

Dharmakīrti's Apoha Theory: Perceptual Judgment and the Lack of Superimposition (*samāropaviveka*)

by

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Introduction

In the Apoha section in the Svārthānumāna chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika*, Dharmakīrti starts by characterizing *apoha* as the difference (*bheda*) among real entities from an ontological point of view (PV I.40–42), and then as the exclusion of superimposition (*samāropavyavaccheda*) from an epistemological point of view (PV I.43–58). He defines as a determinate cognition (*niścayajñāna*) an inference (*anumāna*) and a perceptual judgment, of which the latter is the conceptual cognition that follows a perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣaprṣṭhabhāvivikalpa*), and argues that both have the exclusion of superimposition as their object. It is important to note that what Dharmakīrti means by the term *samāropavyavaccheda* “exclusion of superimposition” differs for inference and perceptual judgment. In the case of an inference, the term in question signifies the function of excluding superimposition (*samāropavyavaccheda*) that is carried out by the inference when there is an erroneous cognition with respect to the subject of the inference. In the case of a perceptual judgment, on the other hand, it means “lack of superimposition” (*samāropaviveka*). This latter point is made by Dharmakīrti in PV I.48.

PV I.48: *kvacid drṣṭe 'pi yaj jñānaṃ sāmānyārthaṃ vikalpakam /*

asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram //

Katsura (1984, 1989, 1993) and Kellner (2004), when dealing with Dharmakīrti's concept of perceptual judgment, refer to the exclusion of superimposition. Katsura (1984: 226), relying on PV I.48–49, says: “Apart from provoking a practical activity, another important function is to prevent wrong judgement from arising.” In addition, Kellner (2004: 41) explicitly states that “ascertainment which follows immediately after perception, serves to keep error and doubt away and for this reason also has an ‘exclusion’ as its object.” Their view of perceptual judgment is quite acceptable. But to my knowledge, no studies have ever tried to show how perceptual judgment is linked to the exclusion of superimposition. The aim of this paper is thus to show how Dharmakīrti establishes that a perceptual judgment has “exclusion” as its object.

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1. Arguments in PV I.43–47: *samāropavyavaccheda*

Before entering into the main task, let us look at the preceding arguments Dharmakīrti brings forward in PV I.43–47. Dharmakīrti introduces PV I.43 by saying the following:

PVSV ad PV I.43 (G25.26–26.1, M17.1–2): *kathaṃ punar etad gamyate – vyavacchedaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyāṃ pratipādyate vidhinā na vasturūpam eveti pramāṇāntarasya śabdāntarasya ca pravṛtteḥ ।*

[Objection] But how can this be understood: it is exclusion (*vyavaccheda*) and not a real thing in a positive form that is understood from a word and an inferential mark?

[Answer] [This is reasonable] because another word occurs [with respect to one and the same real thing] and because another valid cognition occurs [with respect to one and the same real thing].

Dharmakīrti here cites Dignāga's well-known statement: *vyavacchedaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyāṃ pratipādyate vidhinā na vasturūpam eva*.¹ According to Dharmakīrti, the fact that different words or different valid cognitions can occur with reference to one and the same real thing shows that what is understood from a word or an inferential mark is not the real thing itself but exclusion (*vyavaccheda*). In order to demonstrate this point, Dharmakīrti starts to develop arguments.

In PV I.43–44, to begin with, Dharmakīrti says the following:

PV I.43: *ekasyārthasvabhāvasya pratyakṣasya sataḥ svayam ।*

ko 'nyo na dṛṣṭo bhāgaḥ syād yaḥ pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣyate ॥

PV I.44: *no ced bhrāntinimittena saṃyojyeta guṇāntaram ।*

śuktau vā rajatākāro rūpasādharmyadarśanāt ॥

When the single essential nature of an object is perceived as it is, what part could be left unseen separately from it? To be sure, if a part is left unseen, it is examined through valid cognitions.

[But the condition must be imposed:] “On the condition that a quality foreign to the object is not connected with it by cause of an erroneous cognition (*bhrāntinimitta*), unlike the case where the form of a piece of silver is connected with mother of pearl due to the perception of the similarity in form between them.”

PVSV ad PV I.44 (G26.18–27.2, M17.16–21): *tasmāt paśyan śuktirūpaṃ viśiṣṭam eva paśyati । niścayapratyayaivaikalyāt tv aniścinvan tatsāmānyam*

¹ This translation of Dignāga's statement is based on Śākyabuddhi's interpretation. According to Karṇakagomin, the statement is interpreted as follows: It is exclusion in a positive form and not a real thing that is understood from a word and an inferential mark. On the different interpretations, see Kellner 2004: 5, n. 3. On this statement of Dignāga's, see Pind 2015: II 127, n. 431.

paśyāmīti manyate / tato 'sya rajatasamāropah / tathā sadṛśāparāparotpattyā-lakṣitanānātvasya tadbhāvasamāropāt sthitibhrāntiḥ / yāvanto 'sya parabhāvās tāvanta eva yathāsvaṃ nimittabhāvinaḥ samāropā iti tadvyavacchedakāni bhavanti pramāṇāni saphalāni syuḥ / teṣāṃ tu vyavacchedaphalānāṃ nāpratītavastvaṃśapratyāyane pravṛttis tasya dṛṣṭatvāt / anamāsasya caikadeśena darśanāyogāt /

Therefore, a person, when seeing the form of mother of pearl, is to see it precisely as what is differentiated [from a piece of silver]. But, due to the deficiency of causes of a determinate cognition,² the person, without determining the form, conceives: “I see a property common to them.” Consequently the person superimposes [the image of] silver [on mother of pearl]. Similarly, to a person who does not recognize the difference between moments since there arise similar moments in sequence, there arises the erroneous cognition: “This is [temporally] persistent” because of the superimposition of identity (*tadbhāvasamāropa*).³

If an entity has a certain number of foreign properties, that number of properties is what arises from causes [of erroneous cognitions] according to each case and is superimposed on the entity.

