

The Apoha Section of the *Nyāyamañjarī*

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Introduction

The Buddhist doctrine of apoha, literally ‘exclusion’, arose in order to provide an answer to two questions: (1) What is the meaning of a word such as ‘cow’? (2) What is the object of a conceptual cognition such as ‘cow’? Whereas the Brāhmaṇical Realist answers to both of these questions involve an appeal to ‘cowness’ regarded as a really existing universal, the doctrine of apoha asserts that the answer to both questions is rather ‘exclusion of non-cow’.¹ In this way the Buddhist Apohavādins sought to explain word-meaning and conceptual cognition without having to appeal to the real existence of universals such as ‘cowness’.

In the passage translated below, we find three different versions of the apoha doctrine:

1. Apoha is an absence that exists externally.
2. Apoha is internal, an aspect of cognition itself (*jñānākāra*).
3. Apoha is neither internal nor external.

The first of these is the apoha doctrine of Dignāga, at least as outlined and argued against by Kumāriḷa. The second can tentatively be attributed to Dharmakīrti.² The third can safely be attributed to Dharmottara.

The structure of the passage is that after view 1 has been confronted with a number of objections in Part 1, the Buddhist asserts at the beginning of Part 2 that these objections would be valid if apoha were an absence that existed externally, but that it is not. Views 2 and 3 are then given as accounts of apoha that avoid the objections in Part 1 by not falling into the trap of conceiving of apoha as an external absence. The translation is based on the editions produced by Kataoka (2008: 19–31; 2009: 26–41), whose revised versions are contained in the present volume. For previous studies of the passage, see Hattori (2006) and Kataoka (2008: 1–18; 2009: 1–18).

We would like to offer sincere thanks to the organizers and participants of the Apoha workshop in Vienna, 2012, in the course of which we read through the passage translated here, and to the following people with whom Alex Watson read the text in Harvard in the 2013 Spring Term: Dan Bertoni, Tyler Neill, Parimal Patil, Ben Williams.

1. For some advocates of the doctrine, the meaning of the word is strictly speaking not ‘exclusion of non-cow’, but ‘an object qualified by exclusion of non-cow’.

2. See Kataoka (2009: 9–12). The attribution is not completely certain, and is the topic of Kensho Okada’s contribution, CHAPTER 5 in this volume (Okada 2017). It is clear at least that it is how Śākya-buddhi interpreted Dharmakīrti.

Conventions

- signifies denotation, e.g. 'cow' → cow (= A cow is that which is denoted by the word 'cow').
- ↔ signifies the relation of contradiction between two things that are mutually opposed, e.g. the relation between 'exclusion of X' and X, i.e. between *apoha* and *apohya*.

Translation


Part 1

0 Introduction

[Jayanta:] Surely Bhaṭṭa [Kumārila] has [already] rained down an immense shower of criticisms on to the [Buddhist] view that apoha is the meaning of a word.³

1 The Support of Apoha

For to explain further: This thing called apoha is taught [by you Buddhists] to be an exclusion, [i.e.] an absence.⁴ Now an absence cannot be known as something independent, in the way that pots and the like [can be perceived as independent things].⁵ Therefore, this [apoha] must be grasped as being supported by something else.⁶ And what this support is of the [apoha] needs to be considered.



3. The whole of the rest of Part 1 is a summary, with some small changes of details, of a few of the arguments in the *Apoha* chapter of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*. Our understanding of that chapter has been shaped by the translation of it being prepared by John Taber and Kei Kataoka.

Text-critical remark: On the choice of readings in this Sanskrit sentence, and Bhattacharyya's translation, see Kataoka 2008: 6–7.

4. Dignāga did not, to our knowledge, explicitly assert that apoha is an absence (*abhāva*). He was interpreted that way, though, by Siṃhasūri (*Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* 733,17-18, cited and translated by Pind 2009: 268, note 451): *nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ. kasmāt? abhedāt. na hy arthāntarāpoho bhedeṣu bhidyate, abhāvāt. tanmātraṃ ca śabdenocyate, na bhedaḥ.* 'Nor does the fact that particulars are infinite lead to the problem that [words] would be incapable of denoting. Why? Because [exclusion] is not divided. For exclusion of other referents (*arthāntarāpoha*) is not divided among the particulars, because it is non-existence (*abhāva*); and this [exclusion] alone—not the particulars—is denoted by a word.'


What Dignāga does state is that apoha is *adravya* (insubstantial, not really existent): *avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti, arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvāt, adravyatvāc ca* (*Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5:36c, Pind 2009: A14). 'And the fault that [apoha] is not [capable of functioning as] a universal, which might [be thought to] follow from it not being all-pervading, does not exist, because a mere exclusion of other things is common (to all individuals of the same type), and because it is insubstantial/not really existent.'

5. Absences, like properties such as smells, tastes etc., and unlike substances such as pots, are not self-standing for Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas; they rest on some other thing (a 'support', *āśraya*) to which they belong and on the basis of which they are grasped.

6. At the beginning of the *Abhāva* chapter of his *Ślokavārttika* (2cd–4), Kumārila gives examples of absences such as the absence of milk in curd. In order to grasp the absence of milk you have to grasp the curd, and by grasping the curd you grasp the absence of milk. By grasping what do we grasp the absence of non-cow? That is the question he will now pose and to which he will give four possible answers, showing none of them to be satisfactory.


1.1 The Cow-Individual

Firstly, a cow-individual (*gosvalakṣaṇa*) is not the support, because that is not the basis / the object of a conceptual cognition.⁷



1.2 The Intermediate Universal

Nor is the intermediate universal, such as *śābaleyatva*, its support, because absence cannot have absence as its support, [yet that would have to be the case if the intermediate universal were the support,] because that [intermediate universal] also has exclusion [which is a kind of absence] as its nature in that it is a universal.



7. The support of the apoha is the basis or object of a conceptual cognition in the sense that it is that which, when cognized, provokes the cognition of the apoha. Hence an individual cannot be the support of the apoha, since an individual cannot be grasped by a conceptual cognition for Dignāga. Jayanta is following Kumāṛila closely here; see *Ślokavārttika, apoha*, 3ab: *neṣṭo 'sādhāraṇas tāvad viśayaḥ, nirvikalpanāt*. 'Firstly, it cannot be accepted to be the particular object, because that is not conceptualised'.

Would Dignāga claim that the cow-individual is the support of the exclusion of non-cow? Dignāga states that a word 'expresses things qualified by the exclusion of other entities' (*arthāntaranivṛtīviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha, Pramāṇasamuccaya* ad 5:36d). If by 'things' (*bhāvān*) Dignāga intended individuals, do we not have some evidence that he envisaged a support-supported relation between individuals and exclusion? It is unclear what precisely Dignāga was referring to with the word 'things', just as it is unclear what precisely he intended by 'meaning/referent' (*artham*), when he wrote that a word 'denotes its own meaning/referent through the exclusion of others' (*svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate, Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5:1). See SECTION 2 of Pascale Hugon's essay in this volume for a discussion of whether in those sentences Dignāga was referring to real particulars with the words *bhāva* and *artha*. She discusses the different answers of Pind, Katsura, Tillemans, Herzberger and Yoshimizu.

But even if Dignāga did mean to assert that it is real particulars that are 'qualified by exclusion', the relation of qualifier and qualified that is suggested by his use of the word *viśiṣṭa* is not the same as the relation of supporter and supported that is in play in this part of the *Nyāyamañjarī*; for here the support of the apoha, as we will find out in § 1.5, is something that is common to all instances of that apoha; i.e. the support of the exclusion of non-cow is something that is common to all cows. Dignāga would certainly not accept the existence of some support of apoha that is found in all cows. Thus Dignāga would respond to this argument not only by denying the option of this subsection (1.1) that it is the cow-individual that is the support (*āśraya*) of the apoha, but also by denying that there is *any* support of apoha in the sense that Kumāṛila and Jayanta are requiring.

What justifies this requirement for Kumāṛila and Jayanta is that apoha, being an absence, must have some externally existing support. Although Dignāga would probably not have a problem with apoha being characterised as an absence, he would deny that absences require some external support.


And [for the following reason too] the common property of Śābaleyas (i.e. *śābaleyatva*) is not the support of the exclusion of non-cows: for this [*śābaleyatva*] [if it is the support of anything] should be the support of the exclusion of non-Śābaleyas. For it is not appropriate to say that a cow is that which is not a non-Śābaleya; rather [it is appropriate to say] that a Śābaleya is that which is not a non-Śābaleya.⁸ For the exclusion of non-Śābaleyas does not exist in Bāhuleyas etc., even though Bāhuleyas are cows.⁹

1.3 The Aggregate of Individuals

If [the Buddhists] were to say that the aggregate of Śābaleya etc. individuals is the support of the exclusion of non-cows, [we would reply that] that too is still unfit, be-

8. The logical connections between these sentences may not be clear from the translation alone. We have four assertions (*śābaleya* and *bāhuleya* here are names for two cows, or possibly two types of cows). (1) *Śābaleyatva* is not the support of the exclusion of non-cows. (2) For *śābaleyatva* should be the support of the exclusion of non-Śābaleyas. (3.1) For it is not correct to define a cow as that which is not a non-Śābaleya; (3.2) rather a Śābaleya should be defined as that which is not a non-Śābaleya. The argument becomes clear once it is understood that that which is denied in 3.1 (that a cow can be defined as that which is not a non-Śābaleya) is a corollary of 1 (*śābaleyatva* being the support of the exclusion of non-cows) and 3.2 is a corollary of 2. Since 3.1 is clearly false, it follows that 1 is false. The correctness of 3.2 supports the correctness of 2.


9. If we take *śābaleyatva* to be the support of exclusion of non-cow, i.e. that which when cognised gives rise to cognition of exclusion of non-cow, i.e. cognition of 'cow', then it undesirably follows that *bāhuleya* cows would fall outside of what is capable of producing the cognition 'cow'. Could one not object that exclusion of non-cow could sometimes have as its support *śābaleyatva*, but at other times *bāhuleyatva*?



Jayanta does not address this possibility explicitly, but it will be clear when we reach section 1.5 that it can be ruled out on the grounds that the support of exclusion of non-cow must be common to all cows. This assumption would be justified by Kumāriḷa and Jayanta on the grounds that for Dignāga it is one (*eka*), undivided (*abhinna*) exclusion of non-cow that exists in all cows (see FOOTNOTE 13), and that what is so of the apoha must also be so of its support. Kumāriḷa dismisses this possibility of *śābaleyatva* in verses 3cd–7 of *Ślokavārttika*, *apoha*. The second of Jayanta's two arguments is found there, elaborated in more detail by Kumāriḷa, but Jayanta's first point about an absence not being able to support an absence is not.


Text-critical remark: For a discussion of the transmission of these sentences, and Bhattacharyya's translation, see Kataoka 2008: 9–10.

cause no [aggregate] is observed as separate from the particular aggregate members [according to the Buddhists' own view].



1.4 The Particular Aggregate Members

And because the individuals that are the particular aggregate members are infinite in number in accordance with their difference in space, time and so on, it would be impossible [for a person] to classify them [into a group] even were they¹⁰ to live for hundreds of human life-spans.¹¹ Therefore particular aggregate members are not the support of the [apoha] either.¹²



1.5 Conclusion

Therefore it should be concluded that something which is common to all [individuals] and which is complete in each individual [cow] is certainly the locus of the

10. 'They' = the person: in order to avoid sexist language we sometimes use third person plural pronominal forms in singular meaning.

11. I.e. tens of thousands of years.

12. Since the aggregate members (*samudāyins*) are the individuals (*svalakṣaṇas*), one might have thought that this position is not significantly different from that which was argued against in section 1.1. How they are different can be seen from the refutation here. It clarifies that a requirement of this position is that every individual must be known before the apoha can be known, which is not a requirement of the position in 1.1. Why must they all be known on this view? Because the idea here is that it is the totality of individuals that are the support of the apoha. How then is this position different from that in 1.3? Whereas here it is the totality of particular individuals that is the support, there it was some over-arching unity comprising all the particular individuals. Here it is a plurality; there it was a unity.

Text-critical remark: On the reading *samudāyino 'pi na tadāśrayaḥ*, for what is given in all the editions as *samudāyo 'pi na tadāśrayaḥ*, and on Hattori's summary of this argument, see Kataoka 2008: 12–13.

exclusion of non-cows; and that is nothing but cowness.¹³ Or once that [cowness] is accepted, what is the point of exerting oneself to postulate the exclusion of non-cows?¹⁴

13. Jayanta is here following Kumāriḷa (*Ślokavārttika*, *apoha*, v. 10) closely:


tasmāt sarveṣu yad rūpaṃ pratyekaṃ pariniṣṭhitam |
gobuddhis tannimitā syāt, gotvād anyac ca nāsti tat ||

‘Therefore the cause of a cognition of ‘cow’ must be some nature in all [cows] and complete in each one. And that is nothing other than cowness.’


We need a support that is (A) common to all individuals and (B) complete in each individual. The views considered in 1.1 and 1.2 do not meet requirement A (neither a particular *svalakṣaṇa* nor *śābaleya-atva* exist in all cows). The views considered in 1.3 and 1.4 do not meet requirement B (the aggregate and the totality of aggregate members are only complete once all individuals are taken into account); neither, strictly speaking, do they meet requirement A (it does not make sense to say that every individual has the totality of individuals or the aggregate of individuals).

Dignāga asserts that a ‘type’ or ‘class-indicator’ (*jāti*), being one and yet pertaining to the many individual members of the class, must fulfill certain requirements. His claim is that apoha can fulfill these, while real universals such as cowness cannot. He lists the requirements as: being one, being permanent, and being complete in each member of the class. (*jātidharmās caikatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā atraiva vyavatiṣṭhante, abhedāt, āśrayāvicchedāt, kṛtsnārthapratīteḷ.*) ‘And the properties of a type are characterized by oneness, permanence, and being complete in each member; they are tenable in this [view of apoha] alone. [An apoha is one] because it is undivided, [it is permanent] because its substrate (consisting of its individual members) never ceases, [and it is complete in each individual member] because the whole object/meaning is cognized.’

