Concluding Remarks

In this study I have attempted to reconstruct the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century history of Mā Warāʾ al-Nahr—Transoxania—from an alternative angle. The resulting narrative revolved around the question of order and ordering in a fluid context where the king held the throne but no monopoly of force. Another question concerned the durability of power structures and the institutional framework of authority. To address these phenomena appropriately, the investigation of the sources went hand in hand with conceptual reflections ushering in the Social Order concept. In the first chapter, I tried to connect my analytical framework to the state of knowledge of historians who were concerned either with the same region or with power, authority and patterns of social organization. The concept as such centers on the explanatory value of power concepts that were useful to approach the issue of persistence and change of patterns of authority and order in the long term.

Inspired by this analytical framework, I explored the sources from three major points of view: patronage, mediation and gift exchange. In addition, a range of other norms and institutions such as kinship, descent, seniority, marriage alliances, corporate decision making (*qūrīltāys/kingāshs*) and clan rule played a crucial role in the organization of society. Some of these structures have been explained in the historical overview. In a second step, I endeavored to elucidate social order as a constant power-driven process that works in a dual way: structuring in the sense that it determines future courses of action, behavior and outcomes, and being simultaneously structured by past experiences and the socially constructed social environment (reality). This part of the book introduced the major groups and protagonists engaged in an ongoing power struggle for access to and control over resources. It also shows the many interdependent processes of power accumulation by a range of social entrepreneurs such as Chingizid rulers, Uzbek *amīrs*, Sufi sheikhs, members of the royal harem and so on.

The fourth chapter discussed the symbolic dimensions of power in the example of the above-mentioned fields of investigation. Here I have explored the language of power, the literary repertoire with a vast terminology giving the narrative sources a particular hue. In the final chapter, I highlighted the formative aspect of power in different settings and independent sequences of causalities. Covering the nineteenth century, I

gave insights into power processes at various scales of Transoxania's social order. The results of these micro-level studies make it evident that the local framework of authority cannot be understood by looking at territorial or hierarchical principles of administration.

In the next sections, I would like to summarize my findings in such a way as to render my research process comprehensible and underline the added scientific value of the Social Order concept. The following points may help those who find the concept inspiring or worth adopting.

WHY APPLY THE SOCIAL ORDER CONCEPT?

The reader might have been wondering why I constantly abstained from using the state as an actor or a decisive structural principle in most parts of this study. In the conceptual chapter I pointed to the problems arising from an unquestioned application of Weber's concepts of power and authority. The same holds equally true for the notion of the Weberian state (*Anstaltsstaat*). I argue that the time and geographical context addressed by this book require a different lens to generate a profound understanding of the dynamics to be observed in the sources. Avoiding repeated and ponderous references to an Islamic concept and understanding of statehood, of whatever nature, I stepped back and limited the investigation to social order and authority. In my eyes statehood is only one mode of authority and social organization.

Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the state has become the dominant principle of social organization in Europe. Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* was certainly the first milestone in this process. The philosophical idea of statehood was further developed after the French Revolution in 1789. The improvement of the administration in nineteenth-century Germany, especially in Prussia, "caused new professional philosophers, sociologists and historians to pay much attention to the state, with Friedrich Hegel himself in the vanguard."[1] Other philosophers like Karl Marx soon followed. It was last but not least Max Weber's *Anstaltstaat* that has continued to have a great impact until the present. Decisive criteria for the definition of the

[1] Bayly, *Birth*, 250.

Weberian state are a) a clearly defined territory, b) a monopoly of force and c) an administrative apparatus.[2]

In his work, Weber paid particular attention to the last two pillars. According to his functional model, "the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence."[3] Weber also places emphasis on its bureaucracy and the role of a well-trained officialdom, which is solely committed to the written law. At the same time he remarks that this appendage of the state, which was nowhere so constitutive for the social order, can only be found in the Occident.[4] The Weberian *Anstaltstaat* is further characterized by a separation of the administrative staff from the material resources and means of running it.[5] With this, the state is an impersonal institution or form of authority that is far less accessible to the single individuals than other orders of the past.[6]

The different sociological concepts of statehood developed in a period that was increasingly dominated by nation states pursuing their expansionist global agendas in the age of European imperialism. It was also the period of the last voyages of discovery by men like Alexander von Humboldt, Carl Ritter, Sir Joseph Banks and others. Later many discovery missions were organized and financed by the Royal Geographic Society.[7] The hunger for knowledge regarding unknown regions like Central Asia was also fostered during the heydays of the Great Game. In that period magazines and newspapers delivered weekly reports about the events and conditions in this region.[8] From the 1860s onward, large parts of Central Asia and other world regions opened up to Russian, British and French travel and research activities. Although some of those areas had witnessed foreign travelers and diplomats before, the new wave of traveling had a different quality. Legions of men in the service of colonial governments engaged in the ordering of hitherto unknown parts of the world. The output of this process were travel

---

[2] On the definition of statehood see also Max Weber, *Soziologie. Universalgeschichtliche Analysen: Politik* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1973), 110–11, 245–46, 453.

[3] Weber, *Politik als Beruf*, 8.

[4] Ibid., 14; Weber, *Soziologie*, 342–43.

[5] Weber, *Politik als Beruf*, 13.

[6] Weber, *Soziologie*, 453.

[7] Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (München: C. H. Beck, 2009), 132–34.

[8] Kreutzmann, "Vom 'Great Game' zum 'Clash of Civilizations'?," 168.

accounts and colonial archives, indices and encyclopedias often based on clear-cut categories (tribes, ethnic groups, dynasties and states, geographic entities) that continue to inform our knowledge until today. Around 1900 geographical descriptions and textbooks existed for many regions of the world and were soon acknowledged as scientific standard works. Professional and amateur geographers systemized their "discovery missions" that often ran along national lines. Aiming to fill and occupy the last white spots on the map, they also produced knowledge of power, which was later exploited by the colonial regimes. At the same time, the accuracy of the maps produced by cartographers increased. The model of geography as a science, which developed in France and Germany, soon found imitators elsewhere. Their textbooks monopolized the new kind of knowledge and were crucial for exercising the power of naming (*Benennungsmacht*).[9]

Simultaneously we observe a growing territorialization of power at the global level. In Central Asia, this process was driven by the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia. Motivated by geostrategic considerations, both powers tried to extend their grip to the buffer zone of independent principalities separating Britain's possessions in India from Russian-dominated Central Asia.[10] Control over a territory that contained the population became more important than control over people or a few urban centers. While in former times the king functioned as sovereign, now the impersonal state took over. In the nineteenth and particularly in the twentieth century, the colonial powers exported the idea of statehood, especially the concept of linear borders, to other parts of the world[11] in order to delineate their spheres of influence.[12] A case in point is Transoxania, where this process was initiated after the Russian conquest and the formal establishment of the Protectorate of Bukhara. By 1900 the majority of states in the Western industrialized world and their colonial dependencies fulfilled the criteria of the Weberian state. Most of the time, they were able to control,

[9] Osterhammel, *Verwandlung*, 131–34, 153.

