

1 Introduction

This book is an attempt to answer three questions about an eleventh-century Sanskrit work, the *Apoḥasiddhi* (henceforth AS) by Ratnakīrti: in what form does this work survive, what does it say, and why does it say what it does?

These questions are to be answered, primarily from the perspective of the history of philosophy in South Asia, in a critical edition of the AS, in its annotated translation, and in a study of some of its main arguments. These three sections, taken each by itself, do not, however, cleanly correspond to each question. In fact, the questions cannot be answered independently of each other: judging well what the text says is difficult to do, at least in non-obvious cases, without reflection on the history that a specific argument might have had; and even the choice of readings sometimes depends on an understanding of Ratnakīrti's point (though the editorial method adopted to establish the text tries to minimize the risk of misjudgements arising from this kind of argument). In addition, the translation contains the argument for things that are not explicitly discussed in the edition of the text, e.g., the decisions about punctuation and paragraph breaks, which are not found in any of the witnesses, but are introduced to make the structure inherent in the work easier to see for modern readers. The edition (chapter 2) and the translation (chapter 3) thus answer the first and second questions. The translation, augmented by explanatory comments (section 4.1) and an analysis of the text's argumentative structure (section 4.2), and the study of the AS (chapter 5) try to answer the third question.

1.1 RATNAKĪRTI

Ratnakīrti (Tib. *rin chen grags pa*) was a Buddhist scholar active in the monastery of Vikramaśīla in the first half of the eleventh century CE.¹

He was a pupil of Jñānaśrīmitra, who he refers to as his *guru* in phrases such as “*yad āhur guravaḥ*” that introduce quotations from Jñānaśrīmitra on various occasions.² Jñānaśrīmitra is recognized as the last Buddhist philosopher in ancient South Asia to produce major innovations.³ Since Ratnakīrti’s texts are closely based on those of his teacher and are generally more accessible due to their relative brevity and clear structure, they are an ideal way in which to first approach this phase of Buddhist thought, and to gather the main points that Ratnakīrti regarded his teacher as having made.

All of Ratnakīrti’s surviving works in Sanskrit belong to the logico-epistemological tradition of Buddhism.⁴ Having started with

¹The following presentation of the most important facts about Ratnakīrti’s life, works, and intellectual environment draws on Thakur 1975a, Thakur 1987a: 29 ff., Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 7 ff., Mimaki 1976: 3 ff., and Mimaki 1992. It does not add any important new information, and the following is a synopsis of the available information. The dates of persons in the following usually follow Frauwallner 1961, unless otherwise noted.

²Cf. the comments in Thakur 1975a: 11 ff. The following list of these passages is based on the *viśiṣṭanāmasūcī* (the name index) in RNĀ 151 f.: SJS 27,5 (most probably referring to a verse in the lost *Sarvajñasiddhi* of Jñānaśrīmitra, see Steinkellner 1977: 384, also cf. frag. 8 on p. 388), KBhSA 72,5, KBhSV 88,3, SSD 118,23; 119,9; 118,31, CAPV 132,6; 133,16; 136,23; 138,28; 141,9; 142,28. The references to RNĀ 32, 96, 135, given under the entry *guruḥ*, do not actually contain the word *guruḥ*.

³Cf. the reconstruction of his status by Frauwallner (1931), and the assessments, after his works had become known, by Thakur (1987a: 29), Jong (1962: 75), and McCrea and Patil (2006: 304 ff.).

⁴See Steinkellner and Much 1995 for the most complete bibliography of the primary texts that constitute this tradition. Though the compilers of the Tibetan Buddhist canon categorized the works in the *tshad ma* (*pramāṇa*) section, it is unclear to what extent the authors in this group that wrote in Sanskrit would have identified with it. In any case, the word “tradition” here should not be understood as an exclusive label, since we have evidence that authors assigned to this tradition were very free to write or otherwise engage in other “traditions” of Buddhism.

Dignāga (late fifth to early sixth centuries), this tradition’s most influential figure was Dharmakīrti (mid-sixth century), who all but eclipsed Dignāga and became the central authority for all those that followed in this tradition, including Ratnakīrti.⁵

The attribute “logico-epistemological” means that many works from this tradition centre on logical and epistemological problems (if not as the actual topic of the text, then at least as its method). The topics covered by these treatises range from the critique, description, and foundation of correct means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*), the development and proof of ontological theories (most importantly, that of universal momentariness, *kṣaṇikatva*), and general theories of consciousness, to the possibility of omniscience and the Buddha’s being a source of knowledge. Ratnakīrti is representative for this tradition because his works touch on most of these topics. In all of his works, furthermore, there is an intense engagement with non-Buddhist, and sometimes also Buddhist, opponents: this makes his works rich sources for the investigation of South Asia’s intellectual history in general.

1.1.1 Previous scholarship on Ratnakīrti

Ratnakīrti’s texts were amongst the first treatises on Buddhist logic and epistemology to become the subject of modern studies. The *editio princeps* of the AS is found in Shāstri 1910.⁶ Mookerjee (1935: 125 ff.)

Ratnakīrti is a good example of this, since on the topics of *pramāṇa* he was the follower of Jñānaśrīmitra, whereas in matters of Tantric practice he was closer to Ratnākaraśānti—the ‘enemy’ of Jñānaśrīmitra on several key philosophical issues (see deb ther sngon po X.23a5–6, trl. in Roerich 1949–1953: 800–801, and the assessment in Mimaki 1992).

Scholars attribute at least one text surviving only in Tibetan, *mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi ’grel pa grags pa’i cha zhes bya ba* (**Kīrtikalā Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛttiḥ*, D: 3799, Q: 5197) to Ratnakīrti (see Tomabeche and Kano 2008 and Harter 2014).

⁵See Krasser 2012 for the dating of Dharmakīrti, against the dating to the seventh century by Frauwallner 1961.

⁶This book was reprinted as Shāstri 1989 and, for want of a better word, re-edited as Shāstri 1996. This latter publication is not very useful, because it introduced quite a few misprints, omitted some footnotes, and changed the layout, so that references to the other editions are sometimes difficult to resolve.

made an early attempt to place Ratnakīrti's *AS* in its historical and argumentative context, and was also responsible for initiating a still ongoing debate about the development of the *apoha* theory.⁷ Before that, Stcherbatsky had noted about the *AS* that it was "...written in one night and, probably for this reason, lacking clearness...." (Stcherbatsky 1932 2, 404)⁸

Sāṅkṛtyāyana discovered a manuscript of Ratnakīrti's collected works in 1934 in *Zha lu ri phug*,⁹ and on the 3rd of June, 1938, had pictures of that manuscript taken.¹⁰ Anantalal Thakur published the first edition, entitled *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* (henceforth RNĀ₁), on the basis of these pictures in 1957, and a second, revised edition in 1975 (RNĀ).

Based on these sources, Ratnakīrti's works have been the subject of several studies. The most noteworthy monographs, in order of publication, are as follows:¹¹

⁷Cf. Kataoka 2009: 498–496 for a concise summary of this discussion. The hypothesis developed by Mookerjee (1935: 125 ff.) is, in a nutshell, that after Dharmakīrti the *apoha* theory was interpreted in two ways, either as primarily affirmative or as primarily negative, and that these two positions were then synthesized by Jñānaśrimitra. The passage drawn on for this hypothesis corresponds to § 8 in the edition below. See Okada 2017 for a recent reassessment of this hypothesis.

⁸This misinterpretation of the colophon was corrected by Thakur (1957a: 13, n. 1): the point of the colophon is that a scribe copied the *AS* in a certain amount of time, not that it was composed that quickly. See below, § 62.

⁹See Kellner and Sferra 2008: 426, n. 16.

¹⁰The discovery of the RNĀ_{ms} is described in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 25 f. The manuscript was first catalogued as item 22 (=VIII.2, sect. III) in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 29, which means it was discovered during Sāṅkṛtyāyana's 2nd expedition to Tibet, April 4th–November 10th, 1934 (cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 21 f.). Pictures of it might also have been taken between the 5th and 15th of August, 1936, according to the account in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1937: 14 f. As Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1938: 138) reports, "[l]ast time [i.e., in 1936—PMA] we took Photographs of some of these MSS., but we had failed to get good results." Manuscript P is signed and dated on the empty folio 60a by "Fany Mockerjee" (the photographer as spelt in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938: 137). The signature in fact looks more like "Fany Mookj", but the date "3/6/38" is clear.

¹¹Four other books, which are of limited usefulness for the present study, should also be mentioned. Two studies concern the *AS*: Sharma 1969 and Chattopadhyay

Mimaki (1976) produced an edition, based on the manuscript used also by Thakur, P, a translation and careful study of the *Sthi-*

2002. For an appreciation of Sharma 1969, see Oberhammer 1975. Sharma 1969 provides a text based on AS₁ with corrections according to AS₂, a translation, and a study. The study, although it is very interesting insofar as it aims at a philosophically coherent restatement of Ratnakīrti's *apoha* theory, is, for that same reason, not always informative about Ratnakīrti's theories themselves. The translation seems to have missed a few important points. One example might suffice to prove this: the phrase "*tatra na buddhyākārasya tattvataḥ samvṛtyā vā vidhiniśedhau, svasaṃvedanapratyakṣagamyatvād ...*" (from § 48 in the edition below) is translated as follows by Sharma (1969: 91):

In this context, affirmation and negation are applicable to the configuration (which is a passive cognition) neither in reality, nor in internal feeling (for it is neither to be desired nor to be not desired), for the self-feeling (or the internal feeling) is produced by sense-perception.

Apart from terminological disagreements, the understanding of *samvṛtyā* as "in internal feeling" and the analysis of *svasaṃvedanapratyakṣagamyatva* as "the self-feeling (or the internal feeling) is produced by sense-perception" are not merely confusing but misleading (cf. § 48 for a different understanding). The proof cited for the interpretation of *samvṛtyā* as "in internal feeling" by Sharma (1969: 90, n. 238) is not convincing: "samvṛtyā samvṛtti = svasaṃvedanā [sic, PMA]. See *PVST*. [=PVSVT, PMA], p. 121; *PVP*. [=PVABh, PMA], p. 573: samvṛttisadeva dharmidharmalakṣaṇam." For the rest of the footnote he cites (and paraphrases) material from Stcherbatsky 1932 2, 385 f., n. 6 (whose note only concerns *svasaṃvedana*, but not *samvṛti*). Neither *svasaṃvedana* nor *samvṛti* is mentioned in PVSVT 121. Although the context of the phrase "*samvṛtisad eva dharmidharmalakṣaṇam*" (PVABh 573,24) has not yet been studied as closely as it deserves, it does not seem to say more than "that which is characterized as either property or property bearer exists only conventionally".