If Dignāga accepts that apoha must be complete in each individual and common to all individuals, how then have Kumāriḷa and Jayanta been able to use these requirements to reach the very un-Buddhist conclusion that apoha requires cowness as its support? What they have done is take these requirements that Dignāga accepts as pertaining to the apoha, and apply them to the support of the apoha. In this way they have arrived at the necessity of postulating a third entity between the apoha and its individual members. What justifies this move for Kumāriḷa and Jayanta is that apoha is an absence (*abhāva*), and so it requires some positive thing (*bhāva*) as support, which when cognized prompts the apoha to be cognized.



14. The text would read smoothly without the *vā* (‘or’), though it is possible to make sense of it: One can either postulate apoha of non-cows, in which case one has to accept that its only suitable support is cowness, or one can, having seen that apoha requires cowness, let cowness do the work that apoha is supposed to do, and hence not bother to postulate apoha at all.



2 The Impossibility of Grasping the Excluded

Moreover it is not only because of the absence of a support that the [apoha] cannot be grasped; it is also the case that to grasp the apoha of whatever these things are that are being excluded—horses and everything else that is a non-cow—is well-nigh impossible while these [excluded things] have not been grasped.¹⁵



And since they are infinite in number, to grasp them is impossible. There is, furthermore, no reason for grouping them.¹⁶ And [conceptual cognitions] do not grasp horses etc. as positive entities according to your view, but only through excluding others.¹⁷ Thus, when one [tries to] grasp the [horses etc.] too¹⁸ by exclusion, the very same problems apply.¹⁹



So now conceptual cognitions cannot grasp apoha with regard to anything. And no everyday activity (*vyavahāra*) results from non-conceptual cognition. Thus it undesirably follows that the activities of the entire world would cease.

3 Synonymity

Furthermore, these words such as 'cow' and 'horse' which express mutually dissimilar general classes, and words such as *karka* and *śābaleya* which express subordi-

15. We understand the *api* as (together with *kintu*) picking up on *na kevalam*.

16. What would count as such a reason? Two examples are mentioned in section 3.3.3.2: existing in the same place or at the same time. Another possibility given by Kumāriḷa: all sharing a common property (*Ślokavārttika*, *apoha* 72).

17. Kumāriḷa makes this point, but in a slightly different context, in *Ślokavārttika*, *apoha* 67–68ab.

18. As well as cows.

19. These same problems being: (1) The exclusion cannot be grasped because it lacks a support. (2) The exclusion cannot be grasped because the excluded (*apohya*), i.e. non-horses, cannot be grasped, since (i) they are infinite, (ii) there is no reason for grouping them, (iii) they too are only known through exclusion, so when one tries to grasp the exclusions that define the concepts that fall into the category of non-horse, all of these just stated faults apply yet again.

nate classes would all become synonyms because of being no different in denoting apoha.^{20,21}

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \text{'cow'} \longrightarrow \text{apoha} & = & \text{apoha} \longleftarrow \text{'horse'} \\
 = & & = \\
 \text{'śābaleya'} \longrightarrow \text{apoha} & = & \text{apoha} \longleftarrow \text{'karka'}
 \end{array}$$

3.1 Absence of Difference between Apohas

[Buddhist:] There is no problem of this kind because apohas are different [from each other].

[Mīmāṃsaka:] That is not correct, because there can be no difference between apohas. Or if they were differentiated, it would undesirably follow that they are real entities, as individuals (*svalakṣaṇas*) [are real entities because they are differentiated].

[Buddhist:] In your [Mīmāṃsaka] view too there is the same problem of synonymy, because [these words] are no different insofar as they [all] denote universals.

[Mīmāṃsaka:] That is not correct, because universals are understood as being different [from each other] given that their natures lack intermixture, since they exist as positive entities.

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \text{'cow'} \longrightarrow \text{cowness} & \neq & \text{horseness} \longleftarrow \text{'horse'} \\
 \neq & & \neq \\
 \text{'śābaleya'} \longrightarrow \text{śābaleyatva} & \neq & \text{karkatva} \longleftarrow \text{'karka'}
 \end{array}$$

Apohas, by contrast, are not distinguished from each other, because they are all the same in having as their nature mere absence.

3.2 Differentiation in Their Supports

[Buddhist:] Apohas are different [from each other] because of the difference between their supports such as Karkas and Śābaleyas.

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \text{'cow'} \longrightarrow \text{apoha 1} & \neq & \text{apoha 2} \longleftarrow \text{'horse'} \\
 | & & | \\
 \text{'śābaleya'} & & \text{'karka'}
 \end{array}$$

20. The problem of synonymy that takes up the following subsections is dealt with in verses 42ff. of *Ślokavārttika*, *apoha*.

21. The portion of text from *paraspara-* to *karkādi-* is missing in all of the editions: see Kataoka 2008: 9–10.

[Mīmāṃsaka:] No, because it has already been rejected that they are supports [of apoha].²² Or if a difference between the [apohas] were accepted owing to differences between their supports, it would undesirably follow that apohas would be differentiated with regard to each individual (*svalakṣaṇa*). And then the fact that [apohas] are of the nature of general properties would be lost.

<i>apoha</i> 1	<i>apoha</i> 2	<i>apoha</i> 3
cow 1	cow 2	cow 3

3.3 Differentiation in What Is Excluded

[Buddhist:] The problem of synonymity is avoided by discerning a difference between apohas based on differences between what is excluded (*apohya*).²³

Exclusion of <i>non-cow</i>	≠	Exclusion of <i>non-horse</i>
≠		≠
Exclusion of <i>non-śābaleya</i>	≠	Exclusion of <i>non-karka</i>

[Mīmāṃsaka:] That [argument] is also not to the point.

3.3.1 Difference between Apohas Is Secondary

A difference [between apohas] resulting from differences between what is excluded, even if it really exists, does not remove the problem of synonymity, for [then] the [difference] is secondary / metaphorical and not primary / literal.²⁴

22. It is more likely that the supports being considered in this section, named as Karkas and Śābaleyas, are the Karka-*svalakṣaṇas* and Śābaleya-*svalakṣaṇas*, than that they are *karkatva* and *śābaleyatva*, because the unwanted consequence pointed to in the next sentence follows more straightforwardly if that is the case. Hence the section being referred to in this sentence, where these things are said to be denied to be the support of apoha, is probably § 1.1 (not § 1.2, even though the word *śābaleya* is used in § 1.2 and not in § 1.1).

23. Since the class of non-cows is different from the class of non-horses, for example, the exclusion of the former is different from the exclusion of the latter. This is the option that Dignāga would take.

24. Among exclusions of excluded things, *apohya-apohas* (exclusion of non-cow, exclusion of non-horse etc.), only the *apohyas* differ, not the apohas, as can be seen from the fact that each one is described in the same way as 'exclusion of ...'. Since the primary element, the apoha, is the same in each case, any difference between an exclusion of non-cow and an exclusion of non-horse is merely secondary and metaphorical. The literal meanings of all words becomes the same; only their secondary meanings can be distinguished.

Table 2.1: Extensional Differences of Negations

	Excluded (<i>apohya</i>)	Uncommon	Common
‘Cow’	Non-Cow	Horses	Elephants, Lions etc.
‘Horse’	Non-Horse	Cows	Elephants, Lions etc.

3.3.2 The Excluded Things Have No Connection with the Apoha

And a difference based on differences between the excluded, for its part (*api*), cannot properly belong to the apohas. For how can something that cannot be differentiated even by its supports,²⁵ which can be well imagined as having a connection with it, be differentiated by the excluded things, which are far away, devoid of a relation with it, and complete outsiders?

3.3.3 Most of the Excluded Things Are Common to Different Exclusions

Or even accepting[, for the sake of the argument, that apohas are differentiated in accordance with differences between the excluded], we reply [as follows]: If differentiation of apohas accords with differences between the excluded, then since the excluded are actually one, the [apohas] will also have to be one. To explain: when a cow and a horse are distinguished by excluding others, the vast majority of the excluded—elephants etc., which are non-cows and non-horses—are common. Just one element sticks out as uncommon: cows in the case of a horse, and horses in the case of a cow (see TABLE 2.1).²⁶

In this circumstance, when one considers whether a cow and a horse should be different owing to the difference of the single excluded thing, or should be non-different owing to the non-difference of the vast majority of excluded things, then it is only non-difference that can be [considered to be] correct, in accordance with this [maxim]: ‘When there is a coming together of [property-possessors] with incompatible properties,²⁷ the majority [of the property-possessors] should be the ones whose properties are accepted’.²⁸

25. That it cannot was argued for in section 3.2.

26. ‘Cows in the case of a horse’: i.e. when one determines a horse by excluding non-horses, cows are the only element among the excluded that are not also among the excluded when one determines a cow.

27. Śābara takes *vipratīṣiddhadharma-* as a *bahuvrīhi*, Cakradhara seems to take it as a *karmadhāraya* (see apparatus to the edition); we prefer the former.

28. The incompatible properties in our case are difference and non-difference; the property-possessors are all of the various excluded things (*apohyas*). Since all of the *apohyas* except one have non-dif-

Table 2.2: Pañcadaśarātra, the 15-day Sacrifice

15-day Sacrifice		Non-Cows		Non-Horses	
Property-possessors	Properties	Property-possessors	Properties	Property-possessors	Properties
Day 1	Dedicated to Agni	Horses	Difference	Cows	Difference
Day 2	Dedicated to Indra	Lions	Non-Difference	Lions	Non-Difference
Day 3	Dedicated to Indra	Elephants	Non-Difference	Elephants	Non-Difference
Day 4	Dedicated to Indra	Tigers	Non-Difference	Tigers	Non-Difference
Day 5	Dedicated to Indra	...	Non-Difference	...	Non-Difference
Day 6	Dedicated to Indra	...	Non-Difference	...	Non-Difference
Day 7	Dedicated to Indra	...	Non-Difference	...	Non-Difference
Day 8	Dedicated to Indra	...	Non-Difference	...	Non-Difference
Day 9	Dedicated to Indra	...	Non-Difference	...	Non-Difference
Day 10	Dedicated to Indra	...	Non-Difference	...	Non-Difference
Day 11	Dedicated to Indra	...	Non-Difference	...	Non-Difference
Day 12	Dedicated to Indra	...	Non-Difference	...	Non-Difference
Day 13	Dedicated to Indra	...	Non-Difference	...	Non-Difference
Day 14	Dedicated to Indra	...	Non-Difference	...	Non-Difference
Day 15	Dedicated to Indra	...	Non-Difference	...	Non-Difference

3.3.3.1 The Uncommon Element

[Buddhist:] The exclusion of horses then, since it is the uncommon element, can be accepted to be the exclusion of non-cows.

[Mīmāṃsaka:] In that case because the [exclusion of horses] exists in lions etc. too, they too should now be regarded as cows.²⁹

3.3.3.2 Non-Cow without Particulars

[Buddhist:] Non-cow [in general], without the appearance³⁰ of particulars such

ference (*abheda*), with only one having difference, it is the non-difference of the majority that should be accepted.

The source of the citation is *Jaiminīsūtra* 12.2.22, which reads: *vipratīṣiddhadharmāṇāṃ samavāye bhūyasāṃ syāt sadharmatvam*. The context, as interpreted by Śābara, is the question of what to do in the 15-day sacrifice known as the Pañcadaśarātra, which is made up of three elements, a one-day sacrifice known as the Agniṣṭut, a three-day sacrifice and an eleven-day sacrifice. The Agniṣṭut is dedicated to Agni but the other days are dedicated to Indra, so there is a doubt concerning which of these two contradictory properties is to be adopted as the property of the whole 15-day sacrifice; should the preparatory recitation for the 15-day sacrifice be dedicated to Agni or Indra? The sūtra states the principle that justifies the latter.

When we have to choose between two contradictory properties, that which is possessed by the majority should be chosen. Jayanta uses this principle to argue that the class of non-cows is, or must be considered to be, the same as the class of non-horses (so that for an Apohavādin ‘cow’ should be synonymous with ‘horse’). The class of non-cows consists of every kind of thing in the universe apart from cows, and all of these apart from one (horses) have the property of non-difference in the sense that they all occur also in the class of non-horses. If fourteen instances of a property can cancel out one instance of a contradictory property in the ritual example, surely an almost infinite number of instances of a property can cancel out one instance of a contradictory property? See TABLE 2.2 on p. 46. The argument can be countered on the grounds that whereas one does have to choose in the ritual case, one does not have to choose in our case of the class of non-cows, for here there is no genuine contradiction between the properties. Difference and non-difference are only contradictory if we are talking of difference and non-difference from the same thing. The lions in the class of non-cows are non-different from *the lions* in the other class, the elephants from *the elephants* in the other class, and so on. The horses are said to be different as a result of comparison with the cows, or with the absence of horses, in the other class. Since the various ‘differences’ and ‘non-differences’, then, result from comparison with different members of the other class, there is no contradiction between them. The class of non-cows can quite coherently be said to have a near-infinite number of members characterized by non-difference from members of another class, and one member characterised by difference from members of the other class. The non-differences and the differences can co-exist; and their result is that the class is very similar to, but different from, the other class, not that it is the same as the other class.

29. If that which defines cows, namely exclusion of non-cows, is regarded as too similar to that which defines horses, namely exclusion of non-horses, and is hence replaced by exclusion of horses, then this new definition of cows, although avoiding the problem of including horses, now includes things like lions.

30. For a defence of the reading *-onmeṣa-*, see Kataoka 2008: 13–14.

as horses, is taught to be that which is excluded.³¹

[Mīmāṃsaka:]: [Non-cow could only be grasped in one of two ways: by grasping its individual members one by one or as a single class.] It[s individual members] cannot be grasped one by one, because they are infinite in number. And there is absolutely no reason to group [its members] into a single class, because all non-cows—horses and the rest—cannot have the property of existing in the same place or at the same time.

