

# Jñānaśrīmitra on *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*

by

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## Introduction

It was really a new attempt when Dharmakīrti introduced *sādhya* *viparyaye* [*hetoh*] *bādhakapramāṇa* (hereafter VBP) as a methodological device with reference to *svabhāvahetu*, especially with respect to the proof of momentariness of all existence, in his logico-epistemological system.<sup>1</sup> Dharmakīrti's followers discussed the role and logical content of VBP in the *pramāṇa* system mainly in the context of the proof of *kṣaṇabhāṅga*.

With reference to the theory, several studies have brought into focus its impact on the whole logico-epistemological theory of later Buddhist logicians.<sup>2</sup> Above all Tani, in his great work, focuses on the relation between VBP and *prasaṅga/prasaṅgaviparyaya* and their roles, and discusses how Dharmakīrti's followers evaluate them in their proof of momentariness.<sup>3</sup> This theory, in fact, raised new complications with respect to the structure of the means of valid cognition and its logical and epistemic base.<sup>4</sup>

One of these complications is the relation between VBP and establishing *anvaya* (*-vyāpti*) as well as *vyatireka* (*-vyāpti*). It seems unclear in both traditional and contemporary interpretations whether VBP is valid for establishing either affirmative concomitance (*anvaya*) or negative concomitance (*vyatireka*), or whether it is valid for both at the same time. It is of course not easy to find a direct answer to this question by an Indian logician. But in an effort to do so, this paper will begin by focusing on Jñānaśrīmitra's descriptions of VBP, especially in the *vyatireka* section of the *Kṣaṇabhāṅga* chapter of the *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali* (JNA). At the beginning of this chapter, an opponent called *viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin* appears, whose claims are criticized by Jñānaśrīmitra. By analyzing the relevant texts, we may be able to discern where Jñānaśrīmitra stands on the issue.

As a preliminary observation, it may help us to keep in mind that *anvaya-vyāpti* and *vyatireka-vyāpti* are accepted as *logically* equivalent, at least by the thinkers after Dharmakīrti. In the epistemic process, however, we cannot simply presume their equivalence, since

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Steinkellner 1982, 1991.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Tani 1999, Woo 1999, Shiraishi 2005, Sakai 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Tani's understanding of the VBP's interpretations by Dharmakīrti's followers, such as Dharmottara and Prajñākara Gupta, are scattered throughout his work (1999), but are found in chapter 3 in particular.

<sup>4</sup> For instance: First, VBP is sometimes identified with or regarded as being based on *vyāpakā[dharmā]-anupalabdhi*, at least by Dharmakīrti and some logicians after him. Is VBP an inference based on *vyāpakānupalabdhi* or it cannot necessarily be identified with such an inference? Second, how is VBP related to *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*? If VBP is different from these, what is the difference between *prasaṅga/prasaṅgaviparyaya* and VBP formally, logically, and content-wise? Or is the latter the same as the former, especially *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, since both of them have the same style of proof formulation. The late Prof. Kajiyama assessed the matter as follows: "I think that Kamalaśīla was quite right when he identified *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam* with a *prasaṅga*. . . . With Kamalaśīla, I also regard *bādhakapramāṇa* as *prasaṅga* in essence" (Kajiyama 1999: 37). He did not, however, mention the passage upon which his estimation depends.

it depends on what kind of independent *pramāṇa* or other subsidiary means of cognition the determination of *anvaya* or *vyatireka* is related to or based upon, as will be discussed in the following. We can suppose this is one of the reasons Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti treat them separately in their discussion on the proof of momentariness.

Jñānaśrīmitra's *Kṣaṇabhāṅgādhyāya* consists of three *pādas*. In the first *pāda*, *pakṣadharmādhikāra*, the theme is that in the formula “*yat sat tat kṣaṇikaṃ yathā jaladharah, santas tu bhāvā ime*” (Whatever is existent is momentary, for instance a rain cloud. And these things are existent. [Therefore, these things are momentary.]), the reason *sat/sattva* is not “unestablished” (*asiddha*). In the second *pāda*, *anvayādhikāra*, it is not incompatible (*viruddha*). And in the third *pāda*, *vyatirekādhikāra*, which I take up in the following, it is not inconclusive (*anaikāntika*).

## 1. The relation between two kinds of pervasion, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*

The critique of the *viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin* in Jñānaśrīmitra's *vyatirekādhikāra* begins with the following argument:

(A) There is also no suspicion that [the reason “being existent” might be] inconclusive, because the proof is given based on the pervasion that comprises all [individual instances] (*sarvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteh*).

⟨Opponent, i.e., *viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin*⟩ The pervasion is established by virtue of “the means of valid cognition that annuls [the reason] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven]” (*viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*). Therefore, we do not find any additional information (*vārtā*) by introducing it (i.e. the pervasion that comprises all individual instances). Then, why do you say that the pervasion is [already] established?

...

⟨Opponent⟩ In this way, there must only be an affirmative concomitance (*anvayamātram*). Then, how can we obtain the conclusive exclusion [of the reason] from the dissimilar domain?

⟨Jñānaśrīmitra⟩ It is because the pervasion is exactly established.

