

Dignāga on air
or
how to get hold of supersensible objects by
means of a credible person

With preliminary remarks on the composition of
the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*¹

Helmut Krasser

1. Introduction

In the second chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*(*vṛtti*) which is devoted to the explanation of inference Dignāga supplies us with a discussion on air (*vāyu*) (PS[V] 2.3c–5b) which might be a summary of an independent work entitled *Vāyuprakaraṇa*.² There, an unnamed opponent attacks Dignāga's claim that inferences operate only with universals (*sāmānya*) arguing that we also know of inferences whose objects are non-universals (*asāmānya*).³ Stating that

¹ This paper is a revised and expanded version of the lecture «Das Selbstverständnis der buddhistischen erkenntnistheoretischen Schule und ihr Zugang zu Übersinnlichem,» held in Vienna in 2005.

² On the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*, see p. 175, Appendix 1.

³ «If so, you cannot say that all inferences have a universal as their object. Why?

Because one sees inferences also with regard to non-universals. PS 2.3c

Also in the case of such things (*svabhāva*) as air which are non-univer-

inferences refer to non-universals could either mean they refer to particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), the objects of perception, or that there is a third kind of object different from the two accepted by Dignāga, namely, particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) and universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Since Dignāga does not discuss the latter possibility and concludes this ‘airy’ discussion with the statement that inference does not refer to particulars,⁴ we can understand ‘non-universal’ in the sense of ‘particular.’⁵ Towards the end of this somewhat obscure discussion⁶

sals, one sees that they are inferred from temperature (*sparśa*)⁽¹⁾. As it is said: ‘And temperature is a logical reason for inferring air, but not the temperature belonging to the substances that can be seen.’» As the text of the PSV is far from being clear, I offer only a free translation.

⁽¹⁾ On the interpretation of *sparśa* as temperature in this context, see Preisendanz 1994: 503–504.

PSV_v 28a1–2: *gal te 'di ltar rjes dpag thams cad spyi'i yul can no žes ni brjod par mi bya ste | ci'i phyir že na |*

spyi ma yin la'an (asāmānye 'pi PST 2 13,13) mthoñ ba'i phyir || PS 2.3c

spyi ma yin la'an žes bya ba ni mthoñ ba'i rluñ la sogs pa'i rañ bžin (vāyvādisvabhāve PST 2 13,14) reg bya la sogs pas rjes su dpog pa'o || de skad du yañ (yathāha PST 2 13,15) ⁽¹⁾reg bya ni reg bya mthoñ ba rnam kyi ma yin no⁽¹⁾ žes bya ba la sogs pas brjod do že na |

PSV_k 109b5–7: *'on te thams cad spyi'i yul can yin no žes bya ba de yañ brjod par mi bya'o | ci'i phyir že na*

spyi ma yin la mthoñ ba'i phyir || PS 2.3c

rluñ la sogs pa spyi'i rañ bžin ma yin pa la yañ reg bya la sogs pa rnam kyi rjes su dpag pa mthoñ ba yin no || ji skad du ⁽¹⁾reg bya yañ mthoñ ba rnam kyi reg bya ma yin no⁽¹⁾ žes bya ba la sogs ba bśad pa lta bu'o ||

⁽¹⁾ *sparśaś ca, na ca dṛṣṭānām sparśaḥ* VSū 2.1.9–10, PST 2 14,3. For a discussion of these *sūtras*, see Lasic 2010: 518–519.

⁴ PSV_k 111a5–6: *de'i phyir rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can gyi rjes su dpag pa ni med do ||* = PSV_v 29a3: *de'i phyir rjes su dpag pa'i yul ni rañ gi mtshan ñid ma yin no ||*

⁵ See also *asāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam iti | svalakṣaṇaviṣayam* (PST_{ms} 153a2) referred to below p. 178.

⁶ A summary of the arguments is given in Onoda 2004 (in Japanese) and

Dignāga gives his definition of a credible person's statements (*āptavāda*), *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumāna-tā/tvam* (PS 2.5ab). While in another paper I have examined this definition in the light of Dharmakīrti's understanding,⁷ here I will examine Dignāga's ideas.

2. Dignāga on the statements of a credible person (*āptavāda*)

The definition of a credible person's statements in PS(V) 2.5ab has already been dealt with by a number of modern scholars.⁸ Recently, Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on this work has become available in its original Sanskrit. On its basis, we can reconstruct at least parts of Dignāga's PSV and thus get a better understanding. For this reason we will have another look at this definition. I will first present a Sanskrit reconstruction with the two Tibetan translations, then a tentative translation based on that, and finally a discussion of the problems involved. The reconstruction, which I have modified slightly, was kindly put at my disposal by Horst Lasic, who is currently preparing an edition and translation of the entire second chapter.⁹

The reader must be warned here that the Sanskrit reconstruction/retranslation, sometimes following PSV_K, sometimes PSV_V, sometimes being a mixture of both, and sometimes only being based on Jinendrabuddhi's PST, represents an artificial text that certainly never existed in this form. Nevertheless, this reconstruction is a necessary first step in order to get at least a rough understanding of the text.

Words that are not based on either Jinendrabuddhi's PST or any other Sanskrit source are printed *in italics*.

in Lasic 2010: 516–520.

⁷ See the chapter «2. PVSV 108,1–109,22 on PS 2.5ab» in Krasser 2012b: 84–102.

⁸ See, e.g., Eltschinger 2007: 70 (with n. 9) and Lasic 2010: 509–510. Mention should also be made of Onoda 2004.

⁹ It goes without saying that any remaining mistakes are my own.

2.1 Reconstruction of PS(V) 2.5ab with Tibetan translations

śābdam api tu⁽¹⁾ sambandhābhāva⁽²⁾ asādhāraṇaviṣayatvena dvidhānu-
mānaṃ kalpayitavyam — drṣṭārtham⁽³⁾ adrṣṭārtham⁽³⁾ ca. tatra drṣṭār-
the sañjñāvyutpattiḥ⁽⁴⁾. adrṣṭārthe ṛthavikalpamātram⁽⁵⁾, na viśiṣṭār-
thapratītiḥ⁽⁶⁾. kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam⁽⁷⁾. na hi svargādiśabdair
arthamātram ucyate⁽⁸⁾.

āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatvam⁽⁹⁾ | PS 2.5ab

āptavacanatvaṃ grhītvā⁽¹⁰⁾-arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt⁽¹¹⁾ tasya⁽¹²⁾-apy
anumānatvam⁽¹²⁾ uktam. tathā hy āha⁽¹³⁾ – pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt sañ-
jñākarmaṇa⁽¹⁴⁾ iti.

anayā diśā pradhānādi⁽¹⁵⁾svabhāveṣv apy anumānaṃ pratiśedhyam. tas-
mān na svalakṣaṇaviṣayam anumānam asti.

References are, if not otherwise indicated, to PST 2: ⁽¹⁾ 26,14–15 ⁽²⁾ 26,15; 27,4;
28,1 ⁽³⁾ 27,5 ⁽⁴⁾ 27,5–6; 28,3 ⁽⁵⁾ 27,7–8; 28,6 (quoted PVSV 37,27) ⁽⁶⁾ 28,6
⁽⁷⁾ 28,4 ⁽⁸⁾ 28,9–10; 28,12 ⁽⁹⁾ 29,1; 29,3; 30,11 ⁽¹⁰⁾ 30,1; 31,4 ⁽¹¹⁾ 30,2–3 ⁽¹²⁾ 30,2
⁽¹³⁾ 31,9 ⁽¹⁴⁾ VSū 2.1.19 ⁽¹⁵⁾ 31,14



sgra las byuñ ba yañ 'brel pa med par thun moñ ma yin pa'i yul mthoñ ba
dañ ma mthoñ ba las rjes su dpag pa rnam pa gñis su brtag par bya'o || de
la mthoñ ba'i don la miñ bstan pa'o || ma mthoñ ba'i don la don du rnam
par rtog pa tsam yin gyi don gyi khyad par rtogs pa ni ma yin no || ji ltar
de rjes su dpag pa ñid yin te mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgra rnam kyis don tsam
brjod pa ni ma yin no ||

yid ches tshig ni mi slu ba || spyi las rjes su dpag pa ñid || PS 2.5ab

yid ches pa'i tshig ñid bzuñ nas don de la mi bslu ba'i phyir dañ | mi 'dra
ba'i phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid du bśad pa yin te || de ltar yañ miñ gi las ni
mñon sum sñon du 'gro ba can źes bya ba yin no || phyogs 'dis ni gtso bo la
sogs pa'i rañ bźin rnam la rjes su dpag pa bkag pa yin no || de'i phyir rañ
gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can gyi rjes su dpag pa ni med do || PSV_K 111a1–6



sgra yañ yul thun moñ ma yin pa dañ 'brel ba yod pa ma yin pas rnam pa
gñis ka rjes su dpag pa brtag par bya ste | mthoñ ba'i don dañ ma mthoñ
ba'i don no || de la mthoñ ba'i don la ni mi (read: miñ) gsal bar byed pa'o ||
ma mthoñ ba'i don la ni rnam par rtog pa tsam 'ba' źig ste | don gyi bye
brag rtogs par byed pa ni ma yin no || gal te mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgras don
tsam brjod pa ni ma yin na ji ltar rjes su dpag pa ñid du 'gyur źe na |

yid ches tshig kyañ mi slu bar // mtshuñs phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid // PS 2.5ab

yid ches pa'i tshig ñid bzuñ nas kyañ mi bslu bar mtshuñs pa'i phyir de yañ rjes su dpag pa ñid du brjod do // de skad du yañ | miñ gi las rnams kyi don du mñon sum soñ ba'i phyir ro zes 'byuñ no // de dag gis ni phyogs dañ gtso bo la sogs pa'i rañ bzin la yañ rjes su dpag pa dgag par bya'o // de'i phyir rjes su dpag pa'i yul ni rañ gi mtshan ñid ma yin no // PSV_v 28b7–29a3

2.2 Translation of PS(V) 2.5ab

On the other hand (*api tu*), inference consisting in words (*śābda*) is, due to its having different objects (*asādhāraṇaviṣayatva*), to be conceived as being of two kinds: one whose object has been seen at the time when there was no knowledge of the connection between a word and its referent (*sambandhābhāva*), and one whose object has not been seen. From among these (*tatra*), in the case of the one whose object has been seen, we learn its name (*sañjñāvyutpatti*). In the case of the one whose object has not been seen (*adr̥ṣṭārtha*) we have a mere conception of the object (*arthavikalpamātra*), but no knowledge of the specific object (*na viśiṣṭārthapratīḥ*). How then (*katham tarhi*) is this latter an inference? Answer: Because (*hi*) it is not (*na*) the case that by words like 'heaven' (*svargādiśabda*) the mere non-specific object (*arthamātra*) is denoted (*ucyate*).

