

B *Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on apoha*

For the following translations, the editions in Krishnamacharya 1926 and Śāstrī 1981 were used. In addition, Hisataka Ishida kindly granted me access to a part of a draft version of his edition of the *śabdārthaparīkṣā* chapter, corresponding to TS_ḡ 866–871. This is referred to as Ishida 2008. In the library of the Institute for South Asian, Tibetan, and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna, furthermore, there is a copy of Krishnamacharya 1926 which was originally in Erich Frauwallner’s personal library. This copy contains many annotations, probably by Frauwallner. Where relevant, these have been considered below. The two sets of manuscripts for these two texts, TSP_{msP}, TS_{msP} on the one hand, and TSP_{msJ}, TS_{msJ} on the other, were not read in their entirety, but only when the existing editions seemed doubtful.

B.1 TS_ḡ 2; 5–6

[TS_ḡ 5–6] This *Tattvasamgraha* is composed, having bowed to the omniscient one, who, [being] the best of the teachers [and] not hanging on to an autonomous teaching,⁶¹⁰ taught, due to a wish for what is beneficial for

⁶¹⁰I.e., Vedic teachings: TSP_ḡ 18,20–21: *svatantrā śrutih* = *svataḥ pramāṇabhūto vedaḥ, nityam vacanam iti yāvat*. (**An autonomous teaching**, [meaning] the Veda, which is a means of valid cognition by itself, which is to say, [it is] an eternal statement.)

the world—he had great compassion which had become his nature over a large number of time-periods—dependant arising, which ...⁶¹¹

[TS_§ 2] is devoid of additional attributes such as quality, substance, activity, genus, inherence etc., [and in which] the range [of objects that] a [conceptual] cognition and a word [act towards has the nature of] a superimposed form.⁶¹²

B.1.1 TSP_§ ad TS_§ 2

[TSP_§ 14,15] [Opponent:] Now, substance, quality, movement etc. are real things. Why is it not [the case that] they [arise in dependence on other factors]?⁶¹³

[Proponent:] To this [objection Śāntarakṣita] said “**quality**” etc. “Qualities, substances, movements, genus, as well as inherence”, that is a copulative compound. Through the word “genus” a universal in all [of its] two forms, the primary (*para*) and secondary (*apara*)

⁶¹¹TS_§ 1–4 are to be construed with TS_§ 6ab (cf. TSP_§ 13,13–14). A full translation of these verses, along with a general appreciation for their role in the *TS*, can be found in McClintock 2010: 96 ff. Cf. also the translation in Jhā 1937: 1 ff.

⁶¹²McClintock (2010: 96 ff.), as well as Yoshimizu (2011: 153, n. 7), understand the compound *āropitākāraśabdapratyayagocaram* (TS_§ 2c'd) as an adjective to *pratītyasamutpāda*, and translate the phrase to the effect of “dependent arising that is the sphere of words and cognitions which have a superimposed form.” Kapstein (2001: 11 f.) translates the phrase as “Empty ..., But within the scope of words and concepts relating to posited features ...”. Kamalaśīla’s interpretation, at least as I understand it, does not seem to support either of these interpretations: *āropitākāraḥ śabdapratyayor gocaro viśayo yatra pratītyasamutpāde, sa tathoktaḥ*. (TSP_§ 15,2–3, cf. the trl. on page 337). It is clearly understood here as a locative *bahuvrīhi*, i.e., that the dependent arising is something, *in which* the sphere of words and conceptual cognition is such and such. The authors mentioned do not, as far as I can see, argue for their respective interpretations.

⁶¹³Cf. TSP_§ 14,13–14: *sa punar ayam pratītyasamutpādaḥ skandhadhātva-āyatanānām draṣṭavyaḥ, teṣām eva pratītyasamutpannavāt*. (Moreover, exactly this dependent arising is to be observed for the aggregates, the elements, and the sense spheres[, but nothing else], because only they have arisen in dependence.)

[one], is included.⁶¹⁴ By the word “**etc.**” there is an inclusion of those properties of the specific characteristics occurring in the lowest substances which, separate from a property bearer, are described by some [as] beginning in such a way as “For all six categories, is-ness (*astitva*) is the state of being an object of a means of valid cognition that grasps [the property] ‘existing’.”⁶¹⁵ [These are] both qualities etc. and additional attributes[, which are the] qualifiers [of qualities, substances, etc.]. This is a modifier compound (*viśeṣaṇasamāsa*). **Empty** means void of these. With regard to this, this was said by the Lord: “Altogether everything, o Brahmin, [that means] just as far as the five aggregates (*skandha*), the twelve sense spheres (*āyatana*), the eighteen elements (*dhātus*) [go]!”⁶¹⁶ And this is a hint at the investigation of the six categories.⁶¹⁷

[TSP_§ 14,23] [Opponent:] Now, if there are no additional attributes, then how can dependent arising be made an object through both words and concepts? And what is not made an object through these cannot be denoted, nor is there [any] usage of word and concept without an additional attribute. [So] how did the Bhagavat teach this [dependant arising to people]?

[Proponent:] [In answer Śāntarākṣita] said: **Superimposed form** etc. Superimposed, [meaning] imposed as being external; form, [meaning] nature; the range [of objects that] words and cognition [apply to which has] that [nature], that is so called[, i.e., *āropitā-kāraśabdapratyaya-gocaraḥ*]. In which dependant arising [there is this] **range [of objects]** (*gocara*)[, i.e.,] **a word’s and a cognition’s** object (*viśaya*) which has a superimposed form, that is so called[,

⁶¹⁴Cf. Halbfass 1992: 117 explains the general notion of these two types of universals (calling them “ultimate” and “nonultimate”) as follows: “Reality’ (*sattā*) constitutes the ‘ultimate universal’ or ‘supreme generality.’ It is all-inclusive and pervades all substances, qualities, and motions. Nonultimate universals, on the other hand, pervade and include certain entities and exclude others.”

⁶¹⁵Cf. the comments on *astitva* in Halbfass 1992: 144 f., and 156 ff.

⁶¹⁶This means everything that exists is contained in these factors.