⟨Opponent⟩ How is the pervasion of the negative exclusion itself established?<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> JNA p. 60, 3–10: *nāpy anaikāntikaśaṅkā, sarvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteh prasāadhanāt. nanu viparyayabādhakapramāṇavaśād vyāptisiddhiḥ, tasya ca nopanyāsavārtā. tat katham vyāptiḥ prasādhitety ucyate? ...nanv evam anvayamātram astu, vipakṣāt punar ekāntena vyatireka iti katham labhyam iti cet. vyāptisiddher eva. vyatireke vyāptisiddhir eva katham it cet.* (Ci' RNA p. 70, 9–11 and 15–16: *na cāyam anaikāntikaḥ, atraiva sādharmaṃ vyatirekaḥ sarvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteh prasāadhanāt. nanu viparyayabādhakapramāṇabalād vyāptisiddhiḥ, tasya copanyāsavārtāpi nāsti. tat katham vyāptiḥ prasādhitety cet. ... nanv evam anvayamātram astu. vipakṣāt punar ekāntena vyāvṛttir iti kuto labhyata iti cet. vyāptisiddher eva. vyatirekasandeha vyāptisiddhir eva katham it cet.*) [Different readings are in bold font.]

From the description above, we first notice that Jñānaśrīmitra evaluates *sarvopasaṃhā-ravyāpti* in the *anvaya-vyatireka* context of their symmetrical roles, while the opponent, *viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin*, does not.<sup>6</sup> This is one of the crucial points dividing Jñānaśrīmitra's position from that of the *viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin*. I will come back to this point again in a later section. Jñānaśrīmitra then formally differentiates and defines the two pervasions, *anvayarūpā* and *vyatirekarūpā*.

(B) 〈Jñānaśrīmitra〉 No, the pervasion is in fact of two kinds. One is that which has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (*anvayarūpā*) and is a property of the subjective element (*karṭṛdharma*). It is the inevitable presence of that which is to be proven in the property-possessor that has the proving [property]. And the other is that which has negative concomitance as its essential characteristic (*vyatirekarūpā*) and is a property of the objective element (*karmadharmā*). It is the inevitable absence of the proving [property] when that which is to be proven is absent. This is because the following is a sound logic: The pervasion is such that the pervader presents there (i.e., in the pervaded) *without fail*, or else the pervaded presents *only* there (i.e., in the pervader).<sup>7</sup>

We do not find any original element in Jñānaśrīmitra's definition of *anvaya-vyāpti* and *vyatireka-vyāpti* except the introduction of the expressions *karṭṛdharma* and *karmadharmā*. As to these terms, taking the *sādhana-sādhya* relation into consideration, I tentatively interpret *karṭṛ* and *karman* as corresponding to *sādhana* and *sādhya*, respectively.<sup>8</sup> If my understanding is correct, then it follows that Jñānaśrīmitra regards a proof as a *kriyā*, of which *sādhana* and *sādhya* are constituent elements. Then, he refers to the relation between *anvaya-vyāpti* and *vyatireka-vyāpti* as follows:

(C) And the establishment of one of these two *inevitably* (*niyamena*) hints at the understanding of the second (i.e., the other). This is because otherwise even one of them cannot be established. The practical activity of the valid means of cognition is carried out only *directly* (*sākṣāt*) with reference to one [of them], and one can gain an understanding of the other as [logically] immediate (*nāntarī-yakatayā*). The expression “one [of the two]” is employed just as far as they are [related to each other in this way]. And in such a case, even if suspicion about one of these two arises before a valid means of cognition of the other functions, the suspicion will be expelled by it afterwards. Just as for those who advocate

<sup>6</sup> The relation between VBP and *sarvopasaṃhāra* has been studied recently by Sakai (2014).

<sup>7</sup> JNA p. 60, 10–13: *na, dvividhā hi vyāptiḥ, anvayarūpā ca karṭṛdharmaḥ sādhanavati dharmiṇi sādhyasyāvaśyambhāvo yaḥ, vyatirekarūpā ca karmadharmāḥ sādhyābhāve sādhanasyāvaśyambhāvo yaḥ,*<sup>←a</sup> *vyāptir vyāpakasya tatra bhāva eva vyāpyasya vā tatraiva bhāva iti nyāyāt.* (a: Ci' RNA p. 70, 17–20: *na, dvividhā hi vyāptisiddhiḥ, anvayarūpā ca karṭṛdharmaḥ sādhanadharmavati dharmiṇi sādhyadharmasyāvaśyambhāvo yaḥ, vyatirekarūpā ca karmadharmāḥ sādhyābhāve sādhanasyāvaśyambhāvo\* yaḥ.*) [Different readings are in bold font.] (\*Emendation. RNA p. 70, 19: *sādhanasyāvaśyambhāvo.*)

<sup>8</sup> Another interpretation is as follows: Taking the context of the *vyāpaka-vyāpya* relation into consideration, *karṭṛ* and *karman* can correspond to *vyāpaka* (i.e., *sādhya*) and *vyāpya* (i.e., *sādhana*), respectively.

“the means of valid cognition that annuls [the reason] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven] (*viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin*),” affirmative concomitance, even though it is suspected, since the suspicion is expelled by virtue of the conclusive exclusion [of the property] from the dissimilar domain (*vipakṣād ekāntena vyāvṛttibalāt*), concludes that the “being existent,” which never happens at all in [the things] that are not momentary, is really restricted by [the property of] momentary perishing.

