Patrick McAllister

RATNAKĪRTI'S PROOF OF EXCLUSION

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ISBN 978-3-7001-8400-3
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Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna 2020
Druck/Printed: Prime Rate, Budapest
https://epub.oeaw.ac.at/8400-3
https://verlag.oeaw.ac.at
Made in Europe

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Patrick McAllister

February 19, 2020
Beiträge zur Kultur und Geistesgeschichte Asiens

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1 Introduction

This book is an attempt to answer three questions about an eleventh-century Sanskrit work, the *Apohasiddhi* (henceforth *AS*) by Ratna-kīrti: in what form does this work survive, what does it say, and why does it say what it does?

These questions are to be answered, primarily from the perspective of the history of philosophy in South Asia, in a critical edition of the *AS*, in its annotated translation, and in a study of some of its main arguments. These three sections, taken each by itself, do not, however, cleanly correspond to each question. In fact, the questions cannot be answered independently of each other: judging well what the text says is difficult to do, at least in non-obvious cases, without reflection on the history that a specific argument might have had; and even the choice of readings sometimes depends on an understanding of Ratnakīrti's point (though the editorial method adopted to establish the text tries to minimize the risk of misjudgements arising from this kind of argument). In addition, the translation contains the argument for things that are not explicitly discussed in the edition of the text, e.g., the decisions about punctuation and paragraph breaks, which are not found in any of the witnesses, but are introduced to make the structure inherent in the work easier to see for modern readers. The edition (chapter 2) and the translation (chapter 3) thus answer the first and second questions. The translation, augmented by explanatory comments (section 4.1) and an analysis of the text's argumentative structure (section 4.2), and the study of the *AS* (chapter 5) try to answer the third question.

1.1 RATNAKĪRTI

Ratnakīrti (Tib. *rin chen grags pa*) was a Buddhist scholar active in the monastery of Vikramaśīla in the first half of the eleventh century CE.[1]

He was a pupil of Jñānaśrīmitra, who he refers to as his *guru* in phrases such as *"yad āhur guravaḥ"* that introduce quotations from Jñānaśrīmitra on various occasions.[2] Jñānaśrīmitra is recognized as the last Buddhist philosopher in ancient South Asia to produce major innovations.[3] Since Ratnakīrti's texts are closely based on those of his teacher and are generally more accessible due to their relative brevity and clear structure, they are an ideal way in which to first approach this phase of Buddhist thought, and to gather the main points that Ratnakīrti regarded his teacher as having made.

All of Ratnakīrti's surviving works in Sanskrit belong to the logico-epistemological tradition of Buddhism.[4] Having started with

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[1]The following presentation of the most important facts about Ratnakīrti's life, works, and intellectual environment draws on Thakur 1975a, Thakur 1987a: 29 ff., Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 7 ff., Mimaki 1976: 3 ff., and Mimaki 1992. It does not add any important new information, and the following is a synopsis of the available information. The dates of persons in the following usually follow Frauwallner 1961, unless otherwise noted.

[2]Cf. the comments in Thakur 1975a: 11 ff. The following list of these passages is based on the *viśiṣṭanāmasūcī* (the name index) in RNĀ 151 f.: SJS 27,5 (most probably referring to a verse in the lost *Sarvajñasiddhi* of Jñānaśrīmitra, see Steinkellner 1977: 384, also cf. frag. 8 on p. 388), KBhSA 72,5, KBhSV 88,3, SSD 118,23; 119,9; 118,31, CAPV 132,6; 133,16; 136,23; 138,28; 141,9; 142,28. The references to RNĀ 32, 96, 135, given under the entry *guruḥ*, do not actually contain the word *guruḥ*.

[3]Cf. the reconstruction of his status by Frauwallner (1931), and the assessments, after his works had become known, by Thakur (1987a: 29), Jong (1962: 75), and McCrea and Patil (2006: 304 ff.).

[4]See Steinkellner and Much 1995 for the most complete bibliography of the primary texts that constitute this tradition. Though the compilers of the Tibetan Buddhist canon categorized the works in the *tshad ma* (*pramāṇa*) section, it is unclear to what extent the authors in this group that wrote in Sanskrit would have identified with it. In any case, the word "tradition" here should not be understood as an exclusive label, since we have evidence that authors assigned to this tradition were very free to write or otherwise engage in other "traditions" of Buddhism.

Dignāga (late fifth to early sixth centuries), this tradition's most influential figure was Dharmakīrti (mid-sixth century), who all but eclipsed Dignāga and became the central authority for all those that followed in this tradition, including Ratnakīrti.[5]

The attribute "logico-epistemological" means that many works from this tradition centre on logical and epistemological problems (if not as the actual topic of the text, then at least as its method). The topics covered by these treatises range from the critique, description, and foundation of correct means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*s), the development and proof of ontological theories (most importantly, that of universal momentariness, *kṣaṇikatva*), and general theories of consciousness, to the possibility of omniscience and the Buddha's being a source of knowledge. Ratnakīrti is representative for this tradition because his works touch on most of these topics. In all of his works, furthermore, there is an intense engagement with non-Buddhist, and sometimes also Buddhist, opponents: this makes his works rich sources for the investigation of South Asia's intellectual history in general.

1.1.1 Previous scholarship on Ratnakīrti

Ratnakīrti's texts were amongst the first treatises on Buddhist logic and epistemology to become the subject of modern studies. The *editio princeps* of the *AS* is found in Shāstri 1910.[6] Mookerjee (1935: 125 ff.)

Ratnakīrti is a good example of this, since on the topics of *pramāṇa* he was the follower of Jñānaśrīmitra, whereas in matters of Tantric practice he was closer to Ratnākaraśānti–the 'enemy' of Jñānaśrīmitra on several key philosophical issues (see deb ther sngon po X.23a5–6, trl. in Roerich 1949–1953: 800–801, and the assessment in Mimaki 1992).

Scholars attribute at least one text surviving only in Tibetan, *mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa grags pa'i cha zhes bya ba* (**Kīrtikalā Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛttiḥ*, D: 3799, Q: 5197) to Ratnakīrti (see Tomabechi and Kano 2008 and Harter 2014).

[5]See Krasser 2012 for the dating of Dharmakīrti, against the dating to the seventh century by Frauwallner 1961.

[6]This book was reprinted as Shāstri 1989 and, for want of a better word, re-edited as Shāstri 1996. This latter publication is not very useful, because it introduced quite a few misprints, omitted some footnotes, and changed the layout, so that references to the other editions are sometimes difficult to resolve.

made an early attempt to place Ratnakīrti's *AS* in its historical and argumentative context, and was also responsible for initiating a still ongoing debate about the development of the *apoha* theory.[7] Before that, Stcherbatsky had noted about the *AS* that it was "...written in one night and, probably for this reason, lacking clearness...." (Stcherbatsky 1932 2, 404)[8]

Sāṅkṛtyāyana discovered a manuscript of Ratnakīrti's collected works in 1934 in *Zha lu ri phug*,[9] and on the 3rd of June, 1938, had pictures of that manuscript taken.[10] Anantalal Thakur published the first edition, entitled *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* (henceforth RNĀ₁), on the basis of these pictures in 1957, and a second, revised edition in 1975 (RNĀ).

Based on these sources, Ratnakīrti's works have been the subject of several studies. The most noteworthy monographs, in order of publication, are as follows:[11]

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[7]Cf. Kataoka 2009: 498–496 for a concise summary of this discussion. The hypothesis developed by Mookerjee (1935: 125 ff.) is, in a nutshell, that after Dharmakīrti the *apoha* theory was interpreted in two ways, either as primarily affirmative or as primarily negative, and that these two positions were then synthesized by Jñānaśrīmitra. The passage drawn on for this hypothesis corresponds to § 8 in the edition below. See Okada 2017 for a recent reassessment of this hypothesis.

[8]This misinterpretation of the colophon was corrected by Thakur (1957a: 13, n. 1): the point of the colophon is that a scribe copied the *AS* in a certain amount of time, not that it was composed that quickly. See below, § 62.

[9]See Kellner and Sferra 2008: 426, n. 16.

[10]The discovery of the RNĀₘₛ is described in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 25 f. The manuscript was first catalogued as item 22 (=VIII.2, sect. III) in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 29, which means it was discovered during Sāṅkṛtyāyana's 2nd expedition to Tibet, April 4th–November 10th, 1934 (cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 21 f.). Pictures of it might also have been taken between the 5th and 15th of August, 1936, according to the account in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1937: 14 f. As Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1938: 138) reports, "[l]ast time [i.e., in 1936—PMA] we took Photographs of some of these MSS., but we had failed to get good results." Manuscript P is signed and dated on the empty folio 60a by "Fany Mockerjee" (the photographer as spelt in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938: 137). The signature in fact looks more like "Fany Mookj", but the date "3/6/38" is clear.

[11]Four other books, which are of limited usefulness for the present study, should also be mentioned. Two studies concern the *AS*: Sharma 1969 and Chattopadhyay

Mimaki (1976) produced an edition, based on the manuscript used also by Thakur, P, a translation and careful study of the *Sthi-*

2002. For an appreciation of Sharma 1969, see Oberhammer 1975. Sharma 1969 provides a text based on AS₁ with corrections according to AS₂, a translation, and a study. The study, although it is very interesting insofar as it aims at a philosophically coherent restatement of Ratnakīrti's *apoha* theory, is, for that same reason, not always informative about Ratnakīrti's theories themselves. The translation seems to have missed a few important points. One example might suffice to prove this: the phrase "*tatra na buddhyākārasya tattvataḥ saṃvṛtyā vā vidhiniṣedhau, svasaṃvedanapratyakṣagamyatvād ...*" (from § 48 in the edition below) is translated as follows by Sharma (1969: 91):

> In this context, affirmation and negation are applicable to the configu-
> ration (which is a passive cognition) neither in reality, nor in internal
> feeling (for it is neither to be desired nor to be not desired), for the
> self-feeling (or the internal feeling) is produced by sense-perception.

Apart from terminological disagreements, the understanding of *saṃvṛtyā* as "in internal feeling" and the analysis of *svasaṃvedanapratyakṣagamyatva* as "the self-feeling (or the internal feeling) is produced by sense-perception" are not merely confusing but misleading (cf. § 48 for a different understanding). The proof cited for the interpretation of *saṃvṛtyā* as "in internal feeling" by Sharma (1969: 90, n. 238) is not convincing: "samvṛtyā samvṛtti = svasamvedanā [sic, PMA]. See *PVST*.[=PVSVṬ, PMA], p. 121; *PVP*. [=PVABh, PMA], p. 573: samvṛttisadeva dharmi-dharmalakṣaṇam." For the rest of the footnote he cites (and paraphrases) material from Stcherbatsky 1932 2, 385 f., n. 6 (whose note only concerns *svasaṃvedana*, but not *saṃvṛti*). Neither *svasaṃvedana* nor *saṃvṛti* is mentioned in PVSVṬ 121. Although the context of the phrase "*samvṛtisad eva dharmidharmalakṣaṇaṃ*" (PVABh 573,24) has not yet been studied as closely as it deserves, it does not seem to say more than "that which is characterized as either property or property bearer exists only conventionally".

The text edition in Chattopadhyay 2002, which draws on AS₁ and AS₃, is generally reliable. The English translation, which is rather free, suffers a bit from terminological problems that seem to stem from not having studied more recent translations of similar works in much detail, but is usually close to the mark. The present author does unfortunately not know Bengali, and so could not form an opinion of that translation.

McDermott 1969 is a monograph on the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ–vyatirekātmikā* (henceforth *KBhSV*). It did not receive much critical acclaim, cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1971 (replied to in McDermott 1972) and Steinkellner 1972. A further monograph on Ratnakīrti is Feldman and Phillips 2011. I am not aware of any scholarly reviews of this work. It has not been used here, since the sections dealing with momentariness had all been completed before its appearance.

rasiddhidūṣaṇa (henceforth *SSD*), the "Refutation of the proof of permanent [entities]."

Bühnemann (1980) translated and studied the *Sarvajñasiddhi* (henceforth *SJS*), the "Proof of an omniscient one", basing herself on SJS_1, SJS, and the manuscript used by Thakur for that edition (again, this is manuscript P).[12]

Lasic (2000b) critically edited, translated and annotated the *Vyāptinirṇaya* (henceforth *VyN*). He based his work on the same manuscript photographed by Sāṅkṛtyāyana, and also supplied an analysis of the argument structure.

Patil (2009) follows a different aim than that of the books mentioned so far. He intends to provide a more systematic account of Ratnakīrti's *Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa* (henceforth *ĪSD*). It should be called "systematic", since Patil shows how the various positions that Ratnakīrti holds on subjects such as inference, perception, awareness, and language influence the very specific arguments of the *ĪSD*. To this end, he relies mainly on the *AS*, and to a lesser degree on the *VyN*, the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ–anvayātmikā* (henceforth *KBhSA*), the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ–vyatirekātmikā* (henceforth *KBhSV*), and the *Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda* (henceforth *CAPV*). These texts are not translated in their entirety, but the main passages of the *ĪSD* and the *AS* are translated and interpreted very thoroughly. Especially with regard to the *AS*, it should be noted that Patil used the manuscripts from Nepal used also here (manuscripts N_1, N_2, N_3). Patil (2011b) also published a translation of the *AS* as a supplement to Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011. This translation is warmly recommended to the readers of the present book. The translation presented here is a rather literal one, to a large extent because its function is to support certain choices made in the Sanskrit edition (mainly those regarding punctuation and paragraph breaks). Patil's translation, on the other hand, aims to make the *AS* accessible to readers who are primarily interested in the philosophical points

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[12]One should note here also Goodman 1989, which was not available to the present author.

of the text, and not in the historical and linguistic problems that one has to surmount in order to arrive at their understanding. The present author believes not only that these two approaches are by no means mutually exclusive, but rather that they complement each other, in that the rather more elegant translation of Patil facilitates a comparatively rapid yet philosophically stringent appropriation of the main arguments of the text, whereas the present one should let a reader sense the formality and artificiality that characterize the style of composition typical of this genre (*śāstra*) of Sanskrit literature in general, as well as Ratnakīrti's logical terseness in particular. The fact that readers will have to reflect deeply on both translations to see their general agreement, as well as some small differences mainly shows how wide a range of possibilities a "translation" of this kind of text allows, and how thorough an analysis and deep a reflection Ratnakīrti and his tradition were capable of.[13]

Finally, McCrea and Patil 2010 is an edition and annotated translation of the text that Ratnakīrti's *AS* is based on, Jñānaśrīmitra's *Apohaprakaraṇa* (henceforth *AP*). In many cases, this text contains the original versions of the arguments that Ratnakīrti reproduces or summarizes. It does not, however, make the following chapters here redundant. Even though Ratnakīrti generally follows the *AP*, often verbatim, his rearrangement, presentation, and occasional clarification of its material constitutes a separate and coherent restatement of

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[13]Apart from these publications, the present book was able to draw on a number of important studies that are not easily available, and even on some that had kindly been provided to this author as drafts. Akamatsu 1983, a doctoral thesis providing an annotated translation of Jñānaśrīmitra's *AP*, is invaluable to any study of the *apoha* theory of Jñānaśrīmitra (and, by extension, Ratnakīrti). This is a pioneering work of the highest quality, and it is a matter of great regret with regard to the scholarship of Buddhist philosophy that it is not easily accessible. Even though a few of the more poetic parts of Jñānaśrīmitra's treatise have been, perhaps, not perfectly understood in this work, the main philosophical points and historical influences of the *AP* are clearly outlined.

The present author has also profited from Woo 1999, a dissertation on the *KBhSA*, from a draft of M. T. Much's German translation of the *apoha* section in *PV I* (Much 2008), as well as from a draft of Hisataka Ishida's critical edition of TS_S 866–871, including the *Pañjikā*, (Ishida 2008).

the *apoha* theory well worth its own investigation.[14] Notwithstanding the excellent translation and useful comments in McCrea and Patil 2010, Akamatsu 1983 was still found to be indispensable for the more historically oriented study here.

1.1.2 *Philosophical background of Ratnakīrti's proof of exclusion*

Before entering into the more detailed discussions of the *AS* in the following chapters, it is helpful to have an overview of the main Buddhist positions to which Ratnakīrti dedicated individual texts. This will provide the context to the often intricate individual arguments of the *AS*, as well as to the general role and position of the *AS* amongst Ratnakīrti's philosophical works.

Ratnakīrti's texts typically combine logical, epistemological and ontological considerations, and sometimes present them with a view to soteriological consequences. Throughout, the texts employ rational argumentation that is intended to be acceptable to Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, and aim to establish core Buddhist beliefs (e.g., the impermanence of existence, ignorance as the core cause for continued rebirth). In order to gain an overview of the most important topics covered by Ratnakīrti, the texts are best divided, following Thakur (1975a: 3–4), into three general groups: five works are aimed at positively arguing for a Buddhist position, three at refuting a position held by non-Buddhists, usually Naiyāyikas, and two correct the partially false views of opponents.[15] The theories relevant for fully appreciating the *AS* are all those to which Ratnakīrti dedicated

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[14]See section 1.2.2 for some of the significant changes that Ratnakīrti introduced into his discussion of the *apoha* theory.

[15] Thakur (1975a: 3–4) classifies Ratnakīrti's texts into three groups: "works refuting the views of the opponents", "works expounding various Buddhist doctrines", and "works seeking to establish the Buddhist views by refuting those of the Brahm[a]nical Hindus on topics of common interest". This differentiation somewhat obscures the fact, however, that there are only two basic dialectical situations, namely whether the Buddhist voice is the one that proves or refutes a position. The main difficulty is how to classify the *VyN* and *PABhP*. Lasic (2000b: 20) characterizes the former as only refuting the positions of opponents, though Ratnakīrti does end

individual proofs: the ontological theory of momentary cessation, the hybrid ontological and epistemological theories of exclusion and non-dual yet variegated cognition, and the epistemological theory of what yogic perception is.

Two texts, both entitled *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (lit. "Proof of Momentary Cessation"), establish, by two variants of the same inference (*anvayātmikā* and *vyatirekātmikā*), the central ontological position of the Buddhist logical-epistemological tradition: universal momentariness. The theory of momentariness states that to exist is to be momentary, whereby existence is here defined as the ability to cause an effect. Ratnakīrti starts his discussion with this proof, KBhSV 83,8–9:

> *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ. santaś cāmī vivādā-
> spadībhūtāḥ padārthā iti svabhāvahetuḥ.*

the presentation with a statement that, in consequence of these refutations, his own position is established. The *PABhP* is similarly structured, and refutes all means of valid cognition except perception and inference by showing that these others are either just a form of inference or not a means of valid cognition. It is also noteworthy that these two texts, which constitute the third group, are formally different from those of the other two groups, since they are not constructed around an inference. See section 1.1.3 for a more detailed consideration.

Ratnakīrti's preserved philosophical works are these (following the sequence of the texts in RNĀ_ms, the basis of Thakur 1957c, Thakur 1975c): *Sarvajñasiddhi*, establishing the possibility of an omniscient being, i.e., a buddha (see Bühnemann 1980); *Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa*, refuting the existence of a god who could have formed the world (see Patil 2009); *Apohasiddhi*, establishing that words refer only to the differences between things, but not to any substantially existing universal (see Patil 2009, Patil 2011b, and this book); the two *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* texts, proving, by different logical means, that real things exist only momentarily (see Feldman and Phillips 2011, McDermott 1969, Steinkellner 1972, Woo 1999); *Pramāṇāntarbhā-vaprakaraṇa*, showing that there are only the two means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) accepted by the Buddhists in Dharmakīrti's tradition, perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*); *Vyāptinirṇaya*, establishing what the "pervasion" relation, which makes inference possible, consists in according to Buddhist logicians (see Lasic 2000b); *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*, refuting the proof of temporally persistent, or non-momentary, things (see Mimaki 1976); *Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda*, teaching that what appears to cognition is a variegated, yet single image (see Moriyama 2011, Moriyama 2012); *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa*, a refutation of the existence of other people's minds (see Yūichi Kajiyama 1965).

> What exists, that is momentary, like a pot. And these
> existing objects which have become the subject of [our]
> dispute do exist. So an essence reason [is used in this
> inference].

According to this inference, momentariness is implied by existence: to exist is to be momentary, and without being momentary nothing can exist. Anything must be momentary, if it is to be real, including particulars, universals, and cognition.

This inference works because two properties, existence and momentariness, are necessarily connected. But it does not, in and of itself, explain how these properties are connected. A simplified version of the chain of arguments that Ratnakīrti uses to establish this connection is this: existence must minimally involve the capacity to produce an effect (*arthakriyāśakti*), so that anything that exists does so only insofar as it is capable of producing an effect.[16] This notion of the ability to produce an effect is itself further examined. Ratnakīrti questions whether it is the same thing that is both able to produce a present effect and capable of causing a future or past effect. His conclusion is that this cannot really be so: if the thing capable of both past, future, and present effects were the same, then why would it, in the present moment, generate only the present, but not the past or future effects? It can only do so, Ratnakīrti maintains, because it is different in all three respects: the thing capable of producing a current effect is not capable of the future or past effect, the thing which was capable of the past effect was not capable of the currently present and future effects, and the thing capable of a future effect will likewise not be capable of producing the other two effects. Ratnakīrti concludes that any (even temporal) change in the effect indicates a change in that which has the capability of producing that effect, the cause. To the extent that this capability is what it is to exist, the essence of a thing changes with each change in this capability, and

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[16]This is discussed in KBhSA 69,11–19, under the heading that "the reason, existence, is not unestablished" (*tatra na tāvad ayam asiddho hetuḥ*). See Woo 1999: 143–145 for a closer analysis of this passage.

the notion of any essential identity continuing throughout different states of causal capacity must be dropped.

A consequence of this argument is that this change in capacity must happen in the shortest possible time that it can happen in (a *kṣaṇa*, or moment): if a thing were identically the same at two different times, in the above sense of being capable of producing the temporally identical effect at two different times, then it would be impossible to explain why it produces that effect at one of those times, but not at the other. The only possible options are that it produces that effect at neither of the two times, and thus cannot be classified as causally active at those times, and, hence, cannot be real, or else that it would produce that effect at both times. The first possibility excludes the thing from the realm of existence, and the investigation can end there. The second possibility, however, is refuted by everyday experience (a seed does not produce the same sprout twice, just as a hammer does not destroy the same pot twice). The only alternative that is left is that, between the two moments, the thing has undergone a change in its causal capacity: it has turned from something that cannot produce said effect into something that can. And if this change happened in any amount of time longer than necessary, there would be the same problem: a thing, once having entered into a continuous state, where two subsequent moments have the same causal capacity, cannot break out of this state anymore. It must forever produce either the exact same effect, or (if there is no capacity in both moments) have ceased to exist altogether.

For Ratnakīrti, the notion of a thing's identity at two moments is thus the strictest one: even the difference in a thing's causal capacity allows him to see this identity as being violated.

A problem arises from our common-sense notions of temporally persistent objects: it would seem to be an unshakeable fact that a desk that existed yesterday exists also today and, in normal circumstances, will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. How can everyday activity proceed without this assumption?

Ratnakīrti's answer to this question has two parts, an ontological one and an epistemological one. The ontological part of the

answer draws on a consequence that is only implicit in the arguments presented so far. The analysis of causal capacity has shown that a thing is able to produce an effect when it produces the effect at the present time. This entails, as explicated above, that the thing cannot produce future or past effects without changing its capacity, and so its essential nature; but such a causal capacity also entails that a thing must *always* produce an effect *immediately*. If a thing were to not produce an immediate effect in any given moment, no further effects could manifest in moments following that one. It is easiest to think of a temporally extended object, as opposed to a momentary thing, as a chain of cause-effect links. Any missing link would break the chain, with the result that the following (future) causes do not arise. This chain is called a continuum, *santāna*, by Buddhist epistemologists like Ratnakīrti.

Such a continuum has several noteworthy features. First, it is constituted of real, and thus momentary, things (*vastu*), such that each thing at a given point in a continuum is the effect of the thing in the previous moment of the continuum and the cause of another thing in the following moment. Each real thing exists only for the shortest time necessary to effect anything, on pain of either constantly producing the same effect or not ever producing any effect at all. This is the final analysis of cause and effect, and anything that really exists must be so constituted. Second, it provides Buddhist epistemologists with a notion of objective difference: each moment in each continuum is absolutely different from each other moment in each other continuum. However, this difference of moments decreases with increased proximity, a moment being less different from another moment the "closer" the other moment is to the current moment. Proximity is here judged by causal proximity in a cause-effect continuum. A proximity so derived harmonizes well with common-sense notions of identity: the cow called Spotty, on the meadow now, is less different from the cow Spotty in the barn this morning than it is from the other cows on the meadow now or in the barn this morning.[17] A

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[17] This also allows a fairly elegant distinction of natural classes that avoids the

third feature of the continuum is that such an objective difference includes the possibility of substantial changes, as in the case of a seed becoming (or, more precisely, causing) a sprout. Similar appearance is possible on this account, and perhaps an important standard case; yet one cannot call the seed moment and the sprout moment similar in the same way that one might want to say the cow this morning and the cow now have a very similar appearance. Yet, in terms of the Buddhist analysis of the cause and effect relations, there is no important difference between the two situations: in both cases, the earlier moment is one link in the causal chain that the latter belongs to, and in this sense the two moments are less different from each other than they are from links in other chains, though this might not be apparent.

This judgement of proximity, and in many cases similarity, in the face of increasing difference is the epistemological part of the answer that Ratnakīrti gives in order to explain how temporally extended objects are possible. For Ratnakīrti, as for Jñānaśrīmitra, the preferred term for this judgement is *adhyavasāya*. The explanation of this term is a central topic both in the *AS* and in the *CAPV*. For the purposes of this introduction, a rough sketch of its main functions will suffice.

The *AS* provides an analysis of how "determination" works in the somewhat limited context of proving the Buddhist tenet that words do not refer to real universals, but only to an insubstantial "exclusion of others" (*anyāpoha*), or, in other words, to relative non-differences attributed to things which, on closer analysis, must be said to be completely different from each other. These non-differences are insubstantial in that they are only relational, but not real, properties that things have. That they are not "real" must here be understood in the sense that is particular to Buddhists following Dharmakīrti: something is unreal if it is not capable of producing an effect. The

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assumption of any similarity in essence: the calf born from a particular cow is less different from that cow than it is from things not born from that cow. And insofar as cows are less different from each other than from other animals, anything born from a cow will be less different from any other calf than from what is not born from a cow.

theory of *apoha* thus posits a negative substitute for any real sameness between things and is often understood to be the basis for nominalist tendencies in this group of Buddhist logico-epistemological scholars. This theory explains how conceptual cognition can work in a world defined by this Buddhist ontology, i.e., in the absence of any temporal, and hence essential, identity of existing things: any conceptual cognition (which all verbal cognitions are a subset of) has an *apoha* as its object and is erroneous by nature, determining its object as existing externally and continuously, when in fact it does not; this kind of cognition can be "true" only in the sense that it allows successful behaviour with regard to an agent's aims, but not in the sense that it presents reality how it is. The *AS* defends "exclusion" by showing its conformance to various functions fulfilled by real universals as accepted by the Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka authors.

A further consequence of this notion of universals is that there is no fundamental difference between universals that qualify objects, such as cowness or existence, and these objects themselves, such as a cow or a pot: they all are simply variant results of the same generalizing error, in the first case leading to the notion of classes of objects, and in the second to the notion of an object with a certain temporal persistence. It is fundamental to understand that, for Ratnakīrti, *any* term, including "this", is a general term.[18]

The *CAPV* ostensibly presents the teaching that any cognition has a variegated, yet non-dual objective form. Under this rather technical heading, Ratnakīrti finds the opportunity to present the general epistemological issues that are central to his and his teacher's philosophical positions: apart from laying the foundation for the idealism typical of the Yogācāra strand of Buddhism (*cittamātra*), the circle of existence (*saṃsāra*) is analysed as the result of determination (*adhyavasāya*), the fundamentally erroneous cognition that continuously mistakes a particular thing for a general one and thus enables the everyday activities that tie living beings into *saṃsāra*. The riddance of this error is conceived of as liberation (*mokṣa*). Together with

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[18]See footnote 106 for some background on this.

the theory developed in the *AS*, determination thus appears as the fundamental philosophical concern. It enables the interaction of unenlightened beings with a world that is, ontologically, constituted only of momentary appearances, by judging them to be external and temporally extended objects. This error, common to all these beings, is the foundation for any use of concepts. Simultaneously, it is the most important manifestation of the deep-rooted nescience that afflicts all unenlightened beings and cannot be intentionally suspended, according to Buddhist doctrine; as such, determination is the driving force of transmigratory existence. Accordingly, the destruction of determination is liberation from this transmigratory existence, and hence the definition of *nirvāṇa*.

The last of Ratnakīrti's texts of proof to consider here is the *SJS*. In the main manuscript of Ratnakīrti's works (RNĀ$_{\text{ms}}$), the *SJS* has the prominent first position. But it is unclear whether this reflects a sequence intended by Ratnakīrti, since the texts' contents do not suggest any systematic arrangement.[19] The *SJS* seeks to establish the possibility of an omniscient being against the background of the detailed ontological and epistemological system just outlined. It differentiates between the fundamentally erroneous, conceptual cognition called determination, and the principally accurate, direct perception, and suggests a way to transform merely conceptual cognition into a direct realization of what is so cognized. The means to accomplish this is a faculty called "yogic perception" (*yogipratyakṣa*), a form of perception that is not necessarily based on any sense organ.[20] Ratnakīrti, as is typical for his tradition,[21] distinguishes two kinds of omniscience: total omniscience, the knowledge of absolutely everything, and omniscience without further qualification, which is the knowledge of everything that is needed for enlightenment. Whilst

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[19]Cf. Thakur 1975a: 3.