⁶¹⁷These, as Jhā 1937: 18 notes, are the topics of the 10th–15th chapter (*Dravya-padārthaparīkṣā–Samavāyapadārthaparīkṣā*) of TS_§.

i.e., *āropitā...gocaraḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ*]. The word “cognition”, because of its close connection with the word “word” [in the compound *śabdapratyaya*] is to be understood as [meaning] the particular cognition “concept,” which has the nature of an internal expression (*āviṣṭābhilāpa*), because both [word and conceptual cognition] go together [in the compound] since they don’t deviate with regard to having the same object. By this the [following] is said: even if additional attributes do not exist, still that conceptual cognition [which is] attained by means of the observation of real things differentiated from each other, [which is] determined as being of an external form, has the nature of a reflection,⁶¹⁸ [and] is the referent of a word, [that conceptual cognition] exists here [in dependent arising]. For this is not really the object of words, because here [in dependent arising] all conceptual cognitions have passed. Rather, exactly as a word referent is established for people due to beauty (*ramaṇīyatā*) that is not [further] considered, so also the Bhagavats, aiming at the reality which is disregarded [by them during teaching], explain [dependent arising to others] by closing their eyes like an elephant [and so] veiling [their] insight into it,⁶¹⁹ for the sake of introducing [people] to the highest truth, because there is no other way [to do this]. Even though the word referent is a superimposed form, it is, because of an indirect connection with the real thing, truly a reason for the attainment of this [real thing]. Therefore, in this manner the real thing becomes taught indeed, because of their[, the word referents’,] ability [to lead to that real thing]. Thus deception (*vipralambha*) is not possible. With regard to this the Protector said:

For whichever thing is denoted by some name, that [name]
does not exist in that [thing] at all. For that is the nature

⁶¹⁸Emend to *pratibimbātmakam* against *pratibandhātmakam* found in TSP_{msP} 6a1, TSP_K 12,6, TSP_§ 15,6–7 . Cf. *rnam par rtog pa’i gzugs brnyan gyi bdag nyid* TSP_D 143a3 (= TSP_Q He 172b6), as well as the formulation *pratibimbātmako ’pohaḥ* in TS_§ 1027.

⁶¹⁹Cf. Kyuma 2005: 80 f., n. 101 for the background of this metaphor, and see also Dunne 2004: 410.

of things.⁶²⁰

And this is a hint at the [16th chapter, the] *Śabdārthaparīkṣa*.

B.2 TS_§ 573–574

[TS_§ 573–574] [Opponent:] These property bearers[, i.e., the categories,] were proclaimed to be six.⁶²¹ The properties are indeed assumed to be distinct from them. [Proponent:] If that [is said], what is this relation of this [property] with these [property bearers] that is assumed? Connection (*saṃyoga*) is not correct,⁶²² because it is limited to substances, and there is no other inherence, and another relation is not accepted by the others.

B.2.1 TSP_§ ad TS_§ 573–574

[TSP_§ 239,24] [Opponent:] There is no [such] error, because that is accepted.⁶²³ [Proponent:] If so, how [can it be that] “six categories” are taught? Therefore [Śāntarākṣita] formulated [a *pūrvapakṣa* starting

⁶²⁰Cf. Hoornaert 2002: 125 f. and Eckel 2008: 276 f. for other translations and pointers to other occurrences of this verse. It is quoted again in TSP_§ 339,22–23 ad TS_§ 869, which reads: *yasya yasya hi śabdasya yo yo viṣaya ucyate / sa sa saṃghāṭate naiva vastūnām sā hi dharmatā* // See below, appendix B.4.

⁶²¹The six categories postulated by the Vaiśeṣika system are, as listed by Halbfass 1992: 70–71: “There are six fundamental categories, or divisions of reality: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*).” This list has its own rather complex history (cf. Halbfass 1992: 70–80), but seems to have stabilized somewhat by the time of Śāntarākṣita. For the purpose of the argument here, it is important to not confuse the “properties” that Śāntarākṣita is debating with the “qualities” of the Vaiśeṣika list. Śāntarākṣita is trying to show that the opponent, if he wishes to attribute a property (such as *astitva*, lit. “is-ness”, cf. Halbfass 1992: 77) to the six categories that is not identical with them, has to explain the ontological status of this property and thereby accept that it must constitute a seventh category.

⁶²²Read *yukto* acc. to TS_{msP} 12a1 instead of *yuktā*. This is also how *yuktā* is emended in Frauwallner’s copy of Krishnamacharya 1926, and by Hishida 1971: 13.

⁶²³The opponent has just explained (TS_§ 572a–c) that the is-ness (*astitva*) of the six categories is the reality in the case of an object of a means of valid cognition

with] “**These are six.**” Only those things that are of the nature of a property bearer are taught as “six categories”, but those [things] that are of the nature of properties are assumed to be different [from] the six categories.⁶²⁴ For a passage in the *Padārthapraveśaka* states: “In such a way, this explanation of the property bearers was given without the properties.”⁶²⁵ “**What is this**” etc. was said in answer. [The relation] “**of this**”[, meaning] “of a property such as is-ness and so on;”⁶²⁶ “**with these**”[, i.e.,] with the six categories. What is the relation on account of which this is a property of those [six categories]? For without a relation, being property and property bearer is not possible, because of the overreaching consequence. For in such a way there would be every property for every [property bearer]; for there is no relation at all with these [property bearers]. For it is so: [this] relation is[, according to Vaiśeṣika authors,] of two kinds, [one] characterized as connection and [the other] characterized as inherence. Of these [two types of relation], to begin with, there is no [relation of a property to anything belonging to the six categories which could be] characterized as connection, because this [connection] is restricted to substances alone since it is a quality.⁶²⁷ Neither is

that lets a person cognize “existing” about a thing. (For some remarks on *astitva*, cf. Halbfass 1992: 143 ff.) Śāntarakṣita’s reply was that this forces the opponent to assume a seventh category in addition to the standard six. The opponent counters here that he accepts that there are *dharmas* separate from the six categories.

⁶²⁴In Frauwallner’s copy, the text is emended to *ṣaṭpadārthavyatirikṭā* instead of the printed *ṣaṭpadārthā vyatirikṭā* (in both TSP_K and TSP_S, as well as TSP_{msP} 61a10). This emendation (or one to *ṣaṭpadārthebhyo vyatirikṭā*, as in Hishida 1971: 13, n. 66) is also supported by TSP_D Ze 262b6 (=TSP_Q He 323b5): *tsig gi don drug las ma gtogs pa ’dod pa kho na’o*.

⁶²⁵This seems to refer to PDhS_D 15,20: “*evam dharmair vinā dharmīṇām uddeśaḥ kṛtaḥ*.” Cf. Chemparathy 1970 and the notes to Potter 1977: 282 for more information on this text and its author. The import of *uddeśa* in this passage is discussed in Halbfass 1992: 78 f., 96 ff.

⁶²⁶Is-ness, denotability, and cognizability are the three characteristics common to all categories. Cf. PDhS_D 16: *saṅgām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni*. See Halbfass 1992: 158 ff. for a discussion of this sentence, and Halbfass 1970: 143 f. for how it applies to universals.

⁶²⁷Cf. the explanations in Halbfass 1970: 122 f. The relation “connection” would have been considered one of the qualities (*guṇa*) by the opponent here. As such, the

there [such a relation that could be] characterized as inherence, because that [inherence] is assumed as singular, like being.⁶²⁸ But, if there were a relation of the type inherence with inherence, a second inherence would be endorsed.⁶²⁹

B.3 TS_§ 738

[TS_§ 738] For a recurring cognition has an appearance of words and particulars. But a genus is declared [to be] free of colour, shape, and the form of letters.