...

Accordingly, there is *no difference in content* (*na kaścīd arthato bhedaḥ*) between them; viz., the conclusive exclusion of the proving [property] in the absence of [the property] to be proven, and the inevitable concomitance of [the property] to be proven when the proving [property] is present [in the subject of the thesis].<sup>9</sup>

Here Jñānaśrīmitra stresses the incorporation of the understanding of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* into the epistemic process. In the last part of the passage cited above, he says that there is no difference in content between them. Here, we must draw attention to the underlined portion. According to Jñānaśrīmitra’s description, the VBP-*vādin* claims that the suspicion of *anvaya* can be expelled by the exclusion [of the property] from dissimilar domain. That is, VBP-*vādin* prioritizes *vyatireka* over *anvaya*.

Jñānaśrīmitra then adds:

(D) As to the function (*vyāpāra*) of the means of valid cognition, however, its practical activity (*vyavahāra*) is of two kinds, *principally* (*mukhyato*) and *implicatively* (*arthataḥ*).<sup>10</sup>

On the level of daily performance, however, we find two kinds of practical activities of the valid means of cognition, principally (*mukhyato*), or directly (*sākṣāt*), and implicatively (*arthataḥ*), which follows direct cognition as [logically] immediate (*nāntarīyakatayā*). For Jñānaśrīmitra, the difference between *anvaya* and *vyatireka* lies only in the level of practical activity (*vyavahāra*). In Dignāga’s system as well as Dharmakīrti’s, the relation between *anvaya* and *vyatireka* is sometimes expressed as *arthāpattiyā*.<sup>11</sup> If one is proven, the other is automatically understood by *arthāpatti*. That is, either of these two is *logically* implied in the other. Jñānaśrīmitra’s expression *arthataḥ* accords with this idea.

<sup>9</sup> JNA p. 60, 13–18 and 61, 2–3: <sup>a→</sup>*enayoś caikasiddhir niyamena dvitīyapratītim ākṣipati. anyathā ekasyāpy asiddheḥ.* <sup>←a</sup> *kevalam sākṣād ekatra pramāṇavyāpāro ’nyatra nāntarīyakatayā pratītir iti tāvataivaikavyapadeśaḥ. tathā ca saty ekatra pramāṇapravṛtteḥ pūrvam anyatra saṁśayaḥ pravartamāno ’pi paścāt [tanyā?] tayā nirasyate. yathā viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādinām anvayaḥ sandhiyamāno ’pi vipakṣād ekāntena vyāvṛttibalāt nirastasaṁśayaḥ paryavasyaty akṣaṇike sarvathā ’nupapadyamāneyam sattā kṣaṇabhaṅganīyateveti, ...tasmāt sādhyābhāve sādhanasyaikāntiko vyatirekaḥ, sādhanē sati sādhyasyāvāśyam anvayo veti na kaścīd arthato bhedaḥ. (a: Ci’ RNA p. 70, 19–20: *enayoś caikatara-pratītir niyamena dvitīyapratītim ākṣipati. anyathāikasyā evāsiddheḥ.*) [Different readings are in bold font.]*

<sup>10</sup> JNA p. 61, 3–4: *pramāṇavyāpāras tu mukhyato ’rthataś ceti dvidhā vyavahārah.*

<sup>11</sup> NMu 3a1–3 (Katsura 1981: 71–72): 若有於此一分已成、隨說一分亦成能立、若如其聲兩義同許、俱不須說、或由義准一能顯二。 PST (Ms) 178b6 ad PS 4.5: *arthāpattiyā vetyādi. ...*; PVSV p. 18, 17 (=PVin2, p. 53, 10): *arthāpattiyā vānyatāreṇobhayapradarśanād iti.*

## 2. *sādhakapramāṇa* and *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*

Then Jñānaśrīmitra presents an argument of *sādhaka*- and *viparyayabādhaka*-*pramāṇa*.

(E) Precisely therefore, in every reasoning, if one seeks “the means of valid cognition that annuls the reverse of that which is to be proven” [and if there is such a means of valid cognition], there is an affirmative concomitance [of the reason] with that which is to be proven, in the case where the proving [property] (i.e., the reason) is present [in the subject of the thesis]. One should know that seeking “the means of valid cognition that establishes [that which is to be proven] (*sādhakapramāṇa*),” is *implied* (*upalakṣita*) by that (i.e., seeking VBP). Furthermore, [when one introduces VBP,] both [of these two *pramāṇas*, namely, *sādhakapramāṇa* and *bādhakapramāṇa*,] are really *integrated* (*ubhayaśaṃgraha eva*) by the term “annulling the reverse” (*viparyayabādhaka*).<sup>12</sup>

If we try to prove the pervasion by VBP, we should know that *sādhakapramāṇa* is *implied* in VBP, and accordingly, we should know that both *pramāṇas* are *integrated* in the concept *bādhakapramāṇa*. The *ubhaya* of *ubhayaśaṃgraha* can also be interpreted as *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, but it seems more likely that Jñānaśrīmitra regards *sādhakapramāṇa* as corresponding to *anvaya* and *bādhakapramāṇa* to *vyatireka*. The above-quoted passage, however, throws into question any simple opposition between adopting *sādhakapramāṇa* and adopting *bādhakapramāṇa*. Though the two positions are ostensibly opposed, his argument makes little distinction between them. Rather, he seems to take an integrative or synthetic stance toward *sādhakapramāṇa*(*vādin*) and *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*(*vādin*), even if he thinks one of them is *prior* to the other in a particular case. Then, the question arises what kind of *pramāṇa* is intended by the term *sādhakapramāṇa*? We can surmise that Jñānaśrīmitra’s answer is given in the subsequent discussion, so let us examine what follows.

