

Action theory and scriptural exegesis in early Advaita-Vedānta (1)

Maṇḍana Mīśra on *upadeśa* and *iṣṭasādhana*tā¹

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In what is presumably his last work, the *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, written in Benares around 1640,² Khaṇḍadeva Mīśra, the great 17th-century Mīmāṃsaka, reports an interesting opinion he attributes to *tārki-kāḥ*, the exponents of “New Logic” or Navya-Nyāya.³

The context is the classical discussion about the cause of human activities (*pravṛttihetu*). According to these late “logicians,” an action (the action of cooking for instance) would take place only once the agent has come to know three distinct properties of the action

¹ This article is the partial outcome of a seminar held at the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge, during the Autumn-term 2010, under the supervision of Dr. Vincenzo Vergiani and Dr. Eivind Kahrs. Although this study greatly benefitted from the comments of these two scholars, I take the entire responsibility for its conclusions. I also heartily thank Dr. S.L.P. Anjaneya Sarma and Dr. Maṇi Drāviḍa, with whom I had the privilege to read and discuss large portions of the *Vidhiviveka* and the *Nyāyakaṇikā* during my stay at the Pondicherry Centre of the École française d’Extrême-Orient in 2010.

² See GODE 1940: 13. It is widely accepted that Khaṇḍadeva (a younger contemporary of Appayya Dīkṣita according to RAMASWAMI SASTRI 2009: 68) was born around 1600 and died in Benares in 1665 (see EDGERTON 1986: 18, RAMASWAMI SASTRI 2009: 68 and KANE 1977: 1199).

³ See *Bhāṭṭarahasya* p. 8.4–21.

he is about to undertake: it should be feasible or realizable by means of an act (*kṛtisādhya*), it should be useful or, in other words, it should be a means of bringing about something suitable to the agent's wish (*iṣṭasādhana*) and it should not entail any strong undesired consequence (*balavadaniṣṭānanubandhin*). A knowledge of the whole set of three properties (without hierarchy between them) would be needed, in their opinion, in order to explain why people do not normally undertake actions such as touching the moon (*candrasparśa*), which is harmless and might be desirable but is unfeasible, going round in circles (*maṇḍalīkaraṇa*), which is certainly possible and harmless but useless, or eating a mixture of honey and poison (*madhuviṣasam-ṛktānnabhojana*), an action at the same time possible and beneficial (inasmuch as eating honey is a means to experience pleasure) but entailing a strong undesired consequence, namely death.

This theory, strongly criticized by Khaṇḍadeva himself in the *Bhāṭṭarāhasya*, is indeed a strange juxtaposition of philosophical ideas that had been considered for centuries in India as mutually exclusive. Leaving aside the last property, probably introduced into the discussion much later, one can easily recognize behind the first two properties the leading positions of the two main theoreticians of action of classical Mīmāṃsā in the second half of the first millennium: Śālikanātha Miśra, the major proponent of Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā in the 8th/9th century (?),⁴ and Maṇḍana Miśra. To explain how both antagonist ideas came to be conflated by these late authors into a single "mixed" theory of action is not an easy task, as it presupposes a precise understanding of these doctrines as they were elaborated in their own particular intellectual context, and this is precisely what Khaṇḍadeva, in spite of all his accuracy, does not provide us

⁴ The equivalence between the two concepts of *kṛtisādhya* ("realizable by [means of] an act") and *kārya* ("to be done," "compulsory"), the second more commonly used by Prābhākara himself in his works, can be seen from Śālikanātha's definition of *kārya* in the *Vākyārthamātrkā* [VAM] 2.13ab: *kṛtisādhyam pradhānam yat, tat kāryam abhidhīyate* |; "That which is realizable by [means of] an act and prevails [over this act] is what [we] call *kārya*" (p. 431.13). See also VAM 2.7c: *kāryatā kṛtisādhyatvam*; "to be *kārya* is to be realizable by [means of] an act" (p. 428.11).

with. Leaving aside Śālikanātha, I will limit myself to a few remarks on the case of Maṇḍana.

The Indian tradition is unanimous in crediting Maṇḍana Mīśra (660–720?)⁵ with an original theory of action, according to which the cause of all human activities is the knowledge of their “being a means for realizing a desired [end]” (*iṣṭasādhana*tā).

Following this well-known theory, first exposed in the *Vidhiviveka* (“A reflection on *vidhi*,”⁶ henceforth ViV), rational beings under-

⁵ The most exhaustive discussions of Maṇḍana’s date are found in SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 216, who assigns him “um 700, höchstens ein wenig früher, keinesfalls später” (n. 150), and in THRASHER 1993: 111–128, who surveys most of the available opinions (see especially n. 1 and 2 [p. 152]) and proposes the similar date 660–720. The main landmarks circumscribing Maṇḍana’s period of activity are, on the one hand, Kumārila, Prabhākara and Dharmakīrti, whom he repeatedly refers to, and, on the other, Umbeka, who reports variant readings of the *Bhāvanāviveka* in his commentary thereon. According to Thrasher, Maṇḍana’s *Brahmasiddhi* presupposes Śāṅkara’s work (see THRASHER 1993: 114–121), but the evidence he provides in favour of this hypothesis is not sufficient, in my opinion, to establish a more precise dating on this basis.

⁶ The Sanskrit word *vidhi* is used in (Pūrva- and Uttara-)Mīmāṃsā texts to express (at least) three different meanings, that should not be confused. 1. According to Pāṇini’s use of the term in A. 3.3.161 (*vidhinimantraṇa ... prārthaneṣu liṅ*), *vidhi* is a “command,” understood as the particular act or intention of a speaker, justifying the use of the optative and other related verbal forms. This and similar grammatical *sūtras* are frequently referred to by Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins, who generally avoid though using *vidhi* in this first sense and favour equivalent (sometimes equally Pāṇinian) terms, such as *ājñā*, *praiṣa* or *preṣaṇa*. 2. In the most widely and anciently accepted classification of Vedic sentences into *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa*, a *vidhi* (syn. *codanā*) is a kind of *brāhmaṇa*, namely the direct “injunction” of a particular ritual act. 3. In a more technical sense, already found in Kumārila’s work (see DAVID 2012), *vidhi* is the cause of human activity (*pravṛttihetu* or *pravartaka*), especially when it is the result of a speaker’s utterance, regardless of its being a particular speech-unit (*śabda*), its operation (*vyāpāra*) or a particular meaning (*artha*). On the identification of *vidhi* with *pravṛttihetu*, see for instance ViV 1 (*Vṛtti* [S 66.1–70.1 – quoted below]) and VAMV

take activities if and only if they know that their action will lead to an expected good.⁷ This evaluative principle of action is claimed to provide a universal explanation for human activity, regardless of its being the result of an independent reflection on the part of the agent or the response to a speaker's utterance such as a command, a request, etc., in the context of an inter-subjective or collective action. Correlatively, this property of actions is also considered to be a specific meaning (*artha*)⁸ conveyed by verbal suffixes present in

2.3–4ab (p. 419.10–11: *śabda eva pravṛttihetubhūto vidhiḥ, tadvyāpāro vā ...*). See also Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's definition of *vidhi* in the fifth *āhnika* of the *Nyāyamañjarī* (*vidher lakṣaṇam etāvad apravṛttapravartanam* |; “the distinctive characteristic of *vidhi* amounts to this, that it induces the activity of [someone who is still] inactive” [vol. 2, p. 92]), obviously a paraphrase of the *Brahmasiddhi* (p. 116.17: [...] *tasyā apravṛttapravartanālakṣaṇatvāt*). I have chosen not to translate the term *vidhi* when it is used in this third sense, as it is clearly the case in the title of Maṇḍana's work or in that of later works concerned with the same topic and closely dependent on the ViV, like Pārthasārathi Miśra's *Vidhinirṇaya* or the *Vidhivāda* of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. A work such as Appayya Dīkṣita's *Vidhirasāyana*, on the other hand, is a discussion of different categories of injunctions (*vidhi*, in the second sense) and as such lies, to a large extent, outside the intellectual tradition inaugurated by Maṇḍana's treatise.

⁷ I am using the expression “rational being” as an equivalent of the Sanskrit term *prekṣāvanta*, denoting an individual who is capable of undertaking an action on the basis of a reflection on the goals he wishes to accomplish and on the means to achieve them. See BIARDEAU 1969: 83, who appropriately paraphrases the Sanskrit term *prekṣā* as “un regard porté en avant et en fonction duquel l'action sera déterminée.” The importance of this concept in Maṇḍana's system was rightly pointed out by M. Biardeau, but her claim (*ibid.*) that the use of this term is specific to him is certainly an exaggeration. On *prekṣāvanta* and related terms denoting (practically) rational agents/persons, see V. Eltschinger's contribution in the present volume.

⁸ The Sanskrit word *artha*, when it is used in Mīmāṃsaka or Vedāntic texts, is often advantageously translated by the English word “object,” for in the case of nouns like *ghaṭa* (“pot”) for instance it always refers to the pot itself or to the corresponding universal (“pot-ness”), none of which is, strictly speaking, the “meaning” of this word: “le terme sanskrit *artha* ne désigne jamais autre chose dans la Mīmāṃsā que l'objet

injunctive sentences, such as the optative (*liñ*) and imperative (*loṭ*) endings, or suffixes involved in the derivation of gerundives (*kr̥tya*).⁹ For instance, in an imperative sentence such as *gām ānaya* (“Bring the cow!”), the function of the imperative is, according to this theory, to indicate that the specific action referred to by the verbal root (the bringing of a cow) is the means for realizing (*sādhana*) a desired end (which, in that particular case, can only be supplied).

Prescriptions found in religious texts (Maṇḍana discusses mostly, if not exclusively, Vedic examples) are no exception to this general scheme, their elements being understood, according to an old exegetic principle already found in Śabara’s *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*, along the lines of worldly usage.¹⁰ Hence, a Vedic injunction such as the archetypal *svargakāmo yajeta* (“Let him who desires heaven sacrifice!”) should be interpreted, just like its worldly counterpart, as indicating the existence of a causal relationship between a certain means (*sādhana*) – the sacrifice, expressed by the verbal root \sqrt{yaj} – and its expected result (*sādhyā*), a relationship which, when this result or “fruit” (*phala*) is a desired one (*iṣṭa/samīhita*), alone justifies the actual undertaking of the prescribed sacrifice. This analysis clearly

lui-même en tant que perçu et non une idée de l’objet” (BIARDEAU 1964: 161). In the context of Maṇḍana’s thought, I nonetheless prefer to keep the more general translation “meaning,” insofar as the word *artha* is used by him to refer to any kind of import of a word or a sentence, be it the “thing-meant” (BROUGH 1951: 29 [n. 1]) in the case of nouns, or the particular intention of a speaker, i.e. what is “meant” by him while uttering a certain word or sentence. This nuance does not fundamentally invalidate M. Biardeau’s remark, since, for a Mīmāṃsaka like Maṇḍana, speech is in any case directly related to entities of both kinds (things-meant and intentions), and not to the corresponding idea.

⁹ These three categories of suffixes, to which the Vedic *leṭ* is sometimes added, are generally summed up in the compound *liñādi* (“[Suffixes] such as *liñ*”) often used without further precision or analysis.

¹⁰ See Śābarabhāṣya 1.3.30 (*lokaveda*°): *ya eva laukikāḥ śabdāḥ, ta eva vaidikāḥ, ta evaiṣām arthāḥ*; “The [words] of the Veda are the same as the words of ordinary [Sanskrit]; [hence,] their objects must [also] be the same” (A₂ 231.6–232.1). Similar statements are found elsewhere in Śabara’s *Bhāṣya*. See KATAOKA 2011₂: 441–442 (n. 564).

involves the presupposition that each and every act prescribed in the Veda, including perpetual (*nitya*) and occasional (*naimittika*) rites, could be linked with a desired fruit, a presupposition that is not shared by all Mīmāṃsakas.¹¹

The general idea lying at the heart of Maṇḍana's analysis is certainly not entirely new within Mīmāṃsā around that time. His great predecessor, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (600–650?), states more than once in his work that the specific teaching of an injunction (*codanā*) indicates the causal relationship between an action and its expected result. As he writes in the *Ślokaṅgīyā*: “a relationship between what is to be accomplished and the means of accomplishing [it] is [what is] made known by an injunction” (*sādhyasādhanasambandh[o] vidhinā pratipādit[aḥ]*).¹² Nonetheless, the characterization of *iṣṭasādhanatā* as the specific object of injunctive suffixes (*liṅ*, *loṭ* and the *kṛtyas*), the consequent identification of the knowledge of this property as the instrument (*karāṇa*) of “verbal effectuation” (*śabdabhāvanā* or *abhidhābhāvanā*),¹³ as well as the project of a general explanation of

¹¹ See VAMV 2.30 (p. 445.1–7). See also STCHERBATSKY 1926 and NAKAMURA 1994.

