

5. Social Order(s) in Nineteenth-Century Transoxania

In the previous chapters I addressed the topic of social order in eighteenth-century Mā Warā al-Nahr from different perspectives. Adopting two different approaches, I reconstructed the political setting in Transoxania during the first half of the eighteenth century and the lengthy departure from the Chingizid dispensation. This power-driven process and the incremental change of the social order continued after the death of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, the founder of the Manghit dynasty, in 1759. His successors, especially Muḥammad Dānyāl Bī, struggled to hold the remainder of the realm together. It was only from the middle of the nineteenth century onward that Transoxania sailed in somewhat calmer waters. But despite a more settled state of authority, the Manghit dynasty still had to contend with internal rivals and external enemies.

In the Western literature, the second half of the eighteenth and the whole nineteenth century are described as the era of the three khanates or emirates: Bukhara ruled by the Manghit dynasty, Khiwa governed by the Qungrāt and Khoqand under Ming authority.¹ The secondary literature provides different answers to the question of the internal conditions in these political entities. One group of authors stresses the increasing administrative centralization of the three Uzbek polities, resulting in the strengthening of the central government,² which relied more and more on standing armies. In the course of administrative and military reforms, the influence of tribal forces was considerably reduced, whereas non-tribal elements, especially Persian slaves, were able to make a career in the administration.³ Bregel argues that in all three khanates the centralization processes “resulted in the establishment of despotic monarchies,” which ruled through huge bureaucracies.⁴ Yet the process of centralization was inconclusive since

¹ Hambly, “Verfall,” 186; Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 1; Fagner, “Die ‘Khanate’,” 34, 70–71.

² Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire. Reform and Revolution in Central Asia* (London/New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 25; Jürgen Paul, *Neue Fischer Weltgeschichte*, vol. 10: *Zentralasien* (Frankfurt a. Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2012), 376–77; Bregel, “Central Asia vii.,” 196.

³ Bregel, “Mangits,” 419; Bregel, “Central Asia vii.,” 196; Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 29; Paul, *Zentralasien*, 77. See also Adeeb Khalid, “Society and politics in Bukhara, 1868–1920,” *Central Asian Survey* 19, no. 3–4 (2000): 369.

⁴ Bregel, “Central Asia vii.,” 196.

some areas like Kulāb, Darwāz, Ḥiṣār as well as the great desert to the southwest of the khanates remained outside their control.⁵ H  l  ne Carr  re d'Encausse argues that

“[t]he political authorities assumed considerable importance throughout the period of unification, since they allowed the emir in his capital Bukhara to be the omnipresent sovereign he needed to become. To administer from a capital a territory of almost 250,000 sq. km., of which many regions were either always or in certain seasons inaccessible, seemed an impossible enterprise. The complexity of the emirate’s administrative apparatus was of the greatest assistance.”⁶

According to Paul, the centralization ushered in an increasing territorialization, implying linear boundaries. This pertains also to the inner order of the khanates made up of provinces and districts.⁷ Yet some historians raise doubts regarding the administrative centralization and territorialization. Although referring to Am  r Naṣrullah’s establishment of a standing army composed of Iranian and Qalm  q slaves, Adeeb Khalid is of the opinion that the last Manghit rulers did not develop any centralized bureaucratic structure to deal with daily administrative affairs.⁸ Holdsworth argues that in spite of the internal administrative strength and institutional cohesion, all this “did not produce stable boundaries.” Thus it would be misleading to conceive the rule of the three dynasties as unfolding within the framework of the European nation-state.⁹ In contrast to the three Uzbek dynasties, Russia, though equally lacking a firm frontier, already had the sense of frontier and strove to establish lines, which were defined and held by military posts.¹⁰

What ultimately emerges from screening the secondary literature are significant changes at the rulers’ level and a more settled political order: dynastic changes, the end of Chingizid descent as the rule determining succession, a growing militarization and interdynastic wars resulting from conflicting territorial claims.¹¹ Another aspect that catches the attention of

⁵ Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 404.

⁶ Carr  re d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 25.

⁷ Paul, *Zentralasien*, 377.

⁸ Khalid, “Society and politics,” 369, 371.

⁹ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹¹ For questions of change in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Fragner, “Die ‘Khanate’,” 68–72.

the historian is the Great Game,¹² the period of Anglo-Russian rivalry in staking out their own spheres of influence. During this process, the buffer zone between Iran, the Indian subcontinent and the vast Central Asian steppes moved into the orbit of colonial politics and the greatly diverging interests of the two colonial powers.¹³ Although the Russians were much more successful in gaining sway over new territories than the British, Bukhara and its neighbors north of the Oxus remained, like Afghanistan, “in many ways veiled to the penetrating colonial eye.”¹⁴ Nevertheless, the establishment of Russian protectorates elicited further changes, especially on the region’s political map.

In this chapter I will spotlight certain aspects of Transoxania’s social order in the late eighteenth up to the end of the nineteenth century. Exploring various kinds of sources, I will open four different windows revealing views of different spheres and contexts of social order.¹⁵ First, I will focus on the court, especially in the time of Shāh Murād and his successors Amīr Ḥaidar and Amīr Naṣrullah Khān. Since life at the courts is well captured by the local historiography, I will continue to look at chronicles such as Ya‘qūb’s *Tārīkh-i salāṭīn-i manghūīya*, Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī’s *Tārīkh-i pādīshāhān* (Histoire), the famous *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh* by Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, the *Zafarnāma-yi khusrawī* compiled by an unknown author and Sāmī’s *Tuḥfa-yi shāhī*. The investigation of the chronicles will be enriched with a look into a series of *inshā*’ collections from the time of Amīr Ḥaidar, the so-called *Maktūbāt*, and a collection of royal diplomas and other correspondence, the *Maktūbāt wa manshūrāt* housed in the Institute of Oriental Studies in St. Petersburg (Inv. No. A-212) and published by Maṣṣūr Ṣifatgul. The second window will serve to reconsider the mechanisms

¹² For more details on the Great Game and its historical background, see Hermann Kreutzmann, “Vom ‘Great Game’ zum ‘Clash of Civilizations’? Wahrnehmungen und Wirkung von Imperialpolitik und Grenzziehungen in Zentralasien,” *Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen* 141, no. 3 (1997): 169–74.

¹³ The Great Game is today commonly associated with Afghanistan (see Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946* (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1969), 91–128.

¹⁴ Noelle, *State and Tribe*, xv.

¹⁵ We may also speak of different social orders an individual may have simultaneously been part of: the social order of the court, the social order of the military, the social order of the bazaar or an urban neighborhood, the social order of a certain village or along an irrigation canal, or the social order in a retinue of travelers and diplomats.

behind the establishment of the Russian protectorate. Instead of providing new results, the current state of knowledge will be put into the context of power and authority. The third window will enable me to examine power structures from the perspective of foreign travelers. By exploring the travelogues, I hope to create an understanding for the perceptions of foreign visitors, whose misinterpretations can be attributed to a gap of meaning between collective Western and Transoxanian worldviews. In the last step, I will turn to the rural context and the manifestation of worldviews in an extensive rent system intertwined with patterns of patronage and the petition system in the hinterland of Bukhara. Before opening these different windows, it seems worthwhile summarizing the major events of Manghit rule. Afterward I will provide brief sketches of the individual *amīrs*. This procedure will help establish a rough framework of reference, to which the information given in this chapter can be related.

THE MANGHIT PERIOD: RULERS AND MILESTONES

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Bukhara went through numerous ups and downs. On the one hand, the Manghits had to fight their internal opponents such as the Kīnakās of Shahr-i Sabz. On the other hand, Manghit authority was temporarily extended toward Marw and Khurāsān. Simultaneously, the dynasty was threatened by frequent succession struggles between various pretenders of the ruling house, struggles that were very much patterned on historical precedents. But let me start with an overview of the major events of this period and the reigns of the individual Manghit rulers.

1759–85	Reign of Dānyāl Bī b. Khudāyār Bī Manghit as <i>atālīq</i> and <i>amīr al-umarā</i>
1759–68	Rebellion of the Yūz, the Khiṭāʿī-Qipchāq and most of the Yetī Ūrūgh in Miyānkāl
1785–1800	Reign of Shāh Murād Bī b. Dānyāl Bī Manghit
1788–89	Shāh Murād conquers Marw and installs his half-brother ʿUmar Bī and Fāzil Bī as governors” a little later, Marw becomes the scene of a rebellion by ʿUmar Bī against the Bukharan ruler.
1795–96	Shāh Murād conducts plundering raids into Khurāsān and allegedly reaches the surroundings of Mashhad.

1800–26	Reign of Amīr Ḥaidar ¹⁶
1804	First campaign of Bukharan troops against Khiwa; the Khiwan ruler ʾİltūzar Khān (r. 1804–06) is killed during the encounter. ¹⁷
1805	Second Bukharan campaign against Khiwa; at the same time, the ruler of Khoqand, ʿĀlim Khān (r. 1798–1810), conquers Ūrā Tippa.
1818–24	War between Amīr Ḥaidar and Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān (r. 1806–25), the ruler of Khiwa
1821–25	Rebellion of Kḥiṭāʿī-Qipchāq and Qaraqalpāq tribes in Miyānkāl
1826	Reign of Amīr Ḥusain b. Amīr Ḥaidar
1826–27	Reign of Amīr ʿUmar b. Amīr Ḥaidar
1827–60	Reign of Amīr Naṣrullah Muḥammad Bahādur Khān b. Amīr Ḥaidar
1839–43	A war between Bukhara and Khoqand culminates in the temporary occupation of the capital of Khoqand by Naṣrullah Khān in 1843.
1856	Bukharan troops conquer Shahr-i Sabz after twelve years of successive annual campaigns against this principality.
1860–85	Reign of Amīr Muẓaffār al-Dīn Khān
1865	Amīr Muẓaffār al-Dīn Khān occupies Khoqand and reinstates Khudāyār Khān on the throne.
1866	Russian troops occupy Khojand, Ūrā Tippa and Jizakh; Khudāyār Khān of Khoqand recognizes Russian suzerainty.
1868	Russian troops inflict a defeat on the Bukharan <i>amīr</i> ; afterward Samarqand and the Zarafshān Valley up to the town of Katta Qūrghān are absorbed into the Russian government-general Turkistan; Bukhara becomes a Russian protectorate.
1885–1900	Reign of Amīr ʿAbd al-Aḥad

¹⁶ The sources give varying dates for the death of Amīr Ḥaidar: Yaʿqūb dates his death to 1242 (1826–27) and says that his successor Amīr Ḥusain was enthroned on Rabīʿ I 4, 1242 (October 5, 1826) (Yaʿqūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 22a–b); the author of the *Ẓafarnāma* gives 1243 (1227–28) as the year of Amīr Ḥaidar’s death (*Ẓafarnāma*, 67).

¹⁷ According to Bregel, this encounter took place in 1806 (Bregel, “The three Uzbek states,” 399).

1900–20	Reign of Amīr ‘Ālim Khān
1920	Fall of the Manghit dynasty and flight of Amīr ‘Ālim Khān to Afghanistan.

MUḤAMMAD DĀNYĀL BĪ B. KHUDĀYĀR BĪ

After the death of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, his paternal uncle and successor Muḥammad Dānyāl Bī (r. 1759–85), who held the title of *dīwānbēgī* and the governorship of Karmīna, became the new strongman of Bukhara. According to Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, immediately before his death, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān allegedly chose him as his successor,¹⁸ which seems very unlikely. He first placed Fāzil Tūra, a grandson of Raḥīm Khān, on the throne.¹⁹ Immediately after this step, he had to suppress an uprising of the Yūz, Burqūt, Yetī Ūrūgh, Kīnakās, Sarāy, and Qungrāt leaders in Bukhara. Most of them were put to death in the course of the fighting.²⁰ Writing in the early twentieth century, ‘Ainī retrospectively attributes the revolt of the Uzbek leaders breaking out after Raḥīm Khān’s death to the erstwhile enthronization of Fāzil Tūra, who, as a non-Chingizid, lacked sufficient legitimation.²¹ After the end of the first round of fighting, Dānyāl Bī reverted to the practice of having a shadow *khān* on the throne. He governed as *atālīq* and *amīr al-umarā* on behalf of a certain Abū’l-Ghāzī Khān, a Chingizid pretender. Henceforth, the *khutba* was read in his name.²² In the following years, the government was dominated and led by Dānyāl Bī and Muḥammad Daulat Qūshbēgī.²³ During his reign, the *amīr* had his hands full quelling the rebellions of the Uzbek tribal chiefs. The petty principalities

¹⁸ Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 53 (French text, 117).

¹⁹ Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān left no biological heir; Fāzil Khān was the son of his daughter and Nārbūta Bī b. Badal Bī b. Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fol. 325a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 425a; Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 6b).

²⁰ Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 325–327b; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 427b–429b.

²¹ ‘Ainī, *Tārīkh*, 9.

²² Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fol. 330a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 436b; Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 7b. See also Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 104–05; Bregel, “Mangits,” 418; Bregel, “Central Asia,” 195; Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 395; von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 73–74; Fragner, “Die ‘Khanate,’” 69.

²³ Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm sharply criticizes the growing influence of Daulat Qūshbēgī and his companion, the chief judge Mīr Nizām al-Dīn Ḥusainī (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 54 (French text, 121)).

like Ḥiṣār, Shahr-i Sabz, Nūr-i Aṭā, Kulāb and Bāysūn, which had been subjugated by his predecessor, managed to ward off Bukharan dominance once again.²⁴

At the beginning, and again similar to his predecessor, Dānyāl Bī acted from a very limited base of power. His authority did not extend beyond the capital. Even in Karmīna, his rule was extremely fragile and permanently contested. While Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān could count on his alliance with the Kḥiṭāʾī-Qipchāq, Dānyāl Bī did not have such strong partners. In the following ten years, there were two major centers of resistance: first Miyānkāl, where a broad alliance of Yetī Ūrūgh, Kḥiṭāʾī-Qipchāq and Yūz challenged his atālīqate and engaged Dānyāl Bī's army in permanent combat. And second Nasaf, the home of the Manghit tribe, where his authority was called into question by his relatives.

In Miyānkāl the conflict broke out when Fāzil Bī Yūz took Samarqand after a one-week siege and put the governor, Barāt Bī Qūshbēgī b. Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī, to death.²⁵ Afterward Fāzil Bī and his allies took other important towns like Khaṭarchī and Panjshanba, from where they moved on to conquer the town of Karmīna.²⁶ Besides the Yūz leader, the new anti-Manghit alliance comprised Yādgar Bī Burqūt, Khwājamyār Bī Baḥrīn, and Bābā Bī and Badal Bī, two sons of the former *atālīq* Khwājam Yār Bī Ūtārchī. The ensuing tug-of-war between this coalition and the Bukharan forces is reminiscent of previous conflicts in the central parts of the Zarafshān Valley. The war lingered on throughout the 1760s with various sieges of the major towns. In the following years we observe a number of *amīrs* changing sides and a lot of movement and maneuvering in this region. Despite enjoying the support of the Kīnakās, the sphere of action held by Dānyāl Bī's opponents constantly shrank as one fortress after the other fell back to the government. After the occupation of Samarqand in 1768 by Yūz forces, who were meanwhile allied with the Manghits, the conflict in Miyānkāl slowly came to an end.²⁷

The second trouble spot that kept Muḥammad Dānyāl Bī busy was the Qashqā Daryā Valley, and there especially the region of Nasaf. As already mentioned, the Bukharan *amīr* had quickly responded to the request of other

²⁴ Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 105; Chekhovich, "O nekotorykh," 84.

²⁵ Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 329a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 435b, 437b; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 7a.

²⁶ Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 332a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 437b–438a; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 7a.

²⁷ For a detailed account see Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 329a–346b, 361a–365b.

Uzbek chiefs to install a Chingizid *khān*. His great-nephew Fāzil Khān was dethroned and sent to Nasaf together with his father Nārbūta Bī Mīrākhūr. As a son-in-law of the deceased Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, the latter had his own aspiration to the atālīqate and certainly wanted to keep his son on the throne. Although he enjoyed the support of some followers of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān, his efforts to occupy the *arg* of Bukhara remained unsuccessful.²⁸ Whereas Ya‘qūb says that Nārbūta Bī was then sent to Nasaf together with Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān’s daughter and their son to govern this region,²⁹ Wafā writes that Nasaf was granted to them as an *iqṭā’*.³⁰ According to the *Tuḥfat*, Qarshī was soon wrecked by a conflict between the former governor Bēg Būta Bī b. Yūqāshī Bī b. Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī and the newcomers from Bukhara. When finally the populace of Nasaf sided with Nārbūta Bī and recognized him as new governor, Bēg Būta Bī escaped to Khuzār.³¹ In the following years, Qarshī was engulfed by an endless war between various Manghit sub-clans, whose leaders often solicited the aid of Bukhara. In the course of the fighting, Nasaf became divided between the rival factions: *qal‘as* like Kasbī, Shulluk and Chāh Dārū were defended by troops loyal to Dānyāl Bī and Shāh Murād; Kāsān changed its possessors at least twice; and the fortress of Mīr-i Mīrān became the headquarters of the opponents around Bēg Būtā Bī. Later, the rebels in Nasaf were also backed by the Kīnakās chief Bēg Naẓar Bī who sent his troops to help defend Qarshī, which was attacked by government forces in 1182/1768–69. As a result, the war encroached upon Shahr-i Sabz, where many towns were taken by the Bukharan army.³² Unfortunately, Qāzī Wafā’s account breaks off here. Ya‘qūb refers to another campaign to Qarshī in 1185/1771–72. The town was finally occupied after Bēg Būtā Bī was killed.³³

After years of fighting, Dānyāl Bī and his son were able to bring most of the core areas of Mā Warā’ al-Nahr into their fold.³⁴ Some of these wars are described by Effremov, who served at Dānyāl Bī’s court and writes that the commander-in-chief was able to subjugate all of Bukhara and that the

²⁸ Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 7b.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 330a.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., fols. 329a–353b, 361a–b, 365a, 366a–369a; Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 8a–b.

³³ Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 8b.

³⁴ von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 75.

government lay entirely in his hands.³⁵ Malcolm tells us that in the final phase of his reign, the *atālīq* “exercised an almost absolute authority over the Oosbeg tribes inhabiting the territory immediately dependent on Bokhara.”³⁶ But it was in fact his son Shāh Murād who acted as a charismatic military leader and eventually subdued most of the regions making up the heartland of Bukhara.³⁷

SHĀH MURĀD BĪ

After Dānyāl Bī’s death in 1785, his son Shāh Murād (r. 1785–1800)³⁸ took over, deposed Abū’l-Ghāzī Khān and only retained the title of *amīr* instead of *atālīq*.³⁹ According to some Persian sources referred to by Malcolm, this ruler was called Bēgī Jān (here Begee Jān), a title that cannot be verified on the basis of the Bukharan material.⁴⁰ In the Bukharan historiography, the ruler is titled *amīr-i ma‘šūm*, the sinless *amīr*.⁴¹ Sāmī calls him *amīr-i ma‘šūm ghazī*.⁴² With his enthronization and the deposal of the last puppet *khān*, the Chingizid principle had become obsolete for the time being.⁴³ Although Wafā mentions Shāh Murād’s marriage to Abū’l-Faiẓ Khān’s daughter,⁴⁴ none of the later Manghit chroniclers refer to it as a legitimizing factor. Instead of descent from Chingīz Khān, many authors pay attention to his divinely desired and legitimized rule. This goes hand in hand with the portrayal of Shāh Murād as an opponent of Mongol norms and customs and

³⁵ Effremov, *Devjatiletnee*, 37.

³⁶ Malcolm, *History*, II, 160.

³⁷ For further details see Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 76–77.

³⁸ The date of Shāh Murād’s death greatly varies in the sources (for details see Anke von Kügelgen, “Sufimeister und Herrscher im Zwiegespräch: Die Schreiben des Faḡl Aḡmad aus Peshawar and Amīr Ḥaydar in Buchara,” in *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia*, vol. 3: *Arabic, Persian and Turkic Manuscripts*, ed. Anke von Kügelgen, Aṣīrbek Muminov, Michael Kemper (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2000), 219, footnote no. 2).

³⁹ Shāh Murād posthumously ascribed this title to his father on the coins he struck in the name of the latter (Bregel, “Mangits,” 418; Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 396).

⁴⁰ Malcolm, *History*, II, 160–74; see also Burnes, *Travels*, II, 359.

⁴¹ Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 396.

⁴² Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuhfa*, 44, 60, 65.

⁴³ The chroniclers in the time of Amīr Ḥaidar emphasize his Chingizid descent through the maternal line (von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 367).

⁴⁴ Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fol. 355b.

as a religious reviver.⁴⁵ In the secondary literature, he is sometimes characterized as a “dervish on the throne.”⁴⁶ Shāh Mūrād was already very prominent before he succeeded his father. His mother was a Qungrāt woman. He himself was born in Karmīna, where his father had acted as governor for many years. According to Mullā Sharīf, Shāh Murād was seventeen years old when Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān died.⁴⁷ During his father’s reign as *amīr al-umarā*, he participated in many military campaigns and earned fame as a capable commander. In the *Tuḥfat* he seems more active than his aged father. It was in fact he who launched most of the punitive expeditions with great élan.⁴⁸ According to Qāzī Wafā, Shāh Murād bore the rank of *qūshbēgī*,⁴⁹ but Bregel doubts that he really acted in this position.⁵⁰ Ya‘qūb states that in 1172/1759, this ruler assumed the “reins of all major affairs of the kingdom,”⁵¹ which, given his young age, seems very unlikely. Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm tells us that the young *amīr* took responsibility for the government after the murder of Muḥammad Daulat Qūshbēgī, at a time when his father was still alive.⁵²

The Marw and Khurāsān Campaigns

Shāh Murād’s policy was characterized by territorial expansion, focusing on Marw and Khurāsān. Since he was the first Uzbek ruler to resume territorial expansion and plundering expeditions against Khurāsān, Shāh Murād is sometimes called Amīr Ma‘šūm Ghāzī or *pādishāh ghāzī* in the Bukharan historiography.⁵³ Although the Bukharan historiography underlines Shāh Murād’s military prowess and success in Marw, it also mentions his difficulties in establishing lasting control over the oasis. During Shāh

⁴⁵ von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 78, 337, 340–53. For a detailed treatment of the *mujaddid*, see *ibid.*, 303–17.

⁴⁶ Paul, *Zentralasien*, 381; for further details see von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 342–47.

⁴⁷ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 433b. Wafā gives 1153/1740–41 as the year of Shāh Murād’s birth (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 323a).

⁴⁸ Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 328a, 330a, 332b–337a, 341a, 342a–b, 348a–350a.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 355b.

⁵⁰ Bregel refers here to the content of the *Risāla* by Ya‘qūb (Bregel, *Administration*, 11). However, in my version of this work, no mention is made of Shāh Murād’s assumption of this title.

⁵¹ Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 7b.

⁵² Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 55 (French text, 123).

⁵³ Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 51, 68–69, 80.

Murād's first campaign to Marw in 1200/1785–86, Bukharan troops looted the surroundings of the oasis. Finally, the local governor Bairam 'Alī Khān was killed, his head sent to Bukhara and nailed to the gallows. After the withdrawal of the Bukharan troops, the Marwīs called Bairam 'Alī Khān's son Hājī Muḥammad Ḥusain from Mashhad.⁵⁴ In the following year, the Manghit *amīr* led his second expedition to Marw, where the governor of the *qal'a* near the *band-i sulṭānī*, the dam in the south of the Marw oasis, ceded his fort to the conquering Uzbek forces. Shāh Murād then destroyed the dam for the first time and started a large-scale resettlement campaign. At the same time, he appointed his brothers 'Umar Bī and Fāzil Bī as governors.⁵⁵ In 1203/1788–89, a rebellion by his brothers and the local Turkmen tribes called for Shāh Murād's third expedition. He destroyed the *band-i sulṭānī* a second time but had to retreat because of the resistance of the Turkmen.⁵⁶ In the end, 'Umar Bī and Fāzil Bī escaped and took refuge in Shahr-i Sabz.⁵⁷

Shāh Murād's conquest of Marw in 1788 was accompanied by extensive devastation of the irrigation system, causing the oasis to fall dry.⁵⁸ Depending on the different sources and authors, the number of inhabitants evacuated from the city and resettled in Bukhara by Shāh Murād varies. Whereas Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm assumes that the Bukharan king removed seventeen thousand Qizilbāsh families, Ya'qūb gives a number of thirty thousand families who were forced to resettle in Bukhara.⁵⁹ Although Mīrzā

⁵⁴ Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 58–60 (French text, 131–37). According to Ya'qūb, this first expedition to Marw took place in 1204/1789–90 (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 9b).

⁵⁵ Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 60–62 (French text, 137–42). Ya'qūb adds that Shāh Murād erected a new fort at the southern margin of the oasis (the upper end of the Marw Rūd), which he called Islāmābād. Here he installed his son-in-law 'Abd al-'Azīz Khwāja as new governor (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 9b).

⁵⁶ Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 62 (French text, 142); Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 9b.

⁵⁷ Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 9b–10a; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 62–63 (French text, 142–43).

⁵⁸ Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 9b; Mu'īn, *Tārīkh*, fols. 30a–b; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 60–61 (French text, 136–39). See also Hambly, "Verfall," 192; Bregel, "The new Uzbek states," 396; Paul, *Zentralasien*, 381; A. Yu. Yakubowski [C. E. Bosworth], "Marw al-Shāhidjān," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., VI, 621. According to Ya'qūb, the campaign to Marw and the destruction of the dam took place in 1204/1789–90.

⁵⁹ Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 9b; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 62 (French text, 142). In agreement with Ya'qūb, Imām al-Dīn Ḥusainī says that Shāh Murād resettled thirty thousand people from Marw to Bukhara (Imām al-Dīn Ḥusainī, *Tārīkh-i ḥusainshāhī* (MS Kabul: National Archive of Afghanistan, Inv. No. 52/24), 187). See also Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 271, especially footnote no. 237.

Shams, a contemporary of the ruler, also refers to the campaigns to Marw, he does not mention the destruction of the *band-i sulṭānī*.⁶⁰

The sources shed further light on Shāh Murād's expeditions (*ghaza*) in northeastern Iran. In the course of these expeditions, his troops ravaged some parts of Khurāsān and advanced as far as the vicinity of Mashhad.⁶¹ Although he gives a wrong date for one of these raids, Sāmī provides more detailed data on the Iranian settlements bearing the onslaught of the Uzbek troops, such as Zamānābād,⁶² Chatalīq, Tūrt Gumbad and Tūraq.⁶³

Afghan-Bukharan Encounters

Another hot spot of Shāh Murād's military activities was Balkh. In general, the Afghan sources give far more detailed information on Afghan-Bukharan encounters and overlapping territorial claims than the Bukharan sources. While the former construct the notion of the Āmū Daryā as a concrete boundary fixed by the military activities of Aḥmad Shāh and his son Tīmūr Shāh Durrānī (r. 1773–92),⁶⁴ in the Bukharan chronicles Balkh and Cis-Oxania clearly appear as a secondary theater because the Manghits had their hands full dealing with their opponents in Transoxania. The Bukharan sources, for instance, narrate that Tīmūr Shāh was the aggressor, who, seduced by Niyāz 'Alī Bī Kīnakās and Khudāyār Bī Yūz, around 1790

⁶⁰ Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā'ī, *Tārīkh-i Bukhārā, Khoqand wa Kāshghar (Dar sharḥ-i ḥukmrānī-yi Amīr Ḥaidar dar Bukhārā, Muḥammad 'Alī Khān dar Khoqand wa Jahāngīr Khwāja dar Kāshghar)*, ed. Muḥammad Akbar 'Ashīq (Tehran: Daftar-i nashr-i mīrāth-i maktūb-i Tehrān, 1377/1998), 114–15.

⁶¹ Ya'qūb dates this campaign to the year 1210/1795–96 and says that the whole of Khurāsān allegedly acknowledged Shāh Murād's suzerainty (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 10b–11a). Other authors report about annual plundering raids to Khurāsān (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 63 (French text, 144); Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 115–16; Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 65–72, 79–81. See also Bregel, "The new Uzbek states," 396).

⁶² Zamānābād, sometimes also called Zamīnābād, was a village located sixteen miles from Nishāpūr and known for its brackish water (Adamec, *Historical Gazetteer*, II, 680).

⁶³ Tūraq, also spelled Tūruq (طرف), was a fortified village surrounded by well-irrigated fields just six miles south of Mashhad (Adamec, *Historical Gazetteer*, II, 658–59). For Shāh Murād's campaign and alleged siege of Mashhad, see Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 65–72.

⁶⁴ Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 114.

invaded the region with one hundred thousand soldiers.⁶⁵ After his defeat at the hands of Shāh Murād's army of twenty thousand soldiers,⁶⁶ he agreed on a peace treaty and retreated to Kabul.⁶⁷ While the Bukharan sources suggest a glorious victory by Shāh Murād, the Afghan historiography tells the opposite. In the *Tārīkh-i ḥusainshāhī*, an Afghan chronicle by Imām al-Dīn Ḥusainī, we read about Tīmūr Shāh's campaign as retaliation for Shāh Murād's actions in Marw. Bukhara's Uzbek legions and Turkic *khāns* (*afwāj-i ūzbekīya wa khānān-i turkīya*), making up an army of about fifty thousand soldiers, were defeated by the Afghans. Shāh Murād accepted all the terms of a peace treaty, swore fealty to Tīmūr Shāh and sent his maternal nephew and his son as hostages to the Afghan court.⁶⁸ Similar differences in reporting the course of events regarding Afghan-Bukharan competition for control over Balkh appear some years earlier. According to the *Tārīkh-i aḥmadshāhī*, a Bukharan commander by the name of Khwāja Mūsā, coming from Qarshī with six thousand cavalrymen, invaded Balkh and took the town of Āqcha in 1175/1761–62.⁶⁹ Although the Afghan forces finally prevailed, Bukhara continued to make its influence felt in this region.⁷⁰ Later Afghan sources also narrate the story of the *khirqā-yi mubāraka*, a cloak of the Prophet Muḥammad, which Shāh Murād gave as a token of submission to Aḥmad Shāh Durrānī.⁷¹ Whereas for later Afghan authors the *khirqā* story served to underpin Afghan aspirations in Balkh, Transoxanian chroniclers do not refer to the *khirqā* and the alleged 1761–62 Afghan-Bukharan conflict at all. This and the fact that the Manghits were heavily embroiled in a power struggle in the core areas of Transoxania make us wonder whether this incident really happened or not.

⁶⁵ The sources give varying dates for the Afghan-Uzbek encounter: Ya'qūb 1215/1790–91; Bukhārī one year before Tīmūr Shāh's death in 1792.

⁶⁶ According to Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, Shāh Murād Bī commanded an army of thirty thousand soldiers on this occasion (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 11 (French text, 22)).

⁶⁷ Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 10a–b. Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm only mentions a peace agreement but no combat (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 11–12, 62 (French text, 22–23, 142)).

⁶⁸ Imām al-Dīn Ḥusainī, *Tārīkh*, 186–210. For the different narratives surrounding the Afghan-Uzbek encounter and the establishment of the Oxus as a political boundary, see von Kūgelgen, *Legitimierung*, 79, footnote no. 123.

⁶⁹ Maḥmūd al-Ḥusainī, *Tārīkh*, 414–15.

⁷⁰ Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 71–72.

⁷¹ McChesney, *Waqf*, 222–27.

In addition to his outward military activities, Shāh Murād also had to put down a number of internal rebellions. In 1201/1786–87, he was confronted with a rebellion by his brother Sulṭān Murād Bī, the governor of Karmīna, who was allied with the Kīnakās and the Yūz.⁷² Another focal point of uprisings was of course Shahr-i Sabz, which retained its independence under Niyāz ‘Alī Bēg. Mullā Sharīf refers to prolonged expeditions in this region, which was difficult to access because of its rough terrain and many lakelets. On several occasions, the Manghit ruler conquered quite a large number of settlements, destroyed the local harvest and had many trees cut down. He also managed to construct a new fortress, Dū Āba, which served as the seat of his own governor Daulān Bī.⁷³

AMĪR ḤAIDAR

Shāh Murād’s son and successor Amīr Ḥaidar was far less successful in his attempts to extend his authority to other regions. While Mīrzā Shams reports about a smooth transition of authority and enthronization of the new ruler,⁷⁴ other authors mention a short succession struggle: Shāh Murād’s brothers ‘Umar Bī and Fāzil Bī made an unsuccessful bid for authority but then lifted the siege of the citadel of Bukhara and left the capital for Shahr-i Sabz.⁷⁵ In this short episode, Ūtgūr (Ūtkūr) Qūshbēgī played a particular role in securing the throne for Amīr Ḥaidar, who was brought from Qarshī where he acted as governor.⁷⁶

Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Fāzil Khān gives a very colorful and vivid description of the king’s appearance:

“he is thirty-five years old, tall and a good looking young man of red and white complexion. His face has turned yellowish on account of his religiosity and piety; he

⁷² Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 9a; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 58 (French text, 131).

⁷³ On the punitive campaigns to Shahr-i Sabz and Kitāb and the conflict-prone relationship between Shāh Murād and Niyāz ‘Alī Bēg Parwānāchī, see Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 508a–514b. According to hagiographic sources, Shāh Murād broke off the siege of Shahr-i Sabz because of Khalīfā Khudāyār’s presence in the town (Babadžanov, “Naqšbandīya Muğaddidiya,” 393–94). But Mīrzā Shams says that Shāh Murād punished Shahr-i Sabz (*Shahr-i Sabz-rā gūshmālī ba-sazā dād*). This expression may imply a successful siege and subjugation of Niyāz ‘Alī Bēg (Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 114).

⁷⁴ Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 67–69.

⁷⁵ Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 12a; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 68 (French text, 154–55).

⁷⁶ See below, section on Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Qūshbēgī.

observes fast on alternate days throughout the twelve months of the year, and spends night in vigil, and administers justice daily. He has beard. He wears an Uzbeki cap on which he wraps (First) the Uzbeki turban resembling the Arabs' head-dress and then a strap of (another) cloth. He ties patka (belt of cloth) on his dress with a dagger on the side of the back, and he puts a chikma (a kind of upper garment) mostly ochre-coloured on all of them. He puts on thin boots and these thin boots are called Basih that do not have soles studded with horse-shoe.⁷⁷

Amīr Ḥaidar faced a series of rebellions throughout his twenty-six years' reign.⁷⁸ Shortly after his coronation, he had to smash a rebellion by his brother-in-law and governor of Katta Qūrhān, Muḥammad Amīn Khwāja Naqīb, who had installed his own governors in Miyānkāl. Backed by the Kīnakās troops, 'Umar Bī and Fāzil Bī, the two uncles of the ruler, for example, received the governorship of Panjshanba.⁷⁹ Niyāz 'Alī Bēg Kīnakās managed to maintain his independence.⁸⁰ Under him Shahr-i Sabz resumed its role as a sanctuary for all the opponents and rival family members of the Bukharan *amīr*. Some of them used Shahr as a stopover on their way to Khoqand.⁸¹ An Indian source confirms the state of rebellion in Shahr-i Sabz and Ḥiṣār but states that Niyāz 'Alī Bī and Sayyid Bī, the governor of Ḥiṣār, "always send their envoys with gifts and letters of submission to the King of Bukhara."⁸² In one of his letters, Amīr Ḥaidar instructs Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Dīwānbēgī, the governor of Qarshī, to carefully watch the movements of the tribal militias of the Kīnakās in

⁷⁷ Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl-i manāzil-i Bukhārā* [*Tārīkh-i manāzil-i Bukhārā*], English text, 29 (Persian original missing in edited version).

⁷⁸ Anke von Kügelgen provides a detailed overview of the major events during Amīr Ḥaidar's reign and the style of his administration (see von Kügelgen, "Sufimeister und Herrscher," 223–27).

⁷⁹ Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 12b–13b. According to Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm and Sāmī, the rebellion was instigated by Shāh Murād's brothers Fāzil Bī, 'Umar Bī and Maḥmūd Bī, who were joined by a certain Kiyā Khwāja, the governor of Karmīna, and Niyāz 'Alī Bēg Ūzbek (Kīnakās) (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 68–69 (French text, 155–56); Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 90).

⁸⁰ Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān reports about an unsuccessful campaign led by Amīr Ḥaidar against Niyāz 'Alī Bēg (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 388–89; see also Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 14a).

⁸¹ Schiewek, "À propos des exilés de Boukhara et de Kokand à Shahr-i Sabz," 181–197.

⁸² Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 34 (English text, 33).

Khuzār and Shahr-i Sabz. In another letter, he describes the Kīnakās as a severe enemy.⁸³

Besides internal resistance, Amīr Ḥaidar also faced challenges from his neighbors. In the east, Khojand and Ūrā Tippa formed a bone of contention with ‘Ālim Khān and ‘Umar Khān, the rulers of Khoqand.⁸⁴ A far more serious threat came from Khiwa, whose rulers Īltūzar Khān (r. 1804–06) and Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān (r. 1806–26) repeatedly took advantage of Amīr Ḥaidar’s internal problems and invaded Bukhara to conduct devastating raids.⁸⁵ In most of these encounters, the troops of the Bukharan ruler were on the defensive and Khiwan forces often penetrated deep into his sphere of authority and raided even the environs of the capital.⁸⁶

⁸³ Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt* (MS Tashkent, Al-Bīrūnī Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences/Tashkent, IVANRUZ no. 5412), makt. nos. 131, 154, fols. 59a, 70b–71b.

⁸⁴ ‘Ālim Khān had occupied Khojand in 1216/1801–02 and driven out Bēg Murād Bī b. Khudāyār Bī b. Fāzil Bī Yūz, who killed his uncle Bābā Parwānachī (according to Ḥakīm Khān, he bore the rank of *dīwānbēgī*) and occupied Ūrā Tippa. Amīr Ḥaidar mounted his campaign to the east in 1217/1802–03 and captured Ūrā Tippa, Ūrmītan and Fān. Afterward he sent a certain Īr Naẓār Bī as new governor to Ūrā Tippa (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 13b–14a; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 389–90). Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm reports that the murder of Bēg Murād Bī alienated the populace of Ūrā Tippa, whereupon the *amīr* occupied the town and appointed Qābil Bēg b. Ūtgūr Qūshbēgī as new governor. Subsequently he occupied the territories up to Khojand and Tashkent (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 70 (French text, 159)). ‘Ālim Khān conquered Ūrā Tippa in 1805–06, but Amīr Ḥaidar retook this town the following year and installed his own governor. The new governor was Maḥmūd Khān, who was an Ahrārī *khwāja* and a grandson of Fāzil Bī Yūz through his daughter (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 15a–b; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 393–96). The war for control over Ūrā Tippa flared up again when Khwāja Maḥmūd Khān sided with the new Khoqandian ruler ‘Umar Khān. Ya‘qūb dates the event to the year 1228/1813. According to him, ‘Umar Khān replaced Maḥmūd Khān with Rajab Dīwānbēgī because of his repressive measures and estrangement of the population. The tide turned yet again when the Bukharan king installed Atālīq Bī b. Khudāyār Bī Yūz and helped him reconquer Ūrā Tippa (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 15b). Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān narrates that in 1225/1810–11, Amīr Ḥaidar started his campaign to reconquer Ūrā Tippa when Maḥmūd Khwāja allied with ‘Umar Khān. But Amīr Ḥaidar only advanced as far as Pishāghar and withdrew when learning about the counter offensive of Khoqandian forces (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 402).

⁸⁵ Khiwan troops invaded Bukhara in 1219/1804–05, 1234/1818–19 and 1235/1819–20 (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 14a–b, 16a–17a, 18b–20a; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 71–74 (French text, 159–66); Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 391–92, 408–10; Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 73; Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuhfa*, 95–96, 103–06, 115–16).

⁸⁶ Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 397. See also below.

Amīr Ḥaidar was more successful in extending his authority to Cis-Oxania. In 1817 the region between the Chahār Wilāyat⁸⁷ in the west and Kunduz and Badakhshān in the east submitted to his rule.⁸⁸ Even before, he had maintained close relations with Mīr Qilich ‘Alī Bēg (d. 1817), the ruler of Tāshqūrhān.⁸⁹ Besides his few military successes, this king followed the example of his father as a patron of Islamic institutions and used to give lessons in a Bukharan *madrasa*.⁹⁰

Toward the end of his reign, Amīr Ḥaidar had to deal with a rebellion of the Khiṭā’ī-Qipchāq that lasted more than four years (1237–41/1821–25).⁹¹ The activities of this powerful tribe wrecked the eastern parts of Miyānkāl up to the province of Samarqand. Katta Qūrhān, Panjshanba, Yangī Qūrhān and Chilak continued to be centers of resistance for years.

THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE 1826–1827

The conflict that followed Amīr Ḥaidar’s demise in 1826 is reminiscent of former succession struggles.⁹² Three candidates made a bid for authority

⁸⁷ The region between Maimana, Andkhūy, Shibarghān and Sar-i Pul is often designated Chahār Wilāyat or Lesser Turkistan (see Jonathan Lee, *The ‘Ancient Supremacy’ Bukhara, Afghanistan, and the Battle for Balkh, 1731–1901* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), xxxi–xxii, 7; Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 62).

⁸⁸ For the circumstances in Cis-Oxania (or Lesser Turkistan) in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and the maneuvering of the local Uzbek leadership between Bukhara and Kabul, see Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 71–86.

⁸⁹ Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 74, 78; Lee, ‘Ancient Supremacy’, 119–22.

⁹⁰ Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 397.

⁹¹ Ivanov, P. P. *Vosstanie Kitay-Kipchakov*. For references in the primary sources and different versions of these events, see Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 17a–18b, 20a–22a; *Zafarnāma*, 64–66; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 407–13; Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 80; Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 112–17. According to Mīrzā Shams, the Khiṭā’ī-Qipchāq rebelled throughout Amīr Ḥaidar’s reign (Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 73–80).

⁹² The sources furnish conflicting information on the date and the circumstances of Amīr Ḥaidar’s death. Ya‘qūb tells us that the ruler died at the age of forty-seven in Rabī’ I 1242/October–November 1826 after a rule of twenty-seven years (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 22a; see also Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 125). According to the *Zafarnāma* and the *Muntakhab*, he died in 1243/1827–28 after his return to Bukhara from a journey to Qarshī (*Zafarnāma*, 67; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 418). Giving only the Christian date, Mīrzā Shams says that Amīr Ḥaidar passed away in 1826 (Mīrzā Shams

within just one year: Amīr Ḥusain, Amīr ‘Umar, and finally Amīr Naṣrullah.⁹³ Enjoying the support of at least a part of the urban populace of the capital, Amīr Ḥusain gained the throne first by force and against the will of Ḥakīm Qūshbēgī. But he passed away after a few months.⁹⁴ Amīr ‘Umar seems to have been much more determined to defend Bukhara and the throne against the claims of his brother Naṣrullah. The latter, according to the *Ẓafarnāma*, was chosen heir-apparent and held the *wilāyat* of Nasaf, Kāsān and Kasbī by royal decree, and also the governorship of Chirāghchī, Yartī Tippa and Famī as well as that of the *wilāyat* of Bāysūn, Shīrābād, Kilif and Khuzār. His area of responsibility extended up to the frontier of Ḥiṣār.⁹⁵ Given the bias of this source, it is also possible that Amīr Ḥaidar had not chosen a successor at all. Finally, throne and crown passed on to Naṣrullah’s brother Amīr ‘Umar, the governor of Karmīna. In their assessment of the short reigns of Amīr Ḥusain und Amīr ‘Umar, the chroniclers reach divergent conclusions. Naṣrullah Khān’s unknown chronicler depicts both of them as careless rulers doing justice only to the wine, an assessment that certainly serves to underpin his master’s claim to the throne.⁹⁶ Explicitly stating that he had personally witnessed these events, Mīrzā Shams, however, characterizes Amīr Ḥusain as a capable and lenient ruler, while confirming the unfavorable portrayal of Amīr ‘Umar.⁹⁷

While most sources suggest a relatively smooth transfer of authority from Amīr Ḥusain Khān to Amīr ‘Umar Khān, simply because the latter, as

Bukhārā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 81–82). Ṣadr-i Ẓiyā states that Amīr Ḥusain followed his father in 1242/1826–27 (Ṣadr-i Ẓiyā, *Tārīkh*, fol. 74a).

⁹³ See also Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 139.

⁹⁴ Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 22b–23a; *Ẓafarnāma*, 68–71; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 417–19; Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 84–85; Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 125–26; Ṣadr-i Ẓiyā, *Tārīkh*, fol. 74a. The author of the *Ẓafarnāma* says he ruled only four months (*Ẓafarnāma*, 67–68, 71). According to Ya‘qūb, Muḥammad Ḥusain Khān died after seventy-six days (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 22b–23a).

⁹⁵ *Ẓafarnāma*, 66. Ya‘qūb also says that Amīr Ḥaidar had chosen Prince Naṣrullah Tūra as his heir-apparent (*walī-‘ahd*) (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 22b).

⁹⁶ The early death of the ruler is implicitly attributed to deteriorating health as a result of his consumption of hashish (*bang*) and opium (*kūknār*) (*Ẓafarnāma*, 63), or alcohol (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 23a).

⁹⁷ Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 88–89. Sāmī depicts Amīr Ḥusain Khān as a learned man who always surrounded himself with scholars. After his enthronement, he had coins minted in his name (*tanga-yi sultānī*) and proved to be a generous ruler (Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 118, 126).

governor of Karmīna, was relatively near the capital or enjoyed the support of the courtiers,⁹⁸ Sāmī says that the courtiers and officials of the Manghit court split into two factions: one in support of ‘Umar and the other opting for Naṣrullah.⁹⁹

The accession of Amīr ‘Umar Khān sparked a war for control over Bukhara between the new ruler and Prince Naṣrullah. From past experience, the prince knew that the consent and support of the population of Miyānkāl and Samarqand was essential for every aspirant to authority. Especially Samarqand was regarded as a major asset in the power struggle. Hence Naṣrullah went first to Samarqand and entered the city without resistance. On his arrival, the prince visited the tomb of Khwāja ‘Ubaidullah Ahrār and assured himself of the support of the local leadership. His enthronization in Samarqand and the ceremony, during which he was placed on the famous *kūk tāsh*, served as a powerful symbol of his newly acquired authority. Afterward he slowly traversed the Zarafshān Valley. Naṣrullah Khān was welcomed by the local governors and the Uzbek nomads and tribes (*‘ashāyir wa qabāyil wa ūlūs-i ūzbekīya*). The latter presented gifts to the prince and joined his army.¹⁰⁰ In the course of his westward advance, one fortress after another surrendered to the prince without much resistance.¹⁰¹ When he arrived before the city gates of Bukhara, Naṣrullah Tūra had assembled an army consisting of contingents from Nasaf, southern Transoxania, Samarqand and Miyānkāl. He also garnered support from his younger brothers Mīr Zubair Khān, Mīr Ḥamza Khān and Mīr Ṣafdar Khān. The siege of Bukhara lasted several months. Naṣrullah finally received assistance from Muḥammad Ḥakīm Qūshbēgī, who opened the city gates and let the

⁹⁸ *Ẓafarnāma*, 71; Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 23a; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 419; Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā‘ī, *Tārīkh*, 89.

⁹⁹ According to Sāmī, ‘Umar Khān enjoyed the support of various powerful figures at the court, like Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Qūshbēgī-yī kull, Muḥammad Sharīf Bī Ināq, Iṣmatullah Bī Dādkhwāh Qalmāq and Tūghān Bī Tūra Qazāq (Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 128).

¹⁰⁰ *Ẓafarnāma*, 75–76. According to Khanikov, Naṣrullah deposed all the local governors and took them with him on his march to Bukhara (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 300).

¹⁰¹ In his summary of the succession struggle, Khanikov refers to Katta Qūrhān, Panjshanba, Chilak, Yangī Qūrhān and Nūr-i Atā (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 300).

besiegers in. On Ramaẓān 27, 1242/April 24, 1827, the prince ascended the throne as Amīr Muḥammad Naṣrullah Bahādur Khān.¹⁰²

AMĪR NAṢRULLAH KHĀN

The secondary literature gives the impression that Naṣrullah Khān initiated a centralization process. He achieved this end through the elimination of his rivals, the destruction of the Uzbek amirid elite and some administrative reforms, particularly the creation of a standing army, which was separated from the tribal militias. He also maintained contingents equipped with firearms and artillery. His infantrymen came largely from the sedentary population. Naṣrullah Khān appointed provincial governors who were exclusively loyal to him.¹⁰³ According to Bregel, in Naṣrullah's time, Bukhara "became a despotic monarchy, where the *amīr*, enjoying practically unlimited power, ruled through a huge bureaucratic apparatus."¹⁰⁴ Persons lacking an Uzbek tribal background, such as Turkmens or Persian slaves, also occupied key positions in the bureaucracy.¹⁰⁵

The reign of Amīr Naṣrullah was crucial because he ditched all his opponents and especially the supporters of his brother 'Umar Khān.¹⁰⁶ Ya'qūb mentions that fifty former opponents of the new ruler were killed

¹⁰² *Zafarnāma*, 74–79; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 23b–30a; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 419–23, 426; Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 89–93; Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 128–30; Ṣadr-i Žiyā, *Tārīkh*, 74b. While according to the author of the *Zafarnāma*, the siege of Bukhara was a relatively smooth enterprise, others report about growing problems as the siege lingered on. The Samarqandīs, the Yetī Ūrūgh and the Naymān, for instance, deserted Naṣrullah Khān and plundered the surroundings of his camp. Some of them departed for their home regions. A little later, the population of Samarqand rebelled and some leaders of the Khiṭā'ī and the Yūz took the opportunity to raid Ūrgūt (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 29a–b; Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 92; Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 129).

¹⁰³ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 4; Bregel, "Central Asia vii.," 196; Bregel, "Mangits," 419; Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 25, 28; Khalid, "Society and politics," 369.

¹⁰⁴ Bregel, "Mangits," 419; see also Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 4.

¹⁰⁵ Bregel, "Mangits," 419; Bregel, "Central Asia vii.," 196.

¹⁰⁶ The sources refer here to Iṣmatullah Bī Qalmāq and Tūghān Khān Qazāq (*Zafarnāma*, 79–80; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 30a; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 426; Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 131).

after his accession.¹⁰⁷ Mīrzā Shams, an alleged eyewitness to these events, alludes to a large-scale carnage with about eight thousand people slaughtered.¹⁰⁸ Besides these measures, the new ruler also exiled his three surviving brothers to the region of Narazm.¹⁰⁹ The primary sources dating from Naṣrullah Khān's time, however, suggest that this ruler was far from annihilating the entire Uzbek aristocracy. In fact, a number of capable Uzbek *amīrs* rose to prominence under Naṣrullah Khān despite his alleged attempts to keep their influence in check. Of particular importance were Ibrāhīm Bī Manghit, 'Ādil Bī Ming and Birdī Yār Yūz.¹¹⁰ In spite of his image as a ruthless tyrant, the ruler also turned a blind eye to the shortcomings of his commanders. When Ibrāhīm Bī Manghit, for example, failed to defend the fort of Khoqand against the enemy, he escaped together with his supporters and left the town to the enemy.¹¹¹ Later on this person appears again as one of the king's favorite commanders in the context of a further campaign to Khoqand.¹¹²

Naṣrullah Khān's military activities dominate the narrative of the primary sources. From the late 1830s onward, this ruler pursued an expansionist policy at the expense of Khoqand, which was temporarily occupied and

¹⁰⁷ Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 30a.

¹⁰⁸ This figure is certainly hyperbolic (see Mīrza Shams Bukhārā'i, *Tārīkh*, 93).

¹⁰⁹ *Zafarnāma*, 80; Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 31a–b. Ḥakīm Khān and Mīrzā Shams accuse Naṣrullah Khān of having ordered the murder of his three brothers. They were allegedly killed while on the way to Narazm (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 427; Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā'i, *Tārīkh*, 97).

¹¹⁰ Ibrāhīm Bī Dādkhwāh Manghit served as governor of Samarqand and participated in a number of campaigns. On these occasions he commanded contingents from Samarqand, Ūrgūt, Khuzār, Shīrābād, Nasaf and Shahr-i Sabz. After the conquest of Khoqand, he was promoted to the post of *parwānachī* and also gained the post of governor of Khoqand. With this, he was the second most powerful man in Transoxania (*Zafarnāma*, 120, 122–23, 125, 140, 153, 189 passim). 'Ādil Dādkhwāh commanded contingents from Ūrgūt, Gshut and Kūhistān and assisted Ibrāhīm Bī on a number of occasions (ibid., 122, 145, 153, 163, 180 passim). Another important figure who sometimes appears in this source is 'Abd al-Karīm Tūqsāba Afghān from Khuzār (ibid., 109, 145, 153).

¹¹¹ *Zafarnāma*, 191–92; 'Abbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma-yi Bukhārā* ('*aṣr-i Muḥammad Shāh Qājār*), 1259–1260 h. q., ed. Ḥusain Zamānī (Tehran: Pazūhishgāh-i 'ulūm-i insānī wa muṭāla'āt-i farhangī, 1373/1994), 42. According to the *Muntakhab*, Ibrāhīm Bī also left his family, the treasury and buried treasures (*dafīna*) behind (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 573–74).

¹¹² 'Abbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma*, 44.

annexed in 1843.¹¹³ In 1856 he also managed to conquer Shahr-i Sabz after years of campaigning in this region.¹¹⁴ As ever in the past, the Kīnakās under the leadership of the Qaira Saldī noble Dānyāl Bī, a son of Niyāz ‘Alī Bī, had been able to resist the Manghit *amīr* for a long time.¹¹⁵ According to the *Ẓafarnāma*, Naṣrullah Khān and the Kīnakās struggled for more than twelve years before Shahr-i Sabz fell to the Bukharan army.¹¹⁶

THE LAST THREE MANGHIT AMĪRS

With Russia’s expansion in Central Asia, the last three Manghit *amīrs* and their neighbors came into the focus of the Russian colonial eye. For Transoxania, the most decisive year in this sequence was certainly 1868, the year of the loss of Samarqand to the Russian army.¹¹⁷ In the years before, Amīr Muṣaffar al-Dīn, the son and successor of Naṣrullah Khān, was challenged by rebellions in Shahr-i Sabz and Ḥiṣār, where the leaders of the

¹¹³ The secondary literature gives the year 1842 as the date of Naṣrullah Khān’s conquest of Khoqand (Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 141; Hambly, “Verfall,” 194; Bregel, “Central Asia,” 197; Bregel, “Mangits,” 419; Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 398; Paul, *Zentralasien*, 379, 381).

¹¹⁴ Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 397–98.

¹¹⁵ From their residences in Shahr and Kitāb, the two sons of Niyāz ‘Alī Bī, Muḥammad Ṣādiq Bī and Dānyāl Bī, quarreled for several years over control of the principality. When Amīr Ḥaidar invaded their domains, they united and pushed the Bukharan troops back. After Muḥammad Ṣādiq Bī’s death, Dānyāl Bī (d. 1256/1840) deposed his nephews, Dūst Muḥammad Bī and Jahāngīr Bī, and established himself as sole ruler in Shahr-i Sabz (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 402–05). Naṣrullah Khān’s first, but unsuccessful campaign was aimed at suppressing the resistance of Dānyāl Bī, who had occupied the town of Chirāghchī. Dānyāl Bī was promoted to the position of *atālīq* sometime in the early years of Naṣrullah Khān’s rule. But later the ruler mounted annual expeditions against Shahr-i Sabz. Whereas the *Muntakhab* mentions several expeditions against Dānyāl Bī during the Naṣrullah Khān first ten years and even a marriage alliance between the Manghit king and Dānyāl Bī, the *Ẓafarnāma* refers to one campaign in the first year (*Ẓafarnāma*, 83–88; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 428–29, 452–61, 464–65, 472–77, 481–82). After Dānyāl Bī’s death, authority over Shahr and Kitāb passed on to Khwāja Qulī Bī Parwānachī (d. 1850) (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 533–35).

¹¹⁶ According to the *Ẓafarnāma*, Khwāja Qulī Bī Parwānachī Kīnakās resisted the *amīr*’s troops for more than six years (1844–50) until his death in 1850. Afterward, his brother Iskandar Dādkhwāh continued fighting for a further six years before he surrendered to Naṣrullah Khān (*Ẓafarnāma*, 213–19, 227–32).

¹¹⁷ See below, section on Russia’s Protectorate Reconsidered.

Kīnakās and Yūz tribes asserted their independence and expelled the Bukharan governors.¹¹⁸ In Ferghana, things looked more promising for Amīr Muẓaffar. He continued the policy of his father and interfered in the affairs of Khoqand by supporting the unfortunate pretender Khudāyār Khān (r. 1845–58, 1862–63, 1865–75).¹¹⁹ In 1862–63, his protégé became ruler of Khoqand for a brief interlude, only to lose his kingdom to the Qirghiz commander ‘Ālim Qul. In 1865, Khudāyār Khān was again installed as Khoqandian ruler with the support of his Bukharan protector.¹²⁰

From 1866 onward, the Russian generals turned their attention to Bukhara and inflicted a series of defeats on Amīr Muẓaffar’s troops. Urged by the conservative Bukharan ‘*ulamā*’, Amīr Muẓaffar proclaimed a *jihād* against the invaders in April 1868,¹²¹ but he suffered a severe blow and his army deserted the battlefield on the Chūpān Atā Heights.¹²² On May 2, 1868, von Kaufmann took Samarqand and later advanced as far as Katta Qūrghān. Although the treaty of 1868 did not refer to Russian protection at all—it was merely a commercial convention opening Bukhara for Russian merchants and imposing a war indemnity on the *amīr*—in practice Bukhara had lost much of its former independence.¹²³

On the one hand, the Russian intervention resulted in a further reduction of the influence yielded by the old Uzbek tribal leadership. On the other hand, it boosted the influence of the conservative ‘*ulamā*’, who dominated much of the political discourse under the last *amīrs*, ‘Abd al-Aḥad Khān and

¹¹⁸ Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 158–59, 161–62.

¹¹⁹ Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 25; Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 7; Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 402. For details see Bakhtiyor M. Babadzhonov, *Kokandskoe Khanstvo: Vlast’, Politika, Religija* (Tokyo/Tashkent: Yangi Nashr, 2010), 252–53.

¹²⁰ Bregel, “The three Uzbek states,” 402, 408; for further details on Russian and Bukharan designs in Khoqand, see Babadzhonov, *Kokandskoe Khanstvo*, 257–81.

¹²¹ Bregel, “The three Uzbek states,” 409; Jo-Ann Gross, “Historical Memory, Cultural Identity and Change: Mirza ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Sami’s Representation of the Russian Conquest of Bukhara,” in *Russia’s Orient, Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917*, ed. Daniel R. Brower (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 210–11; Khalid, “Society and politics,” 369.

¹²² See Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 201–02.

¹²³ Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 42; Pierce, “Die russische Eroberung,” 221–22; Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 38–39; Fagner, “Die ‘Khanate,’” 72; Bregel, “The three Uzbek states,” 409; Paul, *Zentralasien*, 385; Khalid, “Society and politics,” 370.

‘Ālim Khān.¹²⁴ Both these rulers were more or less go-betweens bridging cultural and social gaps between the Russian authorities and their own societies.¹²⁵ The last years of Bukharan independence were marked by a discourse between the proponents of societal and political reforms, the Jadids, and the advocates of tradition, the so-called Qadims. Represented by the ‘*ulamā*’, the latter were to be backed by the future Bolsheviks. Men like Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish (1827–97), ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf Fitrat (1886–1937), and Ṣadr al-Dīn ‘Ainī (1878–1954) figured among the Jadids who ran reform-oriented schools in the major towns of Transoxania for a while.¹²⁶ In spite of some setbacks in the early 1910s, the Jadids benefitted from repeated interventions by the Russian political agent in New Bukhara. The most radical elements of the Jadids, the Young Bukharans, were the first who benefitted from the Bolshevik victory in Bukhara in 1920.¹²⁷ Two years before, General Kolesov had launched an unsuccessful campaign against the Transoxanian capital from Russian settlements and enclaves on Bukharan soil.¹²⁸ The last Manghit ruler, Amīr ‘Ālim Khān, escaped to Afghanistan via Eastern Bukhara in the course of the conquest of Bukhara by Bolshevik troops. After his flight, the Protectorate of Bukhara ceased to exist and was turned into a people’s republic.¹²⁹

SOCIAL ORDER AT THE BUKHARAN COURT

In this section, I will highlight various aspects of social order and power at the royal court of Bukhara and the level of the rulers such as can be gleaned from late eighteenth and nineteenth-century narrative sources. It was the

¹²⁴ See Khalid, “Society and politics,” 371–74.

¹²⁵ “Amir ‘Abd al-Aḥad (1302–28/1885–1910) even played a visible role in Russian society, visiting Russia annually and being received at court in St. Petersburg” (Bregel, “Central Asia,” 202).

¹²⁶ For further details on Jadidism see Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). See also Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 78–116; Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 199–209; Ingeborg Baldauf, “Jadidism in Central Asia within Reformism and Modernism in the Muslim World,” *Die Welt des Islams* 41, no. 1 (2000): 72–88.

¹²⁷ One of the leaders of the Young Bukharans, Faizullah Khojaev, became the chairman of the Bukharan Soviet (Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 294–95).

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 265–69; Khalid, “Society and politics,” 389–90.

¹²⁹ Khalid, “Society and politics,” 391; Fragner, “Die ‘Khanate’,” 73; Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 164–65, 167–80.

time of rulers like Shāh Murād, Amīr Ḥaidar and Amīr Naṣrullah, who largely acted within the framework of customs, norms and institutions that they had inherited from their predecessors. The materials I will present in the following focus on different aspects of the respective reigns; each ruler is associated with certain deeds and accomplishments. Instead of giving a complete picture, I opt for a rather selective approach and provide a fractured, at times even contradictory picture of the individual rulers. This way of processing the material is dictated by the sources and the fact that—depending on the time, the author and the ruler—the amount of information greatly varies. Adopting more of a bird’s-eye view, I will follow the chronological order and start with Shāh Murād.

SHĀH MURĀD’S IMAGE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY HISTORIOGRAPHY

Looking at the reign of this ruler, the historian is first confronted with the fact that he had no court chronicler of his own.¹³⁰ In lieu of a chronicle solely devoted to Shāh Murād, a variety of sources is available to us presenting very positive portrayals of him. Most of the contemporary historiographical works such as Mullā Sharīf’s *Tāj al-tawārīkh*, Ya‘qūb’s and Mū‘īn’s histories, or the *Tārīkh-i pādishāhān* by Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm refer to Shāh Murād’s glorious deeds, depicting his era as an age of renewal. Further references perpetuating Shāh Murād’s image can be found in the *Risāla* by Dānish, the *Tārīkh-i Bukhārā*, *Khoqand wa Kāshgar* by Mīrzā Shams Bukhārī or Sāmī’s *Tuḥfa-yi shāhī*.

The Innovator and Patron of Islamic Institutions

One of those alluding first to Shāh Murād as a pious and just ruler who was held in great affection by his subjects, is Ya‘qūb.¹³¹ According to him, the old *auqāf* attached to mosques and *madrasas* began to flourish already in the

¹³⁰ According to von Kügelgen, Shāh Murād, who rejected every kind of worldly pomp, showed little interest in the compilation of a court chronicle under his patronage. He deliberately went without taking a chronicler into his service (von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 100).

¹³¹ Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 9a.

time when Shāh Murād was the heir to the throne.¹³² In a similar way, Mu‘īn remarks that

“[i]n the time of Dānyāl Atālīq, Islam gained strength due to the efforts of his son *amīr-i ma‘šūm* Shāh Murād Bī. The old charitable endowments (*auqāf*) attached to the *madrasas* and the mosques of the kingdom flourished [again]. Doing away with tyrannical traitors and thoughtless marauders, he tore them up by the roots. While the ‘*ulamā*’, *sayyids* and notables became well-to-do, the nobles, *amīrs* and the soldiery were grateful. He bestowed grants upon every one of them in greater quantity than actually required and the subjects were comfortable in the cradle [of tranquility]. [Furthermore], he did away with oppression and novelties in matters of religion which had been left over from the past.”¹³³

The portrayal presented here underlines Shāh Murād’s role as a generous ruler taking care of his subjects and their conditions. It is remarkable that in spite of a comparatively simple style, the author follows established patterns of chronicle writing by invoking the picture of the inhabitants slumbering in a cradle. Another aspect the reader repeatedly comes across in connection with his life and rule are the charitable endowments and the fostering of Islamic institutions.¹³⁴ A similar portrayal is given by Mullā Sharīf:

“All the ruined *madrasas*, *khānaqāhs* and mosques flourished due to the grace characteristic of his great avidity and all the markets, baths, caravanserais, the *chahār-sūs* of the money-changers and goldsmiths as well as the Rīgīstān square became prosperous and were rebuilt once again through the activities instigated by his just and welfare maintaining orders. In the time of this reviver of the Sunna and obliterator of tyranny and novelties in religious matters, all the widespread and unlawful customs as well as the forbidden taxes were banned from the guarded domains. When the phoenix turned toward the valley of non-existence and corner of nothingness, the inhabitants of the places subject to the orders of the paradise-like *sharī‘a* were adorned with the robe of integrity and prosperity [...]. The rule of oppression and tyranny was annihilated due to the fear of punishment and the questions of the vice-regent of God. During his time, calm and tranquility prevailed, so the soldiery was not distinguished from the subjects and the strong were not separated from the weak because of the predominance of submission and humility. [It was] as if it had been a kingdom where the calm of the nobles and the commoners but also the flourishing of Muḥammad’s religion, peace be upon him, as well as the absence of crime and sins committed by the contemporaries were inscribed in the verses of divine mercy on behalf of mankind.”¹³⁵

¹³² Ibid., fol. 8a.

¹³³ Mu‘īn, *Tārīkh*, fol. 29b.

¹³⁴ Chekhovich, “K istorii,” 62.

¹³⁵ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 439a–b.

This depiction of Shāh Murād as a patron of Islamic institutions of learning and charitable endowments is somewhat reminiscent of Mu‘īn’s account and perfectly fits the ideal picture of a ruler. Besides, we gain detailed information about the king acting as a revivalist who strengthened the *sharī‘a* by doing away with unlawful customs. Here the author clearly refers to Mongol taxes. In the second part of this passage, Shah Murād is also portrayed as a caretaker and protector guaranteeing the safety of his subjects. Much of his fame goes back to the king’s attempts to repopulate Samarqand, which had been deserted during the wars and unrest of the previous decades and now began to prosper again. As Mir Izzetullah reports, “[b]efore the reign of Shah Murad Be, Samarkand was in an entirely dilapidated condition, and the colleges were haunted by lions and wolves. Shah Murad by great exertion re-peopled the city, and it increases daily in population.”¹³⁶

The many public buildings and the generous donations to Islamic institutions earned Shāh Murād the title *walī-ni‘mī* (benefactor).¹³⁷ Besides the emphasis on cultural patronage, many chroniclers follow the model of Mullā Sharīf and point to the abolition of un-Islamic rules and taxes, but also the removal of tyrannical officials.¹³⁸ This is best reflected by the actions he took against Daulat Bī Qūshbēgī and Mīr Nizām al-Dīn Ḥusainī, the chief judge (*qāzī-kalān*) and intimate of the first Manghit ruler. The *qūshbēgī* had allegedly managed to establish himself as the possessor of the kingdom (*ṣāhib-i mulk*), while his colleague the chief judge had committed un-Islamic sins. Both were finally put to death and Bukhara turned into the highest paradise.¹³⁹ Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm concludes that during Shāh Murād’s reign the *sharī‘a* prospered and Bukhara became a center of the ‘*ulamā*’ and Islamic learning. He also links the establishment of security on the roads of the kingdom and the abolishment of certain levies to the state of peace and tranquility.¹⁴⁰

His ascetic lifestyle—Shāh Murād was a disciple of the Naqshbandī dignitary Sheikh Şafar—and his initiative to revive charitable endowments

¹³⁶ Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 329.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 340; Mu‘īn, *Tārīkh*, fol. 30a; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, II, 367, 369, 370, 374.

¹³⁸ According to von Kügelgen, Shāh Murād has to be seen as the only Manghit ruler who distinguished himself as a fierce enemy of Mongol norms and customs (von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 347).

¹³⁹ Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 54–55, 66 (French text, 122–24, 151).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 63 (French text, 144–45).

and to reconstruct *madrasas* and mosques earned him a great reputation as a Sufi on the throne and a *mujaddid*, a religious revivalist.¹⁴¹ Ya‘qūb further reports that the ruler spent his life in the “garment of poverty,” in contemplation and asceticism. He used to wear a robe of coarse linen and a turban of six layers of white linen. His old and worn-out clothes were only worth seven *tanga*. His food was very simple and consisted merely of pea soup and a kind of porridge. He ate meat just every fifteen days, and a large part of it was given to his relatives.¹⁴² According to Bukhārī, the ruler was permanently occupied with religious exercises and worship. He never used gold or silver for the enjoyment of worldly pleasures and covered his living costs through the *jizya* collected from Jews and unbelievers.¹⁴³ According to Ya‘qūb, Shāh Murād did not accept gifts and did not attend festivities arranged by his commanders and nobles.¹⁴⁴ Malcolm also alludes to the king’s frugality even with regard to close family members. His wife was granted a daily allowance of only three *tanga*, a sum that increased to five *tanga* after the birth of a son. Although he permitted his family to live in a palace, he contented himself with an unfurnished cell and abandoned all worldly luxuries. Having adopted the aura of a poor Sufi sheikh, the king had the appearance of a common mendicant. When he visited his family, a deerskin was thrown over his shoulders.¹⁴⁵

The glowing portrayal of Shāh Murād was perpetuated by later generations of Bukharan writers, who usually placed emphasis on his religiosity and the material support of institutions of learning. In this, they followed the precedents of earlier authors and contemporaries of this ruler. Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Sāmī, for instance, describes his reign as follows:

“This king was a warrior in the cause of religion, a champion of the faith who, casting the shade of fortune on the heads of all people, fostered the *sharī‘at* and revived the Sunna that had fallen into disuse before, while eradicating religious novelties and their adherents. He cleared the kingdom of the disturbances brought about by rebellion and sedition. Demolishing the wine houses of the *amīrs* and other individuals, he issued the order to throw jars full of wine and beer into the alleys. The lanes of Bukhara became like those of Medina [...]. While forbidding all kinds of tobacco and intoxicating drinks, he rebuilt

¹⁴¹ On his role as a *mujaddid* and his qualities as a king, see von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 312–17.

¹⁴² Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 11b. See also Mu‘īn, *Tārīkh*, fol. 32a.

¹⁴³ Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 66 (French text, 151).

¹⁴⁴ Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 11b; Mu‘īn, *Tārīkh*, fol. 32b.

