

MARK JOYAL

Problems and interpretation in the Platonic Theages

Summary – Recent interest in the Platonic Theages has revealed considerable disagreement over the interpretation of the dialogue’s lengthy and famous presentation of Socrates’ divine sign. Drawing on a close reading and philological analysis of the text of Theages and a full consideration of scholarship on the dialogue, this article seeks to demonstrate in detail the degree to which its presentation of Socrates’ sign is unique within the Platonic Corpus, the author’s motives for crafting this presentation, and the bearing which it has on the question of the dialogue’s meaning and authenticity.

Twenty-five years ago people who studied the Theages could turn to no text of the dialogue that was based on a thorough knowledge of its transmission, no wide-ranging analysis of the textual tradition, no full-scale commentary on the dialogue, few extended treatments of the work as a whole or of individual problems, and only a handful of contemporary translations in English or any other modern language. Since then, conditions for the study of this dialogue have changed significantly. Above all, we now have three commentaries, two of which include translations and one a new critical text, and each accompanied by essays that confront matters of exegetical importance both broad and specific.¹ Thought-provoking articles that deal with Thg. or subjects directly relevant to it have also appeared in this time. These have all projected a variety of viewpoints, with the result that many of the most difficult and contentious issues in the dialogue have remained objects of lively dispute. In these circumstances, differences of opinion are not only unsurprising but also to be welcomed. Through close engagement with the text and with scholarly disagreement we can hope to arrive at a better understanding of this curious work.

The one thing that we should all be able to agree on in our interpretations of Thg. is the need to pay close attention to the words of the author himself. That statement may be a philological truism, yet long study of this work has convinced me that the impression which so many readers take away from it – namely, that its author has not told us everything we need to know in order

¹ Joyal 2000; Döring 2004; Bailly 2004; cf. Sevelsted 2012; also translations with introductions and notes: Pangle 1987; Smith 1997; Aronadio 2008; Centrone 2009; Brisson 2014.

to understand it – has often diverted focus away from the text, its meaning, and the choices which the author has made. The following series of discussions deals with the problems that I consider to be the most interesting, difficult, and controversial, mainly involving the well-known section of the dialogue that concerns Socrates' divine sign (128c6–131a10). Even though I express frequent disagreement (though by no means only disagreement) with the authors of the substantial works cited above, as well as with other scholars, I am grateful for the considerable stimulation which their writings have provided. My analyses will not represent the final word on Thg., of course, but I hope that their concentration on text, context, language and meaning will provoke further discussion about this dialogue.

(I) Is the divine sign (τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον) as it is presented in Thg. different in meaningful ways from the same phenomenon that appears in other Platonic works? That question has preoccupied much of the scholarship on this dialogue for the last two hundred years. The reader's first encounter with the sign in Thg. is 128d2–7:

ἔστι γάρ τι θεία μοῖρα παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἣ ὅταν γένηται ἀεὶ μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε· καὶ ἂν τίς μοι τῶν φίλων ἀνακοινῶται καὶ γένηται ἡ φωνή, ταῦτόν τοῦτο, ἀποτρέπει καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ πράττειν.

There is something that, by a divine allocation, follows at my side, which began in my childhood, a daimonic thing. This thing is a voice which, whenever it comes, always signifies to me a prohibition from whatever I am about to do, and never urges me on. And if any of my friends is consulting with me and the voice occurs, it's the same thing: it turns him away and doesn't allow him to act.

Elsewhere I have identified and discussed various features in this description which, taken together, are hard to square with Plato's practice in other contexts: the use of the phrase *θεία μοῖρα* and of the verb *παρέπομαι* in connection with the divine sign, the characterization of it as *φωνή* and *ἡ φωνή*, the use of the phrase *σημαίνει ... ἀποτροπήν*, and the extension of the sign's influence to include the activities of Socrates' friends (Joyal 1995: 44–46, 47–49, 2000: 74–77, 266/267). There is no reason to repeat those arguments about what these features may mean for our interpretation of the divine sign in this work and for our opinion about its authorship; readers can

judge for themselves.² Instead I wish to focus at the outset on a few important places of disputed meaning in the anecdotes which follow immediately after 128d2–7 and which the author of Thg. intended as an illustration of the sign’s extension to the activities of Socrates’ friends.

(i) The first of these anecdotes involves Socrates’ warning to Charmides not to practise for the Nemean Games (128e1–129a1).

οὗτός ποτε ἐτύγχανεν ἐμοὶ ἀνακοινοῦμενος μέλλων ἀσκήσειν στάδιον εἰς Νεμέαν, καὶ εὐθὺς αὐτοῦ ἀρχομένου λέγειν ὅτι μέλλοι ἀσκεῖν ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή, καὶ ἐγὼ διεκώλυόν τε αὐτὸν καὶ εἶπον ὅτι “Λέγοντός σου μεταξὺ γέγονέ μοι ἡ φωνὴ ἢ τοῦ δαίμονιου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄσκει.” “Ἰσως,” ἔφη, “σημαίνει σοι ὅτι οὐ νικήσω· ἐγὼ δὲ κἂν μὴ μέλλω νικᾶν, γυμνασάμενός γε τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ὠφελήθησομαι.” ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἤσκει· ἄξιον οὖν πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ ἃ αὐτῷ ξυνέβη ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσκήσεως.

Charmides happened to be consulting with me one day when he was going to practise for the foot race at the Nemean Games. As soon as he started to say that he was going to practise, the voice occurred. I tried to stop him and said, “The voice of the divine sign has occurred to me just while you were speaking. Don’t practise.” “Maybe it’s signifying to you that I won’t win,” Charmides said. “But even if I’m not going to win, at least by training during this time I’ll be better for it.” After saying this he began to practise. It is worth asking him what happened to him as a result of this practising.

Commenting on 128e5, I noted (2000: 269/270) that Friedrich Schleiermacher objected to the phrase ἢ τοῦ δαίμονιου in Apology 40a4 (in ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαίμονιου) on the grounds that it over-personalizes Socrates’ sign, that he proposed its deletion from the text, and that he faulted the same phrase in Thg. 128e5 (in ἡ φωνὴ ἢ τοῦ δαίμονιου) as un-Platonic. Bailly (2004: 226) objects to this line of reasoning: “the genitive τοῦ δαίμονιου is added (in Thg. 128e5: MJ) primarily to fully identify the voice, which could be something other than the sign. It is hard to see how one ought to express the thought without overtones of personification, since ‘voice’ by itself seems to imply a person.”³ Whether or not one believes that

² Bailly rightly places importance on the comparison of this passage with the related Ap. 31c7–d4 (see n. 5 below), but it is only the last of the features listed above that receives mention in his discussion (2004: 268).

³ Bailly adds: “Joyal offers a defense of ἢ τοῦ δαίμονιου in the Apology.” In fact, I agree with Schleiermacher’s proposal to delete the phrase; I expressed agreement (with arguments) in my commentary, and then at greater length in an article a year after the

the personalization of τὸ δαιμόνιον is problematic, it cannot be right to defend its presentation here by arguing that “the voice ... could be something other than the sign.” We need only refer back a few lines, to 128d3 (quoted above), in order to see the difficulty in this belief: ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο [= τι ... δαιμόνιον] φωνή; cf. d5/6 ἐὰν ... γένηται ἡ φωνή and e3 ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή (in indisputably-genuine Plato γίγνεται is the verb normally predicated of τὸ δαιμόνιον itself⁴); also 129b6–8 καὶ μοι ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή, καὶ εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, “Μηδαμῶς,” ἔφην, “ἀναστῆς· γέγονε γάρ μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον.” In these four passages Socrates is stating either explicitly or implicitly that “the voice” and τὸ δαιμόνιον are the same thing. I see no logical way that the two phrases ἡ φωνή ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου and ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή (together with the other three passages) can be reconciled with one another: in one description ἡ φωνή is a part of (belongs to or originates from) τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the other it is identified with the whole. We might of course argue that the author has simply contradicted himself unwittingly within the space of two or three sentences. More probable, however, since it is supported by other evidence, is the argument that ἡ φωνή and τὸ δαιμόνιον are equated in 128d3 because the author has taken over a passage nearly verbatim (Ap. 31c7–d6) in which they are equated (through the appositive phrase d3 φωνή τις γιγνομένη),⁵ whereas they are distinguished in 128e5

commentary’s publication (2001: 344–352; cf. 2005: 101–103). Although he does not identify his source, Bailly is drawing from my doctoral thesis (1988), where I had questioned Schleiermacher’s arguments (elsewhere too he variously cites either book [Joyal 2000] or thesis, often without indicating to which he is referring; of course, where my opinions differ between the two works, as they often do, those in the later reflect my more developed views). Senn (2012: 19 n. 56) argues for the retention of ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου in Ap. 40a4 on the basis that the antecedent of μαντική, and therefore the noun with which it should be understood, is φωνή in 31d3. But φωνή can be called an “antecedent” of μαντική only in the most literal, non-specific sense; for it “came before” μαντική at a distance of nearly nine Stephanus pages. The ancient reader who saw ἡ ... μαντική in isolation – i. e., without a qualified noun in a reasonable vicinity – would surely have understood μαντική itself as a noun, sc. τέχνη. Senn’s further argument, that verbal symmetry between ἡ ... εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική and τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον in Ap. 40c3, Euthd. 272e3/4 and Phdr. 242b9 corroborates his interpretation of μαντική as “prophetic φωνή,” does not take into account the dramatic and rhetorical context within Ap., specifically the reason why Socrates here chooses (uniquely) to emphasize the prophetic element of τὸ δαιμόνιον, on which see my 2001 article cited above (which Senn did not consider); also 2000: 269/270.

⁴ See Joyal 2000: 66, 72. Xenophon never uses the verb for this purpose.

⁵ τοῦτου δὲ αἰτίον ἐστὶν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται [φωνή], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμωδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο.

because here our author is innovating, taking his exposition beyond the place where his source had stopped.⁶ This he has done conformably with the way in which Thg. 128d5–8 also takes the activities of τὸ δαιμόνιον beyond the limits expressed in the language of Ap. 31c7–d6 by extending its intervention to Socrates' friends.⁷

In his brief comparison of Thg. 128d2–7 and Ap. 31c7–d4 Bailly finds no evidence of “ineptitudes” that “betray one author as a ham-handed plagiarist” (2004: 268), but the incoherence which I have just pointed out is more than simply awkward (the issue of “plagiarism” here is a red herring). Bailly, as we saw, also attempts to defend the personalization of the divine sign in Thg. by asking how else the phenomenon of a “voice” could be introduced “without overtones of personification.” Yet Plato found a simple way to do just that: instead of referring to φωνή, “a voice,” or to ἡ φωνή, “the voice,” as the author of Thg. did (and as Xenophon did in Ap. 12), he used the phrase φωνή τις/τις φωνή, “a kind of voice,” “a voice, as it were,” in the only two places where he applies φωνή to the activities of the sign (Ap. 31d3, Phdr. 242c1/2 [n. b. ἔδοξα ... ἀκοῦσαι]). The phrase involves a common use of the indefinite adjective τις to soften the application of the adjoining noun or to acknowledge its metaphorical sense (e. g. Ap. 20d7, Phd. 62b3/4, Men. 72a6; also Thg. 125a1–2⁸). If anything, Plato's way of using φωνή in

ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικά πράττειν, καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι.

⁶ We must look to much later works in order to see a recurrence of the phrase ἡ φωνή ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου *vel sim.* in a Socratic context: Socr. Ep. 1,9 συνέβη μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον. ἐνέστην οὖν καὶ εἶπον “ἄνδρες, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ταύτην πορεύεσθαι· τοῦ γὰρ δαιμονίου μοι ἡ φωνὴ γέγονεν” (possibly borrowed from Thg. 128a5 and context); [Plu.] de Hom. Π, 212,5 ὡς γὰρ ἐγὼν ὄπ' ἄκουσα θεῶν αἰεγενετάων, παρέχει πιστεῦειν ὅτι καὶ Σωκράτης ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ δαιμονίου φωνῆς ἐμαντεύετο; Procl. in Alc. 79,20–21 Segonds “τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ φωνή, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δαιμονίου σημεῖον,” ἐν τῷ Θεάγει φησί (Proclus is assimilating 128d3 with e5); cf. in non-Socratic contexts D. H. 5,16,3 (ἡ ... τοῦ δαιμονίου φωνή), D. C. 55,1,4 (τὸ τινα φωνὴν παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου τοιαύτην τῷ γενέσθαι).

⁷ Döring (2004: 52) considers this extension to be a signal that, whereas Socrates to this point had been presented in a way broadly consistent with the Platonic character, from this sentence forward what Socrates has to say about τὸ δαιμόνιον will depart from its presentation in the works widely accepted as genuinely Platonic.

⁸ εἰς [διδασκάλου] τυραννοδιδασκάλου τινός, “to the place/school of a tyrant-teacher, as it were.” Bailly's argument for the retention of διδασκάλου (2004: 171) is incorrect, since τυραννοδιδασκάλου is a noun, not an adjective (a point which I could have made more clearly in my note on this passage).

connection with τὸ δαιμόνιον proves the opposite of what it has been taken to show.⁹

(ii) Socrates was present at a συμπόσιον attended by the otherwise unknown Timarchus and Philemon, who carried out a plot to murder Nicias, also otherwise unknown. Socrates relates what happened (129a9–c5):

ὅτε ἀνίστατο ἐκ τοῦ συμποσίου ὁ Τίμαρχος καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ Φιλημονίδου ἀποκτενοῦντες Νικίαν τὸν Ἡροσκαμάνδρου, ἠπιστάσθην μὲν αὐτὰ μόνω τὴν ἐπιβουλήν, ὁ δὲ Τίμαρχος ἀνιστάμενος πρὸς ἐμὲ εἶπεν, “Τί λέγεις,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες; ὑμεῖς μὲν πίνετε, ἐμὲ δὲ δεῖ ποι ἐξαναστῆναι· ἤξω δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ἐὰν τύχω.” καὶ μοι ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή, καὶ εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, “Μηδὰ μῶς,” ἔφη, “ἀναστῆς· γέγονε γάρ μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον.” καὶ ὃς ἐπέσχε. καὶ διαλιπὼν χρόνον αὐθις ὠρμάτο ἰέναι, καὶ ἔφη· “Εἴμι δὴ, Σώκρατες.” αὐθις ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή· αὐθις οὖν αὐτὸν ἠνάγκασα ἐπισχεῖν. τὸ τρίτον, βουλόμενός με λαθεῖν, ἀνέστη οὐκέτι εἰπὼν μοι οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ λαθῶν, ἐπιτηρήσας ἄλλοσε τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· καὶ οὕτως ὄχγετο ἀπιὼν καὶ διεπράξατο ἐξ ὧν ἦει ἀποθανούμενος.

When Timarchus got up from the drinking party, along with Philemon, son of Philemonides, to kill Nicias, the son of Heroscamandrus, they themselves were the only ones to know about the plot, and after Timarchus got up he said to me, “What do you say, Socrates? You people go on drinking; I have to get up and go somewhere. But I’ll return a little later, perhaps.” And then the voice occurred to me, and I said to him, “Don’t get up; for my

⁹ See also Jedrkiewicz 2011a: 214/215 on φωνή τις, and 214–220 in general on the impersonal nature of τὸ δαιμόνιον in Plato; Schinkel 2007: 105/106; Partridge 2008: 287; Senn 2012: 18/19. φωνή *simpliciter* occurs in connection with Socrates’ sign in the paradosis at Ap. 31d1 (see n. 5 above), but the word there is certainly a gloss, as recognized by nearly all editors of that work, a position also supported indirectly by the second-century Apuleius; see Joyal 1995: 44 n. 15; 2001: 347/348; 2005: 106/107; also Alt 2000: 242; Jedrkiewicz 2011a: 215 n. 26; Finamore 2014: 42/43. Plutarch takes a similar line against the characterization of the sign as an unqualified voice or as the source of such a voice (Mor. 588c–e [de Genio Socratis]; n. b. φωνῆς τινος αἰσθησις); so does Olympiodorus (in Alc. 21, 9–14 Westerink): τρίτον ὅτι ὡς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ ἐδόκει ἀκούειν [cf. Phdr. 242c2 ἔδοξα ... ἀκούσαι], οὐχ ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἐλάλει, ἀλλ’ ἔλλαμψις τις αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο περὶ τὰ ἀκουστικὰ ὄργανα, καὶ φωνὴν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι; cf. Procl. in Alc. 79, 18/19 Segonds φωνῆς τινὸς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ προιούσης ἐπὶσθάνετο [sc. Σωκράτης]. On Phdr. 242c1/2 Hermias makes the sensible point (in Phdr. 68, 13–16 Lucarini-Moreschini) that if the “voice” were a regular one, Phaedrus too would have heard it. Evidently it was well established in the Platonic tradition that Socrates’ sign was something very different from a voice as conventionally understood; see Hoffmann 1985: 422, 428–432; Timotin 2011: 281/282, 317; Margagliotta 2012: 42–46, 96–99.

customary divine sign has occurred to me.” And so he stopped. And after a while he again made a move to go, and he said, “I’ll be going, then, Socrates.” The voice occurred again; so again I made him stop. The third time, since he didn’t want me to notice him, he got up without saying anything to me this time and without my noticing, when he observed that my attention was somewhere else. And so he was away and gone, and he carried out what led him to his execution.

Heidel remarked (1896: 53 n. 3): “In ἀλλὰ λαθῶν [129c4] there is an admission fatal to the prophetic spirit ascribed to Socrates and hardly in keeping with the deification of the δαμόνιον (131a).” I questioned Heidel for applying to Socrates’ sign a standard of omniscience which in popular thought Greeks did not recognize even for their gods of cult (Joyal 2000: 276). Bailly (2004: 235) quoted the same sentence and likewise faulted Heidel’s conclusion, but (taking up Cobb’s line of argument, 1992: 278–281) he went further:

Timarchus does not consult Socrates, Socrates does not notice him leaving, and thus the sign has no opportunity to recur. What is more, deification is never in question here or elsewhere in the corpus when the sign is mentioned. To claim the sign should have reacted to stealthy Timarchus is preposterous, and can only be done by ignoring the obvious: the sign reacts only to things to which Socrates pays some attention and can react.¹⁰

Bailly’s description of the way in which the sign operates may well be correct as far as the assumptions of this story are concerned,¹¹ but even if that is so, his analysis misses the point. For neither Heidel nor anyone else

¹⁰ Bailly continues: “To talk of a god being deceived here, as Joyal, 276f., does, is inaccurate.” This statement misrepresents what I wrote, which concerns not Socrates’ sign but rather the depiction of Homeric gods: “Divine agents in Homer (to take one source) are often described as omniscient but are nevertheless frequently deceived. [Four Homeric passages, as well as one pseudo-Aeschylean, are then cited.] ... Passages such as these suggest that omniscience among Greek deities is only relative.”

¹¹ He supports his approach, however, by interpreting 129b4/5 – “τί λέγεις,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες; ὑμεῖς μὲν πίνετε, ἐμὲ δὲ δεῖ ποι εἰς ἀναστῆναι” – as conveying “What do you say to the idea that you keep drinking while I go somewhere” (2004: 233). The justification for his paraphrase is that “the force of the utterance may be interrogative while the grammar is imperative,” a usage which he considers “perfectly natural” but for which he provides no parallels or other supporting evidence. The paraphrase is part of his (and Cobb’s [1992: 279/280]) defence that “the sign only reacts to Socrates’ imminent advice-giving role, not to others’ actions.” Cobb’s interpretation likewise relies on a mistranslation of 129b5 ὑμεῖς μὲν πίνετε; see Joyal 2000: 275 on 129b4 τί λέγεις and b5 ὑμεῖς ... πίνετε.

denies that the story about Timarchus unfolds in accordance with its own internal logic. The issue instead is whether that logic is itself coherent with the presentation of τὸ δαιμόνιον in this dialogue and elsewhere. In the two stories that are to follow (c8–d8: Sicilian Expedition; Sannio and Thrasyllus in Ephesus), at any rate, prior consultation with Socrates is not a condition for the sign's occurrence. In other Platonic works, the case which comes closest to the set of circumstances that we find here – Euthd. 272e1–273a3 – is not helpful for Bailly's assumptions: Socrates was sitting in the dressing-room in the Lyceum and stood up to leave; at that moment his divine sign occurred to him, so he sat down again; a little later the two sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus entered. Here the sign occurs before the two men arrive, even without Socrates' noticing them. If anything, this event makes the failure of the divine sign to occur a third time in Thg. 129a9–c5 more puzzling, especially since Socrates, though distracted, would by now have easily understood its significance.¹² Moreover, to characterize interpretation of (or assumptions about) the divine sign's operation as “preposterous” is unhelpful, not only because it implies a special insight into the many possible ways in which ancient authors felt at liberty to depict the sign,¹³ but above all because the ancient public's views about the sign may well have included the belief that it was inherently preposterous or outrageous. For instance, the Socrates of Xenophon's *Apology* provokes a θόρυβος among his jurors (according to Hermogenes, who is Xenophon's source) through claims about his prophetic powers (14): ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούοντες οἱ δικασταὶ ἐθορύβουν, οἱ μὲν ἀπιστοῦντες τοῖς λεγομένοις, οἱ δὲ καὶ φθονοῦντες, εἰ καὶ παρὰ θεῶν μειζόνων ἢ αὐτοὶ τυγχάνοι κτλ. Here it is the phenomenon itself rather than its mechanics that inspires incredulity among some (οἱ μὲν ἀπιστοῦντες). Centuries later, one of the characters in Plutarch's *De Genio Socratis* (*Polymnis*), though an admirer of Socrates, accepts that Socrates' sign was a sneeze (his own and others') and declares that Socrates' application of the adjective δαιμόνιον to this experience was an indication of τύφου ... κενοῦ καὶ κόμπου, “empty bluster and conceit” (581b).¹⁴

¹² The passage in Euthd. is not a perfect parallel, but closer than Cobb allows (1992: 271). For a critique of Cobb's assessment of this anecdote, see Centrone 1997: 335–338, 2009: 28–30; and for some of the complications in the occurrence of τὸ δαιμόνιον in Euthd., see Partridge 2008: 304–306.

¹³ See in general Willing 1909.

