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Materials for the Study of Xuanzang's Inference of Consciousness-only (*wei shi bi liang* 唯識比量)*

INTRODUCTION

As is well known, Xuanzang 玄奘 (602-664) is the founder of the Chinese tradition of Buddhist logic inasmuch as he was not only a prolific translator of Indian Buddhist literature into Chinese, but also succeeded in promulgating Buddhist logic in China. The whole treasury of commentarial literature concerned with Buddhist logic in China, Korea and Japan is directly or indirectly based on his teachings. When he translated the Nyāyapraveśa and the Nyāyamukha in 647 and 649, respectively, he held lectures on these two treatises for his translation team. The earliest Chinese commentaries on these two works were written against this backdrop.¹ They are thus believed to preserve many of Xuanzang's interpretations conveyed orally by him. Kuiji 窺基 (632-682), though not among the audience at that time, is said to have received in-depth private instruction on Buddhist logic by Xuanzang.² His "Great Commentary on Hetuvidyā" (Yinming da shu 因明大疏 [YMDS]), which was written after Xuanzang's death,³ incorporates many materials from the preceding commentaries and arranges Xuanzang's teachings on logic in a systematic way. It became authoritative in the Chinese tradition of Buddhist logic and a great number of works written afterwards in China, Korea and Japan are commentar-

* I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Karin Preisendanz, Prof. Eli Franco and the anonymous reviewer of this paper. They carefully read my paper and made many expert suggestions of various kinds towards its improvement. I would also like to thank my colleague, Dr. Liqing Qian, with whom I discussed the main ideas of this paper and who supported me in the English formulation of an earlier version of it. Further thanks are due to Prof. Jeson Woo and several colleagues who kindly commented on the original version of the paper presented in the panel "Pramāṇa Across Asia: India, China, Korea, Japan" at the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (IABS), held at the University of Vienna, Austria, in 2014. Needless to say, I am responsible for all remaining mistakes. Recently, the authenticity of the *wei shi bi liang* 唯識比量 has been questioned by Prof. Shigeki Moro (Kyoto) on the basis of the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu of Wengui 文軌 (see Moro 2017). Much to my regret, I will have to consider and discuss this problem on another occasion. At the present stage of my research and in this paper, I work on the adequately underpinned assumption that the *wei shi bi liang* 唯識比量 does have an Indian background.

¹ See ZYS 1.2a2-b4; cf. Takemura 2011: 31-47 and Zheng 2007: 86-90.

² See Song gao seng zhuan 宋高僧傳 (SGSZ) 725c24-726a1; cf. Zheng 2007: 156-159 & 2010: 4-7.

³ See below, Texts 1.9 and 1.10.

ies on it. Among them, Zenju 善珠 (723-797)'s "Lamp of the Great Commentary on Hetuvidyā" (Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō 因明論疏明燈抄 [IRMS]) and Zōshun 藏俊 (1104-1180)'s "Notes on the Great Commentary on Hetuvidyā" (Inmyō daisho shō 因明大疏抄 [IDS]) are the most important ones.⁴

However, in spite of the foundational character of his teachings on Buddhist logic, Xuanzang's statements have survived only rarely in their original wording. The most famous case of such a statement is his inference of consciousness-only (*wei shi bi liang* 唯識比量). This inference runs as follows:

- Thesis: From the standpoint of ultimate truth (**paramārthataḥ*, *zhen gu* 真故), the visual form (*rūpa*) that is well established (*prasiddha*, *ji cheng* 極成) (i.e., equally accepted by you and us) is certainly not separate from the visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) (「真故極成色，定不離於眼識」宗).
- Reason: Because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept (*zi xu* 自許), [it] is not included in the visual sense (*cakṣus*) (i.e., the visual faculty [*cakṣurindriya*]) (「自許初三攝，眼所不攝故」因).
- Example: Like the visual consciousness (「猶如眼識」喻).⁵

According to Kuiji's report, the inference was presented by Xuanzang in order to establish the central Yogācāra idealist tenet when he was challenged by various non-Buddhist and Hīnayāna scholars in a great debate held by King Śīlāditya in Kanyākubja.⁶ If Kuiji's report is reliable at least in this point, the inference must have an Indian background and should have been intelligible in the context of Indian logic at the time.⁷ Although the Chinese tradition of Buddhist logic is commonly regarded as following the logic of Dignāga (c. 480-540),⁸ almost one hundred years separate Dignāga and the beginning of the Chinese tradition. Our knowledge about the development during this period is rather limited. To fill the gap, above all a careful study of the interpretation of Dignāga's logic as inherited in the Chinese tradition is called for. An examination of the sort of rules of debate hypostatized in Xuanzang's inference of consciousness-only will prove helpful towards this aim.

The most remarkable feature of Xuanzang's inference is that three qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*, *jian bie* 簡別)⁹ were employed to qualify certain expressions, statements as well as terms, in it, in order to avoid certain logical faults. They are

⁴ Cf. Takemura 2011: 67-72 & 113-114.

⁵ See Text 1.1 and the notes thereupon.

⁶ See Text 1.1.

⁷ Franco 2004: 205-207.

⁸ See YMDS 10-15 / 91c6-92a9.

⁹ Cf. He 2014: 1233.

zhen gu 真故 (**paramārthataḥ*, “from the standpoint of ultimate truth”), *ji cheng* 極成 (*prasiddha*, “that is well established”) and *zi xu* 自許 (“that we accept”). In classical scholarship, extensive discussion has been devoted to their articulation, with occasionally contradictory opinions. This situation, while providing us with various angles to appreciate Xuanzang's inference, has also caused us to get lost in trivialities and somehow cast a shadow across the main idea of Xuanzang's inference. A recent study by Eli Franco¹⁰ has successfully shed light on the topic by taking a fresh approach and enabled us to gain a clear understanding of the main train of thought expressed in the inference. According to Franco, Xuanzang's inference can be well explained against the “tripartitionism” of *pakṣa* (“subject of inference”), *sapakṣa* (“similar instance”) and *vipakṣa* (“dissimilar instance”) in Dignāga's logic.¹¹ This approach is not unfounded because this “tripartitionism” is also an important aspect of the Chinese tradition of Buddhist logic. When the definitions of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are articulated, restrictions like *chu zong yi wai* 除宗以外 (“apart from the *pakṣa*”) are always formulated.¹² Generally speaking, the Chinese tradition of Buddhist logic approves of the triple division of the universe of discourse presupposed in Indian Buddhist logic, a fact that has not yet been paid attention to in traditional interpretations of Xuanzang's inference, especially with regard to the difference of the *pakṣa* from the possible *sapakṣas* and *vipakṣas* of the inference.¹³ Franco's approach thus seems natural and provides some new clues about the continuity between Dignāga's logic and the Chinese tradition of Buddhist logic.

However, the issue of the three qualifications, i.e., *zhen gu* 真故 (**paramārthataḥ*, “from the standpoint of ultimate truth”), *ji cheng* 極成 (*prasiddha*, “that is well established”) and *zi xu* 自許 (“that we accept”), remains unsolved. They are not totally “immaterial to the logic of the argument.”¹⁴ In my view, especially the qualification “that we accept,” which is used to qualify “the first three

¹⁰ Franco 2004; for a discussion of this study, see Moro 2010.

¹¹ For the “tripartitionism”, or the threefold division of the universe of discourse into *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* in Buddhist logic, especially Dignāga's logic, see the papers by Tom J.F. Tillemans, Pascale Hugon, Shōryū Katsura and Eli Franco published in *Hōrin* 11 (2004).

¹² See Zheng 2015: 155-163.

¹³ For studies of this inference in modern China, see Lü 1926: 14b-20a & 1983: 62-79, Luo 1982 & 1988, and Zheng 2007: 229-254 & 436-469, 2010: 48-55. Lü and Luo provide a relatively clear explanation of the inference within the traditional framework, but do not mention or address the issue of “tripartitionism” in Chinese Buddhist logic. Zheng has most strongly argued for the existence of “tripartitionism” in Chinese Buddhist logic, but has not applied this result of his research to Xuanzang's inference. He has made a mistake similar to that committed by Christoph Harbsmeier, as mentioned in Franco 2004: 204, n. 17.

¹⁴ Franco 2004: 205.

[*dhātus*]” (*chu san* 初三) in the reason-statement of Xuanzang’s inference, is also closely related to “tripartitionism” because this qualification is said to leave room for a counterexample to be adduced by the proponent, i.e., Xuanzang, in view of a possible refutation of his inference by the opponent that is based on a reason that proves the opposite of a specific attribute of the property-possessor meant to be proven in his own inference (*dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*).¹⁵ Such a refutation may run like this:

- [Thesis:] The visual form that is well established cannot be the visual form that is identical with (i.e., not separate from) the [visual] consciousness (極成之色，應非即識之色).
- [Reason:] Because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept (*zi xu* 自許), [it] is not included in the visual sense (*cakṣus*) (i.e., the visual faculty [*cakṣurindriya*]) (自許初三攝、眼所不攝故).
- [Example:] Like the visual consciousness (如眼識).¹⁶

Here, the realm of *sapakṣas* includes things that are not the visual form that is identical with the visual consciousness, such as the visual consciousness, the visual faculty and many other things. They are not the visual form as specified.

In a scenario where “tripartitionism” would not hold inasmuch as the *pakṣa* would be included either in the realm of *sapakṣas* or *vipakṣas*, with no third possibility, there would only be a single instance acceptable to both the proponent and the opponent that might take the role of *vipakṣa*, namely, the visual form that is well established. This instance, which is actually the subject under discussion, has already been claimed to possess the reason-predicate because the latter fulfils the first characteristic of a correct reason, i.e., being a property of the subject of inference (*pakṣadharmatva*). Hence, it would become a counterexample to the logical relation (*vyāpti*) on which the above refutation is based, viz. that “whatever, while being included in the first three *dhātus* that we accept, is not included in the visual sense, is not the visual form that is not separate from the visual consciousness.” Thus, in this scenario, the reason-predicate of the opponent would fail to fulfil the third characteristic of a correct reason, i.e., the requirement that it should be absent from all *vipakṣas*. The reason employed in the opponent’s refutation would thus not be a correct one, but inconclusive.

As a matter of fact, however, the reason-predicate of a refutation based on a *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*-type reason is normally assumed to meet all three

¹⁵ This is one of four types of contradictory reasons documented in the Nyāyapraveśa; see the contribution by Shinya Moriyama in this volume.

¹⁶ See Text 2b.4.

characteristics of a correct reason (*trairūpya*), including the third one. In the case of the above refutation, the third characteristic would be fulfilled only when the subject in question, as an instance exhibiting the reason-predicate, would be excluded from the realm of *vipakṣas*; however, nothing but the visual form may function as *vipakṣa* here. That is to say, for a refutation to be acceptable its *vipakṣa* realm should only include instances apart from the subject in question. This implies that the *pakṣa* is classified as something different not only from *sapakṣas*, but also from *vipakṣas*. Therefore, “tripartitionism,” especially its aspect of the exclusion of the *pakṣa* from the realm of *vipakṣas*, constitutes a necessary precondition for the acceptability of a *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based refutation; a refutation of this kind only works in a scenario where “tripartitionism” holds.¹⁷

As a technique frequently practised in Buddhist logic, to point out that the reason-predicate in a refutation is inconclusive can vindicate, though indirectly, the proponent's original inference, in the present case of Xuanzang's inference of consciousness-only. In order to show the inconclusiveness of the reason-predicate in the above refutation, the proponent needs to come up with some extraordinary counterexample that is in the *vipakṣa* realm but different from the *pakṣa* in question. Such a kind of counterexample are “the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world” (*ta fang fo se* 他方佛色). On the one hand, they belong to the kind of “visual forms that are not separate from the [visual] consciousness” and can therefore function as a *vipakṣa*. On the other hand, they are different from the subject in question, i.e., are not “the visual form that is well established.” They are visual forms “that [only] we (i.e., the followers of Mahāyāna) accept,” since the opponent, i.e., a follower of Hīnayāna, does not accept the existence of such forms. Furthermore, *vipakṣas* like these are said to function as counterexamples to the logical relations on which refutations such as the one above are based and to render the reason-predicates used in such refutations inconclusive. That is to say, the above examples also instantiate the reason-predicate employed by the opponent because, inasmuch as they are accepted as visual forms by the proponent, they are included in the first three *dhātus* accepted by him and at the same time are not included in, i.e., are not the same thing as, the visual faculty.

The above should demonstrate the necessity of the qualification “that we accept” pertaining to “the first three *dhātus*.” If the reason-predicate in the refutation would not have this qualification, the reason-statement would run as follows:

¹⁷ Here, I am relying on Claus Oetke's analysis of *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* and *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*. See Oetke 1994: 35-41.

Because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [the visual form that is well established] is not included in the visual sense (i.e., the visual faculty) (初三所攝、眼所不攝故).¹⁸

With such a formulation, the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world may still function as *vipakṣa* in the above refutation, but would no longer exhibit the reason-predicate because without any further qualification the first three *dhātus* would include nothing beyond the visual form, the visual faculty, and the visual consciousness that are well established, i.e., accepted by both the proponent and the opponent. The visual forms of the Buddhas in another world, however, are only included in the visual form accepted by the proponent, not in the visual form accepted by the opponent, and thus not in the visual form that is well established. They would only exhibit the reason-predicate if “the first three *dhātus*,” as a component of the reason-predicate, were provided with the qualification “that we (i.e., the followers of Mahāyāna) accept.” Therefore, the function of the qualification “that we accept” used here is to extend the realm of the first three *dhātus* to visual forms that only the proponent accepts, to the effect that the first three *dhātus* include not only the visual form that is well established, i.e., the subject in question, but also visual forms that only the proponent accepts, such as the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world.

But why does the opponent, when he formulates the above *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based refutation, retain the qualification “that we accept” in its reason-statement? Without this qualification, the refutation would be perfectly acceptable; with it, it can be shown to be flawed because of the inconclusiveness of its reason. According to NP 3.2.3(3)-(4),¹⁹ the reason-statement in an opponent’s *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based refutation should strictly follow the wording of the reason-statement in the proponent’s original inference that the refutation is meant to attack. This is because the contradictory reason called *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana* is “the very same reason” (*ayam eva hetuḥ*, NP 3.2.3[4]) as the reason adduced by the proponent himself, i.e., the very same reason is meant to prove the opposite of some specific attribute of the property-possessor (*dharmiviśeṣa*)²⁰ claimed by the proponent. In other words, the opponent, when formulating a *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based refutation, intends to show that the very reason-predicate used by the proponent implies a consequence that the proponent himself cannot accept. Hence, for his refutation of Xuanzang’s inference to be a *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based one, the opponent has to retain the qualification “that we accept” as long as Xuanzang’s inference has this qualification.

¹⁸ See Text 1.7.

¹⁹ See Texts 4.0a and 4.0b.

²⁰ See n. 39.

The presence of the qualification “that we accept” in Xuanzang’s inference may thus be explained as follows: When conceiving his inference of consciousness-only, Xuanzang foresaw the risk of being challenged with a refutation based on a *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*-type reason. Taking into consideration the explanation of this kind of reason and of a refutation based on it in NP 3.2.3(3)-(4), he added the qualification “that we accept” to “the first three *dhātus*” so that the first three *dhātus*, being qualified in this way, may include the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world, which “[only] we (i.e., the followers of Mahāyāna) accept.” Thus, in the face of an actual refutation of this type the said qualification allows Xuanzang to adduce the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world as a counterexample to the logical relation on which this refutation is based and thus to show that it is flawed by the inconclusiveness of its reason. The addition of the qualification “that we accept” in Xuanzang’s inference can therefore be regarded as a technique to prevent a specific refutation based on a *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*-type reason.

The above is only a sketch of a possible interpretation of the purpose of the qualification *zi xu* 自許 (“that we accept”) in Xuanzang’s inference. A more detailed analysis will invite further questions of which I can address only the two most important ones here. (1) One would think that a reason-statement involving components that are only accepted by the proponent, as in Xuanzang’s inference, would not also be accepted by the opponent and hence not be well established. However, Xuanzang’s followers, and probably even Xuanzang himself, assumed that the reason-statement in the inference of consciousness-only could be accepted by both parties. For this traditional assumption to be valid, which kind of epistemic interpretation of the truth of a statement should be presupposed and which kind of interpretation has to be excluded? This question concerns the very conception of Buddhist logic in Xuanzang’s age, and an adequate answer would provide further clues to the development of Buddhist logic in the period between Dignāga’s time and the formation of the Indian scholarly circle where Xuanzang was trained in Buddhist logic. (2) Wōnhyo 元曉 (617-686), in his antinomic (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) inference directed against Xuanzang’s inference of consciousness-only, adopts all the techniques used in this inference, but intends to prove the opposite thesis that “the visual form that is well established is certainly separate from the visual consciousness” (極成色定離於眼識).²¹ Why has Xuanzang’s reason-statement been said to be well established, and Wōnhyo’s not to be so? In my view, this second question is answered more easily than the first one. The second question pertains merely to the interpretation of the relation of inclusion referred to in Wōnhyo’s

²¹ See Texts 1.9 and 5.2.

reason-statement, namely whether this relation only concerns some categorical state of affairs or implies some ontological commitment. Here, we should not assume that the interpretation of Wōnhyo's inference by Kuiji and his followers was impartial. In any case, I believe that further studies of Xuanzang's inference will not fundamentally deviate from the approach taken by Eli Franco, but only turn out to improve it.

In the present paper, I do not intend to suggest a new interpretation of Xuanzang's inference. I rather present some materials that, in my estimation, are necessary and "essential" for the further study of this inference. The materials are organized in six sections, with Section 2 divided into two subsections (2a and 2b). Each section has been subdivided into several passages which will be referred to as Text 1.1, Text 1.2 and so on. The first number always refers to the section, the second to the passage. The texts presented here are not claimed to be critical, although variants are given whenever an important alternative version of the text exists. In the case of the texts presented in Section 1, a critical edition is available in Zheng 2010²² from where I have simply adopted the text. The punctuation is mine throughout.

Here, a few more words need to be added about the texts and their authors.²³ Section 1 presents Kuiji's complete explanation and discussion of Xuanzang's inference which is inserted in his commentary on the faulty thesis contradicted by common knowledge (*lokaviruddha*) in NP 3.1(4). Kuiji was the son-in-*dharma* of Xuanzang and his explanation is traditionally regarded as the most authoritative one. It is the earliest source among the extant literature where Xuanzang is explicitly said to be the author of the inference. The section has two parts. Texts 1.1-1.8 explain Xuanzang's inference, and Texts 1.9-1.16 criticize the antinomic inference directed against Xuanzang's inference which Kuiji wrongly ascribes to Sungyōng 順憬 (7th century).