B.3.1 TSP_§ ad TS_§ 738

[TSP_§ 300,23] Showing also that the thesis is defeated by an inference, [Śāntarākṣita] said: “**Recurring**” etc. [With this] the following is said:⁶³⁰ you wish to prove that repeated apprehensions have a cause that is different from the individual things etc. [and] that is really the basis [for these cognitions]. And this is wrong, because that [cause, postulated by you,] does not appear, and because colour, shape, etc., [all] different from this [cause], do appear. For it is so: a universal

opponent will maintain that it qualifies only substances (*dravya*), and so cannot be what enables properties to qualify things of all six categories.

⁶²⁸Cf. PDhS_D 16,18: “*dravyādīnām pañcānām samavāyitam anekatvam ca.*”

⁶²⁹The explanation of ŚV Ps 148 given in J. A. Taber 2005: 109 is remarkably close to this passage. Since he thinks it is “...better, rather, for the translator to provide his or her own commentary, after thoroughly studying and digesting the available classical ones ...” (J. A. Taber 2005: xiii), these arguments might actually be related.

⁶³⁰This is a paraphrase of the thesis of Bhāvivikta’s inference, given in TS_§ 715ab. This thesis is, as formulated in TSP_§ 294,24–295,9: *tatra bhāviviktaḥ prāha—gavāśvamahiṣavarāhamātāṅgādiṣu gavādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ samayākṛtipi-ṅḍādivyatiriktasvarūpānurūpasamsarginimittāntaranibandhanā ity avagoṣaṇā.* (To this Bhāvivikta said: In the case of cow, horse, buffalo, boar, elephant, etc., the particular cognitions and names such as “cow” etc. depend on another cause mixed together with [and] according to the own nature [of these things, but] separated from convention, shape, material body, etc.—This is the declaration [of what Bhāvivikta wants to prove].) After giving a slightly different second interpretation of the phrase *samayā*°...°*nibandhanā*, TSP_§ 295,19 clarifies: *avagoṣaṇeti pratijñā* (Declaration means thesis.). For Bhāvivikta, cf. Potter 1977: 281.

such as cowness etc. is declared by you to be completely empty of colour, shape, and the forms of letters, but a cognition that conforms to the appearance of colour etc. is experienced. So how should the basis of this [cognition] be empty of colour etc.? For there cannot be one (*anya*) basis for a cognition that has another (*anya*) form, because of an unwanted consequence [that goes] too far. A [formal] proof: that cognition, which has an appearance of an object different from some [other object], never grasps that [other object], as a cognition through a word does not grasp the [visual] form [of a thing]. And a recurring cognition has an appearance of colour etc., [all of] which are different from a genus. This [is] due to apprehending that opposed to the pervader.⁶³¹ [The phrase] “**it has an appearance of words and particulars**” [is analysed:] “word” is the denomination “a cow” etc.; “particular” is what has the nature of colour, shape, etc.; this appearance of these two belongs to [cognition], so: “it has [that appearance].” **Letters** are the letter “c”, the letter “o”, the letter “w”, etc.⁶³²

B.4 TS_§ 870

[TS_§ 870] For⁶³³ particular, class, the connection to this [class], that having a class, as [also] a form of awareness do not really assemble⁶³⁴ where the word referent [is].

⁶³¹For Bhāvivikta, the pervader, which is what he wanted to prove, was the fact that there must be a cause other than the perceptible qualities of a thing due to which there is the same cognition about different things of the same class, and that this can only be a genus (cf. TSP_§ 295,12–13: *yāni ca tāni nimittāntarāṇi tāni gotvādīnīti siddham*. “And those which are these other causes are cowness etc. That is established.”). The *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi* here consists in showing that in these cognitions something that is not a genus appears, and that, since cognitions can only be based on what appears in them, they can therefore not be caused (or have their basis in) a genus.

⁶³²Literally: “The letter “ga”, the letter “au”, the *visarga*, and so on.” The first three spell the Sanskrit word “*gauḥ*” (“cow”).

⁶³³This verse gives the reason for the preceding verse, where it was claimed that whatever a word refers to is not a real thing (cf. footnote 620).

⁶³⁴Literally, the phrase *ghaṭam aṅcati* means “it enters a group/collection”. It is translated as *sgra don du /de kho na nyid du mi 'thad /* (“...is not really correct as

B.4.1 TSP_ḡ ad TS_ḡ 870

[TSP_ḡ 340,4] If [it is asked:] [Opponent:] Now, which means of valid cognition [is there] for the fact that a verbal cognition⁶³⁵ [is] both erroneous and without object? [Proponent:] We have stated the means of valid cognition for this, which is [as follows] (*yad ...iti*): Each and every verbal cognition is erroneous because it occurs by means of a determination of non-difference for different [things].⁶³⁶

For [it is] so: the cognition “this” with regard to what is not this is erroneous, like the cognition of water where there is a mirage. And this verbal cognition, which determines non-difference with regard to different referents, is thus. [So there is] the logical reason [consisting in] an essential property. And neither does this [verbal cognition] grasp a universal that has the nature of a real thing, due to which the reason [used in this inference] would not be established; for this [universal] has earlier been refuted at length.⁶³⁷ Or may a universal [really] exist, still, given that this [universal] is an object different from the differences[, i.e., the different things], the determination of non-difference with regard to differentiated [things] would be only erroneous. For some things similar to something else, [and so] connected to it, would not be said to possess that [other thing,

the word referent.”) in TS_D Ze 33a2 (=TS_Q He 40b6). I understand it to mean that the particular etc. do not belong to what is rightly categorized as the word referent.

⁶³⁵For the reading *śābdapratyayaśya* see also Ishida 2008: 4.

⁶³⁶Cf., e.g., TSP_ḡ 338,10–13: *apohavādināṃ tu na paramārthataḥ śābdānāṃ kiñcid vācyaṃ vastusvarūpam asti. sarva eva hi śābdaḥ pratyayo bhrāntaḥ, bhinneṣu artheṣu abhedākārādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ. yatra tu pāramparyeṇa vastupratibandhaḥ, tatrārthasamvādo bhrāntatve 'pīti darśanam.* (But for those proclaiming exclusion [as the referent of words] the view [is this]: “For words there is in reality nothing denotable at all that has the nature of a real thing. For every verbal apprehension is erroneous, because [it] applies to different referents due to the determination of a non-different form. But for which [conceptual cognition] there indirectly is a connection to a real thing, for that there is concurrence with the referent, even though [the cognition] is erroneous.”)

I follow the emendation in Ishida 2008: 1 to *tatrārthasamvādo*, against *tatrārthāsamvādo* in both TSP_K and TSP_ḡ.