## 3. Two kinds of *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*<sup>13</sup>

Jñānaśrīmitra continues by explaining the latter position:

(F) In fact, with reference to the pervasion that has negative concomitance as its essential characteristic, [there is a means of valid cognition which] *annuls the proving [property] in the reverse of that which is to be proven*. (In the proof of momentariness, it annuls “being existent” in those that are not momentary.) With reference to [the pervasion] that has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic, on the other hand, it *annuls “the reverse of that which is*

<sup>12</sup> JNA p. 61, 4–6: *ata eva yatra yatra sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇaparyeṣaṇā, tatra sādhanē sati sādhyānvayaḥ, sādhyakapramāṇaparyeṣaṇāpi tayopalakṣitā veditavyā. viparyayabādhakaśabdēna punar ubhayaśaṃgraha eva.*

<sup>13</sup> At the last Dharmakīrti conference in 2005, Shiraishi drew attention to this passage. Regrettably, his paper, titled “Jñānaśrīmitra’s two interpretations of *bādhakapramāṇa*” was not included in the proceedings of the conference, *Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis*, 2011.

to be proven” [in the proving property] in the case where the proving property is present [in the subject of the thesis]. (*anvayarūpāyām tu sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakaṃ sādhanē satīti*) (It annuls “not being momentary” in those that are existent.) If these two [kinds of VBP] are absent (*ubhayābhāve*), the inevitable connection of the proving [property] with that which is to be proven would be impossible. The above is intended.<sup>14</sup>

According to Jñānaśrīmitra’s understanding, VBP proves not only *vyatireka* but *anvaya* as well, that is, it can be introduced in two ways. Furthermore, for *anvaya*, VBP annuls “the reverse of that which is to be proven” in the proving [property]. This is a new interpretation of the *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*.

As is well known, in his *Hetubindu*, Dharmakīrti first refers to ‘*sādhyaviparyaye hetoḥ bādhakapramāṇa*’ as follows:

*anvayaniścayo ’pi svabhāvahetau sādhyadharmasya vastutas tadbhāvatayā sādhanadharmabhāvamātrānubandhasiddhiḥ. sā sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇavrttiḥ. yathā yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva, akṣaṇikatve ’rthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇam vastutvam hīyate.*<sup>15</sup>

From the description, it is ambiguous whether or not Dharmakīrti was conscious of the relation between ‘*sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇa*’ and the proof of *anvaya-vyāpti* or *vyatireka-vyāpti*. It seems that Dharmakīrti introduced ‘*sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇa*’ as a subsidiary method for supporting the establishment of the inevitable connection of *anvaya*, stated as *anvayaniścayo ’pi*, but remained strongly conscious of the logical equality of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, an equality that is presupposed by the relation of the contradiction (*virodha*) between *sādhya* and *sādhya-viparyaya*. Logically, it is clear that ‘*sādhyaviparyaye hetor* (i.e., *sādhanasya*) *bādhakapramāṇa*’ can be understood as expressing *vyatireka*, since it proves that where *sādhyaviparyaya* is present, that is, where *sādhya* is absent, *hetu* is absent.

According to Jñānaśrīmitra’s understanding, however, VBP also annuls “the reverse of that which is to be proven” in the proving [property] (*sādhanē sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakapramāṇa*).<sup>16</sup> This is a new interpretation of VBP, based on the interpretation

<sup>14</sup> JNA p. 61, 6–8: *vyatirekarūpavyāptau hi sādhyaviparyaye bādhakaṃ sādhanasya, anvayarūpāyām tu sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakaṃ sādhanē satīti. tadubhayābhāve sādhanasya sādhyapratibandhānupapattir ity ayam arthaḥ. Cf. Shiraishi 2005: 6ff.*

<sup>15</sup> HB p. 4\*, 5–7. Skt. is reconstructed by Steinkellner. “Die Feststellung des gemeinsamen Vorkommens (*anvayaḥ*) ferner besteht beim Eigenwesen als dem Grund in dem Nachweis, daß die zu beweisende Beschaffenheit sich an das bloße Vorhandensein der beweisenden Beschaffenheit anschließt, weil [die zu beweisende Beschaffenheit] der Sache nach das Eigenwesen (*bhāvaḥ=svabhāvaḥ*) von etwas ist [das zugleich die beweisende Beschaffenheit zu seinem Eigenwesen hat]. Dieser [Nachweis] besteht im Auftreten eines Erkenntnismittels (*pramāṇam*), das den Grund im Gegenteil des zu Beweisenden aufhebt. Z.B.: Was seiend ist, das ist ausschließlich augenblicklich; wäre es nicht augenblicklich, würde es, da [die Nichtaugenblicklichkeit] mit der Wirksamkeit in Widerspruch steht, die Dingheit verlieren, da [die Dingheit eben] durch diese [Wirksamkeit] bestimmt ist.” (Steinkellner 1967: 37)