Sections 2a and 2b present texts from two different versions of the commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa* by Wengui (文軌, c. 615-675²⁴), the *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* 因明入正理論疏. The text passages in Section 2a are preserved in a Dunhuang manuscript dating from the late eighth to the middle of the ninth century (ZYS MS);²⁵ the texts in Section 2b are from a woodprint edition of Wengui's commentary (ZYS) that is based on the text version preserved in Japan.²⁶ The *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* of Wengui is the earliest source among

²² For its source, see n. 60 below.

²³ The following information, if not further specified, is based on Takemura 2011 and Zheng 2007.

²⁴ Shen 2008: 3.

²⁵ Takemura 2011: 226.

²⁶ See ZYS 4.27a4-27b3, "editor's words" (*jiao zhe fu ji* 校者附記).

the extant literature on Xuanzang's inference. In both versions, Wengui discusses the inference when commenting on the reason whose substratum is not established (*āśrayāsiddha*) in NP 3.2.1(4). The texts in Section 2b have been cited in full in a work composed in the middle of the twelfth century.²⁷ Further, these texts, rather than the ones presented in Section 2a, probably belong to the version of the *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* that was consulted by Wōnhyo when he composed his antinomic inference directed against Xuanzang's inference. Hence, the texts in Section 2b seem to be very old: they can be traced to the 660s, a period very close to the composition of the *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu*. Even so, I do not think that it can be determined with confidence that these texts represent the original of Wengui's commentary because the texts of Section 2a do not look like inaccurate or sloppy copies of the texts of Section 2b. The former do not only differ in terms of the structure of presentation,²⁸ but also in the exact statement of the reason of the supposed *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based refutation. Source 2a.6 has "the first three [*dhātus*] that are well established" (*ji cheng chu san* 極成初三), whereas Source 2b.4 has "the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept" (*zi xu chu san* 自許初三). Both expressions fit their respective contexts quite well. Even for a captious reader, the presentation in Section 2a is flawless in terms of Hetuvidyā theory. Both versions demonstrate the same excellence of their author in this discipline and the differences are valuable. They may therefore belong to two different recensions of the same work.²⁹ Hence, I decided to present both.

In fact, the *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* was one of the most popular logical works in China before Kuiji. It is based on the author's notes on Xuanzang's lecture on the *Nyāyapraveśa*.³⁰ Thus it seems strange that the author does not mention the authorship of the inference. In the preface to the whole work, he highly praises Xuanzang. If Wengui would have known that the inference had been designed by Xuanzang, he would not have missed the opportunity to further praise his Master. Under the assumption that Kuiji's account of Xuanzang's authorship is reliable, a possible explanation of this discrepancy may be that Xuanzang had not referred to himself when he adduced the inference as a specimen of a good argument in his lecture on the *Nyāyapraveśa*.³¹ However, inas-

²⁷ See n. 85 below.

²⁸ See the table in Appendix 2 below.

²⁹ Cf. Takemura 2011: 219-221.

³⁰ See n. 1 above.

³¹ IRMS 314b3-26 contains the quotation of a passage from the *Gu jin yi jing tu ji* 古今譯經圖紀 by Jingmai 靖邁 (7th century). In this passage, the inference is said to have been presented by Xuanzang at the occasion of a great debate held by King Śīlāditya: 其中成立唯識比量云: 真故極成色, 不離於眼識, 自許初三攝、眼所不攝故, 猶如眼識。立斯量已。 Jingmai is a

much as it is said that Kuiji had received separate instruction on logic by Xuanzang later on, it cannot be determined which of the two accounts, Wengui's or that of Kuiji, better represents Xuanzang's own view on the inference.³² Even so, Kuiji's YMDS can be regarded in general as the more comprehensive and deliberate representation of Xuanzang's views on Buddhist logic.

Section 3 presents a discussion which is said to have been part of the "Collection" (Chip 集) composed by Tojüng 道證 (7th to 8th century), a work now lost. This discussion has been cited completely in IDS 520c9-26 and partly in IRMS 318a10-22. Tojüng was a monk from Silla who had been to China and had studied under Wönch'ük 圓測 (613-696), a famous monk from Silla and a disciple of Xuanzang. Both the IRMS and the IDS indicate that the passages were cited second-hand from the Kojökki 古迹記 by T'aehyön 太賢 (active from 735 to 744). T'aehyön, who also was a Silla monk, was a disciple of Tojüng. In the selected passage, Tojüng explains the sophistic nature of the supposed *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based refutation, stating that the refutation would be self-contradictory. Hence, the alleged aim of the qualification "that we accept" is rejected by him. Subsequently, he presents his own alternative explanation of this qualification.³³

Section 4 is a text selected from the Yinming ru zhengli lun lue chao 因明入正理論略抄 (JYLC) by Jingyan 淨眼 (7th century). In combination, the JYLC and Jingyan's Yinming ru zhengli lun hou shu 因明入正理論後疏 (JYHS) constitute a complete commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa, the former on its first half, the latter on the second half. Their texts are found together in a manuscript from Dunhuang which has been estimated to date from the eighth century at the latest.³⁴ The two works were composed some time between the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu of Wengui and the YMDS, probably not earlier than 660.³⁵

contemporary of Wengui. He was also among the audience of Xuanzang's lecture on the Nyāyapraveśa and wrote a commentary on it which is now lost. The Gu jin yi jing tu ji was compiled during 664-665; see Hōbōgirin 274b (s.v. *SEIMAI*). However, the words on the authorship of the inference are found neither in the present edition of this work (see T 55, no. 2151, 366c12-367a16) nor in the corresponding passage cited in IDS 517c12-23. They were probably added by Zenju himself. Thus we cannot infer from them that Jingmai was informed about the authorship of the inference.

³² An important difference between their accounts is that according to Wengui the aim of the qualification "that we accept" is twofold, to prevent the supposed *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based refutation and to avoid a supposed *anaikāntika*-based refutation, whereas according to Kuiji the qualification only has the first-mentioned purpose. Cf. n. 65 and 70 below.

³³ For a discussion of this passage and Tojüng's interpretation of Xuanzang's inference, see Moro 2015c: 112-118.

³⁴ Takemura 2011: 247; cf. also Shen 2008: 22.

³⁵ Zheng 2007: 128.

Jingyan was also said to have been a disciple of Xuanzang.³⁶ In this text, Jingyan first discusses the sophistic nature of the *dharmivīśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based refutation. However, he confuses it with a *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*-based refutation, which is only a slight mistake because the gist of these two kinds of refutation is the same. Then he mentions a technique that may be employed by the proponent to reveal the inconclusiveness of this refutation. This technique consists in adducing “the voice of the Buddhas in another world” (*ta fang fo sheng* 他方佛聲) as a counterexample to the logical relation on which the refutation is based.³⁷ This way of replying to the *dharmivīśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based refutation is strikingly reminiscent of the proponent's strategy supposedly facilitated by the qualification “that we accept” in Xuanzang's inference. However, Xuanzang's inference is not mentioned in the JYLC and the JYHS. Finally, Jingyan mentions two different ways of restricting the use of the *dharmivīśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based refutation in cases when the above technique cannot be employed because there is no such counterexample according to the proponent's own doctrine. For example, a Vaiśeṣika, who does not accept the existence of the voice of the Buddhas in another world, cannot refer to it when challenged with the above refutation.

Tojūng and Jingyan's discussions are valuable because they provide significant clues to understanding the exact nature of the *dharmivīśeṣaviparītasādhana*-based refutation, which was commonly construed by classical commentators as an important element of their narration of Xuanzang's inference. Jingyan's discussion occurs in his commentary on the passage on *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* in NP 3.2.3(3).³⁸ The passage on *dharmivīśeṣaviparītasādhana* in NP 3.2.3(4), although not quoted in the JYLC, is also relevant to Jingyan's discussion. I have therefore included these two passages in Section 4 as Texts 4.0a and 4.0b, together with a translation from the Sanskrit original.³⁹ These two passages of the Nyāyapraveśa form the foundation of the elaboration of *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* and *dharmivīśeṣaviparītasādhana* in the Chinese tradition of Buddhist logic and are highly relevant to Xuanzang's inference.

Section 5 includes the major part of the discussion of his own antinomic inference by Wōnhyo 元曉 (617-686).⁴⁰ Zenju claims that these passages are cited from

³⁶ See Tōiki dentō mokuroku 東域傳燈目錄 (T 55, no. 2183) 1160a11; cf. Takemura 2011: 34.

³⁷ See Text 4.2.

³⁸ Part of NP 3.2.3(3) is quoted in the JYLC; see JYLC MS 363-364: 有法自相相違文云：有性非實、非德、非業，有一實故，有德、業故，如同異性。

³⁹ My translation is mainly based on Claus Oetke's translation in Oetke 1994: 35; see n. 108 and 111 below.

⁴⁰ For Wōnhyo's criticism of Xuanzang's inference, especially its thesis, see Moro 2007: 327 & 2010: 109-112.

Wǒnhyo's "Critical Discussion on Inference" (P'an biryang non 判比量論, PBRN). However, they are not found in the extant text of the PBRN, which is actually incomplete. Its colophon tells us that it was written in 671, the second year of the Xianheng 咸亨 period (670-674),⁴¹ and Kuiji states that the antinomic inference was sent to China during the Qianfeng 乾封 period (666-668).⁴² Nevertheless, the information given by Zenju may well be reliable: Wǒnhyo is the author of the antinomic inference,⁴³ and the relevant passages, as cited by Zenju, may have been part of the lost portion of the PBRN. It is also quite possible that at first Wǒnhyo conceived the inference as such and later on explained it in his PBRN. Furthermore, inasmuch as Wǒnhyo never studied in China, the source of his knowledge about Xuanzang's inference is a special point of interest. Given that Wǒnhyo's inference follows the technique of argument said to have been employed in Xuanzang's inference, we may infer his understanding of Xuanzang's inference from his presentation of the antinomic inference, compare this understanding with different expositions of the inference in earlier literature, and thus determine the source of his knowledge about the inference. When comparing his presentation adduced in Section 5 with the passages of Sections 2a and 2b, we find that Wǒnhyo presupposes an interpretation of Xuanzang's inference identical with that of Wengui. Especially the passages adduced in Section 2b, rather than those of Section 2a, can be identified as the version of the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu that was probably consulted by Wǒnhyo. The structure of presentation in Texts 2b.4-2b.6 and Texts 5.3-5.6 is exactly the same.⁴⁴ Even the employed terms are almost identical. For example, Text 2b.4 has "the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept" (*zi xu chu san* 自許初三) in the reason-statement of the supposed refutation, which corresponds to 自許初三 in Text 5.3 at the same place, whereas Text 2a.6 has "the first three [*dhātus*] that are well established" (*ji cheng chu san* 極成初三) instead. It seems quite probable that Wǒnhyo copied the presentation adduced in Section 2b, simply replacing Xuanzang's inference with his own. On account of this and other similarities between Wǒnhyo's understanding of Xuanzang's inference and the exposition of the inference in the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu of Wengui, it seems quite probable that a version of the latter text that contained almost the same passages as those adduced in Section 2b was transmitted to Silla in the 660s and was at the disposal of a Silla scholar like Wǒnhyo who had never been to China. This version must have been the source of Wǒnhyo's knowledge about Xuanzang's inference.⁴⁵

⁴¹ See Lusthaus 2012: 268 & 285.

⁴² See Text 1.9.

⁴³ Cf. Moro 2007: 328.

⁴⁴ See Appendix 2 below.

⁴⁵ It has to be noted, though, that the evidence collected here for the transmission of the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu of Wengui to Silla in Wǒnhyo's time does not fully justify the assumption

Section 6 contains the discussion by Zenju 善珠 (723-797) of the nature of the relation of inclusion involved in the antinomic inference. Zenju is a representative figure of the North Temple Tradition (*hokuji den* 北寺伝) of Hetuvidyā. He was a disciple of Genbō 玄昉 (?-746) who had been to China and studied with Zhizhou 智周 (668-723). Zhizhou was a disciple of Huizhao 慧沼 (650-714), and Huizhao a disciple of Kuiji. Zenju's IRMS is a running commentary on Kuiji's YMDS. In the discussion adduced in this section, Zenju mentions two possible responses to Kuiji's criticism of the antinomic inference. I could identify the first response mentioned in Text 6.2 as the one actually proposed by Tojūng in his "Collection." The second response mentioned in Text 6.7 uses materials from T'aehyōn's free citation from Wōnhyo in his Kojōkki, whereas the continuation of this response in Text 6.8 was probably added by Zenju himself in order to make the point clear.⁴⁶ Zenju's discussion adduced in Section 6 clarifies that for Kuiji and his followers the main reason to reject the antinomic inference is that, in their view, an ontological commitment is unavoidably involved in the reason-statement of such an inference. Thus, the reason-statement of the antinomic inference is fated to be understood as a claim to the effect that the visual form that is well established is ontologically, rather than categorically, not included in the visual consciousness. As stated above (p. 150) we should not assume that the criticism of the antinomic inference by Kuiji and his followers was an impartial one.

SELECTED TEXTS WITH ANNOTATED TRANSLATION

1. Kuiji on Xuanzang's Inference of Consciousness-only (YMDS 336-351 / 115b21-116b11)

1.1 ^(336 / 115b21-28) 問：且如大師周遊西域，學滿將還。時戒日王，王五印度，爲設十八日無遮大會，令大師立義。遍諸天竺，揀選賢良，皆集會所。遣外道、小乘，競申論詰。大師立量，時人無敢對揚者。大師立唯識比量云：「真故極成色，定不離於眼識」宗，「自許初三攝，眼所不攝故」因，「猶如眼識」喩。何故不犯世間相違？世間共說「色離識」故。

Question: Now, for example, having traveled around the western regions (i.e., India) and completed his study, the Master (i.e., Xuanzang) was to come back. At that time, King Śīlāditya reigned over five Indias. He held for [him] the great

that Wengui, the author of this work, had close relations with monks from Silla or himself was a monk from Silla. Cf. Moro 2007: 329, n. 24.

⁴⁶ See n. 128 and 133 below.

non-restrictive assembly (*wu zhe da hui* 無遮大會)⁴⁷ of eighteen days and asked the Master to establish [his] doctrine. He chose those who were learned and virtuous all over India, gathered all of them at the place of assembly, and commanded non-Buddhists and Hīnayānists to try to set forth [their] theories and call into question [Xuanzang's standpoint]. The Master established an inference (*liang* 量). No one at that time dared to debate against [him]. The Master established the inference of consciousness-only (*wei shi bi liang* 唯識比量) as follows:

- Thesis: From the standpoint of ultimate truth (**paramārthataḥ*, *zhen gu* 真故), the visual form (*rūpa*, *se* 色) that is well established (*prasiḍḍha*, *ji cheng* 極成) (i.e., equally accepted by you and us) is certainly not separate from the visual consciousness (*caḥsurvijñāna*, *yan shi* 眼識).
- Reason: Because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept (*zi xu chu san* 自許初三), [it] is not included in the visual sense (*caḥsus*, *yan* 眼) (i.e., the visual faculty [*caḥsurindriya*, *yan gen* 眼根]).⁴⁸
- Example: Like the visual consciousness.⁴⁹

Why does [this inference] not incur [the fault of] being contradicted by common knowledge (*lokaviruddha*, *shi jian xiang wei* 世間相違) inasmuch as common people all say that the visual form is separate from the [visual] consciousness?

1.2 ^(338/115b28-c4) 答：凡因明法，所、能立中，若有簡別，便無過失。若自比量，以「自許」言簡，顯自許之言無他隨一等過。若他比量，「汝執」等言簡，無違宗等失。若共比量等，以「勝義」言簡，無違世間、自教等失。隨其所應，各有標簡。此比量中，有所簡別，故無諸過。

⁴⁷ Cf. Lamotte 1988: 60, Skt. *pañcavarṣa* “the quinquennial.” On recent studies of the background of Xuanzang's inference, see Moro 2015a. I should thank Prof. Hong Luo for reminding me of the hypothetical status of the connection between the terms *pañcavarṣa* and *wu zhe da hui* 無遮大會.

⁴⁸ Cf. Franco 2004: 204. The “first three [*dhātus*]” are the visual faculty, the visual form and the visual consciousness. For the scheme of eighteen *dhātus*, see Franco 2004: 208. The word *yan* 眼 literally means “eye.” In the context of Xuanzang's inference, it corresponds to the Sanskrit word *caḥsus* which has a variety of meanings ranging from “eye” to “faculty of seeing.” As noted in Franco 2004: 204, n. 17, it can only be understood here as “visual faculty” (*caḥsurindriya*, *yan gen* 眼根) according to the Buddhist taxonomy, not as “visual organ.” However, when in the selected passages, like in Text 1.6, both *yan* 眼 and *yan gen* 眼根 occur, I translate *yan* 眼 as “visual sense,” and *yan gen* 眼根 as “visual faculty,” in order to preserve this difference in the exact wording of the original in my translation, even though the two words bear the same meaning throughout the selected passages.

⁴⁹ Cf. Franco 2004: 205; Moro 2007: 322; He 2014: 1230; Moro 2015a: 192 & 2015b: 351-352.

Answer: According to the rules of Hetuvidyā, if qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*, *jian bie* 簡別) are added to what is to be proved (*sādhya*) and what is proving (*sādhana*), there will be no fault. In the case of inference [for] oneself (*zi bi liang* 自比量), qualifying [an expression in this inference] with the phrase “that we accept” (*zi xu* 自許) can show that the expression that we accept is not subject to faults such as [being not established for] (i.e., being not accepted by) one of the two parties [in debate] (i.e., the opponent) (*ta sui yi* 他隨一),⁵⁰ etc.

In the case of inference [for] others (*ta bi liang* 他比量), qualifying [an expression in it] with the phrase “that you hold” (*ru zhi* 汝執), etc., [can show that the expression thus qualified] is not subject to faults such as being contradicted by [one's own] doctrine (**siddhāntaviruddha*, *wei zong* 違宗), etc.

In the case of inference [for] both (*gong bi liang* 共比量)⁵¹ and the other [two kinds of inference mentioned above], qualifying [an expression in it] with the

⁵⁰ The expression *ta sui yi* 他隨一 is an abbreviation of *ta sui yi bu cheng* 他隨一不成. This term refers to a kind of reason called *anyatarāsiddha* (*sui yi bu cheng* 隨一不成). *sui yi* 隨一 corresponds to the word *anyatara* in *anyatarāsiddha*. In NP 3.2.1(2), *anyatarāsiddha* refers to the fault that the reason-statement in a three-membered argument is not established for, i.e., not accepted by, one of the two parties in debate, either the opponent or the proponent. *ta sui yi bu cheng* 他隨一不成 refers to the scenario that the reason-statement is not accepted by the opponent (i.e., others, *ta* 他, **para*/**paratah*).