The text edition in Chattopadhyay 2002, which draws on AS₁ and AS₃, is generally reliable. The English translation, which is rather free, suffers a bit from terminological problems that seem to stem from not having studied more recent translations of similar works in much detail, but is usually close to the mark. The present author does unfortunately not know Bengali, and so could not form an opinion of that translation.

McDermott 1969 is a monograph on the *Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhih-vyāyirekātmikā* (henceforth *KBhSV*). It did not receive much critical acclaim, cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1971 (replied to in McDermott 1972) and Steinkellner 1972. A further monograph on Ratnakīrti is Feldman and Phillips 2011. I am not aware of any scholarly reviews of this work. It has not been used here, since the sections dealing with momentariness had all been completed before its appearance.

rasiddhidūṣaṇa (henceforth *SSD*), the “Refutation of the proof of permanent [entities].”

Bühnemann (1980) translated and studied the *Sarvajñasiddhi* (henceforth *SJS*), the “Proof of an omniscient one”, basing herself on *SJS*₁, *SJS*, and the manuscript used by Thakur for that edition (again, this is manuscript P).¹²

Lasic (2000b) critically edited, translated and annotated the *Vyāptinirṇaya* (henceforth *VyN*). He based his work on the same manuscript photographed by Sāṅkṛtyāyana, and also supplied an analysis of the argument structure.

Patil (2009) follows a different aim than that of the books mentioned so far. He intends to provide a more systematic account of Ratnakīrti’s *Īśvarasādhana-dūṣaṇa* (henceforth *ĪSD*). It should be called “systematic”, since Patil shows how the various positions that Ratnakīrti holds on subjects such as inference, perception, awareness, and language influence the very specific arguments of the *ĪSD*. To this end, he relies mainly on the *AS*, and to a lesser degree on the *VyN*, the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ-anvayātmikā* (henceforth *KBhSA*), the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ-vyatirekātmikā* (henceforth *KBhSV*), and the *Citrādvaitaparakāśavāda* (henceforth *CAPV*). These texts are not translated in their entirety, but the main passages of the *ĪSD* and the *AS* are translated and interpreted very thoroughly. Especially with regard to the *AS*, it should be noted that Patil used the manuscripts from Nepal used also here (manuscripts *N*₁, *N*₂, *N*₃). Patil (2011b) also published a translation of the *AS* as a supplement to Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011. This translation is warmly recommended to the readers of the present book. The translation presented here is a rather literal one, to a large extent because its function is to support certain choices made in the Sanskrit edition (mainly those regarding punctuation and paragraph breaks). Patil’s translation, on the other hand, aims to make the *AS* accessible to readers who are primarily interested in the philosophical points

¹²One should note here also Goodman 1989, which was not available to the present author.

of the text, and not in the historical and linguistic problems that one has to surmount in order to arrive at their understanding. The present author believes not only that these two approaches are by no means mutually exclusive, but rather that they complement each other, in that the rather more elegant translation of Patil facilitates a comparatively rapid yet philosophically stringent appropriation of the main arguments of the text, whereas the present one should let a reader sense the formality and artificiality that characterize the style of composition typical of this genre (*śāstra*) of Sanskrit literature in general, as well as Ratnakīrti's logical terseness in particular. The fact that readers will have to reflect deeply on both translations to see their general agreement, as well as some small differences mainly shows how wide a range of possibilities a "translation" of this kind of text allows, and how thorough an analysis and deep a reflection Ratnakīrti and his tradition were capable of.¹³

Finally, McCrea and Patil 2010 is an edition and annotated translation of the text that Ratnakīrti's *AS* is based on, Jñānaśrīmitra's *Apoḥaprakarana* (henceforth *AP*). In many cases, this text contains the original versions of the arguments that Ratnakīrti reproduces or summarizes. It does not, however, make the following chapters here redundant. Even though Ratnakīrti generally follows the *AP*, often verbatim, his rearrangement, presentation, and occasional clarification of its material constitutes a separate and coherent restatement of

¹³Apart from these publications, the present book was able to draw on a number of important studies that are not easily available, and even on some that had kindly been provided to this author as drafts. Akamatsu 1983, a doctoral thesis providing an annotated translation of Jñānaśrīmitra's *AP*, is invaluable to any study of the *apoha* theory of Jñānaśrīmitra (and, by extension, Ratnakīrti). This is a pioneering work of the highest quality, and it is a matter of great regret with regard to the scholarship of Buddhist philosophy that it is not easily accessible. Even though a few of the more poetic parts of Jñānaśrīmitra's treatise have been, perhaps, not perfectly understood in this work, the main philosophical points and historical influences of the *AP* are clearly outlined.

The present author has also profited from Woo 1999, a dissertation on the *KBhSA*, from a draft of M. T. Much's German translation of the *apoha* section in *PV I* (Much 2008), as well as from a draft of Hisataka Ishida's critical edition of TS₅ 866–871, including the *Pañjikā*, (Ishida 2008).

the *apoha* theory well worth its own investigation.¹⁴ Notwithstanding the excellent translation and useful comments in McCrea and Patil 2010, Akamatsu 1983 was still found to be indispensable for the more historically oriented study here.

1.1.2 *Philosophical background of Ratnakīrti's proof of exclusion*

Before entering into the more detailed discussions of the AS in the following chapters, it is helpful to have an overview of the main Buddhist positions to which Ratnakīrti dedicated individual texts. This will provide the context to the often intricate individual arguments of the AS, as well as to the general role and position of the AS amongst Ratnakīrti's philosophical works.

Ratnakīrti's texts typically combine logical, epistemological and ontological considerations, and sometimes present them with a view to soteriological consequences. Throughout, the texts employ rational argumentation that is intended to be acceptable to Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, and aim to establish core Buddhist beliefs (e.g., the impermanence of existence, ignorance as the core cause for continued rebirth). In order to gain an overview of the most important topics covered by Ratnakīrti, the texts are best divided, following Thakur (1975a: 3–4), into three general groups: five works are aimed at positively arguing for a Buddhist position, three at refuting a position held by non-Buddhists, usually Naiyāyikas, and two correct the partially false views of opponents.¹⁵ The theories relevant for fully appreciating the AS are all those to which Ratnakīrti dedicated

¹⁴See section 1.2.2 for some of the significant changes that Ratnakīrti introduced into his discussion of the *apoha* theory.

¹⁵Thakur (1975a: 3–4) classifies Ratnakīrti's texts into three groups: "works refuting the views of the opponents", "works expounding various Buddhist doctrines", and "works seeking to establish the Buddhist views by refuting those of the Brahm[a]nical Hindus on topics of common interest". This differentiation somewhat obscures the fact, however, that there are only two basic dialectical situations, namely whether the Buddhist voice is the one that proves or refutes a position. The main difficulty is how to classify the *VyN* and *PABhP*. Lasic (2000b: 20) characterizes the former as only refuting the positions of opponents, though Ratnakīrti does end

individual proofs: the ontological theory of momentary cessation, the hybrid ontological and epistemological theories of exclusion and non-dual yet variegated cognition, and the epistemological theory of what yogic perception is.

Two texts, both entitled *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (lit. “Proof of Momentary Cessation”), establish, by two variants of the same inference (*anvayātmikā* and *vyatirekātmikā*), the central ontological position of the Buddhist logical-epistemological tradition: universal momentariness. The theory of momentariness states that to exist is to be momentary, whereby existence is here defined as the ability to cause an effect. Ratnakīrti starts his discussion with this proof, KBhSV 83,8–9:

*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ. santaś cāmī vivādā-
spadībhūtāḥ padārthā iti svabhāvahetuḥ.*

the presentation with a statement that, in consequence of these refutations, his own position is established. The *PABhP* is similarly structured, and refutes all means of valid cognition except perception and inference by showing that these others are either just a form of inference or not a means of valid cognition. It is also noteworthy that these two texts, which constitute the third group, are formally different from those of the other two groups, since they are not constructed around an inference. See section 1.1.3 for a more detailed consideration.

Ratnakīrti’s preserved philosophical works are these (following the sequence of the texts in RNĀ_{ms}, the basis of Thakur 1957c, Thakur 1975c): *Sarvajñasiddhi*, establishing the possibility of an omniscient being, i.e., a buddha (see Bühnemann 1980); *Īśvarasāadhanadūṣaṇa*, refuting the existence of a god who could have formed the world (see Patil 2009); *Apoḥasiddhi*, establishing that words refer only to the differences between things, but not to any substantially existing universal (see Patil 2009, Patil 2011b, and this book); the two *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* texts, proving, by different logical means, that real things exist only momentarily (see Feldman and Phillips 2011, McDermott 1969, Steinkellner 1972, Woo 1999); *Pramāṇāntarbhāva-prakarāṇa*, showing that there are only the two means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) accepted by the Buddhists in Dharmakīrti’s tradition, perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*); *Vyāptinirṇaya*, establishing what the “pervasion” relation, which makes inference possible, consists in according to Buddhist logicians (see Lasic 2000b); *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*, refuting the proof of temporally persistent, or non-momentary, things (see Mimaki 1976); *Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda*, teaching that what appears to cognition is a variegated, yet single image (see Moriyama 2011, Moriyama 2012); *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa*, a refutation of the existence of other people’s minds (see Yūichi Kajiyama 1965).

What exists, that is momentary, like a pot. And these existing objects which have become the subject of [our] dispute do exist. So an essence reason [is used in this inference].

According to this inference, momentariness is implied by existence: to exist is to be momentary, and without being momentary nothing can exist. Anything must be momentary, if it is to be real, including particulars, universals, and cognition.