3.3.3.3 Mutual Dependence Makes a Reason for Grouping Non-Cows Impossible

[Buddhist:] It is the denial of cow that [we] hold to be the reason for grouping [all non-cows] into a single class.



[Mīmāṃsaka:] Alas, in that case [you] have to hold that [the concept] ‘cow’ is established in advance, in order that through its denial non-cows could be cognized.³² And if the [concept of] cow that is established in advance is to hand, what is the point of non-cows, and what is the point of their exclusion?

[Buddhist:] The cow-individual (*gosvalakṣaṇa*) does exist as something established in advance.

[Mīmāṃsaka:] That does not [help your argument], because linguistic and conceptual activity (*vyavahāra*) does not take place by means of an individual.³³ If, on the other hand, the universal [cowness] is established in advance, then as we have just pointed out any effort [to postulate] *apoha* is without purpose.


[Buddhist:] The universal of cows is established by means of the denial of non-cows.

31. This gets around the problem of the exclusion of non-cows being too similar to the exclusion of non-horses, for the similarity arises from the extent of overlap of the *particulars*. The idea here is that when one identifies something as a cow, what appears to one’s mind as being excluded is not all particular non-cows, such as horses, elephants etc., but rather just the general notion of non-cow.

32. Cf. *Ślokavārttika*, *apoha* 83.

33. The Buddhist proposed that the cow-individual, since it is established in advance, could serve as that which is denied in order to arrive at the class of non-cows. But denial is a conceptual activity (both sides agree that perception is affirmative in nature); so it should not be able, for Buddhists, to work on individuals (*svalakṣaṇas*). Even if it could, since a ‘cow-individual’ is excluded not only from all non-cows, but also from all other ‘cow-individuals’, the denial of one particular cow-individual could not help us to reach the class of non-cows. Moreover, a ‘cow-individual’ is not actually known as a cow until one has arrived at the level of conceptual cognition; something which is not known as a cow cannot, by being denied, enable us to arrive at the class of non-cows.

[Mīmāṃsaka:] Then mutual dependence cannot be avoided: by denying non-cows the [concept of] cow is established, and by establishing the [concept of] cow the denial of non-cows is established.³⁴



3.3.4 Conclusion


Therefore, because the very things that are excluded cannot be determined, no difference between apohas resulting from differences between these [excluded things] can be established.

4 Exclusion of Horses

4.1 Generally or Particularly?

Furthermore, horses etc. must be excluded either generally or particularly. They cannot [be excluded] particularly, because those [particular horses etc.] are infinite

34. How can we grasp ‘non-cow’ such that exclusion can then operate on this in order to generate the concept ‘cow’? That was the question with which this line of argument began. We cannot grasp all non-cows one-by-one as they are infinite. So the Buddhist must appeal to something that enables us to group them together. He proposes that simply negating cow enables us to generate the idea of, and grasp, ‘non-cow’. But what is this ‘cow’ that is negated? (A) It can’t be the concept ‘cow’, because if that were available to us already, apoha would become pointless. (B) But neither can it be a particular cow, because on the basis of particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) there is no linguistic activity (*vyavahāra*). (C) If the Buddhist tries to get out of this problem by claiming that it is the universal cow, but that this is generated by negating non-cow, then we have the problem of mutual dependence. See the diagram below, where A, B and C denote these three just mentioned faults. (Kumārila gives fault A in *Śloka-vārttika*, *apoha* 84cd, fault C in 84ab, and something resembling fault B in 81cd–82.)



in number³⁵ and are not the object of words.³⁶

In a general form, on the other hand, the [horses etc.] too are apoha in nature and therefore they are non-existences.³⁷ And how could one produce the non-existence of another non-existence? Or if one did, only affirmation would remain because of the application of the double negation.³⁸ Thus the meaning of a word [such as ‘cow’] would be affirmative by nature.³⁹

4.2 The Dilemma of Sameness or Difference of the Two Apohas

And the exclusion₁ of horses etc., which are exclusion₂ in nature, is either different from the [exclusion₂] or not. If the [exclusion₁] is different [from exclusion₂], the [exclusion₁] would be positive in nature.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{'cow'} \rightarrow \text{exclusion of (non-cow)} &= \text{exclusion}_1 \text{ of (exclusion}_2\text{)} \\ \text{exclusion}_1 &\neq \text{exclusion}_2 \\ \implies \text{exclusion}_1 \text{ is positive} \end{aligned}$$

But if [exclusion₁] is not different [from exclusion₂], it would follow that the exclusion₁ of non-cow would be the same as non-cow. So a cow too would be exactly the same kind of thing as a non-cow.⁴⁰

$$\begin{aligned} \text{'cow'} \rightarrow \text{exclusion of (non-cow)} &= \text{exclusion}_1 \text{ of (exclusion}_2\text{)} \\ \text{exclusion}_1 &= \text{exclusion}_2 \\ \implies \text{cow} &= \text{non-cow} \end{aligned}$$

5 The Impossibility of Common Linguistic Usages

In the view that apoha is the meaning of a word, furthermore, linguistic usages (*vyavahāra*) such as the qualifier-qualified relationship and the co-referentiality⁴¹

35. Cf. *Ślokavārttika*, *apoha* 58cd.

36. As to why something has to be the object of words in order to be excluded, see FOOTNOTE 33.

37. Since horses and other non-cows are also apoha by nature, and since apoha is a kind of non-existence, it follows that exclusion of non-cows is a non-existence of a non-existence (*abhāvasyābhāvaḥ*).

38. Cf. *Ślokavārttika*, *apoha* 63cd–64.

39. And not negative, as implied by the apoha doctrine.

40. Cf. *Ślokavārttika*, *apoha* 97.

41. Alternatively *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasāmānādhikaraṇyādityavahārāḥ* may be intended to mean not ‘linguistic usages such as ...’, but ‘linguistic uses based on/in accordance with ...’.

See Ogawa 2017 (CHAPTER 3, SECTION 2.1 in this volume) for another translation and discussion of this passage.

6.2 'Apoha'

And [you] need to consider what is denoted by the word 'apoha'.⁴⁹

[Buddhist:] Apoha is that which is not non-exclusion.

[Mīmāṃsaka:] And what is this 'non-exclusion'?⁵⁰ How, furthermore, can it 'not be'? Or if it [can] 'not be', then what is left over [as the meaning of the word 'apoha']?⁵¹ Thus [on your view] nothing could be expressed⁵² [because you say words express apoha, and yet no coherent definition of apoha can be given].

6.3 Further Miscellaneous Words

And what to say about words such as not which denote negation?⁵³ What would it mean to say 'not is that which is not non-not'?⁵⁴ And how can *upasargas* (e.g. *pra*) and *nipātas* (e.g. *ca*) denote apohas?⁵⁵ And it is difficult to justify exclusion [being the meaning] of the finite verbs such as *pacati* ('he/she/it cooks').⁵⁶

the second half of the sentence to mean: 'because then it would exist and be cognized in a postulated form'. For this idea of *postulating* something 'non-existent' or 'non-cognisable' in order to give it sufficient provisional existence for it to serve as that which is excluded (the *apohya*), see the passages transcribed in Kataoka's apparatus at this point: *Ślokaṅkārttika*, *apoha* 145ab, a *Hetumukha* quote in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (p. 385.7–8), *Śarkarikā* p. 68.6–7, *Nyāyaratnākara* p. 605.2–3 and *Pramāṇavārttika* 1:122.

49. Cf. *Nyāyavārttika* ad 2.2.66, p. 315.16.

50. Cf. *Ślokaṅkārttika*, *apoha* 144ab.

51. Prof. McCrea suggested an alternative interpretation of these two sentences: 'And how could [non-apoha] not be this [apoha] (*asau*) [since the meaning of every word is apoha for you]. Or if it is not [apoha], what else is left for it to be?'

52. Literally, 'all [things] would lack a denoter'. Previously we had translated this as 'all [words] would fail to express any meaning'; but as Prof. Ogawa pointed out, the neuter gender of *sarvam* goes against such an interpretation.

53. Cf. *Ślokaṅkārttika*, *apoha* 142cd.

54. For a discussion of the transmission of this sentence, and Bhattacharyya's translation, see Kataoka 2008: 10–11.

55. Cf. *Ślokaṅkārttika*, *apoha* 143ab. Cakradhara comments that words like *pra* (a prefix) and *ca* ('and') cannot denote apohas because—since they are not used autonomously but only in relation to other words—they lack exclusion-classes ('non-*pra*' and 'non-and'): *prādicādīnām apohasyādarśanād asvatantraprayogavāt teṣām* (*Nyāyamaijjarigranthibhaṅga* p. 132.16).

56. Cf. *Ślokaṅkārttika*, *apoha* 139–40. Kumāri's argument there, which Cakradhara cites in his commentary to this sentence, and which is cited in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (973–974) and explained in the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā ad loc.*, appeals to the fact that negation works differently when applied to nouns and verbs. Through the kind of negation that applies to nouns such as cows (the negation that is termed *parjudāsa*), we arrive at positive entities, non-cows (*ago*) such as horses etc. These can then form the exclusion-class (the *apohya*) on which the apoha can operate. But through the kind of negation that applies to finite verbs such as *pacati*, 'he/she cooks' (the negation that is termed *prasajyapratishedha*), we simply arrive at *na pacati*, 'he/she does not cook'; we understand no positive entities, nor any positive activity such as 'he/she does non-cooking'. Thus we have arrived at nothing that could form the ex-

7 Inconsistency in the Buddhist View

7.1 Class-Terms and Other Words

[Buddhist:] Only nouns, [or to be more specific] class-terms (*jātiśabdānām*),⁵⁷ are held [by us Buddhists] to express apohas—the same words that you [Brahmins] regard as expressing universals (*jāti-*) or things that possess a universal (*tadvat-*).⁵⁸

[Mīmāṃsaka:] Then what to say about words other than these? If they denote external objects, what is this aversion towards class-terms?⁵⁹ If the other words lack an object-support or have a part of cognition as their object-support, then the same should apply to class-terms too.⁶⁰ What is the point of the delusion that is the theory of apoha?

7.2 Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning

Just as [you Buddhists] postulate intuition as the meaning of sentences,⁶¹ so it should likewise be the meaning of words too. What is the point of your clinging to apoha?⁶²

clusion class. Could we not just take *na pacati* as that which is to be excluded, and then negate that? No, because then we just arrive at *na na pacati*, which is an exactly equivalent way of saying *pacati*; it denotes something positive (*vidhīrūpa*), not negative. On the matter of how the meaning of finite verbs can be accounted for by apoha, see Pind (2009: 123–125), and *Tattvasaṅgraha* 1144ff. and *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā ad loc.*, where we get Śāntarakṣita and Kamalśīla's response to Kumārila's argument.

57. There are many other types of noun apart from those that denote classes, e.g. those that denote substances (*dravyaśabda*) and those that denote qualities (*guṇaśabda*). For a full classification of kinds of word see Kataoka 2011: 2–3 and Kataoka 2012: 56.

58. That they express universals is the Mīmāṃsaka view; that they express things possessing a universal is the Naiyāyika view.

59. I.e. what would then justify your reluctance to accept that class terms also denote external objects?

60. Cf. *Ślokavārttika*, *apoha* 36cd–38.

61. Dignāga states that intuition is the meaning of a sentence at *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5:46:

apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vikalpitaḥ |
vākyārthaḥ pratibhākyo 'yaṃ tenādāv upajanyate ||

Pind (2009: 112) translates: “‘The referent of the syntactical word is imagined when abstracted (*apoddhāre*) from the sentence. Yet the referent of the sentence which is called intuition is in the beginning produced by that [namely the syntactical word].”

62. Cf. *Ślokavārttika*, *apoha* 40.

8 Conclusion

[Kumāri] has amply demonstrated the validity⁶³ of critiques such as these⁶⁴ of apoha. So how can the Buddhists insist that it is the meaning of words?

Part 2

1 The View that Apoha Is Internal and of the Nature of Cognition

[Buddhist:] We reply as follows. This statement [of yours, summarizing the criticisms of Kumāri] is that of people who do not know the final view of Buddhists.

If apoha were accepted to be external and of the nature of absence, then your net of [critical] words would apply; but apoha is not like that.

Rather this apoha, as is well known, is held by the Buddhists to be internal and of the nature of cognition.

[Naiyāyika:] If that is what is accepted, what is [the point of employing] this expression 'apoha'? It is appropriate to say no more than that cognition of word-meaning [just like other types of cognition according to you Buddhists] has a part of itself as its object.⁶⁵

63. For this meaning of *audārya* as 'validity', 'correctness', see Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's gloss of it as *aucitya* at *Mṛgendravṛtti* ad *Kriyāpāda* 8.181: *audāryam aucityam* (pointed out to us by Somdev Vasudeva). Other meanings of *audārya* are also possible: '[Kumāri] has shown magnanimity/nobility/acuity in his criticisms directed at apoha'.

64. A small change that has been made to Kataoka's edition between the version published in 2008 and the version published in this volume is that *ityādi* was previously separated by a space from *dūṣaṇa*, whereas now it has been joined: we judged that the *ityādi* is more likely to be qualifying *dūṣaṇa* than *audārya*.

65. Once Dharmakīrti has moved away from Dignāga's position that the referent of a word is apoha to the position that the referent of a word is an image within a conceptual cognition, the question arises as to why apoha has to be appealed to at all. Tillemans (2011: 59) also makes this point that in Dharmakīrti's account apoha becomes somewhat redundant: 'After all, if Dharmakīrti succeeds in linking up scheme and world via his naturalistic account and avoids commitment to real universals in such an account, why should he bother with the Dignāgan approach concerning double negation? [...] There is, thus, whether acknowledged or not, a significant rupture with pre-Dharmakīrtian positions.' As evidence that this was a real and recognized tension within the Dharmakīrtian tradition, see the following sources.

Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti 39.3–4: *sā hi tadanyavivekiṣu eva bhāveṣu bhavanti vivekaviṣayeti gamyate*. 'For that [conceptual cognition], occurring with regard to [particular] entities that are different from things other than them, can be known to have difference as its object.' Karṇakagomin explains that Dharmakīrti is here justifying why it makes sense to claim that conceptual cognition has apoha (seen here as synonymous with 'difference', *viveka*) as its object:

katham tarhy apohaviṣayety ucyata ity āha. sā hi vikalpikā buddhir adhyavasāyavaśāt tadanyavivekiṣu bhāveṣu svalakṣaṇeṣu bhavanti vivekaviṣayeti gamyate kāryataḥ, na tu vivekasvabhāvavivaiṣyikaraṇāt. (*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 170.14–16).

“Why, then, is it said to have apoha as its object?” It is in response to that [consideration] that [Dharmakīrti] says: For that conceptual cognition, occurring, as a result of determination, with regard to individual things which are distinguished from things other than themselves, is known to have distinction as its object because of its effect, but not because of making into an object something with distinction as its nature.

It seems to be admitted here that conceptual cognition does not actually make difference or apoha (= ‘something with distinction as its nature’) into its object; but it is also claimed that because of the effect of a conceptual cognition we can know that it must have in some sense had apoha as its object. These two may seem difficult to reconcile (one might see here a struggle to find a coherent place for Dignāga’s claim that apoha is the object of a conceptual cognition in the new milieu of Dharmakīrtian thinking); but we have what seems to be the same idea expressed in our text in sections 2.6 and 2.7.3 (where *phalataḥ = kāryataḥ* here), and a very similar idea expressed in 2.4. In all four of these places (the three in our text and the Kaṛṇakagomin passage cited above) it is either stated directly or implied that apoha is not directly experienced as the object of a conceptual cognition. How then is a place for apoha preserved? In three of them it is said that we can know apoha to be the object of conceptual cognitions because of their effect or result (*kārya, phala*); in one (2.4) it is said that despite not consciously experiencing apoha as the object of a conceptual cognition, we can know through analysis (*yukti*) that it must have been. As to what precisely is referred to as the ‘effect’ or ‘result’ of a conceptual cognition, see FOOTNOTE 90.

In a subsequent part of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṅkā* (300.17–24), Kaṛṇakagomin again brings up the same question, seeing it as that which Dharmakīrti is addressing: *yadi sāmānyabuddhiḥ svākārābhedenā bhinnān bhāvān abhinnān adhyasya vidhirūpatayā pratipadyate, katham asyā anyāpohaviṣayatvam uktam? ity ata āha* ‘If the cognition of a universal, having through the non-difference of its own form wrongly understood different things as non-different, cognizes [the non-different thing] as being positive, how can that [cognition of a universal] be said to have as its object exclusion of other? It is because of that [consideration] that [Dharmakīrti] says ...’.

Dharmakīrti’s answer, given in more than one place (including *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* 39.3–4, given above), is that since a conceptual cognition such as ‘cow’ is linked by a causal chain to perceptions of ‘cow-particulars’ that are all different from other kinds of particular, and unites those ‘cow-particulars’ through one cow-image, it has difference, i.e. something that is different from non-cows, as its object. See for example *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* 76.23: *yasmād bhinnavastudarśanabalenotpadyate buddhir utpannā ca tāny eva bhinnavastūni svākārābhedenā pratipadyate, tasmād bhedaviṣayatvam, bhinnaviṣayatvam ity arthaḥ.* ‘Because a cognition arises as a result of seeing different entities, and having arisen it understands those different things through the non-difference of its own form, it has difference as its object, i.e. it has things that are differentiated as its object.’

See also *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:163cd–164:

*bāhyaśaktivyavacchedaniṣṭhābhāve ’pi tacchrutiḥ ||
vikalpapratiḥbimbeṣu tanniṣṭheṣu nibadhyate |
tato ’nyāpohaniṣṭhatvād uktānyāpohaḥc chrutiḥ ||*

Even though it does not [directly] have as its object the exclusion [which is established on the basis of] the capabilities of external objects, that word is connected to images in conceptual cognitions that do have that [exclusion] as their object. Therefore, because [the images] have as their object exclusion of other, it is said [by Dignāga at *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* 5:11d] that a word produces exclusion of other.

The question is how a word produces exclusion despite not having exclusion as its object. The answer is that it is connected to (i.e. produces) an image within a conceptual cognition that does have exclusion as its object. That the image has exclusion as its object is taken for granted here: its justification

2 Dharmottara's View that Apoha Is neither Internal nor External

[Buddhist:] That [understanding of apoha as internal and of the nature of cognition] is not [correct] either. This apoha is neither internal nor external, but rather something quite different from both cognition and [external] objects.

2.1 A Mere Fabricated Image

[Naiyāyika:] Something that ultimately exists neither internally nor externally does not exist at all. So how can it be taught to be the meaning/referent of a word?

[Buddhist:] We have not come here yearning to establish⁶⁶ some ultimately existing meaning/referent of a word, which [alone] would make it justified that we be criticized in this way by you.

For precisely the reason that it exists neither internally nor externally, [we] call it 'false' and 'conceptual'.

[Naiyāyika:] But what is it [exactly]?

[Buddhist:] It is fabricated, something that is a mere image and that colors conceptual cognition.⁶⁷

is given in the other passages in this note that explained how the image (which unites different particulars) can be said to derive difference from those particulars. It is clear that Dharmakīrti held the meaning of a word to be an image within conceptual cognition, and it is clear that he links conceptual cognitions and their images to apoha by saying that they, in a sense, have apoha as their object ('in a sense' = they do not directly have, or are not directly known to have apoha as their object, but they can be known to have it as their object from their effect). What is not clear is whether he actually equates apoha with the image within a conceptual cognition—the position that the Buddhist speaker is putting forward at this point in the *Nyāyamañjarī*. See Kataoka's article in this volume for the point that though this equation was not stated explicitly by Dharmakīrti, it was how Dharmakīrti was interpreted by Śākyabuddhi, who was taken to be the authoritative interpreter of Dharmakīrti, and whose understanding of Dharmakīrti may have influenced Jayanta's presentation. How did Śākyabuddhi equate apoha and the image within a conceptual cognition? By separating out three different meanings of apoha, the third of which is 'that by which the other is excluded', and by putting forward the image within cognition as that by which the other is excluded. See Dunne (2004: 131–133) and Ishida (2011).

66. The phrase could mean literally 'thirsting to establish' or 'desiring to protect the establishment of' depending on whether *pipāsita* comes from *pā*, to drink, or *pā*, to protect.

67. Commenting on this part of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Cakradhara cites the following opening verse of Dharmottara's *Apohaprakaraṇa*, and Jayanta may well have had this verse in mind here, echoing it with his words *yat ... nāntar na bahiḥ* and *āropitam*:

*buddhyā kalpikayā viviktam aparair yad rūpam ullikhyate
buddhir no na bahir yad eva ca vadan nistattvam āropitam |
yag tattvam jagato jadāda vijayī niḥśesadosadvaiṣāṇ*
vaktāraṃ tam iha praṇamya śirasāpohāḥ sa vistāryate ||*

Having bowed down here with my head to that teacher, conqueror of the enemies that are comprised of all faults,* who articulated the essence of the world when he stated

2.2 That Which Colours Conceptual Cognition: The Shadow of the Perceived

[Naiyāyika:] What could an image that colours internal cognition belong to, other than the external object?⁶⁸

[Buddhist:] We reply: It is the shadow of the perceived [object] that colours conceptual cognition, not the perceived object [itself].⁶⁹ For an excluded entity⁷⁰ is the object of perception, and as we have said⁷¹ that cannot be touched by conceptual cognitions. And thus⁷² conceptual cognitions, dealing as they do with the shadow of the [perceived object], are said to have exclusion as their content, because they do not grasp the excluded [entities].⁷³

that the form depicted by conceptual cognition, which is distinct from other things and is neither cognition nor external, is unreal and fabricated, I will now elaborate on that apoha.

* For this reading, *niḥśeṣadoṣadviṣāṃ*, see the article by Ishida in the present volume. The variant *niḥśeṣadoṣadviṣāṃ* is also construable: ‘... that teacher, enemy of all faults, who, triumphant ...’.

68. Cakradhara comments:

vikalpo hi jñānaviśeṣaḥ, tasya yo 'yaṃ grāhyānurāgaḥ sa katham bāhyaṃ vinā sambhavati. svata eva tathātve nirvikalpe 'pi tathābhāvād bāhyārthābhāvaprasaṅgāt (Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga p. 133.1–3).

For a conceptual cognition is a certain kind of cognition, and as for a cognition's colouring by something that is grasped (*grāhya*)—how could that take place without something external [doing the colouring]? For if [the conceptual cognition] were coloured (*tathātve*) of itself (i.e. without an external object colouring it), then because the non-conceptual [cognition] too could be coloured of itself, it would undesirably follow that external objects do not exist [because no means of knowledge would be forthcoming to witness their existence].

69. Cakradhara comments:

svalakṣaṇagrāhīdarśanasamanantarabhāvena vikalpānām lākṣāntarasphaṭikaśakalāsamanantaravartina iva sphaṭikaśakalāntarasya lākṣācchāyādhāritvaṃ dr̥śyacchāyādhāritā (Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga p. 133.3–5).

Conceptual cognitions, because they take place immediately after a perception that grasps an individual, contain the shadow of the perceived [individual], just as one lump of crystal placed in front of a second lump of crystal that is [in turn] in front of some red lac, contains the shadow of the red lac.

70. The reader should be aware that the English word ‘excluded’ translated *apohya* in Part 1, but translates *vyāvṛtta* in this Part 2, and that ‘excluded’ thus refers from now on to something very different from what it referred to in Part 1. There it referred to the exclusion class, that which the particular entity is not, e.g. non-cows, whereas here it refers to the particular entity.

71. *Nyāyamañjarī* Vol. 2, p. 6.10–11: *tatpr̥ṣṭhabhāvinas tu vikalpāḥ svabhāvata eva vastusaṃsparśakauśalaśūnyātmāna iti.* ‘But conceptual cognitions coming after the [perception] are by their very nature devoid of the capacity to touch real entities.’

72. The reading *tathā ca* is not certain.

73. This same argument that conceptual cognitions are known to have exclusion as their content

2.3 Non-Difference of Exclusion and the Excluded?

[Naiyāyika:] Because exclusion and the things that have the exclusion (i.e. the excluded entities) are not separate from each other,⁷⁴ the exclusion and the excluded

because they do not grasp the excluded entities is given in § 2.4 (*svalakṣaṇaṃ ca na spr̥śyate ... avatiṣṭhate*). Before the conclusion is reached there, the additional consideration is stated that they do not grasp universals (*sāmānyas*), since these are not real (*vāstava*). So the argument is that since they grasp neither the real excluded particulars, nor universals, the only thing left that it makes sense to postulate as their content is exclusion. Cakradhara explains that the reason why this is the only remaining possibility is that if they did not grasp exclusion either, there would be no similarity between a cow-individual and the object of the conceptual cognition 'cow'. And hence the conceptual cognition 'cow' would not enable us to act towards a cow-individual. If neither an individual, nor a real universal, is grasped by a conceptual cognition, the only way to retain the required similarity is by assuming that the content of the conceptual cognition 'cow' is, just like the individual cow, excluded from non-cows.

*Nyāyamañjarī*granthibhaṅga p. 133.6–8:

yadi hi vyāvṛttim api na viśayīkuryuḥ, katham prakārantarasayābhāvāt tacchāyāvalambinah syuḥ? tacchāyāvalambitve ca sādṛśyābhāvāt tadadhyavasāyena bāhye pravṛttir na syāt.

For if it does not make the exclusion either (as well as the perceived) into an object, how could it be based on the shadow of the [perceived], because [if it does not grasp the perceived] there is no other way [for it to be based on the shadow of the perceived apart from grasping exclusion]? And if it is not based on the shadow of the [perceived], then because there would be no similarity [between the objects of perception and conception], there would be no action towards an external object by means of determining a [concept].

74. That the two are not separate from each other was a tenet introduced by Dharmakīrti. Kataoka (2009: 6–9) sees the move as part of an attempt to prevent the apoha doctrine from being susceptible to Kumāriḷa's criticisms. He cites and discusses (pp. 8–9) the following passage by Dharmakīrti (*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* 32.15–17):

tatrāpy anyāpohē na vyāvṛttir anyānya eva vyāvṛttaḥ, tadvyāvṛtter nivartamānasya tadbhāvaprasaṅgāt.

'Furthermore, with regard to 'exclusion of the other' (*anyāpoha*), it is not the case that exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*) and the excluded (*vyāvṛtta*) are absolutely different. For, [if they are different], it undesirably follows that the thing [such as a cow] that is [different and therefore] omitted from 'exclusion of the other' (*tadvyāvṛtti*) would be equal to the affirmation of the other.'

There are only two camps that the thing in question, the *vyāvṛtta*, such as a cow-individual can fall into: exclusion of X or X (where X = non-cow). If it were different from exclusion of X then it would have to be X, which is absurd, meaning that a cow would be a non-cow.

tathā ca vyāvṛtter apy abhāvah.

'And thus there would be an absence even of the exclusion.'

I.e. no exclusion would occur because a cow would not have been successfully excluded from a non-cow.

tasmād yaiva vyāvṛttili sa eva vyāvṛttaḥ.

'Therefore exclusion is not different from the excluded.'

For another example of Dharmakīrti denying the separateness of the thing and the exclusion, a separateness that he sees as characteristic both of the Naiyāyika/Mimāṃsaka *tadvat* position, and of Kumāriḷa's characterization of Dignāga's position, see *Pramāṇavārttika* 1:64 and the discussion of it in Kataoka (2009: 6).

individuals (*svalakṣaṇas*) are one and the same, so that the conceptual cognitions that grasp the exclusion should grasp the excluded too. Thus these [conceptual cognitions] would be just the same as perception.