⁵¹ Even though *svārthānumāna* (“inference for oneself”) and *parārthānumāna* (“inference for others”) are terms widely used by Indo-Tibetan logicians after Dignāga, they employ them in a sense remarkably different from what the Chinese logicians mean by *zi bi liang* 自比量 and *ta bi liang* 他比量. The correspondence of *zi bi liang* 自比量 to *svārthānumāna* and of *ta bi liang* 他比量 to *parārthānumāna* is only hypothetical. *zi* 自 corresponds to *sva*, *ta* 他 to *para*, and *bi liang* 比量 to *anumāna*, whereas the intermediate word *artha* in both *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* is not reflected in either *zi bi liang* 自比量 or *ta bi liang* 他比量. In addition to the just mentioned two kinds of inference in Chinese logical literature, there is one more kind of inference called *gong bi liang* 共比量. The three form a triple theory of inference comprising inferences based on the proponent's (i.e., one's own) theory, based on the theory of the opponent (i.e., the other), and based on a theory common to both parties in debate. In modern China, *svārthānumāna* is usually translated with *wei zi bi liang* 爲自比量, and *parārthānumāna* with *wei ta bi liang* 爲他比量. Unfortunately, I could not locate these expressions or similar expressions that could easily be identified as translations of *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* in classical Chinese literature. To my knowledge, there is only one discussion from Kuiji that expresses something similar to the Indo-Tibetan idea of *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*. See YMDS 305 / 113b29-c6: 如自決定已，稀他決定生，說宗法、相應、所立，餘遠離。(NMU v. 13 = PS 4.6: *svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādaneccayā / pakṣadharmatvasambandhasādhyokter anyavarjanam* // [see Katsura 1977-1987: 4/74, n. 3]) 此說二比：一自、二他。自比處在弟子之位。此復有二：一相比量，如見火相煙，知下必有火；二言比量，聞師所說比度而知。於此二量自生決定。他比處在師主之位，與弟子等作其比量，稀他解生。上之二句，如次別配。“[The NMU says:] ‘As one wishes to generate certainty for others just like one's own certainty, then anything other than the statements of the *pakṣadharmatva*, [logical] relation (*sambandha*) and *sādhya* is excluded’ (cf. Tillemans 1999: 74; Tucci 1930: 44). Here [Dignāga] states two [kinds of] inference: first, [for] oneself (*zi* 自), and second, [for] others (*ta* 他). The inference

phrase “[from the standpoint of] ultimate truth” (**paramārtha*[*tah*], *sheng yi* 勝義) can show that [the expression thus qualified] is not subject to faults such as being contradicted by common knowledge or by one’s own tradition, etc. (*wei shi jian zi jiao deng shi* 違世間自教等失).

One should mark [one’s own words in an inference in the above manner,] with appropriate qualifications according to circumstance.⁵² Since qualifications have been added in this inference, there are no such faults [as the ones adduced above].

1.3 ^(341 / 115c4-8) 有法言「真故」，明依勝義，不依世俗，故無違於非學世間。又顯依大乘殊勝義立，非依小乘，亦無違於阿含等教「色離識有」。亦無違於小乘學者世間之失。

The phrase “from the standpoint of ultimate truth” (*zhen gu* 真故) [is added to the expression referring to] the property-possessor (*dharmin*, *you fa* 有法 = *pakṣa*, subject of the inference),⁵³ to make clear that [the thesis] is based on

[for] oneself (*zi bi* 自比) occurs in the situation [when] a disciple [generates certainty]. It also has two [kinds]. First, inference from some evidence (*liṅgato 'numānam*, *xiang bi liang* 相比量 [cf. Wayman 1999: 19]). For example, on observing smoke as evidence for fire, one will know that fire is definitely [found] beneath [it]. Second, inference from a statement (*yan bi liang* 言比量). [For example,] on hearing what is said by one’s teacher, one will acquire knowledge by inferring [something from it]. In the case of these two kinds of inference (*er liang* 二量), one generates certainty [for] oneself. The inference [for] others (*ta bi* 他比) takes place in the situation [when] a teacher or master [generates certainty]. He makes an inference for his disciples and wishes to generate understanding among them. The former two *pādas* [of the above verse of the NMu] are related [to inference for oneself and inference for others] respectively.” Again, the Chinese words used here for the relevant two kinds of inference are *zi bi* 自比 and *ta bi* 他比, with no mention of the intermediate word *artha* “purpose” (*wei* 爲). At any rate, a correspondence of *zi bi liang* 自比量 and *ta bi liang* 他比量 to *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*, respectively, is not totally unconceivable since at the beginning of the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* Dharmakīrti criticizes a definition of *parārthānumāna* that appears to be quite similar to the concept of *ta bi liang* 他比量 in the context of Chinese logical literature. I am grateful to Prof. Tom J.F. Tillemans for explaining this possible correspondence to me. I will take up the topic in another paper. At the present stage, I will consistently use “inference [for] oneself,” “inference [for] others” and “inference [for] both” to translate the Chinese expressions *zi bi liang* 自比量, *ta bi liang* 他比量 and *gong bi liang* 共比量, respectively, inserting the square brackets to indicate that the word *artha* (usually translated as “for” at the end of the relevant compound) has been omitted. This is to distinguish the two expressions from “inference for oneself” and “inference for others,” the usual translations of *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*.

⁵² Cf. He 2014: 1231.

⁵³ A famous controversy between the South Temple Tradition (*nanji den* 南寺伝) and the North Temple Tradition (*hokuji den* 北寺伝) in early Japanese Buddhism is whether or not the qualification *zhen gu* is an integral part of the formulation of the subject. What is at stake here is whether this qualification qualifies the entire thesis-statement or only one term in it, i.e., the subject. See HTK 49b25-50a3. From the above sentence we can see that Kuiji himself is to be held responsible for a confusion about the precise role of the qualification *zhen gu*. He never clarifies

ultimate truth (*paramārtha*, *sheng yi* 勝義) rather than on conventional [truth]. Therefore, [it] is not contradicted by non-scholarly common knowledge (*fei xue shi jian* 非學世間).

[This qualification] also shows that [the thesis] is established on the basis of the supreme truth (*shu sheng yi* 殊勝義) of Mahāyāna, rather than on the basis of Hīnayāna, so that [it] is also not contradicted by the Āgamas and other [Buddhist canons] that teach that the visual form exists separately from the [visual] consciousness. [Therefore, the thesis] is also not subject to the fault of being contradicted by the scholarly common knowledge (*xue zhe shi jian* 學者世間) of Hīnayāna.⁵⁴

1.4^(341 / 115c8-14) 「極成」之言，簡諸小乘最後身菩薩染污諸色、一切佛身有漏諸色。若立為唯識，便有一分自所別不成，亦有一分違宗之失。十方佛色及佛無漏色，他不許有。立為唯識，有他一分所別不成。其此二因，皆有隨一分所依不成。說「極成」言，為簡於此，立二所餘共許諸色為唯識故。

The phrase “that is well established” (*prasiddha, ji cheng* 極成) [which qualifies the subject-term “visual form”] is [meant] to exclude [from its realm the visual forms that are only accepted by] various Hīnayāna schools, [like] the defiled forms of the Bodhisattva [Śākyamuni] in his last lifetime [before entering into *nirvāṇa*] (*zui hou shen pu sa ran wu zhu se* 最後身菩薩染污諸色) and all the tainted forms of the Buddha's body (*yi qie fo shen you lou zhu se* 一切佛身有漏諸色). If [we] establish [such forms] to be only [visual] consciousness, there will be [the fault that] one part of the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) (i.e., the subject) is not established for the proponent (*yi fen zi suo bie bu cheng* 一分自所別不成),⁵⁵ and also the fault that one part [of the subject, which is admitted to include these forms,] is contradicted by [the proponent's own] doctrine (*yi fen wei zong* 一分違宗).⁵⁶

which part of the thesis-statement is to be specified by it. The qualification actually relates to the entire statement rather than only one term in it. Cf. n. 63 below and Moro 2015b: 354-358.

⁵⁴ Cf. Moro 2015b: 354-355.

⁵⁵ The Sanskrit expression *ekadeśa*, literally “one place,” is translated as *yi fen* 一分, “one part.” See, for example, NP 3.2.2(3): *sapaṅkaikadeśavṛttir vipakṣavyāpī* (*tong pin yi fen zhuan yi pin bian zhuan* 同品一分轉異品遍轉), “residing in one part of the similar instances and pervading dissimilar instances.” In the Chinese Hetuvidyā tradition, when certain faults, especially various forms of being *asiddha* or *aprasiddha* (“not [well] established”), occur, two further questions are raised, namely (1) whether all parts (*quan fen* 全分) of the involved concept are problematic or only one part (*yi fen* 一分), and (2) from whose standpoint, i.e., from that of the proponent (*zi* 自, **sva-/svataḥ*), the opponent (*ta* 他, **para-/parataḥ*) or both of them (*gong* 共, **ubhaya-/ubhayataḥ*), the involved concept is considered to be problematic.

⁵⁶ For *yi fen* 一分 (“one part”), see n. 55.

[On the other hand,] the forms of the Buddhas in [all] ten directions (*shi fang fo se* 十方佛色) and the untainted form of the Buddha (*fo wu lou se* 佛無漏色) are not accepted to be existent by the opponents (i.e., Hīnayāna scholars). If [we] establish [such visual forms] to be only [visual] consciousness, there will be [the fault] that one part of the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) (i.e., the subject) is not established for the opponent (*ta yi fen suo bie bu cheng* 他一分所別不成).⁵⁷

[Moreover,] the two reasons (i.e., the one that is to establish the set of forms which, besides forms that are well established, also includes forms that only the opponent accepts, and the other one that is to establish another set which, besides forms that are well established, also includes forms that only the proponent accepts) will both have [the fault that] one part of the substratum (*āśraya*) (i.e., the subject of the reason-statement) is not established for one of the two parties [in debate] (i.e., either the proponent or the opponent) (*sui yi yi fen suo yi bu cheng* 隨一分所依不成).⁵⁸

[We] say the phrase “that is well established” in order to exclude these [faults], because [we have specified by way of this qualification that] what [we are to] establish to be only [visual] consciousness are the equally accepted visual forms apart from the [above] two [kinds that are not equally accepted].⁵⁹

1.5 ^(342/115c14-20) 因云「初三攝」者，顯十八界六三之中初三所攝。不爾，便有不定、違宗。若不言「初三所攝」，但言「眼所不攝故」，便有不定言：極成之色，為如眼識，眼所不攝故，定不離眼識；為如五三，眼所不攝故，極成之色定離眼識？若許「五三眼所不攝故，亦不離眼識」，便違自宗。為簡此過，言「初三攝」。

⁵⁷ For *yi fen* 一分 (“one part”), see again n. 55 above.

⁵⁸ When one part (*ekadeśa, yi fen* 一分) (see n. 55) of the substratum (*āśraya, suo yi* 所依) is not established for one of the two parties (*anyatara, sui yi* 隨一) in debate (see n. 50), this is a special case of the reason being *āśrayāsiddha* (*suo yi bu cheng* 所依不成); see NP 3.2.1(4) and n. 79 below.

⁵⁹ Cf. Moro 2015b: 355-356. In IRMS 316b29-c5, Zenju illustrates “the visual form that is well established” with 如世人見柱梁等色 “like kinds of visual forms such as a pillar and a beam as seen by common people.” In IRMS 319c16-26, he records two different opinions on the exact meaning of “the visual form that is well established” in terms of the classification of twenty-five visual forms, especially its three subclasses colour (*varṇarūpa*), shape (*saṃsthānarūpa*) and action (*viññaptirūpa*). The first opinion is that “the visual form that is well established” only refers to colours like blue and yellow. This is because only these colours are substantially existent and the object of visual consciousness (*caḥsurvijñāna*). Shapes like long and short, and actions like bending and stretching are only nominally existent. They are apprehended by mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*). The second opinion is that all twenty-five visual forms, no matter whether they exist substantially or nominally, are comprised by the subject of Xuanzang’s inference. The point here is whether shapes and actions are apprehended by mental or visual consciousness.

“Included in the first three [*dhātus*]” (*chu san she* 初三攝), as said in the reason, is [meant] to show that [the subject] (i.e., the visual form that is well established) is included in the [set of the] first three [*dhātus*] among the six sets of three [*dhātus*] in the [classification of] eighteen *dhātus*. Otherwise, there would occur [two faults of the reason, namely,] being inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) and being contradicted by [one's own] doctrine.

If “included in the first three [*dhātus*]” would not be said [in the reason] and [thus] only “not included in the visual sense” be said [there], there would be [occasion for an objection] stating the [fault of] inconclusiveness [of the reason] (*bu ding yan* 不定言) [as follows]:

Is the visual form that is well established certainly not separate from the visual consciousness because of being not included in the visual sense, like the visual consciousness?

Or is the visual form that is well established certainly separate from the visual consciousness because of being not included in the visual sense, like the [remaining] five sets of three [*dhātus*]?

If [we] accept that the [remaining] five sets of three [*dhātus*] are also not separate from the visual consciousness because of being not included in the visual sense, then [the reason will be held to be] contradicted by our own doctrine.

In order to exclude these faults, [we] say “included in the first three [*dhātus*].”

1.6 (343-344 / 115c20-29) 其「眼所不攝」言，亦簡不定及法自相決定相違。謂若不言「眼所不攝」，但言「初三所攝故」，作不定言：極成之色，為如眼識，初三攝故，定不離眼識；為如眼根，初三攝故，非定不離眼識？由大乘師說彼眼根，非定一向說離眼識，故此不定云「非定不離眼識」，不得說言「定離眼識」。作法自相決定相違言：「真故極成色，非不離眼識，初三攝故，猶如眼根。」由此便有決定相違。為簡此二過，故言「眼所不攝故」。

The phrase “not included in the visual sense” (*yan suo bu she* 眼所不攝) is also [meant] to exclude [another pair of faults of the reason, namely,] being inconclusive and conclusively [proving] the opposite of the own form of the property [to be proved] (*fa zi xiang jue ding xiang wei* 法自相決定相違).

That is, if “not included in the visual sense” would not be said [in the reason] and [thus] only “included in the first three [*dhātus*]” would be said [there], there would be [occasion for an objection] stating the [fault of] inconclusiveness [of the reason as follows]:

Is the visual form that is well established certainly not separate from the visual consciousness because of being included in the first three [*dhātus*], like the visual consciousness?

Or [is it] not certainly (*fei ding* 非定) inseparate from the visual consciousness because of being included in the first three [*dhātus*], like the visual faculty (*cakṣurindriya, yan gen* 眼根)?

Since the visual faculty, in the Mahāyāna masters' elaboration, is not absolutely said to be certainly separate from the visual consciousness, [in] the [above statement of] inconclusiveness [the alternative conclusion] is [merely] stated as “not certainly inseparate from the visual consciousness.” [It] cannot be stated as “certainly separate from the visual consciousness.”⁶⁰

The [objection] stating [the fault of the reason to be its] conclusively [proving] the opposite of the own form of the property [to be proved] is to be made as follows:

- [Thesis:] From the standpoint of ultimate truth, the visual form that is well established is not inseparate from the visual consciousness.
 [Reason:] Because [it] is included in the first three [*dhātus*].
 [Example:] Like the visual faculty.

Hence, there will be [the fault of] conclusively proving the opposite [of the own form of the property to be proved] (*jue ding xiang wei* 決定相違).⁶¹

In order to exclude these two faults, [we] say “not included in the visual sense.”

⁶⁰ This is evidence for the fact that the visual faculty should be considered as the *vipakṣa* in Xuanzang's inference. In the above paragraph, the visual faculty is explicitly said not to possess the property to be proved, i.e., “being certainly inseparate from the visual consciousness” or “being certainly not separate from the visual consciousness.” If the criterion for an entity to function as a *vipakṣa* in Xuanzang's inference would be that it is certainly separate from the visual consciousness, the visual faculty would fail to fall into the *vipakṣa* realm because it is said here to be neither certainly inseparate nor certainly separate from the visual consciousness (cf. Text 1.13). Thus, “being not certainly inseparate from the visual consciousness” serves as an adequate criterion. Whether or not the visual faculty should be counted as *vipakṣa* was also the topic of an ardent debate between the South Temple Tradition and the North Temple Tradition; see HTK 50a22-29. Interestingly, when the property to be proved is reversed to “being certainly separate from the visual consciousness,” the visual faculty should also be counted as *vipakṣa*, since it is neither certainly inseparate nor certainly separate from the visual consciousness. In line with this consideration, the exact formulation of the property to be proved in Xuanzang's inference should be “being certainly not separate from the visual consciousness,” and not merely “being not separate from the visual consciousness.” In the case of the latter formulation, the adverb “certainly” (*ding* 定) should be presupposed, since it is essential for the decision whether the visual faculty should be counted as *vipakṣa*. Otherwise, the place of the visual faculty would be undecidable because of its being neither inseparate nor separate from the visual consciousness. Fortunately, we find this reading in the version of the YMDS dating from the late thirteenth century (see Text 1.1) where also many further better readings are found. This early version, the *Jin zang guang sheng si ben* 金藏廣勝寺本, has been reprinted in *Zhong hua da zang jing (Han wen bu fen)* 中華大藏經(漢文部分), vol. 100, no. 1885, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, p. 269c1-297b28. The portion corresponding to the texts in our Section 1 is found on p. 272a16-c28. The critical edition (Zheng 2010) is mainly based on it.

⁶¹ In fact, in the present context the extensional relation of the reason, i.e., “being included in the first three [*dhātus*],” to both the *sapakṣa* realm and the *vipakṣa* realm is certain, with only one

1.7 ^(345 / 115c29-116a8) 若爾，何須「自許」言耶？爲遮有法差別相違過，故言「自許」，非顯「極成之色，初三攝、眼所不攝」他所不成，唯自所許。謂「真故極成色」，是有法自相。「不離眼識」，是法自相。「定離眼識色」、「非定離眼識色」，是有法差別。立者意許「是不離眼識色」。外人遂作有法差別相違言：「極成之色，非是不離眼識色，初三所攝、眼所不攝故，猶如眼識。」爲遮此過，故言「自許」。

If so, why do [we] need the phrase “that we accept” (*zi xu* 自許)? [We] say “that we accept” in order to prevent the [reason’s] fault [of proving] the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor (*dharmiviśeṣaviparīta*, *you fa cha bie xiang wei* 有法差別相違). [This phrase] is not [meant] to show that [the whole reason-statement, namely,] “while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], the visual form that is well established is not included in the visual sense,” is not established for the opponent, but rather only accepted by [the proponent] himself.⁶²

That is, the [expression] “from the standpoint of ultimate truth, the visual form that is well established” [refers to] the own form of the property-possessor (*dharmisvarūpa*, *you fa zi xiang* 有法自相).⁶³ The [expression] “not separate from the visual consciousness” [refers to] the own form of the property [to be proved] (*dharmasvarūpa*, *fa zi xiang* 法自相). “Being the visual form that is certainly separate from the visual consciousness” and “being not the visual form that is certainly separate from the visual consciousness” are [two] specific attributes of the property-possessor (*dharmiviśeṣa*, *you fa cha bie* 有法差別). What is admitted (**iṣṭa*, *yi xu* 意許) by the proponent is that [the visual form that is well established] is the visual form that is not separate from the visual consciousness.