¹² *Ślokaṅgīyā* (*codanā*°) k. 220ab (text in KATAOKA 2011₁: 50; translation in KATAOKA 2011₂: 472 [I am slightly altering the syntax of Kumārila's verse]). At the beginning of the *codanā*-section of his *Ślokaṅgīyā* (k. 14ab), in a passage which is quoted by Maṇḍana in the ViV (T 224.2–3), Kumārila similarly states that the specific teaching of the Veda is, according to him, that substances, actions and qualities constituting the sacrifice are “means of accomplishing the supreme” (*śreyasādhana*) (see KATAOKA 2011₂: 206–209). The same idea is repeated in k. 190–191 of the same section, where Kumārila explicitly identifies “that which brings about the supreme” (*śreyaskara*) with *dharma* (see KATAOKA 2011₂: 440–441).

¹³ I have emphasized elsewhere (see DAVID 2012) the relative obscurity of the concept of *vidhi* in the framework of Kumārila's theory of verbal effectuation as exposed in the “chapter on *arthavādas*” (*arthavādādhikaraṇa*) of the *Tantravārttika* (under *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.2.7). It seems highly plausible that the ViV was initially written by Maṇḍana with the overt intention to dispel such an obscurity by a thorough examination of the concept of *vidhi*. If this hypothesis is correct, one can directly correlate Kumārila's statement in the *Tantravārttika* (A₂ 12.25) according

human activity on this basis, are undoubtedly Maṇḍana's own original contribution, and were clearly recognized as such by the later tradition.

Nonetheless, if nearly all major Mīmāṃsakas writing after the 7th century extensively discussed Maṇḍana's position, all of them did not, by far, adhere to it. As one might expect, Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas from Śālikanātha onwards unanimously rejected it,¹⁴ but more surprisingly, even within the Bhāṭṭa-tradition, the ideas of Kumārila's most skilled disciple failed to reach full consensus, and remained unfailingly attached to his name throughout the history of the school.¹⁵ If some Mīmāṃsakas like Āpadeva (early 17th century?) showed no overt hostility towards his ideas,¹⁶ others, like Someśvara Bhāṭṭa (12th century?) and Khaṇḍadeva himself, explicitly refuted them.¹⁷ It is not even sure whether Pārthasārathi Miśra

to which the instrument of verbal effectuation is "the consciousness of *vidhi*, dependent on the prior knowledge of a relationship [between a verbal element and its object]" (*pūrvasambandhānubhavāpekṣa[m]* *vidhivijñāna[m]*), with the inaugural statement of the ViV (*Vṛtti* on *k.* 1): *sa khalu śabdabhedo vā liṅādīs tadvyāpārātīśayo vā pravṛttihetur upeyate 'rthabhedo vā, yadabhidhānāc chabdo 'pi tathā vyapadeśyaḥ;* "Sure enough, this [= *vidhi*] is either a particular speech-[unit], [name-ly] *liṅ*, etc., or a specific operation of this [speech-unit], accepted to be the cause of [an agent's] activity, or else a particular meaning, by the expression of which the [corresponding] speech-[unit] would also deserve to be called [*vidhi*]" (S 66.1–70.1 [≈ T 4.1–2]).

¹⁴ Maṇḍana's opinion is reported in Śālikanātha's *Vṛtti* on VAM 2.5–6 (p. 427.15–428.5). A detailed refutation is found in VAM and VAMV 2.7–9 (p. 428.6–430.6).

¹⁵ See for instance Khaṇḍadeva's statement in the *Bhāṭṭarahasya: iṣṭasādhanatvam eva pravartanātvena rūpeṇa vede liṅadyartha iti maṇḍana-miśrāḥ*; "[The opinion according to which] the quality of being a means for realizing a desired [end], in the form of an impelling, is the meaning of *liṅ* and other [injunctive suffixes occurring] in the Veda, is [known to be] Maṇḍana Miśra's" (p. 16.13–14).

¹⁶ See *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (§ 368–382) in EDGERTON 1986: 179–185.

¹⁷ See Someśvara's *Nyāyasudhā* 1.2.7 (p. 64.14–66.16) and the *Bhāṭṭarahasya* (p. 16.17–17.4), where Khaṇḍadeva mentions Someśvara by

(1050–1120?¹⁸), traditionally considered as a supporter of Maṇḍana's thesis, held an absolutely consistent position on this topic.¹⁹

In sharp contrast to the very limited success of Maṇḍana's ideas within the line of thought directly claiming Kumārila's heritage, his thesis quickly became the standard view of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā, better known as Vedānta, at least in its "non dualistic" (*advaita*) trend of which Maṇḍana is a major exponent. If Śaṅkara does not seem to have been aware of it,²⁰ Sureśvara (8th century?) supports the

name. On Someśvara, see also EDGERTON 1986: 179–182.

¹⁸ See VERPOORTEN 1987: 41.

¹⁹ In his independent treatise on *vidhi*, the *Vidhinirṇaya*, Pārthasārathi unequivocally supports Maṇḍana's thesis against Śālikanātha. See *Vidhinirṇaya k. 2: na kāryāvagatiḥ kvāpi pravṛtteḥ kāraṇaṃ matā | kartur iṣṭābhyupāyatvabodhāt sā sarvadā yataḥ ||*; "The knowledge of an obligation is never accepted to be the cause of an activity, for this [activity] always [arises] because the agent knows [the action] to be the means for realizing what [he] desires" (p. 41.6–7). It is on the basis of this work that EDGERTON (1986: 182 [n. 242]) identified the holders of the second explanation of verbal effectuation (*śabdabhāvanā*) in Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* as "the school of Pārthasārathi Miśra." In the *Bhāṭṭarāhasya* (p. 16.14–16), however, Khaṇḍadeva expresses a different opinion. He confronts Maṇḍana and Pārthasārathi (both mentioned by name) and rather considers the author of the *Śāstradīpikā* as an upholder of the interpretation of *vidhi* as *abhidhā* ("expression"), taken into consideration but rejected in ViV 4: *liṅādinīṣṭhaśakter evābhidhākyāyāḥ ... liṅvācyatvaṃ parikalpya tajjñānasya pravṛttiṃ prati kāraṇatvamātraṃ kalpyata iti tu pārthasārathiḥ*; "But Pārthasārathi [thinks as follows:] having supposed that the [expressive] power abiding in *liṅ*, called 'expression' ... is [itself] expressed by *liṅ*, one [should also] suppose that the knowledge of this [operation] is the only cause of an activity" (p. 31). A closer examination of Pārthasārathi's works, especially the *Śāstradīpikā*, would be necessary to identify Khaṇḍadeva's exact source and to decide what Pārthasārathi's final position might have been.

²⁰ W. Halbfass's claim that "Śaṅkara may be called the most radical advocate of the *iṣṭasādhanatā* interpretation of the Vedic injunctions" (HALBFASS 1992: 153) thus seems to be largely anachronistic, since not a single reference to this view can be found in his work.

iṣṭasāadhanatā-theory in the introductory part of his *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣadbhāṣyavārttika*.²¹ More significantly, an elaborate defence of Maṇḍana's thesis against Śālikanātha's attacks is found in Prakāśātman's *Śābdanirṇaya*, probably written towards the end of the 10th century.²² Prakāśātman's stance is perpetuated by his most direct successor within Advaita-Vedānta, Ānandabodha (11th century?), both in the corresponding parts of his commentary on the *Śābdanirṇaya*, the *Nyāyadīpikā*,²³ and in an independent treatise, the famous *Nyāyamakaranda*.²⁴ Jñānaghana, whose date is still uncertain,²⁵ advocates this thesis in the tenth *prakaraṇa* of his *Tattvaśuddhi*,²⁶ and the same position is again advocated in the 13th/14th century in the

²¹ See *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣadbhāṣyavārttika (sambandha°) k. 637–638* (p. 128.2–3), quoted below (see fn. 100). It is not the place here to discuss the much debated hypothesis of Maṇḍana's "conversion" to Advaita under the name of Sureśvara (for a bibliography on this vexed question, see THRASHER 1993: 155–156), against which decisive arguments have already been brought by HIRIYANNA 1923/24 and KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI 1937. Various attempts to rehabilitate this theory have been made since then (e.g. BALASUBRAMANIAN 1983: 11–42), that fail to bring, as far as I can see, any further positive evidence in favour of their identity.

²² See *Śābdanirṇaya k. 52–61* (p. 43–63). A complete French translation of this work, along with a new edition of Ānandabodha's commentary, is currently under preparation as part of my doctoral dissertation (DAVID [forthcoming]).

²³ See *Nyāyadīpikā ad Śābdanirṇaya k. 52–61* (p. 325–371).

²⁴ See *Nyāyamakaranda* p. 179–257.

²⁵ Both THANGASWAMI 1980: 344 and POTTER 2006: 163–164 estimate that Jñānaghana lived around 1000 on the basis of arguments put forth in SRIKANTHA SASTRI 1938. I shall demonstrate elsewhere the weakness of the evidence provided by this last author for such a determination of Jñānaghana's date.

²⁶ See *Tattvaśuddhi* p. 44–46. For a summary of this section, see POTTER 2006: 197–200.

works of Citsukha²⁷ and Ānandapūrṇa (*alias* Vidyāsāgara),²⁸ both commentators of Maṇḍana's work.

This article is a first attempt at explaining this remarkable though largely unnoticed historical fact,²⁹ by a close examination of a few selected portions of the ViV (especially *k.* 26–28 and their *Vṛtti*) and of the corresponding parts of Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyakaṇikā* ("A drop of reasoning," henceforth NK), the only preserved commentary thereon.³⁰

²⁷ See *Tattvapradīpikā* p. 91–105.

²⁸ See *Nyāyacandrikā* 1.30–32 and *Vṛtti* thereon (p. 223–231).

²⁹ Although I hold the preponderance of Maṇḍana's thesis of *iṣṭasādhanatā* in Advaita literature in comparison with the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka tradition as highly significant, I am aware that many factors may contribute to artificially exaggerate this disproportion. First of all, our knowledge of the history of Mīmāṃsā is still very deficient, and many texts are still awaiting publication, let alone a serious examination of their contents. Moreover, a close dependency of the above-mentioned Advaitic works on Prakāśātman is particularly obvious in the case of Ānandabodha and Ānandapūrṇa, and is certainly not to be excluded in the case of Jñānaghana and Citsukha, even though further research would be required to gauge its importance.

³⁰ Modern studies on the ViV are astonishingly scarce given the importance of this text in the history of Indian thought. No translation of it has ever been published in any language whatsoever, including Indian languages and Japanese (STERN 1988: IV acknowledges the borrowing of drafts of a full French translation by M. Biardeau, to which I did not have access). Since E. Frauwallner unfortunately never published the second part of his epoch-making article on Maṇḍana's theory of *bhāvanā* and *vidhi* (FRAUWALLNER 1938), that should have dealt specifically with the ViV, the only available study of this text remains K. Natarajan's meritorious (but very incomplete) monograph (NATARAJAN 1995). For the *pūrvapakṣa*, I am quoting the ViV and NK in E. Stern's critical edition along with two sub-commentaries by Parameśvara I (STERN 1988 [= S]), which also provides a brief summary of the contents of the ViV (STERN 1988: 16–45). Since the present study is mainly concerned with Maṇḍana's *siddhānta*, I am generally quoting the ViV in Mahāprabhuḷāl Gosvāmī's edition (Benares, Tārā Publications, 1978 [= T]). Variant readings from the *editio princeps* (Benares, reprint from "The Pandit," 1907 [= P]) are added for all translated passages.

My main hypothesis is that the core of Maṇḍana's contribution while formulating his theory of action and injunction is to achieve a *depersonalization* of injunctive discourse, as opposed to the theory of injunction elaborated by the grammarians of his time (maybe directly against Bhartr̥hari), and a consequent *reduction* of this kind of discourse to a particular instance of descriptive discourse, conveying a necessary causal link between certain classes of entities – actions, substances and qualities –, the affirmation of which might be true or false. In the following pages, I will also try to show how these two radical innovations, without any prejudice of their theoretical value, directly served an *apologetic* as well as *exegetical* purpose: to inscribe the Mīmāṃsaka thesis of the Veda's impersonality (*apauruṣeyatā*) into linguistics, and to pave the way for a specifically Vedāntic interpretation of the nature and object of the Vedic *corpus* as a whole.

Maṇḍana's reinterpretation of upadeśa in ViV 27

Maṇḍana developed his explanation of human activity on two occasions in his work: once in the ViV, of which it forms the main topic, and once in the second book of his presumably later *Brahmasiddhi* ("A proof of *Brahman*," henceforth BS),³¹ traditionally known as the *Niyogak[āṇḍa]* ("The section on *niyoga*").³² In the architecture of the

³¹ The order of succession of the ViV and the BS can be fixed with relative certainty from the explicit reference to the former in the latter, as already noticed by VETTER 1969: 16 and THRASHER 1993: 130. See BS p. 117.6–8 and p. 118.14–15. One sentence of the ViV (T 327.8) is directly quoted in the BS (p. 116.9–10). On the general chronology of Maṇḍana's work, see especially THRASHER 1993: 129–133.