¹⁴⁵ Malcolm, *The History of Persia*, II, 166.

mosques and *khānaqāhs* and made the *maktabs* prosper. [...] [In former times] most of the *madrasas* and mosques had suffered destruction in the course of rebellions and foreign invasions and thus turned into a state of ruin. [But now] the empty schools were revived [since] he assigned *waqfs* to the *madrasas*, the *khānaqāhs* and Sufi convents and appointed teachers and students to them in order to foster the sciences. Amongst those enjoying his promotion were thirty thousand students enrolled during his reign. [In addition], he forbade the extraction of the *zakāt* from the property of traders and the customs duties and tolls levied by road patrols. The royal revenues were only collected from *amlāk*-land, and [the officials] took nothing but the *kharāj* and the *'ushr*. They took the *jizya* from unbelievers and people of the book and spent it on the expenditures of the king. The expenditures of Abū'l-Ghāzī Khān and the other members of the royal family were entirely covered by the crown lands, and the land grants (*soyūrghāl*) assigned to the *amīrs* and the government officials were firmly established in accordance with known customs. You [Shāh Murād] made everyone successful who showed fidelity and devotion. You did not spend prodigally in bestowing pensions and *tankhwāhs** upon the soldiery and took only four dirhams per day: you gave one dirham for your harem, one dirham for the cooks and spent two dirhams for your own meal. The royal court that had been maintained since the times of Chingīz Khān was dissolved; in lieu thereof, he established the tribunal of justice. Forming an assembly together with forty *'ulamā'*, he asked about the petitions of the people and in the presence of the scholars made decisions according to the religious law. Mostly holding this assembly on Friday and Monday, he did not give credence to the prosecutor in the absence of the accused. There was no help for anyone to escape the justice of his tribunal: the mean and the noble, the chiefs and the poor people, all were equal in this regard. Even the slave could cite his master before that tribunal."¹⁴⁶

Focusing on the charitable endowments, the writer embellishes and enlarges upon the picture drawn by earlier authors by pointing to the justness of Shāh Murād. Although the pattern that shows between the lines of the first half of this passage reminds us of the conventional understanding of justice, Sāmī goes on in the second part to present the picture of a society characterized by

* Granted in exchange for the fulfillment of duties, the *tankhwāh* was always attached to an office or rank. The recipient of such a grant (*tankhwāhdār*) was entitled to the income generated in the form of rent, but he was not the owner of the land as such and, as a consequence, was not responsible for the administration of the land and the inhabitants. Abduraimov identifies the *tankhwāh* in the Uzbek politics of the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries as a land grant similar to the *iqṭā'*. The latter initially meant the allocation of rents to government officials, but not a kind of ownership right (Abduraimov, *Voprosy*, 16, 18; A. A. Semenov, "Ocherk pozemel'no-podatnogo i nalogogo ustrojstva Bukharskogo khanstva," in *Trudy sredne-aziatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, Serija II. Orientalia, vy. 1 (Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo Sredne-aziatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1929), 30–33).

¹⁴⁶ Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuhfa*, 52–53. See also Malcolm, *The History of Persia*, II, 163–64.

religiosity and a strong position of the Islamic law. He even goes so far as to postulate equity and implicit egalitarianism as principles governing the dispensation of justice. This interpretation of the political situation in Bukhara under Shāh Murād may have been inspired by Sāmī's ideas or by his journeys to Russia. It is however remarkable that the chronicler is much more precise in outlining his understanding of justice than authors like Wafā, Amīn Bukhārī or Mullā Sharīf.¹⁴⁷

In contrast to Mīrẓā 'Abd al-'Azīm, Mīrẓā Shams Bukhārī concentrates on Shāh Murād's first refusal of royal authority and the throne offered by the notables and the *'ulamā'*. In addition, he alludes to the first actions taken by the king in order to put an end to the activities of robbers and rebels. This author, however, also mentions Shāh Murād's first military campaign against the Kīnakās chief Niyāz 'Alī Bī Dīwānbēgī.¹⁴⁸ Malcolm reports that the rebellion of Niyāz 'Alī Bī was the reason for Shāh Murād's decision to accept the position of regent and to interfere in politics.¹⁴⁹ Paying a bit more attention to the king's mercilessness with respect to highwaymen and robbers, Mīrẓā Shams reports that thieves were punished by cutting their right hand off. But he also mentions the advisory council of religious scholars established by the ruler, his severe measures against alcohol consumption and all kinds of vices.¹⁵⁰ Yet these descriptions also refer to the dervish-like character of the king, saying that "he behaved like the dervishes and the base subjects," which earned him a great reputation and the loyalty of his men.¹⁵¹

Similar to Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm and Mīrẓā 'Abd al-'Azīm Sāmī, the late nineteenth-century author Aḥmad Makhdūm-i Dānish devotes an entire

¹⁴⁷ Mīrẓā 'Abd al-'Azīm Sāmī was born in Būstān, a village forty kilometers south of Bukhara, and received a classical *madrasa* education in the capital. Afterward he worked as *munshī* under several governors and was later employed at the court of Muẓaffar al-Dīn Khān. At the time of the Russian campaigns he worked as a *waqā'i-nigār* (observer of events) in the royal army. In 1881 he accompanied the heir apparent 'Abd al-Aḥad to St. Petersburg for the inauguration of Tsar Alexander III. Around 1898–99, he was dismissed for his strong criticism and oppositional attitudes. He wrote three historical works on the Manghit dynasty: the *Tuḥfa-yi shāhī*, the *Dakhma-yi Shāhān* and the *Ta'rīkh-i salāṭīn-i manghitīya*. In his later years he worked as a copyist and suffered great poverty (Gross, "Historical Memory," 206–07).

¹⁴⁸ Mīrẓā Shams, *Tārīkh*, 112, 114.

¹⁴⁹ Malcolm, *The History of Persia*, II, 162.

¹⁵⁰ Mīrẓā Shams, *Tārīkh*, 113. See also Malcolm, *History*, II, 163.

¹⁵¹ Mīrẓā Shams, *Tārīkh*, 113.

chapter to Shāh Murād. In order to underline the good governance and the achievements of this king, he contrasts his rule with that of his father Dānyāl Bī:

“There were many shameful differences in the affairs of the [Muslim] community in Bukhara during the days of Amīr Dānyāl Bī’s government. Having been neglected and void of religious lessons and the prayer, the *madrasas* and mosques had turned into hay lofts for water-carrying asses and corn stores for grain merchants. This [was caused by] the Uzbeks, who, having interfered with governmental affairs in order to bring about a state of disorder, captured everything they could find and stole the flame from the candle of the widows and the bread from the *waqf* stores to make use of it for their own expenditures. No one had the opportunity to ask questions, while the bazaar of wine and hazardous games prospered and immoral conduct (*fisq wa fasād*) was very common among the *amīrs* and governors.”¹⁵²

These normative descriptions reflect not only the author’s critical attitude toward Dānyāl Bī and his predecessors, but also his individual worldview that was influenced by his many journeys and visits to the Russian capital St. Petersburg.¹⁵³ His experiences led him to take a critical view of the political circumstances in Bukhara and to depict them in black-and-white terms. Notwithstanding all the critiques of later rulers like Amīr Muẓaffar and his administration, Dānish’s portrayal suggesting his “progressiveness” sometimes shows the contradictions of his worldview.¹⁵⁴

Aḥmad Dānish also refers to the collection of un-Islamic taxes (here described as *ālūq wa sālūq*) like the *amīnāna* or *wakīlāna*,¹⁵⁵ and devotes some pages of his work to the prince’s youth, his contacts with his Sufi

¹⁵² Aḥmad Makhdūm-i Dānish, *Risāla yā mukhtaṣari az ta’riḫ-i salṭanat-i khānadān-i manghitīya*, ed. Abd al-Ghani Mirzaev (Stalinabad: Nashriyāt-i daulatī-yi Tājikistān, 1960), 12–13.

¹⁵³ Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish b. Mīr b. Yūsuf Ḥanafī Ṣaddīqī Bukhārī (1242–1314/1827–97) was also known as Aḥmad Kalla or *muhandīs* (lit. “engineer”). He was a famous historian and progressive writer who received his education in a traditional *madrasa* in Bukhara. Around 1850 he entered the service of Amīr Naṣrullah Khān and worked as a painter and calligrapher, later he became a court astrologer. As a freethinker he was not very popular at the court. The *amīrs* Naṣrullah and Muẓaffar al-Dīn wanted to make use of his talents, while at the same time trying to keep him at a distance. Therefore he was sent to Moscow several times, where he became convinced of the backwardness of his country. After his dismissal from the court, he devoted himself to writing (Vincent Fourniau, “Dāneš (Doniš), Aḥmad,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, VI, 647–49).

¹⁵⁴ See von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 428, 430–31.

¹⁵⁵ Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish, *Risāla*, 13.

sheikh and the subjects, but also his first steps as heir to the throne and his actions against the chief judge Mīr Nizām al-Dīn and Daulat Bī Qūshbēgī.¹⁵⁶ In his opinion, there was no one rising as a *mujaddid* like Shāh Murād, and “if he should be titled a second ‘Umar it would be correct and appropriate.”¹⁵⁷

Another author paying attention to Shāh Murād is Ṣadr al-Dīn ‘Ainī, who largely follows the interpretation of other writers. He likewise mentions the low expenditures of the ruler, the punishment of the *qāzī-kalān* Mīr Nizām al-Dīn, the support of *madrasas* and charitable foundations as well as his measures against the spongers who had occupied the *auqāf* for their own purposes. ‘Ainī additionally describes the removal of the heavy tax burden from the shoulders of the peasants and the fostering of agriculture.¹⁵⁸ Similar to other authors, he too places emphasis on further acts of cultural patronage, especially the reconstruction of many buildings in Samarqand that had lain in ruins due to neglect and abuse in the time before.

“That year [1215/1800] he initiated the construction of twenty-four urban quarters (*gudhars*) and mosques in Samarqand and accommodated the aforementioned settlers there [...]. He ordered the reconstruction of the cupola of Chār Sū, the Pāyqapāq Gate, the tombs of Shāh-i zinda and also renewed the Sūzangarān Gate and Qalandar-khāna, which had fallen into disrepair.”¹⁵⁹

‘Ainī also mentions the resettlement campaigns and Shāh Murād’s attempts at repopulating Samarqand.¹⁶⁰ A similar revival of commerce and urban life is also reported from Bukhara.¹⁶¹ In spite of some criticism regarding Shāh Murād’s reign, ‘Ainī concludes that

“Amīr Shāh Murād was the best and the greatest of the Manghit kings of Bukhara. Having earned credibility for ordering this fractured and unfortunate kingdom (*mamlakat-i parīshān*), he established the just claims to kingship for his line, [an act that was regarded as] unprecedented, so that it is suitable to call him ‘a genius of his age’. The Bukharan kings in the Manghit line were legitimized in the eyes of the people due to the efforts of Shāh Murād. But he was of course not so much different from other Manghit sovereigns.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 14–18.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 12. See also von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 424.

¹⁵⁸ ‘Ainī, *Tārīkh* (1966), 15–16.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 19.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.; Abramov, “Iz istorii Samarkanda,” 98.

¹⁶¹ Nekrasova, *Basare*, 42.

Because of his character he destroyed Marw and dispersed its population, [...] while driving the inhabitants of Zāmin, Khawāṣ, Khojand and Ūrā Tippa into exile.”¹⁶²

Dynamics of Mediation

His ostentatious asceticism notwithstanding, the king allowed his nobles to maintain a magnificent lifestyle.¹⁶³ This is confirmed by the following account by an attendant of Mamish Khān, the chief of Chinārān,¹⁶⁴ who upon surrendering to Shāh Murād was sent to the Uzbek camp for negotiations.¹⁶⁵ For reasons of simplicity, I will quote the passage in full:

“I was introduced to Ishān Nukeeb, who was seated at the further end of a magnificent tent. He was a man of handsome appearance, uncommonly fair, but had a thin beard. He asked after my health, and then after that of Mameish Khan, adding, ‘Why has he not come himself?’ On my making some excuse, he added, ‘I understand the reason: had I been alone, he would have paid me a visit; but he is afraid of Beggee Jān.’ After these observations, he rose and retired to another tent, desiring me to repose myself where I was. A rich sleeping-dress was brought before me, and every person went away; but I had hardly lain down when I was sent for to attend Ishān Nukeeb, who very graciously insisted on my dining with him. The repast was luxurious: an hour after dinner tea was brought, and the favorite drank his in a cup of pure gold, ornamented with jewels: the cup given to me was of silver, inlaid with gold. Three hours after noon, he carried me to a large tent with five poles, where a number of persons were saying their prayers: we did the same; and then returned to his tent, which he had hardly entered, when a servant in waiting announced Utkhoor Soofee. This religious personage, for such he was, from the moment he entered occupied all the attention of Ishān Nukeeb, who appeared to treat him with the profoundest respect. When tea and coffee were served, he held the cup while Utkhoor Soofee drank. We had not sat long, before an officer came into the tent, and told Ishān Nukeeb that Beggee Jān desired he would wait upon him, and bring his guest. We

¹⁶² ‘Ainī, *Tarīkh* (1966), 23.

¹⁶³ Anke von Kügelgen refers here to information given by Mīrī and Ya’qūb (see von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 344). However, the manuscript of Ya’qūb’s *Tārīkh-i amīrān-i manghūlīya* with which I worked does not give any indication of the discrepancy between asceticism and a Sufic lifestyle and ostentatious generosity.

¹⁶⁴ Chinārān (Pers. sycamore trees) is located near Mashhad. It was bounded by Quchān in the north, the Miyān Wilāyat and Darzāb in the south, by Gulmakān and Shandīz in the west and southwest, and by Radkān in the east. Its water supply depended on the Rūd-i Firīzī and the Rūd-i Akhlāmand coming from the Nīshāpūr Hills. The population of the Chinārān consisted of Persian-speakers, Turks and Za’farānlū Kurds (Adamec, *Historical Gazetteer*, II, 125–26).

¹⁶⁵ According to Sāmī, Mamish Khān had sent a certain Mullā Yūsuf as a messenger (*ilchī*) to Shāh Murād’s camp (Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuhfa*, 71).

arose immediately, mounted our horses, and proceeded with him. After riding a short distance we came to a one pole tent, which, I judged from its size and tattered appearance, must belong to some cooks or water-carriers. An old man was seated on the grass, so near it as to be protected from the sun by its shade. All dismounted, and advanced towards the old man, who was clothed in green, but very dirty. When near him, they stood with their hands crossed, in a respectful posture, and made their salutation. He returned that of each person, and desired us to sit down opposite to him. He appeared to shew great kindness to Ishân Nukeeb, but chiefly addressed his conversation to Utkhoor Soofee. [Paragraph] After some time, the subject of my mission was introduced. I gave my letter to Ishân Nukeeb: he presented it to the old man in green, who, I now discovered, was Beggee Jân. That ruler opened it, read it, and put it into his pocket. After a short pause, he said, 'No doubt Mameish Khan has sent me a good horse;' and desired him to be brought. After looking attentively at the animal, he began to whisper and laugh with those near him: then addressing me, said, 'Why has not your master sent the horse Kârrâ-Goz, as I desired?' – 'That horse has defects,' I replied, 'or he would have been sent.' – 'With all its defects,' said Beggee Jân, smiling, 'he is twenty times better than the one you have brought.' [Paragraph] While we were conversing, a great number of nobles came in; and I could not help observing the extraordinary richness and splendour of their arms and dresses. Beggee Jân returned the salute of every one in a kind and affable manner, and bade them be seated; but the shade of his small tent did not protect half of them from the sun. Soon after the chief fell into a deep reverie; and, till evening prayers were announced, appeared wholly absorbed in religious contemplation. At the time of prayer all arose, and retired. I slept that night in the tent of Ishân Nukeeb. At day-light, the army marched, and passed within a few miles of Chinnarân. After Beggee Jân had reached his encampment, he sent for me, and honored me with a private audience, at which he was very affable. 'Your master, Mameish Khan, is, I hear, always drinking wine.' – 'I have not seen him drink,' I replied, 'and cannot speak to that point.' – 'You are right,' said he, 'not to state what you have not seen. Tell Mameish Khan I have a regard for him; but as to Nâdir Meerza, (the ruler of Meshed,) he is a fool. Bid Mameish Khan write to Jaffier Khan, of Nishapore, and advise him to solicit my friendship, if he wishes to save his country from destruction.' A handsome dress was now brought for me, with a present in money. Every article of the dress was good, except the turban, which was of little or no value. This, however, Beggee Jân took himself, giving me his own in exchange, which was a great deal worse. I took my leave, and returned to the tent of Ishân Nukeeb, to whom I repeated all that had passed. He laughed very heartily, made me a handsome present; and I was on the point of retiring, when two men came at full gallop with a letter from Mameish Khan, stating that, notwithstanding the protection he had received, some of his followers had been taken by the Oosbegs. Ishân Nukeeb took me again to Beggee Jân, whom we found seated in his small tent on a goat's skin. He directed the captives to be brought, and made them over to me. He had before written a letter to Mameish Khan, which he re-opened, wrote what he had done, and again committed it to my charge. As this affair was settling, his cook, a diminutive person with weak eyes, came into the tent. 'Why do you not think of dinner?' said Beggee Jân: 'it will soon be time for prayer.' The little cook immediately brought a large black pot, and making a fire-place with stones, put four or five kinds of grain and a little dried meat into it. He then nearly filled it with water, and having kindled a fire, left it to boil, while he prepared the dishes, which were wooden platters, of the kind used by the

lowest orders. He put down three, and poured out the mess. Beggee Jân watched him, and the cook evidently understood from his looks when more or less was to be put into a dish. After all was ready, he spread a dirty cloth, and laid down a piece of stale barley-bread, which Beggee Jân put into a cup of water to moisten. The first dish was given to the ruler of the Oosbegs, the second was placed between Ishân Nukeeb and me, and the cook took the third for himself, sitting down to eat it opposite to his master. As I had dined, I merely tasted what was put before me. It was very nauseous, the meat being almost putrid; yet several nobles who came in ate the whole of our unfinished share, and with apparent relish, that could only be derived from the pleasure of partaking in the same fare with their holy leader."¹⁶⁶

This account gives a unique insight into the patterns of mediation and exchange from the individual perspective of a Persian envoy. Looking at this sequence, we are struck by the brevity of the actual negotiations, which are drowned in the noise of other events and a range of social activities not directly related to the issues of concern. The Persian mediator talked less than the ruler, probably out of fear or because it was regarded as improper. Both were obviously familiar with the procedure so there was little to add. More than two-thirds of the time the Persian envoy spent in the Uzbek camp was taken up with other activities. In the course of the negotiations, he was presented with gifts three times, especially clothes. Surrounded by food sharing, the proverbial tea drinking, invitations to other tents, gift giving, prayers and private talks, the negotiations appear as a social event par excellence. Most interestingly, on the two occasions when the security of Chinārān was negotiated, the ruler and his officials did not come straight to the point. The envoy himself was introduced to the Uzbek ruler just incidentally. In addition, we see two attempts to conceal information from Shāh Murād.

The most interesting part, however, describes the talk about the gifts between the envoy and Shāh Murād. Here we see that gifts were intensely examined by the two sides. The Bukharan king even announced which kind of horse he really wanted instead of the one he had been given. In his eyes, the gift horse was not of great value and he did not shrink from expressing his displeasure. Mamiish Khān's messenger also evaluated the presents he received from his interlocutor and found the turban improper.

Another tendency to be observed are several interconnected levels of mediation and exchange. The Persian envoy first talked with the Īshān Naqīb, who presented himself as the first-hand middleman. It was also the

¹⁶⁶ Malcolm, *History*, II, 169–73.

īshān who led the envoy to the ruler's tent and later intervened when the emissary complained about the abduction of Persian captives in spite of the guarantees of protection and security.

Shāh Murād the Frugal Patron: Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm's Account

Besides the positive picture drawn of Shāh Murād and his reign, there are also critical voices in the sources. Von Kügelgen provides an excellent analysis of critiques with regard to this ruler, and there is very little to be added.¹⁶⁷ Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī in particular gives some interesting insights into questions of exchange, morality and right behavior from an individual point of view. The protagonist in question is Maḥmūd Sadūzai, one of the contenders for authority in Kabul after the death of Tīmūr Shāh in 1793. According to Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm, Maḥmūd Mīrzā b. Tīmūr Shāh b. Aḥmad Shāh Sadūzai was installed as governor of Herat shortly after the enthronization of his father as king of Hindūstān, Iran and Turkistān in 1772. After his father's death in 1793, he became the most determined antagonist of his brother Shāh Zamān (r. 1793–1800). Despite his defeat in 1795, he was soon reinstated as governor of Herat and Farah. In early 1797 he rebelled again but, being less fortunate this time, was soon defeated and forced to take refuge at the Qājār court in Iran. A little while later, Maḥmūd Mīrzā urged Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh (r. 1797–1834) to lead a campaign against Herat. Upon learning about the Iranian expedition, Shāh Zamān allegedly called on Shāh Murād for help. The latter took this plea as a pretext to resume the old pattern of Uzbek policy by invading Khurāsān. Subsequently, Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh gave up his plans concerning Herat and promised to grant Maḥmūd Mīrzā an annual pension of thirty thousand *tūmān* if he would abandon his claims to Herat. Although he took up residence in the town of Kāshān in central Iran, the Sadūzai prince shortly thereafter undertook a second unsuccessful attempt at regaining his former seat of authority. Afterward, he first took refuge in Marw. From there, the Bukharan governor sent a message to Shāh Murād, who for his part summoned the Afghan prince to his court. For the next five years after Shāh Zamān's enthronization, Maḥmūd several times rebelled against his brother and around 1798 sought asylum first in Bukhara.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 359–64.

¹⁶⁸ Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 11, 14–16, 18, 23–24 (French text, 22, 29–36, 39, 49–50).

‘Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī further reports that he himself had met Maḥmūd Mīrzā in Bukhara, where he took up residence in the quarter Āq Masjid near the Khiyābān. During his stay in the Transoxanian capital, the prince initially had a good relationship with Shāh Murād, who granted him four *ṭilā* per day. According to our author, Maḥmūd obviously cherished the hope that the Bukharan king would actively support him in retaking Herat. But after eight months in exile, he understood that he could not count on the military aid and other favors of his host. Expressing his wish to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca, he demanded one thousand *ṭilā* to cover his travelling expenses. Shāh Murād, however, responded in a tight-fisted way by only giving him one hundred *ṭilā* and a few nags. Maḥmūd Mīrzā made it clear that upon Shāh Zamān’s enthronization he had nurtured the hope of probable assistance by the Bukharan king and therefore had sent a number of precious gifts, such as an elephant and one hundred fine Kashmir shawls, thirteen thousand *qarghāshum* water pipes and some fabrics, *kelīms* and swords.¹⁶⁹

Adopting the perspective of the helpless Afghan prince, Bukhārī says: “When it was time for action, he [Shāh Murād] neither granted help nor did he show benevolence and respect.”¹⁷⁰ Disappointed by this experience, Maḥmūd Mīrzā left Bukhara and went to Khiwa where he was kindly received by ‘Awaḥ Bī ‘Ināq, who soothed and relieved his guest (*dil-nawāzī wa khāṭir-jū’ī namūd*). If we believe the author, the ‘*ināq* took the arrival of the Afghan prince as an auspicious sign and a means of enhancing his own reputation, and gifted him with one hundred twenty *ghurūsh* for the purchase of straw, barley and fruits. Apart from his generous help and the daily allowances, he visited his new guest every day and conversed with him.¹⁷¹

Looking at the account given by Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm, the reader can discern a political and moral message. We see here a sharp contrast to Shāh Murād, who is depicted as a skinflint entertaining his guest with a minimum of expense. Moreover, the king had failed to reciprocate the large number of gifts he had received before. Besides these transgressions of everything that was regarded as proper conduct, Shāh Murād was guilty of having violated the norms of hospitality. When he received messages from Shāh Zamān demanding that his brother be delivered or arrested in return for a financial gift from the treasury of Kabul, he sent fifty men after Maḥmūd Mīrzā.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 24–25 (French text, 51–52).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 25 (French text, 52–53).

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 25 (French text, 53).

When all attempts to catch him failed, Shāh Murād dispatched a delegation to Khiwa in order to obtain the delivery of Maḥmūd. Overwhelmed by doubts, moral scruples and fear of the Bukharan reaction, ‘Aważ Bī discussed the issue with the “pillars of the government.” The *āqsaqāls* of Khwārazm and first of all Sayyid Qulī Bī Bāy said:

“The prince was the guest of Shāh Murād for a time. Then he dismissed him and now he is our guest. And even if our kingdom should be destroyed, we will not deliver our guest! Shāh Murād takes himself for a Sufi firm in religion; for what reason and according to what is it possible to act cruelly and in dishonor toward his guest as he did? By the rule of God, this is our answer!”¹⁷²

The Khiwan notables sent their reply to Bukhara and told the Manghit *amīr* the reasons for their decision. For them it was certainly a good opportunity to challenge Bukharan power and jeopardize Shāh Mūrād’s demands. On receiving this message, the king was in a pensive mood and subsequently sent a message to Kabul informing the Afghan king about the pilgrimage of the prince to Mecca.¹⁷³

RITUALS OF POWER AT AMĪR ḤAIDAR’S COURT

In this section I will deal with some aspects of social order under the auspices of Amīr Ḥaidar. As Mullā Sharīf devotes a very detailed account to the coronation of this king, giving instructive information about the taste of the ruler and the ruled but also about seating arrangements and other aspects, I will pay particular attention to the ceremony including the paying of homage and the gift giving procedures surrounding the ritual.

Amīr Ḥaidar’s Enthronization

According to the court chronicler Mullā Sharīf, Amīr Ḥaidar’s inauguration took place on Rajab 16, 1215/December 3, 1800, under the observance of

¹⁷² Ibid., 26 (French text, 54–55).

¹⁷³ Ibid., 26–27 (French text, 55). According to Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm, Maḥmūd Mīrzā left Khiwa after four months and went directly to Iran. In the following year, he set up a larger alliance that took shape after the assassination of Pāyinda Khān Barakzai in 1799 or 1800 on the orders of Shāh Zamān. Backed by Pāyinda Khān’s sons, Maḥmūd first took possession of Kandahār and shortly after gained control of Kabul (ibid., 27 (French text, 56–57). For the following events and the reign of Shāh Maḥmūd, see Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 10–11; Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 130–31).

Chingizid rules.¹⁷⁴ While Mīrzā Shams gives the information that prior to his enthronization the new ruler ordered the construction of a new palace on the advice of the commanders and notables of the realm,¹⁷⁵ Mullā Sharīf only describes the preparation of the coronation and the ceremony:

“When the drummer, committed to the confirmation of God the Glorious, beat the turquoise colored kettle-drum of the fourth firmament to ring in eternal fortune and the large brass drum of felicity in the high portico of the seven skies painted like the green miniatures of the highest dome in order to express his thorough awareness and observance of seal-acceptance and well-wishing, [...] they put the marvelous gold-embroidered turban on [Amīr Ḥaidar’s head]. Ustādh Shukrullah, the shoemaker, being skilled in the rare arts and traditions of faith connected with the preparation of shoes, embroidered the boots with golden leaves and flowers made of jewels worthy of their wearer. He adorned them with threads of gold and silver but also with golden shoe nails so that they were worthy of dressing the feet of the great *khāns* and noble *sulḡāns* of the old days. In the time witnessing the disappearance of the traditions and institutions typical of emperors and kings, he had sewn them to give evidence of his profession. When he passed them according to the custom of the *pīshkash* under the illustrious eyes of His Majesty, the sublime emperor, he was distinguished with kingly favors. [Subsequently], a royal order was issued that Khwāja Šādiq, the *mihtar* of the heaven-resembling court, should organize the white felt of good omen which is an element of the customs and regulations of raising princes and placing them on the throne. After a time, in accordance with the order, the efficient and devoted eunuch obtained the white felt of auspicious fortune from a group of merchants. It was the work of the artists of Birjand and out of its exquisite quality and tenderness had stolen the ball of delicacy and heart-pleasurableness from the velvet of Isfahan and the linen of Europe. [...] [According to] the order needing to be obeyed and issued from the place of glory, the loyal *chuhra-āqāsīs* of the court announced that all *sayyids* and lords of fortune, the *imāms* and the judges, the great commanders, the soldiery, the servants and all the rank and office holders should appear the following morning at the glorious court. All of them should be adorned with suitable golden clothes and robes of honor in order to become distinguished by performing the royal salutation in front of the obedience-demanding throne. [...] On the morning when the king of the Jamshīd-like sun put on the golden robe to come out of the palace of the sunrise and to throw the straight rays of ascendancy on the throne of the fourth firmament, every countenance was illuminated by open eyes awaiting the world-adorning inauguration of the king and his ascent to the royal throne. The chamberlains and the sweepers swift and

¹⁷⁴ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 443b–447b.

¹⁷⁵ This piece of information is not confirmed by other sources. According to Mīrzā Shams, the new throne hall had a length of eighty Bukharan cubits and a width of twenty-five cubits. The servants also organized two marble stones which served as royal thrones. The first of the two stones was named “*raḥīm-khānī*” and the second one “*abū’l-faiḡ-khānī*” after the names of the two eighteenth-century rulers (Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 67–68).

gentle like a breeze cleaned the wide floor of the hall of the royal reception with brooms made from eyelashes and the locks of hyacinths and odoriferous herbs like the interior of the lords of candor and purity from dust and dirt. They spread fine and colorfully embellished carpets and simple rugs of various colors on the seats to the right and the left side of the firmament-like throne up to the stairs of elegance and sublime beauty, thus adorning [the entire hall] up to the beautiful and sublime stairs in the manner of a rose garden full of flowers and colorful waves. The victorious throne, which was stripped of woolen carpets and imperial cloths for such a long time, and on which the time of crookedness and celestial fortune going awry had left nothing but the hem of dark dust and the dirt of affliction, was most beautifully embellished with golden pictures and inscriptions [...] Depending on the position of the universe-conquering sun and the king of the planets, the lords knowledgeable of the calendars and arts of astrology fixed the auspicious hour of the king's inauguration according to the turns of the revolving heavens and the inclination of the stars, the planets and the conjunction of night and day. In accordance with the order (*nasq*) of the past rulers and the decree of the revered king, they spread green Frankish velvet and the most beautiful fine silk and linen over those soft and most colorful carpets under the cupola of the *shāh-nishīn* to the left of the throne. This was the residence of fortune protecting the seats of the distinguished nobility which are firmly fixed and established for the propinquity enjoying Jūybārī *khwājas*. [...] Consenting with the order of the king needing to be followed and the ingenious decree obeyed by the world, all the *khwājas*, *sayyids*, *imāms*, *qāzīs* and learned men came from the high court of justice and all the *amīrs*, the lords of rank and reputation belonging to the sublime royal court, as well as the soldiers and warriors appeared beautifully clothed in colorful robes of honor at the court, the refuge of the world. The area of the court showing the vestiges of felicity and the entire capital were turned into a full and swelling sea dashing with waves because of the throng of notables, and masses of soldiers and servants. The hall of royal reception was crowded up to the threshold of the sublime galleries, which were reserved for the ladies and filled with groups of chamberlains, mace-bearers, keepers of the armory, *mahrāms*, *īnāqs*, confidants and eunuchs. Having awaited the opportunity of such an immense gift, all the subjects, old and young who had long since raised thousands of hands for invocations to God, the King without companion, the greatly revered Lord, now demanded the fortune and the completion of the reign of this illustrious and high-born king. [...] Being grateful for the fulfillment of their wishes and the achievement of the necessary things, all turned their faces to the sublime palace. They did so out of utmost longing like the impudent eye of the mirror wishful to see the applause-demanding dignity and grandeur. All the merchants who had come from other inhabited countries, cities and famous domains such as Herat, Qandahār, Balkh, Kabul, Badakhshān, Ḥiṣār, Khojand, Tashkent, Andijān, Khoqand, Kāshghar, Yārkanḍ, Ūrganḥ, Astrakhān and the *qal'a* of the Qazāq (?) to spend some time in this graceful and traveler-protecting kingdom and to obtain economic profit were cheerful like wing-fluttering birds to see the glorious enthronization of the magnificent king. One group of them turned toward their home regions to spread the glad and glorious news, [while another group remained] and turned toward the splendid residence of authority possessed by the incomparable monarch. [...] At noon, which was fixed as the time of the ascent and exaltation of the ruler of east and west to the green and blue colored heavenly throne, His Majesty the King endowed with the grandeur of the ancient rulers of Persia and the

magnificence of the glorious Solomon donned the garment and adorned sovereignty in order to overshadow the word-embellishing authority of Farīdūn and Alexander. He placed the gold-embroidered heart-ravishing turban and the bejeweled gem-scattered crown on his head as if he were king Parwīz and clothed himself in the valuable and gold-spreading robe as if he were the shining sun. He fastened the gold-embroidered girdle and put on the gold and silver-ornamented boots with the golden nails. The dagger with the bejeweled helve in its sheath set in diamonds was put on the right side of his waist and Solomon's precious gem left to hang out of a pocket. [Subsequently], the object of divine beauty and power second to Yūsuf appeared completely adorned with all kinds of pearls and rare jewels and came out of the high women's chamber. Having set their blessed steps on the threshold of the honored harem, all the noble eunuchs, the intimates steadfast in their loyalty and the confidants with the good manners [...] suddenly genuflected, found the honor of kissing the fortunate ground and opened their mouths in invocation for His Sublime Majesty."¹⁷⁶

The account continues with the enthronization of Amīr Ḥaidar, which, following the centuries-old customs, is interpreted in the usual way as a sign of divine will and fate. The king first appointed the *chuhra-āqāsīs* and *udaychīs*. Then the notables and the population collectively paid homage to the new ruler, and it was not until the end of the congratulations that he was seated on the white felt and raised to the throne.¹⁷⁷ This means that the swearing of allegiance as the ultimate basis of the future king's authority and the conventional exchange that underscored the ceremony had lost none of their importance. Although according to the Chingizid and Shibanid customs only the representatives of the four Uzbek tribes (*chahār firqa-yi ūzbekīya*) had the right to touch the felt, now all the notables and *amīrs* came to take the white felt and to place the new king on the throne and congratulate him on his inauguration.¹⁷⁸ Mullā Sharīf, who was in all likelihood present at the ceremony, refers to a large group of religious dignitaries who helped raise the new ruler onto the throne.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 442b–447a.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, fols. 447b–450a.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. 450b; Sela, *Ritual and Authority*, 47–48. Although the author does not specify the four Uzbek tribes, it was probably either the four tribes of Mongol origin enjoying the highest status and the most prominent seats of honor at the Shibanid and Tuqay-Timurid court, the Dürmān, Naymān, Qūshchī and Qungrāt, or other prominent tribal groups of that time such as the Yūz, Ming or Manghit.

¹⁷⁹ Īshān Raḥmatullah Khwāja, the *khwāja kalān* of the Jūybārī family, Īshān Muḥammad Tayyib Khwāja, the Sheikh al-Islam of the Jūybārī *khwājas*, Īshān Hidāyatullah Khwāja, Muḥammad Sa'dullah Khwāja who also occupied seats reserved for the Jūybārī

Above all, the inauguration of the ruler is portrayed as a social event involving the entire society, from the masses of ordinary people to traders, notables and tribal representatives, the Sufi sheikhs of the most prominent brotherhoods and other religious leaders, the commanders of the army and their followers, the court servants, and last but not least the king himself. Interestingly, the account opens with one of the typical acts of exchange, which once more accentuates the relational and behavioral dimension of power. The shoemaker Shukrullah offers the boots as a *pīshkash* and is distinguished with royal favors. The detailed and ornate descriptions of Amīr Haidar's robe and the decoration of the *kūrnish-sarā* give us an idea of the preference for certain colors and materials. Velvet, fine silk and linen were obviously the most preferred materials, while the metaphors of the meadows and the dashing sea evoke a picture dominated by the colors green, turquoise, blue and red.

The seating arrangement and the body gestures and postures of the servants and the populace echo the symbolic dimension of power and the inertia of the local power structures. The seats were arranged in the usual way on the right and the left side, and, at the end of the hall, the royal throne stood with the so-called *shāh-nishīn*, a special seat of honor to the left side of the king.¹⁸⁰ This pattern displays the resilience of institutionalized power techniques and notions of order. It was solely the actors and the power figurations that had changed, but not the basic structure conveying a sense of taste and order. For instance, the standing of the members of the religious establishment equalled that of the Uzbek *amīrs*. This is best documented by the diminishing importance of the *atālīq* office.¹⁸¹ As an indicator of proximity to the ruler, the *shāh-nishīn* was reserved for the highest-ranking Jūybārī *khwāja*, perhaps the *khwāja kalān* or the *sheikh al-Islām*.¹⁸² All the more interesting are the genuflections of the harem servants and the hands of the populace and their representatives raised to invoke God's blessings for

dignitaries, the chief judge Ishān Qāzī Mīrzā, Qāzī Mīr 'Ināyatullah Mīr-i asad, Īshān Abū Naṣr Khwāja Mīr-i asad, Īshān Mīrzā 'Abd al-Wafā Qāzī-yi 'askar, and a large number of other Sufi dignitaries figure prominently in Mullā Sharīf's account (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 451a).

¹⁸⁰ The *shāh-nishīn* was also mentioned by Qāzī Wafā (see chapter The Order of Things/Mediation and Brokerage/Religious Nobles as Intermediaries).

¹⁸¹ Holzwarth, "The Uzbek State," 107–09.

¹⁸² Later the source mentions several Jūybārī dignitaries occupying a place of honor (see below).

the new ruler. These acts and the kissing of the floor as performed by the eunuchs symbolize acceptance of the king and the kind of authority he exercised.

The fourth aspect noted by the reader is the special attention paid to the merchants and traders from outside Bukhara. Besides the fact that the customary white felt was purchased from a group of merchants who brought it from Birjand, the writer refers to Bukhara's role as a center of trade. By giving a list of the most important coordinates of the caravan trade, he points to its established role within a large regional network of commerce. In addition, the merchants are described as potential messengers spreading the news of all events taking place on the political scene to their home places.

Another, more straightforward account of Amīr Ḥaidar's enthronization is provided by Mīrzā Shams:

“Then the *amīr* issued the decree that from amongst the representatives of the kingdom and the [Muslim] community some persons shall appear every day at the assembly. Their titles were as follows: the *naqīb*, the chief *aurāk*, the *qāzī-yi buzurġ*, the *sheikh al-Islām*, the *qāzī-yi 'askar*, the *'ālim* (?), *aurāk-i kūchak*, the *muftī-yi 'askar* and the *ra'īs* of the city of Bukhara. Besides, the leading merchants (*akābir-i tujār*) and the most revered men were also ordered to show presence and to sit on the right side of the hall. In addition, he ordered the members of the government, the *atālikh*, the *dīwānbēgī*, the *parwānachī*, the *dātkhāk* [*dādkhwāh*], the seal bearer, who is called *ināq*, the *tūqsāba* supposed to act as the keeper of the treasury, the *īshik-āghāsī* and the *amīr-ākhūr* to appear every day at the left side of the royal throne. Except for them, nobody was allowed to take seat. All the military leaders and the court servants had to stand behind the throne and its vicinity. In this way he fixed everybody's ranks and seats and no one was allowed to overstep these limits. [Paragraph] After the ordering and finishing of all affairs, Amīr Ḥaidar intended to ascend the throne. Coming one by one, all the religious nobles and worldly representatives took their seats and a white felt was spread before the throne. Subsequently, Amīr Ḥaidar entered the hall in the garb of authority. Adorned with a colorfully bejeweled sword hanging around his waist and the jewel-encrusted ornament above his forehead, he sat on the cushion [white felt] in front of the throne. Then the *naqīb*, the *atālikh*, the *dīwānbēgī* and the *parwānachī* grasped the four ends of the felt, raised it and placed him on the throne. [Afterward] all persons present congratulated Amīr Ḥaidar on his enthronization, and following the old custom of the *pīshkashī*, everyone in accordance with these conditions scattered many silver and gold coins before the throne.”¹⁸³

¹⁸³ Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 68–69. For another translation of the second part of the passage, see Sela, *Ritual and Authority*, 48.

Apart from the reference to the king's apparel, this passage has little in common with Mullā Sharīf's version. No mention is made here of the four Uzbek tribes, though the conventional number four also appears.¹⁸⁴ Much more attention is paid to the different ranks and titles and a definition of their administrative tasks and duties. In addition, we are informed about the seating order in the throne hall and the presence of the most important representatives.¹⁸⁵ Similar to Mullā Sharīf, Mīrzā Shams refers to the king's outfit, especially the bejeweled sword and the *jīgha* (here spelled *jīqa*)—an ornament or jewel worn in the turban.

Seating Maps and Gift Giving

The description of the coronation festivities by Mullā Sharīf is unique insofar as it gives us an idea of the continued impact of the worldview expressed in a hierarchical order, clear-cut preferences and certain tastes. Furthermore, the source underlines the ordering activities of the new ruler by recording how Amīr Ḥaidar's inauguration reaches its peak with the implementation of the seating plan and the subsequent distribution of gifts:

“That which was prescribed by the customs of throne-embellishment and the requisites of sovereignty and enthroning princes was observed by those knowing about the law of the sublime court and following the way of showing respect to the old *yūsūn*. A noble group of ‘*ulamā*’, holders of superior rank, raised their hands in prayer toward the firmament-like *kūrnish-sarā* to praise the king, the refuge of the world, and to request divine guidance for the eternal justice of His Highest Majesty from the court of the Ruler of the [incomparable] kingdom. After the ordering of the affairs connected with boldness and bravery and at a sign from the dignified *khāqān*, the *īshik-āqāsīs* and the *chuhra-āqāsīs* first placed the high-ranking and pious Jūybārī *khwājas* on the seats of honor. They seated the high-standing *sayyids* and *qāzīs*, the wise *imāms* endowed with inaccessible ranks and the holders of *šadr* and *amīr* titles in accordance with the ranks of honor and religious offices on the right and the left side of the heavenly Saturn-like throne. The revered eunuchs, the *īnāqs*, the loyal keepers of the armory and all the noble excellent confidants took position in suitable places and stood upright behind the throne resembling the firmament. After the arrangement of the right and the left side by following the beauty of the royal statutes and the kingly rites through the complete seating of the glorious nobles and the devoted commanders, the *tūqsābas*, the *chaghatāy-bēgīs*, the *īshik-āqābāshīs*, the

¹⁸⁴ Sela, *Ritual and Authority*, 49.

¹⁸⁵ Sela interprets this passage as a clear sign of the redefinition of a hierarchical hegemony, but also as an indication that the king more or less completely ignored the tribal affiliations of his dynasty (*ibid.*, 49).

mīrākhūrs, the *bakāwuls* and all the office holders of the court, the asylum of imperial dignity, appeared at the lower end of the hall facing the throne. Genuflecting and humbling themselves on the carpet of obedience, they bowed their heads and adorned the lines of reception from the right and the northern side. Some of the closely related *dādkhwāhs* and the courteous *tūqsābas* stood with their golden and bejeweled maces at the foot of the sublime imperial throne [...] and the well-informed *ūdāychīs* and *yasāwul-bāshīs* led the commanders of the contingents of a thousand, a hundred and ten of the glorious soldiers [...] one by one and group by group with their *tūmānāt* and beautifully dressed followers quickly to the horseshoe row of the heaven-resembling assembly where they were honored with the kiss of the floor and rubbing their foreheads on the ground of the *kūrnish-sarā*. When the arrangement of the enthronization, the spreading of agreeable deeds, all the offering of allegiance and obsequiousness came to an end and accumulated in peace of mind, the splendor-disposing Jupiter-like king drew the cypher of rejection and oblivion in Jamshīd's and Alexander's pride-register, thus causing the ornament and the richly embroidered robe of greatness worn by the king of the sun to be complete and to reach the highest steps of perfection. The foundation of dominion and dignity ordained by God rose to the apex of the Pleiades and the stairs of grandeur witnessed the ascent of the longing lords through the means and merits of the monarch ruling over the empire of the firmament. The keepers of the royal arsenal put the robe encrusted with silver on his shoulders and dressed the witness of fortune in gold and silver, while the treasurers of the royal wealth caused the spring clouds to shower gold and diamonds from the right and the left side on his blessed head [...].¹⁸⁶

More than any other passage, this extract echoes Mulla Sharīf's approval and even admiration of the power structures that were vividly expressed by the hierarchical order. By portraying the latter in terms of beauty and esthetics, he follows his usual style of description. Highly valuing the observance of ancient customs and the rules of the *yūsūn*, he depicts the necessary arrangements for Amīr Ḥaidar's enthronization, arrangements widely associated with the term of order. According to him, two groups of dignitaries were of special importance: first, the sheikhs and '*ulamā*', and second, the Uzbek *amīrs*.¹⁸⁷ Similar to the first passage giving an insight into

¹⁸⁶ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 453a–454b.

¹⁸⁷ The growing importance of the Sufi sheikhs was noticeable already in the time of Dānyāl Bī. For instance, Qāzī Wafā refers to a group of religious dignitaries attending the circumcision feast of Dānyāl Bī's sons Sulṭān Murād Bī and Tukhtāmish Bī. This group consisted of the Jūybārī *khwājas* and other Naqshbandī sheikhs, the Sayyid Atā'ī, Mīr Niẓām al-Dīn Ḥusainī and the influential sheikh Mīr Abū Ṭāhir Samarqandī. Of special importance were the Sayyid Atā'ī who were tied to the *amīr* through a marriage alliance; 'Abd al-Ghāfur Khwāja Sayyid Atā'ī was a son-in-law of Dānyāl Bī who also participated in a number of campaigns, e.g., in Jumāda I 1176/November–December 1762 against the Turkmen of the Labāb region. Other influential Sufi sheikhs who simultaneously acted as

the coronation ceremony, our author drafts a map of power relations with the ruler at the locus of the court and the web of vital alliances. In other words, the king is portrayed as an orbit of his own surrounded by the most important actors, the “pillars of power and authority” crucial for the maintenance of his rule. Here, the Jūybārī sheikhs represented one of the main coordinates. Other important positions were occupied by the religious dignitaries and the Uzbek chiefs and commanders on both wings of the *kūrnish-sarā*. This horseshoe panorama was completed by a number of lower-ranking office holders, like the *khwāja sarāyān*, the *īnāqs* and the *qūrchīs* behind the throne and the *tūqsābas*, *dādkhwāhs*, *mīrākhūrs* and others standing opposite the throne at the end of the hall. What Mullā Sharīf describes here is a kind of row with the king in the middle, flanked by his confidants and the most important Sufī sheikhs and other actors. By depicting this order in terms of beauty, the chronicler remains true to himself and takes his familiar standpoint, through which he expresses his appreciation of the existing order including the social hierarchy. We should also not forget that the genuflections and invocations are signs of the influence of power on a broader level than usually assumed.

The text proceeds with the customary scattering of “coins of pleasure and delight” from the “hidden treasury of *an‘ām* gifts” and abundant jewels on “the edge of the desires of commoners and nobles.”¹⁸⁸ Resuming one of the central topics of his voluminous work, placing emphasis on the role of the monarch as a subject of divine favor, Mullā Sharīf states that when the crown was placed on the king’s head and Solomon’s seal-ring was ornamented with the imperial signature, “the umbrella of felicity spread the shade of eternal affection and protection (*sāya-yi ‘ātifat wa zill-i himāyat*) upon the heads of the poor and afflicted.” At the end of the ceremony, “the divine shade threw its world-embellishing ray of grace on the countenances of the nobles and the lowborn.”¹⁸⁹

The splendor of the inauguration ceremony is further accentuated by the numerous acts of lavish gift giving. Amīr Ḥaidar ordered the “benefit-

military commanders were Muḥammad Laṭīf Khwāja Naqīb and Qul Muḥammad Khwāja Urākh (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 354a, 358b–359a). Phillip Effremov also mentions Khwāja Ghafūr as the son-in-law of the *atāliq* who purchased Effremov as a slave just to gift him to his father-in-law after a few days (Effremov, *Devjatiletnee*, 21).

¹⁸⁸ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 454b.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 455a.

spreading kitchen” to slaughter many sheep and prepare delicate food and provisions for the nobles and commoners attending the Friday *kūrnish*. In this context we read that the servants arranged “honey-sweet delicacies and sweetmeats made from and glazed with sugar.” The final preparations for the feast and the efforts of all the servants and administrators, who “fastened the cloth of service around the waist of life and turned to serving up and arranging (*taqdīm wa intizām*) the necessary things,”¹⁹⁰ are again associated with the keeping of order. Mullā Sharīf continues to describe the coronation feast in most colorful terms. Upon the king’s arrival in the hall, the soldiery and the notables were already waiting, dressed in the most beautiful brocade and satin. Amīr Ḥaidar then gifted the gold-embroidered robe, his turban and boots to his intimate friend Ūtgūr Şūfī, who himself is styled a benefactor, a *walī-ni ‘mī*.¹⁹¹ Afterward, the ruler was received by his notables and the court servants genuflecting and praying for the longevity of his rule. The paying of homage and respect was followed by another act of munificence, this time by the notables and the *mīrākhūr-bāshī* Muḥammad Yūsuf going to present a gift horse to the king (see below).¹⁹² Giving a detailed account of the festivities that took place after the first Friday prayer, the text continues as follows:

“When the king resembling Parwīz put his step into the stirrup of the noble steed galloping as if it was spurred by the thunderbolt, all the leaders and commanders dressed in jewel-embroidered clothes and adorned with golden girdles came by foot from all directions and surrounded him like a halo round the moon. Upon their arrival at the foot of the imperial throne [...] all the *sayyids*, the *qāzīs*, the ‘*ulamā*’ and the *amīrs* received the honor of paying homage to the Farīdūn-like king [...]. Mediated and guided by the *udāychīs* and the *chuhra-āqāsīs* of the court, and according to their [respective] abilities, every one of them offered valuable, fleet and ambling horses as *tūqūz* gifts together with gold-encrusted saddles, bridles, horse-blankets and armors adorned with gold. Corresponding to their ranks, the *sayyids* and *qāzīs* presented numerous gifts at the foot of the sublime throne and passed them under the alchemical eyes of His kingdom-embellishing Majesty. All the lords of high rank and the people of dignity took their seats and positions (*ūrūn wa maqām*) on the right and the left side of the royal throne. Arriving contingent by contingent and dashing like the waves of the swelling sea, the soldiers as numerous as stars and impossible to count were blessed with the fortune of kissing the ground in the sacred presence. [Afterward] they returned to their dwellings under the illuminating eyes of His Majesty, the ruler of the world. All the messengers sent by the

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., fol. 464a.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., fols. 464a–465a.

¹⁹² Ibid., fols. 466a–b.

governors to congratulate turned their faces toward the *qibla* of hope and the royal capital. Introduced and guided by the *shaghāwuls* of the great court, they were exalted by kissing the fingers of His Majesty's miraculous hand. Passing the petitions of fidelity and obedience as well as numerous presents under the sublime eyes, they gained entire glory and exaltation through the fortune of royal questions and caresses, and afterward returned to their mansions. Subsequent to all the coming and going and the establishment of calm and tranquility among the glorious soldiers, the imperial opportunity-knowing guards of the lunar court as well as the *khānsālārān* in the noble service of the king adorned with the robes of etiquette out of vigilance and the observance of the provisions and the arrangement of the tablecloths, first spread satin and royal brocade over the heavenly throne in order to serve the splendid and world-conquering emperor. Then they arranged the largesse-showing *khāns* [*khwāns*] of benevolence before the respected *sayyids* and *qāzīs*, the military leaders and commanders in possession of seats and ranks on the left and the right side of the *kūrnish-gāh*. The *bakāwuls* and the excellent cooks poured all kinds of food in lemon-like pots, prepared it on porcelain plates and adorned plate after plate with *Urūz-i jahān-pūrī* (?) and *Dīwzīra-yi Nīshabūrī*.^{*} The excellent attendants of astonishing beauty served mellifluous rice pudding mixed with milk and sugar and brought tablecloths full of *kabāb*, well-tasting roasted lamb meat and meat and rice dressed with milk, and all sorts of dainties and delicacies. [They also brought] delicious juices and sweet beverages made with honey and infused with fragrant rose water, as well as delightful sweets made from jam by the confectioner of reason. Bringing all this food and drink according to the rule of courtesy and etiquette before the ascent and descent of the throne held by the fortunate and most generous emperor, the diligent servants successively arranged it and put it in order before the seats on the left and the right side of the heaven-resembling throne and before most of the lords of dignity and rank. The lords of order serving at the bountiful court of the king of the horizon brought the substance of the perfect gifts without delay to all the soldiery and the people present from the environs of the most generous court, to the nobles and the commoners, the mean and the despised people. All of them were grateful and satiated with pleasure and delight. [...] In accordance with the rule of the ancient *khāns* and as it had been the special duty of the chief judge of the dominion, the exalted and kind king passed a plate of rice pudding to the source of perfection, the excellent chief judge *Īshān Qāzī Mīrzā*, and eminent beneficiary of favor and mercy, thus distinguishing him with particular royal kindness. Since still none of the *amīrs* was blessed and distinguished with the rank of *atālīq*, which,

* *Dīwzīra* is a type of rice that is cultivated in Central Asia, and especially in the Ferghana Valley. Known for its reddish color and much more expensive than ordinary kinds of rice, *Dīwzīra* rice is often used for classical pilaw dishes with carrots, raisins and pieces of lamb. According to Eversmann, this sort of rice (*Diusirā* in the German original) originates from the surroundings of Kabul, from where it was brought and introduced to Bukhara. It is known for its longish thin caryopsis (Evesmann, *Reise*, 89).

Urūz (اروز) is probably a corrupted form of *Aruz/Urūz* (اروز) meaning rice. *Jahānpūr* is a town in northern India near the city of Lucknow, so the reference is probably to pilaw or another kind of rice dish of Indian origin.

according to the custom of royal benevolence, rested with the commander-in-chief, out of favor and infinite royal affection he conceded the responsibility for the *kabāb-i khwān* to the intimate friend of His Majesty Ūtgūr Qūshbēgī. At a sign from His Majesty, the heavenly king, the servants followed the custom of gift giving and provision of food by bringing the *khāns* of benefits and the food gifts one by one, and rank by rank to the great *'ulamā'* and the high-standing *amīrs*.”¹⁹³

This long passage provides an invaluable grid of data enabling the historian to explore the relational and symbolic dimensions of power and authority at the royal court of Bukhara at that time. Similar to the previous extracts, it shows that the king depended on a large number of associates for his enthronization ceremony. The first sentence and the comparison with the moon and its halo illustrates that he was surrounded by many actors with different backgrounds. Showing remarkable reminiscences of the king at the pinnacle of his entourage or the locus of power, this theme dominates the passage to its very end, and even afterward we observe the notables and servants praising their master for his kindness and generosity.¹⁹⁴ Of equal interest is the fact that a part of the food served at this feast was set aside and given to the poor. In the remainder of the text, the author colorfully describes the banquet and “the lips of the lords of questions and demand glued together because of the opulence of the food and the juices mixed with sugar.”¹⁹⁵ Apart from the impressive portrayal of sensual experiences, the narrative revolves around a second strand, the pre-eminent gift giving celebrated by the king and his retinue. Both were givers and receivers at the same time. Hence the coronation feast appears as a stage to celebrate social order and togetherness established by mutual acts of giving and taking. It is remarkable that the serving of food is also depicted as arranging or ordering (*tartīb*), which fits into and follows traditional patterns of munificence and largesse. The food was obviously first presented to the ruler before it was

¹⁹³ Ibid., fols. 475b–477a. Transcribing the term *khwān* (خوان), I followed the version given by the manuscript. There the word is sometimes incorrectly spelled *khān*, like *khān* in the sense of ruler or king. During a series of fieldwork in northern Afghanistan in 2007–08, I noticed that some informants also equated the traditional tablecloth, the *khwān* or *dastar-khwān*, with the term *khān*, an influential nobleman, saying: “There are two kinds of *khwāns/khāns*, the first is the *dastar-khwān*, the tablecloth to be spread out when food is served; the second is an influential man with a large following” (interview on May 1, 2007, in Imām Šāhib/Kunduz—Afghanistan).

¹⁹⁴ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 477a.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., fol. 477b.

distributed among the other people seated on both sides of the throne. The scene described here further bolsters the king's social standing as a generous benefactor and caretaker who always pays attention to the needs of his followers.

In the above-quoted passage, order is presented at two levels: first, the rather fixed seating order that the Uzbek chiefs, the nobles and religious figures were bound by. And second, a kind of fluid order, describing the process of placing dishes and meals before the protagonists. The eating itself also followed and confirmed clear rules reflecting the social hierarchy at court. The first pitch here was made by the king himself, before he passed a plate of rice pudding to the chief judge. Interestingly, a *khwān-sālār* was appointed for the distribution of the *kabāb*, roasted pieces of lamb and mutton. Afterward, the court servants served the followers of the king one by one as if they were coming down a steep staircase step by step. The fact that our chronicler names the 'ulamā' and Sufi sheikhs first may be seen as a reflection of visible shifts of power to the advantage of the religious establishment, whose authority had begun to eclipse that of the Uzbek commanders. But it may also be attributed to the individual taste of the author.¹⁹⁶ After all, Mullā Sharīf was an 'ālim himself.

Besides the seating arrangements and the detailed account of gift exchange, the passage documents the predominant tastes of that time. The food preferred falls into two or three categories: first, savory and substantial meals consisting of rice and mutton, and second, sweet dishes and drinks such as rice pudding, candies and pastries, syrup and juices (perhaps wine as well) infused with honey and rose water (*gulāb*). The preference for sweet food is further underlined by the statement that the lips of the followers stuck together while eating.¹⁹⁷ We read about the *sharbat-khāna*, the wine-cellar, and the customs of sweet giving (*ḥalāwat-bakhshī*), the scattering of sugar (*shikar-afshānī*) and flowers made of sugar candy (*gul-i qand-rīzī*). The servants brought pastries, sweetmeats, ruby-colored round sugar loaves and different kinds of food and drink for this heavenly banquet.¹⁹⁸ Mīrzā Shāms

¹⁹⁶ In Qāzī Wafā's work, the Uzbek *amīrs* often rank first. In this work too they appear as the first recipients of privileges (e.g., land grants, titles, ranks, gifts) before the 'ulamā' who are almost always mentioned in second place (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, 257a–262b).

¹⁹⁷ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 477b.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, fols. 459a–b.

also mentions the royal banquet and a number of nine thousand valuable robes, Kashmir shawls, gold-wrought garments and velvet.¹⁹⁹

The Gift Horse for Amīr Ḥaidar

In addition to the food, the colorful robes of honor and the money gifts embodying a recurrent strand in Mullā Sharīf's report of the coronation ceremony, he also gives a very interesting account of the horse presented to the freshly crowned ruler prior to the first Friday prayer. The very detailed and loving characterization of Amīr Ḥaidar's gift horse mirrors the high value ascribed to horses in Central Asia in general, and at the Bukharan court in particular. In the section on the structural impact and the various aspects of gift exchange, I already referred to gift horses, especially the valuable ambling *tūpchāq* horses offered on a range of occasions, particularly at the *kūrnish* or in the aftermath of the king's enthronization. As we have seen, in many cases it was not only the horse that was given in return for favors, it was presented together with blankets (*yāpūq*) to protect it from rain or cold, beautifully adorned saddles and bridles. In the following I will illustrate that horses continued to represent an important status symbol throughout the nineteenth century by referring to an account given by Amīr Ḥaidar's court chronicler. He portrays the ruler's horse as follows:

“Muḥammad Yūsuf Mīrākhūr-bāshī brought the fairy-like horse of fortune, wild like a gazelle, as fleet as the wind, a strong, restive heaven-traversing horse, resembling a bright star moving up and down on the sky of Saturn. It had the brow of Venus, the intelligence of a perfume seller and the character of Jupiter or Orion in the Pleiades. It had the virtues of a steadfast mountain and was easy-tempered in its motions. It was like the half-moon of its stirrups and swift like the cold ice-wind. Resembling the sun of the diadem, it was as beautiful as the moon, a shy deer with fine pasterns and black, sinister-looking eyes and the passion of Mars. Swift-paced and passionate, it walked gracefully and embellished with emerald-encrusted bridles and a saddle inlaid with rubies. It was so heart-pleasing and exuded the fragrance of cloves. It had black musky hair and was soft-natured with a fiery countenance. Being reminiscent of Burāq, it was gentle-paced, nimble and looked absolutely noble with its narrow neck. It was a horse of dark and rusty color with fragrant pearl-like hooves, a perfect round crupper, amber-like breath, teeth as beautiful as pearls in an oyster and a stable pace. The *mīrākhūr* had curried and groomed it thoroughly. He had washed its mane and tail with perfumes and rose water, like the fragrant, dangling forelock (*zulf*) of the heart-ravishing women in the fashion of divine mysteries and the 'abīr and *suman*-smelling *kākul*. Thus, it resembled one of the fairy-like, rosy-cheeked

¹⁹⁹ Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 69.

creatures brought up in a delicate way or one of the tulip-faced brides as beautiful as the moon. Covered all over with gold and jewels, it was adorned with a jewel-encrusted saddle and embellished with bejeweled and golden bridles. [In its entire splendor], it was ready to be mounted by felicity and awaited the sunrise of fortune on the firmament of prosperity.”²⁰⁰

Although this colorful portrayal of the horse does not tell us whether it already belonged to the royal stables or was gifted by one or several of the notables, it highlights the social value of horses as status symbols and luxury items. Horses were objects of exchange and of desire. Moreover, the chronicler’s metaphoric language hints at certain ideals of beauty rooted in contemporary thinking. Since the horse is depicted in almost anthropomorphic terms, this gives us a clue not only about the preferred qualities of a good horse but also about the favorable characteristics of humans. Let me come first to the qualities pertaining rather to horses: a perfect thoroughbred horse as it is portrayed here had to be strong, swift and amble-paced. Small pasterns, a bright coat, regular, white and pearl-like teeth, a round crupper, a narrow neck and well-shaped hooves were further characteristics to be ideally observed when buying or gifting a horse. Another striking pattern in this text is the comparison with the most important planets and stars like Saturn, Venus, Mars, Orion and the Pleiades. The reader even gains the impression of celestial beauty due to the comparison with a fairy and Burāq, the mythical animal upon which the Prophet is said to have gone from Jerusalem to heaven.²⁰¹

There are a number of characteristics giving an impression of the personal taste of the author and the ideals of beauty held by a larger audience: we read of black eyes, rosy cheeks and a face like tulips and the beauty of the moon. The terms *zulf* and *kākul* refer to special attributes of beauty: *zulf* designates a curling lock; in Sufic poetry it often means the

²⁰⁰ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 466b. The title of *mīrākhūr* or *mīr-i ākhūr* literally meant master of the royal stables (see Semenov, “Ocherk ustrojstva tzentral’nogo administrativnogo upravlenija,” 60), but its bearers often fulfilled purely military or administrative duties. The ranks of *mīrākhūr* and *mīrākhūr-bāshī* are also mentioned in some administrative handbooks from Safavid Iran (Giorgio Rota, “The Horses of the Shah: Some Remarks on the Organization of Safavid Royal Stables, Mainly Based on Three Persian Handbooks of Administrative Practice,” in *Pferde in Asien: Geschichte, Handel und Kultur*, ed. Bert G. Fagner et al. (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009), 35–37).

²⁰¹ R. Paret, “Al-Burāq,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., I, 1310.

divine mysteries forming the delight of the devotee. The *kākul* is the lock of hair on the forehead of boys, young men and horses.²⁰²

Gubernatorial Appointments

This section is devoted to the round of appointments after Amīr Ḥaidar's enthronization. Rather than endeavoring to give a list of offices and to define duties,²⁰³ I will try to briefly identify patterns of gift exchange underlying the whole procedure. The descriptions by Mullā Sharīf are unique insofar as they give an extraordinarily detailed account. Altogether we are dealing with approximately twenty-four folios detailing appointments, which are styled in the usual form of giving and taking. A second tendency to be noticed is that the writer follows a clear hierarchy more or less identical to the seating order in the *kūrnish-sarā*. Beginning with the Sufī dignitaries and 'ulamā',²⁰⁴ he mentions Īshān Raḥmatullah Khwāja, the "Pillar of the Sayyids" (*'umdat al-sādāt*) of the capital and the senior Jūybārī sheikh, upon whom Amīr Ḥaidar bestowed the seat of honor, the *shah-nishīn*, to his left side as well as the title of *khwāja kalān*,²⁰⁵ the post of superintendent of all charitable endowments donated by the Jūybārī family and the government of Jūybār. He also gained the right to appoint and dismiss the religious teachers working at the *madrasas*, the preachers, *imāms* and other mosque functionaries. In addition, "all commoners and notables of Jūybār" should turn to him in their dealings with the royal court. Interestingly, and similar to the appointees of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān more than four decades before, the *khwāja kalān* expressed his gratitude for this appointment and followed the "custom of gift giving of the fortune establishing court" by presenting a number of gifts, in this case one thousand *ashrafi* of the fixed standard weight, three *tūqūz* sugar loaves, three *tūqūz* sweetmeats and three swift and ambling horses.²⁰⁶ Another member of the Jūybārī family by the name of Hidāyatullah Khwāja

²⁰² Dikhudā, *Lughat Nāma*, vol. 39 (ک-کاخ هشت بهشت), 234.

²⁰³ Bregel, *Administration*, 24–30.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 24.

²⁰⁵ This title is not to be confused with that of the chief eunuch, the *khwāja kalān* of the *khwāja sarāyān*.

²⁰⁶ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 484a–b. *Tūqūz* gifts were either composed of nine different items or nine pieces of one item. Thus, when three *tūqūz* gifts were presented, there were actually twenty-seven pieces. See also chapter The Order of Things/Generosity and Gift Giving/The Terminology of the Gift in the Chronicles.

b. Naṣr al-Dīn Khwāja Kalān, who was also granted one of the seats of honor, thanked the ruler by presenting twenty-seven (three *tūqūz*) sugar loaves and three beautiful horses.²⁰⁷ Our author then lists all religious nobles privileged with seats of honor, titles and administrative offices.²⁰⁸ One of the last office holders was Mullā Khwāja Sayyid Atā’ī,

“who in his high magnanimity, bountifulness and piety was at the top of his group, a fact that earned him enormous reputation and complete distinction from others, and whose well-wishing (*du ‘ā-gū’ī*) and efforts to please came to the sublime ears of the caretaker of the people and possessor of the world. He was distinguished with the inaccessible rank of *ūrākh* of the *kūrniṣh-gāh*, which is situated below the seat of the *naqīb* and above that of the commander-in-chief. He was also appointed as the superintendent of the tombs of the saints tracing themselves back to Sayyid Atā.”²⁰⁹

The passage continues with the presents offered by the Sayyid Atā’ī sheikh in return, like a gold-embroidered tablecloth, beautifully embroidered garments and colorful woolen cloth, and honey-sweet pastries such as sugar loaves, different fine confections, forty sheep fattened on the best meadows, one *tūqūz* of heart-melting horses with blankets and girths and so forth. Most remarkably—if we can believe Mullā Sharīf—the round was interrupted for the distribution and sharing of food and sweets, to which the author devoted the following verses:

“When heaven brought the tablecloth of benevolence
 It had never seen bread of this dignity and greatness
 The covetous eye opened the door of felicity
 And the lid of its stomach’s cauldron blew
 Because of the precious *khwāns* laden with immense stuff
 The heavy lash became curved like the new moon
 Being ashamed in light of his [Hidāyatullah Khwāja’s] beneficence

²⁰⁷ Mullā Sharī, *Tāj*, fol. 484b.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, fols. 484b–489b.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, fols. 489a–b. According to Semenov, who extracted his data from the late eighteenth-century *Majma‘ al-arqām*, the *ūrāq* or *ūrākh* was one of the titles bestowed upon members of the religious establishment. Similar to the ranks of *ṣadr* and *ṣudūr*, there were no specific administrative duties attached to this title (Semenov, “Ocherk ustrojstva tzentral’nogo administrativnogo upravlenija,” 61). According to the *Tāj al-tawārīkh*, these titles were seldom given alone but together with other, more prestigious positions like the overseer of *waqfs* or superintendents of shrines, and even military ranks (see below).

The generous gathered the tablecloth from the court of the heavens”²¹⁰

This poem dedicated to the benevolence of Hidāyatullah Khwāja illustrates the approval of gift giving from a social and moral point of view. The sweetmeats and sugar loaves praised here were not gifted by the ruler but by one of his protégés, who further distributed the sweets and pastries immediately after presenting them to the king. The latter “blossomed like a flower and became amazed” when he saw the precious gifts.²¹¹

Another religious figure mentioned here is Aḥmad Khwāja b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Khwāja Sayyid Atā’ī, who is said to have been the tutor or spiritual mentor of the king. However, he was also a protégé enjoying the solicitude and paternal attention of Shāh Murād.²¹² Since his childhood he had shown much boldness and was now granted the position of *ṣadr*. In addition, he was honored with the rank of *amīr* and commander. This case shows how blurred identities could be. Here, a member of the influential Sayyid Atā lineage not only functions as *ṣadr* in a religious office, but also as a military commander who gained his position in return for loyalty and proven bravery. Aḥmad Khwāja showed his appreciation by offering nine gift horses.²¹³ Another member of the religious establishment by the name of Muḥammad Rizā Khwāja submitted three horses and twenty-seven sugar loaves to the king in return for his appointment to the position of *ṣudūr*.²¹⁴

The appointments to worldly positions followed the same procedure. Placing emphasis on the observance of the *yāsā* and *yūsūn*, the author of the *Tāj* refers to the establishment of order (*yāsā wa intisāq*) by the ruler, who now considered the representatives of the Uzbek tribes.²¹⁵ Unlike the author of the *Tuḥfat*, Mullā Sharīf devoted much space to listing the acts of loyalty, especially the military service, the prowess and the heroic courage shown by the warrior nobles on the battlefield.²¹⁶ While describing the appointments of Mīr Sayyid Bī and Ūtgūr Bī to the ranks of *atālīq* and *qūshbēgī* in great detail, he only summarizes the rest of the appointments, saying that the new

²¹⁰ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 489b–490a.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 490a.

²¹² Here the author uses the term *murabbī* (مربی) (tutor, educator, rearer, patron), but at the same time the *sayyid* is described as *dast-parward-i ‘ināyat-i zillu’l-āhī* (reared by the care of the divine shade) (*ibid.*, fol. 490b; see also Bregel, *Administration*, 24).

²¹³ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 491a.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 491b.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, fols. 493a–b.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, fols. 493a–494a.

king reconfirmed the leaders of the Uzbek tribes in their military and administrative positions and that the appointees expressed their gratitude by presenting numerous *bīlākāt*, *tūqūz* horses and other *pīshkash*.²¹⁷ In view of this, the ranks, titles, offices and positions as well as the pattern of appointment under Amīr Ḥaidar appear similar to the appointments described in the *Tuḥfat al-khānī* as presents and objects in an infinite sequence of gift exchange. The recipients of posts and titles also obtained a number of other status objects, like maces in different colors, golden or silver knives, scimitars and sabers, chain mail coats, necklaces of pearls and precious stones, flags and horsetails (*tūq*).²¹⁸

Persian Slaves

Since the late seventeenth century, there was a strong tendency to employ Qalmāq and Persian slaves in the military and the administration of the court. Cases in point were Tūra Qulī Bī Qūshbēgī Qalmāq, Jaushan Qalmāq and Muḥammad Daulat, all of whom received the post of *qūshbēgī*. We have also seen slaves serving as palace guards and as guardians of the fort of Chahār Jūy, one of the strategic gateways to Mā Warā' al-Nahr. In some cases, slaves or freed men held other governorships in the provinces. For example, Qutlugh Bāy, one of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī's *ghulāms*, had served as governor of Shahr-i Sabz.²¹⁹ Thus the employment and social mobility of slaves in the nineteenth century was not anything entirely new.²²⁰ Under Amīr Ḥaidar and Amīr Naṣrullah Khān we observe a further rise in the number of Persian slaves, many of whom were appointed to influential positions in the administration. Khanikov estimates their number at roughly

²¹⁷ Ibid., fols. 498a–b.

²¹⁸ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 237; Moser, *Durch Central-Asien*, 146–47.

²¹⁹ Qāzī Wafā does not mention Qutlugh Bāy as a slave but as one of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's old friends and as "a representative of his authority and a house-steward serving since old times" (*wakīl-i īn daulat wa khān-samān-i qadīm al-khidmat*) (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 276b, 354a). Ya'qūb refers to Qutlugh Bāy as a slave (*ghulam*) (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 6b).