⁶³⁷As Śāstrī (1981: 340, n. 2) points out, this was the general topic of chapter 13, the *Sāmānya(padārtha)parikṣā*, of the *TS*.

i.e., a universal]. [Alternatively,] even if [you were to say that] a universal is not an object different [from the particulars], [then] the entire universe (*viśva*) would in reality be only one (*eka*) real thing; so the cognition of a universal there [amongst the things] is entirely erroneous. For the cognition of a universal does not have the same real thing as an object, because this [cognition] requires the grasping of a difference. And if [this cognition's] erroneousness is established, [its] lack of an object is also established; for[, in the case of a wrong cognition,] there is no referent at all which fulfills the criteria of a basis [for cognition], in that [it is] productive [of the cognition] through a projection of its form [into cognition].

[TSP_§ 340,15] Or else: in another way the lack of an object [for a conceptual cognition] is proven. For only with regard to which referent sounds are agreed upon, that alone is consistent as their referent, [and] nothing else, because of an overreaching consequence. And an agreement on these [sounds] for any real thing cannot exist in reality. Therefore sounds [producing] a cognition are without objects. A [formal] proof: whichever [sounds] do not, in reality (*bhāvatas*), become agreed upon with regard to something, those do not truly denote that, like the word “horse” is not agreed upon with regard to a material entity having a dewlap etc.[, i.e., a cow]. And in reality no sounds at all become agreed upon with regard to any real thing. This is because of a non-observation of the pervading element.⁶³⁸ Because [a word] which denotes is pervaded by the fact that [it has] an agreed upon convention; and this [pervading element] does not exist here[, i.e., words are not agreed upon for real things].⁶³⁹

⁶³⁸Consider also the emendation of *vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* to *vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ* in Ishida 2008: 5. But *iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* does occur a few times (e.g., TSP_§ 119,13; 137,8–9; 198,12), although not as frequently as *iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ*. So it could be that it is a usage particular to Kamalāśīla. Also, the next sentence's construction is not straightforward, looking more like a gloss on *vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* than an additional statement. The Tibetan is not much clearer: ...*mi dmigs pa ste. brda byas pa nyid rjod par byed pa la khyab pa'i phyir la de 'di la med do.* (TSP_D Ze 313a1–2 = TSP_Q He 389a4–5).

⁶³⁹I think the argument is as follows: *abhidhāyaktva*, therefore *kṛtasamaya-*

And, making it clear that this reason is not unestablished etc., i.e., that a word does not denote any real thing], [Śāntarakṣita] said “for” etc. [in TS_§ 870].

For it is so:⁶⁴⁰ a real thing, which an agreement is grasped for, is defined as being the word referent, [i.e., it is] the **particular** that is sometimes defined [as word referent], or the **class**, or the **connection with it—with it** [meaning] with the class, **connection** [meaning] relation—or the thing⁶⁴¹ **having a class**, or the **form of awareness**. These are the alternatives. For none of these is it consistent that [it] is the referent of a word, because a convention is impossible [for any of them]. By [saying] **really**, [he] shows that a conventional referent of words is not negated. Because of this there is no inconsistency (*vyāghāta*) in [his] own words. For otherwise [if he had not added “really”] there would be a contradiction of the thesis to [his] own words. For it is so: without conveying these, particular etc., through a word it is not possible to convey their not being the referent of a word etc. And [someone] showing these, a particular etc., with words, wishing to convey this [that they are not the word referents] would admit that [they] are word referents. Furthermore, precisely this is negated by the thesis. So there would be an inconsistency in [his] own words.

tva, or *a-kṛtasamayatva*, therefore *an-abhidāyakatva*. This understanding follows the schema found in TBh_I 31,16–18: *vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā-nātra śiṃśapā, vṛkṣābhāvāt. pratiṣedhyāyāḥ śiṃśapāyāḥ vyāpako vṛkṣaḥ, tasyehānupalabdhiḥ* (A non-observation of the pervading element is like this: “There is no *Śiṃśapā* tree here, because there is no tree [here].” Here, there is no observation of a tree, which is the pervading element of a *Śiṃśapā* tree, which is to be negated. Cf. also the translation and note in Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 82.) This means that the following two arguments are correct: *śiṃśapā*, therefore *vṛkṣa*, and *a-vṛkṣa*, therefore *a-śiṃśapā*.

⁶⁴⁰Read *tathā hi acc.* to Ishida 2008: 5, TSP_K 276,20 instead of *yathā hi* TSP_§ 340,22.

⁶⁴¹In the copy I am using, there is a handwritten note, in all likelihood by Erich Frauwallner, to the effect of reading *padārtho*, probably according to TSP_D Ze 313a3 (=TSP_Q He 389a6): “...*rīgs dang ldan pa’i dngos po pa’am, blo’i rnam pa...*” This emendation is also made in Ishida 2008: 5, and a correction in TSP_{msP} 86a7 can be interpreted as “ḥ ”, also supporting *padārthah*,

By this also what was said by Uddyotakara: “If words do not denote [anything], [there is] inconsistency both of the thesis and the reason.”⁶⁴² is answered. For we do not deny the word referent in every way, because there is a thorough cognition⁶⁴³ of this [conventional word referent] right down to the cow-herdsman (*ā-gopāla*). Rather, the property “being in accordance with reality” is negated, which is superimposed by [others] onto this [word referent], but [we do] not [negate] the bearer of [that] property[, i.e., the word referent itself].

B.5 TS_§ 890 (=VP_R 2.132)

[TS_§ 890] Or⁶⁴⁴ that object, which is the object of awareness [and] has a founding in an external real thing, is assumed by some [to be] the word referent cognized as “external real thing.”

B.5.1 TSP_§ ad TS_§ 890

[TSP_§ 351,20] But others state the word referent to be a form that is a) only placed on (*āruḍha*) awareness, b) belongs to (*viṣaya*) the external real things, c) is grasped as being an external real thing, [and] d) appears as being [of] the nature of awareness. This [opinion] he explains[, saying] “**Or that**” etc. **Object of awareness**[, i.e.,] that going around in awareness, that is to say, situated in awareness. **Has a founding in an external real thing**[, meaning:] that has a founding in an external real thing, for which a real thing, which exists [or] does not exist [and is] external, is undertaken to be shown

⁶⁴²As pointed out in Ishida 2008: 6, n. 2, this is a quote of NBhV 312,21–22.

⁶⁴³Read *atipratītatvāt*, as suggested by TSP_§ 341,13 against *api pratītatvāt* TSP_K 277,2. Cf. also *āgopālam atipratītam eva* in TSP_§ 1072,11.