[10] Kreutzmann, "Vom 'Great Game' zum 'Clash of Civilizations'?," 173.

[11] Osterhammel, *Verwandlung*, 173, 177–78, 180. Pointing to the border treaties between China and Russia in 1689 and 1727, Osterhammel relativizes the assertion that the idea of linear borders was solely a European invention (ibid., 177–78).

[12] Bayly, *Birth*, 354–55; Kreutzmann, "Vom 'Great Game' zum 'Clash of Civilizations'?," 173.

tax and exploit their territories,[13] which were clearly delineated by fixed borders.[14]

While the globe was ordered by nation states, the Weberian concept of the state gained momentum and came to dominate the thinking of historians and sociologists.[15] The fact that Max Weber occupied a central position in the sociological curricula of many academic institutions also contributed to this trend. As a consequence of Weber's impact and the habitualizing effect of state power, the state and statehood are often taken for granted. In other words, the state—like other forms of order—has removed itself from the consciousness of those whose life is shaped by it. Simultaneously, cases and contexts that did not fit this unquestioned ideal were and are still being classified as non-functioning, failed or failing, and non-efficient. Such diagnoses correspond to popular perceptions of a power vacuum, decline and crisis. Put differently, the Arabic term *daula* or *daulat*, signifying an individual's reign, is very often indifferently translated as state and as such applied to periods and contexts dominated by other orders. Yet the term carries a range of meanings like turn of good fortune, felicity, wealth, and even power, empire or dynasty, and last but not least state.[16] I therefore suggest one should observe the historical background while dealing with this term and prefer to translate phrases such as *dīn wa daulat* not as state and religion but, depending on the time and context of my sources, rather as religious and worldly affairs.

How the developments described influenced the perception of Transoxania's social order will be addressed below. But let me first return to the question of why I followed the Social Order approach. The concept is owed largely to the insights generated by Mottahedeh, Paul, Hourani and others. I have also been inspired by the recent findings of Noelle-Karimi

---

[13] Osterhammel, *Verwandlung*, 247, 266.

[14] The first fixed and surveyed borders were probably established in France at the end of the sixteenth or the end of the seventeenth century (Ellenblum, "Were there Borders and Borderlines?," 118).

[15] According to Mann, the enormous influence of the nation state on the humanities in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century has led to a dominance of the nation-state model in sociological and historical research (Mann, *Geschichte*, I, 15).

[16] F. Rosenthal, "Al-Dawla," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn., II, 177–78. See also Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership*, 185–87; von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 209, footnote no. 104.

with regard to modern notions of territoriality.[17] Concerned with Afghan historiography, she concludes that "descriptions of places and time figure as embellishments in the chronicles; the structuring principle is the sequence of the exchange of military blows turning the tide in favor of this or that protagonist."[18] While reading the *Tuḥfat al-khānī* the first time, I had similar impressions that gave the impetus for a change of perspective. When I explored the passages about the events in Miyānkāl,[19] no clear picture formed in my mind of this area with its many river arms, canals and settlements. Although our author sometimes gives cardinal points or refers to fordable segments of the Zarafshān River, he does not indicate the exact location of many smaller fortresses and their distance from more prominent *qalʿas* like Khaṭarchī. The landscape in between remains largely unmentioned.[20] Sometimes, I had the impression that the king and his army jumped from place to place like figures on a chessboard.[21] The author's information about the landscape of Ḥiṣār, the northern mountains of Miyānkāl or Ūrgūt similarly confirms Noelle-Karimi's findings on space as narrated in nineteenth-century Afghan chronicles. Here the landscape only forms a scenic backdrop for the military events described.[22] The fact that the geography of the terrain was secondary for the maintenance of authority can be attributed to the lack of a linear, geographical sense of space. Instead, we are dealing here with concentric notions of territoriality.[23]

This phenomenon is linked to the absence of clearly defined borders, which was also a feature of medieval polities, where "kings were more often identified not through the lands which they ruled, but through the people

---

[17] Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 296–302.

[18] Nölle-Karimi, "Es ist ein weiter Weg nach Buḫārā," 142.

[19] Qāẓī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fols. 130b–157b.

[20] This corresponds to Aaron Gurjewitsch's results. According to him, medieval European poets only gave sparse topographic information and were not very sensitive to characteristics of the landscape. The only references they give with regard to the physical terrain serve for the orientation of the protagonists on the scene of events (Aaron J. Gurjewitsch, *Das Weltbild des mittelalterlichen Menschen* (München: C. H. Beck, 1978), 67).

[21] See also ibid.

[22] Nölle-Karimi, "Es ist ein weiter Weg nach Buḫārā," 139–41.

[23] This is again confirmed by Gurjewitsch, who argues that in the Middle Ages space did not embody an abstract category or uniform, equal extension that was the subject of a homogenous arrangement (Gurjewitsch, *Weltbild*, 77).

who owed them loyalty."[24] In the Bukharan chronicles, we come across the so-called *sar-ḥadd* or *sar-ḥaddāt*. These were either rivers, mountain ranges or wide steppes guarded by places like Nūr, Chahār Jūy or Tirmidh, which were sometimes called "gateways" (*darwāza*) to Mā Warāʾ al-Nahr. While European border points or lines are fixed and symbolically marked by boundary posts, watchtowers, customs houses, visa checkpoints and the like,[25] the *sar-ḥaddāt* were fortified but not endowed with such facilities. Serving as borderland or frontier posts, the above-mentioned towns were situated on the limits of the areas whose inhabitants fell within the Bukharan space or sphere of authority and protection. Such a gateway gave the rulers who controlled it a strategic advantage. However, the space behind such a castle was not necessarily safe. Its commanders had to expect attacks not from one but from all directions. This corresponds to Ellenblum's results regarding the medieval crusaders' polities that lacked a linear and functional connection between their castles.[26] In a certain sense, the Bukharan *sar-ḥaddāt* and the castles protecting them were similar and did not differ much from other conventional forts. This state of affairs continued into the nineteenth century. Thus, the translation of the term *sar-ḥadd* as a kind of borderland fort or limit of a ruler's power space probably comes close to the realities of that time. The extent of such a borderland—a river, steppe, desert or mountain range—varied and constituted a space in between, a transit zone that was easy or difficult to traverse.[27]

The reader of the chronicles faces similar challenges when dealing with time coordinates and timing systems. People living in industrial societies have a very conscious relationship with time and its measurement. Aaron Gurjewitsch refers to a "time cult" that subjugates men in the present. But linear time is only one of many possible forms of social time.[28] Accordingly, our chronicles show a different picture. Very often dates are of little significance. While they suggest alleged accuracy and authenticity, the historian soon realizes that Bukharan chroniclers, similar to their Afghan

[24] Ellenblum, "Were there Borders and Borderlines?," 108.