³² See BS 2.101–104 (*Vṛtti*) p. 116.17–118.14. This passage has been translated into French by M. Biardeau as part of her full French translation of the BS (BIARDEAU 1969). Since its first edition by S. Kuppaswami Sastri in 1937, the BS has generally been believed to be a work in four chapters (the so-called *Brahma*°, *Tarka*°, *Niyoga*° and *Siddhikāṇḍas*). This general structure of the work is accepted in most classical studies on the BS (see e.g. BIARDEAU 1969, VETTER 1969, BALASUBRAMANIAN 1983 and THRASHER 1993) and it is also admitted by all Indian commentators with the exception of the oldest one, Vācaspati Mīśra

Niyogak°, the concerned passage occurs at the beginning of Maṇḍana's examination of the possibility, for a knowledge consisting of a

(9th–10th century). The recent discovery of Vācaspati's *Tattvasamīkṣā* in a Nepalese manuscript by D. Acharya and his subsequent critical edition of the preserved part of the text (ACHARYA 2006) allow a complete reconsideration of the problem of the construction of Maṇḍana's work with respect to older accounts such as BALASUBRAMANIAN 1983: 4–5. In his introduction (see ACHARYA 2006: XXXIII–XXXV), the editor convincingly argues for a three-fold division of the BS, a first section grouping the first two “*kāṇḍas*” of the *editio princeps* into one single chapter (named by him *prathamakāṇḍaḥ* without any further title). His main arguments are based on Vācaspati's commentary: 1. the absence of a colophon in the manuscript of the *Tattvasamīkṣā* at the end of the so-called *Brahmakāṇḍa*; 2. the mention of the *Niyogakāṇḍa* as “the second section” (*dvitīya[h] kāṇḍa[h]*) of the work by Vācaspati himself (see *Tattvasamīkṣā* p. 153.1: *dvitīyaṃ kāṇḍam āripsuḥ ...*). Hence, the fact that Vācaspati, at least, considered as one single *kāṇḍa* what was to become the first two sections of the BS in S. Kuppaswami Sastri's edition seems to be beyond doubt in the light of this new evidence. Two further arguments, based on Maṇḍana's own text, confirm that this structure must have been the original one: 3. the presence of a concluding verse at the end of all *kāṇḍas* except the “*Brahmakāṇḍa*,” 4. the correlative presence of introductory remarks at the beginning of all *kāṇḍas* except the “*Tarkakāṇḍa*.” It is thus plausible, as D. Acharya himself suggests (p. XXXV), that the four-fold division of the *Brahmasūtra* as interpreted by Śāṅkara into *Samanvaya*°, *Avirodha*°, *Sādhana*° and *Siddhyadhyāyas* was superimposed on the original structure of the BS, a major discrepancy being the very existence of the third *kāṇḍa*, by far the largest (183 *kārikās* out of 231), which does not consider primarily the “means” (*sādhana*) towards liberation, but the possibility for these means to be the object of an injunction. The evidence put forward by D. Acharya makes it possible to look at the BS as a treatise having, as Maṇḍana himself repeatedly underlines, an essentially exegetical purpose, namely the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the sentences of the Vedānta (*vedāntavākya*), considered under three different aspects successively taken up in the three *kāṇḍas*: 1. the congruency of an understanding of *vedāntavākya*s in their primary sense with other means of knowledge (*śrutārthaparigrahe prāmāṇyam*); 2. their capacity to make an existent object known (*bhūtārthe prāmāṇyam*); 3. their validity in general (*prāmāṇyam eva*).

direct perception (*sākṣātkaraṇa*), to be the object of an injunction.³³ The connection between both themes in the BS is certainly not adventitious, as it becomes manifest from a comparison with the ViV, where the discussion that was to become the main topic of the *Niyogak*^o – the possibility of an injunction to know (*pratipattividhi*) – is taken up by Maṇḍana in his auto-commentary (*Svavṛtti*) on *k.* 29.³⁴ Both works are essentially concordant with each other in what regards Maṇḍana’s theory of action,³⁵ the shorter exposition of the BS being, for the most part, a summary of the ViV. I will hence concentrate on the earlier exposition of the ViV, and only occasionally have recourse to the BS, whenever it allows a better understanding of the arguments.³⁶

Maṇḍana begins the section of the ViV identified by Vācaspati as his *siddhānta*,³⁷ from *k.* 26 onwards, with a reflection on the concept

³³ In the *Niyogak*^o, Maṇḍana successively considers the possibility that three kinds of knowledge could be achieved as the result of an injunction to know (*pratipattividhi*), which constitute three stages in the Advaitic path to liberation: a cognition arising from speech (*śabdāt pratipattiḥ*), i.e. verbal knowledge obtained through the study of the Veda, a cognition consisting of the continuous flow of such cognitions (*tatsamāntānavatī pratipattiḥ*), diversely named *dhyāna* (“meditation”), *bhāvanā* (“cultivation”) or *upāsanā* (“contemplation”), and finally a cognition consisting of a direct perception (*sākṣātkaraṇarūpā pratipattiḥ*). On the distinction between these three kinds of knowledge, see BS 2.1 (*Vṛtti* – introduction) p. 74.10–13.

³⁴ T 192.4–202.3 (= P 269.4–283.6).

³⁵ This was already pointed out by M. Biarreau, who rightly insists on the fact that the ViV and the BS should be read “dans la perspective d’un même système” (BIARREAU 1969: 86). This clearly goes against the traditionally accepted division of Maṇḍana’s work into “Mīmāṃsaka” and “Vedāntic” works. See e.g. BALASUBRAMANIAN 1983: 14–17 and THRASHER 1993: VIII, who nonetheless acknowledges that “the consistency of Maṇḍana’s doctrine is visible even in those works which are not on Vedānta” (*ibid.*).

³⁶ A preliminary study of ViV 26–28 will be found in NATARAJAN 1995: 63–76.

³⁷ See NK ad ViV 26: *siddhāntam upakramate* – *ucyate* “[With the words]

of *upadeśa* (“instruction”).³⁸ This term is of particular importance for the tradition of Vedic exegesis. It is already used in the fifth *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* to designate the instruction by sacred texts, which is, according to Mīmāṃsakas at least since the time of Śābara,³⁹ the only source of our knowledge of *dharma*: ... *tasya jñānam upadeśaḥ* ...; “the [cause of our] knowledge of it [= *dharma*] [is] the instruction [given by the Veda].”⁴⁰ Surprisingly enough, Śābara defines *upadeśa*

‘[we] reply,’ he begins [the exposition of] the accepted view” (T 169.20 [= P 238.8]).

³⁸ On the early history of the term *upadeśa*, see OBERHAMMER & AL. 1996: 33–36 (*sub voce*). The range of meanings covered by this term is too wide to be rendered by a single English word. It encompasses all kinds of (worldly or religious) “instruction” or “teaching,” but also simple “indication” or “advice.” In any case, the practical aspect of the teaching referred to by the term *upadeśa* was apparently prevalent (although not exclusive) since its oldest occurrences, as for instance in Kauṭilya’s *Arthaśāstra* (15.1): *evaṃ vartitavyam ity upadeśaḥ*; “*upadeśa* is [the statement] that one should behave in such and such a manner” (quoted in OBERHAMMER & AL 1996: 33–34, who quote a similar statement from the *Suśrutasamhitā*).

³⁹ See Śābarabhāṣya ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2 (*codanā*°): *aśakyam hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum ṛte vacanāt*; “For a human being cannot cognize that [heaven arises from the Agnihotra offering] without [resorting to] a [Vedic] statement” (F 18.5–6; translation in KATAOKA 2011₂: 320 [n. 355]).

⁴⁰ *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5 (*autpattika*°). The full text of the *sūtra* is as follows: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhas tasya jñānam upadeśo* ‘vyatirekaś cārthe ‘nupalabdhe, tat pramāṇam bādarāyaṇasya, anapekṣatvāt (text and punctuation according to FRAUWALLNER 1968: 22–24). This *sūtra*, especially its syntax, can be interpreted in more than one way. This is Frauwallner’s rendering of the aphorism: “Die naturgegebene Verknüpfung des Wortes mit dem Gegenstand ist vielmehr **dessen Erkenntnis(ursache)**, (**denn sie ist) Belehrung** und kein Fehlgehen – bei einem nicht wahrgenommenen Gegenstand; und dies ist nach Bādarāyaṇa Erkenntnismittel, weil es unabhängig ist” (FRAUWALLNER 1968: 23–25). Maṇḍana seems to understand the syntax of the *sūtra* in a slightly different way, since the fragment *tasya jñānam upadeśaḥ* is quoted independently in the ViV (T 171.2 [= P 240.3–4]). A similar choice is made by G. Oberhammer, E. Prets and J. Prandstetter in their rendering of this *sūtra*: “Die Verknüpfung des Wortes

in his commentary on this *sūtra* in a comparatively vague way: *upadeśa iti viśiṣṭasya śabdasyoccāraṇam*; “Instruction is the utterance of a determinate speech-[unit].”⁴¹

The obvious difficulty of Śabara’s definition, which is not commented upon by Kumārila in the corresponding part of the *Ślokavārttika*,⁴² is his ambiguous use of the adjective *viśiṣṭa* (“determinate”). Does he mean by this that the uttered sentence (or group of sentences) called *upadeśa* should be different from any other sentence? Then, this is true of each and every sentence. Or does he mean that it should be different from other kinds of sentences because it possesses a particular characteristic? But then, what is this characteristic? If it pertains to speech itself, how come someone who does not know the concerned language does not act after hearing such a sentence? Maṇḍana’s answer to these questions is found in the first half of ViV 27:

[Speech] is “determinate” when it states the means for realizing a pure goal of men.⁴³

mit dem Gegenstand aber ist naturgegeben. **Die ihr [entsprechende] Erkenntnis ist** im Falle eines nicht wahrnehmbaren Gegenstandes *upadeśa* und geht nicht fehl; und dies ist nach Bādarāyaṇa Erkenntnismittel, weil es [von anderem] unabhängig ist” (OBERHAMMER & AL. 1996: 35). Both interpretations of the *sūtra* appear to me as equally possible, and the fact that the second one is favoured by Maṇḍana does not prove by any means that it is closer to the *sūtrakāra*’s intention. Frauwallner’s rendering comes closer to Śabara’s *Bhāṣya*, as does his understanding of *jñāna* as **jñānanimitta* (“[the cause of] knowledge”). See *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5 (F 24.3–7).

⁴¹ *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5 (*autpattika*°) (F 24.7).

⁴² Kumārila simply identifies the three terms *vidhi*, *codanā* and *upadeśa*. See *Ślokavārttika* (*autpattika*°) k. 11cd: *codanā copadeśaś ca vidhiś caikārthavācinaḥ ||*; “[The words] *codanā*, *upadeśa* and *vidhi* refer to one and the same object[, namely injunction]” (p. 151).

⁴³ ViV 27ab: *viśiṣṭaḥ puruṣārthasya śuddhasyopāyam āha yaḥ* / (T 171.5 [= P 240.8]). The exact meaning of *śuddha* (“pure”) in this verse is uncertain. This term is not commented upon by Maṇḍana in the *Vṛtti*. According to Vācaspati’s commentary, the adjective *śuddha* would be used by Maṇḍana to refer to the fact that the means of realization is of use only

The same idea is further explained in the corresponding *Vṛtti*:

A speech-[unit, i.e. a sentence or group of sentences] is said to be “determinate,” because of its excellence, when it conveys the means for realizing a goal of men, [hitherto] unknown. Otherwise, each and every speech-[unit] being distinct from another speech-[unit], [the word *viśiṣṭa* used in Śābara’s definition] would just fail to be a determinant. Therefore, someone who does not know the meaning [of the uttered words] will not undertake [any action].⁴⁴

As Vācaspati rightly points out, Maṇḍana’s last remark is allowed by the fact that the sentence or group of sentences defined as an *upadeśa* is not specified in its mere phonic form (by which it closely resem-

to the enjoined person (*niyojya*), not to the person who enjoins (*niyoktr*). See NK ad ViV 27: *śuddhasyety niyojyārthasyaiva, na niyoktrarthasyety arthaḥ*; “[The word] ‘pure’ means that [the goal of men for which *upadeśa* teaches the means is] for the sake of the enjoined [person] only, not for the sake of the [person] who enjoins” (T 172.22 [= P 242.14]). In spite of Vācaspati’s opinion, I do not hold a moral connotation of the term *śuddha* as too implausible. In his *Bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2, Śābara differentiates ritual acts leading to something desirable (*artha*) for the sacrificer, like the Jyotiṣṭoma-sacrifice, etc., from those leading him to an evil, i.e. to something undesired (*anartha*), like the Śyena-sacrifice, etc., and does not deny the existence of a Vedic teaching (*upadeśa*) concerned with the second category of sacrifice. See *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2 (F 20.17–18 [quoted below]). However, as we will see later on, Śābara does *not* accept such harmful sacrifices to be taught by the Veda as something that “ought to be done” (*kartavya*) (F 20.17). A further problem for Maṇḍana is, however, that he himself denies, in ViV 32, the existence of any substantial difference between the idea that an action ought to be done (*kartavyam iti*) and the idea of this action as being the means for realizing a desired end (*iṣṭasādhanatā*). Obviously enough, this denial potentially invalidates Śābara’s distinction concerning the Śyena-sacrifice. It is thus not impossible that Maṇḍana uses the term *śuddha* in order to exclude harmful acts such as the Śyena-sacrifice from Śābara’s definition of *upadeśa*.