⁶⁴⁴This is the last in a series of options of what the word referent could be, starting TS_§ 887. This verse is obviously very close to VP_R 2.132 (or practically the same as VP II 132). It is translated in Rau 2002: 71. Houben (1995: 159) notes in this context that he sees “...no objective reason to assume that in Bhartṛhari’s eyes this view in which superimposition is the crucial notion took a foremost position among the various views [expressed in VP_R 2.119–142—PMA].”

as the basis[, i.e.,] the own nature having its place in the letter signs (*akṣaracihna*).⁶⁴⁵ **Cognized as “external real thing”**, this means: manifest as having the nature of awareness [and] determined as being external. For it is so: to the extent that what has the nature of awareness, which is not projected amongst the objects, is grasped as “only having the form of awareness” due to the presence of a consideration of [its] real state,⁶⁴⁶ to that extent its being the word referent is not determined, because there is no connection to a specific activity concerning it. For activities, such as “Bring the cow!” or “Eat the curd!”, are not possible for that having the form of awareness in such a way; rather, words denote an object that is capable of a connection to an activity. Thus this which is grasped as having the form of awareness is not the word referent. But if it becomes projected onto an external real thing, then someone erroneously cognizing this [form] as being external, thinks [there is] a capacity for establishing action. Thus it becomes the word referent.

[TSP_§ 352,5] [Opponent:] But now, what difference of this is there from the position of an Apohavādin? For it is so: also by an Apohavādin the form of awareness, grasped as having the nature of an external [thing], is indeed proclaimed as the word referent. As it was said [in PV III 169:]

However,⁶⁴⁷ because of understanding⁶⁴⁸ that differentiated from others by means (*gatyā*) of a superimposition of that form, there is no contradiction if [there is] this formulation: “That object alone (*eva*)[, the form of awareness,] is the object of a word.”⁶⁴⁹

⁶⁴⁵This phrase is unfortunately not clear to me.

⁶⁴⁶Both manuscripts support *tattvabhāvanatayā*: TSP_{msP} 89a6 reads *tattvabhāvanatayā* (corrected from *tattvabhāvanatayā*), and TSP_{msJ} 123a2–3 reads *tattvabhāvanatayā*. TSP_K 285,14 read *tattvabhāvanayā*, which still seems preferable to *tattvabhāvanayā* in TSP_§ 351,26.

⁶⁴⁷See also

⁶⁴⁸Read °*vyāvṛttādhigateḥ* acc. to PV III 169 against °*vyāvṛttyadhigateḥ* TSP_K 285,20 and °*vyāvṛttyadhigate* in TSP_§ 352,7.

⁶⁴⁹See above, appendix A.3.2.

[Proponent:] That is not [so]. For a Buddhākāravādin⁶⁵⁰ assumes a form of awareness, which a) is non-erroneous⁶⁵¹ with regard to the external real thing, b) belongs to [the external things], and c) is imposed on real [things] such as substance etc., to be the word referent in reality. But⁶⁵² he does not assume [it to be a form of cognition] that is a) without basis, b) erroneous because of [its] occurrence due to a determination of non-difference for differentiated [things], [and] c) based on the [particulars'] differences from each other. But if [he] says, as we [do, in PV I 72]:

A wholly (*sarva*) false appearance is this grasping of the things as having the same nature. A mutual difference [of things], which an expression has as its object, is the seed of this [grasping].

then that to be established is [already] established. And he[, Śāntarakṣita] will say so [in TS_§ 904]:⁶⁵³

If [someone says:] “a mutual difference is the seed of this [grasping],” [then] that is our position.

But an Apohavādin [does not postulate that there is] anything denotable for words in reality, neither a form of awareness nor anything else. For it is so: what appears in verbal apprehension due to being what is to be determined, that is the word referent. But the form of awareness is not determined⁶⁵⁴ by verbal cognition, but rather a completely (*eva*) external real thing performing a causal effect. But

⁶⁵⁰This doctrine is also mentioned in PVV 169,13 (appendix A.4.2.8).

⁶⁵¹Read *vastuny abhrāntam* acc. to TSP_K 285,22 against *vastubhrāntam* TSP_§ 352,9.

⁶⁵²This sentence, TSP_K 285,24–25, is not found in TSP_§. Read *na tu* acc. to TSP_{msP} 89a11 instead of *nānu*, as also noted by Frauwallner's handwritten emendation, and reflected in TSP_D Ze 319a5 (=TSP_Q He 397a7–8): ...*sgra'i don du 'dod kyi. tha dad pa dag la tha mi dad par zhen nas 'jug pa'i 'khrul pa phan tshun ldog pa'i rgyu mtshan can* (TSP_D: n.e. TSP_Q) 'dod pa ni ma yin no.

⁶⁵³Cf. Hattori 1993: 139 f. for a translation and discussion of this verse.

⁶⁵⁴Read *vyavasīyate* acc. to TSP_K 286,2 against the obvious misprint *vyaprasīyate* TSP_§ 352,18.

even an external [thing] is not really determined by it, because there is no determination corresponding to reality, [and] because there is no reality corresponding to determination.⁶⁵⁵ Thus the word referent is only superimposed. And what is superimposed, that isn't anything.⁶⁵⁶ Thus nothing is really denoted by words. What was further said [in PV I 72], "Exactly this object is the word referent.", that [was said] intending (*abhisandhāya*) only the superimposed object. But by a Buddhāyākaravādin a form of cognition is assumed as denotable in reality. This is a big difference [between his view and that of an Apohavādin].

B.6 TS_ś 923 (=ŚV Av 41)

[TS_ś 923] [Opponent:] And⁶⁵⁷ a distinction of an awareness event from another awareness event is not cognized. And this awareness event does not carry any element apart from the arising of its own nature.⁶⁵⁸

B.6.1 TSP_ś ad TS_ś 923

[TSP_ś 364,11] This might be [said by an Apohavādin]: "There is a differentiation of an appearance [to awareness] from another appearance that is of a different kind; thus exclusion is constructed." So [Kumārila] said: "**From another awareness event** etc." To this [reply:] "Even though this [distinction of one awareness event from another] is not cognized, nevertheless it really exists.", [Kumārila] said: **because it arises with its own nature** etc. Even if there is a differentiation of one awareness event from another awareness event, nevertheless, there is no functioning of a word regarding this

⁶⁵⁵Cf. NM APOHA: 28,8–29,3 (trl. in Watson and Kataoka 2017: 71–73), and see AP 219,16–17.

⁶⁵⁶Cf. also DhAP 239,15 f.: *cung zad kyang ma yin no zhes smra'o*.

⁶⁵⁷This verse is part of a series of objections made by Kumārila in the ŚV Av, and quoted by Śāntarakṣita. See Jhā 1985: 303 ff. and Jhā 1937: 498 ff. for translations.

⁶⁵⁸I follow Okada 2003: 68 in reading *nānyam aṃśaṃ bibharti sā* against *nānyam saṃjñāṃ bibhartti sā* in TS_ś and "(vidhirūpavasāyini)" in TS_κ.

[differentiation]. For it is so: this awareness event that arises because of a word is not observed as carrying another element, [which is] qualified as a differentiation from another awareness, [and] determined because of a word, apart from the arising of its own nature; rather, this means that it arises only as determining what has a positive nature. And that part of a real thing that is not determined because of a word cannot be the referent of a word, because of an overreaching consequence.⁶⁵⁹ Therefore, the thesis [that exclusion is the word referent] is refuted by [experiential] knowledge.

B.7 TS_§ 942–943 (=ŚV Av 83–84)

[TS_§ 942] [Opponent:] And a non-cow would be excluded which was established and has the nature of a negation of cow. In this [expression, “non-cow,”] only that cow is expressed which is negated by the [negative] particle *na*.

[TS_§ 943] And if that [cow] had the nature of an absence of non-cow, one would have a connection to the other. If [you say] cow has been established for the sake of exclusion, [then] the assumption of exclusion is vain.

B.7.1 TSP_§ ad TS_§ 942–943

[TSP_§ 370,15] [Opponent:] Therefore, because of the unwanted consequence of an error of mutual dependence, a convention for exclusion cannot be made. Explaining this, [Kumārila] said: “**And the established**” etc. There is a cognition of cow through the differentiation

⁶⁵⁹I emend to “*śabdād anavasīyamāno*” against *śabdād avasīyamāno* in TSP_{msP} 91b17, TSP_§ 364,17 and TSP_K. Cf. TSP_D Ze 324b3–4 (=TSP_Q He 404a8): *sgras ma zhen pa’i dngos po’i cha yang sgra’i don du rigs pa ma yin te* The copy of TSP_K with emendations by Frauwallner has “*na?*” written above “*śabdādavasīyamāno*”, suggesting a similar expectation. The translation of Jhā 1937: 498 also reflects such an understanding, even though there is no note as to why this is assumed. It is not quite clear which unwanted consequence is supposed to result. An error commonly noted in these contexts is that, if a word makes something other than its proper object known, it could make any object known. Cf., e.g., the unwanted consequences mentioned in TSP_§ 301,11 (appendix B.3.1) and TSP_§ 373,9–10 (appendix B.8.1).

from non-cow, and **that non-cow has the nature of a negation of cow**. Therefore, in [this expression] here, “non-cow”, the latter word referent is what is to be expressed, which is negated by the negative particle *na* as in [this case] here: “A non-cow[, or,] not a cow.” For something that has a nature that is not clearly known cannot be negated.

Moreover, now [this] might be [said by an Apohavādin]: “Is that to be expressed here the cow which has the nature of an absence of non-cow?” Because of this [question Kumārila] said: “**And if that ...**”⁶⁶⁰ “That” [refers to] cow. For it is so: A cognition of cow [comes about] only by means of a cognition of non-cow, because [it] has the essence of an absence of non-cow; and a cognition of non-cow has its very means in a cognition of cow, because [non-cow] consists in a negation of cow. So (*iti*) a dependence on each other very clearly presents itself.

Moreover, [this] might be [said by an Apohavādin]: “A cow, which is negated by the word non-cow, is established only as having the form of an affirmation for the sake of exclusion[, i.e.,] for the sake of an establishment of exclusion as qualified by a distinction from non-cow. Due to this, there will not be a dependency on each other.” Therefore [Kumārila] said: “If cow is established ...”[, meaning:] If it is so, then a construction of exclusion in such a way as [this]: “For all words the object is exclusion.”⁶⁶¹ is vain, because the referent of a word has the form of an affirmation. Therefore, no established word referent at all which has the form of an affirmation should be made an element [in exclusion]. But if not making that [positive word referent] an element, the error of dependence on each other is hard to avoid.

B.8 TS_§ 947–949 (=ŚV Av 88–90)

[TS_§ 947] [Opponent:] Neither is an awareness of exclusion generated from words such as “horse” etc. In this

⁶⁶⁰Read *sa ced ity ādi acc.* to TSP_{mSP} 93a14 against *sa cety ādi* TSP_§ 370,19, TSP_K 300,18.

⁶⁶¹Read *°āpohārtha acc.* to TSP_§ against *°āpoho rtha* in TSP_K.

[world], an awareness of something that is qualified is not assumed to be one in which the qualifier [remains] unknown.

[TS_ś 948] Neither should a qualifier having one form cause a cognition of another kind.⁶⁶² But how is this [exclusion, being of one kind,] called a qualifier for a cognition of another kind?⁶⁶³

[TS_ś 949] If a qualifier were assumed even though the qualified [thing] is [classified] in a different way, then, if it were so, any qualifier whatsoever could follow.

B.8.1 TSP_ś ad TS_ś 947

[TSP_ś 372,11] And this mode⁶⁶⁴ [of qualifying] is not possible for exclusion. [Kumāriḷa’s] words: “**neither** etc.” show this. For exclusion is not determined through an awareness of “horse” etc., but rather only the real thing. And for that [reason], because an awareness of exclusion cannot occur, horse etc. is not coloured with this [exclusion] by the awareness of [horse etc.] itself.

Should this be [said by an Apohavādin].⁶⁶⁵ “Exclusion, even though not cognized, becomes the qualifier [of a real thing, like horse etc.],” then this is said [in answer]: **of that qualified** etc. For, an **awareness of a qualified [thing] that does not grasp a qualifier** does **not** exist. That [awareness] is so called[, i.e., called

⁶⁶²I.e., exclusion or difference should not lead to a cognition of a positively characterized thing.

⁶⁶³ŚV Av 89 reads *jñāte* instead of *jñāne* found in TS_K 949 and TS_ś 948.

⁶⁶⁴In TS_ś 946 (=ŚV Av 87) it was argued that the mere existence of a qualifier is not sufficient for it to be a qualifier of something. Rather, a qualifier (*apoha*) has to “colour” (*√rañj*) that which it qualifies (in this case, exclusion has to qualify the object of conceptual cognition). TS_ś 946cd: *svabuddhyā rajyate yena viśeṣyam tad viśeṣaṇam*. (A qualifier is that by which a qualified [thing] is coloured in the awareness of [this qualified thing] itself.) See Watson and Kataoka 2017: 57 ff. for this notion of “colouring awareness”.

⁶⁶⁵Cf. the argument in § 4.

non-existent,] which does not know the qualifier [but knows something that is qualified].

[TSP_§ 372,16 Or] may it really be that there is an awareness of exclusion, nevertheless, because there is no awareness with a form of that [exclusion] when there is a real object [that is being cognized], this qualifier[, exclusion,] for that [thing supposedly qualified by it,] is not coherent. Showing this, [Kumārila] said [in ŚV Av 89]: “**Neither should [a qualifier] having one form**” etc. For every qualifier, corresponding to its own form, is seen to generate an awareness with regard to the [thing] qualified. But a qualifier of a different kind does not generate an awareness of [yet] another kind with regard to the specified [thing]. For, [the qualifier] blue does not bring about an awareness “red” with regard to a water lily, or a stick [the awareness] “an earring-possessing one.” Neither is a verbal awareness for [the words] “horse” etc. produced here that is tainted by the absence [of a thing]. Rather, it determines the form of an existing thing (*bhāva*).

