa Bānū Sultānim (d. 1701–02), an alleged daughter of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān (see Babajanov and Szuppe, *Les inscriptions persanes*, 129).

<sup>487</sup> Ṭāli’ speaks of a friendship or acquaintance (*āshnā’ī*) between Yaḥyā Khwāja and Sultān Bī Kinakās (Ṭāli’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 41a, 155b; Semenov trans., 43, 133), whereas Mullā Sharīf calls the link between the two men an alliance (*ittihād*) (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 152a).

<sup>488</sup> Ṭāli’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 41a; Semenov trans., 43.

<sup>489</sup> *Ibid.*, 121a; Russian text, 66.

<sup>490</sup> In this context Ṭāli’ alludes to Muḥammad Ḥāshim Khwāja, ‘Abdullah Khwāja, ‘Aṭṭāullah Khwāja and Manṣūr Khwāja, the son of Muḥammad Mūsā Khwāja (*ibid.*, fol. 156a; Russian text, 232). Semenov mentions only a son (*syn*) of Muḥammad Mūsā Khwāja without giving his name.

the Jūybārī *khwājas*, who were still popular in a time when the division among the Uzbek tribal aristocracy gave rise to unrest in the region. Especially in a delicate situation, such as occurred around 1723 when large parts of Mā Warā' al-Nahr were in the hands of the independent *amīrs* and ravaged by Qazāq and Uzbek troops, a shift of allegiance by the Jūybārīs could have spelled doom for Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān.

FOREIGN GLIMPSES OF BUKHARA'S SOCIAL ORDER: FLORIO BENEVINI'S  
ACCOUNT

Florio Benevini travelled on a diplomatic mission to Bukhara, where he stayed roughly four years from autumn 1721 until spring 1725.<sup>491</sup> As he was entrusted with gathering information on political and economic life in Transoxania,<sup>492</sup> his letters give a profound insight into the circumstances from a foreign perspective. Although he tries to avoid sweeping assumptions and value judgments, some critical remarks show beneath the surface of his account. Very often Benevini's European worldview was confronted with the social realities in Bukhara and especially the conventions at the court. In particular, the customary gift giving caused a feeling of bewilderment and incomprehension on his part. For instance, the first morning after his arrival at the Bukharan frontier, he showed his appreciation for having been hosted overnight by offering gifts to the governor of Chahār Jūy. In his view, one could hardly avoid giving gifts because the people would demand presents without any feeling of shame (*bez styda*).<sup>493</sup> When he continued his journey to the capital, he was received by two local city commanders, who—as he states—came not to pay their respects and to welcome him with all honors, but just for personal benefit and interest.<sup>494</sup> With regard to the relationship between the Uzbek aristocracy and Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān, he concludes that the Uzbeks were “idiosyncratic and erratic” (*samovol'ny i ne postojanny*) and that the ruler had almost no control over them because they were ready to ally with anyone for booty and profit. Paying attention to the fact that the

<sup>491</sup> See also von Kūgelgen, “Buchara im Urteil,” 418.

<sup>492</sup> On the orders of Peter I and his instructions, see Benevini, *Poslannik* (Prilozhenie—instruktziya sekretariju ekspeditzii oriental'noj Floriju Benevini), 136–37.

<sup>493</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Rep. dated 08-04-1726], 120.

<sup>494</sup> *Ibid.*, 121. In one of his letters, the envoy also found fault with the demands of the *khān* of Khiwa for presents (Di Cosmo, “A Russian Envoy,” 84–85).

king had to “buy” the loyalty of the Uzbeks, the envoy states that they served the regnant *khān* as long as he granted them money gifts and ranks, but as soon as he would cease to do so, they were likely to rebel against him.<sup>495</sup> In one of his personal letters to the Russian sovereign, Benevini writes:

“[T]he Great Eunuch (*glavnoj evnukh*) of the Khan, who is the Prime Minister, often apologized saying that I should forgive the mean treatment, caused by the great disorder in the country and the continuous troubles, as the Khan himself was obliged to give off his own shirt to the Uzbeks to keep them loyal, and to make them defend himself from the enemy, and so on.”<sup>496</sup>

Forming a recurrent strand in his account, Benevini’s statements on rewards in return for service and loyalty clearly mirror the incompatibilities between his European worldview, which led him to interpret the behavior of the Uzbek aristocracy in terms of economic interest and selfishness, and the worldview of the tribal leaders. Whereas the behavior and the expectations of the local leadership were part of the social fabric, and in a certain sense institutionally predetermined, the assertions of the diplomat represent a value judgment from the perspective of the *homo economicus*, considering the interest in profit as taking primacy over culturally entrenched norms and socially constructed expectations.<sup>497</sup>

Apart from rifts in perception and behavior, the Russian envoy found himself increasingly surrounded by suspicion and court intrigues.<sup>498</sup> Between the lines we also read about his isolation, since he was confined to the personal contacts with the court minister, Khwāja Ulfat Sarāyi. Benevini communicated with Abū’l-Faiḏ Khān exclusively through the senior eunuch, who, in contrast to the king and the Uzbeks, appears as an active and tangible actor. Compared to him, the other courtiers, Uzbek officials and ministers figure very much as a grey mass of people without distinct

<sup>495</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Rep. dated 08-04-1726], 124, 126.

<sup>496</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Perevod s zhurnala italianskogo/Rep. dated 1725, transmitted by Peter Sofonov] 93. Translation taken from Di Cosmo, “A Russian Envoy,” 85.

<sup>497</sup> On complaints about expectations and gifts, see Benevini, *Poslannik*, 101–03, 120, 121, 124.

<sup>498</sup> Benevini states that it was impossible to talk confidentially about important affairs, nor was it possible to negotiate any secret agreements with the ruler because the Uzbeks were always in wait. He also tells us that they were against an agreement because they wanted to keep the *khān* dependent. Besides, he mentions the rumors at court and the suspicion of the Uzbeks and the courtiers, who looked on him as a Russian spy (Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Rep. dated 08-04-1726], 127).

characteristics except disloyalty, greed and suspicious attitudes. Interestingly, he mentions none of them by name, and even Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Atālīq does not appear in the account.

In light of the divergent worldviews, further disputes were inevitable from the outset. According to the instructions of Peter I, Benevini should first learn about the Bukharan court protocol and how to pay proper respects to the king during audiences. The *khān* was then supposed to receive the foreign ambassador with all honors.<sup>499</sup> But when the Russian emissary wanted to negotiate and enforce his ideas on etiquette and behavior, he met with serious resistance. According to his report, there was dissent concerning the formal procedure of the audience with the king. This conflict primarily centered on the question of direct access to the ruler. Whereas the envoy wanted to deliver the diplomatic letter directly into the hands of Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān, his interlocutor made it clear that the document had to be handed to the king through another official. Furthermore, Benevini insisted on a seat but met with similar objections because his demands were considered an infringement of the court order and protocol. Especially his insistence on a seat bewildered the king, who was informed about the wishes of the guest through his minister and other officials.<sup>500</sup> Finally, Benevini gave in quietly and understood that further negotiations with “these foolish and barbarian people” (*nerazsudnym i varvarskim narodom*) were pointless.<sup>501</sup>

In the end, the audience took place on December 10, 1721, but the procedure described by the emissary shows that he had not only been unable to assert himself against the ideas of the Uzbeks concerning the order of things. But he was more or less smoothly integrated into this order according to the preferences of his interlocutors. The compromise worked out by both sides was as follows: the Russian envoy entered the hall where the ruler was

---

<sup>499</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* (Prilozhenie—instrukcija sekretariju ekspeditzii oriental'noj Floriju Benevini), 136.

<sup>500</sup> The major argument against a personal seat for the envoy was Uzbek resentment. On the full negotiations concerning the procedure of the audience, see Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Rep. dated 08-04-1726], 121–22.

<sup>501</sup> *Ibid.*, 122. If we believe Jaworskij, Russian envoys and officials visiting Bukhara during the second half of the nineteenth century had similar difficulties with the court etiquette. The refusal to accept the ban on entering the royal court on horseback gave rise to constant ill humor on the Russian side. Expressing his lack of understanding, Jaworskij sharply criticized this behavior by pointing to the Central Asian custom of entering the house of the host only on foot (Jaworskij, *Reise*, II, 330–31).

enthroned above all other persons present.<sup>502</sup> He bowed before the king but not as deeply as was demanded from the Persian emissary, who was visiting the Bukharan court at the same time as Benevini. The *khān* for his part implied a bow by nodding slightly. This gesture was a concession to the wishes of the Russian guest. But when the ambassador began to address the ruler directly in Turkish, he was immediately cut off by Khwāja Ulfat requesting the diplomatic letter from him and continuing to introduce the guest to the king. While he interceded on Benevini's behalf, the envoy was doomed to silence. The official note was handed to the *qūshbēgī*, who passed it to the king. Then he was led to the row of the Uzbek office holders and placed on the fourth seat among them. Although Benevini mentions that this was against the original agreement, according to which he was to be placed on the second seat, he remarks that by bowing deeply in front of the *khān*, the Persian envoy, who was granted an audience after him, acted according to the Bukharan protocol. Moreover, his Iranian colleague was given the sixth seat in the Uzbek row. The concessions made by Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and his entourage notwithstanding, the Russian ambassador remarks that the resentment of the Uzbek leaders could be seen plainly in their faces.<sup>503</sup>

In the course of time, the diplomat found the indirect relationship with the ruler and having a mediator disturbing. Khwāja Ulfat refused to meet him in private to avoid arousing suspicion. Furthermore, the eunuch prevented all his attempts to offer Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān Russian troops and a military alliance. He told Benevini that he did not dare inform his master about such plans because he feared the consequences if the Uzbeks should get wind of it. Khwāja Ulfat argued that the king did not face serious resistance and that he would defeat Rajab Khān sooner or later with divine help.<sup>504</sup> The ambitious chief eunuch certainly mistrusted the envoy and he had good reason to doubt the efficiency of Russian military help. In a context where most of the actors suspected the person opposite, a rebellion and even a larger alliance uniting the Manghit, the Kīnakās and other tribes behind Rajab Khān was quite possible as soon as news about Russian aid trickled down to the *atālīq* and

---

<sup>502</sup> According to Benevini, Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān sat on a cushion four *arshins* (one *arshin* being equal to 0.711 meters) above the other persons present so that it was impossible to reach him. Therefore, the *qūshbēgī* took the diplomatic letter and handed it over to the ruler (Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Rep. dated 08-04-1726], 122).

<sup>503</sup> *Ibid.*, 123.

<sup>504</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

his entourage. Such a broad coalition would have created facts dealing a deathblow to the king before Russian military assistance could arrive. Kwāja Ulfat's own fate was too much interwoven with that of his lord; it was thus his top priority to protect the king against every threat. Since in the past eunuchs had been killed for less significant reasons, Khwāja Ulfat did everything to withhold the information regarding the proposed Russian aid. When he learned about Benevini's attempts to communicate with Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān directly via his sister and mother, he got quite angry and now endeavored all the more to shield his master from every attempt of the envoy to talk directly with him.<sup>505</sup>

The following development and the events surrounding the envoy give an excellent insight into the spiral of mutual distrust and suspicion created by the action and behavior on a micro scale. Of special interest here are the mutual effects these actions had on the future behavior of either side. By the end of 1724, the eunuch and other officials had from their personal point of view every reason to mistrust the envoy. After a failed attempt to set off from Bukhara for Khiwa, he was forced to return to the Transoxanian capital, where he was accommodated in one of the abandoned suburbs of the city.<sup>506</sup> Within a short time, relations between the envoy and his Uzbek counterparts, including Khwāja Ulfat, deteriorated to such a low level that both sides watched the other's steps with reservation. According to Benevini, the Turkmens and Uzbeks had convinced the *khān* that he was a spy trying to gain information about the location of mineral resources.<sup>507</sup>

Benevini attributed the change in the king's attitude to his "mean and unstable behavior," prompting him to command the assassination of his former guest. But the eunuch prevented this by warning against such a step, which would have provoked Russian revenge in the form of a punitive campaign. Simultaneously, the court minister suggested killing the emissary

---

<sup>505</sup> Benevini reports that once Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān wanted to visit him incognito, but when he arrived, he was accompanied by Khwāja Ulfat and Bāqī Qūshbēgī. Both warned him once again that as soon as the Uzbeks learned about an envisaged Russian-Bukharan alliance, this would cause the fall of the young king (Benevini, *Poslannik*, 128).

<sup>506</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Perevod s zhurnala italianskogo/Rep. dated 1725, trans. Peter Sofonov], 95; Di Cosmo, "A Russian Envoy," 87.

<sup>507</sup> According to Benevini himself, it was one of his major instructions to gain information about mineral resources, especially gold (Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Rep. dated 08-04-1726], 130–31. See also "Instruktziya sekretariju ekspeditzii oriental'noj Floriju Benevini," in *Poslannik*, pt. 7, 137).

once he had left the Bukharan sphere of authority so that some thieves could be blamed. The king now changed his mind and accepted this plan. According to Benevini, his communication with the court was still restricted to Khwāja Ulfat, who informed him of the *khān*'s decision. But he had already learned about “such a barbarous intention” and made his interlocutor believe that he wanted to wait for advice from Mashhad about safe travel routes.<sup>508</sup> Benevini describes his final flight from Bukhara as follows:

“On the 8th of April [1725], under the escort of a Tartar whom I keep with me for this purpose, I suddenly set off. I did it without telling anyone, except for a Russian merchant, on the very last day [...] At midnight, together with 27 other men I left Bukhara, running at full gallop until we were outside the urban areas and the villages, into the desert, which we reached at sunrise. At the water-wells I found my camel-driver with the aforementioned four camels, which we loaded with water; I let the horses be watered and then, trusting in God, I ventured into the desert, unbearably hot and arid.”<sup>509</sup>

#### SUMMARY

In the previous sections I have explored the shifting figurations of power during the first quarter of the eighteenth century and the resulting impact on the political setting of Transoxania. The processes I described can be termed dissolution or disintegration accompanied by the rise of amirid forces, factional conflicts and fragmentation of the Tuqay-Timurid realm. The process of dissolution was already apparent during the shift of authority from the Shibanid to the Tuqay-Timurid period, when the numerical strength of the ruling clan decreased and strong *amīrs* could enhance their position. Decisive and qualitative changes occurred during the reign of Subhān Qulī Khān. The dependence of the rulers on amirid support now increased to such a degree that the authority of the Tuqay-Timurids became more or less nominal. In this period we observe the constant forging and breaking of ties

<sup>508</sup> Unfortunately, Benevini does not tell us about his information source at the Bukharan court at that time. Although he does not explicitly mention his personal feelings, a sense of growing isolation that he and his caravan experienced shows between the lines. He was in all likelihood informed by a confidant, a friend or some other persons at the court, but it is also possible that his strategy to pretend guilelessness while preparing his flight was informed by suspicion and speculation. For the whole episode see Benevini, *Poslannik* [Perevod zhurnala italianskogo/Rep. dated 1725], 97–98; Di Cosmo, “A Russian Envoy,” 90–91.

<sup>509</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik* [Perevod zhurnala italianskogo/Rep. dated 1725, trans. Peter Sofonov], 98–99. Translation taken from Di Cosmo, “A Russian Envoy,” 91.

between Uzbek tribal factions and the Bukharan court. This coincided with the emergence of new, very often short-lived coalitions. Yet although the *amīrs* saw no problem in withdrawing their loyalty, the claim to the throne still remained a Chingizid prerogative.

The period under study can be divided into three distinct phases, the first being the final years under Subḥān Qulī Khān and the time of ‘Ubaidullah Khān (ca. 1697–1711). Many *amīrs* acquired key resources like land already in the time of Subḥān Qulī Khān and even before. The land was often tax-privileged and located in the catchments of large irrigation canals in areas like Shaudār, Kish or Qarshī. These vast estates were regarded as a major asset in future contests. The accumulation of power sources by the amirid class went hand in hand with the kings’ difficulties mobilizing Uzbek support for military enterprises. Thus the possibility of territorial expansion, and therewith the spoils from military conquest, became further limited. Not surprisingly, the reluctance to comply with the instructions of the Chingizid ruler was mirrored by constant opposition to the plans for a campaign to Balkh. The Bukharan *amīrs* were obviously not interested in Balkh affairs any longer and instead drew the attention of the king to much weaker, local amirid contenders to enhance their position.<sup>510</sup> With this, they provided ‘Ubaidullah Khān with a pretext for subjugating local forces such as the *ūng wa sūl* tribes.

The second phase covered the first seventeen years of Abū’l-Faiḥ Khān’s reign (1711–28). While under ‘Ubaidullah Khān the *atālīqate* remained in the hands of two or three main players, who did not manage to establish a lasting monopoly on this office, the rotation of key offices now gained an increasing momentum of its own. The material discussed in this section illustrates that the most important ranks, offices and governorships permanently circulated throughout the tribal landscape of Mā Warā’ al-Nahr. Particularly the posts of *atālīq* and *dīwānbēgī* were contested. In the first ten years of Abū’l-Faiḥ Khān’s reign, Bukhara witnessed six changes of government. On average, tenure lasted no longer than two or three years,<sup>511</sup> or even just a few weeks in the case of Khwāja Qulī Bī. Every rearrangement

---

<sup>510</sup> The Bukharan *amīrs* six times dissuaded ‘Ubaidullah Khān from his idea of mounting a campaign to Balkh. In most cases the *amīrs* attempted to draw his attention to the *ūng wa sūl* tribe of Shahr-i Sabz (Amīn Bukhārī, ‘*Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 33b, 37b, 38a–b, 44b, 76a, 143b–144a; Semenov trans., 49, 53–54, 60, 89, 162–63).

<sup>511</sup> See Holzwarth, “Relations,” 192.

of the government occasioned a transfer of loyalties, the break-up of the existing hierarchy and a further fragmentation of the field of power around the *khān* and his court. The changes in the composition of the dominating alliances had a range of other effects: for instance, the administration experienced an influx of members of the respective amirid coalitions with every transfer of power positions. In the course of this process, Transoxania fell into rival Uzbek principalities.

These processes entailed a certain balance or fluctuation of power since every faction was due to assume key offices once in a relatively short period. Although the political game seems to have been dominated by the Uzbek nobles at first glance, the court was still the ultimate power center that balanced the different factions by granting and withdrawing favors and offices. In this way, Abū'l-Faiz Khān and his entourage exploited and even fueled existing rivalries among the amirid actors.

In spite of the relative strength and military capacity of the different Uzbek leaders, even the strongest among them were not able to unseat their rivals on a permanent basis. Although many tribal groups were involved in the overall power struggle, several tendencies can be discerned. Firstly, the conflicts were very much dictated by the increasing rivalry between the Manghit and the Kīnakās.<sup>512</sup> Further in the east, the Yūz established themselves as a third force in western Ferghana, Ūrā Tippa and Ḥiṣār.<sup>513</sup> In some of these regions, their leadership was called into question by their antagonists, the Ming. Another power center was Shahr-i Sabz in the Qashqā Daryā Valley.<sup>514</sup> Secondly, khanly control over the *atālīqs* loosened, though there were no pre-eminent families who controlled the *atālīqāte*, a tendency that can be observed two decades later. The Uzbek tribes tended to use their close relationship with the Tuqay-Timurids to enhance their own position. At the same time, their representatives saw themselves as virtual kingmakers, an illusion that is also supported by the sources. Thirdly, this development gave rise to the *ahl-i mahramīya*, who, composed of non-Uzbek elements, sometimes stood in sharp opposition to the entrenched amirid leadership.

It is also remarkable that the Uzbek alliances changed frequently and drastically in their individual composition. At the pinnacle of power was the

<sup>512</sup> Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 93; Beisembiev, *Ta'rikh*, 7.

<sup>513</sup> During that time Ūrā Tippa and Khojand became de facto independent (Chekhovich, "K istorii," 43).

<sup>514</sup> Ibid.

court backed by two tribal factions (primarily the Kīnakās, Manghit and Kḥiṭāʿī-Qipchāq, whose chieftains were the predominant players) that were represented by the *atālīq* and the *dīwānbēgī*. Other smaller groups were loosely tied into this framework. Later on, in the 1720s, the base of the alliances was considerably extended. Having undertaken their activities on Transoxania's northern margins, nomadic groups such as the Qalmāq and the Qazāq were incorporated into the rival networks of power. Winning them over as allies was considered a strategic advantage by the protagonists, who struggled to break the stalemate between the Bukhara and Samarqand alliances.

Beginning with the retreat of the Qazāq, the third phase (1727/28–1737) was very much dominated by the eunuchs and other figures in Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān's entourage. Now we see the dissolution of the conventional coalitions, the retreat of the Uzbek leaders to their individual strongholds, and the city of Bukhara remaining an island in a sea of independent principalities.

In spite of the difference in their works, both Amīn Bukhārī and 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ṭālī' hated the tribal leaders of their time. According to them, most of the Uzbek chiefs turned out to be oppressors sooner or later after their appointment to the positions of *atālīq*, *dīwānbēgī* or *parwānachī*. A closer look at the sources shows that the characterization of the *amīrs* and their followers shifted throughout the texts. Apart from the *ūng wa sūl* tribes, the Uzbek factions allied with the court are—at least in the beginning—depicted in positive or neutral terms. They were taken into the king's service because of their leaders' loyalty, or they are presented as an alternative to disloyal recipients of benefits and rewards. But this portrayal changes suddenly before every shift of power or immediately after the promotion of the respective chiefs. Now the *amīrs* supporting the court forfeit royal favors because of their tyrannical behavior or unauthorized actions. As soon as the next power shift becomes apparent, they figure as tyrants and their followers as predatory tribes and war bands, those who are predestined to engage in every sort of *fitna*. Conversely, those who were described as disloyal transgressors before are taken into service again and even promoted to a higher position. Unfortunately, we lack alternative sources that could serve as a corrective to these rapidly changing attributes. A comparison of the different appointments between 1711 and 1723 reveals that most of the Uzbek factions were taken into service several times irrespective of their former misbehavior. Their abandonment of allegiance as described by the writers was obviously no obstacle. Conversely, their "laudable skills and

qualities” determining the casting vote for their initial promotion did not help prevent their dismissal.

The ups and downs of the narrative and the shifting portrayals attest to the fluidity of the power structures and uncertainty of the political milieu in early eighteenth-century Transoxania. As a result, the biographies of the Uzbek commanders show a striking degree of mobility. Similar to the *amīrs* of the seventeenth century explored by McChesney, “[t]his mobility was either vertical, involving career promotion and demotion, or lateral, including transfers from one place to another or the shifting of loyalties and service ties.”<sup>515</sup> The social dynamics and upward mobility in this period are remarkable; even (former) slaves and eunuchs could wield authority through their position at court and close personal relations with the ruler.

In the late Tuqay-Timurid period, an intensified networking of the Uzbek chieftains is noticeable. The *amīrs* were well aware of the fact that they needed allies; nobody was able to carry on alone. Of course, loyalty was important, but given a severe lack of resources in a volatile environment, the disloyal behavior of many actors does not surprise us. Anyone who wanted to survive in this environment had to adjust to the circumstances. However, the faster the shifts in the figurations, visible in changes of government and the reshuffling of patronage at the court level, the more the *amīrs* tried to compensate for their losses by extending their personal networks, a strategy that further strained the available resources. Against this backdrop, plundering raids and other practices became even more logical. The greater the clientele maintained by an Uzbek chief, the higher the demand for material wealth in a context lacking any possibility for territorial expansion.

In view of the political circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the *amīrs* sought to attach themselves to the court to foster their own reputation and to win over new followers. Others, like the Manghit *amīrs*, were continuously looking around for other potential protectors and resource suppliers. The last two Tuqay-Timurid monarchs are cases of the purposeful manipulation of one of the important principles of the Chingizid constitution: descent from Jūchī b. Chingīz Khān.<sup>516</sup> Indeed, all factions, including the *ahl-i maḥramīya*, sought to control the *khān* and influence his decisions. Thereby they not only manipulated the ruler but also one of the

---

<sup>515</sup> McChesney, “The Amirs,” 58.

<sup>516</sup> Teufel also noted this tendency, though the last Tuqay-Timurid rulers were not as weak-willed as remarked by him (see Teufel, “Quellenstudien,” 350).

*loci communis* rooted in contemporary thinking. This contributed to a slow change of the worldviews of many actors whose actions I described in the previous sections. After years of unrest and discord that undermined the Chingizid constitution, Uzbek nobles like the Manghit had little to lose and much to gain. When Nādir Shāh invaded Mā Warā' al-Nahr in 1740, they entered his service and offered help by mediating between him and the rest of the Uzbek aristocracy. This and the resulting developments will be described in the next sections.

Another development to be observed throughout the first quarter of the eighteenth century is the chronic state of *fitna* with all its connotations. Every change in the political constellations and the composition of the government put one coalition at a disadvantage. Rebellions emanating from the new centers of gravity were the inevitable result. In many cases, violence took the form of occasional skirmishes and raids, so it was sufficient to mobilize a following that was big enough to impress the enemy.<sup>517</sup> This was the case at least until 1722–23. The events taking place in Samarqand in 1709 document that any doubt regarding the king's physical health was sufficient for the *amīrs* to give up their allegiance and rebel against the ruler. On the one hand, the resulting conflicts kept alive contemporary worldviews and reinforced patron-client relations in the most diverse contexts. On the other, they paved the way for the Iranian invasion that was soon to come.

### NĀDIR SHĀH'S CONQUEST OF MĀ WARĀ' AL-NAHR

In the previous chapter I presented material on the development under the last Tuqay-Timurid kings and the various shifts in the figurations of power that paved the way for the Iranian intervention in 1740. Nādir Shāh's campaign to Mā Warā' al-Nahr ushered in an interlude of about seven years. This short period was crucial because it sounded the death knell for the Tuqay-Timurids and set the stage for the rise of the Manghit.

The following sections explain the impact of Nādir Shāh's expedition on Bukhara. They further illustrate the relationship between the Iranian conqueror and the Manghit *amīrs*. Since Nādir Shāh's career is described in

---

<sup>517</sup> For example, in 1730–31 Allah Shukur Bī Manghit went over to the Khoqandian ruler 'Abd al-Raḥīm Bī, but left his new ally when he saw the Bukharan army of more than twenty thousand soldiers (Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 49a–b).

a number of publications,<sup>518</sup> I will focus on the circumstances in Mā Warā' al-Nahr from the perspective of Bukharan and Iranian sources. Of special interest here are the career of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and the impact of the Iranian intervention on the local figurations of power. Let me first look at the most important actors of that time:

- **Nādir Shāh Afshār** (r. 1736–47); Iranian king who, after establishing control over Bukhara and Mā Warā' al-Nahr, took the Manghit *amīrs* into his service and thus facilitated their career.
- **Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān** (r. 1711–47); last active Tuḡay-Timurid king of Bukhara, who from the first Iranian campaign in 1737 onward became more and more dependent on the chiefs of the Manghit tribe. In 1747 he was put to death by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī.
- **Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Atālīq** (d. 1744–45); commander-in-chief and most influential Uzbek *amīr*. After the end of the Qazāq raids, he forfeited his dominant position in the capital and retreated to his stronghold Qarshī. After 1737, however, he was reinstalled as *atālīq* by Nādir Shāh.
- **Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Atālīq b. Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī**; in late 1740 he entered the service of the Iranian king and was subsequently relocated to Mashhad. In 1746 he returned to Bukhara and together with his Iranian partners put an end to a number of local rebellions.
- **Riẓā Qulī Mirzā**; son of Nādir Shāh. In 1737 he led the first campaign of the Qizilbāsh to Transoxania and besieged Qarshī.
- **Bihbūd Khān Chāpushlū**; Qizilbāsh commander and commander-in-chief of Turkistan (*ṣāhib-i ikhtiyār-i Turkistān*) from 1746–47.
- **'Ibādullah Kḥiṭā'ī**; leader of six thousand Kḥiṭā'ī households and head of a revolt in Miyānkāl in 1745–47. During that time, he led his troops to Bukhara and ravaged the environs of the capital. Later he withdrew to Yangī Qūrghān northeast of Samarqand and from there via Jizakh to Tashkent, where he was put to death by the local nobility.
- **Qābil Kīnakās** (d. 1747); chief of Yakka Bāgh south of Shahr-i Sabz and leader of a local rebellion in 1746–47. He finally succumbed to the Manghit and their

---

<sup>518</sup> Laurence Lockhart, *Nadir Shah* (London: Luzac & Co., 1938); Peter Avery, “Nādir Shāh and the Afsharid Legacy,” 3–62; Ernest Tucker, “Explaining Nadir Shah: Kingship and Royal Legitimacy in Muhammad Kazim Marvi’s *Tarikh-i ‘Ālamārā-yi Nādirī*,” *Iranian Studies* 26, no. 1–2 (1993): 95–115; Ernest Tucker, *Nadir Shah’s Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2006). On Nādir Shāh’s policy toward the Afghans (especially the Abdālī), see Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 87–100.

supporters and was taken prisoner. Qābil Bī was executed by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Manghit on the way to Mashhad.

- **Ghaibullah Bī Baḥrīn**; leader of the Yetī Ūrūgh in the western and central parts of Miyānkāl with strongholds in Khaṭarchī and Panjshanba.
- **Tughāy Murād Bī**; chief of the Burqūt, dwelling north of Karmīna. Sometimes he acted jointly with the Baḥrīn. He was one of the main adversaries of Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān and the Manghit leaders. In 1745–46 he was left behind at the Iranian court but later returned to his native town and organized resistance against his enemies.
- **Khwāja Ulfat Sarāyi** (d. 1747); senior eunuch and confidant of Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān. He presumably led the court faction opposed to the Manghit *amīrs* and was also entrusted with delicate missions to Iran. In 1745–46, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī left him at Nādir Shāh's court in Mashhad. He was put to death after his return to Bukhara.

In Bukhara the political situation on the eve of the Iranian conquest was difficult and tense. Although some of the Bukharan writers state that the region soon recovered after the end of the Qazāq raids in the 1720s,<sup>519</sup> there are indications that some areas were still suffering from the devastations caused by those events.<sup>520</sup> We have already seen that the Manghit leaders and other Uzbek *amīrs* were driven out from the Bukharan court due to their enmity with the *ahl-i maḥram*. According to another source, in 1737 Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī had lost the atālīqate to Dānyāl Bī Qungrāt temporarily, but was reinstalled after a year.<sup>521</sup> Lacking sufficient resources, influence and royal favor, it was certainly not just the Manghit *amīrs* but perhaps also other tribal leaders who were constantly looking for alternatives. None of them was content to leave control of the Chingizid *khān* to the courtiers and eunuchs any longer. In this situation, caution and initiative were the dictates of the moment when the Qizilbāsh led by Rizā Qulī Mīrzā invaded Mā Warā' al-Nahr the first time.

#### THE FIRST IRANIAN CAMPAIGN (AUTUMN 1737)

Nādir's ascent took place at a time when the former equilibrium between the three regional powers, the Mughals, the Safawids and the Tuḡay-Timurids, had gradually broken away. During this time, we observe the scope of authority of the old dynasties diminishing while new elites like the Afghans

<sup>519</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 18a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 190a–191a.

<sup>520</sup> See Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II/III, 819/1106; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 262a. See also next chapter.

<sup>521</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 59b–60a.

rose on the peripheries of the empires.<sup>522</sup> The Manghits differed from their Afghan colleagues insofar as their rise took place at the geographical center of the Tuqay-Timurid kingdom.

By 1722 the Hūtak Afghans had established themselves at Kandahār after putting an end to Safawid supremacy. The end of the Safawids initiated a period of *mulūk al-ṭawāʾifī*, an interregnum of petty local and regional rulers jockeying for the means of power after the collapse of the central government.<sup>523</sup> The Afghan interlude was short and devastating,<sup>524</sup> from 1726 onward Nādir Shāh, then known under his more humble name Nādir Qulī Khān or Tahmāsp Qulī Khān, restored the former Safawid kingdom in the name of Tahmāsp II (d. 1740).<sup>525</sup> In the course of sweeping military campaigns, he brought large portions of Khurāsān and Iran into his fold and greatly enhanced the importance of Mashhad by resettling tribes from the Persian heartland in its environs.<sup>526</sup> From his logistical base, he established a huge empire created by far-flung military expeditions.<sup>527</sup>

The sources dating back to that time show that Nādir had a fairly good knowledge of his society and the dynamics resulting from military conquest and resource distribution. The main beneficiaries of his early successes were his own tribesmen, the Afshār, but also the Jalāyir, the Marwīs, the Bughāyirī Turks and the Bayāt leaders.<sup>528</sup> In the course of time, he tied many tribal leaders into his *Herrschaftsverband* and step by step revived the former Safawid Empire. Nādir Shāh was formally enthroned on Shawwāl 24, 1148/March 8, 1736, after a great assembly (*qūriltāy*) in the Mughān Steppe.<sup>529</sup> In 1737 he set out for India, instructing his eldest son, Rizā Qulī Mīrzā, to organize a campaign to Balkh. The expedition to India lasted two

<sup>522</sup> Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 84–86, especially footnote no. 300.

<sup>523</sup> Avery, “Nādir Shāh,” 33.

<sup>524</sup> On the Afghan invasion and its consequences, see Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

<sup>525</sup> J. R. Perry, “Nādir Shāh Afshār,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., VII, 853–54.

<sup>526</sup> Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 87.

<sup>527</sup> On the details see Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*; Avery, “Nādir Shāh,” 25–39; Perry, “Nādir Shāh Afshār,” 853–54.

<sup>528</sup> Avery, “Nādir Shāh,” 27.

<sup>529</sup> *Ibid.*, 34–37; Perry, “Nādir Shāh Afshār,” 854.

years. The Iranian troops defeated the Mughal army in a decisive battle at Karnal on Dhū'l-Qa' da 15, 1151/February 24, 1739.<sup>530</sup>

Meanwhile, Rizā Qulī Mīrzā had successfully managed to establish his authority in the areas south of the Oxus.<sup>531</sup> Although the prince was ordered to occupy Balkh only, he and his small army composed of twelve thousand soldiers afterward crossed the Amū Daryā, traversed the regions on its northern banks and marched toward Qarshī.<sup>532</sup> After laying siege to this town, the Qizilbāsh looted the villages, orchards and fields in its environs.<sup>533</sup> In spite of his limited authority, Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān was able to mobilize considerable support. The Bukharan sources list Manghit, Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq, Yetī Ūrūgh, Burqūt and Turkmen contingents making up his army. Besides, the historians mention a prominent commander by the name of Ādīna Qul Bī, who was reportedly the governor (*hākīm*) of Samarqand.<sup>534</sup> His troops consisted mainly of tribal contingents (*īlāt wa hazārajāt*) from eastern Transoxania and Ferghana. The Iranian troops, however, dealt a decisive blow to the Uzbek forces, which fell apart completely after the violent death of Ādīna Qul Bī and the desertion of his followers. Whereas Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī attributes this to the failure of the king to listen to the advice of his generals, who suggested that the troops should take a rest,<sup>535</sup> Mullā Sharīf says that in spite of objections from the notables and tribal commanders,

<sup>530</sup> The massacre in Delhi on March 22, 1739, went hand in hand with the systematic looting of the city quarters. According to Lockhart, Nadir's troops extracted an amount of about 700 million rupees. Furthermore, he captured the famous diamond Kūh-i nūr and the peacock throne (Perry, "Nādir Shāh Afshār," 854). By March 27, 1739, Nādir exempted the Iranian population from taxes for three years. In addition, "he gave his soldiers arrears of pay and gratuities said to equal six months' pay" (Avery, "Nādir Shāh," 40).

<sup>531</sup> In summer 1737, the Iranian troops headed by the prince and his general, Tahmāsp Khān Jalāyir, had encroached on Balkh via Mārūchāq and Andkhūd. Having conquered the principality of Andkhūd from the former governor, 'Alī Mardān Khān, the Iranian army proceeded toward Balkh, where they arrived on Rabī' 13, 1150/July 1, 1737. The city was taken without much resistance after a few days' siege and the last Chingizid monarch, Abū'l-Ḥasan Khān, surrendered (Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 572–76).

<sup>532</sup> The Qizilbāsh at first encountered the Qungrāt Uzbeks inhabiting the areas around Tirmidh. There they forced the Qungrāt leader, Dānyāl Bēg, to surrender (Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 583–85; Muḥammad Amīn, *Maẓhar*, fol. 51b).

<sup>533</sup> Muḥammad Amīn gives a detailed account of this fighting (Muḥammad Amīn, *Maẓhar*, fols. 52a–54b).

<sup>534</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 29a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 228b.

<sup>535</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 28b; Muḥammad Amīn, *Maẓhar*, fols. 56b–57a.

some of the court eunuchs pleaded for an immediate encounter and got the Miyānkālī *amīrs* on their side. Together they made sure that the advice of the *atālīq* did not come to the *khāqān*'s attention.<sup>536</sup> As an eyewitness to these events, Muḥammad Amīn attributes the defeat to internal discord and the attempt of the Turkmen commander, Tāsh Muḥammad, and Ādīna Qul to do harm to the Manghit.<sup>537</sup> The Iranian author credits the victory of the Qizilbāsh to the employment of artillery that was allegedly unknown to the Uzbeks. At the same time, he mentions an intrigue by Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān's retinue hatched with the goal of killing Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī.<sup>538</sup>

According to the travelogues, in the 1720s there were almost no cannons, and even the few rifles and handguns were of little use. Benevini tells us that the Uzbeks mostly used sabers, bows and arrows, spears and lances.<sup>539</sup> Following their victory over the Uzbek troops, the Iranian army besieged the important town of Shulluk in Nasaf,<sup>540</sup> but withdrew to Balkh shortly thereafter on Nādir Shāh's orders.<sup>541</sup> According to Bukharan sources, the Qizilbāsh retreated when they learned about the approaching troops of the Khiwan ruler Ilbārs Khān, who was about to intervene after the Bukharans requested military assistance against the Shiite heretics.<sup>542</sup>

#### NĀDIR SHĀH'S MEASURES AFTER THE CONQUEST OF BUKHARA

Nādir's decision to subjugate Bukhara stemmed from his ambitions and the need for resources, especially food provisions for his soldiers. His huge army

<sup>536</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 227a–b.

<sup>537</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḏhar*, fols. 56a–b.

<sup>538</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 593–94.

<sup>539</sup> Benevini reports that Bukhara was the only Transoxanian city protected by artillery. There were fourteen cannons seized from the Mughals, and in addition two cast-iron cannons, but nobody knew how to make use of them. The Uzbeks also did not know how to produce cannonballs and used large stones instead for the cannons (Benevini, *Poslannik* [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Rep. dated 08-04-1726], 123). Just a few years earlier, the troops of Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān used a mortar gun (*zanbūrak*) left by the Mughal army seventy years before in their war against Rajab Khān. But this mortar blew up when being used by untrained soldiers (Holzwarth, "Relations," 202. For primary evidence see Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 76a–b; Semenov trans., 95).

<sup>540</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 594–95; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 29b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 231a–232a.

<sup>541</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 606.

<sup>542</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 31b; Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḏhar*, fol. 58a.

was composed of numerous tribal contingents and grew after every military success, both in terms of sheer military power and in terms of heterogeneity. Each victory resulted in a further strain on the available resources and on the ruler himself, who was now all the more under pressure to keep his men busy and to extract the resources required for maintaining the existing loyalties.<sup>543</sup> The emergent need for material resources (money, provisions etc.) was thus the immediate result of the growing and fast integration of many groups into one overall network of personal loyalties, so that Nādir Shāh's plan to invade Bukhara was determined far more by the actual requirements of his extended following than being purely an end in itself. To what extent he wanted to evoke memories of Tīmūr's conquest is difficult to assess; after all, his grandson was named Shāh Rukh,<sup>544</sup> and after the conquest of Bukhara he ordered the removal of Tīmūr's tombstone, which was to be transported to Mashhad.<sup>545</sup> Besides, he strengthened his authority by entering into a marriage alliance with the Bukharan ruler.<sup>546</sup>

Nādir Shāh's success and the establishment of his authority without any military encounter were facilitated by his relationship with the Manghit *amīrs*.<sup>547</sup> As intermediaries between him and the Bukharan king, their careers received a considerable boost; especially that of Muḥammad Raḥīm

<sup>543</sup> Probably giving inflated figures, Kāzīm says that the contingents of Khurāsān numbered sixty-five thousand men, including contingents of Afshār, Kurd, Bayāt, Bughāyirī, 'Arab, Herātī Shāmlū, Hazāra, Jamshīdī, Taimānī, Abdālī, Ghilzai, Lazgī and Balūch troops. Other areas also furnished troops: Iraq (45,000); Fārs (50,000); Ādharbaijān (60,000); Kirmānshāh and Hamadān (25,000) and so forth (see here Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 92–93).

<sup>544</sup> Avery, "Nādir Shāh," 45; Perry, "Nādir Shāh Afshār," 855.

<sup>545</sup> Khwāja 'Abd al-Karīm reports that when Tīmūr's greenish shimmering gravestone was removed, it broke into four pieces. Since one of the men instructed with the removal of the stone was acquainted with the author of the *Bayān-i wāqi'*, he was able to obtain a small piece of it (Kashmīrī, *Bayān*, 74–75). According to later accounts, Tīmūr's gravestone had the form of a four-cornered truncated pyramid, which was split into two pieces when Nādir ordered its removal (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 132; Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 252; Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, II, 438; Radloff, "Serafschanthal," 420).

<sup>546</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fol. 45a; Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 800–01; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 275a; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 46 (French text, 100–01); Effremov, *Devjatiletnee*, 39.

<sup>547</sup> Kāzīm also mentions a final battle between the Uzbeks and the Qizilbāsh at Qatār Tūt near Qarākūl in 1740. On this occasion, which is not reported by the Bukharan chroniclers, the Iranians allegedly defeated an Uzbek army of one hundred thousand warriors because the latter were not acquainted with the use of artillery. The Uzbek army was composed of Yūz, Mīng, Qungrāt, Kīnakās, Bayāt, Qiyāt, Ārmand, Qazāq und Chaghatāy (for this battle and the inflated figures, see Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 789–92).

