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BEYOND MORGENTHAU: THE TRANSNATIONAL TURN AND THE POTENTIAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES FOR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY

INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL HISTORY FROM POLITICAL REALISM TO A TRANSNATIONAL RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE

In 1948, in the aftermath of World War II and against the backdrop of the emerging Cold War, Hans Joachim Morgenthau published his *Politics among Nations*, a seminal work of International Relations (IR) theory. The seventh and revised edition retains the core elements of Morgenthau's philosophy of international relations: "a realist theory, politics as a struggle for power, the foreign policies of the major powers, nationalism, national power, diplomacy and the possibilities for a world state."¹ The text not only shaped the agenda of post-World War II IR but also the field of contemporary international history for decades to come². Mark Trachtenberg's snapshot of a realist reading of international politics indicates the success of political realism in determining the contours of international history:

"Different countries want different things; sometimes those desires conflict; how then do those conflicts get worked out? This is perhaps the most basic problem in international politics, and the fundamental insight of the realist approach to international politics is that the way such conflicts run their course is heavily conditioned by the realities of power."³

¹ I would like to thank Morten Rasmussen for his comments on a draft version of this chapter. Hans MORGENTHAU, *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* (Boston–London 2005). While the development of political realism is inextricably linked with the name of Morgenthau, his was not the only influential realist voice. Throughout the period of the Cold War, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) by British historian E.H. Carr, for example, was equally considered an important realist work. See Michael Cox, *Will the Real E.H. Carr Please Stand Up?*, in: *International Affairs* 75 (1999), 643–653.

² This observation applies in particular to the international historiography generated in the United States. See Zara STEINER, *On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More*, in: *International Affairs* 73 (1997) 531–546, here 532. The ongoing success of *Politics Among Nations* in US higher education institutions is acknowledged by Douglas B. KLUSMEYER, *Contesting Thukydides' Legacy: Comparing Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau on Imperialism, History and Theory*, in: *The International History Review* 33 (2011) 1–25, here 1.

³ Mark TRACHTENBERG, *The Question of Realism: A Historian's View*, in: *Security Studies* 13 (2003) 156–194, here 156.

Accordingly states are considered the main, if not the exclusive, players in international politics. Functioning as cohesive and purposeful actors, states defend their “national interests” in competition and interaction with other states. Finally, it is assumed that “realities of power” shape interstate conflict. If Trachtenberg’s case demonstrates that there are international historians who have taken an interest in IR and especially in political realism⁴, often historians have tacitly subscribed to political realist assumptions about states and their behaviour in international politics.

Against this backdrop the transnational turn in IR allowed for a departure from state-centric approaches to international politics. In the 1970s, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye crucially challenged political realism and the primacy of states in IR theory by drawing attention to the increasing importance of transnational actors including multinational corporations, international trade unions and various non-governmental organizations in international politics. Rather than write states out of international relations, however, Keohane and Nye were interested in the effects of transnational relations on interstate relations⁵.

In (international) history the origins of the current interest in transnational history go back to the early 1990s⁶. In the same way that Keohane and Nye promoted a transnational perspective to shed light on interstate relations, a transnational research perspective on international history does not replace national histories and historiographies. Nor does it discard outright the findings of diplomatic history and the history of international relations. As Kiran Patel has emphasized, transnational history does not represent a new paradigm, a specific method or a theory but a new research perspective exploring “different degrees of interaction, connection, circulation, overlap and entanglement extending beyond the nation state”⁷. According to some historians this new research perspec-

⁴ See also the special journal issue of *International Security* 22/1 (1997) exploring cross-fertilization between diplomatic history and political science/IR.

⁵ Robert O. KEOHANE, Joseph S. NYE, *Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction*, in: *International Organization* 25 (1971) 329–349, esp. 336–342. Cf. further, Robert O. KEOHANE, Joseph S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston/MA 1977). See also STEINER, *On Writing International History* 534–536.

⁶ The timing of interest in transnational history varied between different national traditions of historiography, however. In the United States, for example, an important point of departure was provided by the Forum in the *American Historical Review* 96 (1991) 1031–1072. In contrast, in Germany, the debate on transnational history only intensified in the early 2000s. Cf. Miriam RÜRUP, *Historikertag 2012: Transnationale Geschichte / Neue Diplomatiegeschichte*, in: *H-Soz-u-Kult*, 12.02.2013: <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/id=2022&type=diskussionen> (last accessed 12 February 2013).

⁷ My translation. Kiran Klaus PATEL, *Transnationale Geschichte – Ein neues Paradigma?*, in: *H-Soz-u-Kult*, 2 February 2005, URL: <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/id=573&type=diskussionen> (last accessed 23 January 2013). Patel is more critical than this chapter with regard to the notion of the “transnational turn”.

tive associated with transnational history represents one dimension of the emergence of a “new international history”, the other dimensions consisting of: new research perspectives associated with global history; and new research questions including the origins and development of the East-West conflict, the end of European colonial rule and the links between the two previous dimensions⁸. The transnational turn in international history was pivotal for a reorientation of the field, not least because it triggered a wave of reflection.

The transnational turn undermined the often implicit but comfortable relationship between international history and political realism. Having said this, the opening up of a transnational perspective in international history was less abrupt and controversial than in IR. One reason for this is that for a long time transnational actors, including networks of bankers and businessmen for example, had featured alongside statesmen and diplomats in international history accounts⁹. The smoother transition international history underwent in moving away from political realism and towards a transnational perspective furthermore reflects the different rules guiding the disciplines of politics/IR and history. In contrast to their peers in politics/IR, historians are not necessarily obliged to take a firm theoretical stand and directly contribute to the development of theory. Nor do historians always engage with the theoretical (and methodological) questions underpinning the works of their colleagues in the other disciplines.