[20]Cf. SJS 16,28–17,8, translated in Bühnemann 1980: 46–47. Steinkellner (1977: 384), elaborating on a first observation by Thakur (1957a: 11), noted that the main section of Ratnakīrti's *SJS* is, in fact, not based only on Jñānaśrīmitra's lost work of the same name, but also on the *Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇa*.

[21]Cf. Bühnemann 1980: ix.

Ratnakīrti does hold that a buddha is omniscient in the first sense, the bulk of his *SJS* is concerned with proving the possibility of a being that is omniscient in the latter sense. This kind of omniscience has the Buddha's four noble truths as its objects: whilst these truths are first known to practitioners as statements, and hence only in conceptual cognitions, omniscience consists in making them as clear as if they were directly experienced or perceived. Omniscience is thus characterized both in terms of its content, the four noble truths, and in terms of its appearance or cognitive status, as a clear image or perception of that object.

The following paragraph from the *CAPV* illustrates how Ratna-kīrti combines all the different concerns that have just been outlined. The passage presents epistemological issues, some of which are central also to the *AS*, as they relate to Buddhist soteriology:

> *CAPV 137,9–16: tathā hi samanantarapratyayabalāyā-tasvapratibhāsaviśeṣavedanamātrād agṛhīte 'pi paratra pravṛttyākṣepo 'dhyavasāyaḥ.*
>
> *na cāsau pūrvoktavāgjālaiḥ pratihantuṃ śakyaḥ, sarva-prāṇabhṛtāṃ pratyātmaviditatvāt, kaiścid apy anudbhi-nnatvāt. ayam eva ca saṃsāras tatkṣayo mokṣa iti kvedā-nīm eva tadvārtāpi.*
>
> *tathā hi vicitrānādivāsanāvaśāt prabodhakapratyayavi-śeṣāpekṣayā vikalpaḥ kenacid ākāreṇopajāyamāna eva bahirmukhapravṛttyanukūlam arthakriyāsmaraṇābhilā-ṣādiprabandham ādhatte.*
>
> *tataḥ puruṣārthakriyārthino bahirarthānurūpāṇi pra-vṛttinivṛttyavadhāraṇāni bhavanti, pṛthagjanasantāna-jñānakṣaṇānāṃ tādṛśo hetuphalabhāvasya niyatatvāt.*
>
> For it is so: Based on the mere knowledge of a particular appearance of [cognition] itself, which is attained by the power of an immediately [preceding] apprehension, determination incites activity toward something else, even though [that is] not grasped.

But this cannot be rejected by the nets of earlier state-
ments,[22] because every breathing being knows [this in-
citement to activity] for itself, [and] because [this activity]
is not broken through by any [of these beings]. And ex-
actly this [determination] is the circle of existence, [and]
its destruction [is] liberation. So where is there now even
news of this [error of immediate liberation]?

For it is so: a conceptual cognition, simply in arising with
a certain form in dependence on a particular condition
awakening [this conceptual cognition] because of var-
iegated impressions that have no beginning, receives a
[certain] connection to causal efficacy, [such as] a memory
[of it], a desire [for it], and so on, which is conducive to
activity towards an external object.

Because of this, there exist restrictions for the positive
and negative activities that correspond to the external
things for someone aiming to bring about human aims,
because, for the moments [making up] the continuous flow
of an unenlightened being, the causal relation [between
two moments in that flow] in such a way, [i.e., as allowing
activity towards an external thing], is fixed.

An adequate understanding of this passage will be possible only
after having studied the *AS* and its background. For now, it will
suffice to highlight its most important aspects: they outline the range
of philosophical problems that Ratnakīrti was engaged with, and
an important subset of these problems is constituted by the topics
considered in the *AS*.

The first sentence roughly defines determination (*adhyavasāya*):
it is the cognitive function that prompts a person to act towards a
"something else" (*paratra*), something that is not actually grasped by
cognition; what is in fact grasped is only a particular appearance of

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[22]This refers back to the various other explanations of *adhyavasāya* that were
discussed and rejected in CAPV 133 ff. See Kataoka 2017b and McAllister 2017a for
details on these other options.

awareness itself. Ratnakīrti thus characterizes determination as an error, a deficient form of cognition insofar as what it shows, its own form, is not the same as that towards which it directs the activity of normal, that is, unenlightened, persons or beings.

Ratnakīrti calls this error, the determination of cognition's appearance to itself, *saṃsāra*, the circle in which all unenlightened beings wander from one existence to the next. The release from this circle, *mokṣa*, is occasioned by the destruction of determination. Ratnakīrti thus explains two soteriological notions central not only to Buddhism, but to most of South Asia's religious traditions,—*saṃsāra* and the liberation from it–in epistemological terms. Ignorance (*avidyā*), the first and foremost cause for suffering in the Buddhist analysis of *saṃsāra*, is not so much defined in terms of its content as by its structure: it is the erroneous, deeply ingrained belief that there are objects which are external to the mind and persist temporally. The determination of "the forms of cognition" (*buddhyākāra*) in this way is what constitutes *saṃsāra*.

Ratnakīrti's further exposition introduces several other terms that reinforce this interpretation: the most prominent are *vikalpa*, *pravṛtti*, and *arthakriyā*, which, in this combination, are unmistakably indebted to Dharmakīrti.

The concept of *arthakriyā*, that something produces an effect which satisfies an agent's aim, is Dharmakīrti's touchstone of reality: only real things can produce an effect, and to produce an effect is to be a real thing. This causal efficacy is the ultimate aim of any agent acting with foresight, and the achievement of which decides whether an act was successful or not.

Causal efficacy also decides whether a cognition is correct or not, insofar as its regular attainment by certain cognitions allows us to classify them as means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). If cognitions do not lead to activity that reliably results in such a satisfaction, then they cannot be counted as a means of valid cognition.

Conceptual cognitions play a pivotal role for activity: even though not all conceptual cognitions, but only inferences, are means of valid cognitions, all means of valid cognitions need conceptual cognitions

to result in activity. The reason that conceptual cognitions are always required is that activity of the kind that engages with mind-external, temporally persistent objects can, in general, not occur without a generalized concept that guides it. The result of inference is un-problematic in this regard: it is a determinate cognition that (at least in the cases usually considered by Ratnakīrti) has an object determined in such a way, meaning that it has an object that is imagined as temporally extended and not identical with cognition itself. Perception, however, is different; it differs from conceptual cognition in that it is not erroneous, and shows reality as it is. Pre-cisely for this reason, however, it is also useless, in and of itself, for generating such activity as characterizes our everyday life. If perception were not distorted by a conceptual cognition following it, one would not act at all: an unenlightened being would simply be a passive recipient of sensory impressions that remain uninterpreted. It is for this reason that determinations are at the centre of the Buddhist analysis of everyday activity; without them, it could not even exist. Determination mistakenly externalizes and generalizes what appears in it, mistakenly construing one thing, the immediately present, unrepeatable particular form that cognition has, as another, *viz.* a repeatable entity; it is this double object of conceptual cognition that is the subject of the *AS*.

This passage further specifies that the moments of the cognitive continuum constituting a being are related to each other as cause and effect. This is, broadly speaking, a causal theory of the mind. The conceptual cognitions that arise and enable activity are thus causally determined. The preceding cognitions, along with mnemonic imprints, habits, and other factors, result in determinations that guide and cause activity. Whilst each of these factors becomes efficacious in causal terms, it does not quite mean that they are fully determined like a merely mechanical cascade of domino stones; rather, they are part of a complex of causal relations that, as a whole, can change. This complex can change quite fundamentally, so Ratnakīrti, in that the core element in everyday activity, determination, can end, and liberation can be attained in this manner.

1.1.3 Ratnakīrti's style

In order to fully appreciate Ratnakīrti's works, one has to be aware of several stylistic features that characterize them.[23] Regarding the level of composition, the passage from the *CAPV* illustrates one of these characteristics of Ratnakīrti's writings: he will silently use material from his teacher, Jñānaśrīmitra, embedding it into the context of his own text with only minor changes. In this example, the explanation given with the sentences *tathā hi vicitrānādivāsanāvaśāt ... niyatatvāt* corresponds nearly verbatim to a passage from the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* (henceforth *SāSiŚā*), SāSiŚā 393,10–14. Whereas in this case it is difficult to judge whether the argument has been repurposed by Ratnakīrti because the source text, the *SāSiŚā*, is not well understood, for the *AS* the situation is usually clearer, because Akamatsu 1983 and McCrea and Patil 2010 provide a good understanding of the *AS*'s basis, the *AP*.

Ratnakīrti's style of writing has been characterized as quite distinctive by several scholars. As mentioned above, Stcherbatsky (1932) considered the *AS* to be very unclear. Thakur (1957a: 14) draws on the conspicuous unity of "style and [...] mode of argument in all these ten works [...]" to argue that Ratnakīrti is the author also of those texts in the manuscript that do not explicitly name him as such, and notes that "[t]he tracts of Ratnakīrti are written in a style that is more common to neo-logic than in the old system." Steinkellner (1977: 385), furthermore, has drawn attention to the fact that Ratnakīrti "is using the logical forms in the macro-structure of his texts."

A short look at the table of contents of the *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* shows that the titles of the texts share only a few different endings: four end in °*siddhi*, three end in °*dūṣaṇa*, and one each ends in °*prakaraṇa*, °*nirṇaya*, and °*vāda*.[24] A detailed investigation of the argument structure of each of these texts is beyond the scope of the

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[23]Thakur (1975a: 5) already observed that the "[...] tracts of Ratnakīrti are written in a style that is more common in neo-logic than in the old system."

[24]See also footnote 15.

current work, but even a superficial examination of their outlines reveals that, except for the *SSD*, all the °*siddhi* and °*dūṣaṇa* texts, as well as the *CAPV*, show an inferential structure in the sense that, first, the whole text is structured around a "guiding inference" and, second, each major section of the text corresponds to one of the possible logical deficiencies of that inference (these are the "logical forms" mentioned in Steinkellner 1977: 385; see table 1.1).

The *VyN* and *Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa* (henceforth *PABhP*) do not show this structure: they both consist mainly of refutations of various opposing theories, thus establishing (*ex negativo*) that the Buddhist position is the correct one. The main distinction of these texts from the other two kinds is, as Thakur (1975a: 4) appears to imply, that they focus on "topics of common interest." They are here classified as correcting false views on these topics, that is, pervasion and the number and nature of acceptable means of valid cognition. The *SSD*, the third text that does not conform to the inferential structure, focuses on the various proofs that non-Buddhists employed to establish things with temporal extension, and is explicitly linked by Ratnakīrti to the inferential establishment of momentariness.[25] The *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa* (henceforth *SAD*) is formally somewhat different from the other texts with regard to a guiding inference: the opponent's position is not presented in the form of an actual inference, but in the form of a description of the elements that would make an inference proving the existence of other minds valid.[26] The *SAD* is therefore listed in table 1.1 as "practically" having a guiding inference. The text is, furthermore, introduced by Ratnakīrti as concerned with investigating the existence or non-existence of other mental continua

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[25]See SSD 128,8: *tathā ca kṣaṇabhaṅgasaṃdehe sattvādyanumānaṃ prāptāvasaram* ("But if, according to this [way in which the proof of temporally extended things has been destroyed], there is doubt about momentary cessation, the proof [of momentariness based on] existence and so on has gained [the right] opportunity [to be employed].") For an outline of the *SSD*, see Mimaki 1976: 11.

[26]See SAD 145,7–11, and the paraphrase in Yūichi Kajiyama 1965: 431–432. Yūichi Kajiyama (1965: n. 14, 431–432) notes that "[t]his argument is similar to that of the Sautrāntika found in the very beginning of Dharmakīrti's *Saṃtānāntarasiddhi*", but adds that in the SAD the speaker is a Vijñānavādin.

Table 1.1 – Ratnakīrti's texts: types and inferential structure

Title	Type	Guiding inference?
Sarvajñasiddhiḥ	**siddhi**	yes
Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇam	**dūṣaṇa**	yes
Apohasiddhiḥ	**siddhi**	yes
Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ-Anvayātmikā	**siddhi**	yes
Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ-Vyatirekātmikā	**siddhi**	yes
Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇam	corrective	no
Vyāptinirṇayaḥ	corrective	no
Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇam	**duṣaṇa**	no
Citrādvaitaprakāśavādaḥ	**siddhi**	yes
Santānāntaradūṣaṇam	**duṣaṇa**	practically

after non-duality has been established, that is, after the work of the *CAPV* has been done.

The *CAPV* illustrates how Ratnakīrti uses an inference and its possible problems to structure his texts. It is constructed around this central inference (the outline of the *CAPV* is summarized in table 1.2):

> CAPV 129,22–24: *yat prakāśate tad ekam, yathā citrākā-racakramadhyavartī nīlākāraḥ. prakāśate cedaṃ gaura-gāndhāramadhurasurabhisukumārasātetarādivicitrā-kārakadambakam iti svabhāvahetuḥ.*
>
> What appears [to cognition], that is one, like the form of blue occurring in the middle of a circle of various forms. And this collection (*kadambaka*) of various forms, such as white (*gaura*), the sound "ga" (*gāndhāra*), sweet (*madhura*), fragrant (*surabhi*), soft (*sukumāra*), pleasure and its opposite (*sātetara*), etc. appears. [This is a proof using] an essence-reason.

Similarly, as shown by Woo (1999: 126 ff.; 141 f.), the *KBhSA* is structured around the following inference, KBhSA 67,7–8: *"yat sat tat*

Table 1.2 – General outline of the *Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda*

Topic	Logical category	Start	End	≈ % of whole
maṅgalaśloka		129.05	129.06	0.06
Main topic of text		129.07	129.11	0.25
Introductory objection and answer		129.12	129.21	0.56
Central inference	*anumāna*	129.22	129.24	0.13
Discussion of *hetu* in general	*asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika*	129.25	130.32	**6.69**
Discussion of *hetu* (relation to *vipakṣa*)	*sādhāraṇānaikāntika or sandigdhavyatirekin*	130.33	141.08	**67.19**
Verses from Jñānaśrīmitra	(same as previous)	141.09	141.29	1.25
Discussion of *dṛṣṭānta*	*viruddhadharma*	141.30	143.05	**10.94**
Closing discussion		143.06	144.30	7.75

kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ, santaś cāmī vivādāspadībhūtāḥ padārthā iti." For the *SJS*, the main structure at least of the first part of the text is entitled "Der Beweis und seine Verteidigung" by Bühnemann (1980: XXIX ff.), i.e., the formal proof and its defence. But the next two sections are also closely related to this inference: sections 2 and 3 consist of a systematic defence against accusations that what the inference is about (the *pakṣa*) or the reason used in it (*hetu*) suffer from faults that would make this inference invalid.[27] Lastly, the *AS* itself also uses this structure (see section 4.2.1), although it is less rigidly governed by it than any of the other °*siddhi* texts.[28]

A second distinctive feature of Ratnakīrti's texts is that they are, to a large extent, a rearrangement of other texts, mainly those of his teacher's.[29] For the text edited below, at least 75% is taken verbatim from Jñānaśrīmitra's *AP*.

A final point to note is that, even though Ratnakīrti organized his texts around the logical relations of various positions to a central inference, he always presented these positions as spoken discussions, in a manner typical for Sanskrit *śāstra*. In this context, Thakur observed for all the works contained in *RNĀ* that "the discussion

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[27]According to Bühnemann (1980: XXX–XLV), sections 2 and 3 are: "Verteidigung der Möglichkeit einer Schlußfolgerung überhaupt" (SJS 3,30–6,21) and "Polemik" (SJS 6,22–31,11), i.e., the defence of the possibility of an inference concerning the existence of an enlightened person, and a section refuting the opponents' attempts to disprove this reasoning. On section 2, Bühnemann (1980: 101, n. 62) notes: "Es folgen nun Einwände gegen den Beweis der Existenz des Allwissenden im allgemeinen [...] und gegen die Beschränkung des Beweises auf den Beweis des alles für die Erlösung Nützliche Wissenden [...].". With regard to section 3, Bühnemann (1980: 106, n. 102) says: "[Es ...] folgt nun eine ausgedehnte Polemik [...]. Ein den Allwissenden aufhebendes Erkenntnismittel könnte seine Nichtexistenz beweisen bzw. seine Existenz widerlegen." Cf. also Steinkellner 1977.

[28]It might be helpful for a chronology of Ratnakīrti's works to remember that of all of Ratnakīrti's °*siddhi* texts (*SJS*, *AS*, *KBhSA*, *KBhSV*, as well as *CAPV*, cf. the classification in Thakur 1975a: 3–4), the *AS* has two specific characteristics within that group: it is the only text that has the inference summing up its main purpose at its end, and it is least strictly built around that inference.

[29]The textual evidence for this can be found in the editions, see the discussion by Bühnemann (1980: §1 III f.), and the edition in Lasic 2000b and the present edition.

is started just in the way of a formal debate, as if the opponent is present before the author." (Thakur 1957a: 14)[30] This applies also to the *AS*.

1.2 THE *APOHASIDDHI*

1.2.1 Title of the Apohasiddhi

According to the colophon of manuscript P, the title of the text is *Apohaprakaraṇa*, the same as Jñānaśrīmitra's work on the same subject (AP). All the other manuscripts support the name *Apohasiddhi*. Since Ratnakīrti himself refers to the *AS* as "...*iti apohasiddhau prasādhitam*" ("...so it is fully established in the *Apohasiddhi*") in SSD 122,18–19, preference is given to the title *Apohasiddhi*.

1.2.2 Characteristics of the Apohasiddhi

Ratnakīrti does not say what kind of text the *AS* is supposed to be. The first impression certainly is that it is little more than a condensed version of Jñānaśrīmitra's *Apohaprakaraṇa*, or even only a rearrangement of passages from that work.[31] But a closer examination reveals at least two interesting points of difference between the *AS* and the *AP*. First, Ratnakīrti, at least in the *AS*, does not use Jñānaśrīmitra's interpretatorial technique of "a conditionally adopted position (*vyavasthā*)" (Patil 2007: 598), whereby certain theories can be provisionally accepted "for only specific and philosophically legitimate purposes" (Patil 2007: 603), just to be abandoned or at least

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[30]At least the *CAPV* is an exception to this rule, however. It starts with the statement of Ratnakīrti's own claim and various other views (CAPV 129,7–21), presents the central inference (CAPV 129,22–24), and then starts a discussion of this inference. SJS 1,1–1,17 also conforms to Thakur's statement (see the translation in Bühnemann 1980: 1–2), since Ratnakīrti opens this work with a dialogue between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti.

[31]Cf. the remarks in Lasic 2000b for examples of differences between Jñānaśrīmitra's *VC* and Ratnakīrti's *VyN*, and cf. Thakur 1975a: 12 for a general assessment, as well as the beginning of McAllister 2015.

substantially altered when those purposes change.[32] The central term used by Jñānaśrīmitra in this context is *vyavasthā*. In the *AS*, this connotation of the term cannot be found, and it simply means definition or classification.[33] A second noticeable difference lies in the arrangement of the texts. The *AP* is organized according to the introductory verse, as has been shown by Akamatsu (1983: 35–38) and Katsura (1986: 179, n. 15). The *AS* is arranged according to more "logical" principles, in particular according to the requirements of the inference found at its end (§§ 54–58).[34]

As pointed out by Thakur (1975a: 12), Ratnakīrti states his intention in writing texts comparable to the *AS* at the end of the *SJS* and at the beginning of the *ĪSD*, SJS 31,24–27 and ĪSD 32,5–8 respectively:

> *durvāraprativādivikramam anādṛtya pramāprauḍhitaḥ*
>   *sarvajño jagadekacakṣur udagād eṣa prabhāvo 'tra*
>   *ca /*
> *sambuddhasthitimedinīkulagirer asmadguroḥ kin tv a-*
>   *yaṃ saṃkṣepo mama ratnakīrtikṛtinas tadvista-*
>   *ratrāsinaḥ //*

> Disregarding the strength of opponents who are hard to repress, through the full development of [his] means of valid cognition, this omniscient one, the single eye of the world, arose. And the mastery over this [subject, omniscience,] is [that] of my revered teacher, [who, like] the chief mountain [upholding] the earth, [upholds] the teaching of the fully enlightened one. But this compendium of mine, the scholar Ratnakīrti's, [is meant] for [the person] fearful of [my teacher's] extensive treatise.[35]

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[32]Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006 and Patil 2007 for two excellent studies on this technique.

[33]Cf. for instance the arguments in 4 and 15.

[34]This point has been argued in the study of the *AS*, cf. section 5.1. This general stylistic mark of Ratnakīrti's works, that the logical categories are used as structuring devices, was first observed by Thakur (1957a: 13, n. 1, and pp. 14 f.).

[35]Cf. also the German translation by Bühnemann (1980: 90):

> *sūktaratnāśrayatvena jitaratnākarād idam /*
> *guror vāgambudheḥ smartuṃ kiñcid ākṛṣya likhyate //*
> *rītiḥ sudhānidhir iyaṃ sattame madhyavartini /*
> *vidveṣiṇi viṣajvālā kiñcijjñe tu na kiñcana //*

Having retrieved some [jewels] to remember from that ocean of words, the revered teacher, who has surpassed [that] mine of jewels, [the ocean], by [himself] being a repository of jewels that are [his] beautiful expressions, this [treatise] is written.[36]

This stream [of words] is a reservoir of nectar for a venerable one occupying the centre, [it is] a poisonous torch for a hostile one, but [it is] nothing at all for someone knowing a little.

To these passages one should add the verses introducing the *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* and the *Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda*, SSD 112,4–5 and CAPV 129,5–6 respectively:

> *yadyogād andhavad viśvaṃ saṃsāre bhramad iṣyate /*
> *sā kṛpāvaśagaiḥ pāpā sthirasiddhir apāsyate //*

Respektlos vor der Stärke der schwer abzuwehrenden Gegner ist durch (seine) Vollendung in der richtigen Erkenntnis dieser Allwissende, die Sonne der Welt, hervorgetreten.

Und die Überlegenheit mit Bezug auf diesen (Gegenstand) gebührt meinem Lehrer, dem Kontinentgebirge der Erde, auf der ein vollkommen Erleuchteter (seinen) Wohnsitz genommen hat;

diese Zusammenfassung aber kommt mir, dem fromm-gelehrten Ratnakīrti zu, der des (Lehrers) Ausführlichkeit vermeiden will.

I thank Harunaga Isaacson and Toru Tomabechi for discussing this verse with me in March 2019.

[36]The word *ratnākara* is commonly used to refer to the ocean (see PW VI: 252 f.). Acc. to McCrea and Patil (2010: 3), *ratnākara* in the phrase *jitaratnākarād* should be understood also as an allusion to Ratnākaraśānti, a Buddhist contemporary and opponent (in certain epistemological matters) of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. The second meaning of the phrase would be that Jñānaśrīmitra "has surpassed [his opponent] Ratnākaraśānti" with his literary compositions.

> That wicked proof of permanence, in consequence of which the whole world, as if blind, is assumed to be wandering in the course of existence, is driven away by those under the power of compassion.[37]

> *dig eṣā svaparāśeṣaprativādiprasādhanī /*
> *citrādvaitamatābodhadhvāntastomakadarthinī //*

> This short instruction overpowers all opponents, whether internal or external,[38] [and] repels the mass of ignorance [that is due] to not knowing the doctrine of variegated non-duality (*citrādvaita*).[39]

From these verses, even though the above translations are far from secure, the following intentions can be attributed to Ratnakīrti's texts: they intend to restate the main points of Jñānaśrīmitra's much longer treatises, they should abolish wrong opinions, held by internal (Buddhist) and external (non-Buddhist) opponents, they should strengthen correct opinions, and, through this, they should aid in deliverance from the cycle of existence. Apart from their being summaries, Ratnakīrti's texts thus reflect the apologetic and polemical motivations (or causes) driving the epistemological tradition that Eltschinger (2012: 473–479) portrays; there is the apologetic aspect that shows how enlightenment and liberation are achievable, even though, by the simple measure of the amount of text dedicated to these issues, they are not the central concerns of these texts. The polemic aspect of refuting both Buddhist and non-Buddhist views that might hinder liberation is ubiquitous.

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[37]Cf. Mimaki 1976: 83: "Il est admis que quiconque est d'accord avec cette [preuve] erre dans la transmigration (*saṃsāra*) comme un aveugle. Aussi, cette fausse preuve de permanence [des choses] est-elle rejetée par ceux qui sont sous l'empire de la compassion (*kṛpā*)."

[38]I.e., whether they are Buddhists or not.

[39]The late Dr. Abhijit Ghosh, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, gave me his very helpful opinion on this verse in May 2009.

1.2.3 Persons and texts mentioned in the Apohasiddhi

The following texts and persons (or groups of persons) are mentioned by name in the *Apohasiddhi* and its colophon (§ 61 and following):

Persons.
- Dharmottara: § 50 (referring to the *Apohaprakaraṇa* (henceforth *DhAP*))
- Followers of Kumārila (i.e., Sucaritamiśra): § 24
- Ratnakīrti: § 60
- Trailokyadatta (scribe): § 62
- Trilocana: § 38
- Vācaspati: § 9, § 21, § 23, § 29 (all references to *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyaṭīkā* (henceforth *NVTṬ*))
- Vidhivādin: § 8
- Pratiṣedhavādin: § 8[40]

Texts.
- *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*: § 30 and § 43.
- *Śāstra*: § 27.

1.3 MANUSCRIPTS OF THE *APOHASIDDHI*

Five of six[41] known manuscripts of the *AS* have been used for this edition:

1. Manuscript K:[42]

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[40]Unnamed persons are referred to in the following paragraphs: § 4, § 30 (Bhāsarvajña), § 37, § 40 (probably Trilocana), § 41 (probably Trilocana), § 54. References to the Siddhāntin are found in § 7 and § 37.

[41]Two manuscripts were used in Shāstri 1910 for the first modern edition of the *AS*: The first is manuscript "G 4711" in the collection of the Asiatic Society in Kolkata (cf. Shāstri 1917: 32 f.). This is manuscript K in the present edition. The other manuscript (Ś) was in Shāstri's private possession, and it was not available to the author.

[42]These keys to the entries are used to reference the source in the critical apparatus.

- This is manuscript number "G 4711" in the collection of the Asiatic Society in Kolkata (cf. the description in Shāstri 1917: 32 f.).
- Its script is characterized by Shāstri (1917: 32) as Bengali of the 12th century.

2. Manuscript P:
   - This manuscript was available as copies of the prints catalogued as "Xc 14/26" in the *Sammlung des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde in Göttingen* (Collection of the Seminar for Indology and Buddhist studies in Göttingen).[43] This manuscript is reported by Bandurski (1994: 60) to be in Beijing, under the signature "Pek.-L., Nr. 52–58.", and is described in Bandurski 1994: 58 ff.
   - The text of the *Apohasiddhi* is found on folios 32b–36b. The manuscript was discovered by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in *Zha lu ri phug* during his second expedition to Tibet.[44] In his note on the manuscript he called the script Purāṇa-maithilī, which he seems to have used synonymously with Nevārī and Vartula.[45] Thakur (1975a: 11) states that the manuscript convolute of which the *Apohasiddhi* is a part "...consists of eighty-six folia in clear Maithil script of *circa* 1200 A.D."[46]
   - This manuscript is the basis of the editions AS$_2$ and AS$_3$.

3. Manuscripts N$_1$, N$_2$, and N$_3$ were microfilmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project (NGMPP). Their microfilm numbers in the Nepal-German Manuscript Cataloguing

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[43] For details on this collection, cf. Bandurski 1994: 15 ff., and see Kellner 2007: 19 for how copies of the prints came to Vienna.

[44] Cf. the comments in footnote 10.

[45] For discussions of this script see Bandurski 1994: 20; 58 f., Dimitrov 2002: 29 ff., and Ishida 2011a: xxvi–xxxiii.

[46] Kellner (2007: 21) gives a succinct overview of the various classifications of the very similar script in JNĀ$_{ms}$.

Project (NGMCP) are A109/12, D35/1, and A117/7, respectively. The descriptions given on their scanned catalogue cards are as follows (my additions are in square brackets, the values are written in Devanāgarī on the cards of manuscripts N_1 and N_3):

- Manuscript N_1, corresponding to NGMCP: A109/12 and written in Newari:
    - *[Number, probably of the microfilm]*: *A109/12*
    - *Subject: bauddhadarśana*
    - *Manuscript-Name: apohasiddhiḥ*
    - *C. No.* [=accession number of the National Archives of Kathmandu] *3–717*
    - *S. No. 2*
    - *Folio No. 13*
    - *Size: 34,5 × 10* [cm]
- Manuscript N_2, corresponding to NGMCP: D35/1 (this manuscript is not in the National Archives of Kathmandu, and the scanned catalogue card is written in English) and written in Newari:
    - *Short Title:* Apohasiddhi
    - *Running No.* 764D
    - *Subject:* Baudd. Nyāya
    - *Title (acc. to Colophon):* Apohasiddhi
    - *Author:* Ratnakīrti (c. 10th cent. AD)
    - *No. of leaves:* 14 complete
    - *Size in cm:* 32,5 × 8,4
    - *Reel No.:* D35/1
    - *Date of filming:* 2 Mar 1976
    - *Script:* Newari
    - *Remarks:* paper [and a note to the effect that the manuscript is undamaged]
    - *Script:* Newari

- Manuscript N_3, corresponding to NGMCP: A117/7 and written in Devanāgarī:
  - *[Number on front:] A117/7*
  - *Subject: bauddhadarśana*
  - *Manuscript-Name: apohasiddhiḥ*
  - *C. No.* [=accession number of the National Archives of Kathmandu] *5–256*
  - *S. No. 2 (kha)*
  - *Folio No. 11*
  - *Size: 32,5 × 11* [cm]

We know little about the missing manuscript, Ś, apart from the fact that it was in the private possession of Shāstri and that it is "written in the Bengali hand of the 12th century" (Shāstri 1910: vii), like K. It will, however, be important to consider its readings as reported in Shāstri 1910 for determining the relation of the manuscripts to each other.

