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## The Thesis of Mental Awareness Accompanying Sensory Awareness Attributed to Sthiramati by Xuanzang and His Interpreters\*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 In the Chinese Yogācāra tradition that began with Xuanzang (602–664) a special thesis with regard to the relation between sensory awareness and mental awareness is attributed to Sthiramati (510–570)<sup>1</sup> and his followers.<sup>2</sup> It says that, because it has the same objective support (*ālambana*)<sup>3</sup> as a sensory awareness, mental awareness occurs simultaneously with any awareness from among the five groups of sensory awarenesses (*pañcavijñānakāya-*, *pañca vijñānakāyāḥ*),<sup>4</sup> and therefore accompanies (*°sahānucaral°anucara*) this awareness. This mental awareness is therefore often referred to as “mental awareness accompanying the five [awarenesses]” (五俱意識). With reference to this thesis, Sthiramati is often grouped together with Dignāga (c. 480–540), to whom a similar statement

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<sup>1</sup> See Frauwallner 1961: 136f.

<sup>2</sup> In the CWSL and its commentaries, different opinions are normally attributed to groups of interpreters headed by important scholars (cf. Chu 2014: 291 and below n. 10); the advocators of such opinions are referred to as “Nanda and others,” “Sthiramati and others” and “Dharmapāla and others.” For the sake of convenience, hereafter I will briefly refer to these groups of interpreters as “Nanda,” “Sthiramati” and “Dharmapāla,” respectively.

<sup>3</sup> The Sanskrit words taken to be equivalents of the terms used in Chinese or Tibetan sources (given in parentheses) are not marked with an asterisk if they are attested in available Sanskrit materials, such as the Sanskrit text of the Yogācārabhūmi (Ybh<sub>skt</sub>) or the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya (ASBh).

<sup>4</sup> In the Chinese sources, the expression “five groups of [sensory] awarenesses” (五識身 = *pañcavijñānakāya*, *pañca vijñānadhātavaḥ*) is often further shortened as “the five awarenesses” (五識) or even merely as “the five” (五). Both the Sanskrit term and its abbreviated form in Chinese sources may refer to an individual instance of sensory awareness from among the five groups of sensory awarenesses; however, for the sake of brevity of expression, hereafter I may also use the short form “the five groups of awarenesses” or “the five awarenesses” wherever the meaning is clear from the context.

is ascribed, supposedly made in his main work, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* with his own commentary.<sup>5</sup>

**1.2** The discussion of the relationship between mental awareness and the five groups of sensory awarenesses was initiated by Xuanzang in the *Cheng weishi lun* (CWSL), a kind of compilation of commentarial materials on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikākārikā* (TrK).<sup>6</sup> In the context of explaining the basis (*āśraya*) of the seventh awareness, i.e., the defiled mind (*kliṣṭamanas*), a general discussion of the three bases of mental activities and subordinate mental activities (*cittacaitta*)<sup>7</sup> is presented, namely, the condition qua cause (*hetupratyaya*), the dominant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*), and the immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya*).<sup>8</sup> When it comes to the third basis, the whole discussion occurs interestingly under the headline of “the basis that gives way” (*kaidao*yi, 開導依), a term that refers to the awareness in the immediately preceding moment which makes room (*\*avakāśadāna*) for the current awareness. In this connection, three different opinions concerning the interpretation of this special concept are presented, with the quotation of sources to back them up and detailed argumentation on the issues at the center of this debate. Further aspects of the concept and their discussion have been studied by me in a previous paper.<sup>9</sup> In

<sup>5</sup> Cf., for instance, *Cheng weishi lun shuji* (CWSL-SJ) 420c21–22: 集量論等五俱意識定現量者。必同緣故。 “It is said in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, etc., that the mental awareness accompanying the five [awarenesses] is nothing but a perception, because it necessarily has the same objective support [as the five awarenesses].” This probably refers to Dignāga's statements about the nature of mental perception (*mānasam pratyakṣam*); indeed, mental perception is described by him in his commentary on *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) 6ab as “having an object such as something visible as its objective support” (*rūpādīviṣayāḷambana*), and “having occurred in the form of an experience [of that visible thing]” (*anubhavākārapravṛtta*).

<sup>6</sup> On the nature of the CWSL, I follow its traditional, generally accepted characterization. However, Nobuyoshi Yamabe has recently suggested the possibility that “there was an Indian original similar to *Cheng weishi lun* in its current form” (Yamabe 2020: 74).

<sup>7</sup> These translation equivalents emphasize the fact that the phenomena called *citta* and *caitta* are conceived as short-lived (subordinate) mental events or instances of (subordinate) mental activity, rather than processes of thinking / accompanying subordinate mental activity or their results, as would be suggested, e.g., by the translations “thought” and “thought concomitant”; see also, e.g., the choice of translation in Hattori 1968: 33.

<sup>8</sup> In the Chinese and Tibetan translations of the Ybh the prefix *sam-* in the compound *samanantarapratyaya* is interpreted as *sama*, and explicitly translated with 等 / *mtshungs pa*, “similar.” In this paper I use the special form “(similar) immediately preceding condition” in the context of discussing the Chinese and the Tibetan texts.

<sup>9</sup> See §2 (“*kaidao* = *avakāśadāna*”) and §3 (“*kaidao*yi = *\*avakāśadānāśraya*”) in Chu 2014: 272–291. My discussion there can be summarized as follows: The Chinese term *kaidao*yi employed in the CWSL reflects a special aspect of the immediately preceding condition, referring to the awareness that has passed away in the immediately preceding moment, which is called “mind” and has the function of giving way to the subsequently arising awareness. The first part of the

the present paper, I will present a more detailed discussion of the thesis that mental awareness accompanies sensory awareness attributed to Sthiramati by Kuiji.<sup>10</sup> For the convenience of the reader, I will first summarize the conclusions reached in my earlier paper on the three opinions.<sup>11</sup>

The first view, according to Kuiji represented by Nanda, says that an instance from among the five groups of sensory awarenesses cannot last for more than one moment, that it comes into being at a given moment in dependence on the “continuing force” (*āvedha*)<sup>12</sup> of a mental awareness, and that it thus has only this mental awareness as the basis that makes room for its arising. A mental awareness, however, being continuous by itself and also having an instance from among the five groups of sensory awarenesses as the continuing force, has all six awarenesses in the preceding moment as the basis that

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compound, *kaidao*, expresses exactly this function and must refer to the Sanskrit term *avakāśa-dāna*. The latter is widely used in Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts to describe the function of the so-called “mind” that has passed away in the moment immediately preceding the occurrence of a further awareness. In the Yogācāra system, a set of terms is used to describe the cause of arising of mental activities and subordinate mental activities. They are called “bases” (*āśraya*), such as “the basis in the sense of the seed” (*bījāśraya*), “the co-existent basis” (*sahabhūr āśrayaḥ*) and “the immediately preceding basis” (*samanantara āśrayaḥ*). This last basis also appears in the classification of the fourfold condition (*pratyaya*) used already in the pre-Vasubandhu Abhidharma texts, which comprises the condition qua cause (*hetupratyaya*), the dominant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*), the immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya*) and the condition qua objective support (*ālambanapratyaya*). Thus, it is unlikely that the special term *kaidaoyi* used in the discussion of the relationship between mental and sensory awarenesses in the CWSL is a translation of the Sanskrit word *krānta*, suggested by La Vallée Poussin (1928: 228, n. 2) on the basis of Kuiji’s phonetic transcription *jielanduo*. I have hypothetically assumed that *kaidaoyi* rather goes back to Sanskrit *\*avakāśadānāśraya*, “basis that makes room,” more precisely, “basis in terms of making room.”

<sup>10</sup> It is worth mentioning that the arrangement of the various opinions into groups can be seen already in the CWSL where each group is introduced with the phrase “some say ...” (有義). However, their attribution to particular persons only appears later on in the commentarial literature on the CWSL, such as Kuiji’s works. My studies on the CWSL in Chu 2014 and in the present paper basically follow Kuiji’s ascriptions and interpretations. In using “Kuiji” instead of “Ji,” I follow the tradition even though the latter is the original form, as has long been pointed out by scholars; cf., most recently, He 2017.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. §4 (“[t]hree interpretations of *\*avakāśadānāśraya*”) in Chu 2014: 291–305, which is dedicated mainly to the study of the materials found in Kuiji’s CWSL-SJ regarding the different views on *\*avakāśadānāśraya* ascribed to Nanda, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla, respectively. The pertinent passages in the CWSL-SJ, together with the text of the CWSL commented upon by Kuiji, and other relevant materials are quoted and translated there; for Nanda, see §4.2–3 (pp. 292–295), for Sthiramati §4.4–5 (pp. 295–298), and for Dharmapāla §4.6–8 (pp. 298–301).

<sup>12</sup> Note that instead of *ākṣepa* suggested in Chu 2014: 292 and 306, the Sanskrit equivalent of the Chinese term 引生 should be *āvedha*; cf. below n. 56. For the source on which this statement is based, cf. CWSL 21a4–8 quoted in Chu 2014: 292, n. 50.

makes room for its arising. Thus, instances from among the five groups of sensory awarenesses and instances of mental awareness come forth one after the other in succession. According to the second opinion, attributed to Sthiramati, an instance from among the five groups of sensory awarenesses has an awareness of its own kind, as well as a mental awareness that accompanies this sensory awareness in the preceding moment, as the basis that makes room for its arising, and upon its arising it is further accompanied by the mental awareness. Thus, there is a continuity of instances of sensory awarenesses of the same kind, and sensory and mental awarenesses do not occur at different moments, as according to Nanda's model, but are always in companionship.<sup>13</sup> Finally, according to the third view, advanced by Dharmapāla according to Kuiji, instances of all eight kinds of awareness have only an awareness of their own kind as the basis that makes room for them. Thus, a mental awareness cannot be caused by a sensory awareness as its immediately preceding condition, or vice versa. The difference between the last two opinions is not significant with regard to the topic discussed in the present paper: according to both, the simultaneous arising of multiple instances of different kinds of awareness is accepted. The point on which they differ is that in the second view, i.e., that of Sthiramati, an instance from among the five groups of sensory awarenesses also has a mental awareness, in addition to a sensory awareness of its own kind, as its basis that makes room for its arising, while the proponents of the third view, i.e., that of Dharmapāla, demand strict adherence to the principle that an awareness serving as an immediately preceding condition must be of the same kind as the subsequent awareness. However, Dharmapāla does not deviate from the fundamental point that a mental and a sensory awareness may arise simultaneously, for he also considers that a mental awareness that arises simultaneously with a sensory awareness can share its object.

**1.3** The central topic of this paper, the thesis that mental awareness accompanies sensory awareness as presented by Xuanzang, which – in the interpretation of Kuiji – is that of Sthiramati, comprises the following two points:

- (1) sensory awarenesses of the five kinds occur continuously, and
- (2) they occur simultaneously with a mental awareness.

In §§ 2 and 3 of the present paper, I will provide a detailed discussion of these two points. The arguments presented in Xuanzang's CWSL, its commentaries and other related Chinese sources, as well as in the relevant Yogācāra sources that are referenced in support of these arguments, will be examined. In §4, some

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<sup>13</sup> For a further summary of Sthiramati's view, cf. below §3.3.

theories or notions relevant to these arguments will be analyzed. Since the arguments are attributed to Sthiramati, a detailed examination of Sthiramati's own statements<sup>14</sup> in the *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya* (TrBh) and the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (ASBh) or *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (ASV)<sup>15</sup> will be offered in §5. Some related problems will also be discussed there.

The main aim of this paper is thus to clarify the opinion attributed in the Chinese sources to Sthiramati, and furthermore to Dignāga. It is hoped that this investigation will succeed to demonstrate how a crucial philosophical issue addressed in the Indian sources was interpreted in the Chinese tradition of *Yogācāra*.

<sup>14</sup> Of course, in many cases these statements do not necessarily reflect his own opinion; sometimes he just repeats the traditional positions of the system he follows.

<sup>15</sup> The ASBh is usually attributed to Sthiramati because of its “great similarity with the *Triṃśikābhāṣya* of Sthiramati.” Cf. Tatia's introduction to the ASBh, p. xxii. Cf. also Pradhan's introduction to the AS, p. 19. Nance opposes this view by arguing that “[t]he presence of parallel passages in two texts is not evidence that those texts were authored by the same individual; at best, such parallelism signals only that one author was familiar with the work of another [...]” Cf. Nance 2012: 240f., n. 7. However, for the following discussion of the opinions attributed to Sthiramati, the issue of whether Sthiramati's authorship of the ASBh can be proved is not directly relevant. It is more important in this context to determine the relationship of his statements in the TrBh to the content presented in the ASBh. Indeed, in the Chinese tradition it is well known that Aśaṅga composed the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *Buddhasiṃha* wrote the *Bhāṣya* on it, and then Sthiramati, combining both texts, composed a new commentary, called *Vyākhyā*. Cf. Zajilun shu ji 1c21–23: 大聖無著具廣慧悲，集阿毗達磨經所有宗要，括瑜伽師地論一切法門，敘此本文演斯妙義；覺師子稟承先訓更為後釋；安慧閑其本末參糅兩文。 and *ibid.* 6c1: 由斯論首標以雜名。 According to a recent study of the newly discovered manuscript of the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (ASV) by Li Xuezhong, Sthiramati composed this *Vyākhyā* by combining the AS and ASBh. Cf. Li 2011: 154ff. and 2012: 3. As for the precise relationship between the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vyākhyā*, Li and Kano state that in the *Vyākhyā* Sthiramati combines the text of the AS and ASBh “by inserting all sentences from the *bhāṣya* into appropriate places of the basic text of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*” (Li – Kano 2014: 53). In the part of the text studied by them, “[t]he *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* contains almost no passages written by Sthiramati himself except for its opening part” (Li – Kano 2014: 62, n. 1). Thus, no matter whether Sthiramati is actually the author of the ASBh or not, it is justified in my view to quote and treat statements in the ASBh as expressing positions shared or at least approved of by Sthiramati. Recently Dr. Li kindly shared with me the draft of his transliteration of the text of the ASV, which had then progressed up to folio 35b1, and allowed me to use it for the present paper. In the following, when quoting from the ASBh, I will therefore also provide references to the manuscript of the ASV, with folio and line numbers, wherever the relevant passages are contained in the already transcribed part, in the form of “(= ASV [...])”; the present unavailability of the text of the ASV will be indicated in the form of “(ASV unavailable).” From the quotations, one can see that the two texts are identical except for some minimal variants (see, e.g., the philological notes in n. 111 below).

## 2. CONTINUITY OF SENSORY AWARENESS

**2.1** In the CWSL Sthiramati's refutation of Nanda's opinion begins with the phrase: "The above-mentioned opinion is not thoroughly correct."<sup>16</sup> In the refutation of the first opinion, an important argument advanced by Sthiramati is that sensory awareness can be continuous,<sup>17</sup> which is formulated based on the theory of five types of mental activity, i.e., five cognitive states that arise in succession during the process of cognizing an object. This theory evidently originates from the "Basic Section" (*\*maulī bhūmiḥ* / *\*maulyo bhūmayāḥ*,<sup>18</sup> 本地分, *sa'i dgnos gzhi*) of the Yogācārabhūmi (Ybh); a passage of the Ybh<sup>19</sup> in which the theory of five types of mental activity is discussed is partly quoted in CWSL 21a14–17. The whole passage runs as follows:<sup>20</sup>

In this case, when visual awareness arises, three [types of] mental activity are attained. [They are] in sequence: (1) a spontaneous [mental activity] (*aupanipātika*), (2) a searching [mental activity] (*paryeṣaka*), and (3) a determined [mental activity] (*niścita*). Of these, the first is none other than visual awareness; the [other] two are mental awareness. Then, subsequent to the determined mental activity, (4) [the mental activity that constitutes] defilement or purification is to be seen. On account of that, also visual awareness occurs as (5) a [mental activity] uniformly flowing from these two (*tannaiṣyandika*), as something wholesome or unwholesome; it does not, however, [occur] due to conceptualization on its own part. As long as this "mind" (*manas*) is not distracted elsewhere, mental awareness and visual awareness are wholesome or defiled. Just as visual awareness has arisen, in the same way [the other four awarenesses] up to tactile awareness have to be understood.

