

How Does One Cognize a Cow? A Dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga

by
Kei Kataoka

1. An unknown Jain ‘distinctionist,’ a Vaibhāgika

In PS 5.39–44 Dignāga defends his theory of *apoha* in reply to a Sāṃkhya theorist. PSV ad 5.39 begins with the words *yas tv āha*; the commentator Jinendrabuddhi identifies this theorist as Vaināśika, i.e. “the destroyer.” As Pind (2015: II Appendix 13) comments, this theorist must be the famous Sāṃkhya theorist Mādhava, who is elsewhere often called Sāṃkhyanāśaka, the destroyer of the Sāṃkhya system, because his unique views often deviate from orthodox Sāṃkhya tenets.¹ As Pind observes, it seems that Mādhava criticizes the theory of *apoha* by quoting from a lost work of Dignāga, probably either the *Sāṃkhyaparīkṣā* or the *Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyaśa*. The main scenario of PS 5.39 can be depicted as follows:

1. Dignāga has criticized Sāṃkhya views in an earlier work.
2. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s theory of *apoha*.
3. Dignāga replies to Mādhava’s criticism in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

PS 5.41ab refers to a certain view, namely, that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of a dewlap, and so on (*sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ*). Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516) ascribes this view to “an unknown Jain ‘distinctionist,’ a Vaibhāgika,” on the basis of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary *tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktam*.² Further, he ascribes the view presented in PS 5.41d (*bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ*) to Mādhava.³ In the following the present author reexamines the relevant material, i.e. PS(V) and PST, and shows that the first view should not be ascribed to a Jain Vaibhāgika but to Mādhava, and the second view not to Mādhava but to Dignāga.

	Pind	Kataoka
PS 5.41ab: <i>sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ</i>	Jain Vaibhāgika	Mādhava
PS 5.41d: <i>bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ</i>	Mādhava	Dignāga

¹ For Mādhava, see Pind 2015: Appendix 13; and Kataoka 2011: 497–498, n. 707.

² Pind 2015: II 153–154, n. 516.

³ Pind 2015: II 154, n. 518.

2. Vaibhāgika and Vaināśika

It seems that the sole evidence on which Pind ascribes the first view to a Jain Vaibhāgika is Jinendrabuddhi's commentary. The edited text in Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516) reads as follows:

PST Ms. B 233a7–233b2: *tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktam. yasya darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati, tadyathā sāsñādidarśanād go-pratyayo bhavati. sāsñādaya eva gaur. ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ. tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāñīti.*⁴

Here the passage *vaibhāgikenoktam* indicates that the subsequent paragraph quoted with *iti* in the end is a quote from a Vaibhāgika. But the corresponding Tibetan translation suggests that the original reading was not *vaibhāgika* but *vaināśika*.⁵

Hattori 1982: 210, 11–12: *de la 'jig pa smar ba pa yis brjod pa*

The Tibetan translation suggests that the original reading is *tatra hi vaināśikenoktam*. This *vaināśika* is also mentioned previously in PST ad 5.39, where the Sanskrit text reads as follows (Pind 2015: II Appendix 13):

PST Ms. 232a2: *anvayavītuktisamanantaraṃ vaināśikenoktaḥ*⁶

The same opponent is also called Sāṃkhya in the following explanation of PST (Pind 2015: II 150, n. 508, B232a6). Regarding the paragraph of PSV ad 5.39 beginning with *yas tv āha*, Pind observes as follows:

This paragraph introduces a lengthy discussion, covering § 56 through § 60, with the Sāṃkhyavaināśika Mādhava, who, as it appears, addresses Dignāga's criticism of his proof of the existence of *pradhāna*, in connection with his own rebuttal of the *apoha* theory. Dignāga now answers his criticism. According to Jinendrabuddhi, Mādhava addresses Dignāga's objection immediately after dealing with the direct proofs of the continuous connection of the particulars with primordial materiality (Pind 2015: II Appendix 13).

⁴ The translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516): “For in this context the Vaibhāgika has stated: ‘In this world whatever cognition is due to the observation of whatever thing: this is such and such a thing only. For instance, the cognition ‘cow’ is due to the observation of dewlap, etc. A cow is only dewlap, etc. And the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things. Therefore the nature of some things are nothing but the non-existence of the nature of other things.’”

⁵ The Tibetan translation *'jig pa*, as also shown in the next example, means perishing (*vināśa*) and not dividing (*vibhāga*). If one wanted to support Pind's reading *vaibhāgika*, one would have to explain how *'jig pa* can mean *vibhāga*, which is usually translated as *dbye ba*.