[25] Osterhammel, *Verwandlung*, 176–77; Ellenblum "Were there Borders and Borderlines?," 108.

[26] Ibid., 112.

[27] The Oxus, for instance, was relatively easy to traverse and "does not figure as an embattled line of defense" in the local historiography. Instead, the Qarā Qum Desert that extended west of it formed a much greater physical obstacle (Noelle-Karimi, *Pearl*, 294).

[28] Gurjewitsch, *Weltbild*, 29–30, 36.

colleagues, often give wrong dates that sometimes differ by months or years from the actual dates of the events. Noelle-Karimi attributes this to the oral information many authors relied on.[29]

In her investigation of timing systems in Manghit chronicles, Anke von Kügelgen comes to different conclusions: there was no one ultimate system for measuring time; until the nineteenth century the chroniclers relied on various systems. The *ḥijra qamarī* system was very common but does not provide information about the season of the year, so many chroniclers indicate the season of the events they describe separately. We see also the parallel use of the Turkic and the Iranian zodiac signs. The first originates from China and is associated with annual calendars. In addition, the chroniclers preferred chronograms over exact but abstract dates. The reference point for the measurement of time is often the ruler and his reign, from the date of his enthronization until his death or spanning the whole ruling dynasty. The chroniclers often refer to and connect parallel events. Simultaneity and consecutiveness form important reference points. Similarly to medieval European chroniclers, Bukharan authors measured time in terms of genealogies and generations.[30] Altogether, the Bukharan authors did not give many dates.[31] All this may be attributed to the tendency to measure time as a cyclic phenomenon.[32] As a reader of the chronicles, I often felt lost in a peculiar timelessness.[33] The flow of events seemed to repeat itself in a similar manner, an impression that may be caused by the dominance of the military element. The campaigns were not dictated by events and dates but by the cyclic rhythm of annual seasons and the low speed of the troops.

---

[29] Nölle-Karimi, "Es ist ein weiter Weg nach Buḫārā," 142.

[30] This is also confirmed by Gurjewitsch, who speaks about generational time (*Sippenzeit*) that mirrored local notions of time (Gurjewitsch, *Weltbild*, 103; see also von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 196, and footnote no. 47 on the same page).

[31] On timing systems in Manghit sources, see von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 188–98.

[32] According to Gurjewitsch, a combination between cyclic and linear notions of time can be observed in various forms throughout history. The value systems of many old oriental civilizations (e.g., India and China) were based on the idea of an eternal present, which was inseparably linked to the past. In ancient Hellas, reality was not perceived in terms of change and development but in terms of persistence in tranquility, while events were seen as embedded in repetitive cycles. In the Middle Ages, this cyclic feature of time was underlined by the constant references to ancestors. The past re-enacted itself and was personified by actors who repeated the deeds of their ancestors (Gurjewitsch, *Weltbild*, 32–34, 104).

[33] See also Nölle-Karimi, "Es ist ein weiter Weg nach Buḫārā," 142.

When going through my abstracts from the *Tuḥfat al-khānī* and other sources while writing this book, I often had difficulties reconstructing a linear chronology of events secured by dates. The few exact dates given by Qāżī Wafā and his colleagues formed very vague reference points, anchors arbitrarily scattered in a timeless ocean of history. More than once I had to go through my notes in order to reconnect specific events to a date that was given many pages before.

This was the world encountered by foreign travelers, diplomats and adventurers in the second half of the nineteenth century. Living in a world of fixed territorial entities, historians increasingly saw even earlier periods like the Middle Ages as dominated by territorial states. In this context, the Central Asian principalities were conceptualized as khanates, meaning territorial states locatable on maps, which were retrospectively projected back into the sixteenth century. A case in point is Mā Warāʾ al-Nahr. Here we find the term Khanate or Emirate of Bukhara, a nineteenth-century creation that originated from the Russian *Bukharskoe khanstvo*. This foreign term does not match the terminology used in the local historiography. There the region is called Mā Warāʾ al-Nahr, Turkistan and Turan, terms that are used interchangeably.[34] How did it come to this? Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, who visited Tīmūr's capital in the early fifteenth century, called the area Mawur-ul-nahr. At the same time, he used the term Grand Tartary for the wider region.[35] Anthony Jenkinson (d. 1611), who travelled on behalf of the Muscovy Company and visited Bukhara in the mid-sixteenth century, called the region the "country of Boghar."[36] In the course of time, the indigenous toponyms faded more and more into the background. By 1800 the old names had been more or less replaced and the region was widely known to a Western audience as Bukhara or Bukharia, though in many travelogues the toponym Mā Warāʾ al-Nahr was also mentioned.[37] Early nineteenth-century

[34] See also Bregel, "The new Uzbek states," 396–97.

[35] de Clavijo, *Narrative*, xii.

[36] E. Delmar Morgan and C. H. Coote (eds.), *Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia by Anthony Jenkinson and other Englishmen*, 2 vols. (New York: Burt Franklin, 1886), I, 81–94. In the introduction to the edition from 1886, the terminology used to denote the region is thoroughly influenced by Russian. Here we already read about the Tsar of Bokhara or the Tsar of Urgenj (ibid., xviii–xix).

[37] Josiah Harlan, for example, used the terms "Mawer ul Neher" and "Tookistaun" as synonyms while referring to "Boucharrah" as an urban center (Harlan, *Central Asia*, 70–71).

travelers like Baron von Meyendorff and Eversmann followed in this fashion.[38] In the German translation of Meyendorff's account we find the feminine German term "Bucharei." The local people were called Bukharans (German Bucharer).[39] At the same time, von Meyendorff tried to identify the borders of the country.[40]

One of the first to describe the region as "Khanat of Bokhara" was Nikolai Khanikov, whose *Opisanie Bukharskogo khanstva* became a standard work.[41] This author also tried to estimate its geographical extent:

> "Most of those who have written on Central Asia have complained of the difficulties they have had to encounter in the attempt to determine its limits, we will not say with the precision which is attainable in the description of civilized countries, but even by approximation, so as to give an adequate idea of it in square miles. We lament that on the present occasion we are forced to join in the general complaint, because the Khanat of Bokhara, like the states which are its neighbors, has no fixed boundaries, sanctioned by time, or circumscribed by international treaties. They expand or contract according to the strength and the weakness of its rulers. […] The variations which the limits of Bokhara have undergone, within the last forty years, plainly show how vain the attempt would be to define them by any fixed landmark; we must, therefore, content ourselves with determining the boundary of the cultivated portion of the Khanat, and with pointing out, merely hypothetically, the limits to which the power of the Amír extends."[42]

These sentences show how much Khanikov was influenced by the idea of a state endowed with a fixed and precisely defined territory. What follows is an attempt to define Amīr Naṣrullah's realm by giving latitudes and longitudes. The author also mentions the relative insecurity of Bukhara's frontiers. In the end, he discusses the limits and borders identified by von Meyendorff.[43] After classifying, characterizing and listing all the different groups (tribes) of the population, he writes:

> "To determine the amount of the population of each separate tribe, is a task we cannot undertake, as it is unknown even to the Amír himself. […] Even in reference of the population of the Khanat we must content ourselves with general statements; subject to a less or greater degree of probability. Unfortunately, the statistics of Asiatic Mussulman

[38] Baron von Meyendorff also attempts to give accurate information about the geographical distances between the places where his caravan halted (von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 184).