Because the character of being non-belying of a credible person's statement is the same (*sāmānya*), it is an inference. (PS 2.5ab)

This (*tasya*) too (*api*) has been said to be inference, because, having grasped a statement's being the statement of a credible person, it is equal in not belying with regard to the object (*arthāvisaṃvādātulyatvāt*). For in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* it is said accordingly (*tathā hy āha*): «Because giving a name to something (*sañjñākarmaṇah*) is preceded by its perception (*pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt*).»

In this way (*anayā diśā*), also an inference with regard to things such as primordial matter (*pradhānādisvabhāva*) is to be negated (*pratiṣedhya*). Thus, an inference that refers to a particular (*svalakṣaṇaviṣaya*) does not exist.

2.3 Explanation of PS(V) 2.5ab

To distinguish between the two kinds of inferences, Dignāga simply follows the opposing school of Nyāya. In *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7 and 8, where one of the four means of knowledge accepted by the Naiyāyikas¹⁰ is defined and explained, namely «word» (*śabda*), we read:

āptopadeśaḥ śabdāḥ // NSū 1.1.7

sa dvividho dṛṣṭādrṣṭārthatvāt // NSū 1.1.8

The means of knowledge ‘word’ is the statement of a credible person. This is of two kinds, due to its having an object that has either been seen or not seen.

This is explained in Pakṣilasvāmin’s *Nyāyabhāṣya* as follows:

yasyeha dṛśyate ṛthaḥ, sa dṛṣṭārthaḥ. yasyāmutra pratīyate, so ’dṛṣṭārthaḥ. evam ṛṣilaukikavākyānāṃ pravibhāga iti. kimarthaṃ punar idam ucyate? sa na manyeta «dṛṣṭārtha evāptopadeśaḥ pramāṇam arthasyāvadhāraṇāt» iti, adṛṣṭārtho ṛpi pramāṇam, arthasyānumānād iti. NBh 14,10–13 on NSū 1.1.8

That statement is said to have a seen object, whose object is seen here in this world. The one, whose object is seen above, i.e. not in this world, is said to have an unseen object. In this way one distinguishes between worldly statements and those of the sages.¹¹ With what purpose has this been said? So that this person (*sa*)⁽¹⁾ cannot maintain that only the statement of a credible person whose object has been seen is a means of knowledge, because one can determine the object; also the one whose object is not seen is a means of knowledge, because its object is inferred.

⁽¹⁾ *sa* might refer to the one who asked this question (?). In the NVTṬ (172,1–2) it is explained as referring to a non-believer who, however, is remote: *sa na manyeta dṛṣṭānāṃ vākyānāṃ prāmāṇyam. sa iti viprakṛṣṭo nāstikaḥ parāmṛṣyata iti.*

Although Dignāga does not count the Naiyāyikas’ means of knowledge *śabda* as a separate *pramāṇa* but subsumes it under inference, there can be little doubt that his distinction between two kinds of in-

¹⁰ See *pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni* // NSū 1.1.3.

¹¹ On the relation of NSū 1.1.8 with Pakṣilasvāmin’s explanation to the *Carakasamhitā*, see Preisendanz 2009: 282–285.

ferences, one whose object has been seen and one whose object has not been seen, is the same as the Naiyāyikas' distinction of *śabda*.

Dignāga's explanation contains, however, a bit more information than the NBh's. Although the meaning of the expression *sambandhābhāve* is far from being self-evident, and although Jinendrabuddhi's comments must be used with caution as he generally tries to interpret Dignāga in the light of Dharmakīrti's innovative elucidations, I see no harm in following Jinendrabuddhi here and understanding *sambandhābhāve*, «when the connection is absent,» as «at the time of convention» (*sambandhābhāva iti saṅketakāle* PST 2 26,15). Although the term *sambandha* has not yet been used in this discussion, it is clear from the context that it refers to the connection between words and their referents. This is what this sentence is about. And since such a connection between words and referents exists only in our mind, according to Buddhists, we can understand *sambandhābhāve* as 'when there is no knowledge of the connection between a word and its referent.' Moreover, since Dignāga is talking about 'word' in this sentence, this is what *śābdam anumānam* means, and this word is one that we learn now, this *sambandhābhāve* is restricted to the time when we hear such a word for the first time. Through this, the time before hearing the word for the first time, which is also characterized by the absence of the connection, is excluded. In this way we arrive at Jinendrabuddhi's *saṅketakāle*. Thus, the first kind of inference is one whose object has been seen at the time of convention when we are told its name, *sañjñāvyutpatti*, e.g. «This is a bread-fruit tree» (*ayam panasa iti* PST 2 27,6). The second kind of inference is different. When we learn the word «heaven» (*svarga*), we do not see heaven and thus, we can only have a conception of it. This seems to imply the problem that we cannot obtain what is taught in the scripture if it is based on mere conceptions, be it heaven or finally *niḥśreyasa* in the case of the Naiyāyikas or *nirvāṇa* in the case of the Buddhists.

In both the NBh and the PSV the problems involved are formulated very vaguely: «With what purpose has this been said?» (NBh) and «How then is this latter an inference?» (PSV).

The answers given to these questions are not very elucidating either. The NBh simply states that, because in both cases of a credible person's statement the object is determined or inferred, both can be regarded as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Dignāga would certainly not agree that we ascertain a real object (*arthāvadhāraṇa*) in the case of a credible person's statement whose object we have seen previously, as is assumed in the NBh. This would imply that words refer to real objects. But for Dignāga ordinary words only refer to the «exclusion» (*apoha*), as he then explains in PS(V) 5.¹² However, in the case of statements of sages regarding supersensible objects, he seems to follow the NBh's explanation, for he tells us that words like heaven are not belying with regard to real objects (*arthāvisamvādatulyatvāt*) and do not merely denote an object in general (*arthamātra*).¹³ Thus, as in the case of the NBh, we obtain what they teach us.

Because of their «similarity in being non-belying» (*avisamvādatulyatvāt*) such words of credible persons can be called inference (*anumāna*). Unfortunately, Dignāga does not tell us with whom or what these words of credible persons share their character of being non-belying. An explanation may have been contained in his *Vāyuprakaraṇa*, but even if this were the case, this is of no help as long as we do not have it. Thus, in order to avoid relying on Dharmakīrti's and post-Dharmakīrtian interpretations and to avoid thereby the risk of being misled by them, it is better to look for possible pre-Dignāgean candidates. As Pakṣilasvāmin has been a good companion so far, he seems a promising candidate for helping us to solve this problem as well. And indeed, in his comments on NSū 2.1.68 we find a few explanations that might shed some light on Dignāga's cryptic formulation in PS 2.5ab. NSū 2.1.68 is located within a series of arguments against the accusation brought forward in NSū 2.1.57 that «word» (*śabda*), in the sense of the credible statements of the sages

¹² The text of PS(V) 5 has recently been published with an annotated translation in Pind 2009.

¹³ This is also explained by Jinendrabuddhi: *tasmān nāptaprayuktaiḥ svar-gādīśabdair arthamātram ucyate. kiṃ tarhi. laukikaśabdāsādhāraṇe bāhye 'py artha iti* PST 2 28,12–13.

as available in the Veda, cannot be a means of knowledge, since the Veda contains untrue statements and is full of contradictions and repetitions.¹⁴ NSū 2.1.68 states that the Veda is a means of knowledge in the parts teaching supersensible objects which one cannot check to be true, just as it is a means of knowledge in the parts about mantras or the Āyurveda, which teach perceptible objects that one can see are true. The reason provided is that a credible person is a means of knowledge. How this works is explained by Pakṣilasvāmin in the following way.

dṛṣṭārthenāptopadeśēnāyurvedenādṛṣṭārtho vedabhāgo 'numātavyaḥ «pramāṇam» iti, āptaprāmāṇyasya hetoḥ samānatvād iti. NBh 97,8–9 on NSū 2.1.68

By means of the Āyurveda, being a teaching by a credible person the objects of which have been seen, that part of the Veda the object of which has not been seen can be inferred as a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇam iti*), because the credible person's authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*), which makes up the logical reason for such an inference, is the same.

If we now compare Pakṣilasvāmin's explanation to Dignāga's formulation *āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatvam*, we can easily see that the credible person's character of being non-belying (*avisaṃvāda*, PS) corresponds to the credible person's authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) in the NBh which is identified as the logical reason (*hetu*). *sāmānyāt* (PS), paraphrased by Dignāga himself as *tulyatvāt*, is the equivalent of *samānatvāt* (NBh). And since when dealing with inferences with seen and unseen objects Dignāga, from the beginning, follows Pakṣilasvāmin to the degree compatible with his own teachings, we might safely assume that the similarity of the character of being non-belying of this credible person consists in, as the validity in the NBh, a similarity between perceptible and imperceptible objects. We can thus understand Dignāga's definition of *āptavāda* in PS 2.5ab as follows.

Because the character of being non-belying of a credible person's statement is the same in the case of supersensible objects as in the case of objects that are accessible to us, such a statement is an inference in the

¹⁴ *tadaprāmāṇyam, anṛtavyāghātapunaruktadoṣebhyaḥ* NSū 2.1.57.

sense of an inferential mark.