²²⁰ For an analysis of the social mobility of Russian slaves in late eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century Bukhara, see Elena Smolarz, "Unterwegs wider Willen. Mobilität in den Schilderungen russischer Sklaven im Buchara des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts," *Internationales Asienforum (International Quarterly of Asian Studies)* 45, no. 1–2 (2014): 85–111.

forty thousand. Many of them were brought in from Marw and settled in the surroundings of Samarqand as a result of military expeditions.²²¹ Baron von Meyendorff gives the same number of Persian slaves imported from Marw and also refers to the slave trade maintained by the Turkmen tribes between Khiwa, Bukhara and Persia.²²²

While many Persian slaves were employed in the local agriculture, particularly the cultivation of gardens,²²³ Amīr Ḥaidar fostered the rise of Persian slaves who came to form a new elite juxtaposed and later balanced against the old Uzbek tribal aristocracy. Many of the Persians served in the military.²²⁴ Others were appointed to important ranks in the administration and were entrusted with the collection of revenues. For their service, many Bukharan slaves received *tankhwāhs* in irrigated areas.²²⁵ A royal diploma of investiture preserved the text of an appointment of such a *ghulām* to the post of *amlākdār* and *mīrāb* in a *tūmān* in Miyānkāl:

“During all this time and according to interest, we have conferred the post of a tax collector (*amlāk-dārī*) of Nahr-i pay-i Āhūgīr together with the duty of a *mīrāb* upon the court slave (*ghulām-i darbār*) ‘Abbās Bakāwul [and thereby] elevated [him]. He shall extract the provisions from the sown fields and sort out and take the *ḥiṣat al-kharāj** from four of ten [*man*] of the harvest of the winter crops and the summer crops (*saḥīd barī wa kabūd barī*). At places where the one of ten prevails, he shall give one *man* out of ten as *dah-yak* and take three *man* as *kharāj*. [He shall also levy] one *man* out of five (*panj yak*) on straw as is the custom in Bukhara. In recording and accounting for the *kharāj* he should fulfill the conditions of well-wishing and he should not act in opposition.”²²⁶

²²¹ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 86.

²²² von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 315–16. On the slave trade of the Turkmen tribes and the selling of Persian slaves in Khiwa and on the banks of the Āmū Daryā, see *Zafarnāma*, 221.

²²³ von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 318.

²²⁴ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 87. Ya‘qūb mentions a local *ilghār* of Īljabīk (?) consisting entirely of *ghulāms* (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, 24b).

²²⁵ In a document dating from the nineteenth century, two (former) slaves, Banda Qul Bahādūr and Ādīna Qul Bahādūr, are listed among the recipients of *tankhwāhs* near Karmīna. At least this is suggested by their individual names (Chekhovich, *Dokumenty*, doc. 50, 209; Russian trans., 212; see also section Sharecropping, Land Tenure and Patronage in Bukhara in this chapter).

* In medieval times, the term *kharāj* described a tax on agricultural land. Very often it was used to denominate taxes in general. Its exact amount depended on several factors: the condition of the land and its geographical location, the manner of irrigation, the crops and the prices (for further information see A. K. S. Lambton, “Kharāj II. In Persia,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., IV, 1034–53).

²²⁶ *Maktūbāt wa manshūrāt*, fols. 79b–80a; Şifatgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 470–71.

In addition to posts in the bureaucracy and, as described by the document, the fiscal duties, Persian slaves and manumitted slaves often received prestigious governorships like that of Samarqand. One of the most prominent Persian slaves, or freed men, was Ayāz Bī, who served first as governor of Katta Qūrgḥān and later helped open the city gates for Naṣrullah Khān.²²⁷ Ayāz Bī served successively as governor of Qarshī, Samarqand,²²⁸ and as chief of the Bukharan artillery (*tūpchībāshī*). He later fell out of favor with Naṣrullah Khān and was executed in 1840.²²⁹ According to Ya‘qūb, the most prominent Persian slave serving Amīr Ḥaidar was Daulat Bī Qūshbēgī, who was installed as governor of Samarqand at the beginning of Amīr Ḥaidar’s rule.²³⁰ A document belonging to a collection of royal diplomas, however, says that Daulat Bī served first as *ināq* and was later promoted to the post of *qūshbēgī* of Bukhara and governor of Qarākūl.²³¹ Although Ya‘qūb’s account is very inconsistent with regard to the rotation of the *ḥukūmat-i* Samarqand, suggesting that it was transferred several times around 1235/1819–20, other sources point to Daulat Bī’s continued service as governor there.²³²

Another prominent Persian serving the Manghit *amīrs* in various positions was Muḥammad Sharīf.²³³ Like other Iranians before him, this man

²²⁷ Ya‘qūb names him Ayāz Ghulām (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 17a, 30a). On the assistance of Ayāz Bī in securing the capital for Naṣrullah, see also Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 301–02.

²²⁸ Baron von Meyendorff notes that Ayāz Bī served as governor of Samarqand already under Amīr Ḥaidar (von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 293).

²²⁹ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 301–02, 304.

²³⁰ Ya‘qūb states that the *ghulām* of the ruler by the name of Daulat was brought from Khuzār to Samarqand where he was installed as governor (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 13b). Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm confirms this appointment and says that Daulat Qūshbēgī came originally from Isfahan in Iran. He allegedly belonged to the slaves of Abū’l-Faīz Khān. But he probably confused this individual with the *qūshbēgī* of the same name, Muḥammad Daulat, also a slave, serving under Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 70 (French text, 157)).

²³¹ *Maktūbāt wa manshūrāt*, fols. 107b–108b; Şifatgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 498–99.

²³² Mir Izzetullah calls him governor of Samarqand and *qūshbēgī* of the slaves of the king (Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 336; see also Ḥāfīz Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 23 (English text, 25)). According to an account dating from the beginning of the 1820s, at that time Daulat Bī (here Dewlet Begi) still served as governor and commander of the citadel of Samarqand (“Descriptions of Bokhara and Samarkand,” *Oriental Herald and Colonial Review* 1, no. 2 (1842): 242).

²³³ It is not clear whether this man is in fact Muḥammad Sharīf Ināq who belonged to the supporters of Amīr ‘Umar Khān b. Amīr Ḥaidar in the succession struggle in 1826–27.

held the rank of *dīwānbēgī*. In a *manshūr* he is styled “Trust of the Dominion” (*mu‘tamad al-daula*) and worthy of promotion (*lāyiq al-tarbīya*). With the same document, the king conferred on him the seat of *bī*, hitherto an exclusive prerogative held by members of the Uzbek tribal elite. Simultaneously, he appointed him as vice regent (*nāyib*) of Samarqand. As such, he had to levy the *kharāj* from the important *tūmāns* Āfarīnkent, Anhār, Shaudār and others, and spent it on the maintenance of the *naukariya* and the training of the army.²³⁴ In the *Zafarnāma*, a chronicle dedicated to Amīr Naṣrullah, Muḥammad Sharīf Bī figures as *tūpchībāshī* and commander of Iranian contingents.²³⁵

The Ideal Patron versus the “Bad” Patron

In this section, I would like to pay attention to one part of the *Tāj al-tawārīkh* giving instructive information about the situation in Shahr-i Sabz during the time of Shāh Murād and at the beginning of Amīr Ḥaidar’s rule. Moreover, the passage helps highlight typical notions of good and bad governance held at that time.

In the third chapter, I already explored the position of the Kīnakās *amīrs* and their way of coping with other players in the field of power. During the following time, the local leadership became very much a talking point as opponents of the central authorities. In the first years after Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān’s sudden demise, they had posed a constant challenge to Dānyāl Bī Atālīq and even sided with the Qarā-Manghit sub-division of the ruling Manghit tribe.²³⁶ At the beginning of Shāh Murād’s rule, the sources report about a rebellion instigated by Niyāz ‘Alī Bī Dīwānbēgī b. Bēg Nazar Bī.²³⁷ Mullā Sharīf vividly describes the plundering campaigns and the ferocity with which the ruler continued his actions. He ordered the construction of some forts in sight of Shahr and Kitāb but was also able to occupy some of the fortified settlements held by the rebels. In addition, his troops wreaked immense havoc on the local agriculture by destroying the

²³⁴ *Maktūbāt wa manshūrāt*, fols. 80a–81a; Şifatgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 471–72.

²³⁵ *Zafarnāma*, 86, 121, 123.

²³⁶ Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 361a, 363b–364b; Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 8a; Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 38, 40.

²³⁷ Besides Niyāz ‘Alī Bī, Bēg Nazar Bī had two other sons, Ḥakīm Bī and ‘Abdullah Dādkhwāh (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 368). According to the *Tāj al-tawārīkh*, Niyāz ‘Alī Bī bore the title of *parwānachī* (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 508a).

irrigation system, cutting down the characteristic trees and plundering harvests.²³⁸ One of the *qal'as* to be erected was Dū Āba located near Shāri' Sukān, Qaşān-i Tagāb, Rakān Dharra and Bīshar, which formed one of the most fertile parts of the Tagāb-i Kish. Shāh Murād placed a certain Daulān Bī, who had earned great fame because of his glorious deeds and his loyalty during this campaign, in charge of Dū Āba, while tightening the siege on Shahr and Kitāb.²³⁹ Our sources supply conflicting information concerning the events leading to an end of the campaign. Mullā Sharīf reports that Niyāz 'Alī Bī finally submitted to the Bukharan troops and swore allegiance to Shāh Murād. At the same time, he formed a matrimonial alliance with the ruler and was sometimes described as the excellent, distinguished and beloved son of his majesty.²⁴⁰

In contrast to this, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān writes about a protracted war in Shahr-i Sabz and the withdrawal of the royal troops who failed to conquer the region.²⁴¹ According to Babajanov, who worked with hagiographic texts, Khalīfa Khudāyār—an influential Naqshbandī sheikh who had maintained good contacts with Bēg Naẓar Bī Kīnakās and the ruler of Ūrā Tippa, Khudāyār Bī b. Fāzil Bī—soon came to Shahr-i Sabz when he heard about the campaign of the Bukharan forces. On learning that Khalīfa Khudāyār was among the besieged, Shāh Murād withdrew his troops and lifted the siege.²⁴²

Whatever led to the retreat of Shāh Murād's forces and the continued rule of Niyāz 'Alī, our main source tells us that the latter broke his oath shortly after the king's death in 1800. The fact that Mullā Sharīf condemns this perjury while underlining his statements with a *ḥadīth*, speaks for a considerable resilience of the oath system.²⁴³ All the sources agree that Fāzil Bī and 'Umar Bī, two brothers of Shāh Murād, led an unsuccessful rebellion against Amīr Ḥaidar and were eventually forced to take refuge in Shahr-i

²³⁸ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 508a–509a. According to the *Muntakhab*, Shāh Murād erected eighteen forts in the surroundings of Shahr (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 369).

²³⁹ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 509a–b.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, fols. 512b, 514a.

²⁴¹ Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 369.

²⁴² Babadžanov, "The Naqšbandīya Muğaddidīya," 393–94.

²⁴³ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 515b. On the role of oaths in the eighteenth century, see chapter The Order of Things.

Sabz.²⁴⁴ Here both were generously hosted by Niyāz ‘Alī Bī, who granted them places of residence and dwellings.²⁴⁵ In the months following Amīr Ḥaidar’s enthronization, the Kīnakās *amīrs* spread their rebellious activities throughout Shahr-i Sabz and were able to oust the forces of the central government.²⁴⁶ At the same time, however, the inhabitants of Dū Āba decided to rid themselves of their unpopular *ḥākīm* Daulān Bī. If we believe our author, the populace was on the “verge of poverty and desperation” because of the measures taken by the governor, who is characterized as a prime example of selfishness and miserliness:

“Daulān Bī was a hundred days’ journey away from the path leading to the strength of judgment and foresight. He was famous for the non-observance of kindness to kinsmen and his ignorance with respect to the protection of strangers (*aqārib-nawāzī wa ajānib-parwarī*) owing to love of wealth and property. Out of immense greed he had transferred all that he possessed in silver, gold and various kinds of riches, which he had gained from the government of this province, to the ‘place of glory’ [Bukhara]. He did not pay much attention to the state of his tribesmen and the devoted attendants. Therefore the subjects were dissatisfied with his characteristics and dealings, and even his dependents and close relatives demanded his removal from office.”²⁴⁷

The text continues with the information that the *amīr*—in spite of having been informed about his misdemeanor by complaints from the entire population—left the potentate in office and “did not turn the countenance of grace away from him.”²⁴⁸ This interesting passage strikingly displays contemporary notions of moral behavior. Daulān Bī is portrayed as the opposite of Amīr Ḥaidar. While the latter is often described as the perfect patron by his court chronicler, the governor is depicted as a ruthless tyrant, somebody who failed to take care of his followers, and who amassed wealth for himself instead of distributing it among his kinsmen and supporters. Placing emphasis on Daulān Bī’s misbehavior, the chronicler reports how the representatives of the people opted to call the Kīnakās troops in and how the latter, backed by the inhabitants of Dū Āba, attacked the local garrison

²⁴⁴ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 515a; Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 12a; Mu‘īn, *Tārīkh*, fols. 32b–33a; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 62–63 (French text, 143).

²⁴⁵ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 515a.

²⁴⁶ Mullā Sharīf reports about a series of Kīnakās campaigns against Bukharan positions. The rebels soon took the *qal‘as* Chaghatay and Sārbān Tippa, the latter being located near Kitāb (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 516a–518a).

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 518b.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

and the governor. When the fighting reached a first peak, Daulān Bī's supporters were ready to surrender but he refused. Mullā Sharīf finally attributes the political weakness of the governor of Dū Āba to his neglect of followers and friends whom he failed to generously reward.²⁴⁹ In the following time, Shahr-i Sabz retained its independence from Bukhara and became a refuge for fugitives from Bukhara and Khoqand.²⁵⁰

This negative portrayal of Daulān Bī also contrasts with the data provided by the *Tāj* and other sources about the performance of Amīr Ḥaidar. Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, for instance, reports that he supported ten thousand followers. In addition, the ruler maintained friendly relations with Kabul and was tied in a vital web of marriage alliances.²⁵¹ The image of the ideal patron as conveyed by the chronicles also corresponds to the content of some official letters from Amīr Ḥaidar. These documents reveal the significance of social order—and especially the institutions related to patronage—for daily administrative routines. One of the letters says:

“The ‘Asylum of Honor’ and the ‘Manifestation of Amīrhood’ Mu'tamad al-daula Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Dīwānbēgī distinguished by royal favors, be informed that five hundred persons of the *shāgird pīsha*, nine hundred Manghit and one hundred Sarāy make one thousand persons. Having envisaged paying two *tanga* for everyone, I have sent about three thousand *tanga*. Give three thousand *tanga* and distribute them amongst the *naukar*.”²⁵²

This letter addressed to the governor of Qarshī continues with the arrangement of troops according to tribal divisions and a promise to send robes of honor for the military leaders assigned to the several contingents.²⁵³ In fact, the document gives evidence of the transition from an exchange-based political economy to a more sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus including regularly paid tribal contingents. Apart from that, it shows a certain sense of solicitude with respect to the ordinary soldiers (*naukar*).

²⁴⁹ Ibid., fols. 518a–523a. The difficulties of the government and the loss of Dū Āba, Chaghatay and Sārbān Tippa (here Shādiyān Tippa) are also documented by an official letter from Amīr Ḥaidar (Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 29, fols. 12a–b).

²⁵⁰ See Schiewek, “À propos des exilés”, 17.

²⁵¹ Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 76 (French text, 170). According to Bukhārī, Amīr Ḥaidar had married a daughter of Shāh Zamān b. Timūr Shāh (r.1793–1800). Besides, he had entered into marriage alliances with the governor of Ḥiṣār, Sayyid Bī Yüz, and the later ruler of Shahr-i Sabz, Muḥammad Šādiq Bī (ibid.).

²⁵² Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 7, fols. 4b–5b.

²⁵³ Ibid.

Another letter issued by the ruler orders the governor of Qarshī, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Mihtar, to look after one of the royal clients by the name of Muḥammad Mūsā Khwāja belonging to “the old ancestral well-wishers” (*du ‘ā-gūyān-i dīrīna-yi maurūzī*). The governor was instructed to caress and favor the *khwāja* “because of the dues connected to invocation of blessings (*du ‘ā-gū’ī*) and good service.”²⁵⁴ With this, the document echoes notions of solicitude and support of a religious noble who is rewarded for his continued loyalty expressed in *du ‘ā-gū’ī*,²⁵⁵ invocations on behalf of the ruler. There are some other official letters conveying a sense of custody, not only for particular persons but for the entire population:

“[...] During these five years we have granted privileges and kindness to the entire populace and garnered *khwāns* for the *naukar*. The subjects were likewise paid attention (*ri ‘āyat*) because of their continued loyalty. So, do also grant privileges to the subjects! If attention is paid to them, the kingdom will prosper [...]”²⁵⁶

In these short instructions addressed to Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī, emphasis is placed on the topic of *ri ‘āyat*—attention, solicitude and favor as a visible and practical expression of the shade of benevolence spread by the ruler to protect his subjects. By pointing to the *khwāns* for the *naukar*, Amīr Ḥaidar gives a concrete example of the proper exercise of patronage. The message here is clear; authority is exercised through a mediator or broker, in this case the governor of Qarshī, who is ordered to observe the decree. Simultaneously, the king refers to protection and attention ensuring the prosperity of his realm. With these documents the ruler presents himself as a good protector having an eye on the physical well-being of his subjects.²⁵⁷ This is confirmed by Mīrzā Shams saying that the king did not neglect even for a minute to pay attention to the state of the subjects and the peace and quiet of the soldiery and the kingdom.²⁵⁸ The most interesting evidence of the significance of royal patronage in everyday life is given by another letter. In it, Amīr Ḥaidar refers to one of his protégés who had been brought up and

²⁵⁴ Ibid., makt. no. 32, fol. 13b.

²⁵⁵ On *dū ‘ā-gū’ī* see also Paul, “Herrschaft und Gesellschaft,” 181, footnote no. 13.

²⁵⁶ Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 52, fols. 18b–19a.

²⁵⁷ In one of his letters dating from 1215/1800–01, the ruler warns his governor about pursuing an oppressive policy in Qarshī and its environs. He also advises Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī to pay special attention to the Qungrat and the Abar Sārī communities (Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 97, fols. 41b–42a).

²⁵⁸ Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā’ī, *Tārīkh-i Bukhārā*, 73.

promoted by him personally for many years. The person in question is a certain Yūsuf, described as a *mahrām*, a confidant or intimate friend. Although the document does not tell us the particular reason for the separation of the client from his patron, the king makes his point by stating that it is morally wrong to separate a follower from his protector.²⁵⁹ With this, the letter ultimately reflects a certain morality rooted in the worldview of the protagonists, as well as the great affection a patron could have for one of his associates. Affection and paternal love are not secondary aspects but are central for this kind of social relationship. The immense solicitude and attention paid by the ruler to his servants and *tarbiyat yāftagān* is also explained in some of the chronicles. For example, the *Tāj* mentions a certain Sulṭān Khān Khwāja Aḥrārī, a nephew of Khudāyār Bī Yūz and grandson of Fāzil Bī, who had left his home region already during the tenure of Khudāyār Bī to take refuge “under the *ḥimāyat*-spreading shade” of his majesty in Nasaf. From that time onward, he remained loyal to Amīr Ḥaidar, and on his patron’s inauguration was rewarded with the position of *mīr-i asad* and the custodianship of Khwāja ‘Ubaidullah Aḥrār’s tomb in Samarqand.²⁶⁰ The persons privileged in this way expressed their gratitude by praising the ruler with this poem:

“The divine shade’s treasury of beneficence is like a deep ocean
 The sea is full and swelling, the ocean so great
 According to his ability and will to follow the right way
 Everyone completely and successfully obtains what he desired
 No one in the world is deprived of the fruits of his benevolence
 He is the munificent nourisher of the thirsty, the benefactor of the world
 The sweet drink of the medicine granted by the Jesus-like king
 Is a proven salve for the mournful and the desirous
 His splendid sun, the illuminated mind, the illustrious gem
 Is the countenance in the mirror of Alexander and Solomon.”²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 85, fols. 32b–33a.

²⁶⁰ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 487a–b.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 488b.

Other signs of paternalistic behavior are to be found in the *inshā'* collections. For instance, in one of his letters, the *amīr* instructs his governor of Qarshī to take care of Khān Khwāja Sheikh al-Islām and a certain Muḥammad 'Alī Chaghatay-bēgī. Until the next spring, the governor shall be informed about their condition and help them with meat and grain.²⁶²

NAŞRULLAH KHĀN: THE LORD OF THE AUSPICIOUS CONJUNCTION

Amīr Naşrullah Bahādur Khān was the most successful Manghit ruler of the nineteenth century. This is at least the impression given by his unknown chronicler and other primary sources. Sometimes he is also described as “the most bizarre ruler” in the region, and was, at least to a Western audience, known for the execution of the British agents Conolly and Stoddart.²⁶³ His reign contrasts with that of his late father, who had faced prolonged rebellions and invasions by external enemies for many years. Naşrullah Khān soon recognized that he had to direct his energies beyond the limits of his immediate sphere of influence in order to generate material resources and stabilize his regime. In the early 1840s, he started a series of campaigns focusing on his eastern neighbors, the Ming rulers of Khoqand. In the course of these expeditions, he succeeded in subduing his enemy, Muḥammad 'Alī Khān, and temporarily annexed Khoqand in 1842.²⁶⁴ With this striking success, Naşrullah earned himself great fame as the unquestioned strongman north of the Oxus, even though it was more of a pyrrhic victory. His unknown chronicler therefore calls him respectfully the “Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction” (*ṣāhib-qirān*), an epithet that clearly puts him on the same footing as Tīmūr.²⁶⁵ It is not without reason that the chronicle dedicated to him bears the title *Zafarnāma* (Book of Victory), in which the military element prevails over other aspects of power. Since he is sometimes described as a “World-conquering King of Kings” or simply as “World-conquering and Fortunate Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction”

²⁶² Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 30, fol. 12b.

²⁶³ Fragner, “Die ‘Khanate’,” 72; “Nasr Ullah Bahadur Chan, Emir von Buchara. (Mit einem Porträt.)” *Das Ausland* 91 (April 1, 1845): 361.

²⁶⁴ The secondary sources give the year 1842 for the Bukharan conquest of Khoqand (Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 141; Hambly, “Verfall,” 197; Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 399; Paul, *Zentralasien*, 381). But according to the *Zafarnāma*, it took place in 1259/1843–44 (*Zafarnāma*, 201).

²⁶⁵ See also Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 5.

(*shahanshāh-i gītī-sitān; amīr-i šāhib-qirān-i sa ‘ādat-nishān-i gītī-sitān*),²⁶⁶ the next two sections will deal with several aspects of Naṣrullah Khān’s reign: his measures against internal rivals, the composition and organization of the military, and the distribution of gifts.

Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī’s Family Network

Two men engineered Naṣrullah Khān’s usurpation of the throne: Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Qūshbēgī and Ayāz Bī Tūpchībāshī. This is confirmed by most of the primary sources.²⁶⁷ Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī and his family looked back on a long and illustrious career under three successive Manghit rulers.²⁶⁸ The rise of this family set in with Ūtgūr Bī. Calling him Ūtgūr Ṣūfī, Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm says that he was one of the friends and a *hampīra* of Shāh Murād.²⁶⁹ This “probably indicates some earlier ties between him and Shāh Murād when the latter became a Sufī.”²⁷⁰ This author also says that Ūtgūr Bī gained the position of *qūshbēgī* in the time of Dānyāl Bī and after the assassination of his predecessor Daulat Bī, a former slave of the first Manghit king.²⁷¹ He further refers to Ūtgūr Bī’s attempts to secure the throne for Amīr Ḥaidar, who was faced with rival claims by his maternal uncles. After the enthronization of the new king, he was confirmed as *qūshbēgī*, while his son

²⁶⁶ *Zafarnāma*, 160.

²⁶⁷ ‘Umar Khān’s fall was accelerated by the *qūshbēgī*’s decision to hand the capital over to Naṣrullah Khān (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 30a; *Zafarnāma*, 78; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 422, 426; Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā’ī, *Tārīkh*, 93–94; Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuhfa*, 129).

²⁶⁸ If we include the short reigns of Ḥusain and ‘Umar, they served under five *amīrs*.

²⁶⁹ [...] *wizārat-rā Ūtgūr Ṣūfī ki az dūstān wa hampīra-yi Shāh Murād būd dād*. Schefer translates it as “Les fonctions de vėzır furent donnės à Outkour Soufy, ami de Chāh Murad et affiliė à la męme secte religieuse qui lui” (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 56 (French text, 127)).

²⁷⁰ Bregel, *Administration*, 11, footnote no. 42.

²⁷¹ Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 56 (French text, 127). According to Bregel’s reading of the *Tāj al-tawārīkh*, Ūtgūr Bī gained the post of *qūshbēgī* only two years before Shāh Murād’s death. For the exact wording of the English translation of the text, see Bregel, *Administration*, 11, footnote no. 42. Sāmī also mentions Ūtgūr Bī holding the post of *ināq* under Shāh Murād. The latter allegedly appointed him as *atālīq* at the side of the young Amīr Ḥaidar (Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuhfa*, 77).

Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī became governor of Qarshī in return for Ūtgūr Bī's loyalty.²⁷² Recording the appointment, Mullā Sharīf states that Ūtgūr Bī

“shall become the ‘point of reference’ for all the learned people, the *amīrs* and the entire populace (*sipāhī wa ra‘āyā*). All matters and necessities of the nobles and the commoners, all hopes and problems of the lowborn and the nobles shall be solved by him.”²⁷³

In this source, Ūtgūr Bī also figures under the title of a “benefactor” (*walī-ni ‘mī*) and is listed among the most prominent Manghit chiefs and commanders.²⁷⁴

Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī was the most successful of Ūtgūr Bī's sons. As governor of Qarshī, one of the key places in Mā Warā' al-Nahr, he was the addressee of Amīr Ḥaidar's letters. In this correspondence, he is addressed either as *dīwānbēgī* or as *mihtar*.²⁷⁵ Later he was promoted to the post of *ināq-i kalān* and transferred to the capital,²⁷⁶ where he continued his career. In Bukhara he later attained the position of an “intimate friend” (*muqarrab al-khaqān*) of Amīr Ḥaidar and also received the *tūmāns* of Āhūgīr and Khairābād as *tankhwāh*.²⁷⁷ Finally he was entrusted with the office of *qūshbēgī-yi kull* and collector of the tithe (*‘ashir/‘ushr*) of the capital area, along with the post of keeper of the arsenal (*qūrbāshī*) and head of the *maḥramīya*, the Qalmāq, the *khāṣa-bardārs*, *shāgird pīsha* and the slaves in service of the artillery (*bandagān-i tūpchī*). For his own upkeep Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī received Narazm and its dependencies as *tankhwah*.²⁷⁸

Baron von Meyendorff, who visited Bukhara around 1820, describes Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Qūshbēgī as follows:

“Hakim-beg appeared to be in his fifties; his long, dark brown beard was becoming white; he was of tall stature, his physiognomy was ingratiating and gentle; he also expressed himself skillfully in Persian. He wore a white cashmere shawl as a turban, a *khal‘at* made

²⁷² Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 68–69 (French text, 154–55).

²⁷³ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 496a.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 451a.

²⁷⁵ The letters addressed to Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī date from 1215–16/1800–02 (Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, IVANRUZ no. 5412).

²⁷⁶ *Maktūbāt wa manshūrāt*, fols. 109b–111a; Şifātgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 501–02.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, fols. 106a–107a; Şifātgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 497–98.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, fols. 97a–98a; Şifātgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 490.

from the same material printed with big flowers, and a sable fur covered with stripy cashmere.²⁷⁹

Pointing out the influence of the *qūshbēgī*, von Meyendorff mentions that he owned many slaves and that Bukhara's administrative apparatus was run by them and Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī's relatives.²⁸⁰ The great influence of this man and his family is noted by other authors too. Mir Izzetullah claims that no other official had equal authority:

“All the affairs of the state are conducted by the king himself, without the assistance of any principal ministers, except Hakim Be, who when the king goes out from the city on any journey, is left in charge of the citadel and the administration of affairs. The collection of the *Māli Zikat*, and other imposts, is in the hands of Hakim Be, under the supervisal of the king : no other officer of the state has equal authority.”²⁸¹

By the beginning of the 1830s, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī was the linchpin of a powerful faction, the members of which held key positions in the administration. He commanded an extended family network, while at the same time the position of *atālīq* was reduced to near insignificance.²⁸² The following list of persons suggests that Muḥammad Ḥakīm's personal network reached even into distant parts of *Mā Warā' al-Nahr* where his brothers acted as governors:

- ‘Abd al-Rasūl Bī, a brother of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī,²⁸³ served as governor of Jizakh in the time of Amīr Ḥaidar;²⁸⁴ in 1238/1822–23, he was deposed from this post by the prince Mīr Ḥusain, at that time governor of Samarqand, and sent to Bukhara. But since this step was not authorized by the king, Mīr Ḥusain was

²⁷⁹ von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 229.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 292–93, 318.

²⁸¹ Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 331.

²⁸² By that time, *atālīq* was only an honorary title (Bregel, “*Atālīq*,” 97) held by the *amīr* of Ḥiṣār.

²⁸³ According to another source, ‘Abd al-Rasūl Bī was a nephew of Ḥakīm Bī (Ḥāfiz Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 24 (English text, 25)).

²⁸⁴ Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 328; von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 293. According to Bukhārī, ‘Abd al-Rasūl Bī served first as a minister to Dīn Nāṣir Bēg, a son of Shāh Murād and governor of Marw (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 63 (French text, 144)). Sāmī notes that ‘Abd al-Rasūl Bī held the rank of *dādkhwāh* and served as governor of Jizakh. In 1811 ‘Abd al-Rasūl Bī withstood an unsuccessful siege by the Khoqandian ruler ‘Umar Khān (r. 1810–22) and was also sent on a mission to Pishāghar (Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 101).

soon removed as *ḥākīm* of Samarqand and allegedly replaced with ‘Abd al-Rasūl Bī.²⁸⁵

- Muḥammad Qābil Bī Ināq, another brother, served in the garrison of Ūrā Tippa in the early years of Amīr Ḥaidar’s rule.²⁸⁶ According to Mīr ‘Abd al-Karīm, he was appointed governor of Ūrā Tippa in 1219/1804–05; in 1812 he held the post of governor of Qarākūl.²⁸⁷ After Naṣrullah Khān’s coronation, he was appointed governor of Nahr-i pay.²⁸⁸
- An unnamed son was appointed governor of Qarshī after the enthronization of Naṣrullah Khān.²⁸⁹
- Ayāz Bī Īrānī, his father-in-law, served as governor of Qarshī for a while and later became *tūpchībāshī* in Naṣrullah Khān’s army.²⁹⁰

This list is not exclusive but contains the names of relatives mentioned in the sources. It shows that the power structure at the Bukharan court had changed considerably since Shāh Murād’s reign. There are signs that Ūtgūr Šūfī and his descendants had managed to keep the position of *qūshbēgī* hereditary in their family. Pointing to the power of this actor, Burnes confirms that the *qūshbēgī* wished to pass his rank on to one of his sons:

“His [the king’s] minister, the Koosh Begee, possess great influence over him; and, though chiefly indebted to him for his throne, the King entertains no dread of his power. He never leaves the citadel till his Vizier is present to take charge of it. His Majesty will never receive his food at any hands but those of his minister. This person is of an advanced age; upwards of sixty. He is an Uzbek, of the tribe of Mungut, possessed of

²⁸⁵ Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 20b–21a. ‘Abd al-Rasūl Bī’s governorship of Samarqand is not confirmed by other sources.

²⁸⁶ Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 390; Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 70 (French text, 159). On the appointment of Qābil Bī as *ināq-i kalān* of Bukhārā, see *Maktūbāt wa manshūrāt*, fols. 70b–71b; Šifātqul, *Pazhūhishi*, 485.

²⁸⁷ Ḥāfīz Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 24 (English text, 25); Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 336. According to von Meyendorff, the *ināq* wielded great influence over the king, and his sons held pensions without rendering service. One of them served as treasurer of the ruler’s private treasury (von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 293).

²⁸⁸ Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 132.

²⁸⁹ Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 31a; Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 132. Khanikov mentions another son of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Qūshbēgī by the name of ‘Abdullah Khān (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 300–01).

²⁹⁰ Ayāz Bī Tūpchībāshī was a former Persian slave of the late Amīr Ḥaidar (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 303). Von Meyendorff says that Ayāz Bī acted as governor of Samarqand (von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 293). According to Ya‘qūb, who calls him Ayāz Ghulām, this man had served as governor of Katta Qūrgān in 1235/1819–20 (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 17a).

talent and acquirements; and unremitting in his attentions to business. He also trades to a great extent, and is fond of money, but strictly just in levying the taxes on commerce. The Shhigh office of Vizier may be considered hereditary in his family: his father enjoyed it; his brothers hold two of the governments; and his sons, of whom he has thirteen, are employed in different districts and provinces. He has fixed on one of these as his successor. There is a great mixture of cunning in the minister's character [...]. The whole wealth and power of the kingdom is at his command; since he receives the revenues, and is able to sway the priesthood, to whom he is ever respectful and conciliatory.²⁹¹

His administrative functions as *qūshbēgī* made Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī a man of enormous influence. As holder of the royal seals and collector of the customs duties from trade, he headed an extensive staff, the members of which were also posted in the provinces. He was also entrusted with the collection of the *jizya*, the tax paid by non-Muslims, and the security of the *arg* of Bukhara in the absence of the ruler.²⁹²

By the early 1830s, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Qūshbēgī was the main power broker at the court and benefitted greatly from Naṣrullah's success. In the first years of his long reign, the king kept Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī in office; after all, he was a man with expertise in governance and administration. Later on Naṣrullah Khān probably foresaw that this ambitious family would set up a dynasty of *qūshbēgīs*. From there it was only a small step to full power. Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī's family could also hope to govern through puppet *amīrs* from the Tūq Manghit line. Henceforth the measures taken by the ruler against the Uzbek soldiery (*sipahīs*) mentioned by the secondary literature were primarily directed against Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī in order to overcome his powerful minister. In the *Zafarnāma*, the *qūshbēgī* appears for the last time in the context of an expedition to Shahr-i Sabz in the first year of Naṣrullah's reign. On that occasion, he was entrusted with the protection of the Bukharan city *arg*.²⁹³ According to Khanikov, Muḥammad Ḥakīm's downfall came in 1837 when he was deprived of his post and thrown into prison. His father-in-law, Ayāz Bī, shared the same fate a little later.

The *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh* sheds light on the quick rotation of important governorships prior to the total removal of this party.²⁹⁴ It seems that from

²⁹¹ Burnes, *Travels*, II, 365–66.

²⁹² Khanikov, *Bokhara*, 243–45.

²⁹³ *Zafarnāma*, 84. Visiting Bukhara at the beginning of the 1830s, Burnes informs about his meetings with the *qūshbēgī* (Burnes, *Travels*, I, 289–91, 312–16).

²⁹⁴ Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī was first deprived of his rank and transferred to Qarshī, the governorship of which was held by Ayāz Bī before. Ayāz Bī was then transferred to

the very beginning, the ruler let other *amīrs* change positions frequently to prevent them from building their own local power base.²⁹⁵ In the following time, he forcefully destroyed the faction around the *qūshbēgī* and also executed many influential military leaders.²⁹⁶ These severe measures are confirmed by Mīrzā Shams stating that the ruler ordered most of the nobles to be executed or arrested, their property confiscated and their estates looted.²⁹⁷ Other sources generously leave these measures unmentioned. It is also possible that Khanikov, who himself admits the dearth of written sources, largely drew on Mīrzā Shams' strongly colored account in his assessment of Naşrullah Khān.

*The Military*²⁹⁸

In this section I will explore the impact of Amīr Naşrullah's actions in the military field. In a first step, I will have a look at the army of his father, Amir Ḥaidar, to outline principles of warfare and military organization. The secondary literature often refers to the establishment of a standing army directly paid by Naşrullah Khān and other military innovations, as well as

Samarqand. Shukūr Bī, another important figure, was recalled to the capital. After only forty days, Ayāz Bī was removed from Samarqand and recalled to Bukhara, while Ḥakīm Bī was transferred to Nūr-i Atā. After a little while, both of them found themselves imprisoned and executed. While their estates were either looted or confiscated, all their relatives were deprived of their former positions and income, and then expelled from the court (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 482–83).

²⁹⁵ Ya'qūb reports several rounds of appointments within a relatively short time and states that most of the governorships were assigned to Manghit nobles (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 31a–32a).

²⁹⁶ Khanikov, *Bokhara*, 303–05.

²⁹⁷ According to Mīrzā Shams, Naşrullah Khān allegedly ordered the execution of fifty to one hundred people, whereupon many influential nobles escaped from Bukhara. He himself also fled and took refuge in Shahr-i Sabz together with many other people (Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 94–95, 97–98).

²⁹⁸ Exploring a much larger corpus of written sources, Wolfgang Holzwarth worked on similar issues of the military organization of the Uzbeks. He focuses on a longer time span from 1670 to the first Uzbek-Russian encounters, but also goes back to the Mongol (Chingizid) legacy (see Wolfgang Holzwarth, "Bukharan Armies and Uzbek Military Power, 1670–1870: Coping with the Legacy of a Nomadic Conquest," in *Nomadic Military Power in Iran and Adjacent Areas in the Islamic Period*, ed. Kurt Franz and Wolfgang Holzwarth (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 2015), 273–354).

attempts to curb the power of the tribal chiefs.²⁹⁹ Yet the primary sources provide a more complex picture. While in many ways historical patterns of military organization lingered on, the reforms undertaken by Amīr Ḥaidar and Amīr Naṣrullah Khān were often not very effective.

Amīr Ḥaidar made the first attempts to establish more direct control at least over some sections of the army. According to some travel accounts, he relied on an army of eighty to one hundred thousand horsemen (*sawārs*), who were registered in muster rolls. The soldiers were paid regularly, and large contingents of up to ten thousand men were stationed in Samarqand and also in Marw.³⁰⁰ According to Ḥāfīz Muḥammad Fāzil Khān,

“the entire army was placed under the command of the king and paid its allowances in cash (*zarr-i naqd*). [...] Likewise, the army has been scattered in different places, particularly in Adratappa [sic! Ūrā Tippa], Marv-i Shah Jahan and Bukhara. The papers relating to the descriptive rolls of the army men and the marks and colour of the horses are kept by the King himself. He always checks them at muster.”³⁰¹

Notwithstanding the degree of control imposed by the *amīr*, Amīr Ḥaidar’s *inshā’* documents suggest that tribal affiliations were still essential for the organization of the military. In one of his letters, the king orders his governor of Qarshī to station garrisons in various citadels and assigns commanders to the individual tribal contingents. Here the *amīr* lists five hundred *shāgird pīsha*, nine hundred Manghit and one hundred Sarāy soldiers.³⁰² In another letter, the ruler demanded the *daftar-i naukar*, a kind

²⁹⁹ Paul, *Zentralasien*, 377; Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 397; Khalid, “Society and politics,” 369; see also “Nasr Ullah Bahadur Khan,” 362.

³⁰⁰ Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 332–33, 336; Ḥāfīz Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 25–26 (English text, 27). According to an unknown visitor, at that time the Bukharan army consisted of one hundred and fifty thousand “well-organized horsemen, besides artillery, but very few infantry” (“Description,” 243). But this figure seems unlikely. According to von Meyendorff, Amīr Ḥaidar’s garrison in Marw consisted of only four hundred to five hundred men (von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 241).

³⁰¹ Ḥāfīz Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 25 (English text, 27).

³⁰² The Manghit contingents further divided into the Tūq Manghit with the exception of the Qara Pīr sub-section, the Kūblak, Bāy Ghundī, Ūngī, Ḥauqī, Pīshkal, Kala Bahādur, Tās, Qara Yur, and Yurcha Qara, who were assigned to a certain Muḥammad Naṣar Tūqsāba; the Bughūrdaq, Mamū (Maḥmūd ?) Khwāja, Sū Bū’ī, Āq Manghit and Īsh Bābā Jībājī were placed under the leadership of Ḥakīm Mīrākhūr; the Baqarchī and Qūldātamghali acted under the command of ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Mīrākhūr; the Qara Pīr contingents of the Tūq Manghit were led by Manṣūr Qūrchībāshī, while the Tīmūr Khwāja-yi Qazāqī were

of register of tribal levies, to be brought to the capital. In this case, the *daftar* registered the Manghit, Sarāy and *shāgird pīsha* of Qarshī and contained all the names of the soldiers.³⁰³ These letters and the frequency of instructions suggest a greater degree of control that the ruler had over the appointment of individual commanders placed in charge of these tribal contingents. Many orders were connected with the movement and payment of troops and the installation of commanders.³⁰⁴ Some of the instructions also give the impression that the *amīr* tried to establish garrisons (*ilghārs*) even in small places,³⁰⁵ a measure that was intended to increase the degree of control over certain areas, especially in Nasaf and Khuzār.³⁰⁶ But these local garrisons often consisted of no more than two or three dozen men.³⁰⁷ In most cases, the troops steered and moved around by Amīr Ḥaidar consisted of Manghit, Sarāy and *shāgird pīsha*,³⁰⁸ which were in fact limited in number. Besides their function as garrisons, *ilghārs* could also comprise more than one thousand mounted warriors sent out to conduct quick military action or plundering raids.³⁰⁹ According to Amīr Ḥaidar's correspondence, many of the measures and instructions were carried out to check the actions of the Kīnakās, a tribe that was still considered a hostile and severe enemy.³¹⁰

The grid of data provided by the narrative sources, however, suggests that the ruler was far from successful in establishing territorial control over all

commanded by a certain Muḥammad Naẓar Qarawulbēgī and the Kūshā (Kūsa?) by 'Umar Bāy Qarawulbēgī (Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 7, fols. 4b–5a).

³⁰³ Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 31, fol. 13a.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, makt. nos. 2, fol. 1b; 7, fols. 4b–5a; 29, fols. 12a–b; 36, fol. 15a; 52, fols. 18b–19b; 94, fols. 39a–40a; 110, fols. 42a–b; 131, fol. 59a; 154, fols. 70b–71b.

³⁰⁵ Ya'qūb also mentions the frequent establishment of *ilghārs* in several places like Samarqand, Chārjūy, Bitik (on the banks of the Oxus near Farāb), and Lāyish (near the town of Chilak in Miyānkāl) (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 12b–13a, 17a, 19a, 20b, 24b).

³⁰⁶ Two letters mention garrisons to be set up in Panjāb, Khabar Qūrghān, Gharjāb, Basta Khānham and Khuzār (Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. nos. 2 & 7; fols. 1b, 4b–5a).

³⁰⁷ One document refers to an *ilghār* of only fifteen to twenty men in Khanham (*ibid.*, makt. no. 7, fol. 4b).

³⁰⁸ Only one letter refers to Qaṭaghān, Qūshchī, 'Arab, Arlāt, Kḥiṭā'ī and Qarluq troops besides the Manghit, Bāy Bacha Manghit, Sarāy and *shāgird pīsha* (*ibid.*, makt. no. 110, fols. 42a–b).

³⁰⁹ Ya'qūb mentions an *ilghār* of one thousand men sent to secure Samarqand at the beginning of Amīr Ḥaidar's reign. Other *ilghārs* were sent at frequent intervals to plunder Marw (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 12b–13a, 15a, 17a).

³¹⁰ Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. nos. 2, fols. 1b; 7, fol. 5a; 29, fol. 12a; 94, fols. 39a–b; 131, fol. 59a; 154, fol. 70b–71b; 199, 90b–91a.

parts of Mā Warā' al-Nahr. In fact, we see a great degree of autonomy enjoyed by the large and most important tribes like the Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq, the Kīnakās and the Yūz,³¹¹ and perhaps also the Qungrāt. The last major Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq rebellion ravaging Miyānkāl for several years (from 1820/21 onward) was triggered by an attempt of the governor, Ayāz Ghulām, to recruit members of the tribal elite into the auxiliary militia (*qarā chirīk*) that was to participate in an *ilghār* being sent to Marw.³¹² In the course of this rebellion, important towns such as Katta Qūrghān, Chilak and Yangī Qūrghān slipped temporarily from the hands of the government. The Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq siege of Samarqand was a protracted undertaking. What followed was a war of five years entailing frequent sieges of smaller rebel strongholds and the destruction of resources, primarily harvests, arable land and irrigation channels.³¹³ This conflict led to the reduction of Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq power in the long term and also smoothed the path for Amīr Naṣrullah, who did not encounter any resistance from the tribespeople when he traversed Miyānkāl on his way to Bukhara in 1827.

Apart from the upheavals in Miyānkāl, Amīr Ḥaidar's efforts to end the constant invasions of Khiwan forces were not crowned with lasting success. Khiwan troops conducted regular campaigns deep into Bukharan territory,

³¹¹ The Yūz of Ḥiṣār and the Kīnakās in Shahr-i Sabz were de facto independent rulers who only nominally acknowledged Manghit suzerainty. Sayyid Bī b. Muḥammad Yār Bī Yūz, the governor of Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān, for instance, sent a messenger to Bukhara instead of attending Amīr Ḥaidar's coronation in person. Although he is described as an obedient commander (*mīr-i muṭī'-i farmān-paṣīr*) in the *Tāj al-tawārīkh*, Mullā Sharīf also notes that Sayyid Bī held sway over the forts and tracts of land all over Ḥiṣār (*iṣālat-takhmīr ba qalā' wa bulūk-i sar tā pā-yi Ḥiṣār*) (Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fol. 494b). Niyāz 'Alī Bī Kīnakās neither struck coins nor read the *khūṭba* in Amīr Ḥaidar's name (Mir Izzetullah, "Travels," 333).

³¹² According to Ya'qūb, *ilghārs* sent to Marw rotated on a regular basis every three months among the tribes of Miyānkāl. But the members of the local elite (*kalān-shawandagān*) were usually exempted as they either paid a fee of only two *ṭilā* or mobilized ordinary subjects (*fuqarā*). The tribal leaders of the Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq began to rebel when Ayāz Ghulām (the future Ayāz Bī Tūpchībāshī), the man responsible for the organization of an *ilghār*, refused to accept the *fuqarā* who were put forward by the notables. Simultaneously, he rejected the sum of thirty *ṭilā* offered by members of the elite and began to recruit them into the *qarā chirīk* (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 17a–b).

³¹³ Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 17b–18b, 20a–22a; *Zafarnāma*, 64–66. See also Ivanov, *Vosstanie Kitay-Kipchakov v Bukharskom Khanstve 1821–1825 gg.*

carrying off livestock and making caravan routes unsafe.³¹⁴ In 1235/1819–20, Khiwan troops looted even the immediate environs of the city of Bukhara.³¹⁵ During one of Naṣrullah Khān's expeditions to Khoqand, the ruler of Khiwa invaded Bukhara and carried off forty thousand families from Chahār Jūy.³¹⁶ Particularly the Khiwan attacks rendered the ruler's position increasingly precarious. As he could not afford to fight on two fronts simultaneously, against attacks from Khiwa and the Khitā'i-Qipchāq, Amīr Ḥaidar even had to accept the terms of peace dictated by the rebels in order to have room for maneuver against his external enemies.³¹⁷

The combined findings from the narrative sources and Amīr Ḥaidar's letters to the governor of Qarshī make it clear that the ruler controlled only specific tribal contingents, which can be described as the core of his army. Apart from occasional punitive expeditions to Marw or Ūrā Tippa, his troops were constantly on the move between Bukhara, Qarshī, Khuzār and Samarqand, and some smaller settlements in between. Within this triangle, they maintained control, whereas towns such as Chahār Jūy, located at the *sar-ḥadd*, were particularly vulnerable to attacks from outside.³¹⁸ The Bukhārān garrison there formed no obstacle to the Khiwan troops entering the realm and advancing as far as the gates of the capital. In other regions

³¹⁴ In the time of Amīr Ḥaidar, the Khiwans invaded Transoxania several times: 1219/1804–05, 1234/1818–19 and 1235/1819–20 (Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 14a–b, 16a–20a). Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī reports that immediately after his visit to Bukhara in 1219/1804–05, the Khiwan ruler İltuzar Khān (d. 1806) had allegedly carried away fifty thousand sheep and several thousand camels (Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 70–71 (French text, 161)).

³¹⁵ Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fols. 16b–17a. Von Meyendorff reports that on invading Bukharan territory in 1821, the Khiwan troops inflicted great hardship on the inhabitants of Chahār Jūy, one of the major entrances to Mā Warā' al-Nahr. Their forays also circumvented the settlement of people in northern Bukhara despite the favorable conditions there (von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 218, 241, 305).

³¹⁶ 'Abbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma*, 30–31. Confirming the removal of forty thousand families, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān claims that the Khiwan troops took five hundred thousand sheep as booty (*panj lak gūsfand ba ūlja burd*). As all the people took refuge in fortified towns, nobody remained in the steppe outside the cities and the price of grain rose to three *ashrāfi* per *man* (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 587). Sāmī also mentions the Khiwan siege of Chahār Jūy, but he does not confirm the high number of captives (Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 139–40).

³¹⁷ Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 18b.

³¹⁸ Another such town marking the northern limit of Amīr Ḥaidar's realm was Nūr-i Atā. Here the local garrison was commanded by the governor Gul Muḥammad Bī, an Afghan from the Hotak Ghilzays (Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 24 (English text, 25)).

and places, local leaders and governors recruited their own forces. For instance, the governor of Ūrā Tippa, Maḥmūd Khān,³¹⁹ was allegedly able to muster fifteen to twenty thousand horsemen among the local Uzbek tribes such as the Qirq and the Yūz.³²⁰

Although the local Manghit garrison was small in number, at least some of the soldiers (*naukar*) were landowners, meaning that they had their own resource base, or obtained their income not exclusively in cash but in kind too.³²¹ Described as *naukar-i zamīndār*, many of these individuals received their *tankhwāhs* together with millstones (*sang-i āsyāb*),³²² enabling them to supply themselves with flour.³²³ In Cis-Oxania, where the local potentates at that time firmly recognized Bukharan suzerainty or shifted their allegiance between alternative power centers,³²⁴ the Uzbek nobility also maintained their own troops on the basis of land grants.³²⁵ Utilizing the competing

³¹⁹ Belonging to the noble clan of the Yūz tribe, Maḥmūd Khān was a nephew of Khudāyār Bī b. Fāzil Bī. He was also related to the lineage of the Aḥrārī *khwājas* and the Tuqay-Timurid king Abū'l-Faiẓ Khān through the maternal line. Although Khwāja Maḥmūd Khān had the *khuṭba* read and coins struck in the name of the *amīr* of Bukhara, the latter's rule was not acknowledged in other respects (Mir Izzetullah, "Travels," 327–28. For further information on Maḥmūd Khān, see also Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 15b).

³²⁰ Mir Izzetullah, "Travels," 327–28.

³²¹ Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. nos. 63 & 69, fols. 24a–b, 26b–27a.

³²² *Ibid.*, makt. nos. 7, 152 & 181, fols. 5a, 69a–b, 81b.

³²³ Mills constructed on newly granted arable land are also mentioned in the *'Ubaidullah Nāma*. In this context, the author accuses the *khwāja sarāyān* of having confiscated the agricultural estates of the old Uzbek elite and building new mills (Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 203a; Semenov trans., 225). The administration of eighteenth-century Balkh and Herat, for instance, levied a stone or millstone tax (*māliya-yi kull-i tawāḥīn-i dā'ira*). In Herat, the amount levied per stone depended on the location of the mill on the canal (McChesney, *Waqf*, 183). According to a *mubāarak-nāma* from 1293/1876–77, the administration distinguished between two categories of mills; mills running on private land (*āsiyā-yi milk*), and those operating on crown land (*āsiyā-yi sulṭānī*) (Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn, *Mubāarak-nāmajāt-i Amīr Muẓaffar*, doc. 124).

³²⁴ Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 74–80, 84–85. See also A. S. Shamansurova, "K voprosu sredneaziatsko-afganskikh otnoshenij v period polovenij XIX v.," in *Vzaimootnoshenija narodov Srednej Azii i sopredel'nykh stran Vostoka v XVIII–nachale XX v.*, ed. Marat A. Babakhodzhaev (Tashkent. Izdat. Akad. Nauk Uzbekskoj SSR, 1963), 9–16.

³²⁵ In the Chahār Wilāyat, Mizrāb Khān Mīng had a household guard of two thousand five hundred men and could call on eight thousand to ten thousand armed men. Maḥmūd Khān of Sar-i Pul had his own standing force of two thousand mounted soldiers and two thousand infantrymen. Qilich 'Alī Khān, the ruler of Khulm, controlled an army of seventeen thousand men. The local ruler of Kunduz, Mīr Murād Bēg, was able to maintain

interests of Bukhara and Kabul, the petty Uzbek lords of this region “were able to maintain a precarious independence.”³²⁶ For example, “the local ruler of Khulm (Tāshqūrhān), Mīr Qilich ‘Alī Bēg, reserved land for his army:

Details about the land reserved by the chief (for Minakbashis [sic! Mingbāshīs]): twenty qalbas [sic! qulbas] (ploughs) land for every Minakbashi; and every Minakbashi has ten officers and every one of them is assigned ten qalba land. Every officer of them commands one hundred sawars. Among these hundred sawars there are four or five (petty) officers. They are given four qalbas land each. The soldier gets cow and upto two qalbas of land. There are always two thousand sawars in attendance of the Mir, while the bulk is scattered in the territory. But all of them join the Mir at the time of need or when he has to lead an expedition.”³²⁷

Tribal divisions continued to serve as a template for the organization of military units after Amīr Ḥaidar’s death in 1826. When Naṣrullah Khān besieged the capital to oust his brother ‘Umar Khān, the latter staffed the individual city gates and sections of the wall with different tribal contingents, which were placed under the command of his favorite officers.³²⁸

In the manner of his late father, Amīr Naṣrullah Khān commanded a heterogenous army composed of diverse elements, ranging from Uzbek tribal groups to Turkmen and Afghan contingents to Iranian mercenaries.³²⁹ Burnes informs us that the Bukharan military was levied from the different parts of the kingdom and had no discipline.³³⁰ According to him, the king could only call on two thousand horsemen from various tribes in the capital

a force of fifteen thousand to twenty thousand cavalry and conducted his own campaigns leading him as far as Badakhshān and Chitral (Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 75, 78, 80–83).

³²⁶ Ibid., 121.

³²⁷ Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 20 (English text, 22–23); there are inconsistencies in the spelling of *qulba* (plough) in the English translation quoted here.

³²⁸ Ya‘qūb lists the following commanders and their contingents: 1. the *shāgird pīsha* led by Ḥakīm Qūshbegī and ‘Iṣmatullah Bī Qalmāq backed by two hundred Qalmāq soldiers, Ishān Khwāja with three of his brothers, ‘Abd al-Karīm Tūqsāba Qarlīq with one hundred Qarlīq warriors, Akram Tūqsāba Afghān with two hundred Afghans, Ayāz Bī Ghulām in command of four hundred Lazgī, Ottoman and Iranian soldiers (all probably descendants of those who left Nādir Shāh’s army and went over to Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī during the Iranian siege in 1747); 2. Dūlāb Bēg Qarawulbēgī Naymān in command of one hundred Naymān warriors; 3. Mīrzā ‘Ibādullah Bī and Ṭurāghī (Tūghān) Khan Qazāq; 4. Niyāz ‘Alī with thirty Juyūt soldiers (Ya‘qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 24b; Mu‘in, *Tārīkh*, fols. 56a–b).

³²⁹ See Ivanov, *Ocherki*, 140.

³³⁰ Burnes, *Travels*, II, 371.

and its vicinity and the *shāgird pīsha*, the latter consisting mainly of Persian elements.³³¹ In addition, he relied on Qalmāq contingents of one thousand soldiers and two thousand Persian cavalry including Marwī and Zūrābādī troops.³³² Another important group that was often employed as a rear guard were the Turkmen, many of whom were recruited from the Labāb.³³³ Apart from the Ming, Yābū, Qungrāt and Surāʿī (Suraee?), other tribal groups sent only a few soldiers each. This may be seen as a sign of the declining strength of the tribal chiefs at the time, especially those of the Khiṭāʿī-Qipchāq and Yetī Ūrūgh.³³⁴ Consisting of about four thousand men, particularly Tājiks, the number of Naşrullah’s infantry was likewise limited.³³⁵

A Persian envoy describes Naşrullah Khān’s military in similar terms:

“There are twenty thousand men apart from the regular army (*qushūn*), who were furnished by the provinces in former times. Now they sometimes provide [these contingents] and sometimes they do not, and if they do, then they have to send only three thousand men in times of need. The details of the three thousand troops received from the provinces: six hundred from Shahr-i Sabz, and two thousand four hundred from Shibarghān, Balkh, Maimana, Andkhūy, Sar-i Pul and Dehnau.”³³⁶

The numbers of soldiers given by different authors vary considerably. Whereas the figures given by Burnes for the early 1830s say that Naşrullah Khān could call upon twenty thousand horsemen and four thousand infantry, Khanikov estimates the strength of the Bukharan army at around forty thousand men, only a third of whom were completely armed. The rest were followers and indifferently equipped warriors. The number of firearms was limited, and the infantry, consisting of only one thousand men, was numerically weak.³³⁷ But he admits to not knowing the exact number of

³³¹ Khanikov also mentions four hundred and fifty regular troops consisting of Persians (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 87).

³³² Zūrābād is a village in Khurāsān about forty miles from Sarakhs on the road to Turbat-i Sheikh Jām (Adamec, *Historical Gazetteer*, II, 689). According to Burnes’ list, the Zūrābādī troops were Persians recruited from a village of the same name near Qarshī (Burnes, *Travels*, II, 374). In the *Zafarnāma*, the Zūrābādī contingents are distinguished by their black outfit (*jamāʿat-i siyāh-pūsh*) (*Zafarnāma*, 117).

³³³ *Zafarnāma*, 109, 146, 154, 203. According to an unknown visitor to Bukhara, the Turkmen inhabiting the region between Sarakhs, Marw and the Āmū Daryā allegedly furnished Amīr Ḥaidar with fifty thousand horsemen. But this inflated figure is not confirmed by other sources (“Description,” 244).

³³⁴ For the full list of tribes and districts furnishing troops for Naşrullah Khān’s army, see Appendix D.

³³⁵ Burnes, *Travels*, II, 374–75.

soldiers, and the ruler himself was not correctly informed about the strength of his troops either, in spite of keeping registers.³³⁸

Other pieces of information provided by Burnes suggest that the condition of Naṣrullah Khān's army—apart from the standing infantry elements—did not differ much from that of his father. Local *īlghārs* (here called “eeljaari”) consisting of servants and dependents of the government amounted to about fifty thousand horsemen. The latter were seldom employed and did not receive any payment. Registered troops were paid in grain, whereas the chiefs were assigned land. Each soldier received only eight maunds of grain annually. The infantrymen came on horseback to the field and then dismounted. The artillery of forty-one cannons was concentrated in the capital and there were no native artillerymen. The *amīr* relied on Russian slaves to employ the brass cannons.³³⁹

In Naṣrullah's later years, a growing number of soldiers were paid directly. According to Khanikov and other sources, the major change came when ‘Abd al-Ṣamad Khān entered the service of the *amīr*. With him, we see a professionalization of the artillery and an increase in the number of Persian infantrymen (*sarbāz*; *khāṣa-bardār*).³⁴⁰ But if we consider the figures given by Khanikov (one thousand *sarbāz* compared to forty thousand Uzbek warriors, making a ratio of forty to one), the standing element was inferior, at least numerically speaking. Moreover, the direct payment and maintenance of standing troops was not a totally new phenomenon. About a hundred years before, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān had a standing corps of eleven thousand to twelve thousand soldiers who received their pay directly from him.

Highlighting Naṣrullah's uncertain grip on the Bukharan military, a Persian envoy to Bukhara refers to the empty treasury and the chronic shortages of money preventing the ruler from campaigning at will.

³³⁶ ‘Abbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma*, 66.

³³⁷ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 233, note.

³³⁸ Despite the measures the ruler took to strengthen his control over the military, Khanikov found they had little effect. Naṣrullah Khān kept registers and was informed by the individual chiefs and governors about soldiers' deaths and losses of equipment and horses twice a year (*ibid.*, 232–33).

³³⁹ Burnes, *Travels*, II, 371–73.

³⁴⁰ ‘Abbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma*, 66; Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 310–11; “Nasr Ullah Bahadur Khan,” 362.

“The estates farmed out to proprietors delivering taxes (*māliyyāt*) to the king amount to a total sum of one hundred and fifty thousand *‘irāqī tūmāns*. According to their own [currency, the] *ṭilā*, which has been taken into account here, he [the king] has tremendous expenditures as compared to these total gains. The revenues are not sufficient for the expenditures. There is never a *tūmān* to be found in the king’s treasury. As I saw with my own eyes, several times they took books, shawls and Korans to the market and sold them there. [...] But if the king wants to transfer his army for a campaign, there is no *dīnār* in the treasury to be spent on the military. He has to take loans from the merchants of the kingdom and pay them back later on. If the traders want to provide [a credit], they give it, and if they do not want to, they do not. [In such a case], the king’s wealth does not suffice. For instance, after the return of this devoted servant, he requested an amount of money in cash for a campaign to Khojand, the merchants refused and nothing happened. [Paragraph] But when they are confronted with a military expedition from another side, the king receives a payment from the peasants and the merchants, and they call this payment *dūd pulī* and *jul pulī*.^{*} If such a thing happens [once] in ten, fifteen years, they accept it.”³⁴¹

The financial situation and the lack of revenues described here was not only typical of a context with limited possibilities for rapid territorial expansion, but is also reminiscent of the conditions in the early eighteenth century.³⁴² The results of the lack of money in the mid-nineteenth century are further commented by the Persian envoy.

“[I]n any direction they [the soldiers] in the king’s service go, their expedition will not last more than forty days. If the king wants to stay more than five days, he has no authority, the army becomes dispersed no matter whether they have accomplished a conquest or suffered defeat. The king has no control at this stage [of the campaign]. They say amongst each other the campaign has aged (*saḡar pīr shud*) and one has to go. As has become clear, there is a secret in this matter. But they themselves announce that it is a miracle. In Turkistan all the armies, no matter whether it is the military of Mā Warā’ al-Nahr or the army of Khwārazm and Khoqand, all have these conditions. But in this short time I understood it better than they did and told them that what is known as a miracle in Turkistan is not such, but is due to lack of wealth on the part of the ruler and the bad state of the troops, which have no provisions and contributions in kind. Every time three *man*

* The *jul*, or more correctly *ju’l* (جول), was a particular tax levied in times of war and campaigns and is often mentioned in records dating from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (see Abduraimov, *Voprosy*, 53, especially footnote no. 135; see also Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. nos. 13 & 122, fols. 7a, 52b).

³⁴¹ ‘Abbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma*, 64–65.

³⁴² We saw a similar lack of financial resources then in a shrinking and fragmenting realm. ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s officials had to obtain loans from merchants and also decided on a debasement of the Bukharan currency (see chapter The Figurations of Power/The Ahl-i Maḡramīya).

of flour are consumed, they are forced by necessity to scatter, and this situation has been going on since the old days. [...]”³⁴³

In his description of the army of Naṣrullah Khān’s son, Muẓaffar al-Dīn, Dānish also mentions the great disorder (*bīzabtī*) among the Bukharan military and attributes it to the dearth of financial resources. As the monthly allowances of twenty *tanga* did not cover their personal expenses, hunger seems to have been rampant among the soldiers and many of them were indebted to creditors (*ṭalab-kārān*).³⁴⁴ If we believe ‘Ainī, the Hindu moneylenders greatly benefitted from this vicious circle of indebtedness, poverty and lack of material resources. Normally they sat in their shops until twelve o’clock. But every time the Bukharan soldiers received their monthly pay, the Hindus flocked to the Rīgīstān Square early in the morning to demand their rates from the indebted soldiers.³⁴⁵

Naṣrullah Khān’s Campaigns to Khoqand

In spite of the establishment of standing contingents and the strengthening of the artillery, we see that Naṣrullah Khān’s measures did not turn his army into a cohesive body. He achieved personal control only during expeditions, and even then it was rendered precarious by a severe lack of supplies. In the following, I will pay attention to the expeditions to Khoqand³⁴⁶ to

³⁴³ ‘Abbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma*, 65–66.

³⁴⁴ Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish, *Risāla*, 50.

³⁴⁵ ‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, III, 362.

³⁴⁶ Khoqand was the youngest of the three nineteenth-century Uzbek principalities north of the Oxus. It gained independence under the Mīng leader Shāh Rukh Bī, who eliminated the Khwājas of Chadak, a lineage of Naqshbandī nobles in the western part of Ferghana, in 1709. Having assumed the title of *khān*, ‘Ālim Khān Mīng, the formal founder of the Khoqand khanate, embarked on an expansionist policy beyond the limits of Ferghana. After the annexation of Tashkent and Khojand, he conquered the steppe areas north of those towns. His successors, ‘Umar Khān (r. 1810–22) and Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān (r. 1823–42), extended their sphere of influence to the Tian Shan mountains up to the region south and west of Lake Issyk Kul (Bregel, “The three Uzbek states,” 400–01; Levi, “Ferghana Valley,” 221–22). In the following decades, Khoqand benefitted from its strategic position at the crossroads of different trade routes linking Bukhara and Samarqand further in the east to Russia in the north and China in the south. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Khoqand prospered due to its intense trade relations with China. While the Mīng rulers were connected to the Chinese Qīng dynasty through regular tribute and gift missions, Khoqandī merchants actively sought to establish

demonstrate that these enterprises, though displaying at least partly new modes of movement and warfare, were still dictated and structured by conventional principles of resource acquisition. Since the *amīr* ruled over a relatively consolidated realm, he needed to divert the army toward an outside target to keep his soldiers busy, gain new resources, primarily in the form of booty, and avoid internal rebellions. As I will illustrate, these campaigns afforded him the opportunity to demonstrate his personal authority by implementing a tight scheme of rules and instructions. Moreover, the conquest of a place like Khoqand enhanced his image as *ṣāhib-qirān* and unquestioned ruler of southern Central Asia.

In the *Zafarnāma*, the ruler of Khoqand, Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān, and his relatives are portrayed as villains who repeatedly provoked Naṣrullah Khān’s anger. In the Bukharan and in the Khoqandian sources, the Mīng ruler is shown to be a source of trouble causing a state of *fitna* in the borderland region between Jizakh and Khojand. There he reconstructed the old fort of Pishāghar,³⁴⁷ which served as a military base for campaigns against Jizakh and Ūrā Tīppa.³⁴⁸ Between 1256/1840–41 and 1258/1842–43, Naṣrullah Khān led four campaigns against Khoqand:

commercial networks in Xinjiang (Laura J. Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate. A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760–1860* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 45–50, 64–70, 120–50; Levi, “Ferghana Valley,” 224, 226).

³⁴⁷ The fortress of Pishāghar was in a strategically convenient location between Jizakh in the west, and Ūrā Tīppa, Zāmin, Khawāṣ and Yām to the east and southeast. In the time of Amīr Ḥaidar, Yūz chiefs like Muḥammad Raḥīm Dīwānbēgī b. Khudāyār Bī Yūz used Pishāghar as a military base, from which they mounted their campaigns against the armies of Khoqand to assert control over this region (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 402, 405–07; & II, 147–56). Prior to the Khoqand wars, Pishāghar was an old town (*qadīm qaṣaba’i*) where no one but owls lived. But then it was rebuilt and became an impregnable fortress (*Zafarnāma*, 116–17).

³⁴⁸ The Bukharan and Khoqandian sources narrate different stories, all of which end with the arrest of a Bukharan envoy in Khoqand. According to the *Zafarnāma*, the conflict between the two rulers flared up when the king of Khoqand, Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān, crossed the canal of Achī, which was considered the boundary between the Bukharan and Khoqandian spheres of influence. When the Khoqandians rebuilt the old fortress of Pishāghar, Naṣrullah Khān took immediate action. He sent his envoy, Muḥammad Raḥīm Tuḡsāba Qalmāq, who was arrested by Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān. Subsequently, the latter assembled a huge army of troops from Khojand, Khoqand, Yārkanḍ, Kāshghar and the Dasht-i Qipchāq. The second campaign took place against a similar backdrop: Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān had Naṣrullah’s envoy arrested. The third expedition was launched when Naṣrullah Khān’s ally and governor of Khojand, Maḥmūd Khān, reconciled with his

- 1840 First Bukharan-Khoqandian encounter takes place at Pishāghar, which is occupied and destroyed after heavy artillery bombardment;³⁴⁹
- 1842 Naşrullah Khān's second campaign leads as far as Btsh Arīq in Ferghana; the Bukharan army conquers Ūrā Tippa and Khojand; in Khojand Naşrullah Khān appoints Maḥmūd Khān, a brother of the Khoqandian king Muḥammad 'Alī Khān, as governor;³⁵⁰
- 1842/43 Naşrullah Khān mounts his third expedition and conquers the capital of Khoqand; Muḥammad 'Alī Khān is executed and replaced with Bukharan governors;
- 1843 the Bukharan king leads a further, but unsuccessful campaign to Khoqand, which was occupied by Qirghiz and Qipchāq forces in support of Shīr 'Alī Khān (r. 1842–45), a cousin of Muḥammad 'Alī Khān.³⁵¹

In order to guarantee constant supplies for his army, the Khoqand campaigns took place either in spring, the start of the growth cycle, or during the harvest season in early autumn. At the beginning of Naşrullah Khān's reign, for instance, the unknown author of the *Zafarnāma* mentions a campaign against Jizakh launched in 1243/1827–28:

“Having put the finger of acceptance on their heads and eyes, all the pillars of power (*arkān-i daulat*) and the mighty *amīrs* strove for such an occurrence. Therefore His Majesty, the successful Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction, at the time of effervescent spring, the time of colors and the fragrance of budding flowers, which is the season of Urdībihisht, called upon God, the ‘Bestower of Gifts’ and requested the conquest of the city of Dīzaq [Jizakh] for the punishment of the *jamā'at* of the Qirq-Yüz. Now the world-

brother and deserted his Bukharan overlord (*Zafarnāma*, 115–16, 138, 176). According to our main Khoqandian source, the conflict was sparked off when Muḥammad 'Alī Khān's brother, Sulṭān Maḥmūd Khān, invited Naşrullah Khān to intervene in a religious conflict concerning a supposed unlawful relationship between his mother and the Khoqandian ruler. Naşrullah Khān sent a messenger to Khoqand to investigate the matter, but the messenger was arrested in due course. When Muḥammad 'Alī Khān launched a campaign against Bukhara, Naşrullah Khān reacted and allied with Maḥmūd Khān, whom he installed as governor of Ūrmītan and Falghar. Together with this governorship, Maḥmūd Khān received a *khal'at*, a gift horse with a *jabdūq* of gold, one thousand *ashraft*, one hundred upper garments and three hundred dresses made of atlas. Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān does not give a specific reason for Naşrullah Khān's second Khoqand campaign. The third campaign is attributed to Maḥmūd Khān's disloyalty (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 524–31, 535, 544–45).

³⁴⁹ *Zafarnāma*, 123–129; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 530.

³⁵⁰ *Zafarnāma*, 145–72; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 535–41.