⁴⁴ ViV 27 (*Vṛtti*): *puruṣārthasyopāyam anavagatam avagamayann utkarṣād viśiṣṭaḥ śabda uktaḥ. anyathā sarva eva śabdaḥ śabdāntarād bhinna^a ity aviśeṣaṇam eva syāt. ato nāviditārthasya pravṛttiḥ* (T 171.7–172.1 [= P 241.1–4]).

^a*bhinnaḥ* ViV_{T+P} : *bhidyate* NK_{T+P}.

bles any other verbal utterance), but only inasmuch as it expresses a particular meaning (*artha*), namely the fact that the action which is taught is the means for realizing a goal that is desired by human beings.⁴⁵ The fact that speakers of Sanskrit sometimes designate this meaning itself by the word *upadeśa* is not an objection against this state of fact, but rather the consequence of the breadth of usages of this word in ordinary language. Just as the English word “teaching” is used, in some situations, to designate a sentence or group of sentences uttered by a teacher and, in other cases, to refer to the content of his/her teaching (that which is taught), to the operation by which a teaching is taught, or to the particular speech-act that is performed by the teacher, so the Sanskrit word *upadeśa* is used, according to the will of the speaker, to designate a verbal unit (*śabda*), its meaning (*artha*), the expressive operation (*abhidhā*) by which it is conveyed or the utterance (*uccāraṇa*) of this determinate speech-unit:

And this [= Śābara’s definition of *upadeśa* in the *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*] is meant as a [mere] indication. Therefore, the word *upadeśa* (“instruction”) [might] express a [certain] meaning, the [corresponding] speech-[unit], [its] expressive [operation], [its] utterance [by a speaker], etc., or else knowledge,⁴⁶ depending on which factor of action [is insisted upon]

⁴⁵ NK ad ViV 27: *yataś cārthaviśeṣeṇopadeśatā śabdasya, tasya ca nānava-gataśaṅgatinā puruṣeṇa pratītiḥ, ato 'pi vyutpatter apekṣā*; “Moreover, a [certain] speech-[unit] is an ‘instruction’ inasmuch as it [expresses] a particular meaning, and a person who does not know the relationship [between words and their meaning] does not understand this [meaning]; it is for this reason also that linguistic competency is required [for instruction to produce its effect]” (T 171.26–27 [P 241.11–13]).

⁴⁶ The phrase *jñānam ca* is problematic. Both editions (ViV and NK alike) read it in a compound with what precedes (*arthaśabdābhidhoccāraṇādijñānam ca*), but I think it is preferable to read it independently, for it does not correspond to anything in the following list of four “factors of action” (*sādhana*). This reading of the sentence is confirmed by Vācaspati, who clearly considers *jñāna* as a separate import of the word *upadeśa*: *kva cij jñānam – “śāstraṃ śabdavijñānād asaṃnikṛṣṭe 'rthe vijñānam” iti*; “Sometimes, [the words *upadeśa* or *vidhi* refer to] knowledge, [as in the passage] ‘instruction (*śāstra*) is the knowledge, [born] of the consciousness of a speech-[unit], of an object that is not in contact [with the senses]” (T 172.7 [= P 241.17–18]). The quote is from Śābara’s

– the object (*karman*), the agent (*kartṛ*), the instrument (*karaṇa*)⁴⁷ or the process (*bhāva*) –, just like [the word] *preṣaṇa* (“command”), etc., by which one also indicates a meaning, etc., according to his will.⁴⁸

A depersonalization of injunctive discourse

Maṇḍana’s first characterization of “instruction” in ViV 26, however, is not based on a consideration of its meaning. It is also quite independent of the technical use of this concept in canonical texts of classical Mīmāṃsā. In the initial portion of his *siddhānta*, Maṇḍana rather attempts to define *upadeśa* on a purely linguistic level, on the basis of the experience of ordinary speakers of Sanskrit. In this perspective, instruction appears as a certain kind of *act* carried out by a speaker while uttering a definite category of injunctive sentences (in the case of Vedic instruction, as an act carried out by the Veda itself), or as the *intention* presupposed by such an act. His main effort is thus to circumscribe the type of pragmatic situations in which such sentences are used, leaving temporarily aside the question of the meaning of their constitutive elements.

His insistence on the dynamic relationship between a speaker involved in instruction and a hearer to whom it is addressed, as well as the stress laid on the particular intentions of a speaker while he uses certain categories of sentences, are quite unique within Mīmāṃsā (and, of course, within Vedānta) at that time, and strongly suggest that he was not addressing an audience exclusively composed of specialists of Vedic exegesis. Rather, one gets the impression from

Bhāṣya ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5 (F 32.3).

⁴⁷ Even though both editions of the ViV read here *kāraṇa* (“cause”), one should definitely adopt the reading *karaṇa* (“instrument”) found in both editions of the NK.

⁴⁸ ViV 27 (*Vṛtti*): *pradarśanārthaṃ cedam. ato 'rthaśabdābhidhoccāraṇādi jñānaṃ ca^a karmakartṛkaraṇabhāvasādhanenopadeśaśabdena^b yathāyatham^c ucyate, preṣaṇādivat. tair api hi yathāvivaḥsam^d arthādayo nirdiśyante* (T 172.1–3 [= P 241.4–242.1]).

^a*uccāraṇādi jñānaṃ ca* emend. : *uccāraṇādi jñānaṃ ca* Edd; ^b*°karaṇa*° NK_{T+P} : *°kāraṇa*° ViV_{T+P}; ^c*yathāyatham* NK_{T+P} : Ø ViV_{T+P}; ^d*yathāvivaḥsam* NK_{T+P} : *yathāvivaḥṣitam* ViV_{T+P}.

this and similar passages that Maṇḍana is trying to justify the point of view of exegesis to a wider circle of intellectuals, by engaging on its own turf with the Pāṇinian tradition of linguistic analysis as represented by its foremost thinker in the 5th century: Bhartṛhari. His most evident and explicit purpose while doing so is to provide a linguistic basis for one of Mīmāṃsā's most fundamental assumptions, the Veda's impersonality (*apauruṣeyatā*), that might appear to thinkers less committed to the cause of Vedic exegesis as a matter of pure philosophical dogma.

In this section of the ViV, instruction is compared to a group of three meanings (*artha*), supposedly encompassing everything a speaker might wish to convey when he utters an injunctive sentence: "command" (*ājñā/praiśa/preṣaṇa*), "request" (*abhyarthanā/adhyeṣaṇa/adhyeṣaṇā*) and "permission" (*anujñā/abhyanujñā*).⁴⁹

Maṇḍana already mentioned this list of three meanings on two occasions in his work, in the *Vṛtti* on ViV 3 and ViV 5. There, he defined them as three "properties of a speaker" (*prayokṛdharmā*),⁵⁰ an expression already used by Bhartṛhari in one place in the *Vākyapadīya*,⁵¹ as "particular intentions" (*abhiprāyātīśaya*) of a speaker, or

⁴⁹ On the presumably grammatical origin of this three-fold classification, see below. There is every reason to consider the distinction of these three meanings as an attempt to rationalize the more exhaustive, but less systematic, list of significations found in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. See especially A. 3.3.161 (*vidhinimantraṇāmantraṇādhiṣṭasampraśnāprārthaneṣu liṅ*) and A. 3.3.163 (*praiśātisargaprāptakāleṣu kṛtyāś ca*).

⁵⁰ It is not impossible, in the context of ViV 5 (quoted below), that the term *prayokṛ* stands, with the meaning of "instigator," as a synonym of the term *niyokṛ*, used by Maṇḍana in the *Vṛtti* on ViV 26. The parallel with Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (see following note) and Helārāja's *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* (see below), where *prayokṛ* clearly points to the speaker in general, makes me doubt, however, of this possibility.

⁵¹ See *Vākyapadīya* 3.9.105 (*kāla*°): *āśaṃsyamānanatratvād āśaṃsāyāṃ viparyayaḥ | prayokṛdharmāḥ śabdārthe śabdair evānuṣajyate ||*; "In the case of expectation the opposite [occurs] because of the predominance of what is wished for. It is only through words [i.e. the linguistic context] that [expectation, which is] a property of the speaker can be associated to the meaning of the expression" (part 2 p. 85 – I thank Vin-

else as “properties of a person” (*puruṣadharmā/nṛdharmā*). His insistence on the *personal* dimension of command, etc., is quite understandable in the context of the *pūrvapakṣa*, where such meanings are mentioned to serve two distinct (though closely related) purposes, namely to deny that operations such as command, etc., could be “operations of speech” (*śabdavyāpāra*) regardless of its speaker (ViV 3)⁵² and to contest that the allegedly authorless Veda could convey such “particular meanings” (*arthabheda*) (ViV 5).⁵³

The distinction between these three meanings is made, in the *Vṛtti* on ViV 26, along two criteria: 1. Command and request benefit the *speaker* or, in Maṇḍana’s favoured terminology, the person who enjoins (*niyoktr*), and not the hearer, whose action does not necessarily entail any benefit for himself, while permission clearly benefits the *hearer*, i.e. the person who is enjoined (*niyojya*); 2. Command and request are meant to start a *new* action; in other words, the agent that is commanded or requested is “not [yet engaged] in activity” (*apravṛtta*), while permission simply triggers an action that

cenzo Vergiani, from whom I borrow this translation, for having drawn my attention to this verse). As recently argued by V. Vergiani, it is not impossible that a treatment of *prayoktrdharmas* occurred in the lost part of Bhartṛhari’s *Vṛtti* on the second *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. On the grammatical distinction between meanings that are “properties of a speaker” (*prayoktrdharma*) and those that are “properties of an expressed [meaning]” (*abhidheyadharmā*), see *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* p. 329.6–7.

⁵² See ViV 3 (*Vṛtti*): *na hi preṣaṇādhyeṣaṇābhyanujñālakṣaṇaḥ śabdasya prayogo nirūpyate, tasya puruṣadharmatvāt*; “Surely, an operation that would consist of a command, a request or a permission is unthinkable for speech, for such an [operation] is the property of a person” (S 155.3–156.1 [≈ T 12.9–13.1]).

⁵³ See ViV 5ab: *apauruṣeḥ praiṣādir nṛdharmo nāvakalpate* /; “Properties of a human being such as command, [request or permission] do not suit the impersonal [Veda]” (S 195.1 [= T 17.6]). See also ViV 5 (*Vṛtti*): *loke hi pratītaḥ preṣaṇādhyeṣaṇābhyanujñālakṣaṇo ’bhiprāyātīśayaḥ prayoktrdharmo līnārthaḥ. tasyāpauruṣeṣu vedavākyeṣv asambhavaḥ*; “Surely, it is perceived in worldly [usage] that a specific intention or property of a speaker consisting of command, request or permission is the meaning of *līn*. Such [an intention] does not occur in impersonal Vedic sentences” (S 195.3–196.1 [= T 18.2–3]).

is already started (or as if started), where the agent is thus “[already engaged] in activity” (*pravṛtta*).⁵⁴

While making this distinction, Maṇḍana apparently introduces only slight modifications and further elaboration into a linguistic theory that is found in grammatical texts of his time.⁵⁵ In the *Sādhanasamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya* (k. 3.7.125–126), Bhartṛhari already considered command (*preṣaṇa*) and request (*adhyeṣaṇa*) as the two main operations of a *hetu* (“causal agent” or “prompter”)⁵⁶ or, more generally, of an “instigator” (*prayojaka*).⁵⁷ The presence of these

⁵⁴ This dimension of permission may not be immediately manifest. One should keep in mind here that an authorization is generally given as the result of a request (be it explicit or implicit) from the agent, who thus already took the firm decision to carry out the action for which he is asking permission, just as he would remove an obstacle standing on his way.

⁵⁵ The questions of chronology are here particularly delicate to solve because of the time gap between Bhartṛhari and his commentator, Helārāja. Bhartṛhari is a very frequent interlocutor of Maṇḍana, and is commonly accepted to have lived about one or two centuries before him (see IYER 1969: 2, who accepts Frauwallner’s dating of Bhartṛhari around 450–510), whereas Helārāja is generally considered to have lived in the 10th century (see IYER 1969: 40 and VERGIANI [forthcoming]). However, it is hard to differentiate, in his commentary, what is fully original and what could have been borrowed from an earlier source, like the lost parts of Bhartṛhari’s *Vṛtti* to the second *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*.

⁵⁶ The two terms *preṣaṇa* and *adhyeṣaṇa* are already used by Patañjali in the section of his *Mahābhāṣya* (ad A. 3.1.26: *hetumati ca*) where he discusses the concept of *hetu* (I thank V. Vergiani for this information).

