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Dignāga on a Famous Sāṅkhya Definition of Inference*

Elsewhere¹ I have dealt with a certain section of a text that Frauwallner in his article “Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṅkhya-Systems”² presented as being a part of the Śaṣṭitantra. The reason for investigating this section was that Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya contains passages that were supposed to be quotes from the Śaṣṭitantra, and I was in need of a frame of reference when dealing with them in my ongoing reconstruction of the second chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. An additional reason was that I had access to the Sanskrit text of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā – one of the major sources for Frauwallner’s partial reconstruction of the Śaṣṭitantra –, which was available in his day only in Tibetan translation. There, I argued that the text Frauwallner presented as a part of the Śaṣṭitantra is actually not by one single author, but rather composed of two or perhaps even more layers. The present paper is a follow-up on that investigation. It is concerned with the corresponding paragraph of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter 2. This paragraph starts with the Sāṅkhya definition of inference that we find in what I will call henceforth “Frauwallner’s Śaṣṭitantra”:

sambandhād ekasmāt pratyakṣāc cheṣasiddhir anumānam.

Frauwallner translates this definition in the following way:³

Die Schlußfolgerung ist der Nachweis des Restlichen durch das Sichtbare auf Grund einer bestimmten Verbindung. (“Inference is the establishment of the remainder by the visible on account of a certain connection.”)

The word “certain” in “a certain connection” seems to render *ekasmāt* of the Sanskrit original. How this translation of *eka* is motivated or what Frauwallner conceived as its purport, he does not say. I can only guess that the translation “a certain” is meant to indicate that any connection that can serve as a base of inference must be one among the limited set of seven connections that are mentioned shortly after the definition in Frauwallner’s Śaṣṭitantra. I doubt whether *eka* can serve this purpose.

* I would like to express my thanks to Katharine Apostle, who kindly improved my English. Dr. Patrick McAllister discussed the translation in the appendix with me and contributed considerably to its intelligibility, for which I am very grateful. Research for this article was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), Project P 27452.

¹ Lasic 2016.

² Frauwallner 1958.

³ Frauwallner 1958: 126 (= 1982: 265).

I would like to refer to another, unfortunately only partial translation presented by Birgit Kellner when she says that “inference is defined as ‘on the basis of a connection [between two objects], the establishment of the remainder [...] from the one [object which is] perceived’.”⁴

Taken as a translation of an isolated phrase, to my mind Kellner’s rendering outperforms Frauwallner’s in several aspects:

- in a usual word order, one would expect *eka* to precede the word that it specifies rather than follow it
- “one” seems to be a more appropriate word for rendering *eka* than “a certain”
- “perceived” has the advantage over “visible” that it does not exclude other than visually perceptible objects, even though “visible”⁵ is closer to the original meaning of *pratyakṣa*.

I feel inclined to understand that the purpose of *eka* in this definition is to single out one of two objects that form a pair, namely the one that is distinct on account of its being perceived, so that the other object, namely the one that is not being perceived, can be referred to as the remainder (*śeṣa*). Whether this is also Kellner’s understanding, I am unable to determine from her translation.

Disregarding the mentioned differences, I think, we can say that both translations, by Frauwallner and by Kellner, present the definition as talking about a perceived thing (*pratyakṣa*) as the logical mark, the remainder (*śeṣa*) as the thing that is inferred from this logical mark, and a connection (*sambandha*) that serves as the basis for the inference. I would like to stress at this point that I see no reason to disagree with this interpretation and that in the following I will not propose a different understanding of the probable original meaning of this definition. That I am talking about the likely original meaning at all is in order to emphasize the difference to that interpretation that underlies, as I will try to show, Dignāga’s discussion.

In the second chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga presents the above definition of inference in order to expose its shortcomings.⁶ This definition is followed by an elaboration, which according to Frauwallner is part of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, and which to my mind already contains materials from a commentary.⁷ In any case, Dignāga’s purpose of providing this passage in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is to present a certain Sāṅkhya opinion which, in turn, he then cri-

⁴ Kellner 2010: 87.

⁵ A more literal translation would be “before one’s eyes”. For discussions what kind of compound the word *pratyakṣa* is, see Sharma 1985.

⁶ Cf. passage P1 of the Appendix.

⁷ Cf. passage P2 of the Appendix.

ticises.⁸ From Dignāga's critique, which seems to build on previous discussions, we can gain a certain understanding of the definition in question.