1.3.1 Relation of the manuscripts

Before the relation between the available manuscripts can be established, the following points should be noted:

1. In the opening line, N_1, N_2, N_3, K pay hommage to Śrīlokanātha, P to Tārā.
2. N_1, N_2, N_3, K share a practically identical colophon.
3. N_2 and N_3 have several significant features in common (most of these are documented in the list of variants for the Nepalese manuscripts, starting on page 72). Most importantly, they both repeat ll. 48 to 59.
   Furthermore, it seems natural to assume that N_3 might have misread some of the unclearer passages in N_2. For example, °*śabdāt* in l. 196, is found in N_3 as "śa(+b)dat". The *akṣara* *dā* is the last one on line 1 of N_2 9b. As there was not enough space there to write the long *ā* in the usual way, it was written

with a small hook above the base *akṣara*, *da*. The scribe of N_3 might have missed the hook (cf. figs. 1.13 and 1.14).

Similarly, the evidence presented below for *śabdāntarāvagatena* (see notes to l. 143) suggests that in N_2 7b1 it was first emended from *śabdāntarāvābhābhāvaṃgatena* to *śabdāntarābhāvābhā-vaṃgatena*, by placing the numbers 2 and 1 over the syllables *vā* and *bhā*, and then corrected to *śabdāntarāvaṃgatena*, deleting *vābhābhā* (and forgetting to delete the remaining *anusvāra*) by marking the initial *vā* and the final *bhā*. The reading found in N_3 6a6 is *śabdāntarābhāvābhāvagatena*. The simplest explanation is that the scribe of N_3 correctly understood the first correction in N_2, but missed the deletion marks.[47]

A last example is the case of °*sāṃkarya*° (l. 297, cf. figs. 1.15 and 1.16), where N_3 apparently mistook a *ṅka* for *kā*. N_2 has a prefixed *ṅ* that looks like a sign for a long *ā* in its script.[48]

The evidence suggests therefore that N_3 is directly dependent on N_2. For this reason, no variants that are due only to its particularities have been noted in the edition below. Its readings are reported, however, when one of the other manuscripts has occasioned a note.

4. N_1 and N_2 in turn appear closer to K than to P: apart from the common colophon, cf. the cases listed in table 1.3.

To these points we have to add observations about the the last manuscript, Ś, which was not available for the following edition. It can be evaluated only on the basis of the readings and variants presented in Shāstri 1910 (see table 1.3): clearly, it is closer to P than K, showing only a few differences which can be explained either as copying errors (*nimitta*°, *viprakīrṇa*, a missing *tad*) or as attempts at improving the text (°*sūtratvā*°, *sarvasya vyava*°). The only problematic

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[47]The other important possibility is that N_2 and N_3 had a common ancestor reading *śabdāntarābhāvābhāvagatena*, which N_2 initially reproduced, and then, having corrected a slight mistake made during copying, changed to something more meaningful.

[48]Cf. figs. 1.13–1.16.

Table 1.3 – Variants in Ś, compared to material available for the edition. "Line" refers to the line number in the present edition. Readings accepted in the edition are set in bold face.

Line	Ś	K	P	N₁, N₂, N₃	AS₁
16	nimittapratyayā°	**nivṛttapratyayā°**	**nivṛttapratyayā°**	as K = P	as K
77	**viśeṣaṇabhāvakṣa**	viśeṣaṇakṣa	**viśeṣaṇabhāvakṣa**	as K	as K
82	**prakṛta**	aprakṛta	**prakṛta**	as K	as K
101	**ekasyaivārthasya**	ekasyaiva	**ekasyaivārthasya**	as K	as K
123	**asadbhāve tu**	asadbhāve	**asadbhāve tu**	as K	as K
129	viprakīrṇa° (?)	**viprakīrṇa°**	**viprakīrṇa°**	as K = P	as K
134	**tāvatā tāvan na**	tāvan na	**tāvatā tāvan na**	as K	as K
136	svarūpeṇaiva (svala-kṣaṇarūpeṇaiva?)	**svalakṣaṇa-svarūpeṇaiva**	svarūpeṇaiva	as K	as K
175	**sattvena**	sattve	**sattvena**	as K	as K
177	**viśiṣyate**	viśiṣyate	**viśiṣyate**	as Ś = P	as Ś
203	**asad eva vā tad°**	asad evātad°	**asad eva vā tad°**	as Ś = P	as Ś
204	**eva vā**	eva	**eva vā**	as Ś = P	as Ś
209	**piṇḍadarśana°**	piṇḍadaṇḍadarśana°	**piṇḍadarśana°**	as K	as K

Table 1.3 – Variants in Ś, compared to material available for the edition. "Line" refers to the line number in the present edition. Readings accepted in the edition are set in bold face. (continued)

Line	Ś	K	P	N₁, N₂, N₃	AS₁
231	**svāśrayeṣu**	svāśraye	svaviṣayeṣu	as K	as K
250	daṇḍasūtratvādinā	**daṇḍasūtrādineti**	**daṇḍasūtrādineti**	as K = P	as K
273	**tad evam na sāmānyasiddhiḥ**	tad eva na sāmānya-buddhiḥ	**tad evam na sāmānyasiddhiḥ**	as K	as K
275	**vā prasiddhaḥ**	prasiddhaḥ	**vā prasiddhaḥ**	as Ś = P	as Ś
284	vidhibādhanam	**vidhisādhanam**	vidhibādhanam	as K	as K
286	**bāhyatvavidhi**	bāhyatva(+sya)vidhi	**bāhyatvavidhi**	as K p.c.	as K p.c.
294	**dhūmasya jananavat**	... long example 1 (p.c.)	long example 2	as Ś; probably = K a.c.;	as Ś
297	tasmād adhya°	**tasmāt tadadhya°**	**tasmāt tadadhya°**	as K = P	as K
308	**vācyavācakabhā-vasyābhāve**	vācyavācakasyābhāve	**vācyavācakabhā-vasyābhāve**	as Ś = P	as Ś
310	sarvasya vyava°	**sarvavyava°**	**sarvavyava°**	as K = P	as K
final verse	no equiv.	present (p.c.)	no equiv.	present	as K p.c.
(post) colophon	no equiv.	present	no equiv.	as K	as K

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element is the example: Ś has the shortest exemplification; that it shares this with the Nepalese manuscripts shall be discussed below; K, though it is possible (judging from the available space in the ms) that it contained this example *ante correctionem*, was changed to a much longer version; and P shows yet another reading. The problem is that none of these three variants can be explained as a corruption or transmission error of any of the others:

- Ś: *dhūmasya parokṣāgnijñānajananavat.*
- K:
    - *ante correctionem* (inferred only from available space): *dhūmasya parokṣāgnijñānajananavat.*
    - *post correctionem*: *asadutpattivat. yady api vahnau dhūmasya trailokyasyābhāvas tathāpi tato dhūmasyaivotpādo nānyasya.*
- P: *yathā vahnau dhūmaghaṭādyor asatve 'pi dhūma evotpadyate na ghaṭādiḥ.*

The decision in the critical edition to favour the shortest reading stems from two considerations: first, it is likely that K supported this reading *ante correctionem*; second, the appearance of the more elaborate exemplifications could be explained as attempting to clarify a terser original formulation. It must be admitted, however, that neither argument is decisive.

One might be tempted, at this point, to take the evidence of the Nepalese manuscripts (N_1, N_2, N_3) into account. Looking at the variants presented in table 1.3, it seems that they mostly accord with K, and that any reading shared by the Nepalese manuscripts and the unrelated Ś should be the preferred one. For it is usually less likely that an unoriginal reading would have found its way into otherwise distinct branches of the text's tradition rather than that an original reading changed into the same reading twice.

But the closest match for the Nepalese manuscripts is not K. Rather, it is the first edition, AS_1.[49] To see this, one has to consider the last two columns in table 1.3: the first shows which of the other manuscripts the Nepalese ones are closest to, and the second lists the source of the readings that Shāstri chose for the constituted text in AS_1. It is evident that the Nepalese manuscripts deviate from K only when AS_1 accepts the reading of Ś. One explanation for this state of affairs is that Ś and K share an ancestor which is common also to N_1, N_2 and N_3. Another explanation is that an edition, AS_1, was the exemplar for the Nepalese manuscripts.

Based on the few variants that are recorded in AS_1 for Ś, it would probably be impossible to decide this issue. Fortunately, a closer examination of the appearance of the Nepalese manuscripts provides enough evidence to ascertain that the latter explanation is the better one.[50] A distinctive feature of these manuscripts is their use of apparently random dots between *akṣara*s. For example, compare the phrase "*asmin vānyad apohyata iti vyutpattyā vijātivyāvṛttaṃ bāhyam eva vivakṣitam*" (starting in line 4 of the edition below) as written in N_1 and in AS_1:[51]

1. N_1 1b2: "अस्मिन्•वान्यदपोह्यतइति•व्युत्पत्त्या• विजातिव्यावृत्तंबाह्य•मेवविवक्षितं•"[52]

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[49]I would like to thank Elliot Stern for alerting me to the possibility that the Nepalese manuscripts might have been copied not from earlier manuscripts but from a printed source. This has allowed me to substantially revise the interpretation of the dependencies between the various manuscripts that I had proposed in McAllister 2011. The critical edition below has been adjusted accordingly.

[50]Since it was shown above that N_3 depends on N_2, the following comments pertain only to N_1 and N_2.

[51]The transcriptions are in Devanāgarī because it is closer to the manuscript's script, and makes the following argument clearer. The passage from N_1 could be transliterated into IAST as follows:

asmin•vānyadapohyata_iti•vyutpattyā•vijātivyāvṛttaṃbāhya• mevavivakṣitaṃ•

The underscore between °*ta* and *iti* means that there is neither a space nor an *ai*.

[52]See also fig. 1.9, on page 44.

Figure 1.1 – Dependency relations between the manuscripts and main editions of the *Apohasiddhi*

2. AS$_1$ 1,5–6: "अस्मिन् वान्यदपोह्यत (linebreak) इति व्युत्पत्त्या विजातिव्यावृत्तं बाह्य[2]मेव विवक्षितं;"

It is clear that the dots in N$_1$ show a close correspondence to specific features of AS$_1$: every dot corresponds to a space added between words; a dot was used for the "[2]", showing the linebreak in manuscript K, as well as for the final semicolon in AS$_1$. One space, between *apohyata* and *iti*, was missed by the scribe of N$_1$ because a linebreak occurs at that point in AS$_1$. The scribe was perhaps not accustomed to the convention, employed also in AS$_1$, of adding hyphens when breaking a word across lines. A second space, after *eva* was not recorded in N$_1$. This usage of the dots carries on throughout the whole manuscript, and is the same also in N$_2$.[53] This agreement of N$_1$ and N$_2$ to formal features of AS$_1$ makes it all but certain that these two manuscripts do not derive from a common ancestor of K and Ś, but rather from AS$_1$. Since N$_3$ is, in turn, derived from N$_2$, it can be concluded that the Nepalese manuscripts offer no historically

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[53]N$_3$ does also employ dots, but they are used rather sparingly there and mainly for the disambiguation of vowel *saṃdhi* and as a punctuation device.

independent evidence that could be used for the constitution of the text of the *Apohasiddhi*. The evidence collected from the Nepalese manuscripts has therefore been excluded from the main apparatus, so as not to overburden the printed pages.[54]

In consequence, the relation as shown in fig. 1.1 can be determined, the top node "α" standing for the archetype or the reconstructable version of the *Apohasiddhi* closest to the original.[55] The connecting lines mean "descended from", without claiming directness. This diagram also shows the general limitations of editing the *Apohasiddhi*: where K and P do not agree, we have to decide on a reading based on factors besides the witnesses (e.g., internal coherence of the argument or similar formulations in other texts by Ratnakīrti or Jñānaśrīmitra).

1.4 NOTES ON THE CRITICAL EDITION

1.4.1 Conventions and abbreviations used in the critical apparatus

The following conventions are used in the critical edition:

1. Names are emphasized: *vācaspatiḥ*.
2. (×*ka*) means that "*ka*" was deleted or marked as erroneous in the ms.
3. (+*ka*) means that "*ka*" was added to the original flow of text. There is no implicit specification as to where this addition is placed (i.e., above, below, in the margin, etc.)
4. "*ka* ᵛ *ga*" indicates that there is an insertion mark between *ka* and *ga*.
5. (?*ka*) means that "*ka*" was not read with certainty.
6. Some[56] scribal corrections are marked as in *anyāpoḍhovadhā-rya(t(×e)→ta)*, meaning that the scribe wrote *te* and then deleted the vowel sign for *e*, so that the result was *ta*.

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[54]For readers interested in their variants, however, there is a section appended to the critical edition which collects these notes (see section 2.1, starting on page 72).

[55]The term "archetype" is used here as defined by Maas (1960: §5).

[56]I.e., those where a simple note of the correction would not provide useful or clear information. In the example given, a simple report of the correction as "*t(×e)*" could be misunderstood as a correction to "*t*" instead of "*ta*".

7. An arrow as in *katham apoḥaḥ*$^{\downarrow}$ signifies the beginning of a folio, with the manuscript shorthand and the folio number printed in the margin; in this case it would be the beginning of the recto of leaf 33 in manuscript P after the *akṣara "ma"*.

8. A half arrow as in *tatpratītivyavasthā*$^{\downarrow}$ shows the end of a line in K. It is put after the last whole *akṣara* in the line.

9. A half arrow as in *athaivaṃmatiḥ* marks the start of a new line (start of line 3 in K). If this coincides with the end of the previous line, so that nothing is missing, only this sign will be recorded.[57]

10. *anaikāntika_mbhā°* indicates that there is a space of one *akṣara* between *ka* and *mbhā*.

11. A "··" indicates an illegible sign with the width of one *akṣara*.

12. *°bāhya~~~viṣayatvena* indicates that there are three filling signs between *ya* and *vi* (cf. section 1.4.4).

13. A "•" indicates that there is a dot in the ms (occurs in the Nepalese manuscripts, see page 38).

14. Punctuation used in the edition does not reflect the punctuation of the mss. Some special signs are:
    a) Maṅgala sign:[58] ❊
    b) Siddham sign: ✳
    c) Ornamental sign at the end of ms: ✺

15. Variants concerning only *avagraha*-s have not been reported,[59] and their introduction may be only editorial.

16. The gemination of consonants after, and the degemination before, a semi-vowel (*y,v,r,l*) is not reported, and its normalization may be only editorial.

An entry in the critical apparatus is typically as follows:

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[57]Cf. item 6 on page 42 for the usefulness of marking the end of line and start of line in K.

[58]Cf. G. Roth 1986 for a discussion of these signs, and see section 1.4.4 for examples of the signs used in the manuscripts of the *AS*.

[59]With the exception of a variant to *anyathā'sati* (l. 21), where the more reliable manuscripts's scribes explicitly inserted an *avagraha* to avoid confusion.

1. The line number or range of line numbers that the entry is indexed to is given.
2. The lemma is printed. This is a quotation of a text string as found in the edition, and its purpose is to index the entry to the text. If it is not unique within the line, a raised number following the lemma indexes it to the relevant occurrence in the referenced line.
3. Next come the sigla of the witnesses supporting the reading accepted in the edition (save for the neglected errors mentioned in section 1.4.3). If no witness supports the reading, it is an emendation and is marked as "em.". As mentioned, the only edition that had access to Ś is AS_1. The readings found in this edition are therefore mentioned when it is reasonably certain that they indicate a variant of Ś: this is the case when the reading in AS_1 stands against the accepted reading, against K, and no variants are reported for it in AS_1, or when the reading in AS_1 supports the chosen reading against all other witnesses; in both of these cases, it is likely that Ś read as this edition reads. Ś, when it is directly cited as witness in a critical note, is always based on the evidence found in AS_1.
4. Next, the variants found in the other manuscripts are given. These readings (in contrast to the lemma) reflect the text as it is found in the manuscripts. They are separated from each other (and the lemma) either by
   a) a colon, which indicates that the reading following it is different from the one accepted, or
   b) a comma, which indicates that the following reading partially or indirectly supports the accepted reading, or
   c) a semicolon, indicating that the following variant (usually an omission) does not provide decisive evidence.
   These signs always express the relation that the variant has to the accepted reading, and not the relation between two subsequent variants.
5. Following the readings, an additional explanation may be given. It is typeset like this: " — A comment"

6. On most folios of K, a few *akṣara*s at the end of each line are missing. When the surviving material supports a reading or a variant only partially, it has nevertheless been added as a witness. The reader will easily be able to see which part of the reading is actually supported or not supported by looking at the end-of-line and start-of-line marks (cf. items 8 and 9, page 40). When the remaining material does not have any value for deciding the reading, this has been noted by entering " no ev. K" (meaning "no evidence in K").[60]

1.4.2 Textual references in the critical edition

Two symbols are used to show textual relations (as opposed to content relations) of the *AS* to other texts:

1. A "=" is used to show that the passage has a close parallel.
2. A "≈" indicates a loose parallel.

1.4.3 Differences not reported in critical edition

Discrepancies between the manuscripts that result from any of the following factors have not been noted as variant readings:

1. P, N_1, N_2, K do not usually degeminate *tt* following *r*. N_3 does.
2. P, N_1, N_2, N_3 degeminate *tt* before a semi-vowel, K does not.
3. All manuscripts irregularly geminate *m*, *t*, and *y* after *r*.
4. *avagraha*-s are not always written in the mss. When their correctness is beyond doubt and does not change the meaning, they have silently been added.

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[60]An example is the reading *cānyāpoḍhānyāpohayorvirodho* at the beginning of 13: K reads °*ḍhānyāpohayorvirodho*, starting on line 6, and *cānyāpo*° was, presumably, at the end of the previous, damaged line. This has been taken as evidence in K for the reading adopted in the edition, because the relevant information, °*ḍhānyāpoha*° vs. °*hānyapoḍha*° is found in K. That *cānyāpo*° is not found in K can easily be gathered from the end-of-line and start-of-line marks in the edition. This way of presenting the information does not clutter the apparatus with irrelevant notes. Another example is the reading *aprāpter bhrāntir* as against *aprāpte bhrāntir* (cf. l. 202). There K reads *prā*, then the folio is torn, and the next folio starts with °*rbhrānti*°. This is taken as support in K for the reading *aprāpter bhrāntir*.

5. Substitution of a nasal with an *anusvāra*.
6. Additional *anusvāra* before nasals.
7. N_1, N_2, N_3 insert dots (see fig. 1.9) between *akṣara*s at apparently random places, separating meaningful as well as meaningless units. These dots do not usually influence *saṃdhi*. They are only reported (as "•") when they are useful for understanding a variant. As shown above, they correspond closely to spaces or separators inserted in AS_1.
8. In order not to clutter the edition with the many irrelevant differences in N_3, all of which are errors particular to this manuscript, they are not separately mentioned in the edition here. But the readings of N_3 are added in the apparatus entries for other readings.

1.4.4 *Particularities of the scripts*

Noteworthy peculiarities of the scripts encountered in the manuscripts are as follows:

1. Siddham signs (✳) used: cf. figs. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.[61]
2. Ornamental signs (✹) used: cf. figs. 1.7 and 1.8.
3. Spacing (~) in K 8b1: cf. fig. 1.5.
4. P sometimes (e.g., l. 47, p. 50) uses a stylized *ma* with *virāma* as shown in, cf. fig. 1.6.[62]
5. Deletion markers: K sometimes "brackets" wrong text, e.g., in l. 148 (p. 57): cf. fig. 1.12.
6. N_1 and N_2 sometimes use a special correction mark, a sort of tilde above an *akṣara*, to transform that *akṣara* within its class. Cf. the following corrections: *(śa→sa)* in l. 216 (p. 62, cf. fig. 1.11), *(śa→ṣa)* in l. 226 (p. 62), *(ma→ṇa)* in l. 161 (p. 58, cf. fig. 1.10), *(na→ṇa)* in l. 259 (p. 65), *(ṣye→sye)* in l. 271 (p. 65).

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[61]All references in this list are to p. 44.

[62]For a discussion of this letter, cf. MacDonald 2005: xxii, and the references given there. See also Kouda 2004:110, "Characters with ṃ\".

Figure 1.2
Siddham symbol,
K 1b1

Figure 1.3
Siddham symbol,
K 8b3

Figure 1.4
Siddham symbol,
N₁ 1b1

Figure 1.5
Spacing symbols,
K 8b1

Figure 1.6
anusvāra (*ryaṃ*),
P 33a3

Figure 1.7
Ornamental symbol,
N₁ 13b2

Figure 1.8
Ornamental symbol,
N₂ 14b4

Figure 1.9
bāhya•meva, N₁ 1b2

Figure 1.10
Correction of *ma* to
ṇa, N₁ 7a5

1.4.5   *Usage of previous editions*

As mentioned above, the *Apohasiddhi* has already been edited twice.
Shāstri (1910) contains readings of a manuscript not available to the
present author, and could therefore not be ignored here. The editions
by Thakur, AS₂ and AS₃, have also been consulted throughout, be-
cause, although they are not based on more material than used for
the edition below, Thakur's great expertise in reading and editing
these kinds of texts means that his readings and (sometimes silent)
corrections cannot and should not be ignored. All differences to any
of Shāstri's or Thakur's readings which could not be easily resolved
as misprints or similar circumstantial errors have therefore been
noted, and their observations discussed in the following edition.

Figure 1.11
Correction of *śa* to *sa*,
N₂ 10a5

Figure 1.12
Deletion, N₂ 4b6

Figure 1.13
"*śabdā*" in N₂ 9b1
before end of line.

Figure 1.14
"*śa(+b)dat.*" in
N₃ 7b6.

Figure 1.15
"*sāṅkaryya*"
N₂ 13b1.

Figure 1.16
"*sākāryya*" in
N₃ 10b5.

Figure 1.17
Usual *bha* in N₂.

Figure 1.18
Second version of
bha in N₂ 11a4.

2 Text of the Apohasiddhi

❀ namaḥ *śrīlokanāthāya*.

[§ 1] apohaḥ śabdārtho nirucyate.

[§ 2] nanu ko 'yam apoho nāma. kim idam anyasmād apohyate,
asmād vānyad apohyate, asmin vānyad apohyata iti vyutpattyā vi-
5 jātivyāvṛttaṃ bāhyam eva vivakṣitam, buddhyākāro vā, yadi vāpoha-
nam apoha ity anyavyāvṛttimātram iti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ.

[§ 3] na tāvad ādimau pakṣau, apohanāmnā vidher eva vivakṣi-
tatvāt. antimo 'py asaṅgataḥ, pratītibādhitatvāt. tathā hi parvato-
ddeśe vahnir astīti śābdī pratītir vidhirūpam evollikhantī lakṣyate,

---

1 ❀] == ❀ K; n. e. P — Cf.
punctuation schema, item 14
(page 40). The symbol in K closely
resembles symbol number 1 in
G. Roth 1986 plate "Signs used in the

article of Dr. Gustav Roth".
1 namaḥ śrīlokanāthāya] == K <–>
namas tārāyai P
3 idam] == K <–> n. e. P

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1 ❀] In K, the *Apohasiddhi* begins with the first line on folio 1b, in P in the middle
of line 1 on folio 32b.
4 vānyad] Acc. to AS₃ 58, n. 3: "anyad omitted T." ("T" is P).
3–5 anyasmād ...buddhyākāro vā] ≈ AP 202,12–13
3–6 nanu ko ...pakṣāḥ] Cf. TBh_I 52,7–12
7–8 apohanāmnā ...vivakṣitatvāt] = AP 202,13–14

47

nānagnir na bhavatīti nivṛttimātram āmukhayantī. yac ca pratya- 10
kṣabādhitam, na tatra sādhanāntarāvakāśa ity atiprasiddham.

[§ 4] atha yady api nivṛttim ahaṃ pratyemīti na vikalpaḥ, tathāpi
nivṛttapadārthollekha eva nivṛttyullekhaḥ. na hy anantarbhāvitavi-
śeṣaṇapratītir viśiṣṭapratītiḥ. tato yathā sāmānyam ahaṃ pratyemīti
vikalpābhāve 'pi sādhāraṇākāraparisphuraṇād vikalpabuddhiḥ sā- 15
mānyabuddhiḥ *pareṣām*, tathā nivṛttapratyayākṣiptā nivṛttibuddhir
apohapratītivyavahāram ātanotīti cet, nanu sādhāraṇākāraparisphu-
raṇe vidhirūpatayā yadi sāmānyabodhavyavasthā, tat kim āyātam
asphuradabhāvākāre cetasi nivṛttipratītivyavasthāyāḥ. tato nivṛttim
ahaṃ pratyemīty evamākārābhāve 'pi nivṛttyākārasphuraṇaṃ yadi 20
syāt, ko nāma nivṛttipratītisthitim apalapet. anyathāsati pratibhāse
tatpratītivyavahṛtir iti gavākāre 'pi cetasi turagabodha ity astu.

[§ 5] atha viśeṣaṇatayāntarbhūtā nivṛttipratītir ity uktam, ta-
thāpi yady agavāpoḍha itīdṛśākāro vikalpaḥ, tadā viśeṣaṇatayā
tadanupraveśo bhavatu, kiṃ tu gaur iti pratītiḥ. tadā ca sato 'pi 25

K2a

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13 °padārtho°] == K; pa((×thā)→
(+dā))rtho P
15 °pari°] == K <–> n. e. P
16 nivṛtta°] == K P <–> nimitta Ś —
Ś acc. to AS₁ 1, n. 2.

21 apalapet] em. <–> apalepet P;
no ev. K — AS₁ 2,9 supports the text
chosen here, suggesting that this is
also how Ś read.
21 anyathāsati] em.; anyathā 'sati K
anyathā 'sati P
25 ca] == K <–> n. e. P

8–10 parvatoddeśe ...āmukhayantī] Cf. ĀTV₂ 112,9–10 (ĀTV₁ 278,6–8)
8–11 pratītibādhitatvāt ...sādhanāntarāvakāśa] ≈ AP 201,9–12
12–19 yady api ...°vyavasthāyāḥ] ≈ĀTV₂ 112,11–113,7 (ĀTV₁ 279,17–280,6)
19–22 tato ...astu] ≈ĀTV₂ 113,8–12 (ĀTV₁ 282,2–5)
24–25 agavāpo° ...pratītiḥ] ≈ĀTV₂ 113,7–8 (ĀTV₁ 282,1)

nivṛttilakṣaṇasya viśeṣaṇasya tatrānutkalanāt kathaṃ tatpratīti-
vyavasthā.

[§ 6] athaivaṃ matiḥ — yad vidhirūpaṃ sphuritam, tasya pa-
rāpoho 'py astīti tatpratītir ucyate, tathāpi sambandhamātram a-
pohasya. vidhir eva sākṣānnirbhāsī. api caivam adhyakṣasyāpy
apohaviṣayatvam anivāryam, viśeṣato vikalpād ekavyāvṛttollekhino
'khilānyavyāvṛttam īkṣamāṇasya. tasmād vidhyākārāvagrahād a-
dhyakṣavad vikalpasyāpi vidhiviṣayatvam eva, nānyāpohaviṣayatvam
iti katham apohaḥ śabdārtho ghuṣyate.   P33a

[§ 7] atrābhidhīyate — nāsmābhir apohaśabdena vidhir eva kevalo
'bhipretaḥ, nāpy anyavyāvṛttimātram, kin tv anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ
śabdānām arthaḥ. tataś ca na pratyekapakṣopanipātidoṣāvakāśaḥ.

[§ 8] yat tu goḥ pratītau na tadātmā parātmeti sāmarthyād
apohaḥ paścān niścīyata iti *vidhivādināṃ* matam, anyāpohapratītau
vā sāmarthyād anyāpoḍho 'vadhāryata iti *pratiṣedhavādināṃ* matam,

26 viśeṣaṇasya] == P, viśeṣa(+ṇa)
sya K

28 yad vidhirūpaṃ] == P <–>
yadi(+vi)dhirūpaṃ K

28 sphuritam] == K <–> sphurati P

29 astīti] == P, astī(×i)ti K

29 tathāpi] == K <–> tadāpi P

30 vidhir] == K <–> vidher P

30–31 °syāpy apo°] em. <–> syāpo P;
no ev. K — AS₁ 2,19 supports the
reading accepted here, suggesting

that this is also how Ś read.

31 °vyāvṛttollekhino] == P,
vyā(×··)vṛttollekhino K

32 'khilānyavyāvṛttam] == P,
'khilānya(?vyāvṛ)ttam K — Worm
damage in K.

34 śabdārtho] == K <–> śabdārtha
uda P

40 °dhāryata] == P; dhārya(t(×e)→
ta) K

12–27 atha ...°pratītivyavasthā] = AP 201,17–202,4
28–33 yad vidhirūpaṃ ...nānyāpohaviṣayatvam] ≈ AP 202,7–202,11
36–37 anyāpohaviśiṣṭo ...arthaḥ] Cf. TBh_I 52,14
38 na tadātmā parātmeti] Cf. TS_Ś 1013a.
38–39 yat tu ...matam] ≈ AP 206,15–16

K2b tad asundaram, prāthamikasyā[↓]pi pratipattikramā[↓]darśanāt. na hi

vidhiṃ pratipadya kaścid arthāpattitaḥ paścād apoham avagacchati,

apohaṃ vā pratipadyānyāpoḍham. tasmād goḥ pratipattir ity anyā-

poḍhapratipattir ucyate. yady api cānyāpoḍhaśabdānullekha^{K²↓} uktaḥ,

tathāpi nāpratipattir eva viśeṣaṇabhūtasyānyāpohasya,^{P³↓} agavāpoḍha   45

eva gośabdasya niveśitatvāt. yathā nīlotpale niveśitād indīvaraśa-

bdān nīlotpalapratī[↓]tau tatkā^{K³↓}la eva nīlimasphuraṇam anivāryam,

tathā gośabdād apy agavāpoḍhe niveśitād gopratītau tulyakālam

eva viśeṣaṇatvād ago'pohasphuraṇam anivāryam. yathā pratya-[↓]

kṣasya prasajyarūpā^{K⁴↓}bhāvagrahaṇam abhāvavikalpotpādanaśaktir^{P⁴↓}   50

eva, tathā vidhivikalpānām api tadanurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśaktir

evābhāvagrahaṇam abhidhīyate. paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇaṃ tu[↓]

niyatasvarūpasaṃvedanam^{K⁵↓} ubhayor aviśiṣṭam. anyathā yadi śabdād

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41 pratipattikramā°] em. <–>   42 paścād] == P, (+paścād) K

pratītikramā P; no ev. K — AS₁ 3,13   45 nāpratipattir] == K <–>

reads as chosen here, suggesting that   nāpratītir P

Ś also supports this decision.   45 °ānyā°] == P <–> (×nyā) K

42 pratipadya] == P, prati(p×ā)→   49 ago'poha°] == K <–> apoha P

pa)dya K   51 °dāna°] == K <–> n. e. P

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41 tad asundaram ...°ādarśanāt] ≈ AP 206,16

42 apoham] AS₃ 59, n. 2 states that AS₁ reads *artham*, which is not true. Also all
the mss support *apoham*.