<sup>16</sup> CWSL 21a9: 有義。前說未有究理。This is indicated by various commentators as the opinion of Sthiramati, for instance, cf. CWSL-SJ 388a16: 安惠等解。

<sup>17</sup> For his other argument, see below §3.1.

<sup>18</sup> On the reconstruction of the name of this section of the work, *maulī bhūmiḥ*, see Schmithausen 1969: 17f., n. 14, Schmithausen 2000: 245, n. 3, and Kritzer 2005: xiii, n. 2. The plural form *\*maulyo bhūmayāḥ* is used, among others, in Kragh 2013: 49, n. 86. I prefer to use the English translation of the former in this paper.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. also the discussion in Takatsukasa 2014.

<sup>20</sup> Ybh<sub>SkT</sub> 10,2–7: *tatra cakṣurvijñāna utpanne trīṇi cittāny upalabhyante yathākramam aupanipātikaṃ paryeṣakaṃ niścitaṃ ca. tatrādyam\* cakṣurvijñānam eva, dve manovijñāne. tatra niścitāc cittāt prabhṛti\*\* samkleṣo vyavadānaṃ ca draṣṭavyam. tatas tannaiṣyandikaṃ cakṣurvijñānam api kuśalākuśalaṃ pravarttate, na tu svavikalpavaśena. tāvac ca dvayor manovijñāna-cakṣurvijñānayoḥ kuśalatvaṃ vā kliṣṭatvaṃ yāvat tan mano na anyatra vikṣipyate. yathā cakṣurvijñāna utpanna evam yāvat kāyavijñānaṃ veditavyam.* = Ybh<sub>Ch</sub> 280a22–27: 復次由眼識生。三心可得。如其次第。謂率爾心。尋求心。決定心。初是眼識。二在意識。決定心後。方有染淨。此後乃有等流眼識。善不善轉。而彼不由自分別力。乃至此意不趣餘境。經爾所時。眼意二識。或善或染相續而轉\*\*\*。如眼識生。乃至身識。應知亦爾。*\*tatrādyam* em. : *tatra cādyam* Ybh<sub>SkT</sub>; *\*\*prabhṛti* em. : *param* Ybh<sub>SkT</sub>. These two emendations are based on Takatsukasa 2014: 1249, nn. 3 and 4. \*\*\* 相續而轉 does not have an equivalent in Ybh<sub>SkT</sub>.

**2.2** In this passage, the initial part addresses the first three states of awareness when a cognitive event takes place; it says clearly that the first state of mental activity can be identified with a sensory awareness, while the other two that follow are mental awarenesses. Of these mental awarenesses, the one that investigates the objective aspect grasped by the sensory awareness is the searching mental activity, and the one that makes a discerning judgment upon the object is the determined mental activity. Thus, these two kinds of awareness, being sensory (i.e., the first one), and mental (i.e., the other two), respectively, apparently come forth one by one in succession.

Then, in the latter part, the remaining two states are discussed, and a special case of sensory awareness is mentioned. Here, as I understand it, the text simply says that a sensory awareness, such as a visual awareness with a special moral quality, can be caused by the fourth type of mental activity, namely, the mental activity that constitutes defilement or purification, which results, for its part, from the third state of a mental activity, the determined mental activity, and thus this sensory awareness also becomes a uniformly flowing mental activity, the fifth type of mental activity, i.e., the sensory awareness possesses the moral quality determined by the mental awareness. It is further said that as long as the “mind” is not distracted, the moral quality of both mental awareness and sensory awareness remains unchanged.

Thus, it seems to me that this passage is irrelevant to the argument advanced by Sthiramati. However, this passage is quoted in Xuanzang’s CWSL as support of Sthiramati’s position. As we will see below in §2.9, Kuiji, his disciple and main commentator, takes effort to prove that this passage indicates the fact that both sensory awareness and mental awareness can be in the state of the fourth and fifth type of mental activity, and thus sensory awarenesses are continuous, simultaneous with mental awarenesses. However, this interpretation is not convincing to me.

**2.3** After the quotation of the above passage of the Ybh in the CWSL, we find the following interpretation:<sup>21</sup>

The purpose of this [passage] is definitely to demonstrate that as long as [this “mind” is not distracted elsewhere] mental awareness and visual awareness occur in company continuously (俱相續轉). Since there is never a case where there is visual awareness but no mental awareness, it is impossible that these two kinds of awareness come forth one by one continuously (互相續生).

<sup>21</sup> CWSL 21a18–20: 彼意定顯經爾所時眼意二識俱相續轉。既眼識時非無意識。故非二識互相續生。

It is worthwhile to note that according to the Chinese version of this quoted passage, the sentence “As long as this ‘mind’ (*manas*) is not distracted elsewhere, mental awareness and visual awareness are wholesome or defiled” is to be translated as follows: “... mental awareness and visual awareness, being wholesome or defiled, occur continuously.”<sup>22</sup>

The phrase “occur continuously” (相續而轉) is seen only in the Chinese translation of the Ybh;<sup>23</sup> it is found neither in the Sanskrit version nor in the Tibetan version. If we compare the Sanskrit sentence beginning with *tāvāt*, we can understand this phrase to mean that the moral quality of the two awarenesses continues or remains the same. However, the sentence is interpreted in the CWSL as meaning that these awarenesses continue to exist in more than one moment; further, a new element “in company” (俱) is added by changing 相續而轉 to 俱相續轉. Kuiji’s comment on this statement in the CWSL makes this sense even clearer: he interprets the statement as an answer to the supposed objection that these two awarenesses may come forth in immediate succession, but not simultaneously:<sup>24</sup>

If one interprets [the passage quoted from the Ybh] as saying that the five awarenesses are definitely interrupted, then why is it said that they occur continuously? [Objection:] “They come forth one after the other continuously.” [Answer:] They cannot be described as “continuously” when only after the cessation of visual awareness a mental awareness can come forth, and thereafter visual [awareness] again comes forth.

**2.4** The conclusion of the argument attributed to Sthiramati is that the five awarenesses, in company with mental awareness, must continue for many moments in some special cases. Therefore, with regard to the fifth type of mental activity, namely, uniformly flowing mental activity, the following question is asked:<sup>25</sup>

When the five awarenesses in the state of being uniformly flowing [mental activities], brought forth by the strength of attention (*\*manaskāra*), which is determined [mental activity] or [mental activity that constitutes] defilement or purification, concentrate upon an object to be observed [such as a picture of the Buddha], why is it not accepted that they are continuing for many moments as long as [this concentration does] not stop?

<sup>22</sup> Ybh<sub>ch</sub> 280a26–27: 眼意二識。或善或染相續而轉。

<sup>23</sup> Cf. n. 20.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. CWSL-SJ: 彼若解言五識定斷。若爾何故言相續轉。遞相續生。非眼識斷已唯有意識。後復眼生可言相續。

<sup>25</sup> CWSL 21a12–14: 等流五識。既為決定染淨作意勢力引生。專注所緣。未能捨頃。如何不許多念相續。Cf. La Vallée Poussin 1928: 242f.

This seems to emphasize that the five sensory awarenesses are not limited to spontaneous mental activities; rather, in the state of being uniformly flowing mental activity, they may also be conditioned by attention having the nature of determined mental activity or mental activity that constitutes defilement or purification. In this case, as long as they are concentrating upon an object and are not distracted by another object, the five awarenesses accompanied by mental awareness can continuously be produced by mental awareness and thus last for more than one moment.

**2.5** The problem is that the CWSL quotes the “Basic Section” of the Ybh to prove the thesis that sensory awareness is continuous and accompanied by mental awareness.<sup>26</sup> However, as mentioned already above in §2.2, the quotation does not support this thesis. In another passage of the same section of the Ybh,<sup>27</sup> the intention of the author is expressed more clearly:<sup>28</sup>

Moreover, it is not the case that [individual instances from among] the five groups of awarenesses arise continuously in two moments; nor is it the case that they arise one from another immediately one after the other. [Rather,] mental awareness necessarily arises subsequent to [individual instances from among] the five groups of awareness that arise in a single moment.

This passage seems to suggest the model attributed to Nanda, namely, that individual instances of the five sensory awarenesses, on the one hand, and mental awareness, on the other hand, come forth one after another in succession.<sup>29</sup> It does not seem to be related to the model attributed to Sthiramati, namely, that sensory awarenesses of the five kinds and mental awareness occur simultaneously, in other words, that sensory awarenesses are accompanied by mental awareness.<sup>30</sup>

**2.6** As I have already pointed out elsewhere,<sup>31</sup> in many respects the Yogācāras share doctrines with the realistic systems, the Sautrāntika or the Sarvāstivāda, in the earlier period of development of the Yogācāra system to which the “Ba-

<sup>26</sup> Cf. above n. 20.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. also below §2.7.

<sup>28</sup> Ybh<sub>Skt</sub> 58,13–15: *na cāsti pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānām anusahitaṃ\* dvayoḥ kṣaṇayor utpattiḥ, nāpy anyonyasamanantaram anyonyotpattiḥ. ekakṣaṇotpannānāṃ pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānām\*\* anantaram manovijñānam avaśyam utpadyate.* = Ybh<sub>Ch</sub> 291b1–4: 又非五識身有二剎那相隨俱生。亦無展轉無間更互而生。又一剎那五識身生已。從此無間必意識生。\* *anusahitaṃ* em. : *saha* Ybh<sub>Skt</sub>; \*\* *vijñānakāyānām* em. : *kāyavijñānānām* Ybh<sub>Skt</sub>. These two emendations are based on Takatsukasa 2014: 1249, nn. 7 and 8. Note that the first emendation is not supported by the Tibetan translation which reads *lhan cig tu* (Ybh<sub>Tib</sub> 29b3). Cf. also the translations in Chu 2014: 293 and Takatsukasa 2014: 1249.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Chu 2014: §4.2–3.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Chu 2014: §4.4–5.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Chu 2014: 294.

sic Section” of the Ybh belongs. In the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā (AMV) we read an interesting passage which mentions the different opinions of certain *yogācāras* (諸瑜伽師)<sup>32</sup> and Abhidharma masters related to the above topic:<sup>33</sup>

Question: Do [individual instances from among] the five awarenesses, such as visual awarenesses, come forth immediately one from the other (*\*anyonyasa-manantaram*) [and thus keep their continuity]? Answer: The *yogācāra* masters say that [individual instances from among] the five awarenesses, such as visual awarenesses, do not come forth immediately one from the other, because they all arise immediately from mental awareness. However, the masters of the Abhidharmaśāstra say that it is possible that [individual instances from among] the five awarenesses, such as visual awarenesses, arise immediately one from the other[, provided that all conditions for their arising are present].

Here, it is clearly said that the *yogācāras* maintain that individual instances of the five groups of sensory awarenesses do not arise from instances of the same kind; rather they are necessarily produced by mental awareness, a position similar to that attributed to Nanda, that is, the position of Yogācāra at its early stage of development which, of course, differs from the one we can find in the later Yogācāra system.

2.7 After the quotation from the “Basic Section” of the Ybh and the interpretation thereof, another problem was brought into the discussion in the CWSL. This is the relationship between the five awarenesses and other types of mental activity among the five types of mental activity besides the spontaneous mental activity and the uniformly flowing mental activity. In the Ybh there are two other passages that are also mentioned by Kuiji,<sup>34</sup> in which the five types of

<sup>32</sup> In this passage, the term *yogācāra* should refer to Yogācāra not at its Mahāyāna stage, but rather at an earlier stage. At this stage, designated by Yinshun as that of “Śrāvaka-Yogācāra,” “the physio-psychical experiences of the *yogācāras* have been partly integrated into the doctrines of the Ābhidharmikas and the Dārṣāntikas” (Yinshun 1968: 615). As an example, Yinshun quotes a passage from the AMV in which the meditative experience of *yogācāras* is mentioned as proof of the doctrine of the selflessness of entities (*dharmanairātmya*): “Whether there is a scriptural proof or no scriptural proof [of the selflessness of entities], there is definitely the cognitive form (*ākāra*) that has the selflessness of all entities as its objective support. It is said that the *yogācāra* masters give rise to this cognitive form at the stage of meditative cultivation” (AMV 45a22–24: 隨有經證。或無經證。然決定有緣一切法非我行相。謂瑜伽師。於修觀位起此行相。). Cf. also the translation in Dhammajoti 2007: 21 and the discussion on this topic in Deleanu 2019: 7–8. These *yogācāra* masters can be regarded as the forerunners of the later Mahāyāna-Yogācāra masters.

<sup>33</sup> AMV 682b2–4: 問眼等五識展轉無間現在前不。答諸瑜伽師說。眼等五識展轉無間不現在前。皆從意識無間生故。阿毘達磨諸論師言。眼等五識展轉皆得無間而起。Cf. also the translations in Chu 2014: 294 and Takatsukasa 2016: 1224.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. CWSL-SJ 388b11–13: 瑜伽第一第三等說。若於此不決定。五識之後起意尋求心。為先未決故。諸佛先決故無尋求。 , and Dachen fayuan yilin zhang (FYYLZ) 256a4–6: 故瑜

mental activity as mental awareness and their relationship with the five sensory awarenesses are explained. The first passage reads as follows:<sup>35</sup>

In this case, when a mental awareness arises that is impassive (*anābhoga*) or distracted, or has something unfamiliar as its objective support (*asaṃstutālam-bana*), desire, etc., do not occur. And this mental awareness is to be taught as a spontaneous [mental activity] (*aupanipātika*), taking only something past as its objective support. The “mind” which has arisen immediately subsequent to the five groups of awarenesses, be it searching or determined, is to be taught as having only something present as its object. This [“mind”] comes about only if it has their object as its objective support.

In the second passage, which actually precedes the first one, it is said that<sup>36</sup>

mental awareness necessarily arises subsequent to [individual instances from among] the five groups of awarenesses that arise in a single moment. Sometimes, subsequent to these [instances of awareness, it] is distracted; [in this case] an auditory awareness or any other [awareness] from among the five groups of awarenesses [may arise] thereafter. When it is not distracted, precisely a mental awareness that is a determined [mental activity may arise] thereafter. And the two kinds of mental awareness, the searching [mental activity] and the determined [mental activity], conceptualize the object.

**2.8** Here, two cases of the occurrence of a mental awareness are mentioned. In the first case, which is a special one, being impassive, being distracted and having something unfamiliar as its objective support, the mental awareness is called

伽論第三卷云。意識任運散亂。緣不串習境時。無欲等生。爾時意識名率爾墮心。有欲等生，尋求等攝故。

<sup>35</sup> Ybh<sub>skt</sub> 59,12–15: *tatra manovijñāne 'nābhogavikṣipte\* 'saṃstutālabane nāsti chandādīnām pravṛtīḥ. tac ca manovijñānam aupanipātikaṃ vaktavyam atītālabanam eva. pañcānām vijñānakāyānām samanantaroppanam manaḥ\*\* paryeṣakam niścitam vā vartamānaviṣayam eva vaktavyam. tac cet tadviṣayālabanam eva, tad bhavati.* = Ybh<sub>ch</sub> 291b18–20: 又意識任運散亂緣不串習境時。無欲等生。爾時意識名率爾墮心。唯緣過去境。五識無間所生意識。或尋求或決定。唯應說緣現在境。若此即緣彼境生。\* In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh), “evenness of mental activity” and “impassivity of the mental activity” (*anābhoga*) are used to explain indifference. Cf. AKBh 55,18: *upekṣā cittasamatā cittānābhogatā*, and Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (AKV) 150,3: *upekṣā cittasamatā iti. yadyogāc cittaṃ samam anābhoge vartate, sopekṣā saṃskāropekṣā nāma.* Cf. also TrBh \*22,17: *upekṣā cittasamatā citta-praśaṭhatā cittānābhogatā.* \*\* Here the term *manas* is used instead of *citta*. In the Chinese translation, however, *manas* is translated as “mental awareness” (意識 = *manovijñāna*).

<sup>36</sup> Ybh<sub>skt</sub> 58,15–19: *ekakṣaṇoppannānām pañcānām vijñānakāyānām anantaram manovijñānam avāśyam utpadyate.\* tadanantaram kadācid vikṣipyate, tataḥ śrotravijñānam vā anyatamānyatamad vā pañcānām vijñānakāyānām. sa cen na vikṣipyate, tato manovijñānam eva niścitam nāma. tābhyām ca niścitaparyeṣakābhyām manovijñānābhyām sa viṣayo vikalpyate.* = Ybh<sub>ch</sub> 291b4–5: 從此無間必意識生。從此無間或時散亂或耳識生。或五識身中隨一識生。若不散亂。必定意識中第二決定心生。由此尋求決定二意識故。分別境界。\* See above §2.5 and n. 28.

a spontaneous mental activity, and no sensory awareness is accompanied by it; thus, it only has something past as its objective support. In the second, normal case, a mental awareness, be it a searching or a determined mental activity, arises immediately subsequent to an individual awareness from among the five groups of sensory awarenesses. This mental awareness takes the object of this sensory awareness as its objective support, which is something present. This means of course that, in the second case, immediately subsequent to a sensory awareness mental awareness of a conceptual nature will arise and, since the two awarenesses share the same object, will accompany this sensory awareness which lasts for more than one moment. A question then arises: What is the nature of the sensory awareness, whose object is also taken by the mental awareness as its objective support, during the time when the mental awareness, which may be a searching or determined mental activity, exists and accompanies it? This sensory awareness cannot be a spontaneous mental activity which definitely may last only for one moment. Since in the Ybh only spontaneous and uniformly flowing mental activity is associated with the five groups of sensory awarenesses, whereas searching and determined mental activity is normally associated with mental awareness that arises subsequent to one from among the five groups of sensory awarenesses, a further question arises: Is sensory awareness accompanied by a mental awareness qua a searching or determined mental activity? Since it is held that individual instances of the five groups of sensory awarenesses are always accompanied by a mental awareness, it is quite logical to maintain that they are accompanied by either of these two types of mental activity.

**2.9** Probably because of this consideration, Kuiji devotes a good deal of effort to proving that the five sensory awarenesses themselves may also have the nature of these two types of mental activity. First, with regard to the searching mental activity, he argues:<sup>37</sup>

As long as [a mental awareness] does not stop searching for an object to be seen or to be heard, the five [awarenesses] occurring in company with a mental [awareness] (五隨意轉) are also searching mental activities, because together with them there are expectations [of perceiving the object]. Otherwise, this (i.e., a searching mental activity) could not be comprised (*\*parigrhīta*) [as a possible nature] by the five [awarenesses]. [The five awarenesses as] spontaneous [mental activities] last for one moment (*ekakṣaṇa*), and a determined [mental activity] has not yet arisen; if [the five awarenesses] were not considered as searching [mental activities], this would entail a serious fault.

<sup>37</sup> FYYLZ 256b2–4: 尋求見聞未了之間。五隨意轉亦是尋求。有希望故。不爾此心應非五攝。率爾一念。決定未生。若非尋求便為大失。 The phrase 五隨意轉 in the second sentence should be related to the Chinese translation of *manovijñānasyānuvartakāni*; cf. below, §3.4f. and n. 55.

Since sensory awareness accompanied by a mental awareness that is a spontaneous mental activity is said to be a spontaneous mental activity, it can also be said to be a searching mental activity, etc., when it is accompanied by a mental awareness that is a searching mental activity, etc. Probably considering this point, Kuiji states that the five sensory awarenesses may also be searching mental activities themselves. The “fault” refers to the problem that if at a subsequent moment the five awarenesses would not have the nature of a searching or determined mental activity, it would follow that a spontaneous mental activity would repeat itself. This would be an undesired consequence since the five awarenesses in the state of spontaneous mental activities should last for only one moment. Kuiji solves this problem by maintaining that, although the five awarenesses as spontaneous mental activities last for no more than a single moment, they are reproduced (復起) for the period during which a searching mental activity, namely the accompanying mental awareness, does not cease to exist. In this case, the five awarenesses can be nothing other than searching mental activities; thus, the fault that an individual instance of spontaneous sensory awareness would be repeated can be avoided.<sup>38</sup>

As for the five awarenesses being determined mental activities, Kuiji’s argument is the same: since it is accepted that determined mental activities may last for many moments, as long as a mental activity that constitutes defilement or purification does not arise, instances of the five sensory awarenesses occurring simultaneously with a mental awareness can be nothing other than determined mental activities.<sup>39</sup> Thus, the five sensory awarenesses, parallel to mental awareness, may pass through all five types of mental activity, i.e., five types of cognitive states, as their nature.

**2.10** Kuiji’s presupposition that searching and determined mental activities occur in conjunction with the five awarenesses is apparently polemical in its nature; his opponent was probably the Korean monk Yuance (or Wōnch’ūk, 圓測), Kuiji’s rival in interpreting Xuanzang.<sup>40</sup> It is reported in the *Cheng wei-shi lun liaoyi deng* that Yuance holds the opposite opinion:<sup>41</sup>

Ximing (西明 = Yuance 圓測) maintains that only three types of mental activity—the spontaneous, [the one that constitutes] defilement or purification, and the uniformly flowing mental activity—are simultaneous with the five aware-

<sup>38</sup> Cf. FYYLZ 256b23–24: 故五識率爾唯一剎那。尋求未了復起五識。此之五識但是尋求。故五識身無多率爾。

<sup>39</sup> Cf. FYYLZ 256b4–5: 決定意識既許多時。染淨未生。五隨意轉。若非決定復是何心。

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Lusthaus 2002: 384ff.

<sup>41</sup> *Cheng wei-shi lun liaoyi deng* 75b6–7: 西明云。唯率爾·染淨·等流三心與五識俱。尋求·決定唯緣過去比量之心。不與五俱。

nesses (so that the former are identical with the latter in their nature); the searching mental activity and the determined mental activity are inferential mental activities that take only something past as their objective support and are not simultaneous with the five [awarenesses].

A detailed discussion of this controversy is outside the scope of this paper. However, no matter which opinion would be the more plausible one, it is clear that, with regard to the theory of five types of mental activity, some Yogācāra thinkers held that sensory awarenesses may only be in the three states of being spontaneous mental activities, mental activities that constitute defilement or purification, and uniformly flowing mental activities; while others held that they may also have the nature of the other two types of mental activity.<sup>42</sup> Thus, these latter Yogācāra thinkers accepted that instances of the five sensory awarenesses, inasmuch as they may be accompanied by mental awareness, may also be in the state of being mental activities that last for more than a single moment.

### 3. SIMULTANEOUS OCCURRENCE OF MENTAL AWARENESS WITH SENSORY AWARENESS

**3.1** In the CWSL 21a22ff., Nanda's opinion is further refuted by Sthiramati through the use of another argument, namely that of the similarity between the awareness in the preceding moment, which serves the function of the immediately preceding condition, and the subsequent awareness.<sup>43</sup> In this argument, the traditional term "immediately preceding condition" (*samanantarapratyaya*) is interpreted in a special way: any individual instance of the six awarenesses in the preceding moment may function as the immediately preceding condition for an awareness of its own kind in the subsequent moment.<sup>44</sup> Due to this connection, awarenesses of the same kind can form an uninterrupted series and thus maintain some continuity. According to this interpretation of the notion of the immediately preceding condition, it is of course not the case that only a sensory awareness, upon its cessation, serves the function of the immediately preceding condition for a subsequent mental awareness, as Nanda would hold.

In order to establish this argument, a statement from the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the Ybh is quoted, which is the second part of a short passage that presents

<sup>42</sup> Kuiji draws a clear conclusion at the end of his discussion: "Therefore it is understood that the five sensory awarenesses have [the nature of] the five types of mental activities. This is not contradictory to the Yogācāra [doctrinal system]; it is also superior with regard to reasoning." (FYYLZ 256b19: 故知五識具有五心。不違瑜伽。於理亦勝。)

<sup>43</sup> For the first argument, see §2.1.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. below, §3.3.

a general definition of the immediately preceding condition. The whole passage runs as follows:<sup>45</sup>

Then, what is the (similar) immediately preceding condition? Those factors qua mental activities and subordinate mental activities (*cittacaittā dharmāḥ*) from which [other] factors qua mental activities and subordinate mental activities arise, are called “the (similar) immediately preceding condition” of the latter. In this case, the six awarenesses are the (similar) immediately preceding conditions of the six awarenesses[, respectively]; they are the “mind” and are designated as “mind” (*manas*) (i.e., the mental faculty [*manāindriya*]), “mental sphere” (*manāyatana*) or “mental element” (*manodhātu*).

On the basis of this statement, according to the CWSL Sthiramati argues as follows:<sup>46</sup>

If mental awareness necessarily exists before and after the five awarenesses, either it should be stated in this treatise (i.e., the Ybh) that “this single [mental] awareness is the (similar) immediately preceding condition of these six awarenesses [...],” or it should be stated that “these six awarenesses which are the (similar) immediately preceding condition of this single [mental] awareness [...].” Since this is not stated in that way, it is known that the five awarenesses themselves can be continuous.

**3.2** As is well known, the idea that the awareness that has passed away in the previous moment is called “mind” (*manas*), which is well accepted in the Yogācāra tradition, actually goes back to an interpretation of the notion of the immediately preceding condition in the tradition of Abhidharma.<sup>47</sup> On the basis of the passage of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the Ybh quoted above, this notion can be understood as implying the following points: (1) Mental awareness is not specified as the unique performer of the function of the immediately preceding condition and therefore designated as “mind”; rather, individual instances of all six kinds of awareness, including the five sensory awarenesses, perform this function and should be thus designated. (2) Individual instances of the six awarenesses that arise in the preceding moment do not perform the function of

<sup>45</sup> Ybh<sub>Tib</sub> Zhi 16a2–3: *de la mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen gang zhe na | sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos gang dag gi mjug thogs su sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos gang dag 'byung ba de dag ni | de dag gi mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen zhes bya'o || de la rnam par shes pa drug po gang dag yin pa de dag ni rnam par shes pa drug po de dag mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen yin te | de dag ni yid la yid ces bya ba dang | yid kyi skye mched ces bya ba dang | yid kyi khams zhes bya bar yang gdags so || = Ybh<sub>Ch</sub> 584b28–c2: 復次云何等無間緣。謂此諸心心所無間。彼諸心心所生。說此為彼等無間緣。若此六識為彼六識等無間緣。即施設此名為意根。亦名意處亦名眼界。*

<sup>46</sup> Cf. CWSL 21a23–26: 若五識前後定唯有意識。彼論應言若此一識為彼六識等無間緣。或彼應言若此六識為彼一識等無間緣。既不如是故知五識有相續義。

<sup>47</sup> For a more detailed discussion of this idea in the Abhidharma tradition and adopted in the Yogācāra tradition, cf. Chu 2014: §2.3–7 (pp. 274–282).

the immediately preceding condition for a mental awareness alone; rather, they perform this function for instances of all six kinds of awareness. However, according to the CWSL the statement in the Ybh is interpreted by Sthiramati as implying that individual instances of each of the six kinds of awareness can perform the function of the immediately preceding condition for an instance of their own kind of awareness in the subsequent moment. This means that a visual awareness in the preceding moment can serve as the immediately preceding condition for the arising of a visual awareness in the subsequent moment. In the same way, also an auditory awareness, etc., up to a mental awareness, can be the immediately preceding condition for a subsequent instance of awareness of their own kind, respectively. That is to say, each of these awarenesses can cause its continuity into the subsequent moment and forms its own continuous series; thus, the instances of the different kinds of awareness form separate parallel lines which never intersect. As I have pointed out elsewhere, this theory is adopted both by the group of Sthiramati's followers and that of Dharmapāla's followers, and especially by the latter.<sup>48</sup> For Sthiramati, however, it is more important to draw the conclusion of the simultaneity of mental and sensory awarenesses from this theory.

**3.3** According to the CWSL, in Sthiramati's view an instance from among the five groups of sensory awarenesses takes all six kinds of awareness in the preceding moment as its basis that makes room for its arising, and the sixth awareness takes its own kind of awareness as well as the seventh and eighth awareness in the preceding moment as its basis that makes room for its arising.<sup>49</sup> Thus, according to this rule a mental awareness does not need to take a sensory awareness in the preceding moment as its immediately preceding condition, because this function is performed already by an awareness of its own kind. However, for the case of sensory awarenesses, the above general rule is modified: a sensory awareness takes two kinds of awareness in the preceding moment as its basis that makes room for its arising, that is, not only an awareness of its own kind, i.e., a sensory awareness, but also, in addition, a mental awareness. In this case, a sensory awareness not only can be continuous, but also arises on the strength of the continuing force of the mental awareness so that its arising in immediate succession becomes possible.<sup>50</sup> Under this condition, sensory awareness is constantly accompanied by mental awareness: a sensory awareness

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Chu 2014: §4.4–7 (pp. 295–301).

<sup>49</sup> Cf. CWSL 21b8–9: 應說五識前六識內隨用何識為開導依。第六意識用前自類或第七八為開導依。

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Kuiji's comment in CWSL-SJ 389c18–19: 五識以前六識皆得為依。自相續故。他引生故。得次無間生。

in the first moment is accompanied by a mental awareness in that moment, and this sensory awareness in the second moment is also continuously accompanied by a mental awareness in the same moment. It is therefore said that a sensory awareness takes its own kind of awareness in the preceding moment which is accompanied by the mental awareness in that same moment as its basis that makes room for its arising in the present moment. However, this earlier sensory awareness does not act as the immediately preceding condition for a subsequent mental awareness, because a mental awareness takes an instance of its own kind of awareness or of the seventh and eighth awareness in the preceding moment as its immediately preceding condition and never requires a sensory awareness as such a condition; otherwise, the temporal continuum of mental awareness would be interrupted by sensory awareness. As we will see below in §5.7, this is exactly the opinion stated by Sthiramati in the ASBh (= ASV). This point of view suggests that a certain kind of awareness, being supported by the immediately preceding condition which is constituted by an instance of its own kind of awareness in the preceding moment, is not interrupted by any other kind of awareness. By this argument, both elements of the phrase “(similar) immediately preceding condition,” namely, “similar” (*sam*) and “immediate” (*anantara*), as is clearly the interpretation of the term reflected in its Chinese and Tibetan translations, are taken into account. If this theory is accepted, it is of course not the case that sensory awareness is produced by mental awareness preceding it and gives rise to mental awareness subsequent to it, as Nanda holds.

**3.4** In Kuiji’s commentary, Sthiramati’s opinion is associated with the Yogācāra theory of the simultaneous occurrence of mental and sensory awareness. Kuiji provides two references from the Ybh, the second one identified as a quotation from the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (SNS), to support the arguments set forth by Sthiramati; additionally, grouped together with these references, Dignāga’s works “Pramāṇasamuccaya and so forth” are mentioned. The references are paraphrased by Kuiji in only two sentences.<sup>51</sup> According to him, in the first reference the five groups of sensory awarenesses are taken as the subject and are said to occur in company with a mental awareness,<sup>52</sup> and in the second reference, which is also connected by him to Dignāga’s work, mental awareness is taken as the subject, inasmuch as this awareness is said to necessarily occur simultaneously with the five awarenesses.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>51</sup> CWSL-SJ 389a24f.: 謂瑜伽第三說五識身隨意識轉。及六十七。集量論等云五識俱時必有意識。As pointed out in Han 2002: 1651, the volume number “67” (六十七) should be emended to “76” (七十六).

<sup>52</sup> 隨意識轉 = *manovijñānasyānuvartakāni*, cf. below n. 55.

<sup>53</sup> 五識俱時必有意識 (= *lhan cig rjes su ’jug pa*, 與眼識俱隨行), cf. below n. 58 and n. 61.

According to Kuiji, based on these references Sthiramati draws the following conclusion: Precisely this mental awareness (i.e., the mental awareness which necessarily occurs simultaneously with the five awarenesses in the first moment) can give rise to the second mental awareness, i.e., a searching [mental activity] (being the second of the five types of mental activity), which takes the preceding mental awareness of its own kind as its (similar) immediately preceding condition. Why does it depend on the five [sensory] awarenesses? If in the preceding moment the five awarenesses alone arise, and only in the later moment the mental awareness qua the searching mental activity arises, it could be said that the five [awarenesses] are the [immediately preceding (similar)] condition for mental [awareness]. Since this is not the case, it is therefore concluded that mental awareness does not have the five awarenesses as its basis that gives way, because the five awarenesses themselves do not have this special capacity.<sup>54</sup>

**3.5** However, the first reference is somewhat problematic. It refers to a passage of the “Basic Section” of the Ybh. As discussed above in §2.1–5, Xuanzang also quotes a passage from this section of the work, which, however, does not really support the thesis of a continuity of sensory awareness. Here, it is the same case: the passage referred to by Kuiji does not clearly state the simultaneity of mental and sensory awareness:<sup>55</sup>

In this connection, the defiled or wholesome factor arises due to two causes, [that is,] due to conceptual construction and due to an earlier continuing force (*pūrvāvedha*).<sup>56</sup> There, in the case of mental awareness, [this factor arises] due to [these] two causes; however, in the case of the five groups of awarenesses [it arises] only due to the continuing force of the previous [mental awareness]. The

<sup>54</sup> CWSL-SJ 389a26–b1: 即此意識能引第二尋求意識生。即以前念自類意識為無間緣。何假五識。若前一念獨起五識。後方意識尋求心生。可如所說五為意緣。既不如是。故知意識不以五識為開導依。五識自無勝勢力故。The first part of this passage is also translated in Yao 2005: 140; however, Yao gives a different interpretation than the one presented here.

<sup>55</sup> Ybh<sub>SKT</sub> 59,1–6: *tatra dvābhyāṃ kāraṇābhyāṃ kliṣṭasya vā kuśalasya vā dharmasya utpattir bhavati, vikalpataḥ pūrvāvedhataś ca. tatra manovijñāne dvābhyāṃ kāraṇābhyāṃ, pañcasu punar vijñānakāyeṣu pūrvāvedhata eva. kliṣṭakuśalamanovijñānāvedhāt samanantare caḥsurādivijñāne kliṣṭakuśaladharmotpattir na tu vikalpāt, teṣāṃ avikalpāt. ata eva caḥsurādīni vijñānāni manovijñānasyānuvartakāni ity ucyate.* = Ybh<sub>CH</sub> 291b6–12: 又由二種因故。或染污或善法生。謂分別故。又先所引故。意識中所有由二種因。在五識者唯由先所引故。所以者何。由染污及善意識力所引故。從此無間於眼等識中。染污及善法生。不由分別。彼無分別故。由此道理說眼等識隨意識轉。(= Ybh<sub>TIB</sub> Tshi 29b6–30a1).

<sup>56</sup> Yaśomitra glosses the word *āvedha* in AKBh 151,25 (ad AK 3.38b) with *ākṣepa*. Cf. AKV 388,22: *pūrvāvedhāt pūrvākṣepāt. pūrvābhyāsād ity arthaḥ*. Sthiramati interprets it as the immediately preceding condition and explains “because through its special projection the stream of conditioning factors continues.” Cf. ASBh 32,7 (ASV unavailable): *āvedhataḥ samanantarapratyayaḥ, tadākṣepakaviśeṣeṇa saṃskārasrotānupravṛtteḥ*.

defiled or wholesome factor arises in the case of an immediately subsequent awareness, such as a visual awareness, on account of the continuing force of the defiled or wholesome mental awareness, not, however, on account of a conceptual construction, because these [five groups of awarenesses] do not have conceptual construction. Exactly for this reason it is said that [sensory] awarenesses, such as a visual awareness, occur in consequence to/in company with a mental awareness (*manovijñānasyānuvartakāni*).

Here, it is merely said that sensory awareness is caused by the continuing force, i.e., the immediately preceding condition of the mental awareness, and that the moral quality of a sensory awareness is determined by the continuing force of mental awareness in the previous moment. Indeed, the passage conveys almost the same idea as the passages of the “Basic Section” of the Ybh quoted in the CWSL or mentioned in the Cheng weishi lun shuji (CWSL-SJ)<sup>57</sup> discussed above in §2.3. As mentioned in §2.2 and §2.5, these passages do not support the notion attributed to Sthiramati. Furthermore, even though in the passage quoted here the keyword in the concluding sentence, namely *anuvartakāni* (= 隨意識轉), can be interpreted as meaning “occurring in company with,” this interpretation hardly fits the context of this passage; “in consequence to” would be a much more natural interpretation. That is to say, the three passages quoted from the Ybh in the CWSL support the idea that sensory and mental awarenesses arise one after the other in a series, which would actually be Nanda’s position.

**3.6** The second reference from the Ybh, in which it is clearly stated that mental awareness arises “simultaneously accompanying (*sahānucara*) visual awareness, at the same time and with the same object,” is identified as a quotation from Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra §V.4.<sup>58</sup> As was pointed out by Schmithausen,<sup>59</sup> the SNS is “quoted, and even wholly incorporated, in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.” In this passage of the SNS it is argued that individual instances from among the six groups of awarenesses arise based on and abiding in (*\*saṃniśritya pratiṣṭhāya*) the appropriating awareness (*ādānavijñāna*).<sup>60</sup> Then, the relationship between mental awareness and visual awareness is described thus:<sup>61</sup>

<sup>57</sup> Cf. n. 20 and n. 28.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Ybh<sub>Ch</sub> 718b2 (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* section): 與眼識俱隨行。同時同境有分別意識轉。 This corresponds to the passage of the SNS quoted below in n. 61.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Schmithausen 1987: 12.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. SNS §V.4, p. 56,1–4: *len pa'i rnam par shes pa de la rten cing gnas nas rnam par shes pa'i tshogs drug po 'di lta ste | mig gi rnam par shes pa dang | rna ba dang | sna dang | lce dang | lus dang | yid kyi rnam par shes pa dag 'byung ngo* |. For the *ādānavijñāna*, cf. Schmithausen 1987: 49f. (§3.9.2.5f.).

<sup>61</sup> SNS §V.4, p. 56,4–8: *de la rnam par shes pa dang bcas pa'i mig dang gzugs rnam la brten nas | mig gi rnam par shes pa 'byung ste | mig gi rnam par shes pa [de dang lhan cig rjes su*

Among these [awarenesses], based on the visual sense accompanied by awareness and something visible, visual awareness arises; and simultaneously accompanying (*sahānucara*) this visual awareness, at the same time and with the same object, the conceptually constructive mental awareness (*vikalpakaṃ manovijñānam*), also arises.

It is also stated there that the relationship between mental awareness and instances from among the other four groups of sensory awarenesses, i.e., auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and bodily awarenesses, is the same.<sup>62</sup> Again, it is pointed out that no matter how many sensory awarenesses arise (depending on conditions), a single mental awareness always occurs simultaneously with these sensory awarenesses and has the same object as they have. The passage reads:<sup>63</sup>

If a single visual awareness occurs simultaneously [with its object], only a single conceptually constructive mental awareness, having the same object as the visual awareness, occurs simultaneously. Even if [instances from among] two, three or four groups [of sensory awarenesses] occur simultaneously, or [even if instances from among] the five groups [of sensory awarenesses] occur simultaneously [with their object], in these cases still only a single conceptually constructive mental awareness, having the same objects as [the instances from among] the five groups of [sensory] awarenesses, occurs simultaneously.

In my opinion, this passage of the SNS is probably the main source based upon which the thesis of mental awareness accompanying the sensory awareness has been formulated both in the Indian and the Chinese Yogācāra tradition.

*'jug pa dus mtshungs pa spyod yul mtshungs pa rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa'ang 'byung ngo ||* = SNS<sub>ch</sub> (X) 692b20–21: 此中有識。眼及色為緣生眼識。與眼識俱隨行。同時同境有分別意識轉。

<sup>62</sup> Cf. SNS §V.4, p. 56,8–14: *de la rnam par shes pa dang bcas pa'i rna ba dang | sna dang | lce dang [lus dang sgra dang dri dang ro dang red bya rnams la rten nas rna ba dang sna dang lce dang lus kyi rnam par shes pa dang 'byung ste | rna ba dang sna dang lce dang] | lus kyi rnam par shes pa de dang lhan cig rjes su 'jug pa | dus mtshungs pa | spyod yul mtshungs pa | rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa'ang 'byung ngo ||*.

<sup>63</sup> SNS §V.4, p. 56,14–20: *gal te mig gi rnam par shes pa gcig lhan cig 'byung na ni mig gi rnam par shes pa dang spyod yul mtshungs pa | rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa gcig kho na lhan cig 'byung ngo || gal te rnam par shes pa'i tshogs gnyis sam | gsum mam | bzhi lhan cig gam | lnga char lhan cig 'byung na'ang der rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga po dag dang spyod yul mtshungs pa | rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa'ang gcig kho na lhan cig 'byung ngo ||* = SNS<sub>ch</sub> (X) 692b25–28: 若於爾時一眼識轉。即於此時唯有一分別意識。與眼識同所行轉。若於爾時二三四五諸識身轉。即於此時唯有一分別意識。與五識身同所行轉。

## 4. THE NATURE OF MENTAL AWARENESS ACCOMPANYING SENSORY AWARENESS

**4.1** In the sources describing the nature of the mental awareness accompanying sensory awarenesses, as quoted in §3.6 above, this mental awareness is said to be *vikalpaka*, “conceptually constructive.”<sup>64</sup> This statement, *prima facie*, raises a problem, for, as we know, if mental awareness accompanies sensory awarenesses and occurs simultaneously with them, for that reason being also a perception, it must be free from conceptual construction, as is clearly asserted in Dignāga’s epistemology.<sup>65</sup> However, we should keep in mind that according to the Buddhist tradition beginning with the Sarvāstivāda, conceptual construction has different natures. There are different ways of differentiating conceptual construction; one of them to assume a threefold division: (1) conceptual construction in terms of its own nature (*svabhāva*), that is, its cognitive nature; (2) conceptual construction in terms of reasoning (*abhyūhanā*); and (3) conceptual construction in terms of recollection (*anusmaraṇa*).<sup>66</sup>

In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh) *ad* *Abhidharmakośa* (AK) 1.32f., in the context of a discussion about the elements (*dhātu*) that are associated with two kinds of subordinate mental activities, i.e., inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*), the nature of conceptual construction is also addressed. Vasubandhu first stated that all of the five sensory awareness elements are always accompa-

<sup>64</sup> As can be seen in the preceding note, in the translation of the SNS by Xuanzang the term *vikalpaka* (= *nam par rtog pa*) is translated as “conceptually constructive (分別).” However, in Bodhiruci’s (菩提流支) translation we find “not conceptually constructive” (SNS<sub>Ch</sub> [B] 669a26: 無分別). Yuance comments on this striking difference and concludes that Bodhiruci’s version of the text is the correct one. Cf. Jie shenmi jing shu 248c20–22: 深密經云。無分別意識。依解節經等皆云。分別意識。與此本同。故知分別為正。 The Tibetan translation of Yuance’s commentary is contained in the Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka (P), Ti 280a1–2.

<sup>65</sup> PS 3c: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham*.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. AMV 219b7–11: 此中略有三種分別。一自性分別。謂尋伺。二隨念分別。謂意識相應念。三推度分別。謂意地不定慧。欲界五識身唯有一種自性分別。雖亦有念，而非隨念分別，不能憶念故；雖亦有慧，而非推度分別，不能推度故。“Here, briefly stated, there are three kinds of conceptual construction. The first is conceptual construction in terms of its own nature (*svabhāvavikalpa*), which refers to inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*); the second is conceptual construction in terms of recollection, which refers to the mindfulness (*smṛti*) associated with mental awareness (*manovijñānasamprayukta*); the third is conceptual construction in terms of reasoning (推度, *abhyūhanā*), which refers to the non-concentrated discrimination (*asamāhitaprajñā*) at the stage of mental activity (*manobhūmi*). [Instances from among] the five groups of [sensory] awarenesses in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) possess conceptual construction only in terms of its own nature; although they also possess mindfulness, they do not possess conceptual construction in terms of recollection (*anusmarāṇavikalpa*), because they cannot recollect; although they also possess discrimination (*prajñā*), they do not possess conceptual construction in terms of reasoning (*abhyūhanā*), because they cannot reason.” This passage is partly translated in Sharf 2018: 842; cf. also his discussion on the related topic on pp. 841f.

nied by inquiry and investigation, because these awarenesses are gross in nature since they are directed toward external things (*\*bahirmukha*).<sup>67</sup> In answer to the question “If the five groups of awarenesses are accompanied by inquiry and investigation, how can they be said to be devoid of conceptual construction?”<sup>68</sup> Vasubandhu explains that the five groups of awarenesses are designated as “devoid of conceptual construction” with reference to determination (*nirūpaṇā*) or recollection (*anusmaraṇa*) as two relevant kinds of conceptual construction.<sup>69</sup> Indeed, here he adopts the threefold differentiation of conceptual construction found in the Sarvāstivāda.<sup>70</sup> He explains that sensory awarenesses possess only the first kind of conceptual construction, i.e., conceptual construction in terms of its own, cognitive nature, but not the other two, i.e., conceptual construction in terms of determination and recollection. For this reason, he adds, they are said to be devoid of conceptual construction, just as a horse with one leg is said to be legless. Furthermore, of these three kinds of conceptual construction, the first one, “conceptual construction in terms of its own nature,” refers to inquiry (*vitarka*).<sup>71</sup> In another work, the Pañcaskandhaka, Vasubandhu defines inquiry as “the mental murmur (*manojalpa*) that searches,” that is, a kind of intention-

<sup>67</sup> Cf. AK 1.32ab: *śavitarkavicārā hi pañca vijñānadhātavaḥ* || and AKBh 22,4: *nityam ete [dhātavaḥ] vitarkavicārābhyāṃ saṃprayuktāḥ*. As has been pointed out in Kritzer 2005: 24, n. 60, the sentence explaining the reason is missing in the Sanskrit text, but it is given in both the Tibetan translation of the AKBh and its Chinese translation prepared by Xuanzang. Cf. AKBh<sub>Tib</sub> 42a5: *'di dag ni rtag tu rtog pa dang dpyod pa dag dang mtshungs par ldan pa yin te | 'di ltar kha phyi rol du bltas pa'i phyir rtsing ba yin no* || and AKBh<sub>Ch</sub> (X) 8a12–13: 眼等五識有尋有伺。由與尋伺恒共相應。以行相麤外門轉故。However, it is not found in Paramārtha's translation of the AKBh; cf. AKBh<sub>Ch</sub> (P) 168a13–14: 是五識界恒與覺觀相應故言定。Furthermore, this sentence is quoted and criticized in Saṅghabhadra's *Abhidharmanyañūsāra*. Cf. *Abhidharmanyañūsāra* 350a7–9: 經主釋言：以行相麤外門轉故。此因非理。現見意識。內門轉時。亦常與彼共相應故。應作是釋。 “The *sutra* master (i.e., Vasubandhu) explains: ‘because these awarenesses are gross in nature since they are directed toward external things.’ This reason is not correct, because we perceive that mental awareness is always accompanied by these (i.e., inquiry and investigation), even when it is directed towards internal things (*\*antarmukha*).”

<sup>68</sup> According to Yaśomitra, this question is asked on the basis of a widely quoted scriptural statement: “The complex of the visual awareness is aware of the blue, but not of ‘blue’” (AKV 72,13–14: *caḥśurvijñānasamsargī nīlaṃ vijñānti no tu nīlam iti vacanāt*). For a more detailed discussion on the topic of knowing “blue” as opposed to “this is blue” in the Abhidharma system, cf. Sharf 2018.

<sup>69</sup> AKBh 22,18–19 (*ad* 1.33ab): *yadi pañca vijñānakāyāḥ śavitarkāḥ śavicārāḥ, katham avikalpakā ity ucyante. nirūpaṇānusmaraṇavikalpenāvikalpakāḥ* ||.

<sup>70</sup> Vasubandhu uses the word *kila* here (see the next note); this indicates that he just reports the opinion of others, namely the Sarvāstivādins. Cf. AKV 72,14: *kīlaśabdaḥ paramatadyotanārthaḥ*.

<sup>71</sup> AKBh 22,20–22: *trividhaḥ kila vikalpaḥ. svabhāvābhiniṛūpaṇānusmaraṇavikalpaḥ. tad eṣāṃ svabhāvavikalpo 'sti. netarau. tasmād avikalpakā ity ucyante. yathā ekapādako 'śvo 'pādaka iti. tatra svabhāvavikalpo vitarkaḥ*.

al mental activity and discernment (*cetanāprajñāviśeṣa*) that constitutes the grossness of a mental activity. This is in contrast to investigation (*vicāra*), which is the mental murmur that investigates and constitutes the subtleness of a mental activity.<sup>72</sup>

**4.2** In fact, this Abhidharmic theory of conceptual construction is accepted in the Yogācāra system. Parallel to Dignāga's definition of perception "free from conceptual construction," in the section on *hetuvidyā* in the Śrutamayī Bhūmi of the Ybh,<sup>73</sup> that which can be perceived is defined as "that which is (1) not imperceptible, (2) not known by reasoning and not to be known by reasoning, and (3) non-erroneous."<sup>74</sup> Here, the second characterization, "not known by reasoning and not to be known by reasoning," can be interpreted as relating to the absence of "conceptual construction in terms of reasoning," the third type of conceptual construction mentioned in the AMV.<sup>75</sup> Further, in the ASBh (= ASV) Sthiramati states that the conceptual construction pertaining to mental awareness is threefold. The first kind, conceptual construction in terms of its own nature, has the form of its particular characteristic (*svalakṣaṇākāra*) in respect of the present conditioning factors inasmuch as they are being experienced.<sup>76</sup> He also reports that there is a sevenfold division of conceptual construction; of these seven kinds, the first, the conceptual construction that is naturally carrying on with regard to the objective support (*ālambane svarasavāho vikalpaḥ*), is identified with the five groups of awarenesses "because it carries on completely naturally with regard to [its] objects, without making [its] objective support respectively

<sup>72</sup> Pañcaskandhaka 13,7–10 (quoted also in AKV 72,16–17): *vitarkaḥ katamaḥ. paryeṣako manojalpaś cetanāprajñāviśeṣo yā cittasyaudārikatā. vicāraḥ katamaḥ. pratyavekṣako manojalpas tathaiva yā cittasya sūkṣmatā. Sthiramati offers a more detailed discussion on the same topic in TrBh \*31,16–32,3: vitarkaḥ paryeṣako manojalpaḥ prajñācetanāviśeṣaḥ. paryeṣakaḥ kim etad iti nirūpaṇākārapravṛttiḥ. manaso jalpo manojalpaḥ. jalpa iva jalpaḥ. jalpo 'rthakathanam. cetanāprajñāviśeṣa iti cetanāyās cittaparispandātmakatvāt prajñāyās ca guṇadoṣavivekākāratvāt. tadvaśena cittapravṛtteḥ. kadācic cittacetanayor vitarkaḥ prajñāptiḥ kadācit prajñācetasor yathākramam anabhyūhābhyūhāvasthayoḥ. atha vā cetanāprajñayor eva vitarkaḥ prajñāptis tadvaśena cittasya tathāpravṛttatvāt. sa eva cittasyaudārikatā. audārikateti sthūlatā vastumātraparyeṣaṇākāratvāt. eṣa ca nayo vicāre 'pi draṣṭavyaḥ. vicāro 'pi hi cetanāprajñāviśeṣātmakaḥ pratyavekṣako manojalpa eva "idaṃ tat" iti pūrvādhigatanirūpaṇāt. ata eva ca cittasūkṣmatety ucyate.*

<sup>73</sup> A critical edition of this section has been published in Yaita 2005.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Yaita 2005: 103, §3.26: *pratyakṣam katamat. yad aviparokṣam anabhyūhitam anabhyūhyam avibhrāntāṇ ca.*

<sup>75</sup> Cf. above n. 66.

<sup>76</sup> ASBh 16,6–10 (= ASV 26b2–4): *tribhis tāvad vikalpair manovijñānam ekaṃ savikalpakam. trayo vikalpāḥ svabhāvavikalpo 'nusmaraṇavikalpo 'bhinirūpaṇavikalpaś ca. tatra svabhāvavikalpaḥ pratyutpanneṣu saṃskāreṣv anubhūyamāneṣu yaḥ svalakṣaṇākāro vikalpaḥ.*

diverse.”<sup>77</sup> This kind of conceptual construction is certainly not what Dignāga refers to when he talks about “conceptual construction” (*kalpanā*), which has, according to his own definition, a connection with name, genus, etc.<sup>78</sup> Possibly some of the other six kinds of conceptual construction may be associated with it.

To sum up, the mental awareness that accompanies individual instances of sensory awareness comprised by the five groups of sensory awarenesses is a conceptual construction in terms of its cognitive nature; however, inasmuch as sensory awarenesses are free from conceptual construction in terms of determination and recollection, as stated by Vasubandhu, they can still be said to be “free from conceptual construction.”

**4.3** In a passage of Xuanzang’s CWSL there is an interesting discussion about the simultaneous occurrence of multiple kinds of awareness, in which five questions are asked and subsequently answered. In the discussion of the fourth question, the function of mental awareness accompanying the five awarenesses is clarified as follows:<sup>79</sup>

[Question:] Why do many awarenesses of the same kind [such as two visual awarenesses in respect of the same visible thing] not function simultaneously?  
 [Answer:] This is because, in respect of each with its own objective support, if the object can be apprehended, a single [awareness] can apprehend it, and further awarenesses would be useless. [Objection:] If this were the case, then the five awarenesses would have already apprehended their own objects[, respectively]; what then would be the use of the mental awareness occurring simultaneously [with the five sensory awarenesses] in apprehending [the objective support]?  
 [Answer:] The mental awareness accompanying the five [awarenesses] has the function of supporting the five [awarenesses] in their arising (助五令起), rather than merely apprehending the objective support of the five awarenesses; and

<sup>77</sup> Cf. ASBh 16,10–14 (= ASV 26b5–6): *api khalu sapta vikalpāḥ – ālambane svarasavāho vikalpaḥ sanimitto 'nimittāḥ paryeṣakāḥ pratyavekṣakāḥ kliṣṭo 'kliṣṭas ca vikalpaḥ. tatra ādya vikalpaḥ pañca vijñānakāyāḥ, acitrayitvālabhanam yathāsvaṃ viṣayeṣu svarasenaiva vahanāt.* In Ybh<sub>skt</sub> 12,9–11 a similar sevenfold division can be found: *katham ālambanam vikalpayati. saptavidhena vikalpena. sa punaḥ katamaḥ. naimittiko 'naimittikāḥ svarasavāhī paryeṣakāḥ pratyavekṣakāḥ kliṣṭo 'kliṣṭo vikalpaḥ.* With regard to the conceptual construction that is naturally carrying on, which is listed as the third kind, it is stated (Ybh<sub>skt</sub> 12,15): *svarasavāhī katamaḥ. pratyupasthite viṣaye svarasena yo viṣayabalād eva vartate.* “[Question:] ‘What is [the conceptual construction] that is naturally carrying on?’ [Answer:] It is that which is naturally carrying on in respect of a present object, exclusively on the strength of the object.”

<sup>78</sup> PS 3d: *nāmajātyādiyojanā.*

<sup>79</sup> CWSL 38b26–c2: 何故諸識同類不俱。於自所緣若可了者一已能了。餘無用故。若爾五識已了自境。何用俱起意識了為。五俱意識助五令起。非專為了五識所緣。又於彼所緣能明了取。異於眼等識故非無用。由此聖教說彼意識名有分別。五識不爾。For the reference to the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra at the end of this passage, cf. the quotation in n. 58 and n. 61 above.

furthermore, the mental awareness can make the apprehension clear (明了取) in respect of its objective support. This is different from the awareness by means of the visual sense, etc., and therefore it is not useless. For this reason, in the scriptural tradition (i.e., the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra) this mental awareness is said to be conceptually constructive, but the five awarenesses are not.

In explaining this passage, Kuiji says:<sup>80</sup>

This summarizes that the mental awareness is different from the five [sensory awarenesses], because in the Saṃdhinirmocana[sūtra] it is said that the sixth awareness accompanying visual awareness, etc., is a conceptually constructive mental awareness. However, it is not stated that the five awarenesses are conceptually constructive. Although both [mental awareness and sensory awareness] are perception, their functions are different.

This is quite likely the origin of the idea, widely spread in the Chinese commentarial literature, that the twofold function of mental awareness accompanying the five awarenesses is to make the apprehension clear,<sup>81</sup> and to support the five awarenesses in their arising.<sup>82</sup>

4.4 This theory of the simultaneous occurrence of mental awareness and the five awarenesses is, of course, closely connected with the Yogācāra theory of simultaneous occurrence (*yugapatpravṛtti*) of more than one awareness, which may be called a theory of a “multi-layered cognitive series.” This theory is in contrast to the Sautrāntika theory that for a conscious living being only a single cognition is possible at a given moment; Schmithausen calls this the theory of a “single-layered cognitive series” (“einschichtiger Erkenntnisstrom”).<sup>83</sup> The Yogācāra theory of the simultaneous occurrence of more than one awareness is itself based on the Sarvāstivāda theory of relationship of co-existent causation, inasmuch as the latter theory is applied in the Yogācāra tradition to describe the

<sup>80</sup> CWSL-SJ 485c17–20: 此總結。意與五相異。解深密說第六識。為眼等識俱一分別意識。不說五識為分別故。雖俱現量作用有異。

<sup>81</sup> Cf. the discussion of the term “clear” (*spaṣṭa*) in §5.6 below.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Cheng weishi lun yanmi 934a3–5: 五俱意識而有二義。一明了取。二能助五。Cf. also CWSL-SJ 485c14: 此中意起言有二義。一明了。二助五。

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Schmithausen 1967: 113ff., Franco 1994: 367ff. and 1997: 77f. With regard to the Sautrāntika theory of “single-layered” awareness, Harada is of a different opinion (1996: 161ff., especially pp. 163f.). For the Yogācāra theory of a multi-layered cognitive series, cf. ASBh 12,16–17 (= ASV 22a2–3): *sa cet kaścid\* vadet – yady ālayavijñānam asti, tena dvayor vijñāṇayor yugapat pravṛttir bhaviṣyati. sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ – adoṣa eva bhavān doṣasamjñī, tathā hi bhavaty eva dvayor vijñāṇayor yugapat pravṛttiḥ.* (\* *evam* is added in ASV) “If someone may argue: ‘If the substratum awareness exists, [then] for this reason there will be the simultaneous occurrence of two awarenesses,’ he should be replied to as follows: What you call a fault is definitely not a fault, for there is really the simultaneous occurrence of two awarenesses.” Cf. also the translation in Griffiths 1986: 133.

relationship between the substratum awareness (*ālayavijñāna*) and the defiled factors.<sup>84</sup> This is explained in the Mahāyānasamgraha as follows:<sup>85</sup>

Why is it understood that this substratum awareness and these defiled factors are caused simultaneously and reciprocally (*\*samakālānyonyahetuka*)? [Answer:] Just as the arising of a flame and the burning of the wick in [the case of] a lamp are mutually simultaneous, and a bundle of reeds, while [the reeds are] reciprocally supporting each other, does not fall down, in the same way one should see a reciprocal causal relationship also in this case [i.e., in the case of the substratum awareness and the defiled factors]. Just as the substratum awareness is the cause of the defiled factors, in the same way the defiled factors are the condition of the substratum awareness, because the conditions qua cause (*hetupratyaya*) are thus established and other conditions qua cause are not observed.

A similar idea is also stated in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (AS) and the ASBh (= ASV). In the AS, the substratum awareness and the wholesome propensity (*kuśalavāsanā*) are mentioned as the condition qua cause, and it is said that this condition qua cause is to be seen “on account of companionship” (*sahāyataḥ*), among other aspects.<sup>86</sup> This “companionship” is explained as relating to conditions qua cause “which are factors that arise in co-existence, [and] not with any among them missing, just like the primary elements and what is derived from them.”<sup>87</sup> Sthiramati comments that this refers to the co-existent cause, and that “primary elements and what is derived from them (*bhūtāni bhautikaṃ ca*)” is

<sup>84</sup> For a detailed discussion of the Sarvāstivāda theory of a co-existent cause (*sahabhūhetu*), cf. Dhammajoti 2009: 154, §6.3.5ff., especially his remark on p. 154: “This is a new causal category innovated by the Sarvāstivāda, [...] it is of central importance in the causal theory of the school. It became an indispensable doctrine tool for the Yogācāra theory of cognition only (*vijñap-timātrātā*).”

<sup>85</sup> Mahāyānasamgraha 10,12–21 (§17) *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang | kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos de dag dus mnyam du gcig gi rgyu nyid du gcig 'gyur bar ji ltar blta zhes na | dper na mar me'i me lce 'byung ba dang snying po tshig pa phan tshun dus mnyam pa dang | mdung khyim yang dus mnyam du gcig la gcig brten nas mi 'gyel ba bzhin du 'dir yang gcig gi rgyu nyid du gcig 'gyur bar blta'o || ji ltar kun gzhi rnam par shes pa kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos rnams kyi rgyu yin pa de ltar kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos rnams kyang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i rgyu <yin pa'o> \* | de ltar \*\* rgyu'i rkyen rnam par bzhag ste | rgyu'i rkyen gzhan mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro | \* Lamotte's addition. \*\* Instead of *rgyu <yin pa'o> | de ltar*, Nagao 1982: 24 reads: *rgyu'i rkyen du*. Mahāyānasamgraha<sub>ch</sub> (X) 328b14 reads as follows: 復次阿賴耶識與彼雜染諸法。同時更互為因。云何可見。譬如明燈焰炷生燒同時更互。又如蘆束互相依持同時不倒。應觀此中更互為因。道理亦爾。如阿賴耶識為雜染諸法因。雜染諸法亦為阿賴耶識因。唯就如是安立因緣。所餘因緣不可得故。 This passage is also translated on the basis of its Chinese translation in Dhammajoti 2009: 160.*

<sup>86</sup> Cf. AS 27,2–4: *hetupratyayaḥ katamaḥ. ālayavijñānaṃ kuśalavāsanā ca. api khalu svabhāvato 'pi prabhedato 'pi sahāyato 'pi sampratipattito 'pi paripanthato 'pi parigrahaḥ 'pi hetupratyayo draṣṭavyaḥ.*

<sup>87</sup> Cf. AS 27,18–19: *kathaṃ sahāyataḥ. ye dharmāḥ sahabhāvenotpadyante nānyatamavaikal-yena. tadyathā bhūtāni bhautikaṃ ca.*

merely an example “because mental activities and subordinate mental activities, too, by necessity do not occur without each other.”<sup>88</sup>

4.5 Of course, co-existent causation is not limited to the relationship between the substratum awareness and the defiled factors. “Companionship” is also mentioned in the Ybh. At the beginning of the passage from which the quotation below has been extracted, there is a discussion of the stage associated with the five groups of awarenesses (*pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā bhūmiḥ*). This stage is defined with reference to all of the following, namely, the five groups of awarenesses in terms of their own nature, their basis (i.e., the sense faculties), their objective support, their “companionship”, and their morally relevant action at that stage of yogic practice.<sup>89</sup> Regarding “companionship,” it is stated:<sup>90</sup>

What is companionship? [It refers to] the subordinate mental factors (*caitasā dharmāḥ*) that are co-existent and associated with these [five groups of sensory awarenesses],<sup>91</sup> that is to say, attention (*manaskāra*), contact (*sparsā*), sensation

<sup>88</sup> Cf. ASBh 37,6–7 (ASV unavailable): *sahāyanaiyamyena sahabhūhetur vyavasthāpitaḥ. bhūtāni bhautikaṃ cety udāharanamātram etad veditavyam, cittacaitasikānām anyonyam avinābhā-vaniyamāt.*

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Ybh<sub>skt</sub> 4,1–3: *pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā bhūmiḥ katamā. pañca vijñānakāyāḥ svabhāvatas teṣāṃ ca āśrayas teṣāṃ cālambanaṃ teṣāṃ ca sahāyas teṣāṃ ca karma samāsataḥ pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā bhūmiḥ.* For the elliptic formulation of this definition, cf. Ybh<sub>skt</sub> 4.12: [...] *ity etāḥ saptadaśa bhūmayāḥ samāsato yogācārābhūmir ity ucyate.*

<sup>90</sup> Ybh<sub>skt</sub> 5,12–15: *sahāyāḥ katamaḥ. tatsahabhūsamprayuktās caitasā dharmāḥ. tadyathā – manaskārah sparśo vedanā sañjñā cetaneti. ye 'py anye caḥsur<ādi>vijñānena sahabhūsamprayuktās caitasā dharmās te punar ekālambanā anekākārāḥ sahabhūvaḥ\* caikaikavṛttayaḥ ca sarve ca svabījān nirjātāḥ samprayuktāḥ sākārāḥ sālambanāḥ sāsrayāḥ.\*\* \* sahabhūvaḥ is translated as 俱有相應 (= *sahabhūsamprayuktāḥ*) in Ybh<sub>ch</sub> 279b22. \*\* The words *sākārāḥ sālambanāḥ sāsrayāḥ* are omitted in the Ybh<sub>ch</sub>, but attested in the Ybh<sub>tib</sub>. In the section of the Ybh on the “stage of mental activity” (*manobhūmi*), we can find a passage in which a similar definition of “companionship” in the context of the stage of mental activity is given. The essential difference from the above-quoted passage is the explanation by way of exemplification where a comprehensive list of subordinate mental activities is provided. The beginning and the last part of this passage, starting with the words *sahabhūsamprayuktās caitasā dharmāḥ*, are practically identical with the above-quoted passage. Cf. Ybh<sub>skt</sub> 11,14–21: *sahāyāḥ katamaḥ. tadyathā – manaskārah sparśo vedanā sañjñā cetanā chando 'dhimokṣaḥ smrtiḥ samādhiḥ prajñā śraddhā hrīr apatrāpyam alobho 'dveṣo 'moho vīryam prasrabdhir apramāda upekṣāhimsā rāgaḥ pratigho 'vidyā māno dṛṣṭir vicikitsā krodha upanāho mraḥṣaḥ pradāsa īrṣyā mātsaryam māyā śāṭhyam mado vihiṃsāhrīkyam anapatrāpyam styānam auddhatyam āśraddhyam kausīdyaṃ pramādo muṣitasmrītī-dhikṣepo 'samprajanyaṃ kaukrtyaṃ middhaṃ vitarko vicāraś cety evambhāgyāḥ sahabhūsamprayuktās caitasā dharmāḥ sahāya ity ucyante – ekālambanā anekākārāḥ sahabhūva ekaikavṛttayaḥ svabījāniyatāḥ samprayuktāḥ sākārāḥ sālambanāḥ sāsrayāḥ.* A similar list of subordinate mental activities is found in TrK 10–14.*

<sup>91</sup> This means that factors related to the subordinate mental activities are co-existent causes as well as associated causes. For the distinction between the co-existent and the associated cause, cf. AKBh 88,22–26: *yaḥ samprayuktakahetuḥ sahabhūhetur api sa. atha kenārthena sahabhūhetuḥ kena samprayuktakahetuḥ. anyonyaphalārthena sahabhūhetuḥ, sahasārthikānyonyaba-*

(*vedanā*), ideation (*saṃjñā*), [and] intentional mental activity (*cetanā*). Besides, the other subordinate mental factors that are also co-existent and associated with visual awareness etc., have a single objective support [shared with instances of the five groups of sensory awarenesses] (i.e., have the same objective support), [but] have various aspects and are co-existent [with the five groups of sensory awarenesses], and perform their functions individually. And all of them, arising from their own seed (i.e., the substratum awareness), are associated [with the five groups of sensory awarenesses], sharing [with them their] aspect, objective support and basis (i.e., the sense faculty).

It can thus be concluded that the theory of the simultaneous occurrence of the five sensory awarenesses and mental awareness is based on the Yogācāra theory of the simultaneous occurrence of more than a single awareness, which, for its part, has the theory of causation by way of co-existence as its background. This shows that some theories rooted in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, like the theory of concurrent causation, are also shared to a certain degree by Mahāyāna doctrinal systems.

**4.6** As a supplement to the above discussion of the nature of mental awareness accompanying sensory awarenesses, I would like to provide a general remark on the notion of “simultaneity” concerning mental awareness and sensory awarenesses. The words *-anuvartaka*, *-anucara*, and *-sahānucara* are translated in this paper as “occurring in consequence to / in company with,” or similar according to the context. In Sanskrit, the prefix *anu-* can mean both “after, behind” and “along, alongside, by the side of”; the verbal roots  $\sqrt{vrt}$  (“to abide, remain,” “to happen, occur”) and  $\sqrt{car}$  (“to walk, move”), on the other hand, also mean “to occupy or engage oneself; to act,” and “to perform,” respective-

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*lamārgaprayānavat. pañcabhiḥ samatābhiḥ saṃprayogārthena saṃprayuktakahetuḥ, teṣāṃ eva sārthikāṇāṃ samānānapānādīparibhogakriyāprayogavat. ekenāpi hi vinā sarveṇa na saṃprajuyanta iti.* “That which is an associated cause is also a co-existent cause. In what sense is it a co-existent cause, in what sense is it an associated cause? It is a co-existent cause in the sense of a mutual effect (i.e., in the sense that it and another thing are causing each other), just as when fellow merchants traverse a road by means of their mutual strength. It is an associated cause in the sense of the association with the five [kinds of] sameness, just as when these fellow merchants are engaged in the common activity of enjoying food, drink, and so on. For they are not completely associated in the absence of even a single one [among them].” The five kinds of sameness mentioned in this passage consist of the sameness of the basis (i.e., the sense faculties), of the objective support, of aspect, of time and of substance; cf. AKBh 62,9 (*ad AK 2.34*): *pañcabhiḥ samatāprakārair āśrayāmbanākārakāladravayasamatābhiḥ*. On AKBh 88,22–26, cf. Dhammajoti 2009: 167, n. 68.) Cf. also ASBh 37,9–11 (ASV unavailable): *ye dharmāḥ sahabhāvenālaṃbanam pratipadyante, nānyatamavaikalyena, te saṃpratipattitāḥ saṃprayuktakahetur vyavasthāpya<n>te, na sahabhāvamātreṇa, tadyathā cittaṃ caitasikāś ca.* “Those factors which attain the [same] objective support in co-existence, [and] not with any one among them missing, are [also] established as the associated cause in concurrence, not merely in co-existence, that is to say, [the factors which are the] mental activity and subordinate mental activities.”

ly. According to my understanding, the above three adjectives used in the present context should not refer to a “simultaneity” of two actions or events in the sense that they begin and cease at the same points in time. Rather, they may refer to the following situation: *X* arises, and immediately upon its arising, *Y* also arises and thus occurs in company with or accompanies *X*. If we say in English: “*Y* goes along with *X*,” this also implies that *X* starts to move first, and *Y* immediately follows and joins *X*. That is, we are talking about actions or events that occur simultaneously in the sense of being co-existent, but do not necessarily commence at the same time from the very same starting point. Thus, the difference between the theory of the simultaneous occurrence of sensory awarenesses (*X*) and mental awareness (*Y*) advocated by Sthiramati, and the theory of their strict subsequent occurrence advocated by Nanda, can be described as follows: According to the first theory, upon *X*’s arising, *Y* arises and accompanies *X* in a relationship of a slightly delayed companionship; according to the second theory, *Y* only arises upon *X*’s cessation in a relationship of succession to it.

**4.7** The word *saha* also deserves some consideration in this context. Interestingly, there is an extensive discussion concerning the different semantic aspects of this word in AKBh 145,2–146,24, which is closely related to the meaning of the words *-anuvartaka*, *-anucara*, and *-sahānucara* discussed above. Here Vasubandhu digresses into the Vaibhāṣika–Sautrāntika debate on the temporal relationship between sensory contact (*sparsā*) and sensation (*vedanā*). I will omit the details of this discussion and just focus on some salient points important for the present topic.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, these two, contact and sensation, arise simultaneously (*samānakāla*), because they are co-existent causes (*sahabhūhetu*). The Sautrāntikas argue against this, saying that two things which have arisen together cannot be in a relation of produced and producer, because a thing does not have the power of producing an effect in respect of another already produced thing. Otherwise it would follow that they are mutually productive factors. However, the Vaibhāṣikas admit that two things are mutual effect (*anyonyaphala*).<sup>92</sup> The Sautrāntikas refute the Vaibhāṣika theory from the points of scriptural tradition and reasoning. In their answer, the Vaibhāṣikas adduce the example of sprout and shadow (*chāyāṅkura*) which illustrates the basic Vaibhāṣika doctrine of the temporal relationship between two co-existent causes. As Yaśomitra explains, these two, even though they have arisen together, are

<sup>92</sup> This thesis has been discussed already in AKBh 83,18–85,7 (*ad* AK 2.50b–2.51c). Cf. Dhammajoti 2009: 154f.

nevertheless in a causal relationship, because the sprout, immediately after its appearance, produces a shadow.<sup>93</sup>

It is not the case that in the first moment the sprout exists without a shadow, and in the second moment with a shadow. Also contact and sensation are like this. It can be said that also these two, shadow and sprout, have a complex of previously existing factors (*pūrvasāmagrī*) as their cause.

Further, Vasubandhu addresses the theory that sensation comes forth later than contact which is advanced by Śrīlāta, a prominent Sautrāntika master. At the end of the digression, Vasubandhu focuses on a sūtra quotation:<sup>94</sup>

Conditioned by the visual sense and something visible, there arises a visual awareness. Contact is the coming together (*saṃnipāta*) of the three (i.e., the visual sense, something visible and the visual awareness); sensation, ideation and intentional mental activity have originated together (*sahajāta*).

It is important in the context of the present paper that here the word *saha*, “together,” in the compound *sahajāta*, “originated together,” is discussed. According to the Sautrāntika, this word can also be understood as “immediately following” (*samanantara*). For example, it is said in a sūtra: “[He] brings about the limb of enlightenment which is mindfulness accompanied by friendliness.”<sup>95</sup> Yaśomitra explains that the word “together” does not necessarily refer to simultaneity, for friendliness and mindfulness as a limb of enlightenment are not fixed together (*samavadhāna*), because friendliness invariably has some outflow, while mindfulness as a limb of enlightenment is invariably free from any outflow.<sup>96</sup> To conclude: Although the word *saha* indisputably refers to the relationship of simultaneity or companionship pertaining to two things in a causal relationship, it also gives room for its interpretation as indicating a kind of sequence in the arising of these two things. Even in the Vaibhāṣika examples of sprout and

<sup>93</sup> Cf. AKV 375,21–22: *sahotpannayor janyajanakabhāvaḥ. utpanna eva hy aṅkuraś chāyāṃ janayati. na prathame kṣaṇe 'ṅkuro niśchāyo bhavati dvitīye sacchāya iti. evaṃ sparśavedanayor apy iti. anayor api chāyāṅkurayoḥ pūrvasāmagrī hetur iti śakyam vaktum*. Yaśomitra points out that the example of sprout and shadow has been used already before in the main section of the presentation of the theory of the co-existent cause. For this reason, it is not explained again here. Cf. AKV 375,24: *sahabhūhetunirdeṣe tv ayam artha ukta iti na punar ucyate*. In AKV 229,28ff., Yaśomitra explains this example together with the similar example of lamp and light (*pradīpa-prabhayoḥ [...]*).

<sup>94</sup> AKBh 146,12–13: *caḅṣuḥ praṭītya rūpāṇi coṭpadyate caḅṣurvijñānam. trayāṅgāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ, saḅajātā vedanā saṃjñā cetaneti*. Cf. Dhammajoti 2003: 23; for the source of this sūtra quotation, see p. 52, n. 21.

<sup>95</sup> AKBh 146,15–16: *samanantare 'pi cāyam saḅāśabdo drṣṭaḥ, tadyathā maitrīsaḅagataṃ smṛtisambodhyaṅgaṃ bhāvayati*.