⁶ *vaināśikenoktaḥ* at PST Ms. B 232a2 is translated as *'jig pa ñid du brjod de* (Hattori 1982: 208, 10–11).

As Pind remarks here, Jinendrabuddhi's expression *anvayavītōktisamanantaram* indicates the location of the text quoted by Dignāga in PSV ad 5.39. It is a quote from Mādhava's work, in which the precise location is "immediately after the statement of *anvayavīta*." This suggests that *tatra* in *tatra hi vaināsīkenoktam* in PST ad 5.41 also indicates the same context in the same text: "For in the same context it is stated by Mādhava."

Thus, we can conclude that the quotation Pind ascribes to an unknown Jain Vaibhāgika should be ascribed to Mādhava by correcting the reading *vaibhāgikenoktam* to *vaināsīkenoktam* on the basis of the Tibetan translation.⁷ The main scenario of PS(V) 5.41 is the same as that of PS(V) 5.39. The argument is between Dignāga and Mādhava in both cases.

3. The cognition of a cow due to the observation of a dewlap, etc.

It is now clear that the quote in PST following *vaināsīkenoktam* is a quote from Mādhava's text. In order to clarify its content, let me quote the entire PST ad 5.41ab, which reads as follows:⁸

A. *tatra hi *vaināsīkenoktam.*

B. *yasya *khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ. ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ. tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāñīti.*

C. *etena yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ. ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavatīti kāryam āha.*

D. *atra sām̐khyena pratividhānam uktam.*

E. *yadi sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati(1), evaṃ sati yad uktam ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavatīti(2), tad ayuktam iti.*

F. *ātmāntarābhāvanimittasarpvapratyayābhyupagame katham sāsnādinimittatvam gopratyayasyeti yāvat.*

G. *ātmanābhyupetahānir uktā, dr̥ṣṭānte svapakṣatyāgāt.*

**vaināsīkenoktam*] Corr.; *vaibhāgikenoktam* Pind; *vaibhāsīkenokta* Ms. **khalv api*] Corr.; omitted by Pind; *khasvavi* Ms.

⁷ According to information provided by Horst Lasic, the relevant passage of the manuscript can be read as *vaibhāsīkeno*° and surely not *vaibhāgikeno*°. The reading *vaibhāgikeno*° is probably a mistake arisen in two steps: *vaināsīkeno*° → *vaibhāsīkeno*° → *vaibhāgikeno*°. First the original *nā* was probably mistaken by an Indian scribe as *bhā*. Then the modern transcriber who prepared the transcript that Pind uses mistakenly copied *śi* as *gi*. We can conclude that the reading *vaibhāgikeno*° is a modern invention. Furthermore, the immediately following passage which Pind reads as *yasya darśanād* has something in between in the manuscript. Probably the entire passage can be read as *yasya khalv api darśanād*, although the manuscript seems to read *kha sva vi* instead of *kha lva pi*.

⁸ This citation is based on Pind's edited text with slight modifications of *sandhi* and punctuation, etc. See Pind 2015: II 153–154, n. 516.

Paragraph A (*vaināsikenoktam*) indicates that the subsequent paragraph B is a quote from Mādhava's text. Paragraph B constitutes a syllogism: *udāharāṇa* (*vyāpti + dr̥ṣṭānta*), *upanaya*, *nigamana*. Paragraph C, in which the *nigamana* part is missing, is almost identical to B. By adding the words *etena ... iti kāryam āha* Jinendrabuddhi seems to classify the reason (*hetu*) in the syllogism B as *kāryahetu*.⁹ Paragraph D (*atra sām̐khyena pratividhānam uktam*) indicates that the subsequent paragraph E is the Sām̐khya's rebuttal (*pratividhāna*) to the view given in B. This Sām̐khya theorist seems to be Mādhava, because there is no other candidate in this context. Paragraph F restates the main point of E with the expression *iti yāvat*. In order to clarify Mādhava's intention in these paragraphs, let me start by examining the easier paragraph F.

F. *ātmāntarābhāvanimittasarvapatyayābhyupagame katham̐ sās̐nādinimittatvam̐ gopatryayasyeti yāvat*.

It means: If it is accepted that all cognitions are caused by the non-existence of non-X, how then could the cognition of a cow be caused by a dewlap, etc.?¹⁰

Here Jinendrabuddhi explains Mādhava's intention. Mādhava is criticizing someone as being inconsistent because he has stated something that goes against his own view. The main view that this someone accepts is that all cognitions of X (*sarvapatryaya*) are caused by the non-existence of non-X (*ātmāntarābhāvanimitta*). This is exactly what Dignāga insists on as his theory of *apoha*. A cow is cognized by means of the exclusion of the non-cow. This view is formulated in E2 as follows:

E2: *ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare patryayo bhavati*.