³⁵¹ *Zafarnāma*, 175–89; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 545–71, 577.

afflicting and world-subjecting order was issued to equip the victorious and fortunate troops. He sent messengers to the tracts of the guarded domains so that the revered governors of all regions [arrive] on a certain day in the region of Samarqand together with their legions, to become exalted by the imperial stirrup, and join the glorious army.”³⁵²

The weather conditions prior to an expedition to Shahr-i Sabz taking place immediately before the Jizakh campaign are described in even more ornate terms:

“[...] at the beginning of the spring season, which represents the equilibrium of night and day, the world-warming sunrays fertilized the temper of the elements and all beings on the orders of the generous Creator. The blowing of a gentle breeze shook the quiescent souls and the moisture of the air brought freshness to the hearts of the lords of pleasure. The voice of water brought the sense of moisture to the ears of understanding of listeners bountiful as the sea. The heavenly and earthly creatures were provided with fresh gifts of divine mercy and traces of boundless protection [...]”³⁵³

On the campaign to Jizakh, the speed of the army’s progress was relatively slow as their march was interrupted by the usual visits to local shrines, welcome ceremonies arranged by the governors, rounds of gift giving and festivities.³⁵⁴ Similar to eighteenth-century chronicles, the toponyms given by the *Zafarnāma* served to map the web of allegiances maintained by the ruler.³⁵⁵ To reach the Ferghana Valley, the *amīr* and his troops moved on a west-east axis through the fertile stretches of land along the Zarafshān in Miyānkāl and the Sir Daryā River. The first meeting place of the various tribal contingents from the different regions of Mā Warā’ al-Nahr was the

³⁵² *Zafarnāma*, 89–90.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, 83. The praise of spring as the best season of the year is remindful of earlier literary patterns to be observed in other works. Qāzī Wafā, for instance, once describes spring in very ornate terms as the season characterized by “raindrops descending from jewel-scattering clouds,” while Rabī’ I of the year he talks about “spread the verdant carpet reminiscent of emeralds and the heavenly beds of fragrant herbs” (Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 73a). Writing in early sixteenth-century Abu’l-Khairid Bukhara, Faḏlullah b. Rūzbihān Khunjī particularly commends the spring in Turkistan and especially the blossoming of the regional flora (Ott, *Transoxanien und Turkestan*, 96–97).

³⁵⁴ *Zafarnāma*, 90–91.

³⁵⁵ On the above-mentioned expedition to Shahr-i Sabz and Chirāghchī, the king was joined by the rest of the troops from all directions (*baqāyā-yi sipāh az har samt*), from the forts of Miyānkāl, the *qaṣaba-yi* Nūr wa Mīgh, from all of Labāb, Shīrābād, Bāysūn, Ḥiṣār and Khuzār. On the campaign to Pishāghar in 1840, tribes (*īl wa ūlūsi*) from every place obedient to the king joined the latter on his expedition (*Zafarnāma*, 85, 117).

Dasht-i Shīrāz in the environs of Samarqand.³⁵⁶ Here the chiefs and governors and their troops joined the *amīr* and had an opportunity to rest. Very often, the bulk of the army was already there before the *amīr* arrived. Following the military conventions in former times, other chiefs and governors joined the king en route.³⁵⁷ After his arrival, Naṣrullah Khān usually visited the major pilgrimage sites like the necropolis Shāh-i zinda or the mausoleums of Chūpān Atā and Khwāja ‘Ubaidullah Ahrār. Sometimes the royal camp was therefore pitched on the Chūpān Atā Hill.³⁵⁸

Departing from the Dasht-i Shīrāz,³⁵⁹ the troops proceeded through the Īlān Ūtī defile and passed Jizakh, Pishāghar, Yām, Zāmin and Ūrā Tippa. In all these places, Naṣrullah Khān’s troops found fodder for their horses, mules and camels. The most important destinations were certainly Ūrā Tippā and Khojand, the gateways to the fertile Ferghana Valley. Between these two towns, the Bukahran troops traversed a densely populated region and passed small places like Nau Qūshtīgarmān, Āq Tippa,³⁶⁰ Taḡhāyak and Ghūlak Andāz.³⁶¹ From Khojand with its extensive orchards, Naṣrullah Khān’s army advanced along the Sir Daryā to ensure a constant supply of fodder and water for their horses and beasts of burden. Qirqchī Qum, Maḥram,³⁶² Kān-i Bādām³⁶³ and Bīsh Arīq were further intermediate stops on the way to Khoqand. All these settlements were located in a fertile belt of densely irrigated fields and verdant orchards.³⁶⁴ For instance, the Bukharan troops

³⁵⁶ *Zafarnāma*, 117, 141–42, 177, 192.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 83, 85, 106, 109–10, 117, 177, 214 *passim*.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 91, 119, 141, 177, 192.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 141–42. The Dasht-i Shīrāz is near Samarqand south of the Zarafshān and was said to be a large and prosperous area (*wus‘at-i ābād*) that was chosen as a meeting point because it afforded the opportunity to spread out on a larger expanse of land, sparing the city the large-scale presence of troops (*ibid.*).

³⁶⁰ Āq Tippa had a mud fort and was located half a *farsakh* (a three-hour ride) from Khojand (Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 327).

³⁶¹ *Zafarnāma*, 166.

³⁶² Maḥram was later the frontier fortress of Khoqand protected by high, crenelated mud walls. The local garrison housed five hundred soldiers (Schuyler, *Turkistan*, II, 2–3).

³⁶³ Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān states that Kān-i Bādām was one of the best and most prosperous settlements of Khoqand. Its populace consisted of roughly five thousand families (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 579). In the late nineteenth century, Kān-i Bādām was a town of considerable size with several mosques. It was famous for its almonds (Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 326–27; Schuyler, *Turkistan*, II, 3–4).

³⁶⁴ For a description of Bīsh Arīq see Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 313.

stayed three days in Bīsh Arīq³⁶⁵ and captured numerous camels, horses, cattle and sheep.³⁶⁶ They fed themselves en route, actually during the sieges of towns like Pishāghar. While the towns were heavily besieged by Naṣrullah Khān's artillery and infantry,³⁶⁷ the cavalry was often sent a stage further to investigate the situation or movements of the enemy.³⁶⁸ Later on, the Bukharan army largely depleted the wealth of the besieged towns. One example of this is Pishāghar. After its occupation by the *amīr* in 1840, its grain stores were completely plundered; grain, rice, flour and other victuals were distributed among the *alamānīya*,³⁶⁹ a militia that was employed to plunder towns taken after sieges. Khojand and Khoqand were looted by the *alamānīya* during the third campaign.³⁷⁰ In Khojand "nobody found a piece of linen that he could use as a veil for his wife. All wandered barefoot around the bazaars."³⁷¹ During Naṣrullah Khān's last campaign, his troops systematically plundered the environs of the city of Khoqand and stripped many settlements of their agricultural wealth.³⁷²

Looking at the formation of Naṣrullah Khān's army, we come across established patterns of conquest and military organization. The vanguard was made up of contingents from Samarqand, Ūrgūt and Jizakh (Manghit, Yūz and Ming). The left wing was commanded by *amīrs* from the capital, while the right wing was led by unnamed *amīrs* from Miyānkāl. Accompanied by 'Abd al-Ṣamad Khān, his artillery and the musketeers, the king took his place in the center. The rear guard was composed of Turkmen from the Āmū Daryā region and Qarākūl.³⁷³ With his campaigns to Khoqand, Naṣrullah Khān killed several birds with one stone. Firstly, he kept his soldiery busy, and secondly, the expeditions to Ferghana enabled him to forge a corporate identity. In the course of the third campaign, for instance, the king called on

³⁶⁵ Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 547.

³⁶⁶ *Zafarnāma*, 168.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 123–25.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 125, 141, 145, 152–53, 163, 168, 177, 178, 183, 186, 192–93.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 128.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 182; Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 546, 550–51.

³⁷¹ Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 546.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, 581–82. According to the *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, the Bukharan army looted the village of Kān-i Bādām a second time, but they did not find anything (*ibid.*, 585–86).

³⁷³ *Zafarnāma*, 146, 153–54.

“tribal leaders and the guardians of the borderlands (*umarā-yi īl wa ūlūs wa sar-ḥadd-dārān*) from Balkh up to Badakhshān, from Nasaf to Ḥiṣār-i Shādmān, Andkhūy, Maimana, Shibarghān, the Turkmen community on both sides of the Āmū Daryā, from Karkī up to the Chahār Wilāyat, and even the Mīrs of Miyānkāl.”³⁷⁴

Thirdly, the campaigns generated a resource flow benefitting the Uzbek chiefs and especially the ordinary warriors. After the second campaign, the Bukharan soldiers cheered and “overflowed with joy in light of the wealth and property they had acquired.”³⁷⁵ Fourthly, the king enforced a chain of command centered upon himself. The *Ẓafarnāma* gives the impression that he exercised a high degree of control over the individual chiefs, who were now permanently subject to his orders. We also observe a more complex sharing of functions and divisions of labor: some contingents, especially those from Samarqand and Ūrgūt, were always deployed as a vanguard responsible for intelligence.³⁷⁶ Combined with intense artillery warfare, the infantry played a pivotal role in sieges,³⁷⁷ whereas the bulk of the army could launch the major battles.

And fifthly, as he and his army had to travel through the Zarafshān Valley twice a year, he was able to further reduce the influence of the Miyānkālī chieftains and establish a greater degree of permanent control. The conquest of Khoqand broke up the political map of the region and opened up the Ferghana Valley as a vast space with rich resources. This is also underlined by the Khoqandian chronicler citing Naṣrullah Khān after the final defeat of his troops: “Not every day is a festival on which we eat sweets.”³⁷⁸ The possession of the city of Khoqand made further inroads into the neighboring areas and an extension of Bukharan authority toward the Tian Shan and the steppes in the north a worthwhile scenario. After all, these regions were endowed with rich pastures and had a huge nomadic population.³⁷⁹ The conquest of the Ferghana Valley also opened up the

³⁷⁴ Ibid., 176.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., 173.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., 122, 138, 153, 163 passim.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 123, 150–51, 185–86, 219–18.

³⁷⁸ Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 584.

³⁷⁹ The tribal population of Khoqand consisted mainly of the Qipchāqs, by the 1840s by far the most influential tribe, the Qirghiz, Qarā Qirghiz, Qarāqalpāq and Qazāq (Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 8).

prospect of control over important trade routes that linked Transoxania to Eastern Turkistan, China, Siberia and Russia.³⁸⁰

Although the sources suggest that Naşrullah Khān intended to impose a strict regime with a higher degree of control over Khoqand—he appointed several of his favorite generals as governors and left an *ilghār* of ten thousand soldiers—he lacked the means to enforce his rule in the long term. Moreover, he had only conquered Ferghana, the political center of Khoqand, while the Tian Shān Range and the Kazakh Steppe in its northern and northwestern parts were untouched by the Bukharan campaigns. From there, the Qirghiz tribes launched counter offensives and soon reconquered Khoqand, where they raised Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān’s cousin, Shīr ‘Alī Khān, to the throne.³⁸¹

‘Abd al-Şamad Khān

One of the most enigmatic figures at Naşrullah Khān’s court was ‘Abd al-Şamad Khān. In the course of his eventful life, this soldier of fortune maintained an extensive scope of movement and action. Born in 1784 in Tabrīz, ‘Abd al-Şamad Khān had undergone basic military training at Kermānshāh and was afterward employed there in the service of Muḥammad ‘Alī Mīrzā (d. 1821), the eldest son of Fath ‘Alī Shāh Qājār (r. 1797–1834).³⁸² According to Wolff, the prince ordered his ears to be cut off because of some misdemeanor.³⁸³ Learning the news of his punishment, ‘Abd al-Şamad went over to Muḥammad ‘Alī Mīrzā’s antagonist ‘Abbās Mīrzā (d. 1222/1833–34). Shortly thereafter, he was forced to take refuge in India.³⁸⁴ There he entered the service of a relative of Fath ‘Alī Shāh Qājār, who received a pension from the British. When ‘Abd al-Şamad hatched a plot against his master and killed him together with other servants, he was

³⁸⁰ On Khoqand’s role as a transregional crossroads, see Levi, “Ferghana Valley,” 216–20.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 191. See also W. Barthold [C. Bosworth], “Khoqand,” Bregel, “The three Uzbek states,” 402.

³⁸² Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 306. According to Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, ‘Abd al-Şamad Khān belonged to the servants of the Qājār prince ‘Abbās Mīrzā (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 484–85).

³⁸³ Joseph Wolff, *A Mission to Bokhara*, ed. Guy Wint (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 140. Khanikov says that ‘Abd al-Şamad Khān was sentenced to death on account of a murder he had committed (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 306).

³⁸⁴ Wolff, *Mission*, 140.

condemned to death on the gallows by the Supreme Court. Yet he escaped from prison and made it to Kabul where he entered the service of Dūst Muḥammad Khān (r. 1827–38, 1842–63).³⁸⁵ He reorganized the artillery of the Afghan *amīr* and was also responsible for the professional training of the soldiers.³⁸⁶ After staying for a while in Dūst Muḥammad Khān's service, he made an attempt on the life of his master's son, Muḥammad Akbar Khān, and escaped to Bukhara.³⁸⁷ Ḥakīm Bī Qūshbegī then procured him service with the ruler Amīr Naṣrullah Khān.³⁸⁸ In Bukhara he trained the troops in military discipline. He also acted as commander of a contingent of three hundred soldiers and the artillery. Naṣrullah later made him *khān* and appointed him to the post of *nāyib*.³⁸⁹

ʿAbd al-Ṣamad Khān soon gained the confidence of the Bukharan ruler whose artillery he now organized. He also took responsibility for the recruitment and training of professional soldiers. According to the *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*, no slaves remained in Bukhara because all of them deserted their masters and enrolled with the new infantry legion under the command of ʿAbd al-Ṣamad Khān. Within a short time, he recruited one thousand infantrymen for his master.³⁹⁰ In the same source, the troops commanded by ʿAbd al-Ṣamad Khān are depicted as *sarbāzān-i qizilbāsh*, a term harking back to the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, when the Persians

³⁸⁵ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 306; ʿAbbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma*, 66. According to Mohan Lal, ʿAbd al-Ṣamad Khān arrived at Bombay as a horse merchant. From there, he went to Peshawar and entered the service of Sulṭān Muḥammad Khān, a half-brother of Dūst Muḥammad Khān, for whom he raised an infantry regiment. Sometime, he escaped to Kabul for unknown reasons and entered the service of the Afghan ruler (Mohan Lal, *Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Kabul*, 2 vols. (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1846), I, 160–61).

³⁸⁶ Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 485.

³⁸⁷ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 306–07. According to Ḥakīm Khān, ʿAbd al-Ṣamad Khān betrayed Dūst Muḥammad Khān and committed fraud during the war with the Sikhs (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 485).

³⁸⁸ Wolff, *Mission*, 140. According to other sources, the *qūshbēgī* had already been removed from the court when ʿAbd al-Ṣamad Khān arrived at Bukhara. The ruler had then conferred major responsibilities on Raḥmān Birdī Turkomān (Raḥīm Birdī?), who facilitated ʿAbd al-Ṣamad's access to Naṣrullah Khān (Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 485; see also Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 305).

³⁸⁹ Wolff, *Mission*, 140.

³⁹⁰ Muḥammad Ḥakīm Khān, *Muntakhab*, I, 485.

were largely perceived as antagonists of the Central Asian Sunni Muslims.³⁹¹ In the *Zafarnāma*, ‘Abd al-Şamad Khān appears particularly in the context of the Khoqand campaigns.³⁹² In some cases, he acted in concert with another influential commander, Muḥammad Sharīf Bī Tūpchībāshī, who led the Iranian and Zūrābādī forces.³⁹³

In the 1840s, ‘Abd al-Şamad Khān was one of the most influential men in Bukhara. But his closeness to and influence on the ruler had earned him the enmity of many Uzbek *amīrs*.³⁹⁴ As a military specialist, ‘Abd al-Şamad Khān represented a novel type of military leader in Bukhara. The specialist knowledge he possessed was much in demand in those days. Unlike the *amīrs* of previous generations, his influence depended on the handling of artillery cannons and his knowledge of the political configurations in the wider region, especially the British advance in India and the Afghan principalities on his northwestern frontier.³⁹⁵ Yet his most decisive source of power was his personal proximity to the *amīr*. This dependence, however, also made him very vulnerable. He continued his career in Naşrullah Khān’s service throughout the 1840s and wielded great influence at the court. His standing was also reflected by his position in the army during battles: he rode side by side with the ruler at the center of the army.³⁹⁶

‘Abd al-Şamad Khān was said to have lived in great pomp outside the town.³⁹⁷ According to the *Safarnāma-yi Bukhārā*, he had received the revenues of Qarākūl as a *tuyūl*.³⁹⁸ During the nine years of his service, he had allegedly acquired a sum of sixty thousand *ṭilā*. Enjoying the *amīr*’s trust, he visited the king every Sunday. Once ‘Abd al-Şamad Khān lost royal favor because he had withheld the pay of the troops under his command, and his patron even intended to kill him. In the end, he was spared this fate because Naşrullah Khān needed him for the campaigns to Khoqand. There is evidence that ‘Abd al-Şamad Khān was well informed about ongoing events and all the talks and intentions of his patron. According to Wolff, Amīr

³⁹¹ Ibid., 549, 551.

³⁹² *Zafarnāma*, 121, 123, 147–48, 150, 185–86, 196, 214, 217.

³⁹³ Ibid., 86, 121, 123.

³⁹⁴ ‘Abbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma*, 44; Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 310.

³⁹⁵ Hambly, “Verfall,” 194.

³⁹⁶ *Zafarnāma*, 146, 178.

³⁹⁷ In the *Safarnāma-yi Bukhārā*, his residence is called Chahār Bāgh-i Nāyib ‘Abd al-Şamad Khān (‘Abbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma*, 35).

³⁹⁸ Ibid., 53.

Naṣrullah greatly distrusted his protégé. Later on, Wolff himself had cause to distrust the *nāyib*. Some of Wolff's informants characterized 'Abd al-Ṣamad as a *ḥaram-zāda* (a bastard or villain). He was later executed by order of the *amīr*.³⁹⁹ Following the same pattern, Naṣrullah Khān's son, Amīr Muẓaffār, continued to rely on freedmen and Persian slaves (*ghulāmān*) for his military.⁴⁰⁰ He also employed a Persian by the name of Shāh Rukh Khān, who suffered a fate similar to his predecessor 'Abd al-Ṣamad Khān.⁴⁰¹

Naṣrullah Khān the Generous Ruler

Following the conventions of previous authors, Nāṣrullah Khān's chronicler portrayed him as a very kind and generous ruler. The inhabitants and notables of Samarqand in particular were regaled with gifts on numerous occasions. In 1827, for instance, Naṣrullah proceeded first to Samarqand to win the support of the local leadership. On arriving, he gratified the Samarqandī nobles by presenting abundant gifts.⁴⁰² When the ruler visited the city again in 1245/1829–30, he was warmly welcomed by the city elders and notables, who in return were distinguished and honored with royal favors.⁴⁰³

Naṣrullah Khān was renowned for his charitable deeds and gifts, which he distributed among the attendants and visitors of holy shrines to underline his piety. Prior to his first military campaign, he visited the mausoleum of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband and showered the deserving and those employed in

³⁹⁹ Wolff, *Mission*, 140–41, 145, 157–61, 184, 188, 208, 233.

⁴⁰⁰ According to Dānish, the soldiers of the tribal contingents (*il wa ulūs*) disliked the *ghulāmān* because they regarded their service as shameful (Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish, *Risāla*, 50).

⁴⁰¹ Shāh Rukh Khān belonged to a branch of the Qājār dynasty in Persia. After his flight from Astarābād where he had served as governor, he entered the service of the Bukharan king. In Bukhara he was highly honored and came to be distinguished from other actors. Having been desirous of living in the Persian manner, he ordered a palace to be built at great expense. In this house, glass windows were inserted in addition to other luxuries kept inside. The costs were said to have amounted to a sum of fifteen thousand *ṭilā*, which was regarded as an enormous sum in Bukhara. Later Shāh Rukh Khān was accused of having offended religion, thrown into prison and exiled. His palace was confiscated by the ruler and destroyed (Vámbéry, *Travels in Central Asia*, 115–16; see also Smolarz, "Unterwegs wieder Willen," 100).

⁴⁰² *Zafarnāma*, 75.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*, 102.

the service of the shrine with gifts for religious vows and other kinds of presents.⁴⁰⁴ This was not a singular act of generosity; the king frequently visited the shrine and donated gifts.⁴⁰⁵ After his victory over the Afghans and his arrival at Balkh in 1255/1839–40, he visited Mazār-i Sharīf and the tomb of Imām ‘Alī, where he performed the pilgrimage and donated numerous alms, gifts, food provisions and a lot of money. Simultaneously, he benevolently courted the inhabitants in the neighborhood of the shrine.⁴⁰⁶ In Samarqand he is reported to have likewise distributed gifts when he performed the pilgrimage to the local holy sites.⁴⁰⁷

In the following year, he mounted his first major campaign to Ūrā Tippa, Yām and Zāmin. After the occupation of Pishāghar, Naṣrullah Khān rewarded his commanders, soldiers and notables with numerous royal gifts (*an ‘āmāt-i khusrawāna*) and bestowed robes of honor upon them.⁴⁰⁸ A little later, he granted patronage to Maḥmūd Khān, the brother and foe of the Khoqandian ruler Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān (r. 1822–42). He installed him as governor in Ūrmītan, a small fortress southwest of Ūrā Tippa, and equipped him with fleet horses and a caravan of camels laden with gold and jewels.⁴⁰⁹ On the king’s return from Samarqand to the capital, his mother blessed the subjects and the poor with a number of charitable gifts such as gold and jewelry.⁴¹⁰

Naṣrullah Khān also followed the model of previous Transoxanian rulers by generously rewarding his soldiers for their merits. After the conquest of Ūrā Tippa in 1257/1842, he bestowed immense favors on the Uzbek tribal leaders (*majmū‘-i kalāntarān wa sardārān-i īl wa ūlūs-i ṭabaqāt-i uzbekīya*) and also pleased the soldiery with gifts.⁴¹¹ The author of the *Zafarnāma* reports on similar acts of largesse after the conquest of Shahr-i Sabz in 1856. There he not only presented gifts to his commanders and soldiers, but also distributed money, robes and turbans of honor among the Kīnkakās.⁴¹²

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 84.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., 132, 214.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., 106–07.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., 90.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., 128.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., 132. After the conquest of Khojand in 1258, Maḥmūd Khān was made governor there (ibid., 172).

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., 134.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., 161. The *amīr* also gifted his soldiers before the campaign (ibid., 152).

⁴¹² Ibid., 233.

Of course, the ruler also received presents from subordinate actors. In 1258/1842–43, for instance, he arrived in Samarqand on his way to Ferghana and was received by the governor Ibrāhīm Bī Dādkhwāh, who spread out gold and diamonds and offered a number of presents. He also arranged a splendid feast and many provisions for the Bukharan commanders and their troops.⁴¹³ After the occupation of Ūrā Tippa, the king sent one of his officials to Khojand in order to negotiate with the enemy. En route the messenger saw groups of Khojandīs equipped with the usual gifts on their way to the Bukharan camp. Subsequent to the following conquest of Khojand, the Bukharan commanders blessed the poor inhabitants with innumerable *khairāt* gifts.⁴¹⁴ When the *amīr*'s troops advanced further, Muḥammad 'Alī Khān sent his maternal uncle with two notables to Naṣrullah's camp where they submitted gifts, such as five hundred fragrant tea essences, silken cloths, and shawls, three Arghamāq horses with the conventional equipment, chinaware and Chinese fabrics.⁴¹⁵ In addition, they offered the taxes (*bāj wa kharāj*) of one year from the province of Tashkent.⁴¹⁶ After the second conquest of Khojand the next year, the Bukharan ruler generously rewarded his troops with provisions, horses, gold, jewels and robes of honor.⁴¹⁷

Naṣrullah Khān's Mamālik-i Maḥrūsa

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the Manghits did not exercise their authority over a clearly defined territory! It was relatively easy for potential invaders to enter Transoxania, especially when the ruler was absent from the capital.⁴¹⁸ Referring to areas and populations under royal protection, terms like *wilāyāt-i maḥrūsa* or *mamālik-i maḥrūsa* continued to

⁴¹³ Ibid., 139–41.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., 165, 166.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid., 169. These gifts reflect Khoqand's strategic location at the intersection of various trade routes connecting it to China, India, Russia and Transoxania. Thousands of Khoqandī merchants crossed the Tian Shan mountains and went to Kāshghar, Yārkaṇd and other towns in Xinjiang. The traders and their caravans returned to Khoqand with Chinese goods like silk textiles, tea, porcelain, silver and large quantities of rhubarb. The latter was much in demand as a medicine and dye (Newby, *Empire*, 129–35; Levi, "India, Russia and the Eighteenth-Century Transformation," 540; Levi, "Ferghana Valley," 224).

⁴¹⁶ *Zafarnāma*, 169.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., 182.

⁴¹⁸ 'Abbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma*, 30–31; Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuhfa*, 139–40; see also sub-section The Military in the current chapter.

carry weight in the local historiography.⁴¹⁹ In this context, we sometimes read about the protection of the *aṭrāf wa aknāf* or *aṭrāf wa jawānib* of the kingdom,⁴²⁰ an ambiguous term covering a range of meanings like environs, confines, tracts of land, quarters, but also ends, limits or boundaries. Despite concrete ideas about the spatial contours of the Manghit realm in Bukharan historiography, the list of places and locations under Manghit protection differed from author to author. Outlining Amīr Ḥaidar's kingdom (*mamlakat*), Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī says that it extended over

“Bukhārā, Chār Jū, Karkī, Aqcha, Khuzār, Tirmidh, Ḥiṣār, Qarshī, Chirāghchī, Karmīna, Panjshanba, Katta Qūrghān, Marw-i Shāhījān, Zamānābād, Islāmābād, Amīrābād, Miyānkāl, Samarqand, Jizakh, Ūrā Tippa, Turkistān, Shahr-i Sabz, Dū Āba and the seven dependencies (*haft tūmān*), every one of which consists of villages and quarters like Qarākūl, Laqlaqa (?), Khairābād, Wābkand, Ghijduwān, Kharkūs and Zindānī [...]”⁴²¹

Outlining the spatial and administrative contours of Amīr Naṣrullah Khān's realm after the enthronization of that ruler, Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm Sāmī says

“When His Sublime Majesty took his seat on the throne of authority (*takhta-yi salṭānat*), he set in order and strengthened the high government. As in the past manner, Daulat Bī Kull Qūshbēgī took the seat of the vizierate and viceregency, his son became governor of Qarshī. Pīr Nazar Bī was installed in Karmīna, Qābil Bī Dīwānbēgī in Nahr-i pay, Yār Muḥammad Bī Dādkhwāh in Katta Qūrghān, Allah Nazar Bī Parwānachī in Panjshanba, his paternal nephew, Faizī Khwāja, in Nūr-i Atā, 'Ālim Bī Yūz in Chilak, Īrdāna Mīrākhūr, the son of Rajab Bēg Dīwānbēgī, in Dushanba Qūrghān, Mīrzā 'Ibādullah Bī in Qarākūl, his younger brother, Faizullah Mīrākhūr, in Kām-i Mīgh, they all administered the above-mentioned regions. [...] The inhabitants of the region of Samarqand and Miyānkālāt, those of Ḥiṣārāt and the Turkmen of Lab-i āb, they all put their neck through the necklace of servitude. The governors of the areas of Balkh, Badakhshān, Khatlān, Ūrā Tippa and Ūrgūt, they all showed signs of acceptance. The kingdom's limits (*sar-ḥadd-i mamlakat*) extended from Ūrā Tippa to the Sir Daryā and from the environs of Qunduz and Badakhshān [all areas] fell into the sphere of protection and under the sway of the Bukharan government [...]”⁴²²

Several patterns can be observed in this statement: first, the author indicates the extensive network and the various dignitaries and power brokers, all of whom are associated with different titles, regions and seats of power. Second, and even more important, the kingdom did not resemble a

⁴¹⁹ *Zafarnāma*, 65, 71, 81, 83, 85, 99, 141, 176, 201 passim.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, 73, 81, 83, 89, 195 passim.

⁴²¹ Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 76–77 (French text, 170–71).

⁴²² Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 131–32.

geographic container or an entity confined by linear borders. Here our author describes the *sar-ḥadd* of Bukhara's sphere of influence as wide and open borderlands stretching from one point or landmark to another rather than dividing two different realms. Sāmī does not mention neighboring polities or powers nor does he define their relations with the Bukharan ruler. Instead, he emphasizes the internal divisions of power and shows the various regions under royal protection. Enumerating the most important coordinates in Transoxania's mid-nineteenth-century administrative framework, Sāmī moves—at least from a Bukharan vantage point—from Transoxania's geographical margins and places making up the *sar-ḥadd* toward the interior and the residence of the king and his administration.

A similar procedure can be observed in other texts. The author of the *Zāfarnāma* lets his hero, Amīr Naṣrullah Khān, embark on a final journey through his realm. The intermediate stops made by the king serve to map the kingdom and list its several parts:

“[A]t the beginning of the great *chilla*, he stepped into the cold and glittering stirrup together with his personal guard, a group of confidants and a legion of soldiers. They passed the ford of Chār Jūy and spent one week resting in that region. Then he fortunately mounted and proceeded along the river together with his glorious troops. Travelling several stages, he arrived at the *wilāyat* of Karkī and spent several days there. [Here, he received] the notables [...], boosted their standing by granting them *khal'ats*, *dirams* and *dīnārs*, and elevated them by showing royal kindness. The governors of the Chār Wilāyat also arrived one by one and were granted the honor of kissing the stirrup. They prayed for His High Majesty and were elevated with kingly favors and the duty of regulating local affairs. [...] Afterward, the king and benefactor traversed the full and swelling river, whose banks were out of sight, with many difficulties and proceeded toward the *wilāyat* of Qarshī. He stopped for ten days in that delightful place and showered its inhabitants with high favors. Subsequently, he steered the bridles of the world-traversing bay horse toward the region of Kish, blessed that paradise-like area with the luster of his fortunate arrival [...] granted royal favors and spent one month in the town of Kitāb. Then [...] he proceeded via the Takhta Qaracha Pass and three stages later arrived at the paradisiacal *wilāyat* of Samarqand, to make the capital of that area proud like the highest paradise. The high-standing *sayyids* and the revered '*ulamā*' made the dust scattered by the magnificent king's noble and swift steed the collyrium of their eyes. He rested for fifteen days in that paradisiacal place. In that time span, all the notables of that region performed the *ziyārat* in order to solicit aid and protection from the glorious spirits of the pious [sheikhs and holy men]. He distinguished the noble and the lowborn of that *wilāyat* and raised them to the highest steps of royal sympathy [by distributing] *dirams* and *dīnārs*, robes and turbans of honor, horses and equipment of every kind and so on. From there, the pure-minded *amīr* departed at an auspicious hour and turned toward the noble capital Bukhara. En route, he blessed the governors of the towns in the Miyānkālāt with royal favors, passed

several stages in a great hurry and arrived at the seat of authority (*pāytakht-i salṭanat wa mustaqarr-i khilāfat*) [...].⁴²³

Describing Naṣrullah's final, counter-clockwise journey through his realm, this source shows that the king's personal attendance was still needed to enforce his authority in the various regions and places. At the same time, the author names geographical fixed points that were regarded as essential for the exercise of authority. Although Naṣrullah had subdued most of his enemies, regions like Shahr-i Sabz, Hiṣār and Kulāb "always remained a rather doubtful 'outer fringe'."⁴²⁴ In an article published in April 1845 in the German journal *Das Ausland*, we read that

"It is impossible to make a statement regarding the boundaries and limits of Bukhara's authority; when the ruler is strong, his influence extends up to the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush and as far to the north and northeast as the Chinese permit; when the ruler is weak, the Uzbek principalities of Balkh, Khullum, Khunduz etc. drop away, and in the north, for example in Khotschend, independent states arise; or they follow the Kingdom of Kabul, whereas the latter joins the Khan of Khokand."⁴²⁵

In spite of all this, the increasing importance of spatial and territorial notions can be observed. The *Zafarnāma* reports on an agreement (*'ahdi wa mīthāqi*) between Naṣrullah Khān and the ruler of Khoqand, under which the canal of Achī constituted a landmark separating the spheres of influence between the two sides:

"From today, we shall not transgress by force or violence the canal of Achī (*āb-i Achī*), which serves as a determined spot, nor shall we, driven by inordinate desire, resort to deceit [in our quest for] retaliation. We should not ignore the extension of those confines and should keep the subjects nomadizing in the steppes (*fuqarā-yi chārpā-dār-i dashtī*) in a condition [of calm] and on the passage of tranquility. Every one of us should content himself out of justice with his own strong God-given dominion and keep the traffic routes used by the merchants free of the wicked and malevolent."⁴²⁶

This is indeed the first instance in Bukharan historiography of an agreement fixing a given landmark as a physical boundary to separate Uzbek polities. Besides, it also defined the mutual rights and obligations of two rulers within

⁴²³ *Zafarnāma*, 243–44.

⁴²⁴ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 4.

⁴²⁵ "Nasr Ullah Bahadur Khan," 361. The transliteration in this quote follows the German original.

⁴²⁶ *Zafarnāma*, 115.

their respective realms. Yet in practice, the agreement, if it ever existed,⁴²⁷ was of little significance because the canal was frequently overstepped by both rulers. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, overlapping territorial claims remained the order of the day.⁴²⁸

SUMMARY

Addressing questions of power and authority in late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Mā Warā' al-Nahr, the previous sections selectively highlighted the historical development in the context of the court. We saw in the fourth chapter that until 1760, the institutionalization of Manghit power had reached only the stage of positioning. Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān did not rule long enough to introduce lasting changes, for example, the setup of a non-Chingizid dynasty, the rulers of which could bear the *khān* title. After his death, his successor had to start from scratch to build up his own following. Except for the two years of Muḥammad Raḥīm's khanship, the first two Manghit rulers did not exercise khanly authority but ruled as *atālīqs*. In doing so they blurred the role distinctions between *khān* and *atālīq* or *amīr al-umarā*, and thus further undermined the Chingizid rule of succession.

By 1800, the Manghits were firmly established as a dynasty of *amīrs* ruling the core areas of Mā Warā' al-Nahr.⁴²⁹ Acting as a *mujaddid*, a religious reviver, Shāh Murād was able to increase the legitimacy of the new dynasty. Some of the chroniclers emphasize the element of divinely

⁴²⁷ This treaty fixing the canal as a border between Khoqand and Bukhara is not mentioned by the major Khoqandian source, the *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh*.

⁴²⁸ Marw was claimed by the Qājārs in Iran, the Qungrats of Khiwa and the Manghits of Bukhara. Sometimes we also see Afghan claims to this area. Ūrā Tippa remained a bone of contention between the Manghits of Bukhara and the Ming of Khoqand. Balkh was claimed by both the Manghits and the Durrānīs of Kabul. The small Pamir principalities and parts of Badakhshān were contested between the Afghan rulers, the Manghits and Chinese Kāshghar (see Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 2).

⁴²⁹ By 1812, most governor positions in Transoxania were held by close relatives, members of the Manghit tribe, mercenaries or slaves: Tūra Khān, Amīr Ḥaidar's son (Karmīna), Mīr Raḥīm Qul Bēg, a maternal cousin of the ruler (Kilif), Tūra Khwāja, a nephew of Amīr Ḥaidar (Panjshanba), Niyāz Bēg, a member of the Manghit tribe (Khaṭarchī), relatives of Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī (Qarākūl and Jizakh), Daulat Bī Qūshbēgī, a slave of Amīr Ḥaidar (Samarqand), Gul Muḥammad Bī Afghān (Nūr) (Ḥāfīz Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 23–24 (English text, 25–26); see also Mīr Izzetullah, "Travels," 336).

legitimated authority, which was in line with his measures in the religious sector.⁴³⁰ Under him we see the emergence and stabilization of an institutionalized structure of positions based on a regular flow of resources that were generated through extensive campaigns to Khurāsān. Because of his religious charisma and standing as a *ghāzī*,⁴³¹ he managed to pass the position of the leading amirid force in Mā Warā' al-Nahr on to his son. Moreover, and as a result of his Sufi affiliation, we see the Naqshbandīya *mujaddidīya* growing in influence and the whole religious establishment increasing at the expense of the Uzbek amirid elite.⁴³² The first round of appointments under his son, Amīr Ḥaidar, is an indicator of the major change at the actors' level. His chronicler starts with a detailed account of the qualities of the religious establishment and the appointments of the *khwājas*, *īshāns* and *sayyids* to various offices in the religious sphere of the administration. While the description of these appointments takes up twenty-eight folios,⁴³³ he only devotes thirteen folios of his *Tāj al-tawārīkh* to the appointment of *amīrs* and various *dīwān* officials.⁴³⁴ Forty years before, Qāzī Wafā had chosen the reverse order, starting with the promotions of the Uzbek *amīrs* on a larger number of folios.⁴³⁵ In addition to the slowly shrinking influence of the amirid class, ranks and positions changed in significance. The influence of the atālīqate was greatly reduced, whereas the *qūshbēgī* became the second in command after the *amīr*.

From 1800 onward, and probably even earlier, a more elaborate administration slowly developed within the more settled framework of authority. The close-meshed grid of data provided by countless letters of instructions and royal diplomas reflects administrative minutiae. The documents also indicate the measures taken by the ruler to establish military and administrative control. At the same time, old notions of Chingizid

⁴³⁰ For details see von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 337–53.

⁴³¹ Anke von Kügelgen argues that the Weberian concept of charisma did not pertain to Shāh Murād, but rather a “Veralltäglichung” of charisma in Weber’s sense (von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 365).

⁴³² See “Description,” 243; Burnes, *Travels*, II, 366. For the Islamization of public life in Bukhara, see von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 347–50; Babadžanov, “Naqšbandīya Muğaddidīya,” 385–413; von Kügelgen, “Die Entfaltung der Naqšbandīya Muğaddidīya,” 103–51.

⁴³³ Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 478a–492b.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, fols. 492a–498b.

⁴³⁵ Qāzī Wafā, *Tuhfat*, fols. 257a–260a.

descent as a precondition for khanship lingered on and only slowly disappeared over time.⁴³⁶

Despite these visible changes in the constellations of actors and the increasing influence of the religious elite, we also see continuities. For instance, succession to the throne was contested as ever. Despite Shāh Murād's relatively secure hold, he was challenged by two of his brothers, Tukhtāmish and Sulṭān Murād.⁴³⁷ Amīr Ḥaidar and Amīr Naṣrullah Khān had to overcome rival brothers too. In addition to the rampant succession struggles, authority was still embedded in conventional rules of the game. On the more visible level of order, rival powers still existed on the margins of Bukhara. Regions like Ḥiṣār, Shahr-i Sabz, Ūrā Tippa and Bāysūn were, for most of the time, beyond the immediate grip of the Bukharan *amīrs*. Large tribal groups such as the Kīnakās, the Yūz and the Kḥiṭā'ī-Qipchāq were often opposed to the Manghit regime and tended to ward off Bukharan control when the rulers were engaged on other fronts.

Under Amīr Ḥaidar, Manghit-ruled Transoxania appeared as one of three major Uzbek polities on the political map of the region. Now we see a balance of power between the Manghits, the Qungrats and the Ming, which reminds of the equilibrium between the Mughals, the Safawids and the Shibanids and their successors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, just on a smaller Central Asian scale. After a temporary weakness during Amīr Ḥaidar's final years, it was under Naṣrullah Khān that Manghit authority was again consolidated. This ruler converted his entourage into a more enduring power structure by constant campaigning against his neighbors. At the same time, he further reduced the stratum of Uzbek chieftains to near insignificance. Having visited Bukhara in the 1830s, Alexander Burnes comments that

“[n]othing is more remarkable to a traveller in Toorkistan than the entire want of chiefs, or Sirdars, among the people, as in India and Cabool. Here there are no great men, no Khans, or nobles, and no one of consequence, but the court and the priesthood. The whole

⁴³⁶ In a personal letter to Shujā' al-Mulk, the *pādishāh* of Kabul, Amīr Ḥaidar complains about İltuzar İnāq, the ruler of Ūrgançh, who had himself inappropriately called *khān* (*khwud-rā khān khaṭṭāb karda*) (*Maktūbāt wa manshūrāt*, fols. 10a–12b; Şifatgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 396).

⁴³⁷ Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, *Histoire*, 56 (French text, 130–31); Ya'qūb, *Tārīkh*, fol. 9a.

of the government are either held by slaves or dependents of the minister; and every town and village is ruled by the Moollahs or Khwajus, the descendants of the first Caliphs.”⁴³⁸

Although Burnes’ statement may be exaggerated, it is evident from this assessment that many chiefs had been permanently absorbed into Naṣrullah Khān’s apparatus of power. While at governmental level the key positions were given to members of the royal family or Persian *ghulāms*, some of the Uzbek leaders had been turned into governors who were entirely dependent on the king’s favor. The latter’s supra-personal aura was underlined by more frequent rounds of appointments and perhaps also the rotation of governorships. Under Naṣrullah Khān, the space of Manghit power gained clearer contours with Bukhara, Samarqand, Qarshī and Miyānkāl making up its heartland. The stabilization of royal authority can be partly attributed to military reforms. But the introduction of new military techniques did not translate into the establishment or effective defense of borders. This is illustrated by the following statement of Naṣrullah Khān to a Persian envoy:

“The Khān of Ūrganj [Khīva], on his part, began hostilities against us. When I was away campaigning to Khūqand and not a single soldier remained at Bukhārā and its environs, he entered my realm (*vilāyat*), besieged Chahārjūy and deported 40,000 families. This happened at a time when we were about to conquer Khūqand. Upon receiving this news, I returned and marched to Chahārjūy.”⁴³⁹

The circumstances described here show that campaigning in one corner of the region ultimately meant leaving the doors open to hostile neighbors. The tensions among the Central Asian rulers and particularly the conflicting territorial claims kept them divided, thus paving the way for the Russian conquest, which will be investigated in the following sub-chapter.

RUSSIA’S PROTECTORATE RECONSIDERED

The Russian penetration of Central Asia had begun already in the eighteenth century under Tsar Peter the Great (r. 1682–1721; 1721–25). Given the bulk of works on the Russian expansion into Central Asia, many of which are based on Russian archival sources, I will not dig deeply into this topic.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁸ Burnes, *Travels*, II, 366.

⁴³⁹ ‘Abbās Qulī Khān, *Safarnāma*, 38. English translation taken from Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 273.

⁴⁴⁰ For Russian expansionism in Central Asia see Yuri Bregel, “Central Asia vii. In the 12th–13th/18th–19th Centuries,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. V, especially part II. The Russian

Instead of combing again through Russian colonial archives, I will put the results yielded by the available secondary literature in the context of the conceptual framework employed in this study. Hence the following sections will add only a few observations to the existing state of knowledge. The short discussion will not be guided by questions about Russia's motives but rather by an analysis of the structural phenomena leading to the establishment of Russian authority in this region. After summarizing the major events of its colonial enterprise, I will look at the interaction between Russian state agents and local actors during and in the aftermath of the conquest.

THE RUSSIAN EXPANSION: A CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

- | | |
|---------|--|
| 1716–17 | A Russian expedition led by Prince Alexander Bekovich-Cherkasskij to Khiwa fails; most of its members are killed or enslaved. ⁴⁴¹ |
| 1717 | Establishment of the Orenburg-Siberia line of forts and first Cossack colonies, serving as a springboard for the penetration into the Kazakh Steppe. |
| 1718–25 | A second, much smaller diplomatic mission under Florio Benevini reaches Bukhara and Khiwa. |
| 1718 | Foundation of Semipalatinsk |
| 1720 | Foundation of Ust-Kamenogorsk |

conquest of Central Asia and the first decades of Russian rule, 199–205; Richard Pierce, “Die russische Eroberung und Verwaltung Turkestans (bis 1917),” in *Fischer Weltgeschichte*, vol. 16: *Zentralasien*, ed. Gavin Hambly (Frankfurt a. Main: Fischer Verlag, 1966), 217–32; Bregel, “The new Uzbek states,” 405–11; Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, especially the chapter on “Russia’s Entry,” 46–65; Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*; Paul, *Zentralasien*, especially chapter four “Das Vordringen Russlands,” 361–65; Manuel Sarkisyanz, “Russian Conquest in Central Asia: Transformation and Acculturation,” in *Russia and Asia. Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples*, ed. Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 248–88; Alton S. Donnelly, “Peter the Great and Central Asia,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes* 17, no. 2–3 (1975): 211–13.

⁴⁴¹ For further details see René Létolle, “Les expéditions de Bekovich-Tscherkassy en Turkestan (1714–1717) et le début de l’infiltration en Asie centrale,” in *Cahiers D’Asie Centrale* 5–6: *Boukhara La Noble*, ed. Maria Szuppe (Tashkent/Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1998), 259–84.

- 1734 Foundation of Orenburg, which becomes the major hub of Russian commercial and political activities.
- 1801 The Turkmen of the Manghishlāk Peninsula officially recognize Russian suzerainty.
- 1820s Erection of Russian frontier posts in the Kazakh Steppe: Kokpety (1820), Kokchetav and Karkalinsk (1824), Bajan Aul (1826) and Sergiopol (1831)
- 1839–40 Unsuccessful military mission headed by the governor of Orenburg, Perovskij.
- 1840 Second Russian expedition led by General Perovskij to Khiwa fails.
- 1837–47 Qazāq uprising under the leadership of Sultan Kenesary Kasimov, a grandson of the *khān* of the Middle Horde.
- 1847 Foundation of Fort Raimovskoe (later Aral'skoe)
- 1853 Occupation of the Khoqandian fortress Āq Masjid (later renamed Fort Perovskij;⁴⁴² present-day Qizil Orda) on the banks of the Sir Daryā by Russian troops.⁴⁴³
- 1864 Russian troops under the command of General Chernjaev capture Chimkent.
- 1865 General Chernjaev's troops take Tashkent; foundation of the *oblast* Turkistan.
- 1866 The Khoqandian ruler Khudāyār Khān accepts Russian suzerainty, his kingdom becomes a Russian protectorate; Russian troops conquer Ūrā Tippa and Jizakh.
- 1867 Foundation of the government-general Turkistan with center in Tashkent; General K.P. von Kaufmann becomes the first governor-general.
- 1868 The Russian army captures Samarqand and the Zarafshān Valley up to Katta Qūrghān; these areas are later ceded by the Bukharan *amīr*, Muẓaffar al-Dīn, and integrated into the government-general Turkistan; Bukhara becomes a Russian protectorate.
- 1869 Erection of a Russian fort in Krasnovodsk and annexation of the surrounding territory to the Russian *oblast* of Daghestan.

⁴⁴² For a description of Fort Perovskij see Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 64–65.

⁴⁴³ The fortress of Āq Masjid had been erected in 1820 under 'Umar Khān on the lower course of the Sir Daryā. The fort was strategically important because it guarded and controlled the trade routes from Tashkent, Bukhara and Khiwa to Russia (Sarkisyanz, "Russian Conquest," 267; Pierce, "Die russische Eroberung," 219; Bregel, "Central Asia vii.," 200).

- 1873 Russian troops defeat the Khiwan army; Khiwa becomes a Russian protectorate.⁴⁴⁴
- 1876 Khoqand is annexed to the Russian Empire.
- 1881 Russian troops commit a massacre of Turkmen in Gök Tippa.
- 1884 Russian troops conquer Marw.

From this sequence of events, it appears that Central Asia became absorbed into the Russian Empire in three stages. The diplomatic missions of Prince Bekovich-Cherkasskij and Florio Benevini were the first steps undertaken to establish closer ties between the Tsarist Empire and the Central Asian principalities.⁴⁴⁵ At the same time, Russia established the Orenburg line consisting of fortress towns and trading posts to protect and advance Russian commercial interests in the steppe and adjacent regions.⁴⁴⁶ In the second phase, the first half of the nineteenth century, Russia's activities in the region intensified. Between 1824 and 1854 Russian troops occupied the Kazakh Steppe,⁴⁴⁷ and moved its southern frontier, hitherto protected by a chain of Russian forts such as Orenburg, Omsk, Petropavlovsk and Semipalatinsk, toward the south.⁴⁴⁸ After a longer phase of consolidating its newly acquired possessions, Russia resumed its expansion in 1853 parallel to the Crimean War (1853–56). In the early 1850s and mid-1860s, Russian troops began to move into the so-called khanates. The first candidate was Khoqand, which was finally annexed and integrated into the government-general, whereas Bukhara and Khiwa were turned into Russian protectorates

⁴⁴⁴ Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 72–76; Bregel, "Central Asia vii.," 202; Fragner, "Die 'Khanate'," 72; Paul, *Zentralasien*, 385.

⁴⁴⁵ The diplomatic contacts between the Central Asian principalities and Russia began in 1558 with the mission of Anthony Jenkinson, a representative of the British Muscovy Company (Bregel, "The new Uzbek states," 405). Other Russian diplomatic missions were sent to Persia, Bukhara and India on the accession of Tsar Alexis (r. 1646–76) in 1646. But the missions to Bukhara and India failed due to disturbances in parts of Central Asia. A second mission to Bukhara headed by the Pazukhin brothers from 1669 to 1673 was more successful. Other diplomatic missions to Bukhara and India followed from the mid-1670s. There were altogether eight embassies to Central Asia and forty-one from Central Asia to Muscovy (Donnelly, "Peter the Great," 203–05). Sarkisyanz speaks of sixteen Uzbek embassies to Russia and nine Russian embassies to the Uzbeks in the seventeenth century (Sarkisyanz, "Russian Conquest," 266).

⁴⁴⁶ Levi, "India, Russia and the Eighteenth-Century Transformation," 532–33, 535.

⁴⁴⁷ Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 13.

⁴⁴⁸ Pierce, "Die russische Eroberung," 217–19.

after military defeats. The protectorate status and the treaties imposed on them allowed their rulers to conduct internal policy as they pleased, but their sovereignty was greatly reduced as Russia represented them in foreign relations.⁴⁴⁹

RUSSIAN PROTAGONISTS AND LOCAL POWER BROKERS

From the very beginning of their colonial enterprise, the relationship between the Russian agents and the local elites was shaped by conventional patterns of interaction. The way local middlemen approached the new authorities is indicative of established rules of negotiation and power sharing.

The account provided by Schuyler highlights the formation of negotiation interfaces in the aftermath of the conquest of Tashkent:

“The morning after the capture of Tashkent a deputation from the city came to wait upon General Tchernayef. He immediately sent for his interpreter, but to his astonishment the venerable leader of the deputation began to talk to him in pure Russian, about science, philosophy, and the benefits of civilisation. He turned out to be a certain Alim Hadji Yunusof, a Tartar, from Penza, in South Russia, who had received his education at Moscow, and had been as a pilgrim to Mecca and through India.”⁴⁵⁰

This situation, where outsiders or newcomers to the local arena are contacted by members of the local elite acting as intermediaries, is typical not only of the Central Asian context but also the wider region. The scene described by Schuyler does not differ much from previous examples of bargaining taking place after a siege or conquest. Not surprisingly, von Kaufmann faced a similar situation after the defeat of the Bukharan army. Moreover, the arrival of the Russian troops in Samarqand was preceded by factional conflicts and fighting in the city.

⁴⁴⁹ Since 1868, Bukhara existed as an independent state despite the fact that it was treated as a dependency by Russia. After 1873, the Bukharan *amīrs* were entitled to maintain foreign relations provided that they acted within the framework of friendship with Russia. But this practice was de facto limited to Afghanistan, as it was Bukhara’s only independent neighbor. In spite of upholding their status as independent sovereigns, the Bukharan as well as the Khiwan rulers had lost their independence and became Russian clients (Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 78, 98, 155).

⁴⁵⁰ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 89–90.

Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn Kūz-Falak

Sāmī provides a very detailed account of the Russian occupation of Samarqand. Prior to the campaign of the Russian detachment, there was a lot of dissatisfaction in the city with the Bukharan governor, Shīr ‘Alī Bī ‘Ināq, and many people felt harassed by his extortion and indecent behavior.⁴⁵¹ Therefore they petitioned Amīr Muẓaffar several times, but their attempts to get rid of the unpopular governor were of no avail. When the Russians occupied Jizakh, the populace urged the *amīr* for a solution, but he kept Shīr ‘Alī Bī ‘Ināq in office and sent detachments to back him against the population. This, and the fact that the religious establishment rebelled when learning about a probable reconciliation between the *amīr* and the Russians, provoked pro-government forces to take action.

When the situation escalated with a bloody uprising by the ‘*ulamā*’ and the siege of the *madrasas* Ṭilākārī and Shīrdār, some of the urban notables like ‘Ārif Bāy, Mu’min Jān and Urūn Bāy from the local Tajik community, as well as Muḥammad Yūsuf Tūqsāba and Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn Kūz-Falak, the representatives of the Īrānīs, contacted the governor-general of Turkistan, von Kaufmann, and invited him to the city. This situation and the invitation of the notables provided the pretext for von Kaufmann to intervene in Samarqand. While the Russian forces dealt a final blow to the Bukharan troops and occupied the Chūpān Atā hills north of the city, the Samarqandīs attacked the city garrison, put the Uzbek commanders to flight and plundered the residence of the governor. The chronicler, who was an eyewitness of these events, was unable to escape and finally took refuge with Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn, the *mufī* of Samarqand and head of the Īrānī community. The morning after the defeat of the Bukharans, the city notables gathered for consultations and decided to surrender. Subsequently, they collected cows and eggs, and sent eight elders (*kalān-shawanda*, *āqsaqālān*) to the Russian camp to invite the Russians to the city.⁴⁵²

On this occasion, the spokesman of the delegation of notables, Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn Kūz-Falak, said:

⁴⁵¹ Adopting the Bukharan vantage point, Sāmī sharply criticizes the inhabitants of Samarqand and describes them as wicked and seditious people who always took the path of hypocrisy (Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuhfa*, 196).

⁴⁵² Interestingly, the chronicler attributes the fate of Samarqand and the defeat of the Uzbek army to the will of God (*irāda-yi illāhī*). For the whole episode see Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuhfa*, 196–204; Khalid, “Society and politics,” 369–70.

“For us people, the adherents of Islam, it became quite apparent from the promise of reliable reporters that the followers of the Christian faith are merciful and kind to the Muslims. Of all nations and professions of faith, the people of this persuasion are the closest friends of the followers of Islam. This has been mentioned in the holy Koran, the book of the divine mansion. Therefore, we Samarqandīs request an alliance and wish the entry of the Christians, and being free of trouble and confusion of mind, we fully agree and put ourselves under the shade of fortune spread by the protective shield of the [Russian] emperor (*khwudhā-rā ba sāya-yi daulat wa zill-i himāyat-i imparātūr kashīdāīm*). It is absurd to expect our absent commanders to follow the path of well-wishing and faithfulness.”⁴⁵³

Here the *muftī* of Samarqand delivers his message with rhetorical skill.⁴⁵⁴ The chronicler, who was perhaps not present, puts words into Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn’s mouth that are reminiscent of the vocabulary I explored in the previous chapter of this study. The tsar is perceived and portrayed here like other potential rulers shading the poor subjects with his protective shield. The way Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn Kūz-Falak negotiated with the Russians is indicative of his pragmatism as a go-between.

In an alternative version of these events, Dānish suggests that the bloody upheaval in Samarqand occurred after the defeat of the Bukharan troops by the Russian army at Jizakh. When the Samarqandī ‘*ulamā*’ learned about the *amīr*’s retreat, a large crowd of people, among them many *mullās*, gathered in the city and called the culprits for the military disaster to account. In the next step, Shīr ‘Alī ordered a large-scale massacre of the ‘*ulamā*’ to restore order to the city. Facing this situation, the *madrasa* students and the populace sided with the ‘*ulamā*’ and attacked the local garrison until “streams of blood poured into the alleys of the city.”⁴⁵⁵ In this version, commanders of the local garrison (*umarā*) settled the conflict. Neglecting the role of the city notables, this writer attributes the final occupation of Samarqand by the Russian troops to their superior discipline, better military equipment and organization.⁴⁵⁶ Interestingly, both Sāmī and Dānish mention

⁴⁵³ Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 203.

⁴⁵⁴ Rhetorical skills were necessary for everyone engaging in negotiations. The author of the *Zafarnāma* mentions situations where envoys and supplicants employed eloquent (*zabān-i charb, sukhanhā-yi charb*) and mind-assuaging words (*sukhanhā-yi dil-āsā*) (*Zafarnāma*, 137, 222, 242).

⁴⁵⁵ Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish, *Risāla*, 56.

⁴⁵⁶ Dānish strongly criticizes the lack of discipline in the Bukharan military, its organization, the tribal nature of the army and particularly the prevalence of contingents of slaves and

that the Russian governor-general was placed on the famous *kūk tāsh* of Samarqand.⁴⁵⁷ Thus the notables had no real problem with placing an outsider on the symbolic icon of authority in Transoxania.

The Manghit Amīrs as Russian Clients

On the eve of the Russian expansion into Transoxania, some parts of the region were outside the *amīr*'s scope of authority. At least in the eastern *wilāyats*, Manghit authority was challenged by a number of rebellions. The principalities of Shahr-i Sabz and Ḥiṣār, in particular, had slipped from Bukharan control and the new ruler had yet to prove his military clout.⁴⁵⁸ According to Dānish, the new *amīr* also lacked political farsightedness and military skills. For example, he failed to secure the banks of the Sir Daryā by erecting forts (*qūrghān*) as had been done by his father.⁴⁵⁹

The tensions were further fueled by the Russian presence in the aftermath of the occupation of Samarqand and the Russo-Bukharan treaty. The latter triggered a wave of unrest and insurrections, which further deepened Amīr Muẓaffar's dependence on Russian support. Backed by the religious establishment and the opponents of his father, Prince 'Abd al-Malik placed himself at the forefront of a rebellion against the *amīr*. Especially the

freedmen (*ghulāmān*), as well as the fact that the loyalty of the soldiers had to be ensured with money gifts (Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish, *Risāla*, 51–55).

⁴⁵⁷ 'Abd al-'Aẓīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 203; Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish, *Risāla*, 58.

⁴⁵⁸ Soon after Amīr Muẓaffar's enthronization, the followers of Jūra Bēg Bī Qaira Sāldī wrested Shahr, Kitāb, Yakka Bāgh and other areas from the forces of the government. During the following campaign, the army of the *amīr* only conquered Yakka Bāgh and withdrew to Samarqand when learning of the occupation of Ūrā Tippa by the Khoqandians. On the retreat of his forces, Muẓaffar recognized the Kīnakās chieftains as governors, who from now on ruled again as independent potentates. In Ḥiṣār, the situation was quite different in that the Bukharan *amīr* always mediated the conflicts of the various Yūz governors such as 'Abd al-Karīm Khān (*wilāyat-i* Ḥiṣār), Sattār Qulī Bēg (Rīgar), 'Abd al-Ghaḥār Bī Parwānachī (Sar-i Āsyā and Sar-i Jūy) and Şūfī Bēg Bī Dīwānbēgī (Dehnau). In 1280/1863–64, they followed the example of their Kīnakās neighbors and warded off Bukharan control. In spite of a successful campaign against the Yūz, Ḥiṣār and Kulāb remained trouble spots in the following years (Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Aẓīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 158–69).

⁴⁵⁹ Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish, *Risāla*, 38–39. Dānish also criticizes the lack of fortification in Jizakh, which he terms the gateway (*darwāza*) to Samarqand (*ibid.*, 43).

Qarā Manghit⁴⁶⁰ and Tūq Manghit of Qarshī as well as the Qungrāt of Khuzār supported the prince's course of action.⁴⁶¹ The Russians intervened on behalf of Amīr Muẓaffar in order to prevent a takeover by an anti-Russian faction. They also stationed troops at Jām, near Shahr-i Sabz, the refuge of the prince. In October 1868, Russian troops put an end to the insurrection and captured Qarshī for Muẓaffar al-Dīn. His son escaped together with a small group of followers to Khiwa. From there he went to Afghanistan, Kāshghar and finally to British India, where he died in 1909.⁴⁶²

Two years later, Russian detachments conquered Shahr-i Sabz on behalf of the Bukharan *amīr* and removed his enemies, the notorious rebels Jūra Bēg and Bābā Bēg.⁴⁶³ Very soon, Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn recognized the advantage of his status as a Russian dependant. For example, in 1870 he demanded a present of four thousand rifles as well as technical and military assistance from the Russian envoy Nosovich.⁴⁶⁴ During the next years, he was to gain new territories in other regions that had hitherto been outside his sphere of influence. In order to compensate him for the loss of Samarqand and large parts of the central Zarafshān Valley, the Russians ceded the mountain *wilāyats* of Ḥiṣār, Kulāb, Baljuwān and Qarātegīn to him. In addition, he gained the tiny Pamir principalities of Shughnān, Roshān and the northern part of Darwāz. This region became known as “Mountain Bukhara” or simply “Eastern Bukhara.”⁴⁶⁵ The Russian contingents also

⁴⁶⁰ Sāmī spells it Qara Manghit (قره منغیت) (Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 206).

⁴⁶¹ Sāmī lists the following tribal chiefs as instigators of the revolt: Khudāyār Īshik-Āqābāshī Qara Manghit (here spelled Manghit), ‘Ibādullah Tūqsāba Tūq Manghit, Ibrāhīm Tūqsāba and Tīmūr Khwāja Manghit (more likely Ibrāhīm belonging to the Tīmūr Khwāja Manghit), Īsh Nazar Bēg Shaghāwul Baḥrīn and Ma‘šūm Qul Mīrākhūr Qungrāt. In a second step, the Kīnakās *amīrs* Bābā Bēg Bī and Jūra Bēg Bī also joined the rebels (Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 206–08).

⁴⁶² Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 46–47; Sarkisyanz, “Russian Conquest,” 268; Bregel, “The three Uzbek states,” 409; Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 38. According to another account by Sāmī, the prince went into exile in Kāshghar (Gross, “Historical Memory,” 220).

⁴⁶³ Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 51; Bregel, “The three Uzbek states,” 409.

⁴⁶⁴ Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 51.

⁴⁶⁵ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 64; Pierce, “Die russische Eroberung,” 227; Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 6, 48–49, 155–58; Sarkisyanz, “Russian Conquest,” 268; Bregel, “The three Uzbek states,” 409; Khalid, “Society and politics,” 371.

helped him suppress a revolt by the Qungrāt in 1870 and annex some sections of Khiwan territory on the right bank of the Āmū Daryā.⁴⁶⁶

Altogether, the Bukharan *amīr* benefitted from the Russian presence as it allowed him to enforce his authority. In the long term, the Russian troops and their suppression of rebellions signaled the end of the independence some of the tribes had resumed after Naṣrullah Khān's death in 1860.⁴⁶⁷ In return, the ruler sent gifts at all important events in the Russian Empire. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the *amīr*'s largesse to his protector amounted to a million rubles annually. Carrère d'Encausse points to the strong impression he made outside his realm.⁴⁶⁸ The Manghit *amīrs* assumed the role of representatives or, more appropriately, intermediaries bridging two worlds. The order of things Amīr 'Abd al-Aḥad, for instance, had to adjust to was by no means new as argued by Becker.⁴⁶⁹ The only new aspect was the intensifying relationship with a non-Muslim interventionist force. 'Abd al-Aḥad travelled several times to the European part of Russia and was well acquainted with the Russian way of life. When he met the tsar and many officials during his stay in Moscow in 1882, he referred to them as his old friends and well-wishers.⁴⁷⁰ Besides this obvious affiliation, 'Abd al-Aḥad acted like a conventional local representative because he maintained his relations with St. Petersburg through the governor-general in Tashkent, and later the political agency in New Bukhara. In 1869–70 Tsar Alexander II and his cabinet refused a petition sent by the *amīr*, who requested direct access to St. Petersburg. Besides, the Russian interventionists also fueled local conflicts by intervening on behalf of their respective allies. In 1870, von Kaufmann mediated a conflict between Bukhara and Khoqand over the possession of Qarātegin.⁴⁷¹ Toward the end of the century, the Bukharan ruler increasingly appealed to the Russians to put down local riots and rebellions, particularly in the *wilāyats* of Eastern Bukhara.⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁶ Sarkisyanz, "Russian Conquest," 268.

⁴⁶⁷ Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 50.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 47–48. See also Sarkisyanz, "Russian Conquest," 269.

⁴⁶⁹ Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 195.

⁴⁷⁰ Olga Yastrebova, "The Bukharan emir 'Abd al-Aḥad's Voyage from Bukhara to St. Petersburg," in *Looking at the Coloniser. Cross-Cultural Perceptions in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Bengal, and Related Areas*, ed. Beate Eschment and Hans Harder (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2004), 64.

⁴⁷¹ Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 48–49.

⁴⁷² Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 64; Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 49.

THE EFFECTS OF THE RUSSIAN PRESENCE

Although Transoxania witnessed an enormous influx of Russian citizens, the population remained relatively unaffected by Western cultural influence.⁴⁷³ Furthermore, the Russian presence gave rise to the valorization of traditional practices as the measure of true Islam, while the rulers could present themselves as the upholders of local traditions. This traditionalism, however, should not be interpreted solely as a political posture, seeking to anchor the legitimacy of the Bukharan kings in their announced defense of tradition, as has been argued by Khalid.⁴⁷⁴ Increasing traditionalism can be explained as a sign of inertial power structures rooted in the minds of the ruler and the population. Simultaneously, the Bukharan *amīrs* presented themselves as the sole guarantors of political stability and “the best means of keeping the ‘fanaticism’ of the local population in check.” To keep the Russians at bay this argument “was trotted out to prevent troops from being stationed in Bukhara and even to keep out unwanted advice about hygiene and public health (as happened with a commission from St. Petersburg in 1895).”⁴⁷⁵

Inertia and the Emergence of New Elites

The Russian advance in Bukhara and the gradual establishment of the protectorate remained within the bounds of the existing order, though it also changed things. First of all, the imposition of the protectorate status corresponded to local worldviews as it was in line with the principle of indirect authority. Even in the Samarqand *okrug*, which was part of the government-general, Russian authority was very much of an indirect nature. The change made itself felt first and foremost at the actors’ level, where we see new players or old ones in new positions, whereas others were excluded or marginalized. While Bukhara’s inclusion into the orbit of the Tsarist Empire was to the detriment of the tribal leadership, it boosted the rise of the ‘*ulamā*’. The latter came to form a powerful elite often opposed to the *amīr*. Other developments occurred in the economic field. Due to land reforms and the introduction of cotton as a new cash crop, we observe the emergence of a

⁴⁷³ Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 19.

⁴⁷⁴ Khalid, “Society and politics,” 370.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 370–71.

new class of middlemen and landowners.⁴⁷⁶ However, “Russian policies did not transform agricultural and urban populations as they had the nomads of the steppe.”⁴⁷⁷

Carrère d’Encausse misinterpreted the process in the aftermath of the Russian conquest as the emergence of a “national bourgeoisie” and the appearance of capitalism in Bukhara, coinciding with a “tragic crisis of the peasantry.”⁴⁷⁸ But in fact, we see the rise of new local elites facilitated by conventional worldviews and patron-client ties. Particularly the Bukharan merchants were able to establish themselves as intermediaries between the small native producers of cotton and karakul and the Russian buyers of those items.⁴⁷⁹ The Bukharan *bāys* also “became detached from the mass of the peasantry and came to swell the intermediate groups.”⁴⁸⁰ In the time when all the control levers of the Bukharan economy were concentrated in the hands of the Russians, the latter needed interlocutors and intermediaries to gain access to the domestic market. Local middlemen established themselves as agents for Russian enterprises and brokered the purchase of raw materials and the sale of Russian products.⁴⁸¹ Members of the new elite were the Khodzhaevs, who had an annual turnover of one million rubles, the Vazhaev brothers, who ran eleven factories and managed twenty others, and the Arapov brothers, who were influential on the astrakhan market.⁴⁸²

The reliance on middlemen in the various different contexts of the region inevitably meant mediatization of the populace, who was unfamiliar with the Russians. Referring to Nalivkin, who spoke of “corrupt petty native officials that grew up after the Russian conquest, cutting the local population off from

⁴⁷⁶ See also section Social Order(s) in the Bukharan Countryside/Sharecropping, Land Tenure and Patronage/Institutionalized Indebtedness in the current chapter.

⁴⁷⁷ Manz, “Historical Background,” 13.

⁴⁷⁸ Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 45.

⁴⁷⁹ Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 180.

⁴⁸⁰ Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 20.

⁴⁸¹ Similarly in Khoqand and Khiwa, cotton production was pushed by brokers and dealers who bought up large shares of the local cotton harvest in advance. Local middlemen lent money and cotton seeds to the sharecroppers. Yet the intermediaries themselves had to borrow money from Russian merchant bankers and wholesalers (Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 20, 25). According to ‘Ainī, in his home village north of Bukhara city, the chief winter work for everybody was cotton processing. Local intermediaries provided the cotton bolls, which were then carded, cleaned and delivered to landlords in exchange for a small amount of money (‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 7; Aini, *Sands of Oxus*, 33).

⁴⁸² Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 45–46.

the Europeans [...] and from most of the benefits of European enlightenment,” Alexander Morrison identifies a “Living Wall” against foreign influence.⁴⁸³ What is described here as an evaporation of direct Russian influence should not be interpreted as a response of “corrupt native officials” working in the colonial administration of the Zarafshān *okrug*, but can be explained by age-old power structures. In spite of the emergence of a new stratum of officials acting under Russian auspices, their behavior followed the same long path as that of their Bukharan colleagues and their forebearers! The members of the new elite greatly enhanced their standing through Russian patronage and the fact that they had access to the new authorities. As a result, Russian rule in Samarqand—and probably much of Turkistan—remained as indirect as Manghit rule in Bukhara. The problem here was that the Russian colonialists complained about and fought against a system they were part of from the very beginning. Moreover, by using local actors as middlemen, they contributed to the maintenance of collective aspects in local worldviews.

Inertia, however, is also reflected in the difficulties local actors had with the recognition of territorialized authority. Like in many other areas between the Great Steppe, Iran, Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent, the colonial regime introduced the boundary concept to Transoxania. Since the loss of Samarqand and eastern Miyānkāl in 1868, the town of Katta Qūrghān had already functioned as a border town between the Bukharan and the Russian part of the Zarafshān Valley. But Wilhelm Radloff, who was responsible for the regulation of the Russian-Bukharan border and therefore visited the region in the early 1870s, complains that he was forced to spend some time in Katta Qūrghān against his will, because it took the Bukharan border officials about one week to get there.⁴⁸⁴

Other signs of the persistence of local worldviews can be observed at the boundaries of Transoxania. For instance, the attempts of the quartermasters of Russian frontier posts to purchase grain locally in the border regions faced opposition because of the established routine of collecting grain and sending it to the capital.⁴⁸⁵ The opposition to this new practice materialized despite the obvious increased turnover offered to local trade by the garrisons,

⁴⁸³ Alexander S. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910. A Comparison with British India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 181.

⁴⁸⁴ Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, II, 450.

⁴⁸⁵ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 18.

especially since the latter paid punctually in cash. The persistence of the petition system in the Russian part of the Zarafshān Valley is another case of inertial worldviews.⁴⁸⁶

The Unequal Share of the Zarafshān Water

In addition to the Russian interference on behalf of the partners of the colonial administration in Tashkent, and the mediation attempts, the replication of local patterns of authority can be traced to the highest level and surface of Transoxania's social order. First we see the conflict centering on the question of the Zarafshān water. Since the sources of the Zarafshān and its entire upper course as far as Katta Qūrhān belonged to the Russian possessions, much of the water supply was used for agriculture in Samarqand and its environs. But neglect of dam constructions and canal work on its middle course west of Samarqand caused severe shortages on the lower course of the river. This and a general crop failure in 1870–71 caused a famine in Bukhara and other parts of Mā Warā' al-Nahr. In this situation, many people accused the colonial administration at Samarqand of inattentiveness with regard to the dam and of not supplying enough water to Bukhara. These accusations are thus to be seen as a reflection in the rural context of similar dynamics and the accusations targeting careless patrons.⁴⁸⁷ The high grain price caused not only by famine and drought but also by the presence of many foreign garrisons in the region fueled the crisis in Bukhara and enforced social relationships down to the villages, since now many peasants relied all the more on moneylenders. The situation escalated when von Kaufmann forbade grain exports and only sent a gift of fifty-four tons.⁴⁸⁸

After settling the water issue in 1872, Bukhara had to cover the expense of the dam repair and furnish laborers for regular cleaning and construction work.⁴⁸⁹ According to Becker, the farmers who used the Zarafshān water on the Bukharan side and had formerly paid an annual tax to cover repairs continued to pay for the construction work, but the payment was used for liquidation of the war indemnity debt imposed by Russia.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁶ Morrison, *Russian Rule*, 183.