The first thing to be noted is that we find *ekasmāt pratyakṣāt* quoted twice as one syntactical unit.⁹ Beyond that, we have to try to understand Dignāga's critique in order to establish his understanding of the definition. Actually, it would be more accurate to speak of that interpretation of the definition that Dignāga's critique presupposes at this point of the discussion, since there is no reason to believe that Dignāga would confine his critique to only a single interpretation known to him. With this said, I will present step by step the relevant passage of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. The main argument for the plausibility of my understanding of Dignāga's interpretation of the definition is that it can explain the meaning of the passage in a consistent and coherent way, without taking refuge to anachronistic explanations. To prevent a possible misunderstanding, I would like to emphasize that I am referring at this point to my following explanations. I am not, however, claiming that the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* itself is free from anachronistic interpretations.

In contrast to what I consider the likely original meaning of the definition,¹⁰ Dignāga's critique presupposes an understanding to the effect that the word *pratyakṣa* in this definition refers to a perceived object rather than to the perceiving cognition.¹¹ In the elaboration on the definition,¹² there is mention of the possibility that some cognition of a logical mark (*lingajñāna*) might be insufficiently determined (*anīścita*) or might not correspond to the object (*ayathārtha*). I understand the underlying argument to the effect that the definition is over-extensive, for it allows one to consider an establishment of the rest (*śeṣasiddhi*) on the basis of such an undetermined cognition of the logical mark, or by one that does not correspond to its object, to be considered inference. Let me make a remark that is perhaps superfluous: This argument against the definition of inference presupposes a certain understanding about which kinds of cognitions may be termed *pratyakṣa*, namely, not only immediate correct perceptions.

In order to counteract this reproach, a proponent of the definition quotes a certain passage as having the purpose of specifying the word *pratyakṣa* of said

⁸ Cf. passages P3 to P6 of the Appendix.

⁹ Cf. passages P3 and P5 of the Appendix. Note that in this, Dignāga's interpretation matches Kellner's and not Frauwallner's.

¹⁰ See p. 52.

¹¹ Edeltraud Harzer remarks that the first among the three translations of the definition she is presenting, namely "Inference is the proof of the other [of the two relata] on the basis of a relation after perceiving one [relatum]" (Harzer 2006: 87), "seems to be Dignāga's reading in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*" (op. cit., p. 128, n. 63).

¹² Cf. passage P2 of the Appendix.

definition.¹³ This passage describes the case that one or – to be more precise – the intellect (*buddhi*)¹⁴ cognizes (*pratipadyate*) an object that at first was perceived in a general and undetermined form, and later on, when its specific property or properties are seen, in its specific form. I construe the underlying intention to the effect that one should understand the word *pratyakṣa* in the definition as referring to the last step in a cognitive process that starts with an unspecific or undetermined cognition and results in a specific, determined cognition. Or perhaps the word *pratyakṣa* should be understood as referring to the whole series of involved cognitions.

Dignāga starts his critique by saying that following this interpretation it is incorrect to use the phrase *ekasmāt pratyakṣāt* (“because of one perception”) in the definition of inference.¹⁵ The fact that he says *ekasmāt pratyakṣāt* rather than only *pratyakṣāt* and that his critique does not explicitly state an argument against the use of the word *ekasmāt* in the definition possibly indicates that here Dignāga takes over a discussion from some unknown source and omits the arguments provided there against the use of *ekasmāt*. One could assume that the use of the word *ekasmāt* was criticised on the grounds that, according to the above interpretation of the word *pratyakṣa*, more than one single perception is involved. Or the employment of the word *ekasmāt* was criticised for the reason that the logical mark has not only to be perceived at the time of inference, but also had to be perceived already previously, namely as connected with the “remainder”. This later interpretation seems less concerned with the passage Dignāga directly responds to, but it is the only one for which I can find at least some support in another source, however weak it may be. It is in the Nyāyavārttika that we find the following argument against the correctness of the Sāṅkhya definition of inference: “For inference does not occur because of one single perception (*pratyakṣa*).”¹⁶ Vācaspati confirms that the word *pratyakṣa* is interpreted here as signifying “perception”, and that *eka* is to be understood as its qualifying attribute: “If the word *pratyakṣa* denotes a cognition and [this] cognition is specified as being a single one, then this refutation [applies].”¹⁷ Unfortunately, Vācaspati does not elaborate on how this refutation works in detail. Since Vācaspati was content with stating just this much, he must have been confident that the audience would easily understand the purport without addi-

¹³ Cf. passage P2.1 of the Appendix. For the relation of passage P2 to passage P1, cf. Lasic 2016: 162-164.

¹⁴ Cf. Lasic 2016: Reconstructed section of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, passage 8.

¹⁵ Cf. passage P3 of the Appendix.

¹⁶ *na hy ekasmāt pratyakṣād anumānaṃ bhavati* (NV 53,7).