[39] Ibid., 218, 224, 233–35; Eversmann, *Reise*, 75, 88. See also von Helmersen, *Nachrichten*, 70–71, 106.

[40] von Meyendorff, *Reise*, 233–34.

[41] Khanikov also mentions the old name "Mavero Innahr" (Khanikoff, *Bokhara*, 3, 5).

[42] Ibid., 1–2, 5–6.

[43] Ibid., 6–9.

> states are so little cultivated, that it becomes difficult to calculate the number of souls to a given square measure, as we do in making an estimate of the population, when travelling through any part of Europe."[44]

Since Khanikov's book was soon translated into English, the "Khanat of Bokhara" found its way into encyclopedias and textbooks. A German review of it was published in the magazine *Das Ausland* in 1845 and introduced the Khanat(e) to the German public.[45] Since many of those who visited the region in the second half of the nineteenth century read the works of their forbearers to prepare their own journeys, the Khanat(e) of Bukhara gained a life of its own. Later Russian historians and orientalists like Logofet and Semenov also tended to see the administration of the Emirate of Bukhara in terms of territorial constituencies. Semenov tried to ascribe clearly defined and identifiable tasks to the Bukharan offices and titles. In this context, Russian terms such as *begstvo*, *khanstvo*, *aminstvo* or *amlakdarstvo* were applied to make sense of Transoxanian realities. They were later retranslated into the national languages as *begligi*/*begigarī*, *khanligi/khanigari*, *amirligi*/*amirigari*, and so on. These terms were adopted by a new generation of Uzbek and Tajik historians and continue to inform local worldviews to this day.[46]

Due to the Russian dominance in historical research on the region, the Khanates of Khiwa and Bukhara, which were simply named after the seats of the rulers, entered the Western literature. Since the question of statehood served as the standard measure for the explanation of certain developments,[47] the Khanates were increasingly classified as objects unworthy of research because their internal conditions did not correspond to those in prospering European nation states. Following the travel literature and the early Soviet works, Western historians adopted a judgmental perspective and often dismissed post-Timurid Mā Warāʾ al-Nahr as being an unfruitful field of research. Transoxania was perceived in terms of isolation and decline. The very limited access to primary sources, which were almost exclusively housed in Soviet archives, strengthened this trend. For decades, a

---

[44] Ibid., 93–94.

[45] "Nasr Ullah Bahadur Chan, Emir von Buchara. (Mit einem Porträt.)," *Das Ausland* 91 (April 1, 1845): 361–63.

[46] When I conducted fieldwork, particularly oral history interviews, in southern Uzbekistan in 2007, my informants only referred to *begligs* (e.g., Shīrābād, Dehnau). Former indigenous terms such as *wilāyat* were not mentioned.

[47] For a critique see also Schwarz, *Unser Weg*, 7.

real tradition of historical research on the region developed only in the Soviet Union, albeit under political and ideological constraints.[48] In the West things have begun to change since the 1990s. Yet in post-Soviet Uzbekistan historical scholarship is still focusing on the period of high culture and territorial expansion (the Timurid Empire) and on the region's ethnic history, while the post-Timurid era is given less consideration.[49]

THE ADDED SCIENTIFIC VALUE OF THE SOCIAL ORDER CONCEPT

The Social Order concept as I have used it here yields several advantages. First, it has the potential to help the historian grasp realities that differ from his or her social background. The approach enables the reader of the chronicles to see more than the conventional façade of statehood usually permits. Providing a heuristic lens through which processes can be viewed and analyzed in a non-normative way, the concept also implies a radical change of perspective. Second, and as a direct consequence of the first point, it allows the sources to be read as a kind of entertainment literature and understood from within. And third, it provides an analytical framework that helps focus on relationships, practices and processes, and the actors involved, rather than on structures. But more importantly, it enables the social historian to uncover transhistorical constants and clusters of relationships between stable and durable structures as has been demanded by Bourdieu.[50]

---

[48] On the ideological undercurrents of Soviet scholarship on Central Asia, see Bregel, *Notes*, 6–8.

[49] See ibid., 23–26. Besides Bakhtiar Babajanov, there are only a handful of scholars working on early modern Central Asia: Ulfatbek Abdurasulov works on the social history of Khiwa, particularly on landownership and property relations from the eighteenth to the early twentieth century; Nigora Allaeva investigates Khiwan-Iranian relations from 1500 to 1800; Gulchehra Sultanova is doing research on the relations between Bukhara and its neighbors (e.g., Yarkand, Khoqand), her recent project concerns the construction of legitimacy in Manghit diplomatic documents; Gulchehra Agzamova writes on trade relations of the Central Asian khanates; Uktambek Sultonov focuses on the institution of *waqf* and the Islamic legal system; Sherzodhon Mahmudov has produced works on the Khoqandian administration; and Ikromjon Azizov does research on the Bukharan fiscal politics.

[50] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 108.

In the following, I would like to emphasize the following premises and insights gained from the analysis of the chronicles:

1. Chaos does not exist but order always does
2. Worldviews reproduce their own raison d'être
3. Inertia and the question of social change
4. Power in institutionalized, non-institutionalized and other forms

As Franz Wenneberg puts it, "for the uninitiated observer the Bukharan political arena frequently appeared to be merely an uninstitutionalized chaos."[51] Made from a state-centric point of view, this observation contrasts with the argument that I have tried to prove throughout this thesis. The assumption of persistence, which I formulated in the conceptual chapter, contrasts with Hobbes's notion of the wolf-like individuals who always need the Leviathan to carry on.[52] As I have shown in chapter three (on the figurations of power in early eighteenth-century Transoxania), *fitna* and *fasād* (discord, insurrection, rebellion, calamity, depravity) were part of the social fabric and in a way systemic. This is also reflected by the dominance of the military element in our sources. I argue that these conflicts should not be treated as abnormal deviations from a harmonious state of peace that is often erroneously associated with order. Rejecting the idea that the manifestation of order depends on the degree of institutionalization, I argue that patterns of order (worldviews, institutions) can always be observed irrespective of the stage of the process.[53] Hence conflicts to be empirically observed at whatever level of analysis are not signs of disorder or a power vacuum, chaos and anarchy, but forms of human interaction, which, being shaped by power, are to a certain degree institutionalized. My argument is well in line with Georg Elwert's theses on the social embeddedness of conflicts[54] and the normalcy of violence. He also speaks of an order of

[51] Wenneberg, *Inquiry*, 12.