The cognition of X is due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X.¹¹

⁹ Cf. PST 1 10, 6–10: *yo 'nanyasattvaneyasyābhiratipūrvako hīnasthānaparigrahaḥ, sa ātmasnehavato duḥkhasukhatyāgāptivāñchāpūrvakaḥ. tad yathā makṣikāṇām abhiratipūrvako 'śucisthānaparigrahaḥ. ananyasattvaneyasyābhiratipūrvakaś ca garbhādihīnasthānaparigrahaḥ prāñina iti kāryam*; PST 1 11, 9–11: *yo yadviparītasvabhāvaḥ, sa tasya pratipakṣaḥ. tad yathā vāyuviparītasvabhāvaḥ tailam vāyoḥ. ātmarāśanaviparītasvabhāvaḥ ca nairātmadarśanam iti svabhāvaḥ*; PST 1 11, 12–13: *yo yannidānaviruddhaḥ, sa tasya bādhaḥ. yathā vātikasya vyādhes tannidānaviruddham tailam. ātmasnehādīnīdānātmadarśanaviruddham ca nairātmadarśanam iti svabhāvaḥ*; PST 1 57, 8–9: *kalpanājñānam api nāmeti. asyāyam arthaḥ – yat svasaṃvedyam, tat svādhiḡgamam̐ prati patryakṣam, rāḡādijñānavat. tathā ca kalpanājñānam iti svabhāvaḥ*; PST 1 84, 3–4: *asyāyam arthaḥ. yatra smṛtiḥ, tatrānubhavaḥ, rūpādivat. asti ca smṛtir iti kāryam*; PST 1 130, 12–131, 1: *kuta etat – samudāyaviṣayaḥ tu na punar vastusadghaṭādidravyaviṣayam ity āha – rūpādyagrahe tadbuddhyabhāvād iti. yo yadagrahe saty upalabdihlakṣaṇaprāpto nopalabhyate, na sa tato vyatirikto 'sti. tad yathā kāṣṭhādibhyaḥ ṣaṇṇagarī prāmādamālā vā. rūpādyagrahe nopalabhyate copalabdihlakṣaṇaprāptam̐ ghaṭādi dravyam̐ iti svabhāvānupalabdhim̐ āha*; PST 2 41, 6–7: *siddhatvād iti. yat siddham̐ na tat sādhyam, uṣṇo 'gnir̐ iti yathā. siddhau ca kevalau dharmadharminā v̐ iti svabhāvaviruddham̐ āha*; PST 2 78, 15–16: *saṃyogasya cetyādi. yaḥ saṃyogāśrayaḥ sa dviṭīye pratiyogini pratītihetuḥ, tad yathā dhūmaḥ. tathā cāgnir̐ iti svabhāvaḥ prasaṅgam̐ āha*; PST 2 111, 1–4: *na hītyādi. anena yat pūrvānubhūtam̐ tad evedam̐ iti patryavam̐rṣati, tat smṛtyātmakam. yathā sa evāyam̐ dhūmaḥ iti jñānam. yathoktadharmakam̐ ca viṣeṣadr̥ṣṭam̐ iti svabhāvam̐ āha*; B 119a5: *ekadeśatvād iti. tad anena yo yadekadeśaḥ sa tadvyapadeśam̐ arhati. tad yathā paṭe deśaḥ paṭavyapadeśam. pakṣaikadeśaś ca dharmīti svabhāvam̐ āha*. (I thank Horst Lasic for these references. Orthographical modifications are given by the present author.)

¹⁰ My translation; cf. the translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516).

¹¹ My translation; cf. the translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516).