¹⁷ *yadi pratyakṣaśabdo jñānavacanaḥ, jñānaṃ caikatvena viśiṣyate, tadaitad dūṣaṇam* (NVTT 160,14-15).

tional help. The argument Vācaspati had in mind is possibly related to the discussion of the word *tatpūrvakam* in Nyāyasūtra 1.5¹⁸ where it is argued that inference depends on more preceding cognitions than just one single perception.¹⁹

As mentioned above, Dignāga does not present any arguments why the use of the word *ekasmāt* in the definition should be blamed. Only against the use of the word *pratyakṣa* does he provide a line of reasoning, elements of which can be traced in Sāṅkhya sources. In one version of Sāṅkhyakārikā 28ab we read: “[We] assume [that] the operation of the five [senses] towards a visual form and so on is nothing but illumination.”²⁰ In his commentary, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* informs us that *-mātra* in *ālocanamātram* serves to counteract an opinion entertained by some *ācāryas*: “The cognition of general properties [belongs] to the senses, the cognition of specific properties [belongs] to the intellect.”²¹ From the discussion in the *Yuktidīpikā* that follows on this passage,²² we learn that neither the cognition of general properties (*sāmānya*) nor that of specific properties (*viśeṣa*) can be accepted as belonging to the senses, but rather pertain to the intellect (*buddhi*) or – as it is expressed there – to the internal organ (*antahkaraṇa*). If we consider that the word *pañcānām* in verse 28 of the Sāṅkhyakārikā refers to the five senses (*indriya*), and that a definition of perception, which is ascribed to Vārṣaganya, reads “Perception further is the operation of the auditory sense and so on” (*śrotrādivṛttiś ca pratyakṣam*)²³ we can imagine that an attentive observer, Dignāga himself or somebody before him, must have easily detected internal contradictions in the Sāṅkhya tenets under discussion.

In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* the reason why the phrase *ekasmāt pratyakṣāt* in the definition of inference is inappropriate, is stated as follows: “because perception is nothing but the illumination of its object” (*svārthālocanamātravāt* [PS 2.36c] *pratyakṣasya*).²⁴ This is then explained: “For neither a general property nor a specific property of a cow and so on is object of the operation of the auditory

¹⁸ “Then there is inference, which follows on that (*tatpūrvakam*) [and] is of three kinds: *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*” (*atha tatpūrvakam trividham anumānam pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca* [NV 41,1]).

¹⁹ Cf. NV 41,7-12; see also NVT 128,9-129,1.

²⁰ *rūpādiṣu pañcānām ālocanamātram iṣyate vṛttiḥ* / (YD 201,11).

²¹ *sāmānyajñānam indriyāñām viśeṣajñānam buddheḥ* (YD 201,22). An alternative translation could be: “[The operation] of the senses is the cognition of general properties, [that] of the intellect is the cognition of specific properties.” The exact meaning of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* here and in the following discussion calls for further investigation. Cf. Bronkhorst 1994, esp. p. 318f.

²² YD 202,1-16.

²³ Cf. Steinkellner 1999a: 669 (ST 1) and 1999b: 251.

²⁴ Cf. passage P3 of the Appendix.

sense and so on” (*na hi śrotrādivṛtter gavādīnām sāmānyam viśeṣo vā viśayah*).²⁵ If, however, – the argument continues – one were to accept that the operation of the senses can relate to specific and general properties as its objects, then only a subset of this operation could be counted as being perception and the Sāṅkhya definition of perception would therefore have to express this explicitly. Jinendrabuddhi remarks at this point that if the Sāṅkhya definition of perception were formulated accordingly – his proposal is: “Perception is the operation of the audible sense and so on that is in accordance with the object.”²⁶ –, then it would have two advantageous effects: First, the definition of perception would be faultless, and, second, it would not have been necessary to specify the word *pratyakṣa* that is used in the definition of inference in a further explanation, since undetermined logical marks were then excluded by force of the proper definition of perception.²⁷ However, since the Sāṅkhya definition of perception under discussion is stated as it is, the word *pratyakṣa* in the definition of inference still requires the already mentioned specification²⁸ that asserts that perception can relate to both *sāmānyā* and *viśeṣa*, and therefore the raised blame still stands.

In order to counter the argument that perception does not have general and specific properties for its object, a Sāṅkhya proponent claims that the word perception (*pratyakṣa*) in the definition of inference denotes the result of perception (*pratyakṣaphala*), which he equates with “operation of the mind” (*manovṛtti*).²⁹ The underlying assumption is evidently that the operation of the mind can relate to general and specific properties as its objects.³⁰ The answer to this harks back to the very first argument, “*svārthālocanamātravāt* (PS 2.36c) *pratyakṣasya*”, which, as we have seen, is understood as excluding general and specific properties as objects of perception. In Dignāga’s opinion, which he had already voiced in the first chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, a means of cognition that has one thing as its object cannot have a cognition that refers to something else as its result.³¹ Accordingly, the operation of the mind cannot be the result of perception, and can therefore not be called perception.

²⁵ Cf. passage P4 of the Appendix.