Bī, who, recognizing the mood of the times, departed from the Uzbek camp and entered the service of the conqueror at Karkī, offering him loyalty and obedience.<sup>548</sup> Both sides benefited from this arrangement. The Iranian emperor was able to present himself as a generous sovereign and “king-maker” or “crown-bestower” (*tāj-bakhsh*), having accomplished a further prestigious conquest.<sup>549</sup> The Manghit chieftains consolidated their dominant position and regained the atālīqate in return. On this occasion, Nādir purchased a large amount of grain to feed his soldiers,<sup>550</sup> and we can be certain that a lot of the Indian spoils were put into circulation by the king and his troops, thereby unwittingly strengthening the Bukharan bazaar. Yet in the short term, they also stripped the local economy of its agricultural base in the environs of the capital. Given the rapid consumption of the harvest by the invaders, an exorbitant rise in the price of grain seems more than likely, especially in the *tūmānāt* of Bukhara. According to Khwāja ‘Abd al-Karīm,

“Nādir Shāh’s tent was pitched outside Bukhara, the ‘Dome of Islam.’ Taking the inner city for not corresponding to the unruly Shāhjahānābād, he ordered the *nasaqchī-bāshī* to assign his men to the protection of the suburbs. They should not allow anybody from the soldiery to enter the city and to molest the poor [inhabitants] so that the people of Bukhara [...] were saved from oppression and violence by the warriors and the pillaging of the Qizilbāsh. Moreover, they benefited from the commerce due to the fear of the *nasaqchīs* and in accordance with the petition of the urban population. [...] Yet, while they only bought food provisions, daily supplies and the most necessary things, the people in the countryside were trampled down. It was clear to those destitute and poor people that the gold and wealth should be presented to the eyes of the ruler, because he was the Pharaoh of the time and the Qārūn of the age due to all the money and the goods of Hindūstān.”<sup>551</sup>

<sup>548</sup> See next chapter.

<sup>549</sup> The term *tāj-bakhsh(ī)* appears in Kazim’s work in the context of the bestowal of the crown/kingdom (*tāj-bakhshī*; *mamlakat-bakhshī*) after the conquest of Delhi (Shāhjahānābād) in 1739. This generous act was later repeated in the case of Kiyā Naṣīr (Shāh Qulī Khān), the ruler of Sindh, the Bukharan king Abū’l-Faiḏ Khān and the new Khiwan ruler Ṭāhir Khān (Kāzim, *‘Ālamārā*, II, 751, 761–62). On Nādir Shāh’s role as “crown-giving emperor” see also Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 12.

<sup>550</sup> According to Qāzī Wafā and Mullā Sharīf, Nādir Shāh acquired two hundred thousand donkey loads (*kharwār*) of grain (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 44b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 274b). Muḥammad Amīn speaks of one hundred thirty thousand *man* of grain bought by Nādir for one hundred thirty thousand rupees (Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḏhar*, fol. 70a). See also chapter The Order of Things/Notions of Loyalty and Obedience/Provision of Resources by Subordinated Actors.

<sup>551</sup> Kashmīrī, *Bayān*, 69–70. I abstained from quoting the English version because of the many translation errors. Qārūn was a son of Moses’ paternal uncle, the Korah of the Old

Holzwarth points to the positive picture of Nādir Shāh, a picture that contrasts with the plundering Uzbeks and Qazāqs who had caused much havoc in the last decades.<sup>552</sup> After settling the affairs of Mā Warā' al-Nahr, he removed the enemies of the Bukharan king and the Manghit. For example, Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī allegedly requested Nādir to transfer their enemies, the Yūz leaders Muḥammad Amīn Bēg and Fāzil Bēg as well as the Kīnakās *amīr* 'Ālim Bī, to Iran. This measure was carried out on the grounds that:

“in the region of Samarqand a group of the Yūz tribe twists the bridles of obstinacy and opposition. They always rebelled against the king endowed with the grandeur of Afrāsyāb, thus causing a state of complete confusion in the protected domains (*wilāyāt-i mahrūsa*). [...] The holder of Afrāsyāb's magnificence said that a group of the Ḥiṣārī people like Muḥammad Amīn Bēg, Fāzil Bēg, 'Ālim Bēg Shahr Sabzī and others belong to the chiefs who committed acts of negligence with respect to serving us.”<sup>553</sup>

In addition to the removal of refractory Uzbek chiefs as requested by his Uzbek followers, Nādir Shāh recruited five to six thousand warriors from the Yūz and the Ming tribes near Samarqand.<sup>554</sup>

The Manghit profited in several ways from their association with the Iranians. First, they enhanced their own position and prestige vis-à-vis the Bukharan court and other Uzbek tribes by attaching themselves to Nādir. In return for his loyalty and service, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī was confirmed as commander-in-chief (*ṣāhib-i ikhtiyār-i kull*) of Turkistan.<sup>555</sup> After all, he and his son had managed to save the Transoxanian capital from sharing the fate of Delhi. Qāzī Wafā several times mentions that the Iranian troops watched over the safety and the hopes of the inhabitants and travelers, and that they guaranteed the tranquility of the entire population. Even in 1747, when a huge army of Iranian and Uzbek soldiers as numerous as the stars encamped before Bukhara, the subjects were spared from looting.<sup>556</sup> And second,

---

Testament, and proverbial for the public display of his wealth (D. B. MacDonald, “Kārūn,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., IV, 673).

<sup>552</sup> Holzwarth, “Relations,” 204.

<sup>553</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 799, 802. See also Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 346. The Bukharan sources do not confirm any such step.

<sup>554</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 819–20. According to Muḥammad Amīn, Nādir demanded *naukars* from the urban population and the nomads (*il wa bāy*). Finally, the city of Bukhara and the *tūmānāt* furnished one thousand *naukars* (Mūhammad Amīn, *Maẓhar*, fol. 70b).

<sup>555</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Maẓhar*, fol. 70a.

<sup>556</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 47a, 110.

similar to the Abdālī Afghans of Herat, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his followers became acquainted with the wider region and gained more cosmopolitan experience.<sup>557</sup>

#### THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE IRANIAN PRESENCE

Apart from facilitating the rise of a new elite whose radius and scope of action was greatly enlarged, the Iranian presence had a range of other results despite its ephemeral character. The *Tuḥfat al-khānī* in particular furnishes a fine grid of data on subsequent events. Yet the following story, which is not verified by other sources,<sup>558</sup> may have been construed by Qāzī Wafā, who often took a pro-Manghit position in trying to legitimize the actions of his masters. According to him, before the advance of the Qizilbāsh army, the conflict between the court faction, presumably the *ahl-i maḥramīya*, and the Manghit flared up once again. The courtiers of Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān and other Uzbek *amīrs* suspected the motives of the Manghit *atālīq*, who had suggested surrendering to Nādir Shāh. As they knew about his son having attached himself to the invaders, they predicted that with Iranian assistance the Manghit would eventually prevail in the local power struggle.<sup>559</sup> They therefore opted for a further plot against Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī before it was too late for action. But since the destiny of Farhād Bī and Khwāja Qulī Bī was a warning to him, the *atālīq* foresaw such an intrigue and refused to come to the palace on the orders of the courtiers. Instead, he prepared himself for the conflict by fortifying the *madrassa* Mīr-i 'Arab, where he accommodated his followers and his property. The servants of the king now feigned to give up their resistance but—according to Qāzī Wafā—they still

<sup>557</sup> For the example of the Abdālī leadership enjoying Nādir Shāh's support, see Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 89–93.

<sup>558</sup> The other Bukharan chronicles and even Mullā Sharīf, who largely followed Qāzī Wafā's text, remain silent and just explain that the monarch and his followers were content with the decision to surrender to the Iranians. Only Kāzīm concurs that the advisers of the king disagreed with Muḥammad Ḥakīm's suggestion to give up and that they planned to kill him (Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 789).

<sup>559</sup> According to Qāzī Wafā, the jealousy of the king's slaves was provoked by the success of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī in obtaining Nādir's promise with regard to the security of the capital, especially when they saw that, thanks to his negotiation skills, the urban population was full of praise for him (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 39b–40a). In Muhammad Amīn's opinion, it was several *amīrs* and also the low people in the king's entourage who opted for resistance against Nādir Shāh (Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḏhar*, fols. 65b, 68b).

wanted to do away with their adversary.<sup>560</sup> Their plans, however, were finally thwarted when Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī gave the order to open fire on Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān's entourage when they left the palace to meet Nādir Shāh.<sup>561</sup> This story is also confirmed by Ḥakīm Bī's chronicler, who claims to have witnessed these events. The fact that the entire army and the *maḥramīya* afterward bowed to the Manghit leader further documents the political dynamics following the end of this episode.<sup>562</sup>

As reported by the chroniclers, before he moved on to Bukhara, Nādir took Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, who had already joined his camp, into his service.<sup>563</sup> Prior to his departure from Transoxania, Nādir also appointed Dānyāl Bī, the paternal uncle of his new protégé, as governor of Karmīna, the Bukharan frontier post and gateway to the Miyānkāl.<sup>564</sup> This appointment became a bone of contention between the Manghit and the Yetī Ūrūgh. Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān was apparently not as weak-willed as portrayed by many contemporary writers. Since he and his favorites saw themselves increasingly surrounded by the Manghit *amīrs*, they endeavored to limit the latter's influence. Employing a tried and tested strategy, Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and his confidants skillfully fostered the rivalry between the Manghit and the Miyānkālī *amīrs*.<sup>565</sup> In effect, both sides were played off against each other, and the cycle of conflict focusing on the possession of Karmīna, a pattern well known from the past, repeated itself. Particularly the Yetī Ūrūgh considered Karmīna to be their home and struggled to expel the new governor. From 1741 until Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī's death in 1744, the town was besieged several times by Bukharan and Miyānkālī troops. The *atālīq* does not seem to have been very determined to oust his brother from Karmīna, so eventually a precarious stalemate emerged. In consequence, the Manghit maintained the favorable position they had gained during the

<sup>560</sup> In Qāzī Wafā's eyes, the courtiers wanted to kill Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī before arriving at the Iranian camp in order to organize a counter offensive and announce a holy war against the infidel Qizilbash (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 41a).

<sup>561</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 41a–b; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 69a; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 3b.

<sup>562</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 69b.

<sup>563</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 36a–b; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 66a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 262b–263b; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 46 (French text, 99).

<sup>564</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 322a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 298a.

<sup>565</sup> Qāzī Wafā lists here the Yetī Ūrūgh, the Burqūt and the Khitā'ī-Qipchāq as opponents of Dānyāl Bī (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 322a).

Nadirid conquest.<sup>566</sup> But this position proved to be temporary; with Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī's death in 1157/1744, the pendulum of power swung back to the royal court. The leadership of the Manghit passed to his second son, Yūqāshī Bī, while Dānyāl Bī was forced to give up his claims to Karmīna and retreated to Qarshī.<sup>567</sup>

In 1157–58/1740–41, alarming messages of a rebellion in Tirmidh reached the court at Mashhad, whereupon Nādir Shāh dispatched his troops to subjugate the rebellious Qungrāt and their chief, Dānyāl Bēg.<sup>568</sup> However, it seems that already at this time the Iranian authorities in the region lacked sufficient resources, in particular food supplies, to provide for their troops. Hence the rebellion, as it is called in Kāzīm's work, was a good pretext to engage in plundering campaigns. After crossing the Oxus from Kilif, the Iranian troops were allowed to raid the adjacent region on their quest for spoils. Subsequently, they entered the Qungrāt areas, and although Dānyāl Bēg quickly surrendered, it was agreed that those sections of the tribe who had engaged in the rebellion should be punished. The following campaign took place with the conscious approval of Dānyāl Bēg, who was much more inclined to make up for his previous insubordination than to intercede on behalf of his tribesmen. Only when the punishment had been carried out was a meeting with local leaders (*sarkardagān-i nawāḥī*) arranged.<sup>569</sup>

A second tendency made itself felt at that time: local actors enlisted the help of the Iranian court to do away with their adversaries at the local level. Many actors on the fringes of the Bukharan sphere of influence had a good knowledge of the political landscape and how to tap the sources of power showing the greatest promise of success when deployed for one's own ends. For instance, in 1745 Muḥammad Amīn Bēg (Bī), the governor of Ḥiṣār,<sup>570</sup> and his ally Niyāz Bēg of Kulāb petitioned the Iranian court for help against

<sup>566</sup> Ibid., fols. 322a–323a.

<sup>567</sup> Ibid., fols. 51b–52b, 323b–324a. According to Wafā, Dānyāl Bī retired to the village of Khwāja Qarluq (ibid., fol. 319a). In the nineteenth century, this place belonged to the *amlāk-i diha-yi Miyanā* (see Muhammadzhanov, *Naseleennie Punkty*, 140/f. 102, 109).

<sup>568</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 827.

<sup>569</sup> According to Kāzīm, Dānyāl Bēg Qungrāt later regretted his inattentiveness (Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 829–30).

<sup>570</sup> In the *Ālamārā*, Muḥammad Amīn Bī bears the title of *bēg* like many other members of the Uzbek tribal elite. But in Bukharan accounts he figures as *bī*. This title usually designates a high-ranking Uzbek chieftain, an *amīr* in command of a large tribal following.

their common enemy Sarimsāq Bēg, who was reported to have allied with the mob of Qungrāt and Kḥiṭā'ī tribesmen. Mahdī Khān, the garrison commander, and Gadāy Khān, the new governor of Balkh, were accordingly entrusted with a punitive campaign against the rebels of Ḥiṣār. When they arrived there, they were welcomed by Muḥammad Amīn Bēg (Bī?) and Niyāz Bēg, the governors of Ḥiṣār and Kulāb. Subsequently, Sarimsāq Bēg bowed to the demands and orders of the Iranian officials and offered the usual gifts after receiving unequivocal warnings should he continue his rebellion.<sup>571</sup>

From this episode it becomes obvious that Muḥammad Amīn Bēg and Niyāz Bēg knew very well whom to approach first in order to attain the desired outcome. It was neither the ruler of Bukhara, nor one of the Uzbek strongmen, nor the newly appointed governor of Balkh. Sparing no trouble, both *amīrs* turned first to the strongest man and circumvented the other intermediate actors in the existing hierarchy.

### *The Early Career of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī*

Not very much is known about the life of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī prior to the Nadirid conquest. Even his chronicler, Qāzī Muḥammad Wafā, furnishes very little information with regard to his early career. Muḥammad Raḥīm b. Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Atālīq Manghit was born in 1127/1715, probably in the town of Chirāghchī, at that time the headquarters of the Manghit tribe. If we give credence to the *Tuḥat al-khānī*, he received a very short education in writing and reading. In his childhood emphasis was placed on the acquisition of religious knowledge (*kalām-i rabbānī*).<sup>572</sup> With the end of his formal education at the age of ten, Muḥammad Raḥīm dedicated himself to learning military skills. He spent much of his time in the company of Manghit warriors and began to build up a small group of followers. Having received the necessary training, he soon took on responsibility for military affairs.<sup>573</sup> His early career coincided with his father's efforts to restore the economic

<sup>571</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, III, 1095–96.

<sup>572</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 20b. According to Mullā Sharīf, Muḥammad Raḥīm was educated in religious science, in the perfection of etiquette and human virtues. He was able to recite the Koran as well as prose and poetry. His education comprised the transcription of poems, lessons in calligraphy and mathematics (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 209b–210a). On the education of *amīrs* see McChesney, "Amirs," 46–49.

<sup>573</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 20b–21a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 210a–b.

prosperity of Bukhara after the end of the Qazāq raids in the 1720s. Since Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī fell into disgrace with the court around 1730, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī must have been living in Nasaf for some time. As I have already described, entering the service of Nādir Shāh in 1740 marked a turning point in Muḥammad Raḥīm's career and set the stage for his rise.<sup>574</sup>

When Nādir left Transoxania in late 1740, he put his Uzbek contingents under the command of the young *amīr*.<sup>575</sup> Between 1741 and 1746, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī was involved in a number of Nādir's expeditions. In 1741–42, he rendered military assistance during a punitive expedition against the Lazgīs in the Caucasus. Nādir's efforts to subjugate the Lazgīs were met with fierce resistance in difficult mountainous terrain. Kāzīm transports the reader to the remote mountains of the Caucasus and even devotes a separate chapter to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's successful siege of the mountain fortress of Dībak, located in a thickly wooded area. As victor of Dībak, he became the subject of royal favors and a confidant of Nādir Shāh.<sup>576</sup> His father's chronicler even states that after the success at Dībak, he was granted the title of *khān*.<sup>577</sup> According to Qāzī Wafā, Nādir Shāh officially granted the Manghit *amīr* the *khān* title in 1747. On this occasion, he announced the deposal of Abū'l-Faiḥ Khān in front of the Transoxanian nobility.<sup>578</sup>

In summer 1743 he accompanied Nādir Shāh on his campaign against the Ottomans in Iraq. During the battle of Mosul in September 1743, Muḥammad Raḥīm and his Uzbek soldiers were serving on the left wing of the Iranian army.<sup>579</sup> Apart from having had the opportunity to improve his skills as an experienced commander, Qāzī Wafā ascribes even a certain paternal aspect to Nādir Shāh's patronage of the young *amīr*. For instance, it

<sup>574</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 71b.

<sup>575</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 45a; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, 70b; Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 800; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 46 (French text, 101).

<sup>576</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 841–50; 856–62; Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, 71a, 75a.

<sup>577</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 71a. This appointment is only confirmed by Ya'qūb (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 4b). In Kāzīm's work, Muḥammad Raḥīm bears the *khān* title after his appointment as commander of the Uzbek contingent in Nādir Shāh's army (Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 822). 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī similarly calls him Muḥammad Rāḥīm Bēg and attaches the *khān* title after the appointment (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 46 (French text, 99, 101)).

<sup>578</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 96a–97a.

<sup>579</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 49a.

was Nādir who informed Muḥammad Raḥīm of his father's death. He consoled him in those sensitive moments and "raised the rank of his education and beneficence by supporting him with royal promises."<sup>580</sup> The next turn in Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's career was his mission to Mā Warā' al-Nahr in 1745–47. Nādir Shāh instructed his Uzbek commander to put down a number of local rebellions that occurred after the death of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī in 1744. These events will be explored in the next sections.

*'Ibādullah Khiṭā'ī and the Rebellion in Miyānkāl*

As Qāzī Wafā notes, the death of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī in 1744 or 1745 caused political instability and friction in the form of local and regional revolts. In Shahr-i Sabz, for instance, "Qābil Kīnakās hoisted the banner of arrogance and rebellion and stretched out the hands of bravery to loot the livestock of that area."<sup>581</sup>

Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī's death brought about important changes. Firstly, it loosened the ties between Mashhad and Bukhara for a short time. Secondly, it left Transoxania without an effective government. Particularly the absence of a strong man at the top of the administrative hierarchy had immediate results in the form of rebellions, which Wafā attributes to the inattentiveness of Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān.<sup>582</sup> In the absence of any effective protector, the sources report a general state of unrest in Miyānkāl. In the *Tuḥfat al-khānī*, the action taken by 'Ibādullah and his following, consisting of roughly six thousand families,<sup>583</sup> is depicted as follows:

"Spurring the horse of malice in the center of Miyānkāl, 'Ibādullah Khiṭā'ī brought the poor and lowborn subjects under the hoofs of the mounts and beasts of burden to the abyss, and exposed them to attacks of the dust and the fist of dirt. Since there was nobody

<sup>580</sup> Ibid., fol. 53a. For the paternal dimension of Nādir's patronage, see also von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 242–43; and further the next chapter of this study. This paternal aspect is once again reminiscent of Nādir Shāh's relationship with the future Aḥmad Shāh Durrānī (Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 101, footnote no. 1).

<sup>581</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 55b.

<sup>582</sup> The author of the *Tuḥfat* often described the course of events from a pro-Manghit perspective. According to him, the pendulum of authority swung back to the confidants of the Tuqay-Timurid king who took over the government, a step that is strongly criticized by Qāzī Wafā. Referring to their formal status as slaves, he holds them responsible for the disorder following the death of the *atālīq* (see next section).

<sup>583</sup> Kāzim, *Ālamārā*, III, 1110.

in his following to oversee his [and his herds'] environs, he passed his limits and overstepped the boundaries of Bukhara with the foot of sturdiness. He picked up the reins of disobedience and capture in the time of spring, the season of pleasure and prosperity—during the days of abundance of joy and bliss—when the meadows were full of flowers and odoriferous herbs.”<sup>584</sup>

Here the author emphasizes the signs of devastation caused by the herds of the Khiṭāʿī nomads passing through the arable areas of Miyānkāl and the havoc wreaked on orchards and fields of the sedentary population. The account suggests that the Khiṭāʿī campaign followed patterns of horizontal nomadic migration. Setting out in spring, the beginning of the growth cycle, the Khiṭāʿī nomads were in search of pastures and traversed the Miyānkāl along the major branches of the Zarafshān. At New Year 1159/1746,<sup>585</sup> the Khiṭāʿī pillaged the shrine of Khwāja Bahāʿ al-Dīn Naqshband and abducted numerous pilgrims who had come to celebrate *nau rūz*.<sup>586</sup> Kāzim says that ʿIbādullah Khiṭāʿī belonged to the followers of the king of Turan (*az chākarān-i pādishāh-i Tūrān būd*). In his eyes, the Khiṭāʿī disapproved of the connection with the Chingizid dynasty and turned away from it because of their deficient descent and character.<sup>587</sup> Yaʿqūb reports that subsequent to these events, Abūʿl-Faiẓ Khān bestowed the office of *dīwānbēgī* on ʿIbādullah,<sup>588</sup> but this is not confirmed by other sources. According to Qāzī Wafā, the situation in the center of Miyānkāl escalated further. When the Khiṭāʿī were on their way eastwards, five thousand Yetī Ūrūgh (Baḥrīn) and

<sup>584</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 55b.

<sup>585</sup> Qāzī Wafā (*Tuḥfat*, fol. 56a) dates this event to a Wednesday (shortly after *nau rūz*) in 1158/1745, but the dates given for the following events in Miyānkāl might be incorrect. According to the author, a battle between the Khiṭāʿī on the one hand and the Yetī Ūrūgh and Burqūt on the other took place on Sunday, Rabīʿ II 5, 1158. But that day was either Thursday, May 6, or Friday, May 7, 1745, and does not correspond to *nau rūz*. This would imply that the Khiṭāʿī remained more than one month in the environs of the capital. But if the Khiṭāʿī sacked the capital on Wednesday or Thursday, Rabīʿ I 1, 1159/March 23–24, 1746, which appears more likely, ʿIbādullah and his tribesmen retired to Miyānkāl two or three days later. Then the battle between the Khiṭāʿī and their enemies would have taken place on Sunday, Rabīʿ I 5, 1159/March 27, 1746. Ivanov and Holzwarth also give the year 1746 as the date for the Khiṭāʿī attack (Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 74; Ivanov, *Vosstanie*, 8; Holzwarth, “Relations,” 203). Bregel dates these events to the year 1745 (Bregel, “Central Asia,” 195).

<sup>586</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 56a. See also Kāzim, *ʿĀlamārā*, III, 1102; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 50 (French text, 107–09); Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 74; Ivanov, *Vosstanie*, 8.

<sup>587</sup> Kāzim, *ʿĀlamārā*, III, 1102.

<sup>588</sup> Yaʿqūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 4b.

Burqūt fighters led by Ghaibullah Bī Baḥrīn and Tughāy Murād Bī met ‘Ibādullah in a violent encounter at the end of March 1746. After suffering a serious defeat, the Khiṭā’ī were heavily looted and forced to retreat to their easternmost possessions.<sup>589</sup> The conflict between the Baḥrīn and Burqūt on the one side and the Khiṭā’ī on the other was not only triggered by the desire of the former to rob the latter. The attack by the Yetī Ūrūgh and their allies took place when the Khiṭā’ī stopped at the spring of Shūr Bulāq, whence rumors of their plundering raids (*tākht wa tārāj*) spread to the surrounding area. The following clashes between Miyānkālī tribes and the Khiṭā’ī occurred in the nearby Ūrta Plain.<sup>590</sup>

According to the *‘Ālamārā*, the Khiṭā’ī leader had first gathered twelve thousand Uzbek warriors (*az jamā‘at-i Ūzbek*) and devastated the environs of Bukhara and Qarshī. Shortly thereafter Yūqāshī Bī b. Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī<sup>591</sup> led an unsuccessful campaign of fifteen thousand Manghit troops against twelve thousand Khiṭā’ī warriors near Samarqand. After several setbacks, the ruler again dispatched Uzbek and Turkmen contingents led by Amīn Khwāja Naqīb to launch a battle against ‘Ibādullah at Khaṭarchī in the center of Miyānkāl, but these measures and an attempt by local elders (*kadkhudāyān*) to bring about an agreement were of no avail.<sup>592</sup> When messages about the situation in Transoxania reached the Iranian court, Nādir Shāh appointed Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī as *atālīq*<sup>593</sup> and governor of Turkistan (*ṣāhib-i ikhtiyār-i mamlakat-i Turkistān*) and entrusted him with a delicate mission to Bukhara.<sup>594</sup>

<sup>589</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 57a–b.

<sup>590</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 57a.

<sup>591</sup> Here misleadingly spelled Dayūmāshadī/Dayūmāshdī Bī (Kāzīm, *‘Ālamārā*, III, 1101).

<sup>592</sup> *Ibid.*, 1101–02.

<sup>593</sup> In Kāzīm’s account, the Manghit *amīr* still figures as Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān (*ibid.*, 1102).

<sup>594</sup> *Ibid.*; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 84a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 298b. Early nineteenth-century accounts give varying numbers of Iranian troops dispatched by Nādir Shāh. While Ya‘qūb refers to twenty thousand soldiers, Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm mentions ten thousand soldiers acting under the command of Bihbūd Khān and his colleagues (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 5a; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 50 (French text, 108). According to Kāzīm, the army dispatched by Nādir Shāh consisted of the following contingents and their commanders: four thousand Sarakhsī and Marwī soldiers as well as two thousand Tabrīzī troops commanded by Shāh Qulī Khān Bēglərbēgī, the governor of Sarakhs, one thousand seven hundred troops of Nisā’ī, Darūnī (Durrānī?) and Ottoman origin and four thousand additional troops transferred from Kabul under the command of Ḥasan Khān Bayāt. The Marwī contingents

Upon the arrival of the Iranian troops together with their artillery at Bukhara, ‘Ibādullah Khiṭā’ī and his tribesmen withdrew to Samarqand, while Tughāy Murād Bī, an influential Miyānkālī *amīr*, joined the Iranian troops. When other rebellious *amīrs* like ‘Ibādullah Qiyāt also bowed to Iranian supremacy, the Khiṭā’ī leader left Samarqand and retired to his fortress Yangī Qūrghān.<sup>595</sup> Further Iranian reinforcements arrived in winter 1746–47.<sup>596</sup> In spite of the urgency of the campaign against ‘Ibādullah Khiṭā’ī, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his Iranian colleagues did not leave Bukhara until spring 1160/1747.<sup>597</sup> In the meantime, the new *atālīq*, who was taking care of the affairs of the government, and the courtiers of the Tuqay-Timurid king watched each other with utmost suspicion. In this situation, disturbing news came that the Khoqandian ruler ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī had attacked ‘Ibādullah’s seat of power. Shortly thereafter, messengers arrived from Khoqand. Offering active military assistance in the conflict with the Khiṭā’ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī suggested taking action in the name of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān to subjugate the rebels.<sup>598</sup>

In view of the situation, the court faction, presumably the *ahl-i mahram*, advised the king to accept the offer in order to reduce Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s influence and ward off his Iranian allies. Thus they wanted to use the power of another tribal force to counterbalance the Manghit *amīr* and his Iranian supporters. But Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī kept an eye on the courtiers

---

transported fifty-two cannons and artillery shells (*tūp wa khumbāra*) and six thousand cannonballs (*gulūla*) (Kāzim, ‘*Ālamārā*, III, 1102–03).

<sup>595</sup> Yangī Qūrghān was located a four-hour ride southwest of Jizakh (Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 328).

<sup>596</sup> Kāzim, ‘*Ālamārā*, III, 1102, 1104; Ivanov, *Vosstanie*, 9.

<sup>597</sup> Qāzī Wafā does not give a precise date for these events. In his view, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī returned to Bukhara in the year 1158/1745–46 (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 59b). But it took a long time to prepare the campaign against ‘Ibādullah Khiṭā’ī. As Kāzim sees it, the punitive campaign against the Khiṭā’ī leader did not start until the arrival of Bihbūd Khān and further reinforcements (Kāzim, ‘*Ālamārā*, III, 1103).

<sup>598</sup> This episode shows the vital interest of the Khoqandian ruler in taking possession of Samarqand and the surrounding tracts of land. Qāzī Wafā argues that ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī fell out with the Khiṭā’ī *amīr* and that there was no other amirid force in that area but him, so he “beat the drum of authority” (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 64a). ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī was the son of the first Mīng ruler of Ferghana, Shāh Rukh Bī (Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 400–01). His policy seems to have been a resumption of the ambitious enterprise of his brother Raḥīm Khān (Bī) Mīng, who invaded Samarqand and the eastern part of Miyānkāl about fifteen years earlier (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 4–5).

while the stay of the Uzbek and Iranian contingents in Bukhara lingered on and the envisaged campaign against the rebels was suspended. In the end, ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī lifted the siege and retreated to Khoqand.<sup>599</sup> Subsequently, the intimates of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān, trying to get rid of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, sent a number of messages to Mashhad to discredit him. But since Nādir Shāh trusted his protégé, he ignored the petitions from Bukhara. Moreover, the desperate attempts of the courtiers to bring their enemy into disrepute had the opposite effect, because the Iranian king sent additional contingents under the command of Biḥbūd Khān Chāpushlū.<sup>600</sup> According to Kāzim, with the subsequent appointment of the latter as commander-in-chief of Turkistan (*sardār-i kull-i mamlakat-i Turkistān*), a dual leadership was installed to administer Transoxania and to put an end to local unrest and prepare an expedition to China and Khotan.<sup>601</sup>

The reinforcement arriving from Iran turned out to be to the detriment of the *ahl-i mahram* as it triggered a “bandwagon effect” hastening the consolidation of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s authority as *atāliq*.<sup>602</sup> Yet before he could move on against the Khiṭā’ī, he was summoned to Iran by order of Nādir Shāh and, according to the *Tuḥfat*, entrusted the Iranian contingents (*qushūnāt*) to Biḥbūd Khān and his Iranian fellow commanders. Command over the Uzbek army (*sipāh-i Uzbek wa lashkar-i Tūrān*) was ceded to his

<sup>599</sup> Here the account shows slight inconsistencies. ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī obviously awaited an answer from Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān and hoped for Bukharan reinforcement as a sign of the new alliance. He retired to Ferghana when consultations regarding joint action were delayed. Wafā is of the opinion that the Khoqandian ruler died shortly thereafter (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 66a–b), but according to the *Tārīkh-i shāhrukhī*, ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī died in 1750/51 (Beisembiev, *Ta’rikh*, 12).

<sup>600</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 70a–b. The *Tuḥfat al-khānī* informs about a first mission of the senior eunuch, Khwāja Ulfat, who was sent to Mashhad in order to report on the state of Bukharan affairs (ibid., fols. 58b–59a; see also Ivanov, *Vosstanie*, 8).

<sup>601</sup> The envisaged expedition to China is only mentioned by Kāzim. According to him, Biḥbūd Khān and his Iranian fellow commanders had to kill two birds with one stone by punishing the Khiṭā’ī leader and making arrangements for the China campaign (Kāzim, *Ālamārā*, III, 1095, 1103). The Bukharan sources do not allude to any aim to conquer China and attribute the transfer of the Iranian troops solely to the Khiṭā’ī revolt (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 59b, 68b–70b; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 50 (French text, 108–09); Ya’qūb *Tārīkh*, fol. 5a. See also Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 74).

<sup>602</sup> Numerous Uzbek chiefs like ‘Ālim Bī Kīnakās, Ghaibullah Bī Baḥrīn, Jahāngīr Bī Sarāy and Tughāy Murād Bī Burqūt closed ranks behind the Manghit leader (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 71a–b).

brothers Yūqāshī Bī and Barāt Qūshbēgī.<sup>603</sup> The following campaign conducted in spring 1747 led to the defeat of 'Ibādullah Khiṭā'ī and his flight across the Sir Daryā. He eventually escaped to Tashkent together with a few followers.<sup>604</sup>

### *The Kīnakās Revolt in Shahr-i Sabz*

The following section is devoted to the developments in Shahr-i Sabz in the mid-1740s. Unfortunately, the sources give little information about local circumstances. Apart from Kāzīm's *'Ālamārā*, which provides a brief overview of the situation in Shahr-i Sabz, most of the narratives are concerned with the joint campaign of Iranian and Uzbek forces against a certain Qābil (Bēg) Kīnakās.<sup>605</sup> This campaign took place before the decisive battle between the Qizilbāsh and Bukharan contingents on the one side and the Khiṭā'ī on the other. Kāzīm describes the situation in Shahr-i Sabz in the 1740s as follows:

“These days [1159/1746] the actual city of Shahr-i Sabz [is ruined] because of quarrels and occurrences that happened when in 1135 [1722–23] the tribes of the Qazāq and the Qalmāq rose to predominance in the region of Mā Warā' al-Nahr, occupied some of its dependencies and besieged the fortified city of Bukhara for seven years. [...] Thereafter,

<sup>603</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 82b–84a. The impressive list of power brokers and representatives accompanying Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī reads like a who's who of Transoxania: Muḥammad Amīn Bī Yūz (Hiṣār), 'Ālim Bī (Shahr-i Sabz), Ya'qūb Bī (Qabādiyān), Jahāngīr Bī (Khuzār), Ghaibullah Bī (Miyānkāl), Tughāy Murād Bī Burqūt (Nūr), the Qungrāt *amīrs* (Bāysūn), Khwāja Ulfat Sarāyi (favorites of Abū'l-Faiz Khān). We also encounter the following members of the religious establishment: Īshān 'Abdullah Khwāja Sheikh al-Islām, Īshān Hādī Khwāja (*ustād al-'ulamā'*), Muḥammad Laṭīf Khwāja Naqīb, Muḥammad Ṣadīq Khwāja Naqshbandī, Muḥammad Ṣalāh Atālīq (?), Muḥammad Amīn Khwāja Naqīb (Chahār Jūy) and other religious nobles (*ibid.*, fols. 84a–b).

<sup>604</sup> The Khiṭā'ī *amīr* had first withdrawn to Jizakh, where he forced the local governor, 'Umar Khwāja, to give him his sister as a wife, but when he learned about the approaching Qizilbāsh, he crossed the Sir Daryā and escaped to Tashkent (Kāzīm, *'Ālamārā*, III, 1105, 1109). The Bukharan sources only report about a combat between the Iranian forces and the Khiṭā'ī and the subsequent flight of 'Ibādullah (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 85a–86b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 302b–303a; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 50 (French text, 108–09)). According to the *Tuhfat*, 'Ibādullah was finally killed at the hands of Bahādur Bēg, the governor of Tashkent. His head was sent to Bukhara on Jumada I 30, 1159/19–20 June, 1746 (?) (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 87a–b).

<sup>605</sup> See Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 77b–81a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 300b–301a.

due to famine and scarcity, the inhabitants of the noble city of Bukhara dispersed in search of help and means of livelihood; one group of these tribes escaped and spread to the regions of Khurāsān, Ūganch and Astarābād. Since that time until now, the city of Shahr-i Sabz has lain in ruins and its inhabitants stayed away from it. But after the withdrawal of the aforementioned groups, the people came down from the mountains and out of the caves to repopulate the dependencies and *qal'as* of [this area] [...].<sup>606</sup>

Kāzim's account is brief but informative. If we give credence to these descriptions, several Kīnakās clans had occupied their own pockets and settlements in Shahr-i Sabz. For instance, Ibrāhīm Bī's son 'Ālim Bī resided in the town of Sang Furūsh, while other family members had taken possession of other forts. According to Beisembiev, 'Ālim Bī, who is called a benefactor (*walī-ni mī*), in 1142/1729 or 1145–46/1732–33, took over as the new leader of the Kīnakās and independent ruler of Shahr-i Sabz.<sup>607</sup> Besides, the town of Yakka Bāgh and its environs were held by Qābil Bēg, who belonged to the Chirkas sub-division (*urūgh-i Chirkas*) of the Kīnakās.<sup>608</sup> The two *amīrs* seem to have cultivated a long-lasting enmity leading to a precarious balance of power. To overcome this equilibrium, Qābil Bēg forged a marriage alliance with a certain Shaikhnaq Bahādur, who was in charge of one of the smaller *qal'as* in the vicinity of Yakka Bāgh.<sup>609</sup> This step was seemingly motivated by “additional bravery and union”, enhancing Qābil Bēg's position in the struggle for local authority and leadership.<sup>610</sup> When 'Ālim Bī attempted to establish marital ties on his part with Shaikhnaq Bahādur, Qābil Bēg attacked the Bahādur, put him to death and looted his estates. A short time later we find him engaged in raiding the vicinity of Sang Furūsh, which was besieged and cut off from its environs. Now 'Ālim Bī turned to the Iranian troops for help, or, depending on the

<sup>606</sup> Kāzim, *Ālamārā*, III, 1105. My translation slightly differs from that of Wolfgang Holzwarth (see “Relations,” 205, footnote no. 137).

<sup>607</sup> Beisembiev, *Ta'rikh*, 152. See also Eckart Schiewek, “À propos des exilés de Boukhara et de Kokand à Shahr-i Sabz,” in *Boukhara la Noble*, ed. Maria Szuppe (Tashkent/Aix-en-Provence: IFEAC/CNRS, 1998), 182.

<sup>608</sup> Kāzim, *Ālamārā*, III, 1105. According to Wafā, around 1182/1768 Yakka Bāgh was predominantly inhabited by the Abāqlī branch of the Kīnakās (see Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 368a–b).

<sup>609</sup> Muḥammad Amīn also mentions a certain Shaghnaq Bahādur, a paternal cousin of Ḥakīm Bī Manghit, who, on the occasion of the Qizilbāsh attack in Qarshī in 1737, arrived from Shahr-i Sabz and rendered useful assistance to the Uzbek defenders (Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḥzar*, fol. 52b).

<sup>610</sup> Kāzim, *Ālamārā*, III, 1105.

version of these events, to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his followers, who were crushing the revolt of the Khiṭā'ī in Miḡānkāl.<sup>611</sup> On their way to Shahr-i Sabz, the Qizilbāsh commanders Bihbūd Khān and Shāh Qulī Bēg were accompanied by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī.<sup>612</sup> Kāzīm describes the following expedition by emphasizing the role of Bihbūd Khān, who is depicted as the leading commander and hero of the campaign. From the Bukharan vantage point, Wafā ascribes a pivotal role to his patron, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, in smashing the revolt. Apart from the differing evaluations, both authors portray the mission and its outcome in similar ways. Confronted with the advancing troops and the defeat of his ally 'Ibādullah Khiṭā'ī, Qābil Bēg soon pulled out from Yakka Bāgh and took refuge in the nearby mountain valley of Yasā Kūh (?). His bastion fell prey to the plundering raids of the pursuers. Afterward, Qābil Bēg found himself besieged in the defile of Yasā Kūh and finally gave up his resistance in Rabī' I 1160/March–April 1747. Our sources report that subsequently Shahr-i Sabz was transferred to Ālim Bī.<sup>613</sup>

After concluding this campaign, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and Shāh Qulī Bēg, the governor of Marw, received the order to return to Mashhad in company with other Bukharan *amīrs*, provincial governors and nobles.<sup>614</sup> This decision by Nadir Shāh was based on the state of unrest in his empire and the fact that he relied to a great extent on Uzbek, Afghan and local Marwī auxiliary troops to put local rebellions down.<sup>615</sup>

With respect to the status and role of Bukhara as a Nadirid protectorate during the years 1746–47, the chroniclers view the events and roles of the actors through opposite lenses. The Iranian author Muḥammad Kāzīm underlines the role of Bihbūd Khān as commander-in-chief (*ṣāhib-i ikhtiyār*;

<sup>611</sup> Ibid., 1102–06; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḡfat*, fols. 71a–b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 299a–300b.

<sup>612</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, III, 1102; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḡfat*, fol. 77a.

<sup>613</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, III, 1006–08; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḡfat*, fols. 77a–81a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 300b–301a. On his return to Mashhad, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī took Qābil Bēg as a prisoner with him and put him to death (Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, III, 1116–17; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḡfat*, fols 91a–91b).

<sup>614</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, III, 1108, 1115, 1120; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḡfat*, fols. 83a–b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 301b. Some early nineteenth-century Bukharan sources pass over Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's return to Mashhad. These works only say that he joined the Qizilbāsh later and learned about Nādir Shāh's death while stopping in Sarakhs (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 5a; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 50 (French text, 111).

<sup>615</sup> Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 50 (French text, 109–10); Avery, "Nādir Shāh," 51.

*sardār-i buzurġ*) of Turkistan and portrays Muḥammad Raḥīm as a minor character who only gained prominence after Nādir Shāh's death. His Bukharan contemporary Qāzī Wafā highlights the performance of Muḥammad Raḥīm and grants him a major role. Although Bukharan affairs were jointly managed by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and the Iranian commander Biḥbūd Khān, there is little doubt that real authority rested with the latter. Before Nādir's death in 1747, Biḥbūd Khān's troops moved around and established control in those areas inhabited by disobedient Uzbek tribes. Enjoying a great deal of power, Biḥbūd Khān had the freedom to conduct his own political affairs. He entered into a marriage alliance with the Khwājas of Jizakh after putting down the rebellion by 'Ibādullah Kḥiṭā'ī. He negotiated with local elders, organized resettlement campaigns, issued orders for the recruitment of soldiers and appointed his new brother-in-law 'Umar Khwāja as governor of Jizakh.<sup>616</sup> He ordered the siege of Bukhara after the murder of Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān and negotiated a ceasefire with Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī for the free return of his troops to Iran.<sup>617</sup> Biḥbūd Khān's activities caused a continuation of Nadirid rule in Transoxania for a few months after Nādir's death, at a time when the core of the empire had already collapsed.

#### SUMMARY

Remarkably, the Iranian intervention in Transoxania was greatly facilitated by structural principles inherent in the social order on both sides of the Oxus. The expedition should be seen as a decisive stage in the overall institutionalization process rather than as an end in itself. The subsequent developments were due as much to Nādir Shāh's ambitions regarding a further conquest as to the needs of local elites who were looking for potential protectors and power sources. Finally, we observe an overall change in the prevalent figurations of power mediated through the relationship between the Iranian emperor and the Manghit *amīrs*. The end of the conventional alliances at the amirid level now loomed ever larger on the political horizon. In effect, one local group of people was absorbed into Nādir's network and dragged numerous other actors and smaller factions into the Iranian orbit. As

<sup>616</sup> Kāzim, *Ālamārā*, III, 1111.

<sup>617</sup> *Ibid.*, 1123–26; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 112b–113b, 118b–125b; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 5b–6a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 340a–347a; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 51–52 (French text, 112–14).

a result, the Manghit began to form a new power center and an alternative to the Tuqay-Timurid court.