[52] See also Georg Elwert, "Sozialanthropologisch erklärte Gewalt," in *Internationales Handbuch der Gewaltforschung*, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John Hagan (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002), 331.

[53] Mielke, Schetter and Wilde, "Dimmensions," 5

[54] According to Elwert, social embeddedness means a repertoire of norms, values and institutionalized arrangements that make action and even the patterns of conflict predictable. As a consequence, even violent conflicts have institutionalized forms and follow certain patterns (Georg Elwert, "Anthropologische Perspektiven auf Konflikt," in

violence (*Gewaltordnung*) that is part of every society.[55] This is in line with Thomas Bierschenk's argument that order-theoretical and conflict-theoretical dimensions of social power must be thought together.[56] However, the existence of order in conflicts does not mean that they were perceived as normal by the people affected.[57] Dichotomist perceptions of order versus chaos mirror "popular attributions to the status of certain social environments."[58]

Numerous reasons can be found for the state of *fitna* and other kinds of conflict described in our sources. First, the emergence of relationships of authority coinciding with subordination and superordination of certain individuals seldom proceeds unquestioned without provoking resistance.[59] Hence norm violation or a deviation from certain standards should also be regarded as normal.[60] Many conflicts also arise from the feeling that with any internal standardization of the social order one has to make concessions. The opponents of the power wielders do therefore not engage with the existing order in terms of content but with the entire societal order as such. This means that even opponents approved of the same structural principles that made up this order.[61]

Second, the subjects of power are often on the horns of a dilemma because they cannot evade what Bourdieu calls the antinomy of authority.[62] The notables and leaders of a besieged Transoxanian town could choose to keep up resistance. With such a decision they locked themselves in the situation of being surrounded and to a certain extent controlled by the superior forces. If they opened the city gates, they would be subjected to the authority of the ruler and his army. Continued resistance meant a certain

---

Anthropologie der Konflikte. Georg Elwerts konflikttheoretische Thesen in der Diskussion, ed. Julia M. Eckert (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2004), 29. Comparing the embeddedness of violence with a river bed and the possibility that it overflows, Elwert also says that it is not realistic to expect a full control over violence (Elwert, "Sozialanthropologisch erklärte Gewalt," 343).

55 Elwert, "Sozialanthropologisch erklärte Gewalt," 342.

56 Thomas Bierschenk, "Zu einem empirisch verwendbaren Begriff der Macht," in *Department of Anthropology and African Studies—Working Paper Series* 24 (2003), 9.

57 On the perception of anarchy and chaos in the chronicles, see below.

58 Mielke, Schetter and Wilde, "Dimensions," 2.

59 Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 110.

60 Elwert, "Sozialanthropologisch erklärte Gewalt," 343.

61 Popitz, *Phänomene*, 243–44.

62 Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 111.

potential for massacre and bloodshed. Both solutions were in all likelihood equally uncomfortable and provoked conflicts within the besieged town. Thus on the one hand, violence can thwart norms and standards. On the other hand, it can also serve as a means of sanction to enforce certain norms or ensure obedience.

Let me return to the argument that conflicts are an essential part of social order. The need to establish social relations arises from our nature as social beings, nobody can live and act in isolation. In addition to this, our chronicles display a highly regulated procedure behind even fierce battles and wars. Plundering raids, for example, were quite normal and followed established patterns. In mid-eighteenth-century Mā Warāʾ al-Nahr, an *alamān* or *īlghār* was dispatched; booty was collected forcefully and afterwards distributed among the soldiery; the *dīwānbēgī* registered all the spoils. Order and the canalization of violence can be observed in the case of military campaigns. Heralds were dispatched to call the Uzbek chiefs to the capital. They gathered with their followers at the tomb of Khwāja Bahāʾ al-Dīn Naqshband. The battle order followed Turko-Mongol patterns. The troops assembled before a town. The towers, gates and segments of the wall were assigned to different commanders and their contingents. If city notables surrendered, they always provided and received gifts or tributes before engaging in negotiations. In cases of repeated resistance, opponents could be annihilated. Cases in point were the Kīnakās chieftains who were killed in 1753. In other cases, we saw the victors of combats erecting pyramids of skulls. The skulls of enemies were often presented to the commander or ruler, who reciprocated the gift by delivering status symbols. In many conflict situations, local elders tried to bring about a solution of the conflict or dispute during *kīngāshs*. Here we can also identify certain regularities: carpets were spread out, the protagonists took a seat according to a coordinated seating map, fruits and other items were served, and some people had the right to speak whereas others listened.

Given the multiplicity of affiliations—a phenomenon Manghit Bukhara shared with the Timurid period—it was indeed difficult to avoid any conflict of loyalty. As in other times and geographical settings, in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Transoxania, an individual was seldom part of just one social group or context. An *amīr* headed not only his family or clan. As *parwānachī* or *dādkhwāh*, a man was tied into the wider network of the Bukharan dynasts and may also have been affiliated to a Naqshbandī network. A Sufi sheikh could engage in overland trade and we have seen some of them acting as military leaders. We also observe fluid social

identities in other contexts: *amīrs* of one and the same tribe, for instance, might support mutually opposed parties in a succession struggle. On the one hand, conflicts arising from multiple affiliations and overlapping identities greatly contributed to the cohesion of society,[63] but also caused incremental changes in the existing power structures. On the other hand, the volatile, conflict-ridden milieu kept the warrior ethos alive and enforced notions of honor, prestige and shame. This ethos and the entire social order were also celebrated on the battlefields by young men who are styled heroes (*dalīrān*, *pahlawānān*) in the historiography. Marriage alliances were also regarded as important and triggered conflicts. In addition, we see instances where an actor restored the reputation of his family or clan by taking blood revenge. These norms and practices were highly political because of the power underlying them.

In chapter three and four of this book I demonstrated that the worldview tends to reproduce its raison d'être. I argue that a vicious cycle of conflicts and resource scarcity enforced and cemented local worldviews and practices as natural choices to achieve individual goals. This pertains to patronage and related practices like mediation and gift exchange, but also to the factor of enrichment. At a cognitive level, the feeling of threat, suspicion, fear and anxiety also played a role. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Transoxania was a veritable hotbed of rumors. Thus worldviews are optimally adapted to the conditions under which they operate and become meaningful.[64] In other words, local worldviews produce practices that enable their holders to survive but at the same time also tend to create hardships. Life was hard in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Transoxania, and it was not without reason that our chroniclers time and again lament the chaos and anarchy (*harj wa marj*) accompanying military campaigns and raids.[65] It was precisely under these conditions that patronage became meaningful.

A large part of this study is devoted to the question of how durable ordering principles are. As I have shown in the micro-studies in chapters three and five, realities were socially constructed repeated cycles of action. The longevity of social practices and local worldviews can be seen in the

---

[63] Manz, *Power, Politics and Religion*, 277, 280.