This view is incompatible with the view that the cognition of a cow is caused by observing the dewlap, etc. This view is formulated in E1 as follows:

E1: *sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati.*

The cognition of a cow is due to the observation of the dewlap, and so on.¹²

In paragraph E (*yad uktam ... tad ayuktam*), as restated by Jinendrabuddhi in F (*katham*), Mādhava criticizes Dignāga for stating the incompatible views E1 and E2. Mādhava's intention is summed up by Jinendrabuddhi in paragraph G as follows:

G. *ātmanābhyupetahānir uktā, dr̥ṣṭānte svapakṣatyāgāt.*

You yourself have formulated the abandonment of what you have accepted, because you give up your own thesis in the example.¹³

Dignāga's own view (*svapakṣa*) is E2, i.e. the view that the cognition of X is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X. This is what he has accepted (*abhyupeta*). But Dignāga, according to Mādhava, abandons this when he states E1 as an example.

svapakṣa/abhyupeta (E2): *ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.*

dr̥ṣṭānta (E1): *sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati.*

These analyses confirm the main scenario. Dignāga first refers to E1 as an example adduced in another work of his that is now lost. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga as being inconsistent, because this E1 is incompatible with Dignāga's theory of *apoha*, which can be summarized as E2. But where does Dignāga state E1? A candidate is easily found in paragraph C.

C. *etena yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati*(1). *tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ*(2). *ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavatīti*(3) *kāryam āha.*

With this [paragraph B] he speaks of an effect [as a reason]: If the cognition of X arises by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. For example, the cognition of a cow arises due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. A cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. And the cognition of X arises due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X.¹⁴

The passage in C “*yaddarśanād ... bhavati,*” i.e. C1, C2 and C3, seems to be a reformulation of B's syllogism by Jinendrabuddhi in accordance with the Dharmakīrtian style: *udāharaṇa* (*vyāpti* + *dr̥ṣṭānta*) and *upanaya* (i.e. *hetu*, which shows *pakṣadharmatā*). Here the syllogism can be analyzed into three parts as follows:

C1 (*vyāpti*): *yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati.*

¹² My translation; cf. the translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516).

¹³ My translation; cf. the translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516).

¹⁴ My translation. This passage is quoted but not translated in Pind 2015: II 153–154, n. 516.

C2 (*dr̥ṣṭānta*): *tad yathā sāsṇādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsṇādaya eva gauḥ.*

C3 (*upanaya*): *ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.*

C1 states an invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*): If X is cognized by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. C2 gives an example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*): One cognizes a cow by observing the dewlap, etc. Therefore, a cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. In other words, a cow is nothing but the aggregate of the dewlap, etc.¹⁵ C3 presents the application (*upanaya*) of this invariable concomitance to his theory of *apoha*: One cognizes X by observing the non-existence of non-X. The conclusion, which is not stated in C, is obvious: *ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi* (Xs are nothing but the non-existence of non-X).¹⁶ This missing part is explicitly stated in paragraph B, which reads as follows:

B. *yasya khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati*(1). *tad yathā sāsṇādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsṇādaya eva gauḥ*(2). *ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ*(3). *tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi*(4).

In this world, as is also well known, if the cognition “X” arises by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. For example, the cognition of a cow arises due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. A cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. And the cognition of X is due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X. Therefore, Xs are nothing but the non-existence of non-X.¹⁷

B1, B2 and B3 are almost identical with C1, C2 and C3.

B	C
1. <i>yasya khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati</i>	1. <i>yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati.</i>
2. <i>tad yathā sāsṇādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsṇādaya eva gauḥ.</i>	2. <i>tad yathā sāsṇādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsṇādaya eva gauḥ.</i>
3. <i>ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ.</i>	3. <i>ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.</i>
4. <i>tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi.</i>	

The main difference lies in B4, which clarifies the unstated conclusion (*nigamana*). In paragraph C Jinendrabuddhi reformulates the syllogism of B in accordance with the Dharmakīrtian style and classifies the reason as *kāryahetu*.

¹⁵ Cf. PST B 233b5: *sāsṇādisamūha eva gauḥ*, quoted by Pind 2015: II 154, n. 520.

¹⁶ With the plural form *ātmāntarāṇi* Dignāga intends, for example, cows in general. See, e.g. his usage in PSV ad 5.36d (Pind 2015: I 45): *śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha*; cf. also PST Ms. B 238b5–6 quoted in Pind 2015: II 179, n. 604: *yathā vṛkṣaśabdaḥ śiṃsapādīn viśeṣān abhedenābhidadhat sāmānyavācī tathā...*

¹⁷ My translation.

C. *etena* “C1, C2, C3 (=B1, B2, B3)” *iti kāryam āha*

With this [paragraph B quoted above] he speaks of an effect [as a reason, for which the entire syllogism is reformulated as] C1, C2, C3.