⁴⁸⁷ See last section of this chapter.

⁴⁸⁸ Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 52.

⁴⁸⁹ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, 288–89.

⁴⁹⁰ Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 53.

War Indemnity and Rising Prices

Besides the conflict over the water issue, the heavy war indemnity dictated by the Russians to the Bukharan *amīr* increased the dependence of the latter on his new protectors. General von Kaufmann made the initial request for an indemnity during his expedition in the Zarafshān Valley. Offering a choice of peace terms, he suggested the payment of 1,150,000 *ṭilā*,⁴⁹¹ an amount equal to four million six hundred thousand rubles, to be delivered over the next eight years. This sum had to be paid for Russia's conquests from Yangī Qūrgḥān to Katta Qūrgḥān. The alternative was an indemnity of only 125,000 *ṭilā*, a lower sum contingent on the recognition of all Russian territorial gains since 1865.⁴⁹² The Bukharan *amīr* accepted the second choice and in return was assured that Bukhara would be spared the fate of Samarqand.⁴⁹³ The imposition of a war indemnity strongly reminds us of the strategies employed by landowners and moneylenders in the smallest Transoxanian villages.⁴⁹⁴ The presence of many troops in the region and the loss of the major part of Bukhara's bread basket, the Miyānkāl, to the Russians caused a remarkable inflation. Radloff, who visited the Zarafshān Valley after the Russian conquest, refers to the increase in prices after the intervention, particularly for food, and attributes it to the large number of soldiers in the region. Mutton, for example, cost eight rubles compared with a price between four and six rubles prior to the conquest. The price of salt rose three times from two or three kopeks to eight kopeks, that of flour from 3.40 to 4.40 rubles.⁴⁹⁵ Simultaneously, Russian imports tended to impoverish Bukharan artisans,⁴⁹⁶ who became more dependent on the good will of creditors.

⁴⁹¹ In the late 1890s, one *ṭilā* was valued at a fraction over twelve rubles (Alexis Krausse, *Russia in Asia. A Record and a Study, 1558–1899* (1899; repr., London/New York: Curzon Press, 1973), 71, footnote no. 1.

⁴⁹² Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 40.

⁴⁹³ Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, 71. According to Dānish, the Bukharans sent one of the Manghit princes to St. Petersburg to deliver a war indemnity of 170,000 *dīnār* (Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish, *Risāla*, 58–59).

⁴⁹⁴ See section on Institutionalized Indebtedness in the current chapter.

⁴⁹⁵ Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, II, 455–46.

⁴⁹⁶ Sarkisyanz, "Russian Conquest," 270.

The following list provided by Schuyler shows the sharp increase in prices in the bazaars of Katta Qūrghān and Samarqand especially in 1870, the year of the famine in Bukhara.⁴⁹⁷

Increase in Food Prices in Katta Qūrghān

Year	Wheat per Batman	Barley per Batman	Rice per Batman	Mutton per Pud	Mutton Tallow per Pud
1862	1.60	1.40	7.00	2.20	3.30
1863	2.40	2.00	6.40	2.40	3.60
1864	2.80	2.20	6.80	2.40	4.00
1865	2.80	2.40	7.20	2.40	4.00
1866	3.20	2.20	7.60	2.40	4.40
1867	3.20	2.40	8.00	2.40	4.40
1868	4.00	2.60	9.20	2.40	4.40
1869	3.20	2.40	9.60	2.80	4.80
1870	14.40	11.20	18.00	7.20	25.60
1871	8.00	4.00	11.00	2.80	7.20

Increase in Food Prices in Samarqand

	1869	1870	1871
Wheat, per batman	4.20	9.00	8.75
Barley, ”	2.60	7.00	5.20
Flax, ”	5.40	9.20	12.80
Rice, ”	4.20	5.60	5.80
Sorghum, ”	2.60	6.40	3.80
Millet, ”	2.20	6.00	3.80
Cotton, ”	8.00	12.00	10.00
Mutton, per pud			2.73
Mutton tallow, per pud			6.76

⁴⁹⁷ Schuyler's lists are based on the notes made by Captain Grebenkin and Colonel Sobolef, but he does not indicate the currency used for these calculations (Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 285).

Factional Conflicts and Centrifugal Forces

The establishment of the Russian protectorate greatly contributed to the preservation of inherited power structures and social realities, entailing factional rifts and disputes on various social and spatial scales. The presence of the Russians and the loss of Samarqand gave rise to centrifugal forces that had been suppressed in the previous decades. The conflict between Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn, his son and the *'ulamā'* is just one case in point. These tensions were fueled by the arrangement between von Kaufmann and the *amīr*, but also called for further military aid. The rebellion of 'Abd al-Malik Tūra was supported by the Manghit of Qarshī, the Kīnakās of Shahr-i Sabz and the Qunghrāt of Khuzār.⁴⁹⁸ First of all, the followers of the prince cast four brass cannons. Then they gathered a large army, crossed the Takhta Qaracha Pass and besieged Samarqand, where other groups joined them. Even Īshān 'Umar Khān, one of the Dahbīdī leaders, rendered support. According to Sāmī, the rebel army entered Samarqand, installed their cannons on the roofs of the *madrāsas* Shīrdār and Ṭilākārī and bombarded the citadel.⁴⁹⁹ At the same time, the Qungrāt stripped off Bukharan authority and captured several fortresses in the region of Shīrābād.⁵⁰⁰ The siege of Samarqand ended upon the arrival of the Russian governor-general and his detachments from Katta Qūrghān. As has been mentioned above, the Russian military was instrumental in quelling the insurrections ravaging various parts of Transoxania for Amīr Muẓaffar.

Factional strife can be observed in other contexts too, for example the religious field that has been investigated by Khalid and others, though the conflicts between different *'ulamā'* groups did not result from the Russian intervention directly. Divided into several factions, the members of the religious establishment competed for influence, ranks and appointments.⁵⁰¹ In particular the post of chief judge, the *qāzī kalān*, formed a bone of contention that fueled the dynamics in this period. As different *'ulamā'* and

⁴⁹⁸ Mīrzā 'Abd al-'Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuḥfa*, 205–07.

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 208–09. When von Kaufmann returned with his troops from Katta Qūrghān to Samarqand, while spreading rumours about an alliance with the Bukharan ruler and his army, the rebel army fell apart and the Samarqandīs attacked the troops of 'Abd al-Malik inside Samarqand. Finally, the prince and his supporters retreated via the Takhta Qaracha toward the south (*ibid.*, 212).

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 209.

⁵⁰¹ Khalid, "Society and politics," 373.

their families were linked either to the traditionalists or the advocates of reform, the struggle among the religious elite and the reform discourse were interdependent.⁵⁰² In that time, factional shifts were based on the competition between the Kulābī, or Kūhistānī from Eastern Bukhara, and the so-called Tūmānī, the *'ulamā'* of the capital and the surrounding oasis, who had long taken their sources of income for granted. The conflict between these two groups started when Muẓaffar al-Dīn summoned Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn, an influential *'ālim* from Kulāb, to the capital.⁵⁰³ In the last years of Bukharan independence, the position of *qāẓī kalān* shifted between these two groups.⁵⁰⁴ At the same time, this power struggle allowed those *'ulamā'* who did not fit into this scheme to carve out constituencies for themselves.⁵⁰⁵ On the one hand, the rotation of the office might be attributed to the wish of the *amīr* to curb the power of the *'ulamā'*, as suggested by Welsford.⁵⁰⁶ This would imply replication of a strategy that worked quite well with the provincial governors. Welsford postulates that the rotation of the *qāẓī* office was an institutionalized practice that, at least in the case of the magistracy of Nasaf, foreclosed a factionalized background.⁵⁰⁷ Here I argue that the rotation of offices and the mobility of Bukhara's juridical personnel have to be seen as by-products of the constant institutionalization of patronage both in the context of the Manghit rulers and in rural areas. This practice had little effect and did not prevent the increase in the reputation of certain *'ulamā'* families. The regular transfer to positions throughout Transoxania considerably enlarged their radius of action and added to their experience. In addition, the practice led to the spread of their family networks in all directions. At the same time, it incited them to demand a growing number of gifts and even money for sealing documents. They did so because they knew

⁵⁰² Ibid., 374–81. On the links of the competing *'ulamā'* families to the traditionalists and the reformists, see also Thomas Welsford, "The Rabbit, the Duck, and the Study of Central Asian Legal Documents," *Islam* 88, no. 2 (2012): 272.

⁵⁰³ For further details see Khalid, "Society and politics," 373–74; Stéphane A. Dudoignon, "Faction Struggles among the Bukharan Ulama During the Colonial, the Revolutionary and the early Soviet Periods," in *Muslim Societies, Historical and comparative aspects*, ed. Sato Tsugitaka (London/New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 76.

⁵⁰⁴ Khalid, "Society and politics," 373, 377–81; Dudoignon, "Faction Struggles," 79.

⁵⁰⁵ Khalid, "Society and politics," 373–74.

⁵⁰⁶ Welsford, "The Rabbit," 275.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

that their stay in Nasaf or in other places was temporary and their next transfer was only a matter of time.

Let us look at the Kulābī faction around the *qāzī-kalān* Badr al-Dīn from Kulāb. Mullā Mīr Badr al-Dīn (d. 1908) belonged to a family of ‘*ulamā*’, the famous Baīza family from Khaṭlān in mountainous Eastern Bukhara.⁵⁰⁸ Having been loyal to Muẓaffar al-Dīn Khān during the revolts of the Uzbek *amīrs* and the heir apparent in the aftermath of the Russian occupation of Samarqand, his father Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn (d. 1879) managed to dominate the judicial administration by expelling most of the prominent ‘*ulamā*’ and replacing them with his own followers. Later, after the interlude of the chief judge ‘Abd al-Shukūr, his son Badr al-Dīn gained considerable strength.⁵⁰⁹ Overshadowing the authority of the *qūshbēgī*, his influence was based on his potential to mobilize the students in the *madrasas* of the capital, especially the *kuhistānī ṭalaba* from Khaṭlān.⁵¹⁰ This illustrious man used his patronage network to control the ‘*ulamā*’, who often took severe measures to circumvent the control of the *amīr*.

The factional strife between the two groups intensified after Badr al-Dīn’s death in 1908, when the post of *qāzī-kalān* passed to the old *maulāwī* Baqā Khwāja. Involving Āstāna Qul Qūshbēgī and his successor, Naṣrullah Bī Parwānachī, this struggle also informed the conflict around the new-method schools, which were accused of introducing *bid‘at* (inventions) into the religious system. In 1914, the Kulābī faction gained the upper hand when Badr al-Dīn’s son Burhān al-Dīn gave a “marathon feast” for the *amīr* and was in return appointed as *qāzī kalān*. Afterward he brought about the closure of the new-method schools and consolidated his position by appointing his followers to posts throughout Bukhara.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁸ Dudoignon, “Faction Struggles,” 74.

⁵⁰⁹ In the time of Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn, Mīr Badr al-Dīn had served as *qāzī* in the *wilāyat* of Nasaf (Kazakov, *Bukharan Documents*, 38; BOB no. 139a/122a). We know that one of his brothers, Mīr Muḥṭy al-Dīn b. Mullā Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn, was also *qāzī* of that province (Welsford, “The Rabbit,” 271).

⁵¹⁰ Franz Wenneberg, *An Inquiry into Bukharan Qadimism: Mīrzā Salīm-bīk* (Berlin: Schwarz, 2002), 11–12, 14–15. Mīr Badr al-Dīn also purchased and kept manuscripts and chronicles. His possession seal (*muhr-i tamalluk*) is to be found in the manuscript of Qāzī Wafā’s *Tuhfat al-khānī* (IVANRUz no. 16), which I used for the purpose of this study.

⁵¹¹ Khalid, “Society and politics,” 377–79, 81. For the various turns this struggle between the groups of Bukharan ‘*ulamā*’ took, see Dudoignon, “Faction Struggles,” 62–96.

Railways, Monocultures and Borders

From 1873 onward we see visible changes being introduced in Bukhara and the wider region. The most important was the end of the isolation that had protected the three Uzbek polities for a long time. Now they opened up and experienced a true rush of travelers, traders and diplomats, especially from Russia.⁵¹² Many of the other changes in this period led to an inclusion of the region in the global economy, primarily the building of modern means of transport and communication and the export of cash crops like cotton. In addition, we see the establishment of linear boundaries between the Central Asian principalities by their foreign patrons. The start signal for this process was the Clarendon-Gorchakov Agreement of 1872, determining the Oxus as an official border that was to separate the Russian and British spheres of interest.⁵¹³

In late 1885, the Russian foreign ministry had set up a political agency based in Kāgān. Over the years, the responsibilities of the political agent expanded parallel to the increase of Russian commercial activities in Bukhara. The first political agent, N. V. Charykov, negotiated the construction of a railway through Bukharan territory.⁵¹⁴ The most important development since the Russian conquest, the Transcaspian Railway soon became the major catalyst for change in Bukhara.⁵¹⁵ Completed in 1891, the extension of the railway connected the Emirate of Bukhara, and particularly the towns of Chahār Jūy and New Bukhara (Kāgān),⁵¹⁶ to the major segment

⁵¹² von Kügelgen, "Buchara im Urteil europäischer Reisender," 419.

⁵¹³ Lengthy negotiations and diplomatic correspondence preceded this agreement. During these negotiations Russian diplomats sometimes literally referred to Great Britain and Tsarist Russia as "patrons" or "protectors" of Bukhara and Afghanistan respectively (Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 61; for the whole process see *ibid.*, 58–63).

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 130–32.

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 125; Pierce, "Die russische Eroberung," 228–29; C. Poujol and V. Fourniau, "Trade and the Economy (Second Half of Nineteenth Century to Early Twentieth Century)," in *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, vol. VI: *Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the end of the Twentieth Century*, ed. Chahryar Adle, Madhavan K. Palat and Anara Tabyshalieva (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2005), 61.

⁵¹⁶ Kāgān was chosen as a stop and site of a railway station because of widespread popular resentment against the project. The *mullās* in particular saw Bukhara as a religious center and therefore strongly opposed a train station in the capital (Poujol and Fourniau, "Trade," 66; Sarkisyanz, "Russian Conquest," 270).

of the Transcaspian Railway.⁵¹⁷ Ordered by Tsar Alexander III after the occupation of Marw in 1885 for military purposes,⁵¹⁸ the construction involved four hundred Russian employees and approximately thirty thousand native workmen, primarily Turkmens, Iranians and Bukharans.⁵¹⁹ According to the initial plan, the construction was to take three years at a cost of seventy million rubles to link Tashkent and Samarqand to St. Petersburg via Orenburg.⁵²⁰ The construction work followed lengthy negotiations with Amīr Muẓaffar, who strongly opposed the plan for a railway through his realm. In June 1885, the two sides signed a protocol, in which the Bukharan *amīr* agreed to the plan while leaving the selection of the route to Russia. He also agreed to buy the building material and to hire the labor force.⁵²¹ By 1899, the railroad segments in the region altogether covered a distance of 2,358 verst⁵²² and continued further from Samarqand to Tashkent.⁵²³ At the beginning, the railway's economic importance was eclipsed by its geostrategic value. Hence all railway officials belonged to the Russian military.⁵²⁴

According to contemporary accounts, the railway stations and other facilities constituted Russian “islands” in Transoxania:

“A broad bulwark of clay separates the roadbed from the fields and the paths. Many old walls, ruins of houses like in Old Marw, towers and other reminders of construction activities are indicators of a lively history. Here, at Chahār Jūy, Alexander the Great had crossed the Oxus. [Paragraph] The new town is grouped around the railway station and with its sheds, magazines and department stores betrays that an important transshipment

⁵¹⁷ The construction began in 1881 with a section of 257 km leading from Krasnovodsk and the Bay of Mikhailovskij to Qizil Arwat in Akhal. From 1884 on, the railroad was extended to Marw (1886), the banks of the Āmū Daryā and the town of Chahār Jūy (end of 1886), and Samarqand (summer 1888) (Wilhelm Launhardt, “Die transkaspische und sibirische Eisenbahn,” *Jahresbericht des Frankfurter Vereins für Geographie und Statistik* 55, no. 6 (1894): 159; Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 39).

⁵¹⁸ Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 127; Paul, *Zentrasiens*, 237–88; Poujol and Fourniau, “Trade,” 66.

⁵¹⁹ Launhardt, “Eisenbahn,” 159.

⁵²⁰ “Die turkestanische Eisenbahn,” *Das Ausland* 55 (1882): 633–34.

⁵²¹ Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 127–28.

⁵²² Approximately 2,515 kilometers.

⁵²³ “Das Eisenbahnwesen in Centralasien und seine Bedeutung. (Spezialbericht des k. & k. Consulates in Tiflis),” *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den Orient* 25, no. 8 (1899): 85.

⁵²⁴ Every thirteen kilometers the Russians built barracks for the signalmen and observation towers (Launhardt, “Eisenbahn,” 159–60).

point has arisen there. The trading and shipping company Kawkas i Merkuri is of course present as announced by their big company placard on the train. Gardens and trees show that the Russian knows how to make himself comfortable in a short time. With a length of one thousand six hundred meters, the new Amu Daria Bridge gives a good reference of his cultural activities. [...] After a construction period of one and a half years, it was opened to traffic in June 1901.”⁵²⁵

The railway had a deep impact on the local economy. It reduced distances and travel times and made the old caravan trade redundant.⁵²⁶ Holdsworth speaks of a “railway track zone” of Russian settlement expanding into a general trading and semi-industrial community.⁵²⁷ From then on, Bukhara became more accessible for Russia. As a consequence, its annual trade with Russia assumed huge proportions.⁵²⁸ The railway also stimulated the cotton trade as low freight costs and protective tariffs gave the Bukharan cotton a competitive edge over foreign cotton.⁵²⁹ Cotton had long been known as a crop in the region. But the types of cotton cultivated locally were short-fibred and, compared to the American brands, of relatively low quality.⁵³⁰ Although the export of cotton had gained importance already before the 1860s, its cultivation now further intensified. Before the Russian conquest, cotton constituted the main economic link between Russia and Bukhara because Russia’s growing textile industry depended on imports of raw cotton. Until the beginning of the 1860s, Russia imported cotton in huge quantities from the United States. The shortages resulting from the American Civil War and the decrease of cotton exports from the United States caused an explosion of the cotton price on the global market.⁵³¹ Henceforth, Central Asian farmers devoted more energy to monoculture. As a consequence, the annual export of raw cotton from southern Central Asia rose to 6,521,000

⁵²⁵ Toepfer, “Im Lande Buchara,” 28–29.

⁵²⁶ In 1876 a journey from Tashkent to Bukhara took twenty-six days by camel. By train, the same route took a quarter of the time at three-quarters of the price (Poujol and Fourniau, “Trade,” 66).

⁵²⁷ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 65.

⁵²⁸ Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 171.

⁵²⁹ Pierce, “Die russische Eroberung,” 229; Sven Beckert, “Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War,” *The American Historical Review* 109, no. 5 (2004): 1430–31.

⁵³⁰ V. Walta, “Der Baumwollanbau in den russischen mittelasiatischen Besitzungen,” *Der Tropenpflanzer* 11, no. 10 (1907): 679, 681. See also “Das Eisenbahnwesen,” 87.

⁵³¹ Beckert, “Emancipation and Empire,” 1413.

rubles in 1864.⁵³² Walta even speaks of a “cotton fever” causing cotton to become a cash crop.⁵³³ Compared to an annual production of sixty thousand *pud* of cotton in the 1850s,⁵³⁴ Bukhara produced one million *pud* of cotton annually on acreage of one hundred thousand to one hundred fifteen thousand *dessiatins* by 1899.⁵³⁵ The cotton economy received a further boost during World War I, when the Russians pushed the *amīr* to foster the cultivation of American cotton, the seeds of which were introduced in the southern and eastern provinces. In 1915, Bukhara’s annual cotton harvest reached an amount of two million seven hundred thousand *pud*, though most of the land under cultivation was still used for the production of wheat.⁵³⁶

Investigating the Bukharan Karakul trade during this period, Holzwarth refers to the “Karakul fever,” leading to a sharp increase in the export of Karakul lambskins to Russia and other European countries. By 1903, the Karakul boom reached its first zenith and Bukhara exported one million pelts per year, whereas the number of Karakul sheep increased from four hundred thousand in 1833 to four million in 1912.⁵³⁷ At that time, Bukhara attracted Karakul buyers from London, Paris, Berlin, Constantinople and Moscow.⁵³⁸

In the wake of growing economic interdependencies, Bukhara experienced an influx of Russian settlers. Russian settlements, or more correctly cantonments, emerged along the railroad and in the river ports. The most important enclaves enjoying extraterritorial status were Chahār Jūy and Kāgān.⁵³⁹ These colonial towns housed a heterogeneous population of Russians, Armenians, Jews, Tatars, Persians and others.⁵⁴⁰ In 1888 Russia

⁵³² Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 22–23; see also Walta, “Baumwollanbau,” 680–81.

⁵³³ Walta, “Baumwollanbau,” 683. Similar impacts of the American Civil War can be seen in India, where the production of cotton was intensified by the British *raj*. One of the regions becoming a major producer of cotton was Berar in the Deccan (Beckert, “Emancipation and Empire,” 1411–14, 1424–27).

⁵³⁴ Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam in the Russian Empire*, 42.

⁵³⁵ “Das Eisenbahnwesen,” 87; Poujol and Fourniau, “Trade,” 58; Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 181. According to Carrère d’Encausse, Bukhara produced two million puds of cotton per year in the pre-revolution period. Cotton represented forty percent of Bukhara’s annual exports (Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam in the Russian Empire*, 42).

⁵³⁶ Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 182–83.

⁵³⁷ Holzwarth, “Mittelasiatische Schafe,” 91–92. On the Karakul trade see also “Das Eisenbahnwesen,” 87.

⁵³⁸ Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 171.

⁵³⁹ Sarkisyanz, “Russian Conquest,” 269–70; Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 138.

⁵⁴⁰ Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 40.

negotiated a new agreement with Amīr ‘Abd al-Aḥad placing the settlements under de facto Russian control. Endowed with their own administration, these enclaves attracted further flows of settlers. In the course of time, other cantonments and garrisons were established in Karkī and Tirmidh.⁵⁴¹ A German visitor gives a vivid description of Kāgān in the year 1907:

“On this journey, New Bukhara presented itself as an unattractive complex rather like a newly constructed American town, with incredibly broad, totally unsurfaced, regular and straight streets, to which the one-storied houses are not even roughly in proportion. Only the new building of the Imperial Bank is a notable exception, and the apartment of the Russian Resident is quite impressive.”⁵⁴²

In the following years, the Russian jurisdiction in Bukhara was enlarged. By 1893 all “legal actions involving Russians in any capacity were now tried according to Russian law before a Russian judge.”⁵⁴³ The same year, the seat of the Russian justice of peace was transferred from Chahār Jūy to Kāgān, the major hub of Russian diplomatic, commercial and industrial activity.⁵⁴⁴

In 1895 Bukhara was absorbed into the Russian customs space and postal union.⁵⁴⁵ Russian customs posts were set up in a number of frontier towns up to Darwāz.⁵⁴⁶ In the first half of the 1890s, the military advance of Russian and British troops further in the east on the “roof of the world” brought the two rivals, Russia and Great Britain, into more direct contact. This again raised the border question in the region. As a result of the bilateral negotiations, in the course of which Russia and Britain settled the Pamir boundary on behalf of their Central Asian clients, the Panj River, one of the parent streams of the Oxus, was recognized as the Afghan-Bukharan boundary.⁵⁴⁷ It was officially surveyed by a boundary commission.⁵⁴⁸ After the delineation, the Bukharan border was protected by a number of Russian frontier posts, forts and garrisons.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴¹ Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 140–41.

⁵⁴² Toepfer, “Im Lande Buchara,” 32.

⁵⁴³ Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 144.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁵ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 65. For details see Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 149–53.

⁵⁴⁶ Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 40.

⁵⁴⁷ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 63–64; Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 155–58.

⁵⁴⁸ Pierce, “Die russische Eroberung,” 227.

⁵⁴⁹ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 63. In 1894 contingents of the Russian Āmū Daryā Brigade were stationed in Tirmidh to protect the border village of Patta Ḥiṣār. In 1899 the Russian

SUMMARY

Representing an attempt to reconsider the Russian protectorate of Bukhara, the previous sections have reviewed the impact of Russia's conquest through the lens of the Social Order concept. Adopting a narrow approach, I spotlighted various aspects of Russia's policy toward Bukhara on the basis of our current state of knowledge. From the perspective of the Russian colonial discourses, the student of Central Asian history is dealing with a colonial project informed by the ambitions of St. Petersburg and Tashkent. According to such a top-down approach, the colonial power appears to have been the master of affairs defining the course of the colonization or, in the Bukharan case, the imposition of the protectorate status. The impact of Tsarist politics and the economic motives quite apart, the review of the secondary literature from a relational perspective provides a useful corrective to common, more Russo-centric explanations. From such a standpoint, the Russian conquest and the subsequent integration of the Bukharan Emirate into the Tsarist Empire was not a one-sided process but can be elucidated with local dynamics that are redolent of established patterns of order.

In many instances, the situation in the last quarter of the nineteenth century reminds one of the Iranian conquest in the mid-eighteenth century. As then, the establishment of the protectorate followed a trajectory set before. Similar to Nādir Shāh's intervention in 1740, the Russian conquest was greatly facilitated by patron-client relations and mediation. A superior military organization, including training and discipline, and possession of more and better means of power such as weapons and ammunition were decisive factors on the side of the conquerors. Simultaneously, however, we also observe differences. While in 1740 Mā Warā' al-Nahr was invaded by a Muslim conqueror from the south, in 1868 the Manghits were confronted with a non-Muslim power coming from the north. The Russian conquest and subsequent policy differed from those of Nādir Shāh and also yielded other effects. First of all, the Russian colonial enterprise represented both a smooth transition and a watershed in Transoxania's history. While Russian overlordship corresponded to and strengthened local worldviews, it brought

authorities established a fortified post in Karkī to foreclose border problems with Afghanistan (Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 41).

about rapid and lasting changes as it pushed Bukhara's social order to a new level of institutionalization.

Concerned with the impact of the Russian protectorate, we observe a very slow institutionalization of statehood under the auspices of von Kaufmann and his successors. The emergence of the Bukharan state, its penetration by Russian infrastructure and its inclusion in the global economy was part and result of the dialectics of power. Bukhara's statehood was owed far more to the impact of local worldviews and the interplay of structuring and structured processes than solely to Russian colonial interest and display of military power. Continuing over the next decades, the Bukharan state was crafted by the interplay between the Manghit dynasty, Russian diplomats and politicians, Bukharan state agents and local elites. As I will show in the following sections, the foreign visitors and diplomats who poured into Transoxania were continuously sucked into the local social order. The resulting process of state-making⁵⁵⁰ took place in various interrelated social contexts and spheres.

FOREIGN IMAGES OF TRANSOXANIA'S SOCIAL ORDER

The period outlined in the last sections above is commonly known as the "Great Game" in the political and historical discourses; the interests of the colonial powers Russia and Great Britain collided in Central Asia and the adjacent region, including Afghanistan, northern India and Iran. During this time, Transoxania and its neighbors witnessed a veritable rush of travelers. Names like Wolff, Vámbéry, Eversmann, Schuyler and Moser, to mention just a few, are widely associated with the genre of travelogues. Many of them evoke the picture of Bukhara as a *terra incognita*, a forbidden realm

⁵⁵⁰ Following the precedents of Arun Agrawal and Katja Mielke, I use the term "state-making" that places emphasis on the negotiation of state control and its extension between state officials and local communities. The term allows taking into account the capture and domination of extending state control through local factions, patronage networks and mediators (Arun Agrawal, "State Formation in Community Spaces? Decentralization of Control over Forests in the Kumaon Himalaya, India," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 1 (2001): 9–40, especially 12–14; Katja Mielke, "Constructing the Image of a State. Local Realities and International Intervention," in *Local Politics in Afghanistan. A Century of Intervention in the Social Order*, ed. Conrad Schetter (London/New York: Hurst & Company/Columbia University Press, 2013), 245–63).

mentioned in one breath with Timbuktu and Lhasa. James Locke, for example, states that Bukhara is

“[...] surrounded by the provinces of a European country which are administered according to broad and humane ideas, we find a state six hundred miles wide, whose three million inhabitants are almost as barbaric, whose institutions are as crude, and governmental methods as tyrannical, as in the days when Central Asia knew no stranger. A little pressure, perhaps, has been brought to bear upon the emir, and some of his refinements of barbarism have been abolished. [...] The line of greatest progress is indicated in the present assurance of safety to travelers. Where, not so many years ago, it would have been absolutely impossible for a European to penetrate, one can now go with more or less freedom. Several Russian cotton merchants are scattered throughout the khanate, and experience no difficulties. Even down on the frontier of Bokhara and Afghanistan (what place on earth would seem less safe?) Russian capital has penetrated, and modern machinery is developing there the gold fields [...]. There are no banks; monetary transactions are carried out as they have been for centuries, by the Hindoo money lenders, sitting each behind his own little wooden box of gold and silver coins. This unwillingness to respond to the advances of civilization is, I think, *sui generis*. At least I have never seen or heard of another case like it. All the Eastern towns I had ever seen before were tainted by the West, and the charm of such a place is injured by the sight of a single modern building. But Bokhara, with all its accessibility, stands today by the side of Lhasa and those very few Asiatic towns which have as yet remained pure and untouched in their barbarism.”⁵⁵¹

Although Locke describes Bukhara as a *terra incognita*, the first travelers and diplomats like Clavijo, Jenkinson and Benevini had visited the area long before. With the establishment of the Russian protectorate, Bukhara opened up for outsiders, primarily Russians but also other visitors, who produced numerous travel accounts. Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the travelogues were the only source of information for the European readership interested in the region. Many travelers prepared themselves by reading the works of their predecessors. After arriving in Bukhara, they relied on native informants and their own observations.⁵⁵²

The next two sections are exclusively devoted to the perception of Bukhara's social order by outside observers. Many of them harshly criticized the social conditions and what is often described as culture and society in Bukhara. Another tendency to be seen was the dismay expressed with respect to the so-perceived absolutism, despotic rule and control exercised

⁵⁵¹ James Locke, “The City Beyond the Deserts,” *Outing* 47 (1905): 32.

⁵⁵² von Kügelgen, “Buchara im Urteil,” 415, 419.

by the administration.⁵⁵³ Lacking a deeper understanding of the societal context, many of the foreign visitors made generalizing and often misleading statements about “first-hand observations” of visible aspects. Phenomena that were more difficult to observe went largely unnoticed, though it seems that many travelers were part of this social relationship without being consciously aware of it. One exception is Henri Moser, whose statements about the local *jigīts* reveal a certain sense and understanding of the local dynamics of power:

“After the horse, the Jigit (young man, hero) is the most important item of equipment. Later, I will often come to speak about this strange class of domestic servants; in Central Asia the black and white lots of the travelers largely depend on them. The Jigit is the medieval landsknecht. Often he is a young man who has escaped from the jail, a ruffian, whose home is as unknown as his parents. Armed and well-mounted, he enters service. The better the reputation of the generosity or the high standing of a traveler, the more Jigits will volunteer for his service. The best and bravest are the Afghans and the Turkmen; the Kirghiz are good and loyal boys. The Jigits of the prince have been in his service since the beginning of the journey; they form a whole horde. At first, they are entrusted with the care of the horses; they take responsibility for them and also ride them if the lord has no time for it. When the chamberlain is in a bad mood or gets a migraine, which happens often, the Jigit is his deputy. It would be difficult to say what the Jigit does not carry out; he is a being sticking hard to the heels of his master, serving him while maintaining his entire freedom. For this he does not receive a fixed pay; he and his horse will be catered for, and if he distinguishes himself, he will be provided with gifts. On the battlefield he becomes a warrior; I know Jigits who have been awarded a military decoration, and even the St. George’s Cross. On the journey he serves as a guide, armed companion and courier; as an excellent, well-armed rider he will be entrusted with important messages and high sums of money with complete reassurance [...] The Jigit has a passion for bright and colorful clothes; he wears a turban, embroidered leather trousers, and a colorful khalat, which he ties with a sash of dazzling colors. [...]”⁵⁵⁴

In the following I will cast a glance at some of the travel accounts and explore the perception of the typical gift giving and notions of Bukharan hospitality.

⁵⁵³ Ibid., 425.

⁵⁵⁴ Moser, *Durch Central-Asien*, 125–26; own translation. Von Hellwald describes the Jigits as native riders (von Hellwald, *Centralasien*, 388).

FOREIGN EXPERIENCES OF BUKHARAN HOSPITALITY

One of the first to visit Bukhara and Khiwa back in the eighteenth century was the Russian envoy Florio Benevini, whom we met in one of the previous chapters. Upon arriving at Bukhara, he already complained about the “greediness” of the Bukharan officials, and he made similar confusing experiences in Khiwa. Before arriving there around April 20, 1725, Benevini was received by a *mihmāndār* sent by the favorite of the Khiwan ruler Shīr Ghāzī Khān, Dūstum Bāy. Shortly thereafter, he was accommodated in a fine country house of the latter and the city elders provided him with five rams, one hundred pieces of bread and fifteen measures of sorghum for his horses. But in the same breath, he complains that this continued for “only” fifteen days, with the addition of just five carts of straw.⁵⁵⁵ Benevini’s statements are interesting because they betray his own contradictory thoughts and views. On the one hand, the envoy grumbles about the expectations of the locals with regard to presents, but on the other he expected to be catered for free by the Khiwan nobles. The following account is a good illustration of the misinterpretation of the gift giving and its meaning, and also of how differently the objects exchanged were valued:

“Two days later, the Favourite sent somebody to tell me that the Khan was going to grant me an audience in two days, and, therefore, that I had better bring some gifts for him, for some Uzbek ministers and for the Favourite himself, who was curious to see what nice things I had prepared. Such were the invitations and promises: instead of giving me, they wanted to take from me; they were displeased that I had not come earlier simply because they wanted to rob me with more profit, and the later I reached Khiwa, the poorer, and the more useless to them I was. Thus, I led him to a couple of marvellous black fox furs which I had kept with me just in case of need, a silver watch, a silver jar for the tea leaves, a dozen china cups, six pieces of Russian silver lace, one lyre of silver thread, a half-*braccio* mirror with white amber facets, a white amber glass with its strainer, a large crystal glass together with its cover, a couple of fine pistols and a couple of fish-bone combs. Moreover, I had for the ministers fifty of the nicest lambskins, twenty pieces of Bukharan fabric, little knives, several sashes and so on. [Paragraph] The Favourite saw all this, did not say a word and left, almost angry. I had one of my men to follow him and listen to the Favourite’s conversation with his men. Afterwards the man told me that he said the following words: ‘what? does the envoy think that he can come out with these trifles? The Khan does not need what he showed to me; he was able to find so many gifts for the Khan of Bukhara and his ministers and nothing for our Khan and for me? Where

⁵⁵⁵ Benevini, *Poslannik* [Perevod zhurnala italianskogo/Rep. dated 1725—transmitted by Peter Sofonov], 99, 101. Di Cosmo, “A Russian Envoy,” 92, 94.

are – he said – the scarlet clothes, the highly valued silver sashes and silver bridles, horses and so on? He will have to explain it to someone, now that he is in our hands.”⁵⁵⁶

The account proceeds with Benevini’s efforts to acquire new gifts for the Khiwan ruler and Dūstum Bāy, the latter being described as “a diabolic and treacherous man.” Benevini even offered to take out a credit from other merchants to satisfy his interlocutors. The favorite demanded other fabrics and sashes to be included in the list of gifts together with some other presents from Bukhara. What interests most in this case is the fact that things were valued differently by the Russian diplomat and the Khiwan representative. While the envoy presented a number of items more or less corresponding to the pattern of things desired by many native actors, he obviously failed to provide presents that many Khiwans valued much more: well-equipped gift horses and a special kind of fabric, things befitting the social status of the receivers and their worldview. Dūstum Bāy’s reaction also illustrates how stereotyped the gifts and the expectations were. In his eyes, Benevini had obviously failed to reciprocate in the right way, and he did not want the horses just out of greed but because gift horses were status symbols and expressed the social rank and reputation of the giver as well as that of the receiver much more than the presents from the envoy.

According to the rest of the story, the emissary was forced to buy twenty-two ells of the fabric for four thousand two hundred *tanga* an ell from a merchant, but in fact it belonged to Dūstum Bāy, and the money went directly into his pocket. The manipulation of the gift giving for individual purposes went even further: Dūstum Bāy distributed the gifts to twenty-four Khiwan officials instead of eight as was agreed at the beginning. Moreover, he went to the ambassador’s stable and selected two of the most beautiful horses as well as the other items already shown and ordered them to be brought to the ruler together with the fabric he had bought before and two black fox furs. Simultaneously, Dūstum Bāy secretly chose a scarlet cloth and the best black fox for himself. The remainder of the first rounds of gift giving went to the ruler, who, being unaware of the embezzlement, now pretended to have been offended by such ignoble presents.⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵⁶ Benevini, *Poslannik* [Perevod zhurnala italienskogo/Rep. dated 1725—transmitted by Peter Sofonov], 102–03. Translation taken from Di Cosmo, “A Russian Envoy,” 96.

⁵⁵⁷ Benevini, *Poslannik* [Perevod zhurnala italienskogo/Rep. dated 1725—transmitted by Peter Sofonov], 103–04; Di Cosmo, “A Russian Envoy,” 96–97.

What Benevini did not know was the social context with its many mutual obligations. As an influential Khiwan merchant, Dūstum Bāy not only derived his reputation from his close relationship with the ruler, but in all likelihood took care of an extended clientele. Many of his protégés, among them some of the city elders, on being requested or ordered to do so, supplied the Russian diplomat and his retinue for more than two weeks with food provisions. The latter expected this kind of giving to be purely disinterested. But he did not consider the compulsion Dūstum Bāy probably felt from his own clients demanding something in exchange. When they put pressure on their patron, Dūstum Bāy felt obliged to reciprocate, and since in his view the diplomat had offered insufficient and partly unsuitable gifts, his actions to get the money were wholly justified. Finally, Benevini was perceived as a person with strange expectations, as somebody unable or unwilling to exchange in the proper way.

Let us leave the Khiwan setting and return to those visiting Bukhara in the nineteenth century. Some of the travelers like Alexander Lehmann, Eduard Eversmann or Henri Moser traveled around Bukhara as part of diplomatic missions. All of them describe the hospitality of the ruler and his officials. The mission Eversmann belonged to was welcomed by a Bukharan delegation accompanied by fourteen camels laden with fruits, bread, and fodder for the horses.⁵⁵⁸ Lehmann's caravan was received by a small delegation led by a young man riding a beautiful horse with a gold-embroidered blanket who was dressed in a flowered satin *khal'at* and wore a small dagger in a golden sheath.⁵⁵⁹ After arriving at their domicile, the officials brought a number of large brass bowls full of melons, grapes, figs, peaches, roasted mutton and bread, and also dishes with water and ice, and huge plates with teapots and cups. In addition, every member of the mission got a sugar loaf. After the meal, the envoys immediately presented gifts such as crystal glasses and porcelain, blue fabrics, silk and gold brocade.⁵⁶⁰

The Danish traveler Olufsen, who led expeditions to the mountainous Eastern Bukhara, provides some of the most detailed accounts of Bukharan hospitality and generosity. In the *qal'a* of Wamar, for instance,

“[a] table in the garden was laid with all that we could possibly wish of grapes, apples, pears, melons, Bokharan bread (small round cakes), several loaves of white sugar, raisins,

⁵⁵⁸ Eversmann, *Reise*, 62.

⁵⁵⁹ Lehmann, *Reise*, 68.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 71.

Bokharan sweetmeats, large quantities of meat, soup swimming with fat, boiled eggs and a large brass-tjillem (water-pipe) with tobacco to enjoy after the meal. Hamrakul, my right hand man from Turkestan, was all eyes; of late his confidence in my greatness had dwindled down very much; but on this reception it rose considerably.”

[...]

“In a large wooden pavilion open on two sides was the Beg in a caftan embroidered with gold and beside him two of his nearest relations in motley silk caftans. They were sitting at one end of a large wooden table covered with a table-cloth of figured stuff, and the whole table was closely laid with many dishes of meat, bread, fruit, sweetmeats in such quantities that there would have been enough for the whole population of the town. [...] After the meal a beautiful water pipe inlaid with precious stones went about, I took a draught with a certain caution, then we had a view of the magnificent garden where a luxuriant growth of vines covered the walls of the castle, and where besides fruit-trees there were many flowering plants and ornamental bushes.”⁵⁶¹

While the first extract mirrors the interconnectedness of generosity and patronage, including the expectations of Hamrāhqul, one of Olufsen’s Jigits, the second passage is reminiscent of Bukharan hospitality and taste in the eighteenth century. After their arrival at the residence of the governor of Karmīna, Lehmann and his companions made similar experiences.⁵⁶²

Some travelers go on about the traditional *dastarkhwān*, the tablecloth mentioned so often in the chronicles. Jaworskij, a member of the Russian mission of 1878–79, describes a reception and small banquet at the residence of the governor of Chirāghchī and lists the following items on the *dastarkhwān*: *ayrān* or *qatiq* (a kind of curdled milk), water with ice, different kinds of juices, egg white beaten stiff and mixed with cream, almonds and pistachios—plain and sugared—raisins and apricot stones, fresh apricots and cherries, Russian confect, gingerbread made of fruit and nut dough, Russian rock candy and sugar loaves, and a range of meat dishes.⁵⁶³ Describing his experiences in Kitāb, the missionary Lansdell refers to a tablecloth laid with similar items.⁵⁶⁴

Some of the travelers make mention of gift horses and that in many cases the donor generously offered seven horses. Traveling with the diplomatic

⁵⁶¹ Olufsen, *Emir*, 82, 86.

⁵⁶² They were supplied with an abundance of fresh and dried fruits, the latter being pickled in sugar, almonds and pistachios. In Panjikent, he had the opportunity to admire the governor’s garden with its many fruit trees (Lehmann, *Reise*, 101, 111).

⁵⁶³ Jaworskij, *Reise*, I, 45; see also Moser, *Durch Central-Asien*, 127.

⁵⁶⁴ Lansdell, *Russisch-Central-Asien*, III, 551.

mission of Prince Wittgenstein, Moser mentions seven fine horses together with the usual equipment (turquoise-encrusted bridles and brocade blankets) that the Russian mission was presented with by the *bēg* of Ẓiyā al-Dīn. Moser himself got a grey Karabayr horse and seven *khal'ats* made of different fabrics. He also states that the governor distributed altogether one hundred and fifty *khal'ats* and seven horses and that the Jigits had always dreamed of taking part in such a mission. After the sale of all the items, the Jigits, Cossaks and other servants obtained two hundred rubles. The next day, the leader of the diplomatic delegation reciprocated and gave Russian silver utensils, revolvers and robes made of Russian fabrics.⁵⁶⁵ Eugene Schuyler also reports about the customary robes and a gift horse, a valuable *arghamāq*, which he received from the governor of Kitāb together with a gold-plated bridle and embroidered harness. Soon after, he got another large white horse covered with an immense embroidered blanket from 'Abd al-Karīm Bī Dīwānbēgī, the *ḥākim* of Shahr-i Sabz. At the same time, he was presented a *dastarkhwān* with more than thirty dishes.⁵⁶⁶

TRAPPED IN THE REGIONAL GIFT CYCLE

The systematic usage of local institutions for individual purposes followed well-established, centuries-old patterns of behavior and contributed to a limitation of the Russian influence. For example, Bukharan officials and the *amīr* himself ensnared the Russian missions with personal presents. While this practice conformed to Central Asian moral codes, it limited the effectiveness of the Russian missions in collecting information and conducting closer relations with Bukhara. Although the Russians themselves definitely had difficulties in accepting gifts—General von Kaufmann had forbidden Russian agents to take money—the material I explored shows that exchange between the new patrons and clients remained the order of the day.⁵⁶⁷ Since it was favored by the officialdom of Russian Turkistan, the

⁵⁶⁵ Moser, *Durch Central-Asien*, 129–30.

⁵⁶⁶ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, II, 66. Schuyler received his most beautiful and valuable horse from the governor of Qarshī. In Bukhara the *amīr* likewise gifted him with a horse together with four caparisoned gowns (*ibid.*, 78, 85).

⁵⁶⁷ In 1870 the members of Nosovich's mission accepted *khal'ats*, horses and four hundred rubles. The following year Struve did the same, he also accepted a money gift of six thousand rubles. In 1872 Petrovskij accepted robes, horses and money from the governor of Karmīna (Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 55).

practice continued until 1917, and any embassies invariably accepted more gifts from Bukharan officials than they could give in return.⁵⁶⁸

Sticking to this practice and becoming more or less integrated in the local social order, the Russians faced problems reminiscent of those of earlier rulers: their influence evaporated in a chain of intermediaries and exchange-based patronage:

“The Russians complain that their Government shows no firmness in its diplomatic relations, and does not assert the influence to which it has a right from its actual power, and accuse the diplomatic *employé* and other envoys of yielding too much to what is called Asiatic usage. One of these usages is that of giving and receiving presents. When Russia first opened relations with the Khanates, and when it was itself in outward character an Asiatic power, it is but natural that the system of presents should have been maintained. It was, however, found exceedingly burdensome. The Khans approved of it in order to obtain rich presents from the Tsars, as well as to reward their favourites at Russian expense by sending them on missions. In consequence of this, it became necessary to issue an order that Asiatic envoys could not be received more than once in three years, and then only under special circumstances, and that the direct relations between the countries should be carried on by the governors of the nearest provinces. [Paragraph] [...] For presents and expenses of ambassadors, a very large sum is required. The Governor-General for Turkistan receives for these purposes 35,000 rubles yearly; but this sum is quite insufficient to cover the actual outlay for the reception of ambassadors and the purchase of articles for presents. In consequence of this, the Governor-General is obliged to give to one presents received from another, or else to sell those presents, in order with the money thus obtained to purchase others to be given in return. The second method is, perhaps, to be preferred to the first, so as to prevent the absurd incidents which it is said sometimes formerly happened. The Bukharan Amir, for example, in the horses sent him from Khokand, recognised the same animals which he had previously given to the Bek of Tashkent. These horses, with their gorgeous trappings, had succeeded in making several visits, and had returned to their own stable. But even now it sometimes happens that the robes sent from all quarters to Tashkent get mixed, and instead of Khokandian robes, Bukharan robes are sent to Bukhara, so that people believe there that the present has not been accepted, but has been returned.”⁵⁶⁹

This not only shows the difficulties the Russians had in handling the gift system, it also tells us how much they found themselves willy-nilly in the role of patrons, whose own worldview led them to misinterpret many practices as capitalistic. Radloff and Abbott are just two cases illustrating “culture shock” or a general misunderstanding of the social situation. Others like Khanikov or Schuyler, although not immune to value statements, paid

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid., 86.

⁵⁶⁹ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, II, 271–72.

much more attention to unobservable aspects of the social order. According to Khanikov, there were no particular privileges in favor of merchants of one generation at the expense of another, nor was any attention paid to whether the import or export of commercial items was profitable or not.⁵⁷⁰ As Locke states, there were plenty of Russian goods, but the natives showed tenacity and much preferred Bukharan articles to the Russian ones, even though the factories in Moscow had imitated the colors and patterns and offered goods for half the price.⁵⁷¹

DIVERGING WORLDVIEWS, DIVERGENT TASTES

Interestingly, some of the travelers tell us that they did not understand the ritual of gift giving, nor did the presents suit their taste. This pertained especially to the customary robes of honor. In the case of Jaworskij, the leader of the diplomatic mission gifted the *bēg* of Chirāghchī with a silver watch and *khal'at*. The mission received seven gift horses and seven sheaves with robes made of brocade, cashmere, silk and so on.⁵⁷² The figure seven also applied to the sugar loaves and the small boxes of sugar candy. Jaworskij refers to the differences in the Bukharan and the Russian understanding by stating that all these gifts hardly made any sense to the Russians. He questions why a Russian should wear a *khal'at*, but in the same breath argues that it would have been offensive to refuse the presents.⁵⁷³ Lord Curzon similarly mentions the differences between Russian and British versus Bukharan tastes:

“On our table was spread every morning a *dastarkhan* (literally table-napkin) or collection of sugar-plums, dried raisins, sweetmeats, and little cakes, together with a huge flat slab of brown bread – the traditional hospitality of the Amir. We never knew what to do with

⁵⁷⁰ Khanikov, *Bokhara*, 207, 211.

⁵⁷¹ Locke, “The City beyond the Deserts,” 32.

⁵⁷² Bukharan *bēgs* preferred summer robes, furs and fur coats, boots made of Saffiyan leather, shawls and fabrics made of silk (Jaworskij, *Reise*, I, 43).

⁵⁷³ According to Jaworskij, the Bukharans attributed the giving of *khal'ats* to an instruction in the Koran (Jaworskij, *Reise*, I, 47). In Qarshī, Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn Khān offered his Russian guests various robes, velvet and silk fabrics, girdles with golden and silver turquoise-encrusted ornaments, other fine *khal'ats* made of lambskin, and seven horses adorned with brocade blankets and bejeweled bridles (ibid., 66).

these dainties, which were not altogether to English taste, and the various plates with their contents became quite a nuisance.”⁵⁷⁴

Another kind of confusion, this time on the part of the Bukharan *amīr*, is reported by Lansdell, who gifted the king with a red robe, a Freemason’s collar, a doctor’s hat and a European travel primer with colorful illustrations in addition to a Persian bible and the Old Testament in Arabic. While Muẓaffar al-Dīn Khān reciprocated by giving the typical Bukharan presents, he returned some of Lansdell’s gifts like the Freemason’s collar, the hat and the primer. He justified this by referring to the fact that he was unfamiliar with the language of the book and in consequence could not understand the pictures, a statement that probably also held true for the other gifts returned.⁵⁷⁵ Since they did not make any sense to the *amīr*, he could not retain or make use of them without triggering similar irritations in his surroundings.

The fact that objects were valued completely differently can also be discerned from Khanikov’s statement on local commerce:

“The great number of shops that one meets with in these towns, would, at first sight, give a very favourable idea of the commercial activity of the country; but entering any of them you are at a loss to understand with what stock the shopkeeper is to trade, because, with the exception of a few Russian goods (we speak of the generality of the shops) one seldom finds any article of value. The home trade yields but trifling profit to those engaged in it, and if they persevere in it, it is more through habit or on account of the scarcity of land, than for any other reason.”⁵⁷⁶

These words verify the picture of a society that was not driven by the logic of market exchange but by that of social exchange. Here, the continued existence of an “unprofitable” home trade supports the argument that social realities, including the institutional setting in this region during that period, did not follow a Western capitalistic but its own local rationale.

Upon their arrival in Khush Hauz, located east of Žiyā al-Dīn, Moser and his companions were evidently annoyed at the endless Bukharan hospitality and the *dastarkhān*. They were fed up with the tea and the masses of local food and grudgingly observed the etiquette. He also notes: “They take care of every detail and arrange it in accordance with ancient customs, and to

⁵⁷⁴ George Curzon, “A Visit to Bokhara the Noble,” *Fortnightly Review* 45, no. 265 (1889): 128.

⁵⁷⁵ Lansdell, “Russisch-Central-Asien,” 566, 573.

⁵⁷⁶ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 207.

neglect it would have been a violation of the customary law.”⁵⁷⁷ Moser proceeds to describe one of the customary banquets:

“Very soon we were overwhelmed by boredom; at last, the Prince gave permission to smoke. I sat beside the elder Parwanachi and offered him a cigarette. I see from his behavior while lighting his cigarette with the fire of mine that it was the first time he smoked a product of the Occident. He obviously did not enjoy it because after the first attempt he had his mouth full of tobacco; but out of courtesy he retained the cigarette in his hand and put it in his mouth every time he saw that we did the same. [...] The same happens with the glasses, bowls, but particularly with the forks and spoons from the treasury of the Emir, utensils only appearing on the table of the Russian mission; in this primeval country everyone from the monarch down to the beggar eats with their fingers.”⁵⁷⁸

Here we see the different tastes and body techniques of the hosts and the guests, tastes causing a feeling of bewilderment on both sides. From the way the *parwānachi* lighted his cigarette and his clumsiness it was obvious that he was not accustomed to this practice. The same applied to the different eating techniques.⁵⁷⁹ It is also remarkable that the members of the Russian mission did not dare wear the fur robes given them by Muẓaffar al-Dīn Khān, because in their eyes it was improper to wear such garments over their Russian uniforms. By the end of the mission, Moser had obtained one hundred and forty robes and seventeen horses. He also reports that his companions resold their gifts, a lively trade with the presents taking place in the residence of the Russian mission, since most of the merchants and *āqsaqāls* acted on the orders of the king and bought the items back only to put them into circulation again. Having marked some of the robes with a stamp, the traveler was upset about this practice when he got some of the garments back.⁵⁸⁰ He did not understand that the act of giving was probably just as important as the nature of the gift itself in a context where gift giving meant the constant renewal and confirmation of social relationships.

⁵⁷⁷ Moser, *Durch Central-Asien*, 134.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 134.

⁵⁷⁹ Abbott describes similar experiences of eating with hands and the amusement of his host (James Abbott, *Narrative of a Journey from Herat to Khiva, Moscow and St. Petersburg during the Late Russian Invasion of Khiva with Some Account of the Court of Khiva and the Kingdom of Khaurism*, 2 vols. (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1884), 49).

⁵⁸⁰ Moser, *Durch Central-Asien*, 152, 158. Ignat’ev likewise forbade the members of his mission to wear a Bukharan outfit because he perceived this as a degrading act (N. P. Ignat’ev, *Mission of N. P. Ignat’ev to Khiva and Bukhara, 1858*, trans. and ed. John L. Evans (Newtonville: Oriental Research Partners, 1984), 108).

The linguist Wilhelm Radloff, in particular, expresses a disparaging opinion of the local population, saying that they were after “advantage and acquisition” and that even ties of kinship would not prevent people from seeking profit. He also complains about the practice of the *sillau* (a corruption of the term *şilat*), the demand for a small present on a range of occasions. Even for minor and unimportant services like giving directions in the street, the person who asked would be requested for a gift by a gesture of the hand, easy to understand for the locals.⁵⁸¹ Confused and alienated by their “strange behavior,” Radloff confirms that apart from avarice and the acquisition of money, cowardice, cruelty, malice and hypocrisy were the most striking characteristics of the natives.⁵⁸² Schuyler, who was a very careful observer, also expresses his amazement about the customary gift giving and the fact that in Central Asia one rarely voiced gratitude for the gift itself but thanked when being congratulated by others for the reception of a present. He also tells us that a gift could not be refused without offending the giver, and if accepted, one had to reciprocate it quickly. Schuyler also mentions the *sillau* and that in Tashkent the locals would tell a Russian the exact amount they expected.⁵⁸³

Travelling to Khiwa by order of the British government, Abbott finds the deceitfulness of the locals remarkable and refers to the many “wretched gift-horses” one of his colleagues had received in Herat. When the emissary got a grey-colored horse from the son of a Sufi sheikh at Marw, he thought the animal would have a lame gait, but found it in good condition. Being clandestinely asked about the value of the horse by one of his local servants in order to report the answer to the giver’s father, he concludes:

“Such is the nature of the gift amongst this people. It is as the meat we generously fling to the ocean with a large barbed hook in the centre. Such, too, is the friendship and good faith between them.”⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁸¹ Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, II, 471–72.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*, 472.

⁵⁸³ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, II, 37.

⁵⁸⁴ Abbott, *Narrative of a Journey*, 52.

THE BUKHARAN HORSE TRADE

In one of the previous sections, I cited the *Tāj al-tawārīkh* giving information about the gift horse dedicated to Amīr Haidar on the occasion of his enthronization. The role of the horse as a highly esteemed status object was echoed by the importance of horse breeding and trade in the local economy. There are indications that the Oxus Valley including the whole of Transoxania was a border or contact region where two equestrian areas overlapped: that of the more robust Mongol pony, a war and workhorse, and that of the thoroughbreds from the Iranian plateau, a horse for representation.⁵⁸⁵ In the course of time, horses became one of the most important luxury goods that were primarily exported to India.⁵⁸⁶ At the Indian fairs, also called *melās*, the horses from Transoxania and neighboring Afghanistan were generally known as Kābulī, Qandahārī, or Wilāyatī horses, but they were actually of Turkī breed.⁵⁸⁷ Among the imported horses, the latter enjoyed great popularity and comprised the bulk of India's equestrian population. Burnes, however, distinguished between horses reared in Balkh, the eastern parts of the Turkmen territories, Andkhūd, Maimana and the banks of the Āmū Daryā, which were inferior to the animals bred in Bukhara, Marw and Sarakhs.⁵⁸⁸

Various statistics cited by Levi illustrate that in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Uzbek merchants brought between twenty-five thousand and sixty thousand horses annually from Bukhara and Samarqand

⁵⁸⁵ Bert G. Fragner: "Asiens Pferdeökonomie aus der Sicht der historischen Forschung über den Vorderen Orient," in *Pferde in Asien: Geschichte, Handel und Kultur*, ed. Bert G. Fragner et al. (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009), 5.

⁵⁸⁶ The Indian climate and the agrarian-based economy with a lack of extended pasture land were unsuitable for horse breeding (Levi, "India, Russia and the Eighteenth-Century Transformation," 526–27). In the sixteenth century, seven to ten thousand Central Asian horses arrived at Kabul annually. From there, they were further trafficked via the Khyber Pass to India. During the seventeenth century, the number of horses purchased by Indian traders in Kabul sometimes amounted to one hundred thousand (Alam, "Trade, State Policy and Regional Change," 209). Some eighteenth-century accounts suggest that Uzbek merchants brought more than sixty thousand horses per year to Kabul (Levi, "India, Russia and the Eighteenth-Century Transformation," 527).

⁵⁸⁷ Jos Gommans, "The Horse Trade in Eighteenth-Century South Asia," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 37, no. 3 (1994): 230.

⁵⁸⁸ Burnes, *Travels*, II, 274.

to Kabul, the major entrepôt of horses to the subcontinent.⁵⁸⁹ According to Mir Izzetullah, the horse bazaar was on four days each week. On Saturday, Monday and Thursday it was held inside the city near the citadel. On Wednesday horses were sold near the shrine of Khwāja Bahā' al-Dīn. Most of the animals sold there were of low economic value and their price varied between ten and fifteen *ṭilā*. More valuable horses had to be bought from the dealers at their private houses for one hundred to one hundred and fifty *ṭilā*. Afterward, they were brought by brokers for inspection. Since most of the fine horses were reserved for export, there were only a few to be purchased in Bukhara and—if we believe the traveler—it was difficult to collect fifty to one hundred horses at any given time.⁵⁹⁰

In nineteenth-century Transoxania we find several breeds of horse: first the *arghamāq*, the fine Turkmen horse bred in the dry steppes in the western and southern parts of Mā Warā' al-Nahr.⁵⁹¹ Vámbéry distinguishes between two Turkmen breeds, the Kōroqli and the Akhal.⁵⁹² The *arghamāq* is described as a horse of probably mixed breed, rather large but slightly built, and very fast over short distances. The prices given by the travelers for the Turkmen horse vary. While Mir Izzetullah estimates the price at twenty to one hundred *ṭilā*,⁵⁹³ Khanikov gives a sum of one hundred *ṭilā* for the best animals, and fifty to seventy *ṭilā* for an average Turkmen horse.⁵⁹⁴ According to Abbott, the ordinary price for a Turkmen horse of medium height was fifteen pounds.⁵⁹⁵ Vámbéry states that a good horse of this breed cost between one hundred and three hundred ducats.⁵⁹⁶ Khanikov's statement about the generally low prices of Bukharan horses supports my argument

⁵⁸⁹ Levi, "India, Russia and the Eighteenth-Century Transformation," 527; see also Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 77.

⁵⁹⁰ Mir Izzetullah, "Travels," 331. Khanikov mentions that the horse bazaar was located one and a half verst outside the city of Bukhara, north of the Samarqand road (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 118).

⁵⁹¹ Schuyler differentiates between the *arghamāq* and the Turkomān horse (Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 128).

⁵⁹² Vámbéry, *Travels in Central Asia*, 420.

⁵⁹³ Mir Izzetullah, "Travels," 332; see also Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 41 (English text, 37).

⁵⁹⁴ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 201–02.

⁵⁹⁵ Abbott remarks that Muḥammad Amīn Bēg, an Uzbek noble from Marw, had purchased two horses for seventy and sixty *ṭilā* each (560 and 480 Co.'s Rupees, or 56 and 48 Pounds) (Abbott, *Narrative of a Journey*, 32).

⁵⁹⁶ Vámbéry, *Travels*, 421.

that the social value ascribed to objects often exceeds their utility and economic value. Yet his assumption may also reflect a typical European view of things. In his opinion the horses were sold for a very low price, whereas many Bukharans, especially the mass of poor and landless peasants, could never afford to purchase an *arḡhamāq*. According to Burnes, the price of horses differed according to race and place of origin. Eastern horses were usually sold for one hundred *ṭilā* and often less than half this price, whereas western Turkmen horses cost two hundred *ṭilā*. The best horses kept in studs of the *amīr* were worth three hundred *ṭilā* and more. He also mentions that the horses imported into India from Turkistan were of an inferior quality as compared to the horses kept by many natives. Burnes attributes this to the high prices of one thousand to one thousand five hundred rupees demanded by the horse dealers.⁵⁹⁷ The relativity of prices is also noted by Jaworskij, who states that in Samarqand he abstained from buying a fine horse because the trader demanded a price of one hundred and sixty rubles.⁵⁹⁸ Schuyler says that a good animal of Turkmen breed commanded a very high price, but that it was almost impossible to buy such a horse because “only great necessity would make its owner part with it.”⁵⁹⁹ The social and cultural value of horses is further underlined by the fact that they did not leave the stable unless they wore amulets (so-called *dulāna*) around their neck to protect them against evil influences.⁶⁰⁰

The second and more robust breed was the Uzbek horse bred in Miyānkāl and Shahr-i Sabz. The Uzbek horse called *qaralghi* was much smaller than the *arḡhamāq* but also stronger.⁶⁰¹ It was of medium height, well built and fetched seven to twenty, and sometimes even forty *ṭilā*.⁶⁰² There were two further breeds in Bukhara, first the smaller Karabayr, a cross between an *arḡhamāq* stallion and a Qirghiz mare or vice versa, which were good racehorses but only over shorter distances, since they were trained for the game of *kobkari*. The Karabayr equaled the Uzbek horse in size, but resembled the Turkmen horse in the shape of its head and legs. The other breed was the ordinary Qirghiz horse used by the nomads of the highlands

⁵⁹⁷ Burnes, *Travels*, II, 275.

⁵⁹⁸ Jaworskij, *Reise*, I, 21–22.

⁵⁹⁹ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 129.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 130.

⁶⁰¹ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 200.

⁶⁰² Ḥāfīz Muḥammad Fāzil Khān, *Aḥwāl*, 41 (English text, 37).

and mountains east of Transoxania.⁶⁰³ According to an older source, in Bukhara Uzbek horses were generally sold for twenty to one hundred *ṭilā*.⁶⁰⁴ Khanikov estimates the price of a good horse of the last three breeds at between five and fifteen *ṭilā*. Curzon gives a price varying from five shillings to thirty pounds. But on average, a good horse brought about ten pounds.⁶⁰⁵ The strongest horses were the Qazāq or Khoqand horses bred in Samarqand and the mountainous regions east of it.⁶⁰⁶ Burnes also mentions Marw, the mountain region east of Samarqand and Shahr-i Sabz, as one of the places furnishing the finest horses.⁶⁰⁷

In the nineteenth century, horse breeding in Transoxania faced several challenges. First of all, the areas available for grazing were shrinking because of an expansion of agriculture, particularly the cultivation of cotton.⁶⁰⁸ Therefore lucerne was cultivated to make up for the lack of meadows.⁶⁰⁹ In Transoxania, horses were traditionally bred by Turkmen and Uzbek nomads. They were bred in Miyānkāl too. In that region, the Naymān-Khiṭā'ī of Żiyā al-Dīn engaged in horse breeding on a larger scale. Sometimes this tribe wandered with its horses between Miyānkāl and the capital.⁶¹⁰ Last but not least, horses were also bred by the Qungrāt and other nomads wandering in Eastern Bukhara between their winter quarters in the river plains and summer quarters in the mountains.⁶¹¹

⁶⁰³ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 199, 201; Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 129. The *kobkari*, spelled *kukbari* by Khanikov, is called *būzkashī* in Afghanistan. For a brief overview of the game in Bukhara, where it was known as *skachka* (?), see Ignat'ev, *Mission*, 105–06. For a thorough investigation of the game, see Whitney G. Azoy, *Buzkashi—Game and Power in Afghanistan* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982).

⁶⁰⁴ Mir Izzetullah, “Travels,” 332.

⁶⁰⁵ Curzon, “A Visit to Bokhara the Noble,” 134.

⁶⁰⁶ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 201. Vámbéry distinguishes between Qazāq and Khoqandī horses and says that the Turkmen horses were exclusively exported to Persia, while the Uzbek horses were sold to Afghanistan and India (Vámbéry, *Travels*, 421).

⁶⁰⁷ Burnes, *Travels*, II, 272.

⁶⁰⁸ The Khiṭā'ī-Qipchāq rebellion in the early nineteenth century can be partly attributed to the hunger for land of nomadic groups “who found themselves without adequate grazing for nomadic cattle-breeding [...]” (Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 14).

⁶⁰⁹ Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 185.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 77, 83.

⁶¹¹ Holzwarth, “Mittelasiatische Schafe,” 93–94; see also chapter Historical Overview, section on the Qungrāt.

SUMMARY

In the previous sections I investigated the different emotions and patterns of perception of Bukharans and outsiders in the nineteenth century, a time when contacts between Mā Warā' al-Nahr and the outside world intensified. The scenes and events I have described also reveal the gaps between European and Bukharan worldview(s), and the inability of most of the travelers to free themselves from their own prejudices. Of course, these were perpetuated by the fact that the foreign visitors often read the works of their predecessors to inform themselves about local circumstances. In many respects the travelogues say more about the authors and their worldviews than about the society in question. This is not to devalue the travelogues as an important source on Central Asian history, and it would be inappropriate to lump all travelers together. There are differences and the amount of information given by the authors greatly varies. Khanikov, Moser, Lehmann and Schuyler in particular offer invaluable information. But a lot of research needs to be done to classify the knowledge furnished by these sources.

Starting out from a mercantile-capitalistic worldview, the majority of the travelers I investigated were unable to grasp the actual political meaning of gift giving in Transoxania. They came from a world that had already embarked on the process of industrialization, with characteristic capitalist attitudes dictated by market behavior. In the Western world, the market had to a great extent undergone emancipation from the corpus of social rules and conventions. According to Western worldviews of that time, profit-seeking and utilitarian behavior were largely disconnected from notions of hospitality and gift giving, which were regarded as truly altruistic and laden with emotions of sympathy. This entailed a conceptual redefinition of norms such as reciprocity or generosity. While in industrialized societies gift exchange—with the exception of charity—occurs in the private domain, in many non-European contexts it took still place in the social and political field. Here, kinship, religion and the administrative apparatus were primarily involved in the exchange and circulation of goods. The exchange had clear political and utilitarian connotations. This general difference also applied to the West and Bukhara. In the former, market exchange and calculations already represented the dominant mode of transaction, whereas social norms such as reciprocity and generosity dominated transactions in the latter.⁶¹²

⁶¹² “Gift Giving i. Introduction,” 605.

This is best exemplified by the following statement by Ignat'ev, who visited Bukhara in 1858:

“Passing the long stretch of undulating sand dunes we came out into the valley of the Zarevshan River and were received triumphantly in Karakul on September 19. Several officials (of whom two were very important, close relatives of the Tokhsab) were sent from Bukhara for our meeting. They fed us different kinds of Bukharan sweets, candy and jam. For all those goodies I gave presents to all, without exception, those officials who had come to meet us, spreading the value of the gifts according to the rank of importance and significance of the official which makes a thin, ticklish and unsuitable calculation to Europeans.”⁶¹³

Concerned with the gift exchange in Ottoman society, Reindl-Kiel reaches similar conclusions. In the Ottoman context as well as in Bukhara, Western visitors did not understand the rather impersonal way of redistributing goods and bestowing honor. Most of them were bewildered by the evaluation of the gifts. While in the West a gift symbolized the affective bond between two persons, in large parts of the Orient a gift had to match the social status, the reputation and importance of its receiver.⁶¹⁴ In accordance with these differences in European and Bukharan worldviews, the travelogues reflect severe discrepancies and the expectations of the visitors regarding the selflessness of Bukharan hospitality. Bewildered that local practices linked to generosity were more than selfless giving, some of the visitors expressed strong criticism. The misinterpretations of local Transoxanian customs can be attributed to the “wrong reading” of the Bukharan context through the travelers’ worldviews. It comes therefore as no surprise that, apart from a few exceptions, the travelers and diplomats developed only a limited understanding of the local social order in spite of being absorbed into it.

Although the diplomats and travelers assiduously engaged in the gift exchange, they lacked understanding of its political meaning. Some of the accounts mirror alienation and even exoticism. Overwhelmed by a range of new impressions and alienated by local, apparently strange customs, the majority of foreign visitors did not take notice of the patronage behind a veneer of exotic things. At least, the phenomenon remains unmentioned in the accounts. Strongly influenced by the Soviet thinking and major changes the local order had undergone during the first half of the twentieth century,

⁶¹³ Ignat'ev, *Mission*, 102.

⁶¹⁴ Reindl-Kiel, “Der Duft der Macht,” 225–26, 232; Reindl-Kiel, “East is East and West is West,” 115–17.

‘Ainī also criticizes the traditional gift giving. He particularly condemns the exchange of gifts in return for offices, a behavior that was interpreted in terms of corruption, especially by later intellectuals, whose view of the past order was already Soviet-biased.

SOCIAL ORDER(S) IN THE BUKHARAN COUNTRYSIDE

As I have already shown, the chronicles very much take the ruler’s perspective and only provide scarce information on the circumstances in rural areas. There are, however, many signs suggesting that the rural social order was structured in a similar way by kinship bonds, patron-client ties, gift exchange and mediation. Thus the nascent Bukharan state was not emancipated from the society it tried to control and govern, but was crafted by the rulers and their subjects resorting to the same worldviews. In one of the sections of the previous chapter, I illustrated the relevance of local power brokers in a range of settings, though those people do not appear as individuals in the accounts.⁶¹⁵ Apart from minor changes in the institutional make-up coinciding with the periodic rise of new elites, or changing property relations taking shape within the framework of administrative centralization and Bukhara’s conversion into a Russian protectorate, there is little reason to assume a total change of the local order until the beginning of the twentieth century. Foreign travelers also noticed that the country seemed to be more or less unaffected by the presence of Russian merchants and diplomats in the region. When stepping onto Bukharan soil, some of them felt as if they had left the nineteenth century behind and were now confronted with an ancient and exotic world.⁶¹⁶

“On balance, the West appeared in Bukhara more as an intruder than as a transformer. Beyond the Russian enclaves along the railroad and the Amu Darya frontier, the Western impact was confined to a scattering of material objects, such as quantities of Russian cloth, which had slight effect on native life. The Russian enclaves themselves formed a world apart from the native community, with only Bukharan and a few enterprising Russian merchants and native intellectuals serving as intermediaries between the two.”⁶¹⁷

In the following I would like to take a closer look at the social order(s) in the hinterland of Bukhara. Since generations of Soviet scholars were concerned

⁶¹⁵ See section on Mediation and Brokerage/Village Elders: Fragments from the Sources

⁶¹⁶ Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 119.