This inference works because two properties, existence and momentariness, are necessarily connected. But it does not, in and of itself, explain how these properties are connected. A simplified version of the chain of arguments that Ratnakīrti uses to establish this connection is this: existence must minimally involve the capacity to produce an effect (*arthakriyāśakti*), so that anything that exists does so only insofar as it is capable of producing an effect.¹⁶ This notion of the ability to produce an effect is itself further examined. Ratnakīrti questions whether it is the same thing that is both able to produce a present effect and capable of causing a future or past effect. His conclusion is that this cannot really be so: if the thing capable of both past, future, and present effects were the same, then why would it, in the present moment, generate only the present, but not the past or future effects? It can only do so, Ratnakīrti maintains, because it is different in all three respects: the thing capable of producing a current effect is not capable of the future or past effect, the thing which was capable of the past effect was not capable of the currently present and future effects, and the thing capable of a future effect will likewise not be capable of producing the other two effects. Ratnakīrti concludes that any (even temporal) change in the effect indicates a change in that which has the capability of producing that effect, the cause. To the extent that this capability is what it is to exist, the essence of a thing changes with each change in this capability, and

¹⁶This is discussed in KBhSA 69,11–19, under the heading that “the reason, existence, is not unestablished” (*tatra na tāvad ayam asiddho hetuḥ*). See Woo 1999: 143–145 for a closer analysis of this passage.

the notion of any essential identity continuing throughout different states of causal capacity must be dropped.

A consequence of this argument is that this change in capacity must happen in the shortest possible time that it can happen in (a *kṣaṇa*, or moment): if a thing were identically the same at two different times, in the above sense of being capable of producing the temporally identical effect at two different times, then it would be impossible to explain why it produces that effect at one of those times, but not at the other. The only possible options are that it produces that effect at neither of the two times, and thus cannot be classified as causally active at those times, and, hence, cannot be real, or else that it would produce that effect at both times. The first possibility excludes the thing from the realm of existence, and the investigation can end there. The second possibility, however, is refuted by everyday experience (a seed does not produce the same sprout twice, just as a hammer does not destroy the same pot twice). The only alternative that is left is that, between the two moments, the thing has undergone a change in its causal capacity: it has turned from something that cannot produce said effect into something that can. And if this change happened in any amount of time longer than necessary, there would be the same problem: a thing, once having entered into a continuous state, where two subsequent moments have the same causal capacity, cannot break out of this state anymore. It must forever produce either the exact same effect, or (if there is no capacity in both moments) have ceased to exist altogether.

For Ratnakīrti, the notion of a thing's identity at two moments is thus the strictest one: even the difference in a thing's causal capacity allows him to see this identity as being violated.

A problem arises from our common-sense notions of temporally persistent objects: it would seem to be an unshakeable fact that a desk that existed yesterday exists also today and, in normal circumstances, will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. How can everyday activity proceed without this assumption?

Ratnakīrti's answer to this question has two parts, an ontological one and an epistemological one. The ontological part of the

answer draws on a consequence that is only implicit in the arguments presented so far. The analysis of causal capacity has shown that a thing is able to produce an effect when it produces the effect at the present time. This entails, as explicated above, that the thing cannot produce future or past effects without changing its capacity, and so its essential nature; but such a causal capacity also entails that a thing must *always* produce an effect *immediately*. If a thing were to not produce an immediate effect in any given moment, no further effects could manifest in moments following that one. It is easiest to think of a temporally extended object, as opposed to a momentary thing, as a chain of cause-effect links. Any missing link would break the chain, with the result that the following (future) causes do not arise. This chain is called a continuum, *santāna*, by Buddhist epistemologists like Ratnakīrti.

Such a continuum has several noteworthy features. First, it is constituted of real, and thus momentary, things (*vastu*), such that each thing at a given point in a continuum is the effect of the thing in the previous moment of the continuum and the cause of another thing in the following moment. Each real thing exists only for the shortest time necessary to effect anything, on pain of either constantly producing the same effect or not ever producing any effect at all. This is the final analysis of cause and effect, and anything that really exists must be so constituted. Second, it provides Buddhist epistemologists with a notion of objective difference: each moment in each continuum is absolutely different from each other moment in each other continuum. However, this difference of moments decreases with increased proximity, a moment being less different from another moment the “closer” the other moment is to the current moment. Proximity is here judged by causal proximity in a cause-effect continuum. A proximity so derived harmonizes well with common-sense notions of identity: the cow called Spotty, on the meadow now, is less different from the cow Spotty in the barn this morning than it is from the other cows on the meadow now or in the barn this morning.¹⁷ A

¹⁷ This also allows a fairly elegant distinction of natural classes that avoids the

third feature of the continuum is that such an objective difference includes the possibility of substantial changes, as in the case of a seed becoming (or, more precisely, causing) a sprout. Similar appearance is possible on this account, and perhaps an important standard case; yet one cannot call the seed moment and the sprout moment similar in the same way that one might want to say the cow this morning and the cow now have a very similar appearance. Yet, in terms of the Buddhist analysis of the cause and effect relations, there is no important difference between the two situations: in both cases, the earlier moment is one link in the causal chain that the latter belongs to, and in this sense the two moments are less different from each other than they are from links in other chains, though this might not be apparent.

This judgement of proximity, and in many cases similarity, in the face of increasing difference is the epistemological part of the answer that Ratnakīrti gives in order to explain how temporally extended objects are possible. For Ratnakīrti, as for Jñānaśrīmitra, the preferred term for this judgement is *adhyavasāya*. The explanation of this term is a central topic both in the *AS* and in the *CAPV*. For the purposes of this introduction, a rough sketch of its main functions will suffice.

The *AS* provides an analysis of how “determination” works in the somewhat limited context of proving the Buddhist tenet that words do not refer to real universals, but only to an insubstantial “exclusion of others” (*anyāpoha*), or, in other words, to relative non-differences attributed to things which, on closer analysis, must be said to be completely different from each other. These non-differences are insubstantial in that they are only relational, but not real, properties that things have. That they are not “real” must here be understood in the sense that is particular to Buddhists following Dharmakīrti: something is unreal if it is not capable of producing an effect. The

assumption of any similarity in essence: the calf born from a particular cow is less different from that cow than it is from things not born from that cow. And insofar as cows are less different from each other than from other animals, anything born from a cow will be less different from any other calf than from what is not born from a cow.

theory of *apoha* thus posits a negative substitute for any real sameness between things and is often understood to be the basis for nominalist tendencies in this group of Buddhist logico-epistemological scholars. This theory explains how conceptual cognition can work in a world defined by this Buddhist ontology, i.e., in the absence of any temporal, and hence essential, identity of existing things: any conceptual cognition (which all verbal cognitions are a subset of) has an *apoha* as its object and is erroneous by nature, determining its object as existing externally and continuously, when in fact it does not; this kind of cognition can be “true” only in the sense that it allows successful behaviour with regard to an agent’s aims, but not in the sense that it presents reality how it is. The AS defends “exclusion” by showing its conformance to various functions fulfilled by real universals as accepted by the Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka authors.

A further consequence of this notion of universals is that there is no fundamental difference between universals that qualify objects, such as cowness or existence, and these objects themselves, such as a cow or a pot: they all are simply variant results of the same generalizing error, in the first case leading to the notion of classes of objects, and in the second to the notion of an object with a certain temporal persistence. It is fundamental to understand that, for Ratnakīrti, *any* term, including “this”, is a general term.¹⁸

The CAPV ostensibly presents the teaching that any cognition has a variegated, yet non-dual objective form. Under this rather technical heading, Ratnakīrti finds the opportunity to present the general epistemological issues that are central to his and his teacher’s philosophical positions: apart from laying the foundation for the idealism typical of the Yogācāra strand of Buddhism (*cittamātra*), the circle of existence (*saṃsāra*) is analysed as the result of determination (*adhyavasāya*), the fundamentally erroneous cognition that continuously mistakes a particular thing for a general one and thus enables the everyday activities that tie living beings into *saṃsāra*. The riddance of this error is conceived of as liberation (*mokṣa*). Together with

¹⁸See footnote 106 for some background on this.

the theory developed in the *AS*, determination thus appears as the fundamental philosophical concern. It enables the interaction of unenlightened beings with a world that is, ontologically, constituted only of momentary appearances, by judging them to be external and temporally extended objects. This error, common to all these beings, is the foundation for any use of concepts. Simultaneously, it is the most important manifestation of the deep-rooted nescience that afflicts all unenlightened beings and cannot be intentionally suspended, according to Buddhist doctrine; as such, determination is the driving force of transmigratory existence. Accordingly, the destruction of determination is liberation from this transmigratory existence, and hence the definition of *nirvāṇa*.

The last of Ratnakīrti's texts of proof to consider here is the *SJS*. In the main manuscript of Ratnakīrti's works (*RNĀ_{ms}*), the *SJS* has the prominent first position. But it is unclear whether this reflects a sequence intended by Ratnakīrti, since the texts' contents do not suggest any systematic arrangement.¹⁹ The *SJS* seeks to establish the possibility of an omniscient being against the background of the detailed ontological and epistemological system just outlined. It differentiates between the fundamentally erroneous, conceptual cognition called determination, and the principally accurate, direct perception, and suggests a way to transform merely conceptual cognition into a direct realization of what is so cognized. The means to accomplish this is a faculty called "yogic perception" (*yogipratyakṣa*), a form of perception that is not necessarily based on any sense organ.²⁰ Ratnakīrti, as is typical for his tradition,²¹ distinguishes two kinds of omniscience: total omniscience, the knowledge of absolutely everything, and omniscience without further qualification, which is the knowledge of everything that is needed for enlightenment. Whilst

¹⁹Cf. Thakur 1975a: 3.

²⁰Cf. *SJS* 16,28–17,8, translated in Bühnemann 1980: 46–47. Steinkellner (1977: 384), elaborating on a first observation by Thakur (1957a: 11), noted that the main section of Ratnakīrti's *SJS* is, in fact, not based only on Jñānaśrīmitra's lost work of the same name, but also on the *Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇa*.

²¹Cf. Bühnemann 1980: ix.

Ratnakīrti does hold that a buddha is omniscient in the first sense, the bulk of his *SJS* is concerned with proving the possibility of a being that is omniscient in the latter sense. This kind of omniscience has the Buddha's four noble truths as its objects: whilst these truths are first known to practitioners as statements, and hence only in conceptual cognitions, omniscience consists in making them as clear as if they were directly experienced or perceived. Omniscience is thus characterized both in terms of its content, the four noble truths, and in terms of its appearance or cognitive status, as a clear image or perception of that object.