But who has composed this syllogism in paragraph B? As suggested in paragraphs E, F, G, the syllogism of B must have been originally formulated by Dignāga. Then it is quoted by Mādhava, either literally or not literally, as a *pūrvapakṣa*, as Jinendrabuddhi’s opening remark *tatra hi vaināśikenoktam* indicates. Thus, it is surmised that paragraph B (which Jinendrabuddhi explains as C) is Mādhava’s quote from a lost work of Dignāga and that Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s view in E (which Jinendrabuddhi explains in F and G). Recapitulating these analyses, the main scenario can be reconstructed as follows.

1. First a syllogism was stated by Dignāga in a work that is now lost.
2. Mādhava quotes Dignāga’s statement as B, which Jinendrabuddhi reformulates with classification as C.
3. In paragraph E, which follows D (*atra sāmṅhyena pratividhānam uktam*), Mādhava points out Dignāga’s inconsistency with the words *yad uktam ... tad ayuktam*. The issue at stake raised by Mādhava is that the example Dignāga mentions does not fit with the theory of *apoha*, because the cognition of a cow (*gopratyaya*), according to the theory of *apoha*, should be based on the exclusion of the non-cow (*agovyavaccheda*) and not on the dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādi*). By referring to, and thereby admitting the example, Dignāga amounts to having abandoned his own tenet that the cognition of X (e.g. a cow) is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (e.g. the non-existence of the non-cow).

4. Dignāga’s intention in referring to the example

Although there are uncertainties here and there regarding the reconstruction of PSV ad 5.41, the main argument of the following part is more or less certain.¹⁸

PSV ad 5.41: *yasya hy [agonivṛttagopratyayaḥ, tasya katham sāsnādidarśananimittāḥ]*.¹⁹

PST B 233b5: *yasya hīty apohavādināḥ*.

As an *apoha* theorist (*apohavādin*), it is inappropriate for Dignāga to state that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc., because according to the theory of

¹⁸ V (Hattori 1982: 142, 10–11): *gañ la ba lañ ma yin pa las log pa'i ba lañ gi blo de ji ltar nog la sogs pa mthoñ ba'i rgyu mtshan can du smra bar byed l*; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 11–12): *gañ gi ba lañ ma yin pa las ldog pa's ba lañ gi rogs par 'gyur ba de'i ji ltar lkog śal la sogs pa mthoñ ba rgyu mtshan du smra bar byed l*; Pind 2015: II 154: “For how could someone, to whom the cognition of a cow (**gopratyayaḥ*) as precluded from non-cows (**agonivṛttaḥ*), assert that it is caused by the observation of dewlap, etc. (**sāsnādidarśananimittāḥ*)?”

¹⁹ Pind 2015: I 52 presents the reconstruction as “*yasya hi [...]*,” not filling in the blank. But the main words are more or less safely reconstructed on the basis of the two Tibetan translations; Pind provides the Sanskrit words in his translation.

apoha it is based on the exclusion of the non-cow. Here Dignāga seems to accept Mādhava's claim of inconsistency. The example *sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ* is indeed incompatible with the theory of *apoha*. PS 5.41ab amounts to saying, using the word *katham*: How could an *apoha* theorist accept the example? But then how can Dignāga defend his reference to the example? The subsequent passage clarifies his strategy.

PSV ad 5.41 (reconstructed by Pind 2015: I 52): *abhyupagamyāyaṃ drṣṭāntaḥ svamataviruddhaḥ. śabdabhedād dhi gosāsnādiṣu bhinnam apohyam.*²⁰

PST Ms. B233b5–B234a1: *abhyupagamyetyādi. bhavato hi sāsnādisamūha eva gaur iti. atas tad abhyupagamyāyaṃ drṣṭāntaḥ svamataviruddho 'py uktaḥ. etad uktaḥ bhavati. yathā tava sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayas tathā mamāpy ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyaya iti. śabdabhedād dhītyādi. sāsnādiśabdasyāsāsnādy apohyam sāsnādiṣu, gośabdasyāpy agaur gavi. yata evaṃ bhinnam apohyam, ataḥ sāsnādiṣv asāsnādyapohena sāsnādipratyayaḥ, gavy agovyavacchedena gopratyayaḥ. evaṃ cātrāpy ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād evātmāntare pratyayaḥ.*²¹

It is not easy to reconstruct the original text of PSV, because the two Tibetan translations differ from each other. Nonetheless the main argument can be summarized as follows: the example (*drṣṭāntaḥ*), although it is incompatible with the Buddhist view (*svamataviruddho 'pi*), is presented by provisionally accepting (*abhyupagamyā*) your view, i.e. the Sāṃkhya's view.