¹⁴ Cf. Long 2006: 63: “We can be certain that Socrates' claims to experience this divine visitation ... strongly contributed to the general sense of his being weird even among

Bailly's assertion that "deification is never in question here or elsewhere in the corpus when the sign is mentioned" is similarly too confident and categorical, since it is precisely the comparison between the sign's presentation in Thg. and its depiction in the rest of the Platonic Corpus that has animated so much of the scholarship on this dialogue for the past two centuries. The assertion is certainly incorrect in regard to Platonic evidence outside Thg.; for in Alc. I (probably spurious, in my opinion), Socrates' divine sign, initially referred to as $\tau\iota$ δαίμόνιον ἐναντίωμα (103a5/6), is identified thereafter as $\acute{\omicron}$ θεός: 105d3–106a2 (3 times), 124c6–11, and by implication 127e5 and 135d6, where there are plays on the stock phrase ἐὰν/ἄν θεός (ἐ)θέλη. Xenophon also calls the sign $\acute{\omicron}$ θεός: Mem. 4, 8, 5/6, Ap. 5.¹⁵ To apply the noun θεός to some entity is to deify it; there is no more unambiguous way in Greek to do so. But what about the divine sign in Thg. itself? Elsewhere Bailly similarly claims that in Thg. the sign's deification is not in question, e. g. 242: "the sign itself is not a god. The sign is a particular manifestation of a god, a signal from a god, *vel sim.*"; cf. 261: "the god signals through the daimonion." He produces no evidence from Thg. to demonstrate that the sign has so precise a relationship to a god;¹⁶ indeed, on the two occasions in Thg.

those who did not see him as a threat to religious tradition." Many in antiquity were critical of the sign or of Socrates' claim to its possession; see, e. g., Joyal 1995: 39/40 n. 1.

¹⁵ See Bussanich 2013: 285–288, who considers both Alc. I and the evidence of Xenophon, comparing also X. Mem. 1, 2, 4 with X. Ap. 13.

¹⁶ In Joyal 2000: 76/77 I have considered possibly relevant Platonic texts outside Thg. I suspect that Bailly is thinking of Ap. 40b2 τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, which alone in the Platonic Corpus might justify his characterization of the divine sign (though it does not justify the identification there of τὸ δαίμόνιον and $\acute{\omicron}$ θεός, as he supposes [2003: 106 n. 1; likewise Droge 2007: 60/61 and n. 13; Renauld 2012: 193]; see Joyal 2005: 108/109), or possibly X. Mem. 4, 8, 5/6, Ap. 5; see further Jedrkiewicz 2011a: 232/233; 235–237. Although the sign "signals" (σημαίνει) in Thg. and in Xenophon (Mem. 1, 1, 2. 4; 4, 8, 1), elsewhere in the Platonic Corpus it is not said to do so (γίγνεται is the verb used instead; see nn. 61, 70 below). Contrast, however, the salutary interpretive principle which Bailly sets out in his Preface and repeats many times throughout his book (2004: 3; cf. 24 n. 41, 25, 28/29, 33/34, 37 etc.): "I have avoided assuming a Platonic context or a post-Platonic date, chiefly because doing so begs the question of date and authorship, but also because the dialogue is a self-contained unity that benefits from treatment as such before we interpret it with our Platonic spectacles." The evidence for Socrates' sign outside Thg. should not be used as the grounds for assumptions about it in Thg., not because that begs the question of the dialogue's authorship (it may), but because (as I argued in Joyal 2005; see now Jedrkiewicz 2011a) the divine sign is not portrayed consistently from one dialogue to another by Plato himself for reasons which are identifiable. See further below for Bailly's adherence (and non-adherence) to his interpretive principle (e. g. pp. 117/118, and nn. 38, 60).

where σημαίνει (“signals”) is used (128d4–5, e6), it is τὸ δαιμόνιον = φωνή, or ἡ φωνή ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου, not (ὁ) θεός, that is the verb’s subject (uniquely so in the Platonic Corpus: Joyal 2000: 67, 72, 266). Nevertheless Bailly could have considered the one passage, 128d2/3, which might be of some limited aid for his claim: there is “something” (τι), a “divine/daimonic” (δαιμόνιον) thing which, beginning in childhood, has been “accompanying” (παρεπόμενον) Socrates “by a divine allocation” (θεία μοίρα). Here τὸ δαιμόνιον appears somehow to be subordinate to a higher power; that much, but only that, seems to be implied. Did the involvement of this higher power in Socrates’ life extend beyond the single, early event of “allocation”?¹⁷ Since the only entity said to be continuously at Socrates’ side (παρεπόμενον) is τὸ δαιμόνιον, not ὁ θεός, is the addition of θεία μοίρα intended simply to convey that the source and nature of τὸ δαιμόνιον are inscrutable? Is the appearance of θεία μοίρα meant to account for the capricious or contingent nature of Socrates’ ability to improve others?¹⁸ Does the phrase merely indicate that the association of τὸ δαιμόνιον with Socrates is evidence of the high favour in which he was held by the gods (cf. X. Mem. 4, 3, 12, Ap. 13/14)? Or does it convey that τὸ δαιμόνιον must have been a beneficial force in his life? We cannot know the solutions to these questions; much less can we assert that θεία μοίρα suggests the relationships between τὸ δαιμόνιον and ὁ θεός that Bailly posits.

On the other side, there is in 130e5–7 persuasive evidence for the equation in Thg. of τὸ δαιμόνιον with ὁ θεός (an important passage which will be cited several times in this paper). After he has explained the role that his sign plays in relationships with his associates, Socrates summarizes: Ἔστιν οὖν, ὃ Θεάγεσ, τοιαύτη ἡ ἡμετέρα συνουσία· ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ, πάνυ πολὺ ἐπιδώσεις καὶ ταχύ, εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ (“That’s what association with me is like, Theages: if it pleases the god, your progress will be very great and swift; otherwise, you won’t have any.”). This sentence is an especially effective summary because it responds to the intention expressed in 128c6–d2, where Socrates answers Theages’ observation about the young men he has noticed who have improved quickly (c4/5 ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πάντων βελτίους φαίνονται ὧν πρότερον χείρους) through association (c3 συνεῖναι, c4 συνεγένοντο) with Socrates:

¹⁷ It may have been a desire to express such an extension that produced the ancient variant *παρπεμπόμενον* (implying that τὸ δαιμόνιον is repeatedly “allocated,” i. e., “dis-patched”?) *pro* *παρεπόμενον*, on which see Joyal 1996.

¹⁸ As Trabattoni has argued (1998: 198–205), while defending the authenticity of the dialogue.

Σω. οἴσθα οὖν οἶον τοῦτο ἔστιν, ὃ παῖ Δημοδόκου;

Θε. ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε, ὅτι, ἐὰν σὺ βούλῃ, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴομαι τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι, οἰοίπερ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι.

Σω. οὐκ, ὠγαθέ, ἀλλά σε λέληθεν οἶον τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἐγὼ δέ σοι φράσω. ἔστι γάρ τι θεῖα μοῖρα παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον κτλ.

The account which Socrates then gives in 128d2–130e4 explains at length οἶον τοῦτο ἔστιν, “the character of this thing” (i. e., of rapid improvement in Socrates’ company); in turn, ἔστι ... τοιαύτη ἢ ἡμετέρα συνουσία announces that Socrates’ promise to explain it (ἐγὼ δέ σοι φράσω) has been fulfilled. Our author’s announcement of this fulfillment is made the more explicit through verbal symmetry: 128c6 οἶον τοῦτο ἔστιν ... d1 οἶον τοῦτ' ἔστιν ... 130e5 τοιαύτη ἢ ἡμετέρα συνουσία – “remote” correlatives, as it were. Socrates’ reference back to the earlier exchange with Theages demonstrates another correspondence too: Socrates sought to correct Theages’ belief that “improvement” would come if Socrates willed it, c7 ἐὰν σὺ βούλῃ; his succinct declaration of the correct view about the cause behind the experience of Theages’ peers is ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ἦ κτλ., and this declaration relates to a series of detailed accounts about the activity of τὸ δαιμόνιον. It would therefore be incoherent for Socrates to state (1) that Theages does not know the character of (οἶον τοῦτο ἔστιν) his peers’ experience in Socrates’ company and (2) that this experience depends not on Socrates’ own will but on τι ... δαιμόνιον / τὸ δαιμόνιον, and then (3) to claim, as a summary of all that has been recorded between 128d2 and 130e4, that it really depends on the will or whim of a phenomenon that he has not so far mentioned. The equation of τὸ δαιμόνιον with ὁ θεός obviates this incoherence.¹⁹ If our author had thought it necessary to distinguish them clearly and to forestall their confusion, he could have done so simply by writing τοῖς θεοῖς instead of τῷ θεῷ.²⁰

¹⁹ Döring remarks (2004: 59): “Im übrigen ist es so, daß das genaue Verhältnis von Gott und Daimonion in keinem der beiden Dialoge [i. e., Thg. and Theaetetus 149a1–151d3: MJ] präzisiert wird” (in a footnote he extends this observation to the relationship between τὸ δαιμόνιον and ὁ θεός in Alc. I as well). This comment would, I think, be better applied to the relationship between τὸ δαιμόνιον and θεῖα μοῖρα in Thg. (see above). For what it is worth, it may be noted that in their exegeses of Alc. I both Proclus (e. g. in Alc. 78, 8–79, 16 Segonds) and Olympiodorus (e. g. in Alc. 21, 5–9 Westerink) interpret mention of τὸ δαιμόνιον and ὁ θεός in that dialogue as references to the same entity; so also the scholiast on Alc. I 103a5–6 = 144, 3 Cufalo.

²⁰ As in Pl. Cri. 43d7–8 τύχη ἀγαθῆ, εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω; cf. Hom. Od. 1, 82 εἰ μὲν δὴ νῦν τοῦτο φίλον μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι, and Thgn. 1, 730/731 εἶθε γένοιτο θεοῖς φίλα κτλ.; other syntactical constructions in Euthphr. 15b1–5, Lg. 886c8–d3,

In spite of resistance to the equation of τὸ δαιμόνιον with ὁ θεός, Bailly does elsewhere accept this identification, though he sometimes hedges: Pavlu and Friedländer “correctly think τῷ θεῷ [sc. at 130e6] refers to the daimonion” (261); “The god and the daimonion in Alc. I ... and Thg. ... must be either one and the same entity (i. e. the god is the daimonion and vice versa), or the god mentioned must be what renders Socrates’ sign divine” (281); “... (the god at 130e6 must be the god of the daimonion). Furthermore, even if the daimonion and the god are one and the same ...” (274). The matter, however, is not so enigmatic as this, since (as already observed above) application of the term θεός to an entity deifies it. In my opinion Heidel’s premise that Socrates’ sign is deified in Thg. is correct (and henceforth I shall assume that τῷ θεῷ in 130e6 is a direct reference to Socrates’ sign), though from this deduction Heidel draws the unwarranted inference that the sign should therefore be omniscient. For his part Bailly comes down hard on suspicions that have been raised about the coherence of the sign’s activities in this anecdote, especially the story’s possible implications for divine omniscience (2004: 235/236):

That god knows what will happen need not mean that god will indicate that to Socrates. ... even an absolutely good god might not tell Socrates *via the sign* [Bailly’s emphasis] about every bad thing that Socrates might prevent. Socrates is not like the comic book hero who gets the newspaper a day in advance and then goes searching for the evil to avert it.

Most fifth- and fourth-century Greeks did not expect their gods to possess absolute, infallible omniscience; I have elsewhere presented evidence to illustrate the fact and to demonstrate that, from this perspective, there is little in the divine sign’s behaviour here to trouble the author’s contemporaries, no matter how high those readers’ expectations for the sign (2000: 276). So far, then, Bailly seems to be on fairly safe ground. But this is Socrates’ sign, and it is curious, at least, that this entity – elsewhere in Thg. referred to as ὁ θεός, but not likewise within indisputably genuine works of the Platonic Corpus – should fail to occur after it has already indicated twice to Socrates

Stesich. S 11, 25/26 SLG, B. 4, 18–20, S. OC 964/965, Ar. Pax 1075/1076. For the singular τῷ θεῷ φίλον in a condition, cf. Hdt. 2, 64, 2; after ὅπη or ὅτι ἄν, cf. Pl. Ap. 19a6, Phlb. 12c3, Phdr. 246d3, X. HG 7, 4, 9; in declarative clauses, cf. E. Ion 14, IA 747, Pl. Lg. 821a8–b1. The sole example of δαίμονι/δαίμοσι φίλον is Hdt. 1, 87 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα δαίμοσι κου φίλον ἦν οὕτω γενέσθαι; there is one instance of the similar, if not synonymous, εἰ δαίμων ἐθέλοι, in Hdt. 3, 119 (cf. ἐάν/ἄν θεός (ἐ)θέλη), but τῷ δαιμονίῳ φίλον is unexampled. See also pp. 115–117 and n. 31.

that his fellow symposiasts should not leave. For interesting evidence exists to suggest that the historical Socrates accepted divine omniscience more strictly than did the average Greek. Xenophon contrasted the opinion of οἱ πολλοί that the gods know some things, but not everything, with Socrates' belief that the gods know everything, *τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα*, “the things that are said and done and the things that are planned in silence” (Mem. 1, 1, 19; cf. 1, 4, 17–19, Smp. 4, 48). In his *Life of Euripides*, Satyrus (third century B.C.) characterized as Socratic the belief that nothing can be concealed from the gods (P.Oxy. 1176 fr. 39, 2, 8–22 – text as in Schorn 2004: 97):

(a) “*λ*άθραι | δὲ τοῦ[τ]ων δρωμένων τίνας | φοβῆι;”

(b) “*τ*οὺς | μείζονα βλ[έ]ποντας ἀ[ν-]|θρώπων θεούς.” (E. fr. 1007c Nauck-Snell) |

εἶη ἄν ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπόνοια | περ[ὶ] θεῶν [Σω-]|κρατική· τῶι | γὰρ ὄντι τὰ θνη|τοῖς ἀόρατα | τοῖς ἀθανάτοις | εὐκάτοπα.

(a) “Whom do you fear when these things are done in secret?”

(b) “The gods, whose sight is greater than that of mortals.”

A conception of this kind about the gods is surely or probably²¹ Socratic. For in reality what is unseen to human beings [mortals] is easily observed by the gods [immortals].

Other Platonic and Xenophontic materials point in a similar direction.²² While nobody should claim certainty about what the historical Socrates' religious beliefs were (or about most of his other beliefs, for that matter), a hard line on divine omniscience was an element in the Socratic tradition, at any rate.

²¹ For the optative, see Goodwin 1900: 79/§238.

²² Bailly remarks (236): “Joyal goes so far as to claim that the lack of absolute divine omniscience clashes with what we know about the historical Socrates (presumably he means the Socrates of the ‘early’ Platonic dialogues): it does not, even if we admit claims about the historical Socrates.” The presumption that I am thinking of the early Platonic dialogues is curious, since I do not adduce them as evidence; and Bailly nowhere takes into account the evidence of Xenophon or Satyrus, nor the discussions of modern scholars that I do cite (Joyal 2000: 78, 276/277). For further evidence and discussion on the tradition about Socrates' belief in divine omniscience and (especially) its relation to the Satyrus fragment, see Yunis 1988: 40/41; Schorn 2004: 236–238; also Dorion 2000: 68 (Xenophon).

If we apply this evidence from the Socratic tradition about divine omniscience, accept that the divine sign does indeed undergo a deification in this dialogue through its identification as θεός (and through the attachment to it of other characteristics; see below), and accept Bailly's line of reasoning about the operations of τὸ δαιμόνιον in this particular anecdote, it is hard not to conclude, from a literary perspective, that even though the sign intervened on the first two occasions on which Timarchus rose to carry out his plot, it chose not to do so on the third occasion because it was not triggered by Socrates' attention. That suggests capricious behaviour on the part of τὸ δαιμόνιον, a trait which is consistent with its presentation elsewhere in this dialogue and redolent of conceptions of deity in literary representations and in popular religious thought (this impression would not be so strong if the sign had not occurred two previous times). One will search in vain, however, for this characterization of the sign in Plato's indisputably genuine works.

(iii) A little later, Socrates invites Theages and his father Demodocus to hear²³ from others what he said about the destruction of the Athenian force sent to Sicily in 415 (129c8–d3). Most recently the sign occurred to him when Sannio (otherwise unknown) was setting sail with Thrasyllus to Ephesus (410 or 409). That being so (129d3/4), *πειραν δ' ἔξεστι νυνὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ σημείου εἰ ἄρα τι λέγει*, “In these circumstances it is possible to test the sign [to see] whether it turns out to be right.”

This sentence deserves more attention than it has received. It is not so much that the phrase *τι λέγει* appears as the predicate of the subject τὸ σημεῖον (understood, by prolepsis), though that feature may well be the first one to catch the attentive reader's eye. True, it looks suspicious: nowhere else in the Platonic Corpus is it said that the sign “speaks,” and the application of φωνή/ἡ φωνή to Socrates' sign, especially as the product of the sign (see p. 96/97 above), appears to have conditioned the language which occurs in this sentence. But *τι λέγει* is a familiar colloquial expression whose essential meaning is “says/is saying something important,” but whose implication is “makes sense,” “is right,” “means something,” i. e., “has some λόγος to it” (Joyal 2000: 278). The conditional clause *εἰ ἄρα τι λέγει* therefore raises the question whether the outcome of events will show that the sign “makes sense” and leaves open the possibility that it does not, i. e., that it οὐδὲν λέγει, “is nonsense,” “is wrong.” So while the argument could be

²³ ἀκούσεσθον: Bailly translates “you have heard” (2004: 84), Cobb “you will both have heard” (1992: 280), but the verb is future tense, “you [dual] will hear.” Socrates is telling stories which are unknown to Theages and his father.

made once again that our author has personalized τὸ δαιμόνιον in a way that we do not find elsewhere in the Corpus, the question whether τὸ σημεῖόν τι λέγει, “the sign is right,” does not in itself strengthen that case as much as may initially be thought.

Still, there is more to the trouble than these words. In the numerous instances in Plato in which τι λέγει follows εἰ (ἄρα), the context is always one which involves dialectic: Chrm. 159b8, Hp.Ma. 298c9–d1, Phd. 87b3, 95b8, R. 578d1, Crat. 432b4, Tht. 191c3, Lg. 792c5. What is more, in Platonic works the phrase πείραν [...] λαβεῖν is nearly always applied in contexts that involve dialectical procedure: Chrm. 171a4, Euthd. 275b5, Prt. 342a1, 348a2, a6, 349d1, Grg. 448a5 (other sources in Joyal 2000: 279); πειράομαι and ἀποπειράομαι are used for a similar purpose: Prt. 311b1, 341d8, Phd. 95b8, Tht. 154e1, 157c6. In Plato and some other authors ἀποπειράομαι also appears in connection with the testing of dreams or oracles.²⁴ It is hard to know whether that is how the verb is being used later by Theages, in 131a2 ἀποπειραθῆναι τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου; possibly this phrase is simply periphrastic for the fuller expression in 129d3/4, or perhaps Theages is misapplying what he heard earlier.

There is no way to avoid the conclusion that this sentence contains language that, in Plato, is characteristic of interlocutors and their examination.²⁵ If this phraseology is thought to be compatible with the activities of τὸ δαιμόνιον as it is presented elsewhere in the Platonic Corpus, then scholars who defend the Platonic character of this dialogue’s portrait of the divine sign ought to confront in detail the evidence presented here.²⁶

(II) We turn now to a section of the dialogue which has aroused as much debate and disagreement as any other part of this work. It comes immediately after Socrates has completed his four accounts of deliberations or

²⁴ Hdt. 1, 46, 2 (Croesus is subject) ἀπειρεῖτο τῶν μαντηῶν τῶν τε ἐν Ἑλλησι καὶ τοῦ ἐν Λιβύῃ; X. Cyr. 7, 2, 17 (Croesus is the speaker) ἀπειρώμην αὐτοῦ [sc. Ἀπόλλωνος] εἰ δύναται ἀληθεύειν; Pl. Phd. 60e2 (Socrates is the speaker) ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγει.

²⁵ Bailly 2004: 237 attempts to dismiss the force of πείραν [...] λαβεῖν: “πείραν λαβεῖν can be applied to other things [i. e., other than dialectical procedure: MJ] (cf. La. 189b5 for πείραν used of a non-dialectical trial), and so the usual pattern is not decisive.” He cites, however, no instances of πείραν λαβεῖν to demonstrate his point; the passage from La. to which he refers involves only πείραν, not πείραν λαβεῖν, and is therefore not relevant (Lg. 649d8 and e4 are the only possible exceptions in Plato).

²⁶ Jedrkiewicz’s consideration of genuinely Platonic evidence (2011a: 215–220) demonstrates just how unusual the sentence under discussion is.

events which were accompanied by an occurrence of his sign. Socrates is the speaker (129d9–130a4):

Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα εἶρηκά σοι, ὅτι ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας τῶν μετ’ ἐμοῦ συνδιατριβόντων τὸ ἅπαν δύναται. πολλοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐναντιοῦται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ὠφεληθῆναι μετ’ ἐμοῦ διατρίβουσιν, ὥστε οὐχ οἷόν τ’ ἐμοὶ τούτοις συνδιατρίβειν· πολλοῖς δὲ συννεῖναι μὲν οὐ διακωλύει, ὠφελοῦνται δὲ οὐδὲν συνόντες. οἷς δ’ ἂν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις, οὗτοί εἰσιν ὧν καὶ σὺ ἦσθησαι· ταχὺ γὰρ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόασιν. καὶ τούτων αὖ τῶν ἐπιδιδόντων οἱ μὲν καὶ βέβαιον ἔχουσι καὶ παραμόνιμον τὴν ὠφελίαν· πολλοὶ δέ, ὅσον ἂν μετ’ ἐμοῦ χρόνον ᾧσιν, θαυμάσιον ἐπιδιδόασιν, ἐπειδὴν δέ μου ἀπόσχονται, πάλιν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ὅτουσιν.