⁵⁷ See *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.125: *preṣaṇādhyeṣaṇe kurvāṃs tatsamarthāni cācāran | kartaiva vihitāṃ śāstre hetusaṃjñāṃ prapadyate ||*; “It is indeed an agent, giving an order or making a request or bringing about [the conditions] that are suitable for that [i.e. a given action], who receives the name *hetu* (‘causal agent’) prescribed in grammar” (p. 326 – V. Vergiani’s translation). In k. 125, Bhartṛhari speaks only of a *hetu*, and not of an instigator in general. This technical term (*saṃjñā*) does not fit in all cases of instigation (*prayojanā*). For instance, in a sentence formed around a verb in the imperative, the instigator (*prayojaka*), who

two operations justifies, according to him, both the use of the causative (*ṇic*) and of the imperative (*loṭ*), which is also Maṇḍana's main concern in the ViV. In his commentary on this *kārikā*, Helārāja gives additional precision about the difference between the use of the imperative and the use of the causative.⁵⁸ He himself proposes two criteria to establish this difference: 1. In a sentence whose verb is in the causative, like the sentence **rāmaḥ kṛṣṇaṃ pācayati* ("Rāma causes Kṛṣṇa to cook"), the instigator (*prayojaka*) who gives the command (Rāma) is *expressed*, along with his command, while in a sentence in the imperative – **paca* ("Cook!") or, to use Helārāja's own example, *ṛcchatu* ("Ask!") – the instigator is *not* expressed, as he is none but the speaker in person;⁵⁹ 2. In a sentence making use of the causative, the direct agent (Kṛṣṇa) is mentioned *as being already the agent* of cooking, whereas in the second set of sentences, making use of the imperative, the agency of the person who is instigated is not presupposed; rather, in this last case, the purpose of the speaker while uttering a command is to start a new action, or, in other words, to incite the hearer to *become* an agent.⁶⁰ Helārāja's second distinction thus amounts to saying that the agent of a sentence in the causative is expressed as being already "[engaged] in an activity" (*pravṛtta*),

is none but the speaker himself, does not fall under *hetusaṃjñā*. Nonetheless, his operation is also describable as a command, a request, etc., as Bhartṛhari himself makes clear by distinguishing between the use of the causative and the use of the imperative in *k. 126* (quoted below – see following note).

⁵⁸ See *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* p. 327.19–330.3. The main point of Helārāja's distinction is present *in nuce* in the *Vākyapadīya* itself. See *k. 3.7.126*: *dravyamātrasya tu praīṣe ṛcchādē loṭ vidhīyate | sakriyasya prayogas tu yadā sa viśayo ṇicāḥ ||*; "However, when the command is [addressed] to a mere substance, *loṭ* is prescribed after [verbal roots] such as *√prach-*, but when there is prompting of what is [already] possessed with action, that is the domain of [the causative marker] *ṇic*" (p. 329 – V. Vergiani's translation, with a few modifications]). I will however concentrate here on Helārāja's remarks, which offer closer similarity with Maṇḍana's own analysis.

⁵⁹ See *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* p. 328.25–329.4.

⁶⁰ See *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* p. 328.21–23.

while the person who is instigated by a sentence in the imperative is only *about to* start an action and is thus still inactive or “not [yet engaged] in an activity” (*apavr̥tta*).⁶¹

Nowhere in his work does Maṇḍana reject the overall legitimacy of these or similar distinctions that might have occurred in grammatical texts prior to the time of Helārāja. His analysis of command and request when they are conveyed by an injunction is indeed very close to Bharṭṛhari’s and Helārāja’s determination of the pragmatic conditions in which an imperative mood should be used. The only real discrepancy I can see between Maṇḍana’s and Bharṭṛhari’s understanding of injunctive discourse (apart from the case of *upadeśa*) is Maṇḍana’s definition of “permission” (*abhyanuḥṅā*) as the instigation of somebody who is already engaged in an activity, which, following the grammarian’s criterion, would forbid the use of the imperative in a sentence such as *kuru yathābhīmatam* (“Do whatever you like!”), the agent being already “possessed with action” (*sakriya*).⁶²

Nonetheless, one thing he does contest is the pretension of this threefold classification to cover *all* possible meanings of an injunction, for there are indeed pragmatic situations where an action is enjoined by a speaker for the sole benefit of the hearer, even though he is not yet engaged in any kind of activity. A typical example is when we ask our way: “Which way is it to Benares? – Take left!” In this situation, we do not feel either commanded, requested or given permission, but simply “advised” or “instructed.” Unlike the person who is waiting for permission, the person who is asking for his/her way cannot already be engaged in an activity precisely because he/

⁶¹ See *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* p. 329.12–15.

⁶² It is noteworthy that this definition of permission is a difficulty even from the point of view of the internal consistency of Maṇḍana’s doctrine, as it contradicts his own general definition of *vidhi* as *apavr̥ttapravartanā* (“the activation of [someone who] is not [yet] in activity”) in the BS (p. 116.16–17), which apparently denies the relevance of this concept in the case of permission. I cannot see any immediate solution to this problem in Maṇḍana’s work or in its commentaries, except if one considers that a sentence expressing permission, unlike a sentence expressing command or request, simply does not express *vidhi*.

she does not know which kind of activity he/she should undertake (should he/she take left or right?). Nonetheless, advice is given for the sake of the hearer, and does not necessarily entail any benefit for the speaker.

Maṇḍana's proposal is thus to add a *fourth* possible meaning of injunctive sentences to the proposed list, which is none but *upadeśa*, redefined on this pragmatic basis. He does so in ViV 26, where his intention to reconcile linguistic analysis with the possibility of an injunction by the authorless Veda, against the argument put forward in ViV 5, is particularly obvious:

“Instruction” is the instigation [of an agent who] has not started [to act yet] to [undertake] an action for his own sake. It is widespread among teachers and doctors, and even for the eternal [Veda] it is not unconceivable.⁶³

The same idea is further explicated in the corresponding *Vṛtti*:

Truly, command, request and permission cannot be accounted for in the Veda, but instruction is thinkable [even there]. Moreover, [instruction] is acknowledged from worldly [usage] to be a fourth kind of instigation, along with [command, request and permission]. To explain: as we all know, command and request are about an act that is [accomplished] for the sake of the [person] who enjoins, regardless of the fruit [expected by] the [person who is] enjoined, whereas instruction is [done only] for the sake of the [person who is] enjoined. As for permission, it is indeed such⁶⁴ in some cases, [but] even then, it is not [identical with] instruction, for it addresses a person who is [already engaged] in an activity, [and] the wise ones call “instruction” the activation [of somebody] who is not [yet engaged] in an activity [when it is] about an action [undertaken by] the [person who is] enjoined for his own sake.⁶⁵

⁶³ ViV 26: *upadeśo niyojyārthakarmāprasthitacodanā | prathito guruvaidyādaunītye 'pi na^a na kalpate ||* (T 196.2–3 [= P 238.2]).

^ana ViV_{T+P} NK_P : ca NK_T.

⁶⁴ That is: “[accomplished] for the sake of the [person who is] enjoined” (*niyojyārtha*).

⁶⁵ ViV 26 (*Vṛtti*): *yady apy ājñābhyarthanānujñā^a vede 'nupapannāḥ, upadeśas tu yujyate. so 'pi tadvad eva preraṇātmakaś caturtho loke prajñāyate. tathā hi: ājñābhyarthane hi niyoktrartham anādr̥taniyojyapha-*

The criterion applied to justify this fourth value of an injunction is not different from that which probably gave rise to the initial list, namely the subjective linguistic feeling or “perception” (*pratīti*) of the hearers of an injunction, which Maṇḍana illustrates with a wealth of examples and undeniable linguistic insight:

For [when we hear sentences like] “Bind the cow!,” “Please take this child as your student!” [or] “Do whatever you like!” we do not perceive [that they would be pronounced for the sake of] instruction. Correlatively, [when we hear sentences like] “He should wander for alms” or “The sick should eat suitable food” we do not perceive [that they would be pronounced for the sake of] command, [request or permission]. Moreover, [instruction] is repeatedly acknowledged in worldly [usage] without even a hint (*anārūṣita*) of command, etc., as [for instance] in [treatises authored] by a person such as the *Kāma*- and *Arthaśāstra*, and [even] in the words of a cow-herd, etc., [when he says] “Take this path!” intending to show the way. For a [person] of lower condition⁶⁶ cannot [afford to give] command, there is no point in making a request for the sake of somebody else and no permission is ever given [to somebody] who is not [yet engaged] in activity.⁶⁷

laṃ^b karma gocarayataḥ. niyojyārthaṃ tūpadeśaḥ. anujñā tu yady apy evaṃ kva cit, tathāpi pravṛttapurūṣaviśayatvān nopadeśaḥ. niyojyārthakarmagocaram apravṛttapravartanam upadeśam ācakṣate^c dhīrāḥ (T 169.4–170.3 [= P 238.4–239.2]).

^a*ājñābhyarthanānujñāḥ* NK_{T+P} : *ājñābhyarthanāḥ* ViV_{T+P}; ^b*anādṛta^o* ViV_T NK_T : *anāhata^o* ViV_P NK_P; ^c*ācakṣate* ViV_T NK_{T+P} : *ācakṣīte* ViV_P.

⁶⁶ Maṇḍana clearly has in mind the situation of the cow-herd showing the way to a prince, for instance.

⁶⁷ ViV 26 (*Vṛtti*): *na hi gām abhyāja^a, māṇavakam adhyāpaya, kuru yathā-bhimatam^b ity upadeśapratītiḥ. nāpi bhaikṣaṃ caret^c, jvaritaḥ pathyam aśnīyād ity ājñādipratītiḥ^d. bhūyasā caiṣa^e pauraṣeyeṣu kāmārthaśāstrādiṣv ājñādibhir anārūṣito loke prajñāyate, gopālādivacaḥsu ca mār-gākhyānapareṣv anena pathā gaccheti. na hi hīnasyājñā, anātmārthe^f karmaṇy abhyarthanā, anujñānam apravṛttasya.* (T 170.3–171.1 [= P 239.2–240.2]).

^a*abhyāja* ViV_{T+P} : *ānaya* NK_{T+P}; ^b*abhimatam* ViV_{T+P} : *ōhitam* NK_{T+P}; ^c*caret* ViV_T NK_{T+P} : *cet* ViV_P; ^d*ājñādi^o* ViV_T NK_{T+P} : *ō* ViV_P; ^e*eṣaḥ* ViV_{T+P} NK_P : *eva* NK_T; ^f*ōarthe* ViV_T NK_{T+P} : *ōākhye var.*(ViV_T) ViV_P.

Maṇḍana's redefinition of *upadeśa* in ViV 26 thus integrates the possibility of an injunction which does not entail any substantial participation of the speaker, which is consequently fully compatible with the hypothesis of the Veda's impersonal injunction (*codanā*). Hence, while apparently maintaining the theoretical framework elaborated by the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition to account for injunctive discourse, Maṇḍana silently introduces a major exception to the grammarians' conceptualization of injunction as it appears from Helārāja's commentary to the *Vākyapadīya*: even though instruction does entail specific pragmatic characteristics, it does not imply the manifestation – Helārāja speaks here of “suggestion” (*dyotana*), contrasting it with “expression” (*vacana*)⁶⁸ – of the speaker (*prayoktr*) or of any of his properties to the mind of the hearer, who thus experiences instigation in an impersonal, though unmistakably dynamic, way.⁶⁹

Beyond pragmatics: Maṇḍana's universalization of iṣṭasādhanatā

Maṇḍana's exclusion of the speaker from his explanation of instruction could be nothing but a slender modification introduced into a globally accepted linguistic framework. A closer look at his further

⁶⁸ See *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* p. 328.25.

⁶⁹ Notwithstanding the apologetic use Maṇḍana himself acknowledges for his depersonalized concept of instruction in the context of a defence of the Veda's impersonality, his analysis is not strictly limited to the Vedic domain. As a matter of fact, we do experience injunction in an impersonal way in a host of worldly situations, as rightly pointed out by A. Chakrabarti (commenting on the *Vidhivāda* of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, which holds a position very close to Maṇḍana's): “When we come to think of it, we do quite naturally learn from instruction ... in printed manuals without bothering to bring in the speaker. ... When I read commands (in a manual or a computer screen), I know that I am supposed to remove the lid or press the start key. ... Thus the awareness generated by the imperatives doesn't have to bring in the speaker” (CHAKRABARTI 1992: 429). The distinction between the *practical* necessity of a speaker in the worldly domain and his/her intervention *within the linguistic process*, whose relevance is particularly obvious in such examples, will give rise to important developments in later Vedāntic literature. See for instance k. 7 of Prakāśātman's *Śābdanirṇaya* and the author's own *Vṛtti* thereon (p. 3.12–4.15).

elaborations in the ViV is enough, however, to show that this is not the case. In fact, his modification of the grammarians' analysis of injunctive discourse turns out to be only a preliminary step towards its radical subversion.