As Holzwarth puts it, Bukharan authors like Muḥammad Amīn often allude to Nādir's soft or "gentleman's way of conquest" that stood in sharp contrast to the experiences with the Qazāq one decade before. While the Iranians represented order, the Qazāq intruders stood for chaos.<sup>618</sup> This perception can be attributed to two aspects. First, the experiences made by the population and local elites in the past contributed not only to the positive view of the Iranian presence but also to the decision of many *amīrs* to join Nādir Shāh's camp. Second, and perhaps more decisive, after several decades of successive wars and rebellions, Transoxania was in a state of depletion. Being exhausted, both the people and their representatives were unable or even unwilling to resist the invaders.

When looking at the political situation in Mā Warā' al-Nahr, we notice a shift of power toward the Manghit leadership but also a fragmentation of the political landscape. The material resources provided by Nādir Shāh were further redistributed among other actors who managed to consolidate their position vis-à-vis the Bukharan court. Yet the enormous influx of resources resulted in a myriad of conflicts, both between the court and the Manghit and between the court and other Uzbek tribes. Being provided with sufficient means of power, the latter now all the more rose in rebellion. Although Nādir Shāh's authority was of a mere indirect nature—mediated by his Manghit supporters—and far from being complete, it had a lasting impact as it contributed to the continuing erosion of Chingizid-prone worldviews and the rise of a new elite.

The revolts described in the previous two sections broke out when one of the most important connectors between the Iranians and the Uzbeks died. This shows how much peace depended on one particular actor. Once the strongman died, all those who had directly and indirectly benefited from the resources fed in by Nādir Shāh felt strong enough to challenge each other.<sup>619</sup> A similar effect was to be observed at the level of the army. When the important commander and governor of Samarqand, Ādīna Qul Bī, was killed during the battle with the Qizilbāsh in 1737, his soldiers deserted Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān because the link to the ruler had vanished.

<sup>618</sup> Holzwarth, "Relations," 204, 209.

<sup>619</sup> Particularly the author of the *Tāj al-tawārīkh* attributes the state of disorder to the absence of a strong ruler (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 294a).

As the developments in Miyānkāl and Shahr-i Sabz reveal, many local power struggles revolved around the access to important power sources (pastureland, water, marriage alliances) that were regarded as crucial to enhance the position of individual actors. Another example is the resumption of the former court policy: the intimates of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān playing different Uzbek leaders off against one another to regain their former position.

The Iranian conquest and its results exemplify how the *raison d'être* of predominant worldviews is produced. Firstly, the tensions caused all actors to look around for potential allies. Secondly, local conflicts resulting from the conquest and Nādir's measures led to a proliferation of negotiation interfaces to solve the current problems; it was the hour of the middlemen. The Manghit are just one example of this. Finally, the institution of patronage and related practices were constantly reinforced. The resulting developments can be compared with the gradual closing of a chain of intensified patron-client relations and arbitration processes, which required not only additional resources but also an increasing degree of movement between Mashhad and Bukhara. Within a short period of one year, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī was constantly commuting between the two capitals. The fact that every step to improve the relationship between Nādir and his Uzbek protégés *de facto* led to further initiatives to strengthen the bond between the two sides, proves the argument of power emerging out of itself. It was an unintended development that can be compared with somebody bound by a chain to another actor and gradually being drawn closer to the patron by this chain. As an immediate result of this unplanned process, Transoxania was practically drawn into the Iranian orbit. This development coincided with Nādir's plans to conduct a campaign to China.<sup>620</sup>

The case of the *ahl-i mahram* trying to blacken Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's name with Nādir Shāh is a perfect example of the actions and strategies of

---

<sup>620</sup> Kāzīm points out that after the return of the Qizilbāsh to Samarqand, Bihbūd Khān dispatched a contingent of Iranian soldiers to the banks of the Sir Daryā to build a bridge for the planned campaign to China. In the meantime, tribal leaders and whitebeards from Ūra Tippa, Tashkent and Khojand met the Qizilbāsh commander at Samarqand and offered assistance for the next campaign. On this occasion, Bihbūd Khān issued a decree according to which the reading of the Friday prayers and the striking of coins (*sikka wa khuṭba*) was to be conducted once again in Nādir's name. In addition, the Uzbek tribes of the Sir Daryā basin were ordered to furnish forty thousand soldiers for the planned venture (Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, III, 1111).

one group triggering a cascade of opposite effects. Since the petitions of the courtiers gave the Iranian king an impression of general “disorder,” he was now all the more determined to intervene in local affairs. As a result of his sending troops and artillery, all those who had hitherto hesitated joined his protégé.

Another effect can be observed as a direct outcome of the Afsharid conquest: the Transoxanian economy was fed with the spoils acquired during Nādir Shāh’s Indian campaign. As we have seen, the Qizilbāsh also extracted money and other material resources from the rural population. This money (Khwāja ‘Abd al-Karīm mentions gold), which was probably hoarded by the people during the troubled 1720s and 1730s, was then put into circulation. A further impact of the Iranian invasion was a general inflation. The requisition of grain for the Iranian troops and the sheer presence of the latter caused a phenomenal rise in the price of grain and other products, as shown by McChesney.<sup>621</sup> It seems possible that these effects of the Iranian presence also reinforced local worldviews, including the patron-client relations at village level, as the unexpected rise in food prices induced poor people to enlist the help of wealthy members of their communities.

Toward the end of his eventful reign, Nādir Shāh strengthened his relations with the Uzbeks by delivering three hundred thousand rupees to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī.<sup>622</sup> However, the cementation of Nādir’s authority in Transoxania and the preferential treatment of his Uzbek followers fostered the common belief that he used the practice of extortion to enrich himself and his family. In the end, an increasing number of his followers believed that he relied on “alien tribal contingents from outside the pale of the Shī‘a faith: Türkmens from over the border, Afghans and Uzbeks.”<sup>623</sup> Thus the withdrawal of his Iranian troops’ support, trust and loyalty and his growing preference for Afghan and Uzbek contingents were mutually conditioning. This dialectics gave rise to cruelty on Nādir’s part and to suspicion and

---

<sup>621</sup> The price of grain had risen seven hundred times if Kāzīm reckoned in ‘Irāqī *tūmāns*. But if the *tūmān* was simply the currency of Bukharan copper dinars, then the price had increased only five times. Still, this would have been an increase the local economy had not experienced for almost a century (McChesney, *Waqf*, 201–02). But in spite of the rise in prices, Kāzīm enthusiastically mentions the low costs of grain and other products, from which he concludes that the region of Qabādiyān resembled paradise on earth (Kāzīm, ‘*Ālamārā*, III, 1129).

<sup>622</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 94a.

<sup>623</sup> Avery, “Nādir Shāh,” 58.

bitterness on that of his Iranian soldiery.<sup>624</sup> Finally, we see a vicious circle culminating in the assassination of Nādir Shāh. The subsequent events and developments led to the establishment of a new dynasty, the Manghits. The process of power accumulation by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Atālīq, resulting in his coronation in 1756, will be explored in the next sub-chapter.

### THE CREATION OF MUḤAMMAD RAḤĪM KHĀN'S HERRSCHAFTSVERBAND

On the night of Jumādā II 10–11, 1160/June 19–29, 1747, Nādir Shāh was assassinated by a group of Persian, Afshār and Qājār officers in Fathābād.<sup>625</sup> Immediately after his death, his army fell apart as the Qizilbāsh plundered the royal arsenal while many of the contingents in his army deserted and returned to their respective homelands.<sup>626</sup> One of the men setting off for their native areas was Aḥmad Khān Sadūzai, who later claimed Nādir's legacy as Aḥmad Shāh.<sup>627</sup> The other one following in Nādir Shāh's footsteps was Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, who was on his way back to Bukhara when he learned about Nādir Shāh's fate but kept the end of his patron a secret.<sup>628</sup>

The Manghit takeover occurred in the course of a battle against the Qizilbāsh led by Bihbūd Khān and his colleagues. After a siege of approximately two weeks, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī prevailed with the active assistance of Afghan (Ghilzai), Ottoman and Lazgī contingents that deserted the Iranian camp and joined the Bukharans.<sup>629</sup> The Afghan and Ottoman

<sup>624</sup> Ibid., 58–59.

<sup>625</sup> The village of Fathābād is four miles from Quchān on the road to Mashhad (Ludwig W. Adamec, *Historical Gazetteer of Iran* vol. II: *Meshed and Northeastern Iran* (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt Graz-Austria, 1981), 172–73).

<sup>626</sup> Perry, "Nādir Shāh Afshār," 855.

<sup>627</sup> Avery, "Nādir Shāh," 59; Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 101.

<sup>628</sup> See next chapter.

<sup>629</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fol. 125a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 346b; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 52 (French text, 114). See also Bregel, "The new Uzbek states," 395; Holzwarth, "Relations," 203. Ya'qūb writes that the siege was lifted after only ten days (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 6a). According to Effremov, it was not the Qizilbāsh who opposed Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's attempt to seize authority but the leader of the Russian contingents in the service of Abū'l-Faiz Khān. In his version, the Russians were won over to Muḥammad Raḥīm's side after the city elders mediated by promising rewards and the appointment of the Russian commander to the rank of *tūqsāba* (Effremov, *Devjatiletnee*, 39).

soldiers later played an important role as a kind of “foreign legion” in the Bukharan military.<sup>630</sup>

Before the siege began, on Jumāda II 17, 1160/June 25–26, 1747, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān had ordered the assassination of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān, whose son 'Abd al-Mu'min he installed as new *khān*.<sup>631</sup> Mullā Sharīf gives Jumāda II 16, 1160/June 24–25, 1747, as the date of 'Abd al-Mu'min's coronation.<sup>632</sup> After their unsuccessful siege of Bukhara, the Iranian troops retreated from Transoxania. In the following years, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī tirelessly engaged in military enterprises and established his authority in most of Mā Warā' al-Nahr.<sup>633</sup> Based on the consensus of the notables, his coronation in 1756 followed Mongol customs despite one major deviation from established political thought: Similar to Tīmūr, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī lacked Chingizid descent and was, from a genealogical point of view, not entitled to claim the throne. Thus the installation of a puppet *khān* is reminiscent of Edigū and his descendants, Tīmūr or Muḥammad Rāhīm Bī's foster father, Nādir Shāh, who had Safawid puppet rulers placed on the throne.<sup>634</sup> Standing in the Turko-Mongol tradition, the Manghit *amīr* had initially relied on Chingizid shadow *khāns*, first on 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān b. Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān, and then on 'Ubaidullah Khān.<sup>635</sup> He also felt the need to

<sup>630</sup> The Afghan, Ottoman and Lazgī contingents later formed part of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's standing and regularly paid army (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 128b).

<sup>631</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 115b–116a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 338a–339b; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 5b; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 51–52 (French text, 115); Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 101; Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 395.

<sup>632</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 334a.

<sup>633</sup> Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 102.

<sup>634</sup> Tīmūr acted on behalf of an Ögedeid puppet ruler and in 1379 helped install Tukhāmish, a Chingizid pretender, on the throne of the Blue Horde (Manz, “Mongol History,” 137–38). Under his initial name Tahmāsp Qulī Khān (lit. “the slave or servant of Tahmāsp”), Nādir Shāh aimed at restoring the Safawid Empire. He first promoted the fugitive Safawid heir-apparent Tahmāsp Mirzā, later known as Shāh Tahmāsp II (d. 1740), and then 'Abbās III (d. 1740) (Perry, “Nādir Shāh Afshār,” 853; R. M. Savory, “Şafawids,” 771; Avery, “Nādir Shāh,” 25–33).

<sup>635</sup> Not all chroniclers make mention of the two puppet *khāns*. Qāzī Wafā, for example, alludes to 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān and 'Ubaidullah Khān b. Tīmūr Khān Khwārazmī (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 109b, 147a, 324b), but passes over their assassination. Mullā Sharīf mentions the murder of 'Abd al-Mu'min Khān at the hands of a follower of Raḥīm Bī, and even dedicates a poem to him. He also refers to 'Ubaidullah/'Abdullah Sulṭān, the second Chingizid puppet ruler (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 314b–315a, 331b, 333a–334a, 365a–366a). Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm reports the assassination and says that shortly thereafter

establish family ties with the Chingizids and married a daughter of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān.<sup>636</sup> Although one Manghit author criticizes him for usurping the throne in spite of not being genealogically legitimized, his position was not debated at the time of his coronation.<sup>637</sup> In the *Tuḥfāt al-khānī*, we can see how much Chingizid descent and the *khān* title still mattered. As long as his master acted as *atālīq*, Qāzī Wafā meticulously abstains from calling him *khān*. It is only after Muḥammad Raḥīm's inauguration that he uses the epithets *khān* or *khāqān*.<sup>638</sup> Until his enthronization in 1756, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī is described as the “fortunate commander” (*amīr-i kāmgar/kāmyāb*), “the commander well versed in arranging affairs” (*amīr-i ṣā'ib al-tadbīr*), “the *amīr* blessed with royal augury” (*amīr-i humāyūn-fāl*) and “the lord of the age” (*ṣāhib-i zamānī*) by his chronicler.<sup>639</sup>

While in Bukhara the Chingizid system of government continued to carry some weight, in Balkh Nādir Shāh's campaign had spelled doom for the Chingizids. In 1750 Ḥājī Bī Ming and a group of *āqsaqāls* and other nobles joined the Afghan ruler Aḥmad Shāh in Herat and begged for protection from Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī,

“whose forefathers had been the protégés (*namak-parwarda*) of the illustrious Chingizid house and were exalted by the Turkomān (?) rulers. He had ignored the privileges and the benefits granted by this royal family as well as the infinite favors and continued attention of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān. He has committed the assassination of his true benefactor (*walī ni'mat-i ḥaqīqī*) out of greediness and worldly motives. In order to silence the rumors among the people and the hearts of the nobles and the commoners, he placed the son of

---

Muḥammad Raḥīm married the daughter of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and usurped the throne (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 52–53 (French text, 116)). The nineteenth-century author Sāmī mentions even a third puppet *khān*, whom they brought from the *ḥaramsarā* (Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 32).

<sup>636</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 248b–249b.

<sup>637</sup> Bregel argues that in spite of his marriage to a Chingizid princess, Muḥammad Raḥīm was not really legitimized. Therefore, in a speech to the notables, he stressed that his claim to the throne was based on his strength as a leader and the restoration of order (Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 395). Von Kügelgen is of the opinion that his marriage was a *conditio sine qua non* for the recognition of the notables. However, Muḥammad Raḥīm's military exploits and ordering activities were obviously decisive for his legitimacy as a ruler (von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 275, 321–26).

<sup>638</sup> He only twice calls him by his personal name with the *khān* title: “the victorious *amīr*, meaning the successful Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān.” He uses this phrase when his patron was sent to Mashhad by Nādir Shāh in late 1740 (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 45a, 96b).

<sup>639</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 35a, 36a, 36b, 38b, 44b, 49a, 58a, 61b, 62b, 70a, 73a, 80a, 88b, 100a, 116b, 194a passim.

the aforementioned *khān* on the royal throne of Turkistan. But after some time he brought him to the brink of martyrdom like his father and occupied the seat of authority himself. He captured the notables of the domains who had been respectable personages and possessors of reputation in order to annihilate them. Demanding obedience from every chief and all leaders of the kingdom, he imposed exorbitant burdens upon the subjects and inhabitants of that realm. He encumbered the entire populace with heavy neck-severing taxes and created immense trouble for the people and difficulties no one can bear. We are on the brink of despair because of the desolate situation of the population of Turkistan caused by the tyranny of this cruel oppressor and the activities of a group of malevolent mischief-makers who, instigated by him [Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī], engage in plundering raids. We servants are looking for a just protector [...] and turn the countenance of need to the royal court doing away with tyrants and taking care of the weak.”<sup>640</sup>

Despite lamenting the assassination of Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān and his offspring as signs of disloyalty to the Chingizid dynasty, the local aristocracy did not install a puppet *khān* and turned to the Afghan king instead. The *amīrs* of Balkh had apparently reached a point of no return, where after years and decades of placing puppets on the throne, resorting to a non-Chingizid force was not regarded as illegitimate anymore.

In the following sections I will explore the emergence of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's *Herrschaftsverband* from a local perspective. Particular attention will be paid to the developments in the various Uzbek principalities that had been carved out in the first half of the eighteenth century. Depending on the amount of information given by the sources, I will reconstruct the local histories of places and regions like Shahr-i Sabz, Miyānkāl, Ūrā Tippa and Ḥiṣār. Another strand of investigation focuses on the societal conditions in the Manghit kingdom: patterns of mobility, the nature of Uzbek tribes and the situation of the populace. I will also address the question of to what extent the pattern of patronage was entrenched in a kind of tribal worldview or “tribalism.” Here I will give a summary of my pondering based on pieces of information that must be set in relation to one another and interpreted inductively.

Before describing the historical developments during the ten years of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's/Khān's reign, I want to briefly introduce the major actors of that time:

---

<sup>640</sup> Maḥmūd al-Ḥusainī, *Tārīkh*, 108–09.

- **Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī/Khān** (r. as *atālīq* 1747–56/as *khāqān* 1756–59); acted as *atālīq* and *amīr al-umarā* for the first nine years and was crowned king of Mā Warā’ al-Nahr on Rabī’ I 23, 1170/December 15, 1756. In the course of large-scale military campaigns and conquests, he brought most of the former Tuqay-Timurid realm into his fold.
- **Tughāy Murād Bī** (d. 1759); chief of the Burqūt of Nūr-i Aṭā and at times closely associated with the Baḥrīn and other Yetī Ūrūgh tribes. At the beginning, he was one of the main enemies of the Manghit *atālīq* and posed a tough challenge to the Bukharan troops. After Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān’s coronation, he became reconciled with the Bukharan court.
- **Muḥammad Amīn Bī Yūz** (d. 1758); ruler of Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān and leader of the Tamghāy Shādī sub-division of the Yūz. From 1748 onward, he positioned himself as the arch enemy of the first Manghit king. As time went on, this *amīr* became embroiled in the power struggles that engulfed Mā Warā’ al-Nahr. After two decisive campaigns by Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, he was finally caught and executed.
- **Fāzil Bī b. Ṣādiq Bī Yūz**; *amīr* and *ḥākīm* of Ūrā Tippa and close ally of Muḥammad Amīn Bī. Throughout Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s/Khān’s entire reign, he belonged to various coalitions opposed to the new king. In 1758–59, he was the last remaining opponent of the Manghit ruler.
- **Ghaibullah Bī Baḥrīn**; chief of the Yetī Ūrūgh with strongholds in Karmīna, Khaṭarchī and Panjshanba. After Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s first campaigns, he succumbed and retained his loyalty to him.
- **‘Ālim Bī b. Ibrāhīm Bī Kīnakās** (d. 1752); influential *amīr* of Shahr-i Sabz, residing in the fortress of Sang Furūsh near Kitāb. He was also one of the antagonists of the first Manghit king and joined various coalitions. After continuously proving his disloyalty, he was eventually executed together with his Kīnakās relatives by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s order.
- **Subḥān Qulī Bī Kīnakās** (d. 1752); ruler of Shahr-i Sabz and influential opponent of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī.
- **Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg**; Kīnakās *amīr* and protégé of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī. He utilized his alliance with the Manghit to overcome his relatives in Shahr-i Sabz, but was likewise executed after showing first signs of insubordination.
- **Khwājā Yār Bī b. Farḥād Bī Ūtārchī** (d. 1758–59/60?); acted first as governor of Yangī Qūrghān and Samarqand. On the occasion of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān’s enthronization, he was appointed to the post of *atālīq*.
- **Īrdāna Bī Ming b. Raḥīm Bī**; ruler of Khoqand and foster son of the Manghit *amīr*. He rendered useful assistance during the battle of Ūrā Tippā in 1756.
- **Muḥammad Daulat Dīwānbēgī**; a Persian slave and confidant of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, after whose inauguration he was promoted to the post of *qūshbēgī*.

A look at the situation after the end of Iranian supremacy reveals that Nādir Shāh had left a very fragmented field of power in which various actors positioned themselves, ready to enter the struggle for authority. Meanwhile, the former appanage order that had remained intact during the Shibānid, and in a slightly modified form also in the Tuqay-Timurid period, had been supplanted in the course of the previous struggles for power. The old appanages were a thing of the past. Henceforth, the governors of the provinces and regions were directly appointed by the king.<sup>641</sup> But in fact, with the appointment of this or that strongman, the central government recognized the power relations in the periphery. Regions like Ferghana and Balkh had long since broken away once and for all.<sup>642</sup>

Throughout the eighteenth century, the capital Bukhara retained its traditional title of the “noble city” (*balada-yi fākhira*) and “seat of government” (*dār al-salṭana, markaz-i salṭanat, markaz-i daulat, mustaqarr-i iyālat*). The longevity of the imperial terminology notwithstanding, its role as capital city was rather nominal and it resembled only one of a dozen islands in a lagoon filled with independent and semi-independent Uzbek principalities. In this context, the possession of Bukhara meant next to nothing. It is therefore not surprising that we neither read much about the conditions of urban life nor about commercial or building activities. One remarkable exception is Qāzī Wafā’s account of the reconstruction of the great city wall of Bukhara in Ramāzān 1165/August–September 1752.<sup>643</sup>

The Iranian presence had left the Manghit chief in a favorable position vis-à-vis his amirid foes. But in spite of his standing army being reinforced by Afghan, Ottoman and Lazgī contingents, at the beginning he acted from a very limited base of power. His assumption of the atālīqāte caused the opposition of other *amīrs*. What made Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s claim so problematic was not just the assassination of Chingizid pretenders but also the de facto monopolization of the atālīqāte; in contrast to the previous decades, it was for the first time directly transferred from father to son.

<sup>641</sup> von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 86, 456. See also below.

<sup>642</sup> Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 90; Chekhovich, “O nekotorykh,” 86–88; Bregel, “Central Asia,” 193.

<sup>643</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 201b–202a.

## THE AMIRID ELITE

Most of the Uzbek *amīrs* who had in one way or another benefited from Nādir's rule and the generously distributed material rewards now jeopardized the authority of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī. Backed by his fellow tribesmen and a number of other tribal forces, he was only one of many ambitious actors in a heterogeneous political landscape. In the time of the Iranian presence, the majority of the *amīrs* had been forced to recognize Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's superiority because of his alliance with the Qizilbāsh and his relationship with the Iranian court. Most of the actors had eventually bowed to Manghit supremacy since they knew that as long as Iranian contingents were stationed in Bukhara or other areas, there would hardly be any chance of challenging Nādir's protégé. In the meantime, they did not stand idly by but sought in a very pragmatic way to hold out until the end of Nādir Shāh's supremacy. By endeavoring to attach themselves to the new elite, most of the local Uzbek leaders made the best of the situation. They obtained the necessary resources to bolster their authority among their own supporters and to prepare themselves for the future. To this end, they regarded Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's attempt to ward off his former masters as a good opportunity to pave the way for their own future career and getting rid of him later.

After the complete withdrawal of the Iranians, there was no reason for most of the other actors to acknowledge his right to the atālīqate, let alone his usurpation of the throne and the assumption of khānship. And although Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī had occupied a superior position in the tribal tableau of Transoxania, it seems that he was perceived as a *par inter pares* rather than as a *primus inter pares* by other *amīrs*. Furthermore, the idea of a Chingizid sovereign on the throne had apparently lost none of its attractiveness; the developments after Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's sudden death illustrate that many Uzbek chiefs still regarded the usurpation of the Bukharan throne by a non-Chingizid as a political faux pas. A senior member of the house of Chingīz Khān was still essential to mediate in the numerous conflicts between competing Uzbek *amīrs*, to preside over the *kingāsh* and to dismiss and appoint office holders. In the sources Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and other Uzbek chiefs are still called *amīrs*, bearing the title of *bī* or *bēg*. Each of them headed a tribal formation and in normal times acted as an intermediary between the Bukharan court and his tribesmen. The *amīrs* are often named "pillars of the army" (*arkān-i sipāh*),

“warrior nobles” (*a ‘yān-i mu ‘askar*), or simply “pillars of power and authority” (*arkān-i daulat, arkān-i salṭanat*).<sup>644</sup>

The number of followers and friends making up the nucleus of the new *Herrschaftsverband* was relatively small. Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān could count on slightly more than half a dozen men, most of them Manghit *amīrs*. The Manghit furnished the bulk of his standing army (eleven thousand warriors) and were given key positions and ranks in the governmental hierarchy. Similar to other contemporary kings, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān promoted a new elite by surrounding himself with his own men and family members, who assisted him in forging a corporate entity. Hence he ruled almost exclusively through his own tribe, while placing other chieftains in minor positions. He even curtailed the influence of the *atālīq* by redefining the office.

The supporters of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, especially the *sardārs* of his own tribe and other actors loyal to him, like Khwājam Yār Bī Ūtārchī, were the main beneficiaries of the first round of gubernatorial appointments after his inauguration. The Manghit almost exclusively received the key positions and offices, including the most important and prestigious governorships of Samarqand, Shahr-i Sabz, Qarshī, Karmīna and Ghijduwān. Although he was the first ruler to replace the Chingizids on the Bukharan throne, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān installed a clan dynasty in the tradition of his predecessors. But this clan rule was not structured on previous models; the governorships and sinecures were granted according to loyalty, service and personal proximity to the new ruler. As such they could be easily removed and transferred to somebody else. In the following I will investigate the strategies of the several Uzbek amirid forces and their position vis-à-vis Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī after 1747.

The amirid class can be divided into three major groups by virtue of their attitude toward the new lords. The first group consisted of Manghit commanders (*sardārs*), all of whom were closely related to the commander-in-chief and future *khān*. Besides, this group included close allies of the new dominant force, like Khwājam Yār Bī Ūtārchī, a son of Farhād Bī Atālīq, or Jahāngīr Bī Sarāy. The second group of Uzbek commanders consisted mainly of Miyānkālī *amīrs*, such as Ghaibullah Bī Baḥrīn and Tughāy Murād Bī Burqūt, who took a somewhat ambivalent stand, shifting back and

<sup>644</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 61b, 77a, 114b, 116a, 146a, 245a passim; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 108a, 108b, 109a, 112b, 128b, 135a, 144a, 169a, 175a, 204b, 226a passim.

forth between opposition and submission to the new ruling class. In addition to the Miyānkālī chiefs, we find the Qungrāt leadership of Bāysūn and Shīrābād positioned between the Manghit and their adversaries. The third and most influential group of *amīrs* was made up of the Yūz and Kīnakās chieftains, who emerged as intransigent arch enemies of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī.

Before investigating the last two groups and the way they coped with the claims of the Manghit, I will briefly elucidate the conditions of the new elite and its supporters.

### *The Manghit Sardārs*

Among the Manghit leadership we find Muḥammad Raḥīm's two brothers, Muḥammad Yūqāshī (Yādqāshī?) Bī, the governor of Nasaf and leader of the tribal population until his death in 1752,<sup>645</sup> and Barāt Bī Qūshbēgī, his half-brother, who looked back on a long military career when he was appointed governor of Samarqand with its environs and dependencies (*muẓāfāt wa tūmānāt*) around the canals of Shaudār, Āftāb Rūya, Soghd-i kalān and others in late 1756.<sup>646</sup> Barāt Bī played a pivotal role in most of his brother's expeditions. He was killed during a ten-day siege of Samarqand by Fāzil Bī Yūz shortly after Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's death in early 1759.<sup>647</sup> The next top-ranking *amīr* was Dānyāl Bī b. Khudāyār Bī Atālīq, who held the governorship of Karmīna and advised his nephew in all major and minor affairs.<sup>648</sup> After Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's death, he assumed the title of *atālīq* and acted as executor of governmental affairs.<sup>649</sup>

Besides his close relatives, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān relied on a very small group of prominent Manghit *sardārs*, whom he entrusted time and again with problematic missions. One of those participating in most of the military enterprises was Jum'a Qul Mīngbāshī, who is sometimes designated a *bahādur* (lit. hero) in the *Tuḥfat al-khānī*. He also belonged to the new elite and was probably one of Muḥammad Raḥīm's childhood friends who might

<sup>645</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 201a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 38a–b.

<sup>646</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 258b.

<sup>647</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 328b–329a.

<sup>648</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 324b.

<sup>649</sup> Bregel, "The new Uzbek states," 395; Yuri Bregel, "Manghits," 418; Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 104; Effremov, *Devyatiletnee*, 40; Chekhovich, "O nekotorykh," 89.

have accompanied him when he entered the service of Nādir Shāh. The byname Qul refers to his probable background as a slave whose ancestors may have served Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's family. Later, he was probably adopted into the household of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī and continued to be an intimate friend of the new *atālīq*. He participated in the expedition against the Khiṭā'ī in 1746–47 and assisted Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī during the siege of Bukhara by the Iranian army.<sup>650</sup> He played a key role in all following military campaigns and is often mentioned as the leading commander of a corps of Afghan and Ottoman soldiers.<sup>651</sup> Jum'a Qul was promoted to the rank of *tuqsāba* upon the enthronization of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān in 1756 and assumed the governorship (*ḥukūmat*) of Ghijduwān and the *tūmān* of Kharqān Rūd north of Bukhara with a gold-encrusted staff.<sup>652</sup> After the death of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, he helped Dānyāl Bī quell a joint rebellion of Burqūt and Sarāy Uzbeks in Bukhara, but shortly thereafter we find him among Dānyāl Bī's Manghit opponents in Nasaf.<sup>653</sup> Unfortunately, Wafā does not explain Jum'a Qul's decision to enter the camp of Dānyāl Bī's domestic rivals, but it is possible that he dropped his support for the Manghit *amīr* because the latter had deposed Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's grandson, Fāzil Tūra, in favor of a Chingizid puppet *khān*. As one of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's most loyal followers, Jum'a Qul certainly saw his master's grandson as the legitimate heir and started opposing the *atālīq* when the latter gave way to the pressure of other *amīrs*. We also lack information about Jum'a Qul's fate afterward and the exact date of his death. However, Mullā Sharīf reports that he was killed during a decisive battle for Qarshī, in which he was badly injured and “perforated from the knees to the waist like a beehive so that he never saw the countenance of well-being and vigor.”<sup>654</sup>

The next *sardār* was Imam Qulī Bī, who figured prominently in numerous military campaigns. We do not know exactly how he was affiliated to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's family, but Wafā characterizes him as one of those “who always fastened the belt of loyalty.”<sup>655</sup> In the *Tāj al-*

<sup>650</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 85a, 112a, 120b.

<sup>651</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 172b, 209b, 224b, 235a, 243a.

<sup>652</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 120b, 259b. In Bukhara, staffs of different colors were indicators of social distinction and rank. The staffs granted together with the title were of four sorts: white, red, multicolored and gold (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 235).

<sup>653</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 326a–327b, 349a, 352b, 363b, 368a.

<sup>654</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 338b.

<sup>655</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 258b.

*tawārīkh* he is called an “intimate of his majesty” (*muqarrab al-ḥazrat*).<sup>656</sup> The fact that he bore the title *bī*, in contrast to his colleague Jum‘a Qul, may be a sign of a higher position within the Manghit hierarchy. In the *Tuḥfat al-khānī* he appears for the first time in the context of the Iranian siege of Bukhara in 1747.<sup>657</sup> Initially he bore the title of *mīrākḥūr* (chief of the royal stables), but he does not appear on the battlefield as often as Jum‘a Qul Mingbāshī. Imām Qulī Bī took part in the campaigns against the Kīnakās in 1751 and 1752 and was put in charge of the forts of Yakka Bāgh and Ūrta Qūrghān.<sup>658</sup> In 1756 he was appointed to the post (*ūrūn*) of *parwānachī* of the royal court and was confirmed as governor of Yakka Bāgh.<sup>659</sup> Later he was placed in command of the southern province of Bāysūn, whence he led a punitive campaign against the Yūz leader, Muḥammad Amīn Bī.<sup>660</sup> Since he was one of the most distinguished Manghit commanders, in 1757 he gained the governorship of Upper Ḥiṣār and its dependencies, which were administratively attached to Bāysūn.<sup>661</sup> In the following year, Imām Qulī was among those who approved of the execution of Muḥammad Amīn Bī Yūz because the latter was responsible for the death of his brother and son.<sup>662</sup> After Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān’s death, Imām Qulī Bī joined the ranks of Dānyal Bī Atālīq and fought on numerous occasions against rebels and obstinate Uzbek leaders.<sup>663</sup> In 1176/1762–63, he figured as governor of the province of Qarākūl southwest of Bukhara, where he received the order to mobilize the soldiery and auxiliary troops (*qarā chirīk*) of that province and to lead them against the Turkmen on the bank of the Āmū Daryā.<sup>664</sup>

Another top-ranking commander worth mentioning was Daulat Mīrākḥūr, who also rendered service on numerous occasions. In 1756 he received the title of *parwānachī* to deliver appointment diplomas to the amirid nobility

<sup>656</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 371b.

<sup>657</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 122b.

<sup>658</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 185b, 189a–199a.

<sup>659</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 258b–259a. Bregel, who worked with the Kazan manuscript of the *Tuḥfat al-khānī*, mentions him as Ata-Qul Bī Manghit (Bregel, *Administration*, 21–22).

<sup>660</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 274b–275b.

<sup>661</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 283b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 411b.

<sup>662</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 311b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 417b–418a.

<sup>663</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 337b, 338b, 339a, 334a, 348b *passim*.

<sup>664</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 358b.

(*a' yān-i umarā*) and officials (*' amaldārān*).<sup>665</sup> Ya' qūb also mentions another paternal uncle of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān by the name of Īsān Qildī Bāy (Bī?), who was governor of Ūrgūt in the east.<sup>666</sup>

### *Khwājam Yār Bī Ūtārchī*

One of the *amīrs* who supported the new ruler from the very beginning was Khwājam Yār Bī Ūtārchī b. Farhād Bī Atālīq, the chief of the Kḥiṭā'ī. Following his father's violent death at the hands of rival *amīrs* and the confidants of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān in 1721, the Kḥiṭā'ī-Qipchāq had sided with the Kīnakās chieftain, Ibrāhīm Bī.<sup>667</sup> Shortly thereafter Khwājam Yār Bī, bearing the title of *mīrākhūr*, entered the service of Rajab Khān.<sup>668</sup> Ṭālī' reports that in 1722, Khwājam Yār Bī Mīrākhūr was among the supporters of Rajab Khān and had departed from Samarqand with three hundred warriors to defend Hazāra against Bukharan troops.<sup>669</sup> In early 1722, the Kḥiṭā'ī *amīr* fell into the hands of the supporters of the government and was taken prisoner.<sup>670</sup> Unfortunately, the chronicles leave his fate in the dark and we do not know what happened to him after the end of the Samarqand rebellion. But according to our sources, in 1737 he appears as one of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī's allies fighting against the Qizilbāsh at Qarshī. Here he commanded the troops in the center of the Uzbek army.<sup>671</sup> Khwājam Yār Bī

<sup>665</sup> Ibid., fols. 257b–258a; see also Bregel, *Administration*, 21. According to Khanikov's account of the circumstances in nineteenth-century Bukhara, the *parwānachī* announced the nomination of a title bearer at court and usually affixed the royal diploma (*yarliq*) to the turban of the nominee (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 238).

<sup>666</sup> Ya' qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 6b.

<sup>667</sup> Mullā Sharīf reports that another son of Farhād Bī, a certain 'Awaz Tūqsāba, went together with a cousin to Shahr-i Sabz to side with the Kīnakās and to take revenge for the death of his father. In Mullā Sharīf's view, it was the arrival of the Kḥiṭā'ī leader and the alliance with the Kḥiṭā'ī-Qipchāq that caused Ibrāhīm Bī to rebel against Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 160a–b).

<sup>668</sup> According to the *Mazhar al-aḥwāl*, after his father's death, Khwājam Yār Bī Mīrākhūr had sought assistance from a certain Sheikh Ṣūfiullah who interceded with the ruler and received a horse and a robe of honor for his eloquence (Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fols. 42b–43a).

<sup>669</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 66a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 165b.

<sup>670</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fol. 68a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 168a.

<sup>671</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 29a. According to the *Tāj al-tawārīkh*, Khwājam Yār Bī served on the right wing of the Uzbek army (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 228b).

had in all likelihood made peace with the Bukharan ruler after his capture in 1722 and may simultaneously have joined the forces around Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī. This alliance might have been inspired by the friendship between Khwājam Yār's father, Farhād Bī, and the father of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī.<sup>672</sup>

Whatever happened to the former in the time between 1723 and 1737, afterward he figures as a steadfast supporter of the ruling elite. Qāzī Wafā even states that the leaders of the Manghit tribe and the chiefs of the Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq community had retained a "relationship of concord and affection" and that Raḥīm Bī was connected to Khwājam Yār's family through a matrimonial alliance (*muṣāharat*).<sup>673</sup> As a consequence, Farhād Bī's son greatly benefited from the defeat of 'Ibādullah Khiṭā'ī after the joint campaign of Uzbek and Iranian forces in 1747. Unfortunately, the sources do not inform us about his relationship with 'Ibādullah, who apparently did not belong to the leading Ūtārchī lineage, but it is possible that the latter challenged Khwājam Yār Bī's position. However, after 'Ibādullah's flight he was put in command of the entire Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq tribe. At the same time, he was rewarded with the governorship of the region of Samarqand (*ḥukūmat-i wilāyat-i Samarqand*).<sup>674</sup>

Since the establishment of firm control over the Miyānkāl was one of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's first priorities at the beginning of his atālīqate, the support of the Khiṭā'ī chieftain was absolutely essential for maintaining a secure hold over the second important city of Transoxania. Yet Khwājam Yār Bī seems to have taken up residence in Yangī Qūrghān, 'Ibādullah Khiṭā'ī's former stronghold located southwest of Samarqand. In 1756 he was replaced as governor of Samarqand by Barāt Qūshbēgī and assumed the position of *atālīq* and commander-in-chief (*amīr al-umarā*), together with the honorific title "pillar of the *amīrs*" (*'umdat al-umarā*) and a bejeweled

<sup>672</sup> It is also possible that the Khiṭā'ī sought the protection of the Bukharan court after the death of Rajab Khān and due to the Qazāq incursions in their native areas around Samarqand and in the Miyānkāl in the 1720s.

<sup>673</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 357b.

<sup>674</sup> Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī granted immense favors to the dispersed tribes of the Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq and summoned them to 'Ibādullah's abandoned fortress, where they were ordered to settle. Subsequently, he entrusted Khwājam Yār Bī with "the ordering of their affairs and dealings" (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 76a–b; see also Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 300b).

staff.<sup>675</sup> In contrast to the time of the Shibanids and the Tuḡay-Timurids, when the *atālīq* was the senior *amīr* and chief counselor of the regnant *khān* with similar duties in the respective appanages,<sup>676</sup> Khwājam Yār Bī Atālīq was responsible for official petitions from the Uzbek troops (*sipāh*) and the *amīrs*.<sup>677</sup> The redefinition of the duties attached to this office was tantamount to a restriction of the responsibilities of the office holder. This step was probably initiated by Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, who wanted to limit the authority of the *atālīq* in order to make this office less vulnerable to amirid covetousness. Furthermore, he would not tolerate a strong *amīr* and potential opponent at his side in this position. Despite the shift of duties attached to the office of *atālīq*, Khwājam Yār Bī continued to serve as a military commander, for example in a mission against the Qungrāt in Shīrābād in spring 1757.<sup>678</sup>

#### *Jahāngīr Bī Dīwānbēgī Sarāy*

Another loyal supporter of the Manghit ruler was Jahāngīr Bī Sarāy, who had joined his patron upon the arrival of the Iranian contingents from Marw and elsewhere in 1746.<sup>679</sup> The next year, he belonged to the group of Transoxanian nobles who accompanied the *atālīq* on his return to Mashhad.<sup>680</sup> From then on, he had been one of the most loyal followers of the new strongman of Bukhara. Although our main source says nothing about his role during the siege of the capital by the Qizilbāsh, Jahāngīr Bī was probably in Bukhara at that time and also took an active part in its

<sup>675</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 258a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 405b; Bregel, *Administration*, 13–14; Ivanov, *Vosstanie*, 24; von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 91.

<sup>676</sup> McChesney characterizes the office as “one of military-administrative supervision as the agent of the khan over the activities of a Chingizid sultan.” For further information see McChesney, “The Amirs,” 61–63; Bregel, “Atālīq,” 96–98; Bregel, *Administration*, 12–14.

<sup>677</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 258a. See also Bregel, *Administration*, 13; von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 91.

<sup>678</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 268b.

<sup>679</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 71b.

<sup>680</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 84a.

defense.<sup>681</sup> Subsequently, he participated in an advisory council of Uzbek *amīrs* convened by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī.<sup>682</sup>

His role during the following upheavals in Miyānkāl and his whereabouts are unclear. It is possible that he spent most of his time shuttling between his home region of Khuzār and the capital. Reading between the lines of the *Tuḥfat*, we gather that Jahāngīr Bī was one of the weaker *amīrs* lacking sufficient influence among his tribe. On one folio, Qāzī Wafā says that the *wilāyat* of Khuzār initially belonged to Jahāngīr Bī Sarāy, a loyal supporter of the Manghit *amīr* and an attendant (*mulāzim*) of the court. But the *ūlūs* of the Sarāy, being dissatisfied with him, had an aversion to his government and finally expelled him and his supporters from Khuzār.<sup>683</sup> Although his overlord managed to reconquer the *qal‘a* of Khuzār, which was again transferred to Jahāngīr Bī,<sup>684</sup> the Sarāy chief seems to have been a rather weak actor. A little while later, he participated in the various campaigns to Shahr-i Sabz.<sup>685</sup>

In the context of the round of appointments in late 1756, we learn that the Sarāy chief was deprived of the post of *dīwānbēgī*.<sup>686</sup> On this occasion, he received the seat at the court that “his heart had desired” before and was appointed chief of the royal armory (*jībachī-yi dastgāh-i khāqānī*). At the same time, and in apparent contradiction to his dismissal from the office, the scribes registered him as *dīwānbēgī*.<sup>687</sup> After the death of Mūhammad Raḥīm Khān in 1759, however, he instigated a revolt in Bukhara together with Tughāy Murād Bī and was finally killed by the supporters of Dānyāl Bī Manghit.<sup>688</sup>

<sup>681</sup> Mullā Sharīf explicitly mentions his name as one of the commanders who backed Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī during the siege and actively took part in the battle (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 341a, 344b).

<sup>682</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 126b.

<sup>683</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 163a.

<sup>684</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 186a–b.

<sup>685</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 192b.

<sup>686</sup> Yuri Bregel reads *ma‘zūl būd* as dismissed (Bregel, *Administration*, 21).

<sup>687</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 258b.

<sup>688</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 326a–327b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 427b–429b; Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 6b.