[64] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 163.

[65] Amīn Bukhārī, *ʿUbaidullah Nāma*, fols. 56a, 130b, 137b, 164b, 170a; Semenov, trans., 71, 148–49, 156, 184, 191; Qāżī Wafā, *Tuḥfat*, fol. 127a; Mullā Sharīf, *Tāj*, fols. 161a, 183a, 296a, 428b, 434b.

principle of having a descendant of Chingīz Khān on the throne. It also held true for seniority and reciprocity, resulting in strong patronage bonds, the partitioning of conquered lands and the emergence of the appanage order. Although this order was exposed to continual adjustment and change from within, the grinding down of the Chingizid principle and its incremental abolition took more than five centuries. Only with the interplay between cognitive structuring structure (views) and the structured structure (practices, institutions) in mind, can we explain the fact that in the eighteenth century strong Uzbek *amīrs* placed weak puppet rulers on the throne, despite their own personal ambitions and military capacity.

Apart from the slow change of social realities, the glutinous flow of history was sometimes interrupted. On the dynastic level such ruptures were the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century, the establishment of Timurid rule at the end of the fourteenth century, the annihilation of rival cousin clans by ʿAbdullah Khān in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, or the Iranian interlude and the subsequent enterprise of Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān. The Russian conquest and the transformation of Bukhara into a protectorate also triggered a series of changes. The latter can be attributed to the fact that humans are not just passive and spineless figures inevitably caught up in repetitive developments and transpersonal institutions. Actors like ʿAbdullah Khān and his son or the early Manghit kings had their ambitions and interests, as did other protagonists inside and outside the Bukharan palace like the *amīrs*. Sometimes they deemed their power to be sufficient and actively sought to change the established order of things according to their interests. In 1756, for example, Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān undertook an attempt to redefine the tasks attached to the atālīqate. More than three decades earlier, the *khwāja sarāyān* and their master had tried to run the government without an *atālīq* at its head. Yet some of these modifications were canceled after a while. Cases in point are the Shibanid conquest and the subsequent re-establishment of a royal Chingizid clan around 1500, the raising of a Chingizid puppet ruler after the death of Raḥīm Khān in 1759, or the temporary comeback of the Uzbek chiefs after the death of Naṣrullah Khān in 1860. These discontinuities illustrate that institutionalization processes connected with the continuous reproduction of power are not unidirectional.

As I have already shown, sometimes the changes in the objective structures of authority introduced from above went so far or happened so abruptly that the actors were practically outpaced by these developments. Their disorientation often resulted in nonconformity, the major signs of

which were revolts or seemingly strange behavior.[66] The rebellions of the Uzbek chiefs following the direct transfer of the atālīqate (after 1747) and khanly authority in the line of the Manghits (in 1759) are striking examples. The absence of border officials at the Katta Qūrghān border post in the early 1870s and the fact that it took them two weeks to get there in order to check Radloff's documents is another case in point.

The second instance of inertia can be seen at the procedural level. Time and again we saw old networks of loyalty collapsing soon after the ruler's death. Given the absence of a succession rule like primogeniture, the subsequent succession struggles were quite normal under the Timurids or the Abu'l-Khairids. Another example is the breakup of Nādir Shāh's *Herrschaftsverband* in 1747, a pattern that repeated itself after Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān's death in 1759. An uninitiated reader of the chronicles may ask why the first Manghit king resorted to the same instruments and strategies (of indirect authority) as his patron, particularly since he had witnessed the direct consequences himself. What may seem to be irrational behavior of authority at first glance can be explained by taking a closer look at the sources. The worldview of the rulers was to a certain extent egocentric, though most of them strove to leave the throne to their sons. In addition, we are dealing with a cyclic view of history where the past manifests itself in the present and the ruler formed the main reference point, not a date or past event. According to conventional thought, the succession struggle served one particular end: only the most gifted prince having the best military strategies and the largest network of followers could hope to win and keep the throne.

The reinvention of old instruments of authority, the concept of kingship underlining the ruler's role as a dynastic reviver, and the longevity of patronage can be attributed to the nature of social power. Worldviews are inert and tend to produce durable structures (German *dauerhafte Strukturierungsleistung*). This also corresponds to von Kügelgen's results suggesting that at the turn of the nineteenth century, Bukharan society lacked a concept of "development." The modification of institutions had to be justified with recourse to their origins, which was in line with the circular view of history.[67] This raises the question of how far we can speak of a social change in Bukhara. Certainly, the long period from the thirteenth until

[66] Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Reflexive Anthropologie*, 164.
[67] von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 212.

the nineteenth century witnessed many changes visible at the surface of the political order. It is remarkable that modifications were felt only in the *longue durée* and retrospectively. Changes were manifest in shifts in the political constellations and power figurations on the higher levels of social integration, and here particularly in dynastic changes (from the Abu'l-Khairid to the Tuqay-Timurids and Manghits), the rise of new elites or in the spatial reorganization of the kingdom. In the nineteenth century we saw the introduction of new means of transport and communication, new modes of agricultural production (monocultures) and the rise of new local elites (*ʿulamāʾ* networks, commercial networks) beneath the ruler's level. The stratum of the Uzbek tribal leaders gradually lost its former military power. But nevertheless, the new elites often behaved in the same way as their predecessors by using the politics of patronage to retain followers and obtain resources.

Although I tried to elucidate this phenomenon with the inertial force of the power worldview and concomitants of social order, the reader of this book may still be struck by the persistence of patronage. The only explanation I can offer here refers to the relational aspect of power. We are dealing with the ultimate social precept and binding glue of society, or in other words, with congealed power. As I have shown in chapter four, the analytical term patronage can only serve as a tool to describe a myriad of practices that were informed by reciprocity. After all, this norm, governing the social relations addressed in this study, perfectly reflects the dialectics of the two components of the worldview, the structuring and the structured structure. This interplay causes the norm to become ever more engraved in the worldview and makes it the manifestation of the social and the political. Finally, reciprocity is a deeply rooted adequate reaction and forms the basis of human nature.[68]

In the conceptual chapter, I have mentioned authors arguing that there can be power in a non-institutionalized form (actors can have power but no authority), while authority without power is also possible. During my research, I detected varieties of power that fit neither the first nor the second case. In the first half of the eighteenth century, Tuqay-Timurid power slowly dwindled. Finally, their royal authority was only buttressed by Chingizid legitimacy. Others exercised power and governed the ever fragmenting realm in their name. This process began when the Uzbek elite started to buy

[68] Pflücke, *Beiträge*, 73.

land. Though not possessing khanly authority, the *atālīqs* and eunuchs had their networks of power, over which they exercised patronal authority. They issued orders (engaged in ordering for the king) and derived their authority, allowing them to maintain their own retinues, from the proximity to the powerless king. In this particular context, it is difficult to discern who was the patron and who the client (the *khān* or the *atālīq*/*khwāja sarāyi* or vice versa). The fluidity of social power in early eighteenth-century Transoxania does not permit an unequivocal answer to this question. Depending on the situation and context, Abū'l-Faiż Khān and his *atālīqs*/eunuchs patronized each other. During rounds of appointments, for example, the king acted as a patron who fostered the career of his Manghit, Kīnakās, Sarāy or Khiṭāʾī-Qipchāq followers. Yet on the battlefield or in his besieged palace, he entirely relied on the protection of his *atālīq* or the *ahl-i maḥram*, including eunuchs and bodyguards. Nonetheless, the Chingizid principle still seems to have been strong enough to prevent full equality. In spite of all their power means, the *atālīqs* could not establish themselves at the top of the societal pyramid. Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān had to demonstrate his potential and military power on many occasions before he was able to assume the *khān* title. And even then, he married a Tuqay-Timurid princess.