One sub-field of international history where the transnational turn resulted in significant revision is the history of European integration. This specific area of European international history serves as the empirical point of departure for this chapter, which proceeds to set out how the transnational turn has inspired historians of European integration to explore the potential of related disciplines for international history in an explicit manner (part 1). This chapter will then focus on two concepts, derived from politics and sociology respectively, that have served to expand the toolbox of these historians enabling them to conceive of an international history “beyond Morgenthau” and political realist assumptions about international politics. The network concept (2) and the concept of the field (4) will each be introduced through a concrete “case study” and will then be contextualized within a wider framework (3 and 4). The final part of this chapter dis-

⁸ Iris SCHRÖDER, *Debatte: Zeitgeschichte und Internationale Geschichte. Einleitung*, in: *Zeithistorische Forschungen [Studies in Contemporary History]*, Online-Ausgabe 8 (2011) 1–2, here 1, URL: <http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Schroeder-3-2011> (last accessed 22 January 2013). Other new research perspectives include social and cultural history perspectives. See Celia DONERT, Janou GLENCROSS, *Gendering Universalisms in International History*, in: *Zeithistorische Forschungen [Studies in Contemporary History Online Edition]* 8 (2011) 1–4, here 3, URL: <http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Donert-Glencross-3-2011> (last accessed 22 January 2013).

⁹ Patricia CLAVIN, *Time, Manner, Place: Writing Modern European History in Global, Transnational and International Contexts*, in: *European History Quarterly* 40 (2010) 624–640, here 625.

cusses the potential and limitations of interdisciplinary approaches for international history more generally (5).

TOWARDS INTERDISCIPLINARITY: THE TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION AND THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

(International) historians were relative latecomers to research on European integration, which initially was covered by legal, economic and politics/IR scholars¹⁰. Only in the 1960s did the German historian Walter Lipgens pioneer archives-based research on European integration and develop the study of European integration as a historical subject in its own right. A dedicated federalist, Lipgens focused on the development and circulation of ideas and plans for European unity among transnationally constituted political elites, including most importantly the resistance movements during World War II. Methodologically, Lipgens' account of early European integration was indebted to the tradition of the history of ideas. He was therefore not particularly interested in demonstrating the impact of specific ideas or plans for European unity on the European Communities and their founding treaties, for example¹¹. Crucially for this chapter, however, Lipgens' approach to the history of European integration was transnational.

The transnational dimension of European integration faded into the background when the first wave of historical research was challenged from the mid-1980s. It gave way to two approaches that resonated with political realist notions of international politics – a more traditional diplomatic history approach, on the one hand, and a revisionist economic history approach, on the other. Following the state-centric nature of these approaches it was assumed that member-state governments controlled and influenced the European integration process. Policy developments were regarded as the result of interstate bargaining between different national interests¹². The writings of the British economic historian Alan Milward and the collections exploring the treaty negotiations for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC)

¹⁰ For an introduction into the discipline of the history of European integration, see Wolfram KAISER, Antonio VARSORI, *European Union History: Themes and Debates* (Basingstoke 2010).

¹¹ E.g. Walter LIPGENS, *Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen, 1940–1945: Eine Dokumentation* (Munich–Oldenbourg 1968); Walter LIPGENS, *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945–1950, Erster Teil: 1945–1947* (Stuttgart 1977). On Lipgens, see Wolfram KAISER, „Überzeugter Katholik und CDU-Wähler“. Zur Historiographie der Integrationsgeschichte am Beispiel Walter Lipgens, in: *Journal of European Integration History* 8 (2002) 119–128; Wolfram KAISER, *From State to Society? The Historiography of European Integration*, in: Angela BOURNE, Michelle CINI (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies* (Basingstoke 2006) 190–208, here 192–193.

¹² KAISER, *From State to Society?*, 194–195.

on the basis of (then newly accessible) archival sources and eyewitness accounts are representative of this state-centric approach¹³.

In the 2000s the transnational dimension made a forceful comeback to historical research on European integration. This trend not only coincided with the increased interest by international historians in the transnational research perspective but, crucially, it also fed into a fresh awareness of transnational relations by political scientists/IR scholars, encapsulated by Thomas Risse's call to "bring transnational relations back" into the study of international politics¹⁴. Furthermore, the return of the transnational dimension into European integration history was accompanied by important developments in the theory of European integration, which fall into two categories.

First the European integration theory of neo-functionalism, initially developed in the 1950s, experienced an important revival. The cornerstone of this revival was the theory of supranational governance advanced by Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz, who claim that "transnational activity has been the catalyst of European integration"¹⁵ and accredit neo-functionalism with sketching a transnational European society¹⁶. Neo-functionalist theory, like Lipgens, anticipates that European states will slowly disappear. Other than Lipgens, however, European integration according to neo-functionalism is not conceptualized as an outcome such as a federation, for instance, but as a gradual process in which the notion of "spillover" represents an important element. Integration in one policy sector – a "low politics" sector such as trade rules, for example – therefore creates pressures for integration in other, related sectors. As the functional areas of government become more integrated the political and bureaucratic or technocratic elites administering these policies would increasingly switch their loyalties, expectations and goals from the national government arena to the overall aims of the integration agencies. Spillover of integration from one sector to others, driven by an elite

¹³ Alan S. MILWARD, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe* (London 1992 [1984]); see further the publications by the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians: Klaus SCHWABE (ed.), *Die Anfänge des Schuman Plans 1950/51* (Baden-Baden 1988); and Enrico SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio dell'Europa e i trattati di Roma* (Brussels 1989). For the limited impact of Milward's work on mainstream international and diplomatic history accounts of European integration, see Morten RASMUSSEN, *European Rescue of the Nation-State? Tracing the Role of Economics and Business*, in: KAISER, VARSORI, *European Union History* 128–149, esp. 133.

¹⁴ Thomas RISSE-KAPPEN, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction*, in: Thomas RISSE-KAPPEN (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge 1995) 3–33, here 3.

¹⁵ Wayne SANDHOLTZ, Alec STONE SWEET, *Integration, Supranational Governance, and the Institutionalization of the European Polity*, in: Wayne SANDHOLTZ, Alec STONE SWEET (eds.), *European Integration and Supranational Governance* (Oxford–New York 1998) 1–26, here 4.

¹⁶ SANDHOLTZ, STONE SWEET, *European Integration* 5–6.

socialized into the European integration project, would therefore ultimately lead to some kind of political community¹⁷.

Transnationalism within the neo-functionalist model – and this includes the spin-off by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet – has rightly been criticized for tying the importance and influence of transnational actors exclusively to supranational European integration, thereby discarding any transnational developments preceding and going beyond the institutions established by the ECSC and the EEC¹⁸. At the same time this theory has provided an important incentive for transnational historians to engage with ongoing theoretical developments¹⁹.

