

II. OVERCAST, BUT FRIENDLY? 1961–1972

“[T]here are no universally recognized international legal norms for the policy of neutrality in peacetime.” Lev Voronkov, *Non-Nuclear Status to Northern Europe* (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), 27.

6. The USSR, Austria's Rapprochement with the EEC, and the Convocation of the CSCE

After the Berlin and Cuban crises, international relations steered into less troubled waters and the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 signaled rising chances for a superpower détente. By the end of the year the treaty had been ratified by twenty-three countries. Austria deposited its ratification document in July 1964. By the time Malawi, which had recently gained independence, did so in November, Khrushchev's reign in the Kremlin had come to an end. Owing to his foreign-political rollercoaster course, his tendency to abandon collective decision-making, and his failure to stabilize the ailing Soviet economy, the leader had been ousted in October by a group of Politburo members and his political protégé Leonid Brezhnev. A novice in foreign policy, the new CPSU leader was less ambitious to dictate his private wishes than Khrushchev had been.¹ Therefore, he relied on the loyal Gromyko and the technocratic premier Aleksei Kosygin, while defining the strategic goals as a *primus inter pares* of the leadership. It was only in the wake of the rapprochement with West Germany in 1969 that Brezhnev assumed supremacy in high diplomacy.² While the change from Khrushchev to Brezhnev calmed the character of Soviet foreign policy, the dichotomy of competitive "coexistence," i.e. the tension between the promotion of détente abroad and the military build-up, remained unchanged.³ The Soviet crushing of the "Prague Spring" of 1968 demonstrated that democratization, even if loyal to Moscow, was more than the Kremlin was willing to accept among its satellites.

Both, the blossoming of the Czechoslovakian reform movement and the Soviet decision to end it, were alleviated by détente. Before the Soviet invasion, Gromyko had anticipated that "the international relations now are such that *extreme measures* cannot produce aggravation of the international situation. There will be no big war."⁴ Indeed, after the events had taken place, the West did not terminate détente

¹ Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva*, 69–72.

² Andrey Edemskiy, "Dealing with Bonn: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Response to West German *Ostpolitik*," in Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer (eds.), *Ostpolitik, 1969–1974: European and Global Responses* (Cambridge: University Press, 2009), 15–38, 22.

³ Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman, "Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962–1975," in Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War II: Crises and Détente* (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 134–157, 134. For "competitive coexistence," see Stephan Merl, "Außenpolitik und Wettlauf der Systeme," in Stefan Plaggenborg (ed.), *Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands V/1* (Stuttgart : Hiersemann, 2002), 273–308, 279.

⁴ Quoted in Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 208. Emphasis mine.

nor did it isolate the aggressor, and the Soviet leadership saw the continuation of détente as proof of the “rising strength of the socialist camp.” On the Western side, détente had been initiated as a result of European hopes of reducing the threat of war on the continent. The neutrals had contributed to making the Soviet Union an acceptable partner for dialog and trade, in 1964 Italy signed a long-term trade agreement with the USSR as the first NATO and EEC member,⁵ and the subsequent Soviet-French rapprochement brought détente to fruition.⁶ Five years later, the Kremlin’s policy of isolating the FRG gave way to an even more spectacular rapprochement that outshone all other Soviet partnerships in Western Europe. The relaxation of tension was also supported by the United States, and in 1967 the Harmel Report welcomed the developments.⁷ From the Soviet perspective, the new trend was to serve an old aim. After Brezhnev had received the prime ministers of Norway, Denmark and Sweden in 1965, he revealed to his comrades: “Our reception of the Scandinavians, our relations now with France – they are all steps for undermining NATO.”⁸

Keeping in mind the unfriendly Soviet attitude towards the emerging West European Economic Community, one might add: “and the EEC.” European integration, both in the East and the West, and the Cold War were “separate but intertwined” phenomena.⁹ Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the Kremlin – after a brief “thaw”¹⁰ in 1962 – continued to condemn the Common Market as a hostile organization and watched jealously when three European neutrals, Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria, drew nearer to the organization. For some reason, Austria was the most attentively watched among the three; indeed, some West European political lead-

⁵ Gromyko and Ponomarev, *Geschichte der sowjetischen Außenpolitik 1945 bis 1976*, 544. On Soviet-Italian détente, see I. A. Khormach, *SSSR – Italiia i blokovoe protivostoiianie v Evrope* (Moscow: Institut Rossiiskoi istorii Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, 2005), 797–845.

⁶ On French-Soviet détente, see Marie-Pierre Rey, *La tentation du rapprochement: France et URSS à l’heure de la détente 1964–1974* (Paris: Sorbonne, 1991); Newton, *Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe*, 57–104.

⁷ Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962–1975,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War II: Crises and Détente* (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 198–218, 207. Cf. Mark Trachtenberg, “The Structure of Great Power Politics, 1963–1975,” *ibid.*, 483–502, 484; and Angela Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009), 67–71.

⁸ Stenogramma vystupleniia L. Brezhneva na vstreche s rukovoditeliami raionnykh komitetov partii, 12 July 1965, in Kudriashov (ed.), *General’nyi sekretar’ L.I. Brezhnev*, 32–51, 47.

⁹ N. Piers Ludlow, “European Integration and the Cold War,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War II: Crises and Détente* (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 179–197, 179.

¹⁰ In 1962, Khrushchev had announced his readiness to recognize the EEC, but after the failure of the British accession to the Brussels club, he seems to have lost interest in it. Wolfgang Mueller, “Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration,” in Michael Gehler (ed.), *From the Common Market to European Union Building: 50 Years of the Rome Treaties* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009), 617–662, 631–640.

ers, Paul Henri Spaak among them, saw Austria's rapprochement with the EEC as a way to "free" the country from the neutrality that the USSR had "imposed" upon it.¹¹

While the Soviet leaders must have realized that their hopes to dismantle NATO and the EEC by neutralizing Western Europe would materialize less quickly than expected, their interest in neutrality did not cease, but it changed somewhat. In the wake of the big bang of decolonization, the Soviet focus shifted to the nonaligned, which at the 1961 Belgrade summit numbered twenty-five countries, among them no less than twenty-one that had previously hosted Western military bases.¹² Denying their soil to foreign troops was advantageous for the USSR. As Soviet propaganda often pointed out, a certain parallelism of interests existed between the nonaligned and socialist states.¹³ Taken together, the nonaligned and the socialist countries comprised two thirds of the global population. In addition, the USSR could score propagandistic points in the United Nations – to which the new nations were admitted – by supporting the nonaligned states' struggle for decolonization and nondiscrimination. In return, the USSR received the nonaligned countries' support for Soviet proposals on disarmament and "anti-imperialism."

The increased interest in nonalignment did not mean, however, as was stressed by the Soviet media, that permanent neutrality had become obsolete.¹⁴ While some authors claimed that neutrality was a bulwark against European integration and condemned the neutrals for their interest in joining the EEC,¹⁵ others criticized "that the permanent neutrality of Switzerland and Austria, and the traditional neutrality of Sweden – in contrast to the active and dynamic Afro-Asian neutralism – is significantly more passive and plays a less positive role in international relations."¹⁶ Such passivity was deemed incorrect, for not only the nonaligned states, but also the permanent neutrals should "take an active part in the struggle for world peace and security, peaceful coexistence of states and international friendship."¹⁷ It would be wrong, however, to assume that such Soviet appeals aimed exclusively at encouraging neutrals to support Soviet initiatives against "imperialism." There were other projects for which the Kremlin desired endorsement by the neutral states, in particular the idea of an all-European conference designed to legitimize the postwar

¹¹ Michael Gehler, "Von Unabhängigkeitsgaranten zu internationalen Partnern: Die Signatarmächte des österreichischen Staatsvertrages 1955–2005," in Christian Fornwagner and Richard Schober (eds.), *Freiheit und Wiederaufbau: Tirol in den Jahren um den Staatsvertrag* (Innsbruck: Universitätsverlag Wagner, 2007), 21–36, 26.

¹² Vigor, *The Soviet View*, 190; Lyon, *Neutrality*, 177–195.

¹³ Allison, *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, 23.

¹⁴ Ganiushkin, *Neitralitet i neprisoedinenie*, 179–180.

¹⁵ Osnitskaya, "Neutrality and the Common Market"; K. Timashkova, "Neitral'nye strany v usloviakh imperialisticheskoi integratsii," in M.M. Maksimova (ed.), *Ekonomicheskie gruppirovki v zapadnoi Evropy* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 269–280.

¹⁶ Ganiushkin, *Neitralitet i neprisoedinenie*, 176.

¹⁷ Mojoryan [Modzhorian], "Neutrality in Present-Day International Law," 219.

order, to foster détente in the West, and to weaken the cohesion of NATO and the EEC. In the early Brezhnev period, this project shifted to the top of the agenda. As we shall see, it was the neutrals who were chosen by the Kremlin to promote this idea.

The Soviet attitude towards an Austrian rapprochement with the EEC,
1959–1963

Although the Soviet Union had not been able to prevent Austria from accepting Marshall Plan aid or from joining, in 1948, the US-launched Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), it had never stopped criticizing these decisions.¹⁸ In the following years, the Kremlin condemned the gradual West European economic integration as being an American ploy to strengthen economically NATO's dominance and to remilitarize West Germany.¹⁹ In order not to complicate the state treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Austrian government, despite its interest in joining the European Coal and Steel Community as an associate member, did not pursue this goal for some time after negotiations on tariffs between Austria and the ECSC failed in the fall of 1954.²⁰ The Soviet side did not miss any opportunity, in conversations with Austrian diplomats, to point out the community's aim "to put small members into a straitjacket."²¹ After the conclusion of the state treaty, Moscow continued to keep an eye on any Austrian ambitions to participate in West European integration.

The Austrian decision to join the Council of Europe, a decision that was taken despite Chancellor Raab's reservations, was heavily criticized by the Austrian communist press and the Soviet media, with *Pravda*, on 8 February 1956, even accusing Austria of violating neutrality.²² The Soviet ambassador in Vienna was instructed

¹⁸ Wilfried Mähr, *Der Marshallplan in Österreich* (Graz: Styria, 1989), 106–115. This also held true for the 1960s. Radio Moscow, 19 May 1961. On the Marshall Plan in Austria cf. Günter Bischof and Dieter Stiefel (eds.), *80 Dollar: 50 Jahre ERP-Fonds und Marshall-Plan in Österreich* (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1999); Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Dieter Stiefel (eds.), *The Marshall Plan in Austria*, Contemporary Austrian Studies 8 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2000).

¹⁹ Mueller, "The Soviet Union and Early West European Integration," 83.

²⁰ Gehler, *Der lange Weg nach Europa: Darstellung*, 139, 163–164. The Soviet side assessed that the conditions offered by the ECSC were too strict for Austria, which had hoped to enjoy conditions reserved for ECSC members without joining the community. Bericht der Abteilung für innenpolitische und wirtschaftliche Fragen, 5 October 1954, in Karner, Stelzl-Marx, Tschubarjan (eds.), *Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Dokumente*, 779–783.

²¹ Austrian embassy Rome to Austrian MFA, 15 April 1955, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 321.383-pol/55, Z. 321.383-pol/55.

²² Merhaut-Gurevitsch, "Die Innen- und Außenpolitik Österreichs," 76–81. Cf. *Izvestiia*, 13 January and 22 February 1956. See also Wolfgang Burtscher, "Österreichs Annäherung an den Europarat von 1949 bis zur Vollmitgliedschaft im Jahre 1956," in Waldemar Hummer and Gerhard Wagner (eds.), *Österreich im Europarat 1956–1986: Bilanz einer 30jährigen Mitgliedschaft* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1988), 37–52; and Walter Schwim-

not to react positively, but nevertheless not to obstruct Austria's accession.²³ Soviet legal experts considered Austria's membership in the Council "not a direct violation of neutrality" as long "as article 1 of the statute of the Council of Europe is observed and all questions of military issues are excluded from the organization's sphere of action."²⁴

However, the focus of Soviet criticism soon returned to Austria's rapprochement with the ECSC, an effort that had been renewed after the state treaty was signed. In March 1956, the Soviet ambassador in Vienna, Sergei Lapin, recommended publishing "in the Soviet press an article about the ECSC and our negative attitudes towards this organization."²⁵ Vienna, which had announced its application for membership in the ECSC in October 1956, dropped it during the Soviet intervention in Hungary, after the majority of Austria's leaders had come to the conclusion that full membership was incompatible with neutrality.²⁶ Nonetheless, the Kremlin remained vigilant. On 10 February 1957, *Izvestiia* warned that Austria's membership in the ECSC would not be compatible, on one hand, with neutrality, or with the state treaty, on the other. Making these opinions known had been suggested by the Soviet embassy in Austria and was quickly approved by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, which ordered its media to "publish, within three to four months," several newspaper articles and radio broadcasts in this regard.²⁷

The Soviet argument, as put forward by Professor Tunkin, ran that the ECSC was an industrial basis of NATO and that therefore membership would violate neutrality; secondly, within the community, West Germany was the dominating country, which is why joining the ECSC would mean a new Anschluss and, thus, violate the anti-Anschluss clause of the state treaty.²⁸ This second point was obviously considered necessary by the Soviet ministry, since the reference to neutrality was not without weaknesses; the ECSC was definitely not a military alliance.²⁹ However, pointing out the FRG's dominating position within the ECSC was not much more

mer, "Der Europarat: Entstehungsgeschichte, Rolle und Stellenwert für Österreich," in Waldemar Hummer (ed.), *Österreich im Europarat 1956–2006: Bilanz einer 50jährigen Mitgliedschaft* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), 55–96.

²³ Michael Gehler, "Austria and the European Integration," in Arnold Suppan and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), *Peaceful Coexistence or Iron Curtain? Austria, Neutrality, and Eastern Europe in the Cold War and Détente, 1955–1989* (Vienna: Lit, 2009), 143–163, 146.

²⁴ Ganiushkin, *Sovremennyi neutralitet*, 130.

²⁵ Lapin to Semenov, 19 March 1956, in AVPRF, 66/35/66/26, 1–4.

²⁶ Gehler, *Österreichs Außenpolitik*, 175. Cf. Florian Weiß, "'Gesamtverhalten: Nicht in den Vordergrund stellen.' Die österreichische Bundesregierung und die westeuropäische Integration 1947–1957," in Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger (eds.), *Österreich und die europäische Integration 1945–1993* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1993), 21–54; Schweitzer, *Dauernde Neutralität*, 207–208.

²⁷ Lapin to Zorin, 21 November 1956; Tunkin to Aleksandrov, 12 December 1956; Lavrichenko to Aleksandrov, 20 December 1956, all in AVPRF, 66/35/66/26, 5–6, 19–20.

²⁸ Tunkin to Aleksandrov, 12 December 1956, in AVPRF, 66/35/66/26, 19.

²⁹ Black, Falk, Knorr, and Young, *Neutralization and World Politics*, 58.

convincing, since it was hardly possible to equate the Coal and Steel Community with a new incarnation of Hitler's Greater Germany.

The project of creating a European Free Trade Area (FTA) within the OEEC, launched by the United Kingdom in 1956, seemed just as unacceptable to the Kremlin, which considered it "directed against the USSR."³⁰ Soviet ambassador Lapin repeatedly questioned members of the Austrian government about their attitude towards the project, suspecting that membership would be "used as a camouflage for joining the ECSC." He concluded that membership with either would be incompatible with the state treaty.³¹ Austria nevertheless joined the FTA negotiations and, despite the fact that on 24 September 1957 *Pravda* stressed that Austria's participation in a future European Free Trade Area would have an "unfavorable" effect on the country's neutrality,³² the Austrian government even announced in the summer of 1958 that it considered signing a contract with the recently founded European Economic Community (EEC) of France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries.³³ Long before the failure of the FTA project in November, the highly respected Austrian daily *Die Presse*, by arguing that a full integration of neutral Austria into the Common Market would prevent the latter from turning into a branch of NATO, had sent up a trial balloon to find out whether this point would make Austria's membership in the EEC better digestible for Moscow.³⁴ This argument, however, did not convince the Kremlin. On 22 January 1959, *Pravda* warned that "certain political circles" aimed at wrecking neutrality and pushing Austria into the EEC, and brought forward the thesis that Western economic integration would threaten Austria's independence.

In the meantime, among the Austrian political parties the debate concerning the country's relationship to the EEC intensified. In 1955, possible negative consequences of Austria's newly adopted neutral status with regard to trade and the economy in general and economic integration in particular had been either denied or ignored by both the Austrian elite and the general population.³⁵ However, when, some years later, economic and industrialist groups within the ÖVP and the right-wing FPÖ advocated Austria's participation in European integration, full membership in the EEC was declared legally incompatible with neutrality not only by Foreign Minister Kreisky and the social democrats, but also by a majority of the

³⁰ Mueller, "Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration," 626.

³¹ Conversation Lapin with Lugmayer, 8 February 1957; Lapin with Bock, 22 February 1957; Lapin with Kreisky, 8 April 1957, in AVPRF, 66/36/68/10, 4–5, 9–11, 18–20.

³² Cf. Oskar Wictora, *10 Jahre österreichische Integrationspolitik 1956–1966* (Vienna: Bundesministerium für Handel und Wiederaufbau, [1966]), 26.

³³ Rudolf Kirchschräger, "Integration und Neutralität," in Erich Bielka, Peter Jankowitsch, Hans Thalberg (eds.), and Reinhold Wagnleitner (red.), *Die Ära Kreisky: Schwerpunkte österreichischer Außenpolitik* (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1983), 61–95, 63–72.

³⁴ Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Darstellung*, 180.

³⁵ Ermacora, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität*, 61.

country's international law experts, led by Karl Zemanek and Alfred Verdross.³⁶ This was a strange alliance: Austrian social democrats abhorred the Common Market mainly for ideological and protectionist reasons, SPÖ chairman Pittermann in summer 1959 criticizing it as a "bourgeois bloc." In contrast, the basis of Zemanek's and Verdross' claims was that, in accordance with the Swiss doctrine, neutral policy (which hitherto had not been defined in Austria) would not allow the acceptance of any economic obligations in peacetime which might restrict the neutral's freedom of action during a war. ÖVP leader Raab also called for the careful adherence to neutrality. Kreisky and Pittermann even went so far as to subscribe to the Soviet thesis that joining the EEC would mean a violation of not only the country's neutrality but also the Soviet-Austrian Moscow memorandum and the anti-Anschluss clause of the state treaty – an interpretation that was rejected by international law professor Felix Ermacora.³⁷ Within the debate, which stretched well into the 1970s, Soviet and Austrian communist³⁸ voices underlined their call for "total" neutrality. This obviously did not fail to have an impact on the Austrian side's increasing tendency to interpret neutrality extensively and thus to rule out EEC membership.

It was decided to join the newly-founded European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and to hold talks on a multilateral association between the EEC and EFTA. Only after a Soviet memorandum, dated 28 January 1960, demanded an Austrian declaration that the creation of EFTA would not have any consequences for Soviet foreign trade,³⁹ on 5 April Austria officially informed the USSR that it had joined the recently founded association. This was a significant deviation from the course of Austria's co-neutral Finland, which, after its rapprochement to EFTA had been criticized by the USSR, chose only to become an associate member. The association was obviously viewed by Soviet leaders with less hostility than the stronger EEC. While EFTA's existence was presented by Soviet propaganda as proof of the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist theory of intercapitalist contradictions, the organization was denounced by Soviet voices as another "closed bloc" and an ob-

³⁶ Verdross, *Die immerwährende Neutralität der Republik* (1966), 17; idem, *Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs*, 66–72; Zemanek, "Wirtschaftliche Neutralität," 249–251. Cf. Schweitzer, *Dauernde Neutralität*, 246; Anselm Skuhra, "Österreichs Sicherheitspolitik," in Herbert Dachs et al. (eds.), *Politik in Österreich* (Vienna: Manz, 2006), 838–854; Paul Luif, *Der Wandel der österreichischen Neutralität: Ist Österreich ein sicherheitspolitischer „Trittbrettfahrer“?* 2nd ed. (Vienna: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1998), 13–16.

³⁷ Ermacora, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität*, 114–116.

³⁸ Aurel B.J. Moser, "Die Stellung der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs zur österreichischen Neutralitätspolitik von 1955–1972" (PhD Thesis, Salzburg, 1973), 183–184. Moser's characterizations of the Austrian press as "*antisowjetische Provokationskampagne*" or of Radio Free Europe as "*berüchtigter Hetzsender*" reflect his anti-Western bias. *Ibid.*, 55, 68.

³⁹ Sowjetisches Aide-Mémoire, 28 January 1960, Abschrift, Anlage 1, in SBKA, Länder, UdSSR 1, File Sprechprogramm Moskau 1962.

stacle for East-West trade.⁴⁰ A Soviet memorandum of 20 May deplored Austria's decision, once again condemned the formation of blocs, and attacked EFTA as being linked to NATO. Furthermore, with reference to the Austrian-Soviet trade agreement of 1955, Austria was called on to grant the Soviet Union the same trade conditions as within the Free Trade Association.⁴¹ Since this would have gone against the association's rules, Austria and all other EFTA founding members refused; only EFTA associate Finland agreed. As a consequence, tariffs on Soviet goods were up to 70 percent higher than those on comparable goods from the EFTA area, and the USSR, after protesting such "discrimination,"⁴² in a retaliatory move, raised tariffs on Austrian goods imported to the USSR, until now 7 percent, to 20 percent.⁴³

During his visit to Austria in the summer of 1960, Khrushchev had criticized both the EEC and EFTA as being obstacles to free trade between East and West,⁴⁴ warned against the country's rapprochement with the former and declared it incompatible with neutrality. The question, however, became increasingly important in the spring of 1961. When Alfons Gorbach⁴⁵ took over the chancellorship from the neutralist-leaning Raab, it was signaled by the Soviet media that he was expected to be just as staunch a defender of neutrality as his much-praised predecessor had been.⁴⁶ However, the change in leadership to Gorbach, who strongly advocated European integration, and pressure from his party's youth and trade organizations had an impact on the government's strategy, while at the international level, the British and Danish applications for EEC membership brought the other EFTA states under pressure to regulate their relationships to the Common Market. All EFTA neutrals, i.e. Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, came to the conclusion that an association with the EEC, provided that it curbed neither the neutrals' treaty-making powers nor their right to withdraw, would not impede neutrality.⁴⁷ Despite warnings and criticism voiced by Soviet diplomats,⁴⁸ by *International Affairs* in January and May

⁴⁰ Mueller, "Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration," 628; Conversation Haymerle with Patolichev, 9 December 1960, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. Berichte Moskau.

⁴¹ Sowjetisches Aide-Mémoire, 20 May 1960, in Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Dokumente*, 253–254.

⁴² Soviet memoranda, 17 August 1961 and 12 December 1961, Abschrift, Anlage 4–5, in SBKA, Länder, UdSSR 1, File Sprechprogramm Moskau 1962.

⁴³ Glasneck, "Die Sowjetunion und Österreich," 162–163.

⁴⁴ *Druzhestvennyi vizit*, 38–39, 59.

⁴⁵ On Gorbach's political background, see Robert Kriechbaumer, "Alfons Gorbach," in Herbert Dachs, Peter Gerlich, Wolfgang C. Müller (eds.), *Die Politiker: Karrieren und Wirken bedeutender Repräsentanten der Zweiten Republik* (Vienna: Manz, 1995), 160–167.

⁴⁶ Petersson, *The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality*, 52.

⁴⁷ Ermacora, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität*, 120; on the following, *ibid.*, 249–250. Summaries of Soviet statements concerning Austria's relations to the EEC are given in *ibid.*, 134; and in Dienstzettel des Außenministeriums über sowjetische Äußerungen zur Frage der Assoziierung Österreichs an die EWG, 22 May 1964, in Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Dokumente*, 346–349.

⁴⁸ Karasek to Kreisky, 13 April 1961, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau. Cf. F. Fürnberg, "Neutrality and the Struggle for Peace," in *International Affairs*, no. 1 (January 1961), 55–61.

and by Radio Moscow on 25 and 26 April about plans “to incorporate Austria into the Common Market,” the Austrian government shortly thereafter declared itself ready for negotiations with the EEC – in its declaration, however, the government stressed its intention to stick to neutrality.⁴⁹ While the EEC Commission reacted by stating that neutrality was not compatible with full membership in the EEC but only with an association to the community, the Soviet ambassador in Vienna, Viktor Avilov, on 27 August, handed over a note claiming that the EEC was closely linked to NATO, that any negotiations with the community would contradict neutrality, and asking for explanations regarding Austria's intentions.⁵⁰ The federal government, in a note of reply that was handed over on 2 October, answered that it was seeking an economic arrangement only, and would not commit itself to any obligations that might jeopardize Austria's international status⁵¹ – an assurance that, however, did not convince the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Hence, the systematic attempts by Soviet diplomats to warn their Austrian colleagues against the EEC continued.⁵² Even earlier, during a visit to Vienna in June, Foreign Minister Gromyko had warned that the Common Market was “a bad thing.”⁵³ In a conversation with Leopold Figl, the usually grim diplomat went as far as acknowledging that Austria had hitherto maintained and earned credit for a “good policy of neutrality” – an achievement that would be at risk if Austria continued to tend towards becoming associated with the EEC.

In the following months, the atmosphere surrounding such conversations deteriorated. In November the deputy director of the Soviet ministry's Third European Department, Aleksandr Bondarenko, in a conversation with Austrian diplomats attempted to equate the EEC with a new Anschluss. He observed that in Austria until then only isolated groups had advocated a “rapprochement with West Germany,” whereas now even members of the government claimed that membership in the Common Market was compatible with neutrality. He refused to accept that Austria was only discussing an associative membership in the Community. After this con-

⁴⁹ Kirchschräger, “Integration und Neutralität,” 79–80.

⁵⁰ Sowjetisches Aide-Mémoire, 27 August 1961, Abschrift, Anlage 9, in SBKA, Länder, UdSSR 1, File Sprechprogramm Moskau 1962. Cf. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 1, 410. On Viktor I. Avilov, a diplomat who had served as ambassador to Belgium in 1952–58 and was retired in 1965, see A.A. Fursenko et al. (eds.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964*, 3 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2008), 1070.

⁵¹ Kurt Waldheim, *The Austrian Example* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), 103. Text in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 2 (1961–62), 45. See also Oskar Wictora, *10 Jahre österreichische Integrationspolitik 1956–1966* (Vienna: Bundesministerium für Handel und Wiederaufbau, [1966]), 105–106.

⁵² Karasek to Kreisky, 13 October 1961; Haymerle to Kreisky, 17 November 1961; 12 December 1961; 15 December 1961; Karasek to Kreisky, 30 December 1961, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau.

⁵³ Aktenvermerk Hausberger, Conversation Gromyko – Figl, 3 June 1961, in ÖIZG, NL 72: Fuchs, DO 823, File 23.

versation, the Austrian ambassador in his report to the Ballhausplatz warned, with an eye to the recent Soviet-Finnish “note crisis,” that “we cannot guarantee that the Austrian government won’t be confronted with similar Soviet pressure.”⁵⁴ The Soviet demands of Finnish-Soviet military consultations according to the bilateral Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, demands that were underpinned by the detonation of a Soviet 50-megaton nuclear device, had come after Denmark, Norway, and the FRG had discussed joint naval defenses in the Baltic Sea. It was therefore most probably a Soviet attempt to isolate West Germany and to forestall what Moscow perceived as a shift in the delicate Nordic Balance. In addition, the imminent presidential elections in Finland might have contributed to the Kremlin’s insecurity.⁵⁵ The entire affair appeared even more dangerous, as it overlapped with the Berlin crisis and occurred only two months after the erection of the Berlin Wall. In its internal assessment, the embassy in Moscow warned that the Soviet government, in order to exert pressure on Austria, might withdraw its recognition of neutrality, and it recommended remaining alert to the possibility of a similar Soviet-Austrian crisis. However, such an event was deemed unlikely before Austria’s negotiations with the EEC had officially started.

Despite warnings by the local correspondent in *Pravda* on 1 December 1961 that an Austrian “cold Anschluss” with the EEC would harm the country’s economy and turn the neutral into a colony of NATO,⁵⁶ and despite the “amicable” but critical Soviet memorandum of 12 December, which warned against the “enemies of neutrality” and equated the Common Market with the Atlantic organization,⁵⁷ three days later the neutral EFTA members Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland applied for association with the EEC. On 19 October, the foreign ministers of the three neutrals

⁵⁴ Information Austrian MFA, 23 November 1961, Copy, in ÖIZG, NL 72 Fuchs, DO 832, File 26. Cf. on the Austrian perception of the “note crisis,” Haymerle to Kreisky, 1 November 1961, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. Berichte Moskau.

⁵⁵ Hentilä, “The Soviet Union, Finland, and the ‘Northern Balance,’” 248; Kari Möttölä, “Managing the Finnish-Soviet Relationship: Lessons and Experiences,” in Bo Hultdt and Atis Lejins (eds.), *European Neutrals and the Soviet Union* (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1985), 35–57, 45–46. Cf. the Memorandum of the Soviet government to the government of Finland, 30 October 1961, in *Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuzia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 1961* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1962), 475–483. The crisis was defused after Kekkonen visited Khrushchev, his opponent had withdrawn his candidacy in the presidential elections, and Norway had threatened to invite NATO troops to be stationed on its soil.

⁵⁶ See also O. Afanasyeva, “A Threat to Neutrality,” in *International Affairs*, no. 12 (December 1961), 85–86.2

⁵⁷ The memorandum is attached to Aktenvermerk Bielka, Z. 172.787–9/61, 15 December 1961, in SBKA, Länderboxen UdSSR, 1; copies are in ÖIZG, NL 72 Fuchs, DO 832, File 28; and in SBKA, Länder, UdSSR 1, File Sprechprogramm Moskau 1962. Cf. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 2 (1961–62), 126; and Kirchschräger, “Integration und Neutralität,” 82–86. A German translation of the *Pravda* article is attached to Haymerle to Kreisky, 1 December 1961, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau.

had reached agreement on their attitude to the organization.⁵⁸ With the unspoken final aim of participating in the Common Market and regulating its relations to the ECSC, Austria, in July 1962, declared itself ready to harmonize its tariffs, trade policy and other areas of its economic relations with the Common Market, and to support the principles of the Rome Treaties as far as its neutral status allowed. However, Austria reserved "a certain measure of its freedom of action towards third countries," the right not to participate in economic sanctions that were directed against third parties and that exclusively served political aims, and the right to take "certain measures" in the case of war.⁵⁹

The move was followed by a full blown East European campaign against the neutral's attempted rapprochement with Brussels. Still in December 1961, the Hungarian prime minister, Gyula Kallay, repeated the Soviet theses, in January 1962 Czech and Polish newspapers followed suit, in February the Soviet delegate to the United Nations Zorin focused his criticism on Austria, and in March, a Czech memorandum to Vienna expressed concern that an Austrian arrangement with the EEC would violate the state treaty. While the Soviet diplomatic statements vis-à-vis Austrian officials were voiced for the most part in a friendly and cautionary manner, the East European allies were more outspoken and their propaganda was not friendly at all.⁶⁰ If the early Soviet warnings had left it unclear whether they were referring to Austria's membership in the EEC or to an association with it, *Pravda's* 10 February 1962 article explicitly mentioned the latter, which was declared just as unacceptable as a membership in the community.⁶¹ On 13 March, *Izvestiia* repeated that "any arrangement" with the EEC would force Austria to give up neutrality. The fact that Moscow, seemingly indiscriminately, switched in its terminology from a condemnation of Austria's "Anschluss" to the EEC to its association, from an "arrangement of any form" to membership and back again, seems to have been a deliberate tactic to unsettle the Austrian leaders' convictions and to limit their room to maneuver with Brussels and in the internal Austrian discussion.⁶²

In general, five points were brought forward by Soviet propaganda and legal statements warning against the integration of European neutrals into the Common Market. 1) Since the EEC, in Soviet eyes, was allegedly an economic basis for

⁵⁸ Alan S. Milward, "European Uses of Neutrality," in *Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit* 1, no. 1 (2001), 103–116, 110.

⁵⁹ Österreichische Erklärung vor dem EWG-Ministerrat, 28 July 1962, in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 2 (1961–62), 288–294.

⁶⁰ Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Darstellung*, 216–217.

⁶¹ Dienstzettel des Außenministeriums über sowjetische Äußerungen zur Frage der Assoziierung Österreichs an die EWG, 22 May 1964, in Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Dokumente*, 346–349, 347. Cf. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 2 (1961–62), 186–187.

⁶² Report Haymerle, 22 June 1963, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 67129–6/64, Z. 75215–6/64. Overviews of the terminology used in Soviet warnings against various forms of arrangements with the EEC are in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 44264–6/66, Z. 48063–6pol/66; *ibid.*, GZ. 17042–6/67, Z. 31717–6/67; SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR, 2.

NATO, membership in it was deemed intolerable for a neutral. 2) Membership in a supranational organization such as the EEC was seen as damaging a neutral's sovereignty and, thus, its ability to maintain neutrality. 3) Since the EEC, by its nature, like all regional economic organizations, treated outsiders differently from members, this was seen as a violation of the Soviet thesis that neutrals were obliged not to discriminate against third countries. 4) The close ties to NATO of most EEC countries would make it impossible for the neutrals to maintain neutrality in wartime. 5) All claims that it might be possible to limit the obligations for neutrals by their being associates rather than members of the EEC were unjustified and merely a "maneuver" to blind the public.⁶³ Or as Soviet legal expert Ganiushkin argued: If the EEC had not accepted a special relationship with mighty Britain, why should the small neutrals receive special conditions? G. Osnitskaia, in an article for the Soviet monthly *International Affairs*, declared that any hopes of preserving neutrality while an associate member of the EEC were "illusory." Since the Brussels club would "require the associated state to fulfill definite commitments to the Common Market," Osnitskaia argued, "any form of association, partnership or any other variant of cooperation with this organization cannot guarantee the preservation of neutrality in a state that agrees to such cooperation."⁶⁴

Most of these allegations were debatable: The EEC was hardly identical with NATO, the Common Market's supranationality was anything but fully achieved, and its discrimination against outsiders was similar to the principles of other regional trade organizations. Regarding the compatibility between neutrality and an associative membership in the EEC, the Soviet posture was clearly inconsistent: Whereas the West European neutrals were attacked for their desire to gain associative membership in the EEC, African associates of the same organization were still recognized by Soviet propaganda as being neutral or nonaligned.⁶⁵

For Austria, the rest of the Soviet arguments against an association with the EEC remained the same as they had been regarding its rapprochement with the ECSC; both organizations were allegedly supporters of NATO and therefore unacceptable organizations for a neutral state to join; the FRG was the leading country in the ECSC and EEC, and therefore a rapprochement between Austria and either of the communities would lead to a new Anschluss and thus be incompatible with the state treaty. The warnings against a new Anschluss were underlined by repeated Soviet criticism of veterans' meetings in Austria and the country's mild treatment of neo-Nazis.⁶⁶ The Austrian position – that an association with the EEC would not interfere with neutrality – was rejected by Soviet law experts, who emphasized the "political character" of the community and argued that any association with the

⁶³ Ganiushkin, *Neitralitet i neprisoedinenie*, 168–175.

⁶⁴ Osnitskaya, "Neutrality and the Common Market," 54–55.2

⁶⁵ Daniel Tarschys, "Neutrality and the Common Market: The Soviet View," in *Cooperation and Conflict* 6, no. 2 (1971), 65–75, 72–74.

⁶⁶ E.g. Radio Moscow, 3 May 1961; *Pravda*, 22 March 1962.

Common Market would limit Austria's freedom of action towards third parties and thus also curb neutrality.⁶⁷

Roughly the same points were made by Austrian international law experts, who pointed at the failure of the Austrian-German tariffs union of 1931. Nevertheless, on several occasions Austrian officials tried to explain that Austria's interest in an arrangement with the EEC was strictly economic and that this would not diminish Austria's ability to fulfill its international obligations. In a conversation with Avilov, Foreign Minister Kreisky referred to recent Soviet hints that even the USSR might be ready for relations with the EEC, but he could not convince the ambassador.⁶⁸ Khrushchev had, indeed, in 1962 sent out some friendly signals regarding the establishment of mutual relations with the Brussels club, but later, once the British accession to the EEC had failed, he did not follow up on the matter.⁶⁹

Four main reasons for the Soviet policy with regard to the European neutrals' striving towards the EEC can be extrapolated. First of all, the Kremlin was interested in preserving the status quo it had achieved in Europe after World War II.⁷⁰ This status quo was comprised of a Western sphere of power, a Soviet-controlled power sphere in Eastern Europe, and some neutral states in between. It was in Soviet interests to keep the Western sphere as weak as possible. "Divide and rule" long served as the motto of Moscow's policies towards Western Europe. An alarming aspect of European integration was, however, that the continent's capitalist areas seemed to be increasingly unified and less involved in intracapitalist struggles than had been preached in Marxism-Leninism. From the Kremlin's perspective, any form of West European integration ran counter to the Soviet aim of keeping the West divided and playing Western states (including the US) off one another. It was part of the Soviet strategy, therefore, to obstruct, as far as possible, the emergence of a strong and integrated Western bloc, to hamper European integration by building strong ties to the EEC's individual member states, to fan intra-European differences, and to deter potential member states or associates from joining and strengthening the community, which was depicted as an economic basis for NATO. In his crusade against the Common Market, Khrushchev even went as far as encouraging EEC members such as Italy and France to leave the community.

Secondly, the Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe as had been accomplished by 1945 seemed endangered, on one hand, by growing economic difficulties and public discontent in the Eastern bloc, and on the other, by the wealth and hence, the attractiveness of Western Europe. The Soviet propaganda war orchestrated from the

⁶⁷ K voprosu ob assotsiatsii Avstrii k "Obshchemu rynku," 14 March 1964, in AVPRF, 66/43/90/19, 2-13.

⁶⁸ Conversation Kreisky with Avilov, 16 October 1962, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 60566-4/62, Z. 74556-4pol/62. Cf. *FRUS 1961-1963*, XVI, 379.

⁶⁹ Mueller, "Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration," 632-638.

⁷⁰ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 8 November 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau, 958-960.

early 1950s against West European integration, therefore, aimed at least as much at deterring East Europeans from the temptations of European integration and prosperity, as at abetting West Europeans to resist their governments' "wicked plans."⁷¹ If the neutrals now joined the EEC, this would seriously undermine the Soviet strategy of depicting European integration as an evil ploy.

The third reason for Soviet dissatisfaction was that the European ambitions of the neutrals ran counter to their role as it had been envisaged by the Kremlin in 1955 and still was. This applied not only to Austria; the same can be said about Soviet plans regarding Finland, Switzerland, and Sweden. A common trait of these states was that they were not part of the Western bloc. If their rapprochement with the EEC succeeded, from the Soviet perspective, they would become even more "Western" than they already were and, as a consequence, would also draw nearer to other Western institutions such as NATO. To the Soviet leaders, such a shift in the European balance of power seemed unacceptable. In addition, a neutral country, in Soviet eyes, was to serve as a promoter of Soviet strategic concepts, such as "peaceful coexistence" and (as will be discussed below) all-European security and cooperation.⁷² It was to promote neutrality and East-West trade and struggle against Western "closed blocs," such as the EEC.⁷³ Therefore, it did not suit the Soviet strategy for a neutral country to leave its space between the blocs and slip into an organization that was not only considered close to NATO, but also economically attractive. Any move from the neutral sphere, which was from the ideological point of view regarded more "progressive" than the capitalist sphere, to the latter by becoming part of a Western organization like the EEC was considered a forceful attempt at reversing the course of history and a setback for Soviet policy. It would set an unwanted example and probably trigger dangerous dynamics with critical consequences for Soviet rule in Eastern Europe.

Last but not least, association of the neutrals with the EEC ran counter to Soviet interests in East-West trade. As a regional economic organization aiming at creating a unified economic sphere, the Common Market contained characteristics that were considered discriminatory for the outside world. Since the Soviet Union wanted to foster East-West trade on a state-to-state basis, any rapprochement of third states with the EEC was criticized by Soviet propaganda, also from an economic point of view.⁷⁴

The entire issue overshadowed Chancellor Gorbach's visit to Moscow, Leningrad, Irkutsk and Bratsk from 28 June to 5 July 1962. In his cordial welcome speech, Khrushchev stressed the mutual bonds and feelings between the Soviet and the Austrian people and commended Austria's "policy of permanent neutrality" and

⁷¹ *The New York Times*, 28 November 1966.

⁷² Light, *The Soviet Theory of International Relations*, 229–235.

⁷³ Amtsvermerk Fuchs über Gespräch mit Botschafter Avilov, GZ. 34.699-Pol/61, Z. 35.131-Pol/61, 24 November 1961, Copy, in ÖIZG, NL 72 Fuchs, DO 832, File 26.

⁷⁴ Cf. Hakovirta, "East-West Tensions," 201–202.

the "Soviet-Austrian friendship."⁷⁵ Although the official communiqué of the visit praised the "amicable atmosphere," lauded "Austria's neutrality as a positive contribution to détente and the consolidation of peace," and declared that there were "no unresolved problems" in Soviet-Austrian relations,⁷⁶ the bilateral talks were tough. The main Austrian aim was to get Soviet consent for an association with the EEC. While the Austrian delegation declared that neutrality was only a military matter, Khrushchev denied this, as well as – with reference to a recent declaration by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that the EEC would develop further into a political union – the compatibility between an Austrian association to the Common Market and neutrality.⁷⁷ The CPSU chief indicated, in a friendly manner but firmly, that Austria's "Anschluss" with this new "Holy Alliance against the East" would be understood by the Soviet Union as a violation of the state treaty and of neutrality. In such a case, Austria would not only lose all benefits of its status, but also "destroy the basis of Austrian-Soviet relations,"⁷⁸ and the hitherto friendly attitude of the Soviet government towards Austria would "change fundamentally."⁷⁹ Invoking God not to let a new "Anschluss" happen and referring to the patronage he had conferred on Gorbach's predecessor, Khrushchev warned against damaging what had been built up by his "friend" Raab, the "little capitalist."⁸⁰ The references to his personal relationship to the ex-chancellor was interpreted by the Austrian side as a sign that their country had managed to preserve the Soviet leaders' trust, while their ostentatious friendliness was perceived as a demonstration of what Austria would forfeit if it fell from grace with the Kremlin.⁸¹ As a solution for the dilemma regarding the EEC, the Soviet leadership hinted at the possibility that Austria might conclude a trade agreement. Nonetheless, Kreisky, who had accompanied Gorbach, displayed optimism and, at a press conference, formulated cryptically (and somewhat misleadingly) that the Soviet government had signaled trust in Austria's diplomacy "at

⁷⁵ *Sowjetunion heute* 8, no. 27 (1962), 2.

⁷⁶ Gemeinsames Kommuniqué anlässlich des offiziellen Besuches des Bundeskanzlers in der Sowjetunion, 5 July 1962, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik* 2, 142–143; cf. *Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuzu i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 1962* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1963), 292–294.

⁷⁷ Rede des Ministerratsvorsitzenden der UdSSR, 4 July 1962, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik* 1, 358–359.

⁷⁸ Dienstzettel des Außenministeriums über sowjetische Äußerungen zur Frage der Assoziierung Österreichs an die EWG, 22 May 1964, in Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Dokumente*, 346–349, 347.

⁷⁹ Verhandlungsschrift 54, Council of Ministers, 5 July 1962, and Beilage A, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, MRP.

⁸⁰ Haymerle, "Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten," 176. Cf. Report Gorbach to the Council of Ministers, 5 July 1962, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 66649-6/62, Z. 70081-6pol/62. See also the Protocol of the Conversation Gorbach with Khrushchev, 29 June 1962, in SBKA, Länderboxen UdSSR, I. For the full text of the conversation, see pages 300–318.

⁸¹ Beilage A, Verhandlungsschrift 54, Council of Ministers, 5 July 1962, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, MRP. Cf. Report Haymerle, 23 June 1963, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 67129-6/64, Z. 75215-6/64.

a time when we are trying to reach an association with the countries of the Common Market.”⁸² He also stressed that after the visit to Moscow, Austrian hopes for a rapprochement were still intact. In the Austrian draft communiqué, which was almost fully accepted by the Soviet side,⁸³ no reference was made to the EEC. The same was the case during Bruno Pittermann’s visit to Moscow from 13 to 18 September.⁸⁴

Instead, Khrushchev used a conversation with the Austrian vice-chancellor that took place in the run-up to the Cuban missile crisis to convey some propaganda messages and to wage psychological warfare against the West by depicting US president John F. Kennedy as mentally instable and threatening that a US blockade against Cuba would lead to nuclear war.⁸⁵ Soviet ships, Khrushchev boasted, perhaps referring to the recently launched top secret operation for stationing Soviet missiles in the Caribbean, were already on their way to Cuba. If something went wrong, the USSR would exert pressure on “the Americans’ Achilles heel,” West Berlin. He also renewed his classic threat to deprive the city of its allied protection by signing a “peace treaty” with East Germany and transferring the four-power rights to its communist government. Khrushchev’s threats against West Berlin had also loomed large in a conversation with Gorbach and Kreisky held in June.⁸⁶ The extensive misuse of bilateral meetings with Austrian leaders by the Soviet government for propaganda purposes, characteristic for Khrushchev, bore the risk of Austria becoming an instrument of Soviet psychological warfare.

The *Alleingang*, 1963–1967

After the British application for EEC membership was vetoed by French president Charles de Gaulle in January 1963 and despite the EEC’s reluctance to accept neutrals as associates, the Austrian government – against the wishes of Kreisky, whose SPÖ had lost two seats in the 1962 elections – on 26 February declared its wish to continue the *Alleingang* towards European integration,⁸⁷ thus provoking still more Soviet countermeasures. Switzerland had decided to terminate its rapprochement with the EEC, and in the Swedish case, the neutral’s reluctance to accept the Com-

⁸² *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 2 (1961–62), 310.

⁸³ Amtsvermerk, 12 July 1962, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 66649–6/62, Z. 70015–6pol/62. For the text, see Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik* 2, 142–143.

⁸⁴ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 25 September 1962, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 73544–4/62, Z. 73804–6pol/62; Conversation Pittermann – Kosygin, 14 September 1962, *ibid.*, Z. 73544–6pol/62.

⁸⁵ Conversation Pittermann – Khrushchev, 17 September 1962, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ., Z. 73544–6pol/62. For the full text of the conversation, see pages 318–326.

⁸⁶ Protocol of the Conversation Gorbach with Khrushchev, 29 June 1962, in SBKA, Länderboxen UdSSR, 1. For the full text of the conversation, see pages 300–318.

⁸⁷ Rolf Steininger, “Österreichs ‘Alleingang’ nach Brüssel 1963–1969,” in Michael Gehler and idem (eds.), *The Neutrals and European Integration* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2000), 577–644.

mon Commercial Policy and its demand that an associative agreement be “supervised” had virtually “killed any chances of an agreement” well before de Gaulle’s veto against the British accession did.⁸⁸ Austria’s ambassador to Moscow, Heinrich (von) Haymerle, a more critical observer than his predecessor Bischoff and in Soviet eyes a “reactionary,”⁸⁹ believed that from the Soviet point of view, any further Austrian rapprochement with the Common Market had become even more dangerous, since without the other neutrals Austria would be more susceptible to Western influence.⁹⁰

While the Austrian press had understood the Soviet stance during the Gorbach visit as being a green light for an Austrian association with the EEC, this assumption proved to be a misunderstanding.⁹¹ Between 13 January 1963, with the publishing of an article in *Pravda*, and April, at least nineteen direct and indirect Soviet warnings were issued to the Ballhausplatz. Radio Moscow aired about the same number of broadcasts claiming the inadmissibility of a rapprochement between Austria and the EEC.⁹² On 28 February and 9 April, TASS underlined that the Soviet position remained unchanged.⁹³ However, whereas West Germany, the US, NATO, as well as economic and pan-German circles in the FPÖ had until this time been depicted in Soviet propaganda as the main culprits responsible for Austria’s strive towards the EEC, from this point in time the blame was more frequently put directly on the Austrian government. On 8 March, the CPSU daily, which published three editorials on the subject in these months, stated, in response to Austrian claims of having the exclusive right to interpret its own neutral policy, that neutrality was an international obligation not to be defined by Austria alone.⁹⁴ A Soviet memorandum of 3 May forecast “serious, negative consequences” for Austrian-Soviet relations in the case of Austria’s “participation” in the Common Market,⁹⁵ and less than three weeks later, Ambassador Avilov followed up on the topic in a lively conversation with

⁸⁸ Milward, “European Uses of Neutrality,” 110.

⁸⁹ Dölling to Ulbricht with Amtsvermerk, 12 July 1960, in BA Berlin, SAPMO, NY 4182/1320, 8–10. Cf. Ullmann, “Das Russlandbild,” 44. On Haymerle, who had served in London and Paris before being sent to Moscow, see Agstner, Enderle-Burcel, Follner, *Österreichs Spitzendiplomaten*, 236–238.

⁹⁰ Report Haymerle, 23 June 1963, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 67129–6/64, Z. 75215–6/64.

⁹¹ Haymerle to Kreisky, 7 Februar 1963; Karasek to Kreisky, 9 April 1963, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau.

⁹² Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Darstellung*, 229; *Pravda*, 8 and 31 March 1963.

⁹³ TASS über Österreich, 28 February 1963, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik* 1, 370–371; extracts of the TASS article of 9 April 1963, in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 3 (1963), 243–244.

⁹⁴ Extracts in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 3 (1963), 134.

⁹⁵ The memorandum and a report on the conversation are in Ministerrat, 29 May 1963, Abschrift, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 4215-PrM/63. Cf. Dienstzettel des Außenministeriums über sowjetische Äußerungen zur Frage der Assoziierung Österreichs an die EWG, 22 May 1964, in Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Dokumente*, 346–349, 348; Wictora, *10 Jahre österreichische Integrationspolitik*, 154.

Kreisky.⁹⁶ The Soviet warnings continued well into 1964, *Pravda* repeating on 10 July that, with regard to Austria and the EEC, there was no difference between association and membership.⁹⁷ Within the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the negative position was supported by recent reports from the Soviet embassy in Brussels pointing out that “the [EEC] Commission’s proposals for negotiations with Austria would result in Austria’s de facto accession to the EEC with regard to its economy.”⁹⁸

On the Austrian side, Ambassador Haymerle expressed the opinion that Austria should not renounce its hopes to find an economic arrangement with the Common Market that in the end would be accepted by the Soviet Union.⁹⁹ If Austria yielded too soon, this would bring about further Soviet pressure for Austrian concessions and a subsequent constriction in the neutral’s freedom of action. Nevertheless, he anticipated that the Austrian ambitions with regard to the EEC would become a touchstone of Soviet-Austrian relations and any Austrian rapprochement with Brussels would put Moscow’s patience to a serious test.¹⁰⁰ But since Vienna did not intend to sign anything other than an *economic* arrangement with the EEC, it was thought that Moscow would finally comply with a *fait accompli*. Thus, Kreisky, in his conversations with Soviet officials, pleaded for a wait-and-see approach with regard to the Austrian EEC negotiations.¹⁰¹ Internally, at least from May 1963, Kreisky recommended focusing on the creation of a free-trade area between Austria and the Common Market and giving up other ways for reaching a rapprochement with the EEC.¹⁰²

In order to avoid a deterioration of Austrian-Soviet relations, Vienna had, from the beginning, regularly informed the Soviet side about its aims and the steps being taken in the decision-making and negotiating process with the EEC.¹⁰³ Emphasis was laid thereby on assuring that under no circumstances would Austria enter into an agreement contradicting the neutral’s international obligations, but also on the economic necessity of Austria joining the Common Market in order to forestall financial and economic losses, as it accounted for approximately half of Austria’s foreign trade. On 22 November 1963, the Soviet ambassador jokingly conceded to Fritz Bock that the Austrian minister of trade had almost succeeded in convincing

⁹⁶ See Kreisky’s report in Ministerrat, 29 May 1963, Abschrift, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 4215-PrM/63; and Amtsvermerk, 5 July 1963, in SBKA, Integration, Box 4, File USSR.

⁹⁷ Text in *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 11321, 10 July 1964.

⁹⁸ Soviet embassy Brussels to Soviet MFA, 23 March 1964, in AVPRF, 66/41/85/19, 14–16.

⁹⁹ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 12 December 1961, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 1.

¹⁰⁰ Report Haymerle, 22 June 1963, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 67129–6/64, Z. 75215–6/64.

¹⁰¹ Conversation Kreisky with Gromyko, 16 May 1965, Z. 136.736–6pol/65, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 2.

¹⁰² Kreisky’s report in Ministerrat, 29 May 1963, Abschrift, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 4215-PrM/63.

¹⁰³ Kreisky had informed Gromyko in advance about the Austrian negotiations to be held in Brussels in July 1962. Conversation Kreisky with Gromyko, 4 July 1962, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 1.

the Soviets. Nonetheless, the diplomat reminded Bock of the “strong links” between the EEC and NATO.¹⁰⁴ In a more “dramatic” meeting, Avilov told his designated Austrian counterpart Walter Wodak on 12 June 1964 that Austrian-Soviet relations had entered a “critical phase,”¹⁰⁵ while Ambassador Haymerle, in his farewell visits to Mikoian and Kosygin, was informed of the negative Soviet opinion of Austria's being associated with the EEC.¹⁰⁶ Similar sermons were given to Wodak upon his arrival in Moscow by Mikoian,¹⁰⁷ who as head of state had developed the habit of turning such ritualized diplomatic events into serious political discussions.¹⁰⁸ Wodak, whose “sharp-wittedness” was highly respected by one of the keenest minds among his Soviet counterparts,¹⁰⁹ did his best to reassure the Soviet side. A conversation, described as the “friendliest in tone, however most serious in content,” had been reported by Haymerle in May,¹¹⁰ and in June, Ambassador Avilov told Kreisky that the Soviet Union would no longer feel bound to the state treaty [sic] if it was violated by Austria by entering the EEC.¹¹¹ On 30 September, a Soviet memorandum repeated that an “Austrian Anschluss with the EEC, in whatever form,” would be considered a turning point in Austria's neutral policy and a de facto economic unification with Germany, which was prohibited in the state treaty.

Remarkably enough, all these conversations were conducted in a forthcoming and amicable atmosphere. The Soviet Union was interested in communicating its doubts about the rapprochement between Austria and the EEC in a well-balanced way, so that the neutral country would not feel alienated. As if to demonstrate that Soviet-Austrian relations were not suffering, on 23 October 1964, shortly before the ninth anniversary of Austria's declaration of neutrality, Radio Moscow broadcast the CPSU motto “Long live the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Austria!” and called Soviet-Austrian relations again a good “example of peaceful coexistence,” coexistence that was threatened only by the

¹⁰⁴ Rücksprache mit dem russischen Botschafter, 22 November 1963, in Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Dokumente*, 339–340.

¹⁰⁵ Amtsvermerk [Wodak?], 16 June 1964, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 73367–6/64, Z. 73367–6/64.

¹⁰⁶ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 11 April and 7 May 1964, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ., Z. 70255–6/64 and Z. 71604–6/64.

¹⁰⁷ Conversation Mikoian with Wodak, 17 July 1964, in AVPRF, 66/43/89/6, 3–8. Mikoian suggested that Austria could respond to German pressure with an Austrian boycott of German goods.

¹⁰⁸ Mikoian, *Tak bylo*, 618.

¹⁰⁹ Valentin Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen* (Munich: Droemer Knauer, 1993), 79. On Wodak's career, see Agstner, Enderle-Burcel, Follner, *Österreichs Spitzendiplomaten*, 482–485.

¹¹⁰ Haymerle über Gespräch mit Semenov, 20 May 1964, in Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Dokumente*, 349–351.

¹¹¹ Stephan Hamel, “Eine solche Sache würde der Neutralitätspolitik ein Ende machen: Die österreichischen Integrationsbestrebungen 1961–1972,” in Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger (eds.), *Österreich und die europäische Integration 1945–1993: Aspekte einer wechselvollen Entwicklung* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1993), 55–86, 68–71. The Soviet memorandum was a response to an Austrian document that had been handed over by Wodak on 23 July 1964. Cf. Aide mémoire, in ÖStA, AVA, NL Bielka, File 115.

plans in “certain circles” of incorporating Austria into the EEC – a subject that was further delineated in an *Izvestiia* article the same day. An Austrian memorandum explaining that the country was forced to seek an arrangement with the Common Market solely for economic reasons was answered by the Kremlin on 20 September by a repetition of its well-known views.¹¹²

The official USSR opinion was that an agreement on tariffs and trade would be sufficient to solve the economic problems resulting from Austria’s nonparticipation in the EEC. During his meeting with Gorbach in the summer of 1962, Khrushchev had hinted at this possibility. The Austrian embassy in Moscow was also of the opinion that an “arrangement of purely trade-political [*handelspolitisch*] nature” between Austria and the EEC would be accepted by the Kremlin despite all its loud warnings, as long as it did not discriminate against third parties. But anything more would not leave Soviet-Austrian relations untouched.¹¹³ This was underlined by an article in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* on 26 September 1964.¹¹⁴ Within the Soviet apparatus, the only viable option that was considered remained a trade agreement between Austria and the EEC according to articles 111 or 114 of the Rome Treaty, as had been concluded between the Common Market and Iran.¹¹⁵ Both other alternatives, a customs union between Austria and the EEC or a free-trade area according to article 24 of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), were ruled out as incompatible with neutrality and the state treaty.¹¹⁶

When direct negotiations between Austria and the EEC started in March 1965, *Pravda*, *Izvestiia* and TASS issued further warnings towards Austria not to continue its EEC ambitions as otherwise it would risk coming under the dictate of the aggressive forces responsible for World War II.¹¹⁷ During his visit to Vienna on the tenth anniversary of the state treaty, Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that Austria had a special international position and good relations with the USSR. Both would be at risk if Austria joined the EEC.¹¹⁸ When the Soviet ambassador followed up on the topic the next day, he was less discrete and prophesized “irreparable damages” to Soviet-Austrian relations if Austria continued to steer its course towards

¹¹² Österreich und die EWG, 19 October 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 45707–6/66, Z. 49028–6pol/66.

¹¹³ Vertraulicher Bericht der österreichischen Botschaft in der UdSSR, 29 May 1964, in Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Dokumente*, 351–353.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 366.

¹¹⁵ Soviet embassy Brussels to Soviet MFA, 23 March 1964, in AVPRF, 66/41/85/19, 14–16.

¹¹⁶ K voprosu o vozmozhnosti sozdaniia torgovykh otnoshenii, 16 Februar 1965, in AVPRF, 66/44/93/19, 17–20.

¹¹⁷ Cf. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 5 (1965), 44, 107–108, 402; Wictora, *10 Jahre österreichische Integrationspolitik*, 225, 232, 235, 241.

¹¹⁸ Haymerle, “Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” 177. See the protocols of the conversations in Unterredung des Herrn Bundesministers mit Außenminister Gromyko [16 May 1965], ÖStA, AVA, NL E/1736 Bielka, File 115. Gromyko’s official speech did not touch upon the topic. See the text in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 5 (1965), 81–82.

the EEC.¹¹⁹ The Soviet foreign minister also used the opportunity to promote his proposal of complete disarmament in both German states.

In the meantime, the Austrian government had modified its goal: it was no longer seeking an association with the EEC, but rather an "arrangement of a special kind." It remains yet to be shown to what extent this was due to reservations by the Community and the United States (which wanted to avoid the EEC being watered down by an association of the neutrals¹²⁰) or to the steady stream of Soviet propaganda. A change of terminology had been recommended by the Austrian embassy in Moscow in 1961 and then again in 1963, when it was claimed that gaining an associative membership was possible only in collaboration with Switzerland and Sweden.¹²¹

However, after the ÖVP's triumph in the general elections of 1966, the rapprochement with the EEC was intensified. This shift in the Austrian political landscape, as well as the resolution of the internal "empty chair" crisis in the EEC, which had been provoked by de Gaulle's power struggle against the Commission of the EEC, led to a certain amount of concern on the Soviet side.¹²² Soon after the elections, the head of the Austrian desk at the Soviet Foreign Ministry expressed his uneasiness that "the circles seeking Austria's entry into the EEC had been given leeway in the elections."¹²³ A few weeks later, the Austrian ambassador reported that the formation of Chancellor Josef Klaus' one-party government had "sparked astonishment in Moscow and, in parts, even dismay," as well as fears of a change in Austria's foreign policy.¹²⁴ Soviet media had dubbed the new cabinet an "advance payment to the Western blocs."¹²⁵ Their disquiet increased when Fritz Bock, one of the strongest advocates of Austria's rapprochement with the EEC, was appointed vice-chancellor. An indication of Soviet insecurity was a sharp *Izvestiia* editorial of 25 April 1966 stating that "if Viennese reactionary circles intend, by linking Austria with the EEC, to use the election success of the ÖVP for a semi-masked Anschluss with Bonn and the aggressive military bloc of NATO, they would do their country

¹¹⁹ Gespräch Bundesminister Dr. Kreisky – Außenminister Gromyko, 17 May 1965, Copy, in ÖStA, AVA, NL E/1736 Bielka, File 115.

¹²⁰ Kofler, *Kennedy und Österreich*, 78–95.

¹²¹ Karasek to Kreisky, 13 October 1961; Haymerle to Kreisky, 17 November 1961; Karasek to Kreisky, 9 April 1963, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau.

¹²² Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 17 February 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau, 683–685.

¹²³ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 10 March 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau, 725–731.

¹²⁴ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 16 June 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau, 814–816. Cf. Stifter, "Das politische Österreichbild," 118, 168. On Klaus, see Ernst Hanisch, "Josef Klaus," in Herbert Dachs, Peter Gerlich, Wolfgang C. Müller (eds.), *Die Politiker: Karrieren und Wirken bedeutender Repräsentanten der Zweiten Republik* (Vienna: Manz, 1995), 299–306.

¹²⁵ Quoted in Petersson, *The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality*, 58.

a disservice.” Klaus was severely attacked for having omitted, in his declaration of the new government, any reference to the state treaty.¹²⁶ *Izvestiia* openly asked whether this indicated a change in the neutral’s political line and on 29 April, the Austrian communist *Volksstimme* spread the word as quickly as possible.¹²⁷ Shortly thereafter, a severe warning was published by Nikolai Polianov, an influential *Izvestiia* correspondent, in the journal of the Austrian Society for Foreign Policy.¹²⁸

Despite these discussions, the bilateral relations, which had been in a state of limbo after Khrushchev’s ouster, received some sort of consolidation by the visit of Petr Demichev to Austria in June 1966 – although Klaus did not succeed in convincing the CPSU Presidium member of the economic necessity of Austria’s association with the Common Market. The Soviet guest repeated that such an arrangement would seriously flaw Soviet-Austrian relations.¹²⁹ In reassessing the results of the visit, on 15 June Lev Tolkunov, the *Izvestiia* editor, drew an ambiguous picture: On one hand, he expressed Soviet “concern” about Austria’s ambitions regarding the EEC, depicted the alleged West German threat to the neutral’s independence in dark colors, and criticized Austria’s policy, which was, in his eyes, not neutral enough – Austria neither “condemned aggressive US policy” nor did it recognize the GDR. He also rejected the idea that neutrality was merely a military matter. On the other hand, Tolkunov commended Klaus for his loyal course with regard to the Soviet Union. Similar points were raised in a *Pravda* article on 30 June. Despite such ambivalence, the Demichev journey paved the way for the Soviet president’s state visit to Vienna in November 1966.

The trip of the new chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Nikolai Podgorny, had been preceded, on one hand, by a “wave of Austrian visits” to the USSR in the fall, including delegations of parliamentarians, trade-unionists and industrialists, the mayor of Vienna, and the Austrian minister of defense.¹³⁰ On the other hand, on 3 November *Izvestiia* published, in the Austrian ambassador’s eyes, the “frankest ever” declaration of the Soviet standpoint concerning Austria and the EEC, which, as Wodak stated, “sailed close to the shore of meddling in our most internal affairs.”¹³¹ The article had depicted Austria as being again on the brink of 1938, and portrayed West German and EEC leaders as apostles of Adolf Hitler. Since Soviet

¹²⁶ For the text of Klaus’ governmental speech, which indeed did not mention the state treaty but stressed neutrality, see Gottschlich, *Was die Kanzler sagten*, 171–181.

¹²⁷ Moser, “Die Stellung der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs,” 48.

¹²⁸ Nikolaj Poljanow, “Europa, die Politik der Neutralität und Österreich,” in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 6 (1966), 443–451.

¹²⁹ Conversation Demichev with Klaus, 10 June 1966, in AVPRF, 66/45/95/11, 8–9; Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 22 June 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau, 843–846.

¹³⁰ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 22 September 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau, 915–917.

¹³¹ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 8 November 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte Moskau, 958–960.

soldiers had spilled their blood on Austrian soil in 1945, the article claimed the right for the USSR to have a say in Austria's future.

The program for the Soviet state visit to Vienna from 14 to 21 November 1966, which was Podgorny's first journey to the West as head of state, reflected the wish of both sides to overcome these political burdens and to repeat the success of Khrushchev's trip in 1960. A tour through the country included a visit to the house where Mozart was born and meetings with factory workers at the VÖEST steel plants. The guest's wife, Natal'ia Podgornaia was presented an Alpine *Dirndl* and invited by the chancellor to a dance during an evening visit to his native province Salzburg.¹³² On many occasions neutrality was praised by Podgorny as a contribution to peace; the president repeated the well-known Soviet thesis that the neutrals were in the favorable position of not having to spend money on self-defense. He also expressed his satisfaction with the positive development of bilateral relations, the friendly personal contacts between the political leaders of the two countries, and the tradition of discussing all questions "in the spirit of a good neighborhood, mutual understanding and equal rights."¹³³ Regarding Austria's rapprochement with the EEC, the Soviet position was repeated that "an arrangement in any form" other than a bilateral treaty on tariffs and trade would mean a violation of the state treaty and neutrality. The explicit mentioning of such a treaty between Austria *and the EEC* itself (and not its member-states) seems to have been Podgorny's blunder. Both the Soviet delegation and the embassy later disclaimed the suggestion and tried to leave the impression that the president had spoken about treaties between Austria and the EEC *countries*.¹³⁴

If Austria suffered from discrimination from the Common Market or the ECSC, it should, Podgorny recommended, join the Soviet struggle against closed blocs. Podgorny also repeated the suggestion that Austria should recognize the GDR and support the Soviet project of an all-European conference on security. Furthermore, the Soviet president brought the Austrian government under pressure by calling upon all neutral states to condemn the US policy in Vietnam. Similar demands had

¹³² *Sowjetunion heute* 12, no. 49 (1966), 2–7.

¹³³ Conversation Klaus with Pogorny, 15 November 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 49.225-6/66, Z. 49.860-6/66. Cf. Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Darstellung*, 243–245; *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 6 (1966), 473–486.

¹³⁴ Austrian MFA to all heads of mission, 25 November 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 46141–6/66, Z. 49720–6/66. In an article, Kreisky mentioned that in 1962 Khrushchev had explicitly stated that the USSR was ready to sign a trade agreement with the EEC. Bruno Kreisky, "Der Podgornybesuch und die EWG-Frage," in *Neue Zeit*, 18 November 1966. However, in 1966 this was no longer an option. Mueller, "The UdSSR und die europäische Integration," 639–641. When Ambassador Wodak, in a conversation with Vladimir Semenov in 1970, reminded the Soviet vice-minister for foreign affairs of Podgorny's statement, Semenov claimed that the Austrian protocol of the Soviet president's conversation "obviously does not conform to ours." Wodak to Waldheim, 10 April 1970, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 80916-6/70, Z. 85182.

been communicated to other West European delegations in Moscow.¹³⁵ After tough negotiations, no reference was made to the EEC in the communiqué;¹³⁶ the issue was hinted at only in the mention of “open” talks. In addition, neutrality and the “mutually beneficial” development of bilateral trade were praised and the Vietnam War deplored.¹³⁷

Podgorny’s adherence to the well-known Soviet stance regarding Austria’s policy vis-à-vis the EEC mirrored Moscow’s internal assessment. A report of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, which had been prepared a few weeks before the state visit, acknowledged that the Austrian plans were motivated by the fact that “Austria, in the area of foreign trade, is closely linked to the countries of the Common Market, especially West Germany.”¹³⁸ However, negotiations had gotten stuck because the EEC allegedly demanded “nothing less than Austria’s de-facto giving up neutrality.” Neither within the Common Market, where France was against strengthening the “German position,” nor in the Austrian government was there a consensus about how to solve the problem. With regard to Soviet-Austrian relations, the report acknowledged that

“the Austrian government tries not to spoil its relations to the Soviet Union with its association with the Common Market. It makes great efforts not to give any pretext for charging Austria, from the Soviet side, with violating the state treaty or abandoning neutrality, and it takes pains not to demote the economic relations to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.”¹³⁹

The Soviet position should therefore be understanding, but firm. Furthermore, the report pointed out that

“the difficult political situation resulting from Austria’s intention to associate with the Common Market creates certain opportunities, in the future, for the Soviet Union to exert influence on the Austrian government and to strengthen the position of those Austrian circles that stand for the strict observation of the state treaty and of neutrality and that disapprove of Austria’s association with the Common Market.”¹⁴⁰

Access to Soviet documents on this subject is still too insufficient for an exhaustive delineation of all internal shifts in the Kremlin’s attitude towards the Austrian aspirations to become an associate of the EEC. However, there are indications that within the Soviet apparatus, various opinions started to emerge. In addition to the groups that rejected the idea entirely and those that were “understanding, but firmly against” it, there were, as the communist secretary of the Austrian-Soviet Society,

¹³⁵ Bonwetsch, “Sowjetische Westeuropapolitik II,” 155.

¹³⁶ Austrian MFA to all heads of mission, 26 November 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 46141–6/66, Z. 49028–6/66.

¹³⁷ Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik* 2, 144–145; *Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 1966* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1967), 293–297.

¹³⁸ Obshchii ryok i Avstriia, [26 September 1966], in AVPRF, 66/45/96/20, 31–37.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Obshchii ryok i Avstriia, [26 September 1966], in AVPRF, 66/45/96/20, 31–37.

Martin Grünberg, stated in a conversation with the Austrian ambassador, also Soviet officials who thought "that they had to take into account our economic necessities if we [i.e. the Austrians] were ready to respect their [i.e. the Soviets'] political concerns."¹⁴¹ These officials were interested in the progress of the negotiations between Austria and the EEC and their consequences on Austrian-Soviet trade.

It is very likely that the Austrian chancellor was informed of Grünberg's assessment, because he tried to address this alleged Soviet demand for respect of "their political concerns." However, the dismissive attitude with regard to the EEC remained the Soviet mantra during Klaus' visit to Moscow, Leningrad, Lipetsk, Tbilisi, and Kiev from 14 to 21 March 1967. Prior to the visit, Soviet officials had signaled to the Austrian embassy that the decision to receive Klaus in Moscow was a sort of Soviet "advance"; within the Kremlin and the Foreign Ministry there had been significant resistance to the chancellor's visit and serious doubts about his loyalty, i.e. responsiveness to Soviet wishes.¹⁴² According to Ambassador Wodak, the Soviet side would not put the EEC issue on the agenda unless the Austrian side proposed discussing it. Instead, concrete steps should be made regarding an agreement on cultural exchange as well as the building of a Soviet pipeline to Western Europe.

In order to prepare the visit, the Kremlin had activated a back channel and commissioned political analyst Mikhail Voslenskii to convey to the Austrian ambassador that the Soviet side wished to preserve its good relations with Austria and therefore recommended not proceeding with the rapprochement with the EEC.¹⁴³ An agreement on tariffs and trade was the maximum the USSR would be ready to tolerate. Even earlier, Voslenskii had pointed out that Moscow was not convinced of the Austrian motives for concluding a special arrangement with the EEC and encouraged the Austrian chancellor to send out a memorandum on the topic.¹⁴⁴ In order to promote the Austrian point of view, the chancellor handed over such an unofficial memorandum on the subject to Soviet ambassador Boris Podtserob, a month before his departure to Moscow.¹⁴⁵

While it was obviously the aim of the memorandum to convince its readers of the economic necessity for Austria to associate with the Common Market, it did not have the wanted effect on the Soviet Foreign Ministry experts. In its evaluation of the paper, the Institute for World Economy and International Relations

¹⁴¹ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 20 February 1967, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 14838-6/67, Z. 16543-6/67.

¹⁴² Memorandum Wodak, Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 4 February 1967, Copy, in ÖStA, AVA, NL E/1736 Bielka, File 115

¹⁴³ Wodak to Austrian MFA, 2 March 1967, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. Berichte Moskau.

¹⁴⁴ Austrian embassy Moscow, 11 November 1966, Copy, in ÖStA, AVA, NL E/1736 Bielka, File 115.

¹⁴⁵ Blatov to Semenov, 23 February 1967, in AVPRF, 66/46/99/16, 5; Russian translation *ibid.*, 66/46/99/20, 4-38. On Podtserob, an experienced diplomat who had served in 1949-52 and 1957-65 as general secretary of the Soviet MFA, see *SSSR i Germaniskii vopros* 1, 750.

of the Soviet Academy of Sciences criticized the Austrian essay, stating that “in order to demonstrate that an associative status is based only on economic aims, [it] does not deal with the state treaty, neutrality, and political consequences.”¹⁴⁶ With regard to foreign trade, in the eyes of the Soviet experts the Austrians gave undue importance to the neutral’s discrimination by the EEC and did not pay the necessary attention to the structural problems of the Austrian economy, which included a disproportionately high percentage of heavy industry and the production of semi-finished goods, insufficient research and capital formation, falling productivity, and, consequently, sinking competitiveness in relation to the EEC. Austria, the Soviet experts stated, wanted to become an associate for economic reasons; however, it should solve its problems through internal reforms that increased competitiveness, rather than by entering the Common Market. This would boost imports of capital and make Austrian exports easier, but at the same time increase competition on the domestic market. From a political point of view, the Soviet experts predicted, any type of association with the EEC would, as in the case of Greece and Turkey [sic], after a certain period of time lead to full membership. This would be intolerable for Austria and have “negative consequences for the Soviet Union.” Concerning further action, the experts suggested a “new serious explanation” of the Soviet standpoint towards the Austrian government, Soviet proposals for what form of cooperation between Austria and the EEC would be acceptable for the USSR, and an increase in Austrian trade with CMEA countries (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance). In order to allow Austria to step up its exports to the Soviet Union within the framework of the trade agreements and their stipulated trade balance, Moscow, having reached its limits in the export of raw materials, should offer helicopters, trucks, and technical goods such as typewriters and television sets.

Following these recommendations, the Soviet hosts of Chancellor Klaus, including Advisor Mikhail Voslenskii, tried to explain to their Austrian guest and his foreign minister, Lujo Tončić-Sorinj, that any sort of Austrian participation in the Economic Community would mean a violation of the state treaty. The chancellor, in a speech at the Soviet Academy of Sciences entitled “Neutrality – Austria’s New Political Way,”¹⁴⁷ again attempted to convince his hosts that the Common Market was, as explicitly stated by Khrushchev in 1962,¹⁴⁸ a “reality” that Austria had to deal with. Neutrality, Klaus stressed, was not to be understood as an obligation to ideological neutralism; Austria had never hidden that it belonged to the Western democratic and economic model, and it had even joined the Council of Europe. The chancellor did not attempt to cover up the difference between the Soviet and Western understandings of neutrality; he reserved the right to define Austria’s neutral

¹⁴⁶ IMEMO to Semenov, 10 March 1967, in AVPRF, 66/46/99/20, 39–91.

¹⁴⁷ For the text and further documents, see *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 7 (1967), 165–176.

¹⁴⁸ Mueller, “Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration,” 636.

policy and repeated the plea to allow Austria to acquire the necessary weapons¹⁴⁹ to defend itself. In an attempt to calm down Soviet worries, Klaus, who was briefly received by Brezhnev¹⁵⁰ and later given the opportunity to address the Soviet people in a televised speech, underlined that the Austrian government understood Moscow's concerns "very well," that it would not deal irresponsibly with neutrality, and that the final result of the talks between Austria and Brussels would not be "at variance with the status of permanent neutrality."¹⁵¹

However, the USSR remained adamant, only tolerating a trade agreement or a free-trade area between Austria and the Common Market.¹⁵² Despite this, Podgorny encouraged the chancellor to continue the "open and objective exchange of opinions concerning questions of the further development of the amicable relations between the USSR and neutral Austria."¹⁵³ In addition, the Soviets made attempts to encourage Austria to launch an initiative for an all-European conference on security.¹⁵⁴

The Klaus visit demonstrated the clash of two opposing concepts of neutrality.¹⁵⁵ The Austrian chancellor had traveled to the Soviet capital in order to achieve Soviet acquiescence to a special arrangement between Austria and the EEC and a less strict interpretation of article 13 of the state treaty, which banned the possession and use of missiles, even for defensive purposes. Neither wish ran counter to the Western understanding of permanent neutrality. On the other side, the Soviet Union wanted Austria to promote the Soviet project of an all-European conference, which was, by then, suspected by many in the West to be a sinister move to undermine NATO. While advancing such a conference was exactly what the Soviet side wanted the guest to do, Klaus felt that launching such a call was inappropriate for a permanent neutral. In the end, the wishes of neither side were fulfilled and the differences remained unreconciled.

In the communiqué, which mirrored the differences in the Soviet and Austrian interpretations of neutrality, "friendship," "cooperation," and the "open exchange of views consolidating [...] the mutual understanding" were again extolled; the bilateral rejection of "economic discrimination" hinted at Austria's EEC aspira-

¹⁴⁹ For a discussion of defense issues, see pages 181–184.

¹⁵⁰ Lujó Tončić-Sorinj, *Erfüllte Träume: Kroatien – Österreich – Europa* (Vienna: Amatheia, 1982), 381.

¹⁵¹ Josef Klaus, Neutralität, der neue politische Weg Österreichs, 16 March 1967, in AVPRF 66/46/99/16, 33–40. Cf. Reinhard Meier-Walser, *Die Außenpolitik der monocoloren Regierung Klaus in Österreich 1966–1970* (Munich: Tuduv, 1988), 303–304. For Klaus' conversation with Kosygin, see ÖIZG, NL 72: Fuchs, DO 837, File 68.

¹⁵² Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Darstellung*, 245, 255.

¹⁵³ Conversation N.V. Podgorny with Josef Klaus, 14 March 1967, in AVPRF, 66/46/99/16, 19–20.

¹⁵⁴ See below, page 164.

¹⁵⁵ Konrad Ginther, "Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union," in George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein (eds.), *Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1978), 66–85, 74.

tions.¹⁵⁶ In a rather unusual move, the Soviet government, shortly after Klaus' departure, published an unsigned *Izvestiia* editorial declaring that "the development of the amicable relations between the Soviet Union and Austria is an important and positive aspect of international life" and "proof for the validity of the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries of different social systems."¹⁵⁷

Klaus, who was fascinated by Russia and started to learn its language, demonstrated his gratitude and goodwill towards the Kremlin by intensive travel activities in Eastern Europe, including a trip to Hungary in May, to Romania in July, and to Bulgaria in October. The chancellor even spent his two-week holidays in August on a leisure cruise down the Danube in Eastern Europe, for which he was criticized by social democratic circles of "political lopsidedness."¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, two articles on 26 September and 27 October in the weekly *Novoe vremia* warning of the danger of a "cold Anschluss" of Austria to the EEC signaled that Moscow still remained vigilant.

The EEC issue and Soviet encouragement for convoking the CSCE, 1967–1972

As usual at that time, a considerable share of the Soviet-Austrian talks during the Klaus visit was devoted to the Soviet concept of an all-European conference on security. The roots of this concept dated back to the Berlin conference of 1954, when Moscow had proposed replacing NATO with an all-European security system that included the USSR but assigned the United States merely observer status.¹⁵⁹ Since then, proposals for a security conference or security system were periodically relaunched in various Soviet attempts to gain legal blessings for the postwar order, including the borders of Eastern Europe and East Germany, to foster détente in the West and weaken the cohesion of NATO and the EEC.

From 1955 it had been part of the Kremlin's patronizing attitude towards Austria to encourage the neutral country to take the initiative in the international arena and to support Soviet proposals for disarmament and security conferences. Communist

¹⁵⁶ *Gemeinsames Kommuniqué anlässlich des offiziellen Besuches des Bundeskanzlers in der Sowjetunion*, 21 March 1967, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik* 2, 145–146.

¹⁵⁷ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 23 March 1967, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 14838–6/67, Z. 18477–6/67; *ibid.*, GZ. 14838–6/67, Z. 19786–6/67. Cf. *Izvestiia*, 23 March 1967; "Gutes Beispiel der Zusammenarbeit," in *Sowjetunion heute* 13, no. 10 (1967), 2, 26.

¹⁵⁸ Meier-Walser, *Die Außenpolitik*, 466; *Österreichisches Jahrbuch* (1967), 236–239. On Klaus' relations to the USSR, cf. Meier-Walser, *Die Außenpolitik*, 295–300; on his *Ostpolitik* *ibid.*, 345–349; Michael Gehler and Günter Bischof, "Austrian Foreign Policy after World War II," in Günter Bischof, Michael Gehler, and Anton Pelinka (eds.), *Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context*, Contemporary Austrian Studies 14 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2006), 1–24, 6.

¹⁵⁹ Proposal of the Soviet delegation on ensuring European security, 10 February 1954, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, VII: Germany and Austria I* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 1189–1192.

propaganda had cited "voices from Austria" who demanded that Vienna take the lead in promoting the Soviet ideas; such behavior was depicted as consistent both with the neutral's international obligations and geographic position.¹⁶⁰ In 1958, in reply to the Bulganin notes, Austria had agreed in principle to back the Soviet proposal launched a month earlier for an all-European summit on security, albeit under the condition of the summit being "well prepared."¹⁶¹ However, since the Western attitude towards the Soviet proposal was rather lukewarm, the Austrian government was reluctant to go out on a limb and become a spokesperson for the initiative.

Nevertheless, in the following years, particularly after the change in power from Khrushchev to Brezhnev, the Soviet advances towards the neutral countries concerning this matter were intensified. In the Warsaw Treaty Organization's Bucharest declaration of July 1966, the neutrals were assured that they "could play a positive role" in the convocation of an all-European summit¹⁶² and in November of the same year Podgorny expressed his hope for the neutrals' support, particularly from Austria. Some weeks earlier, the Soviet Foreign Ministry had recommended, in an above-cited internal document, to make use of the "opportunity" created by Austria's European ambitions "to exert influence over the Austrian government."¹⁶³ During his visit to Vienna in 1966, the Soviet president declared that the USSR welcomed any initiative from the Austrian side that would lead to such a conference, as well as the active participation of all the neutral countries.¹⁶⁴ The Soviet insistence on an initiative from the Austrian side was quite remarkable as Finland showed much more willingness to support the plan. However, this was not to the Soviet liking because in the 1960s, Austria's neutrality seemed to be better accepted in the West than that of Finland.

A large number of Soviet statements criticizing Austria's attempts to be part of the EEC, such as an article in *Izvestiia* on 16 June 1966, actually linked the two issues and demanded that the neutral country rather engage in more "peaceful" activities, as for instance in instigating an all-European conference on security.¹⁶⁵ Similar demands were published in the above-mentioned article by Nikolai Polian-

¹⁶⁰ *Pravda*, 15 May 1957.

¹⁶¹ Zhiriakov, *Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia*, 42–46; Erklärung des Bundeskanzlers J. Raab über die Österreichische Antwortnote auf die Note der sowjetischen Regierung vom 10.12.1957 im Nationalrat, 22 January 1958, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralitäts- und Integrationspolitik* 2, 230–232.

¹⁶² Memorandum of the members of the Warsaw Pact, 6 July 1966, in Friedrich-Karl Schramm, Wolfram-Georg Riggert, and Alois Friedel (eds.), *Sicherheitskonferenz in Europa: Dokumentation 1954–1972: Die Bemühungen um Entspannung und Annäherung im politischen, militärischen, wirtschaftlichen, wissenschaftlich-technologischen und kulturellen Bereich* (Frankfurt am Main: Metzner, 1972), 425–435, 434.

¹⁶³ Obschchii rynok i Avstriia, [26 September 1966], in AVPRF, 66/45/96/20, 31–37.

¹⁶⁴ Conversation with the Soviet president, 15 November 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 49225–6/66, Z. 49860–6/66.

¹⁶⁵ Petersson, *The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality*, 82–89; *Pravda*, 26 October 1970.

ov in the *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik*¹⁶⁶ shortly before the Soviet president's visit to Austria. Throughout the following months, the Soviet media campaign encouraging Austria to give up its European ambitions and to launch an initiative for a European security conference instead continued. With such pressure from the Soviets, it became an ever more viable option for Austria to try to balance its strivings towards the EEC by offering the USSR its help in the conference issue.¹⁶⁷ During Podgorny's visit to Vienna in November 1966, both sides agreed that a "well prepared" summit on European security would have a favorable influence on the global situation.¹⁶⁸ Austria, which in Soviet declarations had repeatedly been singled out for the role it could play in an all-European security system,¹⁶⁹ thus became the first Western country to endorse the proposal in a joint communiqué with the USSR.¹⁷⁰ Similar endorsements had been made earlier on the occasion of Polish-Swedish and Soviet-Finnish meetings in June; further endorsement by Italy and Britain followed during Soviet visits to these two countries in early 1967.¹⁷¹ During Klaus' visit to Moscow in March, Kosygin again underlined that, in the Soviet understanding, neutrality not only provided an opportunity for an "active peace policy," but even made such a policy obligatory. The Soviet prime minister continued to argue strongly in favor of an Austrian initiative for an all-European conference on security.¹⁷² Klaus, who at first had tried to beat the Soviets at their own game by stating that Austria had no opinions concerning this question because that would be in violation of Austria's neutrality, conceded.¹⁷³

After this agreement was reached, the Soviet interest in more substantial Austrian contributions to Soviet initiatives, particularly the all-European conference, increased, as Martin Grünberg reported in early 1967.¹⁷⁴ It became clear that Moscow would have welcomed an Austrian decision to launch a call for the summit. The European communist parties' Karlovy Vary declaration of 26 April stated that, in preparing the conference, much depended upon a "more active peace policy" of the

¹⁶⁶ Poljanow, "Europa, die Politik der Neutralität und Österreich," 445–447.

¹⁶⁷ Thomas Fischer, "Die Sowjetunion, Österreich, und die finnische KSZE-Initiative vom 5. Mai 1969," in Wolfgang Mueller and Michael Portmann (eds.), *Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007), 313–340, 324–329.

¹⁶⁸ Communiqué, 22 November 1966, in *UdSSR – Österreich*, 118–121, 119.

¹⁶⁹ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 22 June 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. Berichte Moskau, 843–846.

¹⁷⁰ Otmar Höll, "The Foreign Policy of the Kreisky Era," in Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (eds.), *The Kreisky Era in Austria*. Contemporary Austrian Studies 2 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1994), 32–71, 41.

¹⁷¹ Schalhorn, "Sowjetische Westeuropapolitik I," 121. The Soviet-Italian communiqué in Schramm, Riggert, Friedel, *Sicherheitskonferenz in Europa*, 45–46.

¹⁷² Ginther, *Neutralität und Neutralitätspolitik*, 55.

¹⁷³ Zhiriakov, *Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia*, 50.

¹⁷⁴ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 20 February 1967, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 14838–6/67, Z. 16543–6/67.

neutrals;¹⁷⁵ in his speech in the Czech spa, Brezhnev made this appeal even more explicit by encouraging the neutrals to offer their "good services" to the cause.¹⁷⁶ Keeping in mind the imminent expiration of the NATO Treaty in 1969, the Soviet leader also used the opportunity to call upon the European member states of the Western alliance to reconsider their options; he declared that "for a number of [NATO] countries, in particular in Europe's north, neutrality might be an alternative to participation in military-political groupings." In order to make the communist invitation more tempting, the Karlovy Vary declaration tried to bait the neutrals with the offer of including an official "recognition of the principle of neutrality and of unconditional respect for the inviolability of neutral states" into the conference agenda. The Soviet intentions behind this demand seemed to be clear: Since the communist proposal obviously had little chance of being accepted by the West if it came directly from the Warsaw Pact, the neutrals should step in and promote the idea. While Sweden and Switzerland were traditionally less susceptible to Soviet pressure, the weaker neutrals Austria and Finland were regarded as more likely to fulfill Brezhnev's wishes. However, with the prestige of Finnish neutrality in decline both in the East and the West, Austria remained the favorite addressee for the Soviet demand.

It did not take long for a more explicit Soviet invitation for Austria to be issued: In an article commemorating the signing of the state treaty in May, *Pravda* repeated that "in our times, much depends upon the role of the neutrals." *Novosti* underlined their role and, alluding to the question at hand, stated that "every state has to decide whether it wants to strengthen cooperation [i.e., the conference project] or closed blocks [i.e., the EEC]."¹⁷⁷ In his correspondence with Klaus, Kosygin hinted that the Soviet Union might be ready to fulfill the Austrian chancellor's wish and support Austria's candidature for hosting the United Nation's nuclear research center CERN; however, the Soviet premier coupled this information with further praise for the Soviet idea of an all-European system of security being created and statements that this should be promoted by the neutral.¹⁷⁸

In addition to inspiring Austria to initiate an all-European conference, Soviet diplomacy aimed at inducing the neutrals to recognize the GDR. Already in 1959, Khrushchev had charged Austria with violating the principles of neutrality by main-

¹⁷⁵ Erklärung der Konferenz der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien Europas in Karlovy Vary, [26 April 1967,] in *Für den Frieden und die Sicherheit in Europa: Konferenz der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien Europas zu Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit, Karlovy Vary, 24. bis 26. April 1967* (Berlin: Dietz, 1967), 12–23, 18. Cf. Hans-Adolph Jacobsen, Wolfgang Mallmann, and Christian Meier (eds.), *Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE): Analyse und Dokumentation II/1* (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1973), 90–93, 91.

¹⁷⁶ Rede des Leiters der Delegation der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion, Leonid Iljitsch Breshnew, in *Für den Frieden und die Sicherheit in Europa*, 77–101, 91–92.

¹⁷⁷ ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 14838–6/67, Z. 19786–6/67.

¹⁷⁸ Kosygin to Klaus, 18 November 1967, Copy, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 110732-6a/71, Z.120.003; Klaus to Kosygin, 8 August 1967, Copy, *ibid.*

taining diplomatic relations with West Germany while not recognizing the East German Republic. Foreign Minister Kreisky had apologized by referring to the Hallstein Doctrine of powerful West Germany.¹⁷⁹ In the 1960s, together with growing pressure for an all-European conference, the Soviet appeals to become active in the recognition process of the GDR were intensified in numerous diplomatic conversations as well as during the Demichev and Podgorny visits to Austria.¹⁸⁰ The Soviet argument ran that it would be easier for neutral states to extend their recognition to the GDR than for NATO members.¹⁸¹ Austria's "passivity" and "inconsequent position in the German question" were criticized by Soviet statements on many occasions.¹⁸² When the CSCE drew nearer, the Austrian government signaled support for an accession of both German states into the UN, support that was further encouraged by Soviet diplomacy.¹⁸³ Nonetheless, Austria recognized East Germany only after the Bonn government had established diplomatic relations with the GDR.¹⁸⁴

However, the background for all these Soviet attempts to influence Austria's policy soon changed fundamentally. In March 1967, after Klaus' return from Moscow, the Austrian Foreign Ministry had drawn the conclusion that the Soviet government, despite its negative official statements, might be prepared to accept an economic arrangement between Austria and the Common Market that guaranteed maximum economic benefits for Austria.¹⁸⁵ The ministry therefore recommended that Austria continue negotiating with the EEC. Yet in June 1967, Italy, due to Ger-

¹⁷⁹ Conversation Khrushchev with Schärf and Kreisky, 13 October 1959, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 236.711-pol/59, Z. 249.552-pol/59. For the full text of the conversation, see pages 298–300.

¹⁸⁰ Conversation Pogorny with Klaus, 15 November 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 49.225-6/66, Z. 49.860-6/66. Similar conversations with the deputy head of the Third European Department of the Soviet Ministry, Lavrov, were reported in Haymerle to Kreisky, 25 September 1961, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. Berichte Moskau; and Karasek to Kreisky, 11 January 1962, *ibid.*

¹⁸¹ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 17 May 1967, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 13.847-6/67, Z. 21.951-6/67.

¹⁸² Zhiriakov, *Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia*, 47; Poljanow, "Europa, die Politik der Neutralität und Österreich," 448.

¹⁸³ Conversation Kirchschräger with Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov, 1 June 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 105.880-6/71, Z.112.831.

¹⁸⁴ A monograph by Maximilian Graf on this topic is forthcoming. See also Maximilian Graf, "Austria and the GDR 1949–1972: Diplomatic and Political Contacts in the Period of Nonrecognition," in Arnold Suppan and Maximilian Graf (eds.) *From the Austrian Empire to Communist East Central Europe* (Vienna: Lit, 2010), 151–177.

¹⁸⁵ „Gewisse Anzeichen [...] lassen die Vermutung zu, dass ungeachtet der offiziellen Stellungnahmen innerhalb der sowjetischen Führungsspitze möglicherweise Überlegungen in der Richtung angestellt werden, ob es nicht eine Formel geben könnte, die ermöglichen würde, die österreichischen wirtschaftlichen Wünschen bis zu jener nach sowjetischer Auffassung maximalen Grenze entgegenzukommen, die für Moskau noch politisch tragbar wäre.“ Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzlers in der Sowjetunion: Konklusionen, 22 March 1967, in ÖStA, AVA, NL E/1736 Bielka, File 115.

man-speaking South Tyrol's struggle for autonomy from Rome (which had been denounced by Radio Moscow as nationalist and condoning terrorist acts sponsored by West Germany [sic]), vetoed any further EEC negotiations with Austria. France, until then supportive of an Austrian association, but now, in light of promising developments in Soviet-French relations,¹⁸⁶ suddenly also came to the conclusion that such an association would not be compatible with neutrality. During his visit to Austria in September 1967, French prime minister Georges Pompidou took up a suggestion that had recently been made by Podgorny, namely that Austria should conclude trade agreements with the EEC members instead of further striving for a special arrangement with the community.¹⁸⁷ Due to this profound change in the West as well as the constant Soviet pressure, the Austrian government finally gave up its ambition of reaching such an arrangement with the EEC. Within the cabinet, the staunchest supporter of the EEC course, Vice-Chancellor Bock, resigned as did Tončić-Sorinj; EEC matters were transferred to the newly appointed foreign minister Kurt Waldheim, who in September 1968 ruled out any special arrangements with the EEC.¹⁸⁸ After still another conversation on the topic with the adamant Kosygin, a frustrated Klaus acquiesced, stating that Austria would remain "rather poor, but neutral."¹⁸⁹

In the Soviet press, the reshuffle of the Austrian cabinet caused the usual signs of uneasiness.¹⁹⁰ It took some time for Moscow to assess that the changes reflected the fading Austrian chances of renewing negotiations with the Common Market. Even though the Austrians received some encouragement by Pompidou, once he succeeded de Gaulle as president of the republic in 1968, their prospects remained dim. The Italian position was, if perhaps no longer entirely negative, at least unclear. The EEC's priorities favored the accession of the northern candidates Britain, Ireland, and Denmark over an Austrian association. In August 1969, the Soviet embassy in Vienna came to the conclusion that "despite all efforts by the Klaus administration, the Austrians have no real chance for renewing the talks with the Commission of the Common Market in the near future. It is unlikely that such negotiations can begin this year."¹⁹¹

The failure of its European ambitions seems to have had a negative impact on Austria's readiness to support the Soviet all-European conference plan. Although

¹⁸⁶ Newton, *Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe*, 75–77.

¹⁸⁷ Gehler, *Österreichs Außenpolitik*, 334. Gehler suspects that this decision by France was not only influenced by internal considerations regarding the EEC, but also by the consideration that French support for an Austrian association with the EEC might strain de Gaulle's relations to Moscow. With regard to the French attitude as well as EEC doubts about Austria's association, Gehler furthermore concludes that these obstacles were much more significant for Austria than the constant Soviet criticism of the Austrian ambitions.

¹⁸⁸ Ginther, "Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union," 74.

¹⁸⁹ Quoted in Ermacora, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität*, 121.

¹⁹⁰ Conversation Gromyko – Waldheim, 19 March 1968, in AVPRF, 66/47/101/11, 23.

¹⁹¹ Soviet embassy Vienna to Soviet MFA, 18 August 1969, in AVPRF, 66/48/104/19, 6–10.

the CSCE became the main “nonbilateral” theme of Austrian-Soviet communiqués, Austria remained reluctant and no initiatives were made to call for the conference. During the visit of Waldheim to Moscow from 18 to 25 March 1968, Gromyko again harped on the role the neutrals could and should play in convening an all-European conference and, anonymously, criticized those politicians who verbally endorsed the project but did not take any actions to move it forward.¹⁹² The Austrian side did not want the communiqué to include the Soviet reference to inviting all “interested *European* states” (thus excluding the United States and Canada) to the summit, but Waldheim did not succeed in making this clear, which resulted in a grave gaffe.¹⁹³ On the other hand, the Soviet wish that Austria follow the Swedish example and condemn alleged Israeli “provocations” in the Near East and the so-called US “aggression” in Vietnam did remain unfulfilled.¹⁹⁴ The communiqué mentioned both sides’ “concern” about the two hotbeds, but did not repeat Soviet propaganda slogans. When the Austrian minister made the mistake of mentioning the Austrian attitude towards the EEC, he, as the Soviet protocol of the conversation stated, was “told in strict terms” that the Soviet Union, for known reasons, remained dismissive about any plans of Austria entering the Common Market and would vigilantly monitor any measures that might damage Austria’s independence and neutrality.¹⁹⁵ In contrast, Waldheim’s report in the Austrian cabinet depicted the Soviet criticism of Austria’s EEC ambitions as “less dramatic than it had been earlier.”¹⁹⁶ The reason was, as Waldheim guessed, that “they [the Soviet leaders] know that nothing can possibly happen any more” regarding an Austrian association. A month before Waldheim’s visit, the Soviet press, in an article that the Austrian embassy considered “the most unfriendly in a long time,” had criticized the Austrian striving to become an associate of the EEC.¹⁹⁷

No reference was made to the EEC issue throughout Franz Jonas’ stay in Moscow.¹⁹⁸ During the visit from 20 to 25 May 1968, which was ennobled by the unexpected appearance of Leonid Brezhnev, Podgorny repeated to the Austrian presi-

¹⁹² Zapis’ besed A.A. Gromyko s ministrom inostrannykh del Avstrii, 30 April 1968, in AVPRF, 66/47/101, 23–29. Cf. Conversation Waldheim with Gromyko, 19 March 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 110.044–6/68, Z. 115.353–6pol/68. For extracts of the protocol, see pages 328–330.

¹⁹³ Sprachregelung, 26 March 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 110.044–6/68, Z. 115.350–6pol/68.

¹⁹⁴ O vizite v Sovetskii Soiuz ministra inostrannykh del Avstrii, 10 April 1968, in AVPRF, 66/47/101/11, 11–16; the communiqué is printed in *UdSSR – Österreich*, 134–136, 135; cf. the Russian text in *Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 1968* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1969), 65–67.

¹⁹⁵ O vizite v Sovetskii Soiuz ministra inostrannykh del Avstrii, 10 April 1968, in AVPRF, 66/47/101/11, 11–16.

¹⁹⁶ Verhandlungsniederschrift 77, 26 March 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, MRP.

¹⁹⁷ Information, March 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 17.042–6/67, Z. 31.717–6/67.

¹⁹⁸ Haymerle, “Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” 178.

dent the Soviet call for an Austrian contribution to convening the CSCE, to forming an "initiative group" in the matter, and also for Austria's recognition of the GDR.¹⁹⁹ Waldheim, who accompanied Jonas, had expected that he would have to defend his government against Soviet claims that they had verbally endorsed the conference project but remained inactive. Such charges had been published by the Soviet press, which criticized that Austria was not doing all it could to find a solution to the European problem. However, Gromyko, who rejected the Western idea to form a group of nine countries that would be charged with organizing the conference, refrained from pressing the issue too hard.²⁰⁰ Other East European leaders, such as Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov, also encouraged Austria to launch an invitation.²⁰¹ However, once the EEC application had failed, the USSR had lost one of its levers over Austria.²⁰²

Another neutral had to step in. In 1968, Finland, which of the European neutrals was traditionally the one most exposed to Soviet demands, had come under increased pressure. While the neutral had hitherto avoided recognizing either of the two Germanies, the USSR and the GDR demanded with growing insistence that the Finnish government recognize the East German state. With the waning power of West Germany's Hallstein Doctrine, the pressure on Helsinki to give in to Soviet demands grew.²⁰³ A further menace could be seen in the decreasing Soviet willingness to recognize Finland's neutrality, a change that had been noted since early 1968. In the official report to the Supreme Soviet on 27 June 1968, Finland was not counted among the neutrals when Gromyko praised the role of neutrality and the USSR's good relations with Austria, Sweden and Switzerland.²⁰⁴ During a bilateral visit in 1969, the Soviet side forestalled the hitherto traditional mentioning of Finnish neutrality in the communiqué.²⁰⁵ In 1970 President Kekkonen threatened to resign and thus managed to convince the Soviet leaders to again include the reference in a declaration. But this was to be the last such mention for many years.

¹⁹⁹ Conversation Podgorny with Jonas, 20 May 1968, in AVPRF, 66/47/101/11, 35–42. Cf. Verhandlungsniederschrift 85, 28 May 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, MRP; Communiqué, 25 May 1968, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik* 2, 148–149; *Vneshniaia politika 1968*, 110–112.

²⁰⁰ Conversation Gromyko with Waldheim, 21 May 1968, in AVPRF, 66/47/101/11, 49–56.

²⁰¹ Gerhard Wettig, *Europäische Sicherheit: Das europäische Staatensystem in der sowjetische Außenpolitik 1966–1972* (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1972), 94. On the occasion of Zhivkov's visit, Austria made up for Waldheim's mistake in Moscow of not insisting on the inclusion of the United States in a European conference. However, the Soviet press, in its reports on the Bulgarian-Austrian talks, again only referred to European states. Scarlis, *Neutralität*, 95–96.

²⁰² Fischer, "Die Sowjetunion, Österreich, und die finnische KSZE-Initiative," 329–330.

²⁰³ Seppo Hentilä, *Neutral zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten: Finnland und Deutschland im Kalten Krieg* (Berlin: BWV, 2006), 74–77, 89–92.

²⁰⁴ *Vneshniaia politika 1968*, 151.

²⁰⁵ Kimmo Rentola, "Der Vorschlag einer europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz und die stille Krise zwischen Finnland und der Sowjetunion," in Dominik Geppert and Udo Wengst (eds.), *Neutralität – Chance oder Chimäre? Konzepte des Dritten Weges für Deutschland und die Welt 1945–1990* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 177–202, 178–185.

Until 1989 reference was only made to Finland's "striving for neutrality," and the so-called Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line of foreign policy was praised in Soviet statements. Although the Soviet reasons for downgrading Finland's neutrality are yet to be fully analyzed, it seems that in the wake of the "Prague Spring," the Kremlin was interested in limiting the attractiveness of neutrality in Eastern Europe. Hence, Finland was promoted by Soviet propaganda as a model for "friendship with the Soviet Union" rather than as a model for neutrality. Finland saw the writing on the wall, which was all the more threatening since from 1966 to 1971, the Soviet Union seemed to support what appeared to be a major, final attempt at gaining power by Finland's pro-communist People's Democratic League.²⁰⁶ Against this background it does not come as a surprise that the Warsaw Pact's invasion in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 created widespread fear in Finland; even the crafty Kekkonen felt his country might be the next on the list.

In this situation, the Finnish president decided to strengthen his country's prestige and independence vis-à-vis the USSR by following the Soviet proposal and calling for an all-European conference – without, however, assessing the chances very high that such a conference might actually come into being.²⁰⁷ It was only after Finland, in a declaration issued on 5 May 1969 to all European states plus the United States and Canada, proposed holding a CSCE and declared itself ready to host the conference²⁰⁸ that Austria reacted positively, submitting its own memorandum on 28 May. During talks with Soviet Foreign Ministry officials in December of the same year, their Austrian counterparts underlined their country's interest in the conference and insisted on meticulous preparations; it was announced that Austria was prepared to serve as a mediator during the conference, to which all "interested European states plus the US and Canada" were to be invited.²⁰⁹ Some weeks earlier, Vienna had hosted a conference of "representatives of the public on problems of security and cooperation in Europe," which had supported the Soviet project and was

²⁰⁶ Heikki Larmola, "Finnland zwischen sowjetischem Versuchslabor und beginnendem KSZE-Prozess," in Stefan Karner et al. (eds.), *Prager Frühling: Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), 633–657, 638–639.

²⁰⁷ Thomas Fischer, "'A Mustard Seed Grew into a Bushy Tree': The Finnish CSCE Initiative of 5 May 1969," in *Cold War History* 9, no. 2 (2009), 177–201.

²⁰⁸ Finnish memorandum, 5 May 1969, in Jacobsen, Mallmann, Meier, *Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE) II/1*, 128–129.

²⁰⁹ Protokoll über die vom Generalsekretär für auswärtige Angelegenheiten Botschafter Dr. Platzer am 16. und 17. Dezember 1969 im sowjetischen Außenministerium geführten Gespräche, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 152.678-6/69, Z. 168.408-6(pol)/69. The Austrian delegation used the opportunity for communicating the US standpoint as well, which pictured US and Canadian participation at the conference and a clear agenda that included troop reductions and the laying down of a set of principles concerning relations between sovereign states. With regard to the conference agenda, the Soviet side criticized the recent NATO proposal on arms control, troop reductions, and the German question as being "unclear," and called on Austria to support the Eastern draft. NATO proposals are published in Schramm, Riggert, Friedel, *Sicherheitskonferenz in Europa*, 104–108.

highly publicized in communist propaganda.²¹⁰ Furthermore, in a memorandum in July 1970 to all interested states (including the United States and Canada), Austria offered a meeting place for the conference and support for the Soviet bloc's two-point agenda as well as for portions of the NATO proposal on mutual and balanced reductions of armed forces.²¹¹ In an earlier declaration, dated 22 June, of the Eastern foreign ministers, which had been forwarded to all interested states by Hungary, the Warsaw Treaty Organization had tabled the proposal to create a permanent body following the conference.²¹²

In the meantime, French president Pompidou had withdrawn de Gaulle's veto against the British accession to the EEC and, in December 1969, the EEC had decided to restart negotiations with all EFTA members. As a result, Soviet warnings, despite having grown fewer in 1968, again began to intensify towards Austria and the other neutrals Sweden and Switzerland, which had decided to rejoin Austria in striving for some sort of EEC participation. Soviet propaganda against the Swedish leader Olof Palme was particularly vehement, as it long remained unclear whether Sweden was perhaps even aiming for full membership in the EEC, not merely a free-trade agreement.²¹³ Communist propaganda castigated the Common Market as a basis for NATO and a branch of "West German imperialism," criticized the wavering of the neutrals, warned against their loss of sovereignty, and offered favorable bilateral trade agreements and an increase in East-West trade as an alternative to the EEC-EFTA rapprochement. With regard to Austria, the Soviet voices referred to the Anschluss ban in the state treaty and the country's neutrality. On 26 October 1970, on the eve of the preparatory talks between the EEC and Austria, TASS declared that Austria's "accession to the EEC in whatsoever guise" would contradict the country's international obligations. In January 1971 Podgorny told Rudolf Kirchschräger, the new Austrian foreign minister, that the Soviet position was unchanged. He also repeated the argument that, since the EEC was not merely an economic organization, if Austria finalized an agreement with it, this could not but affect the country's neutrality.²¹⁴ Due to such

²¹⁰ Schalhorn, "Sowjetische Westeuropapolitik I," 128.

²¹¹ Austrian memorandum, 24 July 1970, in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 10 (1970), 250–251. Cf. Jacobsen, Mallmann, Meier, *Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE)* II/1, 234–236. The Austrian proposal made it clear that the reductions should apply to all forces in Europe, not only non-European ones. For the further Austrian contribution in the pre-conference stage, see Thomas Fischer, *Neutral Power in the CSCE: The N+N States and the Making of the Helsinki Accords* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 120–128.

²¹² Text in Jacobsen, Mallmann, Meier, *Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE)* II/1, 225–227.

²¹³ Scarlis, *Neutralität*, 126–127, 132–143.

²¹⁴ Conversation Kirchschräger – Podgorny, 29 January 1971, in *ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 105.456-6/71, Z.108.141* Cf. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 11 (1971), 50. The communiqué omitted the topic. *Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 1971* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1972), 9–11.

contentions and Kirchschräger's failure to attain Soviet consent regarding Austria's wish to buy defense missiles, the visit was considered a disappointment by the Austrian media.²¹⁵

After EEC-Austrian talks were recommenced in November 1970, Soviet diplomats requested that their Austrian colleagues continue to inform the USSR about the negotiating progress. However, when Ambassador Wodak invited the Soviet side to feel free to ask whatever it deemed necessary, Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov responded that he did not wish to "meddle in [Austria's] domestic affairs." In addition, he confessed in a "confidential" aside, the Soviets had lost track of the twists and turns of Austria's integration into the EEC and "no longer knew what questions to ask, since they simply no longer understood the European Community issue and no one at the Soviet embassy in Vienna was able to formulate relevant questions."²¹⁶

As it turned out, in the neutrals' negotiations with the EEC, only free-trade agreements with the EFTA members were in the cards and a special arrangement with Austria, as had been discussed prior to 1968, was out – a fact that was noted positively by *Izvestiia* on 1 December 1970. The agreements between EFTA member states and the EEC, which were signed on 22 July 1972, were, as the Soviet ambassador in Vienna Averkii Aristov stated afterwards, not considered a threat to neutrality nor to Soviet interests.²¹⁷ In the meantime, Brezhnev had signaled, in a speech at the all-Union congress of the Soviet trade unions in March 1972, that the Soviet Union might be prepared to revise its hitherto negative attitude towards the EEC. The Soviet leader had been convinced to modify his stance in light of prospects for European détente, for smoothing the ratification of the Soviet-West German Moscow Treaty of 1970, and for realizing an all-European conference on security.²¹⁸ During an audience with the Austrian ambassador in April, Brezhnev insisted that if the EFTA states concluded agreements with the EEC, Soviet economic interests in free trade must be safeguarded.²¹⁹ In the case of Finland, the Soviet Union achieved several extra concessions: an extension of both the Soviet-Finnish Treaty and the term of President Kekkonen, the conclusion of an associative agreement with the CMEA, and the signing of bilateral free trade agreements with the

²¹⁵ Press survey, 8 February 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 105.456-6/71, Z.106.893.

²¹⁶ Wodak to Kirchschräger, Streng Vertraulich, 2 June 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 105.880-6/71, Z.113.202.

²¹⁷ Soviet embassy Vienna to Soviet MFA, 8 September 1972, in AVPRF, 66/51/110/12, 4–12. On Averkii B. Aristov, a politician who had been, in 1952–53 and 1957–61, a member of the CPSU Presidium before serving as Soviet ambassador, first in Warsaw and then from 1971 to 1975 in Vienna, see Fursenko, *Prezidium* 1, 1190.

²¹⁸ On the background of Brezhnev's decision, see Wolfgang Mueller, "Recognition in Return for Détente? Brezhnev, the EC, and the Moscow Treaty with West Germany, 1970–1973," in *Journal of Cold War Studies* (forthcoming).

²¹⁹ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 April 1972, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 153.589-6/72, Z. 155.752.

CMEA members. This delayed the Finnish agreement with the EEC, which was signed only in October 1973.²²⁰

When Austria's free trade agreement with the EEC was concluded, the *Pravda* report of 28 July 1972 displayed some modest misgivings. A month later, a Soviet aide-mémoire reminded the Austrian government of its duties resulting from the state treaty and neutrality. The document stressed the importance of a statement made by Chancellor Kreisky on the day of the signature of the free trade agreement, "that Austria takes this step in due consideration of its obligations as a neutral state."²²¹ Furthermore Moscow expressed concerns that the Austrian free trade with the EEC might create discriminatory conditions for the Soviet Union on the Austrian market. In its response of 20 September, the Austrian government declared that the new agreements with the EEC and ECSC "cannot and shall not" in any way impede the fulfillment of the obligations resulting from the state treaty and neutrality. In order to reduce any negative side effects for the trade between Austria and the Soviet Union, both sides entered into negotiations on a new trade agreement, which was signed in May 1975 and granted the USSR most-favored nation status.

By this time, the CSCE had almost reached its conclusion. At the conference, many things had developed differently than the USSR had hoped. Soviet-Austrian relations had been affected as well. The Austrian memorandum of 24 July 1970, which was addressed to all European states as well as the United States plus Canada and supported the Finnish proposal for a CSCE, the Eastern agenda, as well as the Western calls for mutually balanced force reductions (MBFR) of all (not only "foreign") troops in Europe, had been received frostily in Moscow. Since the USSR did not favor MBFR, *Pravda*, on 26 October of the same year, called upon Austria to show "more activity" as well as "more independence" from the West. In contrast, Swiss contributions, which omitted the troop reduction issue, were welcomed by Soviet propaganda.²²² When Kirchschräger traveled to Moscow in January 1971, Gromyko, Kosygin and Podgorny reproached him about the Austrian proposals, and in order to put further pressure on the Austrian minister, they struck up the old tune about "recognizing the GDR."²²³ In addition, Gromyko and Kosygin stated that they considered Kreisky's proposal to put the Near East issue on the CSCE agenda "absolutely incomprehensible."²²⁴ The Soviet Union had no interest in tor-

²²⁰ Scarlis, *Neutralität*, 140–143.

²²¹ Aide-mémoire der sowjetischen Regierung an die österreichische Regierung, 18 August 1972; Aide-mémoire der österreichischen Regierung an die sowjetische Regierung, 20 September 1972, in *Europa-Archiv* 27, no. 21 (1972), D 520–522. Cf. Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Darstellung*, 261–262.

²²² Petersson, *The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality*, 90; Scarlis, *Neutralität*, 97–100.

²²³ Conversation Kirchschräger – Gromyko, 26 and 29 January 1971; Kirchschräger – Kosygin and Kirchschräger – Podgorny, 29 January 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 105.456-6/71, Z.106.503.

²²⁴ See Kreisky's speech in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, 25 January 1971, in Jacobsen, Mallmann, Meier, *Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE)* II/1, 260–262, 262.

pedoing the conference by including a major crisis into its program. Kirchschräger, who at that point in time had not even read Kreisky's idea, as he stated during the conversation, could only register the Soviet objection.

Despite earlier Soviet dissatisfaction with Austria's hesitation regarding the convocation of the CSCE, in 1972 Soviet propaganda about Austria took on a predominantly friendly tone. For the first time in many years, on the occasion of that year's state treaty anniversary celebrations, *Pravda* correspondent Boris Dubrovin, in his commentary "A Good Basis," neither criticized the country's EEC policy nor its inactivity regarding the CSCE.²²⁵ Nonetheless, as soon became apparent, the activities of Austria and the other neutrals at the CSCE were not much to the liking of the Soviet leadership.

²²⁵ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 15 May 1972, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ., Z. 156.959-6/72.

7. The Czechoslovakian Crisis of 1968 and Austria's Military Vulnerability

After the failure of Austria's European ambitions in 1967, the generally friendly Soviet-Austrian relations as well as the signs for a general European détente became overshadowed by the Warsaw Treaty Organization's military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In May of that year, Austrian president Jonas had told his Soviet colleague that the neutral country had watched the "Prague Spring" with empathy.¹ When the Soviet crackdown on reformist Czechoslovakia started in the summer, the Austrian government was caught by surprise, although it had received warnings of an imminent Warsaw Pact action five weeks earlier.²

The Warsaw Pact's intervention and the Soviet reputation in Austria

Due to lengthy internal disputes on questions of authority, and in striking contrast to Klaus' public claim that "the federal government acted quickly" and that "all necessary measures have been taken," it took the cabinet a total of eight hours to have the marching order issued for the army, which was moreover ordered to stay twenty-five kilometers away from the border. Also in contrast to his later claims, the chancellor, in his first speech on 21 August, broadcast on the radio at 7 a.m., did not express any regret or sympathy with the victims nor did he judge or criticize the invasion; he barely mentioned "the events in Czechoslovakia."³ Although the federal government did not consider Austria threatened by a Soviet invasion,⁴ Foreign Minister Waldheim, who in contrast to Austria's behavior in 1956 ruled out any Austrian comments on the Warsaw Pact's invasion in its neighborhood save disapproval, was said to have deleted two passages from Klaus' speech that he considered too outspoken.⁵ The second speech by Klaus, which was televised, remained cautious – in opposition leader Kreisky's words, "obedient" and "appeasing."⁶ It adopted the terminology that no country should meddle in the "*internal affairs* of

¹ Conversation Podgorny with Jonas, 25 May 1968, in AVPRF, 66/47/101/11, 45–47.

² Eger, *Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen*, 104–107.

³ Erklärungen des Bundeskanzlers Dr. Josef Klaus und des Staatssekretärs für Information Karl Pisa, 21–30 August 1968, in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 8 (1968), 251–254.

⁴ Gehler, *Österreichs Außenpolitik*, 341.

⁵ Meier-Walser, *Die Außenpolitik der monocoloren Regierung Klaus*, 429, 432; Eger, *Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen*, 87–89.

⁶ Quoted in Eger, *Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen*, 115. The text of Klaus' speech *ibid.*, 195.

other states.” Whether this referred to Austria or the USSR was – on purpose or unwittingly – left open by Klaus. That the events of August 1968 did not constitute “internal affairs,” but a violation of international law remained unsaid. In the meantime, other West European governments had already protested the Soviet invasion, which was denounced in a British memorandum of the same day as a “flagrant violation” of the Charter of the United Nations and of all commonly recognized norms of international law.⁷ Only in his third speech on the subject did Klaus mildly criticize the invasion as a “blow against détente policy,” expressing regret about the damage that had been brought to the “peaceful cohabitation of peoples” and calling for respect for the rules of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the rights of small countries. In addition to Klaus’ desire to avoid being charged by the USSR with overstepping neutrality, this cautious approach has also been attributed to the Austrian wish to host the SALT talks in Vienna and therefore not to alienate the Soviet leadership.⁸

The Austrian government, in its “hesitant and maneuvering behavior” towards the Warsaw Pact,⁹ did not even go as far as the Austrian Communist Party, which in a spontaneous declaration by its Central Committee publicly condemned the invasion.¹⁰ The KPÖ was not brought in line by the Kremlin until some days later. The CPSU Politburo dispatched the Soviet ambassador in Vienna to inform the KPÖ leaders about the Soviet “surprise” at the Austrian comrades’ support for the idea of the French communists to organize a conference of West European leftists to discuss the consequences of the Warsaw Pact’s intervention in Prague.¹¹ The crisis led to a rift within the KPÖ between apologists and critics of the intervention. Former party leader Ernst Fischer, who condemned the military action, was expelled from the party.¹²

The Austrian self-restraint was not honored by the Soviet Union. When Ambassador Podtserob, on 21 August at 12:30 p.m., met with Klaus to explain the operation, he assured the chancellor that the USSR did not intend to take any actions against Austria and that the Warsaw Pact’s invasion would not harm Soviet relations with Austria. Nonetheless, he warned that “any [Austrian] greater military measure would be considered an unfriendly act, if not even a violation of

⁷ Quoted in Bonwetsch, “Sowjetische Westeuropapolitik II,” 158.

⁸ Anselm Skuhra, “Austria and the New Cold War,” in Bengt Sundelius (ed.), *The Neutral Democracies in the New Cold War* (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 117–147, 128.

⁹ Gehler, *Der lange Weg: Darstellung*, 250.

¹⁰ *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 8 (1968), 245–246.

¹¹ Politburo CPSU, protocol 104/3, 8 October 1968; Conversation Podtserob – Waldheim, 29 August 1968, in Stefan Karner, Natalja Tomilina, and Alexandr Tschubarjan (eds.), *Der Prager Frühling: Dokumente* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), 1331–1335.

¹² Manfred Mugrauer, “Der Prager Frühling und die Parteikrise der KPÖ,” in Stefan Karner et al. (eds.), *Der Prager Frühling 1968: Das internationale Krisenjahr* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), 1043–1061.

neutrality."¹³ Despite his reassurances, Soviet planes committed systematic and repeated reconnaissance flights into Austria's air space. On the evening of 21 August, Waldheim called Podtserob, warned that if the Soviet flights continued, the federal government would be forced to file a protest, and announced the reinforcement of Austrian garrisons near the border. The Soviet ambassador again expressed his regret about the Soviet intrusions.¹⁴ The violations were explained away as being due to technical problems – an explanation that lost its credibility after the flights continued for several days. After further Austrian semi-protests were communicated to Podtserob,¹⁵ on 23 August the Austrian ambassador was ordered to file a protest in Moscow, but he was not received until 26 August.¹⁶ Wodak was, then, again given Soviet reassurance that these violations would be discontinued. Nonetheless, Soviet flights over Austrian territory were still reported on 1 September.¹⁷

Instead of discontinuing these violations immediately, the Soviet side began to accuse Austria of disregarding its neutrality. As in 1956, but less intensely, *Literaturnaia gazeta* charged Austria with tolerating training centers for Western secret services and with smuggling Western soldiers and weapons into the Eastern bloc. After checking the information, Waldheim, in a conversation with Podtserob,¹⁸ rejected the allegations and Minister of Defense Georg Prader invited the Soviet military attaché to visit Austrian military facilities in order to assure him of the incorrectness of the Soviet claims. In Moscow, Ambassador Wodak insisted on an official correction.¹⁹ Both attempts were unsuccessful and the Soviet propaganda attacks intensified. *Pravda* on 27 September charged the Austrian media with conducting a "disinformation campaign," and on 1 October Radio Moscow attacked President Jonas, who had dared to criticize the Soviet intervention. As in 1956, the Soviet media campaign against Austria had several aims: warning the neutral against going too far in its empathy with the architects of the "Prague Spring," destroying the country's attractiveness for East Europeans, as well as externalizing

¹³ Quoted in Lobova, "Die Außenpolitik Österreichs aus der Sicht der UdSSR," 904. This threat was not mentioned in Podtserob's report of the meeting. Conversation Podtserob – Klaus, 21 August 1968, in Karner, *Der Prager Frühling: Dokumente*, 1293–1293.

¹⁴ *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 8 (1968), 244. Cf. Conversation Podtserob – Waldheim, 21 August 1968, *ibid.*, 1295–1297.

¹⁵ Conversation Podtserob – Platzer, 23 August 1968, in Karner, *Der Prager Frühling: Dokumente*, 1301–1303.

¹⁶ Bericht Waldheim an Ministerrat, 10 September 1968, in Eger, *Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen*, 213–216. On the basis of the Austrian cabinet protocols, see Maximilian Graf, "Internationale Reaktionen auf die Intervention der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten in der ČSSR 1968" (MA Thesis, Vienna, 2008), 145–153.

¹⁷ Meier-Walser, *Die Außenpolitik der monocoloren Regierung Klaus*, 428.

¹⁸ Conversation Podtserob – Waldheim, 29 August 1968, in Karner, *Der Prager Frühling: Dokumente*, 1309.

¹⁹ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 4 September 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 111298–6/68, Z. 127871–6pol/68.

the responsibility for the events in the Eastern bloc and thus legitimizing Soviet behavior.

In the meantime the USSR had put pressure on the Austrian government to impose restrictions on media coverage of the Soviet intervention. On 29 August, Podtserob paid back Waldheim's rejection of Soviet allegations by criticizing the "unfriendly and nonobjective" character of Austrian media coverage, and two days later, the ambassador handed over a note protesting the "hostile conduct" of the Austrian television and press with regard to the USSR and other socialist countries.²⁰ This type of conduct, the note claimed, would contradict Austria's neutral status. Furthermore, the USSR charged Austria with tolerating organizations on its soil that were providing "immediate help for counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia." All these factors, the note claimed, had "damaged Austria's foreign policy."

Klaus, who wanted to avoid giving the Soviet Union any pretext for such accusations, answered that the Austrian government was observing neutrality but that neither the public nor the media were bound by or obliged to neutrality. Nevertheless, he tried to influence the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation's (ORF) managing director Gerd Bacher and other representatives of the mass media to "soften" media coverage.²¹ Even earlier, State Secretary Karl Pisa had caused an uproar among Austrian journalists by appealing to the media not to "dramatize" the events in Czechoslovakia. And in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador on 29 August, Waldheim had agreed that the freedom of the Austrian press was limited by obligations resulting from the state treaty.²²

While the Austrian and, to some extent, the Soviet government tried to avoid damaging the bilateral relations, the Soviet reputation in the Austrian population seemed to have been badly harmed. The military intervention was condemned by the entire media, the opposition parties and the Federation of Trade Unions. Even the Austrian-Soviet Society communicated its "great consternation" to its Soviet "brother society" and stated that all its efforts "to explain, in decade-long activities, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as a policy of peaceful coexistence, respect for the sovereignty of other states, and nonintervention in their internal affairs," activities that had achieved "a positive attitude" among the Austrian people, had been ruined and trust in the USSR was "deeply shaken."²³ The general anger was

²⁰ Text of the Soviet note in Eger, *Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen*, 210–212. The Soviet protocol of the conversation, 31 August 1968, in Karner, *Der Prager Frühling: Dokumente*, 1313–1317.

²¹ Berthold Molden, "Die 'Ost-West-Drehscheibe': Österreichs Medien im Kalten Krieg," in Manfred Rauchensteiner (ed.), *Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 687–774, 724, 728.

²² Conversation Podtserob – Waldheim, 29 August 1968, in Karner, *Der Prager Frühling: Dokumente*, 1311. Cf. Peter Ruggenthaler, "Der Neutralität verpflichtet: die sowjetisch-österreichischen Beziehungen 1968," in Stefan Karner et al. (eds.), *Der Prager Frühling 1968: Das internationale Krisenjahr* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), 993–1006, 1001.

²³ Austrian-Soviet Society to Soviet-Austrian Society, 28 August 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 110879–6/68, Z. 127319–6pol/68.

demonstrated on 21 August, when the Soviet embassy in Vienna was attacked with a Molotov cocktail.²⁴ According to an Austrian opinion poll, the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Austria was, in September 1968, considered impossible by 21 percent, slightly possible by 29 percent, possible by 37 percent, and probable by 8 percent.²⁵

In contrast to the image of the Soviets (and of the Austrian government) held by ordinary Austrians, official relations quickly recovered. The Soviet minister for natural gas, Aleksei Kortunov, who traveled to Vienna in September to celebrate the start of gas deliveries to Austria, was officially received by Jonas, Klaus, and Waldheim,²⁶ thus revealing Klaus' statement that the invasion would jeopardize détente to have been an empty threat. As Austrian leaders had made clear in a parliamentary session the same month, they were still interested in continuing to foster détente; in their eyes, only a relaxation in tensions would provide Austria greater room to maneuver.²⁷ By receiving Kortunov, the Austrian government, as in 1957, again played the role of being the first Western country to make Soviet politicians respectable after a violation of international law. In December, a visit by the Soviet minister of trade, Nikolai Patolichev, followed. His September trip had been postponed by the USSR, although on 31 August, only ten days after the invasion, the Austrian government had confirmed its interest in soon receiving the Soviet guest. On the economic side, Austria's passivity in August was rewarded by an increase in Soviet oil deliveries from 500,000 tons to 750,000 tons per annum and with an invitation to an Austrian delegation including Minister of Trade Otto Mitterer and the president of the Austrian chamber of commerce, Rudolf Sallinger, and of the board of industrialists, Franz Josef Mayer-Gunthof. The visit of the president of the Austrian parliament, Alfred Maleta, from 10 to 18 March 1969, for which the Soviet side specially coined the expression "official friendship visit," was the first high-ranking Western official trip (after the Finnish foreign minister) to the Soviet Union after the crackdown on the "Prague Spring."²⁸

In general, the crisis demonstrates that the Austrian government's interpretation of neutrality had become much more extensive than it had been during the Hungarian crisis in 1956, covering not only military matters, but also its own readiness for speaking frankly. That Klaus and Waldheim attempted to curb the freedom of speech and influence the Austrian media coverage of the events reveals the extent of their "mental neutralization." Secondly, the crisis underlined that neutrality did not automatically mean Austria's protection from violations from without, not even from the USSR, a signatory power of the Austrian state treaty.

²⁴ Graf, "Internationale Reaktionen auf die Intervention der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten," 152.

²⁵ Eger, *Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen*, 121.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 101–102.

²⁷ Hanspeter Neuhold and Karl Zemanek, "Die österreichische Neutralität im Jahr 1968," in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 9, no. 2 (1969), 144–169, 145.

²⁸ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 19 March 1969, in *ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ*. 151532–6/69, Z. 154983. Cf. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 9 (1969), 116.

Warsaw Pact plans and Austria's self-defense

This appears quite surprising, as the Soviet Union, like the other three great powers, in article 2 of the Austrian state treaty of 1955, had obliged itself to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Austria. However, the Soviet respect for neutrality in military terms seems to have been defined by considerations of utility rather than international law.²⁹ When the Soviet minister of defense, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, during his visit of the Austrian *Bundesheer*'s 1959 exercises, stated that "the Soviet Union would never violate Austria's neutrality *as an initiator*,"³⁰ the emphasis rested on the last words: In their war games, Warsaw Pact planners took it almost for granted that the enemy would soon occupy Austrian territory. From that moment on they were ready to enter it too and to use it as a battlefield. An authentic detailed plan for a Hungarian command-staff war game, dated May 1965, foresaw Hungarian troops confronting NATO forces, which under the cover of the *Bundesheer* had entered the country. The Hungarian troops were to deliver a main strike in the direction of Vienna and Linz and another in the direction of Graz and Villach, and thus within five to six days "to eliminate Austria from the war."³¹ Vienna was to be either totally destroyed or at least largely demolished by two Soviet 500-kiloton nuclear devices launched from Hungarian soil.

Whereas such plans always assumed that NATO would be the first to violate Austria's neutrality, it remains up to debate whether the USSR was prepared to "cast the first stone." When the Czech general Jan Šejna defected to the West, he caused an uproar by publishing alleged war plans of the Warsaw Pact. He claimed that from 1963, the USSR was ready to commit a first strike.³² When some of the

²⁹ Erich Reiter and Georg Bautzmann, "Kriegsführungspläne des Warschauer Paktes in der so genannten Zeit des Kalten Krieges," in Erich Reiter and Ernest König (eds.), *Österreichs Neutralität und die Operationsplanungen des Warschauer Paktes*, Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik 20 (Vienna: Landesverteidigungsakademie, 1999), 11–14, 13. On Soviet war planning in general, cf. Vojtech Mastny, "Imagining war in Europe: Soviet strategic planning," in idem, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat perceptions in the East and West* (London: Routledge, 2006), 14–45.

³⁰ *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 23 June 1959. *Emphasis* mine.

³¹ Róbert Széles, "Die strategischen Überlegungen des Warschauer Paktes für Mitteleuropa in den 70er Jahren und die Rolle der Neutralen," in Manfred Rauchensteiner (ed.), *Tausend Nadelstiche: Das österreichische Bundesheer in der Reformzeit 1970–1978* (Graz: Styria, 1994), 25–45. Cf. Czechoslovakia's Strategic Position in a European War, April 1961; Plan for a Hungarian Command-Staff War Game, May 1965, in Mastny and Byrne, *A Cardboard Castle?*, 118–119, 189–191. See also Erwin Schmidl, "The Warsaw Pact and Austria: Threats and Threat Perceptions," in Arnold Suppan and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), *Peaceful Coexistence or Iron Curtain? Austria, Neutrality, and Eastern Europe in the Cold War and Détente, 1955–1989* (Vienna: Lit, 2009), 203–217; Wolfgang Mueller, "Der Warschauer Pakt und Österreich 1955–1991," in Manfred Rauchensteiner (ed.), *Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 135–191.

³² Jan Sejna, *We Will Bury You* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1982) 42–43, 119–121. Cf. below, page 212. On the following, see Alfred Schätz, "Die sowjetische Militärpolitik im Kalten Krieg

Warsaw Pact's war plans were declassified after 1991, defense analysts and representatives of all political parties concluded that it appeared unlikely that the Eastern alliance would have respected Austria's status in the case of a general war. This could be seen by the preponderance of *Blitzkrieg* offensives in Soviet preparations for war in Europe, as well as the Soviet interest in the case of such a war to quickly eliminate West Germany and France: While the concentration of NATO forces in the FRG let a quick advance on the German front appear unlikely, the military vacuum in Austria almost invited an attack along the Danube.

While such war games luckily never became reality, the frequent violations of Austria's airspace by Soviet planes during their intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968 underline the low Soviet respect for Austrian neutrality from a military point of view. Eleven years later, Minister of Defense Otto Rösch, after a visit to the USSR, reported in an Austrian cabinet meeting: "Neutral Austria's political importance for détente and peace in Central Europe has been repeatedly acknowledged by the Soviet minister of defense. At the level of the military command and below, however, there seems to be no understanding whatsoever with regard to permanent neutrality."³³ This assessment conforms to research results that have seen the fate of Austria, in the case of a military conflict between the two alliances, to have been a matter of strategic deliberations, particularly in view of its geographical position as a corridor between Hungary and West Germany. A similar curse of geography had been the fate of neutral Belgium in 1914 and 1940. Indeed, even after 1945, for a small country "it was still the worst thinkable mistake to be located in the wrong place."³⁴ Only after 1989, following the new "defensive" defense doctrine of the Warsaw Pact introduced by Gorbachev, East European military exercise planning foresaw Austria retaining her neutrality.³⁵

Given that Warsaw Pact military planners took a Western, and then Eastern, violation of Austria's neutrality for granted, it comes hardly as a surprise that the USSR did not make significant investments in Austria's capability to defend itself and turned a deaf ear on Austrian requests to enable the country to acquire modern defense weaponry. In comparison to the US donations to the Austrian army of

und die österreichische dauernde Neutralität" (PhD Thesis, Vienna, 2008), 72–73, 201–209; Martin Malek, "Österreich und der Auflösungsprozess des Warschauer Paktes, 1989–1991," in Manfred Rauchensteiner (ed.), *Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 557–614, 595–596; Andrew E. Harrod, "Felix Austria? Cold War Security Policy between NATO, Neutrality, and the Warsaw Pact, 1945–1989" (PhD Thesis, Medford, 2007), 822–830.

³³ Mündlicher Bericht Rösch an Ministerrat, BMLV ZI. 10061/54–1.1/80, 2 January 1980, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 5.

³⁴ Wilhelm Agrell, "Silent allies and hostile neutrals: Nonaligned states in the Cold War," in Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West* (London: Routledge, 2006), 141–162, 145.

³⁵ Czechoslovak Description of "Vltava-89" Exercise, 23 May 1989, in Mastny and Byrne, *A Card-board Castle*, 634–635.

military equipment, worth 100 million dollars, the Soviet side gave only symbolic assistance.³⁶ Furthermore, Austria's (albeit weak) efforts to beef up its defense were treated by the Kremlin with suspicion and foot-dragging, while calls for the country's complete disarmament, such as the initiative of the Austrian physicist, social democrat, and member of the peace movement Hans Thirring met with Soviet approval.³⁷ In the 1970s, the Soviet army's newspaper voiced concerns about alleged increases in the country's military spending; it was claimed that peace policies would better contribute to Austria's security than investments in its defense.³⁸ Such statements conformed to the Soviet understanding of neutrality and Soviet criticism of the defense policies of other Western neutrals, in particular those of Sweden and Switzerland, as was repeatedly voiced during the 1960s and 70s.³⁹

In contrast to the Swiss concept of neutrality, to US insistence, and, indeed, to the Austrian declaration of neutrality, the Soviet understanding of neutral policy comprised no obligation for self defense,⁴⁰ and the state treaty contained a number of significant restrictions against Austria possessing or using ground-based anti-aircraft and other missiles. These stipulations of the state treaty's article 13 had been copied from the United Nations' peace treaties of 1947 with Hitler's former allies, when missiles had been banned as offensive weapons. Due to the development of missile-based anti-tank defense, however, such weapons were increasingly used for defensive purposes and the restrictions acquired a new meaning, namely they prevented Austria from purchasing the necessary means for this type of defense. Although Austria, with US consent, regularly approached the USSR to obtain its blessing for buying these weapons, the Kremlin remained adamantly against such purchases, even after Finland had successfully amended the anti-missile article in its peace treaty.⁴¹ During Minister of Defense Prader's visit to Moscow in 1966, Austria was granted the right to order anti-tank missiles;⁴² however, similar requests by Klaus, Waldheim, Kreisky, Kirchschräger, and Rösch concerning ground-air-missiles in the late 1960s and 70s were refused.⁴³ Klaus, in a lecture at the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1967, argued in favor of lifting

³⁶ Kofler, *Kennedy und Österreich*, 117–118.

³⁷ Ganiushkin, *Neutralitet i neprisoedinenie*, 125. Cf. Hans Thirring, *Mehr Sicherheit ohne Waffen: Denkschrift an das österreichische Volk und seine gewählten Vertreter* (Vienna: Jugend und Volk, [1962]).

³⁸ *Krasnaia zvezda*, 4 February 1975. Cf. Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 4 February 1975, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Z. 225.05.40/1-II/75.

³⁹ Petersson, *The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality*, 68.

⁴⁰ See above, page 65.

⁴¹ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 22 September 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. Berichte Moskau, 915–917.

⁴² Ministerratsvortrag Prader, 23 September 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 45707–6/66, Z. 49028–6pol/66.

⁴³ O vizite v Sovetskii Soiuz Ministra inostrannykh del Avstrii, 10 April 1968, in AVPRF, 66/47/101/11, 11–16; Conversation Kreisky with Kosygin, 31 May 1974, in SBKA, NL Thalberg,

the restrictions on Austria's self-defense; only by acquiring all necessary defensive means, including missiles, would the prestige of the country's neutrality be ensured and its function as a deterrent possible.⁴⁴ While some of these requests were met by the Soviets encouraging Austria, as in 1965 and 1971, to order Soviet missiles or planes with air-to-air missiles,⁴⁵ others were fended off with the thesis that, as a neutral, Austria should rather focus on peaceful foreign policy instead of wasting money on obsolete defense.⁴⁶ Such postures can be explained by the Soviet interest to keep Austria weak and unarmed in case of a war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In addition, there seems to have existed a certain Soviet distrust of Austria's impartiality. In 1965, press reports cited a Soviet diplomat with the words: "Why do you [i.e. the Austrians] need rockets? You would shoot down a Czech plane violating your airspace, but would you shoot down an American plane?"⁴⁷

During a visit of an Austrian delegation in 1979, the Soviet army demonstrated various types of missiles and thus raised Austrian hopes that it might be possible to order some. The Austrian minister of defense Otto Rösch, however, felt that this would be, from the Austrian standpoint, politically inopportune.⁴⁸ His predecessor Karl Lütgendorf, who had discussed the issue two years earlier, had been stopped by Kreisky.⁴⁹ When Rösch in 1979 drew his Soviet colleague's attention to the problem that Austria still had no anti-aircraft missiles, he was rebuffed by Ustinov's words: "You don't need them."⁵⁰ While politicians of the opposition party ÖVP demanded the modernization of Austria's self-defense, Soviet commentators ridiculed their "lust for rockets."⁵¹ By this time, all of the former Axis allies that had joined the Warsaw Pact, and even Finland had already freed themselves from similar anti-missile restrictions contained in their 1947 peace treaties, and had bought, mostly from the USSR, anti-aircraft missiles.⁵² In addition to such double standards, the Soviet attitude towards Austrian defense included a certain

Depositum 1, Box 2, File 3; Report, 28 April 1975, in AVPRF, 66/54/115/13, 34–35. On the Kirchschräger visit, see *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 11 (1971), 49.

⁴⁴ *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 7 (1967), 168.

⁴⁵ Conversation Prader with Malinovskii, 30 September 1965, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 2; Conversation Kirchschräger with Gromyko, 26 and 29 January 1971; Kirchschräger with Kosygin and Kirchschräger with Podgorny, 29 January 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 105.456-6/71, Z.106.503.

⁴⁶ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 May 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 105.880-6/71, Z.111.995; Hanspeter Neuhold and Karl Zemanek, "Die österreichische Neutralität im Jahr 1967," in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 8, no. 1 (1968), 14–32, 25.

⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, 6 October 1965. Quoted in Schlesinger, *Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe*, 123.

⁴⁸ Hinteregger, *Im Auftrag Österreichs*, 241–243.

⁴⁹ Ginther, "Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union," 78, 80–81.

⁵⁰ Conversation Rösch with Ustinov, 17 December 1979, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 5.

⁵¹ S. Tarow, "Gier nach Raketen," in *Neue Zeit*, no. 14 (1979), 16.

⁵² Harrod, "Felix Austria?," 283.

amount of hypocrisy: On one hand, it was taken for granted that Austria's integrity and neutrality would be violated by NATO; on the other, Austrian efforts to improve its poor defense were blocked. And when in 1983 NATO secretary Joseph Luns questioned Austria's capability to defend itself, *Izvestiia* on 2 April issued a sharp reprimand against this "blunt intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state."⁵³

The Soviet "*nyet*" does not seem to have particularly disturbed the Austrian government, which indeed usually shied from providing the necessary means for the country's security. Austria's per capita defense expenditure was, during the 1960s, 70s and 80s, among the lowest of all European states, lagging significantly behind comparable, despite their being strategically less exposed, neutral states such as Sweden and Switzerland, both in absolute and relative numbers. During these years, the Austrian government spent 0.9–1.4 percent of the country's GDP on defense purposes, while Finland assigned 1.1–1.7 percent, Switzerland 1.7–2.3 percent, and Sweden 2.9–3.7 percent; in 1968, per capita spending for defense amounted in Austria to \$19, in Finland to \$27, in Switzerland to \$68, and in Sweden to \$128.⁵⁴ This was paralleled by the rudimentary mobilization of Austria's population: while in the late 1960s, the Swedish and Swiss armies were able to mobilize about 10 percent of the entire population, the Austrian figure was 2 percent. In the 1970s, Switzerland (which, as the proverb goes, does not "have an army, but is one") was able to mobilize 15 soldiers per square kilometer, West Germany 7, nonaligned Yugoslavia 6.4, and Austria 1.8. The indicators for Austria's defense capability began to improve somewhat at the end of the Cold War. It was only in 1985 that the Austrian government decided to upgrade the *Bundesheer's* air force with twenty-four Saab Draken jets – a decision highly welcomed by the US government.⁵⁵

⁵³ Quoted in Ludmilla Lobova, "Russland und die Neutralität Österreichs: Aktuelle Einschätzungen vor dem Hintergrund des Verhältnisses zur NATO," in *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik* (2000), 371–389, 373. Cf. S. Tarow, "Luns provoziert," in *Neue Zeit*, no. 5 (1980), 17.

⁵⁴ Dieter A. Binder, "Trittbrettfahrer des Kalten Krieges," in Johann Starlinger (ed.), *Armee, Zeitgeist und Gesellschaft 1955–2005* (Vienna: Wissenschaftskommission beim Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, [2006]), 57–65, 59; Neuhold, "The Neutral States of Europe," 116; Harrod, "Felix Austria," 297, 309; Otto Heller, "Die Schild-Schwert-These und die Neutralen: Eine strategisch/operative Betrachtung über die Zeit von der Aufstellung des zweiten Bundesheeres bis zum Beginn der Reform 1970," in Manfred Rauchensteiner and Wolfgang Etschmann (eds.), *Schild ohne Schwert? Das österreichische Bundesheer 1955–1970* (Graz: Styria, 1991), 61–88, 78.

⁵⁵ Ingemar Dörfer, "The European Neutrals in the Strategy of the Reagan Administration," in Bengt Sundelius (ed.), *The Neutral Democracies in the New Cold War* (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 182–197, 184.

Table 2: Defense indicators of neutral states in the mid-1980s

	Austria	Finland	Sweden	Switzerland
Mobilization strength	240,000	734,000	776,000	645,000
% of population	3.2	15.1	9.3	9.8
Tanks	170	165	985	875
Armored vehicles	460	230	1,000	1,475
Fighting aircraft	32	80	501	295
Defense expenditure as % of GDP	1.3	1.4	3	2.3
as \$ per capita	106	168	341	301

Source: Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, 151.

The alarming shortage of funding, arms, and manpower raised concern not only within the Austrian army but also in the West. In the 1960s, both US reports and internal Austrian documents claimed that the *Bundesheer* was only capable of maintaining order *within* the country.⁵⁶ In 1974, the Austrian army's *Limes* exercises led to the conclusion that the Warsaw Pact would probably need only a day to reach its strategic objectives in Austria. That the country did not have the necessary means to control or defend its airspace was proven by a Soviet pilot making an alleged emergency landing on the neutral's territory on 30 November 1967, only six months before the Warsaw Pact's intervention in Czechoslovakia. But neither of these incidents nor the systematic Soviet violations of Austria's airspace in the summer of 1968 increased the Austrian government's readiness to ensure that its airspace was efficiently defended. To make things worse, the Austrian government, despite having adopted a Comprehensive Defense Doctrine in 1965, two years later was still unwilling to approve any of the *Bundesheer*'s strategic plans for the country's defense. Such disregard of the obligation to prepare for self-defense was quite remarkable, since the creation of a credible Austrian deterrent and neutrality being "self-chosen" had been the only Western preconditions for agreeing to Austria's neutrality.

Several factors have been discerned by analysts as reasons for this military weakness: While two world wars and the concentration of troops and nuclear devices in the Cold War made defense an increasingly unpopular undertaking in Western Europe in general,⁵⁷ in Austria the overwhelming numeric superiority of Warsaw Pact forces at the country's border might have contributed to considerations such as "our situation is hopeless, why try to change it?"⁵⁸ In addition, some Austrians seem to

⁵⁶ Rauchensteiner, "Sandkästen und Übungsräume: Operative Annahmen und Manöver des Bundesheeres 1955–1979," 266–281, 319; Franz Freistetter, "Das strategische Konzept des Ostens und Österreich 1955–1970," in Manfred Rauchensteiner and Wolfgang Etschmann (eds.), *Schild ohne Schwert? Das österreichische Bundesheer 1955–1970* (Graz: Styria, 1991), 29–60, 56.

⁵⁷ On the "rise of the Civilian State" in Europe, see James J. Sheehan, *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 172–197.

⁵⁸ *The Times* (London), 7 May 1985, quoted in Johnson-Freese, "Austria," 177.

have taken NATO's protective "nuclear umbrella" for granted – a tendency that led to repeated accusations that the neutral was taking a "free ride" on Western defense efforts.⁵⁹ Even more important, however, may have been the gradual integration into Austrian official statements of the Soviet neutrality myth that neutral countries, first, were more secure than members of alliances, and, secondly, should focus on fostering détente and "peaceful coexistence" instead of creating armed deterrents.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Binder, "Trittbrettfahrer des Kalten Krieges," 63; Luif, *Der Wandel der österreichischen Neutralität*, 60–82.

⁶⁰ See below, pages 199–200.

8. Making Economic and Cultural Relations Mutual

Despite the Soviet-Austrian debates about Austria's participation in the EEC and despite the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia, the 1960s were a period of steady growth in the area of economic and cultural relations. In July 1961 the last delivery of goods stipulated by the state treaty was made, and in February 1964 the USSR acknowledged the receipt of the last million tons of Austrian crude oil that had been the price for the Austrian buy-back of its oil wells seized by the USSR in 1945–46, shipments that in the end totaled six million tons instead of the ten originally negotiated.¹ These deliveries, in combination with a growing number of delegation visits and several barter agreements, helped to get Soviet-Austrian trade moving. In 1963 the Soviet Union purchased Austrian goods worth twenty-five million dollars, which included mainly rolled steel, machine tools, electric machinery, and barges, and delivered, in return, coal (for 14.3 million dollars), crude oil (8.4 million dollars) and iron ore (6.7 million dollars).²

Trade

Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, the USSR continued to intensify its commercial trade with Western countries. Industrial cooperation was begun, such as the Italian-Soviet Fiat/VAZ car-plant project in Toliatti on the Volga. From 1966 to 1970, Soviet imports from the West increased on the average by 11.2 percent a year, the increase mainly consisting of imports of machinery and equipment.³ The Soviet-Austrian trade agreement for this period, signed in 1965 in Vienna by Trade Minister Patolichev and his counterpart Bock, foresaw increases in volume and in the types of goods.⁴ Austria continued to export largely machinery, industrial equipment, and electrical goods (altogether one third of Austrian exports to the Soviet Union), sheet metal and metal goods (a quarter), and cable, lacquer, paper, spun rayon, textiles, shoes, and breeding cattle (of the kind that had been presented to Khrushchev in 1960). The Soviet Union delivered feed grain, cotton, coal,

¹ *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 4 (1964), 37–38; Stourzh, *Um Einheit*, 774–775.

² Report Alekhin, 6 August 1963, in AVPRF, 66/42/87/11, 17–21.

³ Philip Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945* (London: Longman, 2003), 120; 122. Soviet imports of Western machinery rose from 489 million dollars in 1964 to 1,574 million dollars in 1973.

⁴ *Langfristiges Abkommen zwischen Österreich und der UdSSR über den gegenseitigen Warenverkehr*, 14 July 1965, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik* 2, 143–144.

crude oil, iron ore, chemicals, as well as a small amount of machinery (only 2 percent of the Soviet exports to Austria). However, neither the list of goods nor its implementation fully satisfied the Soviet side. On 26 December 1967, Radio Moscow accused the Austrian side of having neither fulfilled its import obligations to buy natural rubber, tobacco, and tea, nor fully exhausted its import quota for coal and iron ore.⁵ The allegations were justified, as the Soviet-Austrian trade balance, indeed, persistently favored the Austrian side. The situation for Soviet machinery was especially poor, since for years Austria had not imported enough to fulfill the import quota. Many of these goods, Radio Moscow criticized, were purchased by Austria from the West, although the latter did not import the same quantities of Austrian goods. As a solution, Radio Moscow proposed that Austria buy Soviet helicopters and airplanes, and, in return, export pipes for Soviet pipelines.

Negotiations concerning the use of Austrian pipes for a gas pipeline to Italy, between the Soviet natural gas exporting company *Soiuznefteksport* and a consortium consisting of several companies including *Ferngas*, *VÖEST* steel and the *ÖMV* oil refineries had started in 1966. Prior to this, Austria had already declared itself willing to import natural gas from the USSR, but had been refused since the Soviet capacity was insufficient.⁶ During the Klaus visit to Moscow in March 1967, a deal was concluded for integrating Austria into the Soviet-Italian pipeline project; the agreement with Italy had been reached during Prime Minister Kosygin's trip to Rome two months earlier.⁷ However, since Austria could not produce pipes of sufficient diameter (just as the USSR could not), *VÖEST* had to strike a deal with *Mannesmann* and *Thyssen* of West Germany for Austrian deliveries of steel in return for German pipes.⁸ The Soviet side repeatedly encouraged the Austrian government to organize pipe production in Austria itself, but *Waldheim* signaled that Austria was reluctant to start producing pipes without a Soviet purchase guarantee. The 2.6 billion schillings deal on the delivery of 520,000 tons of West German pipes made of Austrian steel was signed in Vienna by the Soviet deputy minister of foreign trade, *Nikolai Osipov*, on 1 June 1968; the Soviet Union paid with natural gas and oil. Austria thus became the first West European state to import natural gas from the USSR.⁹ The agreement foresaw gas deliveries for twenty-three

⁵ Sowjetische Vorwürfe, 16 January 1967, in *ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 13847–6/67, Z. 13847–6/67*. Similar allegations had been raised in July 1966. *Ibid.*, *GZ. 32503–6/66, Z. 41205–6pol/66*.

⁶ Report, 31 May 1966, in *AVPRF, 66/45/96/21, 2–6*.

⁷ *Gromyko and Ponomarjow, Geschichte der sowjetischen Außenpolitik 1945 bis 1976, 545–547*.

⁸ Conversations *Waldheim* with Deputy Prime Minister *Kuznetsov* and Prime Minister *Kosygin*, March 1968, in *ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 110044–6/68, Z. 115353–6pol/68 and Z. 115779–6pol/68*.

⁹ *Lobova, "Die Moskauer Perception," 144–146*.

years, starting with 300 million cubic meters in 1968 and reaching 1.5 billion cubic meters per annum in 1971.¹⁰

The gas and pipeline agreement was preceded by another on economic-scientific-technical cooperation signed in May 1968 during President Jonas' visit to Moscow, which was followed in July by an agreement on air transport that cleared the way for intensified cooperation between Austrian Airlines, which as the first Western airline received landing rights in Kiev,¹¹ and Aeroflot, which was granted the right to fly from Vienna to Zurich. A new five-year trade agreement, signed in 1970 and replacing all previous trade agreements, was the first without fixed quotas and clearing in freely-convertible currency.¹²

On the Austrian side, trade with the Soviet Union was primarily conducted in the nationalized sector. The Soviet minister for foreign trade Ivan Kabanov had visited the state-owned VÖEST as early as in 1955. His visit was followed, in 1960, by Khrushchev's, who proposed several long-term contracts between the Soviet side and the steel plant in Linz. The first deal, concerning 10,000 tons of VÖEST steel for the USSR, had been signed in 1956. A year later, the company received its first delivery of Soviet coal and iron ore.¹³ In 1963, 45 percent of all Austrian goods exported to the USSR were produced by state-owned companies, with VÖEST and machine producer Voith the primary exporters.¹⁴ According to Soviet data, the state-owned share of Austria's exports to the Soviet Union was on average as high as 60 percent.¹⁵ Voith, in 1960, exported 40 percent of its paper-producing machinery to the USSR. In 1971, the Linz plant celebrated the delivery of its second million tons of steel to the Soviet Union with a ceremony and a bilingual brochure.¹⁶ The biggest deal landed by VÖEST in these years, however, was the delivery to Belarusian Novo-Lipetsk of an entire steel plant of the "Linz-Donawitz" (LD) type, including an oxygen processor and a production site of industrial dolomite, and its construction. The deal was worth 36 million dollars and boosted VÖEST's share

¹⁰ *Archiv der Gegenwart* 13957, 1 June 1968.

¹¹ *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 8 (1968), 233.

¹² Langfristiges Abkommen über den Waren- und Zahlungsverkehr zwischen Österreich und der UdSSR, 5 August 1970, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik* 2, 149–152.

¹³ VÖEST, *Die 2millionste Tonne VÖEST-Stahl für die UdSSR: Dvukhmillionaia tonna stali firmy VEST dlia SSSR* (Linz: no publisher, 1971).

¹⁴ Zhiriakov, *SSSR – Avstria*, 52–54. Other state-owned Austrian companies involved in Soviet trade were the Böhlerwerk and Schoeller-Bleckmann steel companies, Chemie Linz, Simmering-Graz-Pauker railcar construction, the Korneuburg dockyard, and the Elin-Union, a producer of electrical goods.

¹⁵ Report Alekhin, 6 August 1963, in AVPRF, 66/42/87/11, 17–21. In 1968–69 the share of Austrian state-owned companies in the Austrian trade with the USSR even reached 73.3 percent of the exports and 54.3 percent of the imports. File Offizieller Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzler in der Sowjetunion, May 1974, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 3.

¹⁶ VÖEST, *Die 2millionste Tonne*.

in Austria's trade with Eastern Europe from 27 to 35 percent.¹⁷ The Soviet side, in return, stepped up its coal and iron ore deliveries to the Linz steel plant.

These deliveries, however, added even more to the much-deplored dominance of raw materials in Soviet exports. In order to diversify the list of trading goods, in 1967 the Soviet Union participated in the trade fairs in Vienna, Graz and Klagenfurt, and exhibited, among other things, excavators, machinery, helicopters, sea vessels, and Moskvich cars.¹⁸ The previous year, the USSR had organized an exposition in Austria of Soviet electronics and optics, the first such exposition in a capitalist country.¹⁹ Austria did not remain inactive either and took part, together with about twenty other countries, in all ten international fairs held in Moscow in the years 1964–69. Even earlier, in 1963, a special exposition of Austrian machinery had been shown in the Soviet capital.²⁰ The Austrian disregard for Soviet machinery and technology and its lively exporting activities as well as the Soviet inability, during the 1960s, to step up deliveries in crude oil and natural gas tended to result in a trade imbalance favoring Austria, an imbalance that was nevertheless nearly within the framework of the trade agreements. The low attractiveness of Soviet goods in the West also troubled Soviet economic relations with other West European states.²¹ It was only in 1971 that the newly built gas pipeline and booming Soviet exports of natural gas turned the tide.

The third significant problem for Soviet-Austrian trade, in addition to the passive trade imbalance and Austrian unwillingness to purchase little more than raw materials from the Soviet Union, was Austria's EFTA membership. At least five times between Austria's accession in 1960 and 1963, the Soviet Union demanded, due to its most-favored nation status that had been granted in 1955, the same trading conditions as intra-EFTA trade. Austria, naturally, was not allowed to fulfill such wishes.²² The USSR, in frustration, raised its tariffs for Austrian goods.²³ When the Austrian minister of trade Otto Mitterer traveled to the USSR in 1969, he was confronted by Kosygin and Patolichev, who bitterly criticized Austria's preferential treatment of the Free Trade Association's co-members.²⁴

Despite these problems, due to many efforts in the decade following 1961, Soviet-Austrian trade doubled.

¹⁷ *Sowjetunion heute* 11, no. 1 (1965), 18.

¹⁸ Zhiriakov, *SSSR i Avstriia v 1945–1975 gody*, 123.

¹⁹ Report, 31 May 1966, in AVPRF, 66/45/96/21, 2–6.

²⁰ *Sowjetunion heute* 9, no. 42 (1963), 6.

²¹ Bonwetsch, "Sowjetische Westeuropapolitik II," 183.

²² Information, [1973], in SBKA, Länderboxen UdSSR, 2.

²³ Report Alekhin, 6 August 1963, in AVPRF, 66/42/87/11, 22–25.

²⁴ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 17 July 1969, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 160920–6/69, Z. 160920.

Table 3: Soviet-Austrian trade 1961–1972

	Austrian exports	Change from previous year	Share of Soviet imports	Soviet exports	Change from previous year	Share of Austrian imports
1961	1,122.8	10.0	1.3	1,191.8	13.6	3.1
1962	1,402.4	24.9	1.0	1,138.4	-4.5	2.8
1963	1,612.6	15.0	1.0	1,348.0	18.4	3.1
1964	1,501.4	-6.9	0.8	1,354.2	0.5	2.8
1965	1,485.0	4.0	0.8	1,371.0	1.2	2.5
1966	1,547.2	4.2	0.9	1,267.8	-7.5	2.1
1967	1,545.6	-0.1	1.0	1,271.7	0.3	2.1
1968	1,779.5	15.1	0.9	1,519.0	19.4	2.3
1969	1,784.7	0.3	0.9	1,720.1	13.2	2.3
1970	2,134.1	19.6	0.8	2,067.9	20.2	2.2
1971	1,738.2	-18.2	0.7	2,685.0	29.8	2.6
1972	2,177.6	25.3	0.6	2,621.6	-2.4	2.2

Source: Butschek, *Statistische Reihen; Vneshniaia togovlia*

Exports in millions of Austrian schillings; changes and shares in percent.