Therefore, valid cognitions which arise to exclude what is superimposed must be fruitful.

But, it is not the case that the [valid cognitions] bringing about the exclusion take place in order to make known the part of a real thing which has not been understood. For the [part for which valid cognitions take place] has been perceived. Indeed, it is not proper to say that something indivisible is partially perceived.

It is important to note that Dharmakīrti accepts the following points:

1. On the condition that no erroneous cognition (*bhrānti*) arises with respect to a real thing, when a real thing is perceived, all its parts are perceived.
2. An erroneous cognition can arise with respect to a real thing.
3. When a person does not recognize the difference between moments, the person superimposes identity between them, and erroneously cognizes “this is permanent.” (The non-recognition of the difference between

² According to Dharmakīrti, the causes of a determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment are: acuity of a cognition (*buddhipāṭava*), a state of habituation to the imprint of *this* (*tadvāsanābhyāsa*), situation-context (*prakaraṇa*), and others. PVSV ad PV I.58 (G32.3–8, M20.29–21.1): *yady apy amśarahitaḥ sarvato bhinnasvabhāvo bhāvo 'nubhūtas tathāpi na sarvabhedeṣu tāvatā niścayo bhavati / kāraṇāntarāpekṣyatvāt / anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhyāsaṃ niścayapratyayān janayati / yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe 'pi kuṇapakāminībhakṣyavikalpāḥ / tatra buddhipāṭavaṃ tadvāsanābhyāsaḥ prakaraṇam ityādayo 'nubhavād bhedaniścayotpattisahakāriṇaḥ /* On the concept of the causes of a determinate cognition, see Kellner 2004: 19–32.

³ Karṇakagomin glosses *tadbhāva* as *sattā* “the property of continuing to exist.” PVSVT 123.28: *tadbhāvasamāropāt sattāsamāropāt*. But the term *tadbhāva*, synonymous with *tattva*, can be taken as meaning “identity,” as opposed to “difference” (*nānātva*).

moments or the observation of the similarity between moments [*bhrāntinimitta*] → superimposition of identity [*samāropa*] → an erroneous cognition [*bhrānti*].)

4. A valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), i.e., an inference, is resorted to in order to exclude the superimposition.
5. This superimposition must take place with reference to the part which has been perceived.

Dharmakīrti here explains the basic structure in which a valid cognition brings about the exclusion of superimposition.

In PV I.45,⁴ which is a recapitulating verse (*saṃgrahaśloka*), he goes on to argue that when a real thing is perceived, all its qualities are perceived; but when an erroneous cognition arises with reference to that real thing, these qualities are not determined. Thus one must resort to an inference in order to determine them.

Moreover, in PV I.46⁵ he states that if an inference were to grasp a real thing, then it would follow that once one property of it is determined, all properties are determined; and that if an inference has exclusion (*apoha*) as its object, the undesirable consequence does not follow. It is in commenting this verse that Dharmakīrti makes an important point: an inference brings about the exclusion of superimposition (*samāropavyavaccheda*). He states:

PVSV ad PV I.46 (G27.13–15, M18.1–3): *yadā punar anumānena samāropavyavacchedaḥ kriyate tadā naikasamāropavyavacchedād anyavyavacchedaḥ kṛto bhavatīti tadartham anyat pravartate /*

However, when [it is assumed that] the exclusion of superimposition is brought about by an inference, then [it can be said that] since the exclusion of a different [superimposition (non-B)] is not brought about just because the superimposition (non-A) is excluded by one [inference (A)], another [inference (B)] takes place in order to [exclude the different superimposition (non-B)].⁶

Here Dharmakīrti assumes that, with reference to sound, two superimpositions arise: (non-A) the superimposition of the property of not being produced (*akṛtakasamāropa*), and (non-B) that of the property of being permanent (*nityasamāropa*). Also, two inferences take place: (A) the inference to prove the property of being produced (*kṛtakānumāna*) and (B) that to prove the property of being impermanent (*anityatvānumāna*). He supposes that when a real thing is perceived, a property which the real thing does not bear is superimposed on it and that an inference is performed in order to exclude such a superimposition.

⁴ PV I.45: *tasmād dṛṣṭasya bhāvasya dṛṣṭa evākhilo guṇaḥ / bhrānter niścīyate neti sādhanam saṃpravartate //*

⁵ PV I.46: *vastugrahe 'numānāc ca dharmasyaikasya niścaye / sarvadharmagraho 'pohe nāyaṃ doṣaḥ prasajyate //*

⁶ PVSVT 125.23–25: *tadaikena kṛtakānumānenaikasyākṛtakasamāropasya vyavacchedād anyasya nityasamāropasya vyavacchedaḥ kṛto na bhavatīti kṛtvā tadartham anyasamāropavyavacchedārtham anyad ity anityatvānyānumānam pravartate /*

In PV I.47,⁷ which is also a *saṃgrahaśloka*, he states that it is due to the reason stated in PV I.46 that Dignāga declares an inference to have exclusion as its object; if an inference did not have exclusion as its object, it would follow that when the subject of an inference is known, it would be known in its entirety, and therefore there would be no part left to be inferred.

All these points make the following clear: In PV I.43–47 Dharmakīrti develops an argument to establish that an inference has for its object exclusion and not a real thing. It is in this connection that, in PV I.48, Dharmakīrti introduces an argument to establish that a perceptual judgment also has exclusion as its object.