This becomes clear from the consideration of Maṇḍana's further developments in ViV 27 and 28. There, his attention moves from the pragmatic determination of instruction to the question of its *content* or meaning. As we saw earlier while discussing the evolution of the concept of *upadeśa* in the early tradition of Mīmāṃsā, Maṇḍana first considers the possibility that "being a means for realizing a desired [end]" (*iṣṭasādhanatā*) could be the specific content of an instruction in the context of his interpretation of the adjective *viśiṣṭa* ("determinate") in Śabara's definition of *upadeśa* in the *Bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5. According to Maṇḍana's understanding of this definition, a sentence is "determinate" (and therefore deserves to be called "instruction") insofar as it teaches the means (*upāya*) to attain a goal of men (*puruṣārtha*) (ViV 27ab). In other words, the specific import conveyed by a speaker when he enunciates a sentence characterized as instruction is the causal link between a certain type of action and a certain kind of expected result. This is clearly the case in all the above-mentioned examples of instruction (the cowherd showing the way indicates direction as the means to reach a certain point in space, the physician teaches how to recover health, etc.), while such a causal link is not so prominent in the case of command or request which, as Maṇḍana repeatedly urges, are not pronounced for the benefit of the person to whom they are addressed (*niyojyārtha*).

By saying so, Maṇḍana does not really depart from the letter of Śabara's text. Some passages in the *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* indeed clearly corroborate his interpretation. This is notably the case of Śabara's statements on sacrifices consisting of an evil or "something undesired" (*anartha*), such as the Śyena-sacrifice, resulting in the curse of one's enemy, potentially leading to his death and to the sacrificer's consequent downfall (*pratyavāya*). Describing the Veda's instruction

about this sacrifice in the *Bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2,⁷⁰ Śabara clearly insists on the Veda's teaching the relationship between the object of the sacrificer's desire (*icchā*) – the death of an enemy – and the means (*abhyupāya*) to achieve it: “For the instruction about the [Śyena-sacrifice, etc.] is [as follows]: for whomever wishes to harm [his enemy by casting a spell on him], this is the means.”⁷¹

The reason why Śabara gives such a description of *upadeśa* in this particular passage is, however, not the will to generalize it to all kinds of Vedic injunctions (let alone to any kind of instruction!) but, precisely, to absolve the Veda from a *positive* prescription of this sacrifice: “Of course, [one should] not understand [by the Veda's injunction] that [sacrifices] such as the Śyena[-sacrifice really] ought to be done (*kartavya*)!”⁷² Hence, according to Śabara, the Vedic injunction *śyenenābhicaran yajeta* (“Whoever [wishes to] cast a spell [and thereby cause the death of his enemy] should sacrifice by [means of] the Śyena[-sacrifice]”) ⁷³ does not really prescribe such a sacrifice, but merely indicates, in a neutral and “impartial”⁷⁴ way, that this is the right way to kill an enemy by sorcery. Śabara's distinction thus clearly points to a substantial difference between the simple *description* of the causal relationship between a certain action and its result

⁷⁰ On this passage, see also HALBFASS 1992: 89–90.

⁷¹ *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2: *yo hi hiṃsitum icchet, tasyāyam abhyupāya iti hi teṣām upadeśaḥ* (F 20.17–18).

⁷² *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2: *naiva śyēnādayaḥ kartavyatayā vijñāyante* (F 20.17). I am not taking into account Kumārila's intentionally unfaithful reading of this passage in the *Ślokavārttika* (*codanā*°), k. 225cd–231ab. See K. Kataoka's illuminating explanation and translation of these verses in KATAOKA 2011₂: 162–163 and KATAOKA 2011₂: 476–481.

⁷³ *Āpastambaśrautasūtra* 22.4.13 according to EDGERTON 1986: 255 (n. 320) and FRAUWALLNER 1968: 20. BENSON 2010: 67 (n. 117) mentions a similar passage in the *Ṣaḍviṃśabrāhmaṇa* (4.2.1–2), that would make the sentence “Vedic” *stricto sensu*, but the phrasing of Śabara's quote is much closer to that which is actually found in Āpastamba's treatise.

⁷⁴ See KATAOKA 2011₂: 476 (n. 660).

on the one hand, and, on the other, the positive *prescription* of this action by a speaker (or by the Veda itself).

Quite on the opposite, Maṇḍana's final position appears as a complete denegation of the difference between these two levels, and as a simple *reduction* of prescription to description: not only does he consider the knowledge of *iṣṭasāadhanatā* as the specific content of *all* cases of instruction (including Vedic instruction about beneficial sacrifices, such as the Jyotiṣṭoma); he also extends the causal efficiency of the knowledge of this property to all kinds of behaviour resulting from an injunction (including, as we will see, command, request and permission) and, finally, to any kind of action whatsoever, ..., for there is no other cause of an activity than [an entity's] being desired (*iṣṭatā*) or [an action's] being the means for realizing it (*tatsāadhanatā*).⁷⁵

Correlatively, the role of the speaker uttering an injunction (*vidhātṛ*) is reduced by him to its strict minimum, namely the mere transmission of a piece of information about a means of realization and its relationship to an expected result. This is Maṇḍana's statement in BS 2.104, which mainly reassesses the conclusions of the ViV:

For the learned ones think that the operation (*vyāpṛti*) of the author of an injunction (*vidhātṛ*) amounts to showing the means for realizing the [expected fruit⁷⁶], [and] hold *vidhi* to be nothing but [the property of] being the means for realizing what [the agent] aspires to.⁷⁷

However appealing such a hypothesis might be in terms of parsimony, still, one is allowed to wonder whether it really accounts for

⁷⁵ BS 2.101–104 (*Vṛtti*): ... *iṣṭatāyās tatsāadhanatāyās cānyasya pravṛtṭi-hetor abhāvāt* (p. 116.18–19).

⁷⁶ *tad* refers, by *anuvṛtti*, to the expected "fruit" (*phala*) explicitly mentioned in BS 2.103cd: *svātmasthitiḥ supraśāntā phalam, tan na vidheḥ padam* |; "The fruit [of the knowledge of reality] is the abiding in one's self, well-appeased, [and] injunction does not set foot on such a [fruit]" (p. 115.9).

⁷⁷ BS 2.104: *tatsāadhanāvabodhe hi vidhātṛvyāpṛtir matā | apekṣitopāyataiva^a vidhir iṣṭo manīṣibhiḥ* || (p. 115.10–11).

^aeva BS : iva var. (BS).

all human activities resulting from an injunction. One could easily object, on the basis of ordinary experience, that Maṇḍana's analysis fails to account for the positive instigation we feel when we hear an injunction. This instigation, which is not completely absent even from a simple advice,⁷⁸ is what Indian authors (Mīmāṃsakas and grammarians alike) generally call *pravartanā* ("impelling"), that makes us immediately react to an injunction like "Close the door!" or "Bind the cow!," most of the time without any serious conscious consideration of our desires or of the means to realize them. In fact, it is not the same thing to say to somebody "This medicine is good for your health" and to advise him "You should take this medicine!," even less to command him "Take this medicine!" In the first case, the speaker neutrally states the relationship between a means (the medicine) and its expected result (good health), without committing him/herself into direct advice or command, while such a personal

⁷⁸ That instruction (*upadeśa*) itself can have such a nuance of positive instigation in certain contexts is what clearly appears from a passage of Maṇḍana's *Vṛtti* on ViV 11. The hypothesis under consideration in that section of the *pūrvapakṣa* (ViV 9–11) is the equation of *vidhi* with the relationship between an action and an agent (*kriyākartṛsambandha*), which potentially gives rise to an activity when the agent ascertains his/her own relationship with the action through an idea like "This is your task [for] today!" (*adya tavedaṃ karma*). See ViV 9 (*Vṛtti* – introduction), S 279.3–4 (= T 30.1–2). In the course of his refutation of this hypothesis in the *Vṛtti* on ViV 11, Maṇḍana makes the following statement, in which the impelling nature of instruction is clearly put into evidence: *upadeśakam hi śāstram. na cettham upadeśakā yajetetyādayaḥ śabdāḥ. na hy ebhir idam kurv ity upadiśyate, api tu svargakāmāder yāgasambandho 'vagamyate, daṇḍyādiśrutibhir iva daṇḍādisambandhaḥ*; "For Scripture is a source of instruction, and speech-[units] like *yajeta* ('[He] should sacrifice!'), etc., [as you interpret them] are not such sources of instruction. In fact, by these [injunctions] one is not instructed 'Do this!' Rather, one is made to understand the [mere] relationship of a [person] who desires heaven with the sacrifice, just as one would understand by a word like *daṇḍin* ('staff-bearer'), etc., the relationship of [the bearer] with the staff" (S 297.3–6 [≈ T 34.10–35.3]). On the interpretation of the verbal form *avagamyate* as a causative, parallel to *upadiśyate*, see NK: *gamyata iti ṇici rūpam*; "[the verbal form] *gamyate* is [to be taken] in [its] causative form" (S 297.16–17 [= T 35.11–12]).

commitment is at the heart of what is conveyed by the second set of sentences. Following Maṇḍana's hypothesis, these three sentences would be rigorously equivalent as far as their meaning is concerned. It is nonetheless possible (and potentially meaningful) to combine them into a single utterance such as "This medicine is good for your health, you should take it!" This sentence is not only syntactically correct, but also it does not suffer of any redundancy, since the first, descriptive proposition rather states the reason that justifies the subsequent advice or command.⁷⁹ In other words, what was secured by the grammarians' pragmatic analysis and what seems to be, on the contrary, completely lost in Maṇḍana's final understanding of injunction, is the dynamic and inter-subjective dimension of speech which is particularly perceptible in the case of injunctive discourse.

It appears, though, from the objection that Maṇḍana himself formulates on the threshold of ViV 28, that he was acutely conscious of these difficulties in his own position:

[Objection:] Still, while [hearing] *liñ*, etc., one feels impelled [to undertake an action], and this [feeling] you are brushing aside [when you say

⁷⁹ A similar objection, established on the basis of a Vedic example, is actually found in Mīmāṃsaka texts, and might be as old as Someśvara's *Nyāyasudhā*. It is found, again, in Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaparakāśa* (§ 368): *yat tv iṣṭasādhanatvaṃ vidhyartha iti, tan na. tathā satīṣṭasādhanam iti śabdasya vidhiśabdaḥ paryāyaḥ syāt. na ca paryāyatvaṃ yujyate, saṃdhyopāsanam ta iṣṭasādhanam, tasmāt tat tvaṃ kurv iti sahaprayogāt, paryāyānām ca sahaprayogābhāvāt*; "It is not true that the indication of an instrument of a desired result is the meaning of the injunction. If that were the case, the [verbal] injunctive expression [the optative or equivalent form] would be a synonym of the word 'instrument of desired result.' And it is impossible that they should be synonyms, because they are used together in the sentence 'The twilight-worship is thy instrument of desired result, therefore perform thou that,' and because synonyms are never used together" (text in EDGERTON 1986: 268–269; translation in EDGERTON 1986: 179–180).

that] “instruction is the instigation [of an agent who] has not started [to act yet] to [undertake] an action for his own sake”^{80,81}

Impelling (*pravartanā*), isolated by Maṇḍana earlier in the ViV as an invariable (*avyabhicar[ita]*) feature of command, request and permission,⁸² is thus well-recognized by him as a fundamental datum of our experience as hearers and as agents, even in cases of simple instruction or advice. This, however, does not lead him to renounce his main thesis on the nature of *upadeśa*, but rather encourages him to develop it until its ultimate consequences: what we feel when we hear an injunction and designate as “impelling” is not the specific operation of a speaker; nor is it an obscure potency belonging to speech itself, as many later Mīmāṃsakas will argue.⁸³ Rather, it is just a certain property (*dharma*) of the action expressed by the verbal root, a “supplement in [its own] nature” (*bhāvātīśaya*)⁸⁴ that one is free to

⁸⁰ This is, as one will remember, Maṇḍana’s own definition of *upadeśa* in ViV 26ab (see above).

⁸¹ ViV 28 (*Vṛtti* – introduction): *nanu liṅādibhyaḥ pravartanāvagamyaṭe, parāhataṃ cedam upadeśo niyojyārthakarmāprasthitacodaneti*^a (T 172.6–173.1 [P 242.4–243.1]). ^a°codanā ViV_{T+P}: °pracodanā NK_{T+P}.

⁸² See ViV 5 (*Vṛtti* – *pūrvapakṣin*’s discourse): *avyabhicārāt pravartanāmātram loke liṅādyarthaḥ*; “In worldly [usage], mere impelling is the meaning of *liṅ*, etc., for it is invariably [present when *liṅ* is uttered]” (S 203.2–204.1 [= T 19.2]).

⁸³ On these two hypotheses, see especially Someśvara’s *Nyāyasudhā* 1.2.7: *kā punaḥ pravartanā? pravṛtīhetubhūtaḥ pravartayitur dharmāḥ kaś cid iti brūmaḥ. ... vede tu puruṣābhāvena liṅāder eva pravartakatvāt tad-dharmo bhaviṣyati*; “But what [do you mean by] ‘impelling’? We answer that it is a certain property of the instigator, which causes the [agent’s] activity. ... In the Veda, however, since there is no personal being [who could be such an instigator], the cause of [an agent’s] activity is none but *liṅ*, etc.; hence, [impelling] has to be a property of [suffixes such as *liṅ*]” (p. 64.20–25). The same view is advocated by Āpadeva at the beginning of his *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (§ 4). See EDGERTON 1986: 40.