Under his successor, we see a situation that approximated the state of ordered anarchy—sometimes called *mulūk al-ṭawāʾif*—at the highest level of social integration for more than ten years (1759–72/73). It is therefore possible to speak of Transoxania as a space of power devoid of institutionalized royal authority. Although there was a *khān*, his authority was not acknowledged by a *Herrschaftsverband* or a group of chiefs that managed to control the core areas of Transoxania. Put differently, although there was a Chingizid puppet ruler, he did not have the power to enforce his authority, nor was there any *amīr* who had the resources to do so in his name. Dānyāl Bī only controlled Bukhara, and even there he probably relied on a power-sharing deal with the urban nobility. Although power differentials can be traced at the amirid level, with younger *amīrs* in an inferior position, it took him a long time and exhausting military struggles to assert his power and forge a new *Herrschaftsverband* that could serve the puppet *khān*.

It was then under Shāh Murād that the spiral of centrifugal forces slowed down and the institutionalization of Manghit power gained momentum. In spite of prolonged rebellions, this process continued throughout the nineteenth century. The *khān* title was assumed by Naṣrullah and his successors, while Manghit power congealed to an extent that we see first

signs of territorialization. At the same time, and as ever, people still owed their loyalty to individuals only, not to abstract categories like a state or the ruling dynasty.[69] Their radius of action was determined by participation in certain social activities and their simultaneous integration in interrelated webs of a religious, economic and military nature. In Transoxania, a state in the proper sense of the word was being institutionalized from 1868 onward.[70] The Russian intervention and the delimitation of colonial spheres of influence brought a new dynamic to the local power structures. However, the resulting process should not be solely attributed to Russia's colonization agenda. The tender plant of Bukharan statehood grew through a complex negotiation process at the overlaps of local patronage networks.

THE END OF CHRONICLE WRITING

The findings make it evident that the historical materials, especially the court chronicles, provide snapshots of socially constructed realities. Many of those works owe their existence to power relations between the writers and the monarchs, or influential individuals with access to the inner circle of power around the king. Many authors were instructed to compile dynastic histories from the viewpoint of those in authority. Others wrote without resorting to a generous patron. To a certain degree the chronicles express collective attitudes *and* the individual worldviews of their authors. The work of the latter can be described as an ordering process shaped by the social context in which they lived and the norms and values that were common in those days, but also by individual tastes and ideas of proper behavior. Celebrating patronage ties and the exchange practices and relations involved, the chronicles form an integral part of the order they describe. At the same time, and as Anke von Kügelgen states, the Bukharan historiography is not "a monolithic block." Individual views are especially reflected by differences in the narrative form and style, and sometimes even in content.[71] Accordingly,

---

[69] This pattern also applied to the pre-Mongol context, see Paul, *Herrscher, Gemeinwesen, Vermittler*, 162, 169.

[70] This does not mean that Transoxania's social order was completely devoid of any signs of statehood. There were certain elements usually associated with states like diplomatic missions, treatises and handbooks on government (mirrors of princes), or on administration. But I do not consider these elements as major institutions making up a state in the sense proposed by social science.

[71] See von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 453.

the density and nature of information in the sources and the focus as regards content vary greatly. The more voluminous works of Mullā Muḥammad Sharīf and Qāżī Muḥammad Wafā with their characteristic ornate style provide a fine grid of data on the nature of social power and the exercise of royal authority, particularly in the context of the court and the military.

The above-mentioned authors had to legitimize their patrons' authority. Works like the *Tuḥfat al-khānī* needed to show that the new king observed the rules of the game. His actions and style of government had to correspond to local collective worldviews. Nevertheless, the chroniclers do not provide any theory concerning order and authority, and even when coming to talk about conceptual questions of order and rule, they tread in the footsteps of earlier authors like Niẓām al-Mulk.[72] Qāżī Wafā, Mullā Sharīf and their colleagues seldom reflect consciously on the meaningfulness of practices like *tarbiyat* or gift giving. Since the order of things is perceived as natural, there is no need for any explanation. Thus the institutions of authority have to be distilled by looking at the behavior of individual actors, their relationships and procedures.

Although they do not describe the institution of "authority" as such, the narratives of the *Tuḥfat al-khānī*, the *Tāj al-tawārīkh* or the *ʿUbaidullah Nāma* provide information on the institutionalization of power and notions of authority from a practical point of view. They offer detailed insights into power relations and sometimes also administrative minutiae. Yet the reader looks in vain for information about the daily life of the population, the material culture, economic relations or the education system.[73] Coronation ceremonies and rounds of gubernatorial appointments are particularly in the focus of some of the chroniclers. These are the contexts where the exercise of power by the king and his ordering activities become most visible. Here, the respective passages also contain instructions for the king. The exercise of power can similarly be observed during ceremonies like the *kūrnish* or a royal banquet.

Some authors value order, a fact that may be attributed to the tendency of power relations to also produce conditions that were commonly perceived as disorderly. In the chronicles, however, order is explained by the arrangements of often divinely legitimized kings. It is also seen as manifest

[72] Anke von Kügelgen reaches the same conclusions (von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 258–59, 455).

[73] Ibid., 453.

in hierarchies, reflected by a particular seating plan in the *kūrnish-gāh*, the assembly hall. In the works of Qāżī Wafā and Mullā Sharīf, the order of things appears as a divinely sanctioned universe, a cosmos where no clear dividing line between the realms of the supernatural and the natural exists. Since these sources restrict the focus of the investigation to a mere bird's eye view, allowing us to highlight the dynamics at court and at the level of the rulers and the Uzbek *amīrs*, they rarely inform about processes at village level or in urban quarters.