I have told you all these things because this power of this divine [sign] is all-powerful also in my associations with those who spend their time with me. For there are many people whom it obstructs, and it’s not for them to benefit (or to improve) by spending time with me, so that it isn’t possible for me to spend my time with them. There are many others with whom it doesn’t prevent me from associating, but they gain no benefit (or do not improve at all) while associating with me. But with whomever the power of the divine [sign] collaborates (or participates) in our association, these are the ones whom you have noticed, since they immediately make rapid progress. Of these ones who progress, in turn, some have improvement which is both solid and lasting. Many others achieve extraordinary progress for as long as they are with me, but whenever they keep away from me, they are again no better than anyone else.

In 129d9 ταῦτα δὴ πάντα refers to the stories which Socrates has just related (128d8–129d8; Joyal 2000: 280/281). His reason (ὅτι) for telling those stories, it turns out, is that (literally) “this power (or ability) of this divine [sign] is all-powerful also in my associations with those who spend their time with me.” “This power” must be a reference to the efficacy of τὸ δαιμόνιον as it is illustrated in the four preceding stories, namely the ability to forewarn bad outcomes for Socrates’ friends and thus to deter them (Joyal 2000: 50/51, 89/90, 281). Since the demonstrative adjective αὕτη (“this”) is used here, we should be able to conclude that the “power” which was described in the earlier stories is also the power which Socrates claims to be almighty in his “educational” associations. If his subsequent description of these associations were confined to the first two categories which he mentions – the many (πολλοῖς μὲν) whom the power of τὸ δαιμόνιον obstructs

(129e3–5), and the many (πολλοῖς δέ) whom it does not prevent but who nevertheless derive no benefit from their association with Socrates (129e6/7) – we might conclude (though it would be a generous concession) that his sign’s “power” or “ability” to “signal a prohibition” (σημαίνει ... ἀποτροπήν) from actions which his friends are about to undertake is rather different from its preventing or not preventing their association with him, and that his description of this ability as “all-powerful” in his associations is an exaggeration (at least). Although a breach of logic would be evident, we might not think that it is so excessive as to convict the author of a fatal incoherence.

These are not, however, the only kinds of association that interest Socrates. The one on which he wants to focus above all (see Joyal 2000: 51 n. 91, 282 [on 129e3–9]) involves those companions “with whom the power of the divine [sign] collaborates or participates in their associations.” The phrase ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις (“the power of the divine [sign]”) picks up ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου (“this power of this divine [sign]”) from only a few lines earlier and must have the same reference, namely, the sign’s apotroptic ability to forewarn disaster for Socrates’ friends or those about whom he is concerned. Is it possible to accept that claim about the sign’s power as being consistent with its activity as it is described in the section now under discussion and translated above (129d9–130a4)? The answer depends especially on interpretation of the words οἷς δ’ ἂν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις, in particular the verb συλλάβηται (see below).

But that is not the only consideration. Socrates has earlier emphasized that when the sign “signals” (σημαίνει), it is exclusively apotroptic; no exceptions are admitted (128d4–7 ἀεὶ μοι σημαίνει ... ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε· καὶ ἐάν τις μοι τῶν φίλων ... ἀποτρέπει καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ πράττειν). As we have seen, the two kinds of companion mentioned in 129e3–7 consist of those whom the sign prevents from associating with Socrates and those whom the sign does not prevent; neither of these sets makes any progress. Obviously one other class of associate has to be identified, namely those who do make progress through the time they spend with Socrates. Our author could have classified these people in a way that is entirely clear and consistent with the emphatic claim for an apotroptic nature in τὸ δαιμόνιον, using language that was well established for the purpose: “those whom [the power of] τὸ δαιμόνιον does not oppose and who immediately make rapid progress, these are the ones you’ve noticed ...,” e. g. οἷς δ’ ἂν οὐκ ἐναντιῶται [οἱ οὔς δ’ ἂν οὐ διακωλύη] ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις καὶ αὐτοὶ ταχὺ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδῶσιν, οὗτοί εἰσιν ὧν καὶ σὺ ἤσθησαι. Yet he chose not to

express himself in this way. That fact suggests, at the very least, that the words which he selected mean something different from the simple expression of the sign's apotrectic signal (esp. ἀποτρέπει, ἐναντιοῦται, διακωλύει) – perhaps that in this case it does not signal at all, and therefore that apotrecticism and protrecticism are beside the point.

From the outset, therefore, we have good cause to suppose that there are three concepts which are applied in this section to the sign's behaviour: ἐναντιοῦται (= ἀποτρέπει), with the result that some cannot make progress or even associate with Socrates; οὐ διακωλύει (= οὐκ ἀποτρέπει), with the result that others associate with Socrates but do not make progress; and, instead of the strictly consistent and logical οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται or οὐ διακωλύει, followed by a report of progress by certain of Socrates' associates, there is an apparently different concept, συλλαμβάνεται. Those who wish to defend the authenticity of Thg. or seek to defend the presentation of τὸ δαιμόνιον in this dialogue as consistent with that in other Platonic dialogues – i. e., as purely apotrectic – struggle with the implications of this word for our understanding of the behaviour of Socrates' divine sign. For example, Friedländer writes (1969: 34): in Thg. “it is said that the demonic power ‘lends support’ or ‘co-operates’ (συλλάβηται, 129ε), which does not indicate that the dialogue is not of Platonic origin. The author must have thought the two conceptions [i. e. (1) προτρέπει οὐδέποτε / ἄει σημαίνει ἀποτροπήν, and (2) συλλάβηται: MJ] compatible with each other. In the silence of the demonic, Socrates might also have felt and recognized an element of positive co-operation.” Cobb (1992: 275–277) resorts to an impossible translation of the Greek in order to accommodate the context to other Platonic texts (see n. 29 below). Bailly (2004: 244) had plenty of comparative material at his disposal (above all, through the resources of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*), but instead relied on broad generalization rather than a detailed examination of the relevant evidence. He suggests, for instance, that “[t]here are plausible ways for the sign to ‘co-operate in’ or ‘help’ the association without exceeding apotrecticism,” but he does not explain what these ways are, whether they are compatible with the other elements in the dialogue's depiction of τὸ δαιμόνιον, or whether the minimal test of “plausibility” is satisfactory in this case.²⁷ Zuckert (2009: 486–491) and Altman

²⁷ Bailly cites four of the passages which I had previously listed for their use of συλλαμβάνω (Joyal 2000: 282/283), but he does not comment on them. The only passages on which he does comment are: (1) Phd. 82e6/7, for which he quotes Burnet's translation ad loc.; but Burnet's rendering was intended specifically to illustrate the syntactical construction ὡς ἄν + opt., not the verb συλλαμβάνεται, and anyway that passage has the cognate noun

(2011: 23) do not mention the activity of τὸ δαιμόνιον as designated by συλλάβηται; those who are the object of the verb are simply assimilated with the ones with whom the sign does not prevent Socrates from associating.

There is a good deal of conjecture and untested assumption in all these accounts. Cobb and Friedländer (both defenders of the dialogue's authenticity) have at least recognized that with the appearance here of συλλάβηται there is an issue that needs to be confronted. But what they and all others who wish to mitigate that problem fail to do is analyze the meaning of the word on the basis of its usage and its contexts in Greek literature in general, often adopting instead the expedient of translating the verb in a way that is conducive to their interpretation. It is clear by now that a comprehensive philological examination must be undertaken for the use of this word in Thg.; indeed, that is the *sine qua non* for an understanding of our passage. The examination and analysis which forms the Appendix at the end of this article considers all relevant occurrences of συλλαμβάνω and συλλαμβάνομαι down to about the time of Aristotle. Since the question for us is whether the application of this verb to τὸ δαιμόνιον can be compatible with the tightly circumscribed activity αἰεὶ ... σημαίνει ... ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε, we should expect that, if the answer is a positive one, the "collaboration" or "complicity" or "cooperation" designated by the verb will either consist of prevention or prohibition, or express supportive or benevolent passivity, non-intervention, acquiescence or inactivity.

The results of the investigation in the Appendix, however, tell a different story and can be summarized as follows:

(1) The evidence from relevant prior and contemporary use of συλλαμβάνω / συλλαμβάνομαι (48 occurrences in 46 passages) does not support the claim that the verb can in itself be understood as consistent with an implicit protrepticism, i. e., that it ever conveys simply οὐκ ἀποτρέπει, οὐ διακωλύει, or οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται.

(2) A better case might be made that the collaboration expressed by the verb could consist of apotretic warnings (i.e., συλλαμβάνεται = σημαίνει ἀποτροπήν), but the assembled evidence provides little support for such a usage.

συλλήπτωρ, not the verb. Burnet's translation therefore provides no philological evidence for the meaning of our passage. (2) Th. 1, 118, 3, on which he states simply that the verb is here "used of an oracle helping." In his translation of the dialogue Bailly renders συλλάβηται as "furthers"; other translations are listed in Centrone 1997: 338 n. 7.

(3) The verb consistently conveys active assistance or collaboration; in one place (X. Mem. 2,3,18), συλλαμβάνειν is contrasted directly with διακωλύειν.

(4) Although the verb does not inherently express divine complicity or assistance in mortal actions, it is frequently used for just this purpose, to such an extent that it appears to be a favourite for conveying this concept, which was an important one for Greek religious feeling.

To argue that συλλάβηται is consistent with apotrepticism overlooks the fact that in this section apotrepticism has already been attributed to the divine sign, a mere four lines earlier (e3): πολλοῖς ... ἐναντιοῦται. If συλλάβηται implies apotrepticism, in what way or ways does that apotrepticism differ from the instances of apotrepticism which have just been mentioned? Does the putative apotrepticism of συλλάβηται occur after the divine sign has not prevented Socrates from associating with someone, so that those whom the sign συλλάβηται belong to the group that it οὐ διακωλύει? But those whom the sign οὐ διακωλύει have just been described; they are the ones who ὠφελοῦνται ... οὐδὲν συνόντες (e6/7). If there is another group, not mentioned by the author, whom the sign not only οὐ διακωλύει but also συλλάβηται, it hardly seems that the apotreptic “aid” which they receive is of the kind that the stories in 128d7–129d8 portray, since the circumstances of those stories do not demonstrate or support the assertion that the sign is “all-powerful” in συνουσία or any other kind of contact with Socrates. Most problematic of all is that in 129e1–fin. our author provides us with no material (unlike the μάρτυρες who appear in 128d7–129d8) to justify the claim that the supposed apotrepticism in συλλάβηται – of a kind to deserve the characterization “all-powerful” but differing from the apotrepticism designated by πολλοῖς ... ἐναντιοῦται, and sufficiently efficacious, in spite of its essentially negative nature, to enable immediate, rapid, lasting progress (129e8/9, 130a4/5, 130e5–7, cf. 128c3–5) – occurs during his συνουσία with another person. The degree to which this interpretation of συλλάβηται leads to confusion is demonstrated by the fact that Friedländer equates the verb with protrepticism (its non-intervention implies “an element of positive co-operation”; see p. 110 above), while Bailly thinks it implies apotrepticism. Each is able to come to a position opposite from the other’s because they are both arguing without a basis in evidence.

The only way to rescue the theory that συλλάβηται is consistent with apotrepticism is to appeal to the importance of context in the instances in which the word is found. In that case, however, we have to account for the fact that, as far as our extant evidence indicates, no writer down to the end of

the fourth century ever chose the verb for use in a context in which the verb's subject is clearly only acquiescent and passive yet thereby supportive, or where its subject's collaboration consists merely of prevention; that it is used in Thg. within a context which bears strong resemblances to numerous others that involve divine intervention and complicity; and that (again) the argument for the importance of context does not explain why a form of συλλαμβάνεται is employed here even though the standard verbs used to denote apotrecticism for Socrates' sign – ἀποτρέπει, διακωλύει and ἐναντιοῦται – were available and, indeed, were otherwise all employed by our author. If he wanted to describe the apotrectic behaviour of τὸ δαιμόνιον, he could hardly have found a more confusing and opaque way of doing it.²⁸

²⁸ Bailly points out (2004: 27) that “the examples of the divine sign's activities from 128d8 to 129d8 have little organic function,” yet he tries a different maneuver to save the purely apotrectic faculty for τὸ δαιμόνιον (2003: 105, 2004: 240; similarly Cobb 1992: 275 n. 16, 277): the assumption that the phrase ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις in 129e7/8 “shows that the daimonion engaged in non-apotrectic activity ... collapses ... and the argument with it, if, as appears most likely, ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις in e7f. refers to the same capacity (and activity) as the earlier ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου (e1f.). ... the earlier phrase refers to (as indeed it must) the power of the daimonion to foretell coming misfortune – a power that serves, according to Socrates' own account, an exclusively apotrectic function.” He concludes: “Since there is no reason not to assimilate the later phrase at e7 to the earlier one at e1, and since their mutual proximity and similarity strongly support that assimilation, we must conclude that the passage as a whole contains no evidence for non-apotrectic activity by the daimonion” (cf. 274: the sign “apparently helps [Bailly's emphasis] some to progress [the help must be in the form of apotrectic warnings, given 128d5]”). Bailly misses the point; apart from the fact that the problem involves more than simply the phrase ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις, there is no dispute over the relation between it and the earlier ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου, or about the reference of the earlier phrase to the divine sign's power to foretell calamity (see p. 108 above). To be sure, he may well be accepting and expressing what the author wants us to believe, that the earlier section (128d1–129d8) is coherent with the later section (129e1–131a10), hence 129e2 καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας τῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ συνδιατριβόντων, “also in my associations with ...”; see Joyal 2000: 91 n. 65. The real problem, however, is whether we can assume that the sign's apotrectic quality in the earlier section is the basic feature of the sign in the later section too. Excessive faith in the author's claims of the kind that Bailly and Cobb seem to show inevitably leads to a disregard of the fundamental questions that the interpreter must ask. To assume *a priori* that the author's argumentation is sound, trustworthy and true discourages examination of precisely those elements that might justifiably shake our confidence in him (e. g. συλλάβηται in 129e7/8, see above). Obviously we must exercise independent judgement and not simply take the author at his word; we have already seen an instance in which he contradicts himself (pp. 95–97 above). Cobb's interpretation is aided by translation of ἡ δύναμις αὕτη as “the same power” (1992: 275); and Bailly quotes the Greek of 129e1 as ἡ αὕτη δύναμις in

I conclude from the evidence that with the words οἷς δ' ἂν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις the author of Thg. is saying something about τὸ δαιμόνιον which is distinct from the two familiar actions ἀποτρέπει and οὐκ ἀποτρέπει (*vel sim.*) – distinct, in fact, from anything said about it elsewhere in the Platonic Corpus – and that συλλάβηται was chosen for this context because of its suitability, established by long practice, for expressing divine participation in or influence over mortal activity. The verb does not convey apotrecticism here any more than it does in its dozens of relevant occurrences elsewhere; instead it indicates that one of the characteristics of Socrates' sign in this dialogue is to intervene actively, positively and decisively in his associations with certain people. Those who claim that the verb is consistent with a purely apotrectic divine sign are obliged to explain (but have not done so) why our author chose this word over any of the verbs which occur elsewhere in Thg. and the rest of the Platonic Corpus to express the sign's warning about or acquiescence in a course of action, viz. ἀποτρέπει, διακωλύει and ἐναντιοῦται.

We are now in a better position to understand the author's claim that (literally) "this power or capacity of this divine [sign] is all-powerful also in my associations with those who spend their time with me" (129e1–3). The sign's power "is all-powerful" (τὸ ἅπαν δύναται) because, as it is characterized here, it plays a decisive role in all of Socrates' associations: it guarantees a person's progress through its collaboration in their association; it mandates a lack of progress through its non-occurrence and the assistance it witholds; and it prevents some associations altogether through its apotrectic occurrence. Similarly, it is not the case that some of those in whose associations the sign collaborates make immediate progress; they all do (οἷς δ' ἂν + aorist subjunctive).²⁹ The fact that it "is all-powerful" also explains

2003: 105. For Zuckert (2009: 486–491), who does not acknowledge an issue in the meaning of συλλάβηται, the coherence in this part of the dialogue does not require comment (the problems in our dialogue's presentation of τὸ δαιμόνιον are in general much more far-reaching than she acknowledges, esp. 489/490, 491 n. 16). For succinct recognitions of the problem at issue here, see Centrone 2009: 28; Lampe 2013: 405 and n. 49, 411; also Johnson 1996: 335/336.

²⁹ Cobb (1992: 276/277) apparently seeks to avoid this implication through his translation of e7–9: "Yet there are some among those whom [my emphasis] the power of the daimonic sign assists in our association who are the ones you have noticed, for they improve immediately." The true meaning of the Greek vitiates Cobb's contention that "in his reference to the assistance of the daimonic voice, rather than trying to account for the failure of some of his students by saying that those who succeed are assisted in some active way by the daimonic voice, Socrates is simply reiterating that those who benefit

the remarkably absolute prohibition against Socrates' association with those whom the sign obstructs: ε3–5 πολλοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐναντιοῦται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ὠφελθῆναι μετ' ἐμοῦ διατρίβουσιν, ὥστε οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἐμοὶ τούτοις συνδιατρίβειν. Socrates does not say, e. g., ὥστε οὐ δοκεῖ ἐμοὶ τούτοις συνδιατρίβειν, “so that I decide not to spend time with them” (which would imply Socrates' own volition), but rather ὥστε οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἐμοὶ κτλ., “so that it isn't possible for me etc.”; nor does he say, e. g., ὥστε οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἐμοὶ τούτους ὠφελεῖν, “so that it isn't possible for me to improve them” (which would imply Socrates' attempts, albeit unsuccessful), but ὥστε οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἐμοὶ τούτοις συνδιατρίβειν; cf. also καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ὠφελθῆναι μετ' ἐμοῦ διατρίβουσιν, “and it isn't possible or destined [Joyal 2000: 282] for them to improve ...”. We may decide to interpret this prohibition in such a way as to soften its categorical nature, as some have done (without textual basis), but we must nevertheless recognize and confront the language that our author has chosen to use here in preference over other possible formulations.

If συλλάβηται and the context in which it is applied suggest a fairly indeterminate kind of divine intervention and collaboration in Socrates' activities, the combination τὸ ἅπαν δύναται has some firmer connections with descriptions of divinity which need to be set out in detail (see also Joyal 1995: 55, 2000: 90/91, 281). A close variant of the phrase occurs three times in Homer's *Odyssey*: 4, 236/237 ἀτὰρ θεὸς ἄλλοτε ἄλλω / Ζεὺς ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε διδοῖ· δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα; 10, 305/306 μῶλυ δέ μιν καλέουσι θεοί· χαλεπὸν δέ τ' ὀρύσσειν / ἀνδράσι γε θνητοῖσι· θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα δύναται.³⁰ 14, 444/445 θεὸς δὲ τὸ μὲν δώσει, τὸ δ' εἰσείσει, / ὅτι κεν ᾧ θυμῷ ἐθέλη· δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα; cf. 4, 379/380 = 468/469 ἀλλὰ σύ πέρ μοι εἶπέ – θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασι – ὅς τις μ' ἀθανάτων πεδάα καὶ ἔδησε κελεύθου κτλ.³¹ But the expression δύνασθαι πάντα *vel sim.* is not only poetic, and not

from association with him are, of course, among those allowed to join his company by the daimonic voice's not protesting their inclusion.” In fact, Theages has noticed those who are assisted by τὸ δαιμόνιον because they are identical to, rather than a subset of, the group of associates who make immediate progress; see also Johnson 1996: 336 n. 434; Lampe 2013: 390/391 n. 25.

³⁰ N. b. gnomic τε, which indicates here “un fait permanent” (Ruijgh 1971: 648–650, on δέ τε); also in 4, 379/380 = 468/469 cited below. The formula may well have been traditional already by the time of the *Odyssey*'s composition.

³¹ Cf. also Hom. *Il.* 20, 242/243 Ζεὺς δ' ἀρετὴν ἀνδρεςσιν ὀφέλλει τε μινύθει τε / ὅπως κεν ἐθέλησιν· ὁ γὰρ κάρτιστος ἀπάντων; Archil. 130 West τοῖς θεοῖς ἴτ' εἰθεῖάπαντα· πολλάκις μὲν ἐκ κακῶν / ἀνδρας ὀρθοῦσιν μελαίνῃ / κειμένους ἐπὶ χθονί, / πολλάκις δ' ἀνατρέπουσι καὶ μάλ' εὖ βεβηκότας / ὑπτίους, κείνοις (δ') ἐπειτα πολλὰ γίνεται κακά, /

only early. We find it also in Plato, Lg. 901d2–8 AΘ. Πρῶτον μὲν θεοὺς ἀμφοτέροί φατε γινώσκειν καὶ ὄρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν πάντα, λαθεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι τῶν ὀπόσων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ· ταῦτη λέγετε ἔχειν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς; ΚΛ. Οὕτως. ΑΘ. Τί δέ; δύνασθαι πάντα ὀπόσων αὐτὴ δύναμις ἐστὶν θνητοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις; ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ συγχωρήσονται καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; Xenophon has it as well: Smp. 4, 48 οὗτοι τοίνυν οἱ πάντα μὲν εἰδότες πάντα δὲ δυνάμενοι θεοὶ οὕτω μοι φίλοι εἰσὶν ὥστε διὰ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μου οὔποτε λήθω αὐτοὺς οὔτε νυκτὸς οὔθ' ἡμέρας οὔθ' ὅποι ἂν ὀρῶμαι οὔθ' ὅ τι ἂν μέλλω πράττειν; Cyr. 8, 7, 22 εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως [sc. that the soul leaves the body at death] ἀλλὰ μένουσα ἢ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι συναποθνήσκει, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς γε τοὺς αἰεὶ ὄντας καὶ πάντ' ἐφορῶντας καὶ πάντα δυνάμενους [sc. φοβούμενοι] κτλ. The same idea is expressed more commonly through the adjectives παγκρατής and (in poetry) πανδαμάτωρ.

From all this evidence it should be clear that Socrates' claim that “the power of the divine sign τὸ ἅπαν δύναται” involves the same language that is familiar from its application to gods and divinities; in fact the phrase and its surrogates are applied only to them.³² The connection that this usage suggests is strengthened by the arbitrary behaviour with which τὸ δαιμόνιον is here invested, since that is a common feature of omnipotent gods in Greek culture and tradition. I drew attention earlier to this trait of the divine sign in Thg. (pp. 104 – 106 above) and have elsewhere cited and discussed some of

καὶ βίου χρήμητι πλανᾶται καὶ νόου παρήγορος; Pi. I. 5, 52/53 Ζεὺς τά τε καὶ τὰ νέμει, / Ζεὺς ὁ πάντων κύριος; see also West on Hes. Op. 5.