⁸⁴ The identity of meaning of both expressions is confirmed by the NK (T 173.26–27 [= P 243.25–244.2]), where Vācaspati glosses *bhāvātīśaya* with the compound *bhāvadharmā* (“a property of the nature [of an entity]”). An interpretation of *bhāva* in the sense of “action” is contra-

call its “operation” (*vyāpāra*),⁸⁵ knowable by means of speech just as the property of a substance is knowable through sentences like “The lotus is blue” or “The earth is round.” The function of speech is then, in all cases, a purely theoretical one, namely to help us recognize a certain property of an entity or, in other words, to teach us *how it really is*. Injunction thus loses most of its specificity with respect to a simple assertion. Its function, similar to that of any other descriptive sentence, is to unveil in the eyes of the hearer to whom it is addressed a hitherto unrecognized⁸⁶ relational property of the action

dicted by Vācaspati’s commentary, who illustrates Maṇḍana’s use of the expression *bhāvātīśaya* with the example of the contact with the mind (*manaḥsamyoga*) which, when it functions as a supplement in the nature of the self (*ātmano bhāvātīśayaḥ*), allows the self to produce determinate ideas (*buddhi*), etc. See NK ad ViV 28 (T 173.26–27). A similar use of the compound *svabhāvātīśaya* is made by Dharmakīrti to designate a presumed property of *mantras*, which makes them capable of producing an expected result (*phaladāyin*). See *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.295 (*Vṛtti*) in GNOLI 1960: 157 (l. 9). On this passage, see ELTSCHINGER 2001: 93, who translates *svabhāvātīśaya* as “une propriété supplémentaire de [la] nature propre [des *mantra*].” It is on the basis of this parallel that I understand *bhāva* as the “nature” of an entity, and not as the entity itself, which is also a possible interpretation.

⁸⁵ The qualification of *iṣṭasāadhanatā* as an “operation” (*vyāpāra*) of the action expressed by the verbal root presupposes a considerable broadening of the normal application of the concept of *vyāpāra*, and must have been as disconcerting for the first readers of the ViV as it is to a modern reader of Maṇḍana’s work. In the NK, Vācaspati justifies this equation as follows: *na vayaṃ parisṇandam evaikaṃ vyāpāram ācakṣmahe, yenāspandātmanaḥ samīhitasāadhanatāyā apravartanātmatvena paryanuyujyemahi, api tu bhāvadharma eva kaś cit samīhitasāadhanānugūṇo vyāpārapadārthaḥ*; “We do not claim that movement is the only [existing] operation; if we did, [you] might indeed contradict [us by saying] that the [property of] being the means for realizing a desired [end] does not consist of a movement, and [thus] cannot be identical with impelling. Rather, [we claim that, in the present case,] the word *vyāpāra* (‘operation’) only refers to a certain property of the nature [of an entity], which suits the realization of a desired [result]” (T 173.24–26 [= P 243.23–244.4]).

⁸⁶ One might object that, if this were the case, the repeated use of an

(its causal efficiency) by means of a statement that might, like any other declarative statement, be true or false.

Such a reduction is the main achievement of ViV 28, probably the most famous and oft-quoted *kārikā* of the whole treatise:

For a human being, there is no other incitement towards actions than [their] being a means for realizing what he desires (*iṣṭābhyupāyatva*), and what [people] call “impelling” is [nothing but this same] property (*dharmā*) [of an action], which is the cause of [their] activity.⁸⁷

Maṇḍana’s intention is further explained in the corresponding *Vṛtti*:

Impelling, as we know, is a certain supplement in the nature [of an entity] (*bhāvātīśaya*), called [its] “operation” (*vyāpāra*), capable [of giving rise] to an activity. And this is nothing but the actions’ being means for realizing a desired [end], for nobody undertakes an [action] if he does not know it to be such [a means].⁸⁸

In these passages, Maṇḍana makes a move from the purely linguistic plane where he stood until now to a more general reflection on action and its causes. We may better understand his somewhat inexplicit argument with the help of the NK.

injunction – the daily instructions of a master to his servant, for instance – would be vain, since the specific property of the concerned action would already have been manifested by the preceding occurrences of this injunction. I cannot see any answer to such an objection in Maṇḍana’s work, but it is found in the work of some of his successors like Prakāśātman, who deals with this objection in the *Śābdanirṇaya* (see k. 53 and *Vṛtti* thereon [p. 47.20–50.13]). A detailed discussion of his arguments would exceed, however, the ambition of the present study.

⁸⁷ ViV 28: *pumso neṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsv anyah pravartakah | pravṛtthetum dharmam ca pravadanti pravartanām ||* (T 173.2–3 [= P 243.2–3]). The second half of this verse could be understood in more than one way, but the comparison with its paraphrasis in the BS seems to confirm the present interpretation: ... *pravṛtthetoś ca dharmasya pravartanāśabdābhidheyatvāt*; “... and because the property that is the cause of an activity is what is expressed by the word ‘impelling’” (p. 116.17–18).

⁸⁸ ViV 28 (*Vṛtti*): *pravṛttisamartho hi kaś cid bhāvātīśayo vyāpārābhidhānaḥ pravartanā. sā ca kriyāṇām apekṣitopāyataiva. na hi tathātvam apratipadya tatra pravartate kaś cit* (T 173.4–174.1 [= P 243.4–244.1]).

According to Vācaspati's commentary, Maṇḍana's reasoning would be based on a record of the intrinsically painful nature of action, which always involves a certain amount of effort (*prayatna*): "the world's experience is that an action is [in itself] painful."⁸⁹ Hence, no action is ever undertaken unless its inherently painful nature is overcome by an attraction toward possible future beneficial consequences: "only the [property of] being a means for realizing pleasure can incite [a rational person to undertake] actions that are intrinsically painful, because it arouses desire."⁹⁰ No impelling would be powerful enough to provoke by itself a desire to undertake an action, and no action can ever be undertaken – so is, at least, Maṇḍana's and Vācaspati's assumption in this passage – without being grounded in the agent's desire (*rāga/icchā*). Activities resulting from a verbal exchange are no exception to this universal rule. Injunctions (be they worldly or Vedic) thus owe their efficiency to the transmission of this same property of actions, for "if, on the other hand, speech did not convey that [an action] is the means for realizing pleasure, it would never incite a human being to [undertake any] action."⁹¹

The obvious consequence of this desire-centred explanation of action is that the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhana*tā, which is the immediate outcome of Maṇḍana's analysis of *upadeśa*, is by no means limited to this particular pragmatic situation, but can rightly be extended to other interlocutory situations, such as command, request and permission:

Even when an activity is the effect of a command[, a request or a permission,] it cannot [take place] unless [the agent] somehow resorts to

⁸⁹ NK ad ViV 28ab: *kriyā ... duḥkhetṛy anubhavo lokasya* (T 173.14.15 [= P 243.16]). Cp. VAMV 2.8bc–9: *svabhāvena hi karmāṇi duḥkhotpādahetu-bhūtāni*; "As we all know, actions are naturally responsible for the arising of [a certain amount of] pain" (p. 428.4). Vācaspati's commentary on ViV 28ab is largely based on this particular section of Śālikanātha's *Vṛtti* (p. 428.4–429.6).

⁹⁰ NK ad ViV 28ab: *duḥkharūpāsu kriyāsu sukhasādhana*tāivecchopahāramukhena pravartayati (T 173.17–18 [= P 243.16]).

⁹¹ NK ad ViV 28ab: *yadi punaḥ śabdaḥ sukhasādhana*tāṃ na pratipādayen na kriyāyāṃ puruṣaṃ pravartayet (T 173.18–19 [P 243.17–18]).

[the action's] being conducive to what he aspires to, for [an activity] never takes place otherwise.⁹²

Hence, a command such as “Bring the cow!” even if it is pronounced by an authoritative person like one's master – or even by the king in person! – would be completely inefficient if the agent could not somehow make it match his own personal motivational complex, the minimal motivation possibly being, as Vācaspati suggests, the will to please (*pari-√tus*) the person who gave the order.⁹³

This fundamental statement concludes the discussion started in ViV 26–27 in a rather unexpected way. The distinction of *upadeśa* as a fourth possible “meaning” (*artha*) of injunctive suffixes (ViV 26) and the consequent determination of *iṣṭasāadhanatā* as its specific import (ViV 27) were nothing but provisional achievements, whose

⁹² ViV 28 (*Vṛtti*): *yāpy^a ājñādibhyaḥ pravṛttiḥ, sāpi katham cid apekṣitanibandhanatvam^b upāśrityaiva, anyathābhāvāt* (T 174.1–2 [= P 244.1–2]).

^a*yā* ViV_{T+P} NK_{T+P} : *yadi* var. (ViV_{T+P}); ^b*nibandhanatvam* ViV_{T+P} : *nibandhanatām* NK_{T+P}.

⁹³ Vācaspati's explanation in the NK (ad ViV 28 [*Vṛtti*]) deserves to be quoted at length: *nanv anapekṣitopāye 'py ājñayā rājñāḥ pravartante prekṣāvanta iti katham apekṣitopāyataiva pravṛttihetuḥ? ... yady apy ājñādayo niyoktrarthakarmāṇaḥ, tathāpi tadviśayasampādanasya katham cin niyojyāpekṣitanibandhanatvam apy asti. tathā hi: tatsampādanaparitoṣita ājñāpayitā samīhitam asmai prayacchaty ahitam vā na vidhatte. tad idam apekṣitam upāśritya bhṛtyasya pravṛttiḥ;* “[Objection:] Still, rational persons [sometimes] undertake [actions] which are not the means for realizing what [they personally] desire, because of an order [promulgated] by the king [for instance]; how, then, could [an action's] being the means for realizing what [the agent] desires be the only [possible] cause of an activity? ... [Answer:] Even though command [and request] are about actions [accomplished] for the sake of the [person] who enjoins, the accomplishment of [the actions that are] their content is also somehow conducive to [something] that is desired [for himself] by the [person] who is enjoined. To explain: when he is pleased by the accomplishment of the [commanded action], he who gave the order [generally] bestows on him what he wishes, or [at least] does not impose on him anything disadvantageous. Hence, [it is assumed that] the activity of the [king's] servant [takes place] resorting to this [favourable treatment] he wishes [for himself]” (T 174.4–9 [= P 244.9–15]).

ultimate function was to manifest the essentially identical content of *all* (Vedic or worldly) injunctions. In those injunctions where the speaker apparently prevails (command, request and permission), *iṣṭasāadhanatā* remains concealed; in instruction, however, it is conspicuous. This, of course, does not mean that these distinctions become completely obsolete after the establishment of Maṇḍana's final point, but their validity is nonetheless limited to a very superficial level of linguistic analysis, which does by no means amount to a correct description of the effective process leading from a verbal utterance to an activity, or to the display of its real *cause*. To put it another way, the four values of injunctive moods (command, request, permission and instruction) are not really, in Maṇḍana's opinion, different "meanings" of suffixes such as *liñ*, etc., but are better understood as different modes of presentation of a single, universal meaning, which does not always appear with the same degree of clarity, but the presence of which one might always infer from the bare fact that an agent undertakes an activity while he is not physically forced to.

Conclusion: a Vedāntic theory of action?

Can we inscribe Maṇḍana's theory of action and injunction in the wider context of his philosophical and exegetical system? In the final part of this essay, I would like to briefly suggest possible consequences of his theory of *iṣṭasāadhanatā* for his Vedāntic interpretation of the Vedic *corpus*, particularly for the exegetical foundation of the distinction between "injunctions" (*vidhi*), "explanatory statements" (*arthavāda*) and "sentences of the Vedānta" (*vedāntavākya*) as three separate categories of Vedic sentences.