[Buddhist:] That is not how it is. Excluded entities are not grasped by conceptual cognitions. And exclusion is not ultimately existent, but rather some image that is fabricated. For if exclusion were really existent, these flaws would indeed appear⁷⁵ for [a conceptual cognition], which would touch the real entity.⁷⁶ But as we have said⁷⁷ it is not of that nature.⁷⁸

It is for precisely this reason⁷⁹ that the following [argument], reportedly⁸⁰ urged by some, is also repudiated:

75. We follow Prof. Sanderson's suggestion that *prāduṣyuh* is not a corrupt reading, but lax orthography for *prāduṣṣyuh* or *prāduḥṣyuh*. Forms such as *prāduṣyuh* and *prāduṣyāt* occur elsewhere, including in other parts of the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. 2, p. 161.16).

76. What are the flaws that would appear? Those that the Naiyāyika derived in the previous paragraph: that the conceptual cognition would grasp excluded entities and would be just like perception.

77. In § 2.1.

78. I.e. exclusion is not really existent.

This paragraph responds to the objection that if exclusion and excluded are non-different, then we get unwanted consequences such as that excluded entities are grasped by conceptual cognitions.

The paragraph begins by denying that excluded entities are grasped by conceptual cognitions. So it denies the unwanted consequence. But that in itself is an insubstantial response. We expect an explanation of how the unwanted consequence is not generated. Thus we can take it that the following point about exclusion not being real provides this explanation. But why precisely does it follow that if exclusion is not real, conceptual cognitions do not grasp the excluded individual? There are two possibilities. The implication may be that if exclusion is not real, then it cannot be the same as the excluded individual: the non-difference of exclusion and excluded that generated the unwanted consequence is challenged. Alternatively, the implication may be that even though the exclusion is not different from (i.e. not something that exists independently from) the excluded, it is possible—owing to the unreality of the exclusion—to grasp the exclusion without grasping the excluded. If the exclusion were real, like a Naiyāyika universal, then by grasping that universal one would also grasp the thing that had it, but the unreality of the exclusion means that grasping it does not entail grasping the thing to which it 'belongs'.

This section (2.3) of the *Nyāyamañjarī* is the subject of the contribution to this volume by Pascale Hugon. See that article for the point that when Dharmakīrti asserts the non-difference of exclusion and excluded, he is not in fact using 'excluded' (*vyāvṛtta*) to refer to the real unique particular (that would, she says, lead to absurdities), but rather to something that is not real and that belongs to the conceptual realm: the particular *as conceived of in an exclusion*. (Elsewhere though, i.e. where he is not equating exclusion and excluded, he certainly uses 'excluded' (*vyāvṛtta*) to refer to the real unique particular.) Thus, as Hugon points out, Dharmakīrti or a Dharmakīrtian could have responded to the objection in the first paragraph of this section (2.3) by asserting that the opponent is there misinterpreting Dharmakīrti's remarks about the non-difference of exclusion and excluded to apply to the real individual (*svalakṣaṇa*); once it is realized that 'excluded' in those statements refers to something conceptual, the unwanted consequence is not generated. But that is not how Jayanta's Buddhist responds in this text.

79. 'For this reason' means: because we do not have to accept that excluded entities are grasped by conceptual cognitions, because exclusion is not real.

80. The following argument is a summary of a *pūrovaṅka* in Dharmottara's *Apohaprakaraṇa*. The reason for the *kila* ('reportedly') may thus be that it is reported by Dharmottara.

In the view that the excluded is grasped [by conceptual cognitions], it follows that three things must be grasped: that which is excluded, the reason for it to be excluded, and that from which it is excluded.⁸¹ But there *is* no grasping of these three. So how can [the assumption that leads to this false conclusion, namely that] the excluded is grasped, be accepted?⁸²

If the representation ‘I am grasping the excluded’ occurred for a language-user, then that [representation] could be scrutinized in this way;⁸³ but there is no [representation] of this kind [on the part of language-users], so this is not a proper objection.⁸⁴

81. It is not clear, either from this passage or from its source in the *Apoḥaprakaraṇa*, who the proponent of this objection is. ‘That which is excluded’ is the particular thing, such as an individual cow, that the conceptual cognition is subsuming under a general concept, and ‘that from which it is excluded’ is the exclusion class, such as all non-cows; but how about ‘the reason for it to be excluded’ (*yena nimittena vyāvṛttam*)? It is likely that it roughly equates to what was named in Part 1 (§2; see FOOTNOTE 16) as *vargīkaraṇanimitta*, a reason for grouping things together (and thus for excluding them from other things that do not fall within the group). As Prof. McCrea pointed out, the fact that the trio here resembles *āśraya*, *apohya* and *vargīkaraṇanimitta* would seem to make this a Kumāṛila-like objection. But the *vargīkaraṇanimitta* in Part 1 referred to a feature of the exclusion class, non-cows, and possible examples of it were given in §3.3.3.2 as: existing in the same place or at the same time. It is likely that ‘the reason for it to be excluded’ mentioned here refers rather to a feature of the particular thing being excluded. Dr. Hugon helpfully pointed us to Dharmottara’s use of the expression *vyavahārasya nimittam* in the *Pramāṇāviniścayaṭīkā* to refer to properties of something that enable it to be subsumed under a certain label, for example the hump and the dewlap that enable the label cow. See Hugon (2009: 544, note 28) and (2009[2010]: 345–351). See also Kaṛṇakagomin’s (*Pramāṇāvartikasavavṛttiṭīkā* 146.25–26) use of the compound *vyāvṛttinimitta*, a very similar formulation to what we have here: *agovyāvṛttinimittasya gotvasya prakāśanārtham*. He names the reason for exclusion—for non-Buddhists—as cowness.

82. If the excluded is grasped, then three things must be grasped. But we know very well from our conscious experience that we do not grasp three things. Therefore the excluded is not grasped. It is clear that if we substitute ‘excluded’ with individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), then the first stage of this argument does not follow: an individual can be grasped without three things being grasped. So this argument is not just about conceptual cognitions grasping individuals. Rather it is about conceptual cognitions grasping something *as excluded*. If something is grasped *as excluded*, then it is indeed the case that two other things in addition to it must be grasped.

83. I.e. it could be argued that the representation could only be valid if three things are grasped; since three things are not grasped, the representation must be false.

84. The objector thinks that we cannot grasp the excluded object (or the object *as excluded*), and shows that it leads to an absurdity. The Dharmottaran speaker’s response is to agree, but to dismiss the argument as irrelevant. Since he too denies that anybody consciously grasps the object of a conceptual cognition as something excluded, the problematic corollary of consciously having to grasp the other two does not arise.

This section (2.3) has consisted of two objections, which are linked by the fact that they both involve the fallacy of grasping the excluded object (*vyāvṛttagrahāna*). In the first objection the grasping of the excluded individual featured as an unwanted consequence resulting from the non-difference of exclusion and excluded. In the second objection *vyāvṛttagrahāna* meant not grasping an individual but grasping something *as excluded*. And it featured not as an unwanted consequence, but as something that the objector presumed the Buddhist would be committed to. Having dismissed the first objec-

2.4 Why Talk of Exclusion?

[Naiyāyika:] It has thus far been taught only that conceptual cognitions have as their objects fabricated images. The expression ‘having *exclusion* as their object’ does not follow, as we pointed out above.⁸⁵

[Buddhist:] This has already been answered.⁸⁶ After perception, conceptual cognitions such as ‘cow’ depict a form that is excluded from [individuals] that do not have that [conceptual cognition ‘cow’] as their effect. For horses and the like—which do not have a [conceptual cognition of a cow] as their effect—are not depicted in a conceptual cognition of a cow. But an individual is not touched [by conceptual cognition]. And there are no really existing universals. So all that remains standing as the object of conceptual cognitions is the exclusion of those that do not have the same effect. Thus it is because of reasoning (*yukti*) that they are taught to have apoha as their object, not because of [the] experience [of the subject of the conceptual cognition].⁸⁷

tion by explaining how a conceptual cognition can grasp exclusion without grasping an individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), the Dharmottaran speaker says that it is for exactly the same reason that the second objection can be dismissed. But this is a slightly misleading remark. The fact that a conceptual cognition does not grasp an individual does nothing to undermine the second objection: even if a conceptual cognition grasps a concept and not an individual, if it grasps this concept as excluded, it will have to grasp three things. It is true that if the reason is expressed as ‘absence of grasping the *vyāvṛtta*’ it can undermine both objections, but we have to understand that when applied to the first argument this means ‘absence of grasping the individual’, and when applied to the second argument it means ‘absence of grasping the object as excluded’.

85. In § 1; see FOOTNOTE 65. It is pertinent for the Naiyāyika to make this point again in the present context, given the Buddhist’s denial at the end of the previous section (2.3) that anyone ever grasps something as excluded.

86. In § 2.2, in particular the last sentence.

87. I.e. in postulating exclusion we rely on argument, not on the content of any cognition, for when we conceptualize or use language we never actually have an experience (*pratipatti*) such as ‘I am grasping something excluded from things that do not have the same effect as this’. For another denial of the role of conscious experience in postulating apoha, with the same words *na pratipattiḥ* being used, see the *Śarkarikā* sentence cited in FOOTNOTE 90.

What is the particular argument that leads to the postulation of apoha as the unnoticed object of conceptual cognition? That which has just been laid out in this section. One starts from the observation that a conceptual cognition of a cow depicts a form that is excluded from (= different from) non-cows. But what exactly is this form? It cannot be that of the individual cow (for we know from other arguments that a conceptual cognition cannot touch an individual). Neither can it be cowness (for we know from other arguments that that does not exist). Therefore the only remaining possibility is that it is characterized by exclusion from non-cows. For more on why this is the only remaining possibility, see FOOTNOTE 73 and Cakradhara’s comment given there. For the point that one is not actually consciously aware of exclusion through conceptual cognition, see FOOTNOTE 65 (especially the discussion of the *Pramāṇavārtikasvavṛttiṭīkā*’s remark *gamyate kāryataḥ, na tu vivekasvabhāvāviśayikaraṇāt*), § 2.6 (*phalata upacaryate*) and § 2.7.3 (*phalato bhavanti*).

2.5 Exclusion from those of a Different Class as well as those of the Same Class

[Naiyāyika:] The form of a perceived [object] is just as excluded from those that belong to the same class, as it is from those that [do not belong to the same class, i.e.] do not have the same effect as it. That being the case, if conceptual cognitions that follow perception depict an image that is excluded from those of a different class, then they would depict an image that is also excluded from those of the same class. For exclusion from both those of the same class and those of a different class is precisely what a unique individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) is. And we see no reason for restricting the depiction to an image of one out of these two.⁸⁸

[Buddhist:] O wise one, please do not think in that way. For conceptual cognitions have [the act of] ascertaining as their nature. If [they] depicted an image that was excluded from both those of the same class and those of a different class, they would ascertain the [object] in all its aspects, so there would be no room for other conceptual cognitions or other words to operate [with regard to that object]. And likewise we are aware of a conceptual cognition that arises from the word ‘cow’ only as depicting an image that is excluded from those of a different class, not as depicting something excluded from those of the same class. And words have the same objects as conceptual cognitions, so they (i.e. words) are taught to have as their objects exclusion of others.⁸⁹

2.6 Secondary Usage

This fabricated image that we are talking about is not external, precisely because it is fabricated. Neither is it internal, because it is not of the nature of cognition. And therefore it is nothing at all. Although it is nothing, it is secondarily termed

88. Since an individual is precisely exclusion of those of a different class and exclusion of those of the same class, there is no reason for a depiction based on that individual to be restricted to one out of these two exclusions. One might have expected Jayanta to have described the individual not as ‘exclusion’ (*vyāvṛtti*) from both of these classes, but rather as ‘what is excluded’ (*vyāvṛtta*) from them. He seems to be presupposing the previously mentioned non-difference of exclusion and excluded.

89. Where ‘others’ means just those of a different class, not also those of the same class. Perhaps the reason he concludes the paragraph by speaking specifically of words is that he is justifying Dig-nāga’s statement (*Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5:11d, *tenānyāpohakṛc chruṭīḥi*) that a word produces exclusion of others. The Buddhist has not engaged with the specifics of the Naiyāyika argument. The Naiyāyika argued that since an individual is equally excluded from those of a different class and those of the same class, there is no reason for a depiction based on that individual to be restricted to one out of these two exclusions. The Buddhist answers simply that (1) it must be restricted to only one of these two exclusions, because otherwise there would be no scope for further depictions, and (2) we experience a conceptual depiction to involve only one of these two exclusions. He has not elaborated upon how it can be based on something excluded from all other particulars and yet selectively depict it as excluded only from some other particulars; he has not answered the Naiyāyika’s call to come up with a *niyamahetu*, a reason for selecting one kind of exclusion and not another.

‘exclusion’ (*apoha*), because of its result.^{90,91} And thus [you Brahmins] who are dear to the gods, by laying down your criticisms on the assumption of an *apoha* that is external and of the nature of absence, now experience a drying up of your throat; you have wearied yourself with things that are not to the point.

2.7 Three Features

Moreover the object, i.e. the basis, of a conceptual cognition is known to require affirmation or negation brought about by another conceptual cognition;⁹² to have a determinate form;⁹³ and to resemble [yet be distinct from] an external object. And none of these three features are possible in an external entity.⁹⁴

2.7.1 Affirmation or Negation by Another Conceptual Cognition

For when an external entity has been known as it is, it cannot be connected with affirmation brought about by another conceptual cognition, because it is pointless

90. For this point that it is termed *apoha* because of its result or effect, see the discussion in FOOTNOTE 65 of the *Pramāṇavārttikasavṛttiṭīkā*’s remark *gamyate kāryataḥ, na tu vivekasvabhāvaviśayīkaraṇāt* (where *kāryataḥ* corresponds to *phalataḥ* here). See also FOOTNOTE 87.