*Muḥammad Daulat Dīwānbēgī*

Muḥammad Daulat Dīwānbēgī did not belong to the amirid elite but was a Persian slave and in fact a member of the inner circle of loyal servants and officials surrounding the first Manghit ruler. According to Qāzī Wafā, this man belonged to the household of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's father. He was probably one of the servants and confidants close to the old *atālīq*, and also dispatched the message about the death of his master to Iran.<sup>689</sup> How he came into Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī's household is not known. He was probably born in Khurasān and abducted and sold as a slave in one of the local slave markets, or born as a child of Persian slaves in Bukhara.<sup>690</sup> Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm characterizes Muḥammad Daulat as a prudent counselor (*ṣāhib-i tadbīr*).<sup>691</sup> Until his master's death in 1744, Muḥammad Daulat certainly spent a large part of his life in the household of Ḥakīm Bī in the Ghāzīābād neighborhood and later in the royal palace of Bukhara.<sup>692</sup> When writing the famous message to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, he already appears as *dīwānbēgī*, which means that he must have served his patron in the palace administration. We further learn that

“from the agents of the deceased ‘great *amīr*’ (*amīr-i kabīr*) [Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī], the ‘trust of felicity’ Muḥammad Daulat, who was in temper and companionship distinguished among his peers and equals, took the burden of loyalty to this *amīr* chosen by God on his shoulders and recognized the accomplishment of the worldly governmental affairs as his fortune.”<sup>693</sup>

<sup>689</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 52b.

<sup>690</sup> Wafā describes how the Uzbek armies had repeatedly ravaged Khurāsān since the time of Muḥammad Shībānī Khān. These expeditions are typically termed *jihād* launched by the ruler of Turan and his Muslim troops against the Safawids and the Qizilbāsh, who are characterized as “infidels and adherents of error” or as “a group of malevolent heretics.” Wafā also mentions the slave raids conducted by the Uzbek troops in Khurāsān (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 31b–32b).

<sup>691</sup> Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 53 (French text, 118). Ya'qūb describes Muḥammad Daulat as Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's “slave purchased with gold” (*ghulām-i zar-kharīd*) (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 6b).

<sup>692</sup> According to Wafā, Muḥammad Daulat had served Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's family since his early childhood (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 258b).

<sup>693</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 61b.

Throughout the atālīqate of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, he bore the title of *dīwānbēgī*.<sup>694</sup> As a skillful administrator he loyally served his master and together with the chief judge, Mīr Niẓām al-Dīn Ḥusainī, was entrusted with the defense and administration of the citadel of Bukhara in the absence of the king.<sup>695</sup> On more than one occasion, Muḥammad Daulat proved to be a versed mediator and was dispatched on delicate missions to the periphery in order to reconcile tribal leaders with his master.<sup>696</sup> In 1752 he was tasked with the reconstruction of the Bukharan city wall, a duty he carried out with great meticulousness.<sup>697</sup>

After his patron's enthronization as new *khān* in late 1756, he was promoted to the post of *qūshbēgī*.<sup>698</sup> In the following time, he occasionally accompanied Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān on expeditions. For example, he participated in the campaign to Ḥiṣār in 1757 and was responsible for the collection of one-fifth of the spoils reserved for the royal treasury.<sup>699</sup> After the death of his patron, Muḥammad Daulat continued to serve as *qūshbēgī* under Dānyāl Bī.<sup>700</sup> According to Ya'qūb, the Bukharan chancellor, "including the petitioning by the subjects, the bills of the capital area (*hisābī-yi wilāyat*), the taxes (*kharājāt*) as well as the administration of rewards (*an'am*), was assigned to Muḥammad Daulat Qūshbēgī."<sup>701</sup> In Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm's opinion, he was a powerful individual running the affairs of the kingdom. And for that reason he was put to death by order of Shāh Murād.<sup>702</sup>

<sup>694</sup> Kāzīm mentions Daulat Qūshbēgī's alleged military duties, which he performed side by side with his masters in the battle of Qāḫūr Tūt against Nādir Shāh. This battle is not mentioned in other sources (Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 790). Besides, Muḥammad Daulat assumed the rank of *qūshbēgī* only after the inauguration of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān in winter 1756 (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 258b).

<sup>695</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 152b, 170a, 178b, 192a, 201b, 226b passim.

<sup>696</sup> Ibid., fols. 161a–b, 165b–166a.

<sup>697</sup> Ibid., fols. 201b–202a.

<sup>698</sup> Ibid., fol. 258b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 406a; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 6b.

<sup>699</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 282a–b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 410b–411a.

<sup>700</sup> In 1759/60, he stood loyally behind Muḥammad Dānyāl Bī when Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's paternal uncle had to contend with a tribal revolt of Uzbek chiefs and their supporters in the capital (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 326a). According to Mullā Sharīf, Muḥammad Daulat was also among the nobles paying homage to Dānyāl Bī (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 425a).

<sup>701</sup> Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 7a.

<sup>702</sup> Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 54 (French text, 121–23). Unfortunately, we learn nothing about the date of Muḥammad Daulat's death. According to Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm,

## PATTERNS OF MOBILITY

There was a dialectics between the emergence and accumulation of power in the form of extended personalized networks on the one hand, and the siphoning off of resources (mobile property, harvests etc.) on the other. The characteristic lack of resources and the forceful extraction of food provisions, livestock and other kinds of booty (*ūlja*) were mutually conditioning.<sup>703</sup> The chroniclers frequently invoke the picture of ants and locusts falling upon the poor subjects,<sup>704</sup> and although the consequences of raids are depicted in the most dreadful way, plundering was quite a normal practice. High physical mobility was a precondition for extensive raiding; the raiders were mostly mounted and able to cover large distances in a short time. Described as *ghārat*, *yaghmā*, *chapāwul*, *tākht wa tāz*, or *tākht wa tārāj*, in the first half of the eighteenth century the looting campaigns were also designed to collect taxes. One-fifth of the spoils was confiscated by the *dīwān* officials who usually accompanied the king on his expeditions.<sup>705</sup> This pattern continued well into the nineteenth century. Describing the forceful raids by Shāh Murād in Khurāsān, Malcolm reports that while the camp and part of the army were left behind, the Uzbek cavalry spread out over all tracts of land that were not under the protection of Mashhad. Each soldier carried seven days' provisions for himself and the horses. If not ransomed, the "booty" consisting equally of men, women, cattle, sheep and grain was carried off. Towns that could not be immediately subdued had to pay protection money. The invasion took place prior to the harvest, and a refusal to submit was followed by the instant destruction of the fields within the reach of Shāh Murād's followers. The booty was fairly distributed; only one-fifth of the spoils belonged to the king and constituted a considerable part of

---

he was killed in the time of Muḥammad Dānyāl Bī, who afterward conferred the government on Shāh Murād (ibid., 54, French text, 123).

<sup>703</sup> The term *ūlja/ulja* (اولجه/الجه) is of Mongolian origin and means booty or spoils. Sometimes the word was also used in the sense of prisoner. The allocation was carried out after a military victory (Doerfer, *Elemente*, I, 143–45). Sometimes the Persian term *ghanāyim* (غنایم) is used as a synonym.

<sup>704</sup> See Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fols. 49b, 103b, 144a, 180a; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 173b, 345b. Another picture invoked was that of apocalyptic people, "Yājūj wa Mājūj" (see Holzwarth, "Relations," 187, footnote no. 41).

<sup>705</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 244b, 283a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 122b, 183b, 519b. For other, regular looting campaigns see Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fols. 49b, 103b, 144a, 180a.

his revenue.<sup>706</sup> The rest were distributed among the Uzbek commanders and their followers. Designated as a “protection fee” (*māl-i amānī*), “gratitude tribute” (*shukrāna*) or “hoof money” (*naʿl bahā*), the spoils consisted of cash, portable property like beasts of burden and sheep, and even slaves.<sup>707</sup> In many cases, the ruler and some of his foes made conscious use of the institution to bring disloyal actors into line. In the present-day Western worldview(s), the imposition of protection money and the voluntary offering of gifts are reminiscent of the conduct of mafia cliques, pressing local actors into a relationship of authority with the typical role allocation.<sup>708</sup>

One pattern that often strikes the reader of Transoxanian narrative sources is rustling, the purposeful raids on livestock, which is called *ghārat-i māl wa mawāshī* or *dastburd-i haiwānāt*.<sup>709</sup> In one source, the term *duzdī-yi amwāl wa mawāshī* occurs, meaning the theft of cattle and other quadrupeds.<sup>710</sup> The periodic references to large herds of livestock can be seen as an indication that cattle were perceived as a sign of wealth, or at least as an important element of the economy. The strategy of rustling also required a high degree of mobility of the people, who had to be prepared and alert each other when raiders approached their camps. Often they had to seek shelter with their herds in a very short time. Cattle raids were conducted by all the parties and tribes that participated in the various games for power in the region. Even the rulers did not shrink from theft of livestock to attain their goals. According to the *Tāj*, the supporters of ʿUbaidullah Khān suggested raiding cattle in Balkh if they were unable to reconquer this region from Maḥmūd Bī Qaṭaghān.<sup>711</sup> In spring 1753, government forces raided the Marqa sub-clan of the Yūz and the Qurama in the valleys of Panjīkent and Yārī and carried off a large number of sheep. The number of livestock captured by the Bukharan troops in Panjīkent alone is impressive: fifteen thousand sheep, one thousand cattle and more than five hundred horses fell

<sup>706</sup> Sir John Malcolm, *The History of Persia, from the Most Early Period to the Present Time: Containing an Account of the Religion, Government, Usages, and Character of the Inhabitants of that Kingdom*, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1815), II, 168.

<sup>707</sup> Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 61. See chapter The Order of Things/Generosity and Gift Giving/Of Jewels, Horses and Rare Fabrics: Objects of Gift Exchange.

<sup>708</sup> On the “mafia-like” character of clientages see Pflücke, *Theorie*, 32–34. On the “mafia-like” dimension of the *himāyat* system, see also Paul, *Naqshbandīyya*, 167.

<sup>709</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 114a; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fol. 133a.

<sup>710</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḥzar*, fol. 51b.

<sup>711</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 114a.

into their hands.<sup>712</sup> On the one hand, rustling was a welcome strategy for tribes opposed to the government to harm the enemy and enlarge their own herds. But on the other, cattle raids were first signs of rebellion and insubordination. Especially when the government was weak, this left a door ajar for theft of livestock. After the death of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, for instance, his chronicler postulates that

“in the entire Miyānkālāt as far as Samarqand, from Shahr-i Sabz and Khuzār to Bāysūn and Ḥiṣār, the situation worsened and an earthquake of restlessness shook every region and the livestock of the subjects was sacked by the events. Looting and ravishment (*tārāj wa yaḡhmā*) took place in such a manner that the steppes that had been full of herds (*galla wa rama*) were emptied in a very short time.”<sup>713</sup>

Sheep and camels were especially vulnerable to theft, but even horses were not spared this fate.<sup>714</sup> Although almost all nomadic groups appear to have engaged in such raids, two writers mention the Qungrāt in particular as notorious cattle rustlers who did not dare cross the Oxus to carry away herds or to plunder their neighbors.<sup>715</sup>

The permanent quest for resources as well as the frequent resettlement campaigns were the order of the day and engendered a high degree of mobility.<sup>716</sup> A large part of the society was constantly on the move, not only nomads and transhumant groups but also the ruler and his men.<sup>717</sup> Aiming at punishment and establishing a minimum of control over unruly segments of the population, the resettlement campaigns often targeted whole tribes. Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān had become acquainted with this instrument of authority at the court of Nādir Shāh and followed his example by regularly relocating rebellious tribes. In Rabī‘ II 1161/March–April 1748, for example, he resettled some of the Yetī Ūrūgh from Khaṭarchī and Panjshanba in the capital and other regions.<sup>718</sup> When this tribal group revolted again the next year, many Yetī Ūrūgh tribespeople were eventually

<sup>712</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 206b, 215a–b.

<sup>713</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 328b.

<sup>714</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 133a, 164b.

<sup>715</sup> According to the *Mazhar al-aḥwāl*, the cattle theft by the Qungrāt provoked the Qizilbāsh and their leader, Rizā Qulī Mīrzā, to invade Transoxania in 1737 (Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 51b). In 1750, the enemies of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī entered the region of Qarshī in order to pillage the cattle of the Manghit (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 163b).

<sup>716</sup> Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 62.

<sup>717</sup> Karmysheva, “On the history,” 65.

<sup>718</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 139b.

resettled in Bukhara. Simultaneously, their former positions were transferred to the Qarlīq tribes, which were removed from Nasaf and transplanted into the heart of Miyānkāl.<sup>719</sup> In the following years, the *atālīq* continued this policy of amassing Uzbek tribesmen of all shades in the capital, where many of them populated the eastern city quarters. In so doing, the ruler strengthened his authority and made Bukhara a more representative panorama of the dominant stratum of society.

Raids and campaigns also entailed a great deal of movement, though the ruler and his allies were only able to mobilize a modest number of twenty thousand to thirty thousand fighters. Prior to each campaign, the Manghit leader sent out heralds to announce the expedition and summon the chiefs and their soldiers to the capital. After inspecting his troops, the *amīr* and his army left the capital and usually went to the tomb of Khwāja Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband to perform the *ziyārat* and pray for military success.<sup>720</sup> Each campaign was carefully prepared. Together with a large amount of baggage, the Uzbek army took along hundreds of camels and other beasts of burden. The camels had to carry different kinds of weaponry, for example *zanbūraks*, small cannons and falconets.<sup>721</sup> Other materials, particularly the artillery cannons that had been left behind by the Iranian troops, were transported on carts and wagons (*arāba wa gardūn*) or special gun carriages and vehicles (*'arāwa*).<sup>722</sup>

Lovingly describing military expeditions, the routes taken and the occasional stops made by the ruler and his army, the chroniclers emphasize the procedural aspect of the campaigns. The following sketch of such an expedition illustrates the journey to Ūrgūt in early 1166/1753. On Rabī' II 24, 1166/February 28, 1753, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his army set off, leaving the capital via the Mazār Gate in the east. On Rabī' II 25/March 1, the troops arrived at the tomb of Khwāja Bahā' al-Dīn and performed the usual pilgrimage. On Rabī' II 26/March 2, they stayed at the town of Hazāra; a day later they arrived at Karmīna and were received and generously hosted by Dānyāl Bī. On Rabī' II 28/March 4, the latter arranged a great feast (*ḥiyāfat*) for the soldiers. On Rabī' II 29/March 5, the army proceeded

<sup>719</sup> Ibid., fol. 157a.

<sup>720</sup> Ibid., fols. 170b, 179a, 204b, 222b, 242a passim.

<sup>721</sup> Ibid., fols. 205a, 242a. For the expedition to Ūrgūt in 1166/1753, the Bukharan army employed six hundred camels and three hundred other beasts of burden (ibid., fol. 205a).

<sup>722</sup> Ibid., fols. 73b, 119b, 129a, 205a, 211b, 242a.

toward Dabūsī; on Rabīʿ II 30/March 6, they were received by Ismāʿīl Bakāwul Qarluq at Khaṭarchī; the next day the *atālīq* and his men arrived at Panjshanba, where they were entertained by Shāh Sayyid Tūqsāba Kīnakās. On Jumāda I 4/March 9, the army continued marching and was received by Khwājam Yār Bī Ūtārchī at Yangī Qūrghān, where he supplied the ruler and his men with food provisions and took care of their accommodation. Two days later, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his troops entered Dahbīd. Here he performed the pilgrimage to the tomb of the Makhdūm-i Aʿzam. On Jumāda I 8/March 13, 1753, the army arrived at Samarqand, and from there the first detachments set off on a looting campaign to Panjīkent. On Jumāda I 9/March 15, the *atālīq* visited a number of local shrines, and the following day he gathered his commanders to seek their advice regarding the next steps. On Jumāda I 15/March 20—meanwhile the troops had encamped at Jumʿa Bāzār southeast of Samarqand—they all began to celebrate *nau rūz*. On Jumāda I 19/March 24, 1753, almost a month after their departure from Bukhara, the army advanced on Ūrgūt.<sup>723</sup> Thus it took Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his troops twice as long to cover a distance that, even under the difficult circumstances at that time, usually took no more than a week to ten days at maximum speed, or fifteen days if we consider the ponderous movement of the troops with their mounts, the beasts of burden and the baggage. On the campaign to Jizakh in early 1168/1756, it took the army more than six weeks to reach its target, three times longer than at the ordinary speed.<sup>724</sup>

As routine aspects of the life of the ruler and his associates, “military campaigns followed cyclical and seasonal patterns resembling nomadic migrations.”<sup>725</sup> Yet, lasting a few weeks to roughly two months, the expeditions mounted by eighteenth-century rulers were often much shorter than those of the past. The campaigns typically started in early spring, often before *nau rūz*, and proceeded either through the Miyānkāl along the major trade route, or through the Qashqa Daryā Valley with its pastures and arable plots. Frequently punctuated by a range of social activities, like visits to local shrines, festivities and hunting expeditions, the march had a marked

<sup>723</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 204b–209b.

<sup>724</sup> The *amīr* and his troops took the following route: Bukhara—Mazār-i Khwāja Naqshband—Nasaf—Shahr-ī Sabz—Dahbīd—Kān-i Kūl—Āpār Qūrūqī/Shīrāz—Rabāt-i Malik—Āchīq—Yām—Khawāš—Sabāt—Ūrā Tippa (ibid., fols. 226b–233a).

<sup>725</sup> Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 61.

ceremonial character.<sup>726</sup> In addition, the royal campaigns and the intermittent stops helped confirm and maintain a partly nomadic following by exchanging acts of patronage and allegiance. By frequently traversing his realm, the king gave substance to his claims and enacted his sphere of influence.<sup>727</sup> A case in point are the *Hiṣār* campaigns in Muḥarram 1171/September–October 1757 and Dhū'l-Qa'ada and Dhū'l-Ḥijja 1171/July–September 1758. On these occasions, the royal army moved through the southern, geographically speaking outer peripheral parts of the realm. Drawing a complete circle, they traversed the region on partly alternative routes. While the first route taken to Dehnau is not described in the *Tuḥfat*, the meticulously described return route to the capital was as follows: On Muḥarram 20, 1171/October 4, 1757, the king and his men departed from Dehnau and rode to Āq Farmī; from there they marched along the Bāysūn River. After spending two days in Bāysūn, on 24 Muḥarram 1171/October 8, 1757, they continued to the Darband River and then to the mountain valley of Chakchak. From there the troops proceeded through the famous glen of Buzghāla Khāna, also known as the Iron Gate.<sup>728</sup> After one more day, they arrived at Tang-i Ḥaram south of Khuzār. On Muḥarram 26/October 10, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān and his troops went to Qarshī, where they spent two days “to distribute sheep, horses and camels among the deserving and the turban wearers.” On Muḥarram 30/October 13, they proceeded to Kasbī, where the ruler was welcomed by the chief judge Mīr Nizām al-Dīn and 'Awaḏ Bī Bakāwul. The next day, the army entered the area of Khwāja Mabrūk in the midst of the Chūl-i Karnap. On Ṣafar 2/October 15, the notables of the capital received the king and his troops at Rabāṭ-i Qarākūl and accompanied them to Bukhara.<sup>729</sup>

Departing on their second *Hiṣār* expedition taking place in autumn 1758, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān and his legions took the route via Nasaf, Khuzār, Tang-i Ḥaram, Jū-yi Āq Rabāṭ—a lower mountain pass north of the Iron Gate—Buzghāla Khāna, along the Darband River, Bāysūn, Āq Qurchughī, Mīr Shādī, the gateway to *Hiṣār* and the Surkhān Valley, before arriving at Dehnau. After the conquest of Dehnau, the ruler and his army moved on to the town of *Hiṣār* in the Kāfirnihān Valley. On their return, the troops

<sup>726</sup> Noelle-Karimi reaches the same conclusion (*ibid.*, 68).

<sup>727</sup> *Ibid.*, 295.

<sup>728</sup> See chapter Historical Overview.

<sup>729</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 285a–286a.

departed from Ḥiṣār to the meadows alongside the Qarā Tāq River. Subsequently, they continued southwest to the banks of the Tūqlāq rivulet near the town of Sar-i Jūy. From there they marched to Dehnau and Mīr Shādī, then followed the usual route to the capital.<sup>730</sup>

The campaigns served to forge a kind of “corporate identity” and contributed to the integration of a variety of groups into one *Herrschaftsverband*.<sup>731</sup> Moving around in autumn, the king and his army had to use routes where sufficient water and grazing grounds were available. On their return to the capital, they passed through regions where many nomads had their summer pastures. The routes described above were probably also taken by the Qungrāt and other nomads on their way back to their winter quarters in the sandy plains of Mā Warā’ al-Nahr.

#### TRIBESPEOPLE, KINSHIP AND FORMATIVE ASPECTS OF PATRONAGE

I think it is now time to address the impact of kinship and blood ties as well as the question of whether the institution of patronage was tribal in nature or not. In the previous sections, I have deliberately dispensed with kinship and segmentary lineage theories. Most of the chronicles provide little information on tribal structures and the exact position of the leading lineages within the tribal formations. Even Qāzī Wafā, who gives a lot of information on the several Uzbek tribes, does not pay attention to their individual composition, nor does he list sub-divisions of individual tribes in the manner of Ya’qūb. But this should not tempt us to make a blanket statement, because with its political dimension kinship was no less formative for political dynamics than exchange. The scientific value of anthropological theories for historical research has been demonstrated by Noelle in her study on nineteenth-century Afghanistan.<sup>732</sup> Inspired by her results, I will highlight the interplay between patronage and kinship and its impact in the form of continued segmentation and stratification. But I will also try to give an overview of different forms of tribal organization in Mā Warā’ al-Nahr in the first half of the eighteenth century. Since the Persian material does not allow the matching of segmentary theories with the data provided, I prefer to leave segmentary kinship theories aside and treat the Uzbek groups as

<sup>730</sup> Ibid., fols. 302a–303b, 309b, 312a–313a.

<sup>731</sup> Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 68.

<sup>732</sup> See Noelle, *State and Tribe*.

networks in a larger sense. As such they were shaped not just by principles like kinship and patronage, but also by the interdependent actions between ambitious individuals, first of all the chieftains and their supporters.

The historical materials I have discussed in this chapter make it clear that no generalizations can be made. On the one hand, Uzbek tribes can be best described as large and relatively open webs and segments, which at times intermingled with other tribal formations. From the very beginning, they were open to absorbing new groups of people and smaller tribal splinters.<sup>733</sup> On the other hand, we observe a great deal of inner tribal warfare and conflict as typical by-products of the institutionalization process. Chekhovich views the Uzbek tribes as territorial and political units consisting of the remainders of older Turko-Mongol formations, which, having absorbed other groups, were at the stage of increasing segmentation characterizing the tribal system.<sup>734</sup> Apart from the vagueness of this description, she does not refer to specific examples. My analysis of the historical material suggests that the interplay between spatial and geographical conditions marked by a kaleidoscope of landscapes and segmentary processes, in combination with and fueled by court patronage, determined structures and political outcomes.

Designations like *qaum*, *tā'ifa*, *ūrūgh* and *qabila*, appearing regularly in the sources, due to their elasticity offer little information on the social organization of the Uzbek tribes.<sup>735</sup> McChesney points out that “the terms ‘tribe’ or ‘tribal’ have just the sort of ambiguity that is characteristic of the XVIIth century terminology.”<sup>736</sup> Linked to a specific tradition and inertia of thought, the various terms make it, as Khazanov argues, hard for the anthropologist to precisely define them theoretically.<sup>737</sup> Taking the historical materials as a background folio, it may be possible to explain social structures and processes in a more appropriate, albeit cumulative and inductive way. It seems that the Uzbek tribal formations resembled large, internally stratified groups and segments, which, often taking the form of clienteles grouped around senior leaders, branched off from the main tribe. Defined by ancestry, each clientele was highly dependent on the movements

---

<sup>733</sup> Karmysheva, “Naselenie,” 20–21.

<sup>734</sup> Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 56.

<sup>735</sup> See also McChesney, “Amirs,” 34, footnote no. 5; Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 107.

<sup>736</sup> McChesney, “Amirs,” 34, footnote no. 5.

<sup>737</sup> Khazanov, *Nomads*, 121.

and maneuverings of other groups. Within this system, kinship bonds and ancestry played a crucial role as they helped link the different segments and defined their position, but also that of individual tribesmen in relation to each other. At the same time, new lineages constantly branched off from inside the already existing clan segments and groups.<sup>738</sup> In this setting, alliances were more or less temporary and often lasted no longer than one generation, or even less. Alliance building was extremely flexible and adjusted according to the prevailing political circumstances. For example, the Khiṭā'ī chieftain Farhād Bī was an ally of Khudāyār Bī Manghit, but his son Khwājam Yār first supported the foes of the Manghit before resuming the policy of his father. His sons, however, long supported the claims of Fāzil Bī Yūz.

Within the Uzbek tribal order, blood ties were crucial for the reputation and the social standing of the individual in relation to others. Some of the segments, especially the aristocratic lineages, ranked superior whereas others were regarded as subordinate. A case in point is the Tūq Manghit clan itself, as described by Ya'qūb, who adds a kind of appendix to the tribal charter, listing all the important sons of Khudāy Qulī Bī and their offspring. This list also includes the various ranks and offices that the tribal leaders and their descendants occupied.<sup>739</sup> Another interesting case, confirming the importance of kinship and marital ties, are the various marriage alliances forged by the eighteenth-century rulers. Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and the male members of his family, for instance, had matrimonial alliances (*muṣāharat*) with various Uzbek groups. Marriage connexions were arranged first and foremost with the large tribes such as the Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq and the Qungrāt, but also with the Kīnakās.<sup>740</sup> We also see matrimonial alliances with

<sup>738</sup> The Abu'l-Khairid sub-clans and constantly emerging neo-eponymous clans that were influential in the sixteenth century are just one case in point (see chapter Historical Overview/The Uzbeks and their Turko-Mongol Legacy/Social Order in Uzbek-dominated Transoxania).

<sup>739</sup> Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 33a–b, 35b–36a.

<sup>740</sup> Qāzī Wafā mentions *muṣāharat* alliances of the first Manghit ruler with the Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq leader Khwājam Yār Bī and the 'Ālim Bī Kīnakās (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 167b–168a, 360b; see also Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 368a). Mullā Sharīf says that Danyāl Bī was married to a woman from the Qungrāt tribe who was the mother of Shāh Murād (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 433b).

important sheikhs and the leaders of the Sufi brotherhoods.<sup>741</sup> The political connotation of marriage alliances at the amirid level is underscored by the manifold conflicts surrounding the institution of *muṣāharat*.

The centuries-long attachment of individual Uzbek tribes to the ruling clans of Mā Warā' al-Nahr turned them into recipients of rewards in the form of pastureland, rent-free land grants, booty, gifts, titles and so on. Court patronage and the constant access to resources in a relatively small and spatially extremely divided realm created a considerable degree of internal division and further segmentation, but also the emergence of aristocratic lineages like the Tūq Manghit (Manghit), the Acha Mailī (Kīnakās), the Ūtārchī (Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq) and others, whose members positioned themselves as intermediaries between the royal court and their own tribes. While their inner-tribal authority was based on notions of genealogical seniority, their brokerage position and the constant interaction with the ruling houses gave the chieftains considerable advantages over their fellow tribesmen. The privileges individual chiefs enjoyed allowed them to enhance their local position vis-à-vis potential rivals and also helped them extend protection to their supporters or enlarge their clientele.<sup>742</sup> The materials further show that in spite of frequent power shifts—and apart from the Acha Mailī lineage of the Kīnakās—the position of several amirid families representing the major players in the field of power remained fairly stable over a period of sixty years and more. Even at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the descendants of *amīrs* like Fāzil Bī, Farhād Bī and others still played a leading role.

In the short term, the fate of the tribal aristocracy depended on a variety of factors like royal favor and privileges granted by the ruler in return for service and support. Of course, the ruler could also transfer his favor from one sub-division of a tribe to another: the most prominent case is the annihilation of the leadership of the Acha Mailī sub-division of the Kīnakās in 1752, followed by special favors granted to other Kīnakās leaders. This is also an example of the imposition of tribal chiefs from above. Another case

---

<sup>741</sup> Mullā Sharīf refers to the traditional matrimonial ties between the Transoxanian rulers and the Jūybārī *khwājas* (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 482b). According to Wafā, Dānyāl Bī Atāliq had married one of his daughters to a Sayyid Atā'ī sheikh (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 358b).

<sup>742</sup> Taking a look at the Pashtun setting in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan, Noelle reaches the same conclusions (Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 224–25).

in point is the appointment of Ghalcha Bēg b. Sarimsāq Bī as the leader of the Marqa in 1757.

Chekhovich says that the first half of the eighteenth century witnessed the increasing segmentation and stratification of the Uzbek tribes in lieu of the internal segmentation of the ruling Chingizid house. This development was the result of the growing economic and political weight of the Uzbek tribal formations.<sup>743</sup> It is confirmed by Barthold, who points to the acquisition of large hereditary estates, which he calls fiefdoms, by the leaders of the nomadic clans. The practice of allocating land grants coincided with the rise of *amīrs* under the Tuqay-Timurids in the seventeenth century.<sup>744</sup> But since the tribes were closely associated with the Shibanids and the conquest by Muḥammad Khān Shībānī, their stratification began probably in the mid or late sixteenth century, or even earlier, and continued throughout the seventeenth century. This process was not complete in the time of the last two Tuqay-Timurids. The overemphasis placed on the amirid stratum of early eighteenth-century Bukhara in the secondary literature is due to the scenario of decline adopted by Soviet authors. It can also be attributed to the fact that many ambitious *amīrs* and their activities become an important motif in the narrative sources. The length and density of the current chapter of this study may give a similar impression. However, we should not ignore the fact that the court continued to be an important “patronage platform” even under the last, allegedly weak Tuqay-Timurids. The negotiation of power I have analyzed in this chapter took place between the tribal leaders *and* the court, but of course also among the Transoxanian nobility. In fact, the fairly even distribution of ranks and titles—although creating inequalities within shorter time intervals—and other aspects linked to court patronage gave rise to a stratification among the Uzbek groups. But the more actors and factions there were, the higher was the demand for resources to be exchanged and redistributed. We should also bear in mind that this process was by no means intended but followed a centuries-old pattern, which was now perpetuated in the development outlined above. The differentiation among the Uzbek elite was not so much a result of the economic position of individual tribal leaders as of ongoing power-driven institutionalization processes. Those processes were far beyond the control of individual actors.

---

<sup>743</sup> Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 56.

<sup>744</sup> Barthold, *Das kulturelle Leben*, 100–01.

The enhanced economic position of the tribal leadership is just one of the outcomes of this process and not its precondition!

The ascent of the Uzbek chiefs coincided with the numerical shrinkage of the ruling clan. Although the aristocratic lineages certainly emerged before the time of Subhān Qulī Khān, the *amīrs* gained more political weight when they entrenched themselves in certain areas. This development was also fostered by the rulers, who tended to reward their associates with extensive tax-privileged land grants. Cases in point are the decrees of ‘Ubaidullah Khān and the gradual conversion of crown land into private land during the reign of the last Tuqay-Timurid kings.<sup>745</sup> Such transfers coincided with a constant appropriation and reprivatization of private property.<sup>746</sup>

The interplay between structuring and structured processes of power conditioned a decentralized political order that was reflected in many new seats of power. Localism, an element to be observed in the Shibanid era, was strengthened. Some *bīs* and *bēgs* founded new towns such as Katta Qūrgān and Shīrābād.<sup>747</sup>

Echoing power asymmetries on a larger scale, Uzbek tribesmen must have had a fine instinct for power gaps and social hierarchies. Egalitarians did not play an important role. Although Amīn Bukhārī points to egalitarian notions, which were of significance in certain situations,<sup>748</sup> the constant flow of patronage had given rise to a more hierarchical order generally fitting the tradition of many Central Asian tribes.<sup>749</sup>

Unlike the Afghan context, which may be seen as consisting of different “tribal belts,”<sup>750</sup> in Transoxania we can distinguish between heterogeneous tribal clusters like the Yetī Ūrūgh or the Qurama, consisting of different component tribes (and their respective sub-sections), and the ordinary tribal

<sup>745</sup> Chekhovich, *Dokumenty*, XIV, XVII–XVIII.

<sup>746</sup> Florian Schwarz, “Contested grounds: ambiguities and disputes over the legal and fiscal status of land in the Manghit Emirate of Bukhara,” *Central Asian Survey* 28, no. 1 (2010): 36–37.

<sup>747</sup> Barthold, *Das kulturelle Leben*, 101; Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 56.

<sup>748</sup> In their argument with the Naymān leader, the Sarāy soldiers indicated that in light of the fact that his father, ‘Abd al-Karīm, was also an Uzbek, they could not tolerate the dominance of Ni‘matullah Bī Naymān (Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 150a; Semenov trans., 169).

<sup>749</sup> Egalitarian notions and a strong hierarchical order may have contradicted each other from the very beginning of Uzbek rule. Further research needs to be done on this, focusing on a wide array of different sources.

<sup>750</sup> Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 222–23.

groupings such as the Manghit, Yūz, Kīnakās and others. Although tribal structures are not a purely spatial phenomenon, the geographic conditions in Mā Warā' al-Nahr partly affected the political landscape. For instance, the tribes in the immediate vicinity of a power center like Balkh or Bukhara had little room for maneuver and were less powerful than the groups inhabiting the eastern, more remote fringes of Transoxania and Cis-Oxania.<sup>751</sup>

Let us first look at the Miyānkālī tribes. In spite of their favorable position near the northern frontier (in Nūr) and in the midst of the most fertile part of Mā Warā' al-Nahr, their habitat was easily accessible from both directions, Bukhara and Samarqand. They inhabited the densely irrigated tracts of land on both sides of the royal road, the major communication artery of Transoxania. Since every ruler urgently needed the fertile river valley to consolidate his position by extracting agricultural resources, the local tribes were the first candidates to be drawn into the Bukharan or Samarqandian orbit. At times, their fierce resistance even accelerated this development, as it provided the pretext for repeated interventions. In more distant regions, the Yūz, Qaṭaghān and Kīnakās had entrenched themselves in small pockets well surrounded and protected by high mountain chains, such as Ḥiṣār, Shahr-i Sabz and Kulāb. Located at an equal distance from alternative power centers like Balkh, Bukhara, Ferghana or Kāshghar, these areas supplied the local *amīrs* with sufficient resources to maintain their own following. From their comfortable bases the chieftains could extend protection to a range of clients, including sedentary Tajik peasants. But they were also able to shop around and constantly look for alternative protectors, changing the latter whenever it suited their interests. Generally speaking, geographical remoteness did not necessarily imply independence, but it meant more options for individual leaders, who often consciously sought Bukharan or other protection to assert themselves against their domestic enemies.

Finding themselves at a certain disadvantage, the tribes of the Āmū Daryā basin such as the Naymān, Qungrāt and Dūrmān—all of them with Mongol origins—lost political weight already in the first half of the seventeenth century, or even in the time before, as their habitats were quite easily accessible from all sides. From Bukhara, the Oxus plain was approachable through a chain of mountain passes like the Tang-i Ḥarrām, the Iron Gate, or the gorge of Nān Dagāna. The Ḥiṣārī rulers could reach the plain by moving

---

<sup>751</sup> Again Noelle arrives at similar results (*ibid.*, 225).

down the Surkhān and Kāfirnihān Valleys; and from Balkh, the Qaṭaghān and later the Iranians were able to cross the Āmū with considerable ease. Hence, the Qungrāt and their neighbors were alternately subject to Bukharan or Balkh rule. Nonetheless, the middle part of the Āmū Daryā Valley was probably regarded as a “politically blind spot” owing to the harsh environmental conditions; the river was lined by a strip of sand dunes and reed thicket. And the loyalty of the nomadic populace was at least doubtful since they could choose to side with either Bukhara or Balkh. It is remarkable that from the time of Abū'l-Faiḫ Khān onward, and even before, no Qungrāt or Dūrmān chief rose to distinction and prominence.

The openness of Uzbek tribes engendered the formation of political unions and confederacies based on the usual relations of exchange and marriage alliances between larger tribal segments. One example are the Qurama (sometimes also spelled Qūrama), a “patchwork” of smaller groups seeking shelter under the protective shield maintained by larger and more powerful Uzbek factions.<sup>752</sup> Whereas Qāzī Wafā mentions Qurama groups living in the vicinity of the Ming and Yūz,<sup>753</sup> Ya‘qūb gives a more detailed picture of the Qurama living among the Manghit of Qarshī.<sup>754</sup>

Looking at the tribal patterns in Transoxania, we can state that patronage structures had certain formative effects; as the Qurama example illustrates, the Uzbek tribes could grant protection and incorporate outside groups. Moreover, Muḥammad Rahīm Khān himself had demonstrated that he could lead his group toward a certain goal. At a time when his authority was called into question by other Uzbek chiefs, the Manghit showed a kind of solidarity at a comparatively high level. In the course of time, Muḥammad Rahīm was able to attract a great variety of new groups and tie them into his web of

---

<sup>752</sup> The term *qurama* literally means “patchwork,” suggesting a heterogeneous mix of various groups (see Karmysheva, *Ocherki*, 208; Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 825). According to Radloff, the Qurama were a Tatar tribe dwelling on the banks of the river Angren between Khojand and Tashkent. Here they represented a mixed population of Uzbeks and Qirghiz composed of the “Dschalair, Telāu, Tarnet, Dchagal-baily and Tarakly” (Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, I, 225). While according to McChesney it was not until the 1690s that the Qurama appeared in Balkh accounts (McChesney, *Waqf*, 118), Barthold found indications that they already existed around 1635–36. In the nineteenth century, the word was used to denote an administrative and geographic unit (W. W. Barthold, “Qurama,” *Enzyklopaedie des Islam*, Ger. edn., II, 1210).

<sup>753</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 215a, 280b, 282a.

<sup>754</sup> See previous chapter, section about the Manghit tribe of Qarshī.

allegiances. This enabled him to establish counter weights to the influential chiefs and *amīrs* within his own tribe.

At the same time, we see that patronage, including the flows of loyalty and resources between subordinate and superordinate actors, could also dilute horizontal inner tribal solidarity and kinship bonds. This does not imply that kinship lost importance. It seems that in some cases the position of leading families was debated by other tribesmen and lineages. Vying for authority, competitors tapped power sources provided by a superior actor or actors from outside to protect their own associates and to do away with local enemies. In order to attain their goals most effectively, they often bypassed intermediate actors. The examples of the Yūz, Sarāy and Kīnakās reveal that even under conditions of increasing external pressure and military threat, the inner tribal tensions did not cease. Instead of the stabilizing effects to be observed in the context of the Manghit or the Qungrāt enjoying Iranian support, the conflicts sometimes even intensified with growing patronage and the flow of resources from outside. In spite of common origin and local tribal identities, the contenders for local authority did not in every case move to unite against the ruler and his superior army. We often find leading *amīrs* from one and the same tribe in opposite camps, for example the Sarāy, Kīnakās, Yūz, Khiṭāʿī-Qipchāq.<sup>755</sup> It is remarkable that in many cases, conflicts between certain tribal groups or sub-groups echoed the rivalries between their patrons at a higher level of social integration.

While power had an ordering effect leading to the integration of various groups into one *Herrschaftsverband* on the one hand, it caused division and inner tribal dispute on the other. In many cases, joint action and the existence of an alliance was very much situational. The best example of this is probably the Yetī Ūrūgh. At times they consisted of a broader spectrum of tribal formations like the Baḥrīn or the Yābū, who were closely associated with the Burqūt, but at other times they fell apart, showing the same splits as other Uzbek factions even within the respective sub-sections. The case of the Yetī Ūrūgh illustrates that the position of the most influential tribe within such alliances could shift considerably, its extent depending on patronage and the actual figurations of power. Another case in point are the Manghit

---

<sup>755</sup> Referring to the *amīrs* of sixteenth-century Transoxania, McChesney comes to similar conclusions. For example, we find Naymān chiefs fighting alongside each of the Shibānid contenders. Amirid commitment to the Juchids tended to mute expressions of tribal solidarity (McChesney, "Central Asia," 177–78).

themselves. After the death of Muḥammad Rahīm Khān, the inner tribal solidarity step by step gave way to a fierce conflict between several subdivisions, some of which—like the Qarā Manghit—even joined the Kīnakās in their struggle against Dānyāl Bī.

Thus far the structural impact of patronage on the tribal groupings of Mā Warā' al-Nahr. Nonetheless, it is difficult if not impossible to answer the question as to whether the pattern of patronage is solely tribal in nature on the basis of the court chronicles. As will be shown in the final chapter, where I will explore a number of other sources, we are not dealing here with institutions produced by a kind of “tribal worldview.” Instead, patronage may be seen as a feature typical of segmentary and communal settings with a multiplicity of personal attachments and a general blurring of the dividing lines between factions and groups, no matter whether tribal, urban communal, religious, or commercial. All these groups and communities were probably just as indistinct and open as the Uzbek tribal formations.

#### THE POPULATION

In this section I want to take a look at the Transoxanian population during the period in question, that of the late Tuqay-Timurids and early Manghit. The forms of organization and different ways to cope with uncertainties caused by the periodic warfare are of particular interest. Other questions concern how far the ordinary population was involved in military activities and the defense of cities and smaller settlements. Were the people trained in military techniques, and how was the defense organized? I will endeavor to find answers by interpreting the primary sources cumulatively against the background of the existing literature.

According to Paul, in pre-Mongol times local notables played a key role during military campaigns and sieges. In Samanid Transoxania particularly, a large part of the populace, though not performing military service on a permanent basis, was de facto not only well versed in the military field but formed armed contingents on a large scale.<sup>756</sup> When towns and cities were besieged by outside forces, notables and religious dignitaries decided what to do and were also responsible for negotiating the terms of submission. Often

---

<sup>756</sup> Paul, *Herrscher, Gemeinwesen, Vermittler*, 100; see also Jürgen Paul, *The State and the Military: the Samanid Case* (Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1994).

the notables brought about a political decision affecting the overall political configurations by taking the side of a certain candidate or party in the power struggles that engulfed the region. In other cases, armed forces among the urban population were able to decide such a struggle by putting up resistance or opening the city gates. In times when the central authority collapsed, the cities attempted to organize a proper defense, while religious dignitaries were often dispatched to obtain the pardon of the besiegers. A monopoly on the use of force did not exist. There were a lot of groups not only experienced in the handling of weapons but also ready to make use of them to defend themselves.<sup>757</sup> The works of Manz, Paul, Noelle-Karimi and others show that this state continued throughout the post-Mongol period until the second half of the nineteenth century.<sup>758</sup> Not only nomadic invaders or the ruling Turko-Mongol, partly nomadic elite were armed; a large part of the sedentary population was also experienced in war and therefore able to organize and engage in joint military action.