If we formulate an inference of this type based on our reading of Dignāga through the lens of Pakṣilasvāmin, it might look like this:

This statement of this credible person regarding supersensible objects is non-belying, because it is this credible person's statement, like another statement of this credible person concerning perceptible objects.

If we reformulate this in terms of Dharmakīrti's *svabhāvahetu*, we arrive at the following:

Any statement of a credible person is non-belying, because it is the statement of a credible person.

And this is exactly the formulation we find in the comments of Śākya-buddhi/Karṇakagomin and Jinendrabuddhi, whose understanding is in accordance with Dharmakīrti's interpretation:

gañ dañ gañ ñes pa zad pa'i tshig de dañ de ni mi slu ba yin te PVṬ Je D242b3 = *yo ya āptavādaḥ, so 'visaṃvādi* PVSṬ 390,16

yad āptavacanam, tad avisaṃvādi PṢṬ 2 30,7

We thus arrive at the same understanding of PS 2.5ab when guided by Pakṣilasvāmin and when basing ourselves on Dharmakīrti and his commentators.¹⁵ We can therefore safely say that Dignāga was following the Nyāya model when formulating his definition of *āptavāda*.

In the *Vṛtti* on PS 2.5ab Dignāga then answers the first question: *kathaṃ tarhi tasyānumānatvam?* When we hear the statement of a credible person, we can infer that it is correct and that it finally makes known an external object such as heaven, because its non-belying character is the same as in those cases we can check. Jinendrabuddhi's comments read:

«**Having grasped the statement of a credible person**» and so forth. It (*tasya*) has been said to be an inference, having grasped the statement of a credible person which is a logical reason (*hetu*) for understanding that it is not belying (*avisaṃvāda*). The question why this (*tasya*) is

¹⁵ For the interpretation of PS 2.5ab based on Dharmakīrti and his commentators, see Krasser 2012b: 99.

now an inference is to be explained by «**because it is equal in being non-belying with regard to the object**» (*arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvāt*).¹⁶

The quotation from the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* serves the purpose of proving that a credible person must have seen what he relates and thus, being a credible person, what he tells us must be true. He gave the name «heaven» to something that he has seen, because giving a name to something is preceded by its perception (*pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt sañjñākarmaṇaḥ* VSū 2.1.19). Therefore, even if we only have a mere conception of this external object, he finally makes it known. Dignāga is expressing his own opinion by means of this quote. And cleverly, for the Vaiśeṣika remains no possibility to argue against this assumption as otherwise he would contradict his own scripture. Jinendrabuddhi:

By the words *tathā hy āha* Dignāga corroborates (*saṃsyandayati*) his own view with the other, i.e. Vaiśeṣika, treatise (*śāstrāntara*). Credible persons give the respective name only after having grasped the nature of things such as heaven by perception. «Name giving» is to be understood as a mere synecdoche (*upalakṣaṇamātra*), for they speak of everything only after having seen the object. Otherwise they would not be credible persons at all. Therefore each of their statements is non-belying. And thus their statement is inference.¹⁷

Dignāga then concludes his refutation by advising his students to follow the procedure found in this entire section if they have to refute other pseudo-entities such as the primordial matter (*pradhāna*) assumed by the Sāṅkhyas. For this, like «air» in the case of the Vaiśeṣika, is also known only from their scriptures.

¹⁶ *āptavacanam grhītvetyādi. āptavacanam grhītvāvisaṃvādādadhigama-hetuṃ tasyānumānatvam uktam. kasmāt punas tasyānumānatvam arthāvisaṃvādatulyatvād iti vyākhyeyam. PST 2 30,1–3.*

¹⁷ *tathā hy āhety anena svamataṃ śāstrāntareṇa saṃsyandayati. āptāḥ pratyakṣataḥ svargādīnāṃ svabhāvaṃ grhītvā sañjñāṃ praṇayanti. upalakṣaṇamātraṃ ca sañjñākarma veditavyam. sarvam eva hi te ṛthadarśanapūrvakam eva vyāharanti. anyathāptā eva na syuḥ. tasmāt teṣāṃ sarvam eva vaco 'avisaṃvādi. ataś cānumānam iti. PST 2 31,9–13*

Observations on the composition of the PSV

In the next part, I would like to make a few preliminary remarks on the composition of the PSV. These are only preliminary, because they are not based on an examination of the entire PSV, but only on bits and pieces that attracted my attention.

In Appendix 1, I have indicated two *pādas* of verses in the translation prepared by the team Vasudhararakṣita and Seṅ rgyal which are translated as prose in the version of Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab (PSV_V 27b7–28a1/PSV_K 109b5–6 and PSV_V 28a3–4/ PSV_K 102a2); see below p. 176. To this we may add another *pāda* and a half from the Nyāya section of the second chapter which immediately follows *pāda* PS 2.28a:

*'khrul ba'i phyir na ldan pa min // PS 2.28a (na matub vyabhicāritvāt
PST 2 66,12)*

*ldan par byed pa ni rigs na // sñar 'di ru yod do
śes 'bras bu sña ma dañ ldan par byed na ni yul de śes pa yañ sña ma dañ
ldan par 'gyur la | PSV_V D32b6–7*

⌘

*ldan min 'khrul pa srid phyir ro // PS 2.28a
gal te ldan pa byed pa yin na 'bras bu 'di la sñar rgyu yod do śes bya ba ni
sña ma dañ ldan pa yin la | de'i yul can gyi śes par yañ sña ma dañ ldan pa
yin no // PSV_K 115a8–b1*

Another case is from the Sāṅkhya section of the third chapter, where (an unidentified) verse is attributed to an unnamed teacher (*ācārya*, *slob dpon*) in the PSV. In Jinendrabuddhi's commentary, this teacher is identified as Vasubandhu.

*gañ du slob dpon gyis /
nañ la 'dus bsags ñid ma yin // de bzin gzan don can ma yin //
śes dogs pa bsu ste | PSV_V D48a3*

⌘

*slob dpon gyis kyañ dogs ba bsus nas de ltar nañ gi bsdus pa rnams gzan don
byed par mi 'gyur ro śes brjod pa yin no // PSV_K 134a6
yad āśāṅkyācāryavasubandhunā
saṅghātā āntarā evaṃ tathā na syuḥ parārthakāḥ //*

*ity uktam. PST_{ms} 137a5*¹⁸

Other cases are reported in Katsura 2009: 159 n. 19

«V (D49a2; P52a6) inserts one extra line between 3.29ab and 3.29cd: *gcig la nges par zhugs pa dang // log pa min pa('ang) rtags su 'gyur //*. K (135a5) takes this portion as being prose: *mtha' gcig la rjes su 'jug pa dang ldog pa'i shes pa gtan tshigs su 'gyur te.*»

and in Katsura 2009: 161 n. 21

«Here V inserts an extra *pada*: *gcig gi tshig tu bstan pa'i phyir //*. K (135a5) does not take it to be part of the verse, and this is supported by Jinendrabuddhi.»¹⁹

While in this latter case Jinendrabuddhi's exemplar (PSV_{jin}) of the PSV he was commenting upon supports «K» (Kanakavarman), during our work on the edition of PST 2 we have seen that PSV_{jin}, although generally closer to K, is sometimes closer to PSV_v. This has also been noted by Katsura in connection with PS 3.27:

«Generally I prefer to rely on K rather than V when I reconstruct or retranslate Dignāga, for Jinendrabuddhi normally supports K. However, as in the present case, he occasionally supports V, which clearly indicates the existence of more than two distinct recensions of the PS.» (Katsura 2009: 160)

That we are dealing with three quite different versions of the PSV is also supported by the fact that Jinendrabuddhi explains a passage of the PSV which, judged from the context, belongs to Dignāga's comments on PS 2.27d, where the Nyāya *pūrvavat* inference is discussed. This passage cannot be found in either of the two Tibetan PSV versions.

pūrvavaty api ceti. pūrvavad ity atra vipakṣe viṣāṇādiliṅgena gavārthānumāne samavāyaḥ sambandhaḥ. PST 2 69,6

sña ma dañ ldan pa la yañ 'zes pa sña ma vat ces pa 'di la 'dra ba'i phyogs la rva la sogs pa'i rtags kyi ba lañ gi don rjes su dpog pa na | 'du (P : du D) ba'i 'brel pa yin zin / PST_{Tib} D108a5–6/P122a6–7

¹⁸ On this verse, see Watanabe 2008: 64 and Eltschinger/Ratié 2013: 156.

¹⁹ More differences between the two Tibetan translations are presented in Katsura 2009: 161.

The material presented so far not only points to three different versions of the PSV, but it also amply reveals that these differences cannot be easily accounted for as being mere errors that crept in during a transmission that started with a single exemplar. While it is clear that some variants in the Tibetan translations such as *gyi/gyis*, *la/las* or even *yin/ma yin* (the latter possibly a misreading of *yin* and *min*, which look very similar in the Tibetan *dbu med* script) can be explained as transmission errors, differences such as verse versus prose cannot. It is hard to imagine that Kanakavarman could not distinguish between verse and prose. But how then can we explain these discrepancies? One possibility, and this is the one I consider the most plausible, certainly would be to assume that these errors were there from the beginning and that these manuscripts do not stem from the pen of Dignāga, but from the pens of different students who were taught *pramāṇa* by Dignāga. At least in the case of Bhāviveka's *Tarkajvālā* and digressions (*prasaṅga*) in his *Prajñāpradīpa*, we have some evidence that these texts represent notes taken by students.²⁰ And a paper in which I argue for the same in the case of Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya* is under preparation.²¹ Although nowhere in the PSV it is stated that we are dealing with notes by students, there is some evidence for such an assumption.

First we must ask for whom the PSV was composed. To answer this question we have to consider the purpose of this work. At the beginning of the PSV, Dignāga states that he composes this treatise in order to refute the means of knowledge taught by the opponents and to propagate the qualities of his own means of knowledge, because the proper cognition of knowable objects depends on these means of knowledge and because many people understand them incorrectly.²² While this is the direct purpose, at the end of the PSV

²⁰ See the chapter «3. On the authenticity of the *Tarkajvālā*» in Krasser 2012a, and Krasser 2011.