43–44 tasmād ...ucyate] ≈ AP 206,19–20

44–46 yady api ...niveśitatvāt] ≈ AP 203,16–17

48 niveśitād] Acc. to AS₃ 59, n. 4, P reads *niveśitatvād*. This is not the case.

46–49 yathā nīlotpale ...anivāryam] ≈ AP 203,20–22

38–52 yat tu goḥ ...abhidhīyate] ≈ TBh_I 52,14–53,12

49–53 yathā pratyakṣasya ...aviśiṣṭam] ≈ AP 205,12–16

arthapratipattikāle kalito na parāpohaḥ, katham anyaparihāreṇa

55 pravṛttiḥ. tato gāṃ badhāneti codito 'śvādīn api badhnīyāt.

[§ 9] yad apy avocad *vācaspatiḥ* — jātimatyo vyaktayo vikalpānāṃ
śabdānāṃ ca gocaraḥ. tāsāṃ ca tadvatīnāṃ rūpam atajjātīyaparā-
vṛttam ity arthatas tadavagater na gāṃ badhāneti codito 'śvādīn
badhnāti, tad apy anenaiva nirastam. yato jāter adhikāyāḥ prakṣepe

60 'pi vyaktīnāṃ rūpam atajjātīyavyāvṛttam eva cet, tadā tenaiva rūpeṇa
śabdavikalpayor viṣayībhavantīnāṃ katham atadvyāvṛttiparihāraḥ.   K3a

[§ 10] atha na vijātīyavyāvṛttaṃ vyaktirūpaṃ tathāpratītaṃ vā,
tadā jātiprasāda eṣa iti katham arthato 'pi tadavagatir ity ukta-
prāyam.

65 [§ 11] atha jātibalād evānyato vyāvṛttam, bhavatu jātibalāt sva-
hetuparaṃparābalād vānyavyāvṛttam. ubhayathāpi vyāvṛttaprati-

53–54 śabdād artha°] == P <–>
śabdārtha K
54 °kāle kalito] == K <–>
kālakalito P
54 katham] == P, ka(?tha)m K
57 tāsāṃ ca] == K <–> tāsāṃ P
57–58 °parāvṛttam] == P,
pa(×rihāre)rāvṛttam K
58 arthatas] == K <–> arthas P —
Read as *atas* in AS₃.
59 badhnāti] == P, ba(×___)dhnāti
K

59 anenaiva nirastam] == P <–>
anenenaiva nirastam K
60 °vyāvṛttam eva] ==
vyā(×(?··))vṛttam e(×tyarthabha)va K
<–> parāvṛttam eva P — AS₃ 59, n. 9
claims "*vyāvṛtta*" for P. The reference
should probably be to AS₁, which
reads as chosen here.
62 atha] == K, atha(×ḥ) P
62 na vijātīyavyāvṛttam] == K <–>
na vijātivyāvṛttam P
65 bhavatu] == P; bhavatu (×kodo)
K

53–55 yadi śabdād ...badhnīyāt] ≈AP 206,13–14; cf. also AP 206, n. 2
53–55 anyathā ...badhnīyāt] ≈ TBh_I 53,12–15
56–59 jātimatyo ...badhnāti] ≈ NVTṬ 443,23–444,2
56–64 yad apy ...uktaprāyam] = AP 206,25–207,4
65 atha ...vyāvṛttam] ≈ AP 207,5

pattau vyāvṛttipratipattir asty eva.

[§ 12] na cāgo'poḍhe gośabdasaṃketavidhāv anyonyāśrayadoṣaḥ, sāmānye tadvati vā saṃkete 'pi taddoṣāvakāśāt. na hi sāmānyaṃ nāma sāmānyamātram abhipretam, turage 'pi gośabdasaṃketapra-saṅgāt, kiṃ tu gotvam. tāvatā ca sa eva doṣaḥ, gavāparijñāne gotvasāmānyāparijñānāt, gotvasāmānyāparijñāne gośabdavācyāpari-jñānāt. tasmād ekapiṇḍadarśanapūrvako yaḥ sarvavyaktisādhāraṇa iva bahir adhyasto vikalpabuddhyākāraḥ, tatrāyaṃ gaur iti saṃke-takaraṇe netaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ. abhimate ca gośabdapravṛttāv agośabdena śeṣasyāpy abhidhānam ucitam.

[§ 13] na cānyāpoḍhānyāpohayor virodho viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇa-bhāvakṣatir vā, parasparavyavacchedābhāvāt, sāmānādhikaraṇyasa-dbhāvāt bhūtalaghaṭābhāvavat. svabhāvena hi virodhaḥ, na parā-bhāvenety ābālaprasiddham.

[§ 14] eṣa panthāḥ śrughnam upatiṣṭhata ity atrāpy apoho ga-myata eva, prakṛtapathāntarāpekṣayā eṣa eva, śrughnapratyanī-

P33b
κ³↓

↓ ↓

70

↓ κ⁴↓

κ⁵↓ P²↓

75

↓

κ⁶↓

80

P³↓ ↓

κ⁷↓

66–67 °pratipattau vyāvṛttipratipattir] == K <–> pratipattau vyāvṛttipratītir P
68 cāgo'poḍhe] == K <–> cāgavāpoḍha P — AS₃ reads *cāgavāpoḍhe.*
73 °piṇḍada°] == P, p(?i)ṇḍa(d(×e) →da) K
77 °āpoḍhānyāpohayor] == K <–> āpohānyāpoḍhayor P — AS₁ 5,14

reads as accepted here, suggesting that Ś also supports this reading.
77–78 °viśeṣaṇabhāva°] == P Ś <–> viśeṣaṇa K — Ś acc. to AS₁ 5, n. 1.
81 eṣa] == K <–> ayam P
81 panthāḥ] == K <–> panthā P
82 prakṛta°] == prakṛta P prakṛta Ś <–> aprakṛta K — Ś acc. to AS₁ 5, n. 2

68–73 na cā°...°vācyāparijñānāt] ≈ AP 203,23–204,2
73–75 tasmād ...°doṣaḥ] Cf. AP 204,2–12
75–76 abhimate ...abhidhānam] ≈ AP 204,13–14
77–80 na cā ...°prasiddham] Cf. AP 206,1

kāniṣṭhasthānāpekṣayā śrughnam eva, araṇyamārgavad vicchedā-
bhāvād upatiṣṭhata eva, sārthadūtādivyavacchedena panthā eveti K3b

85 pratipadaṃ vyavacchedasya sulabhatvāt. tasmād apohadharmaṇo vi-
dhirūpasya śabdād avagatiḥ, puṇḍarīkaśabdād iva śvetimaviśiṣṭasya
padmasya.

[§ 15] yady evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārtho vaktum ucitaḥ, katham
apoho gīyata iti cet, uktam atra — apohaśabdenānyāpohaviśiṣṭo
90 vidhir ucyate. tatra vidhau pratīyamāne viśeṣaṇatayā tulyakālam
anyāpohapratītir iti. na caivaṃ pratyakṣasyāpy apohaviṣayatvavya-
vasthā kartum ucitā, tasya śābdapratyayasyeva vastuviṣayatve vi-
vādābhāvāt. vidhiśabdena ca yathādhyavasāyam atadrūpaparā-
vṛtto bāhyo 'rtho 'bhimataḥ, yathāpratibhāsaṃ buddhyākāraś ca.
95 tatra bāhyo 'rtho 'dhyavasāyād eva śabdavācyo vyavasthāpyate, na
svalakṣaṇaparisphūrtyā, pratyakṣavad deśakālāvasthāniyatapra-
vyaktasvalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt. yac chāstram —

[§ 16] śabdenāvyāpṛtākṣasya buddhāv apratibhāsanāt |
arthasya dṛṣṭāv iva

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84 °vyavacchedena] == K <–>
vyavacchena P
85 apoha°] == K <–> anyāpoha P —
AS₁ 6,3 reads °*apoha* without any
comments, suggesting that this was
the reading of Ś.

86 śvetima°] == P, śvetima(×śa) K
91 °pratītir iti] == K <–> pratītiḥ P
91 °viṣayatva°] == P,
(×vyavasthā)viṣaya(+ᵛtva3) K
92 śābda°] == K <–> śabda P
93 ca] == K <–> n. e. P

81–85 eṣa panthāḥ ...sulabhatvāt] ≈ AP 206,6–9
85–86 tasmād ...avagatiḥ] ≈ AP 204,19–20
86–87 puṇḍarīka°...padmasya] Cf. AP 204,16–18
89 uktam atra] Cf. line 36 on page 49 and line 85 on page 53.
91–93 na caivaṃ ...vivādābhāvāt] ≈ AP 205,9–10
95–97 tatra ...°sphuraṇāt] ≈ AP 208,11–14
98–99 śabdenā°...dṛṣṭāv iva] = PVin I 15a–c

iti.   100

[§ 17] indriyaśabdasvabhāvopāyabhedād ekasyaivārthasya prati-
bhāsabheda iti cet. atrāpy uktam —

[§ 18] jāto nāmāśrayo 'nyānyaś cetasāṃ tasya vastunaḥ |
ekasyaiva kuto rūpaṃ bhinnākārāvabhāsi tat ||

[§ 19] na hi spaṣṭāspaṣṭe dve rūpe parasparaviruddhe ekasya   105
vastunaḥ staḥ, yata ekenendriyabuddhau pratibhāsetānyena vikalpe,
P34a   tathā sati vastuna eva bhedaprāpteḥ. na hi svarūpabhedād aparo va-
K4a   stubhedaḥ. na ca pratibhāsabhedād aparaḥ svarūpabhedaḥ. anyathā
trailokyam ekam eva vastu syāt.

[§ 20] dūrāsannadeśavartinoḥ puruṣayor ekatra śākhini spaṣṭā-   110
spaṣṭapratibhāsabhede 'pi na śākhibheda iti cet. na brūmaḥ — prati-
bhāsabhedo bhinnavastuniyataḥ, kiṃ tv — ekaviṣayatvābhāvaniyata
iti. tato yatrārthakriyābhedādisacivaḥ pratibhāsabhedaḥ, tatra
vastubhedaḥ, ghaṭavat. anyatra punar niyamenaikaviṣayatāṃ pari-

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101 °syaivārthasya] == P Ś <–>   106 vastunaḥ] == K <–> vastuna P
syaiva K — Ś acc. to AS₁ 6, n. 1   106 yata] == K <–> yad P
102 atrāpy] == K <–> tatrāpy P   107 bheda°] == P <–> bhada K
104 °āvabhāsi tat] == K <–>   110 °deśa°] == K <–> n. e. P
āvabhāsi yat P   114 ghaṭavat] == K <–> n. e. P

95–100 bāhyo ...iti] ≈ TBh₁ 53,15–54,2
97–102 yac chāstram ...iti cet] ≈ AP 208,16–19
103–104 jāto ...bhinnākārāvabhāsi tat] = PV III 235
102–109 atrāpy ...vastu syāt] = AP 208,20–209,1
110–111 dūrāsannadeśa ...na śākhibedha] ≈ AP 209,2
111–113 na brūmaḥ ...niyata iti] = AP 209,5–6

115 haratīty ekapratibhāso bhrāntaḥ.

[§ 21] etena yad āha *vācaspatiḥ* — na ca śabdapratyakṣayor vastu-
gocaratve pratyayābhedaḥ, kāraṇabhedena pārokṣyāpārokṣyabhe-
dopapatter iti, tan nopayogī, parokṣapratyayasya vastugocaratvā-
samarthanāt. parokṣatāśrayas tu kāraṇabheda indriyagocaragra-
120 haṇavirahenaiva kṛtārthaḥ. tan na śābde pratyaye svalakṣaṇaṃ
parisphurati.

[§ 22] kiṃ ca svalakṣaṇātmani vastuni vācye sarvātmanā prati-
patter vidhiniṣedhayor ayogaḥ. tasya hi sadbhāve 'stīti vyartham,
nāstīty asamartham. asadbhāve tu nāstīti vyartham, astīty asama-
125 rtham. asti cāstyādipadaprayogaḥ. tasmāc chābdapratibhāsasya
bāhyārthabhāvābhāvasādhāraṇyaṃ na tadviṣayatāṃ kṣamate.

[§ 23] yac ca *vācaspatinā* jātimadvyaktivācyatāṃ svavācaiva
prastutyānantaram eva — na ca śabdārthasya jāter bhāvābhāva-
sādhāraṇyaṃ nopapadyate. sā hi svarūpato nityāpi deśakālavi-

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116 śabdapratyakṣayor] == K <–>
śābdapratyakṣayor P — JNĀₘₛ 11b6
supports *śābdapratyakṣayor*, but
AS₁ 7,14–15 (and perhaps also Ś)
supports accepted reading.
122–123 pratipatter vidhi°] == K
<–> pratipatte vidhe P
124 tu] == P Ś <–> n. e. K — Ś
acc. to AS₁ 8, n. 1.

125 cāstyādi°] == K <–> cātyādi P
125 tasmāc chābda°] == P <–>
tasmāc chabda K
127 svavācaiva] em. <–>
svabhāvatayaiva P; no ev. K —
AS₁ 8,5 reads as chosen here,
suggesting that Ś also supports this
reading.

113–115 tato ...bhrāntaḥ] ≈ AP 209,12–14
116–118 na ca śabda°...bhedopapatter] ≈ NVTṬ 115,8–10
116–120 etena ...kṛtārthaḥ] ≈ AP 210,3–5
120–121 tan na ...parisphurati] Cf. AP 210,1–2
122–125 kiṃ ca ...prayogaḥ] ≈ TBh_I 54,3–6
122–126 kiṃ ...kṣamate] Cf. AP 211,1–6
127–128 svavācaiva prastutyānantaram] Cf. line 56 on p. 51

prakīrṇānekavyaktyāśrayatayā bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇībhavanty a- 130

K4b stināstisambandhayogyā. vartamānavyaktisambandhitā hi jāter

astitā, atītānāgatavyaktisambandhitā ca nāstiteti sandigdhavyatire-

kitvād anaikāntikaṃ bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇyam, anyathāsiddhaṃ

veti vilapitam, tad aprastutam. tāvatā tāvan na prakṛtakṣatiḥ,

jātau bharaṃ nyasyatā svalakṣaṇāvācyatvasya svayaṃ svīkārāt. 135

kiṃ ca sarvatra padārthasya svalakṣaṇasvarūpeṇaivāstitvādikaṃ

cintyate. jātes tu vartamānādivyaktisambandho 'stitvādikam iti tu

bālapratāraṇam. evaṃ jātimadvyaktivacane 'pi doṣaḥ. vyakteś cet

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130 °bhavanty] == P; no ev. K —
Ś probably read *bhavann*, as this
appears in AS₁ 8,9 without noting
alternatives.

130–131 astināstisambandhayogyā]
== K <–> astyādisambandhayogyā P

133 anaikāntikaṃ bhā°] == P <–>
anaikāntika_mbhā K

134 tad aprastutam] == P;
no ev. K — Apparently not entered
in Ś either, as AS₁ does not read it.

134 tāvatā] == P Ś; no ev. K — Ś
acc. to AS₁ 8, n. 3 (*tāvatā tāvat*). This
reading was rejected in AS₁. Since
the part of K where *tāvatā* would
have been written is now missing,
one might conclude either that AS₁'s
editor was still able to read K here, or
that he emended the text here.
Judging from the amount of space,

the first option is more likely: on
average, six *akṣara*s are missing on
each line of this folio, and without a
tāvatā, there would be approximately
enough space for
vi-la-pi-taṃ-ta-da-pra-stu-ta-m, i.e.,
ca. nine *akṣara*s. A *tāvatā* would
hardly have fit in addition.

135 bharaṃ nyasyatā] == K <–>
bharaṃ nyasyatāpi P

136 svalakṣaṇasvarūpeṇaiva°] == K
<–> svarūpeṇaivā P — The intent of
AS₁ 8, n. 4 is somewhat unclear,
suggesting that Ś reads either
svalakṣaṇarūpeṇaivā, or, possibly,
svarūpeṇaivā here. It simply says
rūpeṇaiva (and the *ṇai* is so badly
legible it could also be interpreted as
a *ṇe*).

128–134 na ca ...anyathāsiddham ve°] ≈ NVTṬ 444,2–6

127–135 yac ca *vācaspatinā* ...svīkārāt] ≈ AP 211,7–13

137 iti tu] In his handwritten notes on AS₁, Frauwallner questions the *tu* here.

pratītisiddhiḥ, jātir adhikā pratīyatāṃ mā vā, na tu vyaktipratīti-
140 doṣān muktiḥ.

[§ 24] etena yad ucyate *kaumārilaiḥ* — sabhāgatvād eva vastuno
na sādhāraṇyadoṣaḥ. vṛkṣatvaṃ hy anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ śabdād
avagamyate. tayor anyatareṇa śabdāntarāvagatena sambadhyata iti,
tad apy asaṅgatam, sāmānyasya nityasya pratipattāv anirdhārita-   P34b
145 bhāvābhāvatvāyogāt.

[§ 25] yac cedam — na ca pratyakṣasyeva śabdānām arthapratyā-
yanaprakāraḥ, yena taddṛṣṭa ivāstyādiśabdāpekṣā na syāt, vicitra-
śaktitvāt pramāṇānām iti, tad apy aindriyakaśābdapratibhāsayor
ekasvarūpagrāhitve bhinnāvabhāsadūṣaṇena dūṣitam.   vicitraśakti-
150 tvaṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ sākṣātkārādhyavasāyābhyām api caritārtham.
tato yadi pratyakṣārthapratipādanaṃ śābdena, tadvad evāvabhāsaḥ
syāt. abhavaṃś ca na tadviṣayakhyāpanaṃ kṣamate.   K5a

[§ 26] nanu vṛkṣaśabdena vṛkṣatvāṃśe codite sattvādyaṃśani-
ścayanārtham astyādipadaprayoga iti cet, niraṃśatvena pratya-

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142 hy anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ]   149 °āvabhāsa°] == P <–>
== K <–> hi   āvabhā(×va)ṣa K
anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ P   153–154 °niścayanārtham] == K
147 ivāsty°] == K <–> ivāty P   <–> niścayanārtham P
148 tad] == P, (×tato yadi   154 °pada°] == K <–> śabda P
pratyakṣa.) tad K

138–140 evaṃ ...muktiḥ] ≈ AP 212,18–19
141–143 sabhāgatvād ...sambadhyata] ≈ Kāś apoha 304,6–8
141–143 etena ...sambadhyata iti] ≈ AP 212,20–21
146–148 na ca ...pramāṇānām] ≈ Kāś apoha 304,10–12
147–148 vicitra ...pramāṇānām] =ĀTV₂ 135,6–136,1 (ĀTV₁ 327,12–13)
146–149 yac cedam ...dūṣitam] ≈ AP 213,3–5
149–150 vicitraśaktitvaṃ ...caritārtham] Cf. AP 213,7
151–152 tato yadi ...kṣamate] ≈ AP 213,5–6
153–154 vṛkṣaśabdena ...iti cet] ≈TBhₗ 54,9–11. Cf. AP 212,25–26

57

kṣasamadhigatasya svalakṣaṇasya ko 'vakāśaḥ padāntareṇa dha- 155
rmāntaravidhiniṣedhayoḥ pramāṇāntareṇa vā. pratyakṣe 'pi pra-
māṇāntarāpekṣā dṛṣṭeti cet, bhavatu, tasyāniścayātmakatvād a-
nabhyastasvarūpaviṣaye. vikalpas tu svayaṃ niścayātmako yatra
grāhī, tatra kim apareṇa. asti ca śabdaliṅgāntarāpekṣā. tato na
vastusvarūpagrahaḥ. 160

[§ 27] nanu bhinnā jātyādayo dharmāḥ parasparaṃ dharmiṇaś
ceti jātilakṣaṇaikadharmadvāreṇa pratīte 'pi śākhini dharmāntara-
vattayā na pratītir iti kiṃ na bhinnābhidhānādhīno dharmāntarasya
nīlacaloccaistaratvāder avabodhaḥ. tad etad asaṅgatam, akhaṇḍā-
tmanaḥ svalakṣaṇasya pratyakṣe pratibhāsād dṛśyasya dharma- 165
dharmibhedasya pratyakṣapratikṣiptatvāt. anyathā sarvaṃ sarvatra
syād ity atiprasaṅgaḥ. kālpanikabhedāśrayas tu dharmadharmivya-
vahāra iti prasādhitaṃ *śāstre*.

[§ 28] bhavatu vā pāramārthiko dharmadharmibhedaḥ, tathāpy
anayoḥ samavāyāder dūṣitatvād upakāralakṣaṇaiva pratyāsattir 170

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155 °gatasya] == K <–> n. e. P
156 °vidhi°] == P, (+ᵛvidhi) K
157 °ātmakatvād] == P <–>
ātmatvād K — AS₁ 5,14 reads as K.
165 pratyakṣe pratibhāsād] == K
<–> pratyakṣe 'pi pratibhāsanāt | P
— AS₃ opts for *pratyakṣe 'pi
pratibhāsāt*.

165–166 dharmadharmi°] == K <–>
dharmmidharmma P
167 dharmadharmi°] == K <–>
dharmmidharmma P
169 °ārthiko dharma°] == K <–>
ārthiko 'pi dharmma P
169 dharma°] == P, dharmm(o→a)
K

154–155 niraṃśatvena ...svalakṣaṇasya] Cf. AP 213,10
157–159 tasyā°...apareṇa] ≈ TBh₁ 54,11–14
155–160 ko 'vakāśaḥ ...vastusvarūpagrahaḥ] ≈ AP 213,11–14
161–164 bhinnā ...avabodhaḥ] ≈ AP 213,15–17
167–168 kālpanikabhedā ...vyavahāra] Cf. PVSV 2,22–3,1, and see translation of
§ 27 for more material.

eṣitavyā. evaṃ ca yathendriyapratyāsattyā pratyakṣeṇa dharmipra-
tipattau sakalataddharmapratipattiḥ, tathā śabdaliṅgābhyām api
vācyavācakādisambandhapratibaddhābhyāṃ dharmipratipattau
niravaśeṣataddharmapratipattir bhavet, pratyāsattimātrasyāviśeṣāt.

175   [§ 29] yac ca *vācaspatiḥ* — na caikopādhinā sattvena viśiṣṭe tasmin
gṛhīta upādhyantaraviśiṣṭatadgrahaḥ. svabhāvo hi dravyasyopā-
dhibhir viśiṣyate, na tūpādhayo vā viśeṣyatvaṃ vā tasya svabhāva
iti, tad api plavata eva. na hy abhedād upādhyantaragrahaṇam
āsañjitam, bhedaṃ puraskṛtyaivopakārakagrahaṇa upakāryagra-
180 haṇaprasañjanāt. na cāgnidhūmayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāva iva svabhā-
vata eva dharmadharmiṇoḥ pratipattiniyamakalpanam ucitam, tayor
api pramāṇāsiddhatvāt. pramāṇasiddhe ca svabhāvopavarṇanam iti
nyāyaḥ.

   [§ 30] yac cātra *nyāyabhūṣaṇena* sūryādigrahaṇe tadupakāryāśe-
185 ṣavasturāśigrahaṇaprasañjanam uktam, tad abhiprāyānavagāhana-

K5b (at line 179)
P35a (at line 181)

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171 evaṃ ca] == K <–> evaṃ P
173 °pratibaddhābhyāṃ dharmi°]
== P <–> pratibaddhā_bhyāṃ
dharmmi K
175 sattvena] == P Ś <–> satve K —
Ś acc. to AS$_1$ 10, n. 1. Also
NVTṬ 115,11 reads *sattvena*.
176 gṛhīta] == K gṛhīte (× |) P
176 °viśiṣṭatad°] == K <–> viśiṣṭas
tad P
176–177 dravyasyopādhibhir] == P
dravyasya(×vi)upādhibhir K
177 viśiṣyate] == P <–> viśeṣyate K

177 viśeṣyatvaṃ] == K <–>
viśeṣatvaṃ P
178–179 °grahaṇam āsañjitam] ==
P; no ev. K — Since there is no
evidence in K, Ś apparently read
grahaṇaṃ ca māsañjitam.
179 °grahaṇa] <–> grahaṇe K
grahaṇe P
181 pratipatti°] == P <–> prati K —
AS$_1$ reads *pratiniyama°*, suggesting
that Ś read so too.
181–182 tayor api] == K <–>
tayoradyāpi P
185 °prasañjanam] == P,
prasa(×ṅgaḥ)ñjanam K

175–177 na caikopādhinā ...svabhāva] ≈ NVTṬ 115,10–13
175–180 yac ca ...°prasañjanāt] ≈ AP 215,3–6
184–185 sūryādigrahaṇe ...prasañjanam] ≈ NBhūṣ 247, 2

59

phalam. tathā hi *tvan*mate dharmadharmiṇor bheda upakārala-
kṣaṇaiva ca pratyāsattiḥ. tadopakārakagrahaṇe samānadeśasyaiva
dharmarūpasyaiva copakāryasya grahaṇam āsañjitam. tat kathaṃ
sūryopakāryasya bhinnadeśasya dravyāntarasya vā dṛṣṭavyabhicā-
rasya grahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ saṅgataḥ.

190

[§ 31] tasmād ekadharmadvāreṇāpi vastusvarūpapratipattau
sarvātmapratīteḥ kva śabdāntareṇa vidhiniṣedhāvakāśaḥ. asti
ca. tasmān na svalakṣaṇasya śabdavikalpaliṅgapratibhāsitvam iti
sthitam.

[§ 32] nāpi sāmānyaṃ śābdapratyayapratibhāsi. saritaḥ pāre

195

gāvaś carantīti gavādiśabdāt sāsnāśṛṅgalāṅgūlādayo 'kṣarākārapa-
rikaritāḥ sajātīyabhedāparāmarśanāt sampiṇḍitaprāyāḥ pratibhā-
sante. na ca tad eva sāmānyam.

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186 tvanmate dharma] == K <–> tvanmate yadā dharmma P
192 °pratīteḥ] == K <–> pratipattiḥ P — Acc. to AS₃ 63, n. 3, P reads *pratipatteḥ*.
195 °pratibhāsi] == P (+prati)bhāsi K
196 °lāṅgūlādayo 'kṣarā°] == K <–> lāṅgulādayo 'kṣarā P

197 °āparāmarśanāt] == K <–> āparāmarśāt P — AS₃ 63, n. 4 reports the reading *vamarśāt* for P.
197 sampiṇḍita°] == K <–> saṃpihi(+ṇḍi3)ta P — In P, the point where the *akṣara* in the bottom margin is to be inserted is not clearly marked, but this is the most likely place.

184–186 yac cātra ...°phalam] ≈ AP 215,8–9
191–192 tasmād ...°āvakāśaḥ] ≈ AP 218,22–23
193–194 tasmān na ...sthitam] ≈ AP 219,23–24

[§ 33] varṇākṛtyakṣarākāraśūnyaṃ gotvaṃ hi kathyate ||

[§ 34] tad eva ca sāsnāśṛṅgādimātram akhilavyaktāv atyantavi-
lakṣaṇam api svalakṣaṇenaikīkriyamāṇaṃ sāmānyam ity ucyate.
tādṛśasya bāhyasyāprāpter bhrāntir evāsau keśapratibhāsavat. ta-
smād vāsanāvaśād buddher eva tadātmanā vivarto 'yam astu, asad
eva vā tadrūpaṃ khyātu, vyaktaya eva vā sajātīyabhedatiraskā-
reṇānyathā bhāsantām anubhavavyavadhānāt, smṛtipramoṣo vābhi-
dhīyatām. sarvathā nirviṣayaḥ khalv ayaṃ sāmānyapratyayaḥ. kva
sāmānyavārtā.

[§ 35] yat punaḥ sāmānyābhāve sāmānyapratyayasyā-
kasmikatvam uktam, tad ayuktam, yataḥ pūrvapiṇḍadarśanasma-
raṇasahakāriṇātiricyamānā viśeṣapratyayajanikā sāmagrī nirvi-

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199 kathyate] == K <–> vakṣyate P
200 ca] == K <–> n. e. P
202 °āprāpter bhrāntir] == K <–>
āprāpte bhrāntir P
202 evāsau] == P, e(×ṣai)vāsau K
204 eva vā tad°] == P Ś <–> evātad
K — Ś acc. to AS$_1$ 12, n. 1.
204 vā^2] == P Ś <–> n. e. K — Ś
acc. to AS$_1$ 12, n. 2.
205 anubhava°] == K <–>
anubhava(+sya4) P — The addition in
P is written in the top margin,
directly above this passage. The

usual mark indicating where the
addition should go is missing here,
but no other place seems reasonable.
205 smṛtipramoṣo] == K <–>
smṛtivipramoṣo P
209 tad ayuktam] == K, (+tad
ayuktam (?5)) P — That this
addition was made "...by a separate
hand" (AS$_3$ 63, n. 8) is not evident to
the present author.
209 °piṇḍadarśana°] == P Ś <–>
piṇḍadaṇḍadarśana K — Ś acc. to
AS$_1$ 12, n. 3.