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 195.

with questions regarding socio-political structures in rural areas of Central Asia, I do not claim to draw a complete picture. Likewise, the bulk of the literature approaching the social issues from a Marxist perspective, and hence leading its authors to interpret the situation in pre-colonial Central Asia in terms of exploitation and feudalism, will be left out for practical reasons. To provide a more differentiated picture, I will draw upon a mixture of secondary sources and also fall back upon the works of anthropologists. The first sections will highlight the state of knowledge regarding patterns of sharecropping, land tenure and patronage as well as systemic crediting and indebtedness in Transoxania and the adjacent regions. In a second step, I would like to present archival material, mostly rescripts of petitions from the “Koshbegi Archive” in Tashkent (TzGARUz, f. I-126). The archive and its vast mass of records bear witness to the administrative centralization within the framework of the Bukharan proto state. They may help the social historian in reconstructing social dynamics characteristic of the rural setting from an internal Bukharan perspective. Although a narrow focus “brings the methodological advantage of reducing an ocean of archival documents to a manageable corpus,”⁶¹⁸ I opt here for a holistic approach and set the records in a broader context to make sense of the petition system as a whole. I will therefore work with a relatively large number of records from different fields (selection and performance of elders; fiscal documents; and records on irrigation). Yet for practical reasons, I will only quote a limited number of petitions. Furthermore, I will use quantitative methods allowing conclusions on the degree of administrative control and centralization of what is usually labelled the “Emirate of Bukhara” in the secondary literature. Finally, the petitions will be analyzed against the background of information on power structures and social order given in the previous chapters.

SHARECROPPING, LAND TENURE AND PATRONAGE IN BUKHARA

As Holdsworth states, an entire book could be written on land tenure in Central Asia.⁶¹⁹ Since land was the pre-eminent commodity and a sign of

⁶¹⁸ Wolfgang Holzwarth, “Community Elders,” 223.

⁶¹⁹ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 11. For a thorough discussion see N. A. Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal’no-feodal’nye otnoshenija. Sredi osedlogo sel’skogo naselenija Bukharskogo khanstva v kontze XIX–nachale XX veka* (Moscow/Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1962), 63–72.

wealth, basic information on land property and tenure will be given below. This field has been researched by Chekhovich, Mukminova, Davidovich and others.⁶²⁰ Having worked on the fiscal system of Bukhara, Semenov gives a good overview of the different kinds of taxes such as the *kharāj*, *amīnāna*, *bāj*, *mīrābāna* and so on.⁶²¹ His results suggest that the taxation system fitted the social fabric in Bukhara. Semenov mentions the *dallālī*, a kind of broker's fee imposed at one's discretion and in mutual agreement. In Qarākūl, for instance, it was impossible to sell anything in the local bazaars without an intermediary.⁶²² In the time of the protectorate, local middlemen brokered the purchase of raw materials, cotton and other agricultural produce.⁶²³ Very often the *dallālī* was conflated with the *amīnāna*, a one-off payment levied on agricultural and other produce sold in the local bazaars. We see here how the institutionalization process ushered in the emergence of a rigid revenue system and a firmly established administrative apparatus.⁶²⁴

The same held true for the administration of agricultural affairs that was left to local authorities, landlords and tenants. The most dominant form was a kind of tenure intermingled with sharecropping. The secondary literature and colonial administrators assume a triad of categories of landed property: first, crown land (*mamlaka-yi pādishāhī* or *sulṭānī*); second, privately owned land (*mulk/milk*); and third, *waqf* land.⁶²⁵ Yet, as Semenov states, these categories do not reflect historical realities on the ground,⁶²⁶ where the

⁶²⁰ For example Chekhovich, *Dokumenty k istorii agrarnykh otnoshenii v Bukharskom khanstve*.

⁶²¹ Semenov, "Ocherk pozemel'no-podatnogo i nalogogo ustrojstva," 9, 11, 20–22, 25–28, 34–36, 40–41, 47–53; Abduraimov, *Voprosy*, 47–48.

⁶²² In 1917 the following fees were levied on livestock: on sheep 8 *pūl* (copper coins), camels one *tanga*, cattle half a *tanga*, and on donkeys half a *tanga* (Semenov, "Ocherk pozemel'no-podatnogo i nalogogo ustrojstva," 50). On the role of brokers in Bukharan bazaars, see Sukhareva, *Bukhara*, 236–38.

⁶²³ Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam*, 45; Manz, "Introduction," 13.

⁶²⁴ Semenov describes the *amīnāna* as a tax that was at first periodically levied on merchants, religious figures and well-to-do dignitaries. Later it became a firm and permanent part of the taxation system. This non-*sharī'a*-conform tax was introduced by Amīr Muẓaffar, who designed it to compensate for the costs of the war against the Russian army. As it went directly to the treasury, the *amīnāna*, amounting to 1.5 percent of the cash value of the commodities, contributed to the income of the ruler (Semenov, "Ocherk pozemel'no-podatnogo i nalogogo ustrojstva," 48, 50).

⁶²⁵ For a critique of these categories see Schwarz, "Contested grounds," 34, 38.

⁶²⁶ Semenov, "Ocherk pozemel'no-podatnogo i nalogogo ustrojstva," 19.

situation was characterized by a variety of arrangements, ranging from full ownership and simultaneous usage to different forms of land tenure, lease and sharecropping.⁶²⁷ Although very little is known about taxation and rent tenure practices in nineteenth-century Transoxania,⁶²⁸ the following section gives an overview of our current state of knowledge and my own observations based on archival work.

There were two kinds of “contracts,” the *ijāra* and the *muzāra* ‘a. The first was not a real form of land tenure but a ceding of the right of use of the land as well as of all immobile property on it in exchange for a sum of money or in kind. Paul defined this arrangement as rent tenure. A variety of things like land, income generated from land, and even taxes could in principle become subject to rent tenure. The beneficiaries might be a private owner, a *waqf* or even the royal household. This form of tenure often applied to taxes and crown land to secure the income of the king. One could also define it as tax tenure. According to Paul, such forms of *ijāra* have not been handed down from Central Asia, but an *ijāra* contract from 1915 probably comes close to it.⁶²⁹ Another hint of *ijāra* is to be found in one of the *mubārak-nāmas* issued by Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn to one of his officials. The document refers to *ijāra* fixed for one hundred and five *ṭanāb* of land and paid by cultivators (*kārandagān*) in one of the villages of Kāmāt. The land in question was subject to land tax (*mulk-i kharājī*) and recently turned into *amlāk*.⁶³⁰ In the same document the term *bāz-yāft* appears as income probably reserved for the *amlākdār* or some other officials.⁶³¹ This income, according to the *mubārak-nāma*, is generated from the *kharājī* land and paid as *ijāra-yi bāz yāft*, suggesting that the *amlākdār* was more of a tax farmer than just a tax

⁶²⁷ See also Schwarz, “Contested grounds,” 33–34.

⁶²⁸ For more detailed information see *ibid.*, 33–42.

⁶²⁹ Paul, *Naqšbandiyya*, 119–20. According to this contract, seventy-five *ṭanāb* (15 ha) of land belonging to the *waqf* of the Īshān Afghān *madrasa* in the locality of Changarān in Kāmāt north of Bukhara were ceded to Mīr Afzal Bāy for a period of six months in return for six hundred and sixty *tanga* (see Semenov, “Ocherk pozemel’no-podatnogo i nalogogo ustrojstva,” 19).

⁶³⁰ *Az darūn-i mulk-i kharājī-yi mauẓa ‘i madhkūr yakṣad-panj ṭanāb bāz-yāft bar āmada amlāk gardīda ijāra muqarar kardaand ki kārandagān-i mulk-i kharājī ijāra-yi ū-rā dada āmadaand* (Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn, *Mubārak-nāmajāt*, doc. 70).

⁶³¹ According to Dehkhudā, the word *bāz-yāft* was a technical tax term from the time of the Safawids, meaning income (*dar-yāft*) (Dehkhudā, *Lughatnāma*, vol. 10, (باقر خان-ب), 409). Steingass mentions the term *bāz yāft-i chākar* as lands appropriated for the payment of servants (Steingass, *Dictionary*, 146).

collector. Here, the official in question farmed out the *amlāk* to the *kārandagān* and received rent in return. According to another document, *ijāra* contracts were also concluded for renting out *waqf* land.⁶³² In some cases, the land was distributed among the sharecroppers according to a clearly regulated plan. The extent of the land was measured by the *ṭanāb*. Then the cultivators were registered in a list that was sealed and kept by a local official like the *tūmān* judge.⁶³³ Provided tax tenure was common in the region, the *amlākdārī* system may have originated from rent tenure—accordingly, the *amlākdār* would have been a tax farmer at the beginning—and further developed as a more sophisticated system of revenue collection.⁶³⁴

The second category of land use, the *muzāraʿa*, was probably the most common arrangement in Transoxania. Based on the Ḥanafī law, the *muzāraʿa* is a form of partnership contract, by which a person lacking capital but able and willing to work becomes the partner of somebody with capital. The contract refers to the harvest taken in commission by the landowner, who cedes the right to cultivate his land to a tenant in return for a share of the future harvest and the tenant's labor.⁶³⁵ There was no universal standard form of sharecropping for the whole of Transoxania. Arrangements were often based on the division of the harvest between the landlord, very often a *tankhwah* holder, and the croppers in relation to the five essential parameters determining the agricultural output: land, water, seed, draught animals and labor. Several variations were likely to be found in one particular locality, depending on what inventory (seed, land, credits, and other equipment) and animals the landowner lent to his cropper. A very common form was for the landlord to provide agricultural equipment (like draught animals, seed and food) and sometimes plots of land in the case that the peasant was landless.

⁶³² Amīr Muẓaffār al-Dīn, *Mubārak-nāmajāt*, doc. 120.

⁶³³ *Ibid.*, doc. 156.

⁶³⁴ Florian Schwarz, "Contested grounds," 38. For a thorough discussion of the position of *amlākdār* as a tax collector in Bukhara, see Alexander Morrison, "Amlākdārs, Khwājas and Mulk in the Zarafshan Valley after the Russian Conquest," in *Explorations in the Social History of Modern Central Asia (19th–Early 20th Century)*, ed. Paolo Sartori (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), 26–30.

⁶³⁵ Paul, *Naqšbandīyya*, 123. Paul concludes that depending on factors such as water and proximity to local markets, the tenants ceded the lion's share of the agricultural surplus to the landowner (*ibid.*, 125).

In exchange, the cropper worked the land and received a share of the harvest, often one-fourth, one-fifth or less.⁶³⁶

The different forms of land use and rent arrangements were closely related to various forms of *himāyat* (protection), a practice that I have explored in the context of the court. Rent tenure and *himāyat* already coincided in pre-Mongol times. Later, protection involved peasants who did not interact directly with the administration but had been assigned to a landowner together with the plots they were cultivating. “*Himāyat* in this context is an expression for the refuge that peasants looked for and found with lords other than those designated by the ruler.”⁶³⁷

There is no reason to believe that these conditions changed substantially in later times. Having been a starting point for the formation of communal factions (*jamā‘a*, *tā‘ifa*), protection was one of the basic features throughout Islamic history up to the twentieth century.⁶³⁸ The Ilkhanid ruler Ghazān Khān (r. 1295–1304) struggled in vain against this practice, causing the flow of revenues to the *dīwān* to be cut off. Paul quotes a document issued by a Shibanid ruler, ordering the revision of taxes in a *hazāra* near Ūrā Tippa including all “contracts of protection.” The institution involved competition for manpower. There were two ways of acquiring a clientele: first by assignation of the peasants to a lord along with a land grant, and second when a lord settled wandering peasants on his estates.⁶³⁹

According to Kisljakov, the peasantry was very heterogeneous; there were rich and poor or landless peasants, and those with smallholdings. There was, of course, a marked social difference between peasants who cultivated land for a share of the harvest (*izdol’shchik*) and those working under other conditions (*batrak*).⁶⁴⁰ One of the documents published by Chekhovich clearly suggests that the phenomenon of absentee landlordism, as described by Lambton and others for Persia,⁶⁴¹ was found at least partly in Transoxania too. The document was issued by the Tuqay-Timurid king Imām Qulī Khān

⁶³⁶ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 12.

⁶³⁷ Paul, “Forming a Faction,” 535.

⁶³⁸ *Ibid.*, 533.

⁶³⁹ *Ibid.*, 535–36.

⁶⁴⁰ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal’no-feodal’nye otnoshenija*, 41.

⁶⁴¹ A. K. S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 271–72; Bert G. Fragner, “Social and Internal Economic Affairs,” in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods, ed. Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart (London et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 493.

and makes mention of a category of land designated *hiṣārī*, meaning that the land was used or owned by persons belonging to the urban setting, and cultivated by the rural population. In labor-intensive periods, the land was ceded to individual croppers (*kāranda*) or entire villages.⁶⁴² Other absent landowners were the Jūybārī *khwājas*, whose purchasing activities were closely connected to the conquest of Bukhara by ‘Abdullah Sulṭān from 1557 on.⁶⁴³ In lieu of the term *kāranda* for sharecropper,⁶⁴⁴ one occasionally finds the Arabic *sharīk*⁶⁴⁵ or the Turkish word *yārimchī*. The share of the harvest varied, depending on the location and specific conditions. In many cases the sharecroppers were also called *chahār-yak kār*, in accordance with their share of one-fourth of the harvest. Soviet researchers came to the conclusion that the croppers were generally called *chahār-yak kār* irrespective of their real share.⁶⁴⁶ Big landowners were known as *dihqān*, *bāy*, *bāy-dihqān* or *saudagar-dihqān*, standing in contrast to normal croppers.⁶⁴⁷ One of my interlocutors in Surkhondaryo stated that in his native village Sīna north of Dehnau, the sharecroppers received only one-third of the harvest in return for the plots and the seed.⁶⁴⁸

A good example in this regard is given by ‘Ainī, who describes his native village Sāktarī located on the banks of the Zarafshān at a distance of eight kilometers from Ghijduwān. In this place, the majority of the peasants was landless or possessed only small plots. Most of the village land was in the hands of two families of the Mīrakānī *khwājas*, who originated from Mashhad and, furnishing the elite of the village, were called “sons of the judge” (*qāzī-bachahā*) or “superintendents” (*mutawallīhā*). The majority of the peasants worked for them as sharecroppers on the basis of the *chahār-yak* or cultivated the *amlāk* land, the *zamīn-i pādishāhī*, in the vicinity. In

⁶⁴² Semenov, “Ocherk pozemel’no-podatnogo i nalogogo ustrojstva,” 29–30; Abduraimov, *Voprosy*, 34.

⁶⁴³ For further details see Schwarz, “Bukhara and its Hinterland,” 80–86.

⁶⁴⁴ The term *kāranda* unequivocally refers to the work process (Paul, *Naqšbandiyya*, 127).

⁶⁴⁵ Referring to Guichard (*Les musulmans de Valence*), Schwarz indicates that the meaning of the term *sharīk* cannot be unambiguously defined (Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 31–32).

⁶⁴⁶ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal’no-feodal’nye otnoshenija*, 41, 64; G. P. Vasil’eva, “Zanjatija Naselenija,” in *Etnograficheskie ocherki uzbekskogo sel’skogo naselenija*, ed. G. P. Vasil’eva i B. Kh. Karmysheva (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Nauka, 1969), 76. On sharing out the harvest on the same basis in Iran after the Saljūq period, see Fragner, “Social and Internal Economic Affairs,” 492.

⁶⁴⁷ Vasil’eva, “Zanjatija Naselenija,” 74.

⁶⁴⁸ Interview on August 3, 2007, in Sina/Dehnau—Surkhondaryo/Uzbekistan.

Maḥalla-yi bālā, the second village described by ‘Ainī, the elite consisted of two big landlords (*bāy-i kalān*) and two or three other rich peasants.⁶⁴⁹

Sharing out the harvest also applied to the garden land surrounding the towns where government officials and the relatives of the ruler often acquired plots in exchange for loyalty and service. Deals were ultimately made in spring, the season of the peasant’s greatest need. If the cropper possessed one ox and some other equipment, the landlord supplemented this with an additional animal while the peasant received one-fourth of the harvest.⁶⁵⁰ In some places it was common to deduct from the share of one-fourth a one-fourth share of the total land-tax and of the expense of harvesting. “Alternatively, the cropper did not pay towards these additional costs, but then received only a one-fifth share. More well-to-do peasants practised the one-half share system: here only the land and the seed were the holder’s.”⁶⁵¹ Besides this, there were of course other arrangements for land cultivation.⁶⁵² For instance, we find documents showing that arable land in the vicinity of villages was collectively used and cultivated by the people. In Eastern Bukhara, the land under communal cultivation was called *zamīn-i khwāsh wa ‘amm*, including forests, bush-land and pastures, which were distributed by the governors among the population. But according to Kisljakov, land tenure and use were not standardized. In Qarātegīn, for example, collectively cultivated land was divided into *yailāq-i ‘umma* or *yailāq-i pādishāhī* on the one hand, and *yailāq-i qishlāq* on the other, but the boundary between the two categories was fluid.⁶⁵³ The basic unit for cultivation was the *kosh* or *qulba*, fixed on the basis of the ploughing and cultivation capacity.⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁴⁹ Ṣadr al-Dīn ‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, ed. Sa‘īdī Shīrjānī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i āgāh, 1983), 5–6.

⁶⁵⁰ Telling the story of Nūr Muḥammad, ‘Ainī mentions that this peasant received suckers of fruit trees from the gardens of the *bāys* of the city and the gardens of the king. Although he does not provide further details, it is likely that Nūr Muḥammad got them in exchange for his labor (ibid., 442).

⁶⁵¹ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 12.

⁶⁵² For an overview of different terms and categories of land in the surroundings of rural settlements in documents dating back to the sixteenth century, see Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 32–37.

⁶⁵³ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal’no-feodal’nye otnoshenija*, 121–22. See also Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 38–39.

⁶⁵⁴ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal’no-feodal’nye otnoshenija*, 126. In Iran the basic unit was called *juft-i gau* (a *juft* is a yoke of oxen) (Fragner, “Social and Internal Economic Affairs,” 492).

From the descriptions in the secondary literature it becomes clear that this combination of sharecropping and land tenure was strongly shaped by reciprocity and developed as a patron-client system. The basis of exchange between landholders and peasants stemmed from and mirrored the disparity in their respective wealth, influence and social status. The flows of resources and social services from landed patrons to their peasants so typical of rural Transoxania can be compared to many other rural settings in the world. As depicted above, these flows consisted in granting access to land for cultivation, provision of seed, equipment, probably also marketing services and so forth. The patron was expected to be a friend in need. One of his most valued social services was the provision of credits in times of economic distress, help in case of illness or

“to carry his client through the year following a poor harvest. As a generalized relief agency of first resort, the patron often guarantees a subsistence ‘floor’ for his clients by absorbing losses (in agriculture or income) which might otherwise jeopardize their livelihood.”⁶⁵⁵

In many parts of the world, the landlords also protected their clients from outside threats and depredations, a fact that is confirmed by eighteenth and early nineteenth-century court chronicles. At the same time, they used their influence to extract rewards from outside for the benefit of their peasants. The interests of both the peasants and their patrons may coincide in relations with the outside world, because there is not only the problem of distributing resources within local networks but of extracting them from outside to extend the pool of resources available for distribution. Due to their social status and influence, landlords—and in case of their absence, their deputies and representatives—were responsible for collective tasks and economic functions in the villages. They were likely to sponsor local charity and relief, donated land for communal use, and organized and supported public services such as schools, small roads, bridges, mosques and other community buildings or irrigation canals and ponds. They hosted visitors and official guests, and also sponsored village festivities and celebrations. Finally, local patrons may be valued collectively also for their capacity to mediate in disputes and preserve the local order.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵⁵ Scott, “Patronage or exploitation?” 23.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 23–24.

Indeed, we see the collective organization of *hashars* and *bīgārīs* by landlords and *āqsaqāls* in Transoxanian villages. Based on the norm of reciprocity and patronal mobilization capacities, in Soviet sources these institutions were mostly viewed as clear signs of exploitation,⁶⁵⁷ as if the peasants had never gained anything back. According to Abduraimov, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries terms like *hashar* or *bīgār-i kala* (*gal'a?*) meant the obligation of the population to furnish a labor force (*mard-i kār*) for the construction and repair of fortresses. He also interprets the institution as a kind of corvée.⁶⁵⁸ According to Kisljakov, the *mard-i kārān* were employed for the repair and cleaning of irrigation canals.⁶⁵⁹ The need for *mard-i kārān* is also announced in a *mubārak-nāma* from 1293/1876–77, allowing the recruitment of laborers for a *hashar* to be carried out along the Tīraklīk Canal in Kāmāt.⁶⁶⁰ This document suggests that by the mid-1870s, *hashars* and the mobilization of *mard-i kārān*, at least in the *tūmānāt* of Bukhara, needed the official sanction of the *amīr*.⁶⁶¹ In eighteenth-century sources, we have already seen the recruitment of local peasants and craftsmen from Bukhara and the surrounding *tūmānāt* for the reconstruction of the city wall and the embattlements in summer 1752. The construction of the Khānābād Bāgh near Bukhara, taking place under 'Ubaidullah Khān's auspices in 1121/1709–10, is described in a similar way. Seeing the king's satisfaction after completion of the construction work, the Uzbek *amīrs* appreciated the work of the *mard-i kārān* from their *amlāk* territories and showed gratitude.⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁷ See for example Khakimova, *Krest'janstvo*, 62.

⁶⁵⁸ Abduraimov, *Voprosy*, 36. He translates the term *mard-i kār* as day laborer (Russ. *rabochi podenshchik*) (ibid., footnote no. 84).

⁶⁵⁹ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnoshenija*, 114.

⁶⁶⁰ Amīr Muẓaffār al-Dīn, *Mubārak-nāmajāt*, doc. 114.

⁶⁶¹ See also 'Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 61; Ainī, *Sands of Oxus*, 88.

⁶⁶² Amīn Bukhārī, *'Ubaidullah Nāma*, 166a, 168b; Semenov trans., 186, 189.

سایلان و کارکنان را کیسه پر زر کرده به منازل خودها رخصت فرمودند ... چون توجه خاطر اشرف شهریار جهان را امرا مشاهده کردند هر کدام به مردکاران مواضع املاک خاصه خودها خدمت به جای آوردند ...

There has been confusion over the correct meaning of the terms *amlāk* and *amlākdār* in the secondary literature (for a discussion of the topic of *amlākdārī* and its relation to landed property based on Russian sources, see Alexander S. Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910. A Comparison with British India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 97–110). For a long time, there was consensus that *amlāk* was crown land (*mamlaka*; *mamlaka-yi pādīshāhī*) in addition to private land (*milk/mulk*) and *waqf* land. While the terms *amlāk* and *amlākdār* may have had various meanings in the individual

While from a Marxist perspective the provision of *mard-i kārān* may seem like a form of exploitation, the population and even the craftsmen and architects benefited from this measure as the repaired city wall afforded shelter and protection in times of war. The population and even the *mard-i kārān* may have welcomed the initiative of the wealthy or the ruler.⁶⁶³ Yet the exploitative dimension dominates in the eyes of the outside observer because of the obvious asymmetry of work performance and immediate benefit.

Distinguishing between *hashar* and *bīgārī*, Kisljakov defines the first as mass corvée on agricultural estates, usually for the benefit of the *bēgs* and *amlākdārs*. *Hashars* were conducted especially at harvest time, for the threshing of grain or the preparation of hay. Each *hashar* was announced in advance and usually took two to three days, but since there were several *hashars* per year, most of the peasants worked for ten to fifteen days annually in the fields of landlords and *amlākdārs*. Besides, they also participated in the repair of roads, bridges and irrigation canals.⁶⁶⁴ In many cases, provincial governors also coordinated *hashars*.⁶⁶⁵ In the *bīgār*, individual peasants were mobilized for work in the household of the landlord, for instance, tending livestock, clearing snow off roofs, transporting grain to local mills and some reconstruction work. In addition, the peasants occasionally supplied meat, fruits, vegetables, eggs and butter,

Central Asian principalities, in Bukhara the *amlākdār* seems to have acted as an official responsible for the collection of the *kharāj* and other fees from non-tax-privileged land (for a short discussion see Schwarz, “Contested Grounds,” 38). According to Semenov, *amlāk* land was fallow land that was given to the people for cultivation by the ruler. Usually, this category was taxed much higher than ordinary *kharāj* land. The revenues levied on this land were collected together with the harvest of grain and cotton (Semenov, “Ocherk pozemel’no-podatnogo i nalogogo ustrojstva,” 25). According to Holdsworth and Becker, an *amlāk* was a territorial unit or a tax district (Russ. *amlakdarstvo*). The *amlākdār* was appointed by the provincial governors from among their relatives and favorites (Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 9; Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 9).

⁶⁶³ For instance, the populace of Shāfurkām appreciated the construction of a new canal adding to the area’s prosperity (‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 61, 69; Aini, *Sands of Oxus*, 88, 97).

⁶⁶⁴ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal’no-feodal’nye otnoshenija*, 114, 135; ‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 64–68; Aini, *Sands of Oxus*, 92–96.

⁶⁶⁵ *Hashars* were also ordered by the ruler. For example, on Muḥarram 24, 1234/November 22–23, 1818, Amīr Ḥaidar ordered the local population to repair a bridge damaged by a flood of the Khuzār River (Abduraimov, *Voprosy*, 40–41). On various forms of *hashars* (*katta* (big) *hashar* and *kichik* (small) *hashar*), see Vasil’eva, “Zanjatija Naselenija,” 71.

especially to the big landlords and *tankhwāhdārs*. The food thus supplied was used for the arrangement of festivities serving as a platform for further distribution among an extended clientele. Many peasants also supplied firewood and organized the transport of agricultural and other produce.⁶⁶⁶ This was confirmed during an oral history interview in Beshkutan, a village in southern Uzbekistan. The interviewee stated that the wives and daughters of poorer peasants worked in the households of the landlords and well-off community members, where they spun wool and wove fabrics. He also said that he himself worked in the household of a certain Turāb Bāy, whose sheep he pastured on the nearby banks of the Āmū Daryā. Furthermore, the informant admitted that

“the poor people very much depended on the rich, who also helped in times of need by lending money. But in most cases, they provided grain and food so that nobody starved to death. At the festival of sacrifices, they distributed sheep among the poor families in the village. The poor worked for the rich, especially when they were unable to repay their debts, and it was also possible that wealthy persons would take the land of the debtor in return or one of his daughters.”⁶⁶⁷

As Scott notes, the more pre-commercial the local context is, the more likely it is that the exchange will involve a great variety of reciprocal services beyond the usual arrangements for cultivation by the tenant clients and crop division between peasant and landlord.⁶⁶⁸ The various forms of land use in the different parts of Transoxania, including the two- and three-plot system as described by Kisljakov,⁶⁶⁹ are cases in point and shall not be recounted here. Generally speaking, the kind of rural social order based on patronage, land tenure and extensive sharecropping was by no means unique to

⁶⁶⁶ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnoshenija*, 115–16. This fits in with Scott's findings, who states that at the village level clients supplied goods and supplementary labor to their patrons, which became an anticipated part of the exchange. Domestic services might consist of supplying water and firewood to the patron's household, food offerings, and so forth. Some of these services used to be substantial, but others were rather symbolic expressions of deference (Scott, “Patronage or exploitation?” 24).

⁶⁶⁷ Interview on July 30, 2007, in Naw Shahar/Angor District—Surkhandaryo/Uzbekistan.

⁶⁶⁸ Scott, “Patronage or exploitation?” 26. Very often, a patron's help during crisis, his influence, protection and mediation may be more valued by his peasants than a five or ten percent increase in the share of the crop (*ibid.*, 26).

⁶⁶⁹ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnoshenija*, 120–27.

Bukhara, but can be encountered with minor differences in other settings like Iran and Afghanistan as well.⁶⁷⁰

One of the documents published by Chekhovich may help shed light on the distribution and sharing of land in Bukhara. The document dates from the nineteenth century and lists several *tankhwāh* holders in the area of Hazāra near Karmīna, like Parhād Bēg Jībāchī, Mullā Mu'min, Ādīna Qul Bahādur, Banda Qul Bahādur, 'Abd al-Nazar Mīrzābāshī and others. Their *tankhwāh* lands were centrally registered, but the document also gives extensive lists of third-hand tenants or peasants who obviously received smaller plots from the *tankhwāh* holders. For instance, Parhād Bēg had received 40 *tanāb* (eight ha) of land, which he distributed as follows:

- Niyāz Bāy—two *tanāb* (0.4 ha),
- Kanja Bāy—three *tanāb* (0.6 ha),
- Qūldāsh Bāy—two *tb.* (0.4 ha),
- 'Abd al-Razzāq—two *tb.* (0.4 ha),
- Jum'a Bāy—three *tb.* (0.6 ha),
- Rāfi' Bāy—0.5 *tb.* (0.1 ha),
- Daulat Muḥammad—1.25 *tb.* (ca. 0.25 ha),
- 'Abd al-Ḥayy Bāy—8.5 *tb.* (1.7 ha),
- 'Abd al-Ghafūr—5.25 *tb.* (1.05 ha),
- Mīr Muḥammad and 'Azīm Bāy—5 *tb.* (1 ha),
- 'Abd al-Nabī Mardān Qul—three *tb.* (0.6 ha).⁶⁷¹

This scheme shows that the 40 *tanāb* were unequally distributed among the followers of the *jībāchī*; some of them received a small share of one or even less *tanāb*, whereas others like 'Abd al-Ḥayy Bāy obtained a larger share of land. This uneven distribution mirrors local power structures and the

⁶⁷⁰ For a similar system of sharecropping in Iran down to the present, see Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 295–99, 370–78. For the different forms of land tenure and sharecropping in Afghanistan, including local practices of patronage, see Erwin Grötzbach, *Afghanistan. Eine geographische Landeskunde* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990), 93–98; Jan-Heeren Grevemeyer, *Afghanistan. Sozialer Wandel und Staat im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Bildung, 1990), 74–76.

⁶⁷¹ Chekhovich, *Dokumenty*, doc. 50, 209; Russian trans., 212.

closeness of personal relations between particular actors. The fact that Parhād Bī was not among the croppers suggests that he lived in the town, probably in Hazāra or Karmīna. The communication between him and the other peasants was likely facilitated by one of those receiving the larger plots or some other representatives. Mīr Muḥammad and ‘Aẓīm Bāy were *sharīks*, but not in the sense of sharecropping tenants. However, one should be careful about generalizations and interpreting the material in neat patterns. A closer look at the other cases shows a great variety of different arrangements. Frequently the recipients got a rather modest share of land.⁶⁷² For instance, having received only sixteen *ṭanāb*, Mullā Mu’min worked two and a half *ṭanāb*, while the lion’s share of eleven *ṭanāb* went to a certain Bēg ‘Alī. Ādīna Qul Bahādūr had received a land grant of fifteen *ṭanāb*, twelve of which he retained for himself while giving the rest to other persons. In another case, a certain ‘Abd al-Nazar Mīrzābāshī was blessed with a *tankhwāh* of twenty-five *ṭanāb* of land, which were shared out as follows: ‘Abd al-Nazar eight *ṭanāb*, ‘Aẓīm Qul Bāy two *ṭanāb*, Khāl Murād Bāy twelve *ṭanāb*, and Asad Bāy three *ṭanāb*.⁶⁷³

The cases in the document suggest that we are dealing here with a complex setting and the most diverse arrangements, including *tankhwāh* holders who may have been absent landowners and others who actually worked on a part of their land but shared out the rest. The document further suggests that it was a multi-level land tenure system that coincided with the social and administrative hierarchies materializing through permanent exchange. This practice enabled the landholders to siphon off the agricultural surplus in the form of rents, which were then put into circulation and reinvested in local clienteles and agriculture.

Taking a closer look at the document, one can conclude that *bāy* as a designation for rich or influential men—either big landlords or men possessing large herds—was merely a relative term. Some of them received rather small land plots of one to three *ṭanāb*, while others held ten and more. However, these individuals might have possessed additional land, or further

⁶⁷² This contrasts with Carrère d’Encausse’s claim that the *bāys*’ land property exceeded twenty *desjatinas* (Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 20).

⁶⁷³ For the whole document and the land-sharing lists, see Chekhovich, *Dokumenty*, doc. 50, 209–12; Russian trans., 212–17.

distributed the land they received without registering the lessees.⁶⁷⁴ The above-mentioned Tūrāb Bāy is said to have possessed between two thousand and three thousand sheep and goats in addition to two camels and three horses.⁶⁷⁵ In light of this, it seems advisable to regard the term *bāy* not only as a sign of material wealth but also as a title showing the dignity and social standing of its bearer, whose reputation and influence depended as much on his contacts and contracts with other actors or superior patrons tied into the administrative hierarchy as on his control over land and other resources. The patron status of the *bāys* was always connected to their relationship with their own patrons and the ability to extract resources from outside.⁶⁷⁶

INSTITUTIONALIZED INDEBTEDNESS

In this section I will pay attention to the issue of mutual indebtedness, a phenomenon we have come across in earlier chapters. There I investigated the loans taken up by ‘Ubaidullah Khān II and Naṣrullah Khān to finance their military campaigns.

Indebtedness also worked as a structural principle in other social spheres. It can be observed in the countryside of Bukhara and in other contexts like Iran or Afghanistan.⁶⁷⁷ One example is given by Ṣadr al-Dīn ‘Ainī. Describing his and his brother’s difficult financial situation after the death of their parents, he refers to loans taken from Yuldāsh Bāy, a local creditor.⁶⁷⁸ Since patrons in rural areas often fed an extended circle of dependents, they were under constant pressure to enlarge the pool of available resources if

⁶⁷⁴ According to Carrère d’Encausse, the extent of the land owned by the *bāys* increased throughout the nineteenth century (Carrère d’Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 20).

⁶⁷⁵ Interview on August 22, 2007, in Naw Shahar/Angor District—Surkhandaryo/Uzbekistan.

⁶⁷⁶ Against this way of interpreting the title *bāy*, Barthold’s definition of the term appears in a new light. According to him, in Central Asia the word is often added to individual names, through which its bearer stands out from the mass of the ordinary populace as a wealthy and independent man (W. Barthold, “Bai,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Ger. edn., I, 610; see also Doerfer, *Elemente*, II, 259–60). While *bāys* may have been rich, “independent” in this definition hardly applies to the social realities at the end of the nineteenth century.

⁶⁷⁷ Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 380; Grevemeyer, *Afghanistan*, 66–73.

⁶⁷⁸ According to ‘Ainī, Yuldāsh Bāy received a fixed share of the sorghum harvest to pay for the burial of ‘Ainī’s father. Yuldāsh Bāy then took one hundred fifty *tanga*. One hundred twenty-five *tanga* were reserved for himself, while he immediately distributed the remaining twenty-five *tanga* to other small creditors (Aini, *Sands of Oxus*, 177).

they did not want to lose clients. Otherwise they would have lost their social status along with their followers, who were likely to switch to another patron. Although the rents generated by their clientele enabled landlords to mitigate the immediate effects of multiple clientelistic demands by redistributing resources among family members and associates, years of bad harvests or drought meant the risk of additional dependents in need of credits and help. In such a setting, richer peasants and landlords had to avoid gossip by fulfilling firmly institutionalized expectations among the villagers. For example, “they were expected to sponsor more conspicuously lavish celebrations at weddings, to show greater charity to kin and neighbors, to sponsor religious activity, and to take on more dependents and employees than average households.”⁶⁷⁹ To satisfy these demands and expectations, a local *bāy* was soon in trouble if the rent generated from sharecropping was insufficient to protect the croppers and to arrange festivities at the same time. To feed his dependents, even a landlord was likely to get into situations where taking a credit was inevitable in order to maintain his social standing. In 1900, for instance, one hundred sixty villagers petitioned the administration of Katta Qūrghān, in the *oblast* of Samarqand, to express their gratitude to their *āqsaqāl*, who had borrowed money on their behalf to tide them over the late rice harvest.⁶⁸⁰

Somewhat parallel to the social order at court, in the villages the generosity enjoined by the members of the local elite was not without its compensations, because it fostered their growing prestige and served to surround them with a circle of grateful associates, helping them validate their position within the community.⁶⁸¹ Moreover, the social services provided by the landlords were not a one-sided thing. There was a reciprocity involved in the relationship between *bāys* and peasants. The peasants often worked as shepherds, gathered firewood, or performed as seasonal workers for the *bāys* in order to compensate them for loans.⁶⁸²

⁶⁷⁹ Scott, “Patronage or Exploitation?” 27.

⁶⁸⁰ Morrison, *Russian Rule*, 179.

⁶⁸¹ Scott, “Patronage or Exploitation?” 27.

⁶⁸² ‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 7; Aini, *Sands of Oxus*, 33.

Hindū Moneylenders

Hindus and Jews were the major creditors in nineteenth-century Transoxania, where they lived in separate caravanserais near the business center of the towns.⁶⁸³ Scott Levi estimates the number of Hindu merchants and moneylenders living in southern Central Asia, including Russian Turkistan, at roughly eight thousand.⁶⁸⁴ According to the nineteenth-century traveler Lehmann, in the city of Bukhara they exclusively inhabited the Sarai Badr al-Dīn, Sarai Ḥalīm Jān and two smaller sections in the Sarai Jūybārī Khwāja.⁶⁸⁵ The Hindu moneylenders were all part of an extended trans-regional network of trade agents who were loaned by creditors in India, reportedly “men of substance,” before traveling and settling abroad. There they started selling a small percentage of the goods credited by their family firms,⁶⁸⁶ while hoarding the rest for sale over a longer period to keep the prices low. The Hindus granted different types of loans to their Central Asian clients: agricultural and industrial credits, and cash loans.⁶⁸⁷

There were in principle several solutions to the credit problem. First of all, a village patron could approach merchants in one of the urban markets or one of the Jewish or Hindu moneylenders. The types of loans such creditors granted their clients of course differed in quantity and quality. They differed primarily in their repayment arrangements and the interest rates. Since many peasants and even some of the well-off cultivators regularly depended on credits to get their crops planted, but were also exposed to incalculable risks, these loans constituted an important and lucrative option for the

⁶⁸³ Levi points to results from research on documents from the Koshbegi Archive conducted by Cf. Dmitriev, according to which Hindu traders lived in many Bukharan towns, for example in Ghijduwān, Wardanzī, Wābkent, Qarshī, Khuzār, Yakka Bāgh, Chirāghchī, Karkī, Bāysūn, Kitāb, Karmīna, Shahr-i Sabz, Qarākūl, Nūr-i Aṭā and other places (Scott Levi, “The Indian Merchant Diaspora in Early Modern Central Asia and Iran,” *Iranian Studies* 32, no. 4 (1999): 504).

⁶⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 505.

⁶⁸⁵ Lehmann, *Reise*, 210–11. According to ‘Ainī, there were three Hindu sarais in the city of Bukhara, in each of which lived one hundred to one hundred fifty Hindu merchants (‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, III, 364).

⁶⁸⁶ Although most of the Indian merchants traded in textiles, some of them also sold precious stones and jewels. Even the government turned to Indian jewelers when it obtained valuable precious stones to estimate their value and fix a rate (‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, III, 363).

⁶⁸⁷ Levi, “The Indian Merchant Diaspora,” 492–98.

moneylenders. Needless to say, and with regard to sufficient collateral, greater risks were involved in agricultural loans. But nevertheless, Hindu merchants and moneylenders were attracted to rural markets because the interest earned was much higher. According to Scott Levi, the term of agricultural loans was usually only six months, or even less. Such an arrangement generated the capital for a range of other investments. In Bukhara and other cities, the Indian moneylenders commonly gave credits to agriculturalists on an exchange basis. In return for seed or other production materials, the creditors received a share of the harvest, which they sold in the urban bazaars at the usual market price.⁶⁸⁸

Levi's findings suggest that Hindus were only one group among other potential patrons in the countryside, though they might have served a greater clientele and channeled the income to India through their family networks or made some reinvestments in the local bazaar economy. As Olufsen states, they had managed to usurp almost all the money affairs of Bukhara and their financial operations extended even to remote villages.⁶⁸⁹ According to 'Ainī, their extended clientele was made up of many poor people but also the soldiers of the *amīr* (*sarbāzān*).⁶⁹⁰

Their clientele consisted of ordinary peasants and probably also some of the local *bāys*. In the event that a landlord was in need of a loan, the asymmetry in the exchange between him and his Indian moneylender had a definite impact on the relationship between the former and his own clients at village level. Since this credit system implies a general margin of profit for the creditor, who creamed off the surplus in a similar way as the *bāys* did with their own clients, an indebted landowner had two possibilities. One was to compensate his loss by lowering his peasants' share to preclude a decrease in the rent. In the worst case, local inequalities increased to an extent that corroded the subsistence base of the latter. To avoid such a development and the alienation of his clients, a patron needed a diverse pool of resources. He could engage in other fields, for example the caravan or bazaar trade, or had to establish contacts with a greater number of other actors (merchants,

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid., 496–97.

⁶⁸⁹ Olufsen, *Emir*, 296. According to Carrère d'Encausse, the loans accorded by Hindus were not great in size (Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam*, 44–45).

⁶⁹⁰ In Bukhara the Hindu moneylenders did not possess books and calculation lists but made use of woodblocks. Reserving one such woodblock per client, they noted the name of the respective debtor and the credit sum on the block and made indents for each installment of the loan taken from the debtor on a weekly basis ('Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, III, 362).

tankhwāhdārs/amlākdārs, and other government officials), whose power sources he could tap for himself and his associates.⁶⁹¹ His personal risk of running out of resources was mitigated by an extended circle of followers who provided additional means and social capital. The challenge lay in balancing his interests and connections with other actors in order to avoid one-sided dependences.

The Būnak System and other Instances of Indebtedness

The phenomenon of structural indebtedness increased in the time when cotton was introduced as a cash crop. Loans accorded by wealthy merchants, moneylenders and officials were originally advances on the cotton harvest. Many commercial houses gave credits through the intermediary of the *tarāzūdārs* (scales owners) in the local bazaars.⁶⁹² These advances were called *būnak* and given in April. The cotton producers pledged to hand over the harvest to the *tarāzūdār* at a fixed price defined by the latter on the basis of the previous year's rate. Ignoring the usual risks of agricultural ventures, the price was always below the market rate. As security for the loan, the middlemen usually had an option on the produce, the land of the peasant and all his possessions.⁶⁹³ According to Carrère d'Encausse, the *būnak* was not

⁶⁹¹ There seems to have been no lack of potential creditors in Transoxania. There were many individual merchants and rich families who competed even with the *amīr* in terms of wealth (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 197).

⁶⁹² The institutionalized position of the *tarāzūdār* and the corresponding imposition of the *dallālī* was much to the annoyance of the Russian merchants (Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam*, 45).

⁶⁹³ Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam*, 44; see also Khakimova, *Krest'janstvo*, 68. Similar practices of establishing relationships of dependence are known from Iran and other areas. Particularly in Kurdistan, wandering merchants sold cloth, sugar, tea and similar goods at exorbitant prices on account against the next harvest and thus established lasting power relations. An institution similar to the *būnak* is known from the province of Fārs, where it was called *musā'ida* or *taqāwī*, paid in winter when prices were high and repaid in summer when they were lowest. There, a landlord who was a newcomer often drove a harder bargain with the tenants than a landowner who had been established longer (Lambton, "Landlord and Peasant," 381). In the highlands of central Afghanistan, Pashtun nomads (*kūchīs*) obtained wheat, fodder plants and butter in exchange for industrial products from local Hazāra peasants. Since the Hazāra bought more from the *kūchīs* than their own products were worth, they entered into *gerau* contracts with Pashtuns. This not only led to indebtedness and the loss of arable land to the Pashtun competitors but triggered severe conflicts between the Hazāra and the nomads (Rolf Bindemann, *Religion*

entirely given in cash but partly also in kind, such as manufactured goods, tea, soap, and paraffin. The *tarāzūdārs* boosted the value of these products by at least twenty-five percent. Moreover, a substantial interest of annually eighty percent was attached to the credits. At the beginning of the twentieth century, seventy-five percent of the Bukharan cotton produce was bought under such conditions.⁶⁹⁴ Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that even well-off peasants and landlords could lose their land when they were drawn into the spiral of chronic indebtedness and poverty. The fact that impoverished peasants cultivated their plots as tenants of a creditor who had managed to occupy the land they had mortgaged in return for a credit when they were unable to pay back a loan, is also reported by the interviewee from Beshkutan.⁶⁹⁵ Yet the docility of the Bukharan peasantry in the face of such practices should not be attributed solely to Islam and Koranic prescriptions,⁶⁹⁶ but to the inertial character of local worldviews and their being institutionally surrounded.

The relevance of credits and indebtedness is also reflected by some documents. In an undated petition, the ruler is informed about a dispute between two Jewish moneylenders named Dāwud and Ibrāhīm on the one hand and their debtor, a certain Mullā Khwāja from Ḥiṣār, on the other. Besides the fact that the personal influence of the Bukharan creditors reached to distant places, the case also reveals the involvement of the ruler, who sent one of his *mahrams* to Ḥiṣār to bring the debtor to Bukhara. From the document it becomes clear that Mullā Khwāja was a landlord possessing forty *ṭanāb* (8 ha) of land, amounting to fifteen *ṭilā* each *ṭanāb*, including a

und Politik bei den schi'itischen Hazāra in Afghanistan, Iran und Pakistan (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1987), 21–22). In Afghanistan, the regulations of the institution of the *salaam* were also fixed in the law of 1977. Since peasants usually need wheat in winter, a season of typical food and ground shortages, but returned the credit in the form of produce after the harvest when prices were low, they had to pay back much more to their creditors than the initial loan actually amounted to. Instead of the ten or so sacks of wheat the credit was worth, they had to pay fifteen or twenty sacks. But in a subsistence economy just a small percentage deficit may suffice to cause chronic indebtedness (Grevemeyer, *Afghanistan*, 77). This asymmetric exchange generally applies to a range of agricultural products; in Sar-i Pul, for example, advances are still given on the wheat harvest, while in the district of Sangchārak south of Sar-i Pul the loans are secured by the local produce of raisins (Interview on April 13, 2007, in Sar-i Pul/Afghanistan).

⁶⁹⁴ Carrère d'Encausse, 44.

⁶⁹⁵ Interview on July 30, 2007, in Beshkutan/Termez—southern Uzbekistan.

⁶⁹⁶ Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 44–45.

house, a garden and ten horses, the price of each of which was one thousand *tanga*. Unfortunately we do not learn anything about the reason for his debt (*qarḏ*). Finally, he sold his horses and a small amount of his land to repay ten thousand of the debt of thirteen thousand *tanga*.⁶⁹⁷ Another case is reported in a letter from Amīr Ḥaidar, in which he instructs the governor of Qarshī to take care of his loyal attendee (*du 'ā-gū*) Mullā Muḥammad Shāh and to keep up to date on his condition. The king also gives clear instructions with respect to the recovery of debts (*dād wa girift*) from third persons, saying that the repayments should be handed over to Muḥammad Shāh, otherwise the debtors would be brought before the judge.⁶⁹⁸

Several documents from the Bukharan district library also demonstrate the relevance of debts and the conflicts about the issue of repayment. Highlighting one of the two cases, the first document narrates that the debtor, a man by the name of Muḥammad Naẓar from Jū-yi nau, refused to pay back a loan he had taken from the plaintiff, a certain Ḥaidar Qul. The document also included the request for a *fatwa* to be issued on behalf of the plaintiff as well as the *amīr*'s order given to Mīr Badr al-Dīn, the future *qāzī kalān* of Bukhara, to investigate the case and take a decision.⁶⁹⁹ Dating from 1321 to 1326/1903–08, the second document is a complaint filed by the moneylender Daurā Yahūdī and the supreme judge against the debtor Muḥammad Nabī.⁷⁰⁰

'Alā al-Dīn Gāw-Jigar

There is much evidence that indebtedness was chronic among the Bukharan peasantry because landowners, merchants and moneylenders used the institution to build up an extended clientele. 'Ainī tells the story of Nūr Muḥammad, who took a loan of three thousand *tanga* from a rich cattle owner to cover the costs of his wedding amounting to ten thousand *tanga*. Later he got indebted to a creditor by the name of 'Alā al-Dīn Gāw-Jigar, a rich tea merchant who gave loans in the form of tea. Initially, this man was a poor tea seller who started his "business" with almost nothing. Later he got acquainted with another moneylender who taught him how to bind people to

⁶⁹⁷ Semenov, "Ocherk pozemel'no-podatnogo i nalogogo ustrojstva," 24–25.

⁶⁹⁸ Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 72, fols. 28a–b.

⁶⁹⁹ Kazakov, *Bukharan Documents*, 37–38; BOB no. 139a/122a.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 38; BOB no. 128/111.

himself by creating asymmetric dependences. Fixing the price of a given amount of tea, originally valued at five *tanga*, at ten *tanga*, he handed the tea over for a time of two months. Afterward, he directed his debtors to a small shop in the Sarā-yi pūst near his own tea shop, where he had set up a partner who bought the tea for four *tanga*. Thus he made a net profit of six *tanga* and had created a debtor who found it difficult to evade the debt entanglement. In this way, one hundred or two hundred *nīmchas* of tea constantly circulated between the two shops, while ‘Alā al-Dīn pocketed the net profit. On the way to the Sarā-yi pūst, the debtors were already frightened by the prospect of selling the tea at a lower price. While other creditors granted loans on the basis of the real estate of the debtor, occupying it in case of insolvency, he was not interested in the property of his clients but said, “I am in need of people (*ba man ādam dar kār ast!*)” This went so far that he accepted the requests of the poorest people. He was also not afraid of losing money, because his ever growing clientele was likely to cover possible losses.⁷⁰¹ Of course, this system of exchange based on indebtedness interwoven with patronage and deeply entrenched notions of generosity was also fostered by the Islamic law prohibiting direct interest.

Another way of tying people to oneself was the *gerau* system, a particular kind of mortgage contract that allows the patron to siphon off the agricultural surplus in kind while paying his debtor like a sharecropper.⁷⁰² A case in point is again the above-mentioned ‘Alā al-Dīn, who freed the said Nūr Muḥammad from his debt of three thousand *tanga* including an initial interest rate of one thousand two hundred *tanga*. According to this arrangement, he sold his (the cultivator’s) share of the crop at a low price of one thousand *tanga* in advance and offered to do without the interest rate of an additional two hundred *tanga*. Thereby ‘Alā al-Dīn could present himself as a generous friend of a person in need. In return, Nūr Muḥammad had to host his patron’s guests and provide fodder for their horses. This went well for about one year, but when the debtor wanted to wed his son, he took additional loans from the tea seller, who extended the *gerau* to Nūr Muḥammad’s house and garden. In this situation, no other moneylender was willing to give him a credit anymore.⁷⁰³

⁷⁰¹ ‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, 443–45.

⁷⁰² See Grevenmeyer, *Afghanistan*, 75.

⁷⁰³ For the entire story see ‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, 446–48.

Interestingly, this case is illustrative of the self-production of power at a very individual level. But it also reminds us of Popitz' explanations. At the beginning, 'Alā al-Dīn was an ordinary man like many other Bukharans. Then he gained control over the sale of packets of tea, an instrument to create dependences.⁷⁰⁴ This gave him considerable advantage in the bazaar and vis-à-vis his debtors. With a certain financial stock at his disposal, he used the *gerau* to acquire new dependents like Nūr Muḥammad. Once the relationship with his creditor was established, the permanent exchange between the two men fueled the sense of and the quest for power on 'Alā al-Dīn's part, leading him to use the credits as a means to make his client ever more dependent on him. Social obligations and expectations rooted in local worldviews at that time increased Nūr Muḥammad's dependence on his patron. For example, he brought gifts every time he visited the home of his in-laws. This and the additional wedding costs of ten thousand *tanga* led to his lack of money and urgent need in the first place.⁷⁰⁵

As this story displays, the creditor did not claim the money back, nor did he show any serious interest in the property he occupied through the *gerau*; he just wanted to recruit a follower. With this course of action he followed a path that was established long before, not only in Transoxania but in other regions as well. The debtor's approval of this relationship was mirrored by his offer to cover the expenses of hosting and entertaining his patron's guests in return for the loan and the *gerau* contract. Here we see a clear division of labor and a relationship between a standard-setter giving orders and the peasant becoming a servant who carried out orders.

When Nūr Muḥammad became aware of the "trap," it was too late to free himself from the grip of his friend. Once established, it was difficult to find a

⁷⁰⁴ 'Alā al-Dīn was a moneylender in the Bukharan bazaar who based his credit system on grants in the form of packets of tea, which he gave to his debtors at a high interest rate. The debtors sold the tea and used the profit to satisfy their needs. When, for example, somebody needed a credit of five *tanga*, he handed over a packet of tea worth five *tanga* at an interest rate of ten *tanga* to be paid back within two months. Every time his debtors needed more money, he lowered the price of tea to prevent them from turning to another creditor. This system of crediting worked as follows: he rented a small shop in the leather market (*sarā-yi pūst*), in which he placed somebody whom he provided with a large amount of cash. After delivering the tea, 'Alā al-Dīn sent his debtors to that shop where they sold their packets of tea. Yet there, the debtors could sell a *nīmcha* of tea worth five *tanga* at a price of only four *tanga*. In this way, one hundred to two hundred *nīmcha* of tea always circulated between 'Alā al-Dīn's two shops ('Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, 443–44).

⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 442.

way out of the relationship. The intensifying exchange coincided with and deepened the increasing indebtedness of the peasant. In the end, the moneylender entirely financed and arranged the wedding for Nūr Muḥammad's son by granting a credit of eight thousand *tanga* in exchange for an extension of the *gerau* to his house and garden. At the same time, his growing network of power and the increasing number of dependents induced 'Alā al-Dīn Gāw-Jīgar to demand additional services and resources from the peasant. Having failed to obtain loans from other moneylenders, Nūr Muḥammad eventually turned to the *qāzī*, whose attempt to mediate between patron and client led to a further increase of the latter's debt.⁷⁰⁶ Finally, the peasant gave up trying to free himself from this burdensome relationship, because, to put it in Foucault's words, he was institutionally surrounded.

ĀQSAQĀLS ACCORDING TO FOREIGN AND SECONDARY SOURCES

When taking a closer look at the secondary literature one is struck by the categories given by foreign visitors, and sometimes also scholars, with regard to the functions of officials. At this point I argue that the present state of knowledge is based on a state-centric perspective that—apart from a few exceptions—was adopted by historians and travelers who interpreted offices and functions first and foremost in clearly defined administrative terms. Moreover, their interpretation and assignment of duties to office titles is within clear-cut territorial divisions that the observers thought they could identify. The village heads (*āqsaqālān*, *rīshsafīdān*, *kadkhudāyān*) are no exception in this regard. Instead of viewing them as power brokers and middlemen, most of the foreign observers and scholars described them as functionaries of the state on the lowest level of the administration. However, as will be shown in the next section, the fluidity of the political setting in Transoxania makes it almost impossible to press local power structures into neat patterns.

According to Holdsworth, who conflates the positions of the *āqsaqāl* and the *mīrāb*, the *āqsaqāl* was the “executive functionary, but also the most important local person, as being in closest contact with the people and in control of the administration of the irrigation channels.”⁷⁰⁷ In Becker's eyes, *āqsaqāls* or local elders acted at the lowest level of government. Each village

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid., 447–48.

⁷⁰⁷ Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 9.

elected its own *āqsaqāl* who had minor duties and was subject to the administrative hierarchy.⁷⁰⁸ Carrère d'Encausse describes the administrative structure of the Emirate of Bukhara as consisting of

“two administrative systems juxtaposed: a representative system, emanating from below and inherited from the political traditions anterior to the Uzbek state; and a system of political administration, emanating from above and formed by the state cadres und the authority of the *qush-begi*.”⁷⁰⁹

She further defines the *āqsaqāls* as elders in charge of villages and hamlets. Local spokesmen like the *āqsaqāls*, *min(g)bāshīs* and *īl-bēgīs* (heads of nomadic tribes) were chosen for life by the people they represented vis-à-vis the administration. Their position expired only in cases of serious misdemeanor. As an “element of permanent contact” between the central government and its subjects, the role of village headmen was a purely representative one, so they remained without real effectiveness.⁷¹⁰ Exploring Russian archival material, Morrison states that the *āqsaqāls* were village headmen responsible for revenue collection under the supervision of *amīns*.⁷¹¹ In his recent study on *īl-bēgīs* in Bukhara, Holzwarth investigates the term in native narrative sources, archival records of the Emirate of Bukhara and the secondary literature. He proposes that the *īl-bēgīs* were middlemen positioned at the interface between tribal groups and the state administration. Holzwarth also suggests that the term *īl-bēgī* as such was first introduced in Iran in the course of the eighteenth century and then spread eastwards to Bukhara.⁷¹²

Although the *kadkhudā* appears in some documents together with *amīns*, *āqsaqāls* and the ‘*ulamā*’, there is little information about this position in the Transoxanian context. Some historians, however, provide information coming close to the assumption that we are dealing with a stratum of power brokers. According to Paul, the *kadkhudās* were village elders who acted as spokesmen for their communities, for example in cases when village land was sold or gifted to another person. This term dominated in documents and written accounts in Timurid times and even before. The Turkish term

⁷⁰⁸ Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 9.

⁷⁰⁹ Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 26.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹¹ Morrison, *Russian Rule*, 93–95.

⁷¹² Holzwarth, “Community Elders,” 217–18.

āqsaqāl appears much later in the sources.⁷¹³ In Safawid Iran, the *kadkhudās* were responsible for the collection of taxes and dues. In addition, they appear to have had certain authority over the other villagers. The *kadkhudās* were assembled by the local governors once a year and helped fix the amount of revenues to be paid by their villages, but they also acted as representatives of the landowners and were responsible for the execution of laws and regulations referred to them by the administration. Besides, the *kadkhudā* oversaw agricultural affairs in accordance with the orders of the landowner, so he was looked upon as the servant of the latter and the guardian of his interests.⁷¹⁴ Monika Gronke states that the *kadkhudāyān* represented the rural population vis-à-vis the landlord and government officials. They took care of all the organizational tasks and duties of their community and were likely to oversee the cycle of agricultural production on the estates of the landowners. The elders had to assist the tax collectors and assessors and also took care of travelers and officials visiting the village. Altogether the *kadkhudās* were middlemen between the population and the authorities.⁷¹⁵

Let us return to the *āqsaqāls* of Transoxania. Having visited Bukhara after its defeat by the Russian forces, Radloff followed many of his compatriots in viewing Bukhara as a thoroughly institutionalized territorial state, the dynamics of which can be grasped by looking at territorial units and divisions. According to him, Bukhara was divided into “bēg-ships” (Russian *begstvo*; Uzbek *beglik*), which further split into districts headed by *āqsaqāls*. The most influential district chief was the *āqsaqāl* in charge of the *bēg*’s residence, who bore the title of *amīn*. Radloff also mentions that the village chiefs had a staff of lower-ranking tax collectors.⁷¹⁶ In contrast to this picture, Olufsen describes the whitebeards as being responsible for entertaining guests and travelers, and in some cases they also functioned as guides for foreign visitors.⁷¹⁷ In his other report on the Pamir expedition in 1898–99, he writes that in mountainous Eastern Bukhara justice was maintained by the *āqsaqāl* of the town and the local *qāzī*, “who by turns

⁷¹³ Paul, *Naqšbandiyya*, 45, 135, 155.

⁷¹⁴ For further details see Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 122, 167, 190–91, 337–38.

⁷¹⁵ Monika Gronke, *Derwische im Vorhof der Macht. Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Nordwestirans im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993), 205–06.

⁷¹⁶ Radloff, “Das mittlere Serafschanthal,” 523.

⁷¹⁷ Olufsen, *Emir*, 80, 82, 133, 137–38.

command the peasants to open and shut with flat pieces of slate the channels by which their fields are watered.⁷¹⁸ As the chief magistrate of the village, the *āqsaqāl* had the executive power while the *qāzī* was the judge. Each whitebeard had an assistant, a so-called *harbāb* (*arbāb*?) responsible for the well-being of strangers and travelers.⁷¹⁹ According to Vasil'eva, the whitebeards were elected persons in charge of all village affairs.⁷²⁰

Referring to Russian scholars, Kisljakov gives perhaps the best and most comprehensive overview of the position and its functions in rural areas. In the following I will rely on this information instead of quoting the original works of all the Russian historians. In Begchurin's opinion, each village in Shahr-i Sabz had its own *āqsaqāl*, whereas clusters of villages were administered by a *sarkār* (in the secondary literature also *serker*). The information given on the conditions in Hiṣār and Qabādiyān reveals that these regions were administratively divided into tax districts that further split into sub-units, so-called *sadas* (*ṣada*?) consisting of villages headed by *āqsaqāls*. Enpe reports that the *amīns* assisted the *amlākdārs* in collecting taxes and at the same time were the leaders and chiefs of the *āqsaqāls*. According to Magidovich, the *amlāks* were tax-collecting units divided into "amīnships" (*aminstvo*) consisting of "āqsaqālships" (*aksakalstvo*). The latter formed the lowest level of the administration. Each *āqsaqālship* consisted of a cluster of settlements headed by a *mingbāshī*—in the case of Uzbek settlements—or an *arbāb*—in Tajik hamlets and villages.⁷²¹ Kisljakov's own results obtained through field research suggest that in large villages made up of several mosque communities, there was a greater number of *āqsaqāls*. Besides the elders and whitebeards, the populace selected special representatives, the *amīns*, who, acting above the village level, performed as middlemen between the central administration and the rural population. The *amīns* were present when the *amlākdārs* evaluated and fixed the amount of the harvest. As a spokesman and middleman for the peasantry, the *amīn* estimated the harvest at a much lower amount than the tax collector, in whose interest it was to fix harvests as high as possible.⁷²²

⁷¹⁸ Ole Olufsen, *Through the Unknown Pamirs: The Second Danish Pamir Expedition, 1898–99* (London: William Heinemann, 1904), 115.

⁷¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁷²⁰ Vasil'eva, "Zanjatija Naselenija," 67, footnote no. 54.

⁷²¹ Paraphrased after Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnoshenija*, 57.

⁷²² In his description of the administrative apparatus of the Emirate of Bukhara in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Semenov does not mention the *āqsaqāls*. He

According to other informants, the *amīns* acted as mere neutral observers who stood between the *amlākdār* on the one hand and the *āqsaqāls* and peasants on the other, trying to find an average value of the harvest. *Amīns*, however, were also in charge of the administration of irrigation canals. Sometimes there were two of them administering one canal, one on the upper course and the other on the lower course and the respective intakes.⁷²³ In Moser's account, we only read about the *aryq-āqsaqāl* (canal elder), an administrator selected by the peasants of several districts. This *āqsaqāl* also supervised the *mīrābs*, persons responsible for smaller side canals or larger canal segments. The *aryq-āqsaqāls* were paid annually in kind by the peasants; the payment was directly related to the amount of the harvest.⁷²⁴ For example, there were two *amīns* responsible for the Kharqān Rūd Canal in the *tūmān* of Ghijduwān, one on the upper course and the second *amīn* on the lower part of the canal. They received the water share alternately and distributed the water among the stakeholders residing on the intakes and side canals.⁷²⁵ The smaller side canals were administered by the *āqsaqāls*, and when the main canal was too long, an *amīn* was assisted by several *arbābs*.⁷²⁶ According to Vasil'eva's findings from Pastdorgan in the Zarafshān Valley, the irrigation was managed collectively. Four villages using the water of one canal segment were organized in a *qāzānsharīk* or *qāraqāzān*, irrespective of ethnic affiliations. Each unit was headed by an *ellik-bāshī* responsible for the joint work of his group and supervision of the irrigation and the canal cleaning. He also worked as a broker for transactions concerning land.⁷²⁷

defines the *amīn* as a fiduciary or authorized guardian responsible for the wealth of his ward. Yet this description does not correspond to the data furnished by Bukharan documents (see below) (Semenov, "Ocherk ustrojstva zentralnogo administrativnogo upravlenija," 36–37, 38, footnote no. 1).

⁷²³ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnoshenija*, 58.

⁷²⁴ Moser, *Durch Central-Asien*, 116. The use of particular titles may have varied from region to region; for example, a petition from Žiyā al-Dīn (near Dabūsī) requests the formal recognition of 'Abdullah Khwāja as new *āqsaqāl* for the canal Rūd-i Mīr after the decease of the former greybeard 'Abd al-Jalīl (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 1). Here the term *āqsaqāl* is used instead of *amīn*, a title that was common in the *tūmānāt* of Bukhara.

⁷²⁵ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnoshenija*, 58.

⁷²⁶ *Ibid.*, 134.

⁷²⁷ Vasil'eva, "Zanjatija Naselenija," 67.

The term *āqsaqāls* was not restricted to the Bukharan arena but likely to be found in other places. According to Beisembiev, *āqsaqāls* and *amīns* acted as the lowest-ranking officials in the khanate of Khoqand. For instance, among the Qurama and in the area of Tashkent, the *āqsaqāl* was a village chief and administrator or an urban notable. The same held true for the Ferghana Valley, where in the urban context the headmen of town quarters were also called whitebeard.⁷²⁸ During their campaign to Khoqand in 1842, the Bukharans dispatched messengers to Tashkent to acquire information about the attitude of the city elders, among whom we also find a certain Bēg Muḥammad Āqsaqāl and his Tajik colleague Zuhūr Īshik-Āqābāshī.⁷²⁹

According to the *Ta'rikh-i shāhrukhī*, from 1826 on, Khoqandian forces were able to extend their influence to Kāshghar. In 1832 Beijing and Khoqand concluded a treaty under which China recognized Khoqand's position and granted the Khoqandī *āqsaqāls* and *amīns* the right to levy taxes on the merchants and migrants from western Central Asia.⁷³⁰ Focusing on the political relations between Kāshghar, the Chinese and Khoqand, Chen identifies the *āqsaqāls* (Chinese "Hudai-da") as commercial agents and political envoys of Khoqand in Kāshghar and East Turkistan. While in this context the whitebeard appears as a centrally appointed political agent, in the Sir Daryā basin the term *āqsaqāl* was applied in the usual way. There he functioned as a representative of rural communities and urban neighborhoods,⁷³¹ who derived his income from the regular taxes paid by the populace. Chen concludes that there was a difference between *āqsaqāls* in western Turkistan, where they were chosen by the rural population, and in Kāshghar, where they were appointed by the *ḥākīm bēgī*.⁷³² This is confirmed by the *Tārīkh-i 'Ālimqulī*, which names a certain Hamrāh Qulī Īshik-Āghāsī who in 1864 was appointed as *āqsaqāl* to replace Shakur Khān Āqsaqāl.⁷³³ According to Newby, Qing sources relating to Xinjiang denote

⁷²⁸ Beisembiev, *Ta'rikh*, 68, 71.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid.*, 113.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷³¹ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, II, 205.

⁷³² Chiung-Lung Chen, "Aksakals in the Moslem Region of Eastern Turkistan," *Ural-Altische Jahrbücher* 47 (1975): 41–43.

⁷³³ Timur Beisembiev (ed.), *The Life of 'Ālimqul. A Native Chronicle of Nineteenth Century Central Asia* (London/New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 62–63, see also footnote no. 224.

the *āqsaqāl* as a foreign merchant residing in one of the towns in southern Xinjiang, where he administered the affairs of his own merchant community. Although Khoqandian merchants played a dominant role at that time, the trading communities in Kāshghar, Āqsū and other towns also included Bukharans, Kashmiris and the traders from Tashkent.⁷³⁴

Information on the procedure of revenue collection in Kulāb and Qūrhān Tippa illustrates that the *āqsaqāls* and *amīns* stood between the population and the *amlākdār* when it came to estimating the harvest. In cases of conflict with regard to the exact amount of the harvest and the corresponding share of taxes, the village elders acted as middlemen mediating between the peasants and the *amlākdār*. When collecting the *kharāj* in kind, the *amlākdār* was usually accompanied by a range of functionaries and officials like the *dārūgha*,⁷³⁵ the *āqsaqāls* and *amīns*, the *mīrzā*,⁷³⁶ the smith, the baker, the *tarāzūdār* and so on. All of them received their portion. Furthermore, the local governor was also entitled to claim a certain part of the harvest, mostly in kind. If we believe Kisljakov, in the Zarafshān Valley the share of the harvest received by those actors in kind was called the *kafsan* or *kafsan pulī*.⁷³⁷ In other cases, the imam of the local mosque and the barber also received a share of the harvest.⁷³⁸ According to Schuyler, the *kafsan* (here called *kiafsen*) was only paid to the *sarkār* (here *serker*), an officer who was

⁷³⁴ For further details see Newby, *Empire*, 64–66.

⁷³⁵ The Mongol term *dārūgha* originally designated a governor or city commander, sometimes also a tribal chief (Doerfer, *Elemente*, I, 319–23). In Timurid times, it was one of the most important provincial offices below the governors, who were usually princes of the ruling house. As a commander of the garrisoned Chaghatay troops, the *dārūgha* was a governor either over a region or a town. Sometimes he governed in conjunction with native rulers (Manz, *Rise and Rule*, 170). In some of the localities surveyed by Kisljakov, the *dārūgha* was a functionary who noted and registered the exact amount of the harvest (Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnoshenija*, 151).

⁷³⁶ The *mīrzā* was a scribe who assisted other functionaries in making notes about the exact amount of the harvest.

⁷³⁷ In Kulāb, the *bēg* claimed sixteen pud (256 kg) of the harvest, whereas the *mīrāb* received one and a half pud (24 kg). The *kafsan pulī* was originally paid on a voluntary basis, but later became an obligatory tax paid to the *dārūghas*, the *āqsaqāls*, *amīns* and *arbābs*. In some regions this tax was called *mushrifāna* or *sarāna* (Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnoshenija*, 110, 151).

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.*, 131.

in charge of the revenue collection.⁷³⁹ Semenov is of the opinion that the *kafsan* was levied on the harvest for the maintenance of the *amlākdār*. In addition, the *kafsan-i dārūgha* was imposed as a loosely defined portion of the harvest given to the *dārūgha*. The exact share varied and depended on a mutual agreement between the peasant and the *dārūgha*. An additional levy called *mushtak* or *musht-i bār* was imposed by the *amīns* and *āqsaqāls* at the lowest level of the tax administration.⁷⁴⁰

In addition to tax collection and the organization of *hashars*, the *āqsaqāl* gave support and advice to the peasants, particularly in cases of weddings, funerals and other ceremonies and festivities. He received guests and was responsible for their accommodation and catering. In exchange for his services, he usually received a gift in kind or a *khal'at*.⁷⁴¹ Moreover, the whitebeards supervised land surveys and the distribution of arable plots among the peasantry, a procedure that took place at frequent intervals. This gave the *āqsaqāls* a considerable advantage and authority over their fellow peasants.⁷⁴² Since the land was distributed according to ploughing capacity, it is clear that those landholders who were able to mobilize a larger clientele of *kārandas* finally acquired the biggest plots.⁷⁴³

ĀQSAQĀLS IN BUKHARAN SOURCES

We have seen in the section on local representatives and power brokers that the narrative sources pay little attention to local elders and middlemen.⁷⁴⁴ Characteristically denoted as *āqsaqāls*, *rīshsafidān*, *mūsafidān*, or

⁷³⁹ It is not clear here whether the *sarkār* was a functionary only responsible to the *amīr*, or one of the deputies of the *amlākdār*. Accompanied by his large staff of officials (scribes and land surveyors), the *sarkār* inspected the cultivated land during the whole summer and kept records of the expected size of the harvest. According to Schuyler, he visited the threshing floors and took the share of grain falling due to the government (Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 304). Morrison also points to the confusion resulting from the overlap between *amlākdār* and *sarkār* (Morrison, "Amlākdārs," 27).

⁷⁴⁰ Semenov, "Ocherk ustrojstva tzentral'nogo administrativnogo upravlenija," 35.

⁷⁴¹ Kisjlov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnoshenija*, 151–52.