Although our sources at first glance suggest a sharp divide between military and non-military elements, echoed by the dichotomist distinction between the army and the subjects, the phrase *sipāh wa fuqarā* or *sipāh wa ra'āyā* does not imply that such a sharp dichotomy existed in reality.<sup>759</sup> Similar to the *Turk wa Tājik* or *Ūzbek wa Tājik*, the word pair *sipāh wa ra'āyā* meant the entire population consisting of tribal elements, and here especially the Turko-Mongol warrior elite (*Turk* = *sipāh*) and the sedentary parts of the society composed of Persian-speakers (*Tājik/Sart* = *ra'āyā* or *fuqarā*).<sup>760</sup> Thus the phrase “*sipāh wa ri'āyā*” slumbering in the cradle of

<sup>757</sup> Paul, *Herrscher, Gemeinwesen, Vermittler*, 137; Jürgen Paul, “Wehrhafte Städte. Belagerungen von Herat, 1448–1468,” *Asiatische Studien—Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft/Études asiatiques: Revue de la Société Suisse—Asie* 58 (2004): 186–87.

<sup>758</sup> Manz, *Power, Politics and Religion*, 111–12, 117–28; Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 93–100. Investigating the defense capacity of Timurid Herat, Paul also points to the role of the city’s notables, in particular the members of the religious establishment, who in times of crisis decided whether to hold the city or deliver it to the besiegers. Its actual defense was undertaken by the urban population (Paul, “Wehrhafte Städte,” 171–89).

<sup>759</sup> Starting out from the class theory, Sukhareva focuses on the distinction between warriors (*sipāh*), religious scholars (*‘ulamā*) and subjects (*fuqarā*) (see Sukhareva, *Bukhara*, 183–87).

<sup>760</sup> From the Mongol period onward, the term *Tāzik* was used in historical texts and documents in the formula “*Turk wa Tāzik*” that was later replaced by the western Iranian form *Tājik* (Tajik)—the designation for sedentary, non-tribal Muslims—and by the

safety and tranquility”<sup>761</sup> applied to the entire populace living in peace. Since both elements—Turks and Tajiks—lived in coexistence, it is difficult to draw a clear line of distinction, especially since many people were bilingual. And although the Uzbeks epitomized a rather exclusive military stratum from the sixteenth century onward,<sup>762</sup> this does not mean that other people were “civilians” in the modern sense of the word.

One of those non-Uzbek groups were the Ghalcha. As will be seen later on, their actions decisively influenced the political fate of regions such as Hiṣār and the mountain valleys east of Ūrgūt. Besides, we find a large number of Persian speakers inhabiting the settlements and fortresses in the mountain valleys of the Turkistan Range. In 1756 the local Ghalcha of Santāb turned against their governor, Jum‘a Bēg, because of his oppressive behavior. The local sedentary population locked the governor out and requested the aid of the Bukharan ruler, who promptly sent his troops and installed a new governor. It is likely that in the interval between the expulsion of the old governor and the arrival of government forces, armed elements of the population took control of the town and implemented measures for its defense. Control over the town gates was ceded to the new governor upon the arrival of Bukharan detachments. The Ghalcha of the Nihān Valley north of Dehнау are a similar case; in 1758 they took the side of the ousted ruler, Muḥammad Amīn Bī Yūz, and created serious trouble for the government forces.

Whereas the Ghalcha were experienced riflemen, the Uzbek warriors often fought with conventional weapons like daggers, sabers, bows and arrows, lancets and spears. The travel accounts tell us that the employment of artillery cannons was problematic for most of the Uzbeks who lacked the

---

fifteenth century the phrase “Turk wa Tājik” had become standard when referring to the entire population of the realm, both sedentary and nomadic, Turkic and Iranian respectively (Subtelny, “The Symbiosis,” 48–49). In contrast, the term Sart initially meant merchant and was applied to bearers of the Perso-Islamic civilization (Iranians/Tajiks). But after the advent of the Uzbek and the sedentarization of many Turks, going hand in hand with a broader Turkicization, the term came to denote the entire sedentary population, particularly bilingual town dwellers (W. Barthold [M. E. Subtelny], “Sārt,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., IX, 66–68).

<sup>761</sup> This expression, the cradle of safety or tranquility, is stressed by some of the historians, for instance Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 6b, 126b, 144a, 196a, 197b; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 9b, 18a, 61b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 126b, 300a.

<sup>762</sup> Holzwarth, “The Uzbek State,” 99–105.

skills to use them properly.<sup>763</sup> In mid-nineteenth-century Cis-Oxania, for example, there were just a few in Kunduz that were held to impress the enemy. Despite the small standing and regularly paid army instituted by Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, in the second half of the eighteenth century a large number of fighters were furnished by the Uzbek tribes and led by the respective chiefs, who mobilized a part of their followers and dependants in times of war and also took care of their equipment. Prior to the usual campaigns, local notables and chieftains mobilized “seasonal fighters” by activating their patronage networks.<sup>764</sup> The latter formed relatively stable pools for the recruitment of warriors needed for the defense of the cities. After the end of military expeditions, the tribal contingents dispersed and returned to their home regions, where they continued living either as pastoralists or as ordinary peasants. Another category of soldiers were the *qarā chirīk*, irregular auxiliary troops and militias furnished by local potentates to the central government in times of war.<sup>765</sup>

This implies that a large part of the Uzbek nomads and even sedentary Turkic speakers was either permanently armed or well versed in the use of standard weapons. Lancets, daggers, bows and arrows were probably to be found in many households. A glance at the sources shows that in terms of numbers most of the chiefs were only able to muster a few troops; for instance, the Burqūt and Baḥrīn figure with two thousand and three thousand warriors respectively,<sup>766</sup> and even a strong leader like Īrdāna Bī with a larger sphere of influence commanded only ten thousand soldiers.<sup>767</sup> For those

<sup>763</sup> Benevini, *Poslannik*, [Kratkoj Zhurnal/Rep. dated 08-04-1726], 123; Effremov, *Devjatiletnee*, 32; Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, II, 479; Holzwarth, “Relations,” 202. With regard to the Uzbeks inhabiting the plains south of the Āmū Daryā, Harlan reports that firearms were seldom used, except under cover, and that the military operations of the Uzbeks were confined to predatory excursions against weak and unprotected neighbors. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Uzbeks of Balkh were not acquainted with the use of cannons in the field (Frank E. Ross, ed., *Central Asia. Personal Narrative of General Josiah Harlan 1832–1841* (London: Luzac & Co., 1939), 61–63).

<sup>764</sup> In most cases the seasonal troops gathered near Bukhara before the start of the campaign, or they joined the army en route (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 27b, 140a–b, 171a, 204b, 205a, 227a passim; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 226a–b, 298b, 409a passim).

<sup>765</sup> Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān once employed the *qarā chirīk* to dig a canal in order to divert the water of the Kuzār River and cut off the water supply of the besieged fortress of Khuzār (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 182b; see also next chapter).

<sup>766</sup> Tāli’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 157a; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 57a, 296b.

<sup>767</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 225a.

participating in campaigns, this was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they risked their lives and were uncertain whether they would return from the battlefield; but on the other hand, military enterprises were one of the few opportunities for obtaining income in the form of shares of booty, and this was seen as an alternative to agriculture, pastoralism or trade.

I will now briefly return to the urban population and how they coped with the uncertainty inherent in the prevailing social order(s). There were in principle several ways open to the ordinary people. Firstly, as followers and clients they could exert a considerable degree of pressure on their patrons to satisfy local demands for protection and survival. Often the outcomes of combat were determined from inside the besieged cities, as was the case in Jizakh, Tashkent or Dehnau. In these towns, local lineages of Sufi sheikhs, the *khwājas*, tracing themselves back to the Prophet and/or the first caliphs, constituted an urban elite that had to cope with the ups and downs of history and not infrequently performed as military leaders and governors.<sup>768</sup>

Many *khwāja* families had been involved in commercial activities since Shibanid times and held a monopoly in the caravan trade. They possessed extensive landed property in various cities and concentrated also immovable property (*sukniyat*) such as caravanserais, bath houses, markets, canals and *madrasas* in their hands.<sup>769</sup> An example is the town of Jizakh, which in 1746–47 was governed by a lineage of local *khwājas* affiliated to the Ming tribe. In 1747 the most influential dignitary and governor, Farukh Khwāja,<sup>770</sup> who before this had refused ‘Ibādullah Khiṭā’ī’s suggestion to take him into service, was killed by raiding followers of the Khiṭā’ī chief. Shortly thereafter, Farukh Khwāja’s son ‘Umar Khwāja consented to the Khiṭā’ī leader and gave him his sister as a wife. When he learned about the approaching Qizilbāsh, ‘Ibādullah left Jizakh, whereas a group of Uzbek *kadkhudās* turned to the *khwāja* and in vain suggested giving up resistance. The siege of the town began with artillery attacks, and although the governor resisted, the pressure from the populace was apparently so strong that the local elders independently decided to submit to the Qizilbāsh. After being given the usual *khal’ats* and guarantees of security, ‘Umar Khwāja also surrendered and received some Khiṭā’ī captives delivered by Bihbūd Khān

<sup>768</sup> Holzwarth, “Relations,” 183–86.

<sup>769</sup> Haidar, “Urban Classes,” 26.

<sup>770</sup> Kāzīm refers to Jizakh only as *qal’a-yi Farukh* or *qal’a-yi Farukh Khwāja* (Kāzīm, ‘*Ālamārā*, III, 1109–10).

so that he could take blood revenge for the death of his father.<sup>771</sup> In many cases, *khwājas* and *sayyids* not only acted as religious authorities but also as top commanders in the army, or participated in battles side by side with the ruler. Cases in point are Khwāja Nizām al-Dīn Husainī, Qāzī Ni‘matullah Ghijduwānī and Qāzī Ayūb Khwāja Nasafī, who in 1737 participated in the battle of Qarshī.<sup>772</sup> When in 1758 rebellious factions entered Dehnau and besieged the citadel (*arg*) from the inner city, they could not continue their activities without the consent of the local population and the support of Ismā‘īl Khwāja and other religious figures.<sup>773</sup>

Another possibility was of course open resistance and the participation of the population in the defense and fortification of cities in times of war. In view of the small number of professional soldiers stationed in local garrisons,<sup>774</sup> the male members of the population were often actively involved in defending their towns against invaders and foreign conquerors.

<sup>771</sup> Bihbūd Khān married ‘Umar Khwāja’s sister, razed the *qal‘a* of Jizakh and resettled the population in Samarqand (ibid., 1110). The Bukharan sources only mention the siege of Jizakh and the fight with the *Khiṭā’ī* but do not refer to the *khwājas*.

<sup>772</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Maḥzar*, fol. 57a. Around 1215/1800–01, Muḥammad Yūsuf Khwāja, a son of the influential Muḥammad Amīn Khwāja Naqīb, was governor of Jizakh. He was married to a sister of Amīr Ḥaidar and his father was known for his military prowess. (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 12b–13a). In the time of Amīr Naṣrullah, a certain Sayyid Murshid Tūqsāba figures prominently as a skillful commander whose troops were famous for their red garments (*Zafarnāma*, 192, 194).

<sup>773</sup> See below in the section on Muḥammad Amīn Bī Yūz.

<sup>774</sup> In most cases, Qāzī Wafā does not give the precise number of soldiers stationed at local garrisons (see Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 185a, 200a; 267a). But the small number—the source usually mentions just a few hundred, or one thousand to two thousand warriors at the most—supplied locally to the Manghit *amīr*, as well as the modest number of eleven thousand regularly paid soldiers, suggest that he could only afford to staff his garrisons with a comparatively small force. In a few cases the author gives a clearer picture. For instance, in 1748 Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī stationed one thousand warriors at the forts of Deh Baland and Qarghān south of Nūr, where he had to pay the costs of their provisions and allowances for more than two years (ibid., fol. 145a). In Jumāda II 1163/May–June 1750, only two hundred soldiers manned the fort of Pāshkhūrd in the south to defend it against the troops of Muḥammad Amīn Bī (ibid., fols. 158a–b). In 1750 the Manghit leader stationed three hundred soldiers in the fort of Ūrta Qūrgḥān in the region of Shahr-i Sabz (ibid., fol. 176a). After the conquest of Ūrgūt in 1753, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī conferred the governorship on a certain Ādīna Qul and sent only three hundred soldiers from Bukhara (see below). Dealing with the history of sieges laid to Timurid Herat, Paul also remarks that the garrisons were staffed with only a few soldiers (Paul, “Wehrhafte Stadter,” 182).

As has been described in the section on Ḥiṣār, the inhabitants of a town could cause harm even to troops that were superior in terms of weaponry and military clout. Only armed with stones, clubs, forks and other light utensils, the people of Ḥiṣār were able to reduce the Bukharan camp to a state of tumult and plunder.

The material investigated shows that local potentates and governors as well as the monarchs depended to a considerable extent on the support of the population and the notables. No ruler, not even the strongest, could do without a minimum of consent on the part of the *fuqarā*, who only at first glance appear to be passive subjects to authority.<sup>775</sup> Particularly in periods of war and invasion, the king had to try to enlist the support of the notables and the populace because of his limited military capacities and incomplete control of the realm. When in 1722–23 the forces of Rajab Khān and Ibrāhīm Bī entered the *tūmānāt* of Bukhara, Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān's general soon dispatched some commanders to Ghijduwān in order to ensure the support of the governor, Šūfi Tūqsāba Moghūl, and the local nobility. It was primarily a matter of time and who would first succeed in entering this important town and obtain the support of the notables. After arriving there, the king's commanders had to win over the city elders like Qāzī 'Abdullah Ghijduwānī, Khwāja 'Ubaid und Khwāja Mutawallī in negotiations. Subsequently, the notables organized the fortification of the city wall and took care of its defense.<sup>776</sup> We see here that the members of the religious establishment played a pivotal role in this war by declaring their loyalty to Abū'l-Faiḏ Khān. In this case, Sufi sheikhs also performed military tasks by organizing the defense and stationing their disciples and associates on the walls, towers and buttresses. The chronicler remarks that although the rebel leaders sent messages to instigate the notables to change sides, the local establishment and the entire population retained their loyalty to the king.<sup>777</sup>

In the same context, we learn how Khwāja Inṣāf Sarāyi negotiated the terms of defense with the city elders of Bukhara and instructed them to see to the defense and fortification themselves. In a situation where all troops

---

<sup>775</sup> In her study on Timurid rule, Manz concludes that rulership could not simply be bequeathed but had to be won. Likewise, governors could not hold their cities without the consent of the notables (Manz, *Power, Politics and Religion*, 277, 281). See also Hourani, *History*, 134.

<sup>776</sup> Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 133a–b; Semenov trans., 117.

<sup>777</sup> *Ibid.*; Russian text, 177.

engaged the enemy outside the capital city, the regular armed forces were not very imposing: only four hundred soldiers patrolled inside and outside Bukhara. Hardly surprisingly, the eunuch told the notables to attack the enemies with stones and to cordon off the alleys with wood. When in 1737 the Khiwan ruler Ilbārs Khān appeared with an army before Bukhara, the senior eunuch Ulfat Sarāyi and the notables closed the city gates and together with the inhabitants placed patrols and armed men on the walls and towers.<sup>778</sup>

When after Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's sudden death the Uzbek tribal leaders and their followers from different corners of Mā Warā' al-Nahr rose in rebellion against his uncle and successor, Dānyāl Bī, the latter appealed to the populace to fortify the *kūchas* of Bukhara with wood and not hesitate to attack and kill the rebels:

“When this order spread like rumors in the city, the ordinary population and the commanders of the troops attacked most of the enemies, who had primarily ensconced themselves in the Chahār Bāgh-i Kadū Khāna between the Mazār Gate and Samarqand Gate. Motivated by the public tumult, the inhabitants of the city came upon this *qaum* like the rain of calamity and put them to flight. Throwing stones, clubs, arrows and shooting with rifles at those chiefs and governors, they killed many of them with the blades of perdition, threw most of those unsuccessful losers from the city wall and looted their families and livestock.”<sup>779</sup>

In this example we see how the *ra'āyā*, the subjects, actively chose one side in an unfolding conflict. They brought about a fast decision as to which faction would finally win and take over the government. When in 1759/60 Shāh Murād Bī and his detachment arrived at Karmīna to defend the town against the approaching troops of Fāzil Bī Yūz, he ordered the entire population (*sipāhī wa ra'āyā*) to organize weapons and get ready for war.<sup>780</sup>

The difficulties of distinguishing clearly between the soldiery (*sipāh*) and the subjects (*ra'āyā*) become evident from the material discussed. According to Radloff, this situation continued well into the nineteenth century. He also remarks that the urban population not only actively participated in the

<sup>778</sup> Ilbārs Khān approached Bukhara when Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and his army were at Qarshī, where they had suffered a severe blow at the hands of the Qizilbāsh (Kāzim, *Ālamārā*, II, 596; Muḥammad Amīn, *Maẓhar*, fol. 58a).

<sup>779</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 327a–b. Chekhovich also mentions these events (Chekhovich, “O nekotorykh,” 89).

<sup>780</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 438b.

defense of the cities but often fought better than the soldiers.<sup>781</sup> Having visited Transoxania in the early nineteenth century, an Afghan traveler writes:

“In the whole country of Turkestan every man, small as well as high, ties a scimitar to his waist. Some persons have one dagger while other [sic!] carry two daggers. In short nobody is found without a dagger. Every man is also found with a flint, and whenever he needs, produces fire with it.”<sup>782</sup>

Traveling to Bukhara about ten years later, Baron von Meyendorff reports that some of the Transoxanian villages looked like citadels because they were completely surrounded by walls equipped with embrasures and flanked by small towers.<sup>783</sup>

When after the death of Amīr Ḥaidar in late 1826, a struggle for authority engulfed Transoxania and Naṣrullah Khān besieged the capital, his brother ‘Umar Khān relied on a large number of soldiers and the nobility of Bukhara. The notables mobilized their followers to defend and fortify the city. Discouraged by the resistance of the population, the Yetī Ūrūgh, the Naymān and the Samarqandī contingents deserted Naṣrullah and fled to their native regions. One of the most determined tribes opposing the ambitious prince were the Kḥiṭā’ī-Qipchāq, who captured the towns of Yangī Qūrghān and Chilak near Samarqand, whereupon the people (*mardum*) of Samarqand killed one of their *āqsaqāls*, a certain Khwāja Laṭīf. Shortly thereafter we find the populace in control of the garrison after arresting the commander and his men, who supported Naṣrullah Khān. Even the son of the governor, Ṣafar Bī Ghulām, who had accompanied the prince to Bukhara, now switched over and sided with the population.<sup>784</sup>

#### THE YETI ŪRŪGH AMĪRS OF MIYĀNKĀL

In the first two years of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s rule as *atālīq*, the Zarafshān Valley was the major target of punitive campaigns led by the *atālīq* and his supporters to put down rebellions instigated by local chieftains. At least this is the picture presented by the sources, which very much adopt a pro-Manghit perspective. Remarkably, these local rebellions did not take the

<sup>781</sup> Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, II, 479.

<sup>782</sup> Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 36 (English text, 34).

<sup>783</sup> von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 237.

<sup>784</sup> Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 29a.

form of concentrated attacks on Bukharan forces but were rather characterized by a policy of wait-and-see, probably along with the refusal to deliver the annual *kharāj* and the *zakāt*, the first indicator of open revolt. Another obvious sign of rebellion was the refusal to furnish troops for the army of the ruler. In light of the resources at their disposal, Yetī Ūrūgh chiefs like Ghaibullah Bī Baḥrīn and Tughāy Murād Bī Burqūt considered themselves strong enough to challenge Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, who at the beginning acted from a very small base of power.<sup>785</sup> In contrast to him, the Miyānkālī *amīrs* controlled the most extensive and richest part of Transoxania and were therefore less inclined to recognize his authority.

### *Ghaibullah Bī Baḥrīn*

The main obstacle for the opponents of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī in Miyānkāl was their lack of internal organization. From the very beginning, the local *amīrs* failed to forge a robust alliance strong enough to pose a challenge to the standing Bukharan army. The first to rise in open rebellion were the Yetī Ūrūgh in the central and western parts of the Miyānkāl between Karmīna in the west and Khaṭarchī and Panjshanba in the east.

Led by the Baḥrīn, the Yetī Ūrūgh occupied an important position as guardians of Karmīna, the strategic Bukharan fortress on the route to Samarqand further in the east.<sup>786</sup> Like most of the other Uzbek tribal leaders, in 1737 the Yetī Ūrūgh leaders Ghaibullah Bī Baḥrīn and ‘Abd al-Satār Bī Baḥrīn had participated in the battle of Qarshī against the Qizilbāsh, and in 1746–47 joined the Manghit *amīr* when he was approaching Miyānkāl together with his Iranian allies.<sup>787</sup> Later they also belonged to the delegation of Uzbek nobles accompanying Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī on his return to Mashhad.<sup>788</sup> When the Qizilbāsh commander Bihbūd Khān besieged

<sup>785</sup> After the withdrawal of the Iranian troops in 1747, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his supporters only held possession of Bukhara, Qarshī and a few small pockets in the eastern Miyānkāl.

<sup>786</sup> For a brief description of Karmīna in the middle of the nineteenth century, see Lehmann, *Reise*, 92, 94.

<sup>787</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 27b–28a, 71b, 74b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 226a–b, 302a. Kāzīm does not list them among the other tribes of Miyānkāl joining the Iranians prior to the campaign against ‘Ibādullah Khiṭā’ī (see Kāzīm, *‘Ālamārā*, III, 1104).

<sup>788</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 84a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 302a–b.

Bukhara, they rendered assistance to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī;<sup>789</sup> Mullā Sharīf even portrays Ghaibullah Bī as belonging to the circle of close friends and brave favorites (*wullāt wa muqarrabān-i jalādat-ṣifāt*).<sup>790</sup>

In early 1161/1748, Ghaibullah Bī found himself in an alliance with Tughāy Murād Bī and a group of Qazāq. This alliance started attacking the Turkomān Yūzī who inhabited the small settlement of Kadan (?) near the town of Dabūsīya.<sup>791</sup> The actions of the Baḥrīn chief and his partners were to a great extent dictated by pastoral and agricultural interests. Since many different tribes settled in western and central Miyānkāl, there must have been pressure on the arable land and grazing grounds. Furthermore, the Yetī Ūrūgh leadership had once again lost the governorship of Karmīna, which Nādir Shāh had granted to Dānyāl Bī.<sup>792</sup> Now their military activities at Kadan occasioned the intervention of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, whose troops made the small fortress of Kū-yi Nau (somewhere between Khaṭarchī and Panjshanba) their logistical base for the following operations. But before the arrival of the Bukharan troops, the new coalition suddenly fell apart, and the Burqūt and Qazāq escaped to Nūr further in the north.<sup>793</sup>

When the commander Jum‘a Qul laid siege to Khaṭarchī, the Yetī Ūrūgh quickly moved their herds to the mountain fort of Yanbāsh, where they were soon targeted and plundered by the Bukharan troops.<sup>794</sup> After the occupation of Yanbāsh, Jum‘a Qul launched an assault on Panjshanba, two *farsakhs* east of Khaṭarchī. At the same time, he attacked the Jalāyir inhabiting the area in between and captured their fortress Qulba on the southern bank of the

<sup>789</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fol. 113a.

<sup>790</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 341a. According to Qāzī Wafā, Ghaibullah Bī Baḥrīn was instructed to defend the Samarqand Gate along with other *amīrs* like Dānyāl Bī (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fol. 122b).

<sup>791</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 130b–131a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 358a–b.

<sup>792</sup> Mullā Sharīf reports that although Dānyāl Bī was appointed governor of Karmīna by Nādir Shāh, he was later removed by Abū‘l-Faiḏ Khān. But after Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s return to Bukhara in summer 1747, he again installed his uncle as governor (see Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 298a).

<sup>793</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fol. 131b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 359a.

<sup>794</sup> The small fort of Yanbāsh (Nāybāsh?) was located on one of the southern mountain slopes of the Āq Tāgh, a night’s ride northeast of Khaṭarchī, but it seemed more easily accessible from Panjshanba (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fol. 133a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 360b). For its location see Radloff’s map of the central Zarafshān Valley (Radloff, “Serafschanthal”).

Zarafshān. Subsequently, most of the Jalāyir submitted to the Bukharan troops and were moved to the areas blessed with royal protection.<sup>795</sup>

Impressed by the military power and the rapid advance of the Manghit army, Ghaibullah Bī gathered “the people of the Baḥrīn and the Yetī Ūrūgh” for a consultation (*kingāsh*) and gave up his resistance. But as Qāzī Wafā describes it, this and the rendering of gifts were simply delaying tactics in order to muster additional forces and resume resistance. In the following battle in early Rabi‘ II 1161/March 1748, the Yetī Ūrūgh suffered a resounding defeat and delivered Khaṭarchī and all their settlements to government officials. Subsequently, they were either relocated to Bukhara or placed in other towns and villages in Miyānkāl.<sup>796</sup>

One of the first measures taken by the *atālīq* was the installation of new governors from outside: Shāhsawār Tūqsāba Kīlājī was appointed governor of Panjshanba, while Khaṭarchī was given to a certain Qul Muḥammad Dādkhwāh Manghit.<sup>797</sup>

In the following year, some of the Yetī Ūrūgh joined the new alliance under Tughāy Murād Bī but surrendered on the arrival of Bukharan troops in Kū-yi Nau in spring 1749.<sup>798</sup> From that time on, Ghaibullah Bī remained loyal to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and in 1756 was awarded the office of *dīwānbēgī* for his services and the troops furnished to the court.<sup>799</sup> After the death of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, he continued to remain loyal to his successor Dānyāl Bī. In summer 1759/60, he commanded the left wing of the Bukharan army to defend the town of Karmīna.<sup>800</sup>

---

<sup>795</sup> According to the information given by Wafā, the Jalāyir were led by Īrdal Bāy Tūqsāba and occupied small enclaves on both banks of the Zarafshān, for example the towns of Anjaka (?) und Qulba (?), the first located on the northern river bank between Khaṭarchī and Panjshanba. Living in the shadow of their influential neighbors, the Baḥrīn, the Jalāyir were clearly inferior in number and influence (see Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 135a–b).

<sup>796</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 133a–139b.

<sup>797</sup> Ibid., fol. 139b; see also Bregel, *Administration*, 21.

<sup>798</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 156a.

<sup>799</sup> Ibid., fol. 258a.

<sup>800</sup> Ibid., fol. 335b.

*The Yābū*

The defeat of the Baḥrīn and their allies, and their removal from vast parts of their former habitat had an immediate effect as it led to a considerable reshuffling of the tribal tableau of western and central Miyānkāl. Having gained control over the important towns of the valley, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī had no desire, and perhaps not even the capacity, to extend his authority beyond urban centers like Karmīna and Khaṭarchī in order to establish lasting control over the intervening space. Instead, he opted to create a new local elite loyal to him by favoring the Yābū tribe. For example, the Yābū “enjoyed immense favors from the high-standing *amīr* and received abundant benefits and very much grain from him.”<sup>801</sup> But at the first signs of rebellion, the court chronicler reports that “they pulled the foot of obedience out of the circle of loyalty.”<sup>802</sup>

Whatever plans Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī had in mind regarding his new clients, his strategy thoroughly failed. After the subjugation of the Baḥrīn, the Yābū chieftain, Khāliq Wazīr, managed to become the new ally of Tughāy Murād Bī Burqūt, who is identified as the main motivating force behind all rebellions in the first two years of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s reign as *atāliq*. The revolt of the Yābū, however, occasioned the next military campaign by the Bukharan army, beginning on Dhū’l-Qa‘da 25, 1161/November 16, 1748. Operating from their forts Shahrak and Turkistānī, the Yābū put up stiff resistance to the Bukharan troops.<sup>803</sup>

Muḥammad Raḥīm’s commanders first targeted the fort of Shahrak because the Yābū leadership and their supporters were stationed there. But backed by Burqūt contingents, the rebels were able to repulse the advance of the Manghit and subsequently looted the peasants in the environs of their *qal‘a*.<sup>804</sup>

In the following months, the Yābū upheaval became a considerable threat to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s authority, especially since the *amīr* initially underestimated his enemies and their motivation. Obviously, the new lords of the western Miyānkāl were not willing to give up their newly won position among the local tribes. What made the Manghit leader most vulnerable was certainly the loss of some of his influential commanders, like

<sup>801</sup> Ibid., fol. 149a.

<sup>802</sup> Ibid.

<sup>803</sup> Ibid., fols. 149a–150b.

<sup>804</sup> Ibid., fols. 150a–b.

Qul Muḥammad Dādkhwāh and Khūshḥāl Bēg, who were killed during the first round of fighting.<sup>805</sup> Worse still, the rebellion spread over the whole of central and western Miyānkāl when the Yābū were joined by the Turkomān Yūzī and the Ghalcha from the northern mountains as well as by the Bahrīn and other Yetī Ūrūgh from Kū-yi Nau and the small fortress of Qipchāq. Reinforced by their allies, the rebels cut off all communication and supply routes and, motivated by their surprising success, intensified their resistance. The fighting continued for the next six months, well into the year 1749,<sup>806</sup> and got Muḥammad Rahīm Bī into serious trouble. He knew that as long as the rebellion continued, he would be unable to consolidate his position. The *atālīq* needed to establish a permanent hold over Karmīna and the towns in the western part of the Zarafshān Valley in order to secure the access route to the Bukharan oasis and his own hold there. But it was also important for him to gain permanent access to the agricultural wealth of the valley—resources he required to guarantee the steady supply of his troops with food provisions and to maintain a military power base strong enough to defend the capital against potential rivals. Furthermore, he had to secure the major communication route in Transoxania linking Bukhara to the possessions of his only ally in the east, the Khiṭāʿī chieftain Khwājā Yār Bī.<sup>807</sup>

Despite this sudden success of the rebels, things changed to the advantage of the government the next spring. Muḥammad Rahīm Bī set out on his first major expedition on Rabiʿ II 12, 1162/March 31, 1749. He soon dealt a significant blow to his enemies and occupied Turkistānī and Shahrak after a short siege. The punishment inflicted upon the Yābū was severe: the *amīr* ordered one hundred prisoners to be executed and the subsequent erection of pyramids of skulls as a warning to everyone.<sup>808</sup> The surviving rebels now retired and found refuge in the town of Qipchāq,<sup>809</sup> while their Yetī Ūrūgh allies at Kū-yi Nau submitted to the government. Deserted by all their partners, the Yābū eventually surrendered to Muḥammad Rahīm Bī, who

<sup>805</sup> Ibid., fol. 151b.

<sup>806</sup> Ibid., fol. 152a.

<sup>807</sup> The rebellion impeded communication and transport on the most important road between Samarqand and Bukhara.

<sup>808</sup> The erection of pyramids of the skulls of defeated and killed enemies was a long-lived pattern in the region; one example of this is Tīmūr, who repeatedly committed acts of ferocity (Beatrice F. Manz, “Tīmūr Lang,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., vol. X, 512; Roemer, “Tīmūr in Iran,” 55).

<sup>809</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 155b.

ordered the destruction of Qipchāq and a resettlement campaign to move all the remaining Yetī Ūrūgh to the capital.<sup>810</sup> Khāliq Wazīr Yābū was likewise punished and relocated to Bukhara.<sup>811</sup> Afterward, the *atālīq* appointed Ismāʿīl Bakāwul Qarlīq as new governor of Khaṭarchī and ordered the resettlement of the Qarlīq tribe from Nasaf to Khaṭarchī and its environs.<sup>812</sup> With this step, he killed two birds with one stone. First, he ceded an important town and its environs to tribal forces loyal to him; and second, by removing thousands of Qarlīq tribesmen from Nasaf, he consolidated the dominant position of his own tribe there.

### *Tughāy Murād Bī Burqūt*

Among the tribes of Miyānkāl, the Burqūt enjoyed an exceptional position because of the geographic conditions of their native region, Nūr. In the time of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, Nūr was governed by the Burqūt chief Tughāy Murād Bī (d. 1172/1758), who, with the advantages afforded by his well-protected stronghold, became a major antagonist of the Manghit ruler. From the sources available to me, not very much is known about the ancestors of Tughāy Murād Bī. Ṭālīʿ mentions a message sent by Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Atālīq in 1722 to solicit the aid of Muḥammad Daulat Bī (Daulān?) Turkomān and his ally Sarīgh Bī Burqūt. The latter is portrayed as a mountaineer (*mard-i kūh-naward*)<sup>813</sup> in the fight against the supporters of Rajab Khān.<sup>814</sup> Later he mentions a certain Ḥājī Burqūt, who might have been identical to the above-mentioned *amīr*, commanding the Burqūt troops during the battle of Hazāra in 1722.<sup>815</sup>

Tughāy Murād Bī was probably a son or nephew of Sarīgh Bī Burqūt;<sup>816</sup> he appears for the first time during the battle between the Qizilbāsh and the Uzbeks at Qarshī in autumn 1737. There, together with the Baḥrīn leaders Ghaibullah Bī and ʿAbd al-Satār Bī, he commanded the left wing of the

<sup>810</sup> Ibid., fols. 149a–157a.

<sup>811</sup> Ibid., fol. 149a.

<sup>812</sup> Ibid., fol. 157a.

<sup>813</sup> Ṭālīʿ, *Tārīkh*, fol. 157a; Semenov trans., 134.

<sup>814</sup> Ibid., fols. 48b–49a; Russian text, 73.

<sup>815</sup> Ibid., fol. 67a; Russian text, 88.

<sup>816</sup> Ṭālīʿ also mentions a son of Sarīgh Bī participating in the battle launched against the Baḥrīn in summer 1723, but he unfortunately does not give his name (ibid., fols. 157b–158a; Russian text, 135).

Uzbek army.<sup>817</sup> Three years later he attended Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his father upon the establishment of Nadirid sovereignty and also joined the *atālīq* and his Iranian partners during their campaign against ‘Ibādullah Khiṭā’ī.<sup>818</sup> In the *Tuḥfat*, Tughāy Murād Bī is portrayed as a clever intriguer often causing the courtiers of Abū’l-Faiḏ Khān quite a headache.<sup>819</sup>

“Although the said Tughāy Murād Bī acted in consent with the court functionaries, he caused the steed of calumny to run in the arena of incitement by striking fire and damaging the affairs of others in the service of this mighty dynasty. He whispered contradictory plans and the way to disturb the dignity of His Majesty into the ears of the small and the big confidants of the royal court.”<sup>820</sup>

This unflattering characterization notwithstanding, the Burqūt leader is also described as an astute man unequalled in his sharp intellect and farsightedness.<sup>821</sup> Moreover, he is the *amīr* with the widest scope of spatial movement and the most outstanding cosmopolitan experience after Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī. In spring 1160/1747, he accompanied the Manghit commander and the other Uzbek chiefs on their journey to the Iranian court at Mashhad to pay homage to Nādir Shāh. On that occasion he was identified as one of the opponents of Nādir’s protégé and, together with the court eunuch Khwāja Ulfat, put under the control of the Iranian court, where both remained until Nādir Shāh’s assassination. Making use of the turmoil following Nādir’s death, Tughāy Murād Bī joined the Afghans led by Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī and went with them to Kandahār, where he probably witnessed Aḥmad Shāh’s coronation.<sup>822</sup> From the Afghan capital he made it to Transoxania and his hometown Nūr, where he joined his brother Yādḡār Bī, who had meanwhile established himself as the temporary leader of the Burqūt. Subsequently, Tughāy Murād Bī went to Bukhara and was generously pardoned by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī,<sup>823</sup> only “to cause the kettledrum of hostility to sound among the Uzbek tribes and the *amīrs* of the

<sup>817</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 27b–28a, 29a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 266a–b.

<sup>818</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 44a, 71b, 75b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 274a, 299a; Kāzīm, *‘Ālamārā*, III, 1102.

<sup>819</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 57b.

<sup>820</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 71b.

<sup>821</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 139b, 263a–b.

<sup>822</sup> Bereft of their former patron, the Afghan troops departed for Kandahār, where they elected Aḥmad Khān Abdālī as king and crowned him shortly after (Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 101).

<sup>823</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 84a, 98b, 129a–b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 357b–358a.

frontier regions (*umarā-yi sar-ḥaddīya*)” shortly after his return to his domain.<sup>824</sup>

In the following time, Tughāy Murād Bī is not only reckoned to be one of the most determined rivals of the Bukharan *atālīq*, but also a military genius and a good tactician who continuously moved around Mā Warā’ al-Nahr. His strategy of concealing himself and networking among other Uzbek leaders followed an established pattern of behavior that was practiced by the previous generation of *amīrs*. The Burqūt *amīr* had a fine instinct for the political realities in Bukhara and knew very well that he was militarily too weak to oppose Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī alone.<sup>825</sup> In the following years, he coalesced with almost all amirid contenders and, depending on the prevailing circumstances, took the initiative in the ongoing power struggle. Right at the beginning of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s *atālīqate*, he forged an alliance with some Qazāq groups roaming the area north of Nūr and incited the Yetī Ūrūgh tribes of Miyānkāl to rebel against Bukhara. This shows that he maintained not only good relations with other Yetī Ūrūgh leaders but also contacts with local tribal leaders, especially the Qazāq chiefs in the Great Steppe. During the year 1748, he actively rendered assistance to the Baḥrīn to stop the military advance of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s army, and led his troops from Nūr down to the river valley and to Khaṭarchī.<sup>826</sup>

With the defeat of Ghaibullah Bī, this figuration broke up, but even afterward Tūghāy Murād Bī formed the spearhead of a short-lived anti-Manghit coalition, including the Yābū and other tribes of the Yetī Ūrūgh. On Jumāda I 22, 1161/May 19, 1748, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī dispatched his troops on a punitive expedition to Nūr.<sup>827</sup> In order to protect their possessions in the north, the Burqūt retired to their stronghold and destroyed the settlements of Deh Baland and Gharghām located in the valley of Qarqān

<sup>824</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 130a.

<sup>825</sup> On numerous occasions, the Burqūt were only able to muster two thousand to maximum two thousand five hundred warriors (Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fol. 157a; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 57a). According to Mullā Sharīf, in winter 1746–47 the Burqūt together with the Kḥiṭā’ī-Qipchāq of Khwājam Yār Bī Ūtārchī furnished only four thousand troops for a campaign against ‘Ibādullah Kḥiṭā’ī (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 299b).

<sup>826</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, 130b; see also Chekhovich, “O nekotorykh,” 89; Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 75.

<sup>827</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 140a.

Ghau and providing the access route to Nūr from the south.<sup>828</sup> Faced with the fast march of their enemies, the Burqūt polluted the only water source in this arid region to avert the advance of the Bukharan army. Having restored the source at Deh Baland, the troops continued marching. In the ensuing bloody combat the forces of Tughāy Murād Bī and his brother inflicted a severe blow on the troops led by Jum‘a Qul Mingbāshī. In the course of the fighting, the Bukharan army cut off Nūr’s water supply and wreaked complete havoc on the arable land (*mazāra‘āt wa kishtgāh*) and the subterranean irrigation systems (*kārīzāt*) east of the town. Subsequently, the army was forced to retreat due to the shortage of water and grazing grounds in the environs, but at the same time the soldiers imposed a blockade by obstructing the route between Bukhara and Nūr.<sup>829</sup>

Following the withdrawal of the Bukharan troops, Tughāy Murād Bī incited the Yābū leader Khāliq Wazīr to rebel against the *atālīq*. He did so in order to minimize the military pressure on his followers south of Nūr, but also because he hoped that Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī would lift the blockade. In Rabī‘ II 1162/early April 1749, he left the battleground in the western part of Miyānkāl to mobilize support further in the east. He went to Khojand and allied with Fāzil Bī Yūz, the ruler of Ūrā Tippa, to launch an assault on Samarqand in the hope of diverting the attention of the Manghit army from western Miyānkāl. But the attempt to conquer Transoxania’s second important city failed and Fāzil Bī retired to the east. In this situation, Tughāy Murād Bī tirelessly proceeded to the Turkistan Mountains north of Miyānkāl and from there brought his allies, the Turkomān Yūzī, to the embattled areas.<sup>830</sup> All attempts to prevail over his enemies were in vain, however, and the Burqūt leader eventually retreated to his possessions in the north. In Ramāzān 1163/August–September 1750, Tughāy Murād Bī joined the coalition of Muḥammad Amīn Bī Yūz.<sup>831</sup> Immediately after participating in an unsuccessful plundering campaign to Nasaf, his relationship with the court completely changed as a result of the following events in Nūr, which show very well the importance of local dynamics:

<sup>828</sup> This valley providing access to Nūr-i Aṭā commences northeast of Karmīna. For the description of Qarqān Ghau see Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 140b–141b.

<sup>829</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 142a–145b.

<sup>830</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 151a–b.

<sup>831</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 163b–164b. This alliance included the Yūz of Ḥiṣār and Ūrā Tippa as well as their allies in Khuzār and Bāysūn, the Kīnakās of Kish and the Burqūt.

“After the flight of Muḥammad Amīn Bī and Fāzil Bī from Khuzār to Khojand and Ḥiṣār, Tughāy Murād Bī saw the signs of victory and glory shimmering from the ornament affixed on the top of the victorious standard. Taking notice of all kinds of pleasure and brightness emanating hour after hour from the rose garden of the royal desires, [he realized that] all his endeavors to harm this luminous reign would remain without effect. Now he knew once and for all that the young tree growing in the garden of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s felicity would never lose its leaves because of the events caused by the hatchet of his [Tughāy Murād’s] opposition. Therefore, he retired for consultation with the Burqūt leaders (*sardārān-i burqūtiya*) that took place without the presence of strangers to report to those farsighted people the letter of indigence and loyalty to the victorious dominion. This group was at death’s door and now lamented about the deprivation of the means of livelihood and their diminishing strength. Taking the consequences of his plans regarding great conquests and honor to be the reason for their grief and submission, [...] they urged Tughāy Murād Bī and his brother to consent to this dominion.”<sup>832</sup>

We see here that local conditions—in this case impoverishment and lack of resources caused by the obstruction of the major route to Bukhara and the lingering tug of war with the troops of the Manghit *amīr*—proved decisive for the negotiations with other tribal elders. We can also imagine that things may have got heated at this assembly, as the elders and clan leaders reproached the Burqūt chief with being responsible for the crisis in Nūr and its vicinity. What followed was the usual exchange of mediators and a new covenant with the *atālīq*, including the lifting of the two-year blockade, the delivery of the important fort of Deh Baland to the Burqūt, and at least the partial integration of Tughāy Murād and his tribe into Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s network.<sup>833</sup>

Yet, in view of his former transgressions, the governor of Nūr did not dare appear in person at the royal court but remained in his home region. It was not until Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s enthronization in late 1756 and assumption of the *khān* title that he considered the time ripe for resuming full personal relations with the court. The descriptions by the court chronicler, Wafā, reveal that a local actor like Tughāy Murād actually did not have many options at his disposal in a situation where most of the other

<sup>832</sup> Ibid., fol. 165a.