²¹ First results of my study on the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya* have been presented in the lecture «On ur-texts and writing styles in Indian philosophy» at the IABS conference in Taipei, June 2011.

²² *parapramāṇapratīṣedhāya svapramāṇaguṇodbhāvanāya ca, yasmāt pra-*

Dignāga formulates, according to the commentator Jinendrabuddhi, a second or indirect (*vyavahita*) purpose (*prayojana*) for having composed the work.²³

I composed this work in order to turn those who adhere to (*zen pa rnams*) the assumptions of the non-Buddhist Tīrthikas away from these ideas, because they are without essence as the valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*) and their objects (*prameya*), as taught by the Tīrthikas, are not fixed properly. However, by doing as much (*iyatā*) I do not aim at their introduction into the teaching of the Tathāgata, because his *dharma* is not in the realm of logic. But those who have turned away from the assumptions of the Tīrthikas can easily understand *dharmatā* after hearing it, since it is absent/remote from the Tīrthikas' teaching and present in/near the Tathāgata's teaching.²⁴

Here we learn that the followers of non-Buddhist teachings should be converted to Buddhism. The non-Buddhist teachings that are refuted in the PSV are those of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, and Mīmāṃsā. Thus, their followers are the final addressees of the PSV. Among them may have been followers who were well versed in philosophy and philosophical argumentation. These may have included, besides the Brahmins representing these systems, wealthy persons — nobles, kings or wealthy merchants — but also people from the broad masses. We thus might imagine that Dignāga wrote his PSV in his monastery, whereupon he sent his work to a scriptorium to be copied. Then copies of the PSV were distributed (in a pre-modern bookshop?) to these non-Buddhists.

A quite unlikely scenario. The broad masses, being illiterate, can be excluded. And I think that we are on the safe side when we exclude

māṇāyattā prameyapratipattir bahavaś cātra vipratipannāḥ PS 1 1,11–13. Instead of *pramāṇāyattā prameyapratipattir*, read *pramāṇādhīnaḥ prameyādhigamaḥ*, according to a quotation of the passage later in PST_{ms} 243a2–3: *tathā cōktam — yasmāt pramāṇādhīnaḥ prameyādhigamasa* [read: °ādhigama] *iti*.

²³ *pramāṇaprameyadurvihitatvenetyādinā śāstrārambhasya vyavahitaṃ prayojanaṃ darśayati* PST_{ms} 258b4.

²⁴ For the text and the context, see Krasser 2004: 131–135.

the group of wealthy persons, even if they were educated. Who and how many of them would have been qualified to read such a cryptic text, which rarely expresses what it wants to communicate directly? At best it would have caused a headache for the reader. Thus, only a small group of people remains: Brahmins well versed in philosophical argumentation and their students. But if they purchased and read copies of the PSV and if, in turn, Buddhist intellectuals such as Dignāga read their essays, then it is quite certain that Dignāga didn't achieve his aims. Indeed, no Brahmin author showed any indication that he was even slightly impressed by the PSV. On the contrary, the available texts of Dignāga's opponents that react to his criticism dislike his teachings and refute them. Why should these Brahmins give up their home, their family, their religious affiliation, and their income merely because they read some of Dignāga's arguments? And even if essays by contemporary opponents who reacted to Dignāga found their way into Dignāga's hands, at the best this would have remained an intellectual game under elites, with the general public completely excluded.

Moreover, in such a way Dignāga's statement at the end of the refutation of the Vaiśeṣika's *vāyu* inference, «In this way also the inference with regard to things such as primordial matter is to be negated» (see above, p. 151), must be understood as being directed towards his Sāṅkhya opponents: «Friends! Destroy the pillar of your beliefs by yourself, as I have shown you with the example 'air.' Having done so, jump over into my camp!» But what about Dignāga's aim of converting non-Buddhists? Was he a naive intellectual with his head in the clouds; had he lost any or all contact with reality? I don't think so; his works as summarized in the PSV do not give this impression. In this period, there was a lot of competition on the religious market and hostility between the various religious groups.²⁵ Dignāga's work fits into this socio-religious context very well.

²⁵ See, e.g., Eltschinger 2010. Bhāviveka (490/500–570), for example, introduces the Mīmāṃsakas to his students with the harsh words «Certain **evil Tīrthikas** who cannot stand the rays of the *maṇḍala* of the immaculate ten powers of the Buddha to know everything, his unerring teaching that illuminates all places, like those suffering from eye

But if we assume — as is the case with Bhāviveka's *Tarkajvālā*, the digressions in his *Prajñāpradīpa*, and with Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*²⁶ — that Dignāga's teaching served the purpose of preparing students for debates²⁷ with Mīmāṃsakas, Vaiśeṣikas, etc., then the indirect purpose for composing the PSV, namely to turn the followers of the Tīrthikas away from their erroneous beliefs, can be understood. Dignāga is teaching his students how to refute the main pillars of these non-Buddhist religious groups so that their followers might give up their beliefs and eventually follow the Buddha and his teachings, and join his community. Their introduction into

disease cannot stand the rays of the sun *maṇḍala*, i.e. the disc of the sun, state ...» (Krasser 2011: 53) and teaches them that the Veda is the product of an evil human mind: «Moreover, one can infer this Veda to have been made by an **evil human being**, because it teaches deeds such as harming living beings and drinking wine like the book of the Magas» (Krasser 2012a: 539). The evil Tīrthikas (*mu stegs can ñan pa*) mentioned here is one group of Dignāga's Tīrthikas. Bhāviveka's accusation finds its counterpart in Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*: «But such things that [you] teach seem attractive [only] to devotees. And we, not being devotees, seek reasoning. And these [teachings] which have flowed out of a wall, etc. cannot have been taught by a trustworthy person. And [we] won't trust the [teachings], [because we have a doubt] 'by whom have these [teachings] been uttered?' [Are they] taught by the Buddha [himself]? Or [are they] taught by those who are playing to deceive brahmins by means of distant echoes? Or [are they] stated by an unseen **evil-minded ghost** and the like? — Therefore those who regard [themselves] as wise men should not trust these [teachings]» (Kataoka 2011: 372–373, nn. 431 and 433, and Krasser 2011: 214–215). And Dharmakīrti concludes his PVSV with a quite telling verse (PV 1.340): «[Believing in the] authority of the Veda, claiming something [permanent] to be an agent, seeking merit in ablutions, taking pride in one's caste, and undertaking penance to remove sin, these are the five signs of complete stupidity devoid of any discrimination» (Eltschinger et al. 2012: 77–78).

²⁶ See above, note 20.

²⁷ Such debates are known from reports of Chinese pilgrims, Tibetan historical accounts and a few inscriptions; see Bronkhorst 2007 and Cabezón 2008.

Buddhism, however, is not the aim of compositions like the PSV, «because his *dharmā* is not in the realm of logic» (see above, p. 161).

If the assumption that Dignāga's teachings were addressed to his students is correct, then texts like the PSV were never meant to end up in the hands of his opponents, although they finally did, of course. They even were to be kept out of their reach. Why, after all, would someone provide a rival the arguments with which he intends to refute him? According to my understanding, these texts were meant to be circulated only within an inner circle. Also, they do not provide an account of all the main topics of the opponents' teachings, but only those that are predisposed to criticism. This goes together well with John Taber's observations on Dharmakīrti's arguments against the validity of the Veda:

«Thus, in the end, we arrive at the not very surprising result that, while Dharmakīrti exhibits broad knowledge of problems of Mīmāṃsā exegesis in PV(SV) 1.312–340, he displays nothing like an expert's command. It is possible he received some training in Mīmāṃsā at an early stage, but it would have been an introductory course.» (Taber 2012: 148)

This statement is qualified a little later (2012: 149):

«It would have been surprising, however, if matters turned out any differently. Dharmakīrti, after all, is addressing his own community — other Buddhists. He is not trying to convince Mīmāṃsakas or, it would appear, even get at the truth. In general, philosophical debate in classical India was characterized by *jalpa*, “disputation,” not *saṃvāda*, “discussion.” It was acceptable to raise *prima facie* objections to the views of one's adversaries, as a means of protecting one's own position, without necessarily having to represent those views sympathetically or completely accurately, placing the burden on one's opponent to set the record straight ...»

While I agree with this completely, I am not sure whether one can conclude from Dharmakīrti's arguments that «it is possible he received some training in Mīmāṃsā at an early stage, but it would have been an introductory course.» It goes without saying that if one enters a discussion this should be done with solid arguments. We have at least one statement of his to this effect. In his *Vādanyāya* Dharmakīrti scolds one of his students for not being prepared:

*tayor abhedād adoṣa iti cet, anuttaraṃ bata, doṣasaṅkaṭam atrabhavān
drṣṭirāgeṇa praveśyamāno 'pi nātmānaṃ cetayati. VN 12,7–9*

Dharmakīrti: If you assume that there is no mistake, because these two are not different, alas, this is not an answer! Although His Worship enters the difficulties of that mistake due to his love of his own view, he himself does not understand it. (German transl. Much 1991: 30; modified slightly)

Coming back now to Dignāga, we must ask how his teaching might have taken place. Did he first write the PSV in his cell or dictate it to a scribe, looking up various passages in his other texts and incorporating them, and then use this manuscript for his teaching? Or did he deliver his lectures without relying on a manuscript, quoting his other texts from memory? Although there are no clear indications for either assumption, I favour the latter.