<sup>96</sup> AKV 378,18–20: *ayam saḅāśabdo nāvaśyam yugapadbhāve, samanantare 'pi drṣṭaḥ. na hi maitryāḥ smṛtisambodhyaṅgasya ca samavadhānam asti, maitryaikāntasāsravatvāt, smṛtisambodhyaṅgasya caikāntānāsravatvāt*.

shadow, and lamp and light, the shadow follows the sprout and the light follows the lamp, not vice versa. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that even if the Sautrāntika example of mindfulness accompanied by friendliness is interpreted to mean that friendliness follows immediately upon mindfulness, mindfulness is accompanied by friendliness for at least a certain period of time. Yaśomitra's explanation of the example of sprout and shadow is very insightful: (1) These two, even though they have arisen together, are in a causal relationship; (2) furthermore, they also have a complex of previously existing factors as their cause. This example can be extended also to the present issue, that is, the five groups of sensory awarenesses and mental awareness are in a similar kind of causal relationship: even though they arise in sequence, they occur simultaneously and thus in companionship, just like a sprout and the shadow it produces.

## 5. STHIRAMATI'S OPINION PRESENTED IN HIS OWN WORKS

**5.1** Up to this point, my discussion has concentrated mainly on materials that concern the thesis that mental awareness accompanies the five awarenesses attributed to Sthiramati in the Chinese Yogācāra tradition following Xuanzang. A full and systematic study of the issue of whether this attribution is reliable lies beyond the scope of the present paper. My main concern is rather whether the thesis under discussion was really advocated by Sthiramati. A convincing conclusion on this matter should be drawn on the basis of an examination of Sthiramati's own statements, rather than merely on the evidence within the tradition where this attribution is found. In the following I will therefore discuss some statements seen in Sthiramati's own works, namely, the TrBh and the ASBh (= ASV), concerning the points discussed above, with the aim to offer a reliable basis for drawing my conclusion.

**5.2** In the TrBh, Sthiramati discusses the problem of the simultaneous arising of the five awarenesses from the substratum awareness. There are two alternatives that should be considered with regard to this problem. The first one is that even though the condition qua objective support is present simultaneously for the five sensory awarenesses, only one awareness arises from the substratum awareness at any given moment, neither two nor many can arise simultaneously. Certain scholars (*eke*) consider that neither two nor many awarenesses can arise simultaneously, because there is no immediately preceding condition for such a simultaneous arising, and that no awareness can attain the state of being the immediately preceding condition for more than one awareness.<sup>97</sup> According

<sup>97</sup> Cf. TrBh \*33,1–5: *idam idānīm cintyate – kiṃ pañcānām cakṣurādivijñānānām yugapad-ālambanapratyayasāmīdhye 'py ālayavijñānād ekasyaivotpattir bhavati, na dvayor na bahūnām*

to Vinītadeva, “certain [scholars]” here refers to the Sautrāntikas.<sup>98</sup> The second alternative is that awareness can arise without restriction (*aniyamena*): when the conditions required for the arising of a single awareness are present, only a single awareness arises, but when those required for the arising of two or many awarenesses are present, two or many awarenesses may arise.<sup>99</sup> That is to say, a multiple arising is possible, insofar as the conditions allow the arising of a single awareness only, or of two awarenesses, or of many. In fact, this is the opinion of the Yogācāra, i.e., Sthiramati’s own opinion, and this is exactly what is said by Vasubandhu in TrK 15:<sup>100</sup>

The five [groups of sensory] awarenesses arise together in (i.e., from) the root awareness (*mūlavijñāna*) (i.e., the substratum awareness), or not (i.e., one after the other) according to the condition, just as waves arise in the water.

**5.3** This opinion is based on an idea stated in SNS §V, which is quoted in TrBh \*33,18–28.<sup>101</sup> A similar idea is also found in the Ybh, where the co-occurrence (*lhan cig gi dngos pas ’jug pa*, 俱轉轉) of the substratum awareness and the active awarenesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) is discussed. It is suggested that the substratum awareness sometimes comes forth together (*lhan cig ’byung ba*) with only one awareness, that is to say, with the defiled mind (*[kliṣṭa]manas*), which is the seventh awareness. At other times, it comes forth together with two awarenesses, that is to say, with the defiled mind and a mental awareness, which is the sixth type of awareness. However, at still other times it comes forth together with three or four up to seven awarenesses; that is to say, apart from the defiled mind and the mental awareness, it also comes forth concurrently with one or more instances of sensory awareness from among one or two up to all

vā. *yathaike manyante – na dvayor na bahūnām vā yugapat samanantarapratyayābhāvād ekasyaiva vijñānasotpattir bhavati, na caikaṃ vijñānaṃ bahūnām samanantarapratyayatvaṃ pratipattum utsahate.*

<sup>98</sup> Cf. Trīmśikāṭikā 42b2–3: *phyogs ’di yod pa’ dbang bstan pa’i phyir | ji ltar kha cig sems pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras te | mdo sde pa la sogs pa ni rnam par shes pa gnyis dang mang po dang cig car ’byung du de ma thag pa’i rkyen med de | [...].*

<sup>99</sup> Cf. TrBh \*33,6: *utāniyamena – yady ekasyaiva pratyayasāmnidhyam ekam evotpadyate. evaṃ dvayor bahūnām vā pratyayasāmnidhya utpattir bhavātīti.* I do not follow Buescher’s edition here, according to which a new paragraph begins after *utāniyamena*. According to my understanding, this sentence introduces the second alternative. Interestingly, Vinītadeva interprets the above two sentences as presenting a *pūrvapakṣa*, and considers TrK 15 as presenting its refutation by the *siddhāntin*. Cf. Trīmśikāṭikā 42b4–6: *gal te rkyen gcig dang phrad na | rnam par shes pa gcig kho na ’byung la | gal te gnyis dang mang po dag gi rkyen dang phrad par gyur na yang | de’i tshes gnyis dang mang po dag ’byung bar ’gyur ro zhes phyogs snga mo’o || grub pa’i mtha’ smra bas | lnga rnams rtsa ba’i rnam shes las [TrK 15] | zhes bya ba logs pa smras te |).*

<sup>100</sup> TrK 15: *pañcānām mūlavijñāne yathāpratyayam udbhavaḥ | vijñānānām saha na vā taṅgānām yathā jale ||.*

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Buescher’s footnote \* on p. 102.

five groups.<sup>102</sup> It is clearly stated that sometimes a single active awareness may arise, but that at other times many may emerge. Thus, the simultaneous occurrence of multiple kinds of awareness is a fundamental principle of Yogācāra.

**5.4** A more important issue for the purpose of the present paper is that Sthiramati explains the expression “five [groups of sensory] awarenesses” used by Vasubandhu in TrK 15<sup>103</sup> by saying that it refers to “the [sensory] awarenesses, such as visual awareness, accompanied by mental awareness which accompanies them (*anucara*).”<sup>104</sup> If we assume that *tad-* in the compound *tadanucara* refers to *caḥṣurādivijñāna*, here, *tadanucara* means *caḥṣurādivijñānānucara*. This may be the origin of the technical term “mental awareness accompanying the five [awarenesses]” (五俱意識) which is widely used in Chinese Yogācāra.

Furthermore, in a passage concerning the next verse of the TrK, Sthiramati draws attention to the crucial question whether a mental awareness occurs simultaneously with a sensory awareness like a visual awareness, and without it, or not.<sup>105</sup> The answer is provided in TrK 16, which states that mental awareness arises always, that is, with and without sensory awarenesses, unless in a state lacking mental activity (*acittaka*) in which all mental function ceases: the ide-

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Ybh<sub>Tib</sub> 5a7–b4: *de la lhan cig gi dngos pos 'jug pa rnam par gzhas pa gang zhe na | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni res 'ga' ni 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa gcig kho na dang lhan cig tu 'jug ste | 'di lta ste yid dang ngo || 'di ltar ngar 'dzin pa dang | nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal dang | rlom pa'i rnam pa can gyi yid gang yin pa de ni sems yod pa dang | sems med pa'i gnas skabs dag na yang dus rtag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug ste | da ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la nga'o snyam pa dang | bdag go snyam du dmigs shing rlom pa'i rnam pa can yin no || res 'ga' ni yid dang yid kyi rnam par shes pa gnyis dang lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug go || res 'ga' ni rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga po dag las gang yang rung ba gcig dang gsum dang ngo || res 'ga' ni rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga po dag las gnyis lhan cig 'byung ba dang bzhi dang ngo || res 'ga' ni rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga po lhan cig 'byung ba dang bdun char gyi bar dag dang | lhan cig 'byung zhing 'jug go || = Ybh<sub>Ch</sub> 580c1–9: 云何建立阿賴耶識與轉識等俱轉轉相。謂阿賴耶識。或於一時唯與一種轉識俱轉。所謂末那。何以故。由此末那。我見慢等恒共相應思量行相。若有心位若無心位。常與阿賴耶識一時俱轉。緣阿賴耶識以為境界。執我起慢思量行相。或於一時與二俱轉。謂末那及意識。或於一時與三俱轉。謂五識身隨一轉時。或於一時與四俱轉。謂五識身隨二轉時。或時乃至與七俱轉。謂五識身和合轉時。*

<sup>103</sup> See above n. 100.

<sup>104</sup> TrBh \*33,11: *pañcānām iti caḥṣurādivijñānānām tadanucaramanovijñānasahitānām*.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. the introduction to TrK 16 in TrBh \*34,11–12: *idam idānīm vaktavyam – kiṃ manovijñānam caḥṣurādivijñānaih saha pravartate vinā ca, uta naiveti*. In the last part of the text, *uta naiva* has no equivalent in the Tibetan translation. However, the concluding *iti* is matched by *snyam pa la*, contrary to what is suggested in Buescher's edition who records (p. 105, n. 6) that there is no equivalent for the whole expression *uta naiveti*. For the first alternative, see also the formulation in TrBh \*34,15: *sarvadeti. sarvakālam caḥṣurādivijñānaih saha vinā cety arthaḥ*.

ationless state (*āsamjñika*),<sup>106</sup> the two kinds of absorption, i.e., the ideationless absorption (*asamjñisamāpatti*) and the absorption which amounts to the cessation of ideation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), sleep (*middha*) and fainting (*mūrchana*).<sup>107</sup> Although in his commentary on this verse Sthiramati simply provides a short literal explanation without any further philosophical reflections, his own answer to the introductory question is clear: mental awareness may occur simultaneously with and without sensory awareness,<sup>108</sup> excepting only the five special cases mentioned in the verse. Probably this is the source based on which the Chinese commentators attributed the position represented in the CWSL to Sthiramati, although here he merely follows the Yogācāra position subsequent to the SNS.

**5.5** In the ASBh (= ASV), in the section discussing the necessary existence of the substratum awareness, Sthiramati sets forth eight arguments.<sup>109</sup> Of these, the third argument concerns the simultaneous occurrence of multiple kinds of awareness with regard to mental awareness, to which a special attribute is assigned, i.e., “simultaneously accompanying [the sensory awarenesses] such as visual awareness” (*caḥsurādivijñānasahānucara*). This attribute has the same meaning as the one found in Sthiramati’s TrBh mentioned above,<sup>110</sup> i.e., *caḥsurādivijñānānucara*. Moreover, among the Yogācāras it is taken for granted that this kind of mental awareness possesses a “clear appearance” or “clarity” (*spaṣṭatva*). Thus, in the ASBh the following question is asked and answered:<sup>111</sup>

[Question:] For what reason is it that, when there is no simultaneous occurrence of [multiple] awarenesses, mental awareness, which simultaneously accompanies [instances from among the five groups of sensory awarenesses], such as a

<sup>106</sup> This is one of the non-associated conditioning factors (*viprayuktāḥ saṃskārāḥ*); cf. AKBh 2.35. See also Cox 1995: 182, n. 1, and Dhammajoti 2009: 292f.

<sup>107</sup> Cf. TrK 16: *manovijñānasam̐bhūtiḥ sarvadāsamjñikād r̥te | samāpattidvayān middhān mūrchanād apy acittakāt ||*.

<sup>108</sup> See the text of TrBh \*33,1–5 quoted above in n. 97.

<sup>109</sup> This section, as stated by the author himself, is based upon the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī section of the Ybh. Cf. ASBh 11,18 (= ASV 21a6–21b1): *etasyāś coddānagāthāyā vibhāgas tadyathā viniścayasamgrahanyām aṣṭābhīr ākārair ālayavijñānasyāstitā pratyetyayā*. The whole section is translated in Griffiths 1986: 129–143.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. §5.4 and n. 104.

<sup>111</sup> ASBh 12,20–24 (= ASV 22a4–6): *kena kāraṇenāsatyām yugapad vijñānapravṛttau manovijñānasya caḥsurādivijñānasahānucarasya spaṣṭatvaṃ na saṃbhavati. \* tathā hi – yasmin samaye 'tītam anubhūtam viśayam samanumarati\*\* tasmīn samaye 'viśpaṣṭo manovijñānapracāro bhavati, na tu tathā vartamānaviśayo manaspracāro 'viśpaṣṭo bhavati. ato 'pi yugapatpravṛttir vā yujyate\*\*\* 'viśpaṣṭatvam vā manovijñānasya. \* sam° omitted in ASV \*\* sam° omitted in ASV \*\*\* prayujyate in ASV. Cf. also the translation in Griffiths 1986: 134. This passage is identical to a passage of the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī of the Ybh, namely Ybh<sub>Tib</sub> D Zhi 3a6–7 = Ybh<sub>Ch</sub> 579b18–22.*

visual awareness (*caḥṣurādivijñānasahānucara*), cannot possibly possess clarity? [Answer: It is so because, when there is no simultaneous occurrence of multiple kinds of awarenesses, mental awareness occurs alone and thus takes a past thing as its object; when there is such simultaneous occurrence, mental awareness accompanies sensory awarenesses and thus takes a present thing as its object.] To explain: at the time when one recollects a past object one has experienced, at that time the manifestation of the mental awareness becomes unclear. However, it is not so that, having a present thing as its object, the manifestation of the mind becomes unclear in the same way. Also for that reason, a simultaneous occurrence [of multiple kinds of awarenesses, resulting in the clarity of a mental awareness] is proper, or[, in the other case] unclarity of the mental awareness.

Here it is clearly stated that the simultaneous occurrence of multiple awarenesses, i.e., the fact that mental awareness simultaneously accompanies the five groups of sensory awarenesses, is the precondition for the clarity of mental awareness. The reason for this is evident: Only the five sensory awarenesses can directly access the five sensory objects.

**5.6** The clarity of the mental awareness that simultaneously accompanies sensory awarenesses discussed here is probably also the origin of a widespread idea found in the Chinese Yogācāra tradition beginning with Xuanzang, namely, that the mental awareness accompanying sensory awarenesses supports the five sensory awarenesses in their arising (助五) and causes an apprehension to be clear (明了), which are the two functions of such a mental awareness in a cognitive event as discussed above (§4.3). It needs to be pointed out, however, that the usage of the term *spaṣṭa* in the earlier period of Yogācāra is somewhat different from the usage of the term in the philosophical tradition of Dharmakīrti, where the word *spaṣṭa* (or its synonym *sphuṭa*) is used to refer to the vivid appearance of an object in a sensory cognition free of any conceptual construction.<sup>112</sup> In contrast, as shown above in §5.5, Sthiramati uses the word *spaṣṭa* to describe mental awareness.