Should this be [said]: “[It] is called qualifier, even [if] it produces a cognition [that is] of another kind.”, [Kumārila] said: “**But how, when something of another kind**” For a [cognition] of another kind [, that is,] for a [cognition] not conforming to the qualifier.

[TSP_§ 373,8] Because [of the question of an Apohavādin:] “If it were so, what error [would there be]?”, [Kumārila] said [in ŚV Av 90]: **if [... otherwise** etc. If, for you[, Apohavādin], there should be[, i.e.,] when [there is], an assumption as the qualifier with regard to a specific quality, even though it is classified in a different way[, i.e.,] as not conforming to the qualifier, [then,] if that is so, everything indeed, blue etc., would be a qualifier of everything. And therefore there would be no classification [of anything].

B.9 TS_§ 977CD (=ŚV Av 143CD)

[TS_§ 977cd] And⁶⁶⁶ it is not possible to show absence of another in the referent of a sentence.

⁶⁶⁶This verse is also discussed in Hattori 1979: 69 f., as is Śāntarākṣita’s answer (TS_§ 1159–1161); for the latter also see the discussion in Siderits 1985: 143 ff.

B.9.1 TSP_ḡ ad TS_ḡ 977cd

[TSP_ḡ 384,15] Moreover, the referent of a sentence is assumed to have a single multifarious form, like the colour spotted black (*kalmāṣa*). Therefore, absence of others cannot be shown in that [referent] because there is no cognition of an opposite [to this sentence's object] having a completed nature. And the absence of others having the form of a distinction from non-Caitra etc., which is described [by you] in cases like “Caitra, bring [the] cow!” etc., by grasping the parts [of the sentence], that is only the meaning of a word, not the meaning of a sentence, because this [referent of a sentence], which does not have parts, cannot be divided. Thus, the definition of the word referent [as exclusion] is not comprehensive.⁶⁶⁷

B.10 TS_ḡ 1004–1014

[TS_ḡ 1004] The⁶⁶⁸ reasons for the same judgement [about different things], which were earlier explained [in the chapter called *Sāmānyaparīkṣa*],⁶⁶⁹ are similar objects such as [an] *abhayā* [tree], which are differentiated from others by [their] very (*eva*) nature.

[TS_ḡ 1005–8ab] To call that object's reflection, which, based on these objects, appears in a conceptual cognition, [and] is ascertained just as the object,⁶⁷⁰ even though not being of the essence (*ātmatā*) of an [external] object, by the name “exclusion” is well founded, because of [its] difference from another appearance, because of [its] being the cause of the attainment of real things that are

⁶⁶⁷I.e., it does not cover all cases of language usage. If taken in a more technical sense as “does not pervade”, *avyāpin* could mean that there are some cases where a linguistic referent (*hetu*) occurs without exclusion as an object (*sādhyā*).

⁶⁶⁸For these verses I follow the edition in Ishida 2011b: 201 ff., where they are also translated.

⁶⁶⁹See the references in Ishida 2011b: 201, n. 10 (TS_ḡ 722–725).

⁶⁷⁰Read *artha ity* acc. Ishida 2011b: 201.

differentiated from others, as well as (*api*) because of [its] origination by means of a real thing not connected [to other things], and⁶⁷¹ because the confused determine this [reflection] as identical in nature (*tādātmya*) to the particular which is differentiated from that of another class, [and] has that [reflection] as a result.

[TS_§ 1008cd] Also [to call] a particular that is the reason for this [reflection by the name “exclusion” is reasonable], because [a particular] is differentiated from others.

[TS_§ 1009] And the absolute negation is this: “A cow is not a non-cow.” This is evidently understood as exclusion from others.⁶⁷²

[TS_§ 1010] Amongst these [three sorts of exclusion], the first exclusion[, a reflection in cognition,] is made known by words, because an awareness that determines an external thing arises from a word.

[TS_§ 1011] And, given that, because of a word, there is an arising of a cognition possessing a reflection of that having that form[, i.e., of that determined as external,] this relationship of denoted and denoting has resulted as having the nature of cause and effect.

[TS_§ 1012–1014] And if this form is directly cognized in this way[, i.e., as the effect of a word,] also absolute negation is understood by implication, as “That of this nature is not of another nature.” Given that there is a connection with real things, also a cognition of an excluded real thing arises by implication (*arthāt*). Thereby, this [exclusion]⁶⁷³

⁶⁷¹Read *ca* instead of *vā* according to Ishida 2011b: 201.

⁶⁷²The translation follows the emendation in Ishida 2011b: 202 of *ativispaṣṭa* to *iti vispaṣṭam*.

⁶⁷³*ayam* here refers to the kind of *apoha* being discussed, the one having the nature of a particular. Cf. TSP_§ 393,23: *ayam iti svalakṣaṇātmā*. The import of the following “also” (*api*) is that the *apoha* having the nature of negation is metaphorically called the word referent, TSP_§ 393,23–24: *apiśabdāt prasajyātmā ca*.

is also figuratively called the proper referent of a word.
But this twofold exclusion is not directly expressed by words.

B.10.1 TSP_ḡ ad TS_ḡ 1006–7

[TSP_ḡ 391,12] [Opponent:] Now, why is there this designation “exclusion” for this [appearance in awareness]? [Proponent:] Because [of this question, Śāntarakṣita, in TS_ḡ 1006] said: “[because of the difference] **from another appearance**” etc. [It is] due to four reasons that this [appearance] is named exclusion. Primarily, [this is the case because this appearance] itself appears as different from other appearances imposed by other conceptual cognitions. [This is] because of such a derivation: “It is excluded.”, thus exclusion; “exclusion from another,” thus other-exclusion. But due to metaphorical usage [the name “exclusion” is given to this appearance] for three reasons: either because of the imposition of the property⁶⁷⁴ of an effect[, i.e., a particular,] onto a cause[, a conceptual cognition,] which was stated by [the words] “**due to being the reason for the attainment of a real thing differentiated from others**”; or because of the metaphorical usage of the property of a cause[, which is a particular,] for an effect[, which is a conceptual cognition,] this being explained by “**as well as because of [its] origination by means of a real thing not connected [to other things]**,”—not connected[, i.e.,] not related to another, meaning that differentiated from another. Just this [quality of not being connected with others] is the means[, or] the method, of a real thing [to produce a conceptual cognition], because, in virtue of an experience of this [real thing], a conceptual cognition corresponding [to that thing] arises. And [an appearance is rightly called exclusion] because [this appearance] is determined by erring cognizers as one with the object excluded from that of another class. This is the fourth cause. This is explained: “**that of another class**” etc. **Its** [determination], i.e., [a determination] of the object’s reflection contained in conceptual awareness. **Well founded**[, i.e., the

⁶⁷⁴Read °dharmāropitād acc. to TSP_K instead of °dharmaṃropitād in TSP_ḡ.

word exclusion] occurs [for the reflection] together with the fourfold foundation (*nibandhana*) explained with [the words] “**because of a difference from another appearance**” etc. So [it is] well founded.

B.11 TS_ḡ 1060–1061

[TS_ḡ 1060–1061] And a real thing, differentiated from non-cow, is what is cognized through the sense faculties. A reflection, imposed on it, is cognized by self-awareness. And having observed this [differentiated thing], a word is used for this [thing] by people. Also an experience of the connection of this [word] with that [thing] clearly arises.

B.11.1 TSP_ḡ ad TS_ḡ 1060–1061

[TSP_ḡ 407,13] And what was said, “**by sense perceptions**” etc.⁶⁷⁵, is not established. Showing this, [Śāntarākṣita] said: “**And** [a real thing] **differentiated from non-cow**” etc. Here, first of all, exclusion, which has the nature of a particular, is indeed understood by the sense faculties. And this⁶⁷⁶ exclusion, which has the nature of a reflection of the object, is established by the very perception self-awareness, because [it, exclusion as a reflection,] is in reality of the nature of awareness. The uninflected word “and” [is spoken] in order to include the meanings [of exclusion] not mentioned. Thereby, also that [exclusion] having the nature of absolute negation is indeed understood by implication. [This] was shown [in TS_ḡ 1013a] with [the words] “That of this nature is not of another nature.” Thus **having observed**, and cognized,⁶⁷⁷ only **this** exclusion that has the nature

⁶⁷⁵This was said in TS_ḡ 938 = ŚV Av 78. Kumārila’s argument was that the exclusion of non-cow is not apprehended by the sense faculties when a linguistic convention is being made, and that consequently the word would not refer to anything.

⁶⁷⁶Read *yaścā°* acc. to TSP_ḡ 407,16, instead of *yat svā°* TSP_K 331,14.

⁶⁷⁷TSP_ḡ 407,18 reads *dr̥ṣṭvā jñātvā ca*, noting that *jñātvā ca* is not found in TSP_{msP} (where it is, in fact, found, TSP_{msP} 101b13) and TSP_K. TSP_{msJ} 139a4 equally

of a particular etc.,⁶⁷⁸ a word is used by people, but not [on having observed] a real universal, because that is non-existent and because it does not appear to awareness. A connection of this [word] with that [exclusion] alone is understood, upon the observation of which people use a word; but no [connection] with another [exclusion is understood], because of an overreaching consequence [that then a word would refer to everything].⁶⁷⁹

B.12 TS_Ś 1063–1064

[TS_Ś 1063–1064] Cows and non-cows are fully established because of different judgements. But a word, not established itself, is used as one wants.

For a real thing differentiated [from all other real things] does not, for [the sake of] an awareness [of this thing], depend on the grasping of another [thing]. Therefore, this error of dependence on each other is out of place here.

B.12.1 TSP_Ś ad TS_Ś 1063–1064

[TSP_Ś 407,23] And to that which was said [by Kumāṛila]: “And non-cow, which was established, would be excluded” etc.,⁶⁸⁰ [Śāntarakṣita] said “**Cows and non-cows**” etc. For it is on [their] very own [accord] that things like cows etc., which generate different judgements, are correctly ascertained as separated.⁶⁸¹ To these things normal speakers apply, according to [their] wish, an unestablished word

supports the longer reading. The *jñātvā ca* is also not reflected in TSP_D Ze 345a5 (TSP_Q He 430b3–4): *de'i phyir rang gi mtsan nyid la sogs pa'i ngo bo'i sel ba 'di nyid mthong na ste shes nas 'jig rten gyis* (TSP_Q: *gyi TSP_D*) *sgra sbyor gyi spyi dngos por gyur pa la ni ma yin te.*

⁶⁷⁸By “etc.” here exclusion in all senses just described is meant.

⁶⁷⁹Cf. footnote 659.

⁶⁸⁰This was objected in ŚV Av 83–84, quoted in TS_Ś 942–943, cf. appendix B.7.

⁶⁸¹Cf., e.g., PV I 119 (see trl. on page 310).

for the sake of everyday language usage. For it is so: if that having the nature of a real thing differentiated [from all other real things] depends, for the sake of [its] cognition, on a grasping of another object, then there would be the error of mutual dependence. [But] insofar as a differentiated real thing is known without any grasping of another [thing], the convention “cow and non-cow” is made as one wishes, given that this [differentiated real thing] is established as separate [from other real things] due to being the reason for a judgement [having] a form differentiated [from the forms of other cognitions]. So in what way would there be a dependency on each other? **“For an awareness”** [in TS_§ 1064b means] “for the sake of an awareness [of this thing].”

B.13 TS_§ 1097–1100

[TS_§ 1097] From⁶⁸² words such as “blue”, “water lily” etc. only a single [object] is determined. What is differentiated from non-blue, non-water-lily, etc. is a reflection [of a real thing in the mind].

[TS_§ 1098] But, a real thing endowed with exclusion from others is not postulated by us as what is to be denoted. For us differentiation is not different from the thing that is differentiated from others.⁶⁸³

[TS_§ 1099] Thus, this error of dependency does not, as [it does] for a genus, come about for the [object of a word] as

⁶⁸²This verse is an answer to ŚV Av 115–117 (corresponding to TS_§ 966–968). There, Kumāṛila had pointed out that if it were only other-exclusion that a word refers to, words could not have co-reference or be in a qualifier-qualified relation to each other.

⁶⁸³Read, respectively, *bhāvān* and *anyā vyāvṛttir* acc. to TS_{msP} 21a14 instead of *bhāvān* and *anyād vyāvṛttir* acc. to TS_K 1097cd, TS_§ 1098cd. Cf. also TS_D Ze 41a1 (TS_Q 'e 50a4): *gzhan las ldog pa'i dngos po las /gzhan pa'i ldog pa'i nga la med //* .

explained by the clear minded [Dignāga].⁶⁸⁴ For there is no separation [of a word's object, which is qualified by exclusion, from the object excluded from others.]

[TS_ś 1100] Therefore a classification of being qualifier and qualified, [as well as] of co-referentiality, is not contradictory for the word referent that is exclusion.

⁶⁸⁴Read *avadātamatiprote* acc. to TS_{mSP} 21a14 instead of the *avadātamiti prokte* as printed in TS_K and TS_ś. Cf. TS_D Ze 41a2 (= TS_Q He 50a6): *blo gros bzang pos gsungs pa ni*. Also in the copy of TS_K used by Frauwallner, this phrase is emended to *avadātamati-prokte*, as is the TSP's quote "*avadātamiti prokta iti*."