2. PVSV on PV I.48

2.1 Now let us look closely at what Dharmakīrti says in PVSV on PV I.48. He comments on the verse as follows:

A: PVSV G28.8–9, M18.15–16: *yad rūpādidarśanānantaram alīṅgaṃ niścaya-jñānaṃ bhavati, tat katham asati samārope bhavad vyavacchedaviṣayaṃ bhavati /*

[Objection] A determinate cognition that arises immediately after the perception of an entity like color is not an inferential cognition (*alīṅga*). Therefore, how is it that such a determinate cognition, arising when superimposition is absent (*asati samārope bhavat*), has exclusion for its object?⁸

B: PVSV G28.10–11, M18.16–17: *samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt⁹ / yatra hy asya samāropo yathā sthiraḥ sātmaka iti vā, na tatra bhede¹⁰ niścayo bhavati /*

[Answer] For the very reason that the [determinate cognition] does not arise with respect to an object of superimposition (*samāropaviṣaya*), [it is proper to say that it has for its object the exclusion of superimposition]. Indeed, a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to the difference (*bheda*) on which something is superimposed by the cognizer (*asya*), as in the case where [one has an erroneous cognition such as] “[this is] permanent” or “[this has] an Ātman.”¹¹

⁷ PV I.47: *tasmād apohaviṣayam iti liṅgaṃ prakīrtitam / anyathā dharmiṇaḥ siddhāv asiddhaṃ kim ataḥ param //*

⁸ PVSVT 129.21–24: *yad ityādinā ślokaṃ vyācaṣṭe / ādiśabdāc chabdādipari-grahaḥ / nāsyā liṅgam astīty alīṅgaṃ rūpādikam (alīṅgaṃ rūpādikam Ms; ilīṅgarūpādikam S.) etad iti niścayajñānam / asati samārope bhavati / na hi pratyakṣadṛṣṭe rūpādau tadānīm viparītākārasamāropo 'sti / tat katham vyavacchedaviṣayaṃ bhavati / iyatā ślokasya pūrvārdho vyākhyātaḥ /*

⁹ *samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt* G; *samāropaviṣaye 'bhāvāt* M. PVSVT and PVT: *sgro ma btags pa'i yul la yod pa'i phyir ro* (**asamāropitaviṣaye bhāvāt*). G's reading is supported by PVSVT: *samāropaviṣaye tasya niścayajñānasyābhāvāt* (see note 11). In PVT ad PV I.48 we find a passage parallel to G's reading: *de ni sgro 'dogs pa'i yul la med pa'i phyir* (see 2.3.1).

¹⁰ *bhede* G; *bhedo* M.

¹¹ PVSVT 129.25–28: *uttarārdham vyākhyātum āha / samāropaviṣaye tasya niścayajñānasyābhāvāt tadvyavacchedaviṣayaṃ bhavatīti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ / etad evāha / yatra bhede 'sya pūṃsaḥ samāropo na tatra bhede samāropaviṣaye niścayo bhavaty asthiro nirātmaka iti vā //*

In **A** Dharmakīrti makes two points. First, immediately after the perception of color there arises a determinate cognition (*niścayajñāna*) which is not an inference. Needless to say, this determinate cognition is what we call perceptual judgment. Second, a perceptual judgment arises when there is no superimposition (*asati samārope bhavad*), and thus, unlike an inference, the perceptual judgment cannot have the exclusion of superimposition as its object. This second point is extremely important because it is a strong indication that a perceptual judgment arises when superimposition is absent. Let us note here that Dharmakīrti holds that if the “exclusion” (*vyavaccheda*) is that of superimposition as in the case of an inference, then the exclusion certainly does not obtain; but if it is not, then it does obtain.

In **B** Dharmakīrti argues that perceptual judgment does have the exclusion of superimposition as its object, because a perceptual judgment does not arise with respect to an object of superimposition (*samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt*). To explain. First of all, an object of superimposition (*samāropaviṣaya*) is *bheda* “difference.” With respect to the *bheda* on which (*yatra*) something is superimposed, there is no determinate cognition. The superimposition leads to the erroneous cognition “this is permanent” (*sthira*). Thus the superimposition in question is that of the property of being permanent. We should, however, have the determinate cognition “this is impermanent.” Accordingly, what is meant by the term *bheda* here must be the property of being impermanent. We must note that Dharmakīrti holds the property of being permanent to be superimposed on the property of being impermanent. A real thing has differences (*bheda*) from all other things, such as the property of being impermanent. Suppose that a person superimposes the property of being permanent on the property of being impermanent, resulting in the erroneous cognition “this is permanent.” In this case the person has no determinate cognition with respect to the property of being impermanent. In contrast, suppose that a person has a determinate cognition with respect to the latter property. In this case, the person clearly has no superimposition with respect to the property of being impermanent. This is how the determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment is said to have the exclusion of superimposition as its object. According to Dharmakīrti, one is justified in saying that the exclusion of superimposition forms the object of a perceptual judgment only insofar as the perceptual judgment arises only when a superimposition is absent.

2.2 In the latter half of the verse Dharmakīrti says: *asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram*. It is important to note here that what Dharmakīrti means by the word *aṃśa* “part” in PV I.48 is a difference (*bheda*) such as the property of being impermanent. Naturally it follows that that which has parts is an object to be perceived, referred to by the phrase *kvacid drṣṭe* in the verse.

If we accept that the phrase *asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram* can be paraphrased as *asamāropitānyāṃśe niścayajñānam*, the expression *asamāropitānyāṃśa* must refer to the difference (*bheda*) that is the object of a determinate cognition. If the difference is the property of being impermanent, the term *anyāṃśa* “a different part” must refer to the property of being permanent, which is different (*anya-*) from the property of being impermanent. According to Dharmakīrti, the property of being permanent can be superimposed on the property of being impermanent. Therefore, the expression *asamāropitānyāṃśa*, as a

bahuvrīhi, must refer to the property of being impermanent on which the property of being permanent is not superimposed. When the property of being permanent is superimposed on the property of being impermanent, the latter property is concealed by the former and goes beyond the scope of determination.