The following paragraph from the *CAPV* illustrates how Ratnakīrti combines all the different concerns that have just been outlined. The passage presents epistemological issues, some of which are central also to the *AS*, as they relate to Buddhist soteriology:

*CAPV 137,9–16: tathā hi samanantarapratyayabalāyā-
tasvapratibhāsaviśeṣavedanamātrād agrhīte 'pi paratra
pravrṭtyākṣepo 'dhyavasāyah.*

*na cāsau pūrvoktavāgjālaiḥ pratihantum śakyah, sarva-
prānabhṛtām pratyātmaviditavāt, kaiścid apy anudbhi-
nnatvāt. ayam eva ca saṃsāras tatṣayo mokṣa iti kvedā-
nīm eva tadvārtāpi.*

*tathā hi vicitrānādivāsanāvaśāt prabodhakapratyayavi-
śeṣāpekṣayā vikalpaḥ kenacid ākāreṇopajāyamāna eva
bahirmukhapravṛtṭyanukūlam arthakriyāsmaraṇābhilā-
ṣādiprabandham ādhatte.*

*tataḥ puruṣārthakriyārthino bahirarthānurūpāṇi pra-
vrṭtinvṛtṭyavadhāraṇāni bhavanti, pṛthagjanasantāna-
jñānakṣaṇānām tādrśo hetuphalabhāvasya niyatavāt.*

For it is so: Based on the mere knowledge of a particular appearance of [cognition] itself, which is attained by the power of an immediately [preceding] apprehension, determination incites activity toward something else, even though [that is] not grasped.

But this cannot be rejected by the nets of earlier statements,²² because every breathing being knows [this incitement to activity] for itself, [and] because [this activity] is not broken through by any [of these beings]. And exactly this [determination] is the circle of existence, [and] its destruction [is] liberation. So where is there now even news of this [error of immediate liberation]?

For it is so: a conceptual cognition, simply in arising with a certain form in dependence on a particular condition awakening [this conceptual cognition] because of variegated impressions that have no beginning, receives a [certain] connection to causal efficacy, [such as] a memory [of it], a desire [for it], and so on, which is conducive to activity towards an external object.

Because of this, there exist restrictions for the positive and negative activities that correspond to the external things for someone aiming to bring about human aims, because, for the moments [making up] the continuous flow of an unenlightened being, the causal relation [between two moments in that flow] in such a way, [i.e., as allowing activity towards an external thing], is fixed.

An adequate understanding of this passage will be possible only after having studied the AS and its background. For now, it will suffice to highlight its most important aspects: they outline the range of philosophical problems that Ratnakīrti was engaged with, and an important subset of these problems is constituted by the topics considered in the AS.

The first sentence roughly defines determination (*adhyavasāya*): it is the cognitive function that prompts a person to act towards a “something else” (*paratra*), something that is not actually grasped by cognition; what is in fact grasped is only a particular appearance of

²²This refers back to the various other explanations of *adhyavasāya* that were discussed and rejected in CAPV 133 ff. See Kataoka 2017b and McAllister 2017a for details on these other options.

awareness itself. Ratnakīrti thus characterizes determination as an error, a deficient form of cognition insofar as what it shows, its own form, is not the same as that towards which it directs the activity of normal, that is, unenlightened, persons or beings.

Ratnakīrti calls this error, the determination of cognition's appearance to itself, *saṃsāra*, the circle in which all unenlightened beings wander from one existence to the next. The release from this circle, *mokṣa*, is occasioned by the destruction of determination. Ratnakīrti thus explains two soteriological notions central not only to Buddhism, but to most of South Asia's religious traditions,—*saṃsāra* and the liberation from it—in epistemological terms. Ignorance (*avidyā*), the first and foremost cause for suffering in the Buddhist analysis of *saṃsāra*, is not so much defined in terms of its content as by its structure: it is the erroneous, deeply ingrained belief that there are objects which are external to the mind and persist temporally. The determination of “the forms of cognition” (*buddhyākāra*) in this way is what constitutes *saṃsāra*.

Ratnakīrti's further exposition introduces several other terms that reinforce this interpretation: the most prominent are *vikalpa*, *pravṛtti*, and *arthakriyā*, which, in this combination, are unmistakably indebted to Dharmakīrti.

The concept of *arthakriyā*, that something produces an effect which satisfies an agent's aim, is Dharmakīrti's touchstone of reality: only real things can produce an effect, and to produce an effect is to be a real thing. This causal efficacy is the ultimate aim of any agent acting with foresight, and the achievement of which decides whether an act was successful or not.

Causal efficacy also decides whether a cognition is correct or not, insofar as its regular attainment by certain cognitions allows us to classify them as means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). If cognitions do not lead to activity that reliably results in such a satisfaction, then they cannot be counted as a means of valid cognition.

Conceptual cognitions play a pivotal role for activity: even though not all conceptual cognitions, but only inferences, are means of valid cognitions, all means of valid cognitions need conceptual cognitions

to result in activity. The reason that conceptual cognitions are always required is that activity of the kind that engages with mind-external, temporally persistent objects can, in general, not occur without a generalized concept that guides it. The result of inference is unproblematic in this regard: it is a determinate cognition that (at least in the cases usually considered by Ratnakīrti) has an object determined in such a way, meaning that it has an object that is imagined as temporally extended and not identical with cognition itself. Perception, however, is different; it differs from conceptual cognition in that it is not erroneous, and shows reality as it is. Precisely for this reason, however, it is also useless, in and of itself, for generating such activity as characterizes our everyday life. If perception were not distorted by a conceptual cognition following it, one would not act at all: an unenlightened being would simply be a passive recipient of sensory impressions that remain uninterpreted. It is for this reason that determinations are at the centre of the Buddhist analysis of everyday activity; without them, it could not even exist. Determination mistakenly externalizes and generalizes what appears in it, mistakenly construing one thing, the immediately present, unrepeatable particular form that cognition has, as another, *viz.* a repeatable entity; it is this double object of conceptual cognition that is the subject of the *AS*.

This passage further specifies that the moments of the cognitive continuum constituting a being are related to each other as cause and effect. This is, broadly speaking, a causal theory of the mind. The conceptual cognitions that arise and enable activity are thus causally determined. The preceding cognitions, along with mnemonic imprints, habits, and other factors, result in determinations that guide and cause activity. Whilst each of these factors becomes efficacious in causal terms, it does not quite mean that they are fully determined like a merely mechanical cascade of domino stones; rather, they are part of a complex of causal relations that, as a whole, can change. This complex can change quite fundamentally, so Ratnakīrti, in that the core element in everyday activity, determination, can end, and liberation can be attained in this manner.

1.1.3 *Ratnakīrti's style*

In order to fully appreciate Ratnakīrti's works, one has to be aware of several stylistic features that characterize them.²³ Regarding the level of composition, the passage from the *CAPV* illustrates one of these characteristics of Ratnakīrti's writings: he will silently use material from his teacher, Jñānaśrīmitra, embedding it into the context of his own text with only minor changes. In this example, the explanation given with the sentences *tathā hi vicitrānādivāsanāvāśāt ... niyatatvāt* corresponds nearly verbatim to a passage from the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* (henceforth *SāSiŚā*), *SāSiŚā* 393,10–14. Whereas in this case it is difficult to judge whether the argument has been repurposed by Ratnakīrti because the source text, the *SāSiŚā*, is not well understood, for the *AS* the situation is usually clearer, because Akamatsu 1983 and McCrea and Patil 2010 provide a good understanding of the *AS*'s basis, the *AP*.

Ratnakīrti's style of writing has been characterized as quite distinctive by several scholars. As mentioned above, Stcherbatsky (1932) considered the *AS* to be very unclear. Thakur (1957a: 14) draws on the conspicuous unity of “style and [...] mode of argument in all these ten works [...]” to argue that Ratnakīrti is the author also of those texts in the manuscript that do not explicitly name him as such, and notes that “[t]he tracts of Ratnakīrti are written in a style that is more common to neo-logic than in the old system.” Steinkellner (1977: 385), furthermore, has drawn attention to the fact that Ratnakīrti “is using the logical forms in the macro-structure of his texts.”

A short look at the table of contents of the *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* shows that the titles of the texts share only a few different endings: four end in °*siddhi*, three end in °*dūṣaṇa*, and one each ends in °*prakaraṇa*, °*nirṇaya*, and °*vāda*.²⁴ A detailed investigation of the argument structure of each of these texts is beyond the scope of the

²³Thakur (1975a: 5) already observed that the “[...] tracts of Ratnakīrti are written in a style that is more common in neo-logic than in the old system.”

²⁴See also footnote 15.

current work, but even a superficial examination of their outlines reveals that, except for the *SSD*, all the °*siddhi* and °*dūṣaṇa* texts, as well as the *CAPV*, show an inferential structure in the sense that, first, the whole text is structured around a “guiding inference” and, second, each major section of the text corresponds to one of the possible logical deficiencies of that inference (these are the “logical forms” mentioned in Steinkellner 1977: 385; see table 1.1).

The *VyN* and *Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa* (henceforth *PABhP*) do not show this structure: they both consist mainly of refutations of various opposing theories, thus establishing (*ex negativo*) that the Buddhist position is the correct one. The main distinction of these texts from the other two kinds is, as Thakur (1975a: 4) appears to imply, that they focus on “topics of common interest.” They are here classified as correcting false views on these topics, that is, pervasion and the number and nature of acceptable means of valid cognition. The *SSD*, the third text that does not conform to the inferential structure, focuses on the various proofs that non-Buddhists employed to establish things with temporal extension, and is explicitly linked by Ratnakīrti to the inferential establishment of momentariness.²⁵ The *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa* (henceforth *SAD*) is formally somewhat different from the other texts with regard to a guiding inference: the opponent’s position is not presented in the form of an actual inference, but in the form of a description of the elements that would make an inference proving the existence of other minds valid.²⁶ The *SAD* is therefore listed in table 1.1 as “practically” having a guiding inference. The text is, furthermore, introduced by Ratnakīrti as concerned with investigating the existence or non-existence of other mental continua

²⁵See *SSD* 128,8: *tathā ca kṣaṇabhaṅgasamdehe sattvādy anumānaṃ prāptāvāsaram* (“But if, according to this [way in which the proof of temporally extended things has been destroyed], there is doubt about momentary cessation, the proof [of momentariness based on] existence and so on has gained [the right] opportunity [to be employed].”) For an outline of the *SSD*, see Mimaki 1976: 11.