As is well-known, this comparatively recent⁹⁴ distinction delimits the specific object of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā (= Vedānta), and thus le-

⁹⁴ To this date, the question whether Maṇḍana inherited or created the exegetical category of *vedāntavākya*s remains unanswered. Kumāṛila, whose vicinity with certain aspects of later Vedāntic thought has recently been underlined (see MESQUITA 1994 and YOSHIMIZU 2007), repeatedly mentions separately *arthavādas* and *upaniṣads* in the *Tantravārttika* (see PASHUPATINATH SASTRI 1980: 140–141 and HALBFASS 1992: 150), but this does not mean that he associates with the

gitimates its existence as an independent discipline, distinct from Jaimini's Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.⁹⁵ Beyond a mere descriptive classification of Vedic sentences, it involves a proper exegetical thesis, namely the claim that *vedāntavākyas* possess validity (*prāmāṇya*) independently of injunctions. This, especially, excludes their simple assimilation to *arthavādas*, despite the fact that these two categories of sentences share common linguistic features, such as the accomplished/realized (*bhūta/siddha*) nature of their object⁹⁶ (in the case of *vedāntavākyas*, the eternally present *Brahman* and its equally eternal identity with the individual self [*ātman*]). Hence, "sentences of the Vedānta" as conceived by Uttara-Mīmāṃsakas may roughly be defined as those Vedic sentences speaking of an accomplished object (*bhūtārtha*) and which possess independent validity (*nirapekṣam prāmāṇyam*).

term *upaniṣad* the same thing as Maṇḍana. In any case, this distinction does not seem to be well-established for Bhartṛhari (see *Vākyapadīya* 1.8 and *Vṛtti* thereon; see also W. Halbfass's remarks on this passage [*op. cit.*]). Even Prabhākara apparently ignores the second category of sentences, as the following passage from the *Bṛhatī* 1.1.2 tends to show: *yadi kārya eva cārthe^a vedasya prāmāṇyam, katham tarhi bhūtādyarthāvagatir mantrārthavādeṣu* (^aca C : Ø M); "Moreover, if the Veda's validity is limited to an object [that is] to be done, then how does one apprehend an object [that is] past, [present or future] in the case of *mantras* and *arthavādas*?" (C 18.1–2 [= M 23.5–6]). Had Prabhākara known the category of *vedāntavākyas*, he would probably not have failed to mention them at that crucial point of his commentary, that was to become the *locus classicus* for a discussion of this type of Vedic sentences for later Prābhākaras from Śālikanātha onwards. See *Ṛjuvimalā* 1.1.2 (C 18.29–32 [≈ M 23.11–14]) and *Nayaviveka* 1.1.2 (p. 44.6–46.1). It is not impossible that the occasion for the introduction of this theme into the Prābhākara debate was precisely the appearance of Maṇḍana's work, a very common target of Śālikanātha's attacks. This question would certainly deserve closer attention from historians of Indian exegetical schools.

⁹⁵ On the early denominations of this discipline and the signification of "Vedānta," see DAVID 2012.

⁹⁶ See *Śābarabhāṣya* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.2.1 (*arthavāda*^o): ... *bhūtam artham ācakṣate: rudravān rudraḥ* ...; "... [*arthavādas*] speak of an accomplished object, [like the fact that] Rudra wept, etc." (A₂ 1.6–7).

The isolation of this separate exegetical category could not fail to constitute, for many a Mīmāṃsaka, a major infringement to the strict delimitation of the Veda's competence to supra-sensory matters, i.e. to objects that are to be done/to be realized (*kartavya/sādhyā*), "for," as urged by one of Śaṅkara's opponents in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1.1.4, "an existent entity (*pariniṣṭhitavastu*) [like the eternal *Brahman*] lies [as such] within the realm of perception, etc."⁹⁷ In other words, the Vedāntic extension of the scope of the Veda from actions to existent entities, if not tempered by their strict "agreement" (*ekavākyatā*) with an injunction as in the case of *arthavādas*,⁹⁸ would mar the specificity of its object, which is the foundation of its impersonality and, finally, of its very authority.⁹⁹

The exact determination of Maṇḍana's attitude towards this fundamental exegetical problem in the ViV and in the *Niyogak*° of the BS will require a separate study. It is possible, though, to sense the use he could make of his theory of action and injunction in this context and the potential appeal it could hold for later Vedāntic audiences.

Two aspects of Maṇḍana's theory have been underlined in the course of this study: his depersonalization of injunctive discourse and his subsequent reduction of prescription to description. Both go

⁹⁷ *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* ad *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.4 (*samanvaya*°): ... *pratyakṣādī- viṣayatvāt pariniṣṭhitavastunaḥ* (p. 100.10). See also Vācaspati's *Bhāmatī* thereon: ... *bhūtārthatvena ca pratyakṣādibhiḥ samānaviṣayatayā laukikavākyavat tadarthānuvādatvenāprāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt*; "Moreover[, if sentences of the Vedānta were really meant to express *Brahman*,] their content would be similar to that of perception, etc., inasmuch as [*Brahman*] is an accomplished object. Hence, they would, alas, lose all [independent] validity, just like any worldly sentence, for they would be [mere] reiterations of an object of [perception, etc.]" (p. 100.18–19).

⁹⁸ See *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.2.7: *vidhinā tv ekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhinām syuḥ*; "But thanks to [their] agreement with an injunction, [*arthavādas*] might [occur] for the purpose of praising injunctions" (A₂ 10.1).

⁹⁹ On the Veda's teaching only supra-sensory matters, see for instance *Ślokavārttika* (*codanā*°) k. 13–14 (translation in KATAOKA 2011₂: 206–209). On the Veda's impersonality as the foundation for its authority, see for instance *Ślokavārttika* (*codanā*°) k. 63 (translation in KATAOKA 2011₂: 272).

in the same direction: the assimilation of the understanding of injunctions to a particular case of *theoretical* comprehension.¹⁰⁰ Hence, following Maṇḍana's hypothesis, two worldly sentences such as "The pot is blue" and "Hurry up!," in spite of superficial differences, share an essentially identical function, namely to communicate relevant features of a certain entity (the colour of the pot in the first case, the useful character of an action in the second) for the (direct or indirect) benefit of the hearer.

The same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for two Vedic sentences such as the typical Vedāntic sentence *vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma* ("Brahman is consciousness, [it is] bliss")¹⁰¹ and an injunction like *svargakāmo yajeta* ("Let him who desires heaven sacrifice!"). The first one, an "essential definition" (*svarūpalakṣaṇa*) of *Brahman*, grants the hearer the salvific knowledge of its object, diffracting its unique and unspecified nature into a plurality of non-synonymous designations. The second positively qualifies the sacrifice, the instrument of "objective effectuation" (*arthabhāvanā*), manifesting its causal efficiency (*sādhanatva*) towards heaven. In spite of many differences between these two sentences (first among them, the relational or non-relational nature of their object), their function is thus quite similar: both bestow on the hearer the knowledge of a certain exis-

¹⁰⁰ This aspect of Maṇḍana's theory is pretty well seized by its earliest advocate in post-Śaṅkara Advaita, namely Sureśvara, in k. 637–638 of his *Sambandhavārttika: ataḥ samīhitopāyatayā vastv avabodhayan | abuddhaṃ prerako vedo, jñāpanā preraṇā matā || tathā ca vastuyāthātmyajñāpanena pramāṇatā | na prerakatayā sā syāt pratyakṣāder anikṣaṇāt ||*; "Hence, the Veda instigates [human beings to undertake sacrificial actions] by making known [to them] a [particular] entity (*vastu*) as the means for realizing what [they] wish, [an entity that was hitherto] unknown [to them as being such a means]. By 'instigation' (*preraṇā*) [we] mean 'teaching' (*jñāpanā*). Accordingly, [the Veda] has to be a means of valid knowledge inasmuch as it teaches *how* [this particular] entity *is* (*vastuyāthātmyā*), not insofar as it instigates, for this is not seen in the case of perception, etc." (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* p. 128.2–3).

¹⁰¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.9.28.

tent entity, for his own good.¹⁰² This is, essentially, the appropriate design of an instruction.

Hence, following Maṇḍana's interpretation of *vidhi*, it is not only vain to exclude the possibility of a teaching about existing entities in the Veda: *all* Vedic sentences should be understood precisely in this way. Vedāntic pluralism, rooted in the denial of the Veda's unity of object and purpose, splitting it into two (*dharma* on the one hand,

¹⁰² Although the inclusion of *iṣṭasāadhanatā* under the category of existing entities or "accomplished objects" (*bhūtārtha*) appears to me as a logical consequence of his theory, it is difficult to find a clear statement in this sense in Maṇḍana's work. Two passages of the NK seem, nonetheless, to corroborate such an interpretation. The first one is found in Vācaspati's commentary on ViV 28 (*Vṛtti* – introduction). As we have seen, the main objection addressed to Maṇḍana's theory of *upadeśa* in this portion of his own *Vṛtti* was that the mere teaching of a relationship between a means and its expected result lacked "impelling" (*pravartanā*) and consequently could not be the cause of an agent's activity. Elaborating on this objection, Vācaspati makes the following remark he attributes to Maṇḍana's *pūrvapakṣin*: ... *na punaḥ puruṣārthopāyatā, na khalu bhūtārthapratīṭṭiḥ pravṛttihetuḥ*; "... but the [quality] of being a means for realizing a goal of men is not [what is understood by *liñ*, etc.]; sure enough, the knowledge of an existing object [cannot] be the cause of an activity!" (T 173.7–8 [= P 242.25–243.6]). By this objection, which is not taken up in the corresponding *siddhānta*, Vācaspati clearly implies that, for him at least, *iṣṭasāadhanatā* should be included under the category of *bhūtārthas*, and that injunctions should be understood as statements about an existing entity. In the second passage, the identification of *iṣṭasāadhanatā* with a *bhūtārtha* is found, once again, in the mouth of a *pūrvapakṣin* protesting against Maṇḍana's identification of the two properties *iṣṭasāadhanatā* and *kartavyatā* ("[the quality of] what ought to be done") in ViV 32. Paraphrasing Śālikanātha's VAM and VAMV 2.7–8ab (p. 428.10–15), Vācaspati raises the following objection: *na ca sādhanatākartavyatayos tādātmyam, siddhasādhyatvena dahanatuhinavat svabhāvavirodhāt*; "Besides, the [quality of] a means of realization and [the quality of] what ought to be done cannot be identical, because what is realized and what ought to be realized are opposed by nature, just like fire and snow" (T 215.13–14 [P 302.14–16]). This remark, again, presupposes that the knowledge of an action's being a means of realization is comparable in nature to the knowledge of any other existent entity. Although Vācaspati later refutes this objection, his refutation never bears on this apparently well-admitted point.

Brahman on the other), had everything to gain from this major crack into one of classical Mīmāṃsā's main presuppositions: the functional centrality of Vedic injunction.

References and abbreviations

1) Sanskrit texts:

A. = *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini.

Ṛjvimalā of Śālikanātha Miśra: see *Bṛhatī*.

Tattvapradīpikā (= *Citsukhī*) of Citsukha:

Tattvapradīpikā (Citsukhī) of Paramahaṃsa Citsukhācārya, with the Commentary Nayanaprasādhinī. Ed. Kāshināth Shāstrī. Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan (The Vrajajivan Pracyabharati Granthamala 19) 1987.

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Tattvasamīkṣā of Vācaspati Miśra: see ACHARYA 2006.

Tantravārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: see *Śābarabhāṣya* (A₂).

Nayaviveka of Bhavanātha Miśra:

Mīmāṃsānayaviveka of ... Bhavanātha, with Ravideva's Vivekatattva for pāda 1 and, up to chapter 2, Dīpikā commentary by ... Varadarāja. Ed. S. Subrahmanya Sastri. New Delhi: Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan 2004.

Nyāyakaṇikā [NK] of Vācaspati Miśra: see *Vidhiviveka*.

Nyāyacandrikā of Ānandapūrṇa (*alias* Vidyāsāgara):

Nyāyacandrikā of Ānandapūrṇamunīndra, with the commentary Nyāyaprakāśikā of Svarūpānandamunīndra. Ed. N.S. Anantakrishna Sastri and K. Ramamurthi Sastri. Madras: Government Oriental Manuscripts Library (Government Oriental Series 154) 1959.

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Prakīrṇaprakāśa of Helārāja: see *Vākyapadīya*.

Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra:

C = *Bṛhatī (a commentary on Śābarabhāṣya) by Prabhākara Miśra with the commentary Ṛjuvimalā of Śālikanātha Miśra.* Ed. A. Chinnaswami Sastri. Benares: Vidya Vilas Press (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 391) 1929.

M = *Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra (on the Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya of Śabarasvāmin) with the Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā of Śālikanātha (Tarkapāda).* Ed. S.K. Ramanatha Sastri. Madras: The University of Madras (Madras University Sanskrit Series 3.1) 1934.

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Bhāmatī of Vācaspati Miśra: see *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*.

Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa (= *Āpadevī*) of Āpadeva:¹⁰³ see EDGERTON 1986.

Mīmāṃsāsūtra, attributed to Jaimini: see *Śābarabhāṣya*.

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari:¹⁰⁴

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja. Kāṇḍa 3, part 1 (3.1–3.7). Ed. K.A. Subrahmania Iyer. Pune: Deccan College (Deccan College Monograph Series 21) 1994. Reprint. 1st ed. Pune 1963.

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Vākyārthamātrkā [VAM] and *Vākyārthamātrkāvr̥tti* [VAMV] of Śālikanātha Miśra:

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S = STERN 1988.

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Śābarabhāṣya (= *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*) of Śābarasvāmin:

F = FRAUWALLNER 1968.

¹⁰³ Paragraphs are indicated as in EDGERTON 1986.

¹⁰⁴ Unless specified, all references to the *Vākyapadīya* and *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* are to part 1 of Iyer's edition.

A₂ = *Mīmāṃsādarśan[am]*, *śrīmajjaiminipraṇīt[am]*. Vol. 2. Ed. Subbaśāstrī (revised by P. Gaṇeśaśāstrī Jośī). Pune: Ānandāśramamudraṇālaya (Ānandāśramasaṃskṛtagranthāvali 97,2) 1981.

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