2.3 At this point it may be useful to consider how the commentators interpret this compound.

2.3.1 Śākyabuddhi

PVṬ ad PV I.48cd (D63b6–64a1, P75a4–7): *rnam pa gang la gzhan gyi cha ste / zla bo rnam pa sgro ma btags pa de ni gzhan gyi cha sgro ma btags pa'o // de la 'jug pa de yang de tsam sel ba'i spyod yul can cha sgro ma btags pa gang yin pa de tsam gyi rnam par gcod pa'i yul can yin no // 'di skad du mngon sum gyi rjes la 'byung ba'i shes pa rnam par rtog pa can gyis sgro 'dogs pa sngar zhugs pa sel bar mi byed mod kyi / 'on kyang de ni sgro 'dogs pa'i yul la med pa'i phyir de rnam par gcod pa'i yul can kho na yin no zhes bya bar shes so // gal te yang rnam par rtog pa can gyi shes pa de dngos po la¹² bsgrub par 'jug par 'gyur na ni / rnam pa thams cad la nges par 'gyur ro zhes bshad pa yin no //*

(a) The compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa* is a *bahuvrīhi*, referring to “an image (*x*) on which a different part, i.e., an image (non-*x*) contradictory to the image (*x*), is not superimposed.”

(b) The [cognition] which arises with respect to the [image (*x*)], too, has for its object the exclusion only of that, i.e., the exclusion only of the part (non-*x*) which is not superimposed.

(c1) [What Dharmakīrti means to say] is this: It is not the case that a conceptual cognition arising immediately after perception excludes a superimposition which occurred before [this conceptual cognition].

(c2) On the contrary, it is seen that the [conceptual cognition] does have exclusion as its object because it does not arise with respect to the object of superimposition.

(c3) If the conceptual cognition arose as what establishes a real thing, then it would follow that [the conceptual cognition] determines all forms [of the real thing].

This is what was explained by the teacher.

The compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa* is a *bahuvrīhi* formed from *asamāropita* and *anyāṃśa*, referring to an image (*rnam pa*, **ākāra*) (image *x*). The latter part of the compound, *anyāṃśa*, signifies “a different part,” which refers to “an image contradictory to the image” (*zla bo rnam pa*, **pratyogyākāra*) (image non-*x*). Thus the compound in question means

¹² *la D; om. P.*

“an image (x) on which an image (non- x) contradictory to it is not superimposed.” The demonstrative *tad* in *tanmātra* refers to the image which is not superimposed (image non- x).

2.3.2 Karṇakagomin

PVSVT ad PV I.48cd (128.4–12): (A) ***asamāropitaḥ anyāṃśaḥ pratiyogyā-kāro yasmin viṣaye sa tathā / tatra pravarttamānaṃ tad api tanmātrāpohagocaram / tenāyam artho bhavati / samāroparahitaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ svākā-rabhedena grhṇad***¹³ ***vikalpakaṃ jñānaṃ bhrāntatvāt tatsamāroparahitabā-hyādhyavasāyakam eva na tu bāhyasvarūpagrāhakam / atas tanmātram eva niyatabāhyāvasāya evānyasya samāropasyāpohagocaraṃ vikalpakaṃ jñānam /***

(B) *yadvā asamāropitaś cāsāv anyāṃśaś ca tasmin sati vikalpakaṃ jñānaṃ pravarttamānaṃ tanmātrāpohagocaram / yo 'sāv asamāropito 'nyāñśas tanmātravyavacchedaviṣayaṃ bhavati /*

(A) [First interpretation:]

(a) The compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa* is a *bahuvrīhi*, denoting “an object (*viṣaya*) on which a different part, i.e., an image contradictory to it (*pratiyogyākāra*), is not superimposed.”

(b) The [cognition], which arises with respect to the [object], too, is spoken of as *tanmātrāpohagocara* “the cognition whose part is of that [i.e., an external object] and whose object is exclusion.”

(c1) Therefore, [by the present verse] is meant the following: Since [a conceptual cognition] grasps an individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) that is devoid of superimposition (*samāroparahita*) through its own image, it is an erroneous cognition. Therefore, the conceptual cognition is a mere judgment about the external object that is devoid of superimposition and does not grasp the external object in itself.

(c2) Accordingly, [the cognition] is a conceptual cognition in the form of [a cognition] that has a part related to the [external object] (*tanmātram eva*), i.e., in the form of a judgment about a specific external object (*niyatabāhyāvasāya eva*), whose object is the exclusion of what is other, i.e., superimposition.

(B) [Second interpretation:]

(a) Or, the compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa* is a *karmadhāraya*, meaning “that part (non- x) which is different [from what is to be determined] and which is not superimposed.”

(b) When there is such a part (non- x), a conceptual cognition arises. Accordingly, the conceptual cognition has for its object the exclusion only of such a part (non- x). That is, [the conceptual cognition has] for its object the exclusion only of such a part (non- x) which is different [from what is to be determined] and which is not superimposed.

¹³ *grhṇad* Ms; *grhṇan* S.

Karṇakagomin offers two interpretations for the compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa*: as a *bahuvrīhi* and as a *karmadhāraya*. In the *bahuvrīhi* interpretation the compound refers to an object (*viśaya*) on which an image contradictory to the object is not superimposed. The object is an individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), which is said to admit of no superimposition. The expression *tanmātra* refers to *adhyavasāya* “judgment,” which is said to be that whose part (*mātrā*), i.e., an image, is related to the object.

In the *karmadhāraya* interpretation the compound refers to a different part that is not superimposed, i.e., the part (non-*x*) that is different from the part (*x*) to be determined and that is not superimposed on the latter part (*x*). The demonstrative *tad* refers to this putative part (non-*x*). When such a different part is present (*sati*), that is, when a different part is not superimposed on the object with respect to which determination takes place, a perceptual judgment arises as what excludes only the different part. Accordingly, perceptual judgment is said to have the exclusion only of the different part as its object.