²⁶See *SAD* 145,7–11, and the paraphrase in Yūichi Kajiyama 1965: 431–432. Yūichi Kajiyama (1965: n. 14, 431–432) notes that “[t]his argument is similar to that of the Sautrāntika found in the very beginning of Dharmakīrti’s *Samtānāntarasiddhi*”, but adds that in the *SAD* the speaker is a Vijñānavādin.

Table 1.1 – Ratnakīrti’s texts: types and inferential structure

Title	Type	Guiding inference?
Sarvajñasiddhiḥ	siddhi	yes
Īśvarasāadhanadūṣaṇam	dūṣaṇa	yes
Apoḥasiddhiḥ	siddhi	yes
Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhiḥ- Anvayātmikā	siddhi	yes
Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhiḥ- Vyatirekātmikā	siddhi	yes
Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇam	corrective	no
Vyāptinirṇayah	corrective	no
Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇam	duṣaṇa	no
Citrādvaitaprakāśavādaḥ	siddhi	yes
Santānāntaradūṣaṇam	duṣaṇa	practically

after non-duality has been established, that is, after the work of the *CAPV* has been done.

The *CAPV* illustrates how Ratnakīrti uses an inference and its possible problems to structure his texts. It is constructed around this central inference (the outline of the *CAPV* is summarized in table 1.2):

CAPV 129,22–24: *yat prakāśate tad ekam, yathā citrākā-racakramadhyavartī nīlākāraḥ. prakāśate cedam gaura-gāndhāramadhurasurabhisukumārasātetarādivicitrākāradambakam iti svabhāvahetuḥ.*

What appears [to cognition], that is one, like the form of blue occurring in the middle of a circle of various forms. And this collection (*kadambaka*) of various forms, such as white (*gaura*), the sound “ga” (*gāndhāra*), sweet (*madhura*), fragrant (*surabhi*), soft (*sukumāra*), pleasure and its opposite (*sātetara*), etc. appears. [This is a proof using] an essence-reason.

Similarly, as shown by Woo (1999: 126 ff.; 141 f.), the *KBhSA* is structured around the following inference, *KBhSA* 67,7–8: “*yat sat tat*

Table 1.2 – General outline of the *Citrādvaitaparakāśavāda*

Topic	Logical category	Start	End	≈ % of whole
<i>māṅgalāśloka</i>		129.05	129.06	0.06
Main topic of text		129.07	129.11	0.25
Introductory objection and answer		129.12	129.21	0.56
Central inference	<i>anumāna</i>	129.22	129.24	0.13
Discussion of <i>hetu</i> in general	<i>asiddha</i> , <i>viruddha</i> , <i>anaikāntika</i>	129.25	130.32	6.69
Discussion of <i>hetu</i> (relation to <i>vipakṣa</i>)	<i>sādhāraṇānaikā- nīka</i> or <i>sandigdha- vyatirekin</i>	130.33	141.08	67.19
Verses from Jñānaśrīmitra	(same as previous)	141.09	141.29	1.25
Discussion of <i>dṛṣṭānta</i>	<i>viruddhadharma</i>	141.30	143.05	10.94
Closing discussion		143.06	144.30	7.75

kṣaṇikam, yathā ghataḥ, santaś cāmī vivādāspadībhūtāḥ padārthā iti.” For the *SJS*, the main structure at least of the first part of the text is entitled “Der Beweis und seine Verteidigung” by Bühnemann (1980: XXIX ff.), i.e., the formal proof and its defence. But the next two sections are also closely related to this inference: sections 2 and 3 consist of a systematic defence against accusations that what the inference is about (the *pakṣa*) or the reason used in it (*hetu*) suffer from faults that would make this inference invalid.²⁷ Lastly, the *AS* itself also uses this structure (see section 4.2.1), although it is less rigidly governed by it than any of the other °*siddhi* texts.²⁸

A second distinctive feature of Ratnakīrti’s texts is that they are, to a large extent, a rearrangement of other texts, mainly those of his teacher’s.²⁹ For the text edited below, at least 75% is taken verbatim from Jñānaśrīmitra’s *AP*.

A final point to note is that, even though Ratnakīrti organized his texts around the logical relations of various positions to a central inference, he always presented these positions as spoken discussions, in a manner typical for Sanskrit *sāstra*. In this context, Thakur observed for all the works contained in *RNĀ* that “the discussion

²⁷According to Bühnemann (1980: XXX–XLV), sections 2 and 3 are: “Verteidigung der Möglichkeit einer Schlußfolgerung überhaupt” (*SJS* 3,30–6,21) and “Polemik” (*SJS* 6,22–31,11), i.e., the defence of the possibility of an inference concerning the existence of an enlightened person, and a section refuting the opponents’ attempts to disprove this reasoning. On section 2, Bühnemann (1980: 101, n. 62) notes: “Es folgen nun Einwände gegen den Beweis der Existenz des Allwissenden im allgemeinen [...] und gegen die Beschränkung des Beweises auf den Beweis des alles für die Erlösung Nützliche Wissenden [...]”. With regard to section 3, Bühnemann (1980: 106, n. 102) says: “[Es ...] folgt nun eine ausgedehnte Polemik [...]. Ein den Allwissenden aufhebendes Erkenntnismittel könnte seine Nichtexistenz beweisen bzw. seine Existenz widerlegen.” Cf. also Steinkellner 1977.

²⁸It might be helpful for a chronology of Ratnakīrti’s works to remember that of all of Ratnakīrti’s °*siddhi* texts (*SJS*, *AS*, *KBhSA*, *KBhSV*, as well as *CAPV*, cf. the classification in Thakur 1975a: 3–4), the *AS* has two specific characteristics within that group: it is the only text that has the inference summing up its main purpose at its end, and it is least strictly built around that inference.

²⁹The textual evidence for this can be found in the editions, see the discussion by Bühnemann (1980: §1 III f.), and the edition in Lasic 2000b and the present edition.

is started just in the way of a formal debate, as if the opponent is present before the author.” (Thakur 1957a: 14)³⁰ This applies also to the AS.

1.2 THE *APOHASIDDHI*

1.2.1 *Title of the Apoahasiddhi*

According to the colophon of manuscript P, the title of the text is *Apoahaprakarāṇa*, the same as Jñānaśrīmitra’s work on the same subject (AP). All the other manuscripts support the name *Apoahasiddhi*. Since Ratnakīrti himself refers to the AS as “...*iti apoahasiddhau prasādhitam*” (“...so it is fully established in the *Apoahasiddhi*”) in SSD 122,18–19, preference is given to the title *Apoahasiddhi*.

1.2.2 *Characteristics of the Apoahasiddhi*

Ratnakīrti does not say what kind of text the AS is supposed to be. The first impression certainly is that it is little more than a condensed version of Jñānaśrīmitra’s *Apoahaprakarāṇa*, or even only a rearrangement of passages from that work.³¹ But a closer examination reveals at least two interesting points of difference between the AS and the AP. First, Ratnakīrti, at least in the AS, does not use Jñānaśrīmitra’s interpretatorial technique of “a conditionally adopted position (*vyavasthā*)” (Patil 2007: 598), whereby certain theories can be provisionally accepted “for only specific and philosophically legitimate purposes” (Patil 2007: 603), just to be abandoned or at least

³⁰At least the CAPV is an exception to this rule, however. It starts with the statement of Ratnakīrti’s own claim and various other views (CAPV 129,7–21), presents the central inference (CAPV 129,22–24), and then starts a discussion of this inference. SJS 1,1–1,17 also conforms to Thakur’s statement (see the translation in Bühnemann 1980: 1–2), since Ratnakīrti opens this work with a dialogue between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti.

³¹Cf. the remarks in Lasic 2000b for examples of differences between Jñānaśrīmitra’s VC and Ratnakīrti’s *VyN*, and cf. Thakur 1975a: 12 for a general assessment, as well as the beginning of McAllister 2015.

substantially altered when those purposes change.³² The central term used by Jñānaśrīmitra in this context is *vyavasthā*. In the *AS*, this connotation of the term cannot be found, and it simply means definition or classification.³³ A second noticeable difference lies in the arrangement of the texts. The *AP* is organized according to the introductory verse, as has been shown by Akamatsu (1983: 35–38) and Katsura (1986: 179, n. 15). The *AS* is arranged according to more “logical” principles, in particular according to the requirements of the inference found at its end (§§ 54–58).³⁴

As pointed out by Thakur (1975a: 12), Ratnakīrti states his intention in writing texts comparable to the *AS* at the end of the *SJS* and at the beginning of the *ĪSD*, *SJS* 31,24–27 and *ĪSD* 32,5–8 respectively:

*durvāraprativādivikramam anādṛtya pramāprauḍhitaḥ
sarvajño jagadekacakṣur udagād eṣa prabhāvo 'tra
ca /
sambuddhasthitimedinīkulagirer asmadguroḥ kin tv a-
yaṃ saṃkṣepo mama ratnakīrtikṛtinas tadvista-
ratrāsinaḥ //*

Disregarding the strength of opponents who are hard to repress, through the full development of [his] means of valid cognition, this omniscient one, the single eye of the world, arose. And the mastery over this [subject, omniscience,] is [that] of my revered teacher, [who, like] the chief mountain [upholding] the earth, [upholds] the teaching of the fully enlightened one. But this compendium of mine, the scholar Ratnakīrti's, [is meant] for [the person] fearful of [my teacher's] extensive treatise.³⁵

³²Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006 and Patil 2007 for two excellent studies on this technique.

³³Cf. for instance the arguments in 4 and 15.

³⁴This point has been argued in the study of the *AS*, cf. section 5.1. This general stylistic mark of Ratnakīrti's works, that the logical categories are used as structuring devices, was first observed by Thakur (1957a: 13, n. 1, and pp. 14 f.).

³⁵Cf. also the German translation by Bühnemann (1980: 90):

*sūktaratnāśrayatvena jitaratnākarād idam /
guror vāgambudheḥ smartum kiñcid ākr̥ṣya likhyate //
rītiḥ sudhānidhir iyaṃ sattame madhyavartini /
vidveṣiṇi viṣajvālā kiñcijjñe tu na kiñcana //*

Having retrieved some [jewels] to remember from that ocean of words, the revered teacher, who has surpassed [that] mine of jewels, [the ocean], by [himself] being a repository of jewels that are [his] beautiful expressions, this [treatise] is written.³⁶

This stream [of words] is a reservoir of nectar for a venerable one occupying the centre, [it is] a poisonous torch for a hostile one, but [it is] nothing at all for someone knowing a little.