²⁶ *yathārthā śrotrādivṛttiḥ pratyakṣam* (PST 2 97,13).

²⁷ *evam hy ucyamāne pratyakṣalakṣaṇam cādoṣam bhavati, iha ca viśeṣaṇam na kārtavyam jāyate, anavadhāritasya liṅgasyāpratyakṣatvād evāliṅgatvaprasaṅgāt* (PST 2 97,14-98,2).

²⁸ Cf. passage P2.1 of the Appendix.

²⁹ Cf. passage P5 of the Appendix.

³⁰ Cf. *vikalpikatvān manovṛtteḥ sāmānyaviśeṣaviśayatvāt* (PST 2 98,12-13).

³¹ Cf. Steinkellner 2005: 9,4-5 and the translation by Hattori (1968: 39) from the Tibetan: “It is unreasonable that a means of cognition should take one thing for its object and the resulting cognition another.”

An object of any cognition other than perception or its result – so Dignāga concludes this section – cannot be designated as *pratyakṣa*.³²

At this point we have reached the end of the section we are dealing with. In my view Dignāga reproduces, for the most part, a discussion that he had already found in other sources, and adds only towards the end an argument of his own. In this, the present passage is similar to Dignāga’s discussion of whether inference can or cannot have a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as its object. There, Dignāga reproduces for the greater part a discussion that he possibly knew from one or several commentaries to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*.³³

Since the discussion in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* presupposes that the word *pratyakṣa* in the definition of inference means “perception” rather than “perceived object”, we may then ask whether and how the perceived object, the logical mark, is referred to in this definition. According to Edeltraud Harzer, who understood very well that Dignāga interprets the word *pratyakṣa* here as meaning perception, the perceived object is referred to by the word *ekasmāt*. She translates *ekasmāt pratyakṣāt* with “after perceiving one [relatum]” (Harzer 2006: 87). From the point of grammar, this interpretation seems a bit daring, at least if it is intended to be a literal translation. Maybe one could take *ekasmāt pratyakṣāt* as an elliptical expression, and try to understand the literal meaning as “after a perception [that arose] from one [relatum]”.

³² The purpose of this last statement is not completely clear to me. It might well be that Dignāga tries to cover at the very end of his discussion of the word *pratyakṣa* in the definition another interpretation of the definition according to which this word refers to the perceived object rather than to the perceiving perception. Jinendrabuddhi provides two explanations. According to the first explanation, the last sentence is still part of the refutation directed against the assumption that the word *pratyakṣa* in the definition refers to an operation of the mind: “If the operation of the mind were the result of a perception, it could have such a designation. But it is not [the result of a perception], since [a perception and an operation of the mind] have different objects. And this has already previously been said [in the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*]. It is therefore incorrect that [an operation of the mind] can be designated by the word ‘perception’ (*pratyakṣa*). [Dignāga] shows this [by saying]: ‘It is not [appropriate for an object] of another’ [and so on]. [The reason is] that there is no reason to transfer [the designation ‘perception’] to the object of [any cognition] other than perception or its result” (*pratyakṣaphalatvaṃ yadi manovṛtteḥ syāt, syāt tathāvyavapadeśaḥ. tac ca nāstī, bhinnaviṣayavāt. etac ca prāg evoktam. tasmād ayuktaṃ pratyakṣaśabdavyavapadeśyatvam. tad darśayati – na cānyasyetyādi, pratyakṣāt tatphalāt vānyasya viṣayopacārahetvabhāvāt* [PST 2 98,13-17]). According to Jinendrabuddhi’s second explanation (PST 2 99,1-12), the last sentence of this section is directed against an interpretation of the word *pratyakṣa* in the definition in the sense of ‘well established’ (*prasiddha*): “The word ‘perceived’ (*pratyakṣa*) here [in the phrase] ‘on account of one perceived [object]’ (*ekasmāt pratyakṣāt*) refers synecdochically to [the object] being well established” (*ekasmāt pratyakṣād iti pratyakṣaśabdo ‘yaṃ prasiddhvatvam upalakṣayati* [PST 2 99,1-2]).

³³ Cf. Lasic 2010.

In Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā*, we find a hint at another interpretation. There we read: "In [this] aphoristic sentence, the word *sambandha* is to be understood as expressing the object."³⁴ According to this explanation, which – as I have argued in the aforementioned paper³⁵ – should be understood as being part of a quotation from a commentary on the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, the word *sambandha* does not refer to a connection, but rather to a connected thing. Accordingly, we would have to understand that the word *sambandha* in the definition refers to the connected [thing], i.e., the logical mark, and further that it is the object of the perception. As additional information, I would like to mention that we find an interpretation of the word *sambandha* in the Sāṅkhya definition of inference as referring to the logical mark also in the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭīkā*:³⁶

Through the analysis that [the word "connection" (*sambandha*) means "[that which] is being connected" (i.e., refers to the object of the action expressed by the underlying verbal root), [one understands that the word] *sambandha* [refers] to the logical mark.

When understanding *pratyakṣa* to mean "perception" and *sambandha* to mean "connected thing", a tentative translation of the definition could be: "Inference is the establishment of the remainder because of a single perception [which arose] from the [other] connected [thing]." However, in the section of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* under discussion, there is no hint as to how to understand the word *sambandha* in the definition. And since Dignāga's main point is the discussion of the word *pratyakṣa*, there would not have been any need for discussing the meaning of the word *sambandha*.³⁷

On the basis of the discussed section of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, it is reasonable to hold that the passage starting with *līngajñānaṃ tu*³⁸ actually presupposes that the word *pratyakṣa* in the definition means "perception". In the beginning of this paper, however, I expressed my bias towards understanding the word *pratyakṣa* in the definition as originally meaning "perceived". This discrepancy becomes especially disconcerting in view of Frauwallner's assumption that both the definition and the passage under discussion are authored by one person and are parts of one text, the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*. I see several ways to deal with this situation

³⁴ *sūtre karmasādhanāḥ sambandhaśabdo jñeyāḥ* (PST 2 94,6).

³⁵ Lasic 2016: 160-161.

³⁶ *sambadhyaṭa iti vyutpattiyā sambandho līngam* (NVTṬ 160,18-19). Note, however, that in this context *pratyakṣa* is understood as meaning "perceived" (cf. NVTṬ 160,19-21).

³⁷ In the section that follows immediately after this section, Dignāga discusses the seven types of connections (*sambandha*) between the logical mark and the thing to be inferred. This, however, does not contribute to the question of how Dignāga may have understood the word *sambandha* in the definition.

³⁸ Cf. passage P2 of the Appendix and Lasic 2016: Reconstructed section of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, passage 7.

and will mention but two: First, one could accept that the definition on the one hand and the passage that begins with *līṅgajñānaṃ tu* on the other hand are in conflict with each other and take this as support of my assumption that Frauwallner's *Ṣaṣṭitantra* contains, apart from Vārṣagaṇya's text, passages from a commentary thereon that does not do justice to the supposed original meaning of the definition. Second, one could just as well assume that Vārṣagaṇya understood the word *pratyakṣa* in his definition of inference to mean "perception" and concede that the passage that begins with *līṅgajñānaṃ tu* does not contradict the definition, and may indeed be part of Vārṣagaṇya's original text. My main problem at this point is that I do not have a definitely decisive argument for the original meaning of the word *pratyakṣa* in the definition of inference.

Even though I was not able to further substantiate my view on Frauwallner's *Ṣaṣṭitantra* in this paper, I cherish the hope that it provides an acceptable interpretation of a part of the Sāṅkhya section of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*'s chapter on inference. I also hope that I succeeded in hinting at the historical depths of this work and as bringing to the fore one of Dignāga's ways of dealing with the tenets of his opponents.

APPENDIX

Signs and Sigla³⁹

∪	shows that vowel sandhi has not been applied in order to prevent blending of words testified in Sanskrit sources with others.
Ce	<i>citatum ex alio</i> / citation from another (text, or another part of the same text) marked as such by the author
Ce'	<i>citatum ex alio usus secundarii</i> / citation from another (text, or another part of the same text) being used secondarily, that is, a Ce passage not marked as a citation by the author
Cee	<i>citatum ex alio modo edendi</i> / citation from another (text) marked as such by the author with redactional changes
Ce'e	<i>citatum ex alio usus secundarii modo edendi</i> / citation from another (text) being used secondarily with redactional changes

³⁹ The descriptions of Ce and the other sigla for testimonies are based on PST 1, Introduction, p. lii-liv; cf. the literature cited there. In general, these classifications take the edited – or in the present case rather reconstructed – text as their point of reference. However, if they are put between parentheses, they refer to the immediately preceding named work. For example, “Ce ṢT (Ci NV 53,15)” is to be read as “The *Pramāṇasamuccaya* passage concerned is a citation from the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, and that *Ṣaṣṭitantra* passage is also quoted in NV 53,15.”

Ci	<i>citatum in alio</i> / citation in another (text) marked as such by the author
Ci'	<i>citatum in alio usus secundarii</i> / citation in another (text) being used secondarily, that is, a Ci passage not marked as a citation by the author
Ci'e	<i>citatum in alio usus secundarii modo edendi</i> / citation in another (text) marked as such by the author
<i>italics</i>	words and parts of words not testified in Sanskrit sources
K	Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i shes rab's translation
$P_n \rightarrow \dots \leftarrow P_n$	begin and end of passage number n
V	Vasudhararakṣita and Zha ma Seng ge rgyal mtshan's translation

RECONSTRUCTED PART OF PRAMĀNASAMUCCAYA(VṚTTI), CHAPTER TWO

sāṅkhyānām api – $P^1 \rightarrow$ sambandhād ekasmāt pratyakṣāc cheṣasiddhir anumānam
iti. tatra saptavidhaḥ sambandhaḥ. $\leftarrow P^1$ $P^2 \rightarrow$ tena yathāsambhavaṃ sambandhād
 3 *ekasmāt pratyakṣāc cheṣasya apratyakṣasya arthasya sambandhino yaḥ* siddhi-
 hetuḥ, anumānam tat. līngajñānam tu kiñcid aniścitam api syād ayathārthaṃ
 ca *iti* viśeṣanārtham uttaram ārabhate – $P^2.1 \rightarrow$ sāmānyataḥ khalv api pratyakṣam
 6 cānavadhāritam ca *artham* viśeṣadarśanād viśeṣeṇa pratipadyata $\leftarrow P^2.1$ *iti* sar-
 vam. $\leftarrow P^2$

$P^3 \rightarrow$ evam ceṣyamāṇe – ekasmāt pratyakṣād *ity ayuktam. kasmāt.*

9 **svārthālocanamātratvāt (2.36c)**

pratyakṣasya. $\leftarrow P^3$ $P^4 \rightarrow$ na hi śrotrādivṛtter *gavādīnām* sāmānyam viśeṣo vā viśayaḥ.
atha veṣyate, tena na sarvā śrotrādivṛtīḥ pratyakṣam, ayathārthatvād *iti* saiva
 12 viśeṣya vaktavyā, yathānyatra – avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri *ityādi.* $\leftarrow P^4$
 $P^5 \rightarrow$ *atha atra* pratyakṣaphalaṃ pratyakṣam *uktam*, ekasmāt pratyakṣād *ity atra*
pratyakṣaphalaṃ manovṛtīḥ pratyakṣam ucyate. tadviśayasayāpi pratyakṣatvād
 15 *adoṣa iti cet,* $\leftarrow P^5$ $P^6 \rightarrow$ tad apy ayuktam, **svārthālocanamātratvāt** *pratyakṣasya.*
yadi pratyakṣam sāmānyaviśeṣaviśayam syāt, evam sati manovṛtīr api tad-
viśayam eva pratyakṣam ucyeta. na hy anyaviśayasya pramāṇasyānyatra phalam
 18 *iti prāg uktam. na cānyasya viśayasya pratyakṣavyapadeśo yukta iti.* $\leftarrow P^6$

INTRA- AND INTERTEXTUAL RELATIONS, AND TESTIMONIES

1 sāṅkhyānām api] Ci PST 2 94,1 ◊ sambandhād ... anumānam] Ce ST (Ci NV 53,6, YD 5,12 (om. *pratyakṣāc*), DNCV 240,11 (*sambaddhād*), 685,18, 688,1415) ◊ sambandhād ekasmāt] Ci PST 2 94,2-3 ◊ ekasmāt pratyakṣāc] Ci PST 2 96,7 (cor.) ◊ cheṣasiddhir anumānam] Ci PST

2 96,3 ◊ 2 **saptavidhaḥ sambandhaḥ**] Ce ŠT (Ci NV 53,15, PST 2 94,4) ◊ **tena ... 4 tat**] Ce a commentary on ŠT ◊ **tena ... sambandhād**] Ci PST 2 95,8 ◊ 3 **pratyakṣāc ... 4 tat**] cf. DNCV 240,13 ◊ **apratyakṣasya ... sambandhino**] Ci' PST 2 96,1-2 ◊ 4 **liṅgajñānaṃ ... 6 sarvam**] Ce' a commentary on ŠT ◊ **liṅgajñānaṃ ... syād**] Ci PST 2 96,4 ◊ **ayathārthaṃ ca**] Ci PST 2 96,6 ◊ 5 **viśeṣānartham ... ārabhate**] Ci PST 2 96,6-7 ◊ **sāmānyataḥ ... 6 pratipadyata**] Ce ŠT (Ci PST 2 104,11-12) ◊ **sāmānyataḥ ... 6 cānavadhāritam ca**] Ci PST 2 97,12; cf. PST 2 96,8-9 ◊ **pratyakṣam ... 6 ca**] Ci PST 2 96,8 ◊ 6 **viśeṣadarśanād ... pratipadyata**] Ci'e PST 2 96,9-11, Ci' PST 2 97,2 ◊ **viśeṣadarśanād**] Ci PST 2 96,9-10 ◊ **sarvam**] Ci PST 2 96,12 ◊ 8 **evaṃ ceṣyamāṇe**] Ci PST 2 97,4, PST 2 98,11 ◊ **ekasmāt pratyakṣād**] Ce ŠT; cf. above, line 1 ◊ 9 **svārthālocanamātratvāt 10 pratyakṣasya**] cf. PST 2 98,3 ◊ 10 **na hi śrotrādivṛtter**] Ci PST 2 97,6-7 ◊ **sāmānyam ... viśayaḥ**] Ci' PST 2 97,10 ◊ 11 **śrotrādivṛtīḥ pratyakṣam**] Ce'e ŠT (cf. Steinkellner 1999a/b: Fragment ŠT 1); cf. PST 2 97,13 ◊ **ayathārthatvād**] Ci PST 2 97,11 ◊ **saiva ... 12 vaktavyā**] Ci PST 2 97,12-13 ◊ 12 **yathānyatra**] Ci PST 2 97,13 ◊ **avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri**] Ce NS 1.4 ◊ 13 **atra pratyakṣaphalaṃ ... 15 adoṣa**] Ce(e) another commentary on ŠT ◊ **pratyakṣaphalaṃ pratyakṣam**] Ci PST 2 98,11 ◊ **ekasmāt pratyakṣād**] Ce ŠT; cf. above, line 1 ◊ 14 **pratyakṣaphalaṃ manovṛtīḥ**] cf. PST 2 98,13 ◊ 15 **tad apy ayuktam**] Ci PST 2 98,13 ◊ 16 **sāmānyaviśeṣaviśayaṃ**] cf. PST 2 98,12 ◊ 17 **na ... phalam**] Ce PSV on 1.19d (cf. PST 1 113,10-12) ◊ 18 **prāg uktam**] cf. PST 2 98,14-15 ◊ **na cānyasya**] Ci PST 2 98,15-16, PST 2 99,4.

TEXT-CRITICAL REMARKS

1 **sāṅkhyānām ... 2 iti**] *graṅs can pa rñams ni re žig ... žes zer ro V, graṅs can pa rñams ni ... žes zer ro K* ◊ 2 **tatra**] *de la V : de ltar K* ◊ **tena**] *de rñams nas V, de dag la K* ◊ 3 **arthasya**] not in K ◊ 5 **khalv api**] not in V, K ◊ 8 **kasmāt**] or *kutaḥ* or *katham* ◊ 13 **atra**] not in V ◊ **uktam**] or *ity uktam* with V ◊ 18 **iti**] The assumption of *iti* at this point is based upon the facts that K subordinates *na cānyasya ... yuktaḥ to prāg uktam*, and that in V *de nas* precedes the following '*di skad du ... brjod par bya'o (= idaṃ ca vaktavyam)*.

TEXT OF THE TWO TIBETAN TRANSLATIONS

The text of the translation by Vasudhararakṣita and Zha ma Seng ge rgyal mtshan, printed in the left column, is based on D no. 4204 and P no. 5701; the one by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i shes rab, printed in the right column, is based on P no. 5700.

graṅs can pa rñams ni re žig 'brel pa mñon sum pa gcig las lhag par grub pa ni rjes su dpag pa'o žes zer ro || de la 'brel pa ni rñam pa bdun te | de rñams nas¹ p_{37b5} gañ yañ ruñ pa'i mñon sum pa gcig gis lhag pa'i don mñon sum² D_{36a2} pa ma yin pa ñes par grub pa'i gtan tshigs de ni rjes su dpag² pa'o || rtags kyi šes pa cuñ zad ma ñes par 'gyur te | don ji lta ba ni ma yin no³ p_{37b6} žes³ khyad par du bya ba'i phyir phyis kyi rtsom pa 'jug ste | mñon sum gyi spyi tsaṃ las ñes par ma bzui⁴ ba'i don gyi bye brag bstan pa⁵ D_{36a3} las bye brag gi rtags pa bskyed pa thams cad do žes so ||

graṅs can pa rñams ni 'brel pa gcig las mñon sum las lhag pa grub pa ni rjes su⁵ dpag pa'o žes zer ro || de ltar 'brel pa ni rñam pa¹ p_{119a4} bdun te | de dag la ji ltar 'brel pa gcig las lhag pa ni mñon sum ma yin pa'i 'brel pa can grub pa'i rgyu gañ yin pa de rjes su dpag pa'o || rtags kha cig ni ma ñes pa dañ don ji lta ba bzin ma² p_{119a5} yin par yañ 'gyur bas | khyad par du bya ba'i don du spyi mñon sum du yin pa dañ | ñes par ma gzuñ ba'i don khyad par mthoñ ba las khyad par can rtags par byed do žes bya ba phyi ma thams cad brtsams³ p_{119a6} pa yin no ||

de lta bu 'dod pa ^{p37b7} ltar na yañ mñon sum pa gcig las žes ⁶ pa ni rigs pa ma yin te gañ gi phyir mñon sum ni rañ don tsaṃ la⁷ lta ba'i phyir 	de ltar 'dod na mñon sum gcig las žes bya ba mi rigs te gañ gi phyir mñon sum ni rañ don⁸ lta tsaṃ yin pa'i phyir
ba lañ la sogs pa'i spyi dañ bye brag gñis ka la 'añ rna ba la sogs ^{D36a4} pa 'jug pa ni med ^{P37b8} do ci ste yañ 'dod do že na ma yin te rna ba la sogs pa'i 'jug pa thams cad ni mñon sum ma yin te don ji lta ba ma yin pa'i phyir ro de'i phyir de ñid bye brag tu brjod par bya ste <u>gžan du</u> tha sñad ⁹ du mi bya ^{P38a1} ba 'khrul pa med pa žes bya ba la sogs pa ji ^{D36a5} skad brjod pa bžin no	ba lañ la sogs pa spyi 'am khyad par ni rna ba la sogs ^{P119a7} pa 'jug pa'i yul ma yin no ci ste des na rna ba la sogs pa 'jug pa thams cad ni mñon sum ma yin te ci lta ba bžin gyi don can ma yin pa'i phyir ro žes 'dod na ji ltar <u>gžan du</u> bstan par ^{P119a8} bya ba ma yin žin 'khrul pa med pa žes bya ba la sogs pa ltar khyad par de ñid brjod par bya'o

Variants to the Tibetan text:

¹ nas] om. D.; ² dpag] dpog D.; ³ žes] žes pa de P.; ⁴ bzuñ] gzuñ P.; ⁵ rjes su] rjesu P.; ⁶ žes] šes P.;
⁷ la] las P.; ⁸ don] 'dod P.; ⁹ sñad] dad D.

TRANSLATION

Furthermore, the [definition of inference] by the proponents of the Sāṅkhya is [as follows]: “Inference is the establishment of the remainder because of one perception, based on a connection.” The connection [involved] there is of seven kinds. ⁴⁰Inference is that which is the cause of the establishment of the remaining unperceived connected because of one perception, based on a connection in terms of this [i.e., in terms of the relation of property and property-owner and so on] – whichever might be appropriate. However, since [one could argue that according to the Sāṅkhya understanding of perception] the cognition of a logical mark might sometimes be unascertained or not in accordance with the object, [the author of the *Šaṣṭitantra*] writes, in order to specify [the perception referred to in the definition of inference], the whole [passage] below which goes:⁴¹ “As is well known, one cognizes an object that was perceived [at first] in a general way and also one that [was perceived] without determination [later on] in a specific [form] on account of seeing a specific property.”

⁴²And if it is assumed in this way, the phrase “because of one perception” is inappropriate. Why? – **Because perception is nothing but the illumination of its object.** For neither a general property nor a specific property of a cow and so on is the object of the operation of the auditory sense and so on. Or if one

⁴⁰ I assume that the following explanations are taken from a commentary on the *Šaṣṭitantra*.

⁴¹ I assume that the commentator quotes the following passage from the *Šaṣṭitantra*'s chapter on perception.

⁴² Here starts Dignāga's criticism.

assumes [that they can become its object], then according to this [assumption] not every operation of the auditory sense and so on is perception, since not [every operation of the senses] is in accordance with the object. Therefore, [in the Sāṅkhya definition of perception] this [operation of the senses] would have to be mentioned with further specifications, as elsewhere [in the Nyāya definition of perception the cognition has been specified as being] “not expressible [and] not erroneous”.

But if [one argues in the following way]: “Here the result of perception has been called perception. [To say it more explicitly:] Here in [the phrase] ‘because of one perception’ a result of perception, [namely] an operation of the mind, is being called perception. Since [this result of perception] is [designated as] perception even though it has these [general and specific properties] for its object, there is no fault”,⁴³ then this is also inappropriate, **because perception is nothing but the illumination of its object**. If perception had general and specific properties for its object, then (*evam sati*) the operation of the mind too could be called a perception that indeed has those for its object. [I] have already stated: “A means of cognition that has one [thing] for its object does not have a result (i.e., a resulting cognition) with regard to another [thing].”⁴⁴ And the designation as ‘perceived’ [if one prefers to interpret the word *pratyakṣa* in the definition in this sense] is not appropriate for an object of another [cognition than perception or its result].

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⁴³ That the first sentence of this argument is followed by its paraphrase makes it most likely that Dignāga is here quoting some Sāṅkhya text, rather than introducing only a hypothetical argument. It is, however, difficult to decide whether the paraphrase is part of the text Dignāga quotes or his own addition.

⁴⁴ Cf. PSV on PS 1.9d, translated from the Tibetan by Hattori (1968: 39): “It is unreasonable that a means of cognition should take one thing for its object and the resulting cognition another.”

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