2.3.3 Manorathanandin

PVV ad PV I.48 (305.11–15): *nanu kvacin nīlādāv asamāropito 'nyo viparītāṃśo yasmin tasmin pratyakṣeṇa dṛṣṭe yaj jñānam aliṅgajam vikalpakam sāmānyaviśayaṃ bhavati, tad āropābhāvāt katham anyāpohaviśayaṃ / āha tanmātrasyānīlamātrasyāpoho vijātīyād vyāvṛttir vyavacchedaḥ sa gocaro yasya tat tathā / nīlavikalpasyānīlavyavaccheda eva viśaya ity arthaḥ //*

[Objection] When a certain [entity], say, blue, on which a part foreign to it, i.e., a part contradictory to it, is not superimposed is cognized through perception, there arises a cognition (*jñāna*) which is not based on an inferential mark, which is conceptual, and which has a universal as its object. How could it be that such a cognition has exclusion as its object, since no superimposition occurs?

[Answer] [Dharmakīrti] answers [this objection by stating]: The cognition is spoken of as “that whose object is the exclusion only of that, i.e., the exclusion only of non-blue; exclusion means the exclusion (*vyāvṛtti* = *vyavaccheda*) of an entity of a dissimilar class.” The conceptual cognition “this is blue” has as its object only the exclusion of non-blue. This is what is meant by the verse.

According to Manorathanandin, the compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa* refers to a perceived, real blue on which a part foreign to it is not superimposed. The expression *tanmātrāpoha* means the exclusion of non-blue. We must say that his interpretation strays quite far from the earlier interpretations. Manorathanandin fails to grasp the point made by Dharmakīrti that in the context of a perceptual judgment, the exclusion of superimposition forms the lack of superimposition.

3. PV I.49 and PVSV

In PVSV B, Dharmakīrti states that a determinate cognition does not exist with respect to an object of superimposition (*samāropaviśaye tasyābhāvāt*). This means, as shown

in 2.1, that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to the property of being impermanent on which the property of being permanent has been superimposed. In PV I.49ab, the reason for this point is given.

3.1 *bādhyabādhakabhāva*

Dharmakīrti states the following:

C (=PV I.49ab):

niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ /

Because the relation of what is to be blocked and what does the blocking obtains between a determinate cognition and a superimposing cognition.¹⁴

According to Dharmakīrti, the relation of what is to be blocked and what does the blocking obtains between the determinate cognition “this is impermanent” and the erroneous cognition “this is permanent,” which is based on superimposition. Because of this relationship, it is said that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to the property of being impermanent on which the property of being permanent is superimposed. This point is explained in PVSV as follows:

D: PVSV G28.13–14, M18.19–20: *na hi sarvato bhinno dr̥ṣṭo 'pi bhāvas tathaiva pratyabhijñāyate / kvacid bhede vyavadhānasambhavāt / yathā śukteḥ śuktitve /*

Indeed, even if an entity has been perceived as something differentiated from all others, it is not recognized as it really is. For there can be an impediment to a certain difference [being cognized], just as there is [an impediment to the cognition of] mother of pearl's property of being mother of pearl[, if mother of pearl is erroneously cognized].¹⁵

E: PVSV G28.15–16, M18.20–21: *yatra tu pratipattur bhrāntinimittam nāsti tatraivāsya taddarśanāviśeṣe 'pi smārto niścayo bhavati /*

With respect only to the [difference] about which a cognizer has no cause to have an erroneous cognition, a determinate cognition[, i.e., a perceptual judgment,] arises for the cognizer based on remembrance even if [all] the [differences] have been equally perceived.¹⁶

¹⁴ PVSVṬ 130.9–10: *kiṃ kāraṇam / niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ (bhāvataḥ Ms; bhāvaḥ S.) / niścayajñānasya tadviparītasamāropajñānasya ca bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ /*

¹⁵ PVSVṬ 130.10–15: *bādhyabādhakabhāvam eva sādhyann āha na hīti / sarvataḥ sajātīyād vijātīyā ca bhinno dr̥ṣṭo 'pi bhāvas tathaiveti yathādr̥ṣṭena sarveṇākāreṇa pratyabhijñāyate niścīyate na hīti sambandhaḥ / kiṃ kāraṇam / kvacid bhede kṣaṇikatvādike vyavadhānasambhavāt / *bhrāntinimittagataḥ (read; bhrāntinimittasambhavāt) / yathā śukteḥ sarvato vyāvṛttāyā darśane 'pi śuktikādित्वे राजासādharmyasya bhrāntinimittasya sambhavān na niścayaḥ / *PVṬ: 'khrul pa'i rgyu mishan srid pa'i phyir ro.*

¹⁶ PVSVṬ 130.15–17: *yatra tv ākāre bhrāntinimittam nāsti tatraivāsya pratipattur anubhavottarakālabhāvī smārto niścayo bhavati / taddarśanāviśeṣe 'pi sarvasvākāreṣu pratyakṣasyāviśeṣe 'pi / smārta iti smṛtirūpaḥ /*

D. An entity that is differentiated from all others is a real thing (*svalakṣaṇa*). A real thing has differences relative to all other things. Such a real thing, even if it has been perceived, is not recognized as it really is through a perceptual judgment. This is because a certain difference of the real thing can be blocked from being cognized.

E. Recall that, according to Dharmakīrti, when a person does not recognize the difference between moments, the person superimposes identity between them and so has the erroneous cognition “this is permanent.” That a cognizer has no cause of an erroneous cognition with respect to a difference of a real thing means that the cognizer recognizes the difference as it is. Therefore, when the cognizer has no cause of an erroneous cognition with respect to a difference, there is no chance of superimposition arising with respect to the difference. The point Dharmakīrti makes here is that a determinate cognition arises only with respect to the difference on which nothing is superimposed.