To these passages one should add the verses introducing the *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* and the *Citrādvaitaparakāśavāda*, SSD 112,4–5 and CAPV 129,5–6 respectively:

*yadyogād andhavad viśvaṃ saṃsāre bhramad iṣyate /
sā kṛpāvaśagaiḥ pāpā sthirasiddhir apāsyate //*

Respektlos vor der Stärke der schwer abzuwehrenden Gegner ist durch (seine) Vollendung in der richtigen Erkenntnis dieser Allwissende, die Sonne der Welt, hervorgetreten.

Und die Überlegenheit mit Bezug auf diesen (Gegenstand) gebührt meinem Lehrer, dem Kontinentgebirge der Erde, auf der ein vollkommen erleuchteter (seinen) Wohnsitz genommen hat; diese Zusammenfassung aber kommt mir, dem fromm-gelehrten Ratnakīrti zu, der des (Lehrers) Ausführlichkeit vermeiden will.

I thank Harunaga Isaacson and Toru Tomabechei for discussing this verse with me in March 2019.

³⁶The word *ratnākara* is commonly used to refer to the ocean (see PW VI: 252 f.). Acc. to McCrea and Patil (2010: 3), *ratnākara* in the phrase *jitaratnākarād* should be understood also as an allusion to Ratnākaraśānti, a Buddhist contemporary and opponent (in certain epistemological matters) of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. The second meaning of the phrase would be that Jñānaśrīmitra “has surpassed [his opponent] Ratnākaraśānti” with his literary compositions.

That wicked proof of permanence, in consequence of which the whole world, as if blind, is assumed to be wandering in the course of existence, is driven away by those under the power of compassion.³⁷

*dig eṣā svaparāśeṣaprativādiprasādhanī /
citrādvaitamatābodhadhvāntastomakadarthinī //*

This short instruction overpowers all opponents, whether internal or external,³⁸ [and] repels the mass of ignorance [that is due] to not knowing the doctrine of variegated non-duality (*citrādvaita*).³⁹

From these verses, even though the above translations are far from secure, the following intentions can be attributed to Ratnakīrti's texts: they intend to restate the main points of Jñānaśrīmitra's much longer treatises, they should abolish wrong opinions, held by internal (Buddhist) and external (non-Buddhist) opponents, they should strengthen correct opinions, and, through this, they should aid in deliverance from the cycle of existence. Apart from their being summaries, Ratnakīrti's texts thus reflect the apologetic and polemical motivations (or causes) driving the epistemological tradition that Eltschinger (2012: 473–479) portrays; there is the apologetic aspect that shows how enlightenment and liberation are achievable, even though, by the simple measure of the amount of text dedicated to these issues, they are not the central concerns of these texts. The polemic aspect of refuting both Buddhist and non-Buddhist views that might hinder liberation is ubiquitous.

³⁷Cf. Mimaki 1976: 83: "Il est admis que quiconque est d'accord avec cette [preuve] erre dans la transmigration (*samsāra*) comme un aveugle. Aussi, cette fausse preuve de permanence [des choses] est-elle rejetée par ceux qui sont sous l'empire de la compassion (*krpā*)."

³⁸I.e., whether they are Buddhists or not.

³⁹The late Dr. Abhijit Ghosh, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, gave me his very helpful opinion on this verse in May 2009.

1.2.3 Persons and texts mentioned in the *Apoahasiddhi*

The following texts and persons (or groups of persons) are mentioned by name in the *Apoahasiddhi* and its colophon (§ 61 and following):

Persons.

- Dharmottara: § 50 (referring to the *Apoahaprakaraṇa* (henceforth *DhAP*))
- Followers of Kumārila (i.e., Sucaritamiśra): § 24
- Ratnakīrti: § 60
- Trailokyadatta (scribe): § 62
- Trilocana: § 38
- Vācaspati: § 9, § 21, § 23, § 29 (all references to *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyatīkā* (henceforth *NVT*))
- Vidhivādin: § 8
- Pratiṣedhavādin: § 8⁴⁰

Texts.

- *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*: § 30 and § 43.
- *Śāstra*: § 27.

1.3 MANUSCRIPTS OF THE *APOHASIDDHI*

Five of six⁴¹ known manuscripts of the *AS* have been used for this edition:

1. Manuscript K.⁴²

⁴⁰Unnamed persons are referred to in the following paragraphs: § 4, § 30 (Bhāsarvajña), § 37, § 40 (probably Trilocana), § 41 (probably Trilocana), § 54. References to the Siddhāntin are found in § 7 and § 37.

⁴¹Two manuscripts were used in Shāstri 1910 for the first modern edition of the *AS*: The first is manuscript “G 4711” in the collection of the Asiatic Society in Kolkata (cf. Shāstri 1917: 32 f.). This is manuscript K in the present edition. The other manuscript (Ś) was in Shāstri’s private possession, and it was not available to the author.

⁴²These keys to the entries are used to reference the source in the critical apparatus.

- This is manuscript number “G 4711” in the collection of the Asiatic Society in Kolkata (cf. the description in Shāstri 1917: 32 f.).
- Its script is characterized by Shāstri (1917: 32) as Bengali of the 12th century.

2. Manuscript P:

- This manuscript was available as copies of the prints catalogued as “Xc 14/26” in the *Sammlung des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde in Göttingen* (Collection of the Seminar for Indology and Buddhist studies in Göttingen).⁴³ This manuscript is reported by Bandurski (1994: 60) to be in Beijing, under the signature “Pek.-L., Nr. 52–58.”, and is described in Bandurski 1994: 58 ff.
- The text of the *Apohasiddhi* is found on folios 32b–36b. The manuscript was discovered by Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana in *Zha lu ri phug* during his second expedition to Tibet.⁴⁴ In his note on the manuscript he called the script Purāṇa-maithilī, which he seems to have used synonymously with Nevārī and Vartula.⁴⁵ Thakur (1975a: 11) states that the manuscript convolute of which the *Apohasiddhi* is a part “...consists of eighty-six folia in clear Maithil script of *circa* 1200 A.D.”⁴⁶
- This manuscript is the basis of the editions AS₂ and AS₃.

3. Manuscripts N₁, N₂, and N₃ were microfilmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project (NGMPP). Their microfilm numbers in the Nepal-German Manuscript Cataloguing

⁴³For details on this collection, cf. Bandurski 1994: 15 ff., and see Kellner 2007: 19 for how copies of the prints came to Vienna.

⁴⁴Cf. the comments in footnote 10.

⁴⁵For discussions of this script see Bandurski 1994: 20; 58 f., Dimitrov 2002: 29 ff., and Ishida 2011a: xxvi–xxxiii.

⁴⁶Kellner (2007: 21) gives a succinct overview of the various classifications of the very similar script in JNĀ_{ms}.

Project (NGMCP) are A109/12, D35/1, and A117/7, respectively. The descriptions given on their scanned catalogue cards are as follows (my additions are in square brackets, the values are written in Devanāgarī on the cards of manuscripts N₁ and N₃):

- Manuscript N₁, corresponding to NGMCP: A109/12 and written in Newari:
 - [Number, probably of the microfilm]: A109/12
 - Subject: *bauddhadarśana*
 - Manuscript-Name: *apohasiddhiḥ*
 - C. No. [=accession number of the National Archives of Kathmandu] 3-717
 - S. No. 2
 - Folio No. 13
 - Size: 34,5 × 10 [cm]
- Manuscript N₂, corresponding to NGMCP: D35/1 (this manuscript is not in the National Archives of Kathmandu, and the scanned catalogue card is written in English) and written in Newari:
 - Short Title: *Apoahasiddhi*
 - Running No. 764D
 - Subject: *Baudd. Nyāya*
 - Title (acc. to Colophon): *Apoahasiddhi*
 - Author: *Ratnakīrti* (c. 10th cent. AD)
 - No. of leaves: 14 complete
 - Size in cm: 32,5 × 8,4
 - Reel No.: D35/1
 - Date of filming: 2 Mar 1976
 - Script: *Newari*
 - Remarks: paper [and a note to the effect that the manuscript is undamaged]
 - Script: *Newari*

- Manuscript N₃, corresponding to NGMCP: A117/7 and written in Devanāgarī:
 - [Number on front:] A117/ 7
 - Subject: *bauddhadarśana*
 - Manuscript-Name: *apohasiddhiḥ*
 - C. No. [=accession number of the National Archives of Kathmandu] 5–256
 - S. No. 2 (*kha*)
 - Folio No. 11
 - Size: 32,5 × 11 [cm]

We know little about the missing manuscript, Ś, apart from the fact that it was in the private possession of Shāstri and that it is “written in the Bengali hand of the 12th century” (Shāstri 1910: vii), like K. It will, however, be important to consider its readings as reported in Shāstri 1910 for determining the relation of the manuscripts to each other.

1.3.1 Relation of the manuscripts

Before the relation between the available manuscripts can be established, the following points should be noted:

1. In the opening line, N₁, N₂, N₃, K pay homage to Śrīlokanātha, P to Tārā.
2. N₁, N₂, N₃, K share a practically identical colophon.
3. N₂ and N₃ have several significant features in common (most of these are documented in the list of variants for the Nepalese manuscripts, starting on page 72). Most importantly, they both repeat ll. 48 to 59.

Furthermore, it seems natural to assume that N₃ might have misread some of the unclearer passages in N₂. For example, °śabdāt in l. 196, is found in N₃ as “śa(+b)dat”. The *akṣara dā* is the last one on line 1 of N₂ 9b. As there was not enough space there to write the long ā in the usual way, it was written

with a small hook above the base *akṣara*, *da*. The scribe of N₃ might have missed the hook (cf. figs. 1.13 and 1.14).

Similarly, the evidence presented below for *śabdāntarāvagatena* (see notes to l. 143) suggests that in N₂ 7b1 it was first emended from *śabdāntarāvābhābhāvamgatena* to *śabdāntarābhāvābhāvamgatena*, by placing the numbers 2 and 1 over the syllables *vā* and *bhā*, and then corrected to *śabdāntarāvamgatena*, deleting *vābhābhā* (and forgetting to delete the remaining *anusvāra*) by marking the initial *vā* and the final *bhā*. The reading found in N₃ 6a6 is *śabdāntarābhāvābhāvagatena*. The simplest explanation is that the scribe of N₃ correctly understood the first correction in N₂, but missed the deletion marks.⁴⁷

A last example is the case of °*sāṃkarya*° (l. 297, cf. figs. 1.15 and 1.16), where N₃ apparently mistook a *ṅka* for *kā*. N₂ has a prefixed *ṅ* that looks like a sign for a long *ā* in its script.⁴⁸

The evidence suggests therefore that N₃ is directly dependent on N₂. For this reason, no variants that are due only to its particularities have been noted in the edition below. Its readings are reported, however, when one of the other manuscripts has occasioned a note.