[If the phrase “that we accept” would not be used,] the opponent would make [the following objection] stating [the reason’s] fault of [proving] the opposite

possibility. That is, the reason is present in the only *sapakṣa*, i.e., the visual consciousness, and at the same time in one *vipakṣa*, i.e., the visual faculty, while being absent from the other *vipakṣas*, i.e., the remaining fifteen *dhātus* in the classification of eighteen *dhātus*. Hence, this reason is only an inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) reason, and not also a contradictory (*viruddha*) one. For a reason to be contradictory, it must be present in at least one *vipakṣa* and at the same time be absent from all *sapakṣas*. Kuiji’s discussion in this passage is problematic. The Japanese monk Gomyō 護命 (750-834) already noticed the problem; see RINM 34c17-24. Cf. Lü 1983: 72 and Luo 1988: 36, n. 1.

⁶² In my view, the last sentence is the main source of the frequent misunderstanding of the qualification *zi xu* 自許 “that we accept” to mean “that we, too, accept.” See Franco 2004: 201 (Waley’s translation) & 205 and Moro 2015a: 192; cf. also Moriyama 2014: 143. Here, Kuiji merely says that the entire reason-statement may also be accepted by the opponent. Whether the first three *dhātus* “that we accept” can also be accepted by the opponent is another issue that has not been touched upon here. For similar discussions, see below, Texts 1.14, 2a.2, 2b.2, etc.

⁶³ Here, Kuiji again includes the qualification *zhen gu* in the subject; see above, n. 53.

of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor (*you fa cha bie xiang wei yan* 有法差別相違言):

- [Thesis:] The visual form that is well established is not the visual form that is not separate from the visual consciousness.
 [Reason:] Because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [it] is not included in the visual sense.
 [Example:] Like the visual consciousness.

In order to prevent this fault, [we] say “that we accept.”⁶⁴

1.8 ^(345 / 116a8-15) 與彼比量作不定言：極成之色，為如眼識，初三所攝、眼所不攝故，非不離眼識色；為如自許他方佛等色，初三所攝、眼所不攝故，是不離眼識色？若因不言「自許」，即不得以「他方佛色」而為不定，此言便有隨一過。汝立比量，既有此過，非真，不定。凡顯他過，必自無過，成真能立必無似故。明前所立無有有法差別相違，故言「自許」。

[If the phrase “that we accept” is used, we can make the following reply] to the [above] inference [by means of an objection that is to] state the [fault of] inconclusiveness [of its reason]:

Is the visual form that is well established not the visual form that is not separate from the visual consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [it] is not included in the visual sense, like the visual consciousness? Or is [it] the visual form that is not separate from the visual consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [it] is not included in the visual sense, like [the visual forms] that we accept, such as the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world (*ta fang fo deng se* 他方佛等色)?

If [the phrase] “that we accept” is not said in the reason, [we] are not permitted to reveal the inconclusiveness [of the reason in the above inference] by means of [making reference to] the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world (*ta fang fo se* 他方佛色) [as a counterexample to the logical relation on which the above inference is based, namely, that whatever, while being included in the first three *dhātus*, is not included in the visual sense, is not the visual form that is not separate from the visual consciousness]. [Moreover,] there will be the fault [that the probative property (*sādhanadharmā*), i.e., the reason, in our reply is not established (*asiddha*) for, i.e., not accepted by] one of the two parties [in debate, i.e., the opponent, to be present in a positive example] (*sui yi guo* 隨一過), [like the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world, since the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world are not included in the “first three” that both parties accept, but only in the “first three” that we accept].⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Cf. Moro 2015b: 358-359.

⁶⁵ My explanation of *sui yi guo* 隨一過, “the fault [that the probative property (*sādhanadharmā*), i.e., the reason, in our reply is not established (*asiddha*) for, i.e., not accepted by] one of the

Since the inference you establish has this fault, it is neither true nor conclusive. When [one wants to] reveal a fault [committed] by others, one must [at first] be free from fault [oneself]. This is because for one's demonstration (*sādhana*) to be true, there must be no faults. In order to make clear that the above [inference we have] established does not have [the fault of proving] the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor, [we] say "that we accept."

1.9 ^(347 / 116a15-21) 然有新羅順憬法師者，聲振唐番，學包大小。業崇迦葉，每稟行於杜多；心務薄俱，恒馳誠於少欲。既而蘊藝西夏，傳照東夷，名道日新，緇素欽挹。雖彼龍象不少，海外時稱獨步。於此比量作決定相違。乾封之歲，寄請釋之：「真故極成色，定離於眼識，自許初三攝、眼識不攝故，猶如眼根。」

However, there is the Dharma Master Sungyōng 順憬 in Silla. He is renowned in both China and abroad. His learning includes both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. He venerates Kāśyapa in his practice and follows ascetic practice all the time. His mind is virtually unburdened and he constantly pursues [a state of] reduced desire. Having obtained his learning from China, he transmits and preaches it to Silla. His fame and virtue are revealed daily. He is respected and honored among both clerics and laymen. Although there are a large number of giants [in the field of Buddhist learning in the Indias], he is now renowned for his uniqueness [even] overseas. [He] has designed [an inference based on a reason] that does not deviate, but [is] contradictory (*jue ding xiang wei* 決定相違) with respect to this inference (i.e., the inference of our Master). During the Qianfeng 乾封 period (666-668), [he] sent it [to China] and asked [our Master] to explain it. [This antinomic inference runs as follows:]

[Thesis:] From the standpoint of ultimate truth, the visual form that is well established is certainly separate from the visual consciousness.

two parties [in debate, i.e., the opponent, to be present in a positive example]" is based on the account of Yanshou 延壽 (904-975); see ZJL 719c1-7. Zenju has an alternative explanation. According to him, if the qualification "that we accept" would not be added to the expression "the first three," the opponent would make a further objection in order to point out the inconclusiveness of the proponent's reply: Is the visual form that is well established the visual form that is separate from the visual consciousness because, while being included in the first three, it is not included in the visual sense, like the defiled forms of the Bodhisattva Śākyamuni in his last lifetime before entering into *nirvāṇa*, which we Hīnayānists accept? Or is it not the visual form that is separate from the visual consciousness because, while being included in the first three, it is not included in the visual sense, like the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world, which you Mahāyānists accept? When the "first three" are specified as "the first three that the Mahāyānists accept," the reason is absent from the defiled forms of the Bodhisattva Śākyamuni in his last lifetime before entering into *nirvāṇa* which only the Hīnayānists accept. See IRMS 318c15-24; cf. Texts 2a.4, 2b.6, 5.5 & 6.7, and n. 70.

[Reason:] Because, as we accept (*zi xu* 自許), while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] (*chu san* 初三), [it] is not included in the visual consciousness.

[Example:] Like the visual faculty.⁶⁶

1.10 ^(347 / 116a21-29) 時爲釋言：凡因明法，若自比量，宗、因、喻中皆須依自，他、共亦爾。立依自、他、共，敵對亦須然，名善因明無疎謬矣。前立唯識，依共比量。今依自立，即一切量皆有此違。如佛弟子對聲生論立：「聲無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等。」聲生論言：「聲是其常，所聞性故，如自許聲性。」應是前量決定相違。彼既不成，故依自比，不可對共而爲比量。

At that time, [I] gave the [following] explanation [on behalf of our Master, since he had already passed away]:

[First objection:] According to the rules of Hetuvidyā, in the case of an inference [for] oneself,⁶⁷ the thesis, the reason and the example should all be based on one's own [theory]. This is also the case for [inference for] others and [inference for] both. Inasmuch as [a proponent may] have based his demonstration (*sādhanā*) on either his own [theory] or the opponent's [theory], or [a theory] common to both, the opponent should also refute it accordingly (i.e., base his refutation [*dūṣaṇa*] on the proponent's theory, his own theory or a theory common to both, respectively). [Somebody debating in this manner] could be called well versed in Hetuvidyā and free from carelessness and errors.

The above demonstration of consciousness-only is an inference based on [a theory] common to both (*yi gong bi liang* 依共比量).⁶⁸ The present [inference

⁶⁶ This antinomic inference was actually designed by another Silla monk, namely, Wōnhyo. See Texts 5.2-5.6; cf. Franco 2004: 211-212 and Moro 2015b: 361. An alternative translation of its reason-statement is to place the qualification "that we accept" (*zi xu* 自許) after "the first three [*dhātus*]" (*chu san* 初三) in order to turn it into a term qualification rather than a propositional qualification. In this case, we would arrive at a translation similar to that of the reason-statement in Xuanzang's inference, namely, "because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept (*zi xu chu san* 自許初三), [it] is not included in the visual consciousness." Cf. Franco 2004: 212 and Moro 2015a: 198. However, according to Kuiji's interpretation of the antinomic inference (see below), this qualification has to be interpreted as qualifying the entire reason-statement, and not only "the first three *dhātus*," which is an expression embedded in the reason-predicate. The key point of Kuiji's rejection of the antinomic inference is based on this interpretation. Nevertheless, the above alternative translation does make sense if we are to represent the original intention of the antinomic inference. Therefore, in my translation here I have followed Kuiji's interpretation, while in my translation of Wōnhyo's own words I have translated the phrase "that we accept" as a term qualification even though the original wording of the antinomic inference is the same. See below, Text 5.2.

⁶⁷ See above, n. 51.

⁶⁸ My interpretation of the four characters *yi gong bi liang* 依共比量 here is different from that of the same characters in Texts 1.14 and 6.6. There I translate "in the context of (*yi* 依) an

of Sungyǒng] is a demonstration based on his own [theory]. [If one were allowed to refute an opponent's inference in this manner,] then every inference would incur this kind of contradiction (i.e., could by no means escape an anti-nomic objection).

For instance, when a Buddhist, in confrontation with [a proponent of] the theory that sound is produced (*sheng sheng lun* 聲生論),⁶⁹ sets forth [the inference] “Sound is impermanent because of being produced, like a pot, etc.,” [the proponent of] the theory that sound is produced would say [in reply]: “Sound is permanent because of being audible, like soundness (*śabdatva, sheng xing* 聲性) that we accept.” [If we permit the refutation of an inference (for) both by means of an inference (for) oneself, this inference set forth by the proponent of the theory that sound is produced] would [precisely] be [based on a reason that] does not deviate, but [is] contradictory with respect to the former inference (i.e., the inference of the Buddhist). Since the [latter inference] is [in fact] not established, inferring [something] on the basis of one's own [theory] cannot result in an inference that is in counterbalance to an [inference (for)] both.⁷⁰

inference [for] both (*gong bi liang* 共比量),” whereas here I understand “an inference (*bi liang* 比量) based on (*yi* 依) [a theory] common to both (*gong* 共).” Cf. *yi gong* 依共 “based on [a theory] common to both” in Text 1.11.

⁶⁹ See Moriyama 2014: 133 and n. 17 on the *Śabdotpattivādin.

⁷⁰ Cf. Moriyama 2014: 144-145. In contrast with Kuiji's view expressed in the last sentence of Text 1.10, a fragment from Wengui says that a counterexample that is based only on the opponent's theory and not accepted by the proponent himself can also be used in counterbalance to an inference [for] both. See IDS 520c26-28: 文軌師云：「因明道理，於共比量，自法、他法皆得不定。以自在眼識所變眼根之影作不定過。」 “Master Wengui says: According to the principles of Hetuvidyā, either things (*dharma*) [only] we [accept] or things [only] others (i.e., our opponents) [accept] can be used [as counterexamples in an inference adduced] in counterbalance to an inference [for] both in order to reveal its inconclusiveness. Hence, the visual faculty that is an image manifested by the unimpeded visual consciousness (*zi zai yan shi* 自在眼識) can be used [as a counterexample] to reveal the fault of inconclusiveness [incurred by an inference (for) both].” Cf. n. 127 for the source of this fragment. In fact, many other scholars, including Jingyan and Wōnhyo, expressed this opinion; see Texts 2a.4, 2b.6, 4.2, 5.5, and 6.7. Commenting on Text 1.8, the commentator Zenju even tried to read this idea into Kuiji's text; cf. n. 65. The point at stake is whether an epistemic interpretation of Buddhist logic is necessary. Kuiji thinks that it is necessary, while many other scholars do not. According to an epistemic interpretation, for a premise to be true it should be accepted as true by both the proponent and the opponent, while according to a non-epistemic interpretation a premise is true irrespective of its acceptance by the interlocutor. Therefore, under an epistemic interpretation, the opponent is prohibited to make reference to a counterexample that only he accepts, but not the proponent, in an inference formulated in counterbalance to the proponent's inference [for] both, while under a non-epistemic interpretation there is no such constraint. Cf. Tang 2015: 243-255. For a similar distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic interpretations in connection with the *trairūpya* formula, see Oetke 1994: 77-107.

1.11 ^(350 / 116a29-b1) 又宗依共，已言「極成」，因言「自許」，不相符順。

[Second objection:] Moreover, the thesis [of Sungyǒng's inference] is based on [a theory] common to both (*yi gong* 依共), since the [qualification] “that is well established” has already been added [to the subject term]. [In this connection,] the [qualification] “that we accept” has [now] been added to the reason. [These two members of the inference] are not in agreement with each other [in that both should either be based on a theory common to both or based on Sungyǒng's own theory].

1.12 ^(350 / 116b1-3) 又因便有隨一不成，大乘不許彼自許「眼識不攝故」因於共色轉故。

[Third objection:] Moreover, the reason will incur the [fault] that it is not established for (i.e., not accepted by) one of the two parties [in debate] (*anyatarāsiddha, sui yi bu cheng* 隨一不成), since Mahāyāna does not accept [part of] the reason, i.e., “being not included in the visual consciousness,” to be present in the visual form that is equally [accepted] (i.e., in the subject of the antinomic inference). This is [only] accepted by him (i.e., Sungyǒng) [on behalf of Hīnayāna].

1.13 ^(350 / 116b3-5) 又同喻亦有所立不成。大乘眼根非定離眼識，根因識果，非定即離故。況成事智，通緣眼根。疎所緣緣，與能緣眼識，有定相離義。

[Fourth objection:] Moreover, the positive example (*sādharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*) will also incur [the fault that] what is to be proved is not established [with regard to it] (*suo li bu cheng* 所立不成) (i.e., not accepted by Mahāyāna to be present in it). This is because according to Mahāyāna, the visual faculty is not certainly separate from the visual consciousness. Since the faculty is the cause [and] the consciousness the result, they are neither certainly identical with [each other] nor [certainly] separate from [each other].⁷¹ Furthermore, the knowledge of achieving the task (*kr̥tyānuṣṭhānajñāna, cheng shi zhi* 成事智)⁷² [can even include] the visual faculty in [its] universal apprehension. [Only] an object distant [in time] as a condition [for the rise of consciousness] (*shu suo yuan yuan* 疎所緣緣)⁷³ (i.e., things-in-themselves as the manifestation of seeds in the store-consciousness [*ālayavijñāna*], in contrast to things as they appear in the visual consciousness) can be said to be certainly separate from the apprehending visual consciousness.

⁷¹ Cf. n. 60.

⁷² Another translation of *kr̥tyānuṣṭhānajñāna* is *cheng suo zuo zhi* 成所作智; see Cheng wei shi lun 成唯識論 (CWSL) 56a25-28 and Cook 1999: 348 (“the knowledge of achieving the task”).

⁷³ Cf. CWSL 40c14-21 and Cook 1999: 246-247 (“the distant condition as object”).

1.14 ^(350 / 116b5-7) 又立者言「自許」，依共比量，簡他有法差別相違。敵言「自許」，顯依自比「眼識不攝」，豈相符順？

[Fifth objection:] Moreover, [the phrase] “that we accept” is said by the proponent (i.e., Xuanzang) in the context of an inference [for] both (*gong bi liang* 共比量), in order to exclude [the possibility] of the opponent [refuting him by means of pointing out the fault that the reason proves] the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor. [In contrast, the phrase] “that we accept” is [now] said by the opponent (i.e., Sungyǒng) obviously in the context of an inference [for] oneself. [In his inference, part of the reason-statement, namely,] that “[the visual form that is well established] is not included in the visual consciousness” [is only accepted by himself]. How could [these two different applications of the qualification “that we accept”] be in agreement with each other?⁷⁴

1.15 ^(350 / 116b7-10) 又彼比量，宗、喻二種皆依共比，唯因依自，甚相乖角。故雖微詞適起，而未可為指南。幸能審鏡前文，應亦足為理極。

[Sixth objection:] Moreover, in that inference [formulated by Sungyǒng] both the thesis and the example occur in the context of an inference [for] both,⁷⁵ only the reason occurs in the context of an [inference (for)] oneself. They are [thus] sharply in mutual discordance.

Therefore, although casuistries [may] arise that appear to be conclusive, they are not [truly] instructive. I hope [that the readers themselves] can reflect on the previous text [about the inference of our Master, since this inference is] suitable to be regarded as the supreme achievement of logic.

1.16 ^(351 / 116b10-11) 上因傍論，廣敘師宗。宗中既標「真故」，無違世間之失。

[We] have explained in detail our Master's thesis [in his inference of consciousness-only] on the occasion of the discussion of [the views of] others (i.e., Sungyǒng) [on this inference].

⁷⁴ Cf. Text 1.11, where Kuiji says that the qualification “that is well established” as used in the thesis of the antinomic inference is not in agreement with the qualification “that we accept” as used in the reason-statement of the same inference. Here in Text 1.14, the point of Kuiji's objection is that the use of the qualification “that we accept” in the antinomic inference is not in agreement with the use of the very same qualification in Xuanzang's inference which the antinomic inference is meant to attack.

⁷⁵ The thesis occurs in the context of an inference [for] both in the sense that both the subject and the predicate therein are accepted by both partners in debate, not, however, in the sense that the entire thesis is accepted by both, because in any kind of inference the thesis should be accepted only by the proponent and not also by the opponent, whence the debate begins.