Now we can see the following. A real thing has differences (*bheda*) from all other things, which can also be conceptually posited as parts (*aṃśa*) of that real thing. On the condition that no erroneous cognition arises with respect to a real thing, when the real thing is perceived, all its differences are perceived. A determinate cognition arises only with respect to a difference that is not erroneously cognized. For instance, the determinate cognition “this is impermanent” arises only with respect to the property of being impermanent, which is not the object of an erroneous cognition. When the property of being permanent is superimposed on the property of being impermanent, the latter property is said to be the object of an erroneous cognition. Thus it is clear why Dharmakīrti says that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to an object of superimposition (*samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt*).

3.2 *samāropaviveka*

3.2.1 In PV I.48d Dharmakīrti speaks of a determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment as *tanmātrāpohagocara*. The next step is to consider how this expression should be interpreted.

Consider the following passage:

F₁: PVSV G28.16–19, M18.22–24: *samāropaniścayayor bādhyabādhakabhāvāt / niścayasya*

samāropaviveke 'sya pravṛttir iti gamyate // [49cd]

tadviveka eva cānyāpohaḥ /

Because there obtains the relation of what is to be blocked and what does the blocking between superimposition and a determinate cognition, it is understood that the determinate cognition

occurs when there is a lack of superimposition (*samāropaviveka*). [49cd]

And this very lack of [superimposition] is the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*).¹⁷

¹⁷ PVSVT 130.20–24: *yataś ca pratyakṣāviśeṣe 'pi samāroparahita eva viṣaye niścayo bhavati tasmāt samāropaniścayayor bādhyabādhakabhāvo gamyate / tato bādhyabādhakabhāvāt kāraṇāt samāropavi-*

According to Dharmakīrti, a determinate cognition arises when there is a lack of superimposition (*samāropaviveka*). The reason for this is that a determinate cognition and superimposition are incompatible with each other.

3.2.2 The term *samāropaviveka* can be paraphrased as *samāropābhāva* “absence/negation of superimposition.”¹⁸ It is proper to say that *viveka* is an equivalent for *abhāva* “non-existence, absence.” In PV I.56–57a Dharmakīrti, having introduced an opponent's position that, after a real thing is grasped in its entirety by a conceptual cognition, a valid cognition arises to remove an erroneous cognition which prevents one from determining the real thing as it is, says the following:

PV I.56–57a: *yadi bhrāntinivṛttyartham grhīte 'pi anyad iṣyate /
tad vyavacchedaviṣayaṃ siddham tadvat tato 'param //
asamāropaviṣaye vṛtteḥ*

If it is accepted that even if an entity is grasped in its entirety [by a determinate cognition (C1)], another [valid cognition (C2)] occurs to remove an erroneous cognition [that prevents one from determining the real thing as it is],¹⁹ it is established that the [valid cognition (C2)] has exclusion as its object. Like the [valid cognition (C2)], [it is established that] the [cognition (C1)] different from the [valid cognition (C2) has exclusion as its object]. For [cognition (C1)] occurs with respect to an object that has no superimposition (*asamāropaviṣaya*).²⁰

In PVSV Dharmakīrti explains:

F₂: PVSV ad PV I.56cd–57a (G31.12–15, M20.14–16): *tat tarhi bhrāntinivṛttyartham pravṛttam pramāṇam anyasamāropavyavacchedaphalam²¹ iti siddham anyāpohaviṣayam / tadvad anyad api / asamāropaviṣaye vṛtteḥ / yatṛāsya samāropo na tatra niścaya iti samāropābhāve²² vartamāno 'nyāpohaviṣayaḥ siddhaḥ /*

(a) In that case, it is established that the valid cognition which occurs to remove an erroneous cognition, bringing about the exclusion of the superimposition

veke samāropavirahe niścayasyāsyā (samāropavirahe niścayasya... Ms; samāropavirahaniścayasya... S.) pravṛttir iti gamyate / bhavatu nāma samāropaviveke pravṛttis tathāpi nānyāpohaviṣayatvam vidhirūpeṇa pravṛtter ity āha / tadviveka evānyāpohaḥ (read: eva cānyāpohaḥ) samāropaviveka eva cānyāpohaḥ /

¹⁸ In PVSV Dharmakīrti states that existence is *viveka* of non-existence, while non-existence is *viveka* of existence. PVSV ad PV I.291 (G154.10–11): *bhāvābhāvayor anyonyavivekarūpatvāt /*

¹⁹ PVSVṬ 139.18–19: *yadītyādinā parābhiprāyam āśaṃkate / ekena niścayajñānena sarvātmanā grhīte 'pi vastuni bhrāntinivṛttyartham anyad iti pramāṇāntaram /*

²⁰ PVSVṬ 139.23–26: *yady evam ityādinā siddhāntavādī / yat tad bhrāntinivṛttyartham uttaram pramāṇam iṣyate tad vyavacchedaviṣayam anyāpohaviṣayaṃ siddham pūrvoktena nyāyena / tadvad uttara-pramāṇavat / tata uttarakālabhāvi pramāṇād (read: uttarakālabhāvipramāṇād) aparam api pūrvakālabhāviniścayajñānam tad api vyavacchedaviṣayam / kiṃ kāraṇam / asamāropaviṣaye vṛtteḥ /*

²¹ *anyasamāropavyavacchedaphalam G; anyavyavacchedaphalam M.*

²² *samāropābhāve G; samāropābhāve ca M.*

of a different [image] (*vyavacchedaphala*), has as its object the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*).

(b) In the same manner, it is established that, like the [valid cognition], another [cognition], [i.e., the preceding determinate cognition,] also [has as its object the exclusion of others]. For it occurs with respect to an object which is devoid of superimposition.