<sup>833</sup> The integration of Tughāy Murād Bī into Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s network of mutual allegiances had far-reaching consequences: he received some land estates as *soyūrghāl* in the districts of Bukhara and furnished a contingent of soldiers, but also informed the *atālīq* about the occurrences in other regions of Transoxania (ibid., fols. 165a–167a; Chekhovich, “O nekotorykh,” 89).

chiefs had already been absorbed into the *Herrschaftsverband* of the new king, either by armed force or by voluntarily joining him. Accordingly, the Burqūt leader had only three ways open to him:

“First, to rely on his own resources, but in that case he would have to put up with a possible future conflict and war with all the resultant hardships and difficulties; second, to leave his home region and go into exile, a step that was connected with distress and confusion of the mind; and third, to trust in the help of God the Generous and put the necklace of loyalty (*tūq-i ikhlāṣ*) on the neck of obedience to the order issued by the king of the age.”<sup>834</sup>

These were exactly the options most of the actors had—whether local *āqsaqāls* and city notables, or governors and tribal chieftains like Tughāy Murād, or even a king like Abū’l-Faiṣ Khān in the time of Nādir Shāh’s intervention—when approached by superior actors. The fourth option is included in the first, it being to launch war with an uncertain outcome and even physical annihilation. We see here how limited an individual actor’s scope of action really was. For this reason, Tughāy Murād Bī resumed full personal relations with the help of two intermediaries, Īshān Ishāq Khwāja Makhdūm-i A’zam and Daulat Bī Qūshbēgī.<sup>835</sup> He and his Burqūt fighters then participated in a number of campaigns and were generously rewarded for their services.<sup>836</sup>

This went well until the end of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān’s reign. Afterward, Tughāy Murād Bī refused to recognize Danyāl Bī as new commander-in-chief and was killed when the new *atālīq*, relying on the cooperation of the urban populace, put down the rebellion of several Uzbek *amīrs*.<sup>837</sup> The developments after the violent death of Tughāy Murād Bī in early 1759 seem to have been a repetition of the events in 1748–50. His brother Yādgar Bī joined the opponents of Dānyāl Bī Manghit and rose in rebellion. Within a short time, he and his Khiṭā’ī-Qipchāq allies took the important towns of Khaṭarchī and Panjshanba, formed a coalition with Fāzil Bī Yūz and launched attacks on Karmīna. Shortly thereafter, Yādgar Bī occupied the fortress of Yangī Qūrghān, where he was besieged by Bukharan troops. After a series of setbacks, the new Nūr ruler retired to his

<sup>834</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 264a.

<sup>835</sup> See also chapter The Order of Things/Mediation and Brokerage. .

<sup>836</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 268b, 275b, 277b, 283b passim. See also Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 409a.

<sup>837</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 325b–327b.

fortress.<sup>838</sup> Later in the year he supported Fāzil Bī in his war against the Manghit.<sup>839</sup> On that occasion he also relied on the aid of the Yābū, Jīt and Tama, who formed a short-lived alliance with Yādgār Bī but later joined forces with Shāh Murād b. Dānyāl Bī.<sup>840</sup>

Yādgār Bī's disobedience to the *atālīq* is also mentioned by later sources. According to the nineteenth-century Bukharan author Sāmī, the Burqūt chief reactivated his ties to the Qazāq of the Dasht-i Qipchāq, and, causing disquiet in Nūr and its surroundings, raided and harmed the local populace.<sup>841</sup> This provoked Dānyāl Bī several times to intervene with troops and to lay siege to Nūr. In the following time, Yādgār Bī constantly shifted between submission and rebellion, causing the new strongman more than once to resume a more aggressive policy.<sup>842</sup> Similar to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, the *atālīq* imposed a prolonged blockade on Nūr. This state continued until the final defeat of Yādgār Bī in 1196/1781–82.<sup>843</sup>

### *The Turkomān Yūzī*

Situated within the scope of Burqūt influence, the Turkomān Yūzī were regarded as the traditional partners of the Nūr rulers. Accordingly, their status and relations with the government in Bukhara depended largely on the shifting attitudes of the Burqūt leadership. In 1723, for instance, they had rendered assistance to Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Atalīq against the troops of 'Abd al-Karīm Bī Baḥrīn during the battle of Hazāra, and later dealt a final blow to the Yetī Ūrūgh north of Bukhara with the help of their partners from Nūr. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ṭālī' mentions a certain Daulat Bī Turkomān, who was rewarded with the governorship of Karmīna for his outstanding loyalty, while Sārīgh Bī Burqūt was appointed *dādkhwāh*.<sup>844</sup>

<sup>838</sup> Ibid., fols. 329a–331a.

<sup>839</sup> Yādgār Bī was able to muster three thousand Burqūt, Qarāqalpāq and Turkomān Yūzī warriors (ibid., fol. 338b).

<sup>840</sup> Ibid., fol. 343b.

<sup>841</sup> Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 47.

<sup>842</sup> Yādgār Bī is mentioned here as *parwānachī* (ibid., 44–47).

<sup>843</sup> Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 48.

<sup>844</sup> Ṭālī', *Tārīkh*, fols. 66b–68a, 157a, 161a; Semenov trans., 88, 135–36, 138. Qāzī Wafā names the father of Jum'a Bēg Turkomān Daulan Wakal Bēg (Daulat Wakīl?) (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 246a).

According to the information given in the *Tuhfat*, Jum‘a Bēg, the son of Daulat Bī, was initially loyal to the government of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī but eventually changed his attitude, probably together with his ally Tughāy Murād. He also supported the Yetī Ūrūgh during their rebellion in the first half of 1749, and was therefore counted as one of the adversaries of the Manghit *atālīq*.<sup>845</sup> As his domicile in Santāb and Jūsh was well protected by barren and inhospitable mountains, affording shelter against threats from Bukhara, he lived in hope of maintaining his independence with the help of his Burqūt allies. In addition, the location’s proximity to the Great Steppe led to many useful contacts with the Qazāq nomads. But since he was regarded as an integral part of Tughāy Murād Bī’s covenant with the government concluded in 1753, he subsequently furnished the *zakāt* and a contingent of soldiers (*chirik*), and in return was spared any trouble in connection with the march of the army through his domain.<sup>846</sup>

By summer 1169/1756, the Ghalcha of Santāb “had become weary of his tyranny” and took action, locking him out of the town at the first opportunity. Having gained control over Santāb, the Ghalcha turned to the *atālīq* for assistance. Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī dispatched Ismā‘īl Tūqsāba, the governor of Khaṭarchī, to subjugate the Turkomān Yūzī. When Jum‘a Bēg learned about the campaign, he and his followers suddenly retired and took refuge in Nūr. After his arrival at Santāb, Ismā‘īl Tūqsāba confiscated Jum‘a Bēg’s herds and withdrew after the appointment of a new governor. The Turkomān Yūzī leader then stayed in Nūr, where his companion Tughāy Murād Bī feared “for the protection of his livestock” (*ḥarāsāt-i mawāshī wa amwāl*) because punishment would not be long in coming. Besides, the influx of Turkomān Yūzī nomads into Nūr would sooner or later increase the strain on the scarce resources there anyway. Afraid of the consequences, Tughāy Murād Bī quickly sent a messenger to Bukhara to inform the Manghit ruler about the situation. Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī ordered him to send his own son and a brother of his ally with a corps of soldiers to the court. Shortly thereafter, the two *amīrs* resumed their relations with the court.<sup>847</sup>

<sup>845</sup> Ibid., fols. 151b–152a.

<sup>846</sup> Ibid., fol. 246a.

<sup>847</sup> Ibid., fols. 246a–247b, 263a–265b.

## THE KĪNAKĀS AMĪRS OF SHAHR-I SABZ

As has already been described, Shahr-i Sabz and its surroundings had been the stronghold of the KĪnakās since the time of Subhān Qulī Khān. In the 1720s, the region had suffered enormously under the Qazāq raids, and it was only after the end of these incursions that the refugees returned from the mountains to slowly repopulate the region. The data furnished by the *Tuḥfat al-khānī* suggests that the city of Shahr-i Sabz had suffered great abuse and neglect and was almost completely depopulated. But the surrounding areas and dependencies (*tūmānāt*) seemed to be well populated, as the large number of fortified settlements erected by local potentates shows. Wafā however accuses them of having kept the populace in their own local forts, not leaving anyone in Shahr.<sup>848</sup>

This division of power and space in Shahr-i Sabz reflects the internal segmentation and stratification of the KĪnakās tribe. The local leadership was still furnished by the descendants of Rustam Bī who belonged to the Acha Mailī sub-division of the KĪnakās.<sup>849</sup> Most of the forts seem to have been almost exclusively inhabited by one particular KĪnakās lineage, headed by its own leaders and clan elders. For example, Ibrāhīm Bī's son 'Ālim Bī resided in the town of Sang Furūsh and the nearby settlement of Kitāb, whereas Subhān Qulī Bī exercised authority over Shahr and the small settlement of Qūshchī.<sup>850</sup> The picture drawn in the sources indicates that the KĪnakās were far from being a united force. It even seems that some tribal leaders conducted their political affairs independently. Located to the south of Shahr-i Sabz, Yakka Bāgh was considered the possession of Qābil Bēg, whose clan maintained a lasting rivalry with 'Ālim Bī.<sup>851</sup> Besides, a number of prominent KĪnakās *amīrs* like Shāh Sayyid Tūqsāba served in the army of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Manghit. On a number of occasions, however, the KĪnakās troops were commanded by a certain Shāhsawār Tūqsāba, one of

<sup>848</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 200a; Chekhovich, "K istorii," 44. In the *Tuḥfat al-khānī* we read about a number of bigger and smaller *qal'as* scattered throughout the principality. Wafā names the following settlements: Aulāsh, Sang Furūsh, Kitāb, Qūshchī, Yakka Bāgh, Ūrta Qūrghān, Gāwmīsh and Zarbalāy. Among these Sang Furūsh was a notable exception as it hosted a larger population (*ibid.*, fols. 172a–175b, 185a, 188b–200b; see also Chekhovich, "K istorii," 44).

<sup>849</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 361.

<sup>850</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 162b, 169b, 175a, 191a.

<sup>851</sup> Qāzī Wafā describes Yakka Bāgh as the headquarters of the Abāqlī sub-division of the KĪnakās (*ibid.*, fol. 368b).

Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's followers.<sup>852</sup> This may be a sign that the future king placed his former enemies under the command of one of the men close to him.

Wafā describes 'Ālim Bī as a cautious man who avoided disputes. But in spite of this and his marital ties to the family of the *atāliq*, "he sometimes kicked up a lot of thick dust because of old hostility and eternal jealousy."<sup>853</sup> In 1163/1750, 'Ālim Bī joined the alliance initiated by Subḥān Qulī Bī Kīnakās and Muḥammad Amīn Bī Yūz.<sup>854</sup> The formation of this coalition was the immediate reaction to the shift of power resulting from the subjugation of the Yetī Ūrūgh and the establishment of military posts and governorships in Miyānkāl. Many *amīrs*, like Muḥammad Amīn Bī, Fāzil Bī or the Kīnakās leaders, were afraid of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī enhancing his position through control of the most productive part of Mā Warā' al-Nahr. From 1750 onward, Shahr-i Sabz developed into a logistical base for the following campaigns of the new coalition. At the same time, its position was rendered precarious as it became increasingly squeezed between the Manghit in the west and the Yūz in the east. Our main sources depict the course of events occurring in the years 1750–52 in great detail but explain the reason for the conquest of Shahr-i Sabz by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī differently. Whereas Wafā interprets the events that followed as the direct consequences of shifting figurations of power at local level, Mullā Sharīf attributes the subjugation of the Kīnakās to the intention of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī.<sup>855</sup>

<sup>852</sup> Ibid., fols. 139b, 172a–b, 209b, 229b *passim*. The tribal affiliation of Shāhsawār Tūqsāba is not clear. In the *Tuḥfat al-khānī* he is mentioned as Shāhsawār Tūqsāba Kīlājī, who in 1747 was appointed governor of Khaṭarchī in Miyānkāl. Later he frequently commanded the Kīnakās contingents in the army of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī. In late 1756 he was appointed governor of Panjshanba, but sometimes also acted as leader of the troops of Qarshī and Khuzār (ibid., fols. 139b, 172b, 233a, 243a, 259b, 274b *passim*). In the list of ninety-two Uzbek tribes given by Doniyorov, the Kīlājī (here Keleyji) appear as distinct from the Kīnakās (see Doniyorov, *Uzbek khalqining*, 74).

<sup>853</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 168a. See also Mullā Sharīf, *Tāji*, fol. 368a.

<sup>854</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 162b–163a.

<sup>855</sup> As Mullā Sharīf reports, "when the dependencies, cities and fortresses of Panjīkent were occupied by the guardians of the glorious dynasty according to the will and with the help of God, and when wide tracts of land were cleaned from the dirt of the sway held by others and from the dust of the wickedness of the seditious, being thus attached to the guarded domains of the pillar of the *amīrs*, the desire to liberate the pleasant, paradise-like Kish from the grip of the disobedient and ungrateful *amīrs* of the Kīnakās tribes appeared in his farsighted mind" (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāji*, 368a).

Similar to 1747, when a conflict about a marriage had occasioned the intervention of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and the Qizilbāsh, three years later a dispute over marital issues provided the pretext for the Bukharan *atālīq* to interfere once again in local affairs. In 1750 Subḥān Qulī Bī forged a marriage alliance with the Yūz leader of Ḥiṣār, Muḥammad Amīn Bī, to bolster his relationship with the Yūz and to strengthen his grip on Shahr. Pleased by this opportunity, Muḥammad Amīn Bī immediately sent fine cloths and linen for the wedding preparations. But this and the preparations for the approaching *tūy* triggered a local conflict centered on the right to marry into Subḥān Qulī Bī's family, because Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg Kīnakās, one of Subḥān Qulī Bī's nephews,<sup>856</sup> considered himself fully entitled to make the first bid for marriage relations. According to our main source, his claims were based on consanguinity.<sup>857</sup> Deprived of his right, he promptly turned to Bukhara to enlist the help of the *atālīq*, which was granted in due course. On Dhū'l-Qa'ada 25, 1163/October 24, 1750, the *atālīq* set out for Shahr-i Sabz immediately after a failed attack launched by Barāt Qushbēgī and Imām Qulī Bī Mīrākhūr. Before the arrival of the Bukharan army, the Kīnakās leaders expressed their willingness to compromise, but their suggestion to end the conflict by delivering the *zakāt* and the *kharāj* was refused. When the army arrived, both sides exchanged mediators. Yet Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's delegation uncompromisingly insisted on Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg's right to marry Subḥān Qulī Bī's daughter.<sup>858</sup> In this situation the Kīnakās *amīrs* gathered the tribal leaders and the elders of each clan (*sarān-i qabā'il wa kalānān-i har khail*) for consultations. The elders, however, refrained from making any decision when Muḥammad Amīn Bī's brother Muḥammad Dūst Beg arrived from Ḥiṣār with the message of reinforcement by Yūz troops. Besides, they

<sup>856</sup> The affiliation of Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg does not become clear in the sources. According to Mullā Sharīf, he was a nephew of Subḥān Qulī Bī (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 368b). Qāzī Wafā only says that he was closely affiliated to Subḥān Qulī Bī by consanguinity (*qarābat-i qurbat*) (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 168b).

<sup>857</sup> According to Wafā, Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg, who was known for his sense of honor and impetuosity (*ghairat wa ḥimyat*), was the worthiest and the most deserving of the said matrimonial alliance (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 168b). In Mullā Sharīf's opinion, Subḥān Qulī Bī's daughter was betrothed to Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg (*nāmzad-i Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg*) (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 368b).

<sup>858</sup> According to the *Tāj*, Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg had the status of a *farzand-khwānda* of the *atālīq* (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 268).

planned to arrest the negotiators sent by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī. In the following violent encounters, the Bukharan forces were supported by Khiṭāʾī-Qipchāq, Burqūt, Qalmāq, Turkmen and Juyūt troops, as well as by Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg and ʿĀdil Bēg—both of them Kīnakās *amīrs*. The first settlement to be besieged was Gāwmīsh, which was taken after a short bombardment. Finally, five thousand to six thousand horsemen of the Bukharan army were dispatched to raid the villages in the valley and the mountains.<sup>859</sup>

On Muḥarram 24, 1164/December 23, 1750, a group of Kīnakās serving in the army of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī met the *atālīq* in his camp to provide information about local conditions and to suggest conquering the forts of Aulāsh and Sang Furūsh. The Bukharan army subsequently passed between Kitāb and Sang Furūsh, engaged the enemies before Sang Furūsh, while other troops took Aulāsh without resistance.<sup>860</sup> On his withdrawal, the *atālīq* stationed a small contingent of three hundred soldiers in Ūrta Qūrghān and left Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg's troops in Aulāsh.<sup>861</sup>

In 1164/1751 Shahr-i Sabz continued to form Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's main focus of military activities. Within one year, he conducted three campaigns to subdue his enemies. At the same time, ʿĀlim Bī and Subḥān Qulī Bī constantly changed sides and maneuvered between their Ḥiṣārī allies on the one hand and the Manghit on the other. Each time they faced Bukharan encroachments on their domains, they opted to succumb in order to avoid further damage and an erosion of their authority. In doing so, they converted the customary gift giving into a strategy to placate their enemy and to win time. Interestingly, the constant pressure from outside did not urge them to overcome their internal divisions. Local and intratribal warfare offered Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī unique opportunities to extend his influence at the expense of his foes. For example, when the forces of ʿĀlim Bī attacked their rivals around Qābil Bēg's brother Īsh Yulī near Yakka Bāgh, Imām Qulī Bī Manghit intervened and inflicted a severe blow on ʿĀlim Bī's troops. He then occupied the small town at the eastern fringe of the region.<sup>862</sup>

<sup>859</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 167b–175b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 368b–373b.

<sup>860</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 174b–175b.

<sup>861</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 175b–176a. In Mullā Sharīf's view, the Bukharan troops were able to establish control over most of the settlements of Shahr-i Sabz, for instance Sang Furūsh, Kitāb and Shahr (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 373b), but this is not confirmed by Wafā.

<sup>862</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 188b–189b.

Prior to this setback, the Kīnakās *amīrs* had once again formally submitted to the Bukharan forces and then suggested launching an attack on Khuzār, the habitat of the Sarāy tribe. Notwithstanding their affiliation to a common alliance, Subhān Qulī Bī and ‘Ālim Bī suggested attacking the Khuzārīs to distract the *atālīq* from Shahr-i Sabz and ease the pressure on their domain. It even seems that this maneuver of the Kīnakās leaders was an attempt to play the Bukharan forces and their own allies off against each other. Nonetheless, their internal disputes and estrangement had caused the Bukharan troops to intervene once again; after all, it was the conflict with Īsh Yulī, the brother of Qābil Kīnakās, which gave rise to a series of new battles in the region.<sup>863</sup> By Sha‘bān 1164/June–July 1751, Imām Qulī Bī Mīrākḥūr and Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg had gained control over numerous other towns of Shahr-i Sabz, including Subhān Qulī Bī’s former seat Shahr, where they occupied the prestigious symbol of imperial authority, Tīmūr’s Āq Sarāy palace, which had fallen into disrepair by this time.<sup>864</sup> The last campaign in Shawwāl 1164/September 1751 ended in complete defeat of the Kīnakās and an agreement brokered by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s brother Yūqāshī Bī. According to the new oath of allegiance (*ahd wa paymān*), Shahr-i Sabz was incorporated into the Manghit sphere of authority. While Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg was put in charge of Qūshchī and other areas, the ruler appointed loyal officials and favorites as new governors of Shahr and its vicinity. Only Sang Furūsh and Kitāb remained possessions under the authority of ‘Ālim Bī.<sup>865</sup>

After the conquest of Shahr-i Sabz by the Bukharan army, Subhān Qulī Bī and ‘Ālim Bī were relocated to Bukhara and placed under the direct control of the government. Nonetheless, the deposed *amīrs* continued to make their influence felt in Shahr-i Sabz. When their followers in Sang Furūsh joined forces with Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg, who “considered himself the companion of arrogance and pride” to make himself independent of the control exerted by the Manghit administration, the fate of the Kīnakās leaders was sealed. Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī summoned his former protégé to

<sup>863</sup> The Manghit commander and his Kīnakās supporters occupied a number of settlements and forts like Yakka Bāgh, Ūrta Qūrhān and Aulāsh, where they established themselves as local governors (*ibid.*, fols. 189b, 190b).

<sup>864</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 190b–191b.

<sup>865</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 192a–197b. Mullā Sharīf reports about a siege of Shahr that was so severe that Subhān Qulī Bī gave up resistance to retire to his fort Qūshchī (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 375a).

Bukhara. On Jumāda II 24, 1165/May 8, 1752, he ordered the execution of all Kīnakās chiefs,<sup>866</sup> and tightened his grip on Shahr-i Sabz by mounting a new expedition, which met with no resistance. In fact, the severe punishment and annihilation of the local leadership caused the population to work itself into a panic. Finally, the populace appealed to Manghit officials like Imām Qulī Bī and Qalmāqcha Bahādur and ceded the keys of their forts to them.<sup>867</sup> Subsequently, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī initiated a resettlement campaign aimed at breaking up existing settlement patterns and centralizing the administration. Most of the people inhabiting the environs were moved to Shahr and placed under the supervision of a new garrison. Fortified towns like Kitāb, Sang Furūsh and Qūshchī were destroyed. He also recruited six hundred Kīnakās soldiers for his standing army and resettled their families in the capital.<sup>868</sup>

Being a descendant of the Acha Mailī chiefs of Shahr-i Sabz through his great-grandmother, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān reaches a different conclusion. According to him, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān acted as a brutal tyrant who “got ready for revenge” because the other Uzbek *amīrs* refused to recognize his authority. Using the promise of an agreement to be sealed with an oath as a pretence, he lured the Kīnakās leaders ‘Ālim Bī, Subhān Qulī Bī and others, who are here described as “pure in heart” or simple-minded (*mīrān-i sāda-lauh*), to Bukhara. Pretending to give him the daughter of Yūqashī Bī as a wife, he also summoned Muḥammad Yūsuf Bēg together with thirty-two Kīnakās seal-bearers (*muhrdār-i Kīnakās*) to the capital, where he put them all to death.<sup>869</sup>

The round of gubernatorial appointments following Raḥīm Khān’s enthronization in December 1756 mirrors the strategy the ruler pursued at local level. None of the Kīnakās leaders was considered fit for a governorship. The key forts in the region of Shahr-i Sabz were all conferred on the followers of the new ruler: Qalmāqcha Bahādur was appointed governor of Shahr, while Qutluq Bāy, one of Muḥammad Raḥīm’s former slaves, was granted the governorship of Sang Furūsh and the fertile Tagāb-i

<sup>866</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 198a–b; see also Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 62.

<sup>867</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 199a. After the final integration of the Kīnakās into Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s *Herrschaftsverband*, both commanders jointly administered the region (*ibid.*, fols. 236b, 358b, 259b).

<sup>868</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 200a–b; Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 44.

<sup>869</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 353–54.

Kish. Imām Qulī Bī was appointed to the office of *parwānachī* and confirmed in his position as governor of Yakka Bāgh.<sup>870</sup>

The events occurring in the time before and after the annihilation of the Kīnakās aristocracy are partly covered by the *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*. The data provided by this source is of special interest as it allows us to trace the actions of one particular actor, a daughter of Ibrāhīm Bī. It thereby helps us highlight the female dimension of local history, a perspective that is difficult to grasp in the Persian materials. Knocked around by several marriage agreements and an unpredictable course of events, this woman displayed an extensive radius of movement and action, leading her from Shahr-i Sabz to Khoqand, from there back to Shahr-i Sabz, then to Dabhbīd, Samarqand, Ūrā Tippa, and finally back to Khoqand.

### *Āy Chūchūk Āyim*

When Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī extinguished the local leadership, the aristocratic clan of the Acha Mailī and the *aulād-i Rustam* lost their dominant position. Power now shifted to the Qaira Saldī sub-division.<sup>871</sup> But not all descendants of Ibrāhīm Bī were in Shahr-i Sabz at that time. At the end of the 1720s, his daughter Āy Chūchūk Āyim had been given in marriage to ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Bēg Mīng, the ruler of Khoqand, who died shortly after.<sup>872</sup> However, his wife got pregnant and gave birth to a daughter by the name of Āy Jān Āyim.<sup>873</sup> After the death of her first husband, Āy Chūchūk Āyim, also known by the title Kīnakās Āyim,<sup>874</sup> was married to her brother-in-law ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī Mīng (r. ca. 1734–50/51), who now became the new ruler of Khoqand.<sup>875</sup> Her daughter was later married to her

<sup>870</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 258b, 259b.

<sup>871</sup> Beisembiev, “Unknown Dynasty,” 20.

<sup>872</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 4–5. The *Ta’rīkh-i shāhrukhī* informs us that Āy Chūchūk Āyim was the daughter of Ibrāhīm Bī’s son ‘Ālim Bēg/Bī (Beisembiev, *Ta’rīkh*, 11, 92).

<sup>873</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān attributes the sudden death of the Mīng ruler to his disrespect toward Sheikh Qathum b. ‘Abbās Raḥ when visiting the shrine of the saint (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 5).

<sup>874</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>875</sup> *Ibid.*, 6. ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī Mīng founded Quqān, the capital of the future khanate of Khoqand in the western section of the Ferghana Valley around the year 1740 (Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 400–01; Barthold [Bosworth], “Khoqand,” 29). ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī strengthened Islamic institutions of learning in his capital by building mosques,

stepson ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Bēg.<sup>876</sup> After the death of her second husband, Āy Chūchūk Āyim was again married, this time to a certain Ārtuq Khwāja, whose father had been killed by Farhād Bī Ūtārchī some twenty years before. Surprisingly, she then gave birth to a son, Ḥakīm Tūra, allegedly at the age of forty-eight.<sup>877</sup> Yet her fate dramatically changed in the course of a local struggle for power in the second half of the 1750s. After his victory over the Yūz of Ūrā Tippa and Khojand, Īrdāna Bī b. Raḥīm Bī Mīng (r. ca. 1751–69/74?) engaged in a fierce conflict with his cousin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Bēg b. ‘Abd al-Karīm Bī, the stepson and son-in-law of Āy Chūchūk Āyim. According to the Khoqandian author, this struggle for power lasted seven years, but Īrdāna Bī eventually prevailed and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Bēg was killed together with his wife.<sup>878</sup>

Subsequent to this stroke of fate, Āy Chūchūk Āyim returned to her home region with her son and grandson. In the meantime, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān had died and his uncle Muḥammad Dānyāl Bī pulled the strings of government, while Shahr-i Sabz had once again become virtually independent of Bukharan suzerainty. At that time it was ruled by Bēg Naẓar Bī b. Bahādur Bī, one of the attendants of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, bearing the title of Jilau Mīrākḥūr. After his master’s death, Bēg Naẓar Bī escaped to Shahr-i Sabz where he established himself as an independent ruler.<sup>879</sup> He took the arrival of Ibrāhīm Bī’s daughter as an auspicious sign and ceded Shahr-i Sabz to her as the last surviving offspring of the Rustamid lineage. As the chronicler reports, she came to be recognized as the undisputed lady of Shahr-i Sabz and the Kīnakās.<sup>880</sup> From then on, Āy Chūchūk Āyim developed a keen interest in local politics. Her advanced age did not prevent her from considerably expanding her scope of action and movement to

---

*madrasas* and *khānaqās* (Scott Levi, “The Ferghana Valley at the crossroads of world history: the rise of Khoqand, 1709–1822,” *Journal of Global History* 2, no. 2 (2007): 223).

<sup>876</sup> This marriage produced a son, Nārbūta Bī, who would eventually become ruler of Khoqand (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 7). This ruler was later formally allied with China and at enmity with Bukhara. In his time some prominent buildings were constructed in the capital of Khoqand, for instance the *madrasa-yi* Mīr (Barthold [Bosworth], “Khoqand,” 29; Schuyler, *Turkistan*, II, 13).

<sup>877</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 9–10.

<sup>878</sup> *Ibid.*, 12–14.

<sup>879</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 361.

<sup>880</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 16.

pursue her ambitious goals. She wanted to secure the Khoqandian throne for her grandson.

After only four years, she left Shahr-i Sabz and went with her son and grandson to Dabhbīd, where she visited the Sufī sheikh Īshān Mūsā Khān Khwāja and joined the circle of his clients. After a while she decided to tie herself more closely to the *īshān* and arranged a marriage between her son Ḥakīm Tūra and his daughter. Subsequently, the sprightly lady left Dabhbīd for Ūrā Tippa. Āy Chūchuk Āyim had a good knowledge of the political constellations in the region. Moreover, she knew Fāzil Bī Yūz, the ruler of Ūrā Tippa, who as a *farzand-khwānda* had been affiliated to her second husband.<sup>881</sup> Fāzil Bī welcomed the widow of his former protector with all honors and granted the fortress of Qīzilī to her and Nārbūta Bī.<sup>882</sup> Later she witnessed the enthronization of her grandson as new ruler of Khoqand, and was still alive when he conducted his first punitive expeditions against his enemies.<sup>883</sup>

In the next decades, Shahr-i Sabz came under the control of the Qaira Saldī clan of the Kīnakās, led by Bēg Naẓar Bī and his son Niyāz ‘Alī Bī.<sup>884</sup> Until its final incorporation into the Emirate of Bukhara in 1868, the principality continued to play its traditional role as a haven for all renegades of the wider region. One of the most illustrious visitors to Shahr-i Sabz was the Afghan *amīr* Dūst Muḥammad Khān, who took refuge in Bukhara after the outbreak of the first Anglo-Afghan war (1838–42). Another prominent refugee was Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, a member of the ruling house of Khoqand, who wrote his famous *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh* there.<sup>885</sup>

#### MŪSĀ BĪ OF ŪRGŪT

With the decline of Tuqay-Timurid authority from the beginning of the eighteenth century onward, the region of Kūhistān had enjoyed independence in the shadow of its influential neighbors, Ḥiṣār to the south and Ūrā Tippa further north. According to the *Tuḥfat al-khānī*, in the 1750s

<sup>881</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>882</sup> Ibid., 16–17.

<sup>883</sup> Āy Chūchūk Āyim died shortly after the arrival of her son Ḥakīm Tūra at Khoqand (ibid., 33).

<sup>884</sup> Beisembiev, “Unknown Dynasty,” 21. For a thorough list of the Shahr-i Sabz rulers, see Schiewek, “À propos des exilés,” 190.

<sup>885</sup> Beisembiev, “Unknown Dynasty,” 21–22; Schiewek, “À propos des exilés,” 183–91.

the region was ruled by a set of brothers headed by a certain Mūsā Bī, whose tribal affiliation is not indicated by our author.<sup>886</sup> At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Ūrgūt was governed by a Ming *amīr* by the name of Allah Birdī Bī.<sup>887</sup> Kāzīm reports about a group of Ming and Yūz devastating the environs of Samarqand in 1740 from their small *qal'as*.<sup>888</sup> Hence Mūsā Bī and other local *amīrs* like Dūst Muḥammad and his brother Iskandar, who ruled in the nearby valleys of Gshtut and Urmītan at the entrance to the Falghar Valley further in the east, were probably also Ming *amīrs*.<sup>889</sup> In the nineteenth century, the Ming continued to furnish the local governors of Ūrgūt and the adjacent valleys, where they engaged in animal husbandry, particularly sheep breeding, and short-range migrations.<sup>890</sup>

After Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's assumption of the *atālīqate* in 1747, the town of Ūrgūt, the gateway to the eastern mountain valleys, remained outside his sphere of influence. The preparations for his campaign to Kūhistān were already completed in Muḥarram 1166/November–December 1752, for Muḥammad Raḥīm planned to extend his activities to the easternmost mountain areas in order to secure his hold in Samarqand.<sup>891</sup> On Rabī' II 24, 1166/February 28, 1753, he set off on an expedition to Samarqand and Ūrgūt. If we believe his chronicler, it was his hitherto largest and most expensive campaign.<sup>892</sup> After the arrival of the troops at Samarqand, the *atālīq* dispatched two thousand warriors under the command of Daulat Bī and Ismā'īl Bakāwul Qarlıq to conquer the small forts of Yārī

<sup>886</sup> Qāzī Wafā only tells us that already in spring 1752 Raḥīm Bī planned to punish the enemies who resided in “strongly fortified *qal'as*” (*qal'a-yi raṣīn*) and were responsible for the ruin of this paradise-like region (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 198b).

<sup>887</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 21b; Semenov trans., 36.

<sup>888</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 819.

<sup>889</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 212a, 215b. For Ramazān 1163/August–September 1750, the author mentions two local rulers in Ūrgūt, Mūsā Bī and Ḥaidar, perhaps Mūsā's brother. At that time the nearby Gshtut Valley was ruled by a certain Asad Bī (*ibid.*, fol. 163b). For a brief description of Gshtut see Lehmann, *Reise*, 143.

<sup>890</sup> According to Grebenkin, the rich members of the nomads (*īl-i bāy*) of the Ming tribe had three thousand sheep that were pastured in the mountains of Ūrgūt, Māghiyān and Fān (Grebenkin, “Uzbeki,” 75, 77). For the political development in Ūrgūt in the nineteenth century, see Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 279–84.

<sup>891</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 203a–b.

<sup>892</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 205a.

and Panjīkent east of Samarqand.<sup>893</sup> They plundered the inhabitants in the environs of those places and carried away a large number of cattle.<sup>894</sup> On Jumāda I 10/March 14, the people of Yārī presented a number of gifts and submitted to the Bukharan troops while delivering their former ruler, Būrī Bēg Dādkhwāh. Subsequently, the army raided the Qurama, Ming and Yūz nomads in the valley of Gshtut further to the southeast; all the tents, families and children of the nomads were carried off and evacuated together with the inhabitants of Yārī and Panjīkent.<sup>895</sup> Afterward, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his army entered the mountain region and camped out at Jum‘a Bāzār, where they celebrated *nau rūz*.<sup>896</sup>

On Jumāda I 19/March 24, 1753, the troops departed for Ūrgūt and encamped at Qipchāq Kanītī (?) only half a *farsakh* (3 km) east of the town. The subsequent battle ended in a victory of the Bukharan troops, who were superior in number and strength.<sup>897</sup> Mūsā Bī finally retired to the citadel, taking the first opportunity to flee from there to Gshtut, whereupon the town was occupied by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s army.<sup>898</sup> The victorious *amīr* then recruited local men for his army and resettled five hundred members of the local community (*qaum*) and their families in Bukhara. In return he distributed three hundred orchards to soldiers, especially archers (*mīrgān-i naukarī*) who were relocated from the capital to settle there; he installed a certain Ādīna Qul as governor. At the same time, the population of Māghiyān and Shing sent elders offering the usual gifts.<sup>899</sup> Shortly thereafter,

<sup>893</sup> Yārī (Yar Kishlak) is situated at the foot of the mountains. Lehmann, who visited this place in 1841, reports about a small waterfall, at the foot of which there were many canals, orchards and arable plots (Lehmann, *Reise*, 112–13).

<sup>894</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 206a–b.

<sup>895</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 207a–b. According to the *Tuḥfat*, Būrī Bēg was generously forgiven and sent to Bukhara, but he died en route from an unknown illness (ibid., fol. 208a).

<sup>896</sup> The village of Jum‘a Bāzār is located on the Dargham Canal southeast of Samarqand (for its geographical position see Fedschenko’s map in “Topographical Sketch,” 449–50).

<sup>897</sup> The chronicler tells us that Muḥammad Raḥīm’s supporters took thirty prisoners and presented a number of their skulls to him as gifts (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 199a).

<sup>898</sup> Ibid., fols. 211b–212b.

<sup>899</sup> Ibid., fols. 213a–b. In the nineteenth century, the tiny principality of Māghiyān, situated at the source of the Hujamān-Sū River, also included the small town of Farāp Qūrghān with a bazaar and only one village in its vicinity (Fedschenko, “Topographical Sketch,” 451). The Shing mountain chain is southwest of Gshtut between the Māghiyān and the Wārū Rivers (ibid., map of the upper Zarafshān Valley, 448).

the Bukharan *atālīq* dispatched messengers to inform Dūst Muḥammad, the ruler of Gshtut, that he would show leniency in case of a submission. The brother of Musā Bī immediately sent presents and offered to surrender. Appeased by having established control in Kūhistān, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his troops left Ūrgūt to repair the Dargham Canal. But when the *amīr* learned about the arrival of Qurama and Marqa nomads (*īlāt-i Qurama wa jam 'i az firqa-yi Yūziya-yi Marqa*) in the nearby valley of Yārī, he took this as a further opportunity to supply his supporters with resources. This decision, however, triggered a cascade of mutually reinforcing steps and reactions. According to Wafā, Ghaibullah Bī Baḥrīn and Shāh Sayyid Tūqsāba Kīnakās led five thousand warriors to Yārī, where they plundered the Marqa and carried off their sheep, and even women and children. On hearing about these occurrences, Dūst Muḥammad and his brother Iskandar, the ruler of Ūrmītan,<sup>900</sup> escaped to an unknown destination. Fearing that the populace might follow their example and withdraw to less accessible valleys, the Bukharan army rushed into the valleys east of Ūrgūt and thoroughly looted and destroyed Gshtut, the inhabitants of which had already fled to the mountains. On Jumāda II 14, 1166/April 18, 1753, the judge of Falghar and the *malik* of Gshtut surrendered to the *amīr*; the *qāzī* was afterward appointed “the supreme judge of the ‘Chārpāra-yi Kūhistān’ and distinguished among peers and equals.”<sup>901</sup>

Despite these measures, the firm control established over the valleys east of Ūrgūt by the supporters of the *atālīq* proved to be merely temporary. Once Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī had retired to the capital, the populace of Māghiyān gathered behind Musā Bī and expelled the Bukharan troops, who only consisted of two hundred soldiers.<sup>902</sup> After their hasty retreat, we gain little information on the circumstances in Kūhistān. In 1167/1753–54, the

<sup>900</sup> Lehmann describes Ūrmītan as follows: “Uramitan [...] is a small fortress partly built of slate and it is situated in a small valley close to the Sārafshān; here a dreadful wooden bridge connects both river banks. The higher terraces on the right bank are covered with huts that are surrounded by small plots and beautiful orchards consisting of apple, plum, quince, cherry and pear trees that are artificially irrigated by the nearby water sources. And even the grapes and the peaches flourish very well here [...]” (Lehmann, *Reise*, 115, own translation).

<sup>901</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 215a–216a.

<sup>902</sup> Qāzī Wafā reports about a severe punishment imposed on Mīrzā ‘Alī, the former Bukharan governor of Gshtut; besides receiving a thrashing, all his estates and property were confiscated as a warning (*ibid.*, fols. 218b–219b).

followers of Mūsā Bī escaped from Māghiyān on learning about the arrival of the Bukharan army at Samarqand. They had pitched camp there after an unsuccessful attempt to occupy the town of Jizakh.<sup>903</sup> But since the troops were only marching through and left the region after a short time, it is possible that Mūsā Bī and his men soon returned.

#### FĀZIL BĪ YŪZ OF ŪRĀ TIPPA

Like many other Uzbek chiefs, Fāzil Bī b. Ṣādiq Bī is portrayed as a benefactor (*walī-ni 'mī*) in the *Muntakhab*.<sup>904</sup> Although he had never been the ruler of Khojand, Kāzim simply calls him Fāzil Bēg Yūz Khojandī.<sup>905</sup> According to Mu'īn, Fāzil Bī's father, Ṣādiq Bī, was made ruler of Ūrā Tippa and Khojand by the local population right after the death of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Yūz, but after a short time he was killed at the hands of the Qazāq. Subsequently, Fāzil Bī and his family took refuge with their relatives at Ḥiṣār. He then returned and killed his father's successor, Bēg Būta Bī Yūz, and established himself as independent ruler of Ūrā Tippa.<sup>906</sup>

The brief account by Mu'īn is puzzling because the jigsaw pieces of data, which are probably based on oral information, are not confirmed by other sources. Mu'īn completely ignores the influential role of Āq Būta Bī, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's son who is named as his father's successor, and it is not clear why Fāzil Bī took action against Bēg Būta Bī (an actor not mentioned at all by other sources), though it was allegedly the Qazāq who had stoned his father to death. Subsequently, Fāzil Bī spent some years in Ḥiṣār, where he and Muḥammad Amīn Bī became comrades. After a while, he returned to Ferghana and joined 'Abd al-Karīm Bī Mīng, whose father, Shāh Rukh Bī (d. 1134/1721–22), had eliminated the *khwājas* of Chadak in 1121/1709–10 and established himself as the ruling force in the western part of Ferghana. According to Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, Fāzil Bī Yūz was the foster son (*farzand-khwānda*) of the Mīng ruler.<sup>907</sup> From 1741 to 1745, he assisted 'Abd al-Karīm Bī during his wars against the Qalmāq in the

<sup>903</sup> Ibid., fol. 226a.

<sup>904</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 7, 10–11, 27 passim.

<sup>905</sup> Kāzim, *Ālamārā*, II, 819.

<sup>906</sup> Mu'īn, *Tārīkh*, fol. 61b.

<sup>907</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 7. On the early Khoqand Khanate see Bregel, "Central Asia," 195; Bregel, "The new Uzbek states," 400.

Ferghana Valley and north of it.<sup>908</sup> In 1747 he was allegedly among the *amīrs* who were relocated from their habitats to Iran by Nādir Shāh.<sup>909</sup> But before their departure, he accompanied the Iranian commander Luṭf ‘Alī Khān and Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Manghit as a kind of guide and helped them recruit a large number of local Yūz and Ming warriors east of Samarqand into the Iranian army.<sup>910</sup>

In the *Tuḥfat al-khānī*, Fāzil Bī figures as one of the opponents of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī. In all likelihood he wanted to take revenge either for his relocation to Iran, which is not certain to have taken place, or for the forceful mustering of Yūz troops. Although in 1749 he had made an unsuccessful attempt to take Samarqand with the assistance of Tughāy Murād Bī Burqūt,<sup>911</sup> he seems to have been more or less unaffected by the ongoing power struggle that engulfed Transoxania. During this time he also issued documents, a few of which are preserved and available to us. Dated the year 1162/1748–49, the first document is addressed to the *āqsaqāls* and *kadkhudās* of Maschāh, and shows that by then Fāzil Bī had managed to extend his sphere of influence to the mountain regions on the upper course of the Zarafshān. Moreover, he also appointed tax collectors to those remote areas.<sup>912</sup> Another letter informs about alms and grants that he donated to a family of local *khwājas* in the name of the ruling *khān*. In this document, the *amīr* is titled Nizām al-Daula:

“His Majesty the Khān reigning by divine law. Nizām al-Daula Muḥammad Fāzil Bī my words: during this time it shall be known to the notables, governors and office holders in the area of Ūrā Tippa that we donated the quantity of a water share of one day and one night from the water of the Jaukandak Canal, which was the old and fine *milk* of his Excellency, the ‘Arch-Pole’ (*quṭb al-aqtābī*) Īshān Mūsā Khwājam, to his revered oldest son Īshān ‘Ibādullah Khwājam. In the same manner as they possess it now, they shall be possessed of it [in future]. From today onward, the notables and all the possessors of income in the above-mentioned region and beyond shall recognize it as a specific grant of the aforesaid dignitary. [None of] them shall prevent and oppose this as one will be

<sup>908</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 7; Beisembiev, *Ta’rikh*, 12.