Before then, the only historian seriously to connect his research to theoretical developments and advance an overall argument for European integration was Alan Milward²⁰. He argued from a state-centric perspective (based on the evaluation of state archives) that European states transferred competencies to the European level for economic motives, to ensure the continued existence of national welfare systems and for political motives, to resolve the German problem²¹. The emphasis on the economic focus of state interests made Milward's ideas easily compatible with liberal intergovernmentalism – on the spectrum of European integration theory at the opposite end from neo-functionalism²². However while

¹⁷ Ernst B. HAAS, *The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–57* (Notre Dame/IN 42004).

¹⁸ Bastiaan van APELDOORN, *Transnational Business: Power Structures in Europe's Political Economy*, in: KAISER, STARIE (eds.), *Transnational European Union: Toward a Political Space* (London 2005) 83–106, here 88.

¹⁹ On the relationship between the history and theory of European integration, see Wolfram KAISER, *Transnational Europe Since 1945: Integration as Political Society Formation*, in: Wolfram KAISER, Peter STARIE (eds.), *Transnational European Union: Toward a Political Space* (London 2005) 17–35, esp. 19–28; cf. also Wolfram KAISER, *History Meets Politics: Overcoming Interdisciplinary Volapük in Research on the EU*, in: *Journal of European Public Policy* 15 (2008) 300–313; Alex WARLEIGH-LACK, *Interdisciplinarity in Research on the EU: Politics, History and Prospects for Collaboration*, in: Wolfram KAISER, Brigitte LEUCHT, Morten RASMUSSEN (eds.), *The History of the European Union. Origins of a Supranational Polity 1950–72* (London 2009) 206–220; and Jan VAN DER HARST, *When History Meets Theory. Alan Milward's Contribution to Explaining European Integration*, in: Fernando GUIRAO, Frances M.B. LYNCH, Sigfrido RAMÍREZ PÉREZ (eds.), *Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change* (New York–Abingdon 2012) 365–378.

²⁰ A recent but less widely received attempt to develop an overall explanation of European integration is Wilfried Loth's model of the four driving forces. See Wilfried LOTH, *Explaining European Integration: The Contribution from Historians*, in: *Journal of European Integration History* 14 (2008) 9–26, here 16–18.

²¹ See MILWARD, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe*; and Alan S. MILWARD, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London 2000), esp. chapter 2, 21–45. For a concise yet nuanced assessment of Milward, see RASMUSSEN, *European Rescue* 130–134.

²² Andrew MORAVCSIK, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (London 1998). Moravcsik also addresses the differences between his own work and that of Milward 4, 81.

Milward engaged with theory he refrained from using concepts derived from the social sciences to address his research questions²³.

The second important theoretical development accompanying the return of the transnational dimension into European integration history concerned a shift in research focus from providing an overall framework for European integration to understanding policymaking and decision-making processes within the European Union (EU). This shift was partly fuelled by the desire within the theory of European integration to overcome the long-standing theoretical divide between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, following the coming into force of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. Partly, the new research focus reflected the widespread disillusionment with “grand theory” after the end of the Cold War – an event that no IR theory had predicted²⁴. Constructivist approaches have since highlighted the importance of social interaction within EU institutions and have focused on cultural influences that only change slowly over time. Constructivist literature has also emphasized the desirability of providing empirical confirmation of theoretical claims. Similarly, institutionalism has stressed the role of EU institutions in the convergence of ideas and policies. Sociological institutionalism treats institutions broadly as instances of formal and informal interaction and systems of norms, such as conventions and codes of behaviour. Historical institutionalism, in turn, stresses the significance of the temporal dimension of politics. Generally, these approaches have pointed to the significance of examining political processes over time and have therefore provided the basis for dialogue and the fruitful interdisciplinary cooperation between historians and political scientists²⁵.

To sum up, the revival of the transnational dimension in European integration theory and the emphasis of recent theoretical approaches on the temporal dimension of European integration created a specific research constellation for historians to engage with ongoing research in the social sciences. Crucially these trends provided the basis for developing a conceptually refined transnational history of the EU, quite different from Lipgens’ original version. The following sections will proceed to outline how this transnational history of European integration was developed: first by presenting a historical case study using the network concept (2); and then by introducing recent historical research on European integration informed by interdisciplinary approaches more comprehensively (3).

²³ For Milward’s approach to interdisciplinarity, see VAN DER HARST, *When History Meets Theory*.

²⁴ See, e.g., the 1986 assessment by historian John Lewis Gaddis, inspired by systems and international stability theory, that Cold War bipolarity “showed no signs of coming apart anytime soon.” JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, *The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System*, in: *International Security* 10 (1986) 99–142, here 99.

²⁵ See, for example, KAISER, STARIE (eds.), *Transnational European Union*; and KAISER, LEUCHT, RASMUSSEN (eds.), *History of the European Union*.

THE NETWORK CONCEPT AND THE INTERSTATE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SCHUMAN PLAN

The starting point for exploring the network concept was provided by a specific problem underlying my PhD project, namely how to integrate a transnational (or transatlantic) dimension into a topic of historical research that had been approached mainly from a state-centric perspective. The topic concerned the founding of the first European community, the ECSC, in 1952. The Treaty establishing the ECSC was signed by the governments of France, the newly established Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries and provided the important legal and institutional foundations for European integration²⁶. The historiography of early European integration had focused on the governmental level of the negotiations that took place in Paris. At least implicitly, it has approached the interstate negotiations on the Schuman Plan from a political realist perspective and characterized them as a multilateral bargaining process of national governments driven by domestically derived (economic) interests²⁷. At the same time archival research conducted while preparing the PhD project suggested that there were non-state actors involved during the period of agenda-setting and at the conference and, perhaps more puzzling, that some of these actors were Americans²⁸.