³² The kind of *figura etymologica* we see in ἡ δύναμις ... τὸ ἅπαν δύναται – i. e., “verb + cognate subject” – is much rarer than the common “verb + cognate object” (on which see KG I, 303–308, Fehling 1969: 156–158). Verb + cognate subject achieves some currency in archaic poetry but is very unusual in Attic prose (Fehling 1969: 159, 161); the only combination which shows any frequency is φύσις ... φύει/πέφυκε etc. in instances in which the noun governs a genitive and the verb is intransitive (“is by nature”), but it too is not at all common (cf. Pl. Plt. 266b1/2, R. 359c4–6, 433a5/6, Ti. 72b6/7, Lg. 875a1/2, Arist. EE 1247b23–26). The dearth of close parallels (D. 7, 7 ὅποτε γὰρ ἡ μὲν δύναμις ἡ ὑμετέρα ... μὴ δύναται ... σφάζειν κτλ. does not qualify) makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the special force (if any) of our case. The key, it seems to me, is to recognize that in this combination the essential term is not the noun but the verb, since τὸ ἅπαν δύναται is itself a formulaic expression and concept; it is also the element which expresses the main point in its sentence. As the topic of the ὄτι-clause, δύναμις appears in initial position and emphatically prefigures the active quality in τὸ δαιμόνιον (otherwise unparalleled in the Platonic Corpus), which will be made clear both by the appearance of τὸ ἅπαν δύναται and by the intervening syntactical elements. The noun δύναμις is therefore best analyzed in combination with its predicate τὸ ἅπαν δύναται, not in isolation from it. Possibly ἡ δύναμις ... τὸ ἅπαν δύναται conveys an elevated tone.

the most famous evidence from Greek literature in general (2000: 91, 281). The capricious behaviour of τὸ δαιμόνιον in this part of Thg. is especially clear: no reason is given why it should prevent Socrates' association with some people, allow his fruitless association with others, or actively contribute to the progress that still others make. The summary statement about the divine sign's behaviour which we find in 130e5–7 does nothing to weaken this impression of caprice: "That's what association with me is like, Theages: if it pleases the god, your progress will be very great and swift; otherwise, you won't have any" (quoted also p. 102 above).³³

Some have argued strenuously that this portion of Thg. does not present τὸ δαιμόνιον either in the guise of a god or as behaving capriciously. Bailly in particular has sought to deny the theistic implication of τὸ ἅπαν δύναται for Socrates' sign, not on the grounds that the phrase does not have associations with a common characteristic of gods in Greek thought (something which cannot be denied), but on the grounds that the divine sign is not a god.³⁴ Apart from the fact that he does sometimes accept the sign's equation with a god in this dialogue (see p. 104 above), his argument is question-

³³ Generally τῷ θεῷ/τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον (all instances are collected in n. 20 above) expresses the speaker's belief that an outcome was not, is not or will not be in his control or that it defies human explanation (something more than simply "pious reservation," as De Vries on Phdr. 246d3).

³⁴ See Bailly 2004: 241/242. His discussion of τὸ ἅπαν δύναται is restricted to a consideration of whether τὸ ἅπαν is being used here in a "strong" or "weak" sense, and therefore whether the omnipotence which is presented is "absolute" or "limited" (following Cobb [1992: 275], he translates the phrase, "is altogether effective"). The discussion is not really to the point, since the argument to which he is responding does not suggest that absolute omnipotence is a possibility either for τὸ δαιμόνιον or for Greek gods of cult or literature. Nor is the observation that "Socrates has not indicated that it [i. e., τὸ δαιμόνιον] has signalled anything to him about Theages, nor about Thucydides or Aristides" an argument against the sign's omnipotence, since "signalling" is not the only or main way in which it would manifest its omnipotence; as we have seen, it would do so especially through its "collaboration" (συλλάβηται), and that would be a more subtle thing to assess. The instance of τὸ πᾶν which forms the basis for his argument that the phrase can be used in a "limited" sense (Ap. 32d3) is in fact the only potential comparandum in Plato (though not the only instance of τὸ πᾶν/τὸ ἅπαν). It is also less useful than may at first appear, since it is part of a statement that gains its force as a result of rhetorical emphasis and antithesis, not philosophical reasoning: for death (θανάτου μὲν), Socrates has not even the slightest concern (ἐμοὶ ... μέλει ... οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν), but as for not doing anything unjust or unholy, for that (τούτου δέ) he is entirely concerned (τὸ πᾶν μέλει). To argue against this sentence that Socrates does after all care for other things in addition to avoiding unjust and unholy acts (and that τὸ πᾶν is therefore being used in a "limited" way) is to miss Plato's rhetorical purpose.

begging in any case: it is precisely the nature of τὸ δαιμόνιον that we are trying to determine, and if the dialogue's author applies language to it which is conventionally attached to a god, then we may be justified in concluding that our author wants his readers to think of the divine sign in Thg. as a god. We cannot simply assume and assert that in this dialogue it is not a god, and then use that assumption as the basis for denying evidence that does not comport with the assumption. Weaker still is Bailly's defence of the divine sign against the charge that it is portrayed here as capricious by nature (2004: 242/243):

Although Greek gods are capricious in tragedy and epic, nonetheless the philosophical tradition starting with Xenophanes denied that the gods were capricious, and even within the less philosophical literature, the gods are not always capricious. Hence we cannot, with Joyal, 281, and [1995], 55, assume that the sign acts with no motive or plan in its occurrences based on supposedly frequent concomitancy of gods and capricious or arbitrary behavior in Greek culture generally. Rather, we ought to give Socrates credit for being capable of conceiving of a rational god, and that god credit for having some reason behind its actions.

My justification for characterizing the sign in Thg. as capricious in its behaviour is not grounded in generalizations about gods in Greek culture but in close analysis of the way in which our author has chosen to present the sign in this dialogue. Whatever Greek philosophers believed to be the motives behind divine actions, and irrespective of whether we can generalize about those beliefs, that speculation is of little or no relevance to the determination of whether τὸ δαιμόνιον in Thg. itself behaves capriciously or arbitrarily. Moreover, whether Socrates should be given credit for the ability to conceive of a rational god is a separate (historical) question from whether in this dialogue he shows evidence of viewing his divine sign in this way, or from whether he is capable of conceiving simultaneously of a rational god and a capricious divine sign (an issue which does not arise in Thg.). Readers should be prepared to credit Socrates' sign in Thg. with rational motives for its actions if they can identify evidence in the text for such motives, but as far as I can see in the section under discussion (129e1 – 130e4), at any rate, there is none. Bailly's speculation and assumptions can only have been founded upon a consideration of Socrates' religious attitudes as understood from other works in the Platonic Corpus, and upon the presentation of Socrates' sign in its other occurrences in Plato (see n. 16 above for Bailly's basic principle of interpretation).

(III) So far in the dialogue there has been no hint about the nature of the sign's "collaboration," but by now we are beginning to recognize at least that, remarkably enough, τὸ δαιμόνιον shares some traits with many anthropomorphic deities in Greek literature. It is, or it possesses, a voice (unqualified); it is a collaborator or accomplice in certain human activities; it is labelled and described as "all-powerful," yet there is a suggestion that its prophetic accuracy can be put to the test; and it may behave capriciously, apparently according to its whim. Consistently with these traits, our author's portrayal of Socrates' sign is developed within a context that is overlaid with literary themes and story-telling elements both large and small (Joyal 2000: 264–290 *passim*). The portrait that he has drawn, moreover, goes some distance towards presenting τὸ δαιμόνιον as a guardian δαίμων – uniquely in Platonic works, as I have argued elsewhere.³⁵

It is at this stage, immediately after the passage just analyzed, that Socrates tells a story (130a4–e4) about whose meaning there is profound disagreement:

τοῦτό ποτε ἔπαθεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου υἱὸς τοῦ Ἀριστείδου. διατρίβων γὰρ μετ' ἐμοῦ πάμπολυ ἐπεδεδόκει ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· ἔπειτα αὐτῷ στρατεία τις ἐγένετο καὶ ᾗχετο ἐκπλέων, ἥκων δὲ κατελάμβανε μετ' ἐμοῦ διατρίβοντα Θουκυδίδην τὸν Μελησίου υἱὸν τοῦ Θουκυδίδου. ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης τῇ προτεραίᾳ μοι δι' ἀπεχθείας ἐν λόγοις τισὶν ἐγεγόνει· ἰδὼν οὖν με ὁ Ἀριστείδης, ἐπειδὴ ἠσπάσατό τε καὶ τᾶλλα διελέχθη, "Θουκυδίδην δέ," ἔφη, "ἀκούω, ὦ Σώκρατες, σεμνύνεσθαι ἅττα πρὸς σε καὶ χαλεπαίνειν ὡς τι ὄντα." "Ἔστι γάρ," ἔφη ἐγώ, "οὕτως." "Τί δέ; οὐκ οἶδεν," ἔφη, "πρὶν σοὶ συγγενέσθαι οἷον ἦν ἀνδράποδον;"³⁶ "Οὐκ ἔοικέν γε," ἔφη ἐγώ, "μὰ τοὺς θεοῦς." "Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ αὐτὸς γε," ἔφη, "καταγελάστως ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες." "Τί μάλιστα;" ἔφη ἐγώ. "Ὅτι," ἔφη, "πρὶν μὲν ἐκπλεῖν, ὄψοι ἄνθρώπων

³⁵ See Joyal 2000: 73–75; Jedrkiewicz 2011b: 155/156. Although it is Theages, not Socrates, who makes the proposal (131a4–7) to win over τὸ δαιμόνιον "with prayers, sacrifices and whatever else the seers prescribe" (εὐχαῖσι τε καὶ θυσίαις καὶ ἄλλῳ ὅτῳ ἂν οἱ μάντις ἐξηγῶνται), that proposal, though perhaps reflecting some misapprehension about the sign, is at least consistent with the terms in which Socrates has presented it (see Joyal 2000: 293/294). Moreover, if Theages' assumptions about the sign here are mistaken, Socrates declines to correct him, even though he did so at 128d1/2 and implicitly at 129e5, both times in regard to the nature of τὸ δαιμόνιον (see pp. 132/133 below).

³⁶ So Cobet, against the *paradosis* τὸ ἀνδράποδον; see Joyal 1991: 423/424. Bailly's defence of τὸ ἀνδράποδον (2004: 249) is based on the belief that ἀνδράποδον is an adjective, not a noun. Lampe (2013: 401) translates "what a slave he was" but reads τὸ ἀνδράποδον.

οἷός τ' ἦν διαλέγεσθαι καὶ μηδενὸς χείρων φαίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὥστε καὶ ἐδίωκον τὰς συνουσίας τῶν χαριεστῶν ἀνθρώπων, νυνὶ δὲ τοῦναντίον φεύγω ἂν τινα καὶ αἰσθάνωμαι πεπαιδευμένον· οὕτως αἰσχύνομαι ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ φαυλότητι.” “Πότερον δέ,” ἦν δ' ἐγώ, “ἐξαίφνης σε προύλιπεν αὕτη ἡ δύναμις ἢ κατὰ σμικρόν;” “Κατὰ σμικρόν,” ἦ δ' ὅς. “Ἦνίκα δέ σοι παρεγένετο,” ἦν δ' ἐγώ, “πότερον μαθόντι παρ' ἐμοῦ τι παρεγένετο ἢ τιτι ἄλλω τρόπῳ;” “Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ,” ἔφη, “ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄπιστον μὲν νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀληθὲς δέ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔμαθον μὲν παρὰ σοῦ οὐδὲν πάποτε, ὡς αὐτὸς οἶσθα· ἐπεδίδουν δὲ ὅποτε σοι συνείην, κἂν εἰ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μόνον οἰκία εἶην, μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ οἰκήματι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκήματι, καὶ ἔμοιγε ἐδόκουν πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκήματι ὢν λέγοντός σου βλέπομι πρὸς σέ, μᾶλλον ἢ ὅποτε ἄλλοσε ὀράην, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πλεῖστον ἐπεδίδουν ὅποτε παρ' αὐτόν σε καθήμην ἐχόμενός σου καὶ ἀπτόμενος· νῦν δέ,” ἦ δ' ὅς, “πᾶσα ἐκείνη ἢ ἕξις ἐξεργήκεν.”

This once happened to Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, who was the son of Aristides. By spending his time³⁷ with me he had made great progress in a short time; then some expedition came up for him, and he was gone and sailed off. When he returned he found Thucydides, the son of Melesias, who was the son of Thucydides, spending his time with me. The day before, Thucydides had had some harsh words with me. When Aristides saw me he greeted me and we talked about this and that; he said, “I hear that Thucydides is putting on airs with you and is annoyed as though he’s really something.” “That’s how it is,” I said.

“Well, doesn’t he know what kind of slave he was before he was associating with you?” “It looks as though he doesn’t, by the gods,” I said. “Well, I’m in a ridiculous condition myself, Socrates.” “Why exactly,” I said. “Because,” he said, “before I sailed off, I could carry on a discussion with anyone and look as good as anybody in our arguments, so that I even pursued associations with the most cultivated people; but now, on the contrary, I avoid a person if I even sense that he’s educated. That’s how ashamed I am at my own mediocrity.”

“Did this ability abandon you all at once, or little by little?,” I said. “Little by little,” he said. “When it was present in you,” I said, “was it present in you because you had learned something from me, or in some other way?” “I’ll tell you something, Socrates,” he said, “that is unbelievable, by the

³⁷ Bailly translates διατρίβων “by spending a lot of time” (my emphasis), which is both mistaken and possibly contradicted by “in a short time” (ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ) a few words later (he leaves διατρίβοντα untranslated shortly after, 130a8).

gods, but true. For I never learned anything from you, as you yourself know. But I improved whenever I was with you, even if I was only in the same house but not in the same room, but more so whenever I was in the same room. And I thought I improved much more whenever I was in the same room and looked at you while you were talking, more than when I was looking elsewhere. But I improved by far the most and the furthest whenever I sat³⁸ right beside you, holding you and touching you. But now,” he said, “that condition has flowed out of me entirely.”³⁹

³⁸ Bailly mistranslates καθήμην as “lay” in his introduction (2004: 23/24), in his translation (85), and repeatedly in his commentary (256, 258, 259). His note on καθοίμην [sic] itself (260) does not correct the mistake, which he compounds by writing (in 256) that Socrates “lay next to [Aristides] and touched him” (also in 256: “Aristides tells us that Socrates’ mere presence, gaze, and touch were sufficient to make him an accomplished conversationalist, speaker ...”; cf. 26: “his [i. e., Socrates’] associates feel stimulated by his presence, gaze, and touch”; 30: “Theages may also receive an inexplicable something from Socrates merely through his presence, gaze and touch”; also 43, 220, 275, 277). As we shall see, this misrepresentation of the scene has important implications for Bailly’s interpretation of this part of Thg. I suspect that it was inspired by Smp., which he quotes and references extensively in 256 – 260 (cf. esp. 218b8 – 219d2, with 219b7 κατακλινείς and c1 κατεκείμεν, the two verbs of basic meaning for “lie down,” both occurring many times in Smp.; cf. also Phdr. 255e2 – 256a5). For similar confusion over the subject of ἐχόμενός σου καὶ ἀπτόμενος, see Altman (n. 52 below) and (apparently) Mineo 2008: 6/7. For κάθημαι in Socratic scene-setting (both Platonic and extra-Platonic), see Joyal 2000: 290, 296. The image of the seated Socrates is also familiar in various artistic media: a fourth-century A. D. mosaic from Apamea (Richter 1965: 82, fig. 315; Hanfmann 1951), a second-century A. D. Roman marble sarcophagus (Lapatin 2006: 116, fig. 8, 7), a famous first-century A. D. fresco from Ephesus (Lapatin 2006: 117, fig. 8, 8), and a second-century A. D. (?) terracotta caricature, possibly from Cnidus (Bailey 1974).

³⁹ Zuckert (2009: 489) interprets this sentence: “They [sc., in Zuckert’s reading, those with whom the divine sign does not prevent Socrates from associating, but in reality, those with whom the power of the divine sign collaborates in their associations with Socrates] forget what they have learned as soon as they leave him.” Apart from the fact that Aristides’ ability (ἡ δύναμις) abandoned him “little by little,” not “as soon as he left” Socrates (130c7/8; and ἀπόσχονται in 130a3/4 implies a prolonged absence), the text itself says nothing about “forgetting”; nor could it, since Aristides states (and assumes Socrates’ agreement) that he “never learned anything” from Socrates (d4/5 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔμαθον μὲν παρὰ σοῦ οὐδὲν πρόποτε, ὡς αὐτὸς οἶσθα). The claim that Socrates’ associates “forget” what they have “learned” from Socrates is incoherent with the content and carefully chosen language of this part of the dialogue (see Joyal 2000: 290, on πᾶσα ... ἐξεργήκεν). Bailly too (2004: 260/261) connects ἐξεργήκεν with “forgetting,” but the parallels which he cites do not demonstrate that meaning (his Epicurean example is in 34, 32, 20, not 31, 32, 20).

In itself the passage indicates two experiences clearly enough: an unelaborated kind of “improvement” (ἐπιδιδόναι) in λόγοι and διαλέγεσθαι, and the influence of Socrates’ physical presence on his associates. The latter experience is acknowledged by all commentators as erotic in some way or other: the closer an associate is to Socrates, the greater his improvement; the greatest improvement is made when he sits right beside Socrates and touches him. What the structural significance of this description may be for the rest of the dialogue, however, is the real point of contention. One datum which no interpreter can simply ignore is Socrates’ earlier emphatic assertion (128b1–6) of a knowledge in “the things that have to do with eros (τὰ ἐρωτικά)”:

οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐπίσταμαι τῶν μακαρίων τε καὶ καλῶν μαθημάτων – ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἄν–ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγω δήπου ἀεὶ ὅτι ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος πλὴν γε μικροῦ τινος μαθήματος, τῶν ἐρωτικῶν. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ μάθημα παρ’ ὄντινόν ποιοῦμαι δεινὸς εἶναι καὶ τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν νῦν.

I know none of those blessed and fine skills [viz. which the sophists know] – would that I did – but I even say always, of course (or as you know), that I actually know virtually nothing except a rather small skill,⁴⁰ namely the things that have to do with eros. At this skill I am reputed to be adept beyond anyone⁴¹ who has come before me or is alive today.

⁴⁰ With understatements of just this kind Socrates frequently introduces a matter of fundamental importance for his discussion (Joyal 2000: 37, 215, 260); cf. Döring 2004: 48: “Daß es sich bei diesem Wissen nicht, wie er behauptet, um ‘ein kleines Wissensgebiet’ (σικρόν τι μάθημα, 128b4) handelt, sondern ein ganz umfassendes – nämlich die rechte Erziehung –, versteht sich von selbst. Ironische Minimalisierungen dieser Art sind aus den Dialogen Platons hinreichend bekannt”; also Trabattoni 1998: 197/198. Bailly (2004: 217) considers the Platonic parallels that Döring and I have listed as “inapposite” because in the present case “there is no clear and explicit discussion” of the “small” exception that Socrates introduces. Apart from the question whether Bailly’s is a significant distinction, it fails to countenance the possibility that the idea conveyed by the expression will be developed in the remainder of the dialogue, perhaps implicitly, or the possibility that it is one of our author’s techniques to exploit and modify familiar Platonic expressions and devices for his own special purposes.

⁴¹ Or “as adept as anyone,” which is nearly as emphatic. The use of παρά + acc. in a comparative expression usually conveys superiority (so LSJ s.v. C.I.7); its combination here with τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν νῦν makes this sense nearly certain, as the discussion in Fraenkel, Agamemnon, Oxford 1950: 2, 267–269 demonstrates.

Friedländer (1965: 152) takes his cue from this passage and interprets the later story about Aristides as an expression of Socratic eros and a demonstration of its power in his educational relationships; similarly Pangle (1987: 167, 169–171) sees the combination of these two passages as justifying the identification in Thg. of the theme of educative Socratic eros, while Lampe (2013: 389) recognizes “erotic ‘understanding’ and ‘learning’ as key elements of [Socrates’] educational impact.” Whether one agrees with the details of their interpretations or with their conclusions, their impulse is surely correct: Socrates’ claim that his only skill is in τὰ ἐρωτικά is made with such emphasis (n. b. 128b3–6 δῆπου, αἰεί, σμικροῦ τινος μαθήματος, τοῦτο μέντοι, and παρ’ ὄντινῶν ... τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν νῦν; Joyal 2000: 37–39, 259/260) that we are compelled to look for the reason behind it. It is methodologically unsatisfactory simply to conclude that the relevance of the powerful claim in 128b1–6 cannot be determined, or that there is none.⁴² Implausible in itself, the argument against the structural integrity of 128b1–6 is reduced to an even lower level of probability by the still-earlier allusion to and possible quotation (Joyal 2000: 238) of Anacreon in 125d10–e3 (fr. 449 PMG):

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἄπερ ἔφη Ἀνακρέων τὴν Καλλικρίτην ἐπίστασθαι· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα τὸ ἄσμα;

ΘΕ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τοιαύτης τινὸς καὶ σὺ συνουσίας ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀνδρὸς ὅστις τυγχάνει ὁμότεχνος ὢν Καλλικρίτη τῇ Κυάνης καὶ ἐπίσταται τυραννικά, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην ἔφη ὁ ποιητής, ἵνα καὶ σὺ ἡμῖν τύραννος γένη καὶ τῇ πόλει;

⁴² So Bailly 2004: 23 (“an utterly puzzling statement”), 27/28 (“[the disavowal of knowledge and the claim to erotic knowledge] are left so mysterious as to be utterly frustrating. ... After they occur, nothing integrates them into the dialogue”), 36 (“a riddle”; “The Theages’ reader and Theages ... are left with just the disavowal, and no explanation or even pieces of one to cobble together”), 37 (a “gimmick”); also 40–42, 44/45, 46, 214–220. Bailly for the most part treats Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge and his claim to an unequalled expertise in τὰ ἐρωτικά as two discrete utterances (e. g. 2004: 35–37). Most of his attention is paid to the disavowal of knowledge, and he downplays the significance of Socrates’ positive claim (see also n. 40 above), but these are in fact two ingredients in one syntactically seamless expression, viz. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ... πλὴν γε κτλ. (see Joyal 2000: 259 [on b3 αἰεί]; γε here points πλὴν, “except, that is, ...”). If anything, b4–6 τοῦτο μέντοι ... τῶν νῦν demonstrates that the author’s emphasis and interest lie primarily in the claim to a knowledge of τὰ ἐρωτικά, not in the disavowal of knowledge.

Socrates: This is just what Anacreon said that Kallikrite was skilled in; or don't you know the song?

Theages: I do.

Socrates: Well, do you too desire an association of some such kind with a man who actually practises the same craft as Kyane's daughter, Kallikrite, and is skilled in the things that have to do with tyranny, as the poet said that she was – so that you might become a tyrant over us and the city?

Just what did Anacreon say and mean in the part of his poem to which Socrates refers? Two basic proposals have been offered: either the words mean just what they seem to say, that Kallikrite, daughter of Kyane, was knowledgeable (ἐπίσταται), in a practical or theoretical sense, in matters that have to do with political tyranny (τυραννικά); or the words are being applied metaphorically, so that Kallikrite's knowledge or skill was in erotic "tyranny." Does either of these proposals represent the truth?

The alternatives here seem clear. If the first is accepted, then we have to believe that (1) Kallikrite was characterized by her political wisdom, or was herself an absolute ruler; (2) she was sufficiently famous for her possession of this quality or this position that Socrates could be confident of her recognition by a slight reference to a poem by Anacreon; and yet (3) the historical record about this extraordinary woman has been otherwise completely lost or suppressed. Let us weigh this alternative against the straightforward claims of the other proposal: (1) the Anacreontic fragment is the product of a poet who was associated in the ancient world with themes of eros above all;⁴³ (2) the metaphor of eros as tyranny, or the lover as erotic tyrant, was one which many ancient Greek (and Roman) poets used, including, it seems, Anacreon himself, and which Plato himself knew and used;⁴⁴ (3) τοιαύτης

⁴³ For the ancient testimonia on Anacreon and his poetry, see Campbell 1998: 23–39 *passim* (with accompanying notes); Joyal 1990a: 123 n. 5. The erotic nature of Anacreon's oeuvre is skilfully demonstrated in Rosenmeyer 1992: 12–49, and MacLachlan 1997: 201–211. For the erotic elements in the (fifth-century?) statue of Anacreon on the Athenian Acropolis ("Anakreon Borghese"), see Shapiro 2012.

⁴⁴ For full details and argument see Joyal 1990a, 1990b and 2000: 30–32 (with nn.) and 238 (with n. 20); Luzzatto 1990 (cf. Lambin 2002: 82/83); also now Molino 1998: 320 and n. 14; Nucci 2001; Döring 2004: 37; Tarrant 2005: 132; Müller 2010: 65; Lampe 2013: 388; Davis and Grewal 2013: 42. Bailly himself acknowledges (2004: 180/181) that the second alternative is "attractive" but holds to agnosticism in stating that my four Platonic parallels (he is silent on the many others which I cite from Greek and Latin literature) "are parallels to a best guess about what Anacreon intended: we do not have Anacreon's full poem." In making this assessment he mentions none of the scholarly works referenced above, the first two and the fourth of which are cited in the third. The true but facile

τινὸς ... συνουσίας, “an association of some such kind” (125d13), implies something about the activity of Kallikrite, at least as it was presented in the poem. Whether or not the word συνουσία appeared there, some form of “association” or “interaction” must have taken place, and in an Anacreontic poem that concept seems more compatible with the topic of eros than politics (συνουσίας in d13 would then carry a double entendre).⁴⁵ The first alternative involves more than one improbability; the second, already objectively strong by the nature of the case, is only enhanced by the weakness and implausibility of the first.

If this assessment of Socrates’ appeal to the Anacreon fragment is broadly correct (given the exiguous nature of the fragment we cannot, of course, argue the details of the case with confidence), three important points emerge: (1) Socrates’ reference to his knowledge of τὰ ἐρωτικά in 128b1–6 is not the first occasion in the dialogue (nor will it be the last) in which the topic of eros is raised; the first instance brings up only coyly what the second announces emphatically. (2) This passage is the first of two in which Theages accuses Socrates of having fun at his expense (125e4 πάλαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκώπτεις καὶ παίζεις πρὸς με); the other comes immediately after Socrates has apparently turned down Theages’ request that he become his teacher on the grounds that the only μάθημα he possesses is an unsurpassed knowledge of τὰ ἐρωτικά (128c1 ταῦτα παίζων πρὸς ἡμᾶς λέγει). On both occasions, in other words, Theages’ irritation is piqued by his assumption that in raising the topic of eros Socrates is not taking him seriously.⁴⁶ (3)

statement that we do not have Anacreon’s full poem (a similar observation could be made of most of the surviving evidence for Greek lyric) does not obviate the need to assess in detail the validity of the proposal or the consequences for interpretation if the proposal is correct. For if it is correct, Socrates’ hint at or reference to erotic expertise in two places must be explained, especially in light of the later story about Aristides.

⁴⁵ Bailly construes τῶν τῶν τινὸς with ἀνδρὸς, “the company of some such man” (2004: 80, 180), an error which obscures the possible clue τῶν τῶν τινὸς provides about the erotic content of the poem. The contrast between τῶν τῶν τινὸς καὶ σὺ συνουσίας ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀνδρὸς ὅστις κτλ. here and ἀξιοῖς σου τὸν πατέρα τόνδε ἐξευρεῖν ἀνδρὸς τινος συνουσίαν τοιοῦτου ὅστις σε σοφὸν ποιήσει; earlier in 122e2/3 is suggestive: the emphasis shifts from the kind of person (ἀνδρὸς τινος ... τοιοῦτου) Theages desires to the kind of association (τῶν τῶν τινὸς ... συνουσίας) he wants. The shift is another way in which this passage looks ahead to a moment in the dialogue when Theages will turn his search away from other potential “teachers” to Socrates himself, whose συνουσία is the most remarkable thing about him; see pp. 126/127 below.

⁴⁶ Bailly, who minimizes the role of eros in this dialogue, argues that Theages’ irritation is provoked rather by Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge than by his claim to erotic expertise (2004: 221): “If Socrates has benefitted others, then Socrates’ apparent unwillingness to

Socrates' question to Theages at d13–e3 – i. e., whether he wants association (συνουσία) with a man who is ὁμότεχνος with Kallikrite – is a foreshadowing of Theages' later appeal for association with Socrates, of Socrates' concession that his only skill is in τὰ ἐρωτικά, and of Socrates' agreement in the end that he will provisionally take Theages on as his charge.⁴⁷

While our author skilfully anticipated the story about Aristides through reference or allusion to eros and its connection with Socrates, he prepared the ground for the description of Aristides' experience more broadly. For the general topic of association between two people, including physical closeness, permeates the whole dialogue by means of the many (nearly 40) instances of the noun συνουσία and the verbs συνεῖναι, συγγίγνεσθαι and (συν)διατριβῶ (the first at 122a4, near the beginning of Thg., the last at 131a5, its tail-end).⁴⁸ Harold Tarrant has recently demonstrated through careful analysis (2005: 131–138) not only how central the theme of “association” and “being together” is in Thg. but in particular how exceptional on this account Thg. is within the Platonic Corpus. Now, most of the occurrences of those words do not have unambiguously erotic undertones, either outside the section under discussion or within it, yet the general theme of συνουσία provides a context in which the charged topic of τὰ ἐρωτικά finds expression. It is what distinguishes Socratic συνουσία in Thg.: the one extended association which is described in this dialogue, that with Aristides,⁴⁹ is memorable for its account of the incredible (130d3 ἄπιστον, cf. a2 θαυμάσιον) effect of physical proximity and contact with Socrates himself. There is nothing unusual about τὰ ἐρωτικά *per se*, of

comply with Theages' request must be mockery seems to be the logic” [sic] (cf. 36: “Theages seems to think Socrates does know something: otherwise he would not accuse Socrates of making fun.”). As I pointed out above (n. 42), however, the emphasis in 128b1–6 is squarely on the “one small area of knowledge” to which Socrates does lay claim, i. e., τὰ ἐρωτικά, and not on his disavowal of knowledge, which serves largely as a foil to the positive claim. Lampe recognizes the importance of eros in Thg. but similarly sees Theages' first response as directed towards Socrates' “verbal game” and the second as a “reaction to Socrates' declaration of ignorance” (2013: 414/415).

⁴⁷ For Socrates' implicit acknowledgement (as proposed here) that he practises the same τέχνη as a woman, cf. Tht. 149a1–5, where the acknowledgement is explicit: Theaetetus has heard that Socrates is the son of a midwife, Phaenarete, but he answers οὐδαμῶς (a5) to the paradoxical question that follows (a4): ἄρα καὶ ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην ἀκήκοας;

⁴⁸ See Joyal 2000: 48/49; also Jedrkiewicz 2011b: 153/154; Davis and Grewal 2013: *passim*.

⁴⁹ The meeting with Theages himself is only preliminary and too brief to count, the one with Thucydides (130a7–b8) described in too little detail, and mainly as a foil for Aristides.

course, but the instantiation of it in Aristides' story is something else altogether.⁵⁰

I am aware that the existence of this connection between Socrates' profession of an expertise in τὰ ἐρωτικά (along with his allusion to it earlier in the dialogue) and the story about Aristides is not accepted by everyone. Since the connection is important for our understanding of the dialogue, these objections must be confronted. Döring (2004: 46) believes that "Innerhalb des Dialoges steht diese Bemerkung [sc. the claim to expertise] völlig isoliert da; weder vorher noch nachher wird sie in irgendeiner Weise kommentiert." Bailly not only does not accept that the profession of expertise has a connection with anything else in the dialogue (see n. 42 above), he also thinks that Aristides' experience "may not even be erotic" (2004: 24), though his discussion of 130e1–3 (255–260, cf. 277) leaves considerable doubt about his final verdict. His discussion, however, is undermined, first by his mistranslation of καθήμην (130e2) here and throughout his book as "lay" rather than "sat" (see n. 38 above), and then by his invention (256) of an extra-textual relationship between Socrates and Aristides.⁵¹ The result is

⁵⁰ The emphasis on the irrational in this account is supported by the hyperbolic way in which Aristides expresses himself; see Joyal 2000: 284. Belfiore (2012: 18/19) makes the interesting observation that the four Platonic "erotic" dialogues (Alc. I, Lys., Phdr., Smp.) all take place in private settings, where the narrator or interlocutors can speak freely. A similar motive may have been in our author's mind, for the dialogue's siting in a discreet location (see Joyal 2000: 201) is underscored by the appearance in its first sentence of the rare ἰδιολογήσασθαι, "to have a private discussion (with)," which, after its occurrence in Thg. (the first in our surviving evidence), does not appear with certainty again in extant sources until Philo, and hardly ever after that (Joyal 2000: 197; cf. Davis and Grewal 2013: 37, 38/39). Bailly rightly points out (2004: 103; so also Aronadio 2008: 263 n. 2) that the ἰδιο- and λογ- elements in this word were available from an early time to anyone who wanted to use (or coin?) this compound, but that fact makes the rarity of the word in surviving evidence, and the word itself, all the more striking. He also claims (103 n. 5) that the ἰδιολογ- stem is common in Epicurus, but examination of his evidence shows the opposite: neither ἰδιολογία nor ἰδιολογέομαι appears in LSJ suppl.; 2,36 Usener = ad Pyth. 87, 1, not = Epist. Frag. 109, 17 as Bailly claims, so ad Pyth. 87, 1 does not provide evidence additional to 2,36 Usener (where ἰδιολογία is a conjecture); and Epist. Frag. 119, 17 Arrighetti (not 109, 17) turns out to be the only possible occurrence of the stem in Epicurus, though its restoration – ἰ[δι]ολ[ογη]σά[με]νο[ς] – is far from assured.

⁵¹ "Socrates is human, and as such, we can safely assume, served as a role model and friend and responded to Aristides. When Aristides was in the room, Socrates noticed and Aristides noticed (perhaps only imagined or anticipated) him noticing: hence, Aristides would have tried harder to put on his best appearance, not to say the wrong thing, to be witty, to be smart. When Socrates spoke, even if he did not speak to Aristides, Aristides would take note and think about whatever Socrates said. When Aristides looked at

that the scene which Bailly describes many times – Socrates lies beside Aristides, touches him and holds him, while Aristides does the same to Socrates – becomes the basis for an extensive discussion that has no relation to the text of Thg. itself and is not relevant to its interpretation.⁵²

Amidst this digression, however, Bailly makes a more serious point (256): “Having erotic knowledge is not the same as being erotic”; cf. 24:

Socrates, he would be filled with admiration and inspiration. And when Socrates lay next to him and touched him, Aristides must have been deeply moved by the intimacy with the man he admired so much.” This narrative reflects the interpretive fallacy which supposes that the characters “Aristides” and “Socrates” who appear in Thg. have a recoverable existence outside the dialogue, beyond the tightly circumscribed one which our author gives them (a fallacy which Bailly commits elsewhere; see e. g. n. 52 below, and Joyal 2012: 335 n. 29). In this matter it is hard to do better than to quote E. R. Dodds’s classic article (1966: 40), at the same time underscoring that what he says there of the dramatist also applies to authors and works of dramatic literature in general: “it is an essential critical principle that *what is not mentioned in the play does not exist* [Dodds’s emphasis]. These considerations [sc. which are mistakenly adduced in the interpretation of Oedipus Rex] would be in place if we were examining the conduct of a real person. But we are not: we are examining the intentions of a dramatist, and we are not entitled to ask questions that the dramatist did not intend us to ask. There is only one branch of literature where we *are* [Dodds’s emphasis] entitled to ask such questions about τὰ ἐκτὸς τοῦ δράματος, namely the modern detective story.” As we shall see, our author had good reason for saying no more about the συνουσία of Socrates and Aristides than he does.

⁵² E. g. 259: “Demodocus’ and Theages’ responses to the suggestion that Theages might find himself lying down with and touching Socrates is [sic] unrecorded, but it cannot have been indifference any more than anyone’s usual response to intimacy is indifference. From their silence, perhaps we can assume either that they did not find it objectionable, or that its discomforts did not outweigh the advantages of Socratic company. Why it struck them that way is another question ...”. Similarly Altman (2011: 39 n. 91), who also speaks only of Socrates’ touch and believes in addition that ε3 ἀπτόμενος refers to non-physical contact, comparing Ion 535a3/4 ἄπτει ... μου ... τῆς ψυχῆς. He employs this belief in order to avoid an interpretation which he thinks “readers must entertain”: “were Socrates, the master of love, conceivably interested in its physical fulfillment (Symposium 218e3–7), Demodocus as matchmaker would then be pimping his son.” However, (1) ἄπτομαι may refer to spiritual touch only if the context makes that concept explicit, as it does in Ion (likewise for its use in contexts which involve “contact” with the Forms; see Pender 2007: 44 n. 105), (2) ἀπτόμενος amplifies ε2/3 ἐχόμενός σου, “holding you,” which certainly has physical reference, (3) Aristides, not Socrates, is subject of the participle, and (4) the interpretation assumes the same mistranslation of καθήμην noted above. Droge (2007: 78–80) proposes that Aristides’ behaviour may reflect the touching of a cult statue of Socrates. Bailly’s formulations “responses ... is unrecorded” and “why it struck them that way” (in the first and third sentences above) betray a view of Thg. as the historical but redacted record of an actual encounter between Socrates, Demodocus and Theages.

“Having erotic expertise is surely different from being susceptible to erotic urges or being the object of erotic urges” (also 2003: 103). Bailly’s argument is that the “puzzle” (23) of Socrates’ claim to an unparalleled knowledge of τὰ ἐρωτικά is not solved or answered by the story Aristides tells through Socrates’ mouth – that is, the story does not explain what Socrates means by his claim. His case hinges on the phrases “erotic knowledge” and “erotic expertise,” to which he must be attaching a clear meaning, since he confidently distinguishes them from “being erotic” and “being the object of erotic urges.” Our author twice characterizes τὰ ἐρωτικά as a μάθημα (128b4, 5), and he presents it (essentially) as the direct object of τυγχάνω ... ἐπιστάμενος (128b3). That vocabulary certainly makes it appear that τὰ ἐρωτικά is being treated as a rational, systematic object of knowledge; and perhaps the use of a neuter-plural formation in -ικός (rather than ὁ ἔρωξ itself) contributes to the impression that Socrates is laying claim to a technical ability.⁵³ But ἔρωξ is the irrational impulse *par excellence*, and in the absence of a clear or discursive explanation in this dialogue of the meaning of τὰ ἐρωτικά, we should recognize the sharp, willful paradox in calling it a μάθημα and in making it the object of ἐπίσταμαι (cf. 125e1 ὁμότεχνος, and pp. 123–126 above). We do not know precisely what it means for Socrates to call τὰ ἐρωτικά a μάθημα because τὰ ἐρωτικά *tout court* does not have a precise, single or simple meaning.⁵⁴ On the contrary, τὰ ἐρωτικά-as-μάθημα is an enigmatic and evocative concept whose potential implications should not be narrowly constricted: if τὰ ἐρωτικά is a μάθημα, it is like no other. What we can say confidently is that the concept as presented here exploits the language of teaching and learning, not least because μάθημα is being repeated from earlier in the sentence (b2), where Socrates describes the μακάρια τε καὶ καλὰ μαθήματα that are known by the sophists, who profess an ability to teach (127e7 παιδεύειν). It is unsurprising that Socrates – who knows little, does not teach and has no students – would present his activity in these paradoxical terms. The story about Aristides, which is similarly evocative and imprecise, even ambiguous (who is the wooer, who the wooed?), illustrates how τὰ ἐρωτικά insinuates itself into association with Socrates.⁵⁵

⁵³ See Amman 1953: 259–263; Chantraine 1956: 132–142.

⁵⁴ A point which is well illustrated in Ludwig 2002: 121–169.

⁵⁵ There is a tantalizing parallel for this picture of Socratic συνουσία, similarly suggestive and imprecise, in fr. 11c Dittmar of the Alcibiades of Aeschines Socraticus, especially in the fragment’s (and dialogue’s) final sentence: καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ οὐδὲν μάθημα ἐπιστάμενος ὁ διδάξας ἄνθρωπον ὠφελήσαιμ’ ἄν, ὅμως ᾄμην ξυὸν ἄν ἐκείνῳ διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν βελτίω ποιῆσαι. See further pp. 143/144 and n. 77 below.

Why would we want to deny to the claim “I know τὰ ἐρωτικά better than anyone who has ever lived” the implication that Socrates is ἐρωτικός ἀνὴρ and in this capacity influences those who are with him?

In fact the author has left us with a clear sign that Aristides’ story is an exemplification of Socrates’ claim. In 130d4/5 Aristides himself both refers to Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge and confirms it: ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔμαθον μὲν παρὰ σοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε, ὡς αὐτὸς οἶσθα. Socrates claimed that he “knows” almost nothing but a single μάθημα (128b1–4); now, from a different perspective – from the side of the “associate” – Aristides asserts that he never “learned,” ἔμαθον, anything from Socrates. Aristides’ statement is the simple, predictable consequence of associating with someone who possesses almost no μαθήματα. The two claims are complementary.⁵⁶ The parenthesis ὡς αὐτὸς οἶσθα may be read as a broad allusion to Socrates’ frequent disavowals of knowledge and denials that he has students (Joyal 2000: 289), but its narrower dramatic purpose is to draw the reader’s mind back to Socrates’ earlier acknowledgement of his lack of μαθήματα. Of course, the character who is making this reference (Aristides) exists at a level of narrative discourse different from the acknowledgement itself and therefore did not “hear” those words when spoken by Socrates,⁵⁷ but our author has taken care that in this case that potential objection does not matter. Socrates in 128b2–4 does not merely claim that he knows nothing but τὰ ἐρωτικά: λέγω δῆπου ἀεὶ ὅτι ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος πλὴν γε μικροῦ τινος μαθήματος, τῶν ἐρωτικῶν. The issue here is not whether his

⁵⁶ “These words do not confirm the disavowal of knowledge (130b1–4 [sic]) (Socrates could know without teaching). They add the disavowal of teaching which sometimes accompanies the disavowal of knowledge” (Bailly 2004: 254, cf. 277). Aristides’ words are not a disavowal of teaching; such disavowal would have to come from Socrates’ mouth. Under the right circumstances, Aristides’ claim not to have learned anything might imply a disavowal of teaching, but if it does here, it is only incidentally: Aristides did not learn anything because Socrates does not know anything that he could teach him. Context, especially the identity of the speakers, is crucial. Bailly also thinks that 127d5–e1 “amounts to disavowing teaching” (2004: 42), but it is instead a counterpart to 130d4/5. As the latter looks back to the disavowal of knowledge in 128b1–4, so 127d5–e1 looks ahead to it: Socrates finds it remarkable (e1 θαυμάζω) that Theages and Demodocus would consider him to be the best person to improve Theages, since (e1 γάρ) there are so many superior alternatives whom it is more reasonable for them to prefer (e1–128b1; see pp.136/137 below, with n. 68), since (b1 γάρ) Socrates knows almost nothing except τὰ ἐρωτικά. Once again we see the importance to this dialogue of Socrates’ claim about the things that have to do with ἔρος.

⁵⁷ Such narrative dislocations (“rhetorical metalepses”) are usually remarkable in some way and draw attention to themselves; see Genette 1980: 235–252; Kukkonen 2011.

claim to say “constantly” (ἀεί) that he knows virtually nothing but τὰ ἐρωτικά is supported by the evidence of the Platonic Corpus or other early Socratic literature, or whether the assumption (δήπου) that his interlocutors know this repeated claim is a reasonable one to make, interesting and important as those questions are.⁵⁸ The point instead is that the author has seen to it that Aristides can refer confidently to a specific assertion from Socrates which he was not present to hear since the assertion is (according to this dialogue, at any rate) customary and well known.⁵⁹ And just as Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge was subordinate to his claim of expertise in τὰ ἐρωτικά (see nn. 42, 46 above), so Aristides’ emphasis is much more on the exemplification of Socrates’ claim (130d5–e4) than on this curt reference to his disavowal.

So while we can argue over the exact relation between, on the one hand, Socrates’ forceful claim to erotic expertise in 128b1–6 and (as I would urge) his allusion to it in 125d10–e3, and on the other, the somehow-erotic experience which Aristides describes in 130a4–e4, we can hardly argue that there is no relation, especially given the dominance – unparalleled in the Platonic Corpus – of the theme of συνουσία, with its own potentially erotic implications. Aristides learned nothing from Socrates; he tells us so. But he also tells us that he experienced something in Socrates’ presence (more than once: Joyal 2000: 289, on 130d5); and that experience is easily recognized as erotic.

More difficult still, and more disputed, is the question of the role of τὸ δαμόνιον in Aristides’ story. Aristides, it is true, never refers to it in the account which he gives,⁶⁰ and many commentators either disregard it altogether or pay little attention to it in discussing the story. Yet τὸ δαμόνιον is connected with Aristides’ account through links in a chain which can be plainly discerned when they are set out sequentially as follows:

(i) 129e7–9: With whomever the power of the divine [sign] collaborates in (συλλάβηται) our association, these are the ones whom you [i. e. Theages]

⁵⁸ Joyal 2000: 259; Döring 2004: 46–48.

⁵⁹ φασί in 126d1 performs a similar function; see Joyal 2012: 333.

⁶⁰ As noted, e. g., by Döring 2004: 63/64. Bailly goes further (2004: 256): “the divine sign or voice, as it is called, has no role to play, and one can only slip it in here by sleight of hand” (the support from other Platonic texts which he seeks here for its non-activity contradicts his interpretive methodology; see n. 16 above). Although Bailly links ὁ θεός with τὸ δαμόνιον in 130e6 (see pp. 101/102, 104 above), he does not account for the consequent lack of connection (under his interpretation) of τὸ δαμόνιον with what has preceded in 130a4–e4.

have noticed, since they progress (ἐπιδιδόασιν) very rapidly (ταχὺ παραχρῆμα).

(ii) e9–130a2: Of those who progress (ἐπιδιδόντων), some (οἱ μὲν) have improvement which is both solid and lasting.

(iii) a2–4: Many others (πολλοὶ δέ) make extraordinary progress (θαυμάσιον ἐπιδιδόασιν) for as long as they are with me, but whenever they keep away from me, they are again no better than anyone else.

(iv) a4–6: This once happened to (τοῦτό ποτε ἔπαθεν) Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, who was the son of Aristides. By spending his time with me he had made great progress (πάμπολυ ἐπεδεδώκει) in a short time (ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ).

Clearly Aristides is adduced here as one of the beneficiaries of the divine sign’s “collaboration”: he is explicitly said to belong to one of the two sub-groups (οἱ μὲν and πολλοὶ δέ) that comprise “the ones whom you have noticed” (it is to the experience of the latter set that a4 τοῦτο refers); his progress is designated by the same verb (ἐπιδίδωμι) that is used for the first time in 129e9 to describe those beneficiaries (the word occurs seven times between 129e9 and 130e6, but not before or after); and the rapid nature (ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ) of Aristides’ “progress” recalls that ingredient (ταχὺ παραχρῆμα) from the initial description of those who are aided by the sign’s collaboration. There is a further link (130c1–6): before Aristides sailed off, he could carry on a discussion with anyone, but now he avoids a person if he even senses that he is educated, so ashamed is he at his own mediocrity (φασυλότης) – precisely like πολλοὶ δέ: “whenever they keep away from [Socrates], they are again no better than anyone else” (130a3/4).

But what of Aristides’ failure to integrate τὸ δαιμόνιον into his story? Does that not show that the divine sign plays no role in his account? We must remember that the sign belongs only to Socrates, and by him alone is it experienced directly. Notwithstanding the peculiar ways in which the sign is presented in this dialogue (esp. 128d5–7), Thg. is consistent with other Platonic *loci* in repeatedly emphasizing its occurrence to Socrates and no other, not least through application of the dative first-person singular pronoun.⁶¹ The occasions on which other characters comment in reported speech on the intervention of τὸ δαιμόνιον are telling. Charmides shows no understanding

⁶¹ Cf. 128d2 (ἐμοί), d4 (μοι), e5 (μοι), 129b6 (μοι), b8 (μοι), d5 (μοι); especially characteristic of the personal nature of the Platonic sign’s occurrence is the phrase consisting of μοι + a form of γίγνεται (128e5, 129b6, b7/8); see Jedrkiewicz 2011a: 211/212, with n. 11; also Dorion 2003: 182 n. 39; Brisson 2005: 4/5, with n. 70 below.

of the sign's operation and claims no direct exposure to it (128e6); note the guesswork implied by ἴσως, as well as Charmides' attribution of the sign's activity to Socrates alone (i. e. σοι, not ἡμῖν): “Ἴσως,” ἔφη, “σημαίνει σοι ὅτι οὐ νικήσω κτλ.” Observe also Timarchus' language in explaining the consequences from not heeding successive occurrences of the divine sign (129a7/8): ἐγὼ μέντοι ἔρχομαι ἀποθανούμενος νυνί, διότι Σωκράτει [n. b. not τῷ δαιμόνιῳ] οὐκ ἤθελον πείθεσθαι (cf. c6–8 τοῦτο εἶπεν ... ὅτι ἴοι ἀποθανούμενος διὰ τὸ ἐμοὶ ἀπιστῆσαι).⁶² The one character other than Socrates who offers more than the slightest comment on τὸ δαιμόνιον is Theages (131a1–7), who seems to exhibit misunderstandings about its nature.⁶³ It is alien to everyone but Socrates, and we have no reason to expect Aristides to comment on the place of τὸ δαιμόνιον in his association with him. Aristides' story is a description, not an analysis.

The story about Aristides is therefore intended to illustrate something about Socrates' divine sign and its role in his συνουσία. Interpretations of the story which make no reference to the sign, or do so only to reject any role, are invalidated by the sentences that lead directly into it, but they are also shown to be mistaken by the words that follow it (130e5–7), where ὁ θεός = τὸ δαιμόνιον (see pp. 101–103 above): Ἔστιν οὖν, ὃ Θεάγης, τοιαύτη ἢ ἡμετέρα συνουσία· ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ, πάνυ πολὺ ἐπιδώσεις καὶ ταχύ, εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. Here τοιαύτη indicates that the reference is to what has preceded: “that's what association with me is like” (see also p. 103 above on 128c6 οἶον ... d1 οἶον as “remote correlatives”). What follows (ἐὰν μὲν ... εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ) summarizes and generalizes Aristides' experience: to πάνυ πολὺ ἐπιδώσεις [the seventh and final occurrence of ἐπιδίδωμι] καὶ ταχύ compare 130a6 πάμπολυ ἐπεδεδώκει ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ (as well as the earlier ταχὺ γὰρ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόασιν in 129e8–9); and as ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ ties the experience to the will of the divine sign, so in the

⁶² On 129c8 τὸ ἐμοὶ ἀπιστῆσαι Bailly comments (2004: 236): “Interestingly, Socrates says Timarchus disobeyed him, not the sign or a god. Thus Socrates does not think his sign compels obedience from others.” But with c6–7 ὅθεν δὴ τοῦτο εἶπεν πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ὄπερ νῦν ὑμῖν ἐγώ, ὅτι κτλ., Socrates is explicitly repeating, essentially *mutatis mutandis*, the words which he had reported as Timarchus' own utterances in a7–8. Therefore τὸ ἐμοὶ ἀπιστῆσαι does not provide evidence for what Socrates himself thinks.

⁶³ See p. 107 and n. 35 above; also Döring 2004: 68. The text of 129a3 εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου is too uncertain to allow us to attribute to Clitomachus any kind of judgement about the divine sign; see Joyal 1989, and 2000: 272. As Jedrkiewicz has shown (2011a: 212/213), characters other than Socrates consistently demonstrate a misunderstanding or ignorance of τὸ δαιμόνιον in the other works of the Platonic Corpus in which it is mentioned or discussed.

preamble (129e7–130a6) the experience was linked to the (capricious) collaboration of τὸ δαιμόνιον.⁶⁴

But the connections that Aristides' experience has with τὸ δαιμόνιον and τὰ ἐρωτικά can be discerned beyond the immediate context of that story. Socrates' words in 129e8–9 (οὗτοί εἰσιν ὧν καὶ σὺ ἤσθησαι· ταχὺ γὰρ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόασιν) are prefigured by Theages' interjection at 128b7–c5, which occurs right after Socrates has made his claim for a unique knowledge of τὰ ἐρωτικά:

Ὅρᾳς, ὦ πάτερ; ὁ Σωκράτης οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ἐθέλειν ἐμοὶ συνδια-
τρίβειν – ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν ἔτοιμον, ἐὰν οὗτος ἐθέλῃ – ἀλλὰ ταῦτα παίζων
πρὸς ἡμᾶς λέγει. ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα τῶν ἐμῶν ἡλικιωτῶν καὶ ὀλίγω πρεσβυτέρων
οἱ πρὶν μὲν τούτῳ συνεῖναι οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι ἦσαν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ συνεγένοντο τού-
τῳ, ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγω χρόνῳ πάντων βελτίους φαίνονται ὧν πρότερον χείρους.

Do you see, father? I really don't think that Socrates is still willing to spend his time with me – yet for my own part I'm ready, if he's willing – but he says these things because he's playing games with us. For among those my age and a little older⁶⁵ I know some who were worthless before associating with him, but when they got together with him, in a very short time they appeared better than all the ones to whom they previously appeared inferior.

There is no question that Socrates' observation in 129e8/9 (οὗτοί εἰσιν ... ἐπιδιδόασιν) is an allusion back to 128c2–5 (ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα ... χείρους). The young men whom Theages has noticed improve (βελτίους φαίνονται ≈ ἐπιδιδόασιν) very rapidly (ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγω χρόνῳ ≈ ταχὺ παραχρῆμα); this improvement is achieved through association with Socrates (ἐπειδὴ δὲ συνεγένοντο τούτῳ ≈ ὅσον ἂν μετ' ἐμοῦ χρόνον ὄσιν); and for some, the improvement is enduring (βελτίους φαίνονται, “appeared and still do appear better” [Joyal 2000: 263] ≈ βέβαιον ἔχουσι καὶ παραμόνιμον τὴν ὠφελίαν).

⁶⁴ Döring remarks (2004: 63) that Socrates does not comment on Aristides' report (and in this way and a few others maintains an objective distance from his words), but 130e5–7 are a direct reflection (e7–10 less so) on the experience recounted in the story.

⁶⁵ This cryptic addition does not have the appearance of being merely gratuitous. If Theages is referring to contemporaries who are a little older than he is, it is impossible to know whom (if anyone) the author has in mind. If, however, the reference is to people who, at the time at which they associated with Socrates, were simply “a little older” than Theages is at the dramatic date of this dialogue (410 or 409; see Joyal 2000: 156, 295), then many possibilities emerge, including some mentioned in this dialogue, above all Aristides and Thucydides themselves (cf. Trabattoni 1998: 198).

But whereas the callow Theages knows only success-stories (πάντων βελτίους φαίνονται ὢν πρότερον χείρους), Socrates provides a more balanced and realistic account (ἐπειδὴν δέ μου ἀπόσχονται, πάλιν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ὅτουσιν). Yet it is not only Socrates' words that recall Theages'; Aristides' reported statement in 130c1–6 does as well, in particular c2/3 ὅτωσιν ἀνθρώπων οἶός τ' ἦν διαλέγεσθαι καὶ μηδενὸς χείρων φαίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, which provides some clarity, though only a little, to the utterly nebulous πάντων βελτίους φαίνονται ὢν πρότερον χείρους. It is apparent that Aristides belongs to the type of “the ones whom you have noticed,” as well as being a beneficiary of the divine sign's “collaboration.”

Theages' words anticipate Socrates' and Aristides' in another way too. In 128c6 Socrates responds to Theages: Οἶσθα οὖν οἶον τοῦτο [= rapid improvement in Socrates' company] ἐστίν, ὃ παῖ Δημοδόκου; Theages replies with emphasis: Ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε, ὅτι, ἐὰν σὺ βούλη, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶός τ' ἔσομαι τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι οἷοίπερ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι. Because of his repeated use of ἐθέλω a few lines earlier (ὁ Σωκράτης οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ἐθέλειν ἐμοὶ συνδιατρίβειν – ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν ἔτοιμον, ἐὰν οὗτος ἐθέλη κτλ.), Theages is now seen to be showing commitment to his assumption that improvement in Socrates' company depends on Socrates' will (n. b. ἐὰν σὺ βούλη); cf. also 127a9/10 εἰ γὰρ σύ μοι ἐθέλοις συνεῖναι, ἐξαρκεῖ καὶ οὐδένα ἄλλον ζητῶ (Demodocus shares his son's belief: 127b4/5 εἰ ... σὺ ἐθέλοις τούτῳ συνεῖναι, b6/7 ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἀμφοτέρων ὑμῶν δέομαι, σέ τ' ἐθέλειν τούτῳ συνεῖναι κτλ.). Socrates' response – firm but polite – to Theages' (and Demodocus') assumption could not be simpler: Οὔκ, ὡγαθέ (128d1); and he implicitly disabuses Theages later as well: 129e5 οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἐμοὶ τούτοις συνδιατρίβειν (see p. 115 above). Socrates is not responsible for his companions' “improvement,” at least not in a way that he can control, but the complementary story about Aristides demonstrates what is mainly responsible. Just as Theages' words unfolded in reply to Socrates' emphatic claim of a unique expertise in the only thing he knows – τὰ ἐρωτικά – so the story about Aristides shows Socrates exercising, though passively, a powerful physical influence over him within their συνουσία. That passivity, however, is crucial to the story, not an accident of the narrative or a defect in it. Through it our author puts on display the previously stated principle that Socrates' will is not the determining factor in his associates' improvement or progress.

If there was any confusion about the author's intentions in regard to Socrates' passive role, it is dispelled by his summary of 129e1 – 130e4. First, in 130e5 – 7, he describes the place of his divine sign in his συνουσία and in

the progress that his associates make (see pp. 102/103, 133/134 above). Then, in words that have been widely neglected in analysis of this dialogue, he continues:

ὄρα οὖν μή σοι ἀσφαλέστερον ἢ παρ' ἐκείνων τινὶ παιδεύεσθαι οἱ ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτοὶ εἰσι τῆς ὠφελίας ἦν ὠφελούσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μᾶλλον ἢ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς τοῦτο πρᾶξαι.

So consider whether it's a more reliable thing for you to be educated alongside one of those who, on their own,⁶⁶ are in control of the benefit which they provide people, rather than to get from me just whatever you chance upon.

Who are the people designated by the words παρ' ἐκείνων τινι ... οἱ κτλ.? Bailly (2004: 22/23, 261) and Döring (2004: 67) think they are sophists.⁶⁷ They are partly right – sophists are the last potential educators to be mentioned by Socrates (127e5–128b1) – but the phrase is deliberately unspecific because others have been cited as well (ἐκείνων refers in general to “the aforementioned”): οἱ πολιτικοί (126c3–9), οἱ καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά (127a3, probably only partly distinct from οἱ πολιτικοί), Demodocus himself (127d5–e4), even, perhaps, Socrates' elders (127e1). Among the sophists themselves there are “many” to choose from (128a1), and the selection from among οἱ καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά is apparently limitless (127a4 ὅτω ἂν βούλη συστήσομέν σε). The point here is that Theages has a multitude of options, all of whom, unlike Socrates, are “in control of the benefit which they provide people.”⁶⁸ It is a point which would be lost, however, if only one of these options were identified or implied: the focus is

⁶⁶ LSJ s. v. αὐτός I, 3. The contrast with Socrates, whose positive influence over others depends on the collaboration of ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις, is here made explicit (see also Joyal 2000: 291/292).

⁶⁷ Bailly's ascription (261) of this belief to me is mistaken (the interpretation which he then draws is therefore beside the point). – Provided the restoration below is correct, we can only speculate on what the anonymous commentator on the Theaetetus had in mind when he wrote (58, 5–7 Bastianini-Sedley) οὐ[τ]ως καὶ | τὸν Θ[εάγη] σ[υνέστη]σεν Π[ροδίκω].

⁶⁸ This multiplicity of options may explain the use of παρά + dat. with παιδεύεσθαι, “beside,” “with” (παρ' ἐκείνων τινι), rather than παρά or ὑπό + gen. (agentis), “by” (so the translations by Bailly and Lampe [2013: 393]). The former is better suited to a “generic” educational relationship than the latter; for pedagogical παρά + dat., cf. Pl. Smp. 175e1, Hdt. 1, 73, X. Cyr. 1, 2, 15, Plu. Mor. 835d, Athen. 3, 108e, D. L. 3, 4. The use of παιδεύεσθαι also serves to line up other educators against Socrates, in connection with whom we would not expect to find this verb (Joyal 2000: 256, on 127e7). For the contrast which is drawn on pedagogical terms between Socrates and everyone else, cf. Ap. 24c10–25d8: all Athenians improve the young, Socrates alone corrupts them.

now on Socrates and the unique nature of his *συνουσία*, not on the individual alternatives to him. His *συνουσία* is unique because it is influenced by τὸ δαιμόνιον, which belongs to him alone, and by τὰ ἐρωτικά, in which he is the preeminent expert; and it is these phenomena, not Socrates himself, that are primarily responsible in some way for his associates' progress.

Of course, it is not only Socrates whose agency is drastically reduced. In much of the discussion above it has been implicit that Aristides is the passive beneficiary of Socrates' *συνουσία*. Even the manner in which he is introduced in this dialogue suggests as much: the events which are described in 130a4–e4 are something that “happened” to him (a4 ἔπαθεν), not something that he himself caused, and as we have seen, although Aristides asserts that he learned nothing from Socrates, he devotes his attention to describing what he experienced in Socrates' presence. The degree to which our author has incorporated this passivity into his representation of Aristides is further apparent from examination of a single detail in this section. In 130a5–7 we learn that Aristides had made significant, swift progress in Socrates' company; ἔπειτα αὐτῷ στρατεία τις ἐγένετο καὶ ὄχρετο ἐκπλέων, “then some expedition came up for him, and he was gone and sailed off.” As all who have studied this dialogue recognize, the prelude to the story about Aristides, and the story itself (129e1–130e10), are somehow related to Tht. 150b6–151d6, the famous passage on Socratic “midwifery” (whether the first is derived from the second, as is usually assumed, is not the main issue here). In Tht. 150e1–151a1 Aristides is presented briefly as an example of those who, either on their own initiative or by the persuasion of others, leave Socrates earlier than they should (e3/4 ἀπῆλθον προβαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος), suffer “miscarriage” as a result of the bad company they keep or lose the “offspring” to which they have given birth, and come to recognize their own ignorance. Among the numerous differences between the two accounts is one which has usually been overlooked: in the second, Aristides is himself responsible for his withdrawal from Socrates and is the cause of his own degeneration; in the first, his withdrawal from Socrates is forced upon him, since it occurs as the result of a naval expedition.⁶⁹ Even the phraseology

⁶⁹ Bailly argues (2004: 250, on 130c2 πρὶν μὲν ἐκπλεῖν) that “The explanation [sc. for Aristides' separation from Socrates] is not incompatible with that of the parallel passage in the Theaetetus. Cf. Appendix.” (he has a supporter in Lampe 2013: 401 n. 41). What we find in this Appendix (275), however, is the characterization of Aristides' participation in the στρατεία as “[leaving] Socrates' company for a military commission,” and as Aristides having “accepted his military commission.” Bailly does not attempt to justify his use of these expressions; “acceptance” of a “military commission” is the formulation of a

which describes the event – αὐτῷ στρατεία τις ἐγένετο – implies circumstances in which Aristides is simply involved or affected (γίγνεται + dat. pronoun) rather than one in which he exerts any control.⁷⁰ This ingredient in the story is, I think, a reflection of the author’s purpose; and although its effect appears in higher relief if we assume it to be a modification of the corresponding detail in *Tht.*, that assumption need not be made.

The self-regard and presumption which are implied in Aristides’ withdrawal from Socrates in *Tht.* are in *Thg.* assigned instead to his friend Thucydides, son of Melesias; an important consequence is that Aristides’ separation from Socrates in *Thg.* is seen to be caused by circumstances outside his control and his character. On the face of it, the story about Thucydides which is told in the course of Aristides’ account of his own experience (130a7–b8) is merely incidental to Socrates’ broader narrative, yet it supports the understanding of our author’s intentions which I have developed in the last few pages. While we may wish to infer from some pieces of evidence in these lines that the association between Thucydides and Socrates has included dialectic or philosophical discussion, and the author may well

concept which does not find any support in the text and is certainly anachronistic. Its use has the appearance of an interpretive tactic, since it suggests a voluntary act, like Aristides’ separation from Socrates in *Tht.*, and thus serves to make the two stories seem more consistent with each other than they are. However, since the naval expedition in question is not identified and may very well be a fiction – hence, perhaps, στρατεία τις, in contrast to the two named στρατεῖαι in 129c8–d6 – the only meaningful question for the reader is what the author expected his audience to assume about the nature of Aristides’ participation. There was one occupation on Athenian military ships that was filled by volunteers, and one large class of Athenian citizens which regularly performed this work. These citizens were the thetes, who were attracted (as mercenaries also were) especially by the wages they could earn as rowers. Those who served on naval expeditions as hoplites and epibatai – i. e., who belonged to the hoplite class or higher – were conscripted, their names drawn probably from an established list (κατάλογοις). Since no reader would suppose that the grandson of Aristides the Just (who is mentioned at 130a5, but not in *Tht.*) was a thes, readers would probably assume, in the absence of further information, that Aristides’ service was compulsory. The facts of naval service in contemporary Athens are simply against viewing Aristides’ participation as voluntary (rowers were sometimes conscripted too, and thetes could be conscripted as hoplites); see Christ 2001, esp. on conscription ἐκ καταλόγου; Rosivach 2012.

⁷⁰ For the expression, cf. *Smp.* 219e6 μετὰ ταῦτα στρατεία ἡμῖν εἰς Ποτειδαίαν ἐγένετο κοινή, *Lg.* 943c3/4 αὐτῆς δὲ περὶ τῆς στρατείας τῆς τότε γενομένης αὐτοῖς. See n. 61 above for dative + γίγνεται in occurrences of the divine sign; Brisson comments apropos of that application (2005: 5): “The impersonal construction emphasizes the objective, and as it were automatic nature of the intervention. Socrates never takes the initiative, and never solicits the signal. The signal somehow ‘falls upon him,’ without his expecting it.”

have intended us to do so (Joyal 2000: 284–286), it is notable that he has allowed none of that content to emerge. As he does with Aristides, our author places emphasis instead on the passions towards Socrates which are aroused in Thucydides: he has had harsh words with Socrates (b1/2), acts sanctimoniously, and is angry with him, as though he (Thucydides) is something important (b3–5). And yet, had our author so chosen, it would have been an easy matter for him to leave us with no doubt about the rational nature or goal of their relationship. All that was required is the well-placed addition of the prepositional phrase περί + x (gen.); the simplest location would have been in the first sentence in which Thucydides is mentioned (a7/8), e. g. ἤκων δὲ κατελάμβανε μετ’ ἐμοῦ διατρίβοντα Θουκυδίδην τὸν Μελησίου ὄν τῷ Θουκυδίδου, περὶ ἀρετῆς [or ἀνδρείας, δικαιοσύνης etc.] διαλεγόμενον. ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης κτλ. But he did no such thing, electing instead to leave the content of this συνουσία uncertain to the reader and not to draw attention away from the non-rational influence of Socrates.

Not all who have studied Thg. 130a4–e9 would accept the analysis of it which I have adopted. Bailly’s disagreements, and those of other scholars, have been recorded above in some detail, along with my responses. Two recent interpretations, by Döring and Lampe, deserve special attention; both take the position that the story which Socrates tells about Aristides conceals a meaning which is not apparent on the surface of the text. Döring has argued that our author wanted his reader to take Aristides’ entire story *cum grano salis* (2004: 62, 70). His argument derives from a series of observations, *inter alia* that Socrates maintains an objective distance from Aristides’ words after Aristides announces the story as something which is “incredible but true” (130d3/4 ἄπιστον μὲν νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀληθὲς δέ), that Aristides’ report is intended by the author to be subjective (n. b. 130d7 ἔμοιγε ἐδόκουν; see also n. 64 above), and that Aristides’ improvement and subsequent relapse must be owed to his own capacity (or inability) rather than to the workings of τὸ δαιμόνιον.⁷¹ Döring makes a strong case for the position which he takes, but his evidence, I think, leads to a softer conclusion than the one he has drawn. For while the story may be hard to accept in all its details, it should be treated as an exemplum, conveying truths that are important to the author’s purpose; and as the four anecdotes in 128d8–129d8 illustrate the programmatic words of 128d2–8, this story does the same for the

⁷¹ On this last point, Döring’s argument (2004: 64/65) is principally that the author of Thg. cannot have seriously intended to imply that Aristides lost the gains which he had made with Socrates simply through the bad luck of having been required to join a military expedition.

programmatically 129e1–130a4 (especially e7–130a4). That the story cannot simply be dismissed is shown by the way Aristides refers to or echoes thematically important comments from other characters, despite the important fact that his persona operates at a different level of discourse from those characters (see also pp. 130/131 and n. 57 above). These references occur sometimes on the periphery of Aristides’ “incredible” narrative, sometimes within it: his claim “to appear worse than no one” before he sailed off (130c 2/3 ≈ 128c4/5), his reversion to, and shame over, his state of mediocrity (130c5/6 ≈ 130a2–4), his depiction of Socrates’ passivity and by implication Socrates’ lack of responsibility (130d5–e4, cf. pp. 114/115 above), his central claim to have “improved” through association with Socrates (130d5 ≈ 128c2–5, 129e7–9), and his reference to Socrates’ claim of a nearly complete lack of knowledge (130d4/5 ≈ 128b1–6). Aristides’ story is disarming, but these correspondences should alert us to the fact that it is well integrated into the dialogue through motifs that are essential to the work’s second half. We can also, with Döring (2004: 63/64), view Aristides’ own characterization of his story – as something “incredible but true” – as a signpost that Socrates does not accept the veracity of what follows, but a different explanation recommends itself. Whereas the four stories Socrates related in 128d7–129d8 were addressed to both Demodocus and his son (three second-person plural pronouns [128d7, 129a5, c7], two second-person plural verbs [128d8, 129a1], one dual verb [129d1]), in 129e1 he addresses Theages directly (σοι) and keeps his focus on him alone (e8 σὸν ἡσθησῶν, 130e5 ὃ Θέαγεζ, e7 σοι; Joyal 2000: 51/52). By putting the telling of the story into Aristides’ mouth, he allows Theages to hear it from a peer. For Socrates knows that the words of Theages’ friends and others his age can produce a profound impression on him (n. b. 121d1–6), and he even makes Aristides speak in a manner that Theages will recognize (Joyal 2000: 284 [on 130a4–e4], 107 n. 4). Viewed against this background, Aristides’ description of his story as “incredible but true” can be seen as one means among several of seizing Theages’ attention.

Lampe describes the “core” of his proposal for the interpretation of 130a4–e9 as follows (2013: 384):

“[W]e should understand the Theages in the light of the other Platonic dialogues to which it conspicuously alludes, most important of which are the *Symposium* and the *Theaetetus*. The conclusion toward which these allusions point is that, while the Theages accentuates the role of eros and the daemonic in Socratic education, it does not thereby eliminate the role of cooperative reasoning. To the contrary, cooperative reasoning subsumes the

influence of erotic impulses and daemonic agencies. Understanding the Theages in this way saves us from positing an author who, though he constantly and conspicuously engages with Platonic dialogues, somehow believes that Socrates' commitment to rational inquiry is just window-dressing for magico-religious emanations. It is more plausible that he takes the pervasive religious language of Plato's characters seriously but combines his heightened sense of Socratic religiosity with Socratic reasoning."

In promoting his interpretation, Lampe accepts that Socrates' claim to erotic expertise in 128b1–6 and Aristides' description of improvement-by-contact in 130c7–e4 derive from or rely on passages in the Symposium which deal with these themes (175d3–e2, 177d7/8, 198d1–3, 212b4–8), and that Aristides' account of the failure which he experienced in Socrates' company was inspired by Theaetetus 150b6–151d6 (on intellectual mid-wifery, see pp. 137/138 above). Most commentators have argued similarly, and probably rightly, that our author "engaged with" (Lampe's useful phrase, above) these two dialogues, but Lampe goes further than this: not only has the author drawn upon these passages and been influenced by them in the composition of his work, but he expects his readers to recognize them as his sources and, what is more, to interpret the dialogue in light of them. He takes the author's engagement with these passages as justifying the belief that although reason and argumentation are absent from the story about Aristides, our author intends, through "conspicuous allusions" to Smp. and Tht. and the reader's detailed knowledge of their content, that they be assumed in the experience which Aristides describes.

Lampe's arguments are, I believe, open to some fundamental objections which call his results into question. To accept that the author of Thg. knows and makes use of (engages with) existing Platonic texts is a reasonable, widely held interpretive position. To assume, however, that all these uses are "allusions," as Lampe does throughout his article, begs the question, since the best evidence for the author's use of such "allusions" is the interpretation itself, which cannot work without the reader's recognition of and close familiarity with these texts. Even though we may recognize their use in Thg., there is no place where the author is clearly inviting or encouraging his reader to think specifically of the Platonic texts listed above, as he would have to do if he were "alluding" to them.⁷² By comparison, there is in Thg.

⁷² This point applies also to the "prosopographical signposts" (2013: 386) which Lampe believes are intended to direct readers to relevant contexts in Laches, Theaetetus, Apology and Republic. 128b3 δῆπου may be taken as presuming the reader's knowledge of Smp.

incontestably one allusion to another work, at 125d10–e3, but this allusion is not to a Platonic dialogue: the author refers to a poem by Anacreon, names the poet and identifies two characters (see pp. 123/124 above). The fact that Socrates asks for and receives Theages' confirmation that he knows the poem is an indication that the reader is expected to recognize it too. Here surely it is legitimate for readers to consider Socrates' exchange with Theages against the background of the poem itself (as far as that is possible for us) and to assume that that is the author's intention.

There is little evidence that the author wants or expects his readers to do the same with the passages in Smp. and Tht., but even if we assume that he did, it is not at all obvious that he was coaxing his readers towards the interpretation that Lampe has produced. A few illustrations of this point should suffice. Lampe asserts (2013: 395/396) that Smp. 175c7–d7, where Agathon asks Socrates to sit beside him so that he can touch him and share his wisdom, and Thg. 130e1–4, where Aristides claims that his best progress came when he sat beside Socrates and touched him, both involve the transmission of σοφία. The assertion is certainly true for Smp., where Agathon speaks of σοφία flowing from one person to another, but it is just as certainly not true for Thg., where the author has studiously, and for thematic purposes, avoided any mention of Aristides acquiring σοφία or becoming σοφός.⁷³ Lampe's commitment to interpreting the story about Aristides on the basis of the parallel text in Tht. leads him to claim that "[t]he reason Aristides so easily and eagerly diagnoses Thucydides' mistake [described in 130a7–b8, see above] is because he has made it himself and now regrets it" (2013: 401; cf. Lampe 2010: 203–205). Aristides, however, is reporting what he has heard (b4 ἀκούω), not what he has seen or recognized for himself, and there is good reason why Thucydides' condition is attributed to him rather than to Aristides (see pp. 137–139 above). Lampe argues that the author does not want his readers to take Aristides' account as "a straightforward report of how Socratic eros is supposed to enable progress"

177d7/8, 198d1–3 and 212b6–8 (a possibility raised in Joyal 2000: 259), but its purpose (and the language of 128b2–6 in general) should be explained differently (see pp. 130/131 above). Bailly similarly conflates the principles of textual "engagement" and "allusion" throughout his book but does so from a different perspective: his criticism of other scholars' analyses frequently assumes that these analyses depend on the reader's recognition and application of the other Platonic texts upon which the author may have been drawing (i. e. "allusion"), and not on our study simply of the author's possible or probable sources (i. e. "engagement").

⁷³ See Joyal 2012: 334–337.

(2013: 403),⁷⁴ but Socrates' summary of that account (and of 129e1 – 130e4 in general) in 130e5 – 7 is a large, if not fatal, obstacle to this interpretation: Ἔστιν οὖν, ὃ Θέαγες, τοιαύτη ἡ ἡμετέρα συνουσία· ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ, πάνυ πολὺ ἐπιδώσεις καὶ ταχύ, εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. Lampe takes the first part of this summary (Ἔστιν ... συνουσία) as “slightly ironic,” as he must for the sake of his argument, but Socrates' words in 130e5 show no evidence of irony. They are retrospective (see pp. 133/134 above), and the second half of the sentence (ἐὰν μὲν ... οὐ), presented in asyndeton, is a simple, serious explanation of them. Their subsequent application to Socrates himself focuses solely on the beneficence of chance (e7–10 ὄρα οὖν μή σοι ἀσφαλέστερον ᾖ ... μᾶλλον ἢ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι ἂν τύχης τοῦτο πρᾶξαι; see pp. 135 – 137 above);⁷⁵ no reference is made to the efficacy of reason or dialectic. In spite of Lampe's attempt to argue otherwise (2013: 411/412), the proportion of Thg. which is devoted to Socrates' sign – about 2,5 Stephanus pages, or one quarter of the dialogue – is unlike anything else in the Platonic Corpus and reflects the outsized role that the author has given the sign in this work.⁷⁶ Finally, if it is acceptable to interpret the story about Aristides on the basis of passages in Smp. and Tht., how are we to deal with the author's probable engagement with Aeschines Socraticus' Alcibiades? This is a work which we know only from fragments and second-hand reports; for this reason many of the most important questions about it persist, but in part at least – perhaps in largest part – it presented a Socrates who claimed to exercise a beneficial effect (fr. 11a ὠφελῆσαι, fr. 11c ὠφελήσαιμι, βελτίω ποιῆσαι) on those around him not through rational means (fr. 11b ἀνθρωπίνῃ τέχνῃ), and not by knowledge (fr. 11c ἐγὼ οὐδὲν μάθημα ἐπιστάμενος), but through his association (fr. 11c ξυνών), which was characterized by θεία

⁷⁴ In this respect his interpretation shares features with Döring's (cf. also Johnson 1996: 333/334; Centrone 1997: 346); it is also open to the same counter-arguments that I presented above (pp. 139/140).

⁷⁵ Lampe's translation of παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ τοῦτο πρᾶξαι, “to take your chances with me” (2013: 393, 414), is imprecise and somewhat misleading. The meaning is “to get from me just whatever you chance upon” (reading τύχῃς: Joyal 2000: 292; see also pp. 136/137 above). τοῦτο lays emphasis on the thing that Socrates' companions gain from him, while ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς shows that this thing is an entirely random product.

⁷⁶ The longest Platonic discussions of the sign outside Thg. are in Ap. 31c7–e1 and 40a2–c4, amounting to about half a Stephanus page in total, or in other words about 2% of the whole of Ap. In extant Greek literature the only works which devote as much space (or more) to Socrates' sign as Thg. does are Plutarch's *De Genio Socratis* and Maximus of Tyre's *On the Silence of Socrates' Sign*, both belonging to the period of the Roman Empire.

μοῖρα (fr. 11a, b) and by ἔρωζ (fr. 11c). If the author's intention was to have his reader interpret Thg. with an eye on the works with which he is engaged, the reader's contemplation of Aeschines' Alc. is bound to produce a different perspective from the one that Lampe has developed.⁷⁷

I propose that the author's possible or probable use of Smp. and Tht. takes us in a different direction from the one for which Lampe has argued. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that he did engage with these Platonic texts. The response of the reader who is familiar with them, recognizes a relationship with Thg., and considers the relevant places in Thg. in the light of these texts, will not be to formulate an intricate interpretation of the kind that Lampe has worked out. His response instead will be to notice the essential, striking contrast between the two sets of texts, which derives from the fact that our author has not allowed the dialectical ingredients in the original sources to survive in his own work, having made the decision to remove systematically most of the elements that give rational content to Socrates' claim to an expertise in τὰ ἐρωτικά (cf. Smp.) and to the improvement that young men like Aristides and Thucydides are able to make by associating with Socrates (cf. Tht.). The advantages of this approach to the text should be clear. First, it does not depend on a questionable understanding of the concept of "allusion." Secondly, it does not rely on the average reader's prior, detailed knowledge of Smp. and Tht.; the text of Thg. speaks for itself. Thirdly, readers who do recognize the use of Smp. and Tht. are not expected to make the same series of interpretive moves that Lampe has made; instead they can simply compare the one set of contexts with the other and identify their fundamental differences. Further, the reader who does not recognize the author's sources and the reader who does will not interpret Aristides' story differently; the latter, however, will be able to appreciate it with greater depth and understanding. This approach to the text, finally, does not commit us to a Socrates who is characterized principally by "magico-religious emanations," as Lampe supposes.

⁷⁷ For our author's probable knowledge of Aeschin. Alc., see Joyal 2000: 42–46, 49 and n. 85, together with the scholarship cited in those pages; also Lampe 2010: 194–199, Tarrant 2012: 148/149, and Scholtz 2007: 119–127 for the basic character of Alc. – Lampe suggests in addition (2013: 421) that part of the aim of Thg. "is to begin discussions that will be taken up again later in the educational process, probably with the help of other dialogues." This suggestion seems to be at odds with the theory that the author makes "allusions" to other Platonic dialogues which the reader is expected from the start to apply insightfully to the interpretation of Thg. itself.

The many conceptual and verbal correspondences that have been pointed out in this long section produce a coherent picture that may be summarized here. Socrates asserts his expertise in τὰ ἐρωτικά in 128b1–6 but alludes to it well before, in 125d10–e3. On both occasions Theages responds in a similar manner and from similar motives (παίξεις πρὸς με and παίζων πρὸς ἡμᾶς). Yet this expertise is Socrates' sole μάθημα. The experience which Aristides describes (130c1–e4) is in itself erotic, though in a way that evades precise description or analysis. The erotic element in the dialogue – Socrates' allusion, his outright claim, and Aristides' experience – is played out against the background provided by the pervasive theme of συνουσία and related verbs. Aristides is demonstrably intended to be an example of those who have benefitted from the “collaboration” of τὸ δαίμονιον in συνουσία with Socrates (129e7–130a6). Theages knows young men just like Aristides (128c2–5); his repeatedly stated assumption, however, that Socrates is responsible for their improvement, and his belief that they are all unalloyed success-stories, are rebuked and corrected through Socrates' appeal to the behaviour of τὸ δαίμονιον. It requires most of the remainder of the dialogue to explain this correction; at the core of it is the extraordinary nature of Socrates' συνουσία, characterized above all by τὰ ἐρωτικά and Socrates' claim to an unparalleled expertise in it, and by the “all-powerful” nature of τὸ δαίμονιον in his associations with others.

(IV) At the outset of this paper I asked whether the divine sign which we encounter in Thg. is different in important ways from τὸ δαίμονιον σημεῖον as it appears in other Platonic works. By now it will be apparent that my answer to that question is an affirmative one; I also think that these differences, taken as a whole, are incompatible with belief in a Platonic origin. Others may draw other conclusions, but I hope that they will take the evidence presented in this article fully into account before doing so. As important as the question of authenticity is, however, there is another that is at least as critical. What is the impact that the interpretations and analyses presented above have for our understanding of Thg.?

In this matter as well, people are bound to disagree, but let us first acknowledge a fact about this field of study: the Socratic literature which survives to us represents only a fraction of antiquity's total output. Livio Rossetti has recently enabled us to appreciate the magnitude of our loss for the years 394–370 alone, when Socratic writers were active who had known the man himself (2001a: 13–21, 2001b: 187–191). Rossetti calculates that in this quarter-century around 300 dialogues were produced by 14 writers – in other words, “un nouveau dialogue socratique par mois pendant un quart

de siècle” (2001a: 17). And of course, new Socratic dialogues continued to be written in the years that followed. Faced with this body of work, most of which is no longer extant, we ought to accept the inevitable limitations on our knowledge and exercise caution as we attempt to find philosophical, historical and literary contexts in which to make sense of Thg.⁷⁸

Yet a Socrates who disavows knowledge, lays no claim to the possession of σοφία, places the highest importance on the education of the young and somehow, in a way that distinguishes him from all others, can help or improve (rather than corrupt) those around him through close personal association is a character whom we can recognize from Socratic literature in general. It is in explaining this “somehow” that the primary challenge for Socrates’ apologists and admirers lay. Our author’s response to the challenge is unusual but apparently not entirely unique: consider the Alcibiades of Aeschines Socraticus, which seems to have presented a Socrates who improved others by being with them, through ἔρωσ, but could not explain this phenomenon rationally (see pp. 143/144 and n. 55 above). Interpreters of Thg. may find it frustrating that the collaborative role of τὸ δαιμόνιον in the progress of Socrates’ associates and the influence of Socrates’ expertise in τὰ ἐρωτικά are presented here so elliptically and integrated so indirectly and incompletely. We ought, however, to respect the choices which our author has made and resist the temptation to make the text say what he chose not to put into it and to mean what it does not say. Perhaps we would be less troubled if Thg. had never been transmitted as Plato’s.

Appendix – συλλαμβάνω / συλλαμβάνομαι

The most common meanings given in LSJ s. v. συλλαμβάνω are well represented in the large sample with which we are dealing (i. e., from Aeschylus to Aristotle):

- * “Collect,” “gather together” (s. vv. I, 1, I, 4), e. g. Hdt. 5, 46; Pl. Sph. 234b4, Grg. 456a8; Arist. Met. 992a2, 1037b31
- * “Take with one” (s. v. I, 2), e. g. S. Tr. 1153/1154; Ar. V. 122
- * “Close,” “shut” (s. v. I, 3, a), e. g. Ar. Ach. 926; Pl. Phd. 118a13

⁷⁸ It is partly as a result of this consideration that I am now less inclined to believe, as I formerly did (Joyal 2000: 92–97), that the author of Thg. developed his presentation of Socrates in 128c6–fin. as a result of (*inter alia*) a misunderstanding of certain Platonic sources which he may have known and used. It is apparent to me now that his purpose and method were more deliberate than this belief would imply.

- * “Arrest,” “seize,” “take,” “take hold of,” apparently the most common meaning (s. vv. II, 1, a, II, 2; a use explained by Σ Ar. Ach. 206, see n. 80 below), e. g. Hp. Coac. 540; Hdt. 2, 115; 5, 36; Ar. Ach. 206, Eq. 650; S. Ph. 1003; E. Cyc. 447; Thuc. 2, 6, 2; 3, 34, 3 *et saepe*; X. HG 2, 3, 12; An. 1, 6, 4; Cyr. 2, 4, 23; Isoc. 17, 5; D. 21, 117; Lys. 6, 18
- * “Grasp,” “understand” (s. v. II, 3), e. g. Hdt. 4, 114; 7, 43, 2 *et saepe*; Pl. Sph. 218c6
- * “Conceive an offspring” (s. v. IV; cf. συλλαβή s. v. I), the most common meaning in the Hippocratic Corpus and Aristotle, e. g. Hp. Aff. 17, 19; 213, 28; Morb. 2, 2, 17; Superf. 26, 7; Arist. GA 727b8, 739a30, HA 577a4, 580a3, Met. 992a2
- * “Contribute (to),” close in meaning to the use which interests us here (subsumed by LSJ s. v. VI, 1), e. g. Hp. Art. 33, 4; X. Cyr. 1, 6, 25; Lac. 2, 5; Is. 9, 25

Each of the above uses is “active” in meaning (not necessarily in terms of grammatical voice) in all the instances in which the verb occurs, but they are not the ones that are directly relevant to our investigation. Those cases which interest us express participation or collaboration of some kind (LSJ s. v. VI, 1, 2). All such occurrences for the period under consideration are identified below so that independent verification can be made.