What exactly is this result? Probably *phala* here is used in the same sense as in the expression *pramāṇaphala* (*pramāṇaphala* = that which is cognized as a result of the operation of a means of knowledge, *vikalaphala* = that which is cognized as a result of the operation of a conceptual cognition), and refers to the depiction, mentioned in § 2.4, of a form that is excluded from things that do not produce that effect. For Jayanta’s use of *phalataḥ*, and Dharmakīrti and Jinendrabuddhi’s use of *kāryataḥ*, see the apparatus at this point in Kataoka’s edition in this volume. See also *Śākarikā* 24.21-22:

kevalam pūrvapramāṇād abhyadhikam asya phalam paśyantaḥ phalataḥ ‘apohaḥ śabdalingā-vaseyaḥ’ iti vadāmaḥ, na pratipattiḥ.

We only say “*Apoha* is the determined object of speech and inference” on the basis of their result, seeing this result as something additional to [the result of] the earlier means of knowledge (i.e. perception); [we do] not [say this] on the basis of conscious experience (*pratipatti*).

Speech and inference, and all conceptual cognition, present something additional to what was earlier presented by perception; they present a depiction of something as excluded from dissimilar objects, whereas perception does not present its object as related to any other objects.

91. We understand *na kiñcid api bhavan* as ‘*na kiñcid’ bhavan api*.

92. Cakradhara glosses this phrase as: *astīti nāstīti ca vikalpābhyāṃ sannidhāpitau yau bhāvābhāvau*, ‘The affirmation and negation that are brought about by, respectively, the conceptual cognitions “it exists” and “it does not exist”’ (*Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* p. 133.14–15).

93. Viz. ‘This is A and not B’.

94. And hence, so the implication goes, the object of a conceptual cognition cannot be an external entity.

[to affirm the already affirmed object]. Nor can it be connected with negation, because it is contradictory [to negate an affirmed object].⁹⁵

2.7.2 Possession of a Determinate Form

The fact that the object of a conceptual cognition has a determinate form, [this fact] being understood in such a way as ‘This is a cow and not a horse’, is impossible without the exclusion of other entities. Thus we are forced to accept that [a conceptual cognition] has exclusion as its object, for otherwise there could be no ascertainment of a determinate [form].⁹⁶ And a doubtful object is certainly not grasped [by a conceptual cognition].⁹⁷

95. If it were the external entity, i.e. the real particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), rather than a mere shadow of that, that were known by a conceptual cognition, then it would be known accurately, as it is. Hence it would not require affirmation and could not be negated.

96. Could perception not ascertain the determinate form? No, because it deals with a unique individual without comparing it with other things. Hence it cannot determine that something is A but not B; for this, exclusion is required, of which it is not capable.

97. We take it that the point of this sentence is to confirm that conceptual cognitions always have objects of determinate form—the starting point of the argument in this paragraph, appealed to in its first sentence. Cakradhara, however, sees the sentence as performing a more specific role, namely addressing the potential objection that conceptual cognition could first grasp a determinate form (without grasping exclusion), and only after, and on the basis of, that determinate form, grasp the fact that it is excluded from other things. This sentence rules out that possibility, since on that view the thing grasped first would in fact have to be doubtful, not determinate, given that it is not yet known what it is excluded from. Therefore if, as this sentence claims, a conceptual cognition does not grasp a doubtful form, it must always grasp exclusion.

Nyāyamañjarigranthibhaṅga (p. 133.16–134.3):

gaur evāyam iti yā niyatarūpatayā gṛhītiḥ sānyavyavacchedam antareṇa neti yad uktam, tan na. prathamam tāvad vikalpānī niyatasya rūpasya grahaṇam tato 'nyavyāvṛttiniścaya iti cet, nety āha: samdigdham ca vastu na gṛhyata iti. yāvad vyavacchedo na gṛhītaḥ, tāvad asau niyatatayā na gṛhītaḥ, samdigdhatayaiva gṛhītaḥ syāt. na ca vikalpānī tathā gṛhyate, niyatatayaiva tataḥ pratīti-samutpādāt. ato 'smāt kāraṇatrayād anyavyavacchedana eva vikalpānām viśaya iti niścīyate.*

**anyavyavacchedana* should probably be corrected to either *anyavyavacchedanam* or *anyavyavaccheda*.

An opponent may argue (*iti cet*): “That which [you Buddhists] claim—that the cognition ‘this is a cow’, which grasps something as having a determinate form, is not possible without exclusion from other things—is not correct. First conceptual cognitions grasp a determinate form, then they ascertain its exclusion from other things.” It is in order to refute this that the text states: “And a doubtful object is certainly not grasped [by a conceptual cognition]”. For as long as the exclusion is not grasped, the [object] is not grasped as having a determinate form; it would be grasped as having a doubtful form. And conceptual cognitions do not grasp things in that way (i.e. as having a doubtful form), because from them (*tataḥ*) arises knowledge [of their object] as restricted. Therefore it is ascertained from these three reasons (i.e. that the objects of conceptual cognitions require affirmation or negation, have a determinate form, and resemble an

2.7.3 The Similarity Between the External Object and the Fabricated Form

And since the view that conceptual cognitions have an external entity as their object has been rejected⁹⁸ on the grounds that it would be repetitive (*paunaruktyāt*) [for a conceptual cognition to grasp the same object all of whose aspects have already been grasped] in accordance with the principle [stated by Dharmakīrti in the verse beginning] ‘The single nature of an object ...’;⁹⁹ it is reasonable to assume that they have something that is not external as their object. And this non-external thing is a fabricated form. And it appears as if external. And there is no similarity between the external and the fabricated except for the shadow which is exclusion.¹⁰⁰

external object) that the content of conceptual cognitions is just exclusion from other entities.

In § 2.7 it was asserted that the object of conceptual cognition possesses three features, and that none of these three are possible in an external entity. § 2.7.1 showed how the first is not possible in an external entity, and hence it might have been expected that § 2.7.2 and § 2.7.3 would show how the second and third are not possible in an external entity. In fact § 2.7.2 has not done that. It has shown not that an external entity cannot have a determinate form; but just that a cognition whose object has a determinate form must be aware of exclusion.

98. For where it has been rejected, see the following footnote.

99. *Pramāṇavārttika* 1:43:

ekasyārthasvabhāvāsya pratyakṣasya sataḥ svayam |
ko 'nyo na dṛṣṭo bhāgaḥ syād yaḥ pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣyate ||

When the single nature of an object is itself perceived, what further part can it have that has not been perceived, that can be examined by means of knowledge?

There are two possibilities for where Jayanta is referring with the words ‘has been rejected’. The first is p. 13.11–13 of the Mysore edition of the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. 2), twelve pages prior to the present point (just before the beginning of the passage translated in this article), p. 41.7–9 in Kataoka’s 2011 edition. In favour of that is that the Dharmakīrti verse mentioned here is actually cited there (in full). Against it is the following. § 2.7 implied that the point of these subsections (2.7.1–2.7.3) was to refute that the external entity can be the object of conceptual cognitions (for it declared that an external entity lacks the three characteristics of the object of conceptual cognitions). It would be strange if in the middle of a section purporting to refute X, he appeals to X having been refuted prior to this section. If it was already refuted back there, what would be the point of these subsections (2.7.1–2.7.3) The other possibility is § 2.7.1. The Dharmakīrti verse was not mentioned there, but it made the same point as the verse: *bāhyāsya hi vastunāḥ svarūpeṇāvagatasya* there could be seen as a paraphrase of *ekasyārthasvabhāvāsya pratyakṣasya sataḥ svayam* in the verse. And as Jayanta here captures the argument of the verse with the word *paunaruktyāt* (‘on the grounds that it would be repetitive’), so he uses the similar expression *vaiyarthīyāt* there. So we do not think that the absence of an explicit mention of the Dharmakīrti verse in 2.7.1 precludes that section’s being referred to here. In favour of this option is that we can then regard at least 2.7.1 (and possibly 2.7.2) as serving the purpose that they seemed to be introduced as serving (the refutation of an external entity as the object of conceptual cognition). With both of these options there is the problem of 2.7.3 not serving this purpose (it cannot serve the purpose of refuting X if it begins its argument with ‘given that X has been refuted earlier’). For more on this, see FOOTNOTE 101.

100. Exclusion constitutes the similarity between the external entity and the fabricated form in the sense that an external cow and a generalized cow-image are both excluded from non-cows. We take the

Therefore, it is because of their result [that we hold] conceptual cognitions to have exclusion as their object.¹⁰¹

2.8 Exclusion of Others as the View of Specialists

Even if these [conceptual cognitions] operate in an affirmative way such as ‘cow’ or ‘horse’, specialists stipulate that they have just exclusion of others as their object. As [Dharmakīrti] has taught: ‘As is well known, scholars analyze in this way, but not people in everyday life.’¹⁰²

expression *vyāvṛtticchāyā* to refer to the same thing as the earlier expression *drśyachchāyā*, understanding the latter as a genitive *tapuruṣa* and the former as a *karmadhāraya*: the shadow that is exclusion is the shadow of the perceived object.

101. Again we get the point that it is only because of their result (*phala*) that conceptual cognitions are said to have *apoha* as their object; see FOOTNOTES 65 and 90.

It was pointed out in FOOTNOTE 97 that the argument in § 2.7.2 did not proceed as we might have expected from the final sentence of § 2.7. The same goes for § 2.7.3. He has not argued here that an external entity cannot be the object of conceptual cognition because it cannot resemble another external entity. In fact the very first sentence of this paragraph takes it as already proven that an external entity cannot be the object of conceptual cognition. This is difficult to reconcile with the fact that 2.7 seemed to introduce these subsections as showing that an external entity cannot be the object of a conceptual cognition (on the grounds that an external entity lacks the three characteristics of the object of a conceptual cognition). And that Jayanta does indeed regard these subsections as serving that purpose is further confirmed by his refutation below, which begins by stating that the three characteristics are not impossible in an external object (see *bāhye ca vastuni śabdāntaropaniyamānabhāvāvābhāvasambandhādy api na na yuyjate*, p. 46.1–2 of Mysore edition (vol. 2) = pp. 110.11–111.1 of Kataoka 2010). The argument in Dharmottara’s *Apohaprakaraṇa* on which these subsections are based does not contain this contradiction. Both there and in the summary of that *Apohaprakaraṇa* argument in Sucaritamīśra’s *Kāśikā* on *Ślokaavṛttika*, *apoha*, v. 1 (see Kataoka’s forthcoming edition of that section of the *Kāśikā*) we have three similar syllogisms; the object of a conceptual cognition must be exclusion because it requires affirmation and negation, because it has a determinate form, and because it resembles an external entity. The three arguments we have in 2.7.1–2.7.3 of the *Nyāyamañjarī* seem rather to be: (1) the object of a conceptual cognition cannot be an external entity because it requires affirmation and negation, (2) the object of a conceptual cognition must be exclusion because it has a determinate form, and (3) the object of a conceptual cognition, given that its being an external entity has been refuted earlier, must be (or must contain) exclusion, because it resembles an external entity. It seems then that although Jayanta follows Dharmottara fairly closely in 2.7.2 and 2.7.3, the use to which he puts the first condition in 2.7.1 differs in that it indicates not exclusion but the impossibility of an external entity; and the way he introduces the three subsections only really holds true of 2.7.1. In giving a shortened version of Dharmottara’s longer treatment in the *Apohaprakaraṇa*, he has sacrificed some of the clarity of the original.

102. Cakradhara comments: *te hi vidhimukhena pravṛttim yuktānupapadyamānām paśyanto ‘pohaviśayatayā vyavasthāpayanti. vyavahartārāḥ punar drśyavikalpyayor bhedāgrahaṇena pravartante*. ‘For those [scholars], recognizing that [conceptual cognitions’] affirmative operation (*vidhimukhena pravṛttim*) is not explicable by logic, stipulate that [conceptual cognitions] have exclusion as their object. But people in everyday life act as a result of not grasping a difference between the objects of perception and conception’ (*Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* p. 134.4–6).

3 Summary of the Two Buddhist Views

3.1 Dharmottara: Something Nonexistent Appears

This thing we are talking about is neither internal nor external, [but] some fabricated image that is different from both. Since [this fabricated image] is connected with the shadow that is exclusion, the object/meaning of a word is taught to be apoha.¹⁰³ This line of thought arises from *asatkhyāti*, the theory that what appears [in erroneous cognition] is something nonexistent.¹⁰⁴

3.2 Dharmakīrti: Cognition Itself Appears

Alternatively it is just an image in cognition, a reflection within conceptual cognition that, despite not being external, appears as external, having a plurality of forms placed in it by a plurality of variegated latent impressions; [thus] it fosters worldly activity. And because of its connection with the shadow that is exclusion it is termed apoha. This line of thought arises from *ātmakhyāti*, the theory that what appears [in erroneous cognition] is [cognition] itself.

4 Explanation of Worldly Activity

4.1 Possession of Desire

[Naiyāyika:] Given that either way¹⁰⁵ conceptual cognitions do not have an [external] entity as their object, how can it be the case that people in everyday life take action with regard to an [external] entity?

103. To state the argument of this sentence more fully: (1) The fabricated image is connected with the shadow that is exclusion; (2) the fabricated image is the meaning of a word; (3) therefore the meaning of a word is exclusion. 3 would only actually be entailed if 1 were rather: 'The fabricated image is the shadow that is exclusion'. This is a reflection of the fact that the Dharmottaran speaker tends to oscillate between equating the fabricated image and exclusion, and claiming just that the former is connected with the latter.

104. Cakradhara comments on the phrase *asatkhyātiḡarbhā* (*Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* p. 134.6–7): *evaṃ hy ucyamāne asata evākārasya vikalpabuddhau pratibhāsa ityuktam bhavati*. 'For when things are taught thus (i.e. as in the first part of the paragraph), it amounts to saying that an image that is actually unreal appears in a conceptual cognition.'