Sāṃkhya: *sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayaḥ* (→*sāsnādaya eva gauḥ*)

Dignāga: *ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayaḥ* (→*ātmāntarābhāva eva ātmāntarāṇi*)

It is clear from this that the view referred to by Dignāga as an example is a Sāṃkhya view. The Sāṃkhya holds the view that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayaḥ*), and that a cow is nothing but the aggregate of the dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ*). Dignāga refers to this view by accepting it only provisionally (*abhyupagamyā*). Therefore, there is no inconsistency in Dignāga's statements, because he does not wholeheartedly accept the Sāṃkhya view. Dignāga consistently keeps his doctrine of *apoha*, i.e. the view that the cognition of X (e.g. a cow) is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (e.g. the non-existence of the non-cow), i.e. *ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayaḥ*. Therefore, X is nothing but the non-existence of non-X for Dignāga (*ātmāntarābhāva eva ātmāntarāṇi*). For him the cognition of a cow is caused by the non-existence of the non-cow and not by the dewlap,

²⁰ V (Hattori 1982: 142, 12–13): *ba lañ dañ nog la sogs pa sgra tha dad pas tha dad du sel ba can yin yañ khyod kyi lugs khas blañs nas / 'gal bžin du yañ de ñes par bstan to /*; K: *khas blañs kyañ khyod kyi 'dod pas dpe 'di 'gal ba yañ yin no / ba lañ gi lkog šal la sogs pa rnams la sgra'i khyad par gyis tha dad pa sel ba /*; Pind 2015: II 154–155: “Having assumed [this], the example is in conflict even with your own theory (*svamataviruddhaḥ*). For the excluded [object] is different with regard to a cow and the dewlap because of verbal difference (*śabdabhedāt*).”

²¹ For the text, see Pind 2015: I 52, n. 275, and Pind 2015: II 154–155, nn. 520, 521 and 522.

etc. The two things, i.e. a cow and a dewlap, etc., have a different scope of exclusion. It is obvious for Dignāga that the words “cow” and “dewlap, etc.” have different objects to be excluded (*apohya*). The expression “dewlap, etc.” (*sāsnādi*) communicates the dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādiṣu*) by excluding the non-dewlap, etc. (*asāsnādi*). The word “cow” (*gauḥ*) communicates a cow (*gavi*) by excluding the non-cow (*agauḥ*). This is Dignāga’s own view. The fundamental view of *apoha* is consistent.

	<i>apohya</i>	<i>pratyaya</i>
“ <i>sāsnādi</i> ”	<i>asāsnādi</i>	<i>sāsnādiṣu</i>
“ <i>gauḥ</i> ”	<i>agauḥ</i>	<i>gavi</i>

The view that the two different words have different scopes of exclusion is explicitly expressed in PS 5.41d, which runs as follows.

Pind 2015: I 51: *bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ*.²²

PST: *asmanmatena tu bhinnāpohyās tu te mitho gosāsnādayaḥ, bhinnam apohyam eṣv iti kṛtvā*.

Here Pind’s reconstruction of PS 5.41d is strongly supported by PST. However the reconstruction and interpretation of PS 5.41abc are a bit problematic.²³

PS 5.41abc, Pind 2015: I 51: *sāsnādidarśanād <gopratyayo yo ’yam udāhṛtaḥ / so> viruddho bhavanmatyā*.

PST: *sāsnādidarśanād ityādi ... viruddha iti siddhāntavirodhāt. bhavanmatyeti. bhavato hi sāsnādaya eva gaur iti matam*.

Considering the meter, it would be better to change the word order of PS 5.41abc to the following:

Kataoka: *sāsnādidarśanād yo ’yam gopratyaya udāhṛtaḥ / sa viruddho bhavanmatyā*

It is true that *viruddho bhavanmatyā* can be interpreted as Pind translates, “is in conflict with your own theory.” K’s translation supports Pind’s interpretation. But this interpretation does not fit the entire context. Here *bhavat* clearly refers to the Sāṃkhya, as Jinendrabuddhi clarifies by stating, “For it is your view that a cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. (*bhavato hi sāsnādaya eva gaur iti matam*).” As we have already confirmed, this view should be ascribed

²² V (Hattori 1982: 142, 6): *phan tshun tha dad dag yod kyañ*; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 0): *tha dad sel la de log pa*; Pind 2009: 110: “On the contrary, they have mutually different excluded referents.”