At the twenty-fourth CPSU congress in March–April 1971, Brezhnev and Kosygin mentioned Austria as an important capitalist trading partner, albeit only after France, West Germany and Italy.²⁵ For most of the 1960s, however, Britain and Finland had been the leading Western trading partners of the USSR, followed by Japan. In some years they were even overtaken by the FRG, although its trade with the USSR, due to volatile political relations, followed a sort of rollercoaster track.²⁶ After having ranked sixth in the 1950s, Austria fell back to the rank of ninth and even thirteenth of the Soviet Union's Western partners, and its share in Soviet foreign trade declined, from 1.1 percent (1960) to 0.6 percent (1972). This was a result of the increasing diversification of Soviet foreign trade during the détente years and its shift from neutral to Western partners. A similar development had affected Finland's share in Soviet trade already in the 1950s, falling from 3.6 percent (1955) to 2.4 percent (1960). For Austria, compared to its other trading partners the general importance of the USSR decreased also. With its roughly three-percent share in Austrian foreign trade in 1961 falling to little more than 2 percent in 1972,²⁷ the USSR ranked only seventh or eighth among Austria's trading partners.

²⁵ Rechenschaftsbericht des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU an den XXIV. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion, Referent: L. I. Breshnev, 30 March 1971, in *XXIV. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion 30. März–9. April 1971: Dokumente* (Moscow: APN, 1971), 3–198, 49.

²⁶ See Table 5, on page 242. Cf. Eberhard Schulz, *Moskau und die europäische Integration* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1975), 230–231.

²⁷ The Soviet share of Austrian exports sank from 3.6 percent in 1961 to 2.4 percent in 1972; the Soviet share of Austrian imports from 3.1 percent in 1961 to 2.2 percent in 1972.

Although Austria was often attacked by the Soviet side for being economically less independent from the West than other neutrals, particularly Switzerland and Sweden,²⁸ in some economic sectors the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe became overwhelmingly important markets for Austria. While the member states of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance were the recipient of only 14.6 percent of all Austrian foreign trade, on par with EFTA (14.1 percent) but ranking far behind the EEC (with 55.5 percent), more than 60 percent of the veneered plates and 40 percent of the shoes exported by Austria went to Eastern Europe.²⁹ This reliance, in the 1980s, was to create problems for Austrian exporting industries.³⁰ With regard to Austrian imports, more than 47 percent of imported cast iron, 33 percent of imported iron-ore, and a little less than a quarter of imported coal came from the USSR. Even before the Soviet deliveries of natural gas started, Austria had become increasingly dependent on Soviet exports of energy sources. In the late 1960s, more than 69 percent of Austria's imports of crude oil came from the USSR.³¹

Cultural relations and personal contacts

In the area of cultural relations, the decade of the 1960s saw Austria starting to respond to earlier Soviet visits and to intensify cultural activities in the USSR. During the late 1950s, the Soviet side had begun to be very active in promoting cultural contacts and this continued. In 1961 musicians such as Mstislav Rostropovich, David and Igor Oistrakh, and Sviatoslav Richter made guest appearances in Vienna, the Bolshoi Ballet, with 120 dancers, performed at the Vienna State Opera in 1965,³² and in 1967 the Moscow Artists' Theater MKhAT traveled to Austria. Such events had taken place before, but only now did this cultural love affair cease to be unidirectional. For years, the Austrian embassy in Moscow had appealed to the Ballhausplatz to encourage cultural visits to the land of the soviets. After the enthusiast Bischoff died in 1960, the chargé d'affaires Otto Eiselsberg continued his pleas, criticizing that "in 1955, in the area of culture as in the question of airline connections, Austria had had unique chances it had not known to exploit."³³ Thus, it was only after the spectacular tours through the communist empire, profiting from Khrushchev's thaw, of the New York Philharmonic under Leonard Bernstein, a series of fashion shows by Christian Dior, the Hamburg Theater with Gustav Gründ-

²⁸ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 November 1969, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 166927–6/69, Z. 166927.

²⁹ Report Alekhin, 6 August 1963, in AVPRF, 66/42/87/11, 12–16.

³⁰ See below, pages 238–239.

³¹ Report, 31 May 1966, in AVPRF, 66/45/96/21, 2–6.

³² Zhiriakov, *SSSR i Avstriia v 1945–1975 gody*, 135.

³³ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 January 1960, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 70176–6/60, Z. 77276–6/60. On Eiselsberg, see Agstner, Enderle-Burcel, Follner, *Österreichs Spitzendiplomaten*, 169f.

gens, and several exhibits of Western paintings and publications that Austrian musicians and actors followed in greater numbers. It was not until 1962 that a tour of the Vienna Philharmonic under Herbert von Karajan took place, a tour that had been planned for 1959 but delayed due to disagreements concerning the contract.³⁴ The orchestra was enthusiastically greeted in Moscow and Leningrad, and its performances of pieces by Mozart, Bruckner, and Johann Strauß were even honored by the presence of Khrushchev and Mikoian. The same year the annual tour of the *Eisrevue* was extended to Kiev and Tbilisi, and in 1963 the show was attended by more than half a million Soviet visitors.³⁵ In 1965 the Mozarteum Orchestra under Bernhard Paumgartner visited the USSR, and in 1967 and 1968, the long-awaited trips of the *Burgtheater* and the State Opera finally took place.

Also in 1968, in a “demonstratively amicable atmosphere” as noted by Waldheim,³⁶ two cooperation agreements, one scientific and the other cultural, were signed. Austria had agreed to prepare the agreement, while still under Soviet pressure because of its EEC ambitions. The former included arrangements concerning exchanges of delegations and knowledge, support for cooperation between scientific and technical institutions, the protection of industrial and scientific copyrights, and the creation of a joint advisory board to facilitate collaboration.³⁷ The Soviet side, which by then maintained sixty-two cultural agreements world wide and, since the 1940s, had fought for the signing of yet another with Austria, regarded the cultural agreement’s conclusion, as expressed earlier, “a demonstration of the amicable relationship with the concluding country.”³⁸ In 1971, an agreement on cooperation was signed between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and its Austrian counterpart.

At the broader level, it was above all the Austrian-Soviet and the Soviet-Austrian friendship societies that struggled to propagate the culture of their respective countries. The Soviet side organized Grillparzer, Lenau, Nestroy, Schnitzler, and

³⁴ Hinteregger, *Im Auftrag Österreichs*, 55–58. After the tour, the orchestra was confronted with a Soviet request for extra payment of \$6,000. Schwierigkeiten und Hemmnisse in der Durchführung kultureller Projekte, in SBKA, Länder, UdSSR 1, File Sprechprogramm Moskau 1962.

³⁵ *Sowjetunion heute* 9, no. 30 (1963), 17.

³⁶ Report Waldheim to Austrian parliament, 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 110044–6/68, Z. 12022–6pol/68.

³⁷ Abkommen über die kulturelle und wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Österreich und der UdSSR, 22 March 1968, in *UdSSR – Österreich*, 128–133; Abkommen über die wirtschaftlich-wissenschaftlich-technische Zusammenarbeit zwischen Österreich und der UdSSR, 24 May 1968, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik* 2, 146–148. Austria, in 1968 and the early 1970s, signed further agreements on scientific and cultural exchange with Romania and Bulgaria. Cf. Paul Ullmann, “Austria and Romania,” in Suppan and Mueller, *Peaceful Coexistence or Iron Curtain*, 456–477, 465; Peter Bachmaier, “Austrian-Bulgarian Cultural Relations,” *ibid.*, 478–499, 487.

³⁸ Conversation Piffel-Perčević with Romanovskii, 16 November 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 13850–6/67, Z. 13850–6/67.

Zweig festivals in the USSR, as well as countless concerts of Austrian music, and even an Austrian film festival. In 1966, the honorary president of the Soviet-Austrian Friendship Society, composer Dmitri Shostakovich, was decorated with the Golden Medal of Merit of the Republic of Austria. In 1967, KPÖ leader Koplenig was awarded the Lenin Order by the Soviets. The ÖSG, under its president Hugo Glaser, organized in 1961 more than 1,000 events promoting the USSR which were visited by about 100,000 persons,³⁹ and later managed to bring cosmonauts Iurii Gagarin and Pavel Popovich to Austria. Both friendship societies organized exhibits, as for instance, an exhibit held in Armenia on the Austrian resistance 1938–45, and another in Vienna and Innsbruck of photographs of the USSR. These two exhibits were seen by some 23,000 visitors. In September 1961, a friendship soccer match was played between the Soviet and Austrian national teams in Moscow.

In the 1970s, about one percent of all foreign-language students in Austria, i.e. about 2,000 high school and 300 university students, studied Russian.⁴⁰ To promote the Russian language, Austria was invited to join the “Russian-language Olympics” that were organized annually in Moscow. In the years 1955 to 1975, Russian translations of 125 Austrian books were published in the Soviet Union in more than eleven million copies, among them some eight million copies of works by Stefan Zweig.⁴¹ In Austria, the number of Russian books owned by the Austrian-Soviet Society’s libraries (largely donated by the USSR) by 1970 had reached 29,000 volumes. While the Soviet image among Austrians and the Austrian media (which did not have its own correspondents in Moscow until the 1970s and whose delegations from time to time were refused Soviet visas for alleged anti-Sovietism⁴²) had been dealt a serious blow by the Warsaw Pact’s intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in the USSR, despite periodical, albeit infrequent, criticism in the press and radio about Austrian neo-Nazis, Austria’s anti-Soviet media, its enemies of neutrality and allegedly poor living conditions,⁴³ the image of Austria was generally positive. Austria was pictured as “a clearly Western-oriented, independent country, which nevertheless does not look with hostility at the Eastern world but with kindness.”

³⁹ Zhiriakov, *SSSR i Avstriia v 1945–1975 gody*, 144.

⁴⁰ Zum Russischunterricht in Österreich, April 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ., Z. 115.490-6/71.

⁴¹ Zhiriakov, *SSSR – Avstriia*, 60–63.

⁴² Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 4 March 1969, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 151532–6/69, Z. 153671. In 1958, the visa applications of the Austrian journalists Hugo Portisch and Hans Dichand were refused because of their alleged “anti-Sovietism.” Il’ichev to Zorin, 19 February 1958, AVPRF, 66/37/72/16, [14a]. Of Soviet periodicals, *Pravda* had permanent correspondents in Vienna: from 1951 V. Mikhailov; 1957–62 M. Podkliuchnikov; 1962–66 V. Men’shikov; 1966–74 B. Dubrovin, 1974–91 I. Mel’nikov. Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 69.

⁴³ *Pravda*, 17 November 1967; Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 172.

The Austrian embassy, which had summarized the Soviet attitude in these words, considered it “of prime importance to maintain this picture.”⁴⁴

Nevertheless, personal contacts started slowly and remained sporadic. Allegedly due to Austrian “sins of omission,”⁴⁵ a bilateral student exchange of five Austrians and five Soviets was not implemented until 1961–62 and this quota remained until the end of the 1960s. In the 1970s, nine Austrian and nine Soviet university students participated annually in the government-sponsored exchange programs.⁴⁶ Although tourism grew, it was not without setbacks. In 1959, six hundred Austrian tourists had visited the Soviet Union; ten years later the number had quadrupled.⁴⁷ However, in 1962 the number of Soviet tourists to Austria was reduced to half, to a mere two hundred. When the Austrian embassy investigated the reasons, Soviet officials suggested that, since the “Soviet people are not yet mature enough for tourism,” new restrictions had to be applied.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 8 May 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. Berichte Moskau, 785–790. An analysis of all articles related to Austria in *Pravda*, *Izvestiia*, *Trud*, and *Literaturnaia gazeta* shows a “clearly affirmative” picture. Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 234.

⁴⁵ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 January 1960, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 70176–6/60, Z. 77276–6/60. By this time, West Germany already sent three students per annum to the USSR. The Austrian-Soviet exchange was agreed upon during the visit of education minister Heinrich Drimmel to Moscow in 1961.

⁴⁶ Ministerratsvortrag und Wortlaut Kulturabkommen, September 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 107.781-6/71, Z.117.793-6pol/71.

⁴⁷ Zhiriakov, *SSSR – Avstriia*, 62.

⁴⁸ Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 16 December 1962, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 78033–6/62, Z. 78033–6pol/62.

9. Summary: Soviet Containment and Encouragement; Austria's *Ostpolitik* and Further "Neutralization"

The year 1972, with the formalization of Austria's free-trade agreement with the EEC and the beginning of the CSCE, relieved Soviet-Austrian relations of two burdens, thereby concluding the period begun in 1960–61 that had been overshadowed by these two matters: on one hand, by Austria's ambitions to participate in the developing West European integration and the Kremlin's determination to contain these ambitions, and, on the other hand, by Soviet endeavors to encourage the neutral to convoke an all-European conference for sanctioning the postwar status quo. The late 1960s had brought Soviet attempts to link the two issues.

In the end, both the Austrian and Soviet hopes remained unfulfilled. Austria was not accepted as an associate of the EEC; in the case of the convocation of the CSCE, Finland had to step in, playing the role the Kremlin had most probably conceived to be Austria's. Remarkably enough, both sides' ambitions and frustrations did not result in a deterioration of the bilateral relations. This maintenance of friendly, even cordial, albeit sometimes tense, relations was due to the interests and efforts of both sides. Austria could not afford to anger the Soviet Union and therefore meticulously communicated its plans and the steps it was taking with regard to the EEC to the Kremlin. The latter, too, did not want to alienate Austria or jeopardize its goal of European détente, and therefore used the small Western neutral as a showcase of Soviet friendliness. Even the Soviet intervention in the "Prague Spring," with its propaganda campaign against Austria, did not cause more than a brief interruption of these generally friendly relations.

It should be noted, however, that the "special" position Austria had held in Moscow began to be less significant during the 1960s due to the general movement towards détente, both within Europe and between the superpowers. While in the 1950s the neutral had been used to demonstrate that "peaceful coexistence" between states of different social systems was possible, such a showcase was not as necessary during the 1960s. The decline in Austria's importance was probably reinforced by Khrushchev being toppled, but détente, the general diversification of East-West relations, and the Soviet interest in dealing with larger industrialized trading partners and in reaching out to NATO states were the main reasons for the shift in status, as was assessed by Ambassador Haymerle.¹ Nevertheless, until the

¹ Haymerle to Kreisky, 18 March 1964 and 26 October 1964, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. Berichte Moskau.

CSCE was actually convened, the Soviet tactic of encouraging the neutral to promote the idea of a security conference still made Austria an important addressee for Soviet diplomacy.

Despite this shift in the USSR's focus, as a consequence of Soviet policy, Austria's "neutralization," i.e. its becoming more neutral, intensified. This can be seen in two aspects: Firstly, in the 1960s the neutral's *Ostpolitik* was stepped up under Foreign Minister Kreisky and Chancellor Klaus.² The roots of Austria's "neighborhood policy" (*Nachbarschaftspolitik*) went back to the early 1950s, when Austria had tried to reestablish its economic links with its Eastern neighbors and to please the Kremlin by being gracious to the communist satellites. In 1957, after the Hungarian crisis, Mikoian had encouraged the Austrian government to proceed with developing friendly relations with the East European states. This encouragement was continued in the following years. In April 1960, for instance, the Moscow *New Times* explained that neutrality meant not only abandoning all ambitions of participating in the EEC, but also developing the trade ties with Eastern Europe.³ *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, on 21 November 1967, called upon the neutrals to maintain equal relations with the East and the West.

As a neutral, Austria was a natural addressee for such encouragement. Confronted with the necessity to deal with its Eastern neighbors, and under the influence of this Soviet encouragement, it did not take long for the Austrian government, after the Soviet crackdown on the Hungarian revolution, to adopt a friendlier attitude towards the Kádár regime in Budapest. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, this kind of "neighborhood policy" remained Austria's foreign policy axiom and a priority. In the years 1961–75, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania each received nine visits by the Austrian president, chancellor, or foreign minister, and the USSR received eight.⁴ This policy actively promoted relations with the East European states in order to improve the international climate in general and thus, to widen Austria's maneuvering space and bolster its security. In addition, *Nachbarschaftspolitik* was meant to appease the Soviet Union and create favorable conditions for Austrian

² Cf. Erich Bielka, "Österreich und seine volksdemokratischen Nachbarn," in idem, Peter Jankowitsch, Hans Thalberg (eds.), and Reinhold Wagnleitner (red.), *Die Ära Kreisky: Schwerpunkte österreichischer Außenpolitik* (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1983), 195–231; Meier-Walser, *Die Außenpolitik der monocoloren Regierung Klaus*, 170–171, 179–180, 195; Rathkolb, "Austria's Ostpolitik in the 1950s and 1960s"; Alexander Jehn, "Nachbarschaftspolitik im Donauraum: Die besonderen Beziehungen Österreichs zur Tschechoslowakei, zu Ungarn und Jugoslawien in der Ära Kreisky" (PhD Thesis, Vienna, 1996); Arnold Suppan, "Österreichs Ostpolitik 1955–1989," in Ibolya Murber and Zoltán Fónagy (eds.), *Die Ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956* (Vienna: Czernin, 2006), 75–92; Arnold Suppan and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), *Peaceful Coexistence or Iron Curtain? Austria, Neutrality, and Eastern Europe in the Cold War and Détente, 1955–1989* (Vienna: Lit, 2009).

³ Malicek, "Die Beziehungen," 84–85.

⁴ Of Western states, Switzerland received fourteen Austrian visits, the FRG eight, Britain and the US each four. Neuhold, "Der Staatsvertrag als Grundlage," 165.

trade. However, not only the USSR wanted Austria to establish these relations. Since it was also a tool for displaying “democratic presence” behind the Iron Curtain,⁵ the United States, too, was supportive of Austria’s *Ostpolitik*. With this aim in mind, when Kreisky visited socialist states, he sought the opportunity to give public lectures. Despite these ambitions, Raab, Kreisky and Klaus – much like Berlin mayor Willy Brandt – knew what it was like to live under a communist regime, and thus all three were realistic enough to understand that they first had to accept the postwar reality in order to later, possibly, change it.⁶ In contrast to the first steps of the FRG’s *Ostpolitik* in the late Adenauer and the Erhard years, which were further burdened by the Hallstein Doctrine, the existence of the GDR, and the lingering question of lost eastern territories, Austria’s *Ostpolitik* was wanted and supported by the Kremlin. Austria had initiated its neighborhood policy directly with Moscow and was not considered strong enough to be a threat to the Eastern bloc’s stability.

The second major aspect of Austria’s “neutralization,” also brought about by Soviet policy, at least in part, was a further transformation of Austria’s self-definition of neutrality. For a long time, Austria had adhered to the theory that an association with the EEC was compatible with neutrality. Changing this goal was a result not only of Italian and French resistance and US doubts, but also of persistent Soviet warnings and threats concerning the inadmissibility and the possible consequences of this step. An even more important shift in Austria’s definition of neutrality happened roughly around the time of the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia. In contrast to Soviet claims concerning the broad tasks of permanent neutrals, Austria had until then insisted that its neutrality was a military matter that was to be achieved chiefly by staying out of military alliances. However, in November 1968 this notion of “so-called military neutrality” was explicitly rejected by the new foreign minister, Kurt Waldheim.⁷ Shortly thereafter, the new doctrine was presented to the Austrian parliament.⁸ In stressing the “secondary obligations” of permanent

⁵ Bruno Kreisky, “Die österreichische Außenpolitik: Vortrag, Helsinki, 28 Mai 1965,” in idem, *Reden 1* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1981), 571–580, 579. On US support, see Kofler, *Kennedy und Österreich*, 30.

⁶ André Biever, “L’Autriche et les origines de l’Ostpolitik de la République fédérale d’Allemagne,” in *Relations Internationales* 114 (2003), 213–230. Cf. Gottfried Niedhart, “The East-West Problem as Seen from Berlin: Willy Brandt’s Early *Ostpolitik*,” in Wilfried Loth (ed.), *Europe, Cold War, and Coexistence, 1953–1965*, Cold War History 4 (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 285–296; Peter Jankowitsch, “Das Problem der Äquidistanz: Die Suche der Zweiten Republik nach außenpolitischen Leitlinien,” in Manfred Rauchensteiner (ed.), *Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 451–495, 467.

⁷ Vortrag des Außenministers Dr. K. Waldheim über “Perspektiven der österreichischen Außenpolitik” in Wien, 7 November 1968, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, *20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik* 1, 144–146, 145. Cf. Luif, “Austria’s Permanent Neutrality,” 137–138; Ginther, *Neutralität und Neutralitätspolitik*, 62–64; Meier-Walser, *Die Außenpolitik der monocoloren Regierung Klaus*, 180–183.

⁸ Ginther, “Austria’s Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union,” 79.

neutrality, Waldheim relied on recent publications by the Austrian lawyers Verdross and Verosta. The former, in the second edition of his treatise on Austria's neutrality, dealt comprehensively with the permanent neutral's peacetime obligation to avoid any economic association that might draw it into a conflict, ruled out EEC membership for a permanently neutral state, and briefly referred to the Swiss neutrality doctrine of 1954. Verosta contributed to the latter's "discovery" by publishing it in Austria and presenting it as binding.⁹

In lieu of "military neutrality," the neutral's task of actively promoting détente and peace was underlined. Waldheim's understanding of neutral policy, thus, was much closer to that of the Soviets than any earlier Austrian interpretation. Waldheim was treated with striking approval in the Soviet media and his understanding that neutrality comprised more than just military obligations was highly praised.¹⁰ Although Klaus continued to reject the Soviet interpretation of "peaceful coexistence" as "a continuation of the ideological struggle" and "an active dissemination of ideology,"¹¹ Waldheim, by equating neutrality with an active peace policy, thus, from 1968 on, adopted two further key aspects of the Soviet doctrine, anticipating the developments of the 1970s. In his book *The Austrian Example*, he went as far as equating "peaceful coexistence" with détente and adopting the Soviet topos of Austria's role as being a showcase for the former.¹² During the Czechoslovakian crisis, Klaus and Waldheim furthermore tried to make public statements more "neutral" with regard to the Soviet Union. While the Austrian parliament, in the wake of the crisis, reasserted its right of defining neutrality,¹³ the year 1968 created a "watershed" in Austrian neutrality policy,¹⁴ and though not publicly acknowledged, it was a turning point due, at least in part, to Soviet policy.

⁹ Verdross, *Die immerwährende Neutralität der Republik* (1966), 15–20; Verosta, *Die dauernde Neutralität* (1967), 113–117.

¹⁰ E.g., Polyanov, "Austria, Neutrality, Europe," 84–88. Cf. Petersson, *The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality*, 89.

¹¹ *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik* 7 (1967), 224–228, 224; Ginther, *Neutralität und Neutralitätspolitik*, 58; Meier-Walser, *Die Außenpolitik der monocoloren Regierung Klaus*, 158–159.

¹² Waldheim, *The Austrian Example*, 5.

¹³ Ermacora, *20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität*, 150.

¹⁴ Ginther, *Neutralität und Neutralitätspolitik*, 43, 49, 52. For a discussion of Ginther's theses, see below, pages 254–255. Cf. Helmut Kramer, "Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik 1945–2005," in Herbert Dachs et al. (eds.), *Politik in Österreich* (Vienna: Manz, 2006), 807–837, 816.