105. Cakradhara comments on *ubhayathāpi*: *yat pūrvam uktam āropitākāraṇaviśayatvam, yac ca 'api ca' ityādinoktam tenāpi. athavā buddhyākārāpohapakṣe āropitākārāpohapakṣe ceti* (*Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* p. 134.8). So he gives two possibilities for what the two ways are that Jayanta refers to here: (1) *āropitākāraṇaviśayatvam* and the position given in the section beginning with the words *api ca*, i.e. § 2.7; (2) Dharmakīrti's *buddhyākārāpohapakṣa* and Dharmottara's *āropitākārāpohapakṣa*. The most natural understanding of Jayanta's *ubhayathā* is that it refers to the positions summarized in 3.1 and 3.2, i.e. Dharmottara's view that apoha is an *āropitākāra* and Dharmakīrti's view that apoha is the *buddhyākāra*. But Cakradhara wants to include the possibility that Jayanta refers to two of Dharmottara's perspectives.

[Buddhist:] People do not necessarily take action as a result of observing an [external] entity, because they take no action even when they observe certain objects such as grass. Rather it is their being desirous that is the cause of activity.

4.2 Perceiving an Entity and then Obtaining It

[Naiyāyika:] Being desirous is a cause, but perception too is certainly a cause, because even a person desiring something does not take action towards it if he does not perceive it. And you [also] need to explain how in the theory of apoha a person who takes action can obtain the entity.

4.2.1 Non-Determination of a Distinction between the Perceived and the Conceptually Cognized

[Buddhist:] We reply as follows. Firstly, taking action is based on unifying the perceived and the conceptually cognized.¹⁰⁶ When a conceptual cognition arises immediately after the perception of a perceptible object, the cognizer does not cognize the conceptually cognized as conceptually cognized. Rather, being deceived by the fact that [the conceptual cognition] follows immediately after the perception, he thinks that it is just a perceived object that he has grasped. And he acts on the basis of this mistaken conception [that the thing being grasped is] the [perceived object].¹⁰⁷ That (*yat*) the conceptually cognized is not grasped separately from the perceived entity, that (*tat*) is [what Dharmakīrti] teaches with this (*idam*) [expression] ‘the unifying of the perceived and the conceptually cognized’.¹⁰⁸ And the unification

106. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* p. 39.6–7: *te tu svāmbanam evārthakriyāyogyam manyamānā dṛśyavikalpyāv arthāo ekikṛtya pravartante*. ‘But they act thinking that what is in fact just their own object (i.e. a reflection in their own conceptual cognition) is capable of efficacy, unifying perceived and conceptually cognized objects.’ *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* p. 171.8–10: *arthānubhave sati tatsaṃskāraprabodhena tadākāra utpadyamāno vikalpaḥ svākāraṃ bāhyābhinnam adhyavasyati, na tv abhinnaṃ karoti. tena vikalpaviśayasya dṛśyātmatayādhyavāsāyād dṛśyavikalpyayor (-vikalpyayor em.; -vikalpayor ed.) ekikaraṇam ucyate*. ‘When an object has been experienced, a conceptual cognition arises with an image of that [object] as a result of the awakening of a trace of that [experience]; it determines this image within itself as not different from the external object, but it does not actually make [this image] non-different [from the external object, as one might mistakenly assume from the expression *ekī karaṇa*]. Because it determines the object of the conceptual cognition as perceived, [we] call [this process] “unifying” the perceived and the conceptually cognized.’

Cf. also *Nyāyamañjarīgranthabhāṅga* (p. 134.5–6) commenting on *vyākhyātāraḥ khalu ...* in § 2.8 above: *vyavahartāraḥ punar dṛśyavikalpyayor bhedāgrahaṇena pravartante*; ‘But people in everyday life act because of not grasping a difference between what is perceived and what is conceptually cognized.’

107. We understand *tadabhimānena* as *dṛśyasābhimānena*.

108. Dharmakīrti teaches that conceptual cognitions unify or conflate (*ekīkaroti*) the conceptually cognized and the perceived; but Dharmottara claims that this should not be understood to mean that conceptual cognitions take these two to be non-different, rather that they *do not* take them to be

should not be held to be the determination of the non-difference of the two,¹⁰⁹ because one cannot point to the conceptually cognized as separate from the perceived, as [one cannot point to] silver [as separate] from mother of pearl [at the time when one is mistaking the latter for the former];¹¹⁰ and also because there is no means for determining the non-difference. Perception is not a means for determining non-difference, because it cannot have the conceptually cognized as its object.¹¹¹ Nor is a conceptual cognition [a means for determining non-difference], because it cannot have the perceived as its object.¹¹² Therefore it is because of the non-determination of a distinction [between the two]¹¹³ that one takes action.¹¹⁴

different. That is what motivates Jayanta to assert in this sentence that Dharmakīrti's expression should be understood to mean that the conceptually cognized is not grasped separately from the perceived. There is no evidence, though, that Dharmakīrti himself would have had any problem with explaining his expression to mean that the two are grasped as non-different. As to why it was important for Dharmottara to characterize the process as non-grasping of difference rather than grasping of non-difference, see the remainder of this paragraph of the text.

109. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* p. 171.4–5: *nanu dṛśyavikalpyayor (-vikalpyayor em.; -vikalpayor ed.) ekīkaraṇam kim ucyate. yadi dṛśyasya vikalpyād abhedah, bāhye 'rthe pravṛttir na syāt. vikalpyasya dṛśyād abhedah, svalakṣaṇam śabdārthah syāt.* 'But why do you teach that there is unification of the perceived and the conceptually cognized? If the perceived were not different from the conceptually cognized, there would be no action with respect to an external object. [If] the conceptually cognized were not different from the perceived, an individual would be the meaning of a word.'

110. It only makes sense to say that one determines two things to be non-different if one can identify the two things separately. If one cannot, then, as he will state below, it is more correct to speak of the non-determination of them as *different*.

111. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* p. 171.5–6: *na ca dṛśyavikalpyayor ekīkaraṇam pratyakṣeṇa, tasya vikalpyāvīṣayatvāt.* 'And unification of the perceived and the conceptually cognized cannot take place by means of perception, because that cannot have the conceptually cognized as its object.'

112. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* p. 171.6–7: *nāpi vikalpena, tasya dṛśyāvīṣayatvāt.* 'And neither by means of conceptual cognition, because that cannot have something perceivable as its object.'

113. Not because of a determination of non-difference between the two.

114. In section 1.1 of her article in this volume, Pascale Hugon distinguishes two different interpretations of the claim that the *vikalpya* (conceptually cognized) is mistaken as a *dṛśya* (a perceived object). In option A, the *vikalpya* is mistaken to be perceivable, real (but not to be a specific real particular); in option B it is mistaken to be a specific real particular. She argues that Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara favour option A, and that it is possible to interpret Jayanta's Buddhist in either way. It seems to us however that Jayanta's Buddhist is here going for option B. To be specific, it seems that the thought in this passage is that the *vikalpya* is mistaken for the object of the preceding perception.

For Jayanta says that the reason why the *vikalpya* is grasped as a *dṛśya* is that the person is 'deceived by the fact that [the conceptual cognition] follows immediately after the perception (*darśanānantarya-vipralabdha*)'. This suggests that he thought that the *dṛśya* in question (= the *dṛśya* that the *vikalpya* is mistaken to be) is the object of the preceding perception. For then the fact that the *vikalpya* follows immediately after that perception provides a good explanation for why the *vikalpya* is mistaken to be a *dṛśya*. Hugon's concern is that if the *vikalpya* is mistaken to be the object of the preceding perception, then the object of the preceding perception must somehow feature in the *vikalpya*, which is clearly impossible, since conceptual cognitions cannot touch real entities. It seems that Dharmottara may indeed have had some such worry, for, as we have seen from Jayanta's representation of him in

4.2.2 Explanation of the Obtaining of an Entity

As for the obtaining [of an entity]:¹¹⁵ [what is obtained is] an entity that has efficacy, and that is indeed perceptible, because the chain of effects is indirectly based on that [perceptible object]: from the perceived, perception arises; from that, conceptual cognition; from that, activity. For after perceiving the object at the beginning [of this sequence], one takes action and obtains it, just like someone who acts on the basis of erroneously conceiving as a jewel the light that spreads out from a jewel placed in an inner room and that comes out through the key-hole.¹¹⁶ But in cases where the object does not exist even at the origin, the person will definitely be disappointed after taking action out of delusion, just like someone acting in the same way as above¹¹⁷ towards light that comes [merely] from a lamp.¹¹⁸

this paragraph, he was opposed to interpreting Dharmakīrti's *ekīkaraṇam* (unification) to mean that we grasp the *vikalpya* as non-different from the *dr̥śya*, for such reasons as that the *dr̥śya* does not feature in the *vikalpa*. Instead Dharmottara prefers to characterise the *ekīkaraṇam* negatively as the non-grasping of a difference between the two. But the question is, what exactly are these two? In option B they are the *vikalpya* and the object of the preceding perception; in option A they are the *vikalpya* and 'something real', 'something perceivable', but not some specific real thing. Here again it seems likely that the idea is option B. For surely the best candidate for what exactly is not grasped as different from the *vikalpya* is that which has just been grasped a split second earlier. Given that this featured as the object of one's experience in the immediately preceding moment of consciousness, surely it is a more obvious candidate for what the *vikalpya* is mistaken as than anything else.

115. I.e. the subject of the second of your two points in § 4.2.

116. In such a case the person, desiring to obtain a jewel and mistaking the light coming out through the keyhole as a jewel, moves towards the light, opens the door and does actually obtain the jewel despite acting on the mistaken understanding that the light was a jewel.

117. I.e. on the basis of erroneously conceiving of the light as a jewel.

118. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* p. 43.3–5: *tatpratibaddhajanmanām vikalpānām atatpratibhāsitve 'pi vastuny avisaṃvādaḥ, maṇiprabhāyām iva maṇibhrānteh*. 'Even though conceptual cognitions whose production is connected to (i.e. dependent on) the [object] do not contain the appearance of the [object], they nevertheless do not betray one with regard to the object, just like a false cognition of a jewel with regard to what is just the light from the jewel.' Dharmakīrti then contrasts these with conceptual cognitions that do betray one with regard to their object, comparing them to the cognition of a jewel when one sees light from a lamp. The whole passage is translated by Dunne (2004: 142).

Cf. also *Pramāṇavārttika* 1:81–82b and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttīkā* p. 191.13–16:

yatrāsti vastusaṃbandho yathoktānumitau yathā |
nānyatra bhrāntisāmye 'pi dīpatejo maṇau yathā ||
tatraikakāryo 'neko 'pi tadakāryānyatāśrayaḥ |

dīpatejo maṇau yatheti. yathā maṇitejasi maṇibuddhir bhrāntā, tathā dīpatejasy api. tulye 'pi bhrāntatve maṇiprabhā maṇitvena gr̥hītā maṇāo adhigantavye saṃvādikā. na tu dīpatejaḥ.

Where there is a connection with a real entity, as in the case of inference as mentioned above, [individuals, e.g. individual fires] though many, share the same effect with those which rely on the difference from those that do not have the same effect; but it is not the case elsewhere (i.e. where there is not a connection with a real entity), as in the case

4.3 The Erroneous Conception Involved in Conceptual Cognition

Thus when conceptual cognitions, which lack contact with external entities (*bāhyavastu*), appear, people have the erroneous conception: ‘I have cognized an external object (*bāhyo ’rthah*), and I have taken action towards it, and I have obtained it.’¹¹⁹ This [erroneous conception] is not, in fact, based on determining [the conceptually cognized] as an [external] object.¹²⁰ Thus it has been taught: ‘because truth/reality does not accord with the way things are determined, and because we do not determine things as they truly exist.’¹²¹ And in [Dharmakīrti’s] statement ‘because [inference in particular, and conceptual cognition in general] functions by determining what

of the light of a lamp with regard to a jewel, even though [the two cases] are the same in that [both sets of cognitions] are errors.

The words “just like the light of a lamp with regard to a jewel” [are to be understood as follows]. Just as the cognition of a jewel with regard to [what is actually] the light from a jewel is erroneous, so likewise [the cognition of a jewel] with regard to the light from a lamp is also [erroneous]. [But] although they are equally mistaken, the light from a jewel being grasped as a jewel, is a reliable guide to the jewel which is to be obtained. But the light from a lamp [is not a reliable guide to the jewel which is to be obtained].

See also *Pramāṇavārttika* 3:57–58 = *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2:5–6, translated and discussed by McCrea and Patil (2006: 309–10).

119. The last of these three is correct in the sense that one does obtain the external object; the mistake in that case is in taking that which one obtains to be the same thing as what one cognized through the conceptual cognition.

120. Why not? We have here again Dharmottara’s view that there is no positive determining involved, but rather just non-determining; see FOOTNOTE 108, the second half of § 4.2.1, and the rest of this section (4.3). But there is no evidence that Dharmakīrti would have had any problem with *arthādhyavasāya*, ‘determining [the conceptually cognized] as an [external] object’; that is the precise formulation that he uses (see FOOTNOTE 122).

Elisa Freschi’s article in this volume (see CHAPTER 8, p. 268) cites our translation of this sentence and says she prefers to translate it as ‘This [erroneous conception] is not, in fact, based on determining the [conceptually] cognized meaning [as an external object].’ In other words she puts the brackets in different places because she wants *artha* to refer to the conceptually cognized meaning. We do not regard that as possible. Jayanta is here echoing Dharmakīrti’s famous phrase, *svapratibhāse ’narthe ’rthādhyavasāyena*, which claims that inference functions ‘by determining what is just a manifestation of itself, a non-object, as an object’ (literally ‘by the determining of an object with regard to what is just a manifestation of itself’). As is clear if not from this phrase alone, then from the wider context (see FOOTNOTE 122), *artha* refers here to the external object and *svapratibhāse ’narthe* refers to what is conceptually cognized. Freschi defends her construal on the grounds that ‘*artha* is unambiguously opposed to *vastu* in the sentence before’. We do not understand that; surely the sentence before only works if *bāhyavastu* and *bāhyo ’rthah* refer to the same thing: the external object. The mistaken conception mentioned in that sentence, ‘I have cognized an external object (*bāhyo ’rthah*)’, is ‘mistaken’ precisely because conceptual cognitions in fact ‘lack contact with external objects/entities (*bāhyavastu*)’, i.e. do not cognize an external object.