⁷⁴² Lambton states that "the consequence of any measure of independence on the part of the peasant, or, indeed lack of subservience to the *kadkhudā's* wishes, is likely to be a failure to obtain an adequate share of the good land of the village at the next year's redistribution of the land" (Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 301).

⁷⁴³ For further details see Kisjlov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnoshenija*, 123–27.

⁷⁴⁴ See chapter The Order of Things/Mediation and Brokerage/Village Elders.

khadkhudāyān, the whitebeards, elders or village headmen do not appear as individuals in the chronicles. In these sources, their activities are largely confined to coping with troops traversing particular localities. This coincides with the fact that, apart from accounts of battles and plundering raids, the countryside only figures as a non-entity serving either to provide resources or as an intermediate space, a passage leading to the targets of conquest. In some of the archival documents we also find designations such as *bābā*,⁷⁴⁵ *il-bēgī* (chief or leader of a tribe),⁷⁴⁶ or *mīr-i hazār* (leader of a thousand families or households).⁷⁴⁷

Āqsaqāl, Atālīq, Bī, or What? Ambiguity of Titles in the Chronicles

Before exploring the tasks and duties of village elders in other types of sources, I would like to briefly return to some of the chronicles that give additional clues to the position of *āqsaqāls* and the bearers of this title in the arena of local politics. A careful look at the *‘Ubaidullah Nāma* suggests that in the early eighteenth century, the term “whitebeard” was not exclusively applied to village elders but to a range of actors figuring prominently in our sources. Most of them acted outside the rural setting and connected larger local networks to the ruling house. For example, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Yūz, who was an influential Uzbek *amīr* and one of ‘Ubaidullah Khān’s *atālīqs*, is described here as a “good *āqsaqāl* knowing the rules of the kingdom” (*āqsaqāl-i khūb wa qā’ida-dān-i mulk*), attributes that justify his remaining in royal service.⁷⁴⁸ In an official letter issued by Subḥān Qulī Khān, this *amīr* is also addressed as a “good, loyal *āqsaqāl* who has always been aware of

⁷⁴⁵ See TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 26, docs. 15, 24, 40. The petitions kept in folder 29 exclusively inform about requested appointments of *bābās* (senior leaders or whitebeards) in the *qalandar-khānas* of the Emirate (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 29).

⁷⁴⁶ See TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 28.

⁷⁴⁷ See TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 13. The title *mīr-i hazār* may be equivalent to the *mingbāshī*. According to Holzwarth’s findings, this title was often adopted by heads of Arab communities (Holzwarth, “Community Elders,” 219, footnote no. 23).

⁷⁴⁸ Amīn Bukhārī, *‘Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 21a. Semenov inadequately translates the *āqsaqāl-i khūb* as a good man (*chelovek khoroshii*) (Semenov trans., *Ubaidullah Name*, 35).

allegiance.”⁷⁴⁹ In the ‘*Ubaidullah Nāma*, we find further instances of actors who are described as *āqsaqāls* in spite of having borne other titles as well.⁷⁵⁰

Although Semenov translates *kalānī* and *āqsaqālī* as greatness (*velichie*) and seniority or eldership (*starshinstvo*),⁷⁵¹ it may be advisable to consider other options for a more appropriate translation. Besides the term seniority, which applies here to both *kalānī* and *āqsaqālī*, the two terms can be translated as leadership of a tribe or group of people and the ability to act as a representative or intermediary. The term *āqsaqālī* also subsumes all leadership tasks assigned to community representatives, such as mediation, the settlement of conflicts or representation vis-à-vis the government. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, the word not only denoted an ordinary village elder but power brokers in general irrespective of other titles and ranks.

Āqsaqāls in Inshā’ Letters, Manshūrs and ‘Arīzas

In many official letters from the early nineteenth century, *āqsaqāls*, *amīns*, *arbābs*⁷⁵² and *kadkhudās* are addressed as a group of spokesmen and representatives at local level rather than as state agents at the lowest level of the central administration. Nevertheless, in these letters they function as interlocutors of the authorities and even the rulers. Often the documents bring royal orders, the allocation of land and water titles and similar matters to their attention.⁷⁵³ Some official letters from Amīr Ḥaidar preserved in one of the *inshā’* collections may help shed further light on the issue of

⁷⁴⁹ Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, doc. 14; Russian trans., 30–31; facs., 100–01.

⁷⁵⁰ Khudāyār Bī Manghit, for example, is portrayed as *parwānachī*, *kalān* and *āqsaqāl* of the *ūng wa sūl* tribes of Shahr-i Sabz (Amīn Bukhārī, ‘*Ubaidullah Nāma*, fol. 78b). Here Semenov translates it as village elder (*starshina*), which is likewise inadequate (Semenov trans., *Ubaidullah Name*, 91). Muḥammad Ma‘šūm Ḥājī Atālīq is depicted in a similar way as an *āqsaqāl-i khūb-i mulk*, “who had shown the world his leadership (*kalānī*) and seniority (*āqsaqālī*)” (ibid., fol. 174a).

⁷⁵¹ Semenov trans., *Ubaidullah Name*, 194.

⁷⁵² In Bukharan petitions, the *arbābs* appear as locally elected assistants of the *amīns*. Often former *arbābs* were appointed to the post of *amīn* (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, doc. 48; TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 17, docs. 68, 69).

⁷⁵³ Egani and Chekhovich, “Regesty,” doc. 5; Russian trans., 34; facs., 266; doc. 6; Russian trans., 34–35; facs., 267; doc. 8, Russian trans., 36; facs., 269; doc. 9; Russian trans., 36; facs., 270; doc. 10; Russian trans., 36; facs., 271 passim. Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, doc. 21; Russian trans., 39; facs., 107 passim.

“eldership” in Bukhara. In one of his letters the ruler instructs the governor of Qarshī as follows:

“To the possessor of honor and manifestation of amīrhood, the trustworthy [agent] of the government Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī Dīwānbēgī exalted by royal favors, be aware that since ancient times ‘Ajaz, Khānābād, Qūrghāshīm and Yanghikent have belonged to Qarshī. Appoint and install a *dārūgha* from there [!] You have done well in reconstructing the citadel of Panjāb. Since the populace of Panjāb is well acquainted with you, be kind to their *arbābs* and *āqsaqāls* (*ba arbāb wa āqsaqālash mihrabānī kunīd*) [!] Deliver robes of honor and address them with good parlance. [...]”⁷⁵⁴

Here reference is made to administrative measures carried out by the governor of Qarshī, Muḥammad Ḥakīm Bī. Emphasis is placed on the second part, where the king instructs his governor to act kindly and leniently toward local representatives and to talk to them in a gentle manner (*sukhan-i khūb-i tān-rā gū’īd*). This letter makes it clear that the *dīwānbēgī* is no more than a broker to whom authority was delegated from above.⁷⁵⁵ Rhetorical skills expressed in *sukhan-i khūb* were essential to engage in negotiations with the *āqsaqāls* of the region. In another letter the king gives the following instructions:

[...] Ghāzī Lang Ṣadr Bī [?] and Turāb Bēg Tūqsāba have always quarreled with one another, and although we have attempted to bring about a settlement [of the conflict], they are still disputing with each other [!] You shall mediate (*shumā āqsaqālī karda*) and be informed [about the issue]. Do not let them argue [!] [...]”⁷⁵⁶

This example illustrates how much daily governance in Bukhara was permeated by patterns of conflict and mediation. In this context, *āqsaqālī* simply means finding a modus vivendi between two parties. Moreover, the case illustrates that in practice many actors, and even provincial governors, could perform tasks connected with *āqsaqālī* in certain situations.⁷⁵⁷ In another document the ruler gives a list of loyal persons as receivers of royal orders including Muḥammad Naẓar Tūqsāba, Muḥammad Amīn Mīrākḥūr,

⁷⁵⁴ Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 2, fols. 2b–3a.

⁷⁵⁵ Von Meyendorff states that the provincial governors derived their rank and influence from the contact with the ruler, whose favor they obtained with gifts, primarily in the form of rice, horses and even money (von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 303).

⁷⁵⁶ Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 31, fol. 13a.

⁷⁵⁷ This is very much in line with the results of the chapter The Order of Things/Mediation and Brokerage, where I showed that a wide range of people like village elders, tribal chiefs, the *dīwānbēgī* of Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, religious dignitaries and others could act as intermediaries.

Niyāz Bēg Mīrākhūr, Ḥakīm Mīrākhūr, ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Mīrākhūr and other whitebeards (*wa sāyir-i āqsaqālān*).⁷⁵⁸ This short list shows that ordinary office holders and government agents like *mīrākhūrs* or *tūqsābas* functioned as *āqsaqāls*, in this case as recipients of orders in the region of Nasaf and Khuzār.⁷⁵⁹ Thus we see here the same ambiguous overlap of two administrative terms and titles as in eighteenth-century historiographic sources. This and the results presented in the previous two sections reveal that in principle the scope of *āqsaqālī*—representation, intercession and mediation—was not restricted to the villages, nor was it confined to the court, but extended over the entire society and ended with the ruler, who in some situations was likely to act as a mediator himself.⁷⁶⁰

Āqsaqāls and *amīns* also appear under different titles in a collection of royal diplomas (*manshūrāt*) from the time of Shāh Murād and Amīr Ḥaidar. In various diplomas, the Bukharan *amīr* confirms the appointment of certain persons to the post of *āqsaqāl*, *mīr-i hazār* and others. For example, he confirms the appointment of Mullā Ṣāliḥ b. Mullā Khūj Laṭīf as *āqsaqāl* of Samarqand:

“Since the luminous, justice spreading mind pays attention to the support of the descendants of loyal servants, a particle of the imperial favor has been granted to the faithful Mullā Ṣāliḥ, the son of Mullā Khūj Laṭīf Āqsaqāl. We have bestowed upon him the position of an *āqsaqāl* of Samarqand (*muhimm-i āqsaqālī-yi Samarqand*) except the citadel and the residential quarters. The inhabitants and people of the said city shall recognize the above-mentioned [man] as their *āqsaqāl* and pay him respect. They are not permitted to transgress his approval, which has been good for the august dominion, the welfare of the subjects and the interests of the commoners. The aforementioned *āqsaqāl* shall always strive for good will for the state based on a strong foundation and [for the sake of] benevolence regarding the subjects. They should acknowledge him as under obligation.”⁷⁶¹

A similar content and tone can be seen in two letters referring to the appointment of *mīr-i hazārs*, representatives of Arab communities in the

⁷⁵⁸ Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. no. 202, fol. 92a.

⁷⁵⁹ In other documents the holders of the ranks of *qarāwulbēgī*, *chaghatay-bēgī*, *mīrākhūr* and *aqālīq* were also termed *āqsaqāls* (see Amīr Ḥaidar, *Maktūbāt*, makt. nos. 132, fols. 159b–160a; 146, fols. 67a–b; 152, fols. 69a–b).

⁷⁶⁰ Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān is a case in point. In 1758 he settled a conflict between rival Khiwan factions (see chapter The Order of Things/Mediation and Brokerage/Insights into a *Kingāsh*).

⁷⁶¹ *Maktūbāt wa manshūrāt*, fols. 56a–b; Ṣifātgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 440.

capital Bukhara and the region of Āqcha in Cis-Oxania. In the second one, the ruler refers to an annual grant in kind and cash to the new *mīr-i hazār*, Muḥammad Ṣadīq, which is to be registered by the *dīwān* officials as his father also received annual allowances from the treasury.⁷⁶² According to another *manshūr*, the Bukharan *amīr* confirms the grant of fifty *ṭanāb* of land in the village of Bāgh-i Baland as a *tankhwāh* to the *āqsaqāl* Mullā Rāfi.⁷⁶³ In the same document and connected with this grant, he mentions measures taken for the security of the city:

“[...] he shall register the riflemen of the city (*mihrakān-i shahr*) together with Mullā Khūj Laṭīf Amīn. When the riflemen of Samarqand mount [their horses], he shall station somebody at the gates and ensure the safety of the city [...]”⁷⁶⁴

Very often, local representatives were also put in charge of other tasks. In addition to mediation or security measures, they were responsible for irrigation, especially the distribution of water among the stakeholders of a canal area. Supervisors of irrigation were often called *amīn*.⁷⁶⁵ Stating the appointment of a certain Tughāy Murād as *āqsaqāl* and *amīn* of an unknown community, one of the *manshūrs* gives the following description of his future tasks:

“Having granted favors to the loyal Tughāy Murād all this time we have bestowed [upon him] and elevated him with the rank of *āqsaqāl* for this community [?] together with the duty of an *amīn*. The said community shall recognize the above-mentioned person as their *āqsaqāl* and pay due respect to him. They are not permitted to transgress his approval, which has been good for the august dominion, the welfare of the subjects and the interests of the commoners. The above-mentioned *amīn* shall make efficacious efforts in distributing water shares and give everybody his share according to his participation. He shall oppose and not prefer any plot [of irrigated] land over another plot of land.”⁷⁶⁶

⁷⁶² Ibid., fols. 57b–58a; Şifatgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 442.

⁷⁶³ This village is also located in the surroundings of Samarqand.

⁷⁶⁴ *Maktūbāt wa manshūrāt*, fols. 62b–63a; Şifatgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 448.

⁷⁶⁵ Meaning “trustworthy” or somebody who is generally trusted, the Arabic term *amīn* (pl. *umanā*) was often used for an overseer or administrator. Depending on time and locality, the term also implied a range of technical meanings denoting office holders whose functions entailed financial and economic duties (Cl. Cahen, “Amīn,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., I, 437).

⁷⁶⁶ *Maktūbāt wa manshūrāt*, fol. 75b; Şifatgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 464.

Sometimes the irrigation was also supervised by *arbābs*, who received a share of the harvest and other compensation in kind for their efforts.⁷⁶⁷ According to ‘Ainī’s account of a canal digging campaign in Shāfurkām, the initiative for the construction came from the *āqsaqāls*, the *amīns* and landlords, who petitioned the ruler to provide them with a new canal. In return they bore the expenses and provided the labor force.⁷⁶⁸ Working with royal diplomas of appointment, Holzwarth highlights the role and function of *il-bēgīs* in Bukhara. He concludes that the *il-bēgīs* of the Qazāq had to record the wealth of tribespeople in terms of animals and gather information on bandits as well as performing tasks related to the payment of a herd tax and the safeguarding of the northern frontier of Bukhara.⁷⁶⁹

The letters from the *inshā*’ collection demonstrate that at least up to the time of Amīr Ḥaidar, the administrative functions attached to offices were not always precisely delineated. There are indications that this state continued well into the second half of the nineteenth century and despite the consolidation of an institutionalized administrative structure. In an undated Bukharan document from the Qūshbēgī chancellery, a group of local *bāys*, acting as spokesmen of the Qaltāq community of Burdaliq, petitioned the ruler to inform him about the death of Artīq Bēg Qarawulbēgī and that they were suffering due to suspension of the collection of the *kharāj-i sulṭānī*. At the same time, they presented his son Muḥammad Walī as a suitable candidate to carry on the affairs connected with *āqsaqālī* and ‘*amaldārī*’ (administrative performance).⁷⁷⁰ This is a case concerning the position of an *amlākdār*, who is usually described as a tax collector on crown land but here simultaneously acts also as an intermediary between a local group of villagers and perhaps the governor of the *wilāyat* of Burdaliq.

Compared to the narrative sources from the eighteenth century, suggesting the existence of a stratum of intermediaries between the rulers and local communities, the archival records from the former Qūshbēgī

⁷⁶⁷ Attached to this *amīnī* were one armful (*paykāl*) of grass (‘*alaf*’) per *ṭanāb*, each *paykāl* sufficient to feed eight cows, and ten *sir* (*sēr*?) of the grain, half in wheat and half in maize (*da sir-i ghalla-yi niṣf-i gandum niṣf-i jawārī*) (ibid., fol. 79b; Şifatgul, *Pazhūhishi*, 470).

⁷⁶⁸ At their request, the *amīr* sent the administrative heads of the *tūmān*, the *qāzī*, the *ra’īs*, the *mīrshab* and the *amlākdār* to carry out the canal project (‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 61; Aini, *Sands of Oxus*, 88).

⁷⁶⁹ Holzwarth, “Community Elders,” 218–19.

⁷⁷⁰ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 2.

chancellery, mainly rescripts of petitions (*arīzas*), give us a much clearer picture of typical tasks attached to this position at the village level. The petitions indicate that *āqsaqāls*, *amīns* and other local power brokers performed in different fields: first, they were the representatives of local communities (*jamā'a*; *ṭā'ifa*); second, acting on the interface between their communities and the government agents, many of them assisted the *amlākdārs* and *zakātchīs* in the collection of revenues;⁷⁷¹ and third, they were responsible for irrigation and the collective organization of small projects based on shared labor (*hashar*).⁷⁷² According to some of the fiscal records, particularly the *amīns* appear to have rendered assistance in collecting the *kharāj-i bahārī*, also called *kabūd barī*.⁷⁷³ In another document belonging to Bukharan fiscal records, we read about the procedure of tax collection in the *tūmān* of Kharqān Rūd north of the capital. Here an unknown *amlākdār* petitions the king about the collection of the *kharāj* on wheat and writes that prior to the tax collection, he gathered five elders (*kalān-shawanda*) to consult them about the procedure while serving a meal in the name of the ruling house.⁷⁷⁴ Apart from tax collection and supervision of irrigation matters, the term *amīn* applied to ordinary subjects as agents who were temporarily appointed, or rather, recognized by the *amīr* in order to mediate in local conflicts. According to a *mubārak-nāma* dating from 1292/1875–76, the inhabitants of Qūqān in Kāmāt sought the official recognition of a certain Mīrzā Bāy Muḥammad Sharīf as *amīn*. In this case, *amīnī* did not imply the collection of revenues and the supervision of irrigation matters but mediation in a local conflict. In this particular

⁷⁷¹ For the fiscal records of the Koshbegi archive see TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, dels. 589, 596, 598, 601, 606, 628 etc. In Iran, the *kadkhudās* were similarly responsible for revenue collection (see Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 167–68).

⁷⁷² On the organization of *hashars* in the *wilāyats* and *tūmāns* of Bukhara and the role of *āqsaqāls* and *amīns*, see TzGARUZ, f. I-16, op. 1, del. 16, docs. 31, 75; TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 976, docs. 6, 13, 24, 26; and TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 975, docs. 14, 16, 27, 34, 35, 36, 46, 57 etc.

⁷⁷³ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 596, docs. 4, 5. On the function of *amīns* and *āqsaqāls* in collecting the *kharāj*, see TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 589, docs. 13, 16, 17, 22 etc. The terms *kabūd barī* and *safīd barī*, literally meaning “blue- and white-bearing,” were used to refer to tax payments in kind. The terms differentiate between winter crops (*safīd barī*) and spring crops (*kabūd barī*) (McChesney, *Waqf*, 177–78; Abduraimov, *Voprosy*, 73).

⁷⁷⁴ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 589, doc. 17.

document, the people accuse a Yakhshī Bāy of having committed theft (*duzdī*) and caused trouble arising from insult due to concupiscence.⁷⁷⁵

The data gleaned from the petitions shows the *zakātchīs* and *amlākdārs* as middlemen between the local governor and the central administration on the one side, and the *āqsaqāls* and their clients on the other. For example, in one of the petitions dating from 1300/1882–83, an unnamed governor informs the central administration that “the *amlākdārs* of the province have collected the *kharāj-i wilāyat* from the subjects by employing beautiful language and promises of benevolence.”⁷⁷⁶

Looking at the range of materials, we can discern different contexts where local representatives were crucial for the maintenance of order:

1. Villages or hamlets (*mauza* ‘, *qarīya*, *dih*, *qishlāq*)⁷⁷⁷
2. Urban quarters and neighborhoods (*gudhar*)
3. Mosque communities (*jamā’a-yi masjid*)⁷⁷⁸
4. Tribes, sub-tribes and clans (*qabīla*, *qaum*, *ṭā’ifa*, *īl*, *ūrūgh*)⁷⁷⁹
5. Traders and craftsmen’s communities
6. Irrigation canals (*jū*, *nahr*)
7. Tax-collecting units (*amlāk*)
8. *qalandar-khānas*

The groups of people on whose behalf the elders acted are called *jamā’a*, a term that is applied to a range of contexts (various forms of communal

⁷⁷⁵ Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn, *Mubārak-nāmajāt*, doc. 101. For other cases of *amīnī* see *ibid.*, fols. 150, 185.

⁷⁷⁶ ... *amlākdārān-i wilāyat ham kharāj-i wilāyat-rā ba zabān-i khwush wa mawāsā az fuqarā chīda girifta āwarda* (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 589, doc. 1).

⁷⁷⁷ For a discussion of these terms and their different connotations in Iran in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see Gronke, *Derwische*, 206–09.

⁷⁷⁸ For example, the subjects belonging to the mosque of the *gudhar-i Shāh Malik* in Jūybār petitioned the king to get their new *āqsaqāl* Qulī Jān (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 17, doc. 2). In another letter, the people of the mosque of the *gudhar-i Ūtgūr Qūshbēgī* petitioned the *amīr* for the formal recognition of their new *āqsaqāl* Yusūf Bāy (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 17, doc. 3).

⁷⁷⁹ In one petition, the Tajik community of Kulāb requests the appointment of a new *āqsaqāl* because their previous leader ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Īshik-Āqābāshī was too old to perform his duties (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, doc. 18). In another letter, a group of Naymān in Żiyā al-Dīn asks for the appointment of a new *amīn* (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 8).

organizations like villages and mosque communities, bazaars, stakeholders of an irrigation canal, *qalandar-khānas*) irrespective of visible differences between them. These spheres, however, were not mutually exclusive but overlapped due to multiple affiliations linking the individual to more than one group or social setting. Depending on the context, we can identify local community spokesmen bearing diverse titles, such as *āqsaqāl*, *amīn*, *arbāb*, *mingbāshī*, *il-bēgī*, *aqālīq*, *bābā*, *mīr-i hazār* and so on.

ON THE SELECTION AND PERFORMANCE OF ĀQSAQĀLS

The following sections seek to explore the documents of the Koshbegi Archive, mostly undated rescripts of petitions addressed to the *amīr*. The results will be interpreted in light of the historical materials discussed in the previous sections and the knowledge we have gained so far of the political landscape in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Transoxania.

Concerned with the selection of *āqsaqāls*, we find an extensive stock of records kept in thirteen folders in the Koshbegi fonds. The folders contain more than one thousand copies of petitions (*‘arīza-hā*) on the appointment of local representatives, a number that reflects the importance of the positions on the one hand, and the significance of power relations linked to issues of eldership and representation on the other. Apart from those kept in folder twenty-four,⁷⁸⁰ the bulk of the documents is undated.

Since the huge amount of documents makes it impossible to take all of them into consideration, I randomly chose two hundred and twenty-nine for the investigation of patterns of *āqsaqāl* and *amīn* appointments. My selection criteria were the quality of the letters—the paper, script, legibility and so forth. Since some of the records consist of two or more petitions, I am actually dealing with more cases (altogether two hundred and twenty-five) from different localities than documents. One hundred and fifty-three petitions provide data on the installation of one hundred and sixty *āqsaqāls*, and sixty-nine documents pertain to the nomination of an equal number of

⁷⁸⁰ This folder contains rescripts of eleven petitions sent to the *qūshbēgī* with requests for the formal appointment of *āqsaqāls* and *amīns*. Although the folder description suggests that the documents date back to a period between 1310–33/1892–1914, not all of them are dated. The dated petitions can be traced to the years 1305/1887–88, 1310/1892–93, 1311/1893–94, 1317/1899–1900 and 1322/1904–05.

amīns.⁷⁸¹ The petitions, however, only provide data on the actual appointment process, not on the functions of elders as described in the previous two sections. Given the mass of records, I would like to present a brief statistical overview of the data, especially regarding the spatial distribution of cases and petitions. In doing so, I hope to create an understanding of the degree of administrative density and control exercised by the *amīr* and the central administration.

Spatial Distribution of Petitions on *āqsaqāl* and *amīn* Appointments

<i>Place of origin and issue of the petitions</i>	<i>Number of petitions on āqsaqāl appointments</i>	<i>Share in %</i>	<i>Number of petitions on amīn appointments</i>	<i>Share in %</i>
Bukhara City	46	28.8	–	–
Shumālī-yi Rūd	47	29.4	19	27.5
Janūbī-yi Rūd	6	3.8	6	8.7
Kharqān Rūd (Ghijduwān)	17	10.6	4	5.8
Kāmāt (Wābkent)	9	5.6	–	–
Shāfurkām	4	2.5	–	–
Sāmjan (Rāmītan)	2	1.3	4	5.8
Qarākūl	2	1.3	4	5.8
Khitfar (Zindanī)	–	–	2	2.9
Kam-i Abū Muslim	5	3.1	1	1.4

⁷⁸¹ Some of the documents cover two or more petitions, so the number of cases is actually higher than the number of documents.

Pīrmast	1	0.6	1	1.4
Khairabād	–	–	3	4.3
Provinces/Regions (<i>wilāyāt</i>)	18	11.3	17	24,6
Qarshī	8	5	1	1.4
Karmīna	3	1.9	3	4.3
Chahār Jū	–	–	3	4.3
Others	7 ⁷⁸²	4.4	10 ⁷⁸³	14.5
Not located/locatable	3	1.9	8	11.6
Total Sum of Petitions	160	100	69	100

This data is indicative of the administrative grip of the late Manghit rulers, which apparently did not extend very far beyond the capital and the surrounding oasis.⁷⁸⁴ Despite the folder descriptions in the catalogue of fonds I-126, opis 1, referring to petitions that request the appointment of both *āqsaqāls* and *amīns* in the provinces and districts of Bukhara, we have more records on *āqsaqāl* appointments than on the installation of new *amīns*. Moreover, it is glaringly obvious that the bulk of the documents (87 percent) come from Bukhara and villages in its immediate surroundings in the

⁷⁸² The rest of the petitions requesting the formal recognition of *āqsaqāls* were sent from Žiyā al-Dīn (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 1), Burdaliq (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 2), Shahr-i Sabz (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 27), Khuzār (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 29), Kulāb (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, doc. 18), Yakka Bāgh (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, doc. 19), and Yangī Qūrghān (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 22, doc. 51).

⁷⁸³ The *amīn* petitions from the *wilāyāts* originate from Žiyā al-Dīn (TzGARUz, f. I-15, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 8), Shahr-i Sabz (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, doc. 4), Yangī Qūrghān (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 21), Nūr (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, doc. 40) etc.

⁷⁸⁴ According to Holdsworth, Bukhara and its vicinity constituted a special administrative unit under the *qūshbēgī* (Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 9).

catchments of the lower Zarafshān.⁷⁸⁵ And even within the double oasis of Bukhara-Qarākūl, we observe a very uneven spread of records as the major flow of petitions comes from the capital and the densely populated Shumālī-yi Rūd *tūmān*.⁷⁸⁶ With only 10.6 percent of the *āqsqaqāl* petitions from within the oasis, Kharqān Rūd, the *tūmān* that was administratively organized around the town of Ghijduwān and the Kharqān Rūd Canal,⁷⁸⁷ follows way behind. The same holds true for the *amīn* petitions, approximately sixty-eight of which originate from the Bukharan oasis. This implies that the *amīr* and his bureaucracy only exercised a certain degree of control over the appointment process in Bukhara and Shumālī-yi Rūd, and to a much lesser extent in Kharqān Rūd and other areas, where the population turned either to the *raʿīs* or other officials. However, this unequal coverage does not necessarily mean that other *tūmāns* were ignored. A collection of *mubārak-nāmas* issued by Muẓaffar al-Dīn and exclusively addressed to the *qāẓī* of Kāmāt shows a great interest in the affairs of other *tūmāns* as well.⁷⁸⁸

Although petitions on appointments of village representatives, formal requests and fiscal records from the provinces are also among the archival material, they seem to have trickled in much fewer numbers and almost randomly to the capital.⁷⁸⁹ This shows that Bukhara's control over the appointment procedure was rather nominal and held in the capital only. At least some of the administrative routines outside the capital and Qarshī were not solely regulated and controlled by the center. In view of this, it seems plausible to assume relatively weak direct control as well as a marked

⁷⁸⁵ In former times, Bukhara and Qarākūl were two distinct provinces. Together, they formed the lower end of the irrigation system of the Zarafshān Valley. Referring to the documents of the Jūybārī sheikhs of the sixteenth century, Schwarz states that Bukhara was further subdivided into districts (*tūmāns*) named after the major irrigation canals: Rūd-i Shahr, Kāmāt (Wābkent), Sultānābād, Ghijduwān (Kharqān Rūd), Shāfurkām, Sāmjan, Kām-i Abū Muslim and Tārāb (Schwarz, "Bukhara and Its Hinterland," 82). See also chapter Historical Overview/The City of Bukhara.

⁷⁸⁶ According to the registers of villages, Shumālī-yi Rūd consisted of more than 350 villages (Muhammadzhanov, *Nasellennye Punkty*, 187–90).

⁷⁸⁷ Located at a distance of six *farsakh* (36 km) from Bukhara, Ghijduwān was credited for its great commercial importance. Its surroundings are irrigated by the Kharqān Rūd Canal (Barthold, *Turkestan*, 119–20).

⁷⁸⁸ See Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn, *Mubārak-nāmajāt*.

⁷⁸⁹ It is also possible that some of the petitions originating from the provinces got lost, either on their way to Bukhara or later when the chancellery was dissolved and removed to Tashkent.

contrast between the capital and its hinterland. Among the provinces, only Qarshī, the seat of the heir apparent, and a few other spots appear as exceptions.⁷⁹⁰

This lack of administrative control is also mirrored by some of the registers' listing of names of rural settlements and their respective spokesmen. Differing in length and scope, these lists do not have any standardized form. While, for example, the first list alludes to eleven villages and hamlets with a varying number of greybeards,⁷⁹¹ another much more extensive register gives an overview of villages in a cluster of *amlāks*, including the name of the respective *amlākdār* and all the *amīns* and *āqsaqāls*. For instance, a certain Muqīm Mīrākhūr assigns the names of elders to villages in his *amlāk* Shāhābād,⁷⁹² like 'Abd al-Raḥīm Amīn for Shāhābād, Āla Shukūr Āqsaqāl for Dahiya-yi Qashqar and so on. Mullā Daulat Tūqsāba, the *amlākdār* in Kām-i Mīgh,⁷⁹³ assigns tribal names to some of his interlocutors, for example, Khwājā Birdī Āqsaqāl Kīlajī or Jūra Āqsaqāl Yābū.⁷⁹⁴ A third list gives the names of localities, *āqsaqāls*, *il-bēgīs*, *mīr-i hazārs* and others in Qarshī.⁷⁹⁵ Although the registers give a good overview that is helpful for mapping the local order in an alternative way, they were not compiled systematically and are therefore far from being complete. The lists show parts of networks and groups of people, with tax farmers or tax collectors at the top and village headmen occupying a twofold position as clients of the *amlākdār* and patrons of tenants in the villages. With this, the registers mirror local figurations of power and mutual dependences at a personal level.

But let me turn now to the actual appointment of *āqsaqāls* and *amīns* by quoting one of the petitions:

⁷⁹⁰ According to Holdsworth, Bukhara and its environs formed a special administrative unit under the *qūshbēgī*, whose administrative grip was tighter here than elsewhere in the Emirate (Holdsworth, *Turkestan*, 9).

⁷⁹¹ While there were three *āqsaqāls* (Būta Bāy, Qurbān Bāy and 'Abd al-Raḥīm 'Arab) registered for the village of Badādan, the mosque of the *mauzī*'-i Chūp-furūshān (wood sellers) had eight representatives (Yūldāsh Bāy, Bābā Rāfi', 'Abd al-Wāḥid, 'Abd al-Ghafār, 'Abd al-Jabbār, Bābā Faṣīl, Muḥammad Sharīf Āqsaqāl and Mullā Faṭḥullah Imām (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 50, doc. 3).

⁷⁹² The *amlāk* of Shāhābād was located near Khaṭarchī in Miyānkāl (Muhammadzhanov, *Naseleanye Punkty*, 14).

⁷⁹³ Kām-i Mīgh was located near Karmīna (ibid., 70).

⁷⁹⁴ See TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 50, doc. 4.

⁷⁹⁵ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 51, doc. 1.

“To His Majesty, My Master, may God the Sublime save him!

Petitioning with servitude, this loyal and sincere servant striving to please, Mullā Mīr Badr al-Dīn Ṣadr-Raʿīs, turning with immense infirmity and humility towards the obsequiousness and respect demanding throne of the caliphate of My Sayyid and My Master, may it reach the degree of acceptance:

My Lord, being kind to servants, the subjects of the village of Fūlādī near Shahr-i Islām in the *tūmān* of Shumālī-yi Rūd had explained to Your Exalted Majesty that our *āqsaqāl* Qurbān Bāy [has passed away (*fautīda*) and we suffer] from suspension of our affairs (*muʿtallī mīkashīm*). It has been certified that another person of integrity (*ādam-i ba-ṣalāḥ*) shall be distinguished at the wish of the community (*jamāʿa*). Therefore, a blessed *mubāarak-nāma* was issued by My Lord, with the order to see if this is the case, to find out their will and to report. Having kissed the high *tabarruk-nāma*, this loyal servant rubbed it on my eyes and enquired in compliance with the sublime order. ‘Asylum of the World,’ indeed, Qurbān Bāy the *āqsaqāl* of the aforementioned place has died. Wanting Fāzil Khwāja—a serving man of integrity and able to perform—instead of him as their *āqsaqāl*, the subjects of the aforementioned village hope for a blessed diploma and infinitely prayed for My Master!

This loyal servant has taken the prayer for His Majesty, My Lord, I have reported with servitude out of humility and loyalty. May the ensign of his high and eternal favor extend and increase. The deficient, deficient, deficient ...⁷⁹⁶

In this letter, the ruler is directly addressed by a government official, the *ṣadr-raʿīs* Mullā Mīr Badr al-Dīn, who acts as the petition sender. Since he notifies the *amīr* that the people of Fūlādī have already reported the problem to him, this is probably the second petition from those villagers who were trying to find a solution to their dilemma. It is best expressed by the phrase “we are suffering from a suspension” (*muʿtallī mīkashīm*). The petition can be divided into two sections: the first is the introduction, summarizing the matter and what had hitherto happened, and ends with confirmation of the reception of the royal *mubāarak-nāma*.⁷⁹⁷ Then Mīr Badr al-Dīn presents the candidate in the name of the villagers, in this case a person who is characterized as a man of integrity (*ba-ṣalāḥ*). Simultaneously, the subjects express their hope for a diploma (*manshūr*).

⁷⁹⁶ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, doc. 13.

⁷⁹⁷ With the *mubāarak-nāmas* (lit. auspicious letters) the king replied to requests of his officials by giving orders and instructions (Semenov, “Ocherk ustrojstva tzentralʹnogo administrativnogo upravlenija,” 25). In some cases, the recipients mention that they made it the crown of their head (*tāj-i sar karda*) (see TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, docs. 47, 91; I-126, op. 1, del. 22, doc. 58). This means that they affixed the *mubāarak-nāma* to their turbans and went with it to the applicant villages.

Of course, the historian exploring the documents will identify a lot more reasons leading to the installation of new village heads. One of the most common causes is inattentiveness and neglect of duty (*musāhala-kārī* or *bī-parwā ī*). This is best revealed by the following letter:

“To His Majesty, My Master and My Lord, may God the Sublime save him.

Presented by this loyal servitor [belonging to] the lowest sincere preachers striving to please, Qāzī Mullā Mīr Sirāj al-Dīn Šudūr hoping for acceptance and benevolence [...] to His Exalted Majesty, My Lord and My Master, the ‘Asylum of the World.’

I confirm to My Sublime Master: That Niyāz Bāy, Murād Bāy, Hamrāh Bāy, Mardān Bāy, Quldāsh Bāy, Yuldāsh Bāy, Īkim Bīrdī, ‘Awāz Bāy and other subjects of the village of Bīsh Du‘ā located in the *tūmān* of Kharqān Rūd petitioned His Elevated Majesty that we have an elder by the name of Khwāja Bāy who is thoughtless and careless (*bī-parwa wa musahala-kār*), a deceiver and betrayer (*ghadr wa khiyānat-kunanda*). Having betrayed the subjects, he caused harm (*ba fuqarāyān jirr karda zarar mīrasānd*). Hoping that at the request of the community a man of integrity (*ādam-i ba šalāh*) shall be elevated as *āqsaqāl*, they have said they will perform the prayer. Therefore a revered *tabarruk-nāma* has been addressed to this loyal [servant] with the instruction to look if this is the case, to make inquiries, to find out and to report the wish of the community. This loyal servant has kissed the *mubārak-nāma* of the sublime King, rubbed it on my eyes and made it the crown of my head.

I have summoned big and the little people from the aforementioned village in accordance with the obedience demanding order of My Lord and asked their will. They prayed for His Exalted Majesty and said that Bāzār Bāy is a man of integrity (*ādam-i ba šalāh*), he is humble and able to perform (*bīchāra-yi uhdā-barā*). We want him to be our whitebeard, and, hoping he will become distinguished by the high favor and a sublime *manshūr*, perform the prayer.

This servant striving to please has taken the prayer for His Exalted Majesty from all [of them]. They performed the prayer; their wish became clear to My Master. I have reported out of servility and invocation of a blessing. May the shadow of his grace shine on the heads of the hopeful.”⁷⁹⁸

This petition from a settlement in Kharqān Rūd implies the bad performance of the old village *āqsaqāl*, who is blamed for being a betrayer. But although he has caused much harm to his former clients, we actually learn nothing about his misdemeanors and what had happened in the village. Unfortunately, one looks in vain for an explanation in the second part of the letter, where Qāzī Mullā Mīr Sirāj al-Dīn does not make any attempt to clarify the problem in spite of being ordered to make inquiries. The rest of

⁷⁹⁸ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 18, doc. 25.

the document follows the routine described for the first petition: a *mubārak-nāma* is issued to the petition sender; he visits the applicant village and confirms the candidate of the community, who is characterized by integrity (*ṣalāḥiyat*), humbleness (*bīchāragī*) and the ability to perform as village chief (*‘uhda-barā’ī*).

A comparison of all the petitions shows three or more factors leading to the appointment of new whitebeards:

1. the old *āqsaqāl* has passed away (*fautīda*);
2. the village head has been guilty of inattentiveness (*musāhala-kārī* or *bī-parwa’ī*);
3. the *āqsaqāl* could step down from his position voluntarily, an act that is usually described with the verb *salb namūdan* (lit. to spoil something);⁷⁹⁹
4. other, albeit not clearly defined reasons are stated to have caused the appointment.

Given the numerical richness of my material, it is possible to employ statistical methods in order to give an overview of the frequency of factors causing a village to petition the ruler. The figures presented below show that while most of the *āqsaqāls* died “in office,” a considerable number of them were blamed for inattentiveness. In light of the prestige of the position, it is hardly surprising that only a few of the village representatives responded to the will of the local communities by giving up their *āqsaqālī* more or less voluntarily. The following list shows the pattern of *āqsaqāl* and *amīn* appointments including the reasons for the new appointments:

⁷⁹⁹ This term is most commonly used to indicate that the old *āqsaqāl* had given up his position voluntarily or because of some pressure exerted by the populace. In one case, an *amīn* from the upper part of the Kharqān Rūd was guilty of neglect of duty and betrayal (*khiyānat*). On the arrival of government agents he willingly performed the prayer for the *amīr* and made room (*amīnī-yi khwud-rā ba rizā wa righbat salb namūd*) for the new candidate (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, doc. 48). The same happened in a case reported from Shumālī-yi Rūd, where a certain Mullā Hāmid was accused of inattentiveness and stepped down after the arrival of government officials (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, doc. 49).

Pattern of *āqsaqāl* Appointments

Death (<i>fautīda</i> / فوتیده)	Carelessness (<i>musāhala- kāri/bī-parwā'ī</i> — مساهله کاری و (بی پروائی)	Resignation (‘position spoiled’ (<i>salb namūda</i> — سلب (نموده)	No <i>āqsaqāl</i> selected	Other reasons
64 cases 40%	36 cases 22.5%	21 cases 13.1%	22 cases 13.8%	17 cases 10.6%

Pattern of *amīn* Appointments

Death (<i>fautīda</i> / فوتیده)	Carelessness (<i>musāhala- kāri/bī-parwā'ī</i> — مساهله کاری و (بی پروائی)	Resignation (‘position spoiled’ (<i>salb namūda</i> — سلب (نموده)	No <i>amīn</i> selected	Other Reasons
18 cases 26.1%	24 cases 34.8%	9 cases 13.1%	7 cases 10.1%	11 cases 15.9%

The comparison with the documents on *āqsaqāl* appointments shows a reverse pattern with many more *amīns* guilty of carelessness, whereas other causes such as decease or voluntary resignation played a less significant role. The figures given here in a condensed form admittedly present a simplified and rather incomplete picture, with clear-cut categories and reasons for new appointments that hardly reflect the reality. On the one hand, the petitions give little insight into the political process and decision making on the ground. But on the other, they provide a database sufficient to draw conclusions about the verification procedure and administrative routines in the late Bukharan Emirate, including all persons and intermediate steps involved. In addition, the tone of the petitions echoes the urgent need for an *āqsaqāl* and a royal diploma. Without a spokesman community life was barely able to continue. The villagers ordered their internal affairs through an *āqsaqāl* or *amīn*, so a vacant position could cause confusion and even the feeling of helplessness.⁸⁰⁰ In addition to the formal procedure of writing and

⁸⁰⁰ In a petition from Qara Hājī in Qarākūl, the inhabitants state that they were humble or helpless (*mā bīchāra hastīm*) without an *amīn* (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, doc. 45).

sending petitions, we also gain a deeper understanding of how a suitable candidate had to be presented to the government. Another phenomenon apparent to the historian is the fact that neither the ruler nor the central administration in the capital had any say in appointing an *āqsaqāl*, let alone dictating the choice to the villagers. In one of the records, a certain Mullā ‘Ināyatullah Khwāja Ra’īs reports that Jāndar, the *mīrzā* of the *qāzī kalān*, visited the catchment area of the Khairābād Canal to make inquiries regarding the *amīn* position of a certain Arbāb Jūra. When Jāndar Mīrzā asked questions among the people, five hundred of them, fearing the removal of their *amīn*, gathered and went to the *qāzī kalān*. Arriving at his office, they stated that they had never experienced any betrayal or treachery by their *amīn*! In the same breath they asked him why he wanted to install another *amīn* for the Panj Jū Canal. They had always chosen their *amīn* and if any other person should be named instead, this would cause harm! There were twenty-five villages and hamlets, the surroundings of which had fallen dry (in former times). Their *amīn*, Jūra, had initiated the digging and construction of the five side canals and if somebody else should be appointed, the water would not be distributed in the right way. In that case, they would go and petition the *amīr* directly. After listening to the outraged crowd of people, the *qāzī kalān* even apologized to them for his overhasty attempt to install a new elder. Asking for pardon, he said that he did not know their arrangements.⁸⁰¹

In the *mubārak-nāmas* the king explicitly ordered the officials to find out and report the wish of the subjects.⁸⁰² In many cases they were issued in response to a first petition from the *tūmān* official who wrote in the name of the applicants. But these letters represent only one piece in the overall puzzle of village affairs and their contents often show the same lack of information as the ‘*arīzas*.⁸⁰³ There was not a single case where the government agent rejected the candidate of the populace. Sometimes the king issued an additional *mubārak-nāma* addressed to his officials, confirming the

⁸⁰¹ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 18, doc. 80.

⁸⁰² Orders to find out the truth and report were also issued with respect to other subjects (see Amīr Muẓaffār al-Dīn, *Mubārak-nāmajāt*).

⁸⁰³ Regarding the appointment of elders, the *mubārak-nāmas* are characterized by the same dearth of information as the petitions. In many cases they only repeat the content of the ‘*arīzas* (Amīr Muẓaffār al-Dīn, *Mubārak-nāmajāt*, docs. 108, 146, 186).

appointment of the candidate they had verified.⁸⁰⁴ Despite the obvious need for a royal diploma signaling the validity of the process and confirmation of a candidate from above, the choice was made locally. In most cases, the political process in the villages, craftsmen's communities and *gudhars* was already finished when the government agents came with a *mubārak-nāma* and the order to investigate the matter. Upon the arrival of the officials, most of the applicant villages or groups of people presented their new whitebeards, who were confirmed by the administrators in due course. Thus the king actually affirmed the choice of representatives rather than appointing village officials. The analysis of the *amīn* appointments shows a similar pattern. Here it was the water-using subjects (*fuqarāyān-i ābkhwur*) turning to the government with the request.⁸⁰⁵ The *amīn* petitions differ from the *āqsaqāl* appointments insofar as they mention the name of the canal or the canal system,⁸⁰⁶ or the location of the *amlāk*.⁸⁰⁷ In addition, we often find details about the payment of the *amīns* in kind.⁸⁰⁸ In any case, the diploma requested by the petitioner was only the final step in a chain of paperwork, petitions and *mubārak-nāmas* and *manshūrs*. I surmise that the latter were kept by the *āqsaqāls* and *amīns* but lost their validity as soon as the rank holders died or were dismissed for other reasons. Looking at the *amīn*

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid., doc. 84. In this document the *amīr* states, "I have conferred the *āqsaqālī* of the Rīwadī Canal in Kāmāt on the person you mentioned" (*āqsaqālī-yi jū-yi Rīwadī-yi Kāmāt-rā ba ādam-i 'arż-kardagī-yi tān mihrabānī namūdīm*).

⁸⁰⁵ In one case, a number of local *arbābs*—assistants of the *amīn*—came and complained about the carelessness and betrayal by their *amīn* (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, doc. 48).

⁸⁰⁶ One of the *amīn* petitions names a canal system called Shānzdah Hazār Nahr (lit. Sixteen Thousand Canals) in the *tūmān* of Khitfār with the following settlements: Kūfang, Takhna, Asb-i ... (?), Qīrghīz, Nau Bahār, Ūzbek-i Šarāf, Kushk-i A'lā, Kushk-i Rasūl, Til-i Šarāf, Hawā'ī, Qūrghān Tippa, Ūdanī, Dīḥa-yi Humrī, Dīḥa-yi Mābak and Bālīn (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 17, doc. 75).

⁸⁰⁷ One petition originated from the *amlāk-i Bālā-yi Hazāra* near Karmīna (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 20), another mentions the canal of the *amlāk* of Chūlī wa Turkistān in Karmīna, where the petitioner was the *amlākdār* Aḥmad Bēg (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, doc. 10).

⁸⁰⁸ In fact, the service of the *amīns* and *āqsaqāls* was organized on the basis of reciprocity. Depending on the size of the communities and the length of the canals, the income of an *amīn* in the form of a share of the harvest could vary. In the documents I investigated, their share varied between eight *man* and twenty *man* of grain (see TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, docs. 7, 11; TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, doc. 13).

petitions, one is struck by the high number of cases (around 35%) blaming the position holder for neglect and carelessness.

Thus far, the petitions convey a rather smooth and simple picture without providing much substantial information regarding the events and negotiations in the villages. However, a second and more careful look at some of the records makes it evident that the patterns of appointment juxtaposed in the chart are far less stable or static than assumed at first glance. Particularly the categories “neglect of duty” or inattentiveness (*musāhala-kārī*; *bī-parwā’ī*) and “stepped down” or “spoiled his position” (*salb namūda*) appear difficult to grasp. In some cases, the petitioners attribute the voluntary relinquishing of responsibilities to inability. For instance, a certain Qurbān Bāy was not able to carry out the *amīn* tasks for the Kajkash Canal in Janūbī-yī Rūd and stepped down voluntarily upon the arrival of Mīr Badr al-Dīn Ṣadr-Ra’īs.⁸⁰⁹

In other cases the resignation is explained by old age (*pīr shuda*) and the excessive demands the position entailed. According to a petition from Kāsān near Qarshī, Bābā Kalān Āqsaqāl had become too old to perform as village head. Due to the corresponding suspension of their affairs, the people of Kūh-Turkān-i Kāsān were very worried. In the second part of the letter, the petitioners Muḥammad Akram Bī Dādkhwāh and Qāzī Mullā Muḥammad Baqā Khwāja confirm the neglect of duty (*musāhala-kārī*) by the old *āqsaqāl*.⁸¹⁰ In another letter sent from Bīshkent in the same province, Muqīm Āqsaqāl is said to have given up his position because of his age and illness.⁸¹¹ Reporting to the *amīr* in order to request the confirmation of a new whitebeard, the Tājiks of Kulāb go even further and attribute the inattentiveness of their leader ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Īshik-Āqābāshī to his great age.⁸¹²

In many other cases, the petitions explain the inattentiveness of *āqsaqāls* and *amīns* in terms of more serious misdemeanors like betrayal, and the persons accused are commonly portrayed as traitors (*ghadr wa khiyānat*

⁸⁰⁹ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, doc. 1. A similar case is reported from the Jū-yī Yābān in the same district, where Arbāb Badī’ “spoiled his *amīn* position” due to his inability (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, doc. 33).

⁸¹⁰ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 3.

⁸¹¹ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 7.

⁸¹² TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, doc. 18.

kunanda).⁸¹³ For example, the water users of an unnamed canal blame their *amīn* ‘Abd al-Fatāḥ for being a betrayer. Later the government official confirmed that he was guilty of betrayal with respect to the canal water.⁸¹⁴ In yet another case, the villagers of Rabātak in Kāmāt accuse their greybeard Ḥātām Bāy of betrayal by characterizing him as a careless traitor and seducer. Sometimes the people state that the *āqsaqāl* or *amīn* caused immense disquietude and annoyance (*tashwīsh dāda*).⁸¹⁵ But apart from all these descriptions, the student of local conditions of authority is unlikely to fathom the void of information left by these documents.

SUMMARY

In the previous section I discussed the position of local representatives, who are mostly called whitebeards (*āqsaqāls*) in the sources. Irrespective of the range of other terms like *mīr-i hazār*, *amīn*, *īl-bēgī* and so on, most of them represented local communities vis-à-vis the outside world. In this capacity, they were in close contact with upper-level government agents and even the governors. One can also describe the *āqsaqāls* and local *bāys* as clients of those officials. Sometimes they may have been big landlords or were linked to them.

Most of the secondary sources confirm this state of knowledge, and the Russian literature in particular looks on the local arena through a state-centric prism. This goes hand in hand with the tendency to view local elders as state agents acting within territorially defined constituencies, as indicated by terms like *begstvo* and *aksakalstvo*. Yet the narrative sources and the correspondence of the Bukharan *amīrs* show that until the first half of the nineteenth century, the term *āqsaqāl* was a very fluid one. In the eighteenth century, *āqsaqālī* was also ascribed to high-ranking Uzbek chiefs. This overlapping of the terminology can be attributed to a phase of the overall institutionalization process, allowing for further division of labor but not for a distinction of roles and tasks in various social environments. Although the institutionalization of Manghit power picked up momentum under Shāh

⁸¹³ See TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, docs. 51, 55, 67; TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 17, docs. 71, 79; TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 18, doc. 25 passim.

⁸¹⁴ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 17, doc. 71.

⁸¹⁵ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, docs. 48, 55; TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 17, doc. 75; TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, doc. 3; TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 22, doc. 58.

Murād and Amīr Ḥaidar, a fact that was mirrored by a more sophisticated administrative apparatus, the royal correspondence still shows role ambiguities. Pointing to the nexus of patronage and allegiance, military commanders were several times termed *āqsaqāls*. Provincial governors can perhaps also be described as intermediaries.

From the 1870s onward, the contact with the Russians and the establishment of the protectorate led to the emergence of a nascent Bukharan state. We see how the administration, aiming to control even the appointment of village headmen in certain parts of its territory, became more sophisticated. But at the same time, the flow of *‘arīzas* to the Qūshbēgī chancellery also veils the administrative gap between the capital and its hinterland and the autonomy local communities still enjoyed. The relatively meager information provided by these records is to be attributed to negotiation processes at village level and the fact that information was deliberately filtered by the rural elites and petition writers. Furthermore, the petitions silenced the voice of the ordinary peasants and increased their feeling of being institutionally encircled. However, this lack of information in the records may also be seen as a sign of the petition writers’ wish not to bother the chancellery with too many details. Besides, the petitions mirror a certain language of power. The acts described, such as “I kissed the royal *mubārak-nāma*, rubbed it on my eyes and made it the crown of my head,” depict body techniques that were not carried out in front of the ruler in person or another social superior. The report of the officials that they treated the documents with respect implies a high degree of depersonalization of Manghit authority. The dynast no longer needed to enforce his rules and orders personally, he had a bureaucratic staff for that purpose.

Viewed in isolation, the petitions raise more questions than they answer. The social historian is struck by the interchangeable criteria for the assessment of old village headmen and the respective candidates. Except in cases of death or voluntary resignation, we always see a contrast between humble and capable individuals (*ādamhā-yi bī-chāra wa ‘uhda-barā*) of integrity (*ba-ṣalāḥiyat*) and neglectful elders (*ādamhā-yi bī-parwā wa musāhala-kār*). These catchphrases were obviously code words needed to write a proper petition and to present the candidates correctly according to the rules of etiquette. But no further information is given and we do not learn what really happened in the villages. In the following sections I aim to explore the Bukharan petition system as an inclusive element of social order(s) in Transoxania. Therefore I will use additional petitions, the memories of Ṣadr al-Dīn ‘Ainī, and secondary sources that help shed light on

the social dynamics in Bukharan villages and the various ways local elites conducted politics.

MAKING SENSE OF THE PETITION SYSTEM

In the following sections I will analyze a broader sample of documents, *‘arīzas* and *mubārak-nāmas* in order to shed light on the petition system. Here I am particularly interested in offering explanations for the term *musāhala-kārī*, which has hitherto remained rather an empty shell. By paying attention to documents that furnish data on the collection of taxes, irrigation and the settlement of local conflicts, I hope to fill the void of information left by the petitions on the appointment of village heads.

Embezzlement of Resources and Taxes

Some of the petitions provide information on embezzlement as a major reason behind the confusing terms inattentiveness and betrayal. According to a letter from Narshakh-i Pāyān in Kāmāt, the village headman Sayyid Niyāz was a glib and tart-tongued man, who for no reason molested and insulted the villagers. Moreover, he had also embezzled the donations given by the people in cash for the mosque instead of spending the money on behalf of the mosque community. Subsequently, Mullā Mīr Sirāj al-Dīn Šudūr was instructed to make inquiries, to calculate and confiscate the embezzled sum in order to return it so that it could be used for the mosque. In a second step, he also reported on the new candidate of the people.⁸¹⁶ With this petition, we have a concrete case of misdemeanor committed by an *āqsaqāl* who was then removed from his position.

There is much evidence in the primary sources as well as in the secondary literature that embezzlement and “bribery,” going hand in hand with the asymmetric exchange and clientelistic behavior, were endemic in the Bukharan Emirate. A case in point that I have already mentioned was Daulān Bī, the governor of Dū Āba north of Shahr-i Sabz, who was finally driven out by the population who had turned to the Kīnakās for help.⁸¹⁷ In one of the fiscal records of the chancellery, there is a petition sent by ‘Abd al-Karīm Bēg Tūqsāba, the governor of an unnamed province, about the

⁸¹⁶ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, doc. 91.

⁸¹⁷ See section The Ideal Patron versus the ‘Bad’ Patron in this chapter.

collection of the *kharāj* amounting to eighty-nine *man* of grain and the *kaḥṣan* of four hundred and sixty *tanga*, making altogether a sum of 3,069 *tanga*.⁸¹⁸ When investigating the matter, he asked Mīrzā Kāmil Qarāwulbēgī, probably an *amlākdār*, about the taxes collected and found out that the latter only obtained half the amount of grain, so the actual sum to be delivered to the treasury was less than half of the initial value. The governor also admitted that when he swooned the *āqsaqāls* and *amīns* in all likelihood purloined a part of the *kaḥṣan* and the *kharāj* on the instructions of the *qarāwulbēgī*, who suggested reporting the difference to the government. Later, at the inspection by a government official and ‘Abd al-Karīm Bēg, it was decided that if the difference in the tax amount was to be attributed to the governor, he should be held accountable, otherwise the *amīns* and *āqsaqāls* would have to justify the loss.⁸¹⁹

⁸¹⁸ In Bukhara, the *kharāj* was collected in kind by the *amlākdār* and his assistants who stored the grain (wheat, barley etc.), probably in large earthenware vessels, and later converted the crop into money by selling it in local bazaars long after the harvest, at a time when it was likely to yield the highest possible price. For the governors and *amlākdārs*, who were not only under pressure to meet the burdensome tax demands of the central administration but also had to feed their own clients, it would have made little sense to put the crop into circulation right after the harvest when prices were low due to the agricultural surplus (for this information I have to thank Jürgen Paul, with whom I discussed some of my results during a conference in Halle in December 2009 and who drew my attention to this procedure). In one of the documents, we read about the *amlākdār-khāna* with storage facilities for grain (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 589, doc. 66). Among the fiscal records of the Qūshbēgī chancellery I found a number of partly dated documents informing about the transfer of large sums of money (called *pūl-i ghalla-yi kabūd barī*) to the treasury after the collection of the *kabūd-bahārī* (*kharāj-i bahārī*) in kind (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 596, docs. 1, 8; TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 589, docs. 4, 6, 9, 10, 30, 40, 42, 51). In some of the records, the *amlākdārs* also give the current market price for the taxed crops. Two documents are receipts for harvest crops sold at the actual market price, like cotton (130 *tanga* per *man*)—11,050 *tanga* for 85 *man* of cotton collected, or barley (45.8 *tanga* per *man*)—13,750 *tanga* for 300 *man* (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 596, doc. 4). Another document lists wheat (87 *tanga* per *man*)—69,600 *tanga* for 800 *man*, barley (47 *tanga* per *man*)—14,100 *tanga* for 300 *man* etc. (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 596, doc. 7).

⁸¹⁹ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 609, doc. 1. Cases of embezzlement and even theft of grain are frequently reported. In a *mubārak-nāma* issued to the *qāzī* of Kāmāt in 1292/1875–76, we are informed about a certain Jūrā Bāy, one of the inhabitants of the village (*qishlāq*) of Badr al-Dīn, who stole corn and cotton pods together with a group of other people (Amīr Muzaḥḥar al-Dīn, *Mubārak-nāmajāt*, doc. 72).

Other documents deal exclusively with the transgressions and misdemeanors of *amlākdārs* or their assistants. For example, a certain Mīrzā Muḥammad Qarāwulbēgī reports about the refusal of *amīns* to deliver the exact amount of money obtained after selling the *kharāj-i sultānī*; for instance, Murtaẓā Amīn was said to owe him seven thousand *tanga*, Khudāy Birdī and Ḥasan Bāy refused to pay four thousand *tanga*, and were accused of “deceitfulness” (*ighwā’-garī*). In addition, Bēg Nazar, Khudāy Barakān and Muḥammad Bāy from Qarākūl were said to have committed the same misdemeanor and caused harm (*ẓarar*) but also confusion and trouble among the subjects (*ba fuqarāyān tashwīsh dāda*). The *amlākdār* immediately demanded the punishment of the troublemakers to satisfy the subjects and to save them from further damage.⁸²⁰

With regard to the tasks and duties of local middlemen, many conflicts can be attributed to their role characteristics, but also to the institutionalization processes as such. Positioned between the *amlākdārs* and the villagers, the *amīns* and *āqsaqāls* had to balance the interests and demands of both their clients on the one side and the *amlākdārs* on the other by assessing the amount of the harvest and fixing the tax rate with the consent of all, the peasants and the *amlākdārs*.⁸²¹ While the latter were interested in getting the highest possible share, Bukharan village headmen often acted on behalf of the peasants and fixed the share at a much lower level. In the ideal case, the *āqsaqāls* and the *amlākdār* agreed on a tolerable average,⁸²² otherwise conflicts were inevitable. For example, in one of the petitions an unknown chief judge reports having investigated a local dispute revolving around Āstān Bāy and his colleague Muḥammad Raḥīm, who were blamed for having acted with disgrace (*bī-ḥurmatī*) toward their *amlākdār*.⁸²³

The peasants often expected their representatives to constantly state lower harvest amounts and to clandestinely hide parts of their harvest in pits to prevent increasing taxation.⁸²⁴ These problems were well known from the past, but there are no signs that the authorities were willing to prevent

⁸²⁰ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 759, doc. 56.

⁸²¹ According to Morrison, in Russian Turkistan “in many cases the *amlākdārs* and their assistants ... were taking a much larger share of the harvest for themselves than was reaching the treasury” (Morrison, “Amlākdārs,” 41).

⁸²² Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal’no-feodal’nye otnoshenija*, 58.

⁸²³ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 759, doc. 54.

⁸²⁴ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal’no-feodal’nye otnoshenija*, 109; Fragner, “Social and Economic Affairs,” 495.

embezzlement. When in 1680 Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī Yūz granted land near Ūrā Tippa to Khwāja Mūsā Khwājam, he reminded local elders not to embezzle and hide any of the harvest.⁸²⁵ Since a share of the harvest was allotted to the village chiefs, it was in their interest to push the amount to be taxed to a level such that the peasants were satisfied and their own share was sufficient to meet their personal and their clients' requirements.⁸²⁶ In view of the fact that they were likely to be caught in the crossfire, either when they were unable to respond to the needs of the villagers or when they did not collect the amount demanded by the *amlākdār*, it is imaginable that the tasks of village *āqsaqāls* were far less easy than is usually described in the secondary literature. In other cases, influential villagers often came to an agreement over the heads of the elders. In one case, the government official Mīrza Muḥammadī Mīrākhūr petitioned the central administration, reporting that during the collection of the *kabūd barī* in Shāfurkām and Wābkent (Kāmāt), some of the inhabitants of Qishlāq, deceivers like Ni'mat, Muḥammad 'Alī, 'Abd al-Qayyūm, 'Awaz Bābā and others prevented the tax collection and insulted the local *amīns*. Furthermore, they persuaded other subjects to cede a share of their harvest to them so that they could lower the tax rate for all the villagers and pocket the surplus. According to the petition, the same had happened in the previous year.⁸²⁷

In another case reported from Bālīn in Kāmāt, a peasant by the name of Shukrullah Khwāja argued with the *amīns* who collected the *kharāj* and did not accept the tax imposed upon him. Arguing that his harvest had been too low, he could not deliver the four *man* of grain demanded of him. In this situation, the *amīns* turned again to the other villagers and demanded higher shares from them to compensate for the losses caused by the revenue deficit.⁸²⁸ From here it is only a short step to imagine further consequences for the local intermediaries, who had to bear the pressure exerted upon them by the *amlākdārs* and their patrons, the governors.⁸²⁹

⁸²⁵ Mukhtarov, *Materialy*, doc. 13; Russian trans., 24–25; facs., 97.

⁸²⁶ In her analysis of documents from Ardabīl, Gronke found a case where a local *kadkhudā* engaged in a dispute over his share of the harvest (Gronke, *Derwische*, 199).

⁸²⁷ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 759, doc. 68.

⁸²⁸ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 589, doc. 13.

⁸²⁹ Many *amlākdārs* were also under pressure to collect as much taxes and shares of the harvest as possible. In one case, an *amlākdār* by the name of Qalandar Khwāja Mīrākhūr turned to the central administration to complain about the exorbitant tax demand of Muḥammad Akram Bī Dādkhwāh (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 759, doc. 19). The

In another petition, an unknown government agent writes:

“To the Lord being kind to his servants; I confirm to Your Blessed and Sublime Majesty, My Lord: Prior to the fulfillment of duties [connected with the tax collection] of the province, most of the subjects [stated] they have been suffering immensely from the damages arising from vile behavior and valuation by a peasant by the name of Ya‘qūb Bāy belonging to the honored notables of the Qipchāq of Bālqā.

Having stated this, they petitioned his deceased Majesty, [and subsequently] obtained a *mubārak-nāma* and another one with regard to the increasing *sabzī-mālī*. But in spite of this, when the ‘Asylum of Amīrhood’ Muḥammad Taqī Bī your servant returned to Qarshī, his [Ya‘qūb Bāy’s] son came and assessed [the amount of taxes] in the same manner as every year and wrote a letter that the subjects are not acting in accordance with the *mubārak-nāma* of His High-born Majesty. Telling him you have come once again to assess [the harvest], they refused to respond to him. I confirm to Your Sublime Majesty that for this reason, the aforementioned ‘Asylum of Amīrhood’ announced he would punish the deceiver and petitioned. When the aforementioned Ya‘qūb Bāy heard about the report, he fled and took refuge [somewhere else], so they brought some Qipchāq subjects who were arrested instead of him [...].”⁸³⁰

The story, which happened in the *amlāk* of Mīr wa TātKent, continues with the detention of several subjects;⁸³¹ one of them, Khāl Murād, an *amīn* from TātKent, was thrown into prison for fifteen days. Finally, the petition sender intervened to settle the dispute, and in doing so, interfered with the duties of the local *qāzī*, a step that gave rise to further confusion and conflict.

Similar instances of embezzlement and refusal to pay taxes were discovered by Morrison in Russian documents on the administration of Russian Turkistan. For example, the inhabitants of the village of Yangī near Jām refused to pay the *sawāshil zakāt* of thirty-three kopeks, and the *āqsaqāl* Mullā Farmān Qul was responsible for all this. He was blamed for sending the taxes to Bukhara instead of paying them to the Russian administrators.⁸³² Morrison states that although the local people suffered from the extortions of native officials, “there were instances where they colluded with them in

latter was probably also under pressure to satisfy the demands of his clientele, to which the *amlākdār* very often belonged. In another petition, the inhabitants of Yakhak in Qarāteḡīn complain about the *tankhwāhdār*, who was not satisfied with the usual amount of income (*māliyāt*) yielded from his estates. Therefore the government dispatched a *maḥram* to mediate (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 759, doc. 5).

⁸³⁰ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 759, doc. 8.

⁸³¹ The *amlāk* of Mīr wa TātKand was located in the provinces of Żiyā al-Dīn and Khaṭarchī (Muhammadzhanov, *Naseleanye Punkty*, 12–13).

⁸³² Morrison, *Russian Rule*, 114–15.

order to fool the Russian authorities.” He interprets “corruption” and “inefficiency” as forms of resistance against imperial rule, which was undermined by the bonds of language and sympathy between lower-ranking officials and the populace.⁸³³ However, exclusive reliance on Russian sources only allows an understanding of these phenomena through a colonial lens. As could be shown in the example of the Koshbegi materials, the Bukharan setting, though far less exposed to direct Russian influence, was shaped by similar dynamics. The conflicts surrounding the petitions and the *āqsaqāls* as well as the problems connected with revenue collection should not be attributed to local resistance or hostility to the Russian colonial authorities. These conflicts stemmed from the field of tension that was created by the need to maintain local clientele and the response to the demands for resources arising from the same patron-client bonds at the higher echelons of the society. Nonetheless, Morrison’s findings are invaluable insofar as they show that the dynamics unfolding under Russian rule were quite similar to those on the Bukharan side of the border. According to a report from Shahāb, in 1878 the *āqsaqāl* Karmisak Alibekov collected one hundred twenty rubles more from the inhabitants than the amount of tax apportioned for 1877. A little while later, two other *āqsaqāls* were arrested for embezzlement in Katta Qūrghān.⁸³⁴

As in Russian Turkistan, outsiders observed similar governance mechanisms in the Bukharan Emirate, practices that were often seen as ultimate signs of corruption. For example, Schuyler notes:

“This system opened the way to concealment of the true harvest on the part of the inhabitants, and to a great deal of extortion on the part of the officials. The *serker* would make arrangements with the richer inhabitants, letting them off a part of their tax on receipt of a bribe, and exacting from the poorer proprietors much more than their due. Here is an authenticated instance which occurred under the Russian administration. On the thrashing floor of a small proprietor there were 320 lbs. of corn. The tax collector arrived and first took as his pay one quarter of it. His assistant took his usual pay, - but as he had very large sleeves for the purpose, this amounted to an eighth, or 40 lbs. The messenger of the imam also took 40 lbs., for the religious officials were by custom allowed their share. The scribe also took an eighth. The baker who accompanied the tax-collector then laid two or three small cakes on the thrashing floor and was allowed to take 20 lbs. The pipe-bearer handed to the tax collector his pipe, holding in the other a nosebag in which he was allowed to place 20 lbs. A gipsy prostitute spread out before the *serker* a

⁸³³ Ibid., 182.

⁸³⁴ Ibid., 185.

pair of new trousers and a cap, and received not only 30 lbs., but an invitation to tea as well. There remained, therefore, only 50 lbs. This was then carefully divided into five parts, one of which (10 lbs.) went to the government, while the proprietor had left an eighth of his harvest. It was remarked that in this flagrant case, the agriculturalist made no complaint. In all probability he had suffered no real loss, as he had previously succeeded in concealing the greater part of his harvest.”⁸³⁵

In addition to the *‘arīzas*, the *mubāarak-nāmas* also highlight numerous disputes over money. In many cases, a person was accused of unlawfully acquiring a sum and refusing to return it to its owner. The documents mention conflicts over money in a number of contexts such as *waqf* property.⁸³⁶ Individual cases of such quarrels within families are also reported.⁸³⁷

Carelessness and the Failure to Order Village Affairs

In a social arena that was prone to factional conflicts, the ordering of local affairs was regarded as crucial. Most of the conflicts centered on the access to resources, no matter whether land, water and money, or immaterial resources like a post. Among the overwhelming amount of records on water and irrigation, several letters provide information on water disputes. One reports about a conflict in Nūr, where several canals were diverted from a water source, two of them being named as Murgh-i mīr gidāy and Murgh-i qāzī watering the area west of the source. The users of these canals once came to blows about a *hashar*.⁸³⁸ When the situation became violent, the governor, Mīrzā Jalāl al-Dīn Bī, sent for the *qāzī* to intervene and settle the dispute. After his arrival, the *qāzī* ordered the imprisonment of five or six of

⁸³⁵ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 304.

⁸³⁶ *Mubāarak-nāmajāt*, docs. 56, 60, 62.

⁸³⁷ *Ibid.*, doc. 64.

⁸³⁸ Although ‘Ainī’s remarks are somewhat colored and have to be read through the prism of his later Soviet experience, his reference to *amīns* and *āqsaqāls* tending to adapt the *hashar* to their own demands tells of conflicts and resentment surrounding this institution. Describing a *hashar* in Shāfūr-kām, ‘Ainī cites his father as saying: “‘If the job gets finished, where will those two hundred bosses get their daily bread, pilaf and kabob, and what will their horses do for clover and barley?’ my father answered. ‘And it isn’t just a free lunch they get out of it – of ten thousand tangas per day they collect for the laborers’ expense, they steal half of it in cash before they cook and eat the other half’” (‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 62; English translation taken from John H. Perry and Rachel Lehr (eds.), *The Sands of Oxus*, 90).

the contestants and took the invocation for the king from the canal elders and the populace.⁸³⁹ In this case, the *āqsaqāls* had been unable to bring about a solution that all the parties could have lived with. Furthermore, the damage to local affairs through the imprisonment of a group of villagers certainly gave rise to resentment and further conflict as a result of the failure to settle the matter expediently within the communities.