²³ V (Hattori 1982: 142, 7–9): *nog la sogs pa mthoñ ba las / de’i blo dper brjod ’gal ba de / khyed kyi lugs la rten pa yin /*; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 7–9): *lkog śal la sogs mthoñ phyir gañ / ba lañ rtogs pa’i dper byas pa / de ni khyod kyi ’dod pas ’gal /*; Pind 2015: II 153–154: “The example [you have] adduced, namely that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of dewlap, and so on, is in conflict with your own theory.”

to the Sāṃkhya and not the Buddhist. Then *viruddho bhavanmatyā* would mean that the example is in conflict with the Sāṃkhya view. But what we expect here is the opposite: The example is in conflict with the Buddhist view. Taking into consideration V's translation of *bhavanmatyā* as *khyed kyi lugs la rten pa yin* (resorting to your view), it seems more appropriate to interpret *bhavanmatyā* as being separate from the preceding word *viruddhaḥ*. Jinendrabuddhi's commentary also supports this interpretation, because he comments on *viruddha* separately from *bhavanmatyā*, and states *viruddha iti siddhāntavirodhāt*. Considering that the opponent *bhavat* is the Sāṃkhya in this context, the opposite *siddhānta* (i.e. *svamata*) must refer to the Buddhist view (cf. *svamataviruddha* in PSV ad 5.41). Therefore, the main argument in PS 5.41abc can be reconstructed as follows:

The example (*dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ*) that the cognition of a cow (*gopratyayaḥ*) is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādidarśanāt*) is presented (*udāhṛtaḥ*) by me in my earlier work. This example is indeed incompatible with the Buddhist view (*viruddhaḥ*), as you, Mādhava, claim. But it is mentioned by me only by provisionally resorting to your Sāṃkhya view (*bhavanmatyā*). Therefore, there is no fault of abandoning my thesis.

5. Positive and negative methods of cognizing a cow

The conflict of opinion between Mādhava and Dignāga is clear. Mādhava holds the view that a cow is cognized positively, i.e. by observing the dewlap, etc., whereas Dignāga holds the view that a cow is cognized negatively, i.e. by excluding the non-cow. For Dignāga any X, inasmuch as it is cognized in a general form, is cognized by observing the non-existence of non-X. A dewlap, etc. are no exception. They, too, are cognized by excluding the non-dewlap, etc. This is explicitly stated in PSV ad 5.42 as follows:

Pind 2015: I 52: *sāsnādiṣu hi <sāmānyarūpam> arthāntarābhāvanirapekṣaṃ na bhavatīti pūrvam evopapāditam.*²⁴

Mādhava holds that X (*ātmāntara*) is cognized positively, without dependence on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (*ātmāntarābhāvadarśana*). This view of Mādhava is criticized by Dignāga in PS 5.42ab as follows:²⁵

PS 5.42ab, Pind 2015: I 52: *so 'napekṣa <ity etat tu> svavikalpavi<nirmitam> /*

²⁴ V (Hattori 1982: 142, 18–19): *nog la sogs pa la spyi'i ño bo dan ldan pa gzan med par mi ltos pa ni mi srid do zes snar bsad zin to l*; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 9–20): *lkog sal la sogs pa rnams la spyi'i ño bo bdag ñid gzan med pa la bltos pa med par srid pa ma yin no zes snar bstan pa yin no l*; Pind 2015: II 156: "For it has previously been demonstrated that the general form in a dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādiṣu*), does not exist without dependence upon the non-existence of other referents (*sāmānyarūpam arthāntarābhāvanirapekṣaṃ na bhavati*)."

²⁵ V (Hattori 1982: 142, 14–15): *de mi ltos ses pa 'di ni l ran gi rnam rtog spros par zad l*; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 15–16): *de ltos med phyir 'di yañ ni l ran gi rnam par rtog pas sprul l*; Pind 2015: II 155: "The idea, however, that this [namely the cognition of one thing (*ātmāntara*)] is not dependent [upon the observation of non-existence of other things], is created out of your own imagination."