(I) In many passages (26) the verb expresses its subject’s active collaboration or assistance in three general kinds of relationship (broadly defined):

1. Military: Hdt. 3, 49; Th. 4, 47, 2, 8, 35, 2;⁷⁹ Ar. Pax 450, Lys. 313; X. Hipp. 1, 22, Ag. 2, 31; D. 6, 15, 18, 20.
2. Political or diplomatic: Hdt. 6, 125; Ar. Ec. 861; Pl. R. 488d2, Lg. 752a1; X. Cyr. 7, 5, 49.
3. Personal: S. Ph. 282 (Philoctetes describes his isolation), Tr. 1019; E. Med. 946, Ion 331, IA 160; Ar. Lys. 540; Pl. R. 427e4, Lg. 969d2, 3,⁸⁰ [Pl.] Erx. 396e2; X. Mem. 2, 3, 18 (a contrast between συλλαμβάνειν and διακωλύειν, each here expressing an active kind of behaviour), 2, 6, 37, Oec. 13, 10.

Of the 28 uses in these 26 passages (there are two occurrences in Pl. Lg. 969d2, 3, two in X. Ag. 2, 31), 19 are in the active voice, 7 in the middle.

⁷⁹ συλλαμβάνειν: the scholiast ad loc. glosses the verb βοηθεῖν; cf. Σ Ar. Ra. 1345 (scholia recentiora Tzetze, Koster vol. 4, 3).

⁸⁰ The dialogue’s final words: ΚΑ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Μέγίλλε, καὶ ἐγὼ ποιήσω ταῦθ’ οὕτως καὶ (σὸ) συλλάμβανε. ΜΕ. συλλήψομαι.

There seems to be no difference in meaning, but the genitive may appear with middle forms to express the sphere within which the “collaboration” is conducted (cf. the genitive with the simplex λαμβάνομαι).

(II) In 16 places, the verb is used in a context in which it expresses divine intervention and collaboration or influence; the divine force may be a named god or goddess, simply θεός or δαίμων, or an inscrutable force like τύχη. The basic meaning is no different from the foregoing, but context groups these instances into a set:

1. The god or goddess is named, or the identity is clearly implied: A. Ch. 812 (παῖς ὁ Μαίας); [E.] Rh. 230 (Apollo is subject of ξύλλαβε); Ar. Pax 416 (ὃ φίλ’ Ἐρμῆ); Th. 1, 118, 3;⁸¹ Pl. Phdr. 237a9 (ὃ Μοῦσαι).
2. θεός or δαίμων: E. fr. 432, 2 Nauck²; Ar. V. 734, Eq. 229; Pl. Lg. 709c2 (θεός; see also II, 3 below), 905c7, Ep. 7, 327c4. Rather different is Hp. de Diaeta 87 καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐχεσθαι πρέπον καὶ λίην ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν· δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν ξυλλαμβάνοντα τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπικαλέεσθαι: the need for the gods’ collaboration is recognized, but the verb is used of the human participant.
3. τύχη etc.: S. fr. 927 Radt (τύχη);⁸² Ar. Ra. 1345 (ὃ Μανία); Isoc. ad Dem. (τύχη); D. Ep. 5, 5 (τύχη); cf. Lg. 709c2 (II, 2 above: τύχη καὶ καιρός).

(III) In two places the verb could perhaps be interpreted in a more acquiescent sense, of “complying with” or “supporting” the law: E. Med. 813 σέ τ’ ὠφελεῖν θέλουσα καὶ νόμοις βροτῶν / ξυλλαμβάνουσα δρᾶν σ’ ἀπεννέπω τάδε; Pl. Lg. 645a5 δεῖν δὴ τῆ καλλίστη ἀγωγῆ τῆ τοῦ νόμου ἀεὶ συλλαμβάνειν. Such compliance, however, involves active obedience.

To these 46 passages (48 occurrences of the verb) may be added the one instance in which an ancient author quotes Thg. 129e7–9, namely pseudo-Plutarch, Mor. 574b (De Fato). The author of this treatise considers δαίμονες which are stationed in the terrestrial regions (ὅσοι περὶ γῆν δαίμονες τεταγμένοι) to be the “third level of providence” (τρίτη πρόνοια) in his system (573a). He disregards the fact that τοῦ δαιμονίου in Thg. 129e7/8 (ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις) refers to Socrates’ sign, treats the phrase as designating

⁸¹ ὁ δὲ [sc. the god in Delphi] ἀνεῖλεν αὐτοῖς [sc. the Spartans], ὡς λέγεται, κατὰ κράτος πολέμοῦσι νίκην ἔσσεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφη ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἄκλιτος. The nature of the intervention here is unclear, but the emphasis (αὐτὸς ... καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἄκλιτος) leaves little doubt that it is active.

⁸² To the thought in this fragment – οὐ τοῖς ἀθύμοις ἢ τύχη ξυλλαμβάνει – compare E. fr. 432, 2 Nauck², cited in II, 2: αὐτὸς τι νῦν δρῶν εἶτα δαίμονας κάλει· / τῷ γὰρ πονοῦντι καὶ θεὸς συλλαμβάνει.

the essential quality of δαίμονες,⁸³ and cites e7–9 as “all but a law” (μονο-νουχί θεσμόν τινα). There can hardly be any doubt that this writer understood συλλαβήται here to be expressing the active participation of δαίμονες in people’s lives. That is of course not certain proof for the meaning which the author of Thg. intended, but it is useful to know how one ancient philosophical writer read the passage.

The evidence that συλλαμβάνω and συλλαμβάνομαι can sometimes be understood as not exceeding the semantic range of οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται, οὐκ ἀποτρέπει and οὐ διακωλύει (i. e., an implicit protrepticism) is very slim, if not non-existent. Likewise we find no example in which συλλαμβάνω/συλλαμβάνομαι expresses “collaboration” with someone by preventing him from doing something (in E. Med. 813 it is the νόμοι, not Medea, with which the chorus collaborates by forbidding Medea to murder her children). That συλλαμβάνω/συλλαμβάνομαι is ill-suited to express or imply apotrepticism is indicated pointedly by X. Mem. 2, 3, 1, a passage in which συλλαμβάνειν and διακωλύειν are clearly contrasted. The actively collaborative sense of συλλαμβάνω/συλλαμβάνομαι in all its meanings is no surprise, given the basic force of the simplex on which this compound is constructed (a force which the common English translation of συλλαμβάνω/συλλαμβάνομαι as “cooperate” may serve to conceal).⁸⁴ Of special

⁸³ A philosophical usage which has its origins in Pl. Smp. 202d13 πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον; see Joyal 1995: 53/54. If our evidence for the Plutarchean textual tradition is to be trusted, the author seems to have made this meaning the more explicit by reading ἡ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις, “the power of the daimonic’s essence,” in place of τῆς συνουσίας ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις, which is presented unanimously by the medieval tradition of Thg. His brief exegesis which then follows – τὸ μὲν “συλλαμβάνειν τισὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον” κατὰ τὴν τρίτην πρόνοιαν θετέον – similarly omits τῆς συνουσίας from the construction with συλλαμβάνω, since the phrase has nothing to do with the point he is making. It is at least doubtful whether editors of De Fato should substitute the text transmitted in the tradition of Thg. for the one found in mss. of the Plutarchean work, as they usually do. For the deliberate modification of quoted texts by ancient philosophical writers, see in general Whittaker 1989; Dillon 1989.

⁸⁴ For the scholiast on Ar. Ach. 206 (= Suda ξ 92), the basic distinction to be observed in the use of this verb is between its completion by the accusative case (designating a hostile act) and by the dative case (a well-intentioned act): διττὴ ἐστὶν ἡ χρῆσις τοῦ συλλαβεῖν παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις· πρὸς γὰρ διάφορον κλίσειν, διάφορος καὶ ἡ διάνοια. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς αἰτιατικὴν ἢ σύνταξιν ᾗ, ἔχθραν καὶ δυσμένειαν παρίστησι τοῦ συλλαμβάνοντος, κακουργίαν δὲ τοῦ συλλαμβανομένου, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν. καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατὰ Μειδίου “οὐχὶ συλληψόμεθα αὐτόν;” [apparently a variant in 117 for οὐχὶ συλλήψεσθε;] ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς δοτικὴν, σημαίνει φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν, ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἐν ταῖς παραινέσεσιν [§ II, 3 above]· “ὄρω δὲ καὶ τὴν τύχην ἡμῖν συλλαμβάνουσαν,” ἴσον τῷ συναγωνιζομένην. ἐπάγει

interest are those instances where the verb is predicated of a god or of a possibly divine force (e. g. τύχη). The choice of verb in these cases is not determined by a quality inherent in the word itself but rather by the concept – a recurring one in Greek religious thought – of divine complicity in, rather than absolute domination over, human activity. Eduard Fraenkel discussed the matter in characteristic detail in his commentary on Aeschylus' Agamemnon; one of the points which emerges from that examination is that συλλαμβάνω / συλλαμβάνομαι is a favourite verb for expressing a deity's participation in the activities of mortals (Fraenkel 1950: 2,371–374). Lampe's discussion (2013: 404–412) has similarly emphasized divine complicity and assistance in human action.⁸⁵

References

- Alt, K. 2000. "Der Daimon als Seelenführer: Zur Vorstellung des persönlichen Schutzgeistes bei den Griechen." *Hyperboreus* 6: 219–252.
- Altman, W.H.F. 2012. "Reading order and authenticity: The place of Theages and Cleitophon in Platonic pedagogy." *Plato: The electronic Journal of the International Plato Society* 11: 1–50.
- Amman, A.N. 1953. *-IKOΣ bei Platon*. Freiburg (Schweiz).
- Aronadio, F., ed. 2008. *Dialoghi spuri di Platone*. *Classici della filosofia* 8/5. Torino. 42–49, 263–282.
- Bailey, D.M. 1974. "A caricature of Socrates." *AJA* 78: 427.
- Bailly, J. 2003. Review of Joyal 2000, in *Gnomon* 75: 102–107.
- 2004. *The Socratic Theages: Introduction, English Translation, Greek Text and Commentary*. Hildesheim-Zürich-New York.
- Belfiore, E.S. 2012. *Socrates' Daimonic Art: Love for Wisdom in Four Platonic Dialogues*. Cambridge-New York.

γούν "καὶ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν συναγωνιζόμενον." καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Φιλίππων [§ I, 1 above].

⁸⁵ Examination of context makes it hard to view the cognate noun συλλήπτωρ as expressing anything other than active participation or collaboration on the relatively few occasions that it occurs down to the end of the fourth century B.C.: A. Ag. 1508; E. Or. 1230, IT 95; Ant. Tetr. 2, 3, 10; Pl. Phd. 82e6, Smp. 218d3, Lg. 968b6; X. Mem. 2, 2, 12. The first two of those instances express divine complicity, and in X. Mem. 2, 1, 32 (Prodicus' epideixis on Heracles) συλλήπτρια is applied to personified ἀρετή. The verbal noun σύλληψις is likewise not very common in the period under discussion. Its meanings are of course active and participatory; for its use in describing divine activity, see Rutherford 1989: 193.

- Brisson, L. 2005. "Socrates and the divine signal according to Plato's testimony: Philosophical practice as rooted in religious tradition," in P. Destrée, N. D. Smith, eds. *Socrates' Divine Sign. Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy*. *Apeiron* 38: 1–12.
- 2014. *Écrits attribués à Platon*. Traduction et présentation par Luc Brisson. Paris. 343–369, 474–480.
- Bruell, C. 1999. *On the Socratic Education: An Introduction to the Shorter Platonic Dialogues*. Oxford, OH.
- Bussanich, J. 2013. "Socrates' religious experiences," in J. Bussanich, N. D. Smith, eds. *The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates*. London - New York. 276–300.
- Campbell, D. A., ed. and trans. 1988. *Greek Lyric, vol. II: Anacreon, Anacreontea, Choral Lyric from Olympus to Alcman*. Cambridge, MA - London.
- Centrone, B. 1997. "Il daimonion di Socrate nello pseudoplatonico Teage," in G. Giannantoni, M. Narcy, eds. *Lezioni Socratiche*. Naples. 329–348.
- 2009. *Platone. Teage, Carmide, Lachete, Liside*. Introduzione, traduzione e note. Milan⁴. 16–33, 181–217.
- Chantraine, P. 1956. *Études sur le vocabulaire grec*. Paris.
- Christ, M. R. 2001. "Conscription of hoplites in Classical Athens." *CQ* 51: 398–422.
- Cobb, W. S. 1992. "Plato's Theages." *AncPhil* 12: 267–284.
- Davis, M., G. K. Grewal. 2013. "The daimonic soul: On Plato's Theages," in D. Schaeffer, C. Dustin. *Socratic Philosophy and its Others*. Lanham - Boulder - New York etc. 35–50.
- Dillon, J. 1989. "Tampering with the Timaeus: Ideological emendations in Plato, with special reference to the Timaeus." *AJPh* 110: 50–72.
- Dodds, E. R. 1966. "On misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex." *G&R* n.s. 13: 37–49.
- Döring, K. 2004. *Platon. Werke, V, 1: [Plato], Theages, Übersetzung und Kommentar*. Göttingen.
- Dorion, L.-A. 2000. *Xénophon, Mémoires*. Tome I: Introduction générale. Livre I (texte établi par M. Bandini et traduit par L.-A. Dorion). Paris.
- 2003. "Socrate, le daimonion et la divination," in J. Laurent, ed. *Les dieux de Platon*. Actes du colloque organisé à l'Université de Caen Basse-Normandie les 24, 25 et 26 janvier 2002. Caen. 169–192.
- Droge, A. J. 2007. "'That unpredictable little beast': Traces of an other Socrates," in D. E. Aune, R. D. Young, eds. *Reading Religions in the Ancient World: Essays presented to Robert McQueen Grant on his 90th Birthday*. Leiden - Boston.
- Fehling, D. 1969. *Die Wiederholungsfiguren und ihr Gebrauch bei den Griechen vor Gorgias*. Berlin.
- Finamore, J. F. 2014. "Plutarch and Apuleius on Socrates' daimonion," in D. A. Layne, H. Tarrant, eds. *Neoplatonic Socrates*. University Park, PA.
- Friedländer, P. 1965. *Plato, vol. II*, trans. H. Meyerhoff. London.
- Genette, G. 1980. *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method*, trans. J. E. Lewin. Ithaca, NY.
- Goodwin, W. W. 1900. *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb (rewritten and enlarged)*. Boston.
- Hanfmann, G. M. A. 1951. "Socrates and Christ." *HSCP* 60: 205–233.
- Heidel, W. A. 1896. *Pseudo-Platonica*. Diss. Chicago.
- Hoffmann, Ph. 1985. "Le sage et son démon. La figure de Socrate dans la tradition philosophique et littéraire." *AEHE* V, 94: 417–436.

- Jedrkiewicz, S. 2011a. "Sign, logos, and meaning: The Platonic Socrates and his daemonic experience." *Métis* n.s. 9: 209–243.
- 2011b. "Sobre el diálogo *Theages*, atribuido a Platón," in J. Martínez, ed. *Fakes and Forgers of Classical Literature / Falsificaciones y falsarios de la Literatura Clásica*. Madrid.
- Johnson, D.M. 1996. *A Commentary on Plato's Alcibiades*. Diss. Chapel Hill.
- Joyal, M. 1989. "[Plato], *Theages* 129a3," *RhM* 132: 102–104.
- 1990a. "Anacreon fr. 449 (PMG)." *Hermes* 118: 122–124.
- 1990b. "P. Oxy. 3722: Two observations on the Anacreon commentary." *ZPE* 82: 103/104.
- 1991. "Notes on [Plato], *Theages*." *Mnemosyne* 44: 419–425.
- 1995. "Tradition and innovation in the transformation of Socrates' divine sign," in L. Ayres, ed. *The Passionate Intellect: Essays on the Transformation of Classical Traditions*. Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities VII. New Brunswick, NJ. 39–56.
- 1996. "Aelian, *Varia Historia* 8.1 and the transmission of [Plato], *Theages* 128d2/3." *CQ* 90, n. s. 46: 297/298.
- 2000. *The Platonic Theages: An Introduction, Commentary and Critical Edition*. *Philosophie der Antike* 10. Stuttgart.
- 2001. "Socrates, ΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΟΣ ANHP: Some textual and interpretive problems in Plato," in M. Joyal, ed. In *Altum: Seventy-Five Years of Classical Studies in Newfoundland*. St. John's. 343–357.
- 2005. "To daimonion and the Socratic problem," in P. Destrée, N. D. Smith, eds. *Socrates' Divine Sign. Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy*. *Apeiron* 38: 97–112.
- 2012. "Socrates and the sophists in the Platonic *Theages*." *Mouseion* 12: 325–339.
- Kukkonen, K. 2011. "Metalepsis in popular culture: An introduction," in K. Kukkonen, S. Klimek, eds. *Metalepsis in Popular Culture*. *Narratologia* 28. Berlin - New York. 1–21.
- Lambin, G. 2002. *Anacréon: Fragments et imitations*. Rennes.
- Lampe, K. 2010. "'Socratic therapy' from Aeschines of Sphettus to Lacan." *ClAnt* 29: 181–221.
- 2013. "Rationality, eros, and daimonic influence in the Platonic *Theages* and the Academy of Polemo and Crates." *AJPh* 134: 384–424.
- Lapatin, K. 2006. "Picturing Socrates," in S. Ahbel-Rappe, R. Kamtekar, eds. *A Companion to Socrates*. Malden, MA - Oxford. 110–155.
- Long, A. A. 2006. "How does Socrates' divine sign communicate with him?," in S. Ahbel-Rappe, R. Kamtekar, eds. *A Companion to Socrates*. Malden, MA - Oxford. 63–74.
- Ludwig, P.W. 2002. *Eros and Polis. Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory*. Cambridge.
- Luzzatto, M.J. 1990. "La donna tyrannos: Anacr. fr. 437 e 449 Page." *Sileno* 16: 279–285.
- MacLachlan, B. 1997. "Personal poetry: Anacreon," in D.E. Gerber, ed. *A Companion to the Greek Lyric Poets*. Leiden - New York - Köln. 198–212.
- Margagliotta, G.M.A. 2012. *Il Demone di Socrate nelle interpretazioni di Plutarco e Apuleio*. *Studia Classica et Mediaevalia* 6. Nordhausen.
- Mineo, M.A.B. 2008. "Socratic virtue as divine ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ in the *Meno* and *Theages*," in J.A. Bregman, M.B. Mineo, eds. *Platonic Traditions in American Thought*. New Orleans.
- Molfino, M. 1998. "Lusit Anacreon: Esegese anacreontea antica in P.Oxy. 3722." *Maia* 50: 317–328.

- Müller, A. 2010. *Die Carmina Anacreontea und Anakreon: Ein literarisches Generationenverhältnis*. *Classica Monacensia* 38. Tübingen.
- Nucci, M. 2001. "La posizione di Eros nell'anima: Un caso esemplare: l'eros tiranno." *Elenchos* 22: 39–73.
- Pangle, T. L. 1987. *The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues*. Ithaca-London. 132–174.
- Partridge, J. 2008. "Socrates, rationality, and the daimonion," *AncPhil* 28: 285–309.
- Pender, E. E. 2007. "Sappho and Anacreon in Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Leeds International Classical Studies* 6, 4: 1–57.
- Renaud, F. 2012. "From the Alcibiades to Olympiodorus," in H. Tarrant, M. Johnson, eds. *Alcibiades and the Socratic Lover-Educator*. London. 190–199.
- Richter, G. M. A. 1965. *The Portraits of the Greeks*, vol. 1. London.
- Rosenmeyer, P. A. 1992. *The Poetics of Imitation: Anacreon and the Anacreontic Tradition*. Cambridge.
- Rosivach, V. J. 2012. "The thetes in Thucydides 6, 43, 1." *Hermes* 140: 131–139.
- Rossetti, L. 2001a. "Le dialogue socratique in statu nascendi." *Philosophie Antique. Problèmes, Renaissances, Usages* 1: 11–35.
- 2001b. "La nascita di un nuovo genere letterario all'inizio del IV secolo a.C.: il logos sokratikos." *Classica Cracoviensia* 6: 187–202.
- Ruijgh, C. J. 1971. *Autour de "TE épique": Études sur la syntaxe grecque*. Amsterdam.
- Rutherford, R. B. 1989. *The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius: A Study*. Oxford.
- Schinkel, A. 2007. *Conscience and Conscientious Objections*. Amsterdam.
- Scholtz, A. 2007. *Concordia Discors: Eros and Dialogue in Classical Athenian Literature*. *Hellenic Studies* 24. Washington, D. C.
- Schorn, S. 2004. *Satyros aus Kallatis: Sammlung der Fragmente mit Kommentar*. Basel.
- Senn, S. J. 2012. "Socratic philosophy, rationalism, and 'obedience': Decision making without divine intervention." *Plato: The electronic Journal of the International Plato Society* 12: 1–30.
- Sevelsted, R. 2012. *Den platoniske dialog Theages: Oversættelse og fortolkning*. *Studier fra Sprog- og Oldtids forskning* 348, Copenhagen.
- Shapiro, A. 2012. *Re-fashioning Anakreon in Classical Athens*. *Morphomata Lectures Cologne* 2. Munich.
- Smith, N. D. 1997. *Theages* (trans.), in J. M. Cooper, D. S. Hutchinson, eds. *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis-Cambridge, MA. 627–638.
- Tarrant, H. 2005. "Socratic Synousia: A post-Platonic myth?" *JHPH* 43: 131–155.
- 2012. "Improvement by love: From Aeschines to the Old Academy," in H. Tarrant, M. Johnson, eds. *Alcibiades and the Socratic Lover-Educator*. London. 147–163.
- Timotin, A. 2011. *La démonologie platonicienne: Histoire de la notion de daimon de Platon aux derniers néoplatoniciens*. *Philosophia Antiqua* 128. Leiden-Boston.
- Trabattori, F. 1998. "Sull'autenticità del Teage e del Clitofonte (pseudo)platonici." *Acme* 51: 193–210.
- Whittaker, J. 1989. "The value of indirect tradition in the establishment of Greek philosophical texts or the art of misquotation," in J. N. Grant, ed. *Editing Greek and Latin Texts*. New York. 63–95.
- Willing, A. 1909. *De Socratis Daemonio quae antiquis temporibus fuerint Opiniones*. Diss. Jena.

- Yunis, H. 1988. "The debate on undetected crime and an undetected fragment from Euripides' Sisyphus." *ZPE* 75: 39–46.
- Zuckert, C. H. 2009. *Plato's Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues*. Chicago - London.

Mark Joyal
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8
Canada
m.joyal@umanitoba.ca