[Now we know that] there the fault of being contradicted by common knowledge will not occur when the thesis has already been marked with [the expression] “from the standpoint of ultimate truth.”

2. Wengui on *zi xu* 自許

As mentioned above (p. 150-151), the texts of Section 2a and Section 2b belong to two different recensions of the same work and their presentations of Xuanzang’s inference differ from each other structurally. Interestingly, Texts 5.2-5.6 by Wǒnhyo share the structure of their presentation with Texts 2b.4-2b.6 by Wengui, although the former are intended to explain Wǒnhyo’s inference directed against Xuanzang’s inference, whereas the latter are meant to explain Xuanzang’s inference. For a table showing the correspondences between the texts in Sections 2a, 2b and 5.2-5.6, the reader is referred to Appendix 2 below.

2a. ZYS MS 9-19

2a.1 ⁽⁹⁻¹¹⁾ 問：[如立宗]⁷⁶云「真故極成色，非定離眼識」，因云「自許初三攝，眼所[不攝故]，同」⁷⁷喻云「如眼識」。此因既云「自許」，應非極成。

Question: For instance, [one may] set forth [the following inference]:

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| Thesis: | From the standpoint of ultimate truth, the visual form that is well established is not certainly ⁷⁸ separate from the visual consciousness. |
| Reason: | Because, while being included in the first three [<i>dhātus</i>] that we accept, [it] is not included in the visual sense (i.e., the visual faculty). |
| Positive Example: | Like the visual consciousness. |

Since [the phrase] “that we accept” has been said [as a qualification] in this reason[-statement], [the reason] should [also] be not well established.

⁷⁶ 如立宗 is added following Text 2b.1; cf. Shen 2008: 218, n. 1.

⁷⁷ 不攝故同 is added following Text 2b.1; cf. Shen 2008: 218, n. 1.

⁷⁸ It has to be noted that in many other relevant texts we read “certainly not” (*ding bu* 定不) (cf. Text 1.1) instead of “not certainly” (*fei ding* 非定) as found here in the account of Wengui in Texts 2a and 2b. Moreover, in Texts 1.9 and 5.2 the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*) of the antinomic inference is *ding li yu yan shi* 定離於眼識 “being certainly separate from the visual consciousness,” which is logically contradictory to *fei ding li yan shi* 非定離眼識 “being not certainly separate from the visual consciousness” here in Wengui’s account in Texts 2a.1 and 2b.1, but, strictly speaking, not to *ding bu li yu yan shi* 定不離於眼識 “being certainly not separate from the visual consciousness” in Kuiji’s account in Text 1.1.

2a.2 ⁽¹¹⁻¹²⁾ 答：此云「自許」，不簡他許。彼云「自許」，即簡他許，以他不許「我」爲「德所依」故，故不例也。

Answer: [The phrase] “that we accept” said here [as a qualification] is not [meant] to exclude what others (i.e., the opponent) accept. [Rather, the phrase] “that we accept” said in the above case (i.e., in the reason-statement that “the self that we accept is a substratum of qualities”)⁷⁹ is [meant] to exclude what others accept because the opponent does not accept that the self is a substratum of qualities. Therefore, [one should] not compare [the two].

2a.3 ⁽¹²⁻¹³⁾ 問：既不簡他許，何須「自許」言耶？

Question: If what others accept is not to be excluded [here], why is the phrase “that we accept” [still] necessary?

2a.4 ⁽¹³⁻¹⁵⁾ 答：此爲遮他不定過故。謂他作不定難云：此極成色，如眼識，初三所攝、眼所不攝故，非定離眼識耶；爲如我宗所許「釋迦菩薩實不善色」，初三所攝、眼所不攝故，定離眼識耶？

Answer: This [phrase] is [meant] to prevent the fault of inconclusiveness [of our reason] with respect to [the theory of] the opponent (*ta bu ding* 他不定).⁸⁰

⁷⁹ See the passage immediately preceding the passages of ZYS presented in Text 2b: 問：如立宗云「我所許我是實有」，即所別不成，亦應因云「我許德所依故」，因非極成。答：此「我許」言，唯顯自許。敵論雖許彼自許「我」爲德所依，望敵論者，因無依處，亦不成也。如此之例，但是自比量耳。(ZYS 2.21a8-b2; see also ZYS MS 7-9) “Question: For instance, [one may] set forth the thesis that the self that we accept is a substance. [This thesis has] precisely the fault that the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) (i.e., the subject) is not [well] established. The reason[-statement that is adduced to support this thesis] must also be [equipped with the same qualification ‘that we accept,’ to the effect] that [it reads as follows:] because [the self] that we accept is a substratum of qualities. The reason [must also] be not well established. Answer: The phrase ‘that we accept’ [in this case] is only [meant] to show what [the opponent] himself accepts. Although the opponent accepts that the self that he himself accepts is a substratum of qualities, with regard to an opponent [who denies the existence of a self] the reason is also not established because it has no [existent] substratum. Instances like this are nothing but inference [for] oneself (*zi bi liang* 自比量).” Cf. NP 3.2.1(4) on *āśrayāsiddha: dravyam ākāśam guṇāśrayatvād ity ākāśasattvavādinam praty āśrayāsiddhaḥ* (虛空實有，德所依故，對無空論，所依不成。) “Ether is a substance because it is a substratum of qualities. [When this argument is addressed] to somebody who maintains the non-existence of ether, [the reason] is not established as regards its substratum (*āśraya*) (i.e., because it lacks an existent substratum).” Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 123-124.

⁸⁰ In the Chinese Hetuvidyā tradition, an inconclusive (*anaikāntika*, *bu ding* 不定) (cf. NP 3.2.2) reason is called *ta bu ding* 他不定 when there exists an individual that exhibits the reason-property and does not exhibit the property to be proved, and at the same time is only accepted by the opponent but not by the proponent. Hence, *ta bu ding* 他不定 refers to a scenario where the reason adduced by the proponent is considered to be inconclusive only from the standpoint of the opponent (*ta* 他, **para-*/**parataḥ*). Cf. n. 55 and 70.

That is, [without this phrase occurring in our reason-statement] the opponent would raise the following objection [meant to point out the fault] of inconclusiveness [of our reason] (*bu ding nan* 不定難):

Is the visual form that is well established not certainly separate from the visual consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [it] is not included in the visual sense, like the visual consciousness?

Or [is it] certainly separate from the visual consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [it] is not included in the visual sense, like the very impure form of the Bodhisattva Śākyamuni (*shi jia pu sa shi bu shan se* 釋迦菩薩實不善色) which is accepted in our doctrine?⁸¹

2a.5 (15-16) 問：但應云「極成初三攝，眼所不攝故」，亦遮此難，何須別用「自許」避之？

Question: To state only that “because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that are well established (*ji cheng chu san* 極成初三), [it] is not included in the visual sense” can also prevent this objection. Why should [we] use particularly [the qualification] “that we accept” so as to avoid it?

2a.6 (16-19) 答：雖得避不定過，然不能遮相違難。謂他作相違難云：「此極成色，應非即識之色⁸²，極成初三攝、眼所不攝故，如眼識。」此難便成也。若言「自許」，彼難不成，以得用他方佛色，與彼相違作不定過故。用「自許」之言，一遮他不定難，遮相違難。

Answer: Though the fault of inconclusiveness can be avoided [in this way], the objection [meant to point out the fault that the reason is] contradictory (*xiang wei nan* 相違難) cannot be prevented [altogether by the suggested formulation of the reason]. That is, [if one uses the phrase “that is well established” instead of “that we accept,”] the opponent may raise the following objection [meant to point out the fault that the reason is] contradictory:

[Thesis:] The visual form that is well established cannot be the visual form that is identical with⁸³ the [visual] consciousness (*ji shi zhi se* 即識之色).

[Reason:] Because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that are well established, [it] is not included in the visual sense.

[Example:] Like the visual consciousness.

Then the objection would prove valid.

⁸¹ Cf. Zenju’s explanation referred to above in n. 65.

⁸² 即識之色 em. (cf. Text 2b.4) : 即色之識 MS.

⁸³ Note the formulation “identical with” (*ji* 即) instead of “not separate from” (*bu li yu* 不離於). Cf. Xuanzang’s inference as presented in Text 1.1.

[However,] if [one uses] the phrase “that we accept,” the objection will not prove valid, because [in this connection, we] can make reference to the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world [as a counterexample] to this [objection meant to point out that there is the fault of our reason being] contradictory and reveal the fault of the inconclusiveness [of its own reason].

[Therefore, by] using the phrase “that we accept,” [we] should[, on the one hand,] prevent the opponent's objection [meant to point out the fault] of inconclusiveness [of the reason] (*zhe ta bu ding nan* 遮他不定難)⁸⁴ and[, on the other hand,] prevent the objection [meant to point out the fault that the reason is] contradictory.

2b. ZYS 2.21b2-22a10⁸⁵

2b.1 ^(21b2-4) 問：如立宗云「真故極成色，非定離眼識」，因云「自許初三攝，眼所不攝故」，同喻云「如眼識」。此因既云「自許」，應非極成。

Question: For instance, [one may] set forth [the following inference]:

Thesis: From the standpoint of ultimate truth, the visual form that is well established is not certainly separate from the visual consciousness.

Reason: Because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept, [it] is not included in the visual sense [i.e., the visual faculty].

Positive Example: Like the visual consciousness.

Since [the phrase] “that we accept” has been said [as a qualification] in this reason[-statement], [the reason] should [also] be not well established.

2b.2 ^(21b4-6) 答：此云「自許」，不簡他許，以他亦許「極成之色，初三所攝⁸⁶、眼所不攝」故。彼云「自許」，即簡他許，以他不許「我」為「德所依」故，故不例也⁸⁷。

Answer: [The phrase] “that we accept” said here [as a qualification] is not [meant] to exclude what others (i.e., the opponent) accept, because the opponent

⁸⁴ An alternative translation of *zhe ta bu ding nan* 遮他不定難, translated here as “prevent (*zhe* 遮) the opponent's (*ta* 他) objection (*nan* 難) [meant to point out the fault] of inconclusiveness (*bu ding* 不定) [of the reason],” is “to prevent (*zhe* 遮) the objection (*nan* 難) [meant to point out the fault] of inconclusiveness with respect to [the theory of] the opponent (*ta bu ding* 他不定).” Cf. n. 80.

⁸⁵ Section 2b has been completely cited in IDS 530a18-b11, with trivial variants. The Inmyō daisho 因明大疏抄 was written by Zōshun during 1151-1152; see Takemura 2011: 113. The citation begins with 文軌疏一云 “The first volume of Wengui's commentary says as follows.”

⁸⁶ 所攝：攝 IDS 530a22.

⁸⁷ 例也：例 IDS 530a23.

also accepts that, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], the visual form that is well established is not included in the visual sense.

[Rather, the phrase] “that we accept” said in the above case (i.e., in the reason-statement that “the self that we accept is a substratum of qualities”)⁸⁸ is [meant] to exclude what others accept, because the opponent does not accept that the self is a substratum of qualities. Therefore, [one should] not compare [the two].

2b.3 ^(21b6-7) 問：既不簡他許，何須「自許」言耶？

Question: If what others accept is not to be excluded [here], why is the phrase “that we accept” [still] necessary?

2b.4 ^(21b7-22a3) 答：此爲遮相違故，須「自許」言⁸⁹。謂他作相違難云：「極成之色，應非即識之色，自許初三攝、眼所不攝故，如眼識。」今遮此難云：此極成色，爲如眼識，自許初三攝、眼所不攝故⁹⁰，非即識之色耶？爲如我宗所許「他方佛色」，自許初三攝、眼所不攝故，是即識之色耶？若不云「自許」，即不得與他作不定過，遮相違難⁹¹。

Answer: This [phrase] is [meant] to prevent the [fault that the reason is] contradictory. Hence, the phrase “that we accept” is necessary. That is, [if one would not use the phrase “that we accept,”] the opponent may raise the following objection [meant to point out the fault that the reason is] contradictory:

[Thesis:] The visual form that is well established cannot be the visual form that is identical with the [visual] consciousness.

[Reason:] Because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept, [it] is not included in the visual sense.

[Example:] Like the visual consciousness.

Now, we will negate this objection by means of the following statement:

Is the visual form that is well established not the visual form that is identical with the [visual] consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept, [it] is not included in the visual sense, like the visual consciousness?

Or is [it] the visual form that is identical with the [visual] consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept, [it] is not included in the visual sense, like the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world which are accepted in our doctrine?

⁸⁸ See n. 79.

⁸⁹ 言: 言也 IDS 530a25.

⁹⁰ 眼所不攝故: 故 IDS 530a28.

⁹¹ 難: 難也 IDS 530b2.

If [the phrase] “that we accept” is not said, [we] will not be able to reveal the fault of inconclusiveness [of his own reason] with respect to the opponent in order to prevent [his] objection [meant to point out the fault that our reason is] contradictory.

2b.5 ^(22a3-4) 問：但云「初三所攝⁹²、眼所不攝」，亦得作不定過，何須「自許」耶？

Question: Stating only that “while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [it] is not included in the visual sense,” [we] are still able to reveal the fault of inconclusiveness [of the opponent's reason]. Why is [the phrase] “that we accept” [still particularly] necessary?

2b.6 ^(22a4-10) 答：若不言「自許」者，即有他不定過。謂他作不定過云：極成之色，為如眼識，初三所攝、眼所不攝，非定離眼識耶；為我宗「釋迦菩薩實不善色⁹³」，初三所攝、眼所不攝，定離眼識耶？為避此過，故云「自許」。若為避此過言「極成初三攝、眼所不攝」者，即不得與他相違難，作不定過，故唯言「自許」也。

Answer: If [the phrase] “that we accept” is not said, there will be the fault of inconclusiveness [of our reason] with respect to [the theory of] the opponent. That is, [without this phrase occurring in our reason-statement] the opponent would raise the following [objection meant to point out] the fault of inconclusiveness [of our reason]:

Is the visual form that is well established not certainly separate from the visual consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [it] is not included in the visual sense, like the visual consciousness?

Or [is it] certainly separate from the visual consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [it] is not included in the visual sense, like the very impure form of the Bodhisattva Śākyamuni [which is accepted] in our doctrine?

In order to avoid this fault, [we] say [the phrase] “that we accept.” If, for the aim of avoiding this [very same] fault, [we would alternatively] state that “[because,] while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that are well established, [it] is not included in the visual sense,” [we] will not be able to reveal the fault of inconclusiveness [of his own reason] with respect to the opponent's objection [meant to point out the fault that our reason is] contradictory. Therefore, [we] say only [the phrase] “that we accept.”

⁹² 所攝: 攝 IDS 530b3.

⁹³ 菩薩實不善色: 實不善聲 IDS 530b7.

3. Tojŭng on *zi xu* 自許 (IDS 520c9-26, to be compared with IRMS 318a10-22)

3.1 ^(520c9-11) 《集》曰⁹⁴：諸釋「自許」，皆失本意。三藏量中「自許」，若避他相違者，虛設劬勞。

The “Collection” (Chip 集) [of Tojŭng] says:

The explanations of [the phrase] “that we accept” by many others have all missed its original intention. If the [phrase] “that we accept” in the inference of Tripiṭaka (i.e., Xuanzang) [would] be [used] to avoid the opponent’s [objection meant to point out the fault that the reason is] contradictory, [this] would be a vain endeavor.⁹⁵

3.2 ^(520c11-13) 謂若小乘難「極成色」，合⁹⁶成「非色」，還害自宗，不成相違，必不違自，《理門》說故。若難彼「色不離識」義，是正所諍，非意許故。

That is, if the Hīnayānists intended to refute [Xuanzang’s proposition about] “the visual form that is well established” by means of combining [it with a new predicate, namely,] “is not the visual form,” they would be contradicted by their own doctrine. [This kind of refutation] cannot [legitimately] prove the opposite [of the own form (*svarūpa*) of the subject of Xuanzang’s inference], since [an inference that is meant to prove the opposite of the original inference] cannot contradict itself in precisely the way stated in the Nyāyamukha.⁹⁷

[Alternatively,] if [the opponent] were to refute the tenet that “the visual form is not separate from the [visual] consciousness” [by proving the opposite of some specific attribute (*viśeṣa*) of the subject of Xuanzang’s inference] (i.e., by proving that it is not the visual form that is not separate from the visual consciousness), this is exactly what is under discussion because [the visual form’s being not separate from the visual consciousness] is not something that is admitted [silently by the proponent].

3.3 ^(520c14-17) 若彼差別得成難者，如立宗云：「聲是無常，所作性故，猶如瓶等。」於此亦應出如彼⁹⁸過。謂「是無常之聲」、「非是無常之聲」，是有法差別。立論意許「是無常之聲⁹⁹」。

⁹⁴ 集曰：太賢師抄道證集云 IRMS 318a10: “The ‘Collection’ (Chip) of Tojŭng, as recorded by Master T’aehyŏn 太賢, says.” T’aehyŏn (active during 735-744) is said to be a disciple of Tojŭng; see Takemura 2011: 50. In the Inmyŏ daisho shō 因明大疏抄, the passages presented here belong to a long citation (IDS 520b3-521a12) from T’aehyŏn’s Kojŏkki 古迹記. Cf. n. 127.

⁹⁵ Cf. Moro 2015b: 362.

⁹⁶ 合：令 IRMS 318a12.

⁹⁷ See NMu 1.3 on *svavacanaviruddha*.

⁹⁸ 如彼：彼 IRMS 318a17.

⁹⁹ 之聲：聲 IRMS 318a18.

If this specific attribute can be taken up [as the object of the opponent's] refutation [, we will get the following line of debate]:

For instance, when [one] sets forth the thesis “Sound is impermanent because of being produced, like a pot, etc.,” a fault similar to that [detected in Xuanzang's inference] will also be revealed with regard to this [inference]. That is, “being sound that is impermanent” and “being not sound that is impermanent” are [two] specific attributes of the property-possessor. What is admitted by the proponent is that [sound] is sound that is impermanent.

3.4 ^(520c17-19) 外作有法差別過言：「聲應非是無常之聲，所作性故，猶如瓶等。」

[Then,] the opponent will make [the following objection meant to] state [the reason's] fault of [proving the opposite of some] specific attribute of the property-possessor:

[Thesis:] Sound cannot be sound that is impermanent.¹⁰⁰
 [Reason:] Because [it] is produced.
 [Example:] Like a pot, etc.

3.5 ^(520c19-21) 雖持所諍「無常」之義，合¹⁰¹成「非聲」，既不成難。雖持所諍「不離識」義，合¹⁰²成「非色」，豈獨成難？故上古釋皆不可依。¹⁰³

Although [the opponent here] takes up the attribute “impermanence” under discussion and [then] combines [a new predicate] “not sound” (i.e., “not sound that is impermanent”) [with the subject “sound”], the [resulting] refutation [of sound's being sound] cannot be [a legitimate one because a valid refutation cannot contradict itself].