It is of course not entirely surprising to find an increased presence of US actors in post-World War II Europe and particularly in Paris, which hosted the headquarters of the European arm of the Marshall Plan administration, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. In the emerging Cold War, the Truman government favoured European integration, preferably through the supranational cooperation of European states aiming at economic and political integration, and reacted positively to French foreign minister Robert Schuman's announcement to pool the French and German coal and steel productions. Neither the increased number of US administrators in Paris, nor the endorsement by the Truman administration of Schuman's initiative could account satisfactorily for the role played by US actors, some of them private actors, in the interstate negotiations on the Schuman Plan, however. The methodological question at the core of the PhD project was therefore how to accommodate the presence of Americans and non-state actors into the narrative of the founding of the ECSC and the be-

²⁶ The PhD thesis "Transatlantic Policy Networks and the Formation of Core Europe" was completed at the University of Portsmouth in 2008.

²⁷ See, e.g., Dirk SPIERENBURG, Raymond POIDEVIN, *The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation*, (London 1994), esp. part 1, 9–40; MILWARD, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe*.

²⁸ See also Klaus SCHWABE, "Ein Akt konstruktiver Staatskunst" – die USA und die Anfänge des Schuman Plans, in: SCHWABE (ed.), *Die Anfänge des Schuman Plans* 211–239.

ginnings of European integration. A tool was required to overcome the focus on European states as almost exclusive actors and the prevalence of the national paradigm to explain policy outcomes in the formation of the Europe of the Six.

Politics rather than the historical discipline offered a tool to address these specific research questions in the form of the network concept. In politics, the interest in the network approach coincided with the adoption of new approaches to the study of European integration²⁹. The network concept was originally developed to conceptualize public policymaking in the national arena but became important for the analysis of policy- and decision-making within the EU and European transnationalization³⁰. Networks are transnational when "...at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization"³¹. This basic definition of a transnational network does not yet enhance our understanding of the interstate negotiations on the Schuman Plan. The question therefore arises how, specifically, the network concept helped to overcome the state-centric approach to the study of the negotiations. Addressing this question also means explaining the general benefits for historians in engaging with the network literature.

Crucially the network concept provides an understanding of the international world, which differs from that proposed by Morgenthau and political realist approaches. Assumptions of states as exclusive players in international politics and as cohesive and purposeful actors defending their national interests give way to an approach to international politics focussing on policy networks, or sets "...of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors". Actors "...share common interests with regard to a policy and...exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals."³²

This different worldview of international politics allows for a combination of formulating new hypotheses for research, improving the fine-tuning of the research questions, not least for the analysis of archival sources, and advancing the analytical quality of the historical narrative. Most importantly, in the case of the Schuman Plan conference, the literature on the network concept provided a conceptual tool, lacking in debates on networks in the historical discipline, to describe and assess *systematically* the role of individual and collective actors in policy-making at the negotiations. It offered a set of categories and criteria and a sophis-

²⁹ See Alex WARLEIGH, Conceptual Combinations: Multilevel Governance and Policy Networks, in: CINI, BOURNE (eds.), Palgrave Advances 77–95.

³⁰ Karen HEARD-LAURÉOTE, Transnational Networks. Informal Governance in the European Political Space', in: KAISER, STARIE (eds.) Transnational European Union 36–60, here 37.

³¹ RISSE-KAPPEN, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In 3.

³² Tanja A. BÖRZEL, Organizing Babylon – On the Different Conceptions of Policy Networks, in: Public Administration 76 (1998) 2, 253–273, here 254.

ticated terminology, all of which helped to analyze the formation, scope, structures, functions, and, to some degree, the impact of transatlantic policy networks.

These categories and criteria were not readily available for historical research, as a manual for interdisciplinary research of sorts, but needed to be deduced from the complex and voluminous literature on the network concept. This literature was and can be accessed first by the different understandings and applications of the concept. Policy networks are sometimes used as a metaphor signifying that policymaking involves a large number and a variety of actors. In other cases, policy networks serve as analytical tools to assess the relations between actors interacting with each other in a given policy sector. Policy networks are further employed as a method of social structure analysis (quantitative or qualitative) and they may also entail a theoretical claim³³.

Second, the network literature can be divided into two trends associated with different scholarly communities. According to the “interest intermediation”, or “Anglo-Saxon school”, the network concept applies to all kinds of relations between public and private actors and to different forms of relationships between interest groups and the state. The “governance”, or “German school”, in turn also forwards a theoretical claim. Here, policy networks characterize a specific form of interaction between public and private actors, namely one that is based on non-hierarchical coordination. To describe this interaction, the governance school rejects the notion of hierarchy and market as the two inherently distinct modes of governance and assumes a mechanism based on the mobilization and subsequent dispersion of political resources between public and private actors. The growth of networks represents a new form of governance³⁴.

Third, the network literature has also generated different models. One of these models associated with the Anglo-Saxon school and widely used in the study of EU governance is the Rhodes model, later advanced as the Rhodes and Marsh model³⁵. This model is based on only three criteria, namely the stability or instability and fluidity of network memberships over time; the degree of integration of members into the network (how insular or permeable are networks); and the distribution of resources among actors (where are the strengths and weaknesses of resource dependencies), whereby resources include money, expertise and legitimacy. On the basis of these three criteria, the Rhodes-Marsh model introduces a continuum of policy networks, which stretches from highly integrated policy communities on one side of the spectrum to loosely integrated issue networks, on the other. Membership is constant and often hierarchical in policy communities, which means that external pressures have limited impact and actors are

³³ BÖRZEL, *Organizing Babylon* 254–255.

³⁴ BÖRZEL, *Organizing Babylon* 255–265.

³⁵ Rod RHODES, David MARSH, *New Directions in the Study of Policy Networks*, in: *European Journal of Political Research* 21 (1992) 1–2, 181–205.

highly dependent on each other for resources. At the same time, some groups are consciously excluded. In issue networks, in contrast, membership is fluid and non-hierarchical; the network is easily permeated by external influences; and actors are highly independent.

From this literature, a set of categories and criteria was deduced to guide the analysis of transatlantic policy networks at the interstate negotiations on the Schuman Plan, which included: the level of institutionalization of a policy network (how stable or instable is a network); the scope of policymaking arrangements (are networks restricted to one sector or do they operate across sectors); the number of participants; the regulation of access to the network (is it restricted or open); the types of participants; and the major functions of the network. Additional categories were provided by trust between actors and their common view of the world or shared policy paradigm, which the network approach also considers³⁶. In contrast to political science research, it was not necessary for a historical project to apply or to advance the network concept. Neither was it essential for the historian to engage with the political science debate on key problems relating to the network concept, such as the structure-agent debate; the relation between policy networks and policy outcomes; and the possible classifications and levels of analysis, to name only a few examples³⁷.

The use of the network concept made it possible to identify and analyze two transatlantic policy networks of a variety of academic and other experts, civil servants and state and non-state actors who assumed a vital function in determining the negotiation tactics of various stakeholders at the interstate negotiations on the Schuman Plan. It was also helpful in highlighting different functions of actors involved in the negotiations ranging from a direct contribution to policymaking, over a facilitating and a mediating function to the exercising of political influence. Transatlantic policy networks crucially contributed to shaping the first supranational European institutional framework and Europe's first antitrust law through mediating between American and European politico-legal concepts and ideas³⁸.

The use of the network concept has by no means been restricted to the single case study presented here, however.

³⁶ HEARD-LAURÉOTE, *Transnational Networks* 40–41.

³⁷ David MARSH, *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham 1998).

³⁸ See Brigitte LEUCHT, *Transatlantische Netzwerke und die Schuman-Plan-Verhandlungen: Expertise, Vermittlung und eine Verfassungsordnung für Kerneuropa*, in: Michael GEHLER, Wolfram KAISER and Brigitte LEUCHT (eds.), *Netzwerke im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart*, (Vienna–Cologne–Weimar 2009) 53–68; and Brigitte LEUCHT, *Transatlantic Policy Networks in the Creation of the first European Anti-trust Law: Mediating between American Anti-trust and German Ordo-liberalism*, in: Kaiser, Leucht, Rasmussen (eds.), *The History of the European Union* 56–73.

INTERDISCIPLINARY COOPERATION ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN PRACTICE

The recent comeback of the transnational dimension in historical research on European integration went hand in hand with an interdisciplinary approach using the network concept in particular to develop a conceptually refined transnational history of the EU. Wolfram Kaiser has analyzed the role of Christian democrat party networks in shaping the framework for early European integration, namely a supranational Europe without British participation³⁹. The network concept also provided the foundation for an interdisciplinary book project involving historians and political scientists exploring the role of political and policy networks in European integration from the end of World War II to the present⁴⁰. Furthermore the network concept and recent institutional approaches were crucial to developing a coherent, theoretically informed and conceptually refined framework proposing that the origins of Europe's transnational political society and supranational political system go back to the first two decades of European integration. This claim was forwarded in another collected volume, which combined the theoretical framework with a number of in-depth, archives-based case studies of different transnational and supranational actors including business and party networks and the European Commission⁴¹. Finally, the transnational research agenda has been applied to the 1970s making it possible to tie European integration history to the broader changes in international governance following the oil crisis of 1973, when European economies and businesses faced a variety of economic challenges including increasing competition from the US and Japan, low growth rates, high inflation and rising unemployment⁴².

The network concept was not the only concept derived from political science that has shaped the way some historians of European integration have approached their research. Nor was it the only concept fostering an increased dialogue between historians and political scientists. Another concept that has greatly facilitated this dialogue is the concept of path dependence, which is part of a wider call by historical institutionalists to theorize timing and sequencing in order to move from a "snapshot view" of political life to "moving pictures". For Paul Pierson path dependence is central to understanding why history matters. He has argued that initial institutional or policy decisions have the potential to become self-reinforcing over time. Path-dependent processes therefore can shape and "lock in" institutional change and policy developments. This is not to

³⁹ Wolfram KAISER, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union* (Cambridge 2007).

⁴⁰ GEHLER, KAISER, LEUCHT (eds.), *Netzwerke im europäischen Mehrebenensystem*.

⁴¹ KAISER, LEUCHT, RASMUSSEN (eds.), *The History of the European Union*.

⁴² Wolfram KAISER, Jan-Henrik MEYER, *Non-State Actors in European Integration in the 1970s: Towards a Polity of Transnational Contestation*, in: *Comparativ* 20 (2010) 7–24.

say that a lock in is permanent; it would be wrong to claim the concept is deterministic. Rather, the argument is that a comparatively open process at the outset is followed by a more constrained set of choices once reinforcement sets in⁴³.

Drawing once more on the case study on transatlantic policy networks in the interstate negotiations on the Schuman Plan, path dependence highlights the question of how informal transatlantic policymaking shaped and perhaps locked in the European integration process even before supranational institutions started to operate in 1952. Transatlantic policy networks contributed to creating important path dependencies for the process of European integration in that the institutions they helped to establish are the precursors of the institutions of today's European Union. Although the powers assigned to European institutions and the relations between these institutions differed in the ECSC and EEC Treaties there was continuity in the negotiations on the institutions. The proposed institutions for the constitutional draft treaty for a European Political Community (EPC) – a project that failed together with the European Defense Community in 1954 – incorporated important institutional preferences first introduced into the European polity by the ECSC High Authority. It was deemed necessary, for example, to safeguard the “independence” and the “stability” of the proposed supranational European executive council – both categories which were important in the design of the High Authority⁴⁴. And while the supranational element was tuned down in the EEC negotiations as a result of the failure of the EPC experiment, in the eyes of some negotiators of the Rome Treaty it still set the mark for the talks concerning the EEC institutions⁴⁵. Transatlantic policy networks also contributed to creating path dependencies for European integration through the antitrust provisions of the ECSC Treaty. These articles provided one model for the competition rules of the EEC, which ultimately came to play a crucial role in the construction of a common market⁴⁶.

The use of the concept of path dependence draws attention to another important point regarding the practice of interdisciplinary research. Historians are more or less free to “pick and choose” concepts. It is one of the privileges of historians

⁴³ Paul PIERSON, *The Path to European Integration: A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis*, in: *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (1996) 123–163.

⁴⁴ *Report on the Institutions of the European Community*, by Fernand Dehousse (The Hague, 8–10 October 1953), <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/d416e1c6-b1f8-43df-bd81-906f8bd87a91/en> (last accessed 28 February 2013).