4. N₁ and N₂ in turn appear closer to K than to P: apart from the common colophon, cf. the cases listed in table 1.3.

To these points we have to add observations about the the last manuscript, Ś, which was not available for the following edition. It can be evaluated only on the basis of the readings and variants presented in Shāstri 1910 (see table 1.3): clearly, it is closer to P than K, showing only a few differences which can be explained either as copying errors (*nimitta*°, *viprakīrṇa*, a missing *tad*) or as attempts at improving the text (°*sūtratvā*°, *sarvasya vyava*°). The only problematic

⁴⁷The other important possibility is that N₂ and N₃ had a common ancestor reading *śabdāntarābhāvābhāvagatena*, which N₂ initially reproduced, and then, having corrected a slight mistake made during copying, changed to something more meaningful.

⁴⁸Cf. figs. 1.13–1.16.

Table 1.3 – Variants in Ś, compared to material available for the edition. “Line” refers to the line number in the present edition. Readings accepted in the edition are set in bold face.

Line	Ś	K	P	N ₁ , N ₂ , N ₃	AS ₁
16	nimittapratyayā°	nivṛttapratyayā°	nivṛttapratyayā°	as K = P	as K
77	viśeṣaṇabhavakṣa	viśeṣaṇakṣa	viśeṣaṇabhavakṣa	as K	as K
82	prakṛta	aprakṛta	prakṛta	as K	as K
101	ekasyaivārthasya	ekasyaiva	ekasyaivārthasya	as K	as K
123	asadbhāve tu	asadbhāve	asadbhāve tu	as K	as K
129	viprakīrṇa° (?)	viprakīrṇa°	viprakīrṇa°	as K = P	as K
134	tāvatā tāvan na	tāvan na	tāvatā tāvan na	as K	as K
136	svarūpeṇaiva (sva- kṣaṇarūpeṇaiva?)	svalakṣaṇa- svarūpeṇaiva	svarūpeṇaiva	as K	as K
175	sattvena	sattve	sattvena	as K	as K
177	viśiṣyate	viśeṣyate	viśiṣyate	as Ś = P	as Ś
203	asad eva vā tad°	asad evātad°	asad eva vā tad°	as Ś = P	as Ś
204	eva vā	eva	eva vā	as Ś = P	as Ś
209	piṇḍadarśana°	piṇḍadaṇḍadarśana°	piṇḍadarśana°	as K	as K

Table 1.3 – Variants in Ś, compared to material available for the edition. “Line” refers to the line number in the present edition. Readings accepted in the edition are set in bold face. (continued)

Line	Ś	K	P	N ₁ , N ₂ , N ₃	AS ₁
231	svāśrayeṣu	svāśraye	svaviṣayeṣu	as K	as K
250	daṇḍasūtravādinā	daṇḍasūtrādineti	daṇḍasūtrādineti	as K = P	as K
273	tad evaṃ na	tad eva na sāmānya-	tad evaṃ na	as K	as K
	sāmānyasiddhiḥ	buddhiḥ	sāmānyasiddhiḥ		
275	vā prasiddhaḥ	prasiddhaḥ	vā prasiddhaḥ	as Ś = P	as Ś
284	vidhibāadhanam	vidhisāadhanam	vidhibāadhanam	as K	as K
286	bāhyatvavidhi	bāhyatva(+sya)vidhi	bāhyatvavidhi	as K p.c.	as K p.c.
294	dhūmasya	...	long example 1 (p.c.)	as Ś; proba-	as Ś
	jananavat		long example 2	bly = K a.c.;	
297	tasmād adhya°	tasmāt tadadhya°	tasmāt tadadhya°	as K = P	as K
308	vācyavācakabhā-	vācyavācakasyābhāve	vācyavācakabhā-	as Ś = P	as Ś
	vasyābhāve		vasyābhāve		
310	sarvasya vyava°	sarvavyava°	sarvavyava°	as K = P	as K
final verse	no equiv.	present (p.c.)	no equiv.	present	as K p.c.
(post)	no equiv.	present	no equiv.	as K	as K
colophon					

element is the example: Ś has the shortest exemplification; that it shares this with the Nepalese manuscripts shall be discussed below; K, though it is possible (judging from the available space in the ms) that it contained this example *ante correctionem*, was changed to a much longer version; and P shows yet another reading. The problem is that none of these three variants can be explained as a corruption or transmission error of any of the others:

- Ś: *dhūmasya parokṣāgniññānajanāvat.*
- K:
 - *ante correctionem* (inferred only from available space):
dhūmasya parokṣāgniññānajanāvat.
 - *post correctionem*: *asadutpattivat. yady api vahnau dhūmasya trailokyasyābhāvas tathāpi tato dhūmasyaivotpādo nānyasya.*
- P: *yathā vahnau dhūmaghaṭādyor asatve 'pi dhūma evotpadyate na ghaṭādih.*

The decision in the critical edition to favour the shortest reading stems from two considerations: first, it is likely that K supported this reading *ante correctionem*; second, the appearance of the more elaborate exemplifications could be explained as attempting to clarify a terser original formulation. It must be admitted, however, that neither argument is decisive.

One might be tempted, at this point, to take the evidence of the Nepalese manuscripts (N₁, N₂, N₃) into account. Looking at the variants presented in table 1.3, it seems that they mostly accord with K, and that any reading shared by the Nepalese manuscripts and the unrelated Ś should be the preferred one. For it is usually less likely that an unoriginal reading would have found its way into otherwise distinct branches of the text's tradition rather than that an original reading changed into the same reading twice.

But the closest match for the Nepalese manuscripts is not K. Rather, it is the first edition, AS₁.⁴⁹ To see this, one has to consider the last two columns in table 1.3: the first shows which of the other manuscripts the Nepalese ones are closest to, and the second lists the source of the readings that Shāstri chose for the constituted text in AS₁. It is evident that the Nepalese manuscripts deviate from K only when AS₁ accepts the reading of Ś. One explanation for this state of affairs is that Ś and K share an ancestor which is common also to N₁, N₂ and N₃. Another explanation is that an edition, AS₁, was the exemplar for the Nepalese manuscripts.

Based on the few variants that are recorded in AS₁ for Ś, it would probably be impossible to decide this issue. Fortunately, a closer examination of the appearance of the Nepalese manuscripts provides enough evidence to ascertain that the latter explanation is the better one.⁵⁰ A distinctive feature of these manuscripts is their use of apparently random dots between *akṣaras*. For example, compare the phrase “*asmin vānyad apohyata iti vyutpattyā vijātivyāvṛttam bāhyam eva vivakṣitam*” (starting in line 4 of the edition below) as written in N₁ and in AS₁:⁵¹

1. N₁ 1b2: “अस्मिन्•वान्यदपोह्यतइति•व्युत्पत्त्या•
विजातिव्यावृत्तंबाह्य•मेवविवक्षितं•”⁵²

⁴⁹I would like to thank Elliot Stern for alerting me to the possibility that the Nepalese manuscripts might have been copied not from earlier manuscripts but from a printed source. This has allowed me to substantially revise the interpretation of the dependencies between the various manuscripts that I had proposed in McAllister 2011. The critical edition below has been adjusted accordingly.

⁵⁰Since it was shown above that N₃ depends on N₂, the following comments pertain only to N₁ and N₂.

⁵¹The transcriptions are in Devanāgarī because it is closer to the manuscript’s script, and makes the following argument clearer. The passage from N₁ could be transliterated into IAST as follows:

*asmin•vānyadapohyata_iti•vyutpattyā•vijātivyāvṛttambāhya•
mevavivakṣitam•*

The underscore between *ta* and *iti* means that there is neither a space nor an *ai*.

⁵²See also fig. 1.9, on page 44.




Figure 1.1 – Dependency relations between the manuscripts and main editions of the *Apoahasiddhi*

2. AS₁ 1,5–6: “अस्मिन् वान्यदपोह्यत (linebreak) इति व्युत्पत्त्या विजातिव्यावृत्तं बाह्य_[2]मेव विवक्षितं;”

It is clear that the dots in N₁ show a close correspondence to specific features of AS₁: every dot corresponds to a space added between words; a dot was used for the “[2]”, showing the linebreak in manuscript K, as well as for the final semicolon in AS₁. One space, between *apohyata* and *iti*, was missed by the scribe of N₁ because a linebreak occurs at that point in AS₁. The scribe was perhaps not accustomed to the convention, employed also in AS₁, of adding hyphens when breaking a word across lines. A second space, after *eva* was not recorded in N₁. This usage of the dots carries on throughout the whole manuscript, and is the same also in N₂.⁵³ This agreement of N₁ and N₂ to formal features of AS₁ makes it all but certain that these two manuscripts do not derive from a common ancestor of K and Ś, but rather from AS₁. Since N₃ is, in turn, derived from N₂, it can be concluded that the Nepalese manuscripts offer no historically

⁵³N₃ does also employ dots, but they are used rather sparingly there and mainly for the disambiguation of vowel *samdhi* and as a punctuation device.

independent evidence that could be used for the constitution of the text of the *Apoḥasiddhi*. The evidence collected from the Nepalese manuscripts has therefore been excluded from the main apparatus, so as not to overburden the printed pages.⁵⁴

In consequence, the relation as shown in fig. 1.1 can be determined, the top node “ α ” standing for the archetype or the reconstructable version of the *Apoḥasiddhi* closest to the original.⁵⁵ The connecting lines mean “descended from”, without claiming directness. This diagram also shows the general limitations of editing the *Apoḥasiddhi*: where K and P do not agree, we have to decide on a reading based on factors besides the witnesses (e.g., internal coherence of the argument or similar formulations in other texts by Ratnakīrti or Jñānaśrimitra).