<sup>909</sup> Kāzim, *‘Ālamārā*, II, 802.

<sup>910</sup> According to Kāzim, they mustered six thousand warriors (*ibid.*, 819).

<sup>911</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 151a–b.

<sup>912</sup> Egani and Chekhovich, “Regesty,” Russian trans., 43; facs., 290.

confronted with the wrath of the triumphing spirits of the great sheikhs. They shall not issue new orders every year. 1164/1750–51.<sup>913</sup>

Apart from administrative routines at local level and the confirmation of land and water rights to a descendant of Khwāja Mūsā,<sup>914</sup> the document gives an insight into Fāzil Bī's relationship with the central authority. Interestingly, the letter reveals that this *amīr* still pretended to act in the name of the Chingizid *khān* of Bukhara at a time when neither Muḥammad Mu'min Khān nor his successor as puppet ruler at the mercy of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī' was alive. The claim to be acting in the name of a Chingizid pretender not only enforced his own authority and gave substance to his orders; it further underlined his rejection of the actual political constellation at Bukhara.

Although in Ramazān 1163/late August 1753, Fāzil Bī participated in a plundering campaign conducted by Muḥammad Amīn Bī's alliance against the Manghit in Nasaf,<sup>915</sup> he often sailed in the slipstream of his Ḥiṣārī colleague. In spring 1167/1754, he assisted the besieged Qazāq of Jizakh in their fight against the Bukharan army by sending additional troops from Ūrā Tippa.<sup>916</sup> On this occasion, his enemy Īrdāna Bī sided with the Bukharan *atālīq* and suggested a joint campaign against the Yūz leader.<sup>917</sup> This plan was realized the next year when on Rajab 14, 1168/April 26, 1755, the Bukharan troops set off for Ūrā Tippa and on Sha'bān 23/June 3, 1755, encamped at Zāmin northwest of that town.<sup>918</sup> By this time Fāzil Bī had already evacuated the population from the Ardakhshān Valley and neighboring areas.<sup>919</sup>

When he arrived at Ūrā Tippa, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī was joined by representatives of the Qarāqalpāq, who had their summer pastures on the southern banks of the Sir Daryā and now requested his protection in view of

<sup>913</sup> Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, doc. 22; Russian trans. 22–23; facs., 109; Egani and Chekhovich, "Regesty," Russian trans., 43.

<sup>914</sup> It is remarkable that the position of Īshān Mūsā Khwājam's family did not change significantly in the past seventy years. The water and land rights in the Jaukandak Canal area had de facto become hereditary.

<sup>915</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 163b–164b.

<sup>916</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 223b–224a.

<sup>917</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 225a–226a.

<sup>918</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 226b–228b.

<sup>919</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 227b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 388b.

a possible attack by Fāzil Bī and his Yūz supporters.<sup>920</sup> On Ramazān 18, 1168/June 27, 1755, the joint forces of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and Īrdāna Bī launched a massive attack on the Yūz before Ūrā Tippa. The fighting continued for one week, and eventually the Yūz were only able to save themselves by means of a trick.<sup>921</sup> Subsequent to the retreat of the Bukharan army, Fāzil Bī and his men pursued Īrdāna Bī's troops on their way back to Khoqand and engaged them in a violent encounter at the Āq Sū River. After dealing a major blow to their enemies, the Yūz massacred their captives and erected pyramids of skulls on the river banks.<sup>922</sup> From then on, the two sides were caught up in a vicious spiral of retaliation and conflict. According to Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, Īrdāna Bī used the first opportunity to take revenge on his enemy by attacking the Yūz before Ūrā Tippa. Having defeated them, the Ming for their part pursued their enemies while they were trying to escape. When the followers of Īrdāna Bī eventually prevailed, they committed a massacre of the Yūz, whose "blood turned the Āq Sū into a red-colored river". If we believe Ḥakīm Khān, they erected not just pyramids but even mountains of skulls (*kalla-kūh*).<sup>923</sup>

Exhausted by the previous round of clashes and the heavy losses he had suffered at the hands of the Ming, Fāzil Bī sent a delegation to Bukhara on Rabī' I 1, 1169/December 4–5, 1755, offering his surrender and the usual

<sup>920</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 229b. Afterward, the Qarāqalpāq were resettled at Kān-i Kūl near Samarqand (ibid., fol. 230a).

<sup>921</sup> Qāzī Wafā, likely an eyewitness to this combat, provides a very detailed description of the battle scenes. Besides Manghit and Ming contingents, he mentions Kḥiṭā'ī-Qipchāq, Yetī Ūrūgh (Baḥrīn and Jalāyir), Kīnakās, Qarluq, Qalmāq and Qirghiz contingents on the Bukharan side (ibid., fols. 232b–235b). See also Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 355; II, 10; Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 109; Beisembiev, *Ta'rikh*, 13.

<sup>922</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 10–11. According to Mullā Sharīf, Fāzil Bī's troops pursued their enemies up to Khojand and seized a lot of booty (weapons, horses, tents etc.). He also tells us that Muḥammad Amīn Bī, the ruler of Ḥiṣār, ordered the massacre of the Ming soldiers and the erection of skull pyramids (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 399a–b; Davidovich and Mukhtarov, *Stranitzky*, 35).

<sup>923</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 11–12; Chekhovich, "K istorii," 82. Later we find Īrdāna Bī, the governor of Khoqand (*ḥākīm-i Qūqān*), among the nobles of Fāzil Bī who also participated in the campaign against Bukharan troops in Miyānkāl (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 342a). Unfortunately, the sources do not state the reason for his change of mind.

delivery of *āq ūylī* and the *zakāt* to his enemy.<sup>924</sup> But when he refused to send one of his sons to the court, the envisaged agreement failed to materialize. Subsequently, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, knowing that his ally Īrdāna Bī would do the same from the eastern flank, ordered his troops to obstruct all the supply routes to Ūrā Tippa.<sup>925</sup> But since in the aftermath Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān would come to pay more attention to the subjugation of Ḥiṣār, Fāzil Bī's position in Ūrā Tippa remained more or less secure. In 1759 he was the last opponent remaining outside Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's sphere of authority. Moreover, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's death removed the danger of eventually becoming incorporated into his network of power.

Fāzil Bī and his tribesmen are an interesting case because the events following Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's end illustrate how a series of circumstances at local level caused an actor to abandon his former policy and make peace with his bitterest enemies. After Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's unexpected death, his paternal uncle Muḥammad Dānyāl Bī took over as the new *atālīq* and installed Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's young grandson Fāzil Bī b. Nārbūta Bī as new *khān*.<sup>926</sup> At the same time, the small realm built by his predecessor collapsed as most of the other *amīrs* did not recognize Dānyāl Bī's authority. Yet although the new strongman was able to defeat most of his adversaries right at the beginning of his *atālīqate*, in the following years he faced a number of rebellions, especially in the Miyānkāl and Qarshī. In the Zarafshān Valley, a group of young and inexperienced men belonging to a new generation of *amīrs* flexed their muscles and challenged Dānyāl Bī.<sup>927</sup> All of them soon joined Fāzil Bī when in spring 1759 he captured the

<sup>924</sup> For the meaning of *āq ūylī* see chapter The Order of Things/Notions of Loyalty and Obedience/Provision of Resources by Subordinated Actors.

<sup>925</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 238a–239b. In Mullā Sharīf's opinion, the ruler had ordered a new campaign against Fāzil Bī prior to the arrival of the envoys from Ūrā Tippa (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 400b–401b).

<sup>926</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 325a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 425a; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 6b. See Chekhovich, "K istorii," 76; Bregel, "The new Uzbek states," 395.

<sup>927</sup> Wafā lists here the two sons of Khwājā Yār Bī Ūtārchī, Bābā Bī and Badal Bī, Khwājā Yār Bī b. Ghaibullah Bī Bahrīn and Yādgar Bī Burqūt, a younger brother of Tughāy Murād Bī (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 329a). See also Chekhovich, "O nekotorykh," 89.

important city of Samarqand and imprisoned the governor, Barāt Qūshbēgī.<sup>928</sup>

After this conquest, Fāzil Bī acted as senior chief of a heterogeneous alliance comprising most of the tribes of the Miyānkāl, like the Kḥiṭāʾī-Qipchāq, some of the Yetī Ūrūgh and the Burqūt. Backed by his many supporters, the ambitious Yūz leader managed to extend his sphere of influence to Panjshanba and Khaṭarchī. Finally, his resistance not only got the new *atālīq* into serious trouble, Fāzil Bī also urged him to dethrone his young namesake and to install a Chingizid as a puppet *khān*.<sup>929</sup> Dānyāl Bī then placed Abūʾl-Ghāzī Khān from the Chingizids of Khwārazm (Ūrganch) on the throne and continued to rule in his name.<sup>930</sup>

Yet despite this step, the upheaval in Miyānkāl continued during the next months,<sup>931</sup> and reached a peak when on Dhūʾl-Ḥijja 1, 1172/July 25–26, 1759, Fāzil Bī gathered his troops at Khojand and Ūrā Tippa to embark on his largest campaign to Miyānkāl. According to the *Tuḥfat*, “a mob of low people from every region gathered around him in the hope of booty.”<sup>932</sup> In spite of their overwhelming numerical superiority, the Yūz leader and his alliance suffered a severe blow before Karmīna and broke off the siege of the

<sup>928</sup> According to the Bukharan authors, Fāzil Bī later ordered the assassination of the last surviving son of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Manghit (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 328b–329a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 437b). Yaʾqūb only mentions the conquest of Samarqand by Fāzil Bī after Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān’s death (Yaʾqūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 7a).

<sup>929</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 329b–330a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 437a; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 361; Muʾīn, *Tārīkh*, fol. 29a. According to Mullā Sharīf, Fāzil Tūra was not worthy of the throne of Bukhara because he was not fit for khānship, he lacked descent from the Prophet and he was too young (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 436b). In Yaʾqūb’s version Dānyāl Bī deposed Fāzil Khān when his father, Nārbūta Bī, showed his own aspirations to the post of *atālīq* (Yaʾqūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 7a–b).

<sup>930</sup> The Bukharan sources give conflicting information about the background of Abūʾl-Ghāzī Khān. While some of the chronicles do not inform us about his origin (see Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 325a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 437a), Yaʾqūb writes that Abūʾl-Ghāzī Khān was a descendant of the first Tuqay-Timurid rulers (Yaʾqūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 7b). Muʾīn says that the new shadow *khān* belonged to the *sultāns* of Ūrganch (Muʾīn, *Tārīkh*, fol. 29a). According to Mir Izzetullah, Abūʾl-Ghāzī Khān’s father, Ibrāhīm Sultān, was the nephew of Rajab Khān, who had challenged Abūʾl-Faiẓ Khān in the 1720s (Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 341). According to Sāmī, Abūʾl-Ghāzī Khān was a grandson of Abūʾl-Faiẓ Khān (ʿAbd al-ʿAzīm Būstānī Bukhārāʾī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 41–42).

<sup>931</sup> Qāzī Wafā gives a very detailed account of the rebellion of the young *amīrs* (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, 330a–331b).

<sup>932</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 332a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 437b.

town to retire eastwards.<sup>933</sup> Although his network of power showed the first rifts—his ally Bābā Bī b. Khwājā Yār Bī joined the forces of the *atālīq*—Fāzil Bī continued his activities.<sup>934</sup> In the following time he was constantly on the move between Panjshanba, Khaṭarchī and the smaller fortresses in Miyānkāl.<sup>935</sup> According to Qāzī Wafā, the rebellion continued for the next two months and ushered in a stalemate in the central tracts of the Zarafshān Valley. The rebellion only ended when the Yūz leader did not accept the conditions for a peace agreement and subsequently left the area, retreating to the east.<sup>936</sup> Shortly thereafter, Dānyāl Bī's son Shāh Murād began his war of conquest by subduing the rest of the troublemakers within a comparatively short time. Having been abandoned by their senior leader, most of them were unable to put up resistance. The war ended with the conquest of Tātkand, a smaller *qal'a* inhabited by Khiṭā'ī near Karmīna. Most of the prisoners were beheaded. Afterward, their heads were brought to the capital where the followers of Dānyāl Bī erected pyramids of skulls.<sup>937</sup> The battle of Karmīna is also mentioned by Ya'qūb, who says that Fāzil Bī's troops were put to flight, while the Bukharan army made rich booty.<sup>938</sup>

The following years are unfortunately only thinly covered by the sources I used. Fāzil Bī Yūz in all likelihood continued to rule over Ūrā Tīppa and the adjacent areas. Later his son Khudāyār Bī (d. 1212/1797–98) successfully attacked the city of Khojand east of Ūrā Tīppa on the southern bank of the Sir Daryā but could not enjoy the fruits of his glorious conquest. When the Khoqandian ruler, Nārbūta Bī, retook the city soon after, the young Yūz commander escaped, but en route he learned that Nārbūta Bī had already occupied his native town without resistance.<sup>939</sup> Unfortunately, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān does not give any date for these events, but it seems possible that the whole story took place in the second half of the

<sup>933</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 333a–336a.

<sup>934</sup> According to Wafā, Fāzil Bī's alliance consisted of his Yūz, some of the Yeṭī Ūrūgh (the Baḥrīn and the Jalāyir of Anjaka (?)), the Burqūt led by Yādgar Bī, the Turkomān Yūzī from the northern mountains of Miyānkāl and the Qarāqalpāq (ibid., fol. 338b). For his detailed account of the several battles and violent encounters, see ibid., fols. 336b–338b.

<sup>935</sup> Ibid., fols. 338b–341b.

<sup>936</sup> Ibid., fols. 342a–b.

<sup>937</sup> Qāzī Wafā explains that other prisoners were hanged on gallows, minarets and the city gates (ibid., fol. 346a).

<sup>938</sup> Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 7a.

<sup>939</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 23–26.

1760s. According to Qāzī Wafā, it was Īrdāna Bī who conquered Ūrā Tippa and drove Fāzil Bī and his tribes to Jizakh.<sup>940</sup> Although the *Tuḥfat* dates these events to late 1181/spring 1768, it is not certain which ruler of Khoqand took Ūrā Tippa.<sup>941</sup>

Whoever conquered this town in the early days of 1768, the consequences were devastating for the Yūz. Fāzil Bī and his tribes (*ilāt*),<sup>942</sup> altogether twenty thousand families, were expelled and took refuge in the surroundings of Jizakh.<sup>943</sup> Sandwiched between the Bukharans in the west and the Khoqandians in the east, the Yūz chief opted to join the Manghit *atālīq* to protect his own people. In this situation it was convenient to make peace with his enemies, especially as he could hope for assistance and protection. By now a wily old fox and shrewd tactician, the Yūz *amīr* knew very well that once he had achieved his goals, the Bukharans would be too far away to disturb his rule in Ūrā Tippa or Jizakh. Hence he sent “people of confidence and eloquence” (*mardum-i i‘tibār-i sukhan-ras*) to Bukhara, where

“the innate generosity (*karam-i jibīlī*) of the magnificent *amīr* required that he make him cheerful with all kinds of favors. He shall accept every request with regard to support and assistance of this dynasty with obedience and pleasure so that the cypher of forgiveness may be drawn in the *dīwān* titled ‘Pardon all men on the Day of Resurrection!’.”<sup>944</sup>

<sup>940</sup> The date of Īrdāna Bī’s demise is not clear. According to Ivanov, he died in 1774 (Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 109), but Beisembiev believes that he ruled from 1751 onward and died in 1769 (Beisembiev, *Ta’rikh*, 12–13).

<sup>941</sup> According to Bregel, the time of Nārbūta Bī’s reign is not clear; it is usually dated 1770–98, but in other sources he reigned from 1763 (Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 401). Ivanov dates the beginning of his reign to 1774 (Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 109; see also Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 82). According to Beisembiev, Nārbūta Bī reigned approximately 1770–98 (Beisembiev, *Ta’rikh*, 12–13).

<sup>942</sup> The term *ilāt* first appeared in Il-khanid times and denotes nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. In addition, the phrase *ilāt wa ‘ashā’ir* is frequently encountered in medieval and modern times, and suggests that both terms were used more or less synonymously (for further information about the term *ilāt*, see A. K. S. Lambton, “Īlāt,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., III, 1095–1110).

<sup>943</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 361b–362a. Ḥakīm Khān only relates that when Khudāyār Bī escaped from Khojand, he went directly to Jizakh, where his father had taken refuge since Nārbūta Bī occupied Ūrā Tippa and the nearby town of Khawāsh (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 25–26).

<sup>944</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 362a.

This time Fāzil Bī sent his son with a second delegation of elders to the *atālīq*, who was staying with his troops at Katta Qūrgḥān. On Muḥarram 2, 1182/May 17, 1768, Fāzil Bī along with other chiefs of the Yūz went in person to Katta Qūrgḥān and submitted to the *amīr*. On that occasion he not only received all honors and favors but was granted a *khalʿat* and a horse adorned with a bejeweled saddle and bridles.<sup>945</sup> Shortly thereafter, Fāzil Bī supported Dānyāl Bī’s army during the siege by the Kḥiṭā’ī chieftain Badal Bī Utārchī b. Khwājām Yār Bī and his “nomadic tribe” (*īl-i bāy*) in Samarqand. On entering the city, the troops including the Yūz made a rich haul, especially sheep and horses. Afterward, the ruler of Ūrā Tippa had a meeting with Shāh Murād, the son of Dānyāl Bī and future ruler of Mā Warā’ al-Nahr, at which “the manifestation of friendship opened the countenances of both men.”<sup>946</sup> A little later, the Yūz leader undertook a plundering expedition to Shahr-i Sabz and evacuated ten thousand Yūz families from that region. Upon his arrival at Katta Qūrgḥān, he and his men received endless rewards (*an ʿām-i bisyār wa soyūrghāmishī-yī ziyāda az ḥiṣār wa shumār*), particularly ambling and precious horses, robes of honor, money gifts and rare fabrics.<sup>947</sup>

One of the last traces of Fāzil Bī is again to be found in the *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, telling us that his son Khudāyār Bī remained in the village of Yasī Tippa near Samarqand for three years as an ordinary farmer or landowner. Subsequently, he managed to retake Ūrā Tippa with the assistance of some Ming contingents from Ūrgūt and the Kīnakās *amīrs* of Shahr-i Sabz and established himself as ruler of this region.<sup>948</sup> An additional document has been preserved, giving an insight into administrative procedures in Ūrā Tippa in the first half of the 1770s:

“His Majesty the Khān reigning by divine law. Nizām al-Daula Muḥammad Fāzil Bī my words: during this time it shall be known to the learned men, the *ʿulamā* and the notables of the area of Ūrā Tippa that our mercy and kindness has been extended toward the state and connected to the desires of the ‘Refuge of Wisdom,’ the well-wishing and faultless ‘Repository of Sayyidhood,’ his Excellency Ākhūnd Mullā Mīr Ḥasan. Based on the document issued in the Year of the Snake, we granted him the right to teach in the congregational mosque. The learned men and *ʿulamā* vested with sole authority must take him for their teacher and pay respect to the aforementioned [man] out of firm necessity.

<sup>945</sup> Ibid., fols. 362a–b.

<sup>946</sup> Ibid., fols. 362b–363b.

<sup>947</sup> Ibid., fols. 364a–b.

<sup>948</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 28–31.

From the old days to the present it is dependent upon the office of a teacher and has never lost the status of a *madrasa*. They shall neither oppose nor deviate [from him] and not transgress that which is approved by the *ākhūnd!* They shall act in accordance with the written [orders] and not pass beyond so that they receive attention! 1187/1773–74.<sup>949</sup>

This document was again issued in the name of the Chingizid king, in this case Abū'l-Ghāzī Khān, the monarch in whose name Dānyāl Bī governed the kingdom. It shows how Fāzil Bī delegated professorial authority to a local *maulā* by granting him the position of a teacher. At the same time, he warned other dignitaries and local notables, and also probable rivals of Mullā Mīr Ḥasan, against interfering in his business. The document, however, also reveals that compared to the first letter issued in 1750–51, the local configurations of power had not changed significantly. According to Ḥakīm Khān, Fāzil Bī died at the age of fifty-eight and his son Khudāyār Bī became his successor.<sup>950</sup>

#### MUḤAMMAD AMĪN BĪ YŪZ OF ḤIṢĀR

Ḥiṣār disappears from the sources in the time of Abū'l-Faiḥ Khān. There are signs that the region must have enjoyed stability during that period. For example, many people fleeing from the areas most affected by the Qazāq raids in the 1720s found refuge in Ḥiṣār. Qāzī Wafā alludes to a large number of Tajik families who had taken refuge there during these occurrences.<sup>951</sup> With the end of the Chingizids of Balkh and the annexation of the southern appanage to Nādir Shāh's empire, the Oxus once again had become a political boundary. As a result, Ḥiṣār and its governor, Muḥammad Amīn Bī Yūz, were more or less cut off from the former appanage center, Balkh.

Not very much is known about Muḥammad Amīn Bī, his background and how he assumed leadership in Ḥiṣār. He certainly belonged to the descendants of Khūshika Bī and appears for the first time in the context of a Khoqandian invasion in Samarqand in the early 1730s. In this situation, he furnished a large contingent of Yūz warriors to the Bukharan ruler.<sup>952</sup> When Nādir Shāh's forces first invaded Mā Warā' al-Nahr in 1737, the Yūz played

<sup>949</sup> Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, doc. 110; Russian trans., 23.

<sup>950</sup> Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 363–64.

<sup>951</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 282b.

<sup>952</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 49a.

a rather ambivalent role. Some of them had already surrendered to the Qizilbāsh before the battle of Qarshī, but Kāzīm does not refer to Muḥammad Amīn Bī in this context.<sup>953</sup> According to the *Mazhar*, he was among the Uzbek actors who had already entered the service of the Iranian emperor in late 1740. At that time he was one of the *amīrs* who received the Bukharan *atālīq* Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī and brought him to Nādir's tent.<sup>954</sup> But this is not confirmed by other Transoxanian or Iranian sources. In 1745 he had solicited Nādir Shāh's aid in his conflict with Sarimsāq, a grandson of Ūtikān Bī whom we have already encountered as a major foe of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Yūz.<sup>955</sup>

Wafā mentions Muḥammad Amīn Bī the first time in the course of the Iranian occupation, when he and other Uzbek *amīrs* paid homage to Nādir Shāh.<sup>956</sup> In 1747 he belonged to the group of nobles traveling with Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī to Mashhad; en route he advised the Manghit leader not to engage in the rebellion instigated by Shāh Qulī Khān (Bēg) Qājār in Marw.<sup>957</sup> After their return to Bukhara, the Yūz leader played a key role during the Iranian siege and was put in charge of the defense of the Namāzghāh Gate.<sup>958</sup> During and after the siege, he was a member of the council of tribal leaders rendering assistance to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, and in addition served as a messenger to and interlocutor of the Iranian commanders, thus guaranteeing their security.<sup>959</sup>

<sup>953</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 590.

<sup>954</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Mazhar*, fol. 66b. In Kāzīm Marwī's account of the battle at Qatār Tūt, which allegedly took place immediately prior to Nādir's victory over the Uzbek forces, Muḥammad Amīn Bī is named as one of the commanders of the left wing (*maisara*) of the Uzbek army (Muḥammad Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 790).

<sup>955</sup> According to Kāzīm, Muḥammad Amīn Bī was allegedly transferred to Mashhad in 1740 at the request of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān, but a while later he nevertheless appears as governor (*ḥakīm*) of Ḥiṣār (Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, II, 802, 830; III, 1095).

<sup>956</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 44a.

<sup>957</sup> Kāzīm, *Ālamārā*, III, 1117.

<sup>958</sup> According to the *Tuḥfat*, Muḥammad Amīn Bī, together with Muḥammad Amīn Khwāja Naqīb, defended the Namāzghāh Gate and the tower (*burj*) of Chahār Bāgh-i Ladū Khāna (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 119a).

<sup>959</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 125a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 341a, 345b, 347a.

*The Expanding Space of Yūz Power*

With the retreat of the Iranian troops in 1747, Muḥammad Amīn Bī abandoned his allegiance to the Bukharan ruler and henceforth formed the focus of resistance against him. The Yūz chief probably regarded himself as equal in terms of power means and refused to recognize Muḥammad Raḥīm as a superior. Qāzī Wafā explains Muḥammad Amīn Bī's position as follows:

“In the course of the last generation, due to the intervals of time and the lack of power and authority on the side of the reigning dynasty, the hand of sovereignty was cut short from the collection of revenues and the arranging of [affairs] in this region. [Hence] Muḥammad Amīn Bī boasted about his independence and has brought all tracts of land in this area into his fold. At the beginning of the fortunate days and the rise of His Royal Majesty's star of felicity, he had fastened the belt of loyalty for some days [...]. But when he witnessed the constantly growing magnificence and reputation of royal authority, he showed complete hostility and departed from Bukhara to Ḥiṣār. [...] [When] the breeze of will blew over the meadow of his desires and hopes, he exterminated his enemies on the fringes of his domain by removing the thorns and thistles of his rivals with all the means of munificence and strength at his disposal!”<sup>960</sup>

Qāzī Wafā also states that Muḥammad Amīn Bī's rule over Ḥiṣār was based on a coalition between his Yūz tribes and local Qurama communities.<sup>961</sup> In the following time, the Yūz leader was the most ambitious of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's adversaries, a skillful tactician with an excellent knowledge of the prevailing political situation in the wider region. At times he also revived crucial relationships with other rulers like the Afghan king Aḥmad Shāh Durrānī. Turning Ḥiṣār into an alternative power center, he challenged Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's authority, and for a very long time it was not really clear which side would win the ensuing power struggle. Against this background, it is not surprising that the enmity between Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his arch enemy forms a recurrent strand in Qāzī Wafā's account.

In Jumāda II 1162/May 1749, Muḥammad Amīn Bī formed an alliance with the Qungrāt und the Durmān tribes to launch an unsuccessful campaign in the small town of Pāshkhūrd north of Shīrābād.<sup>962</sup> A little later, he aligned himself with the Kīnakās leaders in Shahr-i Sabz. By summer 1163/1750, he managed to build a larger coalition comprising most of the *amīrs* in

<sup>960</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 280a–b.

<sup>961</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 280b.

<sup>962</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 157b–159b.

Transoxania, such as Tughāy Murād Bī Burqūt, the Qungrāt leadership of Bāysūn, most of the Sarāy in Khuzār, and, of course, Fāzil Bī Yūz, his colleague in Ūrā Tippa. During this time, the Yūz chieftain constantly moved between Ḥiṣār, Shahr-i Sabz and Khuzār, plotting and gathering allies against Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī.<sup>963</sup>

By 1750 the new coalition had made its influence felt in the core areas of Transoxania. On Ramaẓān 18, 1163/August 20–21, 1750, Muḥammad Amīn Bī's activities reached a first peak when he dispatched his Burqūt and Yūz allies to Nasaf to target the economic and military base of his competitors. But this campaign ended in defeat and a hasty retreat from Qarshī.<sup>964</sup> In the following three years, he spread his patronage to all those who, suffering defeat by the Bukharan army, were either not able or not willing to attend the court. As a result, Ḥiṣār was transformed into a refuge for all the rebels and enemies of the *atālīq* and thus played a role similar to that of Shahr-i Sabz thirty years before. Rebels and fugitives like Īsh Yulī, a brother of Qābil Kīnakās, who together with his tribesmen fled the area of Yakka Bāgh in 1751, or Pāqīṣd Sarāy escaping from Khuzār earlier the same year, made their way to Ḥiṣār in order to enlist Muḥammad Amīn Bī's aid.<sup>965</sup> And to complete this list, a certain Mullah Īlkī, who had served at the court of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and used to tell him his fortune, had escaped to Ḥiṣār subsequent to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's assumption of supreme authority. Shortly after his arrival in Dehnau, he declared a small boy named Kafsh Dūz—"the shoemaker"—the legitimized successor of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and began to promote him as new *khān*, probably with Muḥammad Amīn Bī's permission.<sup>966</sup> The underlying logic of this pattern is reminiscent of Ibrāhīm Bī Kīnakās' policy of establishing a Chingizid counter *khān* thirty years before.

<sup>963</sup> Ibid., fols. 162b–163b.

<sup>964</sup> Ibid., fols. 163b–165a. The date given by the author is probably wrong. According to him, Ramaẓān 18, 1163, was a Tuesday, but it was in fact either Thursday (August 20, 1750) or Friday (August 21, 1750).

<sup>965</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 186a, 188b–189a, 277b.

<sup>966</sup> Ibid., fol. 284a. Mullah Īlkī was probably one of Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān's astrologers.

*The Shrinking Space of Yūz Power*

By 1752 the Ḥiṣār ruler had lost his most important supporters, the Kīnakās *amīrs* Subḥān Qulī Bī and ‘Ālim Bī. In spring 1753, Muḥammad Amīn Bī’s alliance suffered its next blow when his associates lost Panjīkent, Urgūt, Māghiyān and Gshut, forming a strategic glacis to the north and northwest of Ḥiṣār. As Qāzī Wafā points out, the constant shrinking of his sphere of influence and the continuing loss of outside support increased the political and military pressure on Muḥammad Amīn Bī. This resulted first in an encapsulation of the Yūz in Ḥiṣār and Ūrā Tippa as the radius of action of the local *amīrs* and their supporters shrank, and second in an increase of intratribal competition and warfare among the Yūz. It is worth remarking that our author also refers to the vendetta flaring up once again between Muḥammad Amīn’s Tamghāy Shādī sub-division and the Marqa led by Sarimsāq b. Subḥān Qul b. Ūtikān. As has been explored in one of the previous sections, this dispute harked back to the abduction of the bride of Muḥammad Rahīm Bī Yūz and lingered on in the following period and even during the Iranian interlude.

Although Wafā states that it was Muḥammad Amīn Bī who in fact first attacked the Marqa when he learned about the loss of his allies in Kūhistān, it is possible that the latter soon threatened his authority on seeing the first signs of weakness. Supported by the Ghalcha of Dūshanba, the Tamghāy Shādī prevailed and committed a major massacre of their rivals. Sarimsāq Bī was also killed during the fighting and Dūshanba was apparently taken over by Muḥammad Amīn Bī’s supporters.<sup>967</sup> After this incident, Sarimsāq Bī’s son Ghalcha Bēg escaped to Bukhara, where he entered the service of the Manghit ruler and became just the first in a chain of actors looking for protection under the new lords of Bukhara. In the following years, the *atālīq* patronized all the local rivals and enemies of the Ḥiṣār ruler by granting them shelter and offering career opportunities. This and Muḥammad Amīn Bī’s transgressions resulted in a shift of gravity from Ḥiṣār to Bukhara, which turned into a refuge for a number of local rivals of the Yūz leader.<sup>968</sup>

<sup>967</sup> Ibid., fols. 219b–220a. Olufsen describes late nineteenth-century Dūshanba as follows: “Dushambé is a very old town of commerce. It has a castle which like all other Bokharan castles is quite mediaeval in appearance. It is surrounded by high walls with towers and bastions and looks very picturesque owing to its high situation on the steep slopes on the river from where it commands the town around it” (Olufsen, *The Emir*, 53).

<sup>968</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 219b–220b.

The next severe setback Muḥammad Amīn Bī suffered was the desertion of his brother Muḥammad Dūst, who had forged an alliance with the fugitives of the Sarāy tribe against his brother. The putative conspiracy was blown in summer or autumn 1753, when Muḥammad Dūst was at Peshawar to enlist the aid of the Afghan ruler Aḥmad Shāh Durrānī (r. 1747–72). Seeking revenge for the plot, Muḥammad Amīn Bī put his brother's wife to death and requested Aḥmad Shāh to deliver his brother. At the same time, he ordered his followers to kill his erstwhile protégé Pāqīṣd Sarāy for plotting against him. Aḥmad Shāh, however, refused to hand over the fugitive. On returning to Bukhara, Muḥammad Dūst entered the service of the Manghit *amīr*. Other notables and *amīrs* who had fallen out with Muḥammad Amīn Bī followed this example and attended the Bukharan court, where Muḥammad Rahīm Bī did not hesitate to shower them with royal favors.<sup>969</sup>

In 1755 the Yūz suffered their next blow at Ūrā Tippa, where they were defeated by a joint army of Bukharan and Khoqandian forces, but their *amīrs* could avoid imprisonment by employing a trick.<sup>970</sup> It should be mentioned that Mullā Sharīf offers an alternative interpretation of this measure:

“Because of the harshness of his opponents, the remoteness of the guarded domains (*wilāyāt-i mahrūsa*), the suspicions of the inhabitants of Jizakh and their resistance to the arrangements, he [Muḥammad Rahīm Bī] sent messengers to the area of Nasaf and issued the order that his revered brother Barāt Qūshbēgī and his dependants, Imām Qulī Bī with the troops of Yakka Bāgh, Qalmāqcha Bahādur with the army of Shahr-i Sabz, and Mīrzā Bāy Tūqsāba with the legions of Khuzār shall become the stirrup-fellows of speed and quickness in order to join the glorious army. When learning about the call for the illustrious brother, the respectable commanders and the victorious army [...], Muḥammad Amīn Bī thought that by launching war and battles he could never push back the triumphing royal troops [who were] as numerous as ants. For the Ḥiṣārīs the situation would turn more and more toward anxiety and compulsion due to a lack of allowances, clover for the horses and the necessities of life. Furthermore, he felt treacherous fear and confusion of mind from the side of his opponents in the region of Ḥiṣār.”<sup>971</sup>

By spring 1757, Muḥammad Amīn Bī and Fāzil Bī were the last of Muḥammad Rahīm Bī's enemies to be taken seriously. Deprived of his final allies, the Qungrāt of Shīrābād and Bāysūn, the Ḥiṣār ruler saw his small

<sup>969</sup> Ibid., fols. 220b–221a. The alliance between Dūst Muḥammad Bēg and his new overlord did not last for long. In early 1756, he revived the contact with his older brother and was put to death when Muḥammad Rahīm Bī learned about the plot (ibid., fols. 242a–b).

<sup>970</sup> See next chapter.

<sup>971</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 395b–396a.

domain increasingly surrounded by Manghit and pro-Manghit forces. The victory over the Qungrāt was the prelude to the final conquest of Ḥiṣār and triggered a chain reaction that further curtailed Muḥammad Amīn's authority at local level.

In the following, we will see the effects of the generation of power as well as an individual actor's worldview reacting to circumstances that were at least partly produced by this worldview. The dynamics of the resulting development can be grasped in terms of mutually reinforcing effects, expressed in vicious circles of violence acting back on the worldviews of all actors and the physical (objective) conditions thus produced. The development began in early 1757, a few months after Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's coronation. After the subjugation of the Qungrāt, Muḥammad Amīn Bī's clients—the renegade Sarāy Uzbeks, who were accommodated in Upper Ḥiṣār (*Ḥiṣār-i bālā*) after their defeat in Khuzār in 1751—deserted under the leadership of Qungrāt Bāy, a brother of Pāqīṣd Sarāy.<sup>972</sup> Next, the Dūrmān and Naymān leaders from Qabādiyān joined the royal court. Complaining about Muḥammad Amīn Bī's transgressions and brutality, the Dūrmān leadership under Muḥammad Ya'qūb Bī offered prompt assistance for an attack on Ḥiṣār.<sup>973</sup> This led the Yūz leader to wreak vengeance for their surrender to the Bukharan king by taking severe measures against his former allies. But his actions actually accelerated the disintegration of his local network, provoking him all the more to do away with his local enemies. Muḥammad Amīn Bī's endeavor to punish the Dūrmān in Ramazān 1170/May–June 1757 proved fatal. The attempt to bring the fertile region into his fold backfired as it provided the pretext for Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān to intervene directly in Ḥiṣār. In the absence of the Yūz forces, Bukharan troops raided Muḥammad Amīn's residence Dehnau and its environs, causing him to hastily withdraw from Qabādiyān.<sup>974</sup> Shortly thereafter, his Kīnakās protégé Īsh Yulī Bēg, whom he had accommodated in one of the smaller towns between Bāysūn and Dehnau, turned away from him and took refuge with Imām Qulī Bī. Wafā explains this decision as being due to concerns regarding the life and future of his tribesmen (*il wa lawāḥiq-i khwud*).<sup>975</sup> This and Muḥammad Amīn Bī's growing ferocity prompted the

<sup>972</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 272b–273a.

<sup>973</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 271a–273b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 408b.

<sup>974</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 275a–276a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 408b.

<sup>975</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 277b–278a.

“bandwagon” to hasten in the direction of the Manghit ruler. Wafā gives a short list of local Yūz tribes that were leaving the sinking ship:

“Having recognized the weakness of [Muḥammad Amīn Bī’s] star of fortune and the damage to his affairs, the Yūz tribes like the Qarā Tughma Bī, Parcha Yūz, Ērkānālī, and the Turkomān Yūzī, as well as many others from the notables of the subjects (*a ’yān-i ra ’āyā*) summoned Imām Qulī Bī from Bāysūn out of consideration for their herds.”<sup>976</sup>

Mullā Sharīf explains this development more drastically:

“The wind of affliction and ruin turned its face of anger toward the gardens of the strength and power of the Ḥiṣārī ruler. The west wind of baseness and sordidness opened the hand of supernatural power and destruction to pillage the paradise-like gardens and the splendor of the oppressor’s domain. The heads of the long-suffering looked out of the pocket of resignation in order to put forward the steps of vengeance in the arena of enmity. From every corner tribal leaders and other hostile men of distinction raised the banner of dispute and conflict. Moreover, dear and consenting relatives, the pillars of his power (*arkān-i daulat-i ū*) and his well-wishing attendants, having enjoyed promotion (*tarbiyat*) under the shade of his government, and all those being reared at the *khwān* of his benefits agreed on the decline of his reputation and grandeur and demanded the punishment of the perishing *amīr*.”<sup>977</sup>

Their plea for help was answered promptly; in the first days of August 1757, Imām Qulī Bī together with three thousand fighters entered Ḥiṣār once again. With the assistance of the local population, he conquered the town of Dehnau and took control of “the gateways to Upper Ḥiṣār,” while Muḥammad Amīn Bī escaped, crossed the Oxus and took refuge in Balkh.<sup>978</sup>

### *Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī’s Administrative Measures*

The flight of his arch enemy occasioned a further expedition by Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, whose troops, with all the former allies and followers of Muḥammad Amīn Bī under their wings, arrived at Dehnau on Dhū’l-Ḥijja 28, 1170/September 13, 1757. With the formal establishment of Manghit sovereignty in Ḥiṣār, the leadership of the Yūz and Qurama (*sarān-i ulūsāt-i*

<sup>976</sup> Ibid., fols. 281a–b. Referring to the structure of the Yūz of Ūrā Tippa, Radloff says that the Parcha Yūz, consisting of the “Uch Tamghali, Qara Qalpaq, Tort Tamghali and Pūjāgay (here Pödschägäi),” were one of the largest sub-sections (Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, I, 226). According to Doniyorov, the Parcha Yūz belonged to the Qarapchi, one of the three major sub-tribes of the Yūz (Doniyorov, *Uzbek khalqining*, 84).

<sup>977</sup> Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 410a.

<sup>978</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 281b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 410a–b; Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 102.

*Yūz wa īlāt-i Qurama*), including a large number of local *arbābs* and *kadkhudās* and members of the Ḥiṣārī nobility (*a' yān wa ashraf*), flocked to the gates of Dehnau and surrendered to the new *khāqān*.<sup>979</sup>

Reflecting patterns of royal patronage in favor of a number of local actors, the subsequent round of appointments gives us a clearer idea of local power structures. Here the *Tuḥfat al-khānī* permits a detailed insight into the closely meshed web of allegiances built up by Muḥammad Amīn Bī before Muḥammad Raḥīm's inauguration and in the time after. The following actors were the beneficiaries of the conquest of Ḥiṣār:

- Imām Qulī Bī Manghit was confirmed as governor of Bāysūn including the adjoining areas of Dehnau and Upper Ḥiṣār, formerly in Raḥīm Bī's service;
- Murād Parwānachī, who had taken refuge at Bukhara, gained the governorship of Ūzbakān and Rīgar, inhabited by the Qarā Tughma Bī sub-division of the Yūz;
- Ghalcha Bēg b. Sarimsāq Bī was appointed as *amīr* of the Marqa (*amārat-i ūlus-i Marqa*) and governor of Dūshanba, Moghūlān and Lawāz;
- Mihtar Ādīna Qulī Bī became governor of the city of Dehnau;
- Īsān Qildī Bī, a paternal uncle of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, received the governorship of Ūrgūt;
- Shāh-i Kalān, the brother of Fīrūz Shāh of Rāmit,<sup>980</sup> was confirmed as governor of Rāmit and its *hazārajāt*;<sup>981</sup>
- The Maliks of Fān, who like many other local actors had taken refuge at the Bukharan court, were again installed as governors of Fān,<sup>982</sup>

<sup>979</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 282a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 411a.

<sup>980</sup> In Kūhistān, local Tajik leaders bore the title *shāh* (Beisembiev, *Ta'rikh*, 72). In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, these local representatives of the Tajik population also issued documents on the status of land and landed property in the mountain *wilāyat* of Qarātegīn (Egani and Chekhovich, "Regesty," docs. 53–59; Russian trans., 38–40; facs., 277–83).

<sup>981</sup> Rāmit is a village on the Rāmit Daryā (one of the tributaries of the Kāfīrmihān) northeast of the town of Kāfīrmihān. The area is predominantly inhabited by Tajiks dwelling in *qishlāqs*, which are built on the river ravines (Maev, "Hissar and Kulab," 328–29).

<sup>982</sup> In the nineteenth century, Fān was protected by a small number of humble and poorly equipped forts, the most important of which was called Fān-Sar-i Wādī, the first mountain fort encountered when coming from the north. Lehmann lists the following settlements: Fān Sar-i Wādī, Wairābād, Fān Qishlāq and Zushkān. The latter village served as the residence of the local governor. The Tajiks maintained a subsistence economy based on

- Qalandar Khwāja Makhdūm-i A‘zam and the descendants of Muḥammad Rizā Khwāja (?) received Dashanābād (?) and Qaraṭāq as *soyūrghāl*;<sup>983</sup>
- Qāzī Mīr Abū Ṭāhir Samarqandī received the governorship of the Kūhistān, including Falghar, Yaghnāb and Maschā;
- Khūshhāl Bī, the former governor of Qabādiyān, was confirmed in his position.<sup>984</sup>

This impressive list illustrates the importance of local interests to be considered by the king, who transferred some of his allies and other nobles to localities within Muḥammad Amīn Bī’s former sphere of influence. Moreover, it shows how many local groups and actors contributed to the formation of extensive webs of loyalties at the amirid level and beneath. The ruler of Ḥiṣār had to mediate between all these groups and to address all the different, particularist interests. To what extent these local leaders had risen in the time of the Iranian interlude under Nadirid patronage and the distribution of money grants by way of intermediaries like Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and Muḥammad Amīn Bī cannot be said with certainty. But it seems that in the aftermath of the campaign, the government officials had no problems collecting booty, particularly in the form of cash.