First of all, this would allow us to explain the differences between the manuscripts, of which two were the basis for Tibetan translations. Another exemplar was used by Jinendrabuddhi. In addition, it better fits the purpose of the PSV as I understand it. Students were to be prepared for discussions with non-Buddhists: oral discussions, not written competitions. Thus, they had to learn to grasp the argument of a rival quickly, arguments that the latter has tried to formulate in a manner as complicated as possible, hoping that the former might not be able to follow. And they have to remember what the other has said, as well, of course, and to consider the context. This is something that must be practiced, either among themselves or under the supervision of an *ācārya*. At least in Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*, where in the second part of the latter students had to show that they had memorized all the points of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*) as taught in the *Nyāyasūtra*, in Pakṣilasvāmin's *Bhāṣya* and Uddyotakara's *Vārttika*, we have samples of discussions between students and their teacher.²⁸

²⁸ The following examples and others, e.g., from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, will be dealt with in another paper.

1) Student: ... Dharmakīrti: *krīḍanaśīlo devānāmpriyaḥ sukhaidhitaḥ kṛtaṃ kṛtaṃ punaḥ kārayati. tathā hi bijādyupanyāse nirloṭhitam etat.* HB 12,21–13,2, HB_{ms} 10b2

Student: ... Dharmakīrti: The beloved of the gods,²⁹ whose highest virtue consists in playing and who grew up under circumstances that were too easy (*sukhaidhita*), asks to be done again what has been done and done / to state again what has been stated again and again (*kṛtam kṛtam punaḥ kārayati*). For this has been explained already when discussing a sprout, etc. (4 pages earlier in the text; HB 8,16; German transl. Steinkellner 1967: 49) [How could an opponent who is not present know what Dharmakīrti has explained before?]

2) ... *idam evāsmābhir ucyamānaṃ kim atrabhavataḥ paraṣam ivābhāti. tasmāt tīrādarśineva śakuninā dūraṅgatvāpi punar āgantavyam ity alam apratiṣṭhānadikpratipattyā.* HB 26,1–4, HB_{ms} 19a6–b1

Student: ... Dharmakīrti: Why does His Honor look nearly aggressive (*paraṣam iva*) inasmuch as we are saying exactly that which you now claim. Thus, like a bird that does not see a shore even if it has flown far away must return to a boat of the sailors, you have to return again to the starting point.³⁰ Therefore, enough of going in a direction where there is no ground. (German transl. Steinkellner 1967: 66)

3) ... *vismaraṇaśīlo devānāmpriyaḥ prakaraṇaṃ na lakṣayati.* VN 12,1–2

Student: ... Dharmakīrti: The beloved of the gods, whose highest virtue consists in forgetfulness, does not consider the context. (German transl. Much 1991: 30)

Although these passages do not prove anything about Dignāga's PSV, in general they show that students might have been involved in the composition of such texts. And there is at least one passage in the PSV that gives the impression of Dignāga discussing with a student. This passage also clearly shows that the differences in the Tibetan translations can hardly be explained if we assume that at the beginning of the transmission there only was a single manuscript of the PSV.

²⁹ Arcaṭa explains *devānāmpriyaḥ* as 'simpleminded or silly one' (*devānāmpriyaḥ rjuḥ mūrkhō vā* HBṬ 119,11). According to Karṇakagomin, when explaining *devānāmpriyo* of PVSV 104,25–26, the gods are the silly ones (*devānāṃ mūrkhāṇāṃ priyo* PVSVṬ 380,29)

³⁰ On this example, see Steinkellner 1967: 177 n. 63.

From verse 14 of the fifth chapter, which deals with *anyāpoha*, the exclusion from others, Dignāga explains how compounds such as *nīlotpala*, blue lotus, can refer to one and the same referent and have a qualifier-qualified relation under the assumption that this *anyāpoha* is the referent of a word.³¹ In the course of his explanation he states that if taken alone, the words *nīla* and *utpala* do not have a referent, but together they do, just as the phonemes *nī* and *la* (of the word *nīla*) alone are without a referent but when taken together as *nīla* they have a referent. It is here that an opponent, my alledged student, disagrees with Dignāga's example, stating that Dignāga has said that the word *nīla* has a referent, whereas in a compound *nīla* alone is without a referent. To the opponent this seems contradictory. This disagreement is expressed in quite different words in the two Tibetan translations.

³¹ For the restored text and translation, see Pind 2009: A5f. and 86f.

Vasudhararakṣita

(V1) *gal te kha dog brjod pa la ni dañ
la yis cuñ žig kyañ don gyi rtog pa mi
bskyed do žes pa ni brgal žiñ brtag pa
spañ ba ste |*

*kha dog gi don cuñ zad kyañ ||
min na'añ tshig gñis la de yis ||
brjod bya rtogs na de la yañ ||
yan gar ba de rtogs pa yin || PS 5.16*

Kanakavarman

(K1) *mi mtshuñs pa bkod pa yin te | yi
ge brjod pa na don 'ga' žig rtogs pa ma
yin gyi | sñon po žes bsdus pa na rtogs
pa yin no ||*

*yig la don 'ga' med ce na |
de'i brjod bya žes bya ba |
tshig gñis la rtogs de la yañ |
de 'ba' žig la rtogs par byed || PS
5.16*

*varṇe na kaścīd arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye |
tadvācya iti tatrāpi kevalam sa pratīyate || PS 5.16*



(V1) Opponent: If you say (*gal te ... žes pa ni*): «If the phonemes (*kha dog, varṇa*) are stated alone, on account of *nī* and *la* no cognition of any referent whatsoever arises,» you give up (*spañ ba, *hāñi*), what you have been questioning (*brgal žiñ brtag pa, *pary-anuyukta*) in my position.

In the case of a phoneme (*varṇa*) no referent whatsoever is known. However, in the case of the two words *nīla* and *utpala* the referent of *nīla* is known. Answer: In the latter case, too (*tatrāpi*), only the referent (*sa*) that is known alone (*kevalam*) is to be denoted by that (*tadvācya iti*). PS 5.16 (translation of the Sanskrit)

(K1) Opponent: What you say is incorrect (*mi mtshuñs pa bkod pa yin, viṣama upanyāsaḥ*): «If the phonemes are stated alone, no referent whatsoever is known. But if they are stated together as *nīla*, the referent is known.»

Vasudhararakṣita

(V2) *ji ltar ni'i sgra dañ la'i sgra dag ni la'i sgras stoñ pa de b'zin du u tpa la dañ sñon po'i sgra dag kyañ 'dus pa'i sgras stoñ ste | (V3) ji skad du ni dañ la'i sgra (read: sgras) cuñ zad kyañ don gyi rtog pa mi bskyed do zes pa b'zin no ze na | (V4) de la yañ rigs sñon po ni sgra'i brjod bya'o zes yan gar ba rtogs par bya ste | (V5) yon tan de'i brjod bya dañ ldan pa yin nam na ni (read: yin nam) rdzas ldan pa'i (read: pas) ldan pa yañ yin pas (V6) kha dog don gyis stoñ pa ñid b'zin du 'dus pa la (read: las?) yañ tha sñad de go bar bya ba yin no || (V7) sgra tha dad kyi brjod pa (read: brjod bya?) yin na ni don gyi sugs kyis don tha dad do zes brjod pa yin no || (V8) de'i phyir g'zan sel ba'i sgra'i don la g'zi mthun pa dañ | khyad par du byed pa dañ khyad par du bya ba dag 'thad pa yin no || PSV_v D69a7-b4 / P73b4-8 (PSV 5 116-118)*

Kanakavarman

(K2) *ji ltar ni'i sgra dañ la'i sgra dag phyi rol gyi (read: brjod bya'i) don gyis stoñ pa de b'zin du u tpa la (add: dañ) sñon po'i sgra dag bsdus pa (read: pa'i) don gyis stoñ pa yin no || (K3) sñon po'i sgras don 'ga' žig rtogs pa yin no zes gañ b'sad pa (K4) de la yañ rigs 'ba' žig sñon po'i sgras brjod pa'i (read: bya'i) phyir 'ba' žig rtogs pa yin no || (K5) de'i yon tan dañ ldan pa dañ rdzas dañ ldan par brjod bya yin par rigs pa'i phyir (K6) yi ge b'zin du don gyis stoñ pa'i bsdus pas kyañ rtogs par byed do || (K7) sgra tha dad pa'i brjod par bya ba'i don gyis don tha dad pa zes brjod pa yin no || (K8) de'i phyir sgra'i don g'zan sel ba la g'zi mthun pa dañ khyad par dañ khyad par gyi g'zi dños po 'thad pa yin no || PSV_k P159b3-8 (PSV 5 117-119)*



(V2) Just as (*ji ltar*) the word *nī* and the word *la* are empty of the word *nīla*, in the same way also the two words *nīla* and *utpala* are empty of the two words combined (*'dus pa'i sgra*, **samuhaśabda*). **(V3)** As has been said (*ji skad du*) in the introduction to PS 5.16: «by *nī* and *la* no cognition of any referent whatsoever arises.» **(V4)** In that case too, the blue genus (*rigs sñon po*, **nīlajāti*) alone (*yan gar ba*, **kevalam*) is known to be denoted by the word (*sgra'i brjod bya'o zes*, **śabdavācyā iti*).

(K2) Just as the words *nī* and *la* are empty of the referent to be denoted (*brjod bya'i don*, *vācyārtha*) by the word *nīla*, in the same way the words *utpala* and *nīla* are empty of the referent of them combined. **(K3)** It has been said in the introduction to PS 5.16: «On account of the word blue no referent whatsoever is known.» **(K4)** In that case too, the genus (*rigs*, **jāti*) alone (*'ba' žig*, **kevalam*) is known, because it is denoted by the word blue alone (*'ba' žig sñon po'i sgras brjod pa'i phyir*).