1.4 NOTES ON THE CRITICAL EDITION

1.4.1 Conventions and abbreviations used in the critical apparatus

The following conventions are used in the critical edition:

1. Names are emphasized: *vācaspatiḥ*.
2. ($\times ka$) means that “*ka*” was deleted or marked as erroneous in the ms.
3. ($+ka$) means that “*ka*” was added to the original flow of text. There is no implicit specification as to where this addition is placed (i.e., above, below, in the margin, etc.)
4. “*ka* ^v *ga*” indicates that there is an insertion mark between *ka* and *ga*.
5. (?*ka*) means that “*ka*” was not read with certainty.
6. Some⁵⁶ scribal corrections are marked as in *anyāpoḍhovahārya(t(×e)→ta)*, meaning that the scribe wrote *te* and then deleted the vowel sign for *e*, so that the result was *ta*.

⁵⁴For readers interested in their variants, however, there is a section appended to the critical edition which collects these notes (see section 2.1, starting on page 72).

⁵⁵The term “archetype” is used here as defined by Maas (1960: §5).

⁵⁶I.e., those where a simple note of the correction would not provide useful or clear information. In the example given, a simple report of the correction as “*t(×e)*” could be misunderstood as a correction to “*t*” instead of “*ta*”.

1. INTRODUCTION

7. An arrow as in *katham apohaḥ* [↓] signifies the beginning of a folio, with the manuscript shorthand and the folio number printed in the margin; in this case it would be the beginning of the recto of leaf 33 in manuscript P after the *akṣara* “*ma*”.
8. A half arrow as in *tatpratīivyaṣṭhā* [↓] shows the end of a line in K. It is put after the last whole *akṣara* in the line.
9. A half arrow as in *athaivammatih* ^{K³↓} marks the start of a new line (start of line 3 in K). If this coincides with the end of the previous line, so that nothing is missing, only this sign will be recorded.⁵⁷
10. *anaikāntika_mbhā*^o indicates that there is a space of one *akṣara* between *ka* and *mbhā*.
11. A “.” indicates an illegible sign with the width of one *akṣara*.
12. *°bāhya~~~viṣayatvena* indicates that there are three filling signs between *ya* and *vi* (cf. section 1.4.4).
13. A “•” indicates that there is a dot in the ms (occurs in the Nepalese manuscripts, see page 38).
14. Punctuation used in the edition does not reflect the punctuation of the mss. Some special signs are:
 - a) Maṅgala sign:⁵⁸ ❀
 - b) Siddham sign: *
 - c) Ornamental sign at the end of ms: ✨
15. Variants concerning only *avagraha*-s have not been reported,⁵⁹ and their introduction may be only editorial.
16. The gemination of consonants after, and the degemination before, a semi-vowel (*y, v, r, l*) is not reported, and its normalization may be only editorial.

An entry in the critical apparatus is typically as follows:

⁵⁷Cf. item 6 on page 42 for the usefulness of marking the end of line and start of line in K.

⁵⁸Cf. G. Roth 1986 for a discussion of these signs, and see section 1.4.4 for examples of the signs used in the manuscripts of the AS.

⁵⁹With the exception of a variant to *anyathā'sati* (l. 21), where the more reliable manuscripts's scribes explicitly inserted an *avagraha* to avoid confusion.

1. The line number or range of line numbers that the entry is indexed to is given.
2. The lemma is printed. This is a quotation of a text string as found in the edition, and its purpose is to index the entry to the text. If it is not unique within the line, a raised number following the lemma indexes it to the relevant occurrence in the referenced line.
3. Next come the sigla of the witnesses supporting the reading accepted in the edition (save for the neglected errors mentioned in section 1.4.3). If no witness supports the reading, it is an emendation and is marked as “em.” As mentioned, the only edition that had access to \acute{S} is AS_1 . The readings found in this edition are therefore mentioned when it is reasonably certain that they indicate a variant of \acute{S} : this is the case when the reading in AS_1 stands against the accepted reading, against K , and no variants are reported for it in AS_1 , or when the reading in AS_1 supports the chosen reading against all other witnesses; in both of these cases, it is likely that \acute{S} read as this edition reads. \acute{S} , when it is directly cited as witness in a critical note, is always based on the evidence found in AS_1 .
4. Next, the variants found in the other manuscripts are given. These readings (in contrast to the lemma) reflect the text as it is found in the manuscripts. They are separated from each other (and the lemma) either by
 - a) a colon, which indicates that the reading following it is different from the one accepted, or
 - b) a comma, which indicates that the following reading partially or indirectly supports the accepted reading, or
 - c) a semicolon, indicating that the following variant (usually an omission) does not provide decisive evidence.These signs always express the relation that the variant has to the accepted reading, and not the relation between two subsequent variants.
5. Following the readings, an additional explanation may be given. It is typeset like this: “ — A comment”

6. On most folios of K, a few *akṣaras* at the end of each line are missing. When the surviving material supports a reading or a variant only partially, it has nevertheless been added as a witness. The reader will easily be able to see which part of the reading is actually supported or not supported by looking at the end-of-line and start-of-line marks (cf. items 8 and 9, page 40). When the remaining material does not have any value for deciding the reading, this has been noted by entering “no ev. K” (meaning “no evidence in K”).⁶⁰

1.4.2 Textual references in the critical edition

Two symbols are used to show textual relations (as opposed to content relations) of the AS to other texts:

1. A “=” is used to show that the passage has a close parallel.
2. A “≈” indicates a loose parallel.

1.4.3 Differences not reported in critical edition

Discrepancies between the manuscripts that result from any of the following factors have not been noted as variant readings:

1. P, N₁, N₂, K do not usually degeminate *tt* following *r*. N₃ does.
2. P, N₁, N₂, N₃ degeminate *tt* before a semi-vowel, K does not.
3. All manuscripts irregularly geminate *m*, *t*, and *y* after *r*.
4. *avagraha*-s are not always written in the mss. When their correctness is beyond doubt and does not change the meaning, they have silently been added.

⁶⁰ An example is the reading *cānyāpo^Kḍhānyāpohayorvirodho* at the beginning of 13: K reads *ḍhānyāpohayorvirodho*, starting on line 6, and *cānyāpo*^o was, presumably, at the end of the previous, damaged line. This has been taken as evidence in K for the reading adopted in the edition, because the relevant information, *ḍhānyāpoha*^o vs. *ḍhānyapoḍha*^o is found in K. That *cānyāpo*^o is not found in K can easily be gathered from the end-of-line and start-of-line marks in the edition. This way of presenting the information does not clutter the apparatus with irrelevant notes. Another example is the reading *aprāpter bhrāntir* as against *aprāpte bhrāntir* (cf. l. 202). There K reads *prā*, then the folio is torn, and the next folio starts with *rbhrānti*^o. This is taken as support in K for the reading *aprāpter bhrāntir*.

5. Substitution of a nasal with an *anusvāra*.
6. Additional *anusvāra* before nasals.
7. N₁, N₂, N₃ insert dots (see fig. 1.9) between *akṣaras* at apparently random places, separating meaningful as well as meaningless units. These dots do not usually influence *saṃdhi*. They are only reported (as “•”) when they are useful for understanding a variant. As shown above, they correspond closely to spaces or separators inserted in AS₁.
8. In order not to clutter the edition with the many irrelevant differences in N₃, all of which are errors particular to this manuscript, they are not separately mentioned in the edition here. But the readings of N₃ are added in the apparatus entries for other readings.

1.4.4 Particularities of the scripts

Noteworthy peculiarities of the scripts encountered in the manuscripts are as follows:

1. Siddham signs (*) used: cf. figs. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.⁶¹
2. Ornamental signs (✱) used: cf. figs. 1.7 and 1.8.
3. Spacing (~) in K 8b1: cf. fig. 1.5.
4. P sometimes (e.g., l. 47, p. 50) uses a stylized *ma* with *virāma* as shown in, cf. fig. 1.6.⁶²
5. Deletion markers: K sometimes “brackets” wrong text, e.g., in l. 148 (p. 57): cf. fig. 1.12.
6. N₁ and N₂ sometimes use a special correction mark, a sort of tilde above an *akṣara*, to transform that *akṣara* within its class. Cf. the following corrections: (*śa*→*sa*) in l. 216 (p. 62, cf. fig. 1.11), (*śa*→*ṣa*) in l. 226 (p. 62), (*ma*→*ṇa*) in l. 161 (p. 58, cf. fig. 1.10), (*na*→*ṇa*) in l. 259 (p. 65), (*ṣye*→*ṣye*) in l. 271 (p. 65).

⁶¹All references in this list are to p. 44.

⁶²For a discussion of this letter, cf. MacDonald 2005: xxii, and the references given there. See also Kouda 2004:110, “Characters with ṃ\”.



Figure 1.2
Siddham symbol,
K 1b1



Figure 1.3
Siddham symbol,
K 8b3



Figure 1.4
Siddham symbol,
N₁ 1b1



Figure 1.5
Spacing symbols,
K 8b1



Figure 1.6
anusvāra (ryam),
P 33a3



Figure 1.7
Ornamental symbol,
N₁ 13b2



Figure 1.8
Ornamental symbol,
N₂ 14b4



Figure 1.9
bāhya•meva, N₁ 1b2



Figure 1.10
Correction of *ma* to
na, N₁ 7a5

1.4.5 Usage of previous editions

As mentioned above, the *Apoahasiddhi* has already been edited twice. Shāstri (1910) contains readings of a manuscript not available to the present author, and could therefore not be ignored here. The editions by Thakur, AS₂ and AS₃, have also been consulted throughout, because, although they are not based on more material than used for the edition below, Thakur's great expertise in reading and editing these kinds of texts means that his readings and (sometimes silent) corrections cannot and should not be ignored. All differences to any of Shāstri's or Thakur's readings which could not be easily resolved as misprints or similar circumstantial errors have therefore been noted, and their observations discussed in the following edition.

Figure 1.11
Correction of *śa* to *sa*,
N₂ 10a5

Figure 1.12
Deletion, N₂ 4b6

Figure 1.13
“*śabdā*” in N₂ 9b1
before end of line.

Figure 1.14
“*śa(+b)dat.*” in
N₃ 7b6.

Figure 1.15
“*sānkaryya*”
N₂ 13b1.

Figure 1.16
“*sākāryya*” in
N₃ 10b5.

Figure 1.17
Usual *bha* in N₂.

Figure 1.18
Second version of
bha in N₂ 11a4.