[Likewise,] although [the Hīnayānists] take up the attribute under discussion, i.e., “being not separate from the [visual] consciousness” and [then] combine [a new predicate] “not the visual form” (i.e., “not the visual form that is not separate from the visual consciousness”) [with the subject “visual form”], how can only this refutation be [a legitimate one whereas the above refutation of sound's being sound is not]?

¹⁰⁰ An alternative translation of the thesis might be “Sound must be sound that is not impermanent.” However, in this case, the positive example, namely, “a pot, etc.,” would not work because under this alternative the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*) would be “being sound,” and not “not being sound.” Therefore this alternative translation would not be in accordance with the authorial intention.

¹⁰¹ 合：今 IRMS 318a20.

¹⁰² 合：今 IRMS 318a21.

¹⁰³ The citation in the Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō 因明論疏明燈抄 ends here.

Therefore, none of the above old explanations [of the phrase “that we accept”] is reliable.

3.6 ^(520e21-24) 然彼三藏立唯識意，通對小乘及外道宗，避外不立十八界者，一分隨一不成過故，因言「自許初三攝」也。

If so, the intention of Tripiṭaka (i.e., Xuanzang) when establishing [the inference of] consciousness-only is to confront any opponent, regardless whether he [may] be a Hīnayānist or a non-Buddhist. Thus, in order to avoid [the possibility] that those non-Buddhists who do not hold [the classification of] eighteen *dhātus* [may point out] the fault that one part [of the reason-statement] is not established for (i.e., accepted by) one of the two parties [in debate] (*yi fen sui yi bu cheng* 一分隨一不成)¹⁰⁴ (i.e., not accepted by these deniers of the classification of eighteen *dhātus*), [the phrase] “included in the first three [dhātus] that we accept” is said in the reason[-statement].¹⁰⁵

3.7 ^(520e24-26) 因既自故，自比量攝。故他不得以不極成「佛有漏色」而作不定，於自量無他不定故。自義已成，何遣他宗？

Since the reason is [based on the proponent’s] own [theory], [the whole inference] is to be included in [the category of] inference [for] oneself.¹⁰⁶ Thus, the opponent can no longer make reference to the tainted form of the Buddha (*fo you lou se* 佛有漏色) which is not well established [but only accepted by the opponent himself, as a counterexample], in order to reveal the inconclusiveness [of the reason of the proponent’s inference]. This is because in an inference [for] oneself, this kind of inconclusiveness with respect to [the theory of] the opponent does not occur [even when there may be a counterexample according to the opponent’s theory, because the proponent does not accept it]. Since the [proponent’s] own theory has already been established [from his own point of view through an inference (for) oneself], why bother to negate the thesis of others [in connection with the same inference]?

4. Jingyan on *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* and *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana* (JYLC MS 392-411)

4.0a ^[NP 3.2.3(3)] *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhano yathā | na dravyaṃ na karma na guṇo bhāva ekadravyavattvād guṇakarmasu ca bhāvāt sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti | ayaṃ hi hetur yathā dravyādipratīṣedhaṃ bhāvasya sādhayati tathā bhāvasyā-*

¹⁰⁴ For *yi fen* 一分 “one part,” see n. 55.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Moro 2015b: 362.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Moro 2015b: 362.

bhāvatvam api sādhayati | ubhayatrāvyabhicārāt ||] 有法自相相違因者，如說有性非實、非德、非業，有一實故，有德、業故，如同異性。此因如能成遮實等，如是亦能成遮有性，俱決定故。

[Among the four contradictory reasons, the reason] proving the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor (*dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*)¹⁰⁷ is as [follows]:

Being (*bhāva*) is neither a substance (*dravya*) nor a motion (*karman*) nor a quality (*guṇa*), because [it] possesses [numerically] one substance [as its locus] (i.e., occurs in a single substance) and because [it] occurs in qualities and motions, like specific universals (i.e., lower universals).

For just as this reason proves the negation of [being] a substance, etc., for being (i.e., proves that being is not a substance, etc.), it also proves that being is not being because [the reason] does not deviate with respect to both [conclusions].¹⁰⁸

4.0b [NP 3.2.3(4) *dharmivīśeṣaviparītasādhano yathā | ayam eva hetur asminn eva pūrvapakṣe 'syaiva dharmiṇo yo viśeṣaḥ satpratyaayakartrtvam nāma tadviparītam asatpratyaayakartrtvam api sādhayati | ubhayatrāvyabhicārāt ||*] 有法差別相違因者，如即此因即於前宗有法差別作有緣性，亦能成立與此相違作非有緣性，如遮實等，俱決定故。

[The reason] proving the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor (*dharmivīśeṣaviparītasādhana*)¹⁰⁹ is as [follows]:

¹⁰⁷ The Chinese translation of *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* is *you fa* 有法 (= *dharmin*) *zi xiang* 自相 (= *svarūpa*) *xiang wei* 相違 (= *viparīta*) *yin* 因 (= *hetu*), with *sādhana* having been replaced with *hetu*. My translation of this term as well as of Text 4.0a as a whole is based on the original Sanskrit text. At the occurrences of the same term in the selected Chinese texts, I translate *you fa zi xiang xiang wei yin* 有法自相相違因 as “a reason [that proves] the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor.” Cf. n. 109.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Oetke 1994: 35, with some modification for the sake of clarity; cf. also Tachikawa 1971: 126 and the contribution by Moriyama in this volume (p. 38 and 41-45). For the Vaiśeṣika background of the original inference, see Tachikawa 1971: 137-138, n. 46. At the same place, Tachikawa points out that the original inference actually involves three independent inferences, that is, three independent reasons with three different *sādhyas*, whereas Oetke (1994: 35-36, especially n. 19) thinks that this is a single inference. He represents the reason as “x possesses/inheres in one *dravya* and occurs/inheres in *guṇas* and *karmas*,” and the *sādhya* as “x is neither a *dravya* nor a *guṇa* nor a *karma*.” Both the Indian commentator Haribhadra and the Chinese commentator Kuiji seem to support Tachikawa’s interpretation, and not Oetke’s, on this issue; see NPT 41,9-42,10 and YMDS 546-558 / 130a2-c13. For Oetke’s explanation of the logical point at stake in NP 3.2.3(3)-(4) on the third and fourth kind of contradictory reason, see Oetke 1994: 35-41.

¹⁰⁹ The Chinese translation of *dharmivīśeṣaviparītasādhana* is *you fa* 有法 (= *dharmin*) *cha bie* 差別 (= *viśeṣa*) *xiang wei* 相違 (= *viparīta*) *yin* 因 (= *hetu*), with *sādhana* having been replaced with *hetu*. My translation of this term as well as of Text 4.0b as a whole is based on the Sanskrit text. At the occurrences of the same term in the selected Chinese texts, I translate *you fa cha bie*

This very same reason with respect to the very same [aforementioned] thesis (*pakṣa*) also proves the opposite of a specific attribute (*viśeṣa*) of the very same property-possessor, namely, “causing the notion ‘being’,” [that is,] “not causing the notion ‘being’,”¹¹⁰ because [it] (i.e., the reason) does not deviate with respect to both [conclusions].¹¹¹

4.1 ⁽³⁹²⁻³⁹⁵⁾ 問：如聲論師破佛法「所作」比量云：「聲應非¹¹²無常聲，所作性故，猶如瓶等。」此既唯違立論有法自相相違。若言是者，一切法因皆斯過，如何言釋？若言非者，此既唯違立論有法，有¹¹³何所以得知非耶？

Question: For instance, a Śābdika (*sheng lun shi* 聲論師) [who argues] against the Buddhist inference [of the impermanence of sound on the ground that it is] produced, sets forth the following refutation [of the Buddhist inference]:

- [Thesis:] Sound cannot be sound that is impermanent.
 [Reason:] Because [it] is produced.
 [Example:] Like a pot, etc.¹¹⁴

This opposite [inference proves] only the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor [in the original inference] of the proponent. [Now,] if we assess [this kind of refutation] as good, the reason [adduced] for any property [to be proved in an inference] will incur this fault (i.e., will prove the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor). How to make [such] an assessment [of this kind of refutation] and explain it? If we assess [this kind of refutation] as bad, then what about the reason [for us] to know [that it is] bad, since this [refutation proves] only the opposite of the property-possessor of the proponent?

xiang wei yin 有法差別相違因 as “a reason [that proves] the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor.” Cf. n. 107.

¹¹⁰ Cf. NPT 43,12-14: *tathā hi – etad api vaktuṃ śakyata eva bhāvaḥ satpratrayayakartā na bhavati | ekadravyavattvād dravyatvavat | na ca dravyatvaṃ satpratrayayakarṭṭr dravyapratrayaya-karṭṭvāt | evaṃ guṇakarmabhāvahetvor api vācyam |*.

¹¹¹ Oetke 1994: 35, with slight modification, especially with regard to the analysis of the compound *asatpratrayayakarṭṭva*. Oetke’s translation of the compound is “causing the idea ‘not being/existing’,” while my translation is “not causing the notion ‘being’”; see n. 110. Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 126.

¹¹² 非 em. (cf. Text 4.2; Shen 2008: 261, n. 5) : 是 MS.

¹¹³ Shen (2008: 262, n. 1) suspects that 有 must actually be 又.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Text 3.4. In his *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, Dignāga gives the following examples of the two contradictory reasons under discussion: “Sound is not sound (*aśabda*) because [it] results immediately from effort” (for the reason that proves the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor) and “Sound is inaudible (*aśrāvaṇa*) because [it] results immediately from effort” (for the reason that proves the opposite of some specific attribute of the property-possessor). See Moriyama in this volume (p. 39-40) on the *Vṛtti ad PS* 3.27.

4.2 (395-397) 答：應與作不定過云：爲如瓶等，所作性故，非無常聲，證聲所作性故，非無常聲耶；爲如他方佛聲所作性故，是無常聲，證聲所作性故，是無常聲耶？

Answer: With respect to [the above opposite inference], we should make [the following statement revealing] the fault of inconclusiveness [of its reason]:

Should sound be proved to be not sound that is impermanent because of being produced, like a pot, etc., which are not sound that is impermanent because of being produced?

Or should sound be proved to be sound that is impermanent because of being produced, like the voice of the Buddhas in another world (*ta fang fo sheng* 他方佛聲), which [we Mahāyāna Buddhists accept and which] is sound that is impermanent because of being produced?

4.3 (397-399) 問：若聲論對勝論「所作」因作此過失，既除餘極成有法外，更無不共許聲，如何與他作不定過耶？

Question: [Now,] if the Śābdika (*sheng lun* 聲論) [who argues] against the Vaiśeṣika (*sheng lun* 勝論) [inference of the impermanence of sound on the basis of the] reason [that it is] produced¹¹⁵ makes [this kind of refutation pointing out] the fault [that the reason proves the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor], then, apart from the property-possessor (i.e., the subject) which is well established [for both parties in debate], there will be no longer any [particular kind of] sound that is not well established (i.e., only accepted by the Vaiśeṣika) [to which the Vaiśeṣika could make reference]. How [then] could [the Vaiśeṣika proponent] reveal the fault of inconclusiveness [of the reason in the above refutation] of the opponent?

4.4 (399-402) 答：若有斯過，應更解云：共¹¹⁶有法自相相違因，不得¹¹⁷翻法作。若翻法作者，即有難一切因過¹¹⁸。如言「聲應非無常[聲]¹¹⁹」是也。若不翻法，不違共許，破有法者，是有法自相相違因收，即如¹²⁰「有性應非有¹²¹」是也。

¹¹⁵ This is the same inference of the impermanence of sound because of its being produced as the inference adduced in Text 4.1, but now it is set forth by a Vaiśeṣika, who does not accept the existence of the voice of the Buddhas in another world. Hence, when a Śābdika refutes this inference in the same way as stated in Text 4.1, the Vaiśeṣika cannot make reference to the voice of the Buddhas in another world, as suggested in Text 4.2 as part of the response by the Buddhist proponent of this inference.

¹¹⁶ 共 MS : 夫 IRMS 317c6; cf. Shen 2008: 262, n. 3. The text from here onwards to the end of Text 4.4 is cited in IRMS 317c6-10.

¹¹⁷ 得 em. (cf. IRMS 317c7; Shen 2008: 262, n. 4) : 同 MS.

¹¹⁸ 過 MS : 之過 IRMS 317c8.

¹¹⁹ 聲 is added following IRMS 317c8.

¹²⁰ 因收即如 MS : 因如 IRMS 317c10.

¹²¹ 有 MS : 大有 IRMS 317c10.

Answer: If there is this kind of fault¹²² [which the Vaiśeṣika is forced to admit since he cannot find a counterexample to refute the above refutation made by the Śābdika], we should give the following additional explanation:

[A refutation based on] a reason [that proves] the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor that is equally [accepted] (*gong you fa zi xiang xiang wei yin* 共有法自相相違因) cannot be carried out [in the form of] a negation [of the very same property-possessor by means of] the [very same] property [of the subject of inference] (*fan fa zuo* 翻法作). If [the refutation] is carried out [in the form of] a negation [of the very same property-possessor by means of] the [very same] property [of the subject of inference], there will be the fault of the refutation of all [logical] reasons (*nan yi qie yin guo* 難一切因過), just like when one states that “sound cannot be sound that is impermanent.”

If a refutation of the property-possessor neither negates [the very same property-possessor by means of] the [very same] property [of the subject of inference] (*fan fa* 翻法) nor violates [the stipulation of] the equal acceptance (*gong xu* 共許) [of the property-possessor], [the reason used in such a refutation] can be included in [the category of] the reason [that proves] the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor (*you fa zi xiang xiang wei yin* 有法自相相違因), just like [the reason adduced for the thesis that] being (*bhāva*, *you xing* 有性) cannot be being.¹²³

4.5 (402-405) 若依此解，但可言「有性應非大有」等，即違他許之「有」；不得言「有性應非離實、離德、離業有」，即是以法翻有法作，便成難一切因過也。

[However,] if [we] follow this explanation, [we] can only state that “being cannot be the great being (*mahāsattā*, *da you* 大有),” and so forth, so that [only] the being that others (i.e., the opponent) accept is violated.

[In contrast, we] cannot state that “being cannot be the being that is separate from substance, quality and motion.” [Such a refutation would] be carried out exactly [in the form of] a negation of the [very same] property-possessor by the [very same] property [of the subject of inference] (*yi fa fan you fa zuo* 以法翻有法作). [If so,] there will be the fault of the refutation of all [logical] reasons.

¹²² Throughout his discussion in Text 4, Jingyan considers the fault to be that the reason proves the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor (*dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*). However, as we can see from the refutation set forth by the opponent in Text 4.1, the fault is actually that the reason proves the opposite of some specific attribute of the property-possessor (*dharmivīṣeṣaviparītasādhana*).

¹²³ See NP 3.2.3(3).

4.6 (405-407) 又更解云：若成立法方便顯有法者，即須與作有法自相相違因過。如言「有性非實等」難，雖成立「非實等」法，意欲顯離實等別有「大有」有法，故得與彼作有法自相相違因過。

Moreover, an [alternative] additional explanation is [the following one]:

If [the proponent] intends to show [the proper existence of] the property-possessor by means of the proof of a property [to be proved] (*cheng li fa fang bian xian you fa* 成立法方便顯有法), then, with respect to [the proponent's inference, the opponent] must carry out [the above kind of refutation in order to reveal] for [the proponent] the fault that [his] reason [proves] the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor.

For instance, although the proponent's statement that "being is not a substance, etc.," [uttered] in [the sense of] an objection [to the position of those who do not believe in the proper existence of being], is meant to prove the property "being not a substance," etc., [the very same statement] is [actually] intended to show that the great being, the property-possessor, exists separately from substance and others (i.e., quality and motion).

Therefore, [with respect to this inference, the opponent] can [legitimately] carry out [the above kind of refutation in order to reveal] for him (i.e., the proponent) the fault that [his] reason [proves] the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor.

4.7 (407-411) 若但成法，不欲方便成有法者，不合作{者}¹²⁴有法自相相違因。即如「聲是無常」等，但欲成立「無常」之法，不是方便成立有法，故不得作有法自相相違。若強作者，即是方便破一切因，何名能破？

If [the proponent] intends only to prove the property [to be proved], [and] does not intend to prove [the proper existence of] the property-possessor by this means, [the opponent] is not permitted to carry out [this kind of refutation meant to reveal the fault that] the reason [proves] the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor.

Just like [the thesis] "sound is impermanent," and so forth, [arguments of this kind] are only intended to prove the property "impermanence," [and] not to prove [the proper existence of] the property-possessor by this means. Therefore, [the opponent] cannot [legitimately] carry out [this kind of refutation meant to reveal the fault that] the reason [proves] the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor.

If one carries out [this kind of refutation] rigidly, one will refute all [logical] reasons by this means. How can [this] be called a [correct] means of refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) [then]?

¹²⁴ Shen (2008: 262, n. 5) suspects that 者 is unnecessary here.

5. Wǒnhyo's Inference Directed Against Xuanzang's Inference
(IRMS 321a17-b5)

5.1 ^(321a17-18) 何以得知，本是曉製？彼師《判比量論》云：

Why [do we] know that [the antinomic inference directed against Xuanzang's inference]¹²⁵ is originally composed by Wǒnhyo? The "Critical Discussion on Inference" (P'an biryang non 判比量論) of this Master (i.e., Wǒnhyo) says as follows:

5.2 ^(321a18-21) 今謂此因，勞而無功，由須「自許」言，更致敵量故。謂彼小乘立比量言：「真故極成色，定離於眼識，自許初三攝、眼識不攝故，猶如眼根。」遮相違難，避不定過。

Now, [I] claim that there is no achievement, regardless of [his] labor, in [the formulation of] the reason [of Xuanzang's inference], because the [alleged] necessity of the phrase "that we accept" [in the reason-statement] would invite an opponent's inference [directed against it]. That is, certain Hīnayāna [scholars in their turn] could set forth the [following] inference:

[Thesis:] From the standpoint of ultimate truth, the visual form that is well established is certainly separate from the visual consciousness.

[Reason:] Because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept (*zi xu chu san* 自許初三), [it] is not included in the visual consciousness.

[Example:] Like the visual faculty.¹²⁶

[By using the phrase "that we accept" in exactly the same way as it is used in Xuanzang's inference, I] have[, on the one hand,] prevented an objection [meant to point out the fault that the reason is] contradictory and[, on the other hand,] avoided the fault of inconclusiveness [of the reason in this inference].