(V5) Either the quality (*yon tan*, **guṇa*) is connected with the genus that is denoted by the word blue, or (*nam ... yañ*) the substance (*rdzas*) is connected with that quality that is connected with the genus (*rdzas ldan pas ldan pa*, **yuktena yuktaṃ dravyam*). **(V6)** Therefore (**tasmāt*), as in the case of the phonemes (*kha dog*, **varṇa*) that each alone lacks the referent of the two together, in the case of / on account of the compounded words *nīla* and *utpala* (*'dus pa la/las*), too, this expression (*tha sñad de*), i.e. *nīlotpala*, is understood to denote the blue lotus (?). **(V7)** Words like *nīlotpala* have been said in PS 5.14a to have referents different (*don tha dad do źes brjod pa/bya yin*) from words like *nīla* and *utpala* alone by implication (*don gyi źugs kyis*) under the condition that ... (*sgra tha dad kyi brjod bya yin na ni*). **(V8)** Therefore, co-referentiality (*gźi mthun pa*, **sāmānādhikarānya*) and qualifier-qualified relation (*khyad par du byed pa dañ khyad par du bya ba dag*) are justified (*'thad pa*) under the assumption that this *anyāpoha* is the referent of a word (*gźan sel ba'i sgra'i don la*).

(K5) It is correct that this genus is denoted (*de'i ... brjod bya yin par rigs pa'i phyir*, **tasya vācyatvopapattiḥ*) inasmuch as it is connected with its quality (*de'i yon tan dañ ldan pa*) and (*dañ*) with its substance (*rdzas dañ ldan par*). **(K6)** Therefore (**tasmāt*), like in the case of the phonemes (*yi ge*, **varṇa*), on account of the compounded words *nīla* and *utpala* (*'dus pas*), too, which are empty of the referent of the words alone, the blue lotus (?) is known. **(K7)** Words like *nīlotpala* have been said in PS 5.14a to have referents different (*don tha dad do źes brjod pa yin*) from the referent that is denoted by the different words alone (*sgra tha dad pa'i brjod par bya ba'i don gyis*). **(K8)** Therefore, co-referentiality (*gźi mthun pa*, **sāmānādhikarānya*) and the qualifier-qualified relation (*khyad par du byed pa dañ khyad par gyi gźi dños po*) are justified (*'thad pa*) under the assumption that this *anyāpoha* is the referent of a word (*sgra'i don gźan sel ba la*).

(1) — In the *pūrvapakṣa*, the opponent's critique is formulated in quite different wordings, although the content is the same: If *nīla* in contrast to the phonemes *nī* and *la* has a referent, it is contradictory to say that *nīla* in the compound *nīlotpala* does not have a referent. Jinendrabuddhi's exemplar of the PSV is closer to (K1), but his identification of this mistake as *abhyupetaḥāni*, giving up one's own assumption, might reflect *brgal źiñ brtag pa spañ ba* (**paryanuyukta-*

hāni) in (V1). *cuñ žig kyañ* of (V1) cannot be construed, but according to (K1) it should qualify the referent (*don*, **artha*). The reason for the adduced example's being incorrect is introduced, according to Jinendrabuddhi, with the words *na hi*. *hi* is not reflected in either of the two Tibetan translations. In verse 16, I understand, following Jinendrabuddhi, *pādas* 16ab as summarizing the opponent's statement, and *pādas* 16cd as representing the answer. This understanding is not reflected in the Tibetan translations. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation:

PST_{ms} 201b1-2: *viṣama upanyāsa iti dṛṣṭāntavaiṣamyam āha. kathaṃ viṣama ity āha — na hītyādi. etenābhyupetahānim āha, nīlaśabdasya kevalasyāpy arthavattvenābhyupagamāt.*

varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye / PS 16ab
naiṣa doṣaḥ, yasmāt

tadvācya iti tatrāpi kevalaṃ sa pratīyate // PS 16cd

tatrāpi nīlaśabde yo ṛtho gamyate, sa nīlaśabdavācya iti kevalaṃ pratīyate, na tu samudāyārtho nīlaśabdavācyaatvena pratīyata ity arthaḥ.

The phrase «**what you say is incorrect**» indicates the incorrectness of the example. The question why it is incorrect he answers with the words *na hi*. By this the opponent is stating that Dignāga gives up his assumption, because he assumes the word «blue» to have a referent also alone.

In the case of a phoneme no referent whatsoever is known. However, in the case of the two words *nīla* and *utpala* the referent of *nīla* is known.

Answer: This mistake does not apply, since

In this latter case too, it is only that referent that is known alone to be denoted by that word *nīla*.

In that case too, i.e. in the case of the word blue, it is only **that** referent which is understood **that is known alone to be denoted by** the word blue. It is not, however, the referent of the two together (*samudāyārtha*) that is known to be denoted by the word blue. This is the meaning.

(2) — The prose explanation is introduced with *yathaiva hi*, according to Jinendrabuddhi (PST 201b3). *eva* and *hi* are not reflected in either (V2) or (K2). (K2), with the correction of *phyi rol gyi* to *brjod*

*bya'i*³² and two other minor corrections, seems to offer a proper beginning of the explanation of the answer in the verse. (V2) is meaningless in this context unless we understand it as a short note in which «the referent» has to be understood from the context. Then (V2) and (K2) cover the same meaning.

(3) (4) — (3) is introduced with the words *yat tūktam* (*ji skad du ... b'zin V, gañ bśad pa K*) which, according to Jinendrabuddhi, repeat the opponent's argument in the introduction to PS 5.16ab. The following sentence (4), beginning with *tatrāpi* (*de la yañ KV*), explains the second half of the verse, i.e., PS 5.16cd, beginning with *tadvācya iti*.³³ While in (V3) the first part of the *pūrvapakṣa* in (V1) is repeated (*ni dañ la'i sgras cuñ zad kyañ don gyi rtog pa mi bskyed do*), in (K3) it is the latter part (*sñon po'i sgras don 'ga' žig rtogs pa yin no*) of (K1). In (K4), where the first 'ba' žig seems to be superfluous, we learn that it is only the genus alone that is known, because it is denoted by the word blue. The ablative clause *brjod bya'i phyir* seems to reflect K's interpretation of *tadvācya iti* of the verse. While (K4) tells us that the genus is known because it is denoted by the word «blue,» in (V4) we read that the blue genus is known to be denoted by a word. It must be understood from the context that the blue genus is denoted by the word «blue.»³⁴

(5) and (6) show, if we follow Jinendrabuddhi, that irrespective of whether the word «blue» refers to the quality blue that is connected to the genus to be denoted by the word «blue» — since the genus is inherent in the quality or refers to the substance that is connected with the quality, the latter being connected to the genus — none of

³² The Tibetan *phyi rol gyi don* reflects a Sanskrit *bāhyārtha*. I consider this to be the result of an erroneously transmitted or misread *vācyārtha*.

³³ *yat tūktam ityādinā pūrvapakṣam pratyuccārya tatrāpītyādinā tadvācya ityāder uttarārdhasyārtham ācaṣṭe* PST_{ms} 210b3.

³⁴ «Genus,» so Jinendrabuddhi, is the blueness that inheres in the blue quality. The word «alone» (*kevalam*) indicates that the word blue lacks the referent of the two words *nīla* and *utpala* together (*jātir nīlaguṇasamavāyini nīlatvam. kevalagrahaṇena samudāyārthasūnyatām āha* PST_{ms} 210b3–4).

the referents of the word «blue» is identical with the referent of the words *nīla* and *utpala* together. Thus, the lack of the referent was stated in the example with regard to the referent of the two phonemes together. In the same way, the lack of a referent of *nīla* alone in the compound *nīlotpala* was meant as the lack of the referent of *nīlotpala*, and therefore the example is not incorrect and Dignāga has not given up his position.³⁵ *'dus pa la* in (V6) might be a translation of *samudāyaiḥ*, the reading that was available to Jinendrabuddhi; see also *bsdus pas* in (K6). In this case, a correction to *'dus pa las* might be taken into account.

(7) and (8) finally show why a co-referentiality and qualified-qualifier relation is justified under the condition that the *anyāpoha* is the referent of a word. This, however, is not my concern here. *sgra tha dad kyī brjod pa/brjod bya yin na ni don gyi śugs kyis* of (V7) might reflect a Sanskrit *bhinnaśabdavācyē rthena*, a corruption of an original *bhinnaśabdavācyēnārthena*. If so, (V7) would have the same meaning as (K7).



The material presented here in connection with the explanation of how co-referentiality is possible in the case of words such as *nīlotpala* clearly shows that the differences in the Tibetan translations cannot be explained if we assume that a single Sanskrit manuscript was the starting point of the Sanskrit transmission of the manuscripts used for the translations.³⁶ And using the phonemes *nī* and *la* as an example for illustrating that the words *nīla* and *utpala* of the compound

³⁵ *nīlaśabdavācyayā jātyā yukto guṇo vā yatra sā samavetā, jātiyukte-
na guṇena yuktaṃ dravyaṃ vā yatra nīlaguṇaḥ samavetaḥ. sarvaṃ
cedaṃ na samudāyasyārthaḥ. tad evam ubhayatrāpi samudāyavācyē-
nārthenānarthakatvasyābhisamhitatvān nāsti vaiṣamyam upanyāsasya.
nāpy upetabādāḥ pratijñāyā iti. tasmād arthaśūnyair iti samudāyār-
thaśūnyaiḥ. samudāyair iti nīlādiśabdaiḥ* PST_{ms} 210b4–6. *tasmāt* seems
to be reflected in *yin pas* at the end of (V5) and *rīgs pa'i phyir* at the end
of (K5).

³⁶ A nice example for the fact that two quite different Tibetan translations
might nevertheless go back to similar Sanskrit versions is presented in
Lasic 2011.

nīlotpala, when taken alone, do not have a referent indicates that this text served an educational purpose, at least in my understanding. I do not see any other meaningful explanation. If we assume that Dignāga sat in his cell and wrote a text about *anyāpoha*, he could simply have stated from the beginning that the example was meant with regard to the referent of the word *nīla*. Then it would have been clear that individually *nīla* and *utpala* do not refer to the same thing as the two words together. Or Dignāga could have used a different example. But it seems odd to suppose that Dignāga wrote this example and then realized that it might be misunderstood (which is really contrary to the purpose of an example), and then started a discussion about why it nevertheless is correct. This does not contribute anything to the understanding of *anyāpoha*, which is the topic of the chapter. If, on the other hand, this example was used in the process of Dignāga teaching students we can assume that it was intentionally formulated to be misleading. The student to whom we might attribute the *pūrvapakṣa* fell into Dignāga's trap. In PS 5.16ab Dignāga recapitulated his mistake and then taught him a lesson: Be careful when you accuse an opponent of arguing in the wrong way. You yourself might be the loser!