⁴⁵ Carl Friedrich Ophüls, *Vermerk*, 14 July 1955, Bundesarchiv, Bundesministerium für den Marshallplan (B 146)/591. Cf. also Anne BOERGER-DE SMEDT, *Negotiating the Foundations of European Law, 1950–57: The Legal History of the Treaties of Paris and Rome*, in: *Contemporary European History* 21 (2012) 3, 339–356.

⁴⁶ This argument is developed more fully in Brigitte LEUCHT, *Learning Competition: the Origins of European Economic Integration* (unpublished manuscript).

not to have to take a firm theoretical stand when using tools from the social sciences. There is a wide gap between the theoretical foundations underlying the network concept and the concept of path dependence. The former emphasizes that relationships between actors are non-hierarchical and that the exchange of resources between actors is vital to their cooperation. States, or the member-states of the EU, are therefore neither the only players in international politics nor do they act cohesively. In contrast, path dependence and historical institutionalism in general maintain that EU member-states and institutions behave in a rational and unitary way. In this manner, historical institutionalism shares important assumptions with rational institutionalism, which portrays the EU as the product of conscious member-state design, therefore approximating a political realist view⁴⁷. As the examples drawn from the interstate negotiations on the Schuman Plan have shown, however, it is not problematic to combine the network concept and path dependence for historical research.

No doubt path dependence has facilitated interdisciplinary dialogue between historians and political scientists on European integration. It has therefore contributed to overcoming what, with the notable exception of Milward's writings, could be characterized as mutual neglect between the historiography and political science of European integration. At the same time path dependence is not necessarily tied to a transnational historical research perspective. In contrast the concept of the field goes hand in hand with a transnational approach.

THE CONCEPT OF THE FIELD AND THE SINGLE MARKET PROGRAMME

The point of departure for exploring the concept of the field is again provided by a concrete research problem, namely how to conceptualize a topic that has been dominated by the almost exclusive focus on one European institution, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), without considering the specific characteristics of the legal arena. The topic concerns the role of the ECJ and its case law in contributing to the "re-launch" of European integration in the form of the Single European Act (1986)⁴⁸.

⁴⁷ Morten RASMUSSEN, *Supranational Governance in the Making: Towards a European Political System*, in: KAISER, LEUCHT, RASMUSSEN (eds.), *History of the European Union* 34–55, for historical institutionalism esp. 38–40. For the dichotomy of rationalism (embracing elements of the originally competing realist, liberal, and institutional approaches) and constructivism, see also Mark A. POLLACK, *International Relations Theory and European Integration*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39 (2001) 221–244.

⁴⁸ This problem is central to the project "Liberalisation Through Case Law? European Law and the Creation of a Single European Market, 1965–1986", which is part of the collaborative research project "Towards a New History of European Public Law. The Battles Over the Constitutional

The SEA crucially closed the gap between the aspirations and the reality of market integration in the European community. The Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC (1957) anticipated the creation of a common European market based on a customs union and a number of liberalising policies including competition, harmonisation of product standards and indirect taxes. Tariffs and quantitative restrictions were addressed in the 1960s and a common external tariff, and formally a customs union, was established in 1968. In contrast the removal of non-tariff barriers, which the European Commission pursued through legislative harmonisation between the member-states, was crowned with only limited success. Trade quotas, subsidies, voluntary export restraints and national product regulation and standards continued to favour domestic over foreign products and hampered the development of the common market for goods, not least because powerful economic interests in the member states ensured that the segmentation of national markets would prevail⁴⁹. Only by efficiently addressing the important remaining non-tariff barriers to trade did the SEA pave the way for the establishment of a unified market.

While the complex historical roots of the single market programme have only been addressed from theory-driven political science perspectives⁵⁰, it has become a prominent argument in the legal and some social science literature that the ECJ significantly contributed to the breakthrough of 1986 through its case law. According to this argument, from the mid-1960s onwards the ECJ provided an alternative to the Commission's unsuccessful attempts at legislative harmonization between the member states by launching a progressive case law and defining, in a far-reaching and liberal manner, the essential legal principles on which the European market was regulated⁵¹. This literature is based on the analysis of the case law generated by the ECJ and considers the Court as a unitary actor. By the same token, it has not paid attention to the possibility of how the subject matter under consideration – the law – influenced the dynamics leading to the launch of the single market programme.

Practice, 1950 to 1993", coordinated by Morten Rasmussen at the University of Copenhagen. See <http://europeanlaw.saxo.ku.dk> (last accessed 28 February 2013).

⁴⁹ Eric BUSSIÈRE, Not Quite a Common Market Yet, in: Michel DUMOULIN (ed.), *The European Commission, 1958–1972. History and Memories* (Luxembourg 2007) 289–301; Michelle P. EGAN, *Constructing a European Market. Standards, Regulation, and Governance* (Oxford 2003).

⁵⁰ The exception to this rule is a chapter based in part on the archives of a transnational business network, the European Round Table of Industrialists. Maria Green COWLES, *The European Round Table of Industrialists and the Single Market Programme: From Political to Policy Network*, in: GEHLER, KAISER, LEUCHT (eds.), *Netzwerke im europäischen Mehrebenensystem* 139–150.

⁵¹ Miguel MADURO, *We the Court. The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution* (Oxford 1998); Alec STONE SWEET, *The Judicial Construction of Europe* (Oxford 2004) esp. chapter 3, Free movement of goods (with Margaret McCOWN) 109–145.

Crucially for the argument here, the field concept, inspired by the political sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, offers a tool to address these lacunae. It shares with the network concept the emphasis on multiple connections between actors. The field concept therefore also casts doubt on the notion that states generate and defend coherent policy preferences and has the potential to overcome the national paradigm to explain policy developments and outcomes. In the same way, the field concept assumes that institutions, be they within states or on the European or international level, are porous⁵². A field perspective on the role of the ECJ and its case law in contributing to the single market programme would therefore start from the assumption that the Court does not articulate consistent preferences, which requires integrating a variety of actors into the analysis including multinational corporations with an interest in market liberalization; law firms representing these multinationals (but with material interests of their own) who were knowledgeable about mobilizing European law to realize the goal of market liberalization; national judges who referred cases to the Luxembourg Court through the preliminary reference procedure; administrators involved in the implementation of case law in the member states; interest groups lobbying against its implementation; and the wider community of legal academic experts.