Kuiji, for his part, equates the term *ming liao* 明了, “clear,” which usually translates *spaṣṭa*, with *jue ding* 決定 (*\*niścita*), “discerned”. He mentions four different ways of being discerned: (1) being discerned in terms of the direct grasping of the objective support – this is called “being similar to the object”; (2) being discerned in terms of the clarification of the objective support – this is called “discrimination”; (3) being discerned in terms of the different moral states – this is called “defilement” (*saṃkleśa*) or “purification” (*vyavadāna*); and (4) being discerned in terms of providing the basis (*āśraya*) – this is called

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Pramāṇavārttika 3.283ab: *na vikalpānubaddhasyāsti sphuṭārthāvabhāsītā* | “[A cognition] that is bound to a conceptual construction does not have the appearance of a vivid thing.”

“the root” (*mūla*).<sup>113</sup> In respect of sensory awareness, Kuiji says that the sense faculties perform the function of the first way of being discerned, i.e., directly grasp the objective support; mental awareness performs the second function, i.e., makes the objective support clear; the seventh awareness performs the third function, i.e., produces the different moral states; and the eighth awareness performs the fourth function, i.e., furnishes the basis. Additionally, all of them, that is, the sense faculties, etc., also cause sensory awareness to possess an object (有境) and to become a principal mental activity (為主).<sup>114</sup> Thus, in this context the word *spaṣṭa* does not refer to the vividness of the object as it appears in an awareness; rather, it means “clear” in the sense of “discerned” and refers to the clarity of an awareness, without any ambiguity or uncertainty.<sup>115</sup> Further, the word is used to describe the function of mental awareness, not sensory awareness.

Thus the available material shows that Kuiji’s explanation of clarity is in some respects different from that of Sthiramati. As stressed above in §5.5, according to Sthiramati the clarity of a mental awareness is dependent on its simultaneous occurrence with sensory awarenesses and thus a mental awareness may have a present object; he does not say that mental awareness can make a sensory awareness clear. Kuiji’s explanation therefore expands Sthiramati’s notion.

**5.7** Another important point regarding Sthiramati’s opinion is his idea that an awareness must be of the same kind as a subsequent awareness while serving the function of the immediately preceding condition to the latter. To explain the notion of immediacy (*nairantarya*) in Asaṅga’s AS,<sup>116</sup> Sthiramati says:<sup>117</sup>

<sup>113</sup> Cheng weishi lun Zhangzhong suyao 637c27–a4: 決定有四。一順取所緣決定。下名同境。二明了所緣決定。下名分別。三分位差別決定。下名染淨。四能起為依決定。下名根本。

<sup>114</sup> Cheng weishi lun Zhangzhong suyao 638a4–7: 五根於五識。有順取所緣決定·有境·為主。意識於五識。有明了所緣決定·有境·為主。第七於五識。有分位差別決定·有境·為主。第八於五識。有能起為依決定·有境·為主。

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Monier-Williams 1899, s.v. *spaṣṭa*: “clearly perceived or discerned, distinctly visible, distinct, clear, evident, plain, intelligible.”

<sup>116</sup> Cf. AS 29,9–10: *katham samanantarataḥ. nairantaryasamanantarato 'pi sabhāgavisabhā-gacittacaittoṣṭapattisamanantarato 'pi samanantarapratyayo draṣṭavyaḥ*. “How [is a condition to be understood] as immediately preceding? An immediately preceding condition should be understood as immediately preceding in the sense of immediacy (lit. of having no interval), and also as immediately preceding in the sense of the arising of homogeneous and heterogeneous mental activities and subordinate mental activities [conditioned by it].”

<sup>117</sup> ASBh 37,23–38,1 (ASV unavailable): *nairantaryasamanantarato 'pīti – nāvaśyaṃ kṣaṇa-nairantaryam, kiṃ tarhi cittāntaranairantaryam apy atra nairantaryam draṣṭavyam. itarathā hy acittikasamāpattau vyutthānacittasya samāpatticittam na samanantarapratyayaḥ syāt, bhavati ca. tasmād ekasmin samāne paścimasya cittasya pūrvakaṃ cittam cittāntareṇānantaritam samanantarapratyayaḥ. yathā cittam evaṃ caitasikā api vedītyāḥ*. A similar idea is also articulated in

“Also as immediately preceding in the sense of immediacy”: [Immediacy] is not necessarily the immediacy of moments; rather, immediacy is here to be understood also as the immediacy of other mental activities[, even if other moments do intervene].<sup>118</sup> For otherwise, in the case of the absorption without mental activity (*acittikasamāpatti*) the mental activity [when one enters] absorption (*samāpatticitta*) would not be the immediately preceding condition of the mental activity when one rises [from this absorption] (*vyutthānacitta*), [because moments without any mental activity occur between these two mental activities], but [in fact] it is. Therefore, within one series [of mental activities], the preceding mental activity that is not separated by another mental activity is the immediately preceding condition of the subsequent mental activity.<sup>119</sup> The subordinate mental activities, for their part, are to be understood in the same way as the mental activity.

Thus, concerning the central topic of this paper, Sthiramati would say that a mental awareness in the present moment takes only the mental awareness in the preceding moment as its immediately preceding condition. If it took a sensory awareness in the preceding moment as its condition, it would be separated from the earlier mental awareness by another awareness, and since the sensory awareness in the preceding moment is not similar to it (*sam-*), the former cannot serve as its immediately preceding condition. As discussed above in §3.3, this is exactly the opinion attributed to Sthiramati.

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Yaśomitra’s commentary on AK 1.17a where Vasubandhu says: “Indeed [any] awareness among the six [groups of awarenesses] that has passed away immediately before is the [element of] mind” (AKBh 11,22 [AK 1.17ab]: *ṣaṅṅām anantarātītaṃ vijñānaṃ yad dhi tan manaḥ* ||). According to Yaśomitra, the genitive is used here in the meaning of specification (*nirdhāraṇa*), i.e., it means “only [one] among these, not another.” He explains: “The use of ‘that has passed away immediately before’ has the purpose of excluding something that is separated by another awareness. For if some *x* occurs immediately before some *y*, [i.e.,] is not separated [from it] by another awareness, then this *x* is the basis of this *y*. However, a *z* that is separated [from this *y* by another awareness can]not be its basis; it is the basis of something else from which it is not separated. For this reason, in a state without mental activity, the mental activity that occurs when one enters absorption, even though it has passed away long before, [can] be the basis of the mental activity at the [time of] rising [from this absorption] (*vyutthānacitta*), because it is not separated by another awareness” (AKV 41,28–32: *ṣaṅṅām iti nirdhāraṇe ṣaṣṭhī. teṣāṃ eva madhye nānyad ity arthaḥ. anantara-grahaṇam anyavijñānavyavahitanivṛtyartham. yad dhi yasyānantaram anyavijñānavyavahitam, tat tasyāśrayaḥ. vyavahitaṃ tu na tasyāśrayaḥ. anyasyāsāv āśrayo yasya tad avyavahitam. ata evācittikāvasthāyāṃ cirātītam api samāpattipraveśacittam vyutthānacittasyāśrayo bhavati, vijñānāntarāvyavadhānāt*).

<sup>118</sup> Cf. the Chinese translation of this sentence in ASBh<sub>Ch</sub> 714a12f.: 雖隔剎那。但於中間無異心隔。亦名中無間隔。

<sup>119</sup> Cf. the discussion of the state of being free from mental activity of the ideationless absorption (*asaṃjñisamāpatti*) and the absorption that is cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) in AKBh *ad* AK 2.44d.

## 6. CONCLUSION

**6.1** According to the CWSL and its commentarial materials, based on the Ybh, Sthiramati holds the following opinion: In a series of awarenesses, the sensory awareness in the preceding moment accompanied by a simultaneous mental awareness is the basis that gives way to the present sensory awareness. The present sensory awareness supported by its basis that gives way, i.e., the preceding sensory awareness in company with a mental awareness, is also accompanied by a present mental awareness. That is to say, when a sensory awareness arises, a mental awareness necessarily arises to accompany it. Thus, the continuity of sensory awareness and its simultaneity with mental awareness can be maintained. This mental awareness which accompanies sensory awareness is by its nature conceptually constructive, which is also the position taken in the SNS, but cannot be identified with the conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) to which Dignāga refers. At the same time, this mental awareness, while accompanying sensory awareness, has a clear content, which is interpreted by Kuiji as performing the function of clarification of the objective support, as one of the four ways of having a discerned nature. This notion of clarity, used by Sthiramati to describe mental awareness, is clearly different from Dharmakīrti's notion of clarity when he describes sensory awareness.

Most of the involved ideas are attested in Sthiramati's own works. In particular, the idea of "being in company" or "simultaneity," expressed by the term 俱 in widely used phrases like 俱轉, 俱隨行, etc. ("occurring in company," "simultaneously accompanying"), in the description of the relationship between sensory awareness and mental awareness in the Chinese sources can be traced back to their respective Sanskrit forms in phrases like *caḥsurādivijñānānucara*/<sup>o</sup>*sa-hānucara* and *manovijñānasyānuvartaka*.

**6.2** The sources available in the Chinese Yogācāra tradition which are discussed above offer plenty of information. Generally speaking, they reflect their historical background in pre-Dharmakīrtian Indian Buddhist philosophy and therefore are free of later interpretations provided by influential thinkers like Dharmakīrti and his followers. For this reason, they should be studied with much care and attention to details. In explaining the thesis of mental awareness accompanying sensory awareness which they attribute to Sthiramati in the CWSL and its commentaries, the authors of these works wished to interpret this thesis within the frame of the Yogācāra tradition. For this purpose, they quote some passages from the "Basic Section" of the Ybh; however, in my view, these quotations do not serve that purpose because – as is generally accepted by modern Yogācāra scholars – the "Basic Section" belongs to the early period of the development of Yogācāra, and contains many doctrines that can be associated with realistic

traditions of Buddhist philosophy.<sup>120</sup> This makes the answer to the question about the precise doctrinal background of the thesis of mental awareness accompanying sensory awareness complicated. Indeed, although this thesis is apparently associated with the Yogācāra theory of the occurrence of multiple kinds of awareness and fits well the Yogācāra analysis of the nature of awareness or cognition, it has not been developed from the central Yogācāra doctrine of eight types of awareness, but rather is closely related to the Abhidharma tradition. Moreover, some notions that are used in formulating this thesis, such as that the awareness that has passed away in the previous moment is called “mind,” is an idea rooted in Abhidharma tradition and accepted as an interpretation of the immediately preceding condition in other traditions, such as Yogācāra. All this indicates that there is no clear-cut distinction between the Yogācāra system and the realistic systems represented in the Abhidharma tradition, and that the theory of mental awareness accompanying sensory awareness is not necessarily unique to Yogācāra.

## Abbreviations and Literature

### 1. Primary Literature

Abhidharmanyāyānusāra	A-pi-da-mo shun zheng-li lun [阿毘達磨順正理論]. Chinese translation of the Abhidharmanyāyānusāra, T 1562 (vol. 29).
AKBh	<i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> by Vasubandhu. Ed. by Prahlad Pradhan and Aruna Halder. Revised Second Edition with Introduction and Indices etc. [Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8]. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975.
AKBh <sub>Ch</sub> (P)	A-pi-da-mo jushe shi lun [阿毘達磨俱舍釋論]. Chinese translation of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya by Paramārtha [真諦], T 1559 (vol. 29).
AKBh <sub>Ch</sub> (X)	A-pi-da-mo jushe lun [阿毘達磨俱舍論]. Chinese translation of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya by Xuanzang [玄奘], T 1558 (vol. 29).
AKBh <sub>Tib</sub>	Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa. Tibetan translation of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, D 4090 (vol. <i>ku</i> , 26b–258a, vol. <i>khu</i> , 1b–95a).
AKV	Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: in <i>The Abhidharmakośa &amp; Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitrā</i> . Ed. by Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī. Vol. I–II. Varanasi 1998.
AMV	A-pi-da-mo da-pi-po-sha lun [阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論]. Chinese translation of the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā, T 1545 (vol. 27).
AS	Abhidharmasamuccaya: <i>Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga</i> . Ed. by Prahlad Pradhan. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950.

<sup>120</sup> Cf., for instance, Schmithausen 1987: 32–33 and Kritzer 2005: xix–xx.

- ASBh *Abhidharmasamuccaya-Bhāṣyam*. Ed. by N. Tatia. [Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 17]. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976.
- ASBh<sub>ch</sub> Da-chen A-pi-da-mo Za-ji-lun [大乘阿毘達磨雜集論]. Chinese translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* by Xuanzang [玄奘], T 1606 (vol. 31).
- ASV *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, transliteration by Li Xuezhong up to folio 35b1 of the manuscript.
- Cheng weishi lun liaoyi deng 成唯識論了義燈 by Huizhao [惠沼], T 1832 (vol. 43).
- Cheng weishi lun yanmi 成唯識論演秘 by Kuiji [窺基], T 1833 (vol. 43).
- Cheng weishi lun Zhangzhong suyao 成唯識論掌中樞要 by Kuiji [窺基], T 1831 (vol. 43).
- CWSL Cheng weishi lun [成唯識論] = *Vijñānamātrasiddhiśāstra* by Xuanzang [玄奘], T 1585 (vol. 31).
- CWSL-SJ Cheng weishi lun shuji [成唯識論述記] by Kuiji [窺基], T 1830 (vol. 43).
- D Derge edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka, ed. by Jikido Takasaki, Zuiho Yamaguchi and Noriaki Hakamaya: *sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka bsTan 'gyur Preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*. Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kankō Kyōkai Co. Ltd., 1977–1981.
- FYYLZ Dacheng fayuan yilin zhang [大乘法苑義林章] by Kuiji [窺基], T 1861 (vol. 45).
- Jie shenmi jing shu 解深密經註疏 by Yuance [圓測], Shinsan Dai Nippon Zokuzōkyō [日新纂大日本續藏經] (= 卍 Xuzangjing [卍續藏經]), Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai 1975–1989, 369 (vol. 21).
- Mahāyānasamgraha Theg pa chen po bsdu pa, Tibetan translation. In: *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asāṅga (Mahāyānasamgraha)*. Tome I: *Versions Tibétaine et Chinoise (Hiuan-tsang), Fascicule I (Chapters I et II)*, ed. by Étienne Lamotte. Louvain: Bureaux du Muséon, 1938.
- Mahāyānasamgraha<sub>ch</sub> (X) She dacheng lun shi [攝大乘論釋], Chinese translation of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* by Xuanzang [玄奘], T 1594 (vol. 31).
- P *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto*. Ed. by Daisetz T. Suzuki. Tokyo – Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1955–1961.
- Pañcaskandhaka *Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaka*, ed. by Li Xuezhong, Ernst Steinkellner and Toru Tomabechi. [Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 4]. Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House – Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2008.
- Pramāṇavārttika In: *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a Commentary by Manorathanandin*. Ed. by Rāhula Sāṅkrītyāna. Appendix to *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* N.S. 24–26 (1938–1940).
- PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, in Ernst Steinkellner, *Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1. A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text*

- with the help of the two Tibetan translations on the basis of the hitherto known Sanskrit fragments and the linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhis Ṭīkā.* April 2005. [https://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/Institute/IKGA/PDF/forschung/buddhismuskunde/dignaga\\_PS\\_1.pdf](https://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/Institute/IKGA/PDF/forschung/buddhismuskunde/dignaga_PS_1.pdf) (last accessed June 7, 2021).
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- TrK Triṃśikākārikā, in TrBh.
- Ybh Yogācārabhūmi.
- Ybh<sub>Ch</sub> Yujiashi dilun [瑜伽師地論], Chinese translation of the Yogācārabhūmi, T 1579 (vol. 30).
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