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199 varṇā ...kathyate] ≈PV III 147cd (*varṇyate* instead of *kathyate*)
195–199 nāpi ...kathyate] ≈ AP 220,2–5
200–201 tad eva ca ...ucyate] ≈ AP 220,8–9
202 tādṛśasya ...°bhāsavat] ≈ AP 220,15–16
202–207 tasmād ...sāmānyavārtā] ≈ AP 220,23–221,1
208–209 yat punaḥ ...tad ayuktam] ≈ AP 221,11

ṣayaṃ sāmānyavikalpam utpādayati. tad evaṃ na śābdapratyaye
jātiḥ pratibhāti, nāpi pratyakṣe.

[§ 36] na cānumānato 'pi siddhiḥ, adṛśyatve pratibaddhaliṅgā-
darśanāt. nāpīndriyavad asyāḥ siddhiḥ, jñānakāryataḥ kādācitka-
syaiva nimittāntarasya siddheḥ.   yadāpi piṇḍāntare 'ntarāle vā   215
gobuddher abhāvaṃ darśayet, tadā śābaleyādisakalagopiṇḍānām
evābhāvād abhāvo gobuddher upapadyamānaḥ katham arthāntaram
ākṣipet. atha gotvād eva gopiṇḍaḥ, anyathā turago 'pi gopiṇḍaḥ syāt.
yady evam, gopiṇḍād eva gotvam, anyathā turagatvam api gotvaṃ
syāt. tasmāt kāraṇaparaṃparāta eva gopiṇḍaḥ, gotvaṃ tu bhavatu   220
mā vā.

[§ 37] nanu sāmānyapratyayajananasāmarthyaṃ yady ekasmāt
piṇḍād abhinnam, tadā vijātīyavyāvṛttaṃ piṇḍāntaram asamartham.
atha bhinnam, tadā tad eva sāmānyam, nāmni paraṃ vivāda iti cet, a-
bhinnaiva sā śaktiḥ prati vastu. yathā tv ekaḥ śaktasvabhāvo bhāvaḥ,   225
tathānyo 'pi bhavan kīdṛśaṃ doṣam āvahati. yathā *bhavatāṃ* jātir
ekāpi samānadhvaniprasavahetuḥ, anyāpi svarūpeṇaiva jātyanta-

P35b (margin)
K6b (margin)

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211 °śābdapratyaye°] == K <–>
śābde pratyaye P
215 yadāpi] == K <–> yadā P

218 atha gotvād] == atha gotvād P
<–> gotvād K
219 turagatvam] == K, tura(+(?ga))
tvam P
220 tu] == K <–> n. e. P

209–211 yataḥ ...utpādayati] ≈ AP 221,13–14
213–215 na cā°...siddheḥ] Cf. AP 221,17–20
215–221 yadāpi ...bhavatu mā vā] ≈ AP 221,20–25
226–227 jātir ...°prasavahetuḥ] ≈ NSū_Th 2.2.69

ran*irapekṣā, tathāsmākaṃ* vyaktir api jātinirapekṣā svarūpeṇaiva bhinnā hetuḥ.

[§ 38] yat tu *trilocanaḥ* — aśvatvagotvādīnāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ svāśrayeṣu samavāyaḥ sāmānyaṃ sāmānyam ity abhidhānapratya- yayor nimittam iti. yady evaṃ vyaktiṣv apy ayam eva tathābhi- dhānapratyayahetur astu, kiṃ sāmānyasvīkārapramādena. na ca samavāyaḥ sambhavī —

> [§ 39] iheti buddheḥ samavāyasiddhir iheti dhīś ca
> dvayadarśane syāt |
> na ca kvacit tadviṣaye dvayekṣā svakalpanāmātram ato
> 'bhyupāyaḥ ||

[§ 40] etena yeyaṃ pratyayānuvṛttir anuvṛttavastvanuyā- yinī katham atyantabhedinīṣu vyaktiṣu vyāvṛttaviṣayapratyaya- bhāvānupātinīṣu bhavitum arhatīty ūhāpravartanam *asya* pratyā-

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230 aśvatva°] == P <–> aśvatvaṃ K

231 svāśrayeṣu] == Ś <–> svāśraye K <–> svaviṣayeṣu P — Ś acc. to AS₁ 13, n. 1.

231 sāmānyaṃ] == K <–> n. e. P — K puts a *daṇḍa* after this *sāmānyam*.

233 °pramādena] == K <–> vacanena P

235 °darśane syāt] == K <–> darśanena P

236 dvayekṣā] == K <–> tv apekṣā P — AS₁ 14,6 reads *tv apekṣa*, possibly reflecting Ś. KBhV reads *dvayekṣā*.

237 yeyaṃ] em. <–> seyaṃ P; no ev. K — AS₁ 14,8 supports *yeyaṃ*, suggesting this was the reading of Ś.

222–229 nanu ...hetuḥ] ≈ AP 222,3–8

230 yat tu] All available mss support *yat tu*, but Thakur 1975a: 64, n. 1 reports the reading *yac ca* for P.

230–232 yat tu ...nimittam iti] ≈ AP 222,10–11

235–236 iheti ...'bhyupāyaḥ] = KBhV 70,13–14

khyātam, jātiṣv eva parasparavyāvṛttatayā vyaktīyamānāsv anu-vṛttapratyayena vyabhicārāt. [240]

[§ 41] yat punar *anena* viparyaye bādhakam uktam — abhidhāna-pratyayānuvṛttiḥ kutaścin nivṛtya kvacid eva bhavantī nimittavatī, na cānyan nimittam ityādi, tan na samyak, anuvṛttam antareṇāpy abhidhānapratyayānuvṛtter atadrūpaparāvṛttasvarūpaviśeṣād ava-śyaṃ svīkārasya sādhitatvāt. tasmāt — [245]

K7a

[§ 42] tulye bhede yayā jātiḥ pratyāsattyā prasarpati |

kvacin nānyatra saivāstu śabdajñānanibandhanam ||

[§ 43] yat punar atra *nyāyabhūṣaṇeno*ktam — na hy evaṃ bhavati — yayā pratyāsattyā daṇḍasūtrādikaṃ prasarpati kvacit, nānya-tra, saiva pratyāsattiḥ puruṣasphaṭikādiṣu daṇḍisūtritvādivyava-hāranibandhanam astu. kiṃ daṇḍasūtrādineti, tad asaṅgatam — daṇḍasūtrayor hi puruṣasphaṭikapratyāsannayor dṛṣṭayor daṇḍisū-tripratyayahetutvaṃ nāpalapyate. sāmānyaṃ tu svapne 'pi na dṛṣṭam. tad yadīdaṃ parikalpanīyam, tadā varaṃ pratyāsattir eva [250] [255]

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242 anena] == K <–> anana P

250 °sūtrādikaṃ] == K <–> sūtrādi P — In the pictures of P, the position of the label identifying the batch of folios ("5B") in the top margin of P 35b covers the place where a marginal correction should be expected.

252 °sūtrādineti] == K P <–> sūtratvādinā Ś — Ś acc. to AS₁ 15, n. 1.

253 dṛṣṭayor] == K <–> dṛṣṭatvād P

253–254 °sūtripratyaya°] == K <–> sūtritvapratyaya P

237–241 etena ...vyabhicārāt] ≈ AP 222,23–25

242–246 yat punar ...tasmāt] ≈ AP 223,15–18

247–248 tulye bhede ...°nibandhanam] = PV I 162 = AP 224,6–7

249–252 yat punar ...daṇḍasūtrādineti] ≈ AP 224,10–12

249–252 na hy evaṃ ...kiṃ daṇḍasūtrādineti] = NBhūṣ 261,5–7

sāmānyapratyayahetuḥ parikalpyatām. kiṃ gurvyā parikalpanayety abhiprāyāparijñānāt.

[§ 44] athedaṃ jātiprasādhakam anumānam abhidhīyate — yad viśiṣṭajñānam, tad viśeṣaṇagrahaṇanānantarīyakam, yathā daṇḍi- P36a
jñānam. viśiṣṭajñānaṃ cedaṃ gaur ayam ity arthataḥ kāryahetuḥ. viśeṣaṇānubhavakāryaṃ hi dṛṣṭānte viśiṣṭabuddhiḥ siddheti. atrā- nuyogaḥ — viśiṣṭabuddher bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇanānantarīyakatvaṃ vā sādhyaṃ viśeṣaṇamātrānubhavanānantarīyakatvaṃ vā.

[§ 45] prathamapakṣe pakṣasya pratyakṣabādhā sādhanāva- dhānam anavakāśayati, vastugrāhiṇaḥ pratyakṣasyobhayaprati- bhāsābhāvāt. viśiṣṭabuddhitvaṃ ca sāmānyam. hetur anaikāntikaḥ, bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇam antareṇāpi darśanāt, yathā svarūpavān ghaṭaḥ, gotvaṃ sāmānyam iti vā.

[§ 46] dvitīyapakṣe tu siddhasādhanam, svarūpavān ghaṭa ityādi- vad gotvajātimān piṇḍa iti parikalpitaṃ bhedam upādāya viśeṣaṇa- K7b
viśeṣyabhāvasyeṣṭatvād agovyāvṛttānubhavabhāvitvād gaur ayam iti

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258 jātiprasādhakam] == P, jāti(×bha)prasādhakam K

260 °jñānaṃ cedaṃ] == K <–> grahaṇam (+jñānaṃ1) cedaṃ P

263 vā] == P, vā (×prathamapakṣe) K

263 viśeṣaṇa°] == P <–> viśeṣa(?ṇa) K

263 °katvam] == P <–> ka(×tva)m K

265 pratyakṣasyo°] == P <–> prakṣasyo K

266 sāmānyam. hetur] == K <–> sāmānyahetur P

268 gotvaṃ] == K <–> gotva P

269 dvitīya°] == K <–> dvitīye P

270 gotva°] == P, go(+$^{\text{v}}$tva7) K

271 °ānubhavabhāvitvād] == K, ānu(+bha(?3))vabhāvitvād P

258–260 athedaṃ ...°hetuḥ] ≈ TBh$_{\text{I}}$ 55,17–56,1

vyavahārasya.

[§ 47] tad evaṃ na sāmānyasiddhiḥ.   bādhakaṃ ca sā-
mānyaguṇakarmādyupādhicakrasya^{K²↓} kevalavyaktigrāhakaṃ paṭu-
pratyakṣaṃ dṛśyānupalambho vā prasiddhaḥ.   275

[§ 48] tad evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ. sa ca bāhyo 'rtho buddhyā-
kāraś ca vivakṣitaḥ. tatra na buddhyākārasya tattvataḥ saṃvṛtyā vā
vidhiniṣedhau,^{K³↓} svasaṃvedanapratyakṣagamyatvād^{P⁴↓} anadhyavasāyāc
ca. nāpi tattvato bāhyasyāpi vidhiniṣedhau, tasya śābde pratyaye
'pratibhāsanāt. ata eva sarvadharmāṇāṃ tattvato 'nabhilāpyatvam,^{K⁴↓}   280
pratibhāsādhyavasāyābhāvāt. tasmād bāhyasyaiva sāṃvṛtau vidhi-
niṣedhau, anyathā saṃvyavahārahāniprasaṅgāt .

[§ 49] tad evaṃ

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273 evaṃ] == P Ś <–> eva K — Ś
acc. to AS₁ 16, n. 1.
273 °siddhiḥ] == P Ś <–> buddhiḥ
K — Ś acc. to AS₁ 16, n. 1.
273 ca] == K <–> n. e. P
274 °karmādy°] == P,
karmmā(×dika)dy K
275 vā] == P Ś <–> n. e. K — Ś
acc. to AS₁ 16, n. 2.

275 prasiddhaḥ] == K <–> siddhaḥ
P
276 sa] == K; (?sa) P
279 śābde] == K <–> śābda P
280 'pratibhāsanāt] == K <–>
'pratibhāsāt P
280 'nabhilāpyatvam] == K <–>
'nabhilapyatvaṃ P
282 saṃvyavahāra°] == K <–>
vyavahāra P

258–272 athedaṃ ...vyavahārasya] ≈ AP 225,1–9
261–272 atrānuyogaḥ ...vyavahārasya] ≈ TBh_I 56,2–10
276–279 tad evaṃ ...vidhiniṣedhau] Cf. AP 229,6–15
282 anyathā ...°prasaṅgāt] = AP 229,15

nākārasya na bāhyasya tattvato vidhisādhanam |
bahir eva[K⁵] hi saṃvṛtyā saṃvṛtyāpi tu nākṛteḥ[P⁵] ||

[§ 50] etena yad *dharmottaraḥ* — āropitasya bāhyatvavidhini-
ṣedhāv ity alaukikam anāgamam atārkikīyaṃ kathayati, tad
apahastitam.

[§ 51] nanv adhyavasāye[K⁶] yady adhyavaseyaṃ vastu na sphurati,
tadā tad adhyavasitam iti ko 'rthaḥ. apratibhāse 'pi pravṛttiviṣa-
yīkṛtam iti yo 'rthaḥ, apratibhāsāviśeṣe viṣayāntaraparihāreṇa[P⁶]
kathaṃ niyataviṣayā pravṛttir iti cet,[K⁷] ucyate — yady api viśvam
agṛhītam, tathāpi vikalpasya niyatasāmagrīprasūtatvena niyatā-
kāratayā niyataśaktitvāt niyata eva jalādau pravṛttiḥ, dhūmasya

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284 °sādhanam] em. <–>
sādhanama K <–> bādhanaṃ P
bādhanaṃ Ś — Ś acc. to AS₁ 16, n. 3.
286 etena] == P, ete((×nāropita)→
na) K
286 bāhyatvavidhi°] ==
bāhyatvavidhi P Ś <–>
bāhyatva(+ᵛsya5) vidhi K — Ś acc. to
AS₁ 16, n. 4.

287 alaukikam] == P,
alaukika(×ḥ)m K
287–288 tad apa°] == tad apa K
<–> tad apy apa P
291 °viśeṣe] == K <–> viśeṣe (?(+pi))
P — It is not certain that the addition
in the bottom margin of P really
belongs here.
294 niyata eva] == niyata eva P,
niyata (+ᵛeva7) K — AS₁ reads *niyatā
eva*, without noting variants.

284–285 nākārasya ...nākṛteḥ] =AP 229,3–4; ≈ SāSiŚā 443,13–14 (*pratiṣedhanam*
for *vidhisādhanam*).
286–287 āropitasya ...niṣedhāv] Cf. DhAP 244,3–4: *sgrub pa dang dgag pa dag
ni sgro btags gang zhig phyi rol nyid du nges par byas pa de dang 'brel pa yin te*.
Identified in Frauwallner 1937: 266, n. 1.
286–288 etena ...apahastitam] ≈ AP 229,16–17
290–291 apratibhāse ...°kṛtam] ≈AP 226,23. Cf. KBhSA 73,11
292–294 yady api ...pravṛttiḥ] ≈ AP 226,2–3

parokṣāgnijñānajananavat.   295

[§ 52] niyataśaktayo hi bhāvāḥ↓ pramāṇapariniṣṭhitasvabhāvāḥ,

na śaktisāṃkaryaparyanuyogabhājaḥ. tasmāt tadadhyavasāyitvam↓

ākāraviśeṣayogāt tatpravṛttijanakatvam. na ca sādṛśyād āropeṇa

pravṛttiṃ brūmaḥ, yenākāre bāhyasya bāhye vᴷ²↓ākārasyāropadvāreṇa

dūṣaṇāvakāśaḥ, kiṃ tarhi svavāsanāvipākavaśād upajāyamānaiva   300

294–295 dhūmasya
parokṣāgnijñānajananavat] == Ś
<–> (+ᵛ(?asadut)pattivat7) yady api
vahnau dhūmasya
trailokyasyābhāvas tathāpi tato
dhūma(+syaivotpādo nānyasya) K
<–> yathā vahnau dhūmaghaṭādyor
asatvepi dhūma evotpadyate na
ghaṭādiḥ P — Ś acc. to AS₁ 17,9–10,
and n. 1. Concerning K: The phrase is
written over an older, deleted version.
The new writing is much more
condensed than in the rest of the ms.
This suggests that the reading now
found in K is significantly longer than
the one replaced by it, and makes it
hard to judge whether it was written
in a different hand. AS₁ 17, n. 1
reports "*asadāpattivat.*" for K. This
addition in the bottom margin of K 7b
is not clearly legible. Cf. also
AP 226,5, *asadutpattivat*. Contrary to
the presentation in AS₁, no *daṇḍa* is

visible after the addition, but only a
"7", indexing the addition to the line
where it should be entered.
296 niyataśaktayo] em. <–>
niyataviṣayā K niyataviṣayā P — Cf.
CAPV 138,5–6: "*niyataśaktayo bhāvā
hi pramāṇapariniṣṭhitasvabhāvāḥ,
na śaktisāṅkaryaparyanuyogabhājaḥ
...*"; AP 226,3–4: "*niyataśaktayo hi
bhāvāḥ
pramāṇapariniṣṭhitasvabhāvā na
śaktisāṅkaryaparyanuyogabhājaḥ ....*"
The context is the same as here in
both cases.
297 tadadhyavasāyitvam] == P,
tadadhya(+vasā)yitvam K <–>
adhyavasāyitvam Ś — Ś reads *tasmāt*
acc. to AS₁ 17, n. 2.
298 °viśeṣayo] == P,
viśe(×ṣayo)ṣayo K
300 svavāsanā°] == K <–> vāsanā
P
300 °vipāka°] == K <–> paripāka P

296–297 niyataśaktayo ...°bhājaḥ] = AP 226,3–4; Cf. CAPV 138,5–6

buddhir apaśyanty api bāhyaṃ bāhye pravṛttim ātanotīti viplutaiva.

[§ 53] tad evam anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo vijātivyāvṛtto 'rtho[K3] vidhiḥ. sa eva cāpohaśabdavācyaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ[P2] pravṛttinivṛttiviṣayaś ceti sthitam.

305 [§ 54] atra prayogaḥ — yad vācakam, tat sarvam adhyava-sitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaram, yatheha kūpe[K4] jalam iti vacanam. vācakaṃ cedaṃ gavādiśabdarūpam iti svabhāvahetuḥ. nāyam asiddhaḥ, pūrvoktena nyāyena pāramārthikavācyavācaka-bhāvasyābhāve 'py adhyavasāyakṛtasyaiva[K5] sarvavyavahāribhir ava-[P3]

310 śya svīkartavyatvāt, anyathā sarvavyavahāracchedaprasaṅgāt. nāpi viruddhaḥ, sapakṣe bhāvāt. na cānaikāntikaḥ. tathā hi śabdānām a-dhyavasitavijātivyāvṛttavastumātraviṣayatvam[K6] anicchadbhiḥ *paraiḥ* paramārthato

[§ 55] vācyaṃ svalakṣaṇam upādhir upādhiyogaḥ sopādhir astu yadi vākṛtir astu buddheḥ |

315 [§ 56] gatyantarābhāvād aviṣayatve[P4] ca vācakatvāyogāt.[K7] tatra

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301 pravṛttim] == (+^v pra)vṛttim P <–> vṛttim K

303 eva cāpoha°] == K <–> evāpoha P

308–309 °vācakabhāvasyā°] == P <–> vācakasyā K

309 °kṛtasyaiva] == kṛtasyaiva P <–> kṛtasya K

309 sarva°] == K P <–> sarvasya Ś — Ś acc. to AS₁ 18, n. 2.

309–310 avaśya] == K <–> avaśyaṃ P

314 sopādhir astu] == P <–> sopādhivastu K

314 vākṛtir] == P, vā (+^v ā6)kṛtir K — The additional ā in K is metrically not correct. AS₁ and AS₃ analyse *vā kṛtir*.

298–301 na ca ...viplutaiva.] ≈ AP 226,9–12

308 pūrvoktena nyāyena] Cf. ll. 167–168.

[§ 57] ādyantayor na samayaḥ phalaśaktihāner madhye 'py
upādhivirahāt tritaye na yuktaḥ | |

[§ 58] tad evaṃ vācyāntarasyābhāvād viṣayavattvalakṣaṇasya

K8b vyāpakasya nivṛttau vipakṣato nivartamānaṃ vācakatvam adhya-
vasitabāhyaviṣayatvena vyāpyata iti vyāptisiddhiḥ.

[§ 59] śabdais tāvan mukhyam ākhyāyate 'rthas tatrāpohas   320
tadguṇatvena gamyaḥ |

arthaś caiko 'dhyāsato bhāsato 'nyaḥ sthāpyo vācyas
tattvato naiva kaścit | |

Colophon

[§ 60] apohasiddhiḥ samāptā. kṛtir iyaṃ mahāpaṇḍita*ratnakīrti*pā-
dānām.

[§ 61] bhavatv apohe kṛtināṃ prapañco
vastusvarūpāsphuraṇaṃ tu marma |

tatrādṛḍhe sarvam ayatnaśīrṇaṃ dṛḍhe tu sausthyaṃ   325
nanu tāvataiva | |

<hr>

317–318 °lakṣaṇasya vyāpakasya]
em. <–> lakṣaṇasya vyākasya K <–>
lakṣaṇavyāpakasya P —
AS₁ 18,19–19,1 reads as chosen here.
319 °bāhyaviṣayatvena] == P,
bāhya~~~viṣayatvena K
320–321 śabdais ...kaścit] ==
(+ᵛśabdais ...kaścit) K <–> n. e. P
n. e. Ś — Ś acc. to AS₁ 19, n. 1. In K
this verse is written after the

colophon, i.e., after *parirakṣaṇīyaḥ* in
l. 327, and marked as an insertion
that should follow *siddhiḥ*, l. 319.
322 °paṇḍita°] == P; paṇḍ(?i)ta K
322–323 apohasiddhiḥ
...°ratnakīrtipādānām] == K <–>
mahāpaṇḍitaratnakīrtipādaviratam
apohaprakaraṇaṃ samāptaṃ P — In
P, emend *viratam* to *viracitam*, as in
AS₃ 66,22.

<hr>

320–321 śabdais ...kaścit] = AP 203,1–4 = SR 712,4–6
324–325 bhavatv apohe ...tāvataiva] = AP 232,12–15

[§ 62] sampūrṇarātripraharadvayena kīrter apoho likhitaḥ
sukhena |
trailokyadattena parātmahetor yatnād ato 'yaṃ
parirakṣaṇīyaḥ ||

324–327 bhavatv apohe
...parirakṣaṇīyaḥ] == K <–>
n. e. P   n. e. Ś — Ś acc. to AS₁ 19, n.
2. For the syllables missing in K (*va*

and *torya*), I follow the suggestions in
AS₁ 19,11; 19,17.
327 parirakṣaṇīyaḥ] == n. e. P
<–> || • || ∗ K

2.1 Variants in the Nepalese manuscripts

This section lists the main variants found in the manuscripts N_1 and N_2, alongside the material presented in the critical edition above. Even though the Nepalese manuscripts derive from the edition AS_1 (see above, section 1.3.1) and therefore do not provide evidence useful for the present critical edition, the material shown here provides insight into how an edition of a Sanskrit text, AS_1, was copied in fairly recent times (after 1910).

1 ❀] == ❀ K ❀ N_1; N_2 N_3; n. e. P

1 namaḥ śrīlokanāthāya] == K N_1, namaḥ śrīlokanāthāyaḥ N_2, namaḥ śrīlokanāthāya(?(×ḥ)) N_3 <–> namas tārāyai P

2 apohaḥ śabdārtho] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> apohaśabdārtha N_1

3 apohyate] == K P <–> apohyateḥ N_1 apohyateḥ N_2 <–> ayohyateḥ N_3

4 apohyate] == K P <–> apohyateḥ N_1 apohyateḥ N_2 <–> ayohyateḥ N_3 — AS_1 1,5 separates the variants with semicolons, graphically similar to the *visarga*.

6 apoha] == K P N_2 N_3, a((×ha(+2) | po(+1))→(+poha)) N_1

9 evollikhantī] == K P <–> evolikhayantī N_1 <–> evolikhanti N_2 <–> evolikhaṃti N_3

9 lakṣyate] == K P N_2 <–> lakṣyateḥ N_1 <–> lakṣate N_3

13 anantarbhāvita°] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> anantabhāvita N_1

14 °pratītir] == K P <–> pratīti N_1 pratīti N_2 pratīti N_3

16 nivṛtta°] == K P N_1 N_2 N_3 <–> nimitta Ś

18 °vyavasthā] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> vyavasthāḥ N_1

21 nivṛttipratīti°] == K P N_1 <–> nivṛttiīti N_2 <–> nivṛti N_3 — In N_2, both *i* and *ī* are attached as vowel signs to the same base letter, *tt*.

23 °tayāntarbhūtā] == K P N_1 <–> tayā antabhūtā N_2 tayā aṃtabhūtā N_3

24 agavāpoḍha] == P N_2 N_3 <–> agadāpoḍha N_1; no ev. K

28–29 parāpoho] == K P N_1 N_3 <–> parāṃproho N_2

31 °viṣayatvam anivāryam] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> viṣayanirvāyam N_1

31 °vyāvṛttollekhino] == P N_2, vyā(×··)vṛttollekhino K <–> vyāvṛ(?(tto)lleṣino N_1 <–> vyāvṛtolekhino N_3

32 'khilānyavyāvṛttam] == P N_1 N_2, 'khilānya(?vyāvṛ)ttam K <–> likhānyavṛtam N_3

35–36 kevalo 'bhipretaḥ] == N_1 P <–> kevalo 'pretaḥ N_2 <–> kevalopretaḥ N_3; no ev. K

38 yat] == K P N_2 <–> yatu N_1 <–> yata N_3

38 parātmeti] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> parātme N_1

38 sāmarthyād] == P N_2 N_3 <–> sāmarthyad N_1; no ev. K

40 °dhāryata] == P N_1; dhārya(t(×e)→ta) K <–> dhāryate N_2 <–> dhāryate N_3

41 pratipattikramā°] == N_1 N_2 <–> pratītikramā P <–> pratipatikramā N_3; no ev. K

42 vidhiṃ] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> vidhi N_1

43 goḥ] == K P <–> agoḥ N_1 agoḥ N_2 <–> ago N_3

43–44 anyāpoḍha°] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> anyāpoḍho N_1

45 nāpratipattir] == K N_1 N_2 <–> nāpratītir P <–> nāpipratipatir N_3

46–47 °śabdān nīlotpala°] == K P N_2 <–> śabdānīlotpala N_1 <–> śabdānīlopala N_3

47 nīlima°] == K P N_2 <–> nīlama N_1 <–> nīlīma N_3

48–59 gopratītau … jāter adhikāyāḥ] Both N_2 and N_3 repeat this passage: N_2 3b1–6 equals N_2 4a1–6, and N_3 3a1–7 equals N_3 3a7–3b5. Note that "*gopratītau*" is the first word both on folio N_2 3b and N_2 4a, which makes it more likely that the repetition originated in N_2 rather than in N_3, where "*gopratītau*" is found in positions less prone to error. In this section of the edition, variants found in the first occurrence of this passage will be referenced by the usual N_2 or N_3, while variants found in the second occurrence will be referenced by N_2^b and N_3^b respectively.

50 prasajyarūpā°] == P N_3 N_3^b <–> prasahyarūpā N_1 prasahyarūpā N_2 N_2^b; no ev. K

50–52 abhāvavikalpotpādanaśaktir …grahaṇam] == K P N_2 N_3 N_2^b N_3^b <–> n. e. N_1

51 vidhivikalpānām] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> vidhikalpānām N_2^b N_3^b

51 °dāna°] == K N_2 N_3 N_2^b N_3^b <–> n. e. P

53 niyata°] == P N_1 N_2^b <–> niyanta N_2 niyanta N_3 <–> niyeta N_3^b; no ev. K

53 anyathā] == K P N_2 N_3 N_2^b N_3^b <–> anyathā yathā N_1

53–54 śabdād artha°] == P N_2^b N_3^b <–> śabdārtha K <–> śabdād arthā N_1 śabdād arthā N_2 śabdād arthā N_3

54 katham] == P N_2 N_3 N_2^b N_3^b, ka(?tha)m K <–> kanyam N_1

54 °parihāreṇa] == K P N_2^b N_3^b <–> parihareṇa N_1 parihareṇa N_2 <–> pariharaṇa N_3

55 tato gāṃ] == K P N_1 N_2^b N_3^b <–> tato (?)gaṃ N_2 tato (?)gaṃ N_3

55 'śvādīn] == P <–> 'ścodīn N_1 'ścodīn N_2 N_2^b <–> ścodin N_3 <–> ścodīn N_3^b; no ev. K

56 vācaspatiḥ] == K P N_2^b N_3^b <–> vācaspati N_1 vācaspati N_2 vācaspati N_3

56–57 vikalpānāṃ …gocaraḥ] == K P N_1 N_2^b <–> vikalpānāṃ śabdānāṃ cāgocaraḥ N_2 <–> vikalpānāṃ śabdānāṃ cāṅgocaraḥ N_3 <–> vikalpānāśabdānāśca goraca N_3^b

57 atajjātīya°] == K P N_2^b <–> atajjātiya N_1 atajjātiya N_2 <–> atajātiya N_3 N_3^b

57–58 °parāvṛttam] == P N_2 N_3, pa(×rihāre)rāvṛttam K <–> parāvṛtyam N_1

58 tadavagater] == K P N_1 <–> tavagater N_2 tavagater N_3 <–> tadavagate N_2^b N_3^b

58 'svādīn] == K P <–> 'ścādīn N_1 'ścādīn N_2 N_2^b <–> ścodīna N_3 N_3^b

59 anenaiva nirastam] == P N_1 N_2 N_2^b N_3^b <–> anenenaiva nirastam K <–> ateneva nirasta N_3

59 adhikāyāḥ] Repetition in N_2 and N_3 ends here, cf. note to line 48.