(c) Since a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to an object on which something is superimposed by a cognizer, it is established that the determinate cognition, occurring when there is an absence of superimposition (*samāropābhāva*), has as its object the exclusion of others.²³

An opponent makes the following points. First, a conceptual cognition grasps a real thing in its entirety. Second, a valid cognition can arise in order to remove an erroneous cognition that is assumed to occur with respect to the real thing. According to Dharmakīrti, in this case it can be said that the valid cognition has exclusion as its object, since the valid cognition brings about the exclusion of the superimposition of something foreign to the real thing. What is important is that Dharmakīrti points out that, like a valid cognition, a perceptual judgment can also be said to have exclusion as its object. It is imperative to note here that the reason the perceptual judgment is said to have exclusion as its object is held to be that it occurs with respect to an object which is devoid of superimposition, or that it occurs when there is absence of superimposition with respect to the object. In this connection, let us recall the passage in **B**: *samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt*. There it was said that no determinate cognition arises with respect to an object of superimposition which consists in a difference. In the above-cited passage (F₂b), on the other hand, it is stated that a determinate cognition arises with respect to an object which is devoid of superimposition. It is clear that the reason a perceptual judgment is described as having exclusion as its object must be found in the way the object of the perceptual judgment should be: the object is far from being what something is superimposed on. To put it in another way, it is because its object lacks superimposition that the perceptual judgment is defined as having exclusion as its object.

3.3 *tanmātra*

In PV I.48 Dharmakīrti has defined a determinate cognition as *tanmātrāpohagocara* instead of defining it as *anyāpohaviṣaya*. A question arises: What is meant by the term *tanmātra*? The following passage offers a key to solving this problem.

G: PVSV ad PV I.49cd (G28.19–22, M18.24–26): *tasmāt tad api tanmātrāpohagocaram / na vastusvabhāvaniścayātmakam / tathā hi kasyacin niścaye 'py anyasyāpratipattidarśanāt / tatsvabhāvaniścaye ca tasyāyogāt /*

²³ PVSVT 140.11–15: *tat tarhītyādinā ślokaṃ vyācaṣṭe / anyasyākārasya yaḥ samāropas tad vyavacchedaphalam iti kṛtvā siddham anyāpohaviṣayam utpitsusamāropaniṣedhadvāreṇa / tadvad anyad api pūrvam api niścayajñānam anyāpohaviṣayam / kiṃ kāraṇam / avidyamānasamārope viṣaye vṛtteḥ / etad evāha / yatrākāre 'sya *pratipatteḥ (read: pratipattuḥ) / iti hetoḥ samāropābhāve varttamānaḥ paurastyo niścayo 'nyāpohaviṣayaḥ siddhaḥ // *PVT: 'di'i zhes bya ba ni rtogs par byed pa po'i'o.*

Therefore, the [determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment] also has as its object the exclusion only of that [putative specific difference]. It does not consist in a determinate cognition which determines the real thing in itself. For [the determinate cognition is defined] in that manner because it is seen that, even if a certain difference is determined, another difference is not understood and because, when the real thing in itself is determined, it is improper to say that [another difference is not determined].²⁴

It is clear that the term *mātra* makes a restriction on the differences the real thing has. In **B** it has been stated that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to a difference on which something is superimposed, and in **E** that a determinate cognition arises only with respect to a difference which does not fall under the scope of an erroneous cognition. In PV I.48c it is stated that a determinate cognition occurs with respect to the part on which a part different from it is not superimposed.

All this makes the following clear: Suppose that a given real thing has the property of being impermanent as its part or difference. When a determinate cognition occurs with respect to this property, the property is that on which the property of being permanent is not superimposed, that is, what has no superimposition of this latter property. Thus the absence of superimposition must be that of the superimposition only of this property. What is meant by the expression *tanmātrāpoha* is the absence (*viveka*, *abhāva*) of the superimposition only of that part or difference which is different from the part or difference to be determined. There is no doubt that the demonstrative *tad* in *tanmātra*- refers to the part which is different from the part to be determined (*anyāṃśa*).

4. PV I.48: reinterpretation

Now we are in a good position to interpret PV I.48.²⁵

²⁴ PVSṬ 130.24–29, 131.7–9: *tasmāt samāroparahite vṛttivaśāt / tad apīti na kevalam anityaḥ śabda iti niścayajñānaṃ pūrvoktena nyāyena tanmātrāpohagocaram, tad api pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvinīścayajñānam* (-niścayajñānam Ms; niścīyajñānam S.) *api tanmātrāpohagocaram na vastusvabhāvaniścāyakam* (read: -niścayātmakam) *svarūpeṇa / kiñ kāraṇam / tathā hi kasyacid ākārya rūpatvāder niścaye 'py anyasya kṣaṇikatvādyākāryāpratipattidarśanāt / yadi tu pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvinī niścayena* (niścayena Ms; niścayena S.) *vastusvabhāvasya niścayaḥ kriyate tadā tatsvabhāvaniścaye ca niraṃśatvād vastunas tasyāyogād anyasyākārāntarasyāniścayāyogāt //*

²⁵ This verse has already been interpreted as follows: Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 108: “Now when in respect of a perceived datum a determinate judgement arises (in its trail) referring to a conceptualized construction without the obtrusion of the opposite misconception, it also serves to eliminate the unperceived misconception (or doubt) of the opposite of that very datum.” Steinkellner 1971: 199, n. 71: “Die vorstellende Erkenntnis, welche ein Allgemeines zum Gegenstand hat, richtet sich, wenn irgendein [Ding] wahrgenommen wurde, ohne daß [auf dieses Ding] ein Teil eines andern [Dinges] übertragen worden ist, bloß darauf, diesen [fremden Teil] fernzuhalten ...” Zwilling 1976: 96: “Even in the absence of an opposing misconception the determinate cognition which follows the direct cognition of some real and whose prime object is a [constructed] general nature nevertheless has for its sphere of operation the elimination of just that [absent misconception.]” Okada 2007: 4, 6: [シャーキヤブッディ解釈] 知覚された何らかのものに関しても、およそ（直接知覚の後に生じる）認識は、普遍を対象としており、分別を有している。他の部分（＝対立項の形象）が付託されていない（形象）に対して（働くその認識は）、それ（＝付託されていない他の部分）のみを排除