5.3 ^(321a21-23) 孱類於前，謂若爲我作相違過云：「極成之色，應非離識之色，自許初三攝、眼識不攝故，猶如眼根。」

In the face [of the above inference], a [disputer] of the weak sort may supposedly point out to me the fault [that the reason is] contradictory [by means of the following objection]:

[Thesis:] The visual form that is well established cannot be the visual form that is separate from the [visual] consciousness.

¹²⁵ See below, Text 5.2. Wǒnhyo designed this antinomic inference on behalf of Hīnayāna scholars.

¹²⁶ Cf. n. 66.

[Reason:] Because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept, [it] is not included in the visual consciousness.

[Example:] Like the visual faculty.

5.4 ^(321a24-27) 我遮此難，作不定過：此極成色，爲如眼根，自許初三攝、眼識不攝故，非離識之色耶；爲如我宗釋迦菩薩實不善色，自許初三攝、眼識不攝故，是離識之色耶？

[In this case,] I will negate this objection by giving [the following response that reveals] the fault of inconclusiveness [of its reason]:

Is the visual form that is well established not the visual form that is separate from the [visual] consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept, [it] is not included in the visual consciousness, like the visual faculty?

Or is [it] the visual form that is separate from the [visual] consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept, [it] is not included in the visual consciousness, like the very impure form of the Bodhisattva Śākyamuni, [which is accepted] in our doctrine?

5.5 ^(321a27-b2) 若不須「自許」，作不定過者。他亦爲我作不定過，謂：此極成色，爲如眼根，初三所攝、眼識不攝故，是離眼識耶；爲如我宗他方佛色，初三所攝、眼識不攝故，非離眼識耶？

There is [also] the [other] case that [the opponent] will point out [to me] the fault of inconclusiveness [of my reason], if [the phrase] “that we accept” [would] be considered unnecessary. That is, the opponent will also point out to me the fault of inconclusiveness [of my reason by means of the following objection]:

Is the visual form that is well established separate from the visual consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [it] is not included in the visual consciousness, like the visual faculty?

Or is [it] not separate from the visual consciousness because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [it] is not included in the visual consciousness, like the visual forms of the Buddhas in another world, [which are accepted] in our doctrine?

5.6 ^(321b2-4) 若爲避此不定過故，須言「極成初三」等者，則不得遮彼相違難云云。

If [instead of “the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept”] the expression “the first three [*dhātus*] that are well established,” and so forth, is considered to be necessary for [achieving] the [very same] aim of avoiding this fault of inconclusiveness [of the reason], [we] will not be able to prevent that objection [formulated above which is meant to point out the fault that the reason is] contradictory. – And so on.

5.7 ^(321b4-5) 既言「今謂」，述其比量，故知彼師所製量也。

Since it is said “Now, [I] claim” in order to introduce one’s [own] inference, we know that this is an inference [directed against Xuanzang’s inference] composed by that Master (i.e., Wōnhyo).

6. Zenju on the Nature of Inclusion (IRMS *ad* Texts 1.12 and 1.14)¹²⁷

6.1 ^(322b1-3) 大乘自許極成之色，眼識所攝；唯汝小乘，自許共色眼識不攝。是故因中便有隨一不成之過。

[According to Kuiji’s third objection to the antinomic inference,] the Mahāyānists themselves accept that the visual form that is well established is included in the visual consciousness. Only you, the Hīnayānists, accept that the visual form that is equally [accepted] is not included in the visual consciousness. Therefore, in the reason [of Wōnhyo’s inference] there is the fault of [its] being not established for (i.e., not accepted by) one of the two parties [in debate] (i.e., the Mahāyānists).

6.2 ^(322b3-6) 若敵救云¹²⁸：敵言「自許」，豈成「眼識不攝故」因？若彼還成「眼識不攝」，而簡大乘「攝相歸識」，還¹²⁹以宗法爲因之失。然其「眼識不攝故」者，但¹³⁰取十八界中¹³¹別攝。

[Against our objection to the antinomic inference,] an opponent [who has sympathy for Wōnhyo’s position] would offer the following defense:

How could the opponent (i.e., Wōnhyo), by saying [the phrase] “that we accept,” [intend to re]establish [his] reason[, namely,] “because [the visual form that is well established] is not included in the visual consciousness”?

¹²⁷ As mentioned in the introduction (p. 155), the Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō 因明論疏明燈抄 is a running commentary on the Yinming da shu 因明大疏. Texts 6.1-6.5 come from Zenju’s commentary on Kuiji’s third objection to the antinomic inference (see Text 1.12). Texts 6.6-6.9 come from Zenju’s commentary on Kuiji’s fifth objection to the antinomic inference (see Text 1.14). Kuiji ascribed the antinomic inference directed against Xuanzang’s inference to Sungyōng (see Text 1.9), while Zenju ascribed the same inference to Wōnhyo (see Section 5, especially Texts 5.1 and 5.7). On this point, Zenju’s account is more exact and reliable; see n. 43. Texts 6.1-6.5 are cited in IDS 527c25-528a8, Texts 6.6-6.9 in IDS 529a8-22, Text 6.2 separately in IDS 520c1-4, and Text 6.7 separately in IDS 520c4-9. The latter two citations, as well as the aforementioned fragment from Wengui (see n. 70) and the entire Section 3, belong to a long citation (IDS 520b3-521a12) from T’aehyōn’s Kojōkki 古迹記. Cf. n. 94 and Moro 2007: 329-330.

¹²⁸ 若敵救云：集曰此難不然 IDS 520c1: “The ‘Collection’ (Chip) says: This objection [by Kuiji] is incorrect.” Hence, we know that Tojūng is the author of the defense of the antinomic inference against Kuiji’s objection here in Text 6.2. Cf. Moro 2007: 329-330.

¹²⁹ 還：致，a variant collated in IDS 520, n. 8.

¹³⁰ 但：俱 IDS 520c4.

¹³¹ 界中：界 IDS 520c4.

If, for the purpose of excluding the Mahāyānist [ontological thesis that] the form (*ākāra*, *xiang* 相) is included in the consciousness (*she xiang gui shi* 攝相歸識), he would establish [the reason] that [the visual form that is well established] is [ontologically] not included in the visual consciousness, there would still be the fault of using a property of the subject of inference (*pakṣadharmā*) [that is actually the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*)] as the [logical] reason (*yi zong fa wei yin* 以宗法爲因).

Hence [the reason-statement] of the opponent that “because [the visual form that is well established] is not included in the visual consciousness” is said only in the sense that [the visual form] is included in a different category (*bie she* 別攝) [than that of the visual consciousness] in the classification of eighteen *dhātus*.¹³²

6.3 ^(322b6-9) 此亦非也。凡因明法，其言相濫，方以爲過。宗言「離識」，因言「不攝」，其義全同。還以宗法爲因之失，猶未得免。

[To the above defense, we reply that] this is also incorrect. According to the rules of Hetuvidyā, if the statement [of the reason] involves too much, coinciding with [what is to be proved], then it will be regarded as faulty. The thesis says that [the visual form is] separate from the [visual] consciousness. The reason says that [it is] not included [in the visual consciousness]. These [two] have exactly the same meaning. [Thus,] the fault of using a property of the subject of inference (*pakṣadharmā*) [that is actually the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*)] as the [logical] reason remains unavoidable.

¹³² Here, two kinds of a relation of “inclusion” are distinguished. That x is or is not included in y can be understood either in an ontological sense to the effect that the existence of x does or does not depend on the existence of y, or in a categorical sense to the effect that x is or is not classified in the same category as y. For the relation of “inclusion” in the former sense, I suggest the designation “ontological inclusion,” while for the one in the latter sense “categorical inclusion.” These two designations are not found in the text, but they seem useful for catching the point of Kuiji and Zenju’s criticism of the antinomic inference inasmuch as the statement that the visual form is not included in the visual consciousness, understood in the former sense, will fail to be accepted by idealist Mahāyāna scholars and thus violate the requirement that the entire reason-statement should be accepted by both parties in debate. If understood in the latter sense, it can be accepted by both because a commitment to a controversial ontological issue will not be involved. Here, an opponent who has sympathy for Wōnhyo’s position maintains that the relation of “inclusion” referred to in the antinomic reason-statement should be understood in the sense of a mere categorical inclusion according to the classification of eighteen *dhātus*, rather than in the sense of ontological inclusion. We will see that Zenju’s criticism in the following passages is nothing more than a repetition of Kuiji’s view that an ontological inclusion is unavoidably involved here. He refrains from considering the possibility that the opponent may revise the exact wording of the reason in order to remove the possible ontological significance altogether.

6.4 ^(322b9-10) 「極成之色，離於眼識」，與「極成色，眼識不攝」，其二無別。「離識」之義，名「不攝」故。

There is no difference between these two [statements], [namely, that] the visual form that is well established is separate from the visual consciousness, and [that] the visual form that is well established is not included in the visual consciousness. This is because [a thing] is designated as being not included [in the consciousness exactly] in the sense [that it is] separate from the consciousness.

6.5 ^(322b10-13) 由此大乘不許彼自許「眼識不攝」因，於「極成色」轉。是故便有隨一不成，以之即為第三過失。

Hence, Mahāyāna does not accept the reason “being not included in the visual consciousness” to be present in the visual form that is well established (i.e., present in the subject). This is [only] accepted by him [on behalf of Hīnayāna]. Therefore, [the reason] will incur [the fault that it is] not established for (i.e., not accepted by) one of the two parties [in debate]. So [Kuiji] regards this as the third fault [of the antinomic inference].

6.6 ^(322c12-16) 前唯識量，因言「自許」，依共比量，簡他小乘有法差別相違之過。後離識量，因言「自許」，顯依自比「眼識不攝」。立、敵因言，既各乖角，豈符因明之軌轍？故以之為第五過失。

[According to Kuiji’s fifth objection to the antinomic inference,] in the former inference of consciousness-only (*wei shi liang* 唯識量) (i.e., Xuanzang’s inference), [the phrase] “that we accept” is said [by Xuanzang] in the reason[-statement] in the context of an inference [for] both, in order to exclude [the possibility] of the opponent, i.e., the Hīnayānist, [refuting him by means of pointing out] the fault [that the reason proves] the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor. [In contrast,] in the latter inference of the separateness [of the visual form] from the [visual] consciousness (*li shi liang* 離識量), [the phrase] “that we accept” is [now] said [by Wōnhyo] in the reason[-statement] obviously in the context of an inference [for] oneself. [In his inference, part of the reason-statement, namely] that “[the visual form that is well established] is not included in the visual consciousness” [is only accepted by himself]. Since the reason-statement of the proponent and that of the opponent are discordant with each other [with respect to the use of the qualification “that we accept”], how could [this antinomic reason] comply with the rules of Hetuvidyā? Therefore, [Kuiji] regards this as the fifth fault [of the antinomic inference].

6.7 (322c16-21) 若敵救言¹³³：敵言「自許¹³⁴」，唯¹³⁵遮有法差別相違，令於「佛有漏色」轉¹³⁶。謂敵意許，是¹³⁷「定離眼識之¹³⁸色」。大乘師作相違難¹³⁹云：「極成之色¹⁴⁰，應非定離眼識之色，初三所攝、眼識不攝故，由如¹⁴¹眼根。」為引自許「佛有漏色」作不定過，故言「自許」，遮相違難，避不定過，孱類於前¹⁴²。

[Against our objection to the antinomic inference,] an opponent [who has sympathy for Wōnhyo's position] would offer the following defense:

[The phrase] “that we accept” said by the opponent (i.e., Wōnhyo) [in his reason-statement] is [also] only [meant] to prevent [the proponent's possible objection that the antinomic inference is flawed inasmuch as its reason incurs the fault of proving] the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor, that is, [the use of the phrase is meant to extend the scope of the phrase “the first three (*dhātus*)”] in order to permit [the reason-property] to be present in the tainted form of the Buddha.

That is, what is admitted by the opponent (i.e., Wōnhyo) is that [the visual form that is well established] is the visual form that is certainly separate from the visual consciousness. [If the phrase “that we accept” would not be said in the reason-statement,] the Mahāyāna master would make the following objection [meant to point out the fault that the reason is] contradictory:

¹³³ 若敵救言：判比量云 IDS 520c4: “The ‘Critical Discussion on Inference’ (P’an biryang non) says as follows.” Hence, we know that the discussion cited in Text 6.7 comes from Wōnhyo. Cf. Moro 2007: 329-330. The content of this passage corresponds roughly to Texts 5.2-5.4. However, the terminology is different, especially *fo you lou se* 佛有漏色 “the tainted form of the Buddha” instead of *wo zong shi jia pu sa shi bu shan se* 我宗釋迦菩薩實不善色 “the very impure form of the Bodhisattva Śākyamuni [which is accepted] in our doctrine.” The former expression is typical for Kuiji; see Text 1.4: *yi qie fo shen you lou zhu se* 一切佛身有漏諸色 “all the tainted forms of the Buddha's body” (cf. Text 3.7). The latter expression is typical for both Wengui and Wōnhyo (see Texts 2a.4, 2b.6 and 5.4). Moreover, this passage does not presuppose a knowledge of Kuiji's criticism as presented in Text 1.14. Therefore, we cannot assert on the basis of the above ascription of the cited discussion in the Inmyō daisho shō 因明大疏抄 that Wōnhyo knew Kuiji's criticism to his antinomic inference. Perhaps Text 6.7 is originally a free citation from Wōnhyo made by T'aehyōn in his Kojōkki (see n. 127). Zenju used materials from Kojōkki and probably composed the continuation of the opponent's response in Text 6.8 himself, in order to clarify the opponent's point.

¹³⁴ 敵言自許：自許 IDS 529a12.

¹³⁵ 唯：亦 IDS 520c5.

¹³⁶ 令於佛有漏色轉 is omitted in IDS 520c5.

¹³⁷ 是：量 IDS 520c5.

¹³⁸ 之：也今, a variant collated in IDS 520, n. 9.

¹³⁹ 難：量 IDS 520c6.

¹⁴⁰ 之色：色之 IDS 529a14.

¹⁴¹ 由如：如, a variant collated in IDS 520, n. 10.

¹⁴² 遮相違難避不定過孱類於前 is omitted in IDS 520c9.

- [Thesis:] The visual form that is well established cannot be the visual form that is certainly separate from the visual consciousness.
- [Reason:] Because, while being included in the first three [*dhātus*], [it] is not included in the visual consciousness.
- [Example:] Like the visual faculty.

In order to cite the tainted form of the Buddha [as a counterexample] that [only] we accept [on behalf of the Hīnayāna scholars] and to reveal the fault of inconclusiveness [of the reason in the above objection by the Mahāyāna master], [the opponent, namely Wōnhyo] says [the phrase] “that we accept” [in his reason-statement]. [Thus, by means of this phrase, the opponent] has [on the one hand] prevented the [proponent’s] objection [meant to point out the fault that his reason is] contradictory and[, on the other hand,] has avoided the fault of inconclusiveness [of the reason in his inference] vis-à-vis [a disputer] of the weak sort.

6.8 ^(322c22-23) 故敵「自許」，不成「眼識不攝故」因，但取十八界中別攝。

Therefore, the opponent, by [saying the phrase] “that we accept” [in his reason-statement] does not [intend to re]establish the reason that “because [the visual form that is well established] is not included in the visual consciousness.” [The reason-statement] is stated [by him] only in the sense that [the visual form] is included in a different category [than that of the visual consciousness] in the classification of eighteen *dhātus*.¹⁴³

6.9 ^(322c23-26) 此救亦非也。敵言「自許」，雖不成「眼識不攝故」因，而因中既言「眼識不攝」，明知即違大乘所許「極成色者，是眼識攝」。是故其因即有隨一不成之過。

[To the above defense, we reply that] this defense is also incorrect. Though the opponent, by saying [the phrase] “that we accept,” does not [intend to re]establish the reason that “because [the visual form that is well established] is not included in the visual consciousness,” what has already been said in the reason[-statement], i.e., that [the visual form that is well established] is not included in the visual consciousness, [if taken at face value] is audacious enough to have to be understood as a violation of the Mahāyāna assumption that the visual form that is well established is [ontologically] included in the visual consciousness. Therefore, [the opponent’s] reason incurs precisely the fault of being not established for (i.e., not accepted by) one of the two parties [in debate, namely, the Mahāyānists].

¹⁴³ Cf. n. 132.

APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY OF CHINESE TERMS

In what follows, I provide a list of Chinese terms that appear in the above selected texts and are related to the interpretation of Xuanzang's inference. Some essential, but difficult to understand phrases, e.g., 別攝 *bie she*, are also included. Each entry consists of (1) the Chinese ideogram, followed by its Pinyin transcription, (2) the Sanskrit equivalent, if available, with all equivalents attested in the NMu and NP that I am aware of, (3) my translation in this paper, and (4) reference to all occurrences of the term or phrase in the selected texts. A number of basic Chinese Hetuvidyā terms have already been collected and glossed in Tang 2015: 337-344, to which the present glossary is a complement. I will not repeat them here, except for a few that are important with respect to Xuanzang's inference, e.g., 極成 *ji cheng*.

別攝 *bie she*, included in a different category; Texts 6.2, 6.8.

不定難 *bu ding nan*, objection [meant to point out the fault] of inconclusiveness [of the reason]; Texts 2a.4, 2a.6. Cf. 不定言 *bu ding yan*.

不定言 *bu ding yan*, cf. NP 7: *anekāntahetu-kaṃ vacanam*, 不定因言 *bu ding yin yan*; [objection] stating the [fault of] inconclusiveness [of the reason]; Texts 1.5, 1.6, 1.8. Cf. 不定難 *bu ding nan*.

成立法方便顯有法 *cheng li fa fang bian xian you fa*, to show [the proper existence of] the property-possessor by means of the proof of the property [to be proved]; Text 4.6.

成事智 *cheng shi zhi*, *kṛtyānuṣṭhānjñāna*; cf. CWSL 56a25-28 (Cook 1999: 348): 成所作智 *cheng suo zuo zhi*; the knowledge of achieving the task; Text 1.13.

初三 *chu san*, the first three [*dhātus*]; Texts 1.1, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2a.1, 2a.4, 2a.5, 2a.6, 2b.1, 2b.2, 2b.4, 2b.5, 2b.6, 3.6, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 6.7. Cf. 自許初三 *zi xu chu san*, 極成初三 *ji cheng chu san*.

大有 *da you*, *mahāsattā*, the great being; Texts 4.5, 4.6.

法自相 *fa zi xiang*, *dharmasvarūpa* (NP 3.2.3[1]), the own form of the property [to be proved]; Texts 1.6, 1.7.