60 atajjātīya°] == K P N_1 <–> atajjātiya N_2 <–> atajātiya N_3

60 °vyāvṛttam eva] == N_1 N_3 vyā(×(?··))vṛttam e(×tyarthabha)va K <–> parāvṛttam eva P <–> vyāvṛttem eva N_2

60 tenaiva] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> tainaiva N_1

61 °vikalpayor] == K P <–> vikalpayo N_1 <–> vikalpāyo N_2 vikalpāyo N_3

61 viṣayībhavantīnāṃ] == K P N_2 <–> viṣaryobhavantīnāṃ N_1 <–> viṣayibhava(?p)īnā N_3

62 na vijātīyavyāvṛttaṃ] == K N_1 N_2 <–> na vijātivyāvṛttaṃ P <–> na vinavijātiyavyāvṛkta N_3

63 arthato 'pi] == K P N_1 <–> athatopi N_2 athatopi N_3

65 jātibalād] == K P N_2 <–> jātibad N_1 <–> jātibasād N_3

65 bhavatu] == P N_1 N_2; bhavatu (×kodo) K <–> evabhu N_3

66 °paramparābalād] == K P <–> parāsparābalād N_1 parāsparābalād N_2 parāsparābalād N_3

66 ubhayathāpi] == K P N_1 N_3 <–> ubhayayathāpi N_2

66–67 °pratipattau vyāvṛttipratipattir] == K N_2 <–> pratipattau vyāvṛttipratītir P <–> pratipattau vyāvṛttipratiprattir N_1 <–> pratipatir N_3

68 cāgo'poḍhe] == K N_1 N_2 <–> cāgavāpoḍha P <–> rāgopāte N_3

72 °parijñāne] == K P N_2 <–> jñāne N_1 <–> (+parī)jñānaṃ N_3

73 tasmād] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> tasmā N_1

76 śeṣasyāpy abhidhānam] == K P N_2 <–> śesyāpy avidhānam N_1 <–> śeṣasyāpy abhidhānem N_3

77 °āpoḍhānyāpohayor] == K; āpoḍhānyāpohayo N_1 āpoḍhānyāpohayo N_2 <–> āpohānyāpoḍhayor P <–> āpotānyāpohayo N_3

77–78 °viśeṣaṇabhāva°] == P Ś <–> viśeṣaṇa K viśeṣaṇa N_1 viśeṣaṇa N_2 viśeṣaṇa N_3

78 sāmānādhi°] == K P N_1 <–> sāmānyādhi N_2 <–> sāmāṃnyādhi N_3

78–79 °sadbhāvāt] == K P N_1 <–> sadbhāvā(×samānādhi) N_2 <–> sadbhāvasamānādhi N_3

79 hi] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> n. e. N_1

82 prakṛta°] == prakṛta P prakṛta Ś <–> aprakṛta K aprakṛta N_1 aprakṛta N_2 aprakṛta N_3

82 °pathā°] == K P N_2 <–> panthā N_1 <–> paṭā N_3

82–83 °pratyanīkāniṣṭa°] == K P N_1 <–> pratyayanīkāniṣṭa N_2 <–> pratyayanīkābhaṣṭa N_3

83 śrughnam] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> śrūghnam N_1

84 °vyavacchedena] == K N_1 N_2 <–> vyavacchena P <–> vyavacchedana N_3

85 vyavacchedasya sulabhatvāt] == K P N_2 <–> avacchedasya sulabhatvāt N_1 <–> vyavacchedasubhalatvāt N_3

85 apoha°] == K N_1 N_2 <–> anyāpoha P <–> amoha N_3

91 °pratītir iti] == K N_2 N_3 <–> pratītiḥ P <–> pratīr iti N_1

91 pratyakṣasyāpy apoha°] == K P, pratyakṣasyāpy a((×ho(+2)po(+1))→(+poho)) N_2 <–> pratyakṣasvāpy aho N_1 <–> pratyakṣasyāpy ahopo N_3

92 śābda°] == K <–> śabda P śabda N_1 <–> śabdā N_2 śabdā N_3

93 atadrūpa°] == K P N_1 <–> antadrūpa N_2 antadrūpa N_3 antadrūpa N_3^b

93–95 atadrūpa° ...'dhyavasāyād] Repetition in N_3. N_3 4b5–6 equals N_3 4b6–7. Probably an eye-skip from *'dhyavasāyād* to *yathādhyavasāyam*, further corroborated by N_3's *'dhyavasāyām* at the end of this passage's first occurrence. Variants found in repetition are noted as N_3^b (cf. note to l. 48).

94 bāhyo 'rtho 'bhimataḥ] == K P N_2 <–> bāhyorthorvibhimataḥ N_1 <–> bāhyārthobhimata N_3 <–> bāhyārthobhimataḥ N_3^b

94 °pratibhāsaṃ] == K P N_1 N_3^b <–> pratibhāṣaṃ N_2 pratibhāsaṃ N_3

96–97 °pravyaktasva°] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> pravyaktaḥ sva N_1

98 °āvyāpṛtākṣasya] == K P <–> āvyāvṛttākhyasya N_1 āvyāvṛttākhyasya N_2 <–> āvyāvṛtākhyasyā N_3

101 °syaivārthasya] == P Ś <–> syaiva K syaiva N_1 syaiva N_2 syaiva N_3

101–102 pratibhāsa°] == K P <–> pratibhāva N_1 pratibhāva N_2 pratibhāva N_3

102 atrāpy] == K N_1 N_3, a(+^{v}trā)py N_2 <–> tatrāpy P

103 cetasāṃ tasya] == K P N_1, ce(t→ta)sāntasya N_2 <–> cetsāṃtasya N_3 — N_2 deleted *virāma*, resulting in *ta*

104 °āvabhāsi tat] == K N_1 <–> āvabhāsi yat P <–> āvabhāsit N_2 <–> āvabhāsita N_3

106 vastunaḥ] == K N_1 N_2 <–> vastuna P <–> v(?e)stunaḥ N_3

106 yata] == K N_1 N_2 <–> yad P <–> yetaḥ N_3

106 ekenendriya°] == K P N_1 <–> ekenandriya N_2 ekenandriya N_3

106 pratibhāsetānyena] == K P N_2 <–> pratibhāvatānyena N_1 <–> pratibhāsatānyena N_3

107 °prāpteḥ] == K P N_1 <–> prāpte N_2 prāpte N_3

108 pratibhāsa°] == K P N_1 N_3 <–> pratibhāṣa N_2

109 trailokyam] == K P N_1 <–> trelokyam N_2 trelokyam N_3

109 ekam eva vastu] == K P N_2 <–> ekam evastu N_1 <–> evastu N_3

109 syāt] == K P <–> na syāt N_1 na syāt N_2 na syāt N_3

112 ekaviṣayatvā°] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> viṣayatvā N_1

113 °sacivaḥ] == K P N_3 <–> saciva N_1 <–> sacirvaḥ N_2

113–114 pratibhāsabhedaḥ ...°viṣayatām] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> pratibhāṣayataṃ N_1

114 ghaṭavat] == K N_2 <–> ghaṭavata N_3 <–> n. e. P

114 °viṣayatāṃ] == K P <–> viṣatāṃ N_2 <–> viṣatā N_3

115 eka°] == P <–> n. e. N_1 <–> eva N_2 eva N_3; no ev. K

117 pārokṣyāpārokṣya°] == K P <–> parākṣyāpārokṣya N_1 <–> parokṣyāpārokṣya N_2 <–> parātmāparokta N_3

120 viraheṇaiva] == K P N$_1$ <–> viraheṇeva N$_2$ <–> viharaṇeva N$_3$

120 pratyaye svalakṣaṇaṃ] == K P N$_1$ N$_3$ <–> pratyayasvalaṇam N$_2$

122 sarvātmanā] == K P N$_1$ <–> savātmanā N$_2$ savatmanā N$_3$

122–123 pratipatter vidhi°] == K N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> pratipatte vidhi N$_1$ <–> pratipatte vidhe P

124 tu] == P Ś <–> n. e. K n. e. N$_1$ n. e. N$_2$ n. e. N$_3$

124–125 asamartham] == K P <–> asamārtha N$_1$ <–> asamatham N$_2$ <–> asamartham astīty asamartham N$_3$

125 tasmāc chābda°] == P <–> tasmāc chabda K tasmāc chabda N$_1$ tasmāc chabda N$_3$ <–> tasmātaśabda N$_2$

128 prastutyānanantaram] == K P <–> prastutyānanantaram N$_1$ prastutyānanantaram N$_2$ prastutyānanantaram N$_3$

128 jāter] == K P <–> jate N$_1$ jate N$_2$ jate N$_3$

129–130 °viprakīrṇā°] == K P N$_1$ <–> viprakīṇā N$_2$ <–> vikirṇā N$_3$

130 °bhavanty] == P <–> bhavann N$_1$ bhavann N$_2$ <–> bhavan N$_3$; no ev. K

130–131 astināstisambandhayogyā] == K N$_2$ <–> astyādisambandhayogyā P <–> astīnāstisambandhayogyāḥ. N$_1$ <–> āstīsambandhayogyā N$_3$

132 astitā] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> astitāḥ N$_1$

133 anaikāntikaṃ bhā°] == P N$_1$ <–> anaikāntika_mbhā K <–> anaikāntikabhā N$_2$ anaikāntikabhā N$_3$

134 tad aprastutam] == P <–> n. e. N$_1$ n. e. N$_2$ n. e. N$_3$; no ev. K

134 tāvatā] == P Ś <–> n. e. N$_1$ n. e. N$_2$ n. e. N$_3$; no ev. K

135 bharaṃ nyasyatā] == K N$_1$, bharaṃ ((×sya(+2)nya(+1))→(+nyasya))tā N$_2$ <–> bharaṃ nyasyatāpi P <–> bharasyanyetā N$_3$

136 kiṃ ca sarvatra] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> kiñ ca savatra N$_1$

136 svalakṣaṇasvarūpeṇaivā°] == K N$_1$ N$_3$ <–> svarūpeṇaivā P <–> svalakṣaṇasvarūpaivā N$_3$

137 °sambandho 'stitvādikam] == K P N$_1$ <–> sambandhāstitvādikam N$_2$ sambandhāstitvādikam N$_3$

138 evaṃ] == K P N$_1$ <–> eva N$_2$ eva N$_3$

138 jātimad°] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> jāmad N$_1$

139 pratītisiddhiḥ] == K P N$_2$ <–> pratītisiddhi N$_1$ pratītisiddhi N$_3$

141 ucyate] == K P N$_1$ <–> ucya N$_2$ ucya N$_3$

141 kaumārilaiḥ] == K P N$_1$ <–> komārilaiḥ N$_2$ komārilaiḥ N$_3$

142 hy anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ] == K <–> hi anirdhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ P <–> hy anidhāritabhāvābhāvaṃ N$_1$ <–> hy aṃnirdvāribhāvaṃ N$_2$ <–> hy anirdvāribhāvaṃ N$_3$

143 śabdāntarāvagatena] == P N$_1$ <–> śabdāntarā(×((×vā(+2)bhā(+1))→(+bhāvā))bhā)vaṃ gatena N$_2$ <–> śabdāntarābhāvābhāvagatena N$_3$; no ev. K — See comments above, page 33.

146 pratyakṣasyeva] == K P N$_1$ N$_3$, pra((×kṣa(+2)tya(+1))→(+tyakṣa))syeva N$_2$

147 taddṛṣṭa] == P <–> tadadṛṣṭa N$_1$ tadadṛṣṭa N$_2$ tadadṛṣṭa N$_3$; no ev. K

148 aindriyaka°]   == K P N_2 N_3 <–> endriyaka N_1

150 sākṣāt°]   == K P N_2 N_3 <–> sākṣā N_1

151 yadi]   == K P N_1 <–> yahi N_2 <–> yadbhi N_3

151 °pratipādanaṃ]   == K P N_1 <–> pratipādanāṃ N_2 <–> pratipādānāṃ N_3

152 abhavaṃś ca]   == K P <–> abhavaśca N_1 abhavaśca N_2 <–> abhaveś ca N_3

152 kṣamate]   == P N_2 N_3 <–> kṣamaḥ te N_1;   no ev. K

153 vṛkṣatvāṃśe]   == K P N_2 <–> vṛkṣatvāśe N_1 vṛkṣatvāśe N_3

157 dṛṣṭeti]   == K P N_1 <–> dṛśeti N_2 dṛśeti N_3

157 °ātmakatvād]   == P <–> ātmatvād K <–> ātmatvāt N_1 ātmatvāt N_2 <–> ātmatvā N_3

157–158 anabhyastasvarūpa°]   == K P N_1 <–> anabhyasvarūpa N_2 <–> anityasvarūpa N_3

158 vikalpas]   == K P N_2 N_3 <–> vikapas N_1

158 svayaṃ ni°]   == K P N_2, ((×ya(+2)sva(+1))→(+svaya))nni N_1 <–> svaya ni N_3

159 grāhī]   == K P N_2 <–> grāhiī N_1 <–> grāhi N_3 — N_1 did not delete the prefix for the short *i*.

161–162 dharmiṇaś ceti]   == K P N_2 <–> dharmmi(ma→ṇa)(?··)ti N_1 <–> dharmmaṇaśceti N_3 — N_1 is smudged here.

163 °ābhidhānādhīno]   ==K P N_1 <–> ābhidhānādhīnī N_2 <–> ābhidhānādhīni N_3

163 dharmāntarasya]   == K P N_1 N_3 <–> dhammāntarasya N_2

164 nīlacaloccaistaratvāder]   == K P N_1 <–> nīlacalāccaistaratvāt der N_2 <–> nīlacalāccaistaratvāt. der N_3

164–165 akhaṇḍātmanaḥ]   == K P N_1 <–> akhadātmanaḥ N_2 <–> akhādātmana N_3

165 pratyakṣe pratibhāsād]   == K <–> pratyakṣe 'pi pratibhāsanāt | P <–> pratyakṣe pratibhāṣāt | N_1 <–> pra((×kṣa(+2)tya(+1))→(+tyakṣa))pratisāt || N_2 <–> pratyekṣapratisāt || N_3

166 pratyakṣa°]   == K P N_2 N_3 <–> pratyakṣaḥ N_1

167 ity atiprasaṅgaḥ]   == K P N_2 <–> ity ati || prasaṅgaḥ N_1 <–> ity a • pratisargjaḥ N_3

168 iti]   == K P N_2 <–> i N_1 <–> iti || iti N_3 — N_1 has a linebreak after *i*.

170 pratyāsattir]   == K P <–> pratyāsantir N_1 pratyāsantir N_2 pratyāsantir N_3

172 °taddharma°]   == K P N_2 <–> tadharmma N_1 <–> saddharmma N_3

173 °pratibaddhābhyāṃ dharmi°]   == P N_1 N_2 <–> pratibaddhā_bhyāṃ dharmmi K <–> pratibaddhyātyādharmi N_3

174 °pratipattir bhavet]   == K P N_1 <–> pratipattibhavet N_2 pratipattibhavet N_3

174 pratyāsattimātrasyāviśeṣāt]   == K P N_1 <–> pratyāsattimātrasyāpi viśeṣāt N_2 <–> pratyāsattimātrasyāpi viṣesyāt N_3

175 sattvena] == P Ś <–> satve K satve N$_1$ satve N$_2$ <–> satva N$_3$

176 gṛhīta] == K gṛhīte (× |) P <–> gṛhīte N$_1$ gṛhīte N$_2$ gṛhīte N$_3$

176–177 dravyasyopādhibhir] == P dravyasya(×vi)upādhibhir K <–> dravya-sya upādhibhi N$_1$ dravyasya upādhibhi N$_3$ <–> dravyasya upādhibhir N$_2$

177 viśeṣyatvam] == K N$_1$ N$_2$ <–> viśeṣatvaṃ P <–> viśeṣyatva N$_3$

178–179 °grahaṇam āsañjitam] == P <–> grahaṇañ ca māsañjitam N$_1$ gra-haṇañ ca māsañjitam N$_2$ <–> grahaṇam ca māsañjitam N$_3$; no ev. K

179 °grahaṇa] <–> grahaṇe K grahaṇe P grahaṇe N$_1$ grahaṇe N$_3$ graha(ṇa→ṇ(+e)) N$_2$

181 pratipatti°] == P <–> prati K prati N$_1$ prati N$_2$ prati N$_3$

185 °prasañjanam] == P N$_1$, prasa(×ṅgaḥ)ñjanam K <–> pramañjanam N$_2$ pramañjanam N$_3$

186 tvanmate] == K P N$_3$ <–> tvatmate N$_1$ tvatmate N$_2$

186 dharmadharmiṇor bheda] == K P <–> dharmmadharmmiṇo bhedaḥ N$_1$ dharmmadharmmiṇo bhedaḥ N$_2$ <–> dharmmadharmmiṇor bheda(?ḥ) N$_3$

187 °pratyāsattiḥ] == K P N$_1$ <–> pratyāsaṃtiḥ N$_2$ <–> pratyāsanti N$_3$

187–189 tadopakāraka ...°opakāryasya] == K P N$_1$ N$_2$ — In N$_3$, this passage has been added in the bottom margin.

187 °opakāraka°] == K P N$_1$ <–> opakaraka N$_2$ opakaraka N$_3$

187 °grahaṇe] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> graṇor bhedaḥ (×upakāra) N$_1$

187 samānadeśasyaiva] == K P N$_1$ <–> samāṇe deśasyaiva N$_2$ samāṇe deśasyaiva N$_3$

192 °pratīteḥ] == K N$_1$ N$_2$ <–> pratipattiḥ P <–> pratīte N$_3$

196 °lāṅgūlādayo ’kṣarā°] == K <–> lāṅgulādayo ’kṣarā P lāṅgulādayo ’kṣarā N$_1$ <–> lāṅgūlādayo ’kṣarā N$_2$ <–> lā(+^{v}2gulā)dayokṣarā N$_3$

197 sampiṇḍita°] == K <–> saṃpihi(+ṇḍi3)ta P <–> sapiṇḍita N$_1$ sapiṇḍita N$_2$ <–> sapaṇḍita N$_3$

197–198 pratibhāsante] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> pratibhāṣante N$_1$

199 kathyate] == K N$_1$ <–> vakṣyate P <–> kathyaṃte N$_2$ <–> (?hi)ka(?thyaṃ)te N$_3$ — N$_3$ is smudged here.

200 atyanta°] == K P N$_1$ <–> antyanta N$_2$ antyanta N$_3$

202 °āprāpter bhrāntir] == K <–> āprāpte bhrāntir P āprāpte bhrāntir N$_1$ āprāpte bhrāntir N$_2$ āprāpte bhrāntir N$_3$

202 keśa°] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> veśa N$_1$

204 eva vā tad°] == P Ś N$_1$ N$_2$ <–> evātad K <–> eva tad N$_3$

204 sajātīya°] == K P N$_1$ <–> sajāya N$_2$ <–> sajāya N$_3$

205 bhāsantām] == K P <–> bhāṣantām N$_1$ bhāṣantām N$_2$ bhāṣantām N$_3$

206 sarvathā] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> sarvarthā N$_1$

206 khalv ayaṃ] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> svalpayam N$_1$

209 yataḥ] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> yata N$_1$

209 °piṇḍadarśana°] == P Ś <–> piṇḍadaṇḍadarśana K <–> piṇḍadaṇḍada-śana N$_1$ <–> piṇḍadaṇḍana N$_2$ piṇḍadaṇḍana N$_3$

209–210 °smaraṇa°] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> maraṇa N$_1$

210 sāmagrī] == K P <–> sāmāgrī N_1 sāmāgrī N_2 sāmāgrī N_3

210–211 nirviṣayaṃ] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> nīrviṣayaṃ N_1

215 yadāpi] == K <–> yadā P <–> N_1 N_2 N_3

216 °sakala°] == K P N_1 <–> (śa→sa)kala N_2; śakala N_3

217 arthāntaram] == K P N_1 <–> aryāntaram N_2 <–> aryyāntaram N_3

218 atha gotvād] == atha gotvād P <–> gotvād K gotvād N_1 gotvād N_2 gotvād N_3

218 gopiṇḍaḥ[1]] == K P N_1 <–> gopiṇḍa N_2 gopiṇḍa N_3

219 eva gotvam] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> eve gotvam N_1

220 °paraṃparāta] == K P <–> parasparāta N_1 parasparāta N_3 <–> parasparāt N_2

222 °sāmarthyaṃ] == K P N_1 N_3 <–> sāmārthyaṃ N_2

223 vijātīya°] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> vījātiya N_1

223 asamartham] == K P N_1 <–> asamartha N_2 asamartha N_3

228–229 °aiva bhinnā] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> aivaṃ bhinnā N_1

231 svāśrayeṣu] == Ś <–> svāśraye K svāśraye N_1 <–> svaviṣayeṣu P <–> śvāśraye N_2 śvāśraye N_3

231 abhidhāna°] == K P N_1 <–> abhitvābhidhāna N_2 abhitvābhidhāna N_3

231–232 °pratyayor nimittam] == K P N_2 <–> pratyayor nimittam N_1 <–> pratyayor nirmittam N_3

233 kiṃ sāmānya°] == K P N_1 N_3 <–> kisāmānya N_2

233 °svīkāra°] == P N_2 N_3 <–> svīkāraḥ N_1; no ev. K

233 °pramādena] == K N_1 N_2 <–> vacanena P <–> prasādena N_3

234 sambhavī] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> sambha(vi→vīī) N_1 — The scribe of N_1 apparently corrected *vi* to *vī*, but without deleting the short *i*.

235 °darśane syāt] == K N_1 N_2 <–> darśanena P <–> darśana syāt N_3

236 dvayekṣā] == K <–> tv apekṣā P tv apekṣā N_1 tv apekṣā N_2 tv apekṣā N_3

236 svakalpanāmātram] == K P N_2 N_3 <–> svakalpanāmāmātram N_1

237 anuvṛtta°] == K P N_1 <–> anuvṛ(tt(×i)→tta) N_2 <–> anuvṛti N_3

238 atyanta°] == K P N_1, atya(×ya)nta N_2 <–> atyayanta N_3

238–239 °pratyayabhāvā°] == K P N_1 <–> pratyabhāvā N_2 pratyabhāvā N_3

239 bhavitum] == K P N_3 N_2 <–> bhavītum N_1 — *bha* in N_2 is not written as is usual for this ms (cf. figs. fig. 1.17 and fig. 1.18).

239 arhatīty] == K P N_1 <–> arha(ti→tiī)ty N_2 <–> arhatity N_3 — N_2 added a vowel mark for *ī*, but did not delete the one for *i*.

240 jātiṣv eva] == K P N_1 <–> jātiṣṭeva N_2 jātiṣṭeva N_3

240 vyaktīyamānāsv] == K P N_1 <–> vyaktiyamānāsv N_2 vyaktiyamānāsv N_3

243 kutaścin] == K P N_1 <–> kataścin N_2 <–> kataścīn N_3

243 bhavantī] == K P N_1 <–> bhavantīti N_2 bhavantīti N_3

244 °ānyan nimittam] == K P <–> ānyanimittam N_1 ānyanimittam N_2 ānyanimittam N_3

247 tulye] == K P <–> tulya N_1 tulya N_2 tulya N_3

247 bhede yayā] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> bhedena yathā N$_1$

247 pratyāsattyā] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> pratyayāsattyā N$_1$

247 prasarpati] == K P N$_1$ <–> prasarṣati N$_2$ prasarṣati N$_3$

250 pratyāsattyā] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> pratyayāsattyā N$_1$

251 pratyāsattiḥ] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> pratyayāsattiḥ N$_1$

252 °sūtrādineti] == K P N$_1$ N$_2$ <–> sūtrāneti N$_3$ <–> sūtratvādinā Ś

253 daṇḍasūtrayor] == K P <–> daṇḍasūtrayo N$_1$ daṇḍasūtrayo N$_2$ daṇḍa-sūtrayo N$_3$

253 dṛṣṭayor] == K, dṛṣṭayoḥ N$_1$ dṛṣṭayoḥ N$_2$ <–> dṛṣṭayo N$_3$ <–> dṛṣṭatvād P

253–254 °sūtripratyaya°] == K N$_2$ <–> sūtrīpratyaya N$_1$ <–> sūtrapratyayo N$_3$ <–> sūtritvapratyaya P

254 °hetutvaṃ nāpalapyate] == K P N$_1$, hetu((×m(+2)tva(+1))→(+tvam)) nāppalapyate N$_2$ <–> hetum utpanām upala(?pya)te N$_3$ — N$_3$ is smudged here.

255 tadā varaṃ pratyāsattir] == K P N$_2$, tadā varaṃ pratya(×yā)sattir N$_1$ <–> (?...............)āsatir N$_3$ — N$_3$ is smudged here.

259 viśeṣaṇa°] == K P N$_2$; viśeṣa(na→ṇa) N$_1$ <–> viśeṣeṇa N$_3$

260 °jñānaṃ cedaṃ] == K N$_1$ N$_2$, jñāna(?ñce)daṃ N$_3$ <–> grahaṇaṃ (+jñā-naṃ1) cedaṃ P

260 arthataḥ] == K P N$_1$ <–> arthaṃ N$_2$ arthaṃ N$_3$

262 °grahaṇanāntarīya°] == K P N$_2$, graha((×ṇā)→ṇa)nāntarīya N$_1$ <–> grahaṇāṃtariya N$_3$

263 °ānubhavanā°] == K P N$_1$ <–> ānubhavatā N$_2$ ānubhavatā N$_3$

265 pratyakṣasyo°] == P N$_1$ N$_3$, pra(×tha)tyakṣasyo N$_2$ <–> prakṣasyo K

266 sāmānyam. hetur] == K N$_1$ N$_2$ <–> sāmāṃnyaṃ hetur N$_3$ <–> sāmānya-hetur P

268 ghaṭaḥ] == K P N$_2$ <–> ghaṭa N$_1$ ghaṭa N$_3$

268 gotvaṃ] == K N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> gotva P <–> n. e. N$_1$

270 gotva°] == P N$_1$, go(+^{v}tva7) K <–> gītva N$_2$ gītva N$_3$

271 °bhāvasyeṣtatvād] == K P N$_2$, bhāva(ṣye→sye)ṣtatvād N$_1$ <–> bhāvasve-ṣtatvād N$_3$

271 ago°] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> davyo go N$_1$

273 evaṃ] == P Ś <–> eva K eva N$_1$ eva N$_2$ eva N$_3$

273 °siddhiḥ] == P Ś <–> buddhiḥ K buddhiḥ N$_1$ buddhiḥ N$_2$ <–> buddhi N$_3$

273 bādhakaṃ] == K P N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> bādhaka N$_1$

274 °upādhicakrasya] == K P, upādhi((×kra(+2)ca(+1))→(+cakra))sya N$_1$ <–> upādhikacakrasya N$_2$ upādhikacakrasya N$_3$

275 prasiddhaḥ] == K N$_1$ N$_2$ <–> siddhaḥ P <–> praddha N$_3$

276–277 buddhyākāraś] == K P N$_1$ <–> buddhyāraś N$_2$ buddhyāraś N$_3$

278 anadhyavasāyāc] == K P N$_1$ <–> anadhyavaśāyāc N$_2$ anadhyavaśāyāc N$_3$

279 śābde] == K N$_2$ N$_3$ <–> śābda P <–> śabde N$_1$

280 'pratibhāsanāt]   == K N_2 <–> 'pratibhāsāt P <–>   pratibhāṣanāt N_1 <–>
pratibhāsanāt N_3

280 'nabhilāpyatvam]   == K N_2 <–> 'nabhilapyatvaṃ P <–> 'nabhilāpyatva
N_1 'nabhilāpyatva N_3

281 sāṃvṛtau]   == K P N_1 <–> sāvṛttau N_2 <–>   sāvṛtto N_3

282 °prasaṅgāt]   == K P N_1 <–> praśaṅgāt N_2 praśaṅgāt N_3

284 °sādhanam]   == N_2 N_3 <–> sādhanama K <–> bādhanaṃ P bādhanaṃ Ś
<–> sādhanaṃm N_1

286 dharmottaraḥ]   == K P N_1 <–>   dharmmonttaraḥ N_2 <–>   dharmmottara
N_3

286 bāhyatvavidhi°]   == bāhyatvavidhi P Ś <–> bāhyatva(+^{v}sya5) vidhi K <–>
bāhyatvasya vidhi N_1 bāhyatvasya vidhi N_2 bāhyatvasya vidhi N_3

287 alaukikam]   == P N_1 N_2, alaukika(×ḥ)m K <–>   alokikam N_3

287 atārkikīyaṃ]   == K P N_1 <–> atākirkīyaṃ N_2 <–>   atākīrttiyaṃ N_3

291 °viśeṣe]   == K N_1 N_2 <–> viśeṣe (?(+pi)) P <–> viṣaye N_3

292 kathaṃ niyatoviṣayā]   == K P N_2 <–>   kathaniyatoviṣayā N_1 <–> ka-
thaṃnniyatoviṣayā N_3

294 niyata eva]   == niyata eva P, niyata (+^{v}eva7) K <–>   niyatā eva N_1 niyatā
eva N_3 <–>   niyatā evaṃ N_2

296 niyataśaktayo]   em. <–>   niyatoviṣayā K niyatoviṣayā P niyatoviṣayā
N_1 niyatoviṣayā N_2 niyatoviṣayā N_3

296 °niṣṭhita°]   == K P N_1 <–> niṣṭita N_2 niṣṭita N_3

297 °paryanuyoga°]   == K P N_2 N_3 <–> nuyoga N_1

297 tadadhyavasāyitvam]   == P N_1 N_3, tadadhya(+vasā)yitvam K <–> adhya-
vasāyitvam Ś <–> tadadhyavasayitvam N_2

298 āropeṇa]   == K P N_1 <–>   āroṣeṇa N_2 āroṣeṇa N_3

300 svavāsanā°]   == K N_2 <–>   vāsanā P <–>   svavāsa N_1 <–> svavānā N_3

300 upajāyamānaiva]   == K P N_1 <–>   upajāyamāṇaiva N_2 upajāyamāṇaiva
N_3

301 apaśyanty]   == K P <–>   apasyanty N_1 apasyanty N_2 apasyanty N_3

301 pravṛttim]   == (+^{v}pra)vṛttim P <–>   vṛttim K   vṛttim N_1 vṛttim N_2
vṛttim N_3

302 °vyāvṛtto 'rtho]   == K P N_1 <–> vyāvṛttārtho N_2 vyāvṛttārtho N_3

303 eva cāpoha°]   == K N_2 N_3 <–>   evāpoha P <–>   ecāpo N_1

305 vācakam]   == K P <–>   vācakraṃ N_1 vācakraṃ N_2 vācakraṃ N_3

307 vācakaṃ ce°]   == K P N_1 <–>   vācakaś ce N_2 vācakaś ce N_3

308 pāramārthika°]   == K P <–>   pāramārthaka N_1 pāramārthaka N_2 pāra-
mārthaka N_3

309 °kṛtasyaiva]   == kṛtasyaiva P <–>   kṛtasya K kṛtasya N_2 kṛtasya N_3 <–>
kṛtasya N_1

309 °vyavahāribhir]   == K P N_1 <–>   vyavaharibhir N_2 vyavaharibhir N_3

311 viruddhaḥ, sapakṣe]   == K P N_1 <–>   viruddhaḥ mapakṣe N_2 <–>   viru-
ddham apekṣa N_3

314 sopādhir astu] == P N_2 N_3 <–> sopādhivastu K <–> sopādhirustu N_1

314 vākṛtir] == P N_1 N_2, vā (+^{v}ā6)kṛtir K <–> kṛtivār N_3

316 °hāner madhye 'py] == K P <–> hāne mardhyepy N_1 <–> hāner madhyapy N_2 hāner ma((×dhya)→(+dhye))py N_3

316 °virahāt tritaye na] == K P <–> virahāṃ tritaye na N_1 virahāṃ tri(?ta)ye na N_2 virahāṃ tritaye na N_3

320 śabdais] == K N_1 <–> śabdes N_2 śabdes N_3

320 tāvan mukhyam] == K N_2 N_3 <–> tāvat mukhyam N_1

320 'rthas] == K N_2 N_3 <–> rthe N_1

321 bhāsato] == K <–> bhāṣato N_1 bhāṣato N_2 bhāṣato N_3

321 'nyaḥ] == K N_2, (×naiva kaścit) 'nyaḥ N_1 <–> n. e. N_3

321 tattvato] == K N_1 <–> tattato N_2 tattato N_3

327 parirakṣaṇīyaḥ] == n. e. P <–> || • || ✳ K <–> parirakṣaṇīyaḥ || ✹śubham N_2 <–> parirakṣaṇīyaḥ || śubham ✹ N_1 <–> parirakṣaṇīyaḥ || (× (?śubham)) N_3

3 Translation of the Apohasiddhi

Oṃ. Hommage to Śrīlokanātha![63]

§ 1. [Proponent:] Exclusion is declared the referent of words.[64] ᴀ

§ 2. [Opponent:] Now, what[65] is this so-called exclusion? Is— ʙ.1
through a derivation [of the word *apoha*] such as "this is excluded

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[63]Tārā in P. The letters and numbers printed in the margins of this translation are those used in the analysis of the argument structure, section 4.2.