If we accept that (at least parts of) works such as Dignāga's PSV or Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* consist of notes taken by students during classes given by the respective teacher, notes that also include discussions between the teacher and his students, it is clear that these are not pure philosophical works structured according to philosophical needs. Sometimes the structure of certain discussions follows the — not always intelligent — questions of the student(s). Thus, not every theory of an opponent as presented in Buddhist works has necessarily to correspond to a theory that was really held by a follower of an opposing school. They might also be ad hoc ideas of students. Nonetheless, we still have the philosophical theories of the teachers, since I do consider these works as having been authored by them.³⁷ But they are also documents that allow a fascinating glimpse

³⁷ See the chapter «Methodological considerations» in Kellner 2010: 181–185, where she, among other problems, also considers the practices of textual production and transmission of Buddhist *pramāṇa* texts.

into Buddhist teaching classes during the fifth to sixth centuries, a teaching the purpose of which seems to have been to introduce students to the art of argumentation and rhetoric.

Appendix 1 — *Vāyuprakaraṇa*

Based on a quotation from the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV_v D28a5–6 on PS 2.3d = PSV_k 110a5) in PVS_v 14,20–21 (= PVin 2 97,8–9), in connection with which Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin refer to the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*,³⁸ the section PS(V) 2.3c–5b dealing with air (*vāyu*) as taught by the Vaiśeṣika has been identified by Steinkellner (1979: 130 n. 499) as being this *Vāyuprakaraṇa*. The relevant passage by Dharmakīrti reads:

PVS_v 14,20–15,1 (= PVin 2 97,8–9): *yady adarśanamātreṇa dr̥ṣṭebhyaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate, na ca so 'pi yukta iti*. This has been identified by Gnoli in his edition as coming from the PSV.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ *ma mthoñ ba tsam gyis mthoñ ba las log par grub pa'i phyir ro || de ltar yañ rigs pa ma yin te | PSV_v D28a5–6 (on PS 2.3d) = gal te ma mthoñ ba tsam gyis ma mthoñ ba 'gag pa byed na de yañ mi rigs te | PSV_k 110a5*

Karṇakagomin identifies this quotation as stemming from Dignāga without giving the name of the source text :

... *ity ukte vaiśeṣikeṇa, tatrācāryadiñnāgenoktam — yady adarśanamātreṇa dr̥ṣṭebhyaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate, na ca so 'pi yukta iti. yad etad uktam, tad virudhyata iti vārttikakāro darśayann āha — dr̥ṣṭetyādi* (= PV 1.20). PVS_vṬ 66,25–27

In his explanation, Karṇakagomin, following Śākyabuddhi, then refers to the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*:

tad vyācaṣṭe — yadītyādi (PVS_v 14,20). *yad āhācāryo vāyuprakaraṇe — yady adarśanamātreṇa dr̥ṣṭebhyaḥ pṛthivyādibhyaḥ sparśasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate vaiśeṣikeṇa, na ca so 'pi yukta iti* PVS_vṬ 67,11–13 = *de bstan pa'i phyir gal te zés bya ba la sogs pa smos te | slob dpon gyis rluñ gi rab tu dbye ba las gal te bye brag pas ma mthoñ ba tsam gyis mthoñ ba sa la*

³⁸ The *Vāyuprakaraṇa* is also referred to by Vibhūticandra (PVV 291) in note 8 (continued from 290). There, Vibhūticandra seems, in part, to base himself on material coming from PVT/PVS_vṬ.

sogs pa las reg pa 'gog par byed na de yan rigs pa ma yin no **zés bśad pa gañ yin pa** / PVT Je D34b1-2

The words *prthivyādibhyaḥ sparśasya* and *vaiśeṣikeṇa* (*sa la sogs pa las reg pa, bye brag pas*), which are neither found in Dharmakīrti's quotation nor in the PSV, might indicate that the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* is a work independent from this *vāyu* section in the PSV. We otherwise must interpret these additional words as explanatory glosses. The strange clause *yadi ... na ca* might indicate that the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* was a *mīśraka* text with *na ca so 'pi yuktaḥ* being part of a verse and the *yadi* sentence being the introductory prose. This might be an example for what Lasic (2010: 515) calls Dignāga's «method of copy-and-paste.» Also, in one translation of the PSV we have parts of verses that are not considered as belonging to the PS. While on the one hand this reveals that the two Tibetan translations are based on quite different Sanskrit manuscripts, it might also indicate that these verses stem from another work by Dignāga, namely, the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*.

1) *rañ gi mtshan ñid bstan bya min ||*

zés byas pas na rtogs par bya ba'i don gyi bdag ñid mñon sum gyi yul yin žiñ spyi rjes su dpag pa'i yul ñid du mñon par brjod pas mñon par brjod do || PSV_v 27b7-28a1

rañ gi mtshan ñid ni bstan par bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir bdag ñid rtogs pa ñid kyi don du mñon sum yin la | rjes su dpag pa ni spyi'i yul can yin te de brjod par byed pas brjod bya'i phyir de ñid rnam pa gñis su phye ba yin no || PSV_k 109b5-6

2) *gal te kun gyi rjes thogs las ||*

*grub ste 'di ltar **kun gyi rjes thogs las** rluñ la sogs pa'i rañ bžin rjes su dpag par grub pa'o || PSV_v 28a3-4*

gal te yoñs su lhag pas grub pa yin te yoñs su lhag pa las rluñ la sogs pa'i rañ bžin rnam la rjes su dpag pa 'di 'grub par 'gyur te | PSV_k 102a2

In the Tibetan tradition, too, the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* is referred to as an independent work. Go rams pa bSod nam señ ge (1429–1489) lists a *Vāyuprakaraṇa* with *Vṛtti* among the works of Dignāga that were

translated into Tibetan and that Sa skya Paṇḍita studied with his teacher Śākyaśrībhadrā.³⁹

Also gTsañ Paṇḍita (1738–1780) treats the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* as though it were a work independent from the PSV. In his (*rGyas pa'i bstan bcos*) *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rañ don le'u dan gžan don le'u gñis kyi dka' ba'i gnad gsal bar byed pa chos kyi grags pa'i dgoñs rgyan*⁴⁰ he distinguishes explicitly between two contradictions, one to the PSV (*kun btus kyi rañ 'grel*) and the other to the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* (*rluñ gi rab byed*): *dañ po luñ drug dañ 'gal tshul la gsum | rigs sgo dañ 'gal tshul | kun btus kyi rañ 'grel dañ 'gal tshul | rluñ gi rab byed dañ 'gal tshul lo ||* (11a1–2). In order to show a contradiction to the PSV, gTsañ Paṇḍita refers, among other things, to *kun btus las | gañ yañ gal te ma mthoñ ba tsam gyis mi snañ ba dag la 'gog par byed na de yañ rigs pa ma yin no | zes pa'i luñ dañ 'gal lo |* (21a5–6). And for a contradiction to the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*, he refers to *rluñ gi rab byed las | gal te ma mthoñ ba tsam gyis mthoñ ba dag la 'gog bar byed na de yañ rigs pa ma yin no || zes pa'i luñ luñ tshad mar khas blañs pa dañ 'gal lo ||* (20b2–3). The difference between the two passages seems to be the perceptibility (*Vāyuprakaraṇa*) and imperceptibility (PSV) of the object in question. This, however, is not our concern here. That the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* is an independent work is also supported by dGe ba rgyal mtshan (1387–1462) who in his PS commentary *Tshad ma kun las btus pa zes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa'i rgyan* tells us that the PS is a summary of the *Nyāyamukha/Nyāyapraveśa* (*rigs pa'i sgo*), the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* and other works of Dignāga (*rigs pa'i sgo dañ rluñ gi*

³⁹ Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge, *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi dka' ba'i gnas rnam par bśad pa sde bdun rab gsal*, in bSod nams rgya mtsho (compiled), *The Complete Works of Go ram bSod nams seng ge* (The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism, Vol. 12), Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko 1969, pp. 1–167: *bod du 'gyur ba la yañ | rluñ gi rab byed 'grel pa dañ bcad pa | dmigs pa brtag pa 'grel pa dañ bcas pa | dus gsum brtag pa ... rnam yod do ||* 3a3; see also *rluñ gi rab byed rtsa 'grel sogs* 5a2.

⁴⁰ Cited from the ACIP version; Catalog Number: S0300; http://www.asianclassics.org/release6/flat/S0300N_T.TXT; last visited 2.3.2013.

*rab byed sogs rañ gi gzuñ kun las rdzogs par btus te 'dir bstan bcos kyi
lus gcig tu bya ba yin pa'i phyir | 11a2-3.*⁴¹

Another quotation can be added to the one from the *Vāyuprakaraṇa* in PVT/PVSVT treated above.⁴² At the beginning of the *Sāṅkhyaparīkṣā* of the PSV's third chapter, *parārthānumāna*, Dignāga, when refuting the existence of primordial matter, refers to another statement of his. The passage reads in its two versions:

gal te gtso bo yod pa ñid bsgrub bya yin na de ni mi bden te |

tshad ma'i yul ni mi śes phyir ||

*spyi'i mtshan ñid kyi yul can ma yin pa'i rjes su dpag pa ni yod pa ma yin
no źes bstan zin to || PSV_K 141b4-5*

*gal te 'dir gtso bo'i yod pa ñid bsgrub bya yin no (yin no P : yin D) źe na |
de ma yin te |*

tshad ma'i yul ma śes pa'i phyir ro ||

*spyi'i mtshan ñid ma yin pa'i yul la (yul la D : yul P) rjes su dpag pa yod pa
ma yin no źes bstan zin to || PSV_V D54a5/P57b6-7*

On the basis of Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā* this passage can be reconstructed as follows.

yady atrāstitvaṃ pradhānasya sādhyam, tad asat,

pramāṇaviśayājñānāt ||

na hy asāmānyaviśayam anumānam astīty upapāditam.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ PST_{ms} 153a1-2: *yady astitvaṃ pradhānasya sādhyam, tad asat, ayuktam. kuta ity āha — pramāṇaviśayājñānād iti. pramāṇaśabdenātrānumānaṃ vivakṣitam. tasya viśayaḥ sāmānyam. tadajñānāt. asāmānyalakṣaṇaviśayam iti svalakṣaṇaviśayam. upapāditam iti vāyuprakaraṇe pratipāditam.*

Later, Jinendrabuddhi refers to this passage again and adds *sākṣāt* (PST_{ms} 157b7): *tatrāpi yadi sākṣāt pradhānāstitvaṃ sādhyam, tad asat, pramāṇaviśayājñānāt. na hy asāmānyalakṣaṇaviśayam anumānam astīti.*

⁴¹ In *Collection of works of the ancient Sa-skyapa scholars* [4 vols.] vol. 1, Dehradun: Sakya College 1999.