Besides the confirmation of local notables and the appointments to prestigious positions, which was considered a usual part of the *ratq wa fatq*—the arranging of affairs—the ruler ordered the relocation of approximately four thousand Naymān households to the *qal‘a* of Dabūsī in Miyānkāl. But prior to their evacuation, the Naymān had to furnish one thousand warriors. Simultaneously, the ruler initiated one of the largest resettlement campaigns by ordering twenty thousand Tajik families, who during the previous decades had taken refuge in Ḥiṣār, to resettle in their home regions. In addition, Muḥammad Raḥīm’s commanders fanned out throughout Ḥiṣār and recruited approximately four thousand soldiers who were placed under the command of *mingbāshīs*, *yūzbāshīs* and *dahbāshīs*. These measures went hand in hand with the usual extraction of resources: twenty thousand *dinār* in cash, three thousand horses and five hundred camels, all of which were taken as the protection and gratitude fee (*māl-i*

---

the cultivation of barley, millet, oats, peas and broad beans. Of importance was the keeping of goats. Fruit trees only flourished in Zushkān (Lehmann, *Reise*, 120–35).

<sup>983</sup> The small town of Qaraṭāq is located northeast of Rīgar on the bank of the Surkhān Daryā (see *The Map of the Emirate of Bokhara* by Olufsen, *Emir*).

<sup>984</sup> For this round of appointments and distribution of sinecures, see Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 283b–284b.

*amānī wa shukrāna*). These and the property of Muḥammad Amīn Bī were included in the royal treasury and transferred to the capital.<sup>985</sup> While most of the Tamghāy Shādī nobles like Shādmān Bī, another brother of Muḥammad Amīn Bī, were relocated to Bukhara, Mullā Īlkī and other followers of Muḥammad Amīn Bī were punished and sentenced to death.<sup>986</sup> The Bukharan army finally withdrew from Ḥiṣār on Muḥarram 20, 1171/October 4, 1757, leaving an *ilghār*, a garrison, of only one thousand warriors behind.<sup>987</sup>

### *The Final Siege of Dehnau*

In this section I shall highlight the role of local actors and the population during the conflict between pro-Bukharan forces and renegades loyal to Muḥammad Amīn Bī that can be gleaned from the *Tuḥfat al-khānī*. The fine grid of data supplied by Qāzī Wafā can be regarded as unique insofar as it enables the historian to understand local figurations of power from a grassroots perspective.

Subsequent to the retreat of the Bukharan army, some of Muḥammad Amīn Bī's attendants led by a certain Amān Bāqī retired to the Nihān Valley northwest of Dehnau, where they organized their opposition against the representatives of the king.<sup>988</sup> In the course of the winter 1757–58, the local Tajik population, all of them mountain dwellers (*mardum-i kūhsārī*), put up stiff resistance to the garrison of the government. Wafā states that between two thousand and three thousand *Turk wa Tājik* led by Amān Bāqī, Shaft' Ghalcha and Amān Qul, a brother of Muḥammad Amīn Bī, took up position

<sup>985</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 282b–283b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 411a–b. See also Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 102–03.

<sup>986</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 284b.

<sup>987</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 285b. *Ilghār* or *ilghār* is a Mongol term meaning a swift attack carried out by cavalry forces, but it also meant to cover a large distance in a short time (Doerfer, *Elemente*, I, 193–94). In eighteenth-century Bukharan sources the term probably meant both. In nineteenth-century sources *ilghār* denotes a small garrison corps of several hundred soldiers (see also Holzwarth, “The Uzbek State,” 105, footnote no. 27).

<sup>988</sup> The Nihān Valley forms the upper part of the catchment area of the Surkhān and extends north and northwest of Dehnau. In its upper, northern part the Nihān Valley system is intersected by at least seven sub-valleys stretching from north to south (Maev, “Hissar and Kulab,” 327; see also *The Map of the Emirate of Bokhara* by Olufsen; and Map 3 in Appendix D).

in the Nihān Valley.<sup>989</sup> From their hiding places, the rebels continued their struggle against the supporters of the central government and launched a series of attacks. Forming the locus of the rebellion, the *qal'ā* of Kazrak at the edge of the mountains was besieged by one to two thousand Bukharan troops commanded by Jum'ā Qul Tūqsāba. The fighting continued throughout the winter and well into spring 1758, flaring up once more when the Ghalcha captured the village of Sīna northwest of Dehnau. Soon after that, the Bukharan troops were reinforced by detachments dispatched from Bukhara.<sup>990</sup>

The revolt reached a climax when some Uzbek tribal groups like the Turkomān Yūzī and the Qurama, particularly the Qalpāq and Qurīchī communities, sided with the rebels. Together with other *ūrūghs*, they joined the Tajiks in the Nihān Valley and brought the entire region of Ḥiṣār and its dependencies under their control. On Ramazān 22, 1171/May 29, 1758, the rebels entered Dehnau and locked up the city commander in the *arg*.<sup>991</sup> The fighting that followed was heavily dominated by the renegades, who practically controlled the inner city and the urban quarters from which they laid siege to the citadel.<sup>992</sup> The situation ensuing during the next few weeks allows conclusions to be drawn about the shifts in the figurations of power at local level. We see both an internal division of local power networks and a conflict with the central authorities in Bukhara.

It should be mentioned here that the local actors who had been privileged with ranks, posts and *soyūrghāls* by Muḥammad Rahīm Bī the year before, now adopted a policy of wait-and-see. Most of them, like the Dūrmān chiefs of Qabādiyān, the Shāh of Rāmit and the leaders of the Qarā Tughma Bī Yūz in Rīgar, were not sure which side would eventually prevail. In the meantime, Muḥammad Amīn Bī had stayed in Balkh, serving as the commander of the Balkh army under Afghan auspices.<sup>993</sup> Acting on behalf of the Yūz chief, the rebels now invited him to return from Balkh.

During the following weeks, Dehnau was exposed to a kind of double siege reflecting local divisions of power: the rebels laying siege to the citadel

<sup>989</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 295a. According to Mullā Sharīf, Amān Bāqī was the former *dīwānbēgī* of the Yūz chief (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 411b).

<sup>990</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 295a–296b.

<sup>991</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 297b. According to Mullā Sharīf, the rebels occupied Dehnau on Ramazān 27, 1171/June 3–4, 1758 (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 412a).

<sup>992</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 298a–b; Mulla Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 412b–413a.

<sup>993</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 294a–b.

from inside the city, and the Bukharan troops besieging the besiegers from outside the town. Backed by the followers and disciples of a certain Ismāʿīl Khwāja, a member of a lineage of local *sayyids* residing in the town, the Ghalcha and the Turkomān Yūzī employed battering rams to take the citadel. At the same time, numerous commanders loyal to the Manghit ruler set out for Ḥiṣār.<sup>994</sup> Local actors like Murād Parwānachī, Ghalcha Bī Marqa or the Shāh of Rāmit only joined the outside besiegers of Dehnau when the different detachments arrived one by one.<sup>995</sup>

Upon hearing about the difficult situation of his followers in Dehnau and pursued by his enemies, Muḥammad Amīn Bī took refuge in the fort of Sar-i Jūy at the entrance to the Nihān Valley, and from there he managed to extend his authority to the neighboring villages. When the siege became protracted and many of the warriors deserted the Bukharan army, the commanders sent a message calling for additional troops. On Dhūʿl-Qaʿda 4, 1171/July 9, 1758, Muḥammad Rahīm Bī set out on his last campaign. After arriving at Nasaf, he dispatched mediators to the Ghalcha and to the other rebelling *qaums* of Ḥiṣār. En route the king took first precautions to drive a wedge between his opponents by drawing the Turkomān Yūzī and Qalpāq leaders over to his side.<sup>996</sup> After the arrival of the army, the rebels in Dehnau increasingly faced internal resistance from the city population. Finally, their leaders ʿAlī Murād, Amān Bāqī, Amān Qulī and Ismāʿīl Khwāja submitted and were soon executed. At the same time, the king ordered the erection of skull pyramids throughout the region.<sup>997</sup>

The fall of Dehnau had a domino effect insofar as the population of the Nihān Valley immediately turned away from Muḥammad Amīn Bī, whose flight was prevented by the Ghalcha attacking his caravan of followers.

<sup>994</sup> Ibid., fols. 298a–b.

<sup>995</sup> Ibid., fol. 299a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 413b. During the following siege, the local forces under the command of Ghalcha Bī, the Shāh of Rāmit and Murād Parwānachī took up position in front of the Maple Gate of Dehnau (*darwāza-yi chinār*) (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 300b).

<sup>996</sup> Ibid., fols. 304a–b. The chroniclers report that only some of the rebels submitted and left Dehnau. Their recalcitrant colleagues just gave in and requested the intercession of the chief judge, Mīr Niẓām al-Dīn Ḥusainī, when Muḥammad Rahīm Khān threatened to employ his artillery (ibid., fols. 306a–b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 415b–416a).

<sup>997</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 307b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 416b. See also Bregel, “Ḥeṣār,” 304. According to Ivanov, the severe punishment inflicted on the local Ḥiṣārī remained part of the collective memory of the population until 1939 (Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 103).

Fearing revenge from the Bukharan troops, the local Tajiks changed sides and took them prisoner. Only the Yūz chief escaped to the Bābā Tāgh Mountains and ended up as a refugee searching around for potential allies. Deserted by all of his former followers, he was accompanied by only ten men. Muḥammad Amīn Bī was eventually captured by the Qaṭaghān of Qūrghān Tippa and handed over to the king. On Dhū'l-Ḥijja 17, 1171/August 21, 1758, he was sentenced to death and executed. His skull was brought to the capital where it was presented to the public as a warning.<sup>998</sup>

#### THE QUNGRĀT AMĪRS OF BĀYSŪN AND SHĪRĀBĀD

The Qungrāt were one of the largest and most prominent Uzbek tribes. Influential at the southern edge of Transoxania between the Oxus and the mountains of eastern Bukhara, the bulk of the tribe was concentrated in the vicinity of Tirmidh. There they often acted in concert with their neighbors, the Naymān.<sup>999</sup> In the neighboring region of Qabādiyān, the Qungrāt sometimes allied with the local Dūrmān Uzbeks and together formed a source of constant “molestation and confusion of the subjects.”<sup>1000</sup>

According to Yūsuf Munshī, in early May 1703 the Qungrāt raided the vicinity of Khānābād in Lesser Turkistan and killed Maḥmūd Bī Qaṭaghān's brother. Taking this as a pretext, the Qaṭaghān chief traversed the Āmū Daryā, conquered Qabādiyān and proceeded to punish his enemies, who soon removed their livestock and families to the mountains. But many of them fell into the hands of the Qaṭaghān, and the rest were defeated at the ravine of Dīwān Band (?).<sup>1001</sup> This version of the events is however not confirmed by Bukharan accounts. In 1703–04, 'Ubaidullah Khān was confronted with a local rebellion led by Shīr 'Alī Qungrāt, who acted from his stronghold Shīrābād while others of his tribesmen remained loyal to the king and stayed in Tirmidh.<sup>1002</sup> Another Qungrāt leader mentioned in this source was 'Ashūr Bēg, who for a long time was responsible for the affairs

<sup>998</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 309a–310b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 416b–418a.

<sup>999</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 49b, 61b, 160a, 182b–183a; Semenov, trans., 65, 75, 179, 203.

<sup>1000</sup> Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, *Tadhkira*, 317–18.

<sup>1001</sup> *Ibid.*, 315, 318–19.

<sup>1002</sup> Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fols. 55a–56a, 57b; Semenov trans., 69–72.

relating to collection of the *zakāt*. This man also sided with the rebels and tried in vain to align himself with Maḥmūd Bī Qaṭaghān, and later allied with Ni‘matullah Bī Naymān at Darf.<sup>1003</sup> Hence the split within the Qungrāt reflected the political constellations and the rift between Bukhara and Balkh. When Maḥmūd Bī’s forces dealt a severe blow to a Bukharan detachment at Pāshkhūrd near Bāysūn, Shīr ‘Alī Qngrāt knew that his ally would sooner or later leave the area and hid in his fortress. Many of his tribesmen then soon turned away from him. The bad news apparently spread among the Qungrāt nomads, who now moved to the plain of Qarā Khowal; Maḥmūd Bī evacuated them from there to Lesser Turkistan.<sup>1004</sup>

Nothing much is reported about the Qungrāt in the following years. Ṭālī‘ recounts that around 1715–16 they rose to dominance at Tirmidh and drove out their former Naymān companions.<sup>1005</sup> During the rebellion of the Samarqand alliance in 1722–23, the Qungrāt supported the Bukharan ruler, Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān.<sup>1006</sup> Later they rendered support to Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī against his enemies. In 1730–31 they furnished a large contingent of fighters to expel the ruler of Khoqand from Transoxania. At that time, the Qungrāt were led by a group of several *amīrs*, for instance Dānyāl Bī.<sup>1007</sup>

According to Kāẓim, in 1737 the same Dānyāl Bēg (Bī?) acted as chief of the Qungrāt north of Tirmidh. He had soon submitted to the Iranian troops and later helped his overlords recruit Qungrāt soldiers for the Iranian army.<sup>1008</sup> The author of the *Maẓhar al-aḥwāl* says that Dānyāl Bī Qungrāt was appointed *atālīq* in late 1737. However, he only acted as *atālīq* of Bukhārā for one year and was then dismissed because the “noble and the low people” did not accept his *atālīqate*.<sup>1009</sup>

<sup>1003</sup> Ibid., fols. 61a–64b; Russian text, 75–78.

<sup>1004</sup> Ibid., fol. 69b; Russian text, 82–83. Qarā Khowal is located in the valley of the Kichi-uru Daryā southeast of Khuzār (see *The Map of the Emirate of Bokhara* by Olufsen).

<sup>1005</sup> Ṭālī‘, *Tārīkh*, fol. 40b; Semenov trans., 43.

<sup>1006</sup> Ibid., fols. 158a, 160a; Russian text, 135–36, 137. According to Muḥammad Amīn, some of the Qungrāt initially sided with Rajab Khān. Together with other Uzbek groups they helped him conquer Miyānkāl (Muḥammad Amīn, *Maẓhar*, fol. 43b).

<sup>1007</sup> Besides Dānyāl Bī, the *Maẓhar al-aḥwāl* also mentions Barāt Bī and Ja‘far Bī as Qungrāt chieftains (Muḥammad Amīn, *Maẓhar*, fol. 49a).

<sup>1008</sup> Kāẓim, *‘Ālamārā*, II, 584–85, 829–30.

<sup>1009</sup> Muḥammad Amīn, *Maẓhar*, fols. 59a–60a. According to Ya‘qūb, a certain Dānyāl Bī Qungrāt was the successor of Khudāyār Bī Manghit as *atālīq* (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 35a), but this is not confirmed by other sources. Ya‘qūb may have mistaken Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Atālīq for Khudāyār Bī.

In the *Tuḥfat al-khānī* we often only read about a group of unnamed Qungrāt *amīrs* of Bāysūn, mentioned along with other tribal chiefs such as Ghaibullah Bī, Tuḡhāy Murād Bī and others, especially when they joined tribal assemblies.<sup>1010</sup> It is not until early 1756 that the leadership of the Qungrāt moves more into the foreground. That year, the nomads flocked to the small town of Pāshkhwurd in the Kū-yi Tan Mountains to join a certain Abdāl.<sup>1011</sup> This man—according to Qāzī Wafā—“did not fear and bow his head to anyone and cooked the raw passion of independence in the cauldron of desire.”<sup>1012</sup> He accommodated the nomads and their herds in the nearby mountain valley of Tumbak Dīwān, supplied them with food provisions and took care of the fortification of this sanctuary.<sup>1013</sup> Another sub-division of the Qungrāt moved to the Tang-i Shīrān.<sup>1014</sup>

On Jumāda I 30, 1169/March 1–2, 1756, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī departed for his last campaign before his coronation in order to punish Abdāl Qungrāt. It is possible that he wanted to engage his soldiers in a further looting campaign because of the prospect of rich booty, especially since the wealth of the Qungrāt in terms of livestock promised abundant spoils. Shortly after their arrival at Tumbak Dīwān, the Bukharan troops defeated Abdāl, destroyed the fortifications at the entrance to the valley, plundered the population and occupied his bastion.<sup>1015</sup>

In spring 1757, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān embarked on his first campaign as king of Transoxania and conquered the forts of Pāshkhūrd and Shīrābād. The commander of Shīrābād and his Ḥiṣārī allies were taken prisoner and executed.<sup>1016</sup> Subsequently, the Yūz who had helped fortify the *qal‘a* of Bāysūn north of Shīrābād escaped to Ḥiṣār, whereupon Badal Bī Qungrāt, the ruler of Bāysūn, surrendered to the king. Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān pardoned the Qungrāt chief and his followers and took them into service. Immediately after this victory, which was in many respects a decisive prelude to the following conquest of Ḥiṣār, the king installed his companion

<sup>1010</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 84a, 126b, 158a, 163b.

<sup>1011</sup> Pāshkhūrd is located west of Shīrābād on the eastern slopes of the Kū-yi Tan Range (see *The Map of the Emirate of Bokhara* by Olufsen; there it is spelled Bash-kurt).

<sup>1012</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 241a.

<sup>1013</sup> Wafā describes Tumbak Dīwān as an extremely narrow valley several *farsakhs* in length with small access routes and rocks on the approach to either side (ibid., fol. 241a).

<sup>1014</sup> Ibid., fol. 241a.

<sup>1015</sup> Ibid., fols. 243a–245a.

<sup>1016</sup> Ibid., fols. 266b–271a.

Imām Qulī Bī Manghit as new governor of Bāysūn and resettled the Qungrāt, the Sarāy and the Ghalcha in Qarshī.<sup>1017</sup> Henceforth, Bāysūn served as a logistical base for the campaigns to Ḥiṣār.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have explored the history of Transoxania from 1700 to the 1760s and 1770s from a local perspective. Although my sources only permit me to trace the institutionalization of order at the level of the rulers and local elites, the results are insightful. The processes I have described should be understood as the ongoing dissolution and integration of interdependent groups of people. Social dissolution meant the split of the former Tuqay-Timurid realm into chiefdoms and petty amirid principalities. Processes of integration, on the other hand, led to the gradual emergence of a new *Herrschaftsverband* after 1748. The material I have presented suggests a permanent state of conflict as the concomitant of the institutionalization process in the period of analysis, thus reinforcing and simultaneously eroding existing worldviews.

In the period discussed, we see the slow transformation of local worldviews. The transition of authority from the Tuqay-Timurids to the Manghits went hand in hand with a long and at times also painful modification of the local social order at higher echelons of the society. The changes were particularly visible in the context of the Chingizid system of government. One of the most obvious signs of change was the gradual departure from the Chingizid rule of succession. A second indicator of gradual change is a redefinition of the *atālīq* office and the corresponding loss of its importance. Other changes can be observed on the surface of social order in Mā Warā' al-Nahr; for example, the rise and fall of dynasties and the spatial extent of their realm. In the first half of the eighteenth century, Transoxania's political map changed from a cluster of appanage principalities to the partitioning of the realm into two major appanages, finally ending in the dissolution of this spatial-territorial framework and the emergence of the Manghit realm. This process began already with the establishment of the Tuqay-Timurid dynasty and was by no means complete at Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's death in 1759. At the same time, the predominant worldview tended to be very durable and inert. In spite of some sudden

---

<sup>1017</sup> Ibid., fols. 272a–274a.

ruptures indicating an unforeseen change in the institutional setting (like the changes introduced by ‘Abdullah Khān and his successor, or the Iranian intervention and the coronation of a non-Chingizid actor), modifications were often reversed in the aftermath of power shifts. The installation of a new clan dynasty after some decisive changes under ‘Abdullah Khān around 1600, the return to a Chingizid appanage holder in the year 1697 after a decade of amirid rule in Balkh, the installation of a new puppet *khān* in Bukhara after seven or eight years without a Tuqay-Timurid king, all these are cases in point. The following shift of power from a Chingizid to a non-Chingizid force did not set the stage for a new form of authority or a radically different political order. In spite of the temporary abolition of Chingizid descent as the principle of succession, power was still generated through the exchange and distribution of goods. Patronage was an important instrument for building extensive networks of allegiance. As a vital means of political conduct, it helped Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān and his followers integrate most of the societal groups into one overall web of power.

#### THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MANGHIT AUTHORITY

In this section, I will sum up the lengthy process of power accumulation by Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, consisting of three to four distinct phases. In the early eighteenth century, the Tuqay-Timurid monarch was still the linchpin of social power. The Manghit were only one of many different forces in Mā Warā’ al-Nahr, and were likely to be played off against others. Not unlike other Uzbek groups, their *atālīqate* was of a merely ephemeral nature.

Phase one—laying the foundation: The rise of the Manghit set in with the advent of Nādir Shāh. Enjoying Nādir’s protection, the Manghit formed a privileged faction with the chance of fast and effective organization. By entering Nādir Shāh’s service, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī and his immediate followers shared a common interest regarding career opportunities and also material rewards. This increased their ability to organize themselves vis-à-vis other groups. Henceforth they were now able to build up their own power center. Muḥammad Raḥīm is a particularly good example of the continued reproduction of power from itself. Through Nādir Shāh’s patronage the members of the new elite got access to various means of power, first and foremost military backing and education. Nādir’s support gave the Manghit something their Uzbek colleagues fundamentally lacked: they were in a position to regulate access to the overlord. At the same time, they were the staff enforcing his authority by mediating between him and the other Uzbek

leaders. Moreover, they had effectively monopolized the sought-after atālīqate. Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī also redistributed material rewards among the other Transoxanian notables and chiefs.<sup>1018</sup> Backed by his Qizilbāsh supporters, he could repeatedly demonstrate his power to others; men such as ‘Ibādullah Kḥiṭā’ī, Qābil Kīnakās, Tuḡhāy Murād Bī and Khwāja Ulfat Sarāyi. Other, weaker amirid figures were closely tied to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, but their mobility was dictated by the needs and demands of Nādir Shāh.

Phase two—norm setting and division of interest groups: With the assassination of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān and the retreat of the Qizilbāsh, the institutionalization of Manghit power entered the phase of norm setting. After Nādir Shāh’s death, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī did not pass up any opportunity to consolidate his position; a lot was at stake for him and his supporters. Cooperation was therefore inevitable. The best example of this is the capture and arrest of the Tuḡay-Timurid king by the Manghit *sardārs*.<sup>1019</sup> With the murder of Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān, the old power center was destroyed once and for all. Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī thereby foreclosed the establishment of new bonds around the old monarch. He could now devote his energy to building up his own *Herrschaftsverband*, while ruling in the name of shadow *khāns*. We also see the first traces of depersonalization. When the Qizilbāsh besieged Bukhara, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī delegated duties and responsibilities to the Manghit *sardārs* and other Uzbek chiefs.<sup>1020</sup> Later Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī relied more and more on his immediate followers and delegated military as well as administrative tasks and duties. Imām Qulī Bī, Dānyāl Bī and others were entrusted with military missions.<sup>1021</sup>

After the retreat of the Iranian forces, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī only needed to expand his overall lead. His major advantage was having sufficient power means at his disposal: first, the artillery that was left behind by Nādir’s

<sup>1018</sup> See Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḡfat*, fol. 94a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 316b–317a.

<sup>1019</sup> According to Qāzī Wafā, the followers of the *amīr* had to seize Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān from the Qizilbāsh after a concerted action. At that point, they were concerned that the Iranian troops might protect and maintain the old king (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḡfat*, fols. 111b–112b).

<sup>1020</sup> Wafā points to the military considerations of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī after the battle. This included the equipping and arming of his troops, paying them, organizing mounts, as well as the necessary division of the contingents and appointment of commanders (*ibid.*, fols. 128a–b).

<sup>1021</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 168b–169a, 185b, 190b–192a, 216a, 227a, 229b, 263b *passim*.

troops,<sup>1022</sup> and second, the corps of Afghan, Ottoman and Lazgī soldiers providing manpower, who could be paid with the money he had received from Nādir previously. The phase of norm setting continued with his presidency over the council of tribal leaders and during the first military campaigns. On these occasions, he not only gave instructions and orders but could also delegate tasks to his staff, which consisted almost exclusively of Manghit *sardārs*. Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī was now in a position to engage in “ordering” activities on a regular basis, mostly in the course or in the aftermath of campaigns.

The most important step in the consolidation of Manghit power was the subjugation of Miyānkāl, where grain was produced by means of constant irrigation. Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī needed the breadbasket of Mā Warā’ al-Nahr in order to consolidate his power base. Otherwise, he could not maintain his army. What followed was a proverbial racing duel with other *amīrs*. During frequent campaigns, the new power center brought its organizational talents to bear, with the result that Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī established himself as the leading commander. He was also able to enforce his power with repeated sanctions. In addition, and even more important, the *atālīq* induced his followers to act collectively. His power was formalized by implementing a clear and predictable set of rules. Some methods of punishment were part of the existing order: opponents like the Yetī Ūrūgh or the Kīnakās were besieged and looted, while loyal actors were bound into a system of redistribution and rewards. Only the resettlement campaigns were qualitatively a new measure.

With the subjugation of his opponents in Miyānkāl and Shahr-i Sabz, the followers of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī had an unbeatable competitive advantage. They had effectively monopolized the access to agricultural resources that were reproduced in a yearly cycle. The administration and control of these resources implied increasing organization and division of labor. His followers, for example, collected revenues in kind and constructed storehouses in Samarqand and other places.<sup>1023</sup> Henceforth the new

---

<sup>1022</sup> It is not clear how skilled the Bukharan army was in employing the cannons (ibid., fols. 150a, 154a, 128b–129a, 181b, 223a–b, 224a, 268b passim). But bringing them to the field and purporting to use them was probably sufficient to impress enemies. Although Wafā often refers to the use of the artillery during sieges, these could be exaggerations by the author in order to flatter his patron.

<sup>1023</sup> Ibid., fols. 203a–b, 222a.

strongman was able to extend his patronage to other groups.<sup>1024</sup> In return for the benefits and material rewards, the new power center could rely on soldiers and manpower recruited by regional potentates. Furthermore, he had established a hold over the two most important cities, Bukhara and Samarqand. At this point, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī had the means to tie other actors into his network and to prevent his enemies from forging counter coalitions—a task that was not always crowned with success.

In this phase we see the amirid class divided up into four different groups according to their interests with respect to the Manghit *amīr*. The first group constituted the power center; these were his close relatives and friends. The second group consisted of Ghaibullah Bī and other Yetī Ūrūgh chiefs. After a phase of resistance, they had been reduced to dependent clients. Their affiliation to the power center was somewhat ambivalent; they can be described as outsiders within the emerging *Herrschaftsverband*. They formed the staff that was now frequently entrusted with the punishment of others. So there was always the potential to enlarge this faction by integrating other actors. With the establishment of the auxiliary staff, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's powerful position gained a new quality. He could now steer the punishment of recalcitrant actors making up the third group: the Kīnakās and Yūz *amīrs*, who were the most hostile toward the power center and tried to stop Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's advance. The fourth group was more or less marginalized. Some of the actors belonging to this faction, for instance the Sarāy, the Qungrāt and the Durmān leaders, at times maneuvered between the different coalitions. At other times, like all the rest not mentioned in the sources, they were reduced to onlookers. Trying to survive, most of them adopted a policy of wait-and-see.

With this division of the Transoxanian aristocracy, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī could continue to cement his authority. The formalization of his power progressed. By now most of the actors had learned how to behave in recurring situations. The members of his retinue knew what to do and how to carry out orders. The processes I have sketched up to this point also engendered a pronounced distribution of power, which was visible in the internal hierarchization of the *Herrschaftsverband*: the *atālīq* in command, immediate friends and followers in subordinate positions and in charge of

---

<sup>1024</sup> The *Tuḥfat* informs about the allotment of grain from Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's estates to his troops or other clients (ibid., fols. 145a, 230a, 274b).

military tasks, and auxiliary forces giving him the chance to subject others to his will and to maintain a system of rewards and control.

Phase three—positioning of power: In late 1756, the time was ripe for a significant stage in the institutionalization of Manghit power. By now a durable *Herrschaftsverband* based on division of labor had been established around the leader. Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's retinue formed in the preexisting Turko-Mongol or Tuḡay-Timurid framework (order) of tribal groups and power positions (e.g., provincial governors, *qāzīs*, *dīwānbēgīs*).<sup>1025</sup> Most of the latter were step by step awarded to retainers. Local rebellions afforded the opportunity to lead his entourage to rapidly organized, collective action. The material support for his followers was relatively secure due to a stable resource base. Henceforth he could think of occupying the throne himself. He had the impression that the bond between him and his following was strong enough for such a step. In addition, his *atālīqate* had gained an almost suprapersonal aura. He was the perfect commander-in-chief, toward whom all other relations in the *Herrschaftsverband* were directed. By virtue of his military success, he could expect that others would regard his claims to khanly authority as legitimate. As *atālīq* Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī was responsible for the *ratq wa fatq*, the rending and mending of affairs. Besides, he had the prerogative of inspecting his troops before campaigns.<sup>1026</sup> All these were hitherto Chingizid prerogatives. The positioning of power was further visible in power rituals such as lavish gift giving, *kūrnišs*, banquets and the bestowal of customary robes of honor. These ceremonies served to demonstrate his power and followed established norms and routines. The rituals and practices will be explored in the next chapter.

By mid-1756, most of the Transoxanian *amīrs* had been subjugated and tied into his network of loyalty. The intensity of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's power constantly increased, while the scope of action of his enemies shrank. The evolving dynamics show that from a certain point in time, it was rather difficult for individual actors to evade the pull of his steadily growing network or "space of power." The events surrounding the subjugation of Ḥiṣār illustrate that little effort was necessary to absorb a large number of local actors into the sphere of Manghit authority. In view of the increasing

<sup>1025</sup> Many of these positions were of course a long-term legacy of other dynasties in pre- and post-Mongol Transoxania (e.g., the Samanids, Qarakhanids, Timurids, Chaghatayids, Abu'l-Khairids and Tuḡay-Timurids) leaving their mark on the local order.

<sup>1026</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 170a, 204a.

military strength of the ruler and his following, local leaders and notables were unlikely to put up resistance and sooner or later offered negotiations.

With regard to Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's coronation, we see that the old principles of legitimized succession were still valid. The fact that he married a Tuḡay-Timurid princess and assumed the *khān* title after a traditional Turko-Mongol wedding shows the continued significance of conventional views. The ceremony was performed according to old Turko-Mongol customs: the new ruler was seated on the white felt and lifted onto the Bukharan throne.<sup>1027</sup> The following round of appointments signaled the creation of a more robust framework of positions based on former Turko-Mongol patterns of organization. It also implied social stratification. Whereas the position of *atālīq* had been successfully bequeathed within an amirid family, there was little chance of transferring crown and throne within a non-Chingizid line. Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān may have had the desire to pass khanly authority to an heir. But it was still too early for such a step. The fact that he was unable to establish a new khanly house legitimized according to current worldviews may also be attributed to Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's short reign of three years. His early death prevented the effectual integration of his khanly authority into the existing social order. He simply lacked time and opportunity to transform the institutional setting by imposing new rules of succession, making his lineage the new khanly dynasty. This stage of institutionalization would be reached under Shāh Murād (r. 1785–1800) and Naṣrullah Khān (r. 1828–60). For the time being, however, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's successor, Dānyāl Bī, had to build his own *Herrschaftsverband* from scratch. In the first weeks and months after his predecessor's death, Transoxania descended into a sphere of power without authority. Facing resistance by almost all the *amīrs*, Dānyāl Bī returned to the old custom of governing in the name of a Chingizid shadow ruler, a certain Abū'l-Ghāzī Khān. And even later, referring to and having a Chingizid background was an issue.<sup>1028</sup>

The institutionalization of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's power did not go beyond the third phase of the Popitzian ideal type model of power accumulation. Despite a positioning of power visible in titles, offices and positions that were constitutive for a preliminary administrative apparatus, there was hardly any institutionalized structuring of offices with clearly

<sup>1027</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 253b–254b.

<sup>1028</sup> See also von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 46–47, 74, 367.

delineated and defined tasks. Only the beginnings of depersonalization were discernible, the process was still in flux. Institutionalized khanly Manghit power still had a personal and not a suprapersonal aura! Moreover, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī did not establish territorial sovereignty but reigned through a patronage network where face-to-face relationships were of ultimate importance. The Manghit king was in many ways similar to other contemporary rulers. Control over a defined territory, a monopoly of power or a sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus were not part of the repertoire of ordering principles! None of this was “on the radar” of the kings of that time, who had neither the interest nor the option to establish such instruments of authority. Instead, they retained power through the ability to balance the groups beneath them, to steer and organize (an) extended heterogeneous network(s) of people and to mediate between the different groups.<sup>1029</sup>

#### THE *WILĀYĀT-I MAHRŪSA* AS A *HERRSCHAFTSVERBAND*

The absence of fixed boundaries was visible in 1757 when, according to Wafā, Bukharan troops traversed the Oxus and penetrated deep into the region of Balkh. Many people accompanied the Bukharan soldiers on their withdrawal, and even one thousand Ming families migrated to Bukhara.<sup>1030</sup> Since political boundaries were as fluid as the whole institutional setting and were established merely through multiple interlinked personal ties, it is no wonder that the space of authority expanded and contracted with the extension and shrinkage of the webs of loyalties. The somewhat pragmatic notions of space and territory are also echoed in the chronicles: late Tuqay-Timurid and early Manghit historians neither lament nor weep over the loss of Balkh. Territorial losses are not discussed or even mentioned at all.<sup>1031</sup> The Manghit leadership at that time was too preoccupied with keeping the remainders of the Tuqay-Timurid legacy together, and control over Balkh gradually faded into the background. Given the fact that this region could be won back through an alliance or a conquest in the near or far future, the

<sup>1029</sup> See also Manz, “Historical Background,” 12.

<sup>1030</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 294b. On the position of the Ming leaders in the previous years, see below.

<sup>1031</sup> The only exception in this regard is Balkhī, who explicitly mentions the independence of Balkh under ‘Ādil Bī Mīng. Attributing this step to ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s assassination, he describes how the local leadership installed ‘Ibādullah Sulṭān, a Chingizid from Herat, on the throne of Balkh (Balkhī, *Tārīkh*, fols. 288b–289a).

Bukharan kings Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān and Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān had no interest in Balkh affairs for the time being. It was only when the Manghits had managed to consolidate their position at home toward the end of the eighteenth century that they could afford to focus on Balkh. The importance of social ties and bonds of allegiance finds expression in the following statement:

[...] the extension of the entire power and authority of the deceased *khāqān* depended on gathering lords and chiefs of the guarded dominion (*wilāyat-i maḥrūsa*) and on the soldiery belonging to the sub-divisions of that tribe (*qaum*).<sup>1032</sup>

With this, Qāzī Wafā offers a sound “definition” of the guarded domains, the *wilāyat-i maḥrūsa*, as a *Herrschaftsverband* consisting of a multitude of actors. Interestingly, the emphasis here is not so much on the territory as on the *ḥukām* and *amīrs* as well as on armed elements. The above-cited statement also confirms Elias’ figuration concept. Hence the *wilāyat-i maḥrūsa* can also be described as a figuration of power, within which the actions of the various actors and segments were interdependent. The different elements within such a patronage network had varying interests and needs. This corresponded to different degrees of dependence on the patron ruler, who had to balance the individual segments.<sup>1033</sup> Muḥammad Raḥīm’s authority, however, could not be built exclusively on the relationships of subordination and superordination; he had to explain his quest for power and convince or compel other tribal leaders more directly and objectively. Only under such conditions did patromorphous relationships emerge and become transformed into an entourage.<sup>1034</sup>

With respect to the insignificance of political boundaries, we observe striking parallels with Noelle-Karimi’s results.<sup>1035</sup> Yet, when looking at land

<sup>1032</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 328a. The concept of the *wilāyat-i maḥrūsa* has been investigated by Noelle-Karimi in the example of Khurāsān (Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 46). The term was common in the Safawid period but may have been in use in earlier times too. The other great chronicler of the Manghits operated with a wider terminology: “protected domains or regions” (*mamālik-i-wilāyāt-i maḥrūsa*), “protected kingdom” (*mamlakat-i maḥrūsa*), “guarded fortresses” (*qalā’-i maḥrūsa*), “protected places and settlements” (*amākin-i maḥrūsa*), “guarded cities” (*bilād wa amṣār-i maḥrūsa*) or “guarded lands or territories” (*arāzī-yi maḥrūsa*) (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 161a, 194a, 233a, 258b, 311a, 312b, 335a, 368a).

<sup>1033</sup> Pflücke, *Theorie*, 74.

<sup>1034</sup> *Ibid.*, 102.

<sup>1035</sup> Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 294.

surveys and the descriptions of plots in *waqf-nāmas* and other documents on the purchase of land, we are confronted with the opposite, namely delineated lands and boundaries of landed property drawn with meticulous precision. How so? As an ultimate source of power, land was highly coveted by many individuals. Furthermore, frequent conflicts over land made surveys and clear partitions necessary. But this did not translate into clearly defined political boundaries or linear notions of space and territory. After all, the precise definition of arable plots as against the blurred understanding of political borders may be attributed to the contradictions of local worldviews.

Of course, the *wilāyat-i mahrūsa* can also be described in terms of space and territory. The authors of my sources themselves permit such a reading. Sometimes they just roughly outline the Manghit sphere of authority by referring to certain places and regions they regarded as primary seats of power. The well-protected dominion was tied to physical coordinates that were considered crucial for maintaining the sphere of authority once it was established. Yet the descriptions of the political map and the question of which areas belonged to it varied from author to author.<sup>1036</sup> Qāzī Wafā, for instance, mentions that in late 1756 the *khutba* was read in Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's name from Bukhara to Samarqand, in Miyānkāl, Shahr-i Sabz, Qarshī, Khuzār and Qarākūl up to the banks of the Āmū Daryā and other settlements and regions.<sup>1037</sup> These were the areas and provinces where the populace was brought under the protective umbrella of the new king. The performative emphasis is remarkable here. As a distinct sphere of influence, the *wilāyat-i mahrūsa* was enacted not only during the reciting of the *khutba* in the name of the ruler, but also in times of war when corporate identity had to be demonstrated, for example during military expeditions. On several occasions, the court chronicler lists the regions that furnished contingents and troops for campaigns.<sup>1038</sup>

At a symbolic level of authority, the cohesion of the *Herrschaftsverband* was exemplified in the capital, where the warriors and major representatives of the ruling stratum of society resided. In contrast to the later Tuqay-

<sup>1036</sup> von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 85.

<sup>1037</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fol. 256b.

<sup>1038</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 27b, 140b, 152b, 171a, 204b passim. Prior to Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's last expedition to Ḥiṣār, numerous Uzbek contingents came from the banks of the Āmūya, Samarqand, from all of the Miyānkālāt, from the *qaṣaba-yi* Nūr, the northern mountains, Qarshī, Shahr-i Sabz and Khuzār to join the army (*ibid.*, fol. 302a).

Timurids, whose sphere of authority was also called *wilāyat-i mahrūsa*, and who increasingly lacked the means to enforce their politics,<sup>1039</sup> Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān relied on a strategy he “copied” from Nādir Shāh. By transplanting a great array of different tribal groups, he repopulated his capital and enlarged his network of power. In this manner he introduced a qualitatively new element into local politics, an instrument designed to strengthen his authority. After years of hardship, Bukhara experienced a revival as the ultimate center of governmental power. Upon Muḥammad Rāḥīm Khān’s death, however, we observe a reverse development, the disintegration of the guarded domains, when

“the tribes, which the deceased *khāqān* had resettled from Ḥiṣār and Khuzār, Shahr-i Sabz, Ūrgūt, Samarqand and the Miyānkālāt to Bukhara, and who took up residence in empty places and suitable quarters, now squadron after squadron mounted and awaited the orders of their chiefs. [...] All contingents that escaped from the city of Bukhara saved their lives from the abyss of danger. After entering their home regions such as Shahr-i Sabz, Khuzār and Ḥiṣār up to Samarqand and Miyānkāl, and arranging their affairs, they wrenched their forts from the hands of the government agents and fought with utmost attention. Therefore, the entire Miyānkālāt, up to Samarqand, Shahr-i Sabz, Khuzār, Bāysūn and Ḥiṣār rose up and an earthquake of anxiety shook every region.”<sup>1040</sup>

Interestingly, the chronicler again lists the coordinates making up the geographical core of Mā Warā’ al-Nahr as a distinct space of authority. This space fragmented with the death of the ruler, as the major tribal groups, now bereft of their overlord, left the capital and returned home. The cataclysmic end of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān’s *Herrschaftsverband* reminds us of the fate many empires suffered after the death of their founder (e.g., Shībānī Khān, ‘Abdullah Khān, Nādir Shāh). On the one hand, these repeated cycles of integration and disintegration of kingdoms and empires are procedural reflections of inert power structures. Although Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, for instance, had witnessed the end of Nādir Shāh, this was not a warning to him. He followed the same example. On the other, these processes also brought about a lasting transformation of local worldviews. The changes, however, were only felt in the long term.

<sup>1039</sup> The term *wilāyat-i mahrūsa* or *mamālik-i mahrūsa* sporadically appears in Tuḡay-Timurid chronicles (Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 125b; Semenov trans., 143; Ṭālī’, *Tārīkh*, fols. 48a, 87a; Semenov trans., 73, 105). Sometimes Semenov translated it as divinely protected provinces (*bogokhrany provinzii*) and sometimes just as region (*oblast*).

<sup>1040</sup> Qāzī Wafā, *Tūḥfat*, fols. 327a, 328a.

In the current chapter, I have attempted to explore processes of power accumulation coinciding with the fall of the established and the rise of a new dynasty that occurred over a period of six to seven decades in Mā Warā' al-Nahr. In the next chapter, I will review the same period through a different lens. In doing so, I will shift the focus to modes of authority, which can be empirically analyzed by looking at visible practices described in the narrative sources. With this, my study changes from a “fact-finding mission” focusing on processes and actors to an analysis of the cornerstones of the local social order and their representation in the texts.