[64]What is at stake in this definition is the kind of object that every conceptual state of cognition has. Cf. the explanations in section 5.3. The Sanskrit compound *śabdārtha* is expanded as *śabdānām arthaḥ* in l. 37, p. 49. The most common translations are: meaning, object, or referent of words, cf., e.g., "meaning of words" for "*śabdasya svārtha*" Ishida 2011b: 204 f., "objects ...of expressions" for *śabdārthasya* Dunne 2004: 359, "referent of the word" for "*śabdārthaḥ*" Pind 2015: II.65. As indicated by Patil (2003: 245, n. 6), *artha* covers all of these semantic possibilities, and more. Here *artha* shall be translated as "referent", with the intention of expressing the object that words refer to. By not translating this *artha* as "meaning", the suggestion that it might correspond to "sense" in a rigorously philosophical (Fregean) interpretation can be avoided. Ratnakīrti does not consider this interpretation in his following treatment of *apoha*. For some material on the Tibetan discussion of *śabdārtha*, cf. Dreyfus 1997: 220 ff.

[65]Acc. to Patil (2003: 245, n. 7) this objection continues to 7. This is feasible not only because of the content, but also stylistically: all Buddhist viewpoints are introduced by *atha* (cf. § 4, § 5, § 6), and are embedded in a discussion led from the opponent's point of view. For an example of this technique in another text, cf. also the notes on the *VyN*, 1.1.3. Another example is found in the opening section of the *SSD* (cf. the overview in Mimaki 1976: 11).

from another," or "another is excluded from this," or "another is excluded in this,"—only [something] external, differentiated from that of another genus meant [by exclusion]; or [is] the form of awareness [meant by it];[66] or else [is]—if [one analyses] "exclusion [is the act of] excluding"—the mere differentiation from something else [meant by exclusion]? Such are the three positions.[67]

B.1.2 *§ 3.*   To begin with, the first two positions are not [correct], because by the name "exclusion" only a positive element[68] is meant. The last [position] is inconsistent as well, because it is invalidated by a cognition. For [it is] so: The verbal cognition "There is a fire on the upper part of the hill." is observed as representing [something] with a positive nature, but not as making a mere rejection apparent,[69]

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[66]This position is mentioned PVV 169,13 *ad* PV III 169 (cf. trl. on page 322, and appendix A.4.2.8). It is one of the theories about the word referent discussed in the *TSP*, cf. the detailed discussion in B.5. Generally, *buddhyākāra* will here be translated literally as "form of awareness", meaning that the awareness has the form of its object. But in phrases where this would be misleading or sound strange, as in "the form of awareness of blue", the term "cognitive form" will be used. At least for Ratnakīrti, the notion of an *ākāra* is not limited to the visual shape or figure of a thing: as evidenced by CAPV 129,22–24 (cf. section 1.1.3), this form that awareness has can be anything perceived by the six sense faculties–visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, somatic, and mental. See Kellner 2014 for a recent treatment of this term in Abhidharma and *pramāṇa* literature.

[67]That is, the three main positions that were usually discussed by Buddhist philosophers as the candidates for *apoha*. Cf. section 4.1.1 for the background of this paragraph.

[68]For the scope of the term *vidhi*, cf. 5.3.2.

[69] In Patil 2011b: 5, as well as in the translation of this section's model by McCrea and Patil (2010: 49–50), *nivṛtti* is treated as fully synonymous with *apohana* or *apoha*. Even though these terms do seem mostly synonymous within the *apoha* theory, a differentiation in this particular text nevertheless seems useful, because derivations of *ni-√vṛt* are not used as equivalents of the corresponding *apa-√uh* derivatives (as *apoha* is one) in those passages of the *AS* where Ratnakīrti outlines his own theory, in contrast to derivatives from *vy-ā-√vṛt*. If this is not a mere coincidence, the reason for it may be that the connotation of *ni-√vṛt* was too close to the "negationist" position (*pratiṣedhavādīnāṃ matam*, § 8) that Ratnakīrti explicitly rejects. A similar consideration might also have influenced the slight change in the

[like] "Non-fire does not exist." And it is widely known[70] that there is
no opportunity for a further proof for that invalidated by perception.[71]

§ 4. If [a Buddhist replies:] "Even though there is no conceptual   B.2.1
cognition such as (*iti*) "I cognize a non-occurrence", still, the repre-
sentation of the non-occurrence is precisely the representation of the
object that does not occur.[72] For there certainly is no cognition of
[something] that is qualified that does not contain the cognition of a
qualifier.[73] Therefore, in the same way as a conceptual awareness
is, for others,[74] an awareness of a universal because a common form
appears, even though there is not the concept "I cognize a universal.",

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formulation *nivṛttyapohavādināṃ matam* that is found in TBh_I 52,17, which uses
much of the material here. These thoughts do not apply to passages where *nivṛtti*
and related forms are used in a sense not related to *apoha*, see, e.g., § 58.

[70]This argument is based on the idea that perception is more authoritative
than inference. This position was held by all parties that Ratnakīrti is concerned
with in this treatise: for Kumārila, cf. Mimaki 1976: 16 and notes, and J. A. Taber
2005: 84–92. Acc. to J. A. Taber (2005: 198, n. 101), NSū 1.1.5, too, maintains that
"...inference, at least, is dependent on perception ...." (J. A. Taber 2005: 198, n. 101)
Cf. also Angot 2009: 280 f. Ratnakīrti himself invokes this rule below, § 45.

[71]This objection, that exclusion is refuted as the word referent by the mere
experience of a verbal cognition, has been traced back to Kumārila by Akamatsu
(1983: 159–164, n. 4), based on the following passages: ŚV Av 38–39; TS_Ś 909–910
(which he convincingly argues are verses from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, being quoted as
of Kumārila in PVSVṬ 114,7–11); TS_Ś 1012–1013a (cf. appendix B.10); PVSVṬ 114,7–17
(trl. appendix A.2.1). Cf. also Akamatsu 1981: 54 f.

[72]Cf. DhAP 246,26 ff. for Dharmottara's explanation of why this is not the way
exclusion is cognized.

[73]That the differentiation and that which is differentiated from others (i.e., that
which is qualified by the differentiation) are only conceptually, but not really, separa-
ble is one of Dharmakīrti's central arguments against Kumārila's and Uddyotakara's
critiques of Dignāga's *apoha* theory, cf. Akamatsu 1986: 68–72 and Much 1997: 170 f.
respectively. See also PV I 59 (cf. trl. on page 293) for more details on Dharmakīrti's
position. A similar point, namely that, if there is a difference between a property
and its bearer, they cannot be known without each other, is made by Ratnakīrti
in § 28. This argument is also used in an interjection against ŚV Av 88 after its
quotation as TS_Ś 947 (cf. appendix B.8, and footnote 77).

[74]Since this passage is found also in the ĀTV_1, it is helpful to consult its com-
mentaries. Acc. to ĀTVK 280,16 (*pareṣāṃ naiyāyikānāṃ*), the others in this passage

in that same way the awareness of a non-occurrence, which is implied by the apprehension of what does not occur, stretches out through [all] everyday treatment[75] [of conceptual cognition] as a cognition of exclusion.",[76] [then we opponents say:] is it not so: if, when a common form appears [in a conceptual cognition], one classifies [this

are the Naiyāyikas. Acc. to ĀTVP 283,10 (*pareṣāṃ naiyāyikādīnām*), the Naiyāyikas et al. are meant. Since this passage is not very specific, and its exact source is not known (cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 122 f., n. 333), the latter interpretation seems more likely. The others would thus be all those who think that a concept's object is a universal. This is the position, at least, of the Naiyāyika authors (cf., e.g., NSū 2.2.66, and Dravid 1972: chapter 2) and of the Mīmāṃsaka authors (cf. Dravid 1972: chapter 3) that Ratnakīrti is engaging with in the AS₃.

[75]The term *vyavahāra* has the broad connotation of "everyday activity." Acc. to Schmithausen (1965: 268, n. 215) and Steinkellner (1967: 156, n. 3, section 1), a threefold and fourfold classification of "everyday activity" can be made: that into a cognitive, linguistic, and physical dealing with something, and that which adds causal efficacy to these three types. According to Steinkellner (1967: 156, note 3, section 1, subnote 3) this 4th sense of the term is already present in Dharmakīrti's writings. See Dreyfus 1997: 269 ff. and Dunne 2004: 258, n. 58 for *vyavahāra* as "convention." Ratnakīrti uses the more common distinction into mental, verbal, and bodily activity, as can be gleaned from the beginning of Ratnakīrti's answer to the objection that conceptual cognition does not exist, since it does not refer to an external object in CAPV 139,17–19: *atrābhidhīyate. ihāgnir atrety adhyavasāyo yathā kāyikīṃ vṛttiṃ prasūte tathāgnir mayā pratīyata iti vācikīm api prasūte, etadākārānuvyavasāyarūpāṃ mānasīm api prasavati.* (To this it is said [by us]: Here, as the determination "Here's fire." brings forth bodily activity, so [it] brings forth also the verbal [activity, which consists in saying] "I cognize fire.", [and] also brings forth this mental [activity] that has the nature of a determination according to the form of awareness.) Note that Ratnakīrti treats all these activities as results of a conceptual determination, and that in this sense mental, verbal, and bodily activity are on an equal footing (though mental activity, unlike verbal or bodily activity, can itself have the nature of a determination.

[76]McCrea and Patil (2010: 50) translate the last part of this comparison as: "In just the same way, the awareness of the exclusion implied by the awareness of the excluded thing makes it possible for us to be aware of and to talk about exclusion." A difference may lie in the understanding of *ātanoti*. In the translation presented here, this verb is interpreted as alluding to the logical relation of pervasion: any case of a cognition of exclusion must, for this Buddhist, be a case of a cognition of a non-occurrence or absence. If one understands "makes possible" in this sense, as saying that a cognition of *nivṛtti* is the necessary precondition for treating any conceptual cognition as a cognition of exclusion, then there is no significant difference in the

conceptual cognition] as an awareness of a universal because [it] is of a positive form, then what is achieved by classifying a thought in which the form of non-existence does not [actually] appear as the cognition of a non-occurrence?[77] Therefore, if there should be an appearance of a form of non-occurrence, even though there is no form such as "I cognize a non-occurrence.", who indeed would deny the existence of a cognition of a non-occurrence?[78] Otherwise, [if one were to deny this,] there would be the everyday usage of a cognition of something when there is no manifestation [of that thing], so that [the following] might be [the case]: even though a thought has the form "cow", there is the awareness "horse".

§ 5.   If it is said [by the Buddhists] that a cognition of non-occurrence is contained [in the cognition of something qualified] due to being [its] qualifier, [then] nevertheless, if [there were] a concept having a form such as "excluded by non-cow", then there may be an involvement of this [non-occurrence] due to being the qualifier [of the form]; but still the cognition [is] "cow." And then, since a qualifier characterized as non-occurrence does not blossom forth in this [cognition], even though it [may] exist [there implicitly], how [can this cognition] be classified as a cognition of this [non-occurrence]?[79]   B.2.3

§ 6.   If this thought [is entertained by a Buddhist]: "For that, which appears in a positive form, there is also an exclusion from [that which is] different. Therefore [it] is called cognition of this   B.2.5

translations. This passage also makes it useful to distinguish between "exclusion" as a translation of *apoha* and as a translation of *nivṛtti*: the latter refers to the process of excluding (*apohana*), or not occurring; this "not occurring" is how the former, more general case of exclusion could be analysed.

[77]Akamatsu (1983: 168, n. 9) refers to ŚV Av 88 (as cited in TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 947) for this position. Cf. appendix B.8.

[78]Cf. ŚV Av 164, also discussed in PVSVṬ 114 f. (cf. appendix A.2.1).

[79]Acc. to Akamatsu 1983: 169, n. 13, this objection corresponds to ŚV Av 41. Again, this is found in TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 923, cf. appendix B.6.

[exclusion].",[80] [then] nevertheless [there is only] a mere connection to exclusion. Only a positive element actually appears. And additionally, in this way it is unavoidable that exclusion [would be] the object also for perception, specifically, because [there would be] a concept for [a perceptual cognition] that, seeing what is different from all others, represents a single excluded thing.[81] Therefore, because of the apprehension of a positive form, only a positive element is, as for perceptual cognition, the object of a conceptual [cognition] also; [but] the exclusion of others is not [its] object. So, how [is it that] exclusion [is] announced as the referent of words?[82]

c *§ 7.*   [Proponent:] To this [the following] is replied: By the word "exclusion" we do not mean a fully positive element alone, nor the mere differentiation from others; rather, a positive element qualified by exclusion from others[83] [is] the referent of words. And therefore, there

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[80]Akamatsu (1983: 170, n. 16) takes this to be the opinion expressed in the *TS*, and refers, in Akamatsu 1983: n. 4, p. 162, to TS$_{\acute{S}}$ 1012–1013a as the central passage that supports this interpretation (cf. trl. on page 355). This seems to be the last, and weakest, option for someone endorsing exclusion as the word referent. The argument of the defender of *apoha* thus goes through four variations: exclusion, in the sense of mere differentiation from others, is the word referent (stated and attacked in § 2–§ 3); there is no representation of a pure exclusion in awareness, but the representation of an excluded object is the representation of the exclusion (discussed § 4); a cognition of exclusion is contained as a qualifier (§ 5); a positive representation possesses, or is connected to, an exclusion of others (§ 6).

[81]No precursor to this specific objection could be found in either PV I, TSP$_{\acute{S}}$ or DhAP. Kamalaśīla, in commenting on TS$_{\acute{S}}$ 1060–1062, explicitly states that exclusion, in the sense of the particular, is the object of sense perception: *tatra svalakṣaṇātmā tāvad apoha indriyair avagamyata eva.* (TSP$_{\acute{S}}$ 407,15, for a trl. cf. appendix B.11). Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 340–56 for Jñānaśrīmitra's position.

[82]The introductory objection ends here, questioning the programmatic statement in § 1. See footnote 65.

[83]As discussed in § 2, the compound "other-exclusion" (*anyāpoha*) can be analysed in various ways. Though it is not altogether clear which analysis Ratnakīrti himself endorses, or even if he thinks they are all possible, *anyāpoha* will here be rendered as "exclusion from others," or simply "other-exclusion," unless the context suggests another interpretation. Cf. also the comments in section 4.1.1.

is no possibility for the errors afflicting each individual position.[84]

§ 8. But the idea of the affirmationists that, in the cognition of a cow, exclusion is ascertained subsequently because of the implication that "That of the nature of this [is] not of the nature of another.", or the idea of the negationists that, in the cognition of an other-exclusion, that excluded from others is understood because of implication,[85] is incorrect, because not even a first time [learner of a word] observes a sequence in cognition. For neither does anyone, upon having cognized a positive element, understand exclusion later by implication, nor [does anyone], upon having cognized exclusion[, understand] that excluded from others. Therefore a cognition of a cow is called the cognition of that excluded from others.[86] And even if the non-representation of the words "excluded from others" [in conceptual cognition] has been maintained,[87] nevertheless there is no non-cognition at all of other-exclusion, which is the qualifier, because the word "cow" is founded only on that excluded from non-cow.[88] As the

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[84]Cf. the three positions in § 2: An external thing, a form of awareness, and exclusion as such.

[85]Acc. to Akamatsu 1986, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are the affirmationists (cf. especially the evidence in TS$_Ś$ 1013a, trl. on page 355), and Dharmottara is a negativist. This analysis by Ratnakīrti has been very influential on modern studies of the development of the *apoha* theory. Cf. footnote 344 for more comments on this passage and secondary literature.

[86]This is a synthesis of the two positions mentioned: *goḥ pratipatti* and *anyāpoḍhapratipatti*. So there is no temporal relation as primary and secondary between the positive and negative elements that the object of a verbal cognition is composed of, they are known simultaneously. For a further discussion, cf. section 5.3.4.

[87]Apparently this refers back to § 4. AP 203,16 supports *anyāpohādiśabdānullekhe* here, so we would have to understand that there is no "representation of the words 'exclusion from others' and so on". But JNĀ$_{ms}$ 9a5, though it is hard to be certain, seems to read *anyāpoḍhādiśabdānullekhe*, so that the main difference to the AS$_4$ is the presence of *ādi*.

[88]Immediately after this passage in AP, Jñānaśrīmitra cites PV I 124 (cf. a translation from the Tibetan in Frauwallner 1933: 58). Akamatsu 1983: 184 ff., n. 34 translates PV I 124–127, and then states that in these verses and the commentary Dharmakīrti presents the four points constituting his theory of *apoha*. Akamatsu

appearance of blue is unavoidable at that time when there is the cognition of a water lily that is blue because of the word "*indīvara*"[89] which is founded on a blue water lily, so also the appearance of the exclusion of non-cow is unavoidable, because it is a qualifier, in the same moment as there is the cognition of a cow from the word "cow" which is founded on that excluded from non-cow. As, for perception, the grasping of absence in a purely negating form[90] is only the capacity to generate the concept of absence, so also, for a conceptual cognition of the positive element, the grasping of absence [in a purely negating form] is considered [to be] only the capacity of granting activity in conformance to this [positive element].[91] But the grasping of absence in an implicative form is the awareness

(1983: 185–6, n. 34) says:

> 1) Le mot exprime l'affirmation et la négation à la fois. ...2) C'est pourquoi, la désignation de l'objet affirmatif (A) et la différenciation-négation de non-A ne sont pas en relation réelle du "déterminé" et du "déterminant". ...3) Par suite de la simultanéité de la désignation affirmative de A et de la négation de non-A, la critique de Bhāmaha contre Dignāga ne sera plus valable. ...4) ...un tel caractère différentiel ...est irréel.

[89]The word *indīvara* is used for *Nymphaea stellata* and *cyanea* (acc. to PW I: 800), a water lily with blue flowers (cf. also Rau 1954). The point is that this name cannot be analysed into the units conveying "blue" and "water lily", respectively, unlike *nīlotpala*, lit. "blue-water-lily".

[90]See footnote 332 for an explanation of this and the following type of negation.

[91]The parallel passage in AP 205,12–16 is preceded by a reference to a *Śāstric* source, i.e., Dharmakīrti. Akamatsu (1983: 195, n. 49) and Katsura (1986: 180, n. 20) trace it to a passage in the *anupalabdhihetu* discussion of the *HB*. The statement they are referring to is as follows (Jñānaśrīmitra's reference ends in *ityādi*, and omits the subject of the sentence, so it is not clear how far this should go), HB 32,5–7: *...kvacit pramāṇaṃ pravṛttaṃ tat paricchinatti, tato 'nyad vyavacchinatti, tṛtīyaprakārābhāvaṃ ca sūcayatīty ekapramāṇavyāpāra eṣaḥ.* (Trl., following the German one in Steinkellner 1967: 67 and McCrea and Patil 2010: 55 f.: "A means of valid cognition demarcates that[, i.e., its object], excludes what is other than that, and makes the absence of a third possibility known. This is the activity of a single means of valid cognition.") The point of the argument is that a single means of valid cognition, in this case an inference using a logical reason of the type non-apprehension, may perform multiple functions, most importantly an

of [something] with a limited form particular [to this object], [and this awareness] is not different for either [perception or conceptual cognition]. Otherwise, if the exclusion of others were not formed at the time of the cognition of a referent because of a word, how could [there be] activity[92] that avoids other [things]?[93] Consequently someone instructed "Tether the cow!" would also tether horses etc.[94]

§ 9.   Furthermore, what Vācaspati said: "Individual things qualified
by a genus[95] are the range [of objects] for concepts and words. And

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affirmative one–defining its object–, and a negative one–excluding objects other than the one at hand. For Katsura (1986: 180, n. 20), the reference to this passage is an important factor in making the case that "...Jñānaśrīmitra's idea of simultaneous understanding of affirmation and negation is not necessarily unique to him, for a similar idea is already found in the *Hetubindu*." (Katsura 1986: 174) For a closer analysis of this comparison in the *AS*, see section 5.3.3.

[92]See footnote 75.

[93]AP 206,3 quotes PV I 96 in this context. Cf. Vetter 1964: 61 for an explanation of the context and a translation. Akamatsu (1983: 200 ff., nn. 60 and 62) links the discussion in the *AP* to the objection in ŚV Av 143cd and the answers to it in PV I 122–123a, as well as in TS$_{\acute{S}}$ 1159–1161.

[94]Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 342 for a discussion of the model in the *AP* of these last two sentences.

[95]For more on the history of this topic, see Hattori 1996. The notion of *jāti*, as held by the Naiyāyika authors with whom Ratnakīrti enters into debates, corresponds in several respects to core features that are often ascribed to universals in traditions of philosophy broadly following Aristotle: it is "eternal (*nitya*), unitary (*eka*), and present in many particulars (*anekavṛtti*)." (Halbfass 1992: 120) As such, a universal or genus is capable of entering into a one-to-many relation that causes the cognition of similarity between individual things and so founds the applicability of certain words to certain things. Even in early Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya texts, the capability of causing the same cognition is the central function of the *jāti* (cf. Halbfass 1992: 118; 120–1).

But below this superficial similarity, there are essential differentiating factors, the most important of which is clarified by Matilal (1985: 174) as follows:

> The Naiyāyikas thought of this *jāti* as something real and indestruc-
> tible, occurring in individuals (*vyakti*). It is as real as an ordinary
> particular object, say, a pot. [As any two material particulars can't be
> in the same place at the same time–PMA], so also only one *jāti* can
> occur in one individual and no other *jāti* can occur in that individual,

thus, because of implicitly understanding this [exclusion by realizing that] the form of these [individuals] so qualified is distinguished from what is not of that genus, someone instructed "Tether the cow!" does not tether horses etc.",[96] that also has been refuted exactly by this.[97] Because, if what is actually differentiated from that of another genus is the form of the individual things, even though an additional genus is thrown in, then how [should there be] an escape from the differentiation from what is not that for [those things, insofar as they] become the object of both word and concept only due to this form?[98]

D.3 *§ 10.* Or, if the form of the individual things is not differentiated from that of a different genus or cognized in that way, then is this [differentiation or cognition] a gift of the genus?[99] So how could there

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unless it is either included in, or is inclusive of, the former *jāti*.

Many of the following arguments will make little sense if this peculiarity, that a *jāti* is not in any way an abstract entity, is disregarded.

This translation will also differentiate between *jāti* and *sāmānya*, using "genus" for the former and "universal" for the latter, even though Halbfass (1992: 121) says that "...the uses of *jāti* and *sāmānya* tend to coincide in classical Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika", and thus also for the *NVTṬ*.

[96]Note the differences (marked by emphasis) of the quote found here from the text as it appears in NVTṬ 443,23–444,2: *tasmāj jātimatyo vyaktayo vikalpānāṃ ca śabdānāṃ ca gocaraḥ, tāsāṃ tadvatīnāṃ rūpam atajjātīyavyāvṛttam ity* arthaḥ. atas *tadavagater na gāṃ badhāneti codito 'śvādīn badhnāti.* There is no reason to suppose that *arthatas*, supported also by AP 206,26, is a corruption of *arthaḥ | atas.*

[97]This probably refers to the general point made in § 8, according to which exclusion and the positive element are cognized simultaneously, and not sequentially.

[98]AP 207,3 reads *atadvyāvṛttipratītiparihāraḥ* instead of *atadvyāvṛttiparihāraḥ*. Ratnakīrti here reduces Vācaspati's opinion to the point that exclusion from others is the only relevant factor in cognizing a particular as belonging to a genus. For, thus Ratnakīrti, the genus of a thing is irrelevant for the thing's classification, since it is the particular's form alone that its classification (and hence the cognition of its genus) depends on.

[99]I.e., the genus makes it possible that particulars are differentiated from others and that they are cognized in such a way, thus facilitating correct activity. It is not very likely that *eṣa* refers to *parihāra* ("escape"), as that would not make good sense.

be a conception of this [form of the particulars] even implicitly? Thus most has been said.[100]

§ 11.   Or, if that differentiated from another [is so] only by virtue of the genus, [then] let it be differentiated from others either by virtue of the genus or by virtue of its uninterrupted series of causes. Given a cognition of that which is differentiated, [may it arise in] any of the two ways, there certainly is a cognition of differentiation.   D.4

§ 12.   And there is no error of mutual dependence when the positive element of the verbal convention of the word "cow" [is] that excluded from non-cow, because this error is possible even in the case of the conventional designation of a universal or that qualified by it.[101]For the so-called universal is not meant [to be] a universal in general,   D.5.1

In his translation of the corresponding passage in AP, Akamatsu 1983: 64 adds "connaissance de la différenciation des autres hétérogènes" in brackets, thus taking *eṣa* (analysed as *eṣā*) to refer to *atadvyāvṛttipratīti* (cf. footnote 98).

[100]Lasic (2000a: 127) translates this phrase (together with a preceding *iti*) as "Damit ist das Wesentliche gesagt."

McCrea and Patil (2010: 59) translate as "This has been effectively explained already.", but do not note where this was done. However, if *uktaprāyam* were understood in this way, the subject would be unclear. If understood as referring to Ratnakīrti ("this was generally said by me"), it is not obvious which preceding passages he would be referring to here (the past participle, *ukta*, can hardly be taken as pointing to subsequent arguments). Since this passage is taken from AP, it could also be that *uktaprāyam* there had Jñānaśrīmitra as its subject, and was reused by Ratnakīrti somewhat imprecisely. But also in the *AP* the preceding discussions do not deal with this question in much depth (cf. the synopsis in Katsura 1986: 179, n. 15, acc. to which the section against *sāmānya* (and *jāti*) as the word referent is found later in the text).

It is also possible that this should be taken as a statement referring to previous authors: "It was generally said", with no particular subject intended.

Furthermore, cf. the gloss of *uktaprāyam* at PVSVṬ 280,23 to PVSV 71,2: *prāyaśabdo bāhulyavacanaḥ. prāyeṇoktam uktaprāyam.* (The word *prāya* expresses "abundance." It was said for the largest part[, thus,] most has been said (*uktaprāyam*).) Karṇakagomin then states that the word *prāya* is at the end of the compound because it is to be analysed acc. to Pāṇ 2.2.31.

[101]That the cognition of "exclusion from non-cow" presupposes the cognition of "cow" was an objection to Dignāga by Kumārila (ŚV Av 83–84, quoted in TS$_S$ 942–943,

since there is the unwanted consequence that even for a horse there is the verbal convention of the word "cow";[102] rather, [the universal is meant to be a particular one, like] cowness. And to this extent there is exactly this error [of mutual dependence], because without the cognition of a cow [there is] no cognition of the universal cowness, [and] because without the cognition of the universal cowness [there is] no cognition of what is to be denoted by the word "cow". Therefore there is no error of mutual dependence when making the conventional designation "This is a cow." for a form of conceptual awareness that, preceded by the observation of a single material object, is spread out externally as if common to all individual things. And if [this] application of the word "cow" is admitted, the denomination of all the rest by the word "non-cow" is accepted.

D.5.2 *§ 13.*   And there is also no contradiction between that excluded from others and the exclusion from others, nor damage to the relation of that qualified and the qualifier, because they are not [really] separate from each other, since for them there really is co-referentiality, as [there is] for a pot's absence on the floor.[103] For there is a contradiction

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and refuted in TS$_{Ś}$ 1063–1064, cf. appendix B.12) and Uddyotakara (NBhV 324,1–7). Dharmakīrti's refutation is found in PV I 113cd–121 (cf. appendix A.1.9). An accessible version of this argument is found in NM ᴀᴘᴏʜᴀ: 14,7–15,4 (translated in Watson and Kataoka 2017: 48–49). Cf. also Akamatsu 1983: 187, n. 37 for a trl. of ŚV Av 83–84, and Much 1994: 361 for the context of Uddyotakara's argument. See also section 5.5 for some comments on this argument.

The term *saṃketa* ("verbal convention") is the act of establishing that a certain word refers to a certain object. Acc. to Dharmakīrti, there is convention only for exclusion, cf. PV I 72cd (trl. Dunne 2004: 343 f.), as well as PV I 110 (trl. appendix A.1.8). Cf. Hugon 2011 for a discussion of *saṃketa* and the problem of circularity as it appears in PV I (also discussed in Hugon 2009) and the *TSP*. See Arnold 2006 for some of the broader philosophical issues that are involved.

[102]Cf. the similar argument at the end of § 35 (trl. on p. 110).

[103]I.e., it is not the case that what is excluded from others, or the object that is qualified, and exclusion from others, or the qualifier, preclude or contradict each other. This is equivalent to Dharmakīrti's solution to the problem of co-referentiality in the context of the *apoha* theory, see J. Taber and Kataoka 2017: 264. Cf. section 5.5.

with its own absence, but not with the absence of another [object].
This is established [for everyone] down to children.[104]

§ 14.   Also here [in the sentence] "This road leads to Śrughna."[105]
exclusion is indeed cognized, because a distinction can easily be
understood for each word: with respect to other roads that are under
discussion, [one understands] only this;[106] with respect to the location

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[104] It was Kumārila who criticized the *apoha* theory for not being compatible with
a relation of qualifier and qualified, and for not allowing any co-reference (cf. the
references in Hattori 2006: 62, and see Ogawa 2017 and J. Taber and Kataoka 2017
for two recent contributions). *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, the co-referentiality that two
words may have, was much debated in earlier texts on *apoha*, cf., e.g., Much 1997,
and the passages referred to there in which Dharmakīrti discusses co-referentiality:
PVSV 34,25–35,4; 42,12–43,18; 65,19–66,1 (cf. the translation of the second passage
in Dunne 2004: 346 ff., as well as appendix A.1.6 for a translation of the first of
these passages). The present passage is the only time Ratnakīrti explicitly mentions
this issue. But, as Much (1997: 170) notes, already "Dharmakīrti does not repeat
Dignāga's treatment of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, but concentrates on discussing the
preclusion (*apoha*, *vyāvṛtti*) and the precluded (*apoḍha*, *vyāvṛtta*)." So the problem
of co-referentiality was apparently subsumed under the more general debate of
qualifier and qualified, as is also suggested by such formulations as: PVSV 42,12–13:
jñānapratibhāsiny arthe sāmānyasāmānādhikaraṇyadharmadharmivyavahārāḥ,
where Dharmakīrti says that universal, co-referentiality, as well as property and
property bearer are used with regard to an object that appears in a cognition;
or TS_Ś 1100: *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvasāmānādhikaraṇyayoḥ /tasmād apohe śabdārthe
vyavasthā na virudhyate //* (cf. appendix B.13 for a trl.).

[105] Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 57 f., n. 132 for the background of this example
in the theory of three kinds of *vyavaccheda*. The problem of a sentence having
exclusion as its object was already clearly seen by Kumārila, cf. appendix B.9.

[106] R. Herzberger claims that for Dignāga "...the *apoha*-operation is confined to
names and does not apply to demonstratives." (R. Herzberger 1986: 107 f.) If this
is true, then this passage would show a very clear break that occurred at some
point between Dignāga and Ratnakīrti. Acc. to Hattori 1968: 25, and 83–85, n. 1.27,
Dignāga accepts proper names (*yadṛcchā-*), genus words (*jāti-*), quality words (*guṇa-*),
activity words (*kriyā-*), and substance words (*dravyaśabda*). This conclusion is
also arrived at in Hayes 1988: 203, and accepted in Pind 2015: II.177, n. 600. Pind
2015: § 65 discusses Dignāga's theory on the denotation of demonstrative pronouns.
Jinendrabuddhi's explanation, as cited and translated in Pind 2015: II.184, n. 627,
implies that demonstrative pronouns refer to exclusion: they are used in the same
way as a general term, e.g., "tree", might be used to refer to a particular tree.

of undesired [places] opposed to Śrughna, only Śrughna; because of not being cut off like a forest track, [the road is understood to] really lead to; through the distinction from a caravan or a messenger [on it], [one understands] only the road. Therefore, that supporting exclusion [and] possessing a positive form is understood from a word, as from the word *puṇḍarīka* a lotus characterized by white is understood.[107]

D.8 *§ 15.* If [an opponent asks:] "If it is thus acceptable to call the positive element alone the referent of words, how is exclusion to be asserted?", [then we answer that] to this it was said[108] that by the word "exclusion" a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others is meant. There, when a positive element is cognized, one simultaneously cognizes other-exclusion since [that] is [the positive element's] qualifier. And the classification that for perception, too, the object is exclusion cannot be made, because there is no dispute about the real thing being the object of this [perception], like [there is about the real thing being the object] of verbal apprehension. And by the word "positive element" an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature[109] is meant according to determination, and according to appearance a form of awareness [is meant]. Amongst these, the external object is defined as that to be expressed by a word only because of determination, not because of a particular's appearance, since there is no appearance of a manifest particular that is limited to a [certain] place, time and condition as [there is in the case of] perception. [This is] what the treatise [says, too]:

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[107]As traced by Akamatsu (1983: 200 ff., n. 62), it was Kumārila who objected that other-exclusion cannot be what a sentence expresses (cf. ŚV Av 143cd = TS$_{\text{S}}$ 977cd, trl. appendix B.9). For the difference between Dignāga and Śāntarakṣita concerning whether a sentence makes exclusion known, cf. Hattori 1979. Patil (2009: 208 ff.) argues that Ratnakīrti's argument in this passage makes it seem "...as if a compositional theory of semantics is assumed to explain how word-meanings are related to sentence-meaning and vice versa." (Patil 2009: 210)

[108]This paragraph repeats Ratnakīrti's own theory of what the word referent is in broader lines than above (see § 7). Cf. section 5.2.2, footnote 382, and section 5.6 for further discussions of these descriptions.

[109]Cf. PVin II 8 for a very prominent occurrence of the phrase *atadrūpaparāvṛtta*.

§ 16. Because an object does not appear due to a word in the awareness of [someone having] an inactive sense organ in the same way as [it does] in perception[, ...][110]

§ 17. [Opponent:] There is a difference in the appearance of [what is in fact] a single object, because the ways [of apprehending an object, according] to the nature of a sense faculty [or] a word, are different.[111] [Proponent:] Also with regard to this it was said:

    D.11.2

> *§ 18.* The basis of thoughts is certainly different [in each case. So] why would a real thing, which is in fact only one, have this nature that appears [to awareness] with different forms?[112]

§ 19. For a single thing does not have two forms, "distinct" and "indistinct", [which are] contradictory to each other, so that [that single thing] would appear with one [form] to the cognition of the sense faculties, with another in a conceptual cognition, since, if it were so, [that single real] thing itself would obtain [this] difference.[113] For the difference of a real thing is nothing but the difference of [its]

D.11.3.1

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[110]The full verse PVin I 15 is:

śabdenāvyāpṛtākṣasya buddhāv apratibhāsanāt /
arthasya dṛṣṭāv iva tad anirdeśyasya vedakam //

Ratnakīrti only quotes the ablative clause giving the reason for the main sentence, i.e., for the fact that "this [perception] makes known [something] that cannot be designated [by words]." Cf. the notes to PVin I 15 for other texts where this verse is found, as well as Vetter 1966: 55 for a translation of this verse's context. For the fundamental difference between the objects of perception and conceptual awareness, cf., e.g., the expositions in Dunne 2004: 79–84 or J. A. Taber 2005: 31 ff., and see Krasser 1995: 252 ff. and McCrea and Patil 2006 for a study of the revisions that this strict distinction underwent with Dharmottara and Jñānaśrīmitra, respectively.

[111]This argument is also found in ĀTV$_2$ 237,8 ff. (ĀTV$_1$ 330,14 ff.). Concerning the parallel passage in AP 208,16–19, Akamatsu (1983: 206, n. 86) notes that the same discussion is found in PV III 233cd–234ab. Cf. appendix A.3.4 for a translation.

[112]This is PV III 235 (cf. appendix A.3.4 for the context). PV III 235a is also cited in Jñānaśrīmitra's SāSiŚā 396,10.

[113]This cannot be the case, because a real thing is a partless entity, the relation of property and property bearer being only conceptually constructed. Cf. footnote 136.

own form. And the difference of [its] own form is nothing but the difference of [its] appearance. Otherwise, the threefold world would be only one thing.[114]

D.11.4 *§ 20.* [Opponent:] There is no difference in a tree, even if there is, in the case of a tree in a single place, a difference in [its] appearance as "distinct" and "indistinct" to two people, [one] situated in a far away [and the other in a] nearby place.[115] [Proponent:] We do not say that a difference in appearance is limited to different things, but rather that it is limited to it not being [the case] that there is the same object [for the two cognitions]. Therefore, there is a difference in the real thing when there is a difference in appearance that is accompanied by a

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[114] A slightly clearer version of this consequence is found in SSD 118,4–7 (where it answers a Mīmāṃsā objection, see Mimaki 1976: 120–123):

> *viruddhayor dharmayoḥ padmarāgād anyatve 'pi viruddhadharmayo-gāt padmarāgasya bhedaḥ katham apahnūyate, trailokyaikatvaprasa-ṅgasya durvāratvāt. na hi dharmadharmiṇor anyatve 'pi brāhmaṇa-tvacaṇḍālatve ekādhāre bhavitum arhata iti padmarāgasya bhedo duratikramaḥ.*

> Even if two contradictory properties[, e.g., here and there, or earlier and later,] are different from a ruby, how can a difference of the ruby [itself] be excluded since it is connected with [these] contradictory properties? For[, if that difference of the ruby could be excluded,] the unwanted consequence of the threefold world being one would be difficult to avoid. For even though property and property bearer are different, "being a Brahmin[, i.e., of the highest caste,]" and "being a *caṇḍāla*[, i.e., of the lowest caste,]" cannot exist in the same subject. So the difference of the ruby [due to having contradictory properties] is difficult to overcome.

The consequence in this passage seems to be that if two contradictory properties can qualify the same thing without that thing having to be recognized as being two different things, then all things in all worlds, though qualified at least by different times and places, would not have to be considered different. The same argument would apply to the case under discussion, a single thing having both a clear and unclear form.

[115] Akamatsu (1983: 207, n. 89) refers to PV III 407ab (cf. appendix A.3.5), where a similar statement is negated.

difference in causal effectiveness etc., as in the case of a pot.[116] In the other case, however, [i.e., when there is a difference in appearance but none in causal effectiveness,] one appearance is wrong because it is certainly[117] refuted that there is the same object.[118]

§ 21.   Due to this, what Vācaspati said[, i.e.]: "[Even though][119] D.11.6 the two [types of cognition], word and perception, have a real thing as [their] object, the [two] apprehensions are not without a difference, because the difference between being imperceptible and being perceptible can arise due to a difference in the cause."[120]   is not relevant, because of the impossibility that a cognition of [something] imperceptible has a real thing as [its] object. Rather, the difference in causes, which is based on [the real thing's] being imperceptible [or not], fulfills [its] aim simply by lacking any grasping of the object of the sense faculties. Thus, the particular does not appear in verbal apprehension.

§ 22.   Moreover, if a thing that has the nature of a particular [were] D.11.7.3 what is to be denoted, both affirmation[121] and negation would be impossible, because [the thing] would be observed with its whole

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[116]In the corresponding passage of Jñānaśrīmitra (cf. section 4.1.3) the example is: "...like the appearance of a cloth [is contrary] to grasping a pot."

[117]Instead of reading *niyamena* adverbially, it could also be understood that there is a refutation through the restriction mentioned, i.e., due to the the fact that a difference in appearances is restricted to there not being the same object.

[118]For a discussion of this paragraph and Jñānaśrī's version of this argument, cf. section 4.1.3.

[119]This concessive construction is much clearer in NVTṬ 115,8–10 : *na ca śabda-pratyakṣayor vastugocaratve saty api pratyayābhedaḥ, kāraṇabhedena pārokṣyāpārokṣyabhedopapatteḥ*.

[120]The different causes referred to here are probably the two types of cognitions that, according to Vācaspati, apprehend the same real object, i.e., perception and conceptual cognitions.

[121]In the *dvandva* compound *vidhiniṣedha*, *vidhi* is not used in the technical sense of "positive element." Cf. the argumentation in § 48, where *vidhiniṣedha* appears alongside *vidhi* in its technical sense.

nature.[122] For if this [thing] really exists, [the expression] "it exists" is useless and [the expression] "it does not exist" is impossible. But if [it] does not really exist, [the expression] "it does not exist" is useless and [the expression] "it does exist" is impossible. But [there] is the usage of the words "is" etc. Therefore, the fact that the appearance of a verbal [cognition] is common to [both] the presence and absence of an external referent does not allow that this [external referent should] be the object [of verbal cognitions].[123]

D.11.7.4.1   *§ 23.*   And what Vācaspati uttered, right after having announced the fact [that] that which is to be denoted is an individual thing possessing a genus[124] with his very own words, [namely]: "And that a genus, [which is] a word's referent, is common to the presence and absence [of an external object] is not impossible, since this [genus], insofar as it, although permanent by its own nature, becomes common to presence and absence by being based on many individual things scattered in space and time, is fit for a connection [to] "it is" and "it is not". For the connectedness to a present individual thing is the state "it is" for a genus, and the connectedness to past and future individual things is the state "it is not". Thus, because [the reason's] negative concomitance is doubtful, [the reason] "commonness to the presence and absence" [of an external object] is [either] ambiguous or established in a different way.",[125] that is not to the point. To the

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[122]I.e., if a word made a particular known (as perception does), every statement about a thing would be either impossible or superfluous: e.g. "A cow exists." is a pointless statement if the word "cow" made a particular, and therefore existing, cow known. Conversely, the statement "A cow does not exist." would be impossible (or at least nonsense), if the word "cow" here would refer to an existing, particular cow.

[123]The obvious fact that words can refer to their objects irrespective of the objects' existence was an important concern already for Bhartṛhari: cf. Houben 1995: 257 ff., and Ogawa 1999: 275 (esp. n. 17), where Bhartṛhari's explanation of secondary or mental existence (*upacārasattā*) is given. As noted by Frauwallner (1937: 262, n. 2), the discussion here and in the following paragraph is very similar to DhAP 241,11–242,6 (trl. Frauwallner 1937: 262 f.).

[124]Cf. § 9.

[125]Cf. section 4.1.4 for the inference that Vācaspati is discussing here.

extent [of what has been said there is], first of all, no damage to what has been put forth [by us], because by laying (*nyasyat*) the burden on the genus [Vācaspati] has himself accepted the fact that the particular is not what is to be designated [by words]. Furthermore, in every case the state "it is" etc. of a word's referent is considered only according to the nature proper to the particular. But [this statement]: "But the genus's connection to present etc. individual things [is considered to be] the state "it is" etc." [is] a trick for a child. In the same manner, there is an error also in [thinking a word] denotes an individual thing possessing a genus. If a cognition is established because of an individual thing, [then] an additional universal[126] may be cognized or not; but there is no liberation from the error [that there is] a cognition of an individual thing.

§ 24.   Due to this [explanation], what is said by the Kumārilites:[127] "It is only because of a thing's having parts that there is no error in [a permanent universal] being common [to present and absent things]. For treeness, unspecified as to presence or absence, is understood from [some] word. It is connected with one or the other of these [properties, presence or absence, either of] which is understood through another word."[128] is also false, because, when there is a cognition of a permanent universal, it is not possible that the state of [its] presence [or] absence is not specified.

D.11.7.4.5

§ 25.   And also this [statement by the opponent]: "But the way of words to cause the apprehension of referents is not like [the way] of perception, so that there would not be a requirement of the words 'is' etc. as in the case of an [object] observed by this [perception], because the means of valid cognition have different capacities.", has

D.11.8

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[126]This repeats the point of § 9.

[127]Acc. to Kataoka 2009: 496, Kaumārila refers to Sucaritamiśra. Cf. Biardeau 1964: 164 ff. for a consideration of Śabara's ideas concerning the relationship between a thing, its parts, and the denotation of words.

[128]Cf. section 4.1.5 for some material on this position.

been falsified by the falsification[129] of different appearances, when two appearances, perceptual and verbal, grasp one and the same nature. And [the requirement] that there are diverse capacities of the means of valid cognition is achieved even by direct perception and determination.[130] Therefore, if the object of perception were made known through verbal [cognition], there would be an appearance in exactly the same way [as for perception]. And something non-existing does not tolerate being made known as an object of this[, i.e., of perception].

D.11.11 *§ 26.* If [an opponent asks:] "Is it not [the case that], when the part "treeness" has been indicated by the word "tree", the words "is" etc. are applied for the purpose of ascertaining [other] parts, [like] existence etc.?", then [we answer:] What opportunity [could there be] for an affirmation or negation of another property through another word or another means of valid cognition for a particular that is, since it is partless, completely comprehended by perception?[131] If [an opponent says:] "Even in [the case of] perception, the requirement of a different means of valid cognition is observed.", [we answer that] that may be [the case] when a [thing's] own form that has not been repeatedly experienced is the object, because this [perception] does not have the

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[129]Cf. the discussion in § 20.

[130]Ratnakīrti is here rephrasing his model, *tad asyāpi vicitraśaktitvaṃ pramā-ṇānāṃ vastusvarūpānubhavādhyavasāyamātrakṛtam eva* (AP 213,7). McCrea and Patil (2010: 68) translate: "Thus even for him, the notion that the modes of valid awareness have different capacities is produced merely by the determination that one has experienced the form of a real thing." This interpretation is not possible for Ratnakīrti's text, which suggests that we should understand Jñānaśrīmitra to be saying that the difference in capacities is produced merely by an experience of the form of a real thing and determination. Akamatsu (1983: 90) understands the AP in a third way, translating: "...est produit par la seule [différence entre l']expérience immédiate ...et la détermination conceptuelle ...par rapport à la nature propre de l'objet existant ...."

[131]As noted in Akamatsu 1983: 223 f., n. 119 this argument is found in PV I 43, cf. appendix A.1.2.

nature of ascertainment.[132] But what [use] would another [means of valid cognition] be where a conceptual [cognition], itself of the nature of ascertainment, [is] grasping [a real, partless thing]? But there is a requirement for another word and a logical mark. Therefore, a real thing's own form is not grasped [by a conceptual cognition].

§ 27. [Opponent:] Are properties such as a genus etc. not different D.12.1 from each other and from the property bearers?[133] So in the case of a tree, although cognized by means of a single property that has the character of a genus, there is no cognition [of it] as possessing other properties. Therefore, why shouldn't [there be] a cognition–dependent

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[132]In the tradition following Dignāga, perception itself does not ascertain its object (cf., e.g., the programmatic statements in Hattori 1968: 25–27, p. 36 (III.Bc–1), and see McCrea and Patil 2006: 318 ff. for a concise review of research on this matter), insofar as "ascertainment" (*niścaya*) is synonymous with determination (*adhyavasāya*). Ratnakīrti is here referring to habituated perceptions, which are discussed in PVSV 27,15 ff. and PVSV 32,5–12, passages closely analysed in Kellner 2004: 11–29 (see especially Kellner 2004: 26 for a note on Jñānaśrīmitra's view of habituation and inference). So Ratnakīrti's statement must not be understood as implying that when an object *is* familiar, perception itself does ascertain it (which one might conclude from the translation by McCrea and Patil (2010: 69) of Jñānaśrīmitra's model for this statement: "...since even perception is not decisive in the case of an object whose form we are not accustomed to."). It is only a conceptual awareness event that can ascertain something. This also finds support in the phrase "*svayaṃ niścayātmako*", qualifying conceptual cognition in the next sentence, because it suggests that it is opposed (*tu*) to perception in so far as it has the nature of ascertaining something of its own accord (*svayam*), i.e., without an additional (ascertaining) means of cognition. For the difference of this position to Kumārila's, cf. J. A. Taber 1998a: 96–101. The Naiyāyika's position is discussed in Matilal 1986: 330 ff. Vācaspatimiśra's discussion of perception as ascertaining its object is found in NVTṬ 107,8–117,6 (a passage translated, or at least paraphrased, in the pioneering work, Stcherbatsky 1994 2, 257–298). McAllister (forthcoming a) investigates Prajñākaragupta's treatment of the relation between inference, perception, and habituation.

[133]As noted in Akamatsu 1983: 224, n. 121, cf. PVSV 29,7 ff. for a discussion of the same objection (appendix A.1.4). The opponents there are Naiyāyikas or Vaiśeṣikas or both (cf. footnote 453). The relation between the separated *dharma* and *dharmin* is called *samavāya*. Cf. Halbfass 1992: 147 ff. for a short characterization of this concept.

on different expressions–of another property [of a tree], like its being green, swaying, being quite tall etc.? [Proponent:] Precisely this is unsuitable, because a perceivable difference of property and property bearer is refuted by perception, since in perception a particular with an indivisible nature appears.[134] Otherwise there is the overreaching consequence that everything would be everywhere.[135] But that the everyday activity [concerned with] properties and property bearers has [its] basis in a conceptual difference, is well established in the treatise.[136]

D.12.4 *§ 28.* Alternatively, may the difference of property and property bearer be real, nevertheless [their] contact is to be assumed [by

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[134]Cf. PV I 43 (and Frauwallner 1932: 249 f., as well as the trl. on page 280).

[135]This unwanted consequence is not clear. "Otherwise" can be taken as "if a particular separable into parts such as treeness, height, swaying, etc., appeared in perception." In this case, where an instance of treeness appears as separated from an instance of height, etc., we could probably not say which particular tree these various properties belonged to, and so they might be said to occur everywhere. If, on the other hand, "otherwise" means that the refutation of a difference between property and property bearer by perception could be wrong, then it could be understood that anything that is cognized by perception could be wrong, so that a tree appearing to be in some place might as well be somewhere else. (This last explanation was suggested by Parimal Patil.) Finally, *anyathā* could just be referring to the general principle that if something refuted by perception could be true, anything could be said to be anywhere, since we would have lost a basic tool for verifying the truth of a statement against reality.

[136]Cf. PVSV 2,21–3,1: *na. dharmabhedaparikalpanād iti vakṣyāmaḥ. tathā cāha— sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharmibhedeneti.* (Trl.: "No, [the proving property and the property to be proven are not identical], because a difference of properties is conceptually constructed. We will explain this [below]. In the same way, [Dignāga] said: all this everyday activity [concerned with] inference and that to be inferred is due to a difference of property and property bearer which is founded [only] in awareness.") This passage is also found in PVin II 56,12–57,1. As noted in Steinkellner 2007: n. to 56,13 f., Dharmakīrti is invoking Dignāga as the authority here: "*tathā cāha ...*". For other translations of this passage, see Steinkellner 1979: 45 and Steinkellner 2013: I.7 f. Note also that acc. to Gnoli (1960: 189, n. to p. 2, l. 22), *iti vakṣyāmaḥ* refers to the *apoha* section. PVSV 32–35 is particularly relevant in this context, see below appendix A.1.5 and appendix A.1.6. Cf. also PVSVṬ 143,15–16 (see footnote 475).

you] only as one of assistance, because [other types of contact such as] inherence etc. between them have been falsified.[137] And so, in the same way as, when a property bearer is cognized through perception, a complete cognition of its properties [arises] through the [simultaneous] contact [of these properties] with the sense faculties, so, when a property bearer is cognized through a word or a logical mark, which are [both] connected [to their object] by a connection such as denoted and denoting etc.,[138] a complete cognition of its properties [would arise], because there is no difference in contact as such.

§ 29.   What Vācaspati [said]: "But if that [real thing] is grasped [which is] qualified by [what a Buddhist opponent calls] a single

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[137]Cf. the comments in section section 4.1.6. In § 38, Ratnakīrti says that inherence is not possible, and then reproduces KBhV 70,13–14 (corresponds to § 39).

As shown by Akamatsu (1983: 229 ff., n. 129), this and the following passage (§§ 27–29) closely follow the arguments in PV I 46 and PV I 52cd–55 (cf. trl. on page 283 and appendix A.1.4, respectively). PV I 52cd, where the unwanted consequence under discussion is introduced under the hypothetical assumption that there really is a difference between properties and their bearers, cf. the phrase that starts the auto-commentary on PV I 52cd, PVSV 29,12 ff.: *yady apy upādhayo bhinnā eva* .... (For a trl. of this passage, cf. appendix A.1.4). The opponent in Jñānaśrīmitra's text argues that Dharmakīrti has stated that there is no difference between a capacity to support an attribute and the thing which has that capacity (probably PVSV 29,13–16, cf. appendix A.1.4 for a trl.). The opponent's point is that there would be a contradiction to the hypothetical acceptance of a difference. But Jñānaśrīmitra simply says that this point is not touched on by this discussion.

[138]In the case of the logical mark, the connection would be between a logical mark (*liṅga*), such as having smoke or being a *śiṃśapā*, and the *pakṣa* (or *liṅgin*), something qualified by the logical mark, such as a mountain or a tree. Note that this amounts to an equation of the relation of both *vācya-vācaka* and *liṅga-liṅgin* with the relation of *dharma-dharmin* in the following respect: knowledge of a denoter (*vācaka*) or a logical mark (*liṅga*), like that of a *dharma*, cannot be had without knowledge of the denoted (*vācya*) or that having the logical mark (*liṅgin*), which thus resemble the property bearer *dharmin*. This equation is, of course, an unwanted consequence (*prasaṅga*), because it is formulated under the unaccepted assumption that this relation is real, i.e., that the relata really exist as relata. It is only on the theory that a word and a logical mark do not refer to or designate any real thing that this consequence does not arise.

additional attribute,[139] [e.g.,] existence, then there is no grasping of it as qualified by other additional attributes. For the nature of a substance is characterized through additional attributes, but neither the additional attributes nor the state of being qualified [by them is] its nature.", that, too, simply flows away. For the grasping of the other additional attributes does not follow from a non-difference, since a grasping of that which is assisted when that assisting [it] is grasped follows only after [their] difference has been presupposed.And it is not appropriate to imagine, as [it is] in the case of the cause and effect relation of fire and smoke, that a cognition is limited to a property and property bearer only due to [their] own nature, because neither is established by a means of valid cognition.[140] And the rule [is] that [only] when [something] is established by a means of valid cognition [is there] a depiction of [a thing's] nature.[141]

D.12.4.6 *§ 30.* And what the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* said about this, [namely:] "If [such a thing as] the sun and so on is grasped, there is the consequence of grasping the multitude of all [other] things assisted by it[, i.e., the sun etc.]."[142] that is the result of not fathoming the intent [of what was said by Dharmakīrti]. For it is so: in your opinion, [there is] a difference of property and property bearer, and [their] contact [is]

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[139]See section 4.1.7, page 147, for some explanations of the term *upādhi*, and the justification for the translation presented here.

[140]For fire and smoke, the cause-effect relation is ultimately established to result from their nature. For the property and its bearer, this is not the case: they are just helpful constructions (insofar as they make everyday activity possible), but they do not reflect reality. The key to the argument presented here is *svabhāva*: the relation between property and its bearer does not follow from the nature of the things involved, but is only imagined. Even though what Vācaspatimiśra claims is true–namely that neither the additional attributes nor their qualifying a material thing constitute that thing's nature–it is true only once one has admitted a difference between properties and their bearers. Thus, whereas the distinction of cause and effect holds in reality, this distinction does not.

[141]Cf. section 4.1.8, page 152.

[142]In this unwanted consequence, the sun is what *assists* the cognition of all other objects, i.e., those *assisted* by the sun, because a person sees things by the light, or assistance, of the sun. Cf. the translation of the passage in section 4.1.9.

only characterized as assistance.[143] When the assisting [thing] is grasped, the grasping of the assisted [thing] at that time follows only [for an assisted thing that has] the same place and only [when it has] the nature of a property [of the assisting thing]. Therefore, how would the unwanted consequence ensue that one would grasp [everything that is] assisted by the sun, [everything, that is,] which, being either in a different place or being a different substance, has been observed to deviate [from being grasped when the sun is grasped]?[144]

§ 31.   Therefore, since [a thing] would be cognized with its whole   D.13
nature if the nature of a real thing were apprehended, even by means of [only] one property, what opportunity of an affirmation or negation by another word [could there be]? But [there] is [this opportunity]. Therefore it is established that a particular does not appear because of a word, a concept, or a logical mark.

§ 32.   Neither does a universal appear in a verbal apprehension.   E.1
Because of a word such as "cow" etc. in [the sentence] "Cows are grