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On Chinese Interpretations of the Distinction Between Two Types of Negation in Indian Buddhist Logic*

1. The Problem

Academic studies on the Chinese tradition of Buddhist logic and epistemology (*hetuvidyā* in Sanskrit, *yinming* 因明 in Chinese) have been conducted from at least two different perspectives. The first perspective is represented by mostly Chinese-language scholarship in so-called *yinming* studies (*yinmingxue* 因明學).[1] Contemporary "*yinming* studies" generally maintained the focus on the pre-modern commentarial tradition which developed around Xuanzang's (玄奘, 602-664) Chinese translations of two Indian manuals of logic and epistemology – the Nyāyamukha and the Nyāyapraveśa – from the Tang (唐) Dynasty (618-907). Consequently, they prioritized those elements of *hetuvidyā* that were reproduced and developed in the works of traditional East Asian exegetes. Nonetheless, scholars of contemporary *yinming* studies have pursued a more systematic and critical analysis of its subject matter with the use of modern methodologies and concepts borrowed from Western studies on logic. On the other hand, the same corpus of texts has attracted the interest of contemporary scholars of Buddhism specializing in the field of *pramāṇa* studies. These scholars tend to approach Chinese translations of *hetuvidyā* treatises (and the commentaries written on them) mainly as historical documents to be used in the study of the development of Buddhist logical and epistemological thought, ancillary to the sources preserved in Sanskrit and Tibetan.

By cross-examining these two perspectives on the legacy of East Asian *hetuvidyā* one can surely gain a deeper understanding of this relatively understudied

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[1] For historical overviews of the emergence and development of *yinming* studies in twentieth-century China and discussions of their relation to traditional Buddhist scholasticism, see the studies of Uwe Frankenhauser (1996: 205-227) and Zheng Weihong (2007: 292ff.). According to Frankenhauser, the Chinese term *yinmingxue* (as opposed to *yinming*) is a neologism which highlights the relatively modern roots of this discipline. Zheng employs the more general term *yinming yanjiu* (因明研究), that is, "research on *yinming*", instead of *yinmingxue*.

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tradition. However, such a comparative approach may also yield new puzzles and questions. One of them is the Chinese reception of the Indian distinction between two kinds of negation. The problem is inextricably linked with the difficulties involved in understanding the precise contours of the concept of *zhequan* (遮詮), "negating expression" or "excluding expression".[2] What to make of this concept is an issue about which the two aforementioned perspectives are not at all in agreement. In the works of the twentieth-century Chinese scholars of "*yinming* studies" it is usually introduced as an opposite of *biaoquan* (表詮), "affirmative expression" or "positing expression". As such, it has often been presented as equivalent, or at least analogous, to what in Western logical parlance would be called the negation of a term, a predicate or a statement.[3] However, contemporaneous studies on the system of logic devised by Dignāga, the Indian scholar whose formulation of *hetuvidyā* was transmitted to China by Xuanzang, are silent about a distinction of this kind. In fact, as pointed out by Zheng Weihong (1997: 135), in both of Xuanzang's translations of Indian *hetuvidyā* manuals the word *zhequan* appears no more than once. It can be found in

[2] Taken in isolation, the morpheme *zhe* (遮) may be rendered as "to stop; to block; to obstruct" or "to conceal; to cover" (Morohashi XI/167). In the usage current in Buddhist treatises it may also mean "to exclude", "to negate" or "to evade" (Yokoyama 2010: 396). The morpheme *quan* (詮) is usually understood as "to expound; to elucidate; to explicate", etc. (Morohashi X/453). In the context of Yogācāra scholasticism (including works on *hetuvidyā*) its meaning is often that of "to express by means of language" (Yokoyama 2010: 606). The word *zhequan* may be construed as a determinative compound ("expressing by the means of negating/excluding") or as a coordinative compound ("negating/excluding and expressing"). The term has also been appropriated by Lü Cheng (呂澂, 1896-1989) and other contemporary scholars as one of the modern Chinese translations of the Sanskrit notion of *apoha*, the "exclusion of another" (Ni 2008: 103, n. 1 & 104, n. 2).

[3] Murakami Senshō (村上専精, 1851-1929), one of the pioneers of modern studies on *hetuvidyā* in East Asia, regarded this distinction as essentially identical to the one between affirmative and negative statements in traditional Western logic (Murakami 1891: 184). Murakami's view was shared by many twentieth-century Chinese scholars, for example Xie Wuliang (謝無量, 1883-1964 [Xie 2011: 201-202]) or Shi Cun 石村 (Shi 1981: 33); cf. also Zheng 2007: 326-327 & 419-420. Other Chinese authors endorsed this view with some qualifications. For example, Chen Wangdao (陳望道, 1891-1977) pointed out that in the system of *hetuvidyā* the distinction between *biaoquan* and *zhequan* applies only to the mode of formulation of disputed theses, rather than to the logical quality of any given statement (Chen 1931: 42-43). Shen Jianying 沈劍英 conceded that the term *biaoquan* is not entirely synonymous with the Western notion of affirmation, since a statement categorized as such simultaneously asserts a certain predicate and denies predicates that are incompatible with the asserted one (Shen 1985: 45, 47). More recently Zheng Weihong 鄭偉宏 has argued that early Chinese commentators understood the distinction between *biaoquan* and *zhequan* as a distinction between "positive concepts" (*zheng gainian* 正概念) and "negative concepts" (*fu gainian* 負概念), rather than between affirmative and negative statements (Zheng 1997: 135-139 & 2007: 420-25). Chen Daqi (陳大齊, 1886-1983) was one of the few renowned *yinming* scholars who explicitly rejected analogies between *biaoquan* and *zhequan* and the Western notions of negation and affirmation as misguided (Chen 1952: 44-47).

the section of Dignāga's Nyāyamukha (Zhengli men lun 正理門論) that explains the difference between two kinds of example (*dṛṣṭānta*, 喻) adduced to complete a valid proof (YZML 2c5-11):

> 「喻」有二種：同法、異法。同法者，謂立「聲無常。 勤勇無間所發性故」以「諸勤勇無間所發，皆見無常。猶如瓶等」。 異法者，謂「諸有常住，見非勤勇無間所發。如虛空等」。前是「遮詮」。後唯「止濫」。由「合」及「離」比度義故。由是，雖對不立實有太虛空等，而得顯示「無有宗處無因」義成。
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> The example is of two kinds: the similar example and the dissimilar example. The similar example is as follows: We establish [the thesis] "Sound is non-eternal because of its being produced by an effort" by the means of [the following statement:] "All that is immediately produced by an effort is seen to be non-eternal, as a jug, etc." The dissimilar example is as follows: [We prove the aforementioned thesis by stating that] "All that is eternal is seen not to be immediately produced by an effort, as space, etc." The former [statement of an example] is a negating expression (*zhequan* 遮詮). The latter [statement of an example] only "stops the overflow" (*zhilan* 止濫).[4] This is because we infer what we want to establish by [demonstrating] the relations of positive and negative concomitance. Therefore, even though the opponent may not hold that there really is something like void or space, we are able to show that our principle that there is no reason-property where there is no property to be proved is fulfilled.

In the above account, *zhequan* is used in contradistinction to the term *zhilan* (止濫, lit. "stopping the overflow"). According to Ejima Yasunori (Ejima 1980: 117) and Katsura Shōryū (Katsura 1981: 63-65), who compared the aforementioned passage with a parallel fragment preserved in the Tibetan rendition of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, the words *zhequan* and *zhilan* are translations of the Sanskrit terms *paryudāsa* (Tib. *ma yin par dgag pa*) and *prasajyapratiṣedha* (Tib. *med par dgag pa*), respectively. These are the famous "two kinds of negation" well known in the Indian grammatical and philosophical tradition.[5]

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[4] In a parallel passage of the Vṛtti to Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya (4.3c-d) it is implied that the difference between the two cases lies in a different understanding of the negative particle *na* (Katsura Shōryū, personal communication). However, it appears that this interpretation was not followed in the East Asian commentarial tradition. See also Tucci 1930: 37: "The first example is negative and affirmative, the second only exclusive." Giuseppe Tucci's interpretation of this passage follows the early Chinese commentary of Shentai discussed below. Yet another reading was proposed by Lü Cheng and Shi Yincang, most likely the first Chinese scholars focussing on the Nyāyamukha who consulted the Tibetan text of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. According to their understanding, the expressions "the former" and "the latter" refer to the two parts of the statement of a dissimilar example that mention the property to be proven and the reason-property, respectively (Lü – Shi 1978: 356).

[5] See Kajiyama 1973. In the aforementioned parallel passage to the Nyāyamukha preserved in the Tibetan translation of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga identifies the similar example with *paryudāsa* and the dissimilar example with *niṣedha*, simple negation (Katsura 2004: 152).

These two kinds of negation have been defined and explicated in different ways by various historical and contemporary authors.[6] However, it is well established that in the passage in question Dignāga understands *paryudāsa* as a so-called implicative negation, i.e., a negation that by denying something actually affirms something else in an indirect way, and *prasajyapratiṣedha* as a "non-implicative negation" which has no other function apart from cancelling its object. Dignāga's distinction draws on the observation previously made by Indian grammarians with respect to negations construed with either nominal or verbal phrases.[7] Nonetheless, in the aforementioned passage from the Nyāyamukha these grammatical categories are applied in a more abstract sense, in order to make a point about rules of rational debate between discussants who hold different ontological commitments. The gist of Dignāga's argument is that these differences should be taken into account only when assessing the adequacy of the similar example, which involves making a statement about reality. They can, however, be disregarded in the case of a dissimilar example, which does not need any "objective support" in the realm of facts.[8]

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[6] Krzysztof Jakubczak (2010: 77) lists contemporary translations of the term *paryudāsa* into English which include "limitational negation", "nominally bound negative", "exclusion", "negation of a term", "choice negation", "relational negation", "presuppositional negation", "strong negation", "weak negation" and "implicative negation". The term *prasajyapratiṣedha* has been variously rendered as "negation (subsequent to tentatively) applying", "verbally bound negative", "negation of a proposition", "negation of a predicate", "exclusion negation", "prohibition", "absolute negation", "pure negation", "non-presuppositional negation", "strong negation", "weak negation", "illocutionary negation" and "non-implicative negation" (ibid.).

[7] In their analyses of Sanskrit sentences and compounds, Indian grammarians assumed that if a negation is construed attached to a noun, its primary meaning is that of "difference" (*bheda*); it expresses something which is "similar but different" to what is negated. For example, the term "non-Brahman" (*abrāhmaṇa*) refers to a member of another caste, i.e., a *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya* or *śūdra*. By contrast, a negation attached to a verb only points to the "absence" (*abhāva*) of something that is mentioned in a given phrase or proposition. For example, the compound word "sun-not-seeing (faces)" (*asūryaṃpaśyāni* [*mukhāni*]) simply denies that any activity of seeing has taken place (Cardona 1967: 40-41 with n. 19). See also Gillon 1987, Matilal 1971: 162-165 and Staal 1962: 58-60 (= Staal 1988: 115-117). In contemporary scholarship on Buddhist philosophy the distinction between *paryudāsa* and *prasajyapratiṣedha* is also frequently paired with a difference in the scope of the negation. On this account, *paryudāsa* is defined as the negation of a term (as in "non-P" or "S is a non-P") and *prasajyapratiṣedha* as a negation attached to a verb that may extend to the whole statement (as in "S is not P" or "it is not the case that S is P"). Cf. the following examples: *abrāhmaṇā ete* vs. *sūryaṃ na paśyanti* (Kajiyama 1973: 171 [= Kajiyama 2005: 137]); *abrāhmaṇam ānaya* vs. *caitro na pacati* (Katsura 1981: 64-65); "An armadillo is unhurried" vs. "An armadillo is not a rodent" (Siderits 1982: 196); "ano hito wa otoko dewa nai" (あの人は男ではない) vs. "kare wa hon o yomanai" (彼は本を読まない) (Nagasaki 1984: 363); "There is a non-cow in the room" vs. "It is not the case that there is a cow in the room (There is no cow in the room)" (Patil 2009: 213, n. 40).

[8] See Katsura 2004: 153. By means of a similar example the arguer demonstrates the relation of positive concomitance (*anvaya*) that occurs between two properties present in some really

Obviously, the meaning of the term *zhequan* intended by the author of the Nyāyamukha, i.e., "a negative expression with an affirmative meaning", is different from the notion of a "negative statement" or "negative concept", the common interpretation of the term *zhequan* in the works of contemporary "*yinming* studies" scholars. On the other hand, the systematized accounts of the East Asian system of *hetuvidyā* provided by contemporary scholars of *yinming* rarely – if ever – touch upon the distinction between *zhequan* and *zhilan*, or Dignāga's distinction between two kinds of negation.

These observations raise at least two questions. Firstly, it is not clear why exactly the distinction intended by Dignāga has been marginalized in the East Asian commentarial tradition. Secondly, it remains to be seen whether – and how – *zhequan* understood in the sense of "negating expression", contrasted with *biaoquan*, is related to *zhequan* mentioned in the Nyāyamukha, where it is contrasted with *zhilan*. The significance of these questions extends well beyond tracing changes in meaning of a particular technical term. The aforementioned passage from the Nyāyamukha certainly presents considerable exegetical difficulties to someone unfamiliar with the original meaning of the terms *zhequan* and *zhilan*, which are not explained in the treatise. It introduces a pair of concepts that originated in the Sanskrit grammatical tradition which was definitely not widely known or studied in China. At the same time, as demonstrated by the example of Dignāga, in India the distinction in question came to be employed in increasingly more general and abstract ways. The application of the two kinds of negation to Indian (and Tibetan) Buddhist philosophy turned out to be – in the words of Kajiyama Yūichi – "really inexhaustible".[9] It remains

existing loci. Hence, a similar example involves making a statement about reality. In the case of such a statement, even those terms that are lexically negative in fact combine a negative and affirmative meaning. For example, in the passage quoted above the term "non-eternal" (**anitya*) affirms the existence of things that are not "eternal" (*nitya*), such as a jug. On the other hand, the statement of a negative example establishes the relation of negative concomitance (*vyatireka*). The only function this example has to perform is to demonstrate that absence of the property to be proved necessarily entails absence of the reason-property. The claim expressed by the statement of a negative example remains valid even if the disputants do not agree as to whether any concrete instance of the negative relation actually exists; in the Nyāyamukha Dignāga refers to the case of an opponent from the Buddhist Sautrāntika school who rejects the existence of eternal and uncreated entities on doctrinal grounds. Hence, in a statement of a dissimilar example even ostensibly positive expressions, such as "eternal", should be construed as purely negative (for example as *na anityam*, "not non-eternal"), in a way that does not imply that some existent "eternal" entities are being spoken of (Ejima 1980: 117-118; Katsura 1981: 63-65 & 2004: 152-153) .

[9] See Kajiyama 1973: 172 (= Kajiyama 2005: 137). Classic examples are the interpretation of Nāgārjuna's tetralemma and the further elaboration of Dignāga's doctrine of *apoha* (Kajiyama 1973: 172-174 [= Kajiyama 2005: 137-139]; Nagasaki 1984: 364-365).

to be seen to what extent East Asian commentators were aware of the grammatical complexities of the original distinction, but also of its rich philosophical implications. It also remains to be investigated whether the semantic shift in the understanding of the concept of *zhequan* occurred as a result of misunderstanding Dignāga's intention or as a conscious modification of his system according to the priorities of the Chinese commentators. Seen in this light, the history of the earliest Chinese interpretations of the distinction between two kinds of negation presents itself as a unique case study of both the difficulties involved in the transmission of *hetuvidyā* to East Asia and the patterns of its "domestication" in this new linguistic and cultural setting.

2. *zhequan* and *zhilan* in the Earliest Chinese Glosses on the Nyāyamukha Passage

The most detailed Chinese exegesis of the passage in which Dignāga makes use of the concepts of *zhequan* and *zhilan* can be found in a seventh-century commentary on the Nyāyamukha, the Li men lun shuji 理門論述記 (LMLS) by Shentai (神泰, date unknown),[10] a disciple of Xuanzang (LMLS 90a12-b4). A remarkably similar, but slightly abbreviated passage appears in the extant part of Wengui's (文軌, date unknown)[11] commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa, the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏 (YRZLS 687c15-21).

The basic ideas expressed in Shentai's and Wengui's commentaries can be summarized as follows. All *dharma*s – individual phenomena or units of experience – can be cognized by their two characteristics: those specific to them (*zixiang* 自相, Skt. *svalakṣaṇa*) and those shared with other *dharma*s (*gongxiang* 共相, Skt. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Specific characteristics are inexpressible by words and can only be apprehended by sense perception. General characteristics are cognized by mental faculties that are responsible for conceptual discrimination, such as "mental consciousness" (*yishi* 意識, Skt. *manovijñāna*) functioning as "dispersed (i.e., being not in a meditative state) mind" (*sanxin* 散心). For this reason, they can be expressed by means of "names and words", i.e., linguistic units that denote concepts (LMLS 90a13-16).[12] However, the only

[10] For an English summary of available biographical information on Shentai, see Rhodes 1994: 13-14.

[11] In Chinese secondary literature Wengui is commonly assumed to have been a co-disciple of Shentai. However, extant historical records offer no clue as to his personal relation with Xuanzang or his followers (Frankenhauser 1996: 127). Zheng (2007: 116) argues on the basis of internal evidence from Wengui's commentary that its author must have been a close associate of Xuanzang's, who absorbed a great deal of his master's oral commentary on the *hetuvidyā* treatises.

[12] Cf. also YRZLS 687c15-17.

way in which "names and words" can convey general characteristics of a particular *dharma* is by "negating other *dharma*s" (*qianzhe yufa* 遣遮餘法). For example, the general characteristics of an entity labeled as "blue" (*qing* 青) are demonstrated by excluding all alternative designations, such as "not blue" (*fei qing* 非青), "yellow", etc. (LMLS 90a16-20).[13] On the other hand, there are cases when a word only negates a particular *dharma*, without expressing (*quan* 詮) any referent. For example, it is possible to understand the expression "[there is] no blue" (*wu qing* 無青) as merely conveying the absence of a *dharma* identified as "blue", but not positing the existence of any entity whose general characteristic may be expressed as "being non-blue" (LMLS 90a20-21).[14]

Both Chinese commentators maintain that the distinction between these two terms explains the difference between the two kinds of example that may be adduced in a correct inference. Terms used in the statement of the similar example demonstrate general characteristics of existent *dharma*s by excluding their complements. Hence, they are "negating expressions" (*zhequan* 遮詮) in the sense that they negate (i.e., exclude) something (e.g., the property of "eternality") so as to express something else (e.g., entities that are non-eternal or transitory). By contrast, terms used in the statement of the dissimilar example do not imply existence of anything real. The function of this latter kind of verbal expression is only to "stop the overflow", i.e., to exclude an undesired possibility by indicating what is not the case (LMLS 90a22-29).

As explained by Shentai, the terms used in both kinds of example should be construed in two different ways due to the divergent logical functions of each example (LMLS 90b1-4):

> 由同喻，合本宗、因而比度故。故是遮而得詮。以本宗、因是遮詮故。由異喻，但欲離本宗、因而比度故。故唯止濫。不欲別有詮表也。
>
> Through the similar example we make an inference by associating the given property to be proven and the reason-property (i.e., on the basis of the positive concomitance between these two properties). Therefore, [the similar example involves] negation, while it nevertheless can express something, as [the expressions of] the two properties are negating expressions. By means of the dissimilar example we merely intend to make an inference by separating the given reason-property and the property to be proven (i.e., on the basis of the negative concomitance of these two properties). Thus, it is nothing but "stopping the overflow". We do not aim to convey [anything] in addition to that.

In all likelihood, Shentai and Wengui must have relied on some unknown source, perhaps an oral commentary, that introduced them to Dignāga's seman-

[13] Cf. also YRZLS 687c17-20.
[14] Cf. also YRZLS 687c20-21.

tic theory based on the notion of *anyāpoha*, or the "exclusion of another".[15] How closely their explanations follow various Indian approaches to the theory of *apoha* is an issue that warrants further investigation. In what follows I would like to focus only on those aspects of Shentai's and Wengui's commentaries that appear significant in the light of subsequent developments within the Chinese commentarial tradition.

Firstly, in the first words of his gloss on the above passage from the Nyāyamukha, Shentai states that Dignāga's claim

> The former [statement of an example] is a negating expression. The latter [statement of an example] only "stops the overflow".

is meant to differentiate between two kinds of example discussed in the system of *hetuvidyā*.[16] This remark, taken by itself, appears trivial. However, it seems that later East Asian commentators indeed explicated the terms *zhequan* and *zhilan* primarily as descriptions of the functions performed by similar and dissimilar examples in the process of inference. Hence, in the preserved East Asian *hetuvidyā* literature the term *zhilan* is typically not understood as a grammatical or semantic category, in the sense of a "non-implicative" or "simple negation". Rather, in the majority of cases it is construed in its more literal sense as "stopping", "eliminating" (*zhi* 止, *zhilan* 止除), etc., the excessive, i.e., illicit presence (*lan* 濫, *lanxing* 濫行) of the reason-property in a locus that is not characterized by the property to be proven.[17] In fact, in the understanding of Wengui, as well as that of later commentators such as Kuiji (窺基, 632-682) and Huizhao (慧沼, 648-714), "stopping the overflow" appears synonymous with establishing the relation of negative concomitance.[18] In this usage, *zhilan* is no longer

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[15] See Ho 2012: 12-16.

[16] 「論前是遮詮，復唯止濫者」此簡二喻差別 (LMLS 90a12).

[17] On the other hand, the eighteenth-century Chinese commentator Wu Xilin 吳西林 (Wu Yingfang 吳穎芳, 1702-1781) proposed to read *zhequan* as "to reject the opponent's discourse" (遮敵論之詮) and *zhilan* as "to stop the overflow of different explanations" (止異說之濫) (quoted by Wu Shuxu 吳樹虞 in his Yinming ru zhengli lun hou ji 因明入正理論後記 [YRZLH] 109b10-110a2).

[18] In the system of *hetuvidyā* the property quoted as the reason has to fulfill three conditions, referred to as the "three marks" (*sanxiang* 三相), in order to establish a given thesis: firstly, it has to be a property of the locus that is the subject of the thesis; secondly, it has to be a property of at least some "similar instances", i.e., loci where the property to be proven is present; thirdly, it has to be absent from all "dissimilar instances", i.e., loci where the property to be proven is absent (YRZL 11b6-7). Wengui explains that the third mark of the reason is necessary because "even though the main and auxiliary marks (i.e., the first two marks) are in place, the overflow has not yet been eliminated. Hence, the third mark – the lack [of the reason-property] in dissimilar instances – is necessary"「雖有主、伴，其濫未除故，須第三，異品無相。」 (YRZLS 684c1-2). Earlier in his commentary Wengui avers: "We establish the thesis through a similar example by stating that similar instances have [the reason-property]. We only need to make this

contrasted with *zhequan* but rather with *shuncheng* (順成), i.e., establishing a thesis by adducing a positive example.[19]

Secondly, it should be pointed out that Shentai presents the distinction between the two terms associated with either the similar or the dissimilar example as a primarily semantic difference between, on the one hand, negation that involves ontological commitment and, on the other, negation that does not presuppose or imply existence of any entity. Unlike so many contemporary scholars, Tang-period Chinese commentators do not make any mention of the grammatical definition of *paryudāsa* as a "term-bound" (or "nominally bound") negation and *prasajyapratiṣedha* as a "verb-bound" (or propositional) negation.[20] In fact, it appears that this aspect of the distinction in question was not emphasized in Chinese Buddhist literature known to the authors of *hetuvidyā* commentaries. In Xuanzang's translation of Saṅghabhadra's Abhidharmanyāyānusāraśāstra, the Apidamo shun zhengli lun 阿毘達磨順正理論 (ASZL 624a8-19), "negating expressions" (*zhequan* 遮詮) are divided into two types: those that have a referent (有所詮者) and those that do not (無所詮者). The first category is illustrated with expressions such as "not a Brahmin" / "a non-Brahmin" (*fei fanzhi* 非梵志) and "not an eternal (thing)" / "non-eternal" (*wuchang* 無常). Despite their negative form, both words denote something that may be described in a positive way, such as a member of a lower caste (*varṇa*) in the former case and the quality of evanescence in the latter. In this respect, they clearly resemble stock examples for a *paryudāsa* negation extracted by contemporary scholars from Indo-Tibetan sources.[21] The second kind of negation, however, is illustrated by examples such as "not existent" / "non-existent" (*fei you* 非有) and "[there

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presence certain and the thesis is established. We stop the overflow by stating that dissimilar instances have no [reason-property]. Unless this absence is pervasive, the overflow is not stopped" 「順成立同有，但定有即順成。止濫立異無，非遍濫不止。」 (YRZLS 684b22-23). Kuiji also states: "As for 'stopping the overflow' into dissimilar instances, it has to be demonstrated that [the dissimilar instances] pervasively lack [the reason-property] in order for the overflow to be stopped" 「異品止濫，必顯遍無，方成止濫。」(YD 108a14-15). In Huizhao's view, as expressed in his Yinming yiduan 因明義斷 (YY), the function of the dissimilar example is to "stop an excess of the reason-property"「遮因濫行」, i.e., to eliminate its unwanted occurrence in dissimilar instances (YY 144b21).

[19] It is worthy of note that those contemporary scholars who did not turn to the Tibetan sources to reconstruct the Sanskrit correlates of the terms in question in the Nyāyamukha proposed fairly similar readings of this term. Cf. for example Kitagawa Hidenori (1965: 243) who understands *zhilan* as the function of the dissimilar example to prevent the reason-property from "deviating" (*itsudatsu* 逸脱) into the domain of dissimilar instances; cf. also Claus Oetke (1994: 52) who proposes to read the term as "exclud[ing] the 'inundation' … = *ativyāpti* = the over-extension of the proving *dharma*".

[20] Cf. n. 7 above.

[21] See Cardona 1967: 40-41; Kajiyama 1973: 171 (= Kajiyama 2005: 137).

is] no thing" (*wu wu* 無物), which may as well be taken as specimens of existential negation rather than of "verbally bound" or propositional negation of the *prasajya* type. It is possible that Shentai and Wengui interpreted the distinction made by Dignāga as congruent with the distinction introduced in Saṅghabhadra's treatise, in contrast to the one invoked in the aforementioned contemporary scholarship. Unfortunately, the example given in their own glosses, namely, the distinction between "blue" (*qing* 青) and "[there is] no blue" (or perhaps "non-blue") (*wuqing* 無青), is hardly transparent in this regard. Taken out of context, the example may also be construed as an illustration of yet another opposition, namely that between positive and negative terms according to the understanding of traditional Western logic.

On the other hand, it may still be argued that Shentai was in some way aware of the difference in scope of the two kinds of negation. When quoting terms used in the statement of a similar example, he seems to understand the negation as extending to the complete predicate phrase that begins with the copula *shi* (是[22]) (LMLS 90a22-25):

> 今同喻云:「諸是勤勇無間所發」，遮「非勤勇無間所發」，顯「勤勇無間所發」。「皆是無常」，遮「是常住」，詮「顯無常生滅」之法。
>
> Now, when in the statement of the similar example it is said: "All that is immediately produced by an effort", [this phrase] negates "[that which] is not immediately produced by an effort" [and] demonstrates [that something is] immediately produced by an effort. [Accordingly, the phrase] "is non-eternal" negates "[that which] is eternal" and makes known non-eternal and transitory *dharma*s.

By contrast, when discussing *zhilan* in the formulation of the dissimilar example, Shentai appears to narrow the scope of negation down to the term itself (LMLS 90a25-27):

> 其異法喻云:「諸常住者」，但遮「無常」，故云「常住」。不欲更別詮「常住」。即「非所作」，但欲遮其「所作」，不別詮顯「非作」法體。
>
> In the [formulation of the] dissimilar example it is said: "all eternal [things]". [Here] "eternal" is said only to negate "non-eternal". There is no further intention of expressing [that something is] eternal. As for "not produced", its aim is only to negate the "produced", not to make known the substance of *dharma*s [that are] not produced.

It is not clear how Shentai's explanation can be reconciled with the understanding of *paryudāsa* as a "term-bound" negation and *prasajyapratiṣedha* as a

[22] The word *shi* 是, originally a demonstrative pronoun, began to be used in the sense of the copula "to be" in the colloquial language of the Han dynasty (Pulleyblank 1995: 17). According to Christoph Harbsmeier (1998: 400), Xuanzang employed it consequently in his translations of *hetuvidyā* treatises, effectively underlining the subject–predicate structure of disputed theses.

"verb-bound" negation. By highlighting the copula *shi* (是) in his analysis of the similar example, Shentai may have only wanted to emphasize that in the statement of a similar example certain properties are predicated on existent subjects. To the best of the author's present knowledge, no other East Asian commentary on the Nyāyamukha or the Nyāyapraveśa makes a more substantial foray into the grammatical aspect of negation.

3. *ZHEQUAN* AND *BIAOQUAN* IN THE COMMENTARY OF KUIJI

In the subsequent commentarial literature the terminological distinction between "negating expressions" and "stopping the overflow" is mentioned infrequently. Its application is almost invariably restricted to the difference in functions performed by the two kinds of example. Nonetheless, taken in its entirety, the passage from the Nyāyamukha discussed in the previous sections had a crucial impact on the development of *hetuvidyā* thought in East Asia. This was mainly because it supplied the necessary point of reference for commentators who grappled with the corresponding passage in the much more widely studied Nyāyapraveśa (YRZL 11b13-18). Readers of the latter are cautioned that terms used in the formulation of a dissimilar example are to be construed as pure negations, but no rationale is provided for this. Unsurprisingly, Tang-period Chinese commentators looked for such a rationale in the much more explicit text of the Nyāyamukha. Some of them went beyond the terse explanations provided by Shentai and Wengui and proposed their own readings of Dignāga's words. An especially ambitious attempt in this direction was made already in the seventh century by Kuiji, whose commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa is often regarded (justifiably or not) as the standard Chinese compendium of *hetuvidyā.* Kuiji's reading is especially noteworthy for its reinterpretation of the category of *zhequan*. Beginning with his commentary, the said term became routinely contrasted with *biaoquan* or "affirming expressions", rather than with "stopping the overflow". In order to understand how this change occurred, some discussion is necessary regarding two conceptual innovations of Dignāga's system proposed by Kuiji and his co-disciples.

As discussed in the previous section, in the Nyāyamukha Dignāga is concerned with establishing the criteria of sound argumentation in those cases where ontological commitments of the debating parties are in conflict with each other. For reasons that have not yet been sufficiently explored, pre-modern Chinese students of *hetuvidyā* took keen interest in this issue which had not been treated by their Indian predecessors in a systematic manner. In the body of East Asian commentaries on Dignāga's logic, it is customary to classify the terms that constitute each "member" of an inference – the statement of the thesis, the

reason and the example – as either "substantial" (lit. "having substance" [*youti* 有體]) or "non-substantial" (lit. "not having substance" [無體 *wuti*]). What was at stake in this assessment is whether the referents of each term are understood to be real by both proponent and opponent. The basic distinction introduced by the Chinese exegetes is that between, on the one hand, "substantial" terms that have mutually accepted real referents, and, on the other, "non-substantial" terms whose referents are either accepted as real by only one party or bilaterally denied.[23]

In addition to the treatment of the problem of "substantiality", discussions of the difference between the two kinds of example introduced the Chinese readers to the basic principles of the Buddhist theory of meaning associated with the name of Dignāga. As explained by Shentai, words can never denote real objects directly, but may either signify certain concepts by negating their contraries or convey the absence of entities that are labeled under a certain concept. In their commentaries on the Nyāyapraveśa, Wengui and Kuiji treat this basic distinction as applied to the two types of properties to be proven, or the two types of predicates of a disputed thesis. In Wengui's commentary the first type is illustrated with the standard example of a *hetuvidyā* thesis: "Sound is non-eternal" (聲是無常). In theses of this kind, the meaning of the predicate is expressed only indirectly, by way of negating complementary properties (e.g., eternality). Nonetheless, the predicate expresses the mutually acknowledged property (e.g., non-eternality) and attributes it to a subject that is recognized by both parties as having a real referent (YRZLS 682b13-14). By contrast, in theses such as "The self is non-existent" (我無) the predicate has no affirmative function whatsoever. It only negates (i.e., excludes) the property (e.g., existence), without positing any object characterized by the complementary property (e.g., non-existence) (YRZLS 682b14-15). In the Yinming da shu 因明大疏 (YD), Kuiji illustrates the difference between these two types of predicates with the following examples: "The self is eternal" (我常) and "The self is non-existent"

[23] See Chen 1974: 184-185, Shen 1985: 124 and Yao 2008: 94. Contemporary scholars tend to regard the distinction between "substantial" and "non-substantial" terms as an original contribution of Chinese authors (Chi 1969: 127-128) or the conceptual elaboration of an idea that had only been hinted at in the Indian sources (Frankenhauser 1996: 59-60). Some traditional commentators, following Wengui, reserve the category of "substantiality" for nominal terms that signify *dharmin*s or the loci of properties, e.g., the subject of the thesis or the concrete exemplification. On this account, predicate terms are labelled as either "having a property (lit. meaning)" (*you yi* 有義) or "being without a property (lit. meaning)" (*wu yi* 無義). In some cases a distinction is made between, on the one hand, terms that are considered "substantial" or "non-substantial" by both parties (共 or 兩俱) and, on the other, terms whose existence is asserted by only one party (隨一), either the proponent (自有他無) or the opponent (自無他有). For comprehensive discussions of this complex topic, see Chen 1974: 177-206 and Shen 1985: 124-141.

(我無).[24] The function of the predicate of the latter type is to negate (*zhe* 遮) the subject of the thesis (YD 135b18-21).[25]

The distinction between these two kinds of properties to be proven (which is not explicitly endorsed by Dignāga)[26] had a crucial impact on the subsequent interpretations of the concept of *zhequan*. In the understanding of Shentai and Wengui, the so-called *zhequan*, which Dignāga associated with similar examples, refers to real properties of real loci, albeit in a negative manner (by the means of "exclusion of another"). This general rule appears uncontroversial in case of those theses that affirm something about a mutually recognized locus. However, it does not seem to apply to theses that deny the existence of an entity (or a class of entities) posited by the opponent. In an inference that supports such a thesis, the statement of the similar example has to assume the form "Whatever possesses the reason-property is seen to be non-existent", followed by the concrete exemplification of a non-existent entity.[27] Therefore, as noted by Kuiji, in inferences of this kind the statement of a similar example does not carry the intention to affirm or posit (*biao* 表) a real object.[28] Kuiji's observation appears to be at odds with the general rule inferred from Dignāga's work by Shentai and Wengui.[29] However, Kuiji evades the potential charge of inconsist-

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[24] It is worthy of note that Kuiji's example of a thesis that combines affirmative and negative meaning contains the predicate "eternal" (*chang* 常) which is not lexically negative, unlike the predicate "non-eternal" (*wuchang* 無常) of Wengui's example thesis. This fact suggests that at least Kuiji considered the distinction in question as a matter unrelated to the presence or absence of a lexical marker of negation, such as *wu* 無 or *fei* 非.

[25] For Wengui, predicates of the second type can be attributed to either "substantial" or "non-substantial" subjects. Moreover, Wengui discusses an example of a thesis whose predicate is a combination of these types (YRZLS 682b15-18).

[26] Dignāga's rather ambiguous approach to negative existential propositions is discussed in Yao 2009: 384-389.

[27] Kuiji provides the following example: "[Thesis:] The *padārtha* (i.e., ontological category) of inherence (*samavāya*) is not real. [Reason:] Because it is admitted that it is one of the six *padārtha*s [recognized by the Vaiśeṣika school]. [Example:] As the previously mentioned five *padārtha*s. Since [all] five *padārtha*s have already been refuted, the substance [of the example is understood] not to be a real entity. Thus, it can serve as an example. In this case, we establish what is non-substantial by means of what is [also] non-substantial" 「和合非實，許六句中隨一攝故，如前五句。前破五句，體非實有。故，得為喻。此中，以無而成無故。」 (YD 111b29-c2). Cf. another example provided by Wengui in his commentary on the so-called Guang bai lun (廣百論), the Chinese rendition of Āryadeva's Śataśāstra: "Emptiness, etc., are non-existent. Because they are not produced. Whatever is not produced is non-existent, as the horn of a hare" 「空等是無。 非所作故。 諸非所作皆悉是無。 如兔角等。」(GBLS 790b10-11).

[28] 「喻亦但遮而不取表」(YD 135b19-20).

[29] This inconsistency may have been at the root of a controversy about the semantic interpretation of the "non-substantial positive example" (無體同喻). Such a controversy is alluded to by Zhizhou (智周, 668-723), the author of two sub-commentaries on Kuiji's work, namely, the

ency with Dignāga's statement by adopting a different reading of the term *zhequan* (YD 111c11-18):

> 同喻能立，成有必有，成無必無。表詮、遮詮，二種皆得。異喻不爾。有體、無體一向皆遮。性止濫故 …
>
> As regards the proof [stated by way of] the similar example, [there is a rule that] what is substantial needs to be established by what is [also] substantial, and what is non-substantial needs to be established by what is [also] non-substantial. [In the case of the similar example] affirming expressions (*biaoquan* 表詮) and negating expressions (*zhequan* 遮詮) are both admissible. The dissimilar example is different in this regard. It uniformly negates, regardless of substantiality or the lack thereof. This is because by its nature it "stops the overflow" …
>
> 理門論云: 『前是遮、詮。後唯止濫。由合及離比度義故』。 前之同喻，亦遮亦詮。由成無以無，成有以有故。後之異喻，一向止濫。遮而不詮。
>
> The Nyāyamukha states: "The former [example] negates (*zhe* 遮) and expresses (*quan* 詮). The latter [example] only "stops the overflow" (*zhilan* 止濫). This is because we infer what we want to establish by [demonstrating] the relations of positive and negative concomitance. "The former", i.e., the similar example, both negates and expresses something, because what is substantial is established by what is [also] substantial, [while] what is non-substantial is established by what is [also] non-substantial. "The latter", i.e., the dissimilar example, uniformly "stops the overflow". It negates, but does not express anything.

These somewhat ambiguous statements by Kuiji have usually been understood as making a distinction between two kinds of theses: those which establish the presence of a particular property in a particular locus, and those which deny the existence of a locus posited by the opponent.[30] In the latter case, both the property to be proven and the reason-property are attributed to an object whose existence the proponent denies. The statement of a similar example adduced to establish such a thesis has therefore to be expressed by means of terms that do not stand for mutually accepted real entities or their properties and do not in any way imply existence of such entities. In this sense, both the similar example and the reason-property may be regarded as "non-substantial". This is what Kuiji appears to mean by saying that "what is non-substantial is established by what is [also] non-substantial".[31]

Yinming ru zhengli lun shu qian ji 因明入正理論疏前記 (YRZLSQ 817a23-24) and the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu hou ji 因明入正理論疏後記 (YRZLSH 855c10-11).

[30] The context of this passage is provided in YD 111b27-c10.

[31] Cf. Chen 1974: 244; Mei I/325; Xiong 2001: 323 & 325-326. Xiong Shili (2001: 323) illustrates Kuiji's point with the following example: "[Thesis:] The soul is non-existent (神我是無). [Reason:] Because it is unknowable (不可得故). [Example:] As the horn of a hare." Cf. also the examples provided in n. 27.

Apparently, the distinction between *biaoquan* (表詮) and *zhequan* (遮詮)[32] mentioned by Kuiji in the context of the similar example is meant to differentiate between these two cases. It should be noted that in this context *zhequan* assumes the meaning of "an expression whose function is [only] to negate", i.e., refers to the use of terms that do not involve ontological commitment. It is therefore employed in a sense that is opposite to the one suggested by Shentai in his gloss on Dignāga's words discussed above.[33] Remarkably, Kuiji supports his stance with a quote from the same passage of the Nyāyamukha as the one on which Shentai based his interpretation. Here, however, he construes *zhequan* in yet another meaning, namely as a coordinative compound whose members – "to negate" (*zhe* 遮) and "to express" (*quan* 詮) – refer to the two possible interpretations of terms used in the statement of the similar example. In other words, Kuiji understands Dignāga to mean that the similar example can consist either of terms that have purely negative meaning or terms that express real referents, depending on the character of the proponent's thesis.[34]

As can be seen in his gloss on the Nyāyapraveśa, Kuiji construes the term *zhequan* in two different ways, both of which appear difficult to reconcile with the interpretation of this concept presented by his co-disciple Shentai. As mentioned above (p. 205), according to Shentai *zhequan* corresponds to an implicative negation, as opposed to negation pure and simple. At the same time, Shentai explicitly denies the possibility of terms signifying their referents directly by way of affirmation. Kuiji, on the other hand, not only appears to associate *zhequan* with a "pure" or non-implicative negation, but also uses the term in opposition to *biaoquan*, "affirming expression", without seeming to provide any justification for his choice of words.

This terminological confusion can to a large extent be clarified with the help of philological glosses provided by later East Asian commentators. Huizhao's disciple Daoyi (道邑, 7th century) points out an ambiguity involved in the use of the term *quan* (詮), rendered as "to express" or "expression" in the present

[32] As stated above (p. 200), this distinction is not attested in the text of *hetuvidyā* manuals translated into Chinese by Xuanzang. However, both terms appear a few times in Xuanzang's translations of other Buddhist treatises, apparently in the sense of "direct" or "indirect statements". For example, in *Asvabhāva's (無性) commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the She dacheng lun shi 攝大乘論釋 (SDLS), it is stated that the "essence and characteristics" (*tixiang* 體相) of the non-conceptual cognition (**nirvikalpajñāna, wu fenbie zhi* 無分別智) cannot be explained with the use of "affirming expressions", but have to be intimated "through the gate (i.e., method) of negating expressions", that is, by listing all kinds of conceptual cognitions that are absent in the case of such a cognition (SDLS 429c2-4).

[33] See above, p. 204-205.

[34] The differences between Shentai's and Kuiji's understandings of the compound *zhequan* have been pointed out and discussed in a lucid way by Ho Chien-Hsing (Ho 2012: 15-19).

paper. In its first sense, "to express" means "to affirm [something] existent" (*biao you* 表有). This understanding agrees with that of Shentai, who explicated "negating expressions" as terms that "negate" but nevertheless "express" something about the real world. It is also concurrent with Kuiji's reading of the term *zhequan* that appears in the text of the Nyāyamukha, namely as "to both negate and express". In its second sense, the term refers to everything that is expressed by words (言所詮 *yan suo quan*). Since something that is non-existent or absent (無 *wu*) can also be expressed by words, it is admissible to label linguistic units that convey such a negative meaning as *zhequan*, with no contradiction in terms. As observed by Daoyi, the way in which Kuiji uses *zhequan* in his own gloss follows this second meaning of *quan*.[35]

At the same time, the glosses attached to words such as *quan* or *biaoquan* by Zhizhou or Zenju (善珠, 727-797), in the YRZLSH and the Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō 因明論疏明燈鈔 (IRMS), respectively, leave no room for doubt that the so-called affirmative expressions always involve a component of negation. Therefore, in effect they are not different from what Shentai terms *zhequan*.[36] This nuanced understanding of the concept of affirmation, which aligns it with the principles of the *apoha* theory, is in fact well attested in Kuiji's works.[37] There are good reasons to assume that it is also implied in Kuiji's use of the term *biaoquan*. For example, commenting on the two general understandings of the term "non-being" (非有 *fei you*), Kuiji makes the following remark (YD 112a17-20):

> 一者，勝論，除有五句，皆是非有。此即表詮。二者，「非有」但非於有。非有所目。 欲顯同喻成有體宗，可如表五。 異喻止濫，可如遮有。
>
> The first [understanding] is that of the Vaiśeṣikas: the five *padārtha*s (i.e., ontological categories) other than "being" are [designated as] "non-being".[38] This is an affirming expression (*biaoquan*). According to the second understanding, [the term] "non-being" only negates being. It does not designate anything. If we want to demonstrate that the similar example establishes a "substantial" thesis (such as "sound is non-eternal"), then we can follow those who affirm the five [onto-

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[35] The gloss in question has been preserved in the Inmyō daisho uragaki 因明大疏裏書 (IDU) compiled by the Japanese monk Myōsen (明詮, 789-868); see IDU 198a12-14. In contemporary scholarship the ambiguity of the term *zhequan* has been noted, e.g., by Zheng (1997: 139).

[36] 「實但言『詮』，遮、表俱有。」 (YRZLSH 855c21-22); 「同喻，若成有義宗法，其義必有體。此唯表詮。 所成有義，唯表詮故。 然，名必有遮用。 依功能說，亦名『遮詮』。」(IRMS 299c24-25).

[37] See Katsura 2014: 111 & 114.

[38] For reasons that are not entirely clear, Kuiji appears to consider "being" (*you* 有) as one of the six *padārtha*s (ontological categories) postulated by the Indian Vaiśeṣika school even though "being" (*sattā*), the highest universal, does not constitute by itself the fourth *padārtha* "universal" (*sāmānya*).

> logical categories]. [Since the purpose of] the dissimilar example is to "stop the overflow", [when stating this example] we can follow those who [only] negate being.

Apparently, Kuiji understands *biaoquan* as an expression that is not affirmative in a commonsensical way, but rather akin to *zhequan* in Shentai's understanding of the latter term, namely as an expression that conveys an affirmative meaning by negating (i.e., excluding) complementary meanings, in keeping with the theory of *apoha*. In the subsequent passage, Kuiji briefly addresses the issue of misleading implications that the notion of *biaoquan* has in the context of Buddhist philosophy of language:

> 然，中道大乘，一切法性皆離假智及言詮表。　言與假智俱不得真，一向遮詮，都無所表。唯於諸法共相而轉。因明之法即不同彼。然，共相中可有詮表義。
>
> However, [according to the] Middle Way [teachings] of the Mahāyāna the nature of all *dharma*s is detached from conventional cognition and from affirmative linguistic expressions. Words and conventional cognition cannot apprehend reality. [All] verbal expressions are uniformly negating. There is nothing they affirm. [All words and concepts] operate only at the level of the *dharma*s' general characteristics. Since the principles of *hetuvidyā* differ from those of Mahāyāna, [they specify that] within general characteristics there is still something [real] that can be expressed by means of language.

Kuiji continues (YD 112a20-25):

> 同喻成立有、無二法。有成於有，可許詮也。無成於無，即可遮也。
>
> The similar example establishes two kinds of properties to be proven: those with substance and those without substance. When a substantial property to be proven is established by a substantial [reason-property], then it may be accepted that [the terms in the statement of the similar example] express [real referents]. When a non-substantial property to be proven is established by a non-substantial [reason-property], then [the terms in the statement of the similar example] can be [purely] negative.

As observed by Xiong Shili (2001: 327), Kuiji's unarticulated premise is that *hetuvidyā* is a system concerned with methods of inference. Therefore, it operates in the realm of verbal expressions that denote "general characteristics" shared by a class of particular *dharma*s. In this restricted context, it is admissible to say that language "affirms" (*biao* 表) or "expresses" (*quan* 詮) something about reality. However, even within the system of *hetuvidyā*, the employment of such indirect affirmation is subject to restrictions. It is admissible only in inferences where the similar example is understood by both parties to demonstrate the presence of real properties in real loci. In other contexts, terms used in the statement of an inference are to be understood as *zhequan* in the sense

preferred by Kuiji, namely as words that only negate and do not imply the actual presence of any object. At the same time, from the standpoint of the Mahāyāna Buddhist view of language all linguistic expressions are only "negating" (*zhequan*), inasmuch as they cannot reveal individual characteristics of the experienced phenomena.

In the final analysis, Kuiji's distinction between *biaoquan* and *zhequan* may be perceived as a reformulation of the distinction between "negating expression" and "stopping the overflow" introduced in Xuanzang's translation of Dignāga's treatise. Unlike the terms chosen by Xuanzang, which have frequently been understood as referring broadly to the function of the similar and dissimilar example, respectively, the pair of concepts employed by Kuiji constitutes unmistakably a distinction that is applied to linguistic units. At the same time, by endorsing the use of the term *biaoquan*, Kuiji gave Dignāga's theory of meaning a slightly different twist than the commentators discussed above.[39] Whereas Shentai and Wengui emphasized the principle that words can signify their objects only by means of negation, Kuiji appears more concerned with differentiating between words whose meaning is primarily affirmative and words whose function does not go beyond expressing a negation.

4. *ZHEQUAN* AND *BIAOQUAN* IN LATER EAST ASIAN *HETUVIDYĀ*

Kuiji's commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa, dubbed the Great Commentary (大疏), had enormous impact on the ways in which Dignāga's system was studied and discussed by the East Asian Buddhists. In terms of influence, it definitely outranked Shentai's commentary on the notoriously difficult text of the Nyāyamukha. This observation may to some extent explain why in the subsequent commentarial tradition, including modern works on the subject, the distinction between *biaoquan* and *zhequan* has elicited much more attention than the distinction between *zhequan* and *zhilan* introduced in Dignāga's work. A more definite statement on this issue would require a comprehensive investigation into the developments that the East Asian tradition of *hetuvidyā* has undergone in the centuries that followed the times of Kuiji. Unfortunately, paucity of relevant studies, which often provide conflicting accounts, makes generalizations on this subject particularly difficult. Therefore, the following remarks should be taken as tentative hypotheses which call for further research.

The first group of factors that may have contributed to the relative neglect of Shentai's and Wengui's interpretation of the concept of *zhequan* – as implicative negation contrasted with negation pure and simple – is internal to the East Asian

[39] See p. 204-209.

tradition of Buddhist logic. As stated above (p. 214-215), Chinese students of Dignāga's system were aware that from the standpoint of the Buddhist theory of meaning the so-called affirmative expressions (*biaoquan*) always involve a component of negation. Nonetheless, it was the component of affirmation that made this concept relevant to discussions of the so-called substantiality of theses and their constituent terms. In later commentarial literature, the notion of *biaoquan* corresponds to the existential commitment involved in stating, supporting and refuting theses such as "sound is non-eternal", namely theses where the predicate attributes a mutually acknowledged property to a locus whose existence is undisputed. Accordingly, on some accounts the categories of *zhequan* and of "non-substantial" terms became effectively merged with each other.[40]

It should be noted that following this tendency, Buddhist logicians classified terms as *biaoquan* or *zhequan* solely according to the context of the particular inference and the metaphysical assumptions of the schools represented by the debating parties. They did not consider the presence or absence of lexical markers of negation as an important factor in classifying terms as belonging to either of the two categories.[41] While this judgment may not do justice to the complexity of the East Asian *hetuvidyā* tradition, it may be argued that in general the system did not provide much incentive to investigate linguistic aspects of negation, such as those discussed by the Sanskrit grammarians. Moreover, pre-modern East Asian scholiasts were generally not interested in exploring broader philosophical implications of the distinction introduced in Dignāga's

[40] According to Kira Kōyō (雲英 晃耀, 1831-1910), the difference between "affirming expressions" and "negating expressions" is essentially reducible to the aforementioned distinction between the two kinds of predicates, exemplified by the examples "sound is non-eternal" and "self is non-existent". This semantic difference can be regarded as the criterion of "substantiality" and "non-substantiality" in the following three cases: a term that indicates the property to be proven, a term that indicates the mutually acknowledged reason-property, and the statement of the relation between both properties which forms the so-called substance (*yuti* 喻體) of the similar example (Kira II/56-58). Elaborating on the opinions of scholiasts such as Wengui, Kuiji, Huizhao, Zenju and Kira, Chen Daqi (1974: 204-206) proposed to view the distinction between *biaoquan* and *zhequan* as a "manifestation" or "application" (*yong* 用) of the underlying distinction between, on the one hand, "substantial" terms (either subjects or predicates) that have bilaterally accepted referents in the real world and, on the other, "non-substantial" terms which are understood not to have such referents. Chen's stance on this issue can be contrasted with the account of affirmative and negative predicates in Chinese Buddhist logic given by Shen Jianying (1985: 125-127), who distinguished the categories of "affirming" and "negating expressions" from the concept of "substantiality".

[41] See Chen 1974: 202-203. According to the example given by Chen in an earlier publication (1952: 47), when an atheist utters the word "God", she pronounces a *zhequan*, i.e., a "negating expression" in the understanding of Chinese Buddhist logicians.

work. Even though they were familiar with the simplified accounts of the *apoha* theory given by Shentai and Wengui, they did not attempt any further elaboration of this doctrine in the manner of the Indian or Tibetan Buddhist scholars. In fact, if the concepts of *zhequan* and *biaoquan* were used outside the body of *hetuvidyā* literature, they were usually applied to issues that were not directly related to either philosophy or grammar. Most typically, the terms appear in discussions pertaining to the classification and evaluation of various Buddhist doctrines.

In the mainstream Buddhist literature of the Tang period, especially in the works of Yogācāra scholiasts, *biaoquan* and *zhequan* usually refer to the two methods (lit. "gates", *men* 門) of expounding Buddhist teachings: either by employing direct statements (*biaoquan*) or by denying alternative formulations (*zhequan*).[42] In this interpretation, the distinction in question belongs to the field of Buddhist hermeneutics rather than Buddhist logic. Nonetheless, it appears that at least some East Asian scholiasts made attempts to establish a meaningful connection between these two usages. For example, Kuiji's co-disciple Woncheuk (Wŏnch'ŭk) (圓測, 613-696), a monk of Korean descent, in his Commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, the Jie shenmi jing shu or Hae simmil gyeong so 解深密經疏 (JSJS), adduces the concept of *zhequan* mentioned by Dignāga together with Shentai's gloss to make a point that is not directly related to the system of *hetuvidyā*. According to Woncheuk's account, Dignāga broke with the earlier tradition of naively perceiving the Buddha's words as "affirming expressions" and demonstrated a more sophisticated view of language essentially concurrent with that of the Mahāyāna tradition. According to the Mahāyānist view, the Buddha's pronouncements should not be taken as straightforward descriptions of the ultimately ineffable reality, but merely as *zhequan*, "negating expressions", meant to liberate people from their attachment to erroneous conceptualizations (JSJS 216c13ff.).[43]

As can be seen, both Kuiji and Woncheuk agree that, from the standpoint of Mahāyāna Buddhism, verbal discourse is not sufficient to express reality in a direct way and in this sense consists only of "negating expressions". A very

[42] See Oda 1988: 1343 and Yokoyama 2010: 828. Among contemporary dictionaries of Buddhist terms, the *Foguang da cidian* (*FGDC* III/6191) makes a clear distinction between these two usages. It should be noted that in mainstream Buddhist literature the morpheme *quan* often appears in the sense of "to explicate" or "to discourse on something" rather than in the technical meaning of "to express by means of language". This ambiguity may have been at stake in Zhizhou's claim that in *hetuvidyā* works the concept of *quan* refers to "verbal expressions" (*yanquan* 言詮) rather than "expressions that clarify [so as to] gain understanding" (*xian yi de quan* 顯以得解詮) (YRZLSH 855c23).

[43] Interestingly, Woncheuk associates *zhequan* (in the sense of a non-implicative negation) with the dissimilar example (JSJS 216c15-17).

different perspective on this issue can be found in the writings of Guifeng Zongmi (圭峰宗密, 780-841), the renowned Chan master traditionally recognized as the fifth patriarch of the so-called Huayan school (華嚴宗). Zongmi famously ascribed the negative view of language to representatives of the tradition labeled "Tradition of Emptiness" (*kongzong* 空宗) and argued for the superiority of the approach represented by the "Tradition of Nature" (*xingzong* 性宗), "nature" referring here to the true nature of one's own mind. In the Preface to the Anthology of Essential Writings on the Origins of Chan (Chanyuan zhuquan ji duxu 禪源諸詮集都序),[44] the categories of "affirming" and "negating expressions" are introduced to illustrate different kinds of discourse endorsed by these two traditions (CZJD 406b18-24):

> 遮，謂遣其所非。表，謂顯其所是。又遮者，揀却諸餘。表者，直示當體。如諸經所說真妙理性。每云: 「不生不滅」、「不垢不淨」、「無因無果」、「無相無為」、「非凡非聖」、「非性非相等」，皆是遮詮。若云: 「知見覺」、「照靈鑒光明」、「朗朗昭昭」、「惺惺寂寂」等，皆是表詮。
>
> To negate means to exclude what is not. To affirm means to demonstrate what is. Moreover, to negate is to pick out and to reject the remainder; to affirm is to directly indicate how things really are. So it is in the case of the Truly Wondrous Principle, [or] the [Original] Nature, that is spoken of in [Buddhist] Scriptures. Whenever it is described as "neither arising nor ceasing", "neither defiled nor pure", "devoid of cause and devoid of effect", "devoid of characteristics and devoid of activity", "neither mundane nor holy", "neither Nature nor the characteristics" – these are all negating expressions. If it is described as "awareness of true knowledge", "brightness of an illuminating mirror", "glowing and brilliant", "alert and tranquil", etc., these are all affirming expressions.

Zongmi reminds the proponents of the "Tradition of Emptiness" that the distinction between affirming and negating expressions makes sense only under the assumption that something is affirmed or denied about some really existent subject. This claim is illustrated with the following example (CZJD 406b26-27):

> 如說鹽，云「不淡」是遮，云「鹹」是表。說水，云「不乾」是遮，云「濕」是表。
>
> When talking about salt, if it is said that it is "not tasteless", then this is a negation; if it is said that it is "salty", then this is an affirmation. When talking about water, if it is said that it is "not dry", then this is a negation; if it is said that it is "wet", then it is an affirmation.

In conclusion, Zongmi criticizes those of his contemporaries who "perceive [only] negating words as sublime" and, acting on this false premise, make no attempt to attain "firsthand realization of the essence of phenomena". He re-

[44] The English translation of the title follows Sasaki 2009: 86.

serves words of praise for the "Tradition of Nature" which is said to integrate both kinds of expressions in its preaching, to the benefit of spiritual practice (CZJD 406b29-c4).[45]

Interestingly, in contemporary scholarship on Chinese *hetuvidyā*, Zongmi's discussion of *zhequan* and *biaoquan* has been quoted as testimony to the fact that Chinese Buddhist logicians distinguished between affirmative and negative statements in the manner of traditional Western logic.[46] Whether Zongmi's formulations indeed resemble traditional Western definitions of affirmation and negation is a topic that merits a separate discussion.[47] For the purpose of the present paper, it is sufficient to point out that Zongmi's understanding of the opposition in question differs from that current in the *hetuvidyā* commentaries in several important respects.[48]

It might be argued that Zongmi's description of "negation" as "picking out and rejecting the remainder" bears some resemblance to the notion of "implicative negation" that was introduced into Chinese Buddhist literature by the disciples of Xuanzang. However, in the above account this "implicative" denial is not contrasted with negation pure and simple, but with something exactly opposite, namely, direct affirmation of "what is the case". Remarkably, Zongmi's definition of *biaoquan* lacks any qualification that would align it with the *apoha* theory. Moreover, he presents "affirming expressions" as complementary, if not superior, to "negating expressions". In this respect Zongmi departs from the stance of Kuiji who restricted the concept of affirmation to the provisional expressions of conceptual "general characteristics", and from the opinion of Woncheuk who associated *biaoquan* with the naive hermeneutical stance of pre-Mahāyāna Buddhist schools. Nonetheless, Zongmi's unequivocal endorse-

[45] Guifeng Zongmi's views on the positive and negative use of language in Buddhist practice are discussed in detail by Peter Gregory (2002: 209-216). For a discussion of the passage in question, see Gregory 2002: 214-215.

[46] See, for example, the work of Shen Jianying (especially Shen 1985: 44-45), whose account influenced the two standard Western studies of Chinese *hetuvidyā*, namely that of Frankenhauser (1996: 41) and Harbsmeier (1998: 391).

[47] Here it is enough to point out that in its original context the example of water and salt was not meant to demonstrate the difference between two logical qualities of statements. Rather, it was intended as an illustration of two complementary ways of preaching Buddhism: the one emphasizing the positive qualities of ultimate reality and the other pointing out its ineffability. Seen in this light, Zongmi's use of the concepts of *zhequan* and *biaoquan* has much more in common with the distinction between the so-called apophatic and kataphatic traditions in Christian theology than with the logical distinction between affirmative and negative statements. Gregory's translation of Zongmi's *zhequan* as "apophatic discourse" (2002: 214) appears particularly apt in this regard.

[48] Ho Chien-Hsing (2012: 19) regards Zongmi's usage of the term *zhequan* as unrelated to those that were current in the Chinese Yogācāra tradition.

ment of "affirmative expressions" is definitely not an isolated case in the East Asian Buddhist literature of his own and later periods.[49]

5. Conclusion

The East Asian reception of the concept of two kinds of negation, rendered by Xuanzang as *zhequan* and *zhilan*, did not stop at the level of mere mechanic translation. At least two early Chinese commentaries explicate this pair of concepts in a way that suggests their familiarity with contemporaneous Indian understandings. According to the interpretation of Wengui or Shentai, the distinction in question is a purely semantic one: a term, regardless of whether it is lexically negative or not, may either signify its referent by differentiating it from something else or only convey the absence of something. Chinese authors presented this idea in the context of a simplified, but reasonably accurate account of the Indian theory of *apoha*. While not using the terms suggested by Xuanzang, they subsequently applied the same distinction to differentiate between predicates used in theses with either positive or negative existential import, a development that finds some parallels in the Tibetan tradition of *hetuvidyā*.[50]

However, beginning with the works authored by direct disciples of Xuanzang, East Asian interpretations of the original distinction made by Dignāga developed in directions that appear peculiar to their own tradition. On the one hand, the concept of *zhilan* was employed independently of its opposite *zhequan* to describe the function performed in the process of inference by the "third mark of the reason" and the statement of the dissimilar example. On the other hand, the term *zhequan*, which originally referred to "implicative negation", became redefined as an opposite of *biaoquan*, or "affirming expressions". East Asian adepts of Buddhist logic subsequently construed this concept in a variety of fairly divergent ways: as an expression of "non-implicative negation", as "apophatic discourse" about the ultimate aspect of reality and, more recently, as a counterpart of negative statements in the understanding of Western traditional logic.

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[49] For example, Yongming Yanshou (永明延壽, 904-975), whose works constituted an important point of reference for Chinese students of Buddhist logic and epistemology after the Tang period, describes *zhequan* as "language that cures ailments" (治病之文) and *biaoquan* as "teachings that directly point to [reality]"(直指之教) in his Wanshan tonggui ji 萬善同歸集 (WTJ 959a23-25). The concept of "affirming expressions" was employed in a positive sense by the followers of Esoteric Buddhism (密教) in Japan (Oda 1988: 1343) and in Chinese Pure Land apologetics, among others; see, e.g., Miaoxie 妙叶 in his Baowang sanmei nianfo zhizhi 寶王三昧念佛直指 (BSNZ 358c24ff.).

[50] See Yao 2009: 392.

These developments may easily be interpreted as evidence for the defective transmission of ideas between India and China. Even in cases where the glosses of Chinese exegetes clearly betray the use of oral commentary (or other non-extant sources) provided by Xuanzang or some unknown informants, their use of this additional information comes across as either limited or very selective. A case in point is the virtual lack of mention of the grammatical aspect of the distinction between *paryudāsa* and *prasajyapratiṣedha* negations. Another tendency that may be discerned from the sources discussed in this paper is the considerable impact of translational choices of Xuanzang on the way in which his successors explicated technical *hetuvidyā* terms. Multiple and not entirely consistent ways in which East Asian scholiasts construed concepts such as *zhequan* or *zhilan* indicate that they had a rather limited grasp of the original Sanskrit terminology and often had to rely on their own ingenuity in interpreting the Chinese compounds occurring in the texts they studied.

On the other hand, it may be argued that the reinterpretations undergone by the concept of *zhequan* in the East Asian tradition of *hetuvidyā* are far from random and cannot be attributed to mere misunderstandings. As discussed above, the emergence of the distinction between "affirming" and "negating expressions" as the dominating category in East Asian *hetuvidyā* can to some extent be explained by the importance that Chinese commentators attached to the issue of consensus about the real existence of entities mentioned in a thesis and its proof. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the case of Woncheuk, the notion of "negating expressions" provided the linchpin between the scholastic tradition of *hetuvidyā* and major hermeneutical and soteriological issues that preoccupied East Asian Buddhists. In modern times the same concept played a considerable role in Chinese and Japanese attempts at reformulating *hetuvidyā* as a formal system of inference concerned with logical qualities of statements. To wit, it appears that the East Asian scholars of Buddhist logic made substantial efforts to understand the distinction introduced by Dignāga in the light of what they themselves considered to be truly important, either within the system itself or from a general Buddhist perspective.

Seen in this light, the history of East Asian interpretations of the concept of two kinds of negation illustrates the multifaceted character of developments that the system of *hetuvidyā* has undergone in East Asia. To some extent, these can be explained as an elaboration – either successful or not – of the ideas implicit in the formulations of the Nyāyamukha and the Nyāyapraveśa. In some cases, they suggest influence of alternative accounts which may or may not have been preserved in the body of Buddhist literature. However, the peculiar interpretations of Chinese, Korean and Japanese exegetes also reveal the impact of an

indigenous hierarchy of concerns and priorities which characterized the East Asian perspective on *hetuvidyā* until modern times. While this perspective may differ from that adopted by the majority of contemporary scholars, it merits attention as a testimony to earnest attempts to domesticate the Indian tradition of logic and epistemology within East Asian Buddhism.[51]

Abbreviations and References

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[51] A possible avenue of research that may throw more light on this indigenous perspective is the history of reception of epistemological concepts such as "direct perception" (*pratyakṣa*, 現量 *xianliang*) or "inference" (*anumāna*, 比量 *biliang*) in East Asian Buddhist literature after the times of Xuanzang.

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