PST ad 5.42: *so 'napekṣa ātmāntarapratyayaḥ. kasmāt. na hi naḥ pratyayo bhavaty ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare, kiṃ tarhi vidhirūpeṇaiva gaur iti.*

According to Dignāga, Mādhava holds that the cognition of X is independent (*so 'napekṣaḥ*), i.e. does not depend on the exclusion of the other. A cow is cognized as such in a positive way (*vidhirūpeṇaiva*). But Mādhava's idea is a mere fancy, because a general form is never cognized without exclusion of the other, as Dignāga has implied in PSV ad 5.34: *vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam*. The individual form (*svarūpa*), i.e. the particular form (*svalakṣaṇa*), is beyond the scope of language and therefore inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*). Thus, the individual form is not the object of everyday communication (*vyāvahārika*). This is stated by Dignāga in PSV ad 5.42 as follows:

PSV ad 5.42 (Pind 2015: I 52): *svarūpaṃ tu ten<āvyāvahārikam> anabhilāpyatvāt.*²⁶

According to the Sāṃkhya, the individual form is denotable. Therefore, the word “cow” refers to the aggregate of the dewlap, etc., in a positive way. For Dignāga, by contrast, the particular form is not denotable. It is the object of perception and not inference. Words communicate things in a general form only by excluding the other. Our cognition of a cow is not independent but always dependent upon the non-existence of the non-cow.

6. Conclusion

1. The crucial passage in PST *vaibhāgikenoktam* should be corrected to *vaināśikenoktam*.
2. The argument in PS(V) 5.41 is not between a Jain Vaibhāgika and Mādhava but between Vaināśika Mādhava and Dignāga. The scenario is similar to that of PS(V) 5.39. The Jain ‘distinctionist’ that Pind postulates does not exist.
3. The view that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. should be ascribed to the Sāṃkhya, not a Jain Vaibhāgika.
4. Dignāga refers to the Sāṃkhya view in an example in an earlier work that is now lost. Dignāga's text quoted by Mādhava is quoted by Jinendrabuddhi in paragraph B and modified as in C.
5. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga's view as being inconsistent, because Dignāga abandons his thesis by admitting the Sāṃkhya example. Mādhava first quotes Dignāga's earlier work (paragraph B) and then criticizes it (paragraph E).
6. Dignāga defends his earlier statement by insisting that his mentioning of the Sāṃkhya example that is incompatible with his thesis is not wholehearted acceptance, but only a provisional acceptance (*abhyupagamyā*). For Dignāga the cognition of a cow is due to the exclusion of the non-cow (*agovyavaccheda*) and not due to the observation of

²⁶ V (Hattori 1982: 142, 19–20): *raṇ gi ṇo bo ni brjod par bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir de'i sgo nas tha sñad du bya'o l*; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 20–21): *raṇ gi ṇo bo ci brjod par bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir de tha dad mi bya'o l*; Pind 2015: II 156–157: “The individual form, however, (*svarūpaṃ tu*) is not denotable (**vyāvahārikam* [sic]) in this (*tena*) [form] because it is inexpressible (*anabhilāpyatvāt*).”

the dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādidarśana*). His main thesis of *apoha* that the cognition of X is based on the non-existence of non-X (*ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayah*), is consistent. For him a cow is essentially the non-existence of the non-cow and not the aggregate of the dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādaya eva gauḥ; sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ*). X is essentially the non-existence of non-X (*ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi*).

References and abbreviations

Corr. Correction by the present author.

Hattori 1982 M. Hattori, The *Pramāṇasamuccaya*vṛtti of Dignāga with Jinendrabuddhi's Commentary, Chapter Five: Anyāpoha-parīkṣā: Tibetan Text with Sanskrit Fragments. *Memoirs of the Department of Literature, Kyoto University* 21 (1982) 101–224.

K Kanakavarman's translation of PS(V).

Kataoka 2011 K. Kataoka, *Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing*. Vienna 2011.

Ms. Manuscript.

Pind 2009 O. H. Pind, *Dignāga's Philosophy of Language. Dignāga on anyāpoha. Pramāṇasamuccaya V. Texts, Translation, and Annotation*. PhD diss., Universität Wien. Wien 2009. http://othes.univie.ac.at/8283/1/2009-12-03_0507516.pdf, last visited 15-03-2016.

Pind 2015 O. H. Pind, *Dignāga's Philosophy of Language. Dignāga. Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti V on anyāpoha. Part I: Text. Part II: Translation and Annotation*, ed. E. Steinkellner. Vienna 2015.

PST *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmālavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Chapter 1, Part I: Critical Edition*, ed. Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, and Horst Lasic. Beijing/Vienna 2005. *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmālavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Chapter 2, Part I: Critical Edition*, ed. Horst Lasic, Helmut Krasser, and Ernst Steinkellner. Beijing/Vienna 2012. For chapter 5, see Pind 2015.

PS(V) *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)*. See Pind 2015.

V Vasudhararakṣita's translation of PS(V).