<sup>16</sup> We should also not overlook the expression *sādhanē sati*. The expression is presumably intended for those who claim that *pakṣadharmatā* is not necessarily required, such as Ratnākaraśānti. AVS p. 86, 2–4: *bādhakāt sādhyasiddhiś ced vyartha hetvantaragrahaḥ. bādhakāt tadasiddhiś ced vyartha dharmyantaragrahaḥ.*

of the compound (*viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*) as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* (hereafter VBP<sub>2</sub>), which is in contrast to the original interpretation of the compound as a locative *tatpuruṣa* (hereafter VBP<sub>1</sub>). According to Jñānaśrīmitra, at least, VBP<sub>1</sub> annuls the reason “being existent” (i.e., *hetos*) in “those that are not momentary” (i.e., *sādhyaviparyaye*). That is, VBP<sub>1</sub> *principally* or *directly* proves that if something is not momentary, it is non-existent, namely, *vyatireka*. It also proves that if a subject of a thesis is existent, it is momentary; that is, it proves *anvaya* *indirectly*, because being momentary and not being momentary are contradictory (*virodha*). In the second new interpretation, however, VBP<sub>2</sub> annuls “being not momentary” (i.e., “the reverse of that which is to be proven”) in that which “is existent” (i.e., the proving property). It proves *principally* or *directly* that if a subject of a thesis is existent, it is momentary, that is, *anvaya*. Therefore, according to his understanding, not only *vyatireka* but also *anvaya* can and should be proven by VBP (VBP<sub>1</sub>/VBP<sub>2</sub>). In the descriptions above, however, we do not concretely find both of these *bādhakapramāṇas*, such as *vyāpakānupalabdhi* introduced by Dharmakīrti and other logicians.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, in the above passage, Jñānaśrīmitra emphasizes not only the logical equivalence of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, but the methodological equivalence of *sādhakapramāṇa* and *bādhakapramāṇa* as well. By *ubhayābhāve* does he indicate that both of these VBPs are necessary? In the next paragraph, he states, “Those who present a proof should seek for both of these (i.e., *anvaya* and *vyatireka*) alternatively (*vikalpena*).” In other words, if one wants to prove a pervasion by VBP, one should introduce not only VBP<sub>1</sub> but also VBP<sub>2</sub>, which principally establishes the *anvaya* relation. It is likely that what he really wants to emphasize is the latter, VBP<sub>2</sub>.

He continues:

(G) Otherwise, even though one cannot directly (*sākṣāt*) obtain the means of valid cognition that determines negative concomitance, if one shows a means of valid cognition that establishes the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance (*anvayaniyama*) of the proving [property] with that which is to be proven, then what is its (=the proving property’s) inevitable connection with reference to the establishment of that which is to be proven? It is because [the means of valid cognition that establishes the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance] hints at the ability of negative concomitance as well (that is, there is no inevitable connection of affirmative concomitance that is independent from the ability of negative concomitance.)<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Steinkellner 1982: 2; 1991: 318. After Dharmakīrti, for instance: HBT p. 44, 24: *etac ca bādha-kaṃ pramāṇaṃ vyāpakānupalabdhirūpam uttaratrāvasaraprāptaṃ svayam eva vakṣyati*. VNT p. 10, 27–28: *idam uktaṃ bhavati. vyāpakānupalabdhir eva sahabhāvaṃ bādhathe hetoḥ sādhyābhāvena*. RNA p. 83, 8: *na ca viruddhānaikāntikate, vyāpakānupalambhātmanā viparyaye bādhakapramāṇena vyāpateḥ prasāadhanāt*. TBh(M) (Kajiyama 1966: 115, n. 309) ... *zhes pa khyab byed mi dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid can bzlog pa la gnod pa can gyi tshad mas* (... *iti vyāpakānupalabdhilakṣaṇa(rūpa)viparyayabādhakapramāṇena...*) [This part is dropped in the Sanskrit text to which we have access. The Sanskrit above has been reconstructed by Kajiyama.]

<sup>18</sup> JNA p. 61, 8–10: *anyathā vyatirekaniścāyakapramāṇasya sākṣād alābhe ’pi yadi sādhanasya sādhye-nānvayaniyamaprasādhakaṃ pramāṇam upadarśayet, kas tasya sādhyasiddhau pratibandho vyatirekasyāpi\* sāmartyāḥkṣepāt*. [\*Corrected with Ms.; JNA: *vyatirekasyānvayasyāpi*.] Concerning the last part, various readings are possible. The difference in the interpretation of the sentence lies in the

Otherwise [that is, if the means of valid cognition that establishes the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance is only able to establish affirmative concomitance, irrespective of the inevitability of negative concomitance], it would ensue that the proof formulation of similarity should not really be presented, since the proof does not directly express [the inevitability of] negative concomitance.

Accordingly, even though [an inevitable connection], the ability of which one can understand, does not have negative concomitance as its essential characteristic, exactly insofar as “wherever the proving [property is present], that which is to be proven [is also present]” [is the essence of pervasion], if there is the proving [property in the subject of the thesis], a wise person who is provided with the expectation of that which is to be proven [being established] achieves his purpose.

This is because, in fact, when the proving [property] is present [in the subject of the thesis], even if [a property that is to be proven] is absent when it (i.e., the proving property) is absent, if the [property] that is to be proven is *inevitably* present when it (i.e., the proving property) is present, then it is fruitful to accept the proof. Hence, a proponent who presents a proof should *seek even for both of these* (i.e., *anvaya* and *vyatireka*) *alternatively* (*vikalpena*), and even in either of these styles [a proof] which is established by a means of valid cognition must be shown by a proponent. In the proofs of the opponent, however, even an affirmative concomitance as having inevitability, is really difficult to be obtained, as a negative concomitance is. We should know in this way.<sup>19</sup>

From the above description, the position of the opponent, the *viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin*, seems to be that VBP should be introduced for the proof of *vyatireka* and it is the only way to prove the pervasion, while Jñānaśrīmitra equates VBP of *vyatireka* with that of *anvaya*, which is the substance of his new interpretation. Here, Jñānaśrīmitra claims that it is needless to state both of the means of valid cognition that prove *anvaya* and *vyatireka*; that the statement of either one is enough because they are logically connected to each other. Therefore, if the pervasion of *anvaya* is proven, it is unnecessary to state the proof of *vyatireka*.

The final statement above is particularly noteworthy. Jñānaśrīmitra points out a disadvantage in the opponent’s view: according to the opponent’s proof by VBP, the relation between *anvaya* and *vyatireka* is not clear. The point of his criticism lies not in VBP<sub>1</sub> itself

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understanding of “*tasya sādhyasiddhau*” [*tasya*: (a) *sādhānasya*, (b) *pramāṇasya*; *sādhyasiddhau*: (a) when ... is proven, (b) with reference to *sādhyasiddhi*].

<sup>19</sup> JNA p. 61, 11–17: *anyathā sādharṃyaprayogo ’nupādeya eva syāt, sāksād vyatirekānupadarśanāt. tad yadi sāmāthyagamyo ’pi na vyatirekātmā, tadā ’pi yatra yatra sādhanam tatra tatra sādhyam itīyataiva sādhanē sati sādhyapratyāsāprayuktaḥ kṛtī kṛtārthaḥ. tadabhāve ’bhāviny api hi sādhanē sati yadi tadbhāve ’vaśyambhāvi sādhyam tadā phalitaḥ sādhanasvīkāraḥ. tasmāt sādhanavādinā dvayam api paryeṣaṇīyam vikalpena, vādinā caiko ’pi prakāraḥ pramāṇasiddha upadarśayitavyaḥ, parasādhanēṣu ca vyatirekavad anvayo ’pi niyamavān durlabha eveti veditavyam.*

as a methodical device, but in the opponent's position whereby the proof of *vyatireka* by VBP<sub>1</sub> is the one and only way to prove a pervasion.

According to Jñānaśrīmitra's understanding, the difference between his position and that of the VBP-*vādin* is as follows:

	<i>viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin</i>	Jñānaśrīmitra's interpretation of <i>viparyaya-bādhakapramāṇa</i>
<i>anvaya</i>		<i>sādhane sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakapramāṇa</i> (VBP <sub>2</sub> ) or
<i>vyatireka</i>	<i>sādhyaviparyaye hetoḥ bādhakapramāṇa</i> (VBP <sub>1</sub> )	<i>sādhyaviparyaye hetoḥ bādhakapramāṇa</i> (VBP <sub>1</sub> )

We can say that the position of the opponent, *viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin*, is a propounder who claims VBP<sub>1</sub> has the exclusive ability to establish pervasion only through proving the *vyatireka-vyāpti* by VBP<sub>1</sub>. Meanwhile, Jñānaśrīmitra regards VBP (VBP<sub>1</sub>/VBP<sub>2</sub>) as having the synthetic ability to prove pervasion.

### 3. Priority of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*

Jñānaśrīmitra continues:

(H) However, for us, with reference to the discussed proof, affirmative concomitance with inevitability (*niyamavān anvayaḥ*) is really shown by *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* prior [to other means of valid cognition] (*paurastyābhyāṃ*). And even if both are applied to the cloud presented as a similar example, if one thing (A<sub>1</sub>) has the essential property of creating another (B<sub>1</sub>), the former (A<sub>1</sub>) inevitably produces the latter (B<sub>1</sub>), and one thing (A<sub>2</sub>) does not produce another (B<sub>2</sub>), then the former (A<sub>2</sub>) does not have the essential property of creating the latter (B<sub>2</sub>). Thus, [*anvaya* and *vyatireka*], which are functioning in this way, show that all [entities], indeed, that are endowed with the ability of activity (*kriyāśaktiyuktam*) are restricted to being momentary. Therefore, comprising all cases (*sarvopasaṃhāro*) is the ground for hinting at negative pervasion (*vyatirekākṣepabījaṃ*),<sup>20</sup> such as smoke and the like.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> As to the usage of *ākṣepa* in the context of the relation between *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, see RNA 67.4: *ākṣiptavyatirekā yā vyāptir anvayarūpiṇī / sādharṃyavati drṣṭānte sattvahetor ihocyate* // [The pervasion that has *anvaya* as its essential characteristic and by which [its] *vyatireka* is hinted at ...]; 83.4: *vyatirekātmikā vyāptir ākṣiptānvayarūpiṇī / vaidharṃyavati drṣṭānte sattvahetor ihocyate* // [The pervasion that has *vyatireka* as its essence and has the essential characteristic that [its] *anvaya* is hinted at ...] It seems that these two verses, which appear at the beginning of each chapter of Ratnakīrti's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, in the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* chapters, respectively, and have symmetrical construction, were composed by the author (Ratnakīrti or someone else) (see Woo 1999: 141), being strongly conscious of the discussion of the relation between *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, which Jñānaśrīmitra makes here.

<sup>21</sup> JNA p. 61, 18–22: *asmābhis tu prakṛtasādhane niyamavān anvayaḥ prasaṅgaviparyayābhyāṃ paurastyābhyāṃ darśīta eva, tau ca yady api sapakṣūkrte jalabhṛti pravartitau, tathāpi yo yatkaraṇasavbhāvaḥ*

Against the VBP-*vādin*, Jñānaśrīmitra argues for the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance (*anvayaniyama*) first and foremost through *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*. In the above statement, the first point to note is the expression *paurastyābhyām*; the second is that the statement is not concerned with pervasion in general, including *vyatireka(-niyama)*, but only with *anvayaniyama*. As to the first point, the term *paurastya* means “prior to,” “first,” or “preceding,” which suggests that he does not necessarily exclude the logic of VBP, but insists only that *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* should be introduced before introducing VBP. That is, for Jñānaśrīmitra, *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* are enough for establishing affirmative concomitance with reference to the proof of momentariness, whereas the VBP-*vādin* considers VBP to be the sole means for establishing the pervasion. Moreover, the “comprising [of] all [individual instances] (*sarvopasaṃhāro*)” as a concept having a connecting function between *anvaya* and *vyatireka* is highly esteemed by Jñānaśrīmitra. According to him, “if *anvaya* is established by *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*,” *sarvopasaṃhāra* is regarded as “the grounds for hinting at negative pervasion (*vyatirekā-kṣepabījam*),” whereas the VBP-*vādin* does not make much of this. The VBP-*vādin*’s low evaluation of *sarvopasaṃhāra* suggests that, according to his/their view, *vyatireka* can be proven independently (concerning each subject of the thesis) as having inevitability and is sufficient for establishing a pervasion.

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the basic difference between Jñānaśrīmitra and the VBP-*vādin* is the evaluation of efficacy of the proof based on the pervasion that comprises all [individual instances] (*sarvopasaṃhāravṛtyāpti*). The opponent, the VBP-*vādin*, apparently takes a negative stance toward *sarvopasaṃhāravṛtyāpti*. On this point it is likely that the opponent, the VBP-*vādin*, is not Ratnākaraśānti, because Ratnākaraśānti takes a positive stance toward the significant role of the *sarvopasaṃhāravṛtyāpti* for the proof of momentariness and his *antarvṛtyāpti*-theory. He says, for instance, “as this pervasion comprises all [individual instances], it depends upon the universal,”<sup>22</sup> and, “for pervasion comprising all [individual instances] is in fact an *indispensable constituent* (*aṅga*) of the establishment of that which is to be proven.”<sup>23</sup>

#### 4. Priority of *anvaya* over *vyatireka*

Furthermore Jñānaśrīmitra argues:

(I) Then, in this way, [the essence of] the pervasion [is that] “the pervading [property] is inevitably present in those which have the [property of being] pervaded.” And the establishment of momentary perishing cannot be repudiated on account of the efficacy itself of the reason “being existent” brought about by such a pervasion as that which has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (*anvayarūpā*) and which is a property of the subjective element. Thus, it is considered “*what is the use of introducing the means of*

*sa taj janayaty eva, yo yan na janayati na sa tatkaraṇasvabhāvaḥ, ity evaṃ pravartamānau sarvam eva kriyāśaktiyuktaṃ kṣaṇikatve niyataṃ darśayata iti sarvopasaṃhāro vyatirekā-kṣepabījam dhūmādivat.*

<sup>22</sup> AVS p. 64, 4: *sā ca sarvopasaṃhārāt sāmānyam avalambate ।*

<sup>23</sup> AVS p. 66, 3: *sarvopasaṃhāravatī hi vyāptiḥ sādhyasiddher aṅgam.*

*valid cognition that annuls [the proving property] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven] in this case? (kim atra viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopanyāseneti)”* Precisely for this reason, even the impossibility of introducing this (=the means of valid cognition that annuls [the proving property] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven]) does not hurt [the inference].

This is because *that which is to be proven is established by [the means of valid cognition] that annuls nothing but [the existence of] the reverse [of that which is to be proven in the proving property] (viparyayasyaiva bādhakena)*. Even in the texts of our tenets, ... , the pervasion that has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (*anvayarūpā*) is established in detail, appearing as excluding the inconclusiveness [of the proving property], as with seeds and the like...<sup>24</sup>

Here we see Jñānaśrīmitra’s efforts to defend the affirmative relation, namely, *anvaya*.

	<i>Viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin</i>	Jñānaśrīmitra’s interpretation of <i>viparyayabādhakapramāṇa</i>	Jñānaśrīmitra’s position
<i>anvaya</i>		<i>sādhane sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakapramāṇa (VBP<sub>2</sub>)</i> or	<i>prasaṅga</i> and <i>prasaṅgaviparyaya (=?)</i> <i>sādhane sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakapramāṇa (VBP<sub>2</sub>)</i>
<i>vyatireka</i>	<i>sādhyaviparyaye hetoḥ bādhakapramāṇa (VBP<sub>1</sub>)</i> (independent)	<i>sādhyaviparyaye hetoḥ bādhakapramāṇa (VBP<sub>1</sub>)</i>	

## 5. Concluding remarks

A cursory glance at the passages cited above seems to suggest that Jñānaśrīmitra criticizes the VBP maintained by the VBP-*vādin*. A detailed examination of the passage as a whole, however, leads us to the conclusion that the difference between his position and that of the VBP-*vādin* lies, in fact, above all in their evaluation of *sarvopasaṃhāravvyāpti* rather than of VBP itself. Both of these issues are, of course, closely related to each other, at least in Jñānaśrīmitra’s theory. The VBP-*vādin*’s low evaluation of *sarvopasaṃhāravvyāpti* suggests that the VBP-*vādin* is not Ratnākaraśānti, because Ratnākaraśānti takes a positive stance toward the significance of the *sarvopasaṃhāravvyāpti*. Secondly, with reference to VBP itself, Jñānaśrīmitra claims the priority of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* over VBP, whereas for the VBP-*vādin* VBP<sub>1</sub> is the only way to establish pervasion. Here Jñānaśrīmitra tries to

<sup>24</sup> JNA p. 63, 10–14: *tad evaṃ vyāptir vyāpakasya vyāpyavati bhāva eveti kartṛdharmānvayarūpavyāptisampāditasāmarthyād eva sattvahetoḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhir apratihateḥ kim atra viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopanyāseneti samarthitam? ata eva tadupanyāsāsakyatāpi na pīḍayati, viparyayasyaiva bādhakena sādhyasya siddhatvāt. śāstre’pi pratha[mani??]yame ca vyāptir anvayarūpā bījādivad anekāntaparihāravvyāptijena vistarataḥ prasādhitā. ...*

interpret VBP as a more synthetic and interrelated theory by expanding his interpretation of VBP (such that VBP is not only used for the proof of *vyatireka* but for that of *anvaya* as well). So it would seem that in all of his argumentation on VBP examined above, Jñānaśrīmitra seeks to establish the superiority of *anvaya* over *vyatireka*.

By this interpretation, we can easily understand and accept his positive statement concerning VBP in other contexts. For instance, in his *Vyāpticarcā*, after criticizing the *bhūyodarśana* of the Naiyāyikas, he says:

However, nothing but the *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, an inference, should be inducted (*unneyam*). If it (i.e., *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*) is absent, it would be impossible to negate the occurrence (*vṛtti*) [of reason] in the dissimilar domain (*vipakṣa*).<sup>25</sup>

In the above statement, where the determination of causal relations is discussed, Jñānaśrīmitra really evaluates VBP. In the Īśvara discussion as well, he states:

The means of valid cognition that establishes a pervasion is of only two kinds: perception and non-cognition or *viparyayabādhaka*, because both of these have perception and inference as their essential characteristics.<sup>26</sup>

In these passages Jñānaśrīmitra accepts the role of VBP, even if he regards it as having a limited secondary function.

As to the relation between VBP and *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, Jñānaśrīmitra gives priority to the latter over the former in the proof of the affirmative concomitance of momentariness. Is VBP<sub>2</sub>, as a genitive *tatpuruṣa*, different from *prasaṅga* or *prasaṅgaviparyaya*? If so, in which aspects is it different? And if the VBP-*vādin* is not Ratnākaraśānti, who might he be? These issues require further investigation.

## References and abbreviations

### Primary literature

**AVS** Antarvyāptisamarthana (Ratnākaraśānti): See Kajiyama 1999.

**HB** *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ, Teil I: Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text. Teil II: Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*, ed. Ernst Steinkellner. Vienna 1967.

**HBT** *Hetubinduḥkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa, with the sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*, ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jinavijayaji. Baroda 1949.

**JNA** *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ*, ed. Anantalal Thakur. Patna 1959, <sup>2</sup>1987.

**NMu** *Nyāyamukha* (因明正理門論). Taisho 1628.

**PST** *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*.

**PVin2** *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya: Chapters 1 and 2*, critically edited by Ernst Steinkellner. Beijing/Vienna 2007.

<sup>25</sup> VC p. 33\*, 7–9: *viparyayabādhakam eva tu pramāṇam anumānam unneyam, tadabhāve vipakṣavṛttiniśedhasyāśkyatvāt,...*

<sup>26</sup> JNA p. 293, 1: *tac ca pramāṇam vyāptisādhakam dvidvidham eva. pratyakṣānupalambhaṃ vā, viparyayabādhakam vā, anayoḥ pratyakṣānumānasvabhāvatvāt,....*

- PVSV** *Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti (Dharmakīrti): The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes*, ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma 1960.
- RNA** *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ*, ed. Anantalal Thakur. Patna <sup>2</sup>1975.
- TBh(M)** *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda*, ed. H.R. Rangaswami Iyengar. Mysore 1952.
- VC** *Jñānaśrīmitras Vyāpticarcā, Sanskrittext, Übersetzung, Analyse*, ed. Horst Lasic. Vienna 2000.
- VNT** *Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the commentary Vipanchitārthā of Acharya Śāntarakṣita and Sambandhaparīkṣā with the Commentary of Acharya Prabhachandra*, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi 1972.

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