⁴² Whether Dharmakīrti's phrase *adṛṣṭārthe 'rthavikalpamātram* (PVSV 37,27), already identified by Gnoli as coming from the PSV,⁽¹⁾ has a counterpart in the *Vāyuprakaraṇa*, we cannot say.

⁽¹⁾ PSV_V 29a1 (on PS 2.5ab): *ma mthoñ ba'i don la ni rnam par rtog pa tsam 'ba' źig ste = PSV_K 111a2-3: ma mthoñ ba'i don la don du rnam par rtog pa tsam yin gyi*

The wording *na hy asāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam anumānam asti* is not found in PS(V) 2.3c–5b, but its content is implicitly stated there as well.

Abbreviations and primary sources

- HB — Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ*. Teil 1 – Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text. Wien 1967.
- HBṬ — Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jinavijayaji (eds), *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the Sub-Commentary Entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*. Baroda 1949.
- NBh — *Nyāyabhāṣya* — Anantalal Thakur (ed.), *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana*. New Delhi 1997.
- NSū — *Nyāyasūtra* — see NBh
- NVTṬ — Anantalal Thakur (ed.), *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra*. New Delhi 1996.
- P — *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking edition*, ed. D.T. Suzuki. Tokyo/Kyoto 1955–1961.
- PS 1 — Ernst Steinkellner, *Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter 1*. (April 2005) http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf (last visited: 2.3.2013)
- PST 1 — Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic (eds), *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, chapter 1*. Part I: Critical edition. Part II: Diplomatic edition with a manuscript description by Anne MacDonald. Beijing/Vienna 2005.
- PST 2 — Horst Lasic, Helmut Krasser, Ernst Steinkellner (eds), *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, chapter 2*. Part 1: Critical edition. Part 2: Diplomatic edition. Beijing/Vienna 2013.
- PST_{ms} — Manuscript B of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*. See the description by A. MacDonald in PST 1, Part II.
- PST_{Tib} — *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi). D Tshad ma vol. 20, no. 4268, Ye 1–314a7/P vol. 139, no. 5766, Re 1–355a8.
- PSV 5 — Masaaki Hattori (ed.), *The Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga with Jinendrabuddhi's commentary. Chapter five: Anyāpoha-parīkṣa. Tibetan text with Sanskrit fragments*. (Kyoto 1982) (Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters,

Kyoto University, 21).

PSV_K — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga), Tibetan translation of PSV by Kanakavarman and (Mar thuñ) Dad pa(ʼi) śes rab. P vol. 130, no. 5702, *Ce* 93b4–177a7. No equivalent in D.

PSV_V — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga), Tibetan translation of PSV by Vasudhararakṣita and (Ža ma) Señ (ge) rgyal (mtshan). D Tshad ma vol. 1, no. 4204, *Ce* 14b1–85b7/P vol. 130, no. 5701, *Ce* 13a6–93b4.

PV_{in2} — *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, chapter 2 — Ernst Steinkellner (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya. Chapters 1 and 2*. Beijing/Vienna 2007.

PVSV — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* — Raniero Gnoli (ed.), *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The first chapter with the autocommentary. Text and critical notes*. Rome 1960.

PVSVṬ — *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭikā* — Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana (ed.), *Karṇakagomin's commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti*. Kyoto 1982 (reprint).

PVṬ — *Pramāṇavārttikaṭikā* (Śākyabuddhi) — D Tshad ma no. 4220, vol. 3, *Je* 1b–328a7, vol. 4, *Ñe* 1–282a.

PVV — Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with commentary by Manorathanandin*. Published as an appendix to the *Journal of the Bihar Oriental Research Institute* 24–26 (1938–1940).

VN — Michael Torsten Much (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāyaḥ. Teil I – Sanskrit-Text*. Wien 1991.

VŚū — Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the commentary of Candrānanda*. Baroda 1961.

Secondary sources

Bronkhorst 2007 — Johannes Bronkhorst, Modes of debate and refutation of adversaries in classical and medieval India: a preliminary investigation. *Antiquorum Philosophia* 1 (2007) 269–280.

Cabezón 2008 — José I. Cabezón, Buddhist narratives of the great debates. *Argumentation* 22 (2008) 71–92.

Eltschinger 2007 — Vincent Eltschinger, *Penser l'autorité des écritures. La polémique de Dharmakīrti contre la notion brahmanique orthodoxe d'un Veda sans auteur. Autour de Pramāṇavārttika I.213–268 et Svavṛtti*. Wien 2007.

Eltschinger 2010 — Vincent Eltschinger, Apocalypticism, heresy and philoso-

- phy – Towards a sociohistorically grounded account of sixth century Indian philosophy. In: H. Marui, Sh. Hosaka, G. Shaku, M. Taniguchi, K. Sasaki (eds.), Project report – *Investigation of religious pluralism and the concept of tolerance in India*. Research project number 19202003. Tokyo 2010.
- Eltschinger et al. 2012 — Vincent Eltschinger, Helmut Krasser, John Taber, *Can the Veda speak? Dharmakīrti against Mīmāṃsā exegetics and Vedic authority*. An annotated translation of PVSV 164,24–176,16. Vienna 2012.
- Eltschinger/Ratié 2013 — Vincent Eltschinger, Isabelle Ratié, *Self, no-self, and salvation. Dharmakīrti's critique of the notions of self and person*. Wien: VÖAW.
- Kataoka 2011 — Kei Kataoka, *Kumārila on truth, omniscience, and killing. Part 2. An annotated translation of Mīmāṃsā-Ślokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (codanāsūtra)*. Wien 2011.
- Katsura 2009 — Shoryu Katsura, Rediscovering Dignāga through Jinendra-buddhi. In: Ernst Steinkellner, Duan Qing, Helmut Krasser (eds), *Sanskrit manuscripts in China. Proceedings of a panel at the 2008 Beijing Seminar on Tibetan Studies, October 13 to 17*. Beijing 2009, 129–166.
- Kellner 2010 — Birgit Kellner, Towards a critical edition of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 52/53 (2009–2010) 161–211.
- Krasser 2004 — Helmut Krasser, Are Buddhist Pramāṇavādins non-Buddhistic? Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the impact of logic and epistemology on emancipation. *Hōrin* 11 (2004) 173–146.
- Krasser 2011 — Helmut Krasser, How to teach a Buddhist monk to refute the outsiders – Text-critical remarks on some works by Bhāviveka. *Dhīh* 51 (2011) 49–76.
- Krasser 2012a — Helmut Krasser: Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti and Kumārila. In: François Voegeli, Vincent Eltschinger, Danielle Feller, Maria Piera Candotti, Bogdan Diaconescu & Malhar Kulkarni (eds), *Devadattiyam, Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume*. Bern, etc. 2012, 535–594.
- Krasser 2012b — Helmut Krasser: Logic in a religious context: Dharmakīrti in defence of āgama. In: Eltschinger et al. 2012, 83–118.
- Lasic 2010 — Horst Lasic, A hot dispute about lukewarm air: Dignāga on āpta-vāda. In: Piotr Balcerowicz (ed.), *Logic and belief in Indian philosophy*. Delhi 2010, 509–525.
- Lasic 2011 — Horst Lasic, Meditations on the retrieval of lost texts with special reference to the Sāṅkhya section of Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter 2.

- Indogaku Chibettogaku Kenkyū / Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies* 15 (2011[2012]) 231–243.
- Much 1991 — Michael Torsten Much, *Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāyaḥ. Teil II – Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*. Wien 1991.
- Onoda 2004 — Harumi Onoda, The controversy between Dignāga and Vaiśeṣika in the Pramāṇasamuccaya (in Japanese). *Indotetsugaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 11 (2004) 71–86.
- Pind 2009 — Ole Holten Pind, *Dignāga's Philosophy of Language – Dignāga on anyāpoha. Pramāṇasamuccaya V; texts, translation, and annotation*. Dissertation, Universität Wien 2009 (<http://othes.univie.ac.at/8283/> ; last visited 8.1.2012).
- Preisendanz 1994 — Karin Preisendanz, *Studien zu Nyāyasūtra III,1 mit dem Nyāyatattvāloka Vācaspatimiśras II. Teil 2*. Stuttgart 1994.
- Preisendanz 2009 — Karin Preisendanz, Logic, debate and epistemology in ancient Indian medical science – An investigation into the history and historiography of Indian philosophy. *Indian Journal of History of Science* 44/2 (2009) 261–312.
- Steinkellner 1967 — Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil 2 – Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*. Wien 1967.
- Steinkellner 1979 — Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*. Wien 1979.
- Taber 2012 — John Taber, Dharmakīrti and the Mīmāṃsakas in conflict. In: Eltschinger et al. 2012, 119–149.
- Watanabe 2008 — Toshikazu Watanabe, Controversies over the proof for the existence of *puruṣa*: Vasubandhu, the *Yuktidīpikā*, and Uddyotakara (in Japanese). *The Annals of the Research Project Center for the Comparative Study of Logic* (2007 [2008]) 5, 63–77.