Another case involved the *qāzī-yi kalān* of Bukhara, Mīr Badr al-Dīn, and a *mahram* sent by the court to investigate a water dispute between the two *tūmāns* of Khitfar and Sāmjan. According to the petition, the Kāmāt Canal bifurcated at Tūgharigī-yi Kām Nīkān, and both *tūmāns* theoretically received the same share of water. Yet due to difficult soil conditions and sedimentation, Sāmjan received less water than Khitfar. The conflict came to a head when the inhabitants began to divert water illegally by way of newly dug side canals. Finally, the *āqsaqāls* assembled and agreed that none of the users should draw off water. In times of shortages or floods, all inhabitants were to turn to the *qāzīs* of both *tūmāns* and the local *amīns* and *āqsaqāls*, who should assemble for consultations and see to the proper distribution of the water.⁸⁴⁰

Similar cases are also narrated by the *mubāarak-nāmas*. In 1293/1876–77, for example, the *amīns* and *āqsaqāls* of the *tūmāns* of Kāmāt, Khitfar and Sāmjan reported to the central government that the inhabitants of the upper *tūmāns* (*tūmānhā-yi bālā*), or, more appropriately, the upper canals, had built new dams and did not allow the water to continue flowing into the Wābkent River. The subjects of these three *tūmāns* therefore suffered great damage.⁸⁴¹ A more revealing case documents a water dispute in Kamūshkent in the same *tūmān*. In this settlement, the *amīn* Sa‘dullah had relinquished responsibility for the intake of the old canal (*sar-i jū-yi qadīmī*). At the same time, he had unlawfully drawn water from disused land belonging to the sister of the accuser, a certain Mullā Amānullah, and drained it into a newly dug canal (*jū-yi ḥādith*).⁸⁴² The document also mentions that the accused *amīn* had caused great damage in the aforesaid village.

It is obvious that a failure to settle the conflict could have caused immense damage to both sides. In such a case, the water users had probably

⁸³⁹ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 975, doc. 41.

⁸⁴⁰ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 975, doc. 45.

⁸⁴¹ Amīr Muẓaffār al-Dīn, *Mubāarak-nāmajāt*, doc. 162.

⁸⁴² *Ibid.*, doc. 99.

turned to other candidates for the regulation of the water and also petitioned the king, asking for recognition of the new *āqsaqāls* while accusing the old office holders of inattentiveness.

As we have seen in the example of the unequal share of the Zarafshān water, the uneven distribution of resources like water or land, often to the disadvantage of one group, or the interference and mediation on behalf of certain actors was also perceived as carelessness or neglect of duty. In addition to the conflict-ridden areas of irrigation and tax collection, we see a huge number of individual cases where the actors involved were probably also perceived as traitors. The *mubārak-nāmas* of Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn reveal many such cases. The principle of exchange regulating the pay-off of *mīrābs* and *amīns* to the advantage of individual water users was rampant in former times⁸⁴³ and left the door open for rich water users (landlords) and *mīrābs* to abuse their position. This is confirmed by a nineteenth-century chronicler who mentions the theft of water by *mīrābs* working in favor of certain people while disadvantaging others. He also mentions payoffs pocketed by local *mīrābs* who brought in laborers (*mard-i kār*) from their provinces to facilitate additional irrigation. They did so to fulfill their obligations with regard to the water and irrigation fee, which was then forcefully collected from the water users.⁸⁴⁴ As Morrison shows, theft of water and the resulting conflicts were also reported from the Russian territories, where *aryq-āqsaqāls* were often accused of diverting water to the lands of the well-to-do or the local authorities in exchange for favors or money in cash or even sheep.⁸⁴⁵

Supposed carelessness could also occur during *hashars*, which were sometimes used by the elders to acquire additional resources. Writing more from a Soviet perspective, ‘Ainī accentuates the exploitative dimension of *hashars*:

“One day I went to the work site, to see how the unpaid labor was going. The four officials and entourages, plus the *arbobs* and the *amins* of the *tuman* – about two hundred people in all – were encamped over a wide area of the steppe. Hundreds of laborers were sleeping all over the place. Butchers were slaughtering sheep, cooks were preparing rice and mutton stew, bakers were turning out thick loaves of flat bread. The horses of the two

⁸⁴³ Walter Busse, *Bewässerungswirtschaft in Turan und ihre Anwendung in der Landeskultur* (Jena: Verlag Gustav Fischer, 1915), 58.

⁸⁴⁴ Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish, *Risāla*, 90–91.

⁸⁴⁵ Morrison, *Russian Rule*, 219–20. For the whole discussion of embezzlement and “corruption” under Russian rule in Samarqand, see *ibid.*, 218–28.

hundred-odd supervisors were tethered by their masters' tents, munching fresh clover-hay, with bags full of barley for their evening meal standing by. Village headmen were bringing in donkey-loads of rice, barley, and flour. All over the campsite, huge samovars were boiling. The two hundred bosses were enjoying their rice and kabob and tea. At this point the *amins* emerged from their tents and called to their respective foremen to round up their men and get them to work."⁸⁴⁶

Although one has to be careful in assessing the account, it paints a vivid picture of the scene of the canal campaign. But it also highlights the resentment of some community members toward the *amīns* and *arbābs* and the rumors arising from the absorption of resources among some families.⁸⁴⁷

Manipulation by Local Elites

There are numerous signs that the appointments as well as the petitions were manipulated by rural elites. In many cases, we observe how a group of local *bāys* petitioned the ruler in order to get their candidate recognized.⁸⁴⁸ The decision frequently seems to have been made beforehand by a few actors. The above-mentioned village Bīsh Du'ā in Kharqān Rūd is just one case in point. Here Niyāz Bāy, Murād Bāy, Hamrāh Bāy and their colleagues petitioned through the *šudūr* to obtain a royal diploma for their candidate.⁸⁴⁹

Since the reputation and influence of a particular person depended on his wealth, Bukharan villagers often selected one of the rich men able to offer gifts to the *bēg* and other officials, who recognized his position in return.⁸⁵⁰

⁸⁴⁶ 'Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 62; Aini, *Sands of Oxus*, 90.

⁸⁴⁷ 'Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 62–63; Aini, *Sands of Oxus*, 90–91.

⁸⁴⁸ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, docs. 3, 6; TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 17, docs. 2, 21, 29, 30, 37, 42, 44, 63 etc.; TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 18, docs. 2, 3, 10, 11, 19, 21, 25 etc.; TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, docs. 40, 43. This was confirmed by an informant in southern Uzbekistan (interview on July 30, 2007, in Nau Shahar/Angor—Surkhandaryo/Uzbekistan). See also Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otoshenija*, 151–52.

⁸⁴⁹ See section On the Selection and Performance of Āqsaqāls in this chapter. For other examples see TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 17, doc. 137; TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 18, docs. 2, 12, 18, 21, 25, 29, 31, 38, 44 etc.; TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 19, docs. 1, 2, 6, 7, 27 etc.

⁸⁵⁰ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otoshenija*, 152. In one case from the village of Jahāndādī in Khuzār, the government had to send a palace official (*maḥram*) by the name of Rahmatullah Mīrzābāshī, who investigated the problem of the Āq Buyun community in that village and had to report about their candidate for the *aghālīq* position. The *maḥram*

In other cases, it seems that local elites co-opted the position and proposed their own clients as candidates. In ‘Ainī’s native village Sāktaṛī, the Mīrakānī *khwājas* were at the same time big landowners responsible for the religious and spiritual life of the community, whereas the *āqsaqāls* and *arbābs* were selected from among the biggest Tajik landlords.⁸⁵¹ This was confirmed by one of my elderly interview partners in Sīna near Dehnau.⁸⁵² With regard to the setting in Russian Turkistan, Morrison reaches the same conclusions.⁸⁵³

A similar phenomenon can be observed in other geographical contexts. In Iran, the *kadkhudās* were looked upon as servants of the landlords and guardians of their interests.⁸⁵⁴ In northern Afghanistan, the appointment of local intermediaries was frequently manipulated by local landlords. Results from interviews conducted in the vicinity of Imām Šāhib in early 2007 show that the choice of village elders and the entire selection process were in many cases predetermined. For example, the family of Nīk Muḥammad Khān Mingbāshī introduced *mūysafīd* candidates who had previously “served as their shepherds.”⁸⁵⁵ The family of the *mingbāshī* belonged to the local elite, whose members had benefitted from the land reclamation in the region in the early 1930s. According to Rasuly-Paleczek, there was constant competition among the elite of the Chechka Uzbeks of Khwāja Ghār over influential positions like that of the *mūysafīd-i qishlāq*. Members of the local elite often tried to manipulate the “election” of *arbābs* and to influence village councils in order to extend their authority.⁸⁵⁶ In Russian Turkistan,

also mentioned receiving the *khidmatāna* offered by the new office holder (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 27, doc. 6).

⁸⁵¹ ‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 6; see also Aini, *Sands of Oxus*, 32.

⁸⁵² Interview on August 3, 2007, in Sina/Dehnau—Surkhandaryo/Uzbekistan.

⁸⁵³ Morrison, *Russian Rule*, 177–79.

⁸⁵⁴ Lambton goes so far as to say that the *kadkhudā* was not at all “the representative of the people, and there is no provision of law, in the case of a landlord village, for consultation of the wishes of the local inhabitants other than the landowner or landowners in the matter of his appointment” (Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 190).

⁸⁵⁵ Interview on April 29, 2007, in Āftābluq/Imām Šāhib—Kunduz/Afghanistan. The term “shepherd” (*chūpān*) as stated in the interview served as a hyperbole to express the dependence of the *mūysafīds* on the family of the *mingbāshī*.

⁸⁵⁶ Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, “Beg, Moyzafid und Arbab: Das politische System der Chechka-Uzbeken und der afghanische Zentralstaat,” in *Studies in Oriental Culture and History. Festschrift für Walter Dostal*, ed. A. Gingich, S. Haas, G. Rasuly-Paleczek and H. Fillitz (Frankfurt a. Main: Peter Lang Publishers, 1993), 96–97.

similar dynamics can be observed after the installation of an election system by the Russian administrators. In the “elections” of *āqsaqāls* and other officials, manipulation and bribery had become prevalent in addition to direct pressure exerted by the authorities for their favorites, and the choice of certain candidates was almost commanded.⁸⁵⁷ This is also confirmed by a *mubārak-nāma* narrating a story from the inhabitants and caretakers of the mausoleum of Khwāja Jahān (just called *sar-i mazār*) in Ghijduwān. According to this story, an assistant of the local judge had unlawfully installed Maḥmūd Khwāja as *amīn* of the *waqf*.⁸⁵⁸ Judging from his Russian worldview, Pahlen in one of his reports complained about the maneuverings of more influential actors and the power contests among village elites as well as their attempts to bribe the electors.⁸⁵⁹ In Bukhara, local families and factions at village level were involved in similar struggles.⁸⁶⁰

So far we have caught a glimpse of the manipulation of the selection process from interviews and secondary sources. But how did it work in practice with the petitions and the Bukharan authorities involved? Here no satisfying answer can be given on the basis of the archival material. We can only draw inductive conclusions. It was not only the periodic contacts with the *amlākdār*, the *tūmān qāzī* or the governor that helped bolster the reputation of individual middlemen, but also the regulation of local affairs (revenue collection, irrigation and so on) that gave them considerable advantage in comparison with ordinary villagers. Therefore the *āqsaqāl* position was regarded as prestigious and wealthy families strove to occupy it. Not surprisingly, local *bāys* figure as community spokesmen and as initiators of petitions. We can also assume that a lot of negotiations and maneuvering went on in the run-up to the first petition. Since some of the *bāys* had good contacts with or were clients of the judges who also acted as petitioners, it was relatively easy for them to introduce one of their relatives and/or followers as a candidate. When the *qāzīs*, *mīrzās* or other officials came to the villages to investigate the matter, they were probably hosted by the *bāys* and entertained in their guesthouses. It is also conceivable that

⁸⁵⁷ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 168–69.

⁸⁵⁸ Subsequent to the unlawful appointment, this person had not only pocketed a part of the expenses for food and water, but also part of a sum to be spent on allowances and other means. In this context we also read about betrayal (*khiyānat*) and insult (*ahānat*) (Amīr Muzaffar al-Dīn, *Mubārak-nāmajāt*, doc. 143).

⁸⁵⁹ Morrison, *Russian Rule*, 182–83.

⁸⁶⁰ Kisljakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodal'nye otnoshenija*, 152. See next sections.

members of the elite delivered presents, which they had collected from their clients before. In the end, it was also in the personal interest of the *qāzīs* to strengthen their influence by placing dependents in such positions.

The judges and their assistants played indeed a crucial role because they were entangled with power processes in rural areas in a threefold manner. Firstly, a *qāzī* like Badr al-Dīn was often sent to investigate and settle conflicts over money and repayment conditions. Secondly, he may also have maintained relations with moneylenders like ‘Alā al-Dīn Gāw-Jīgar and probably acted on their behalf. Thus he could facilitate the flow of credits in cash and kind needed by the elites to help their fellow villagers and cement existing relations of dependency. And thirdly, they were also sent to villages to investigate the conflicts over the position of *āqsaqāl* and *amīn*. Their services were certainly used to settle the disputes surrounding the issue of *āqsaqālī*.⁸⁶¹ In this process, they were probably looked upon as mediators and patrons with the capacity to settle local conflicts. Last but not least, it was the task of petition writing that enabled them to position themselves at the interface between the Qūshbēgī’s chancellery, the villages and other social settings.

Spreading their patronage to the villages in the vicinity of Bukhara earned the *qāzīs* two advantages. First, in return for their help, some of them could count on the loyalty of the landlords and some of the peasant groups during their struggles with their respective rivals. Others built their own networks and constituencies. Second, in their contests with the *qūshbēgī*, actors like Mīr Badr al-Dīn could rely on their extended networks and also improved their position vis-à-vis the *amīr*.

Since the *bāys* and their patrons acted on the interface between the Qūshbēgī chancellery and their own communities, they could easily filter information in both directions (“upward” to the government officials and “downward” to the peasants), as many power brokers customarily did for generations. Due to their economic advantage and social reputation, they also had the prerogative of deciding which choice was in their own and the

⁸⁶¹ A private document in the Bukharan district library illustrates that in fact no *āqsaqāl* could be appointed without the assistance of the *qāzī*. Written on behalf of Amīr ‘Abd al-Aḥād to Qāzī ‘Imād al-Dīn in 1315/1897, this letter confirms the receipt of a petition sent by the judge and the person proposed by the *qāzī* as the new *āqsaqāl*. It also shows that this particular appointment was validated by two documents, the *manshūr* and the letter addressed to the petition writer (Kazakov, *Bukharan Documents*, 35).

community's interest. Whether *tehe qāzī* and his colleagues really asked the "the big and the little people" (*kalān wa khwurd*) about their candidate, as stated in many petitions, is still open to question. Supposing they did ask the people, the villagers could do nothing but nod the candidate through, even if some of them did not like the new *āqsaqāl*. The commoners accepted the choice probably because they were aware that they lacked power means: many were in one way or another indebted to the rich or had economic marginalization and other disadvantages to fear if the candidate was refused. Or they felt in a weak position vis-à-vis the alliance of their community spokesmen and the government officials. Such a scenario would be reminiscent of the situation in early 1747, just in a much smaller and more local context. At that time Nādir Shāh named his retainer Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī as new *atālīq* and declared the simultaneous deposal of Abū'l-Faiḥ Khān. The Uzbek *amīrs* could do nothing in this situation and no one dared give "an answer consisting of yes or no to the fortunate ruler."⁸⁶²

Peasant Groups

Paul has investigated the interdependence between *ḥimāyat* and the emergence of factions (*tāyifa*; pl. *ṭawāyif*) in the example of the Naqshbandī faction headed by Khwāja Aḥrār. This group competed with the *amīrs* to exert influence on the Timurid rulers in the fifteenth century.⁸⁶³ During that time and the following centuries, the most influential landed families in the villages formed the nucleus of extended factional networks granting protection to the majority of the peasants. In their competition for control over local resources, factional leaders attached themselves to social superiors (government officials, Sufi sheikhs, merchants residing in the towns and even the rulers) to influence them on behalf of their clients. There is no reason to assume any kind of change in this pattern up to the Manghit period, a time when factional rivalry at other levels of social integration was as strong as ever.⁸⁶⁴

⁸⁶² See the chapter The Order of Things/Mediation and Brokerage/The Manghit Chiefs as Power Brokers.

⁸⁶³ Paul, "Forming a Faction," 541.

⁸⁶⁴ Lambton also makes mention of this in rural Iran, where the power spectrum ranged from major factions between landlords to minor factions splitting even the smallest villages. In peasant-proprietor villages factional strife was by no means unknown and hampered the

In the third chapter of this study, I have investigated power shifts and conflicts among the Uzbek tribal groups in the first half of the eighteenth century, a time when there was neither a sophisticated administrative apparatus nor an officialdom based on clearly delineated tasks. In that period, the *atālīq*, *diwānbēgī* and *parwānachī* positions constantly shifted between various Uzbek factions. Some actors such as Ibrāhīm Bī, Khwāja Qulī Bī or Farhād Bī were promoted several times in spite of their obvious disloyalty and rebellion. A case in point was Ibrāhīm Bī, who was appointed twice to the posts of *dīwānbēgī* and *atālīq* despite his well-known transgressions. Quickly changing attitudes toward individual actors often coincided with shifting political alignments. In one of the previous sections of the current chapter, I have mentioned the conflicts between the various ‘*ulamā*’ factions in Bukhara as described by Khalid and others. I would therefore like to formulate the following thesis: the material from the Koshbegi Archive reflects numerous facets of local factionalism. Factional conflicts connected with patronage were entangled with the appointment of village headmen and their performance. Shifting in many cases between two, three or even more groups of villagers, the game surrounding the selection, nomination and final appointment of *āqsaqāls* often mirrored a strong competition between peasant factions or local patrons. Although these conflicts took place more than a century later and in another social context, the constant rotation of village *āqsaqālī* and frequency of new appointments resemble the shifts of the *atālīqāte*, just on a microscopic scale. The major difference lay in the quality of resources available to local *bāys* and other actors as compared to the military clout of the Uzbek chiefs in the late Tuqay-Timurid setting.

The first example in this regard is Kū-yī Yārān in Shumālī-yī Rūd with two petitions telling the following story: Faizullah Bāy Āqsaqāl is blamed for having acted carelessly. The subjects nominate ‘Abd al-‘Azīz instead of him.⁸⁶⁵ Yet in the next petition we read about Faizullah Bāy and his colleague ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, who both acted as *āqsaqāls* of the same village but

prosperity of entire areas as well as the solidarity among the villagers in the face of pressure from outside (Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant*, 265–66).

⁸⁶⁵ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 16, doc. 6.

were involved in a local dispute, the details of which remain unmentioned.⁸⁶⁶ Finally, the villagers nominated a certain Bāshī Ūzāq Bēg to get rid of the troublemakers. In both cases Mullā ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Khwāja Ṣadr-Ra’īs acted as petition sender. He probably also brokered the final compromise and the appointment of Bāshī Ūzāq Bēg.

The second case is much the same story. Here the inhabitants of Dīḥa-yi Ḥājī in Shumālī-yi Rūd petitioned the government: blaming their *āqsaqāl* Raḥmat Bēg for being a careless man (*mard-i bī-parwā*), they present their candidate ‘Āshūr Bāy as humble, skillful and capable of performing the duties of a village elder.⁸⁶⁷ In the second document, the subjects of the same village portray ‘Āshūr Bāy, who in the first petition was praised for his skills and ability, as a careless man (*mard-i bī-parwā*). They again nominate Raḥmat Bēg, the inattentive representative we know from the first document, because of his favorable characteristics: he too is now described as humble, skillful and capable.⁸⁶⁸ Here, Mullā ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Khwāja acted once more as petition sender.

When looking at the description given by the *qāzīs* or *ṣadr-ra’īses* in the petitions on the verification of candidates, one doubts the accuracy of these reports, saying that the *qāzī/ṣadr-ra’īs* summoned all “the big and the little people” of the village in question and found out that they all wanted the candidate named in the *mubārak-nāma*.⁸⁶⁹ But this does not mean that all of them voiced their opinion. From what we know about the appointment to governmental posts in former times, it appears that the *qāzī* only negotiated with the actual petitioners—often the local *bāys*—while dining in their guesthouses. Finally, he confirmed the choice in exchange for a gift and announced the decision in the village council, where the landless and poor peasants, being dependent on the cooperation with and good will of the rich, nodded the new *āqsaqāl* through. We also know that some of the Bukharan office holders, particularly many *qāzīs*, used their seals as a source of

⁸⁶⁶ *Ba yak-dīgar nizā’ karda, ba maham-i fuqarā’ musāhala wa bī-parwā’ī karda, fuqarā’ ghuḷām-i shān ba umūr-i khwudhā mu’tallī mīkashīm* (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, doc. 15).

⁸⁶⁷ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 18, doc. 63.

⁸⁶⁸ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, doc. 126.

⁸⁶⁹ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 17, docs. 2, 5, 10, 12; TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 18, docs. 2, 25, 27, 28, 44, 54, 66, 79 etc.; TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 20, docs. 19, 28, 34, 51, 61, 70, 73, 126 etc.; TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 21, docs. 37, 38 etc.

income and charged money for affixing them to documents.⁸⁷⁰ It is therefore possible that they championed candidates of those groups of villagers who paid most for the petition and the seal or were eager to obtain their patronage.

In some cases, *amlākdārs* and their first-hand assistants tried to influence the decision in favor of a certain candidate, or directly appointed persons loyal to them to ensure trouble-free cooperation with the villagers and the smooth collection of revenues. A case in point is a petition describing a conflict between the assistant (*sarakār*) of the tax collector of Qara Yaghāchī and the *amīns* and *āqsaqāls* of the village of Jubrān in Yakka Bāgh on the one side and a group of residents on the other. Revolving around the *kafsan pulī*, the conflict ended with the disgrace brought upon the *amlākdār* by the villagers headed by the “evil deceivers” Mullā Īkām Birdī Khalīfa, Murād Amīn, Islām Qul Āqsaqāl, Īrdān Ustā and Muḥammad Rajab. Finally, the troublemakers went to Qarshī, calling on the heir apparent for help and the *amīns* and *āqsaqāls* of their *amlākdār* for intercession. The prince then instructed one of his officials to inform the governor of Yakka Bāgh, who had to send a mediator. When the mediation attempt failed, Mīrzā Ashrāf Jībājī, a protégé of the *ḥākim* of Yakka Bāgh, installed new *āqsaqāls* and *amīns*. Interestingly, the official also removed the former *amlākdār* and appointed a man whose characteristics—he is described as humble and honest—resemble those of *āqsaqāls*.⁸⁷¹

In the following I would like to refer to a series of contradictory *amīn* appointments at the Jū-yi Zar Canal in Shumālī-yi Rūd. The petitions can be framed as follows:

<i>Inv. no. of 'arīzas</i>	<i>Āqsaqāl to be dismissed</i>	<i>Name of nominee</i>
I-126, op.1, del. 16, doc. 22	Naurūz Bāy Amīn is guilty of inattentiveness	The people nominate Jūra Bāy; no qualifications mentioned
I-126, op. 1, del. 16, doc. 41	Jūra Bāy is blamed for carelessness	The villagers nominate Naurūz Bāy; no qualifications mentioned

⁸⁷⁰ Khalid, “Society and politics,” 374.

⁸⁷¹ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 609, doc. 2.

I-126, op. 1, del. 17, doc. 68	Naurūz Bāy has passed away	Arbāb Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn is presented as a capable candidate
I-126, op. 1, del. 17, doc. 83	Faiḏī Bāy is accused of having neglected his duties	The people name Shāḡān as humble, skillful and competent
I-126, op. 1, del. 20, doc. 96	Vacancy for unspecified reasons	The villagers again nominate Jūra Bāy who is described as a competent man of integrity

The sequence of shifts of the *amīn* position given in the chart is based merely on the inventory number of the documents. It does not precisely match the actual events at the Jū-yi Zar. The shifting *amīn* position shows the split between two individuals, and perhaps also their followers, competing for control over one of the most important resources and the *amīn*ship. The many accusations of mismanagement and the embezzlement of resources in cash and kind investigated in one of the previous sections were rampant in the Protectorate of Bukhara. Since all of the petitions are undated, it is impossible to state any time frame within which this competition at the Jū-yi Zar took place. Maybe several groups of people petitioned the government at the same time, or at short intervals. Interestingly, various office holders were involved in this ongoing game. The first petition was written and sent by an unnamed *ṣadr-ra'īs* and a certain Mullā Sharaf Mīrākhūr Mīrāb. In the next three documents Mullā 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Khwāja Ṣadr-Ra'īs appears again as the petition writer. The last petition was drawn up by 'Abd al-Qayyūm Tūqsāba Mīrāb. Several scenarios are possible here. First of all, the Bukharan office holders mediated time and again in a conflict centered on the access to and possibly also the theft of water. According to such an unlikely scenario, a large majority of water users would have blamed the respective *amīns* of misdemeanor (*musāhala-kārī*) and the Bukharan office holders would have had to settle the issue by appointing new *amīns*. However, this does not explain why the same people were repeatedly appointed to the position despite bad experiences in the past.

The second scenario implies a struggle between different groups of water users and particularly mutually opposed landlords, in whose interest it was to

bring their own followers or family members into this position to ensure a constant water supply to their own and their relatives' fields. Therefore they championed their own candidates and blamed the *amīn*, who sided with their respective opponents, of mismanagement. In such a case, the *ṣadr-ra'īs* and *mīrāb* balanced competing interests within the canal area and helped depose and install *amīns* at the request of the different groups of peasants. This does not exclude the receipt of gifts and payment of money to secure the help of the officials for the petition and the seal. A bigger gift or banquet would have sufficed to bring about a change in the *amīn* or *āqsaqāl* position. This would mean that the *ṣadr-ra'īs* was the patron of the landlords who promised loyalty signaled by their gifts, and formed his constituency in return for help in the water and *amīn* dispute. The *bāys* benefitted from this arrangement as it helped them cement their own clientage networks.

Patronage Exercised by Bukharan Government Agents

The particularism showing between the lines was greatly fostered by the late Manghit rulers, who did not want to keep their governors and other office holders in their posts for any length of time. To prevent their entrenchment through networking in the provinces, the *amīrs* recalled their personnel—governors, *amlākdārs*, *mīrābs* and *qāzīs*—to the court or transferred them to other areas at regular intervals.⁸⁷² This means that the entourage of a *bēg*, including all his relatives, friends, servants and *amlākdārs*, was frequently moved from one province to another. We have already observed a similar phenomenon in the case of the *qāzīs*. Thus every few years the rural population was confronted with new conditions leading to the reshuffling of local power relationships, factions and networks. In the worst case, the appointment of a new governor led to the break-up and the immediate realignment of local figurations of power and patron-client networks down to the lowest ends and capillaries of personalized networks, with the effect of new *āqsaqāl* appointments.⁸⁷³ At village level, the death of an elder often

⁸⁷² Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, I, 478; Welsford, "The Rabbit," 272–75. See also the reports on the arrival of new *hākims* in I-126, op. 1, del. 38 & I-126, op. 1, del. 41.

⁸⁷³ Similar dynamics were to be discerned in the first part of the eighteenth century, when every change in the position of the government led to the reshuffling of the entire administration in the capital (see chapter The Figurations of Power in Eighteenth-Century Transoxania).

gave rise to a similar realignment of networks and factions. Olufsen's account of the arrival of a new governor in Khorog in the Pamir is telling:

“On moving into Khorok the Bokharan Beg presented a very picturesque sight. In front rode the Beg, his sons and nearest officials, all in motley caftans, partly of silk, and white turbans, after them a great many riders, some on horses, others on donkeys. They were the soldiers of the Beg (Sarvas, a sort of personal bodyguard) and his household, but one had to watch the procession closely to see that there were soldiers among them, for all were dressed like Bokhara men or in loose caftans; one had a scimitar in his belt, another carried it in his hand, lacking the sheath; one sat dangling an old matchlock, another was armed with an immense lance, a third with a spear about two feet long. All carried on his horse some domestic utensil or other, such as a copper kettle, a large brass slopbasin, a box, some loaves of sugar, sacks with meal, blankets, tea-pots, fur-cloaks, bottles of hay, all in a picturesque confusion, as when a broker has his moving day.”⁸⁷⁴

The regular transfer of officers did not end practices of networking, as they immediately engaged in exchange processes with rural elites. The rotation of administrative personnel throughout the Manghit Emirate also yielded other effects: the government agents sought to extort bribes from the local populace and gain as much as possible because they knew they could be transferred any time soon to another, less lucrative post. This contributed to the dislike of many Bukharan government agents by the villagers, who perceived them as traitors, swarms of locusts and the like.⁸⁷⁵ On the side of the landlords and village headmen, this process caused an acceleration of the gift spiral as the local power brokers felt under pressure to collect gifts at shorter intervals. Therefore they found themselves in the same boat as their patrons because their position was more and more resented by the locals. In particular, the arrival of a new governor, *raʿīs* or judge gave local elites the opportunity to enhance their standing and extend their influence vis-à-vis their rivals by entering into new alliances with the newcomers. As can be seen in the example given by Olufsen, the latter brought items (e.g., sugar loaves) that were used to establish relations with local notables. The first step in such a power-driven process was certainly the reception for the new office holder and the usual exchange of gifts and favors. Irrespective of different titles and functions, the middlemen endorsed their authority by engaging in face-to-face interaction with higher ranking government agents and officials. In fact, *āqsaqāls*, *amīns* and landlords were often clients of the provincial governors, *amlākdārs* or the big *tānkhwāh* holders. Sometimes the

⁸⁷⁴ Olufsen, *Emir*, 71.

⁸⁷⁵ See also next section.

latter also functioned as local intermediaries. This is confirmed by ‘Ainī saying that the local *bāys* were on good terms with the governors and tax assessors.⁸⁷⁶ The following document from the Koshbegi Archive confirms the involvement of local representatives in the far-reaching exchange and gift giving activities:

“[To the king] being kind to [his] servants. I confirm to His Blessed and High-born Majesty, My Lord, his servant and ‘Asylum of Amīrhood,’ Ḥaidar Qulī Bēg Bī, having been exalted by the honor granted by the sunrays of imperial fortune and favor with the governorship of the province of Chahār Jūy, entered the above-mentioned province and the fortress on Tuesday morning.

Having performed the prayer for His Majesty’s eminent soul, he fulfilled the duty connected with gratefulness and exaltation by taking the prayer for His Sublime Majesty from the servants, officials and attendants (*naukarīya*) as well as from the subjects, the widows and the humble people. In accordance with their rank he gave every one of them sugar loaves (*qand*), rock candy (*nabāt*) and packets of tea (*kughadh chā’ī*). According to their rank and reputation, he further distributed *dahan-shīrīnī*, sugar and sweetmeats amongst some of the *kadkhudās*, *amīns* and *āqsaqāls*, who had come from inside the city and the near and distant surroundings for the prayer to His Exalted Majesty and for congratulations. He took the prayer for His Sublime Majesty from all of them and from all subjects, and the big and the little people.

This lowest-ranking and simple-minded well-wisher, entirely weak and infirm, whose honor, reputation, soundness and well-being depend solely on favor (*tarbiyat*) and kindness to the smallest particle (*zharra-nawāzī*), does not have any other refuge than the high essence of this tutor (*murabbī*), and no other cushion than the shade of fortune (*sāya-yī daulat*) spread by his high attributes. I also went to the above-mentioned citadel, saw your servant, the aforementioned ‘Asylum of Amīrhood’ and was infinitely grateful for the safety of His High-born Majesty.”⁸⁷⁷

This undated document ends with the usual expressions of humbleness and praise of the ruler. What strikes the student of power relations here is not so much the information on sweets and other gifts distributed among local officials, notables and elders as the usage of a language that is strongly reminiscent of the chronicles. The petitioner operates with terms such as *tarbiyat*, *zharra-nawāzī*, *murrabī* and shade of dominion (here *sāya-yī daulat*).⁸⁷⁸ This vocabulary mirrors the durability of narrative structures and

⁸⁷⁶ ‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 7; Aini, *Sands of Oxus*, 33.

⁸⁷⁷ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 38, doc. 65.

⁸⁷⁸ For another example of this vocabulary of power and authority, see TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 759, doc. 4. There the ruler is assured that the petition sender does not have any other *murabbī* or *muttakī*.

notions of humility related to relationships of authority. Laden with terms of praise and extreme servility, the petitions are written in a language of power. In a similar letter addressed to the ruler, a certain Mullā ‘Abd al-Islām, the *ra’īs* of Khaṭarchī, reports on the arrival of the new governor, ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Bēg Bī Dādkhwāh, and his reception by the officials, the *naukarīya* and the *kalān-shawandagān* of the province, including the *amīns*, *āqsaqāls* and *kadkhudās*, who all prayed for His Majesty. Afterward, the newcomer distributed sugar, sweets and other *dahan-shīrīnī* among the officials and servants. Following the prayers for the feast of sacrifice, he showered the *āqsaqāls* and the *amīns* of the province with similar items.⁸⁷⁹

Other petitions reflect the same pattern of patronage and redistribution of gifts at local level. On his arrival at Shahr-i Sabz, the new governor Jān Mīrzā Bī Parwānachī was welcomed by the servants of the *naukarīya* and the *shāgird pīsha* but also by the local *bāys*. The petitioner, Mullā Aḥmad Tūqsāba, further reports that he himself went to the house of the new governor and that when he sat down with ‘Abd al-Ghafūr Dīwānbēgī in the guesthouse (*mihmān-khāna*), other officials like the *īshān qāzī*, the local *ra’īs*, the learned men and the local nobility (*kalān-shawandagān*) entered the room. Moreover, an extensive list of items given by Jān Mīrzā to the *dīwānbēgī* appears in the second half of the document, such as handkerchiefs made of fine white material, one richly embroidered garment of a single color, one cashmere cloak, one velvet robe, one cloak made of Frankish material, two Bukharan satin robes, one garment of unidentifiable origin, two Russian gowns, a Larmisov jerkin (?), one gold watch, one thousand five hundred *tanga*, in addition to one beautiful horse. The attendants of the *dīwānbēgī* received ten Shāhī cloaks and Russian garments.⁸⁸⁰

⁸⁷⁹ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 38, doc. 66.

⁸⁸⁰ TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 38, doc. 69. For other examples of gift giving at the local level, see TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 38, docs. 70, 72, 73, 76, 78. Of special interest is another document belonging to the same folder. In it, the petitioner describes how Āstāna Qul Bēg Bī Dīwānbēgī was welcomed as new governor of Ḥiṣār. On his way from Shahr-i Sabz to his destination, he took a rest in Rīgar, where he was accommodated in the building of the local revenue administration. After his arrival, they spread the *dastarkhwān* and dined with Ni‘matullah Qarawulbēgī and Shahriyār Qarawulbēgī, the *amlākdārs* of Rīgar. For instance, they served bread, biscuits (*kulūcha*), other sweets, a box of rock candy, sugar loaves, pistachios, raisins and melons. The local servants filled their handkerchiefs with the items. Subsequently, they served a regular meal (*āsh-i āb*). At the same time, the petitioner states that he had provided four plates of food, bread, biscuits, three sugar loaves, and a box of sweetmeats in addition to other sweets, raisins,

Let me come back to the rotation of *āqsaqāl* and *amīn* positions. Once a newly appointed *bēg*, *ra'īs* or *qāzī* had arrived, it was just a question of which set of villagers and their representatives recognized the mood of the time first. If things went easily, they soon managed to forge relations with the government agents by offering a large counter gift. Backed by their new patrons, any hitherto inferior group of actors could blame the *amīns* and *āqsaqāls* of their local rivals for mismanagement. Since the water theft committed by the old *amīns* and the unequal distribution of the resource was in favor of their adversaries, a petition and the replacement of the old *amīns* and *āqsaqāls* seemed justified. Once the new elders were installed, the cycle of mutual suspicion, enmity and abuse repeated itself and further framed the worldviews of the rural populace. Similar forms of factionalism and the influence of intermediaries are to be observed in Russian Turkistan, where the *volost upraviteli* positioned themselves at the hinge between the colonial authorities and the population.⁸⁸¹ The quarrels over water and canal maintenance between neighboring *volosts* and villages, as has been explored by Morrison,⁸⁸² can be attributed to the struggle for control over resources at the client level in various social and spatial contexts. The knowledge we have gained so far with respect to patronage in the eighteenth century suggests that conflicts between patron brokers at the upper levels of the societal hierarchy often translated into similar conflicts on lower echelons.⁸⁸³ It may thus be possible to attribute the occasional shifts of the *āqsaqāl* and *amīn* positions at least partly to either the general transfer of administrative personnel or rivalries between various Bukharan officials (like *qāzīs*, *amlākdārs*, *bēgs*, *zakātchīs*) competing for control over local clientele.

pistachios and mutton for the *dīwānbēgī*. Later, Āstānā Qul distributed other gifts varying in number and quality according to the social rank and status of the recipients: the *īshān qāzī* and local leaders obtained two and a half sugar loaves, the *ra'īs* received one and a half sugar loaves and a box of rock candy (*nabāt*), the *ahl-i naukariya* and *tūqsābas* one and a quarter loaves and the obligatory box of *nabāt*, the *mīrākhūrs* and *qarawulbēgīs* received a box of *nabāt* and so on (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 38, doc. 75).

⁸⁸¹ Morrison, *Russian Rule*, 198.

⁸⁸² *Ibid.*, 218–25.

⁸⁸³ A case in point was the tug-of-war between the Bukharan ruler 'Ubaidullah Khān and the *atāliq* of Balkh, Maḥmūd Bī Qaṭaghān, which was mirrored by conflicts among their allies—Ni'matullah Bī Naymān (supported by the Bukharan king) and Shīr 'Alī Bī Qungrāt (an ally of the Qaṭaghān leader)—near Tirmidh (see chapter The Figurations of Power in Eighteenth-Century Transoxania/Ni'matullah Bī Naymān of Tirmidh).

However, since the petitions limit our view solely to the village elites, further research has to be carried out to verify this thesis.

Controversial Role Characteristics of Social Entrepreneurs

Another explanation for the permanent shifts of the *āqsaqāl* post and the contradictory characterization of intermediaries focuses on the typical role characteristics of power brokers. In the eighteenth century, the population but also the court chroniclers often expressed their dislike of the *amīrs* who acted as intermediaries between the king and their own fellow tribesmen. Similar tendencies can be observed in the late nineteenth century with regard to local middlemen. Having been in Samarqand when the city fell to the Russians, Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Sāmī had put himself under the protection (*himāyat wa juwār*) of Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn Kūz-Falak (d. 1872).⁸⁸⁴ Although the *muftī* was driven by the intention to protect the city from possible Russian infringements, Sāmī, at that time one of his clients, strongly criticized his alleged pro-Russian attitude and quest for profit. As a social entrepreneur, Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn’s strategy was very much informed by his local view of the world and fixed expectations of his clientele and other city elders. Sāmī’s criticism reflects contradictions in his individual worldview, inducing him to seek the support of Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn. Despite enjoying his protection in a difficult situation, Sāmī criticizes his protector for following a customary pattern of behavior set generations before to ensure protection.⁸⁸⁵

The impression of negative attitudes and the suspicion of the people with regard to the *āqsaqāls* is also noted by Olufsen. On his trip through the mountain valleys of Eastern Bukhara, he was often confronted with the difficulties of village headmen to supply the travelers with food. His own discussions with the *āqsaqāls* were sometimes preceded by prolonged negotiations between the whitebeards and their fellow villagers, who openly

⁸⁸⁴ At the conquest of Samarqand, Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn ensnared the Russian general Konstantin von Kaufmann with his rhetorical skills and the offer to hand over the city to the Russian authorities, and was promptly made *qāzī-kalān* in return (Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Būstānī [Sāmī], *Tuhfa*, 203). In 1871, he was dismissed and died of cholera the following year (Morrison, *Russian Rule*, 255).

⁸⁸⁵ The local resentment toward Bukharan officialdom in the late nineteenth century, especially the *qāzīs*, is also mentioned by ‘Ainī (‘Ainī, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 111–15; Aini, *Sands of Oxus*, 142–45).

refused to provide resources such as food (cattle, fruits, rice) and beasts of burden for the guests.⁸⁸⁶ He further adds that most of the people hated Bukharan “officialdom”:

“For here people were discontented with the Bokharan Begs and complained that they collected too high taxes. Now being always the guest of these Begs owing to my connection with Bokhara, I was often disliked by the population. In many places they would neither hire out nor sell beasts of burden, provisions nor cattle to be killed, and all this I was obliged to procure while travelling along. [...] We often had to wait for days to get cattle to be killed after long discussions with the native Aksakals (sheriffs or bailiffs) or Kasis (judges).”⁸⁸⁷

The hostility encountered by Olufsen can probably be attributed to the tax burden imposed by the central administration.⁸⁸⁸ As the *āqsaqāls* and *amīns* assisted the *amlākdārs* in the collection of revenues, they were likely also the first to experience the anger of the peasants. The best account of the controversial characteristics of power brokers is given by Eugene Schuyler. The story narrated by him is also indicative of the actions resulting from the dealings between the Russian agents and the local social entrepreneurs:

“The other [merchant], Said Azim, a very sharp and intriguing man, is a native of Tashkent, who learned Russian by being frequently at Orenburg and Troitsk for trading purposes. He was absent at Troitsk when Tashkent was taken, and when, on his return, he found out what high honour and repute certain Sarts and Tartars enjoyed among the Russians as interpreters and mediators between them and the population of the town, he immediately attached himself to the Russian officials, and since then, by universal politeness and flattery, and by presents even, has succeeded in keeping on the very best possible terms with them. Though a man of no great property he lives in a very fine style, is always dressed well, and rides a magnificent horse. He has also engaged in the business of army contracts, and has fulfilled them with great accuracy, though to do so he has been obliged to borrow much money of Hindoos and others, to whom he is still largely indebted. If rumour speaks correctly he uses his influence among the natives very badly, and takes bribes right and left. The position of Said Azim is in some respects very peculiar. The Russian officials believe that he has vast influence with the native inhabitants, and honour him accordingly, and make him their representative in matters which concern the natives, who on their part, seeing that he is on the best of terms with

⁸⁸⁶ Olufsen, *Emir*, 70, 78, 94.

⁸⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 70. Criticizing administrative practices and the supposed extortions by even small-scale office holders, Dānīsh also expresses his dislike of Bukharan officialdom (Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānīsh, *Risāla*, 90–91).

⁸⁸⁸ A systematic count of all the taxes mentioned in the fiscal records of the Qūshbēgī chancellery reveals that there were forty-five different kinds of taxes levied by the government.

the Russians, and that he is much favoured by them, all treat him with respect and use him as their mediator with the officials. In reality the Sarts hate him, and I more than once heard people say that should the Russians ever leave Tashkent the first thing that would be done would be to kill Said Azim. He meddles in every matter, and is said, in carrying on his numerous lawsuits, to hire witnesses and buy up the Kazis, and there are few affairs of importance among the natives in which he does not somehow manage to have a ruling voice. On one occasion a feast was given to me by a young merchant, Azim Bai, at which there were to be a large number of guests, and where it was proposed to have dancing and other amusements. Said Azim heard of this, and felt hurt to think that he, as the most important Sart, had not been requested to get up this festivity. He had previously had a quarrel with Azim Bai on account of an inheritance which he had managed to get hold of by breaking into his house at night. He therefore went to his intimate friend, the Vice-Governor, and represented to him that any such performance as was proposed to be given for me would be contrary to the feelings of the people, and would be looked upon in the light of an insult to their religion and customs, as all the better class of the population were desirous of putting down such performances, which were not allowed by the strict letter of their religion. It would seem that a private party of this sort, to which two Russians only were invited, was hardly worth the interference of the Government, but still a hint was given, and it was accordingly found necessary to confine the festivity to a dinner and some quiet singing. The people apparently did not entirely sympathise with the representations of Said Azim, judging from the fact that more than a thousand loiterers were gathered about the garden of Azim Bai, waiting for the performance to begin, when they hoped to obtain entrance. The sincerity of Said Azim in this matter is shown by the fact that after the return of the Russians from the Khiwan expedition he himself gave a large feast, at which he had all the amusements and dancing which had so offended his religion. [Paragraph] Since then he has been engaged in a very scandalous affair, which, however, does not seem to have at all compromised him with the authorities. Said Azim, it seems, took a fancy to marry the daughter of Ishan Hodja, a native of Tashkent and nephew-in-law of Yakub Khan of Kashgar, but her father opposed this, partly because she was yet a child of nine years old, and partly because Said Azim was not of sufficiently good family, as Hodjas can only marry with Hodjas. Said Azim, finding himself opposed, devised a plan to carry the girl off, when her father and friends asked for the interference of the Kazi. Said Azim on his part obtained the influence of some friends in the government, and the result was that an order was made forbidding Ishan Hodja to allow his daughter to be married until she had reached the full age, and then only on condition that she was first to be proposed to Said Azim, if he should then wish to marry her. This was a very strange decision in itself, but the matter went even farther. Among the persons who acted on behalf of the girl were a son of Yakub Khan and Alik Hadji Yunusof [sic!], of whom I have already spoken. They refused to sign this decision, and protested against it, on the ground of its being illegal. Alim Hadji Yunusof was then arrested on the charge of being a disturber of the public peace and of speaking slightly of the Russian authorities; and in spite of his having the diploma of 'hereditary honourable citizen,'—

which indeed he was the first in Tashkent to obtain, Said Azim being the second,—was conveyed to the common prison and stripped and searched. Subsequently, in the face of all complaints and protests, he was exiled without any trial to Lepsa, on the confines of Siberia. The son of Yakub Khan was so frightened that he ran away to Kashgar.”⁸⁸⁹

All the phenomena connected with patronage culminate in this passage, including indebtedness, the tapping of power sources provided by superior actors to assert oneself over local rivals, the hostility and jealousy of the disadvantaged, and the typical conflicts materializing from asymmetric exchange. Moreover, it illustrates how much the Russians were locked in the social order at the individual level in Tashkent. In spring 1882, the military governor Grodekov replaced the chief *āqsaqāl* Inogam Khwāja from the district of Sabzar with Muḥammad Ya‘qūb from Sheikhtaur. Prior to this, Inogam Khwāja had managed to place family members and clients from Sabzar in all leading posts, and “secured the goodwill of Russian officials through restoring order following the 1887 tax protests, assuring ample tax collections, and facilitating the participation of select Russian officials in business schemes in Asian Tashkent.”⁸⁹⁰

SUMMARY

In the previous sections, I investigated the rural setting in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Bukhara by looking at documents from the Koshbegi Archive. However, the petitions are only one piece in a more complex framework of existing power relations. Treated in isolation from other sources, they do not provide any substantial amount of information that the social historian is looking for. Put into a broader context of written sources, the exploration of the rural setting taking the example of village headmen shows that generalizations and neat interpretations of the materials with regard to administrative functions should be avoided.⁸⁹¹ At least in the

⁸⁸⁹ Schuyler, *Turkistan*, I, 98–100. “An order was also given to exile Ishan Hodja, if anything could be found against him, but it was not carried out. When Mahmud Yakub Khan, the envoy of Kashgar, visited St. Petersburg in 1875, his main object was to settle this question and to obtain possession of the girl, who had, he said, been betrothed to the son of his master” (ibid., 100, footnote).

⁸⁹⁰ Jeff Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865–1923* (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007), 98.

⁸⁹¹ Exceptions were positions such as the *muftī*, the *qāzī* or the *amlākdār*, but as we will see below, many of them derived their influence from the ability to act as power brokers.

eighteenth century and also in the early nineteenth century, the stage of order reflected by the sources did not allow for clearly delineated administrative duties. Likewise, territoriality or territorial units as indicated by the Russian words *begstvo*, *amlakdarstvo* or *aksakalstvo* do not provide an adequate lens to grasp the social realities.⁸⁹² Terms like *āqsaqāl* and *āqsaqālī* were fluid and carried a range of overlapping meanings.

The discussion of the archival material sheds light on the various power means at the disposal of the village elites, the *kalānshawandagān*, in a period when Transoxania's social order had entered another stage of institutionalization. It was exactly at that time that the introduction of new resources from outside raised the level of competition and tension among rural elites. Centered on the access to power means, these conflicts were part of the social fabric and can also be observed in pre-colonial Transoxania. In this context, their relations with Bukharan government agents such as governors and tax collectors were probably the biggest advantage of the rural elites. Other power mediums like agricultural surplus and money were likewise contested and creamed off by local social entrepreneurs. The fact that the elites converted these resources and invested them in new power relations made them such controversial figures disliked by many people.

Digging deeper into the archival documents, the historian notices that factional conflicts between groups and networks of villagers were expressed in the frequent rotation of the *āqsaqāl* position, which became a power asset the more the institutionalization of Bukharan statehood proceeded. At the same time, the local middlemen turned into Bukhara's administrative staff. With this step, *āqsaqālī* became a sought-after object in protracted power struggles between rural elites, whose quest for power was further fueled by the skillful "playing of petitions" and the increasing importance the Qūshbēgī's bureaucracy and the *qāzīs* attached to this post.

It was against the background of these processes that the connotation of *āqsaqālī* changed, at least in the city of Bukhara and the *tūmānāt*. Being included in the officialdom of the emerging proto state, candidates needed

⁸⁹² Even in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the indigenous Bukharan terminology denoting administrative practices and units largely differs from the Russian terms. In the Bukharan sources we read about regions or provinces (*wilāyāt*), highly fertilized and irrigated territories furnishing agricultural products (*tūmāns*), the spatial outlines of which still depended on the amount of water for irrigation, crownland (*amlāk*), rural settlements of varying size (*mauza*), irrigation canals (*jū; nahr*) and so on.

the official sanction of the ruler and the chancellery. While the *inshā* letters from the early nineteenth century show that *āqsaqāls*, *mīr-i hazārs* and other local community leaders received their appointment together with a *manshūr*, we now see a more complex verification procedure. This involved the writing and sending of several petitions and *mubārak-nāmas*. Writing a petition became a regular part of local politics because, sent at the right moment, it was a powerful means in the hands of local elites aiming to influence the pace of events for their own benefit and that of their clients. Simultaneously, *āqsaqāls* needed excellent contacts with an ever growing circle of state agents, especially the *qāzīs* and the *amlākdārs*, but also with *tarāzūdārs* and vendors in the local cotton market. In view of the indebtedness of an increasing number of people, access to credits and moneylenders and also to brokers in the cotton market was perhaps more important than ever before. Persuasive powers deployed in the field of fiscal politics and brought into play vis-à-vis the tax collectors were other important requirements.

The huge amount of data concerning *āqsaqāl* appointments, as well as the instances of frequent shifts of this post, in a number of cases reminds us somewhat of similar dynamics among the amirid elite in the early eighteenth century. The reader of the petitions also comes across the same feeling of confusion and troubled mind (*tashwīsh*, *parīshānī*). This feeling not only pertained to peasants of villages without an *āqsaqāl*, but was also produced in other societal contexts and persons on the upper echelons of the administration such as *amlākdārs*, *mīrābs*, *amīns* and *āqsaqāls*. Irrespective of their different duties and titles, these actors were all afraid of being unable to collect the taxes as was expected of them. Anxieties were justified in view of the frequent embezzlement of resources and the reluctance of many peasants to meet the tax requirements. Hence the position of a village elder was just as demanding as that of an *amlākdār*, a *qāzī* or a tribal leader because he had to consider different groups of people and their interests. Acting as *āqsaqāl* or *amīn* often implied highwire acts as those office holders had to manoeuvre between their communities and their own patrons, especially the big landlords, the *amlākdārs* and the *tūmān* judges.

A broader investigation of the documents suggests that although full control may have been implied by the *arīzas*, the choice of local elders and village headmen was not dictated by the *amīr* or his administration. Although the constant circulation and huge amount of royal diplomas, *mubārak-nāmas* and petitions indicate an increasing absorption of the villages into the Bukharan administration, one should not overestimate their

impact. First of all, the petition system was neither new nor invented in the time of Russian overlordship. In fact, 'arīzas are sporadically mentioned in the chronicles, even in those dating from the eighteenth century.⁸⁹³ It cannot be denied that with the new administrative measures and standards set by the chancellery, the flow of letters to the capital swelled to huge proportions. But apart from the flood of data regarding local circumstances, many facts were already filtered out locally. The quantity of materials did not always translate into full information.

Despite a *manshūr* being needed to confirm village elders, the candidates were chosen after a bargaining procedure among rural elites. Government agents such as the *tūmān qāzīs* or the *ra'īs* were also involved. Besides the lack of control over the appointment process, the quantitative approach to the records reveals the uneven administrative coverage, at least with respect to the appointments of village chiefs but also in the key areas of tax collection and irrigation. The last Manghit rulers contented themselves with the flood of 'arīzas indicating they had a nominal degree of control over their provincial governors and the actual installation of village elders. But it seems that these documents were collected in a very arbitrary way.⁸⁹⁴ In some cases extensive registers of villages and their respective *āqsaqāls* existed, but they were not standardized in form and style. Although we cannot exclude the possibility that some documents got lost either on their way to Bukhara or later during the transfer of the material to the Uzbek archive, the lack of similar surveys for the rest of Transoxania is telling.⁸⁹⁵ It

⁸⁹³ In the eighteenth century, 'arīzas functioned sometimes as simple messages (Amīn Bukhārī, *Uбайдullah Nāma*, fols. 92a, 175b, 216a–b; Tāli', *Tārīkh*, fols. 10b, 34a; Qāzī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 262a, 306b). It is therefore justified to assume that they probably had a different function than those from the late nineteenth century. 'Arīzas are sometimes also mentioned by early and mid-nineteenth-century authors (see Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, 114b, 157b; *Zafarnāma*, 246).

⁸⁹⁴ There were a few lists of officials including *āqsaqāls* kept in the chancellery, but they were not compiled in a systematic manner (see TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op.1, dels. 50, 51 & 52). One undated register lists the provinces and the governors. There also exists a Russian translation of this register. But there were no other registers providing a quick overview of the transfer of governors from one *wilāyat* to another (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op.1, del. 69, docs. 1 & 2).

⁸⁹⁵ It is possible that petitions got lost either on their way from the provinces to Bukhara or during the transfer of the chancellery to Tashkent. I also surmise that the governors were not obliged to collect documents to the same degree as the chancellery of the *wazīrs*, or

was only in 1914 to 1916 that the government took measures to register settlements in the *tūmāns* of Bukhara and the provinces.⁸⁹⁶ This means that complete control over the rural hinterland and its peasant population was not achieved before 1916. But even surveys and records do not imply any kind of direct control over *āqsaqāl* appointments by the central government. Bukharan villages continued to enjoy autonomy.

CONCLUSION

This chapter took the reader on a lengthy journey to various societal spheres ranging from the court of the Bukharan *amīrs* to the military to the interactions between foreign and local actors. It ended in the villages, which are not usually captured by the local historiography. The different windows opened onto Transoxania's social order(s) offered a view of many interlaced processes of power accumulation taking shape on different scales in various social environments. The subjection of Bukhara by Russia and its conversion into a protectorate is a prime example of power and its ordering impact on a macro scale. Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn Kūz-Falak, Sayyid 'Azīm Bāy and 'Alā al-Dīn Gāw-Jīgar are further examples of "power holders" engaged in ordering activities and acts of power to be observed in other social contexts as if under a magnifying glass. But even social activities surrounding the foreign travelers or the *hashars* in the villages were power driven. As I have shown in various sections of this chapter, social life and power relations in the Bukharan hinterland were deeply interwoven with and affected by power

they simply did not send every petition to the capital but solved small local problems on their own.

⁸⁹⁶ TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 70. The records show a large-scale registration process especially in the *tūmāns* of Bukhara but also in the *wilāyats* of Karmīna, Nūr, Khaṭarchī, Karkī and Kilif (TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 70, docs. 1–5, 7, 9, 10–12, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 36, 39, 40, 44, 45 etc.). It is not clear whether the registration followed a systematic or properly designed plan or not. The *qūshbēgī* just issued orders to his officials to survey villages and keep registers, which look very uniform at first glance. Some of the lists bear the seal of the surveying official, while others do not. TzGARUz, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 70, doc. 6 dating from 1914, for instance, represents part of a survey in the *tūmān* of Qarākūl and bears the seal of a certain 'Abd al-Mu'min Bēg Bī Tūqsāba. In many cases, the surveys were conducted in the *tūmāns* as basic spatial units. In others, we see *wilāyats* and *amlāks* as a spatial-administrative framework of reference for the surveys (for the complete registers see Muhammadzhanov, *Naseleddy Punkty*, 187–410).

processes on a global scale. As a result of these interdependencies, local power relations and worldviews were perpetuated and transformed.

TRANSOXANIA'S SOCIAL ORDER BEFORE AND AFTER 1868

Providing the reader with a broader picture of nineteenth-century Mā Warā' al-Nahr, I have attempted to sketch the developments and changes of Transoxania's social order(s) during a very decisive stage in its history. The materials I have discussed in this chapter document and reflect the culmination of the institutionalization of Manghit power and the emergence of Bukharan statehood but also interdependent power processes on other social scales. However, this process was not a smooth and uninterrupted one but also involved discontinuities, for example, in the form of the temporary comeback of centrifugal forces in Samarqand and at the margins of Transoxania in the 1860s.

It was only under the last three Manghit *amīrs* and due to the interaction with Russian actors that a nascent or proto state became firmly institutionalized in Transoxania's social order. I prefer the term nascent or proto state here to demonstrate that it was not ready-made but in the making. The emergence of this nascent state during the second half of the nineteenth century was preceded by manifold attempts at state building or, more appropriately, the consolidation and extension of the Bukharan power space "from above" by rulers like Shāh Murād, Amīr Ḥaidar and Amīr Naṣrullah Khān.

Although in the first half of the nineteenth century Transoxania witnessed the consolidation of Manghit authority within a wider and more settled political space, it is open to question whether the Bukharan dynasts would have been able to establish fixed linear borders without the Russian intervention. This was a qualitatively new concept introduced to the wider region by Great Britain and Russia.⁸⁹⁷ The introduction of state structures in Transoxania "owed its momentum largely to the impact of colonial intervention."⁸⁹⁸ Bukhara stands therefore in a line with other polities such as Iran, Afghanistan and Khiwa. To put it in a nutshell, the formation of Bukharan statehood overlapped with the endeavor of the two European powers to demarcate the colonial space. Now the *sar-ḥadd* or *sar-ḥaddāt*, the

⁸⁹⁷ Paul, *Zentralasien*, 365

⁸⁹⁸ Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 296.

extensive borderlands of the past, shrank and were reduced to internationally acknowledged borders between the Afghan and the Bukharan state.⁸⁹⁹ From the 1880s and 1890s onward, the exact course of the border in minute detail mattered much more than in former times.⁹⁰⁰ This is attested by a document informing the Bukharan ruler that the Afghan governor of Badakhshān and Qaṭaghān was threatening to occupy a tiny island in the middle of the Āmū Daryā.⁹⁰¹

Ruling over a territorial entity, the *amīrs* were for the first time provided with a more or less fixed spatial framework that could be closely administered and controlled. From the mid-1870s onward, the Manghit *amīrs* possessed the means to remove rival powers. They now had the time and energy to strengthen their authority and develop a more sophisticated bureaucratic structure. In addition, Russian support ensured Manghit authority and the smooth transfer of the throne to the descendants of Naṣrullah Khān in the male line. Succession struggles were now a phenomenon of the past.

The contact with Tsarist Russia represents a watershed in Transoxania's history, though the establishment of the Russian protectorate was remarkably facilitated by and in line with pre-existing worldviews. These enabled the Bukharan *amīrs* to take a quite pragmatic stance toward their overlords and the limitations of their sovereignty. Resorting to their local worldviews and historical experience with alien invaders induced many Bukharans to make the intervention fit the local order. Whether the *amīr*, his officials or the vast

⁸⁹⁹ Ibid., 243–92.

⁹⁰⁰ The exact definition of the boundary in the middle of the river and especially the status of various river islands were not covered by the exchange of letters leading to the Anglo-Russian boundary agreement. This caused a series of disputes throughout the following decades. Even during the first decade of Soviet rule, the constant flow of people and goods across the river continued. The border of the Tajik ASSR with Afghanistan remained open until its final closure in 1936. The first fortification measures occurred in the course of the Afghan civil war at the end of the 1920s. As Bernd Kuzmits states, in the following years crossborder activities faded parallel to increasing border fortification (erection of poles, border fences and watchtowers) (Bernd Kuzmits, *Borders and Orders in Central Asia. Transaction and Attitudes between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 95–96, 99, 101).

⁹⁰¹ According to the folder description, the document dates from 1332–1335/1913–1916 and concerns the Island of Barakāt (here *jazīra-yi Darakāt?*). But the document itself does not bear a date (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, del. 223, doc. 1).

range of local office holders, they all seized on the Russian intervention and turned it to their own advantage.

THE FORMATION OF THE NASCENT BUKHARAN STATE

Consisting of a variety of different sources, our materials are admittedly very fragmentary. The comparison of a large number of documents and their contextualization against the backdrop of results presented in the previous chapters helped me make sense of the petitions and other documents. The pieces of the power puzzle fit together as follows: The nascent state of Bukhara was formed in the different contexts I have been looking at. This process was driven by a multitude of interdependent actors: *'ulamā'* and student factions, Jadids and Qadims, landlords and peasant networks, moneylenders, traders and middlemen in the local bazaars, the *qūshbēgīs*, the *qāzīs* and *amlākdārs* and their own clienteles, Bukharan governors, Uzbek tribal formations, even the travelers and their entourage, and last but not least the Russian officials and the *amīrs*. The interaction between all those actors and groups took place on the overlaps of a multitude of power webs and resulted in their growing enmeshment with the Bukharan bureaucracy. Appropriation of, access to and allocation of power sources such as water, land, agricultural surplus, taxes in cash and kind, and the appointment of local representatives and government officials, the nature and amount of gifts and so on were the subject of negotiation processes on all scales of the local order. Although we see similar processes at work in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, their quality now differed because of new power sources introduced to the local arena: new sorts of cotton, money, weaponry for the *amīr's* army, the Bukharan railway and so on. In the course of these processes we also observe a multitude of overlapping conflicts that contributed to the cohesion of society and further changes. Cases in point are the rise of the Jadids and the Bukharan reform discourse. The conflicts over resources in the rural area are interesting because they called for an intervention of government officials. Hence the steps taken by the Qūshbēgī's chancellery, by far the most ingenious administration Bukhara ever had, are the direct outcome that simultaneously invigorated these processes.⁹⁰² Emerging from and affecting all the different social contexts

⁹⁰² The impetus to set up a government archive together with a more elaborate administrative framework probably came from the Russian side. According to Khakimova, it was only

and environments, the leap of institutionalization and the gradual state-making is reflected in an ever growing diversity and density of archival materials. It is charted by documents such as *inshā'* letters and the correspondence of the rulers, *mubāarak-nāmas*, and in particular *'arīzas*. Let me reflect upon the petitions for a while. The impact and ordering capacity of the Bukharan state is exemplified in the petition system, which mirrors the degree of depersonalization Manghit authority had gained in the meantime.⁹⁰³

These documents allow the social historian to understand “the reciprocal reconstructions of state authority in new domains,”⁹⁰⁴ such as the appointment of local representatives, taxation and irrigation, or a closer supervision of the Bukharan borders and security measures in the provinces, however limited they may have been.⁹⁰⁵ In the course of time, the government agents formed a bureaucratic staff whose expertise slowly increased. In this process, the state officials, and especially the *tūmān ru'asā*, provincial governors, judges and *amlākdārs*, came to monopolize the interpretation and enforcement of orders issued by the rulers in document form.

The petition system in particular became a powerful instrument as it underscored the government's ambition to extend its administrative grip to the hinterland. These documents reflect the interdependence between the *amīrs*, their administration based in the capital, local office holders, landlords and peasants. This is shown by the sheer flood of documents circulating between administrative hubs: the palace and the chancellery, but also urban neighborhoods of the capital and villages clustered around the major irrigation canals of the Bukhara-Qarākūl oasis. In Bukhara the state-making was appropriated by actors on all ends of local patronage networks, particularly around the capital, but it also allowed these networks to grow.

after a recommendation by the Russian political agent in 1911 that the Bukharan government sent officials to the provinces to inform local authorities about the necessity to date the documents (Khakimova, *Krest'janstvo*, 4).

⁹⁰³ According to Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā'ī, in the time of Amīr Ḥaidar the petitioners (*'arizīn*) had to appear in person before the ruler, who dealt with their requests himself (Mīrzā Shams Bukhārā'ī, *Tārīkh*, 130–31).

⁹⁰⁴ Agrawal, “State Formation,” 13.

⁹⁰⁵ A number of petitions refer to crossborder activities and the arrival of people from Afghanistan, some of whom were perceived as potential troublemakers (TzGARUZ, f. I-126, op. 1, dets. 226–234).

The encroachment of officialdom upon the villages and the increase in the frequency of governmental activities was tremendous and certainly perceived as a threat by many ordinary peasants. The growing amount of administrative tasks corresponded to a simultaneous increase in the number of government agents serving in the *qūshbēgī's* and the provincial administrations. In that period many small local offices popped up in the hinterland, especially at *tūmān* level.⁹⁰⁶ Some of these local chancelleries, like some of the *qāzīs'* courts and the administration of holy shrines, had certainly existed before. Although this is more inductive reasoning, I suspect that the gates of the Bukharan administration were kept open for local actors and their extended families, providing the pool many officials were recruited from. As a direct consequence, this also led to a greater need for financial resources by the Bukharan state, which sought to increase the level of taxation. The unprecedented demand in taxes⁹⁰⁷ additionally strained the key resources (e.g., harvests, water, pastures) of village communities and local patrons. This further resulted in a visible increase of conflicts in governance domains such as taxation, irrigation and local representation, as can be seen in the content of a greater array of *'arīzas* and *mubārak-nāmas*. Chronic indebtedness consolidated these trends.⁹⁰⁸ In view of all this, many peasants needed protectors in order to deal with the government agents coming and

⁹⁰⁶ Bahadır Kazakov names several offices run by *ra'īses* (*ru'asā*), *qāzīs* (*qāzīs'* courts), *amlākdārs* and *mīrābs* in the *tūmāns*. Another group of offices were the “scribal offices” active wherever private persons were in need of an official document written in the customary form (Kazakov, *Bukharan Documents*, 58).

⁹⁰⁷ I counted the different terms and kinds of taxes in the fiscal records of the Bukharan chancellery and identified forty-five different taxes. Some of those fiscal terms (e.g., *hiṣat al-kharāj*, *kabūd barī*, *saḥīd barī*, *mīrābāna*, *amīnāna*, *kaṣan pūlī*, etc.) appear more frequently than others. For a detailed description of the different taxes in the late Emirate of Bukhara, see Khakimova, *Krest'janstvo*, 39–60.

⁹⁰⁸ This tendency is confirmed by *'Ainī*, who refers to the developments in his home region of Shāfurkām. After a large-scale irrigation campaign, Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn appointed a certain Murād Bēg as tax collector and a *mullā* by the name of Ṣaḥī as *qāzī* there. *'Ainī* describes both of them as plunderers who “with their locust-swarm retinue and diligent apprentices (*mulāzamān wa shāgird pīshagān*) reduced that freshly-flowering garden to a wasteland” (*'Ainī*, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 69; English translation taken from Perry and Lehr, *Sands of Oxus*, 97). Under the pretext of default in payment of the land-tax, the *qāzī* and the *amlākdār* took the crop of the entire year and also forced the peasants to take a government loan to be paid back in future as a larger proportion of their crop. *Qāzī* Ṣaḥī al-Dīn also falsified his reports of the market price for the produce, on the basis of which the annual taxes were fixed (*'Ainī*, *Yāddāshthā*, I, 69–70; *Ainī*, *Sands of Oxus*, 97–98).

going to the villages on a more regular basis. Thus the making of the Bukharan state fostered patronage as a coping strategy of the rural populace. While this process allowed rural elites to connect themselves to potential petition writers such as *qāzīs* and *amlākdārs*, the 'arīzas turned into a power medium of local patrons that helped them enforce their own and their clients' interests. The same happened with the positions of *amīn* and *āqsaqāl*, the constant shifts of which caused further conflicts. These disputes over power sources evoked the mediation of local elders or government agents.⁹⁰⁹

Thus, on the eve of the twentieth century, the state of Bukhara left its stamp on the local social order by bringing visible changes and simultaneously perpetuating conventional institutions. This translated into a growing territorialization, evident in some of the registers of the Koshbegi Archive, and attempts to name, define and organize spatial units for taxation in a more systematic manner.⁹¹⁰ At this point I argue that the petition system only created the façade of an omnipresent state. Though doubtlessly endowed with novel characteristics, the historian will find that the proto state of Bukhara was invigorated by the age-old rules of the game. Furthermore, its emergence did not proceed everywhere and fully in all regions and corners. Despite the removal of rival power centers, many niches for alternative concentrations of power such as the peasant or the 'ulamā' networks were allowed to exist.

Since the late Manghit *amīrs* still relied on middlemen for vital tasks like revenue collection, irrigation, and infrastructural work, their authority remained of a mere indirect nature in many fields. Thus the Bukharan rulers were not as omnipresent as suggested by Carrère D'Encausse. Local rural elites tried to keep the *amīr's* administration at a distance. The substantial lack of direct administrative control is reflected by an uneven flow of

⁹⁰⁹ The *mubārak-nāmas* also give the impression that the administration tried to regulate certain affairs. Many officials were dispatched to mediate in quarrels and accusations over money, or to investigate other conflicts (Amīr Muẓaffar al-Dīn, *Mubārak-nāmajāt*, docs. 6, 31, 56, 60, 63, 64, 68, 87, 101 etc.).

⁹¹⁰ The best overview of territorial units (*wilāyats*, *amlāks* etc.) of the Emirate of Bukhara based on archival records is provided by Muhammadzhanov. He also furnishes extensive registers of *tūmāns*, provinces and *amlāks*, including all settlements (Muhammadzhanov, *Naseleenyte Punkty*).

petitions, most of which were sent from Bukhara city and its environs.⁹¹¹ However, one should avoid blanket statements. The *ḥākims* of the various provinces and other officials were subjected to a lot of paperwork. It appears from the overwhelming amount of petitions that they had to report events in their provinces on a regular weekly or monthly basis.⁹¹² Hence the last three *amīrs* and their chancellery aimed to impose an unprecedented degree of administrative control.

At the other end of the chain of command, the chancellery officials were obsessed by collecting everything, a fact that gave both the *amīrs* and the *qūshbēgīs* the feeling of being in full control. Unfortunately, the question of what other effects such measures had in reality cannot be answered in this study.⁹¹³ The present state of the archive does not permit any conclusions about the system used by the Bukharan officials in collecting and storing the documents. A review of the catalogues and a more detailed investigation of the documents belonging to different administrative domains could potentially fill in the existing gaps of knowledge with regard to the Koshbegi Archive. For now, one can only speculate whether the measures adopted by the chancellery officials in ordering the huge mass of records resulted in a greater degree of centralization, or at least an overview of what had happened in the provinces.

Concerning Carrère D'Encausse's notion of two juxtaposed administrative systems of upward representation and downward administration, I argue that such a structuralist view is inappropriate. My analysis of the archival sources reveals that in nineteenth and early twentieth-century Bukhara, both administration and representation were in fact interwoven to such a degree that a clear distinction seems almost impossible. Administration and representation concurred in the petition system that was part and parcel of the social order and operated according to local worldviews. Furthermore, many actors such as the *qūshbēgīs*, the *qāzīs*

⁹¹¹ The list of "chanceries" given by Kazakov and the number of documents in the Bukharan District Library confirm this result. Kazakov identifies offices in Bukhara, some of the *tūmāns*, Qarshī, Karmīna, Samarqand and a few other provincial towns (Kazakov, *Bukharan Documents*, 59–66).

⁹¹² Most of the petitions and reports on minor matters are stored in opis 2 of the Koshbegi Fonds (see TzGARUZ f. I-126, op. 2).

⁹¹³ Khalid is of the opinion that under Russian auspices, the last Manghit rulers did not develop any centralized bureaucratic structure to deal with administrative affairs (Khalid, "Society and politics," 371).

and *amlākdārs* or even village elders were both representatives of their followers and communities and administrators tied into the bureaucracy. This essential overlap can also be observed when looking at the last three Manghit *amīrs*. As addressees of Russian patronage, they acted as chief representatives of their Emirate and issued administrative orders.