A wider spectrum of actors has the potential to advance existing social science and legal literature by moving away from the almost exclusive focus on the ECJ. At the same time, this shift to integrating a variety of actors hardly provides incentive enough for historians to turn to the field concept. This gives rise to the critical question of how precisely the field concept is used to develop this research on the ECJ, its case law and the single market programme. Beyond offering a tool to write a transnational history, the added value of engaging with the field concept for historians is crucially provided by the insight it provides into the social constraints and pressures, which are specific to the legal arena.

In a seminal article on the juridical or legal field, Bourdieu brings to light how law functions in society⁵³. He conceptualizes the legal field as "...an area of structured, socially patterned activity or 'practice', in this case disciplinarily and professionally defined". The legal field, like any social field, is "...organized around a body of internal protocols and assumptions, characteristic behaviours and self-sustaining values"⁵⁴. In order to understand the dynamics underlying the

⁵² See, for an introduction into the relevant literature, RASMUSSEN, *Supranational Governance in the Making* 41, 43. Cf. also Nilo KAUPPI, *Bourdieu's Political Sociology and the Politics of European Integration*, in: *Theory and Society* 32 (2003) 775–789.

⁵³ Pierre BOURDIEU, *The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field*, in: *Hastings Law Journal* 38 (1986–87) 814–853.

⁵⁴ Richard TERDIMAN, *The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field* by Pierre Bourdieu, *Translator's Introduction*, in: *Hastings Law Journal* 38 (1986–87) 805–813, here 805 and 806.

case law (allegedly) leading to the launch of the single market programme, it is therefore necessary to unearth these protocols, behaviours and values, which represent internalized mechanisms determining the actual operation of law in the European polity.

Bourdieu discusses a number of mechanisms relevant to this case study. First actors within a social field are engaged in a constant power struggle for a social resource, or the specific “capital”, of the field. In the legal field, actors compete for the monopoly of the right to determine the law⁵⁵. Second, the legal field operates on the basis of a division of labour. On the one hand, there is the social division *between* legal professionals and non-specialists, which reinforces the illusion that the system of juridical norms is independent of power relations. On the other hand, there is a division of labour *within* the legal field. In the hierarchically structured legal field, judges, legal scholars, lawyers and solicitors are motivated by different specific interests and hold different types of juridical capital⁵⁶. Jointly, the notion of the struggle for the right to determine the law and the division of juridical labour have important repercussions for the practice of interpreting legal texts, which refers to a third mechanism. The practice of interpreting legal texts is not an end in itself, like literary or philosophical hermeneutics, but “directly aimed at a practical object and designed to determine practical effects”⁵⁷. Juridical language employs a number of rhetorical strategies to produce two effects in particular, namely neutralization and universalization. A case in point is the reliance of the ECJ on “legal reasoning” to legitimize its decisions and to promote the effectiveness of community law. Accordingly, a decision is presented as the *only* possible decision. By the same token, the notion that preferences are role-specific and personal is rendered invalid. The internal logic of legal rules is therefore emphasized at the expense of the context, which also impact on the Court’s decision⁵⁸.

A fourth mechanism shaping the operation of law emerges out of the social division between legal professionals and lay people. This mechanism concerns the “unity of discourse” between judges and scholars, which crucially is not open to actors outside of the legal community⁵⁹. When they comment on specific cases legal scholars argue with the Court about the rationale adopted and the conclusions reached. In contrast to judges, however, scholars do not hold coercive power. In contradistinction to other scholarship, legal scholarship – in the words of another commentator – is “self-consciously normative”, it uses a prescriptive

⁵⁵ BOURDIEU, *The Force of Law* 817.

⁵⁶ BOURDIEU, *The Force of Law* 817–818.

⁵⁷ BOURDIEU, *The Force of Law* 818.

⁵⁸ MADURO, *We the Court* 16–25.

⁵⁹ Cf. also Richard A. POSNER, *How Judges Think* (Cambridge/MA–London 2008).

voice and tries to persuade⁶⁰. Fifth, judges and legal scholars find themselves on opposite ends of the spectrum of interpreting legal texts, which ranges from the practical evaluation of a case (judges) to the theoretical development of doctrine (legal scholars)⁶¹. Finally, the power held by different “authorized interpreters” of the law in the legal field to impose their interpretation of the law onto society varies between legal traditions. The civil or continental European law tradition privileges legal doctrine – Bourdieu refers to the “law of the professors” – over the interpretation of the law by judges and lawyers. The legal community and their output are therefore relatively important. In contrast, in the common law (Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American) tradition, the law is jurisprudential and is based almost exclusively on the decisions of courts and the rule of precedent. Unlike the civil law system, the common law system is only weakly codified and privileges procedures over doctrine⁶². As a result the judge tends to be more important than the legal scholar.

In short, by revealing the “subtext” behind the case law this analysis of the legal field has the potential to enhance our understanding of the development of an area of European law, the driving forces behind it and its impact. Not only does the field concept allow for the conceptualization of the European legal field – a transnational field shaped by both the European civil law and, since the accession of the UK to the EC in 1973, the Anglo-Saxon common law traditions. But moreover, it offers tools addressing the relations between actors in the legal field and the resources they bring with them, which can be used to re-examine the role of the ECJ and case law in the launch of the single market programme. This includes tracing the impact of ECJ case law in the member-states through identifying and analyzing very likely instances of resistance, or at least efforts to reshape this case law.

There already exists considerable research on European legal integration inspired by Bourdieu. An interdisciplinary network of French scholars has reconstructed the European legal field and compiled a database of over 400 actors associated particularly with the ECJ, the Commission, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Parliament⁶³. Individual researchers within this project have moreover shed light on the genesis of this legal field, highlighting the fact that European law was indeed shaped by judges, lawyers, legal advisors to the European institutions and others with an interest in the construction of

⁶⁰ Edward L. RUBIN, *The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship*, in: *Michigan Law Review* 86 (1988) 1835–1905, here 1847–1853, 1859.

⁶¹ BOURDIEU, *The Force of Law* 821.

⁶² BOURDIEU, *The Force of Law* 822.

⁶³ This database is currently not accessible to researchers outside of the network. See, for the group, Polilexes DEJUGE: <http://www.polilexes.com/POLILEXES/Presentation.html> (last accessed 2 March 2013).

Europe⁶⁴. Another group of historians, not tied exclusively to the field concept, has also begun to explore the emergence of EU law beyond the narrow confines of the evolution of case law by approaching its development from an actor and network perspective⁶⁵. This research finally has the potential to intensify the dialogue between historians and lawyers of the European Union, which has been tentative at best⁶⁶.

THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITATIONS OF INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES FOR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY

This outline of interdisciplinary approaches in European integration history has demonstrated that this sub-field of international history has indeed moved beyond Morgenthau. This analysis finally suggests at least four distinct benefits for the use of interdisciplinary approaches in international history more generally. *First*, interdisciplinary approaches encourage intellectual reflexivity. In recent years ontological and epistemological debates have already ranked high on the agenda of international history, not least in response to the transnational turn and the introduction of other new research perspectives into this field. The engagement with other disciplines offers additional perspectives from which to reflect on the assumptions underlying the practice of researching and writing international history. *Second*, interdisciplinary approaches generate methodological refinement. The concepts of the network and the field demonstrate *concrete* ways of “transcending the methodological assumption of the non-porous nation state”⁶⁷. In other words these concepts are representative for the potential of social science concepts to function as methodological tools for realizing a transnational research perspective in international history. The methodology developed to explore the interstate negotiations on the Schuman Plan in particular could be transferred to different sets of negotiations, within but also outside of the European political space. Similarly, the concept of the field could be applied fruitfully to the analy-

⁶⁴ See, e.g., Antonin COHEN, *Constitutionalism without Constitution: Transnational Elites Between Political Mobilization and Legal Expertise in the Making of a Constitution for Europe (1940s–1960s)*, in: *Law and Social Inquiry* 32 (2007) 109–135; and Antoine VAUCHEZ, *L’Endroit de l’Europe. Champ juridique européen et institution d’un ordre politique transnational* (Habilitation Université Paris I-Sorbonne 2010). See also RASMUSSEN, *Supranational Governance in the Making* 43.

⁶⁵ Cf. Morten RASMUSSEN, Bill DAVIES (eds.), *Towards a New History of EU Law*, in: *Contemporary European History* 21 (2012); and the above referenced research project “Towards a New History of European Public Law”.

⁶⁶ An attempt to launch this dialogue is Kiran PATEL, Heike SCHWEITZER (eds.), *Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law* (Oxford 2013).

⁶⁷ WARLEIGH-LACK, *Interdisciplinarity in Research on the EU* 207.

sis of different social arenas in the development of international politics over time. *Third*, interdisciplinary approaches can contribute to overcoming different national traditions in writing international history. As the literature used for this chapter shows, European integration history per definition draws on different national traditions – a tendency that is only intensified when including literature from the neighbouring disciplines of politics and sociology.

A *fourth* crucial benefit for historians engaging in interdisciplinary research is that there is now an interest in the wider politics and IR community in what historians have to say – an interest that goes beyond the use of empirical evidence merely to prove one or another theoretical viewpoint. Recent theoretical developments in IR have highlighted the importance of considering development over time in the study of international politics. International historians therefore find themselves faced with opportunities to contribute to an interdisciplinary dialogue on international politics and to historicize important contemporary phenomena including interdependence and globalization, for example. This opportunity to develop a historical perspective on contemporary international politics also represents an answer to one of the questions set by the editors of this volume, namely why we should write more international history. International history – understood as the ongoing quest for the drivers and forces of international politics, the international order and international relations over time – has the potential to contribute to our understanding of the contemporary world, not just the body of research making up international history.

The question arising in view of this accumulated potential associated with interdisciplinary research is why there is not much more interdisciplinarity in international history. One possible reason is, borrowing once more from Bourdieu, that interdisciplinary research is not necessarily considered a social resource worth investing in or fighting for in the historical discipline. In European integration history the engagement with other disciplines brings with it the advantage not only of writing a more conceptually refined history, but also the recognition by scholars in the wider community of European Studies, which by definition is an interdisciplinary field. It appears, by the same token, that for international historians outside this specific sub-discipline the intellectual benefits of developing an international history informed by interdisciplinary approaches alone are not sufficient to initiate the engagement with other disciplines.

The use of interdisciplinary approaches is encouraged or limited by academic structures reflected in university departments, learned societies and publication outlets. These technical barriers to cooperation across disciplines might help to explain the limited impact of the transnational history of European integration on (European) international history. In some countries research and expertise on the European Union and its history is still more likely to be found in politics/IR departments (some of which focus on European Studies) than in the distinctly more conservative history departments. A case in point is the UK. Furthermore,

in the case of European integration history, the practice of interdisciplinary cooperation has been promoted predominantly from the “periphery” not the “centre”. The institutionalized body representing historians and the history of European integration, the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians, has not contributed to institutionalizing interdisciplinary cooperation although individual members of the Liaison Committee have demonstrated an interest in interdisciplinary research⁶⁸. Finally, with regard to publication outlets, historians of European integration have in the past not been particularly successful in communicating the merits of their research to the larger community of historians of Europe in the twentieth century. This is slowly changing, however⁶⁹, as also evidenced by the recent special issue by Morten Rasmussen and Bill Davies on the emergence of European law in *Contemporary European History*⁷⁰.

⁶⁸ Cf. also Sigfrido RAMÍREZ PÉREZ, *Conclusions and Perspectives for Future Research*, in: GUIARO, LYNCH, RAMÍREZ PÉREZ (eds.), *Alan S. Milward*, 499–525, here 514. For the Liaison Committee, see Antonio VARSORI, *From Normative Impetus to Professionalization: Origins and Operations of Research Networks*, in: KAISER, VARSORI, *European Union History* 6–25.

⁶⁹ E.g. Kiran Klaus PATEL, *Europäische Integrationsgeschichte auf dem Weg zur doppelten Neuorientierung. Ein Forschungsbericht*, in: *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 50 (2010) 595–642, here 606; Jost DÜLFFER, Anja KRÜKE, *Von der Geschichte der europäischen Integration zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte Europas nach 1945*, in: *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 49 (2009) 3–24.

⁷⁰ RASMUSSEN, DAVIES, *Towards a New History of EU Law*.