121. The citation is a paraphrase of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttikasvaortti* p. 107.2–3 (see apparatus to the edition at this point). It is being cited here to support the previous point that the error involved in conceptual cognition is not based on *arthādhyavasāya*. How it does that is not immediately obvious. All

is just a manifestation of itself, a non-object, as an [external] object¹²² one should interpret ‘determining ... as an [external] object’ as in fact ‘non-determining of a distinction [between the perceived external object and the conceptually cognized manifestation of itself]’.¹²³ Thus one acts and obtains the object [towards which the

we can suggest is that the second of the two phrases in the citation, *yathātattvaṃ anādhyavasāyāt*, is more suggestive of Dharmottara’s idea of (*bheda*-)*anādhyavasāya* than of a positive notion of *arthādhyavasāya*. Cakradhara’s explanation of *yathādhyavasāyam atattoṣāṭ* (‘because truth/reality does not accord with the way things are determined’) is: *abahīrūpasya bahīrūpatayādhyavasāyāt*, ‘Because what is not external is determined as external.’ His explanation of *yathātattvaṃ cānādhyavasāyāt* (‘and because we do not determine things as they truly exist’) is: *abahīrūpasyaḥbahīrūpatayānādhyavasāyāc ca*, ‘and because we do not determine something that is not external as non-external’ (*Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* p. 134.10–11).

122. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* p. 46.7–8: *svapratibhāse ‘narthe ‘rthādhyavasāyena pravartanād bhrāntir apy artha-sambandhena tadavyabhicārāt pramāṇam*. ‘[Inference], although it is mistaken since it functions by determining what is just a manifestation of itself, a non-object, as an object, is [nevertheless] a means of knowledge because, as a result of its connection with the object, it does not deviate from that.’ Cf. McCrea and Patil (2006: 309) for a slightly different understanding of the syntax. Dharmottara cites this in his *Aphaprakaraṇa* p. 587(238).22–23. Cf. also *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* p. 71.5: *tathānūmānam api svapratibhāse ‘narthe ‘rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtter anarthagrāhi*.

The *Pramāṇaviniścaya* sentence is the beginning of the commentary to 2:1cd, which characterises *anumāna* as *atasmiṃś tadgrahāt bhrāntir api sambandhataḥ pramā*; ‘[Inference,] although it is mistaken since it grasps what is not X as X, is valid knowledge, because of its connection [with an object].’ What Jayanta cites is a comment on the *atasmiṃś tadgrahāt* portion. It is the *sāmānya* that is referred to by *atasmin* and *svapratibhāse ‘narthe*; and the *svalakṣaṇa* that is referred to by *tad-* and *artha-*. Cakradhara glosses the word *svapratibhāse* (*Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* p. 134.11–12): *pratibhāsa itī pratibhāso grāhyākāras tasmin svasmiṃś ātmīye vikalpasambandhīni*. ‘A *pratibhāsa* is that which appears (*pratibhāsate*), the perceived aspect [of a cognition] (*grāhyākāraḥ*). The word occurs in the locative and is qualified by *sva*, which means [that the appearance is] its own (*ātmīye*), i.e. belongs to the conceptual cognition.’

123. *Dharmottarapradīpa* 72.11–13: *atha “anarthe svapratibhāse ‘rthādhyavasāyenanūmānavikalpo ‘nyo vā pravarttakalā” itī kim uktaṃ bhavati*. *svapratibhāsayāropyamāṇāsya cārthasvācāsiyamāṇāsya ca* [ca em.; om. ed.] *vivekaṃ na pratipadyata ity uktaṃ bhavati*. ‘Now what is meant by “An inferential cognition or some other [conceptual] cognition provokes one into action by determining as an object what is just a manifestation of itself, a non-object”? What is meant is as follows: one does not grasp the difference between the self-manifestation, which [in Dharmottara’s understanding] is [not actually internal to cognition, but rather something] fabricated, and the object [which the fabricated form is] determined as.’

Cf. Kamalaśīla’s interpretation in the *Tattovasaṅgrahapañjikā* ad 1016 (p. 394.17–20): *ayam ācāryasyābhiprāyaḥ*. *na śabdāsya bāhyārthādhyavasāyivikalpapratibimbopādavyatirekeṇānyo bāhyābhīdhanavyāpāraḥ sambhavati*, *nirvṛtyāpāratoṣā sarvadharmāṇām*. *ato bāhyārthādhyavasāyena pravṛttivikalpapratibimbanjanayanti śrutīḥ svārtham abhidhātā ity ucyata itī*. ‘This is the intention of Ācārya [Dharmakīrti]: A word can have no action of denoting an external object other than the production of a reflection in a conceptual cognition that determines [the reflection] as an external object, because all *dharmanas* are devoid of action. Therefore it is taught that language, producing a reflection in a conceptual cognition [that provokes] action by determining [that reflection] as an external object, denotes its own meaning.’

When Cakradhara comments (ad § 2.3 above) on the difference between the view of *apoha* as external and Dharmottara’s view of *apoha* as something fabricated, in order to explain why some mistakenly take the former view, he appeals to the idea that conceptual cognition involves determining something that is not external as external: *yad eva ca tasyāropitasvācārasya grahaṇam*, *sa eva tena rūpeṇa bāhyādhyavasāya*

action is directed]¹²⁴ by unifying the thing that is perceived and the thing that is conceptually cognized.

4.4 Summing-Up

So it is in this way that the conduct of the world is made possible/
accounted for.

And not only worldly people, but scholars too, must engage in the conduct of the world.

5 Apoha Is to be Accepted instead of Universals

Therefore a reflection in a conceptual cognition,¹²⁵ named apoha, is taught to be the meaning of a word.

But the way that cognitions work, when it is not [properly] analyzed, spreads among people¹²⁶ the error that there are universals.¹²⁷

And however many kinds of criteria for restriction [you Naiyāyikas] point to for [explaining] whether universals reside or do not reside [in particular individuals],

ity ato bāhyavyāvṛttiviṣayatvābhimānaḥ. ‘And that which grasps the fabricated form is precisely the determining [of the fabricated form] as external with that form. It is because of that [that some have] the mistaken notion [that conceptual cognition] has as its object an external exclusion.’

124. Two questions were asked by the Naiyāyika in §§ 4.1 and 4.2: why is it that people act towards an external entity and how is it that they obtain the external entity? This sentence rounds off the treatment of those two questions.

125. Since we want these verses to state a position that is acceptable to both of the apoha theories laid out above, we want *vikalpapratibimbana* to refer not explicitly to an image within cognition, but to something that can be interpreted either as an image within cognition, or as something that colours cognition but is neither within it nor external. This is Cakradhara’s intention when he writes (*Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* p. 134.13–14): *vikalpapratibimbanaḥ syeti. vikalpapratibimbanaṃ vikalpāvinābhūto grāhyākāraḥ, vikalpapradarśito vā dharmottarapakṣe.* ‘Reflection in a conceptual cognition is to be understood as: the object-aspect [of cognition] that necessarily occurs together with a conceptual cognition, or, in Dharmottara’s view, that which is shown (i.e. made known) by a conceptual cognition.’ Since that which is made known by a conceptual cognition for Dharmottara is *not* the object-aspect of cognition, we explain the gender of *vikalpapradarśitaḥ* through agreement not with *grāhyākāraḥ* but with just *ākāraḥ*. For an example of Dharmakīrti using the word *vikalpapratibimba*, see *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* p. 37.25–27: *kevalam ayam “tathābhūtaṃ pratyāyayīṣyāmi” iti śabdena śrotary asaṃsr̥ṣṭatatsvabhāvaṃ vikalpapratibimbam arpayati.* ‘It is just that this [person speaking], [thinking] “I will enable [another person] to cognize a thing of this kind”, produces, by means of language, a reflection in a conceptual cognition in the hearer, [a reflection] which is not connected with the real nature of the [entity].’

126. Alternatively *janasya* could be taken with *pratītimārgaḥ*: people’s course of awareness, the way that people’s cognition proceeds.

127. Jayanta concludes his account of apoha with four verses in *upajāti* metre.

the same number [of these criteria] apply equally to whether apohas too [reside or do not reside in particular individuals]. But [apohas] are different from [universals] in that the former are not real entities.¹²⁸

Certain herbs are capable of allaying fever and other related symptoms, despite their lacking a generic property, and despite being equally different [from each other as they are from non-fever-reducing herbs].

In exactly the same way [certain] individuals are capable of [bringing about] one particular effect [despite lacking a generic property and all being equally different from all other individuals].¹²⁹

128. What is it that explains that the cognition 'cow' occurs with regard to certain individuals and not others? Those who believe in the existence of universals claim that they are better equipped to provide an explanation, since they can answer that the cognition occurs only in regard to individuals that possess the universal cowness. But the Apohavādins make a parallel claim, namely that the cognition occurs only in regard to individuals that are excluded from non-cows.

If it is objected against the Apohavādins that they can provide no further criteria for restricting exclusion from non-cows to certain individuals, i.e. no explanation for why it is that only those individuals are not non-cows, then they will point out—this is the claim of the verse—that the Naiyāyikas can also provide no further criteria for restricting cowness to certain individuals. All the Naiyāyikas can and do claim is that cowness occurs in certain individuals—those that produce the cognition 'cow'—and not in others; all the Apohavādins can and do claim is that exclusion from non-cow occurs in those individuals whose effect it is to produce the cognition 'cow', and not in others.

If the Apohavādins' and the Naiyāyikas' doctrines fare equally on that score, what favours the former? The fact that it can explain everything that the latter can explain without having to postulate a mass of real entities for which there is no evidence; that is the point of the final part of the verse. As to how a group of individuals can all produce the cognition 'cow' without possessing cowness, that is the subject of the next verse. Cakradhara comments (p. 134.14–17):

*yathā nimittāntaram vinaiṅvā kāsucid vyaktiṣu sāmānyam samavaiti kāsucin neti tava niyamaḥ nimit-
tāntarābhyupagaṃe 'navasthāpātāt, evaṃ mamāpy apohe bhaviṣyati. tatkāriṣo eva gaur iti pratyaya
iti. athaikam sāmānyam vinā katham ekakāryakāritvam evety āha: tulye 'pi bheda iti.*

Just as the [only] criterion for restriction available to you is just that a universal inheres in some individuals and not in others, without there being any other reason for this, since if a further reason were accepted an infinite regress would result, so in my doctrine of apoha too exactly the same [kind of criterion for restriction] will be there: the cognition cow occurs only with regard to those [individuals] that produce a certain effect. If [you ask], how can [a group of individuals], unless they share a single universal, produce a single effect, we reply [with the point made in the next verse beginning] *tulye 'pi bhede* ('despite being equally different').

129. Cf. *Pramānavārttika* 1:74:

*jvarādīśamane kāścit saha pratyekam eva vā |
dṛṣṭā yathā vauśadhayo nānātve 'pi na cāparāḥ ||*

Or just as certain herbs, and not others, are found that together or individually result in

It is not impossible for us to account for qualification¹³⁰ and other such features of language, despite apoha being a trifling little [postulate].¹³¹

And hence you should not create the worry that universals, forms, and individuals are the meanings of words.¹³²

the bringing down of fever etc., despite [those herbs] all being different from each other.

This is cited by Cakradhara, commenting on this place, with *yathaiṅvaśadhayo bhinnatve* in the second line (p. 134.19–20).

130. *Viśeṣaṇa* probably refers, as Cakradhara takes it, to what was discussed in § 5 of Part 1, namely the relation of qualifier and qualified (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*) in such expressions as ‘blue lotus’. It is not impossible though that Jayanta intended it to refer to cognition’s and language’s ability to ‘particularise’ or ‘specify’, in the sense of refer to particular things and not others, e.g. cows, not horses. Cakradhara comments (p. 134.20–25):

viśeṣaṇādīṅvavahārakṣiptir iti: buddhir eva nīlāvacchinnam utpalam abāhyam bāhyam iva saṃdarśayanty utpadyate, na punar bāhyānām padārthānām niraṃśatvād evaṃrūpatā samasti. ādigrahanāt sāmānādhikaraṇyaparāmarśaḥ. tatrāpy anekadharmavantaṃ dharmiṇaṃ bāhyam iva pradarśayantī buddhir eva tathābhūtodeṭi. yad āha:

*samsrjyante na bhidyante svato ’rthāḥ paramārthataḥ |
bhinnaṃ rūpam abhinnaṃ ca teṣu buddher upaplavaḥ ||*

The sentence beginning “[It is not impossible for us] to account for qualification and other such features of language” means: It is just a cognition that arises, presenting a lotus—delimited as blue—as external even though it is not external. But external objects do not have such a form, because they lack parts. From the mention of ‘and other such [features of language]’ the bringing together [of separate things] into apposition (*sāmānādhikaraṇyaparāmarśaḥ*) [is intended]. There too it is just a cognition that, presenting a property-possessor, having several properties, as external, arises with that form. As [Dharmakīrti] says:

“In themselves objects are not ultimately mixed together (by possessing universals) nor broken down into different aspects (by having different properties inhering in them).

The distinct (*bhinna*) forms (= the ‘broken down aspects’) and the same (*abhinna*) forms (= those that they are thought to have in common with others) in them are a mistake of the mind (*buddhi*).”

The citation is of *Pramāṇavārttika* 1:87, which occurs in Gnoli’s edition in this form:

*samsrjyante na bhidyante svato ’rthāḥ pāramārthikāḥ |
rūpam ekam anekaṃ ca teṣu buddher upaplavaḥ ||*

131. The tone is probably ironic, since *tuccha* usually has a pejorative sense. The serious point is that in spite of apoha being ontologically slight, not being a positive entity at all, it can explain all of the things that real universals are postulated to explain.

132. Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.66: *vyaktyākṛtījāṭayas tu padārthaḥ*. ‘The meaning of a word is an individual, a form or a universal.’

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- Nyāyaratnākara** See Ślokavārttika.
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