The chronicles constituted elements inherent in the existing framework of order and authority. The same held equally true for other types of sources such as *inshāʾ* letters, *mubārak-nāmas* and petitions from the Bukharan chancellery. While the chronicles concentrate on the heroic deeds of the king and his immediate circle of companions and associates, the other documents give detailed information on administrative affairs and the actions of office holders down to the most basic units of society. In a certain sense, instructions formulated in *inshāʾ* correspondence or the petitions affected the lives of many people in a wide range of places in the region. Giving a voice to ordinary people, who do not usually appear in the narrative sources, these documents highlight aspects (e.g., the indebtedness of people, embezzlement by certain actors, local conflicts) that often escape the attention of historians. In chapter five of this book, I used these sources for a range of micro-studies that are insightful and allow general conclusions that have the potential to enrich the debate on power and order.

Several aspects dominate our sources and may be worthwhile future fields of research on Central Asian history: first of all the military element, because the campaigns described served to enforce the rule of the king, which was totally personal and rested on his physical presence and that of his immediate entourage. The second aspect concerns the element of mobility. We observe physical mobility manifest in military expeditions with the character of seasonal migrations. This does not come as a surprise in a context dominated by nomadism and a pastoral economy. The aspect of physical mobility is also manifest in numerous resettlement campaigns, initiated especially by Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī in response to Nādir Shāh's strategy in Khurāsān. The sources also give insights regarding social or "vertical mobility." Social mobility is linked to the question of career opportunities (climbing the social ladder) and the resulting change in the social status of the protagonists. This social mobility is closely connected with the aspect of networking by the actors and their changing position in the field of power. Their careers were highly affected by the patronage they

enjoyed, for instance at the court or in other contexts. Cases in point were Khwāja Bāltū, the eunuch of the queen-mother, Muḥammad Raḥīm Bī, the future Manghit ruler, Ūtgūr Qūshbēgī, Amīr Ḥaidar's influential minister, ʿAbd al-Ṣamad Khān, who made a career in Naṣrullah Khān's service, but also the authors Mullā Sharīf and Amīn Bukhārī. Contacts and close relations with other actors may have played a similarly important role for all of them. Changes in social status were reflected by the reception of gifts (status symbols) from social superiors and/or by their seat near to or far from the throne. Other factors worth considering are the conflicts and violence that constitute routine aspects in the sources.

Throughout the period of investigation, we observe an uninterrupted flow of chronicles produced in Bukhara and its dependencies. The local historiography flourished even in the troublesome early eighteenth century, a period when the city of Bukhara was surrounded by hostile forces and the power of the monarchs shrank. Bert Fragner's analysis of six late Bukharan historiographies illustrates the persistence of indigenous patterns of chronicle writing in the eastern Islamic historiographic tradition. In spite of their critical attitude toward the last Manghit rulers and their reformist ideas, the works of authors like Dānish, Sāmī and ʿAinī display the same characteristics as conventional chronicles. They did not abandon the set of limitations of traditional chronicle writing. The fact that the "rules of the genre," as Fragner correctly puts it, allowed them "to include all kinds of hostile and sarcastic criticism of the Mang'it amirs without casting aside the qualities of the traditional chronicle,"[74] demonstrates the flexibility but also the inertia of their worldviews. The latter mirror an extreme split between reformist ideas on the one side and conformism on the other.

At the beginning of this book, I quoted two of the last works belonging to the conventional Bukharan historiography. One described the flight of the last Manghit ruler Amīr ʿĀlim Khān in 1920, the other the destruction Bukhara suffered during the Bolshevik capture. What had happened before? In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the power of the Manghit

[74] Bert G. Fragner, "Traces of Modernisation and Westernisation. Some Comparative Considerations concerning Late Bukharan Chronicles," in *Reason and Inspiration in Islam. Theology, Philosophy and Mysticism in Muslim Thought. Essays in Honour of Hermann Landolt*, ed. Todd Lawson (London/New York: I. B. Tauris in association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2005), 46–48.

state was further consolidated.[75] Simultaneously, Bukhara witnessed growing tensions between the various segments of the local society, especially the Qadims and the Jadids, but also Sunni Muslims and Shiites and different *ʿulamāʾ* networks. In addition to these groups, we see the rise of the Young Bukharans, a more radical offshoot of the Jadids led by Faizullah Khojaev. Under these conditions, it became increasingly difficult for Amīr ʿĀlim Khān to balance the interests of all those groups. Since the question of societal and political reforms had implications for his own power, he tried to postpone reforms.

The last years of Bukharan independence saw a series of power shifts between the more conservative *ʿulamāʾ* and the Jadids. During this process, the interdependence of Russia and Bukhara grew further. Subsequent to the February Revolution in Russia and the foundation of soviets in the four Russian enclaves (New Bukhara, Tirmidh, Chahār Jūy and Karkī), the Jadids turned to the Russians to push their reform agenda. In the end, the Russian resident in New Bukhara, and later the soviet of Samarqand willy-nilly played the role of mediators, making the position of an independent Bukharan ruler redundant. Enjoying the support of the Bolsheviks, the Young Bukharans made a first bid for power in early 1918. From the Russian enclaves they launched an unsuccessful military offensive headed by General Kolesov. Afterwards, all Jadids were exiled from Bukhara and the conservative forces gained the upper hand. Yet their victory was ephemeral. After two years, Faizullah Khojaev and his Young Bukharans returned together with the Bolsheviks.[76] ʿĀlim Khān fled to Ḥisār, a region that had created so much trouble for his forbearers, and from there to Kabul. The semi-independent Protectorate of Bukhara was abolished and replaced by the People's Republic of Bukhara that continued to exist as a Soviet satellite state until 1924.[77] Afterward it was merged with the People's

[75] Muḥammad ʿAlī Baljuwānī attempts to explain "the order of the authority of the Bukharan rulers" (*tartīb-i salṭanat-i pādishāhān-i Bukhārā*) as a clear-cut set of offices and administrative routines that reflect the consolidation of the Manghit state. However, the general formulation of the chapter title reveals the tendency to retrospectively apply these conditions to earlier periods of Manghit rule (Muḥammad ʿAlī Baljuwānī, *Tārīkh*, 22–37).

[76] Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 242–49, 265–69; Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 121–47, 163–66.

[77] For details see Carrère d'Encausse, *Islam and the Russian Empire*, 167–84.

Republic of Khiwa, the region of Samarqand and the core of the Ferghana Valley into the new Uzbek Soviet Republic.

Although the era of independent Bukharan rulers ended in 1920, chronicle writing continued for at least one decade after the revolution. In post-revolutionary Bukhara, the spectrum of the local historiography was enlarged by Russian, Ottoman and Iranian history, or works about the revolution avoiding the style of court chronicles.[78] An example is the *Tārīkh-i nāfiʿī* compiled by Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Sayyid Baljuwānī and finished in June 1927.[79]

I could now continue with the never-ending story of the order of things being constructed in the lands beyond the river, for instance as regards local worldviews and their impact during the Basmachī upheaval, the collectivization policy or the great purges in Stalinist times. It is a story that remains to be told.

[78] von Kügelgen, *Legitimierung*, 389–91.
[79] Fragner, "Traces of Modernisation and Westernisation," 44–45.