法自相決定相違 *fa zi xiang jue ding xiang wei*, conclusively [proving] the opposite of the own form of the property [to be proved]; Text 1.6. Cf. 決定相違 *jue ding xiang wei* (2). Cf. NP 3.2.3(1): *dharmas-*

svarūpaviparītasādhana, 法自相相違因 *fa zi xiang xiang wei yin*.

翻法 *fan fa*, to negate [the very same property-possessor by means of] the [very same] property [of the subject of inference]; Text 4.4. Cf. 翻法作 *fan fa zuo*, 以法翻有法作 *yi fa fan you fa zuo*.

翻法作 *fan fa zuo*, to carry out [a refutation in the form of] negating [the very same property-possessor by means of] the [very same property [of the subject of inference]; Text 4.4. Cf. 翻法 *fan fa*, 以法翻有法作 *yi fa fan you fa zuo*.

非學世間 *fei xue shi jian*, non-scholarly common knowledge, Text 1.3. Cf. 學者世間 *xue zhe shi jian*.

佛無漏色 *fo wu lou se*, the untainted form of the Buddha; Text 1.4.

佛有漏色 *fo you lou se*, tainted form of the Buddha; Texts 3.7, 6.7.

共比量 *gong bi liang*, inference [for] both (cf. n. 51); Texts 1.2, 1.10 (see n. 68), 1.14, 6.6.

共有法自相相違因 *gong you fa zi xiang xiang wei yin*, a reason [that proves] the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor that is equally [accepted]; Text 4.4. Cf. 有法自相相違因 *you fa zi xiang xiang wei yin*.

極成 *ji cheng*, *prasiddha* (NP 2.1), well established; Texts 1.1, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.11, 2a.1, 2a.4, 2a.5, 2a.6, 2b.1, 2b.2, 2b.4, 2b.6, 3.2, 3.7, 4.3, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 6.1, 6.4, 6.5, 6.7, 6.9.

極成初三 *ji cheng chu san*, the first three [*dhātus*] that are well established; Texts 2a.5, 2a.6, 2b.6, 5.6.

即識之色 *ji shi zhi se*, the visual form that is identical with the [visual] consciousness; Texts 2a.6, 2b.4.

簡別 *jian bie*, *viśeṣaṇa* (cf. He 2014: 1233), qualification; Text 1.2.

決定相違 *jue ding xiang wei*. (1) Cf. NP 3.2.2(6): *viruddhāvyaḥicārin*, 相違決定 *xiang wei jue ding*; [reason that does] not deviate, but [is] contradictory; Texts 1.9, 1.10. (2) [A reason] conclusively proving the opposite [of the own form of the property to be proved]; Text 1.6; cf. 法自相決定相違 *fa zi xiang jue ding xiang wei*.

離識量 *li shi liang*, inference of the separate-ness [of the visual form] from the [visual] consciousness; Text 6.6.

難一切因過 *nan yi qie yin guo*, the fault of the refutation of all [logical] reasons; Texts 4.4, 4.5.

汝執 *ru zhi*, that you hold; Text 1.2.

色 *se*, *rūpa*, visual form; Texts 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.12, 2a.1, 2a.4, 2a.6, 2b.1, 2b.2, 2b.4, 2b.6, 3.2, 3.5, 3.7, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 6.1, 6.4, 6.5, 6.7, 6.9.

攝相歸識 *she xiang gui shi*, [the ontological thesis that] the form (*ākāra*, *xiang* 相) is included in the consciousness; Text 6.2.

勝論 *sheng lun*, “the distinguished school,” i.e., *Vaiśeṣika*; Text 4.3.

聲論[師] *sheng lun [shi]*, [proponent (*shi* 師) of] the theory [of the permanence] of sound, i.e., a *Śābdika*; Texts 4.1, 4.3.

聲生論 *sheng sheng lun*, [proponent of] the theory that sound is produced; Text 1.10.

聲性 *sheng xing*, *śabdatva* (NP 3.2.2[6]), soundness; Text 1.10.

勝義 *sheng yi*. (1) *paramārtha*, ultimate truth; Text 1.3. Cf. 殊勝義 *shu sheng yi*. (2) **paramārtha*(*taḥ*), (from the standpoint of) ultimate truth; Text 1.2. Cf. 真故 *zhen gu*.

十方佛色 *shi fang fo se*, forms of the Buddhas in [all] ten directions; Text 1.4.

釋迦菩薩實不善色 *shi jia pu sa shi bu shan se*, the very impure form of the Bodhisattva Śākyamuni; Texts 2a.4, 2b.6, 5.4.

世間相違 *shi jian xiang wei*, *lokaviruddha* (NP 3.1[4]), [inference] contradicted by common knowledge; Text 1.1.

殊勝義 *shu sheng yi*, supreme truth; Text 1.3. Cf. 勝義 *sheng yi* (1).

疎所緣緣 *shu suo yuan yuan*, object distant [in time] as a condition [for the rise of consciousness]; Text 1.13. Cf. CWSL 40c14-21 (Cook 1999: 246-247).

隨一不成 *sui yi bu cheng*, *anyatarāsiddha* (NP 3.2.1[2]), [a reason] not established for (i.e., not accepted by) one of the two parties [in debate]; Texts 1.12, 3.6. 6.1, 6.5, 6.9. Cf. 他隨一 *ta sui yi*, 一分隨一不成 *yi fen sui yi bu cheng*.

隨一過 *sui yi guo*, the fault [that the probative property (*sādhanadharmā*), i.e., the reason, is not established (*asiddha*) for, i.e., not accepted by] one of the two parties [in debate, i.e., the opponent, to be present in a positive example]; Text 1.8 (cf. n. 65). Cf. NP 3.3.1(1): *sādhanadharmāsiddha*.

隨一分所依不成 *sui yi yi fen suo yi bu cheng*, [the fault that] one part of the substratum (*āśraya*) (i.e., the subject of the reason-statement) is not established for one of the two parties [in debate] (i.e., either the proponent or the opponent); Text 1.4 (cf. n. 58).

所立不成 *suo li bu cheng*, cf. NP 3.3.1(2): *sādhadharmāsiddha*, 所立法不成 *suo li fa bu cheng*; [the fault of the positive example that] what is to be proved (*sādhya*) is not established (*asiddha*) [with regard to it]; Text 1.13.

他比量 *ta bi liang*, inference [for] others (cf. n. 51); Text 1.2.

他不定 *ta bu ding*, inconclusiveness with respect to [the theory of] the opponent (cf. n. 80); Texts 2a.4, 2a.6 (cf. n. 84), 2b.6, 3.7.

他方佛色 *ta fang fo se*, visual form of the Buddhas in another world; Texts 1.8, 2a.6, 2b.4, 5.5.

他方佛聲 *ta fang fo sheng*, the voice of the Buddhas in another world; Text 4.2.

他隨一 *ta sui yi*, [not established for] (i.e., not accepted by) one of the two parties [in debate] (i.e., the opponent); Text 1.2 (cf.

n. 50). Cf. 隨一不成 *sui yi bu cheng*, 一分隨一不成 *yi fen sui yi bu cheng*.
 他一分所別不成 *ta yi fen suo bie bu cheng*, [the fault that] one part of the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) (i.e., the subject) is not established for the opponent; Text 1.4. Cf. NP 3.1(7): *aprasiddhaviśeṣya*, 所別不極成 *suo bie bu ji cheng*; 一分自所別不成 *yi fen zi suo bie bu cheng*.

唯識比量 *wei shi bi liang*, inference of consciousness-only; Text 1.1. Cf. 唯識量 *wei shi liang*.

違世間自教等失 *wei shi jian zi jiao deng shi*, faults such as being contradicted by common knowledge or by one's own tradition, etc.; Text 1.2. Cf. NP 3.1(3): *āgamaviruddha*, 自教相違 *zi jiao xiang wei*; 3.1(4): *lokaviruddha*, 世間相違 *shi jian xiang wei*.

唯識量 *wei shi liang*, inference of consciousness-only; Text 6.6. Cf. 唯識比量 *wei shi bi liang*.

違宗 *wei zong*, **siddhāntaviruddha*, contradicted by [one's own] doctrine; Texts 1.2, 1.4, 1.5. Cf. 一分違宗 *yi fen wei zong*.

無遮大會 *wu zhe da hui*, the great non-restrictive assembly (cf. n. 47); Text 1.1.

相違難 *xiang wei nan*, objection [meant to point out the fault that the reason is] contradictory; Texts 2a.6, 2b.4, 2b.6, 5.2, 5.6, 6.7.

學者世間 *xue zhe shi jian*, scholarly common knowledge; Text 1.3. Cf. 非學世間 *fei xue shi jian*.

眼 *yan*, *caḥsus*, visual sense (cf. n. 48); Texts 1.1, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.12, 1.13, 1.14, 2a.1, 2a.4, 2a.5, 2a.6, 2b.1, 2b.2, 2b.4, 2b.5, 2b.6, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9. Cf. 眼根 *yan gen*.

眼根 *yan gen*, *caḥsurindriya*, visual faculty (cf. n. 48); Texts 1.6, 1.9, 1.13, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 6.7. Cf. 眼 *yan*.

眼識 *yan shi*, *caḥsurvijñāna*, visual consciousness; Texts 1.1, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.12, 1.13, 1.14, 2a.1, 2a.4, 2a.6, 2b.1, 2b.4, 2b.6, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 6.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9.

以法翻有法作 *yi fa fan you fa zuo*, to carry out [a refutation in the form of] negating the [very same] property-possessor by the [very same] property [of the subject of inference]; Text 4.5. Cf. 翻法 *fan fa*, 翻法作 *fan fa zuo*.

一分隨一不成 *yi fen sui yi bu cheng*, [the fault that] one part [of the reason] is not established for (i.e., not accepted by) one of the two parties [in debate]; Text 3.6. Cf. 隨一不成 *sui yi bu cheng*, 他隨一 *ta sui yi*.

一分違宗 *yi fen wei zong*, [the fault that] one part [of the subject] is contradicted by [one's own] doctrine; Text 1.4. Cf. 違宗 *wei zong*.

一分自所別不成 *yi fen zi suo bie bu cheng*, [the fault that] one part of the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) (i.e., the subject) is not established by the proponent (cf. n. 55); Text 1.4. Cf. 他一分所別不成 *ta yi fen suo bie bu cheng*.

一切佛身有漏諸色 *yi qie fo shen you lou zhu se*, all the tainted forms of Buddha's body; Text 1.4.

意許 *yi xu*, **iṣṭa*, admitted; Texts 1.7, 3.2, 3.3, 6.7.

以宗法爲因 *yi zong fa wei yin*, using a property of the subject of inference (*pa-kṣadharmā*) [that is actually the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*)] as a [logical] reason; Texts 6.2, 6.3.

有法 *you fa*, *dharmin* (NP 2.1), property-possessor; Texts 1.3, 1.7, 1.8, 1.14, 3.3, 3.4, 4.0a, 4.0b, 4.1, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 6.6, 6.7.

有法差別 *you fa cha bie*, *dharmaviśeṣa* (NP 3.2.3[4]), specific attribute of the property-possessor; Texts 1.7, 1.8, 1.14, 3.3, 3.4, 4.0b, 6.6, 6.7.

有法差別過言 *you fa cha bie guo yan*, [objection meant to] state [the reason's] fault of [proving the opposite of some] specific attribute of the property-possessor; Text 3.4. Cf. 有法差別相違 *you fa cha bie xiang wei*, 有法差別相違言 *you fa cha bie xiang wei yan*.

有法差別相違 *you fa cha bie xiang wei*, *dharmaviśeṣaviparīta* (NP 3.2.3[4]), [the reason's fault of proving] the opposite of

- [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor; Texts 1.7, 1.8, 1.14, 4.0b (cf. n. 109), 6.6, 6.7. Cf. 有法差別過言 *you fa cha bie guo yan*, 有法差別相違言 *you fa cha bie xiang wei yan*.
- 有法差別相違言 *you fa cha bie xiang wei yan*, [objection] stating [the reason's] fault of [proving] the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor; Text 1.7. Cf. 有法差別過言 *you fa cha bie guo yan*, 有法差別相違 *you fa cha bie xiang wei*.
- 有法差別相違因 *you fa cha bie xiang wei yin*, *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana* (NP 3.2.3[4]), [a reason] proving the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor; Text 4.0b (cf. n. 109).
- 有法自相 *you fa zi xiang*, *dharmisvarūpa* (NP 3.2.3[3]), own form of the property-possessor; Texts 1.7, 4.0a, 4.1, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7.
- 有法自相相違因 *you fa zi xiang xiang wei yin*, *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* (NP 3.2.3[3]), a reason [that proves] the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor; Texts 4.0a (cf. n. 107), 4.4, 4.6, 4.7.
- Cf. 共有法自相相違因 *gong you fa zi xiang xiang wei yin*.
- 有性 *you xing*, *bhāva* (NP 3.2.3[3]), being; Texts 4.0a, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6.
- 真故 *zhen gu*, **paramārthataḥ*, from the standpoint of ultimate truth; Texts 1.1, 1.3, 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, 1.16, 2a.1, 2b.1, 5.2. Cf. 勝義 *sheng yi* (2).
- 自比量 *zi bi liang*, inference [for] oneself (cf. n. 51); Texts 1.2, 1.10, 3.7.
- 自許 *zi xu*, that we accept; Texts 1.1, 1.2, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 1.14, 2a.1, 2a.2, 2a.3, 2a.5, 2a.6, 2b.1, 2b.2, 2b.3, 2b.4, 2b.5, 2b.6, 3.1, 3.6, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9.
- 自許初三 *zi xu chu san*, the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept; Texts 1.1, 1.9 (cf. n. 66), 2a.1, 2b.1, 2b.4, 3.6, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4.
- 自在眼識 *zi zai yan shi*, unimpeded visual consciousness; n. 70.
- 最後身菩薩染污諸色 *zui hou shen pu sa ran wu zhu se*, defiled forms of the Bodhisattva [Śākyamuni] in his last lifetime [before entering into *nirvāṇa*]; Text 1.4.

APPENDIX 2: CORRESPONDENCES BETWEEN PASSAGES IN SECTIONS 2A, 2B AND 5

In the chart below, raised numbers following the text numbers indicate the sequence of sentences in the respective text. For example, 2a.6³ indicates the third group of sentences of Text 2a.6. 2a.6³^[1] indicates a sentence that is part of 2a.6³.

Text 2a (Wengui)	Text 2b (Wengui)	Texts 5.2-5.6 (Wōnhyo)	Analysis of Content
2a.1 問如立宗... 應非極成	2b.1 問如立宗... 應非極成	5.2 ¹ 今謂此因... 猶如眼根	statement of the inference to be discussed
2a.2 答此云自... 故不例也	2b.2 答此云自... 故不例也		the being well established of the reason-statement
2a.3 問既不簡... 自許言耶	2b.3 問既不簡... 自許言耶		the question about the aim of “that we accept”
2a.6 ¹ 答雖得避... 遮相違難	2b.4 ¹ 答此為遮... 須自許言	5.2 ² 遮相違難避 不定過	the two aims of “that we accept”
2a.6 ² 謂他作相... 難便成也	2b.4 ² 謂他作相... 故如眼識	5.3 辱類於前... 猶如眼根	a possible refutation based on a <i>dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana</i> reason

Text 2a (Wengui)	Text 2b (Wengui)	Texts 5.2-5.6 (Wōnhyo)	Analysis of Content
2a.6 ³ 若言自許... 遮相違難	2b.4 ³ 今遮此難... 識之色耶	5.4 我遮此難... 識之色耶	response by means of an extraordinary counterexample
	2b.4 ⁴ 若不云自... 遮相違難	5.5 ¹ 若不須自... 不定過者	impossibility of the above response without “that we accept”
	2b.5 問但云初... 須自許耶		
2a.4 ¹ 答此爲遮... 不定難云	2b.6 ¹ 答若不言... 不定過云	5.5 ² 他亦爲我作 不定過謂	prevention of the fault of the reason's inconclusiveness by means of the same qualification
2a.4 ² 此極成色... 離眼識耶	2b.6 ² 極成之色... 故云自許	5.5 ³ 此極成色... 非離眼識耶	refutation in order to point out the reason's inconclusiveness if “that we accept” were omitted
2a.5 問但應云... 自許避之	2b.6 ³ 若爲避此... 所不攝者	5.6 ¹ 若爲避此... 初三等者	prevention of the fault of the reason's inconclusiveness through the qualification “that is well established” added to “the first three (<i>dhātus</i>)”
2a.6 ⁽³⁾ 用自許之... 遮相違難	2b.6 ⁴ 即不得與... 言自許也	5.6 ² 則不得遮彼 相違難云云	impossibility of the prevention of the refutation based on a <i>dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana</i> reason through the above qualification

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- IDS Zōshun 藏俊, Inmyō daisho shō 因明大疏抄. T 68, no. 2271.
- IRMS Zenju 善珠, Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō 因明論疏明燈鈔. T 68, no. 2270.
- JYHS Jingyan 淨眼, Yinming ru zhengli lun hou shu 因明入正理論後疏; see Shen 2008: 278-299 (text), 300-314 (plates).
- JYLC Jingyan 淨眼, Yinming ru zhengli lun lue chao 因明入正理論略抄; see Shen 2008: 244-264 (text), 265-277 (plates).
- NMu Nyāyamukha (Dignāga): see Katsura 1977-1987.
- NP Nyāyapraveśa (Śāṅkarasvāmin): see Tachikawa 1971: 140-144.
- NPT Nyāyapraveśakaṭīkā (Haribhadra): *Nyāyapraveśakaśāstra of Baudh Acārya Dīnāga*. With the Commentary of Acārya Haribhadrasūri

- and with the Subcommentary of Pārsvadevagaṇi ed. by Muni Jambuvijaya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 2009, p. 13-55.
- PBRN Wōnhyo (元曉), P'an biryang non 判比量論. X 53, no. 860; English translation: see Lusthaus 2012.
- PS Pramāṇasamuccaya (Dignāga), as quoted in Katsura 1977-1987 and by Shinya Moriyama in this volume.
- RINM Daijō hossō kenjin shō 大乘法相研神章 (Gomyō 護命), Chapter 10: Ryakken Inmyō nisshōri mon 略顯因明入正理門: T 71, no. 2309, 29a5-36b24.
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- X Shinsan Dai Nippon Zokuzōkyō 已新纂大日本續藏經. Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 1975-1989.
- YMDS Kuiji (窺基), Yinming da shu 因明大疏; see Zheng 2010 and T 44, no. 1840.
- ZJL Yanshou (延壽), Zong jing lu 宗鏡錄. T 48, no. 2016.
- ZYS Wengui (文軌), Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏, abbreviated as Zhuang yan shu 莊嚴疏. Woodprint Edition. Nanjing: Zhina neixue yuan, 1934.
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