PV I.48: *kvacid dṛṣṭe 'pi yaj jñānaṃ sāmānyārthaṃ vikalpakam /*

asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram //

Even when a certain [real thing] has been perceived, a cognition which has a universal as its object and which is conceptual arises; [this cognition, arising] with respect to the [real thing's part (x)] on which a part (non- x) different [from it] is not superimposed, [is characterized as] what has as its object the exclusion only of that [part non- x].

Dharmakīrti is saying this: A conceptual cognition arising immediately after the perception of a real thing, that is, a perceptual judgment, has for its object only one part or difference of that real thing, say, the property of being impermanent (x); if this part or difference is determined, then it is one on which a putative part or difference contradictory to it, say, the property of being permanent (non- x), is not superimposed. In this case the perceptual judgment is said to have as its object the exclusion of the superimposition only of the putative part or difference, or, in other words, the exclusion only of the putative part or difference.

Thus the reason that a perceptual judgment is described as that which has exclusion as its object lies in the fact that the object of the perceptual judgment is what is devoid of the superimposition that gives rise to an erroneous cognition with respect to that object. We may say that Dharmakīrti establishes that perceptual judgment has exclusion as its object

の活動領域とする。〔カルナカゴーミン解釈〕知覚された何らかのものに関しても、およそ（直接知覚の後に生じる）認識は、普遍を対象としており、分別を有している。付託されていない他の部分がある時、（分別知は）それ（＝付託されていない他の部分）のみを排除の活動領域とする。〔シャンカラナンダナ解釈〕他の部分が未だ付託されていない何らかの知覚された（対境）に関しても、およその分別知は、（知覚されたものに限定される）普遍を対象としており、「そのみ（＝未来に付託される可能性のある他の部分）」を排除の活動領域としている。〔Śākyabuddhi's interpretation:〕 With respect to something that has been perceived, too, any cognition [that arises immediately after perception] has for its object an universal and has conceptualization. [Such a cognition, which functions towards] an image on which the part different from the image (= an image conflicting with it) is not superimposed, has for its domain of exclusion only that (= the different part which is not superimposed). [Kaṛṇakagomin's interpretation:〕 With respect to something that has been perceived, too, any cognition [that arises immediately after perception] has for its object an universal and has conceptualization. When there is a different part which is not superimposed, (a conceptual cognition) has for its domain of exclusion only that (= the different part which is not superimposed). [Śāṅkaranandana's interpretation:〕 With respect to a certain (object) which has been perceived and on which the part different from it is yet to be superimposed, too, the conceptual cognition, whatever it be, has for its object an universal (qualified by the perceived object) and has for its domain of exclusion 'only that (= the different part that has the possibility of being superimposed in the future)'. (English translation mine.) Fukuda 2011: 62: ある [対象が現量によって] 知覚された場合であっても、普遍を対象とした分別知が他の属性 (*aṃśa*) の増益されていない [対象] に対して、*tanmātrāpoha* を活動領域 (*gocara*) として [生じる]。 (“Even in the case where a certain [object] has been perceived [through perception], a conceptual cognition whose object is a universal [arises], having for its domain *tanmātrāpoha*, with reference to an [object] on which another property (*aṃśa*) has not been superimposed.”) (English translation mine.) Eltschinger et al. 2018: 43: “The conceptual cognition [arising] with reference to something [just] perceived on which an extraneous element (*anyāṃśa*) has not been superimposed [and] which has a universal for its object, also pertains to an exclusion[, namely, the exclusion] of just this [non-superimposed extraneous element].”

from the point of view of the object of a perceptual judgment. By contrast, he establishes that inference is said to have exclusion as its object from the point of view of how one can remove an erroneous cognition which can occur with reference to a real thing.

5. Conclusion

In PV I.48 Dharmakīrti tells us that in the case of a perceptual judgment, the occurrence of determination implies the absence of superimposition. To put it in another way, perceptual judgment and superimposition are incompatible with each other. Unlike in the case of an inference, in the case of a perceptual judgment there is no chance of a prior superimposition.

Dharmakīrti defines a perceptual judgment as having exclusion as its object in the sense that the perceptual judgment arises with respect to the difference which a real thing is supposed to bear and on which no putative contradictory difference has been superimposed. According to Dharmakīrti, a perceptual judgment is described as “what has exclusion as its object” because its object is devoid of superimposition. In Dharmakīrti's theory of perception, perceptual judgment plays a critical role in sustaining the practical efficacy of a perceptual cognition. By defining perceptual judgment as having as its object the absence of superimposition, he tries to show that perceptual judgment, distinguished from a mere erroneous cognition, is a trustworthy cognition (*avisamvādiñāna*). The great significance Dharmakīrti attaches to perceptual judgment is clearly seen in his interpreting *apoha* as “lack of superimposition.”

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- PV I** Pramāṇavārttika, Chapter 1 (Svārthānumāna): See PVSV.
- PVSV(G)** Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*, ed. R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.
- PVSV(M)** Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: *Svārthānumāna-pariccheda by Dharmakīrti*, ed. D. Malvania. Varanasi 1959.
- PVSVt** Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (Tib.): D 4216, P 5717.
- PVSVṬ** Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā: *Karṇakagomin's Commentary of Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti*, ed. R. Sāṅkrtyāyana. Allahabad 1943 (repr. 1982).
- PVṬ** Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Tib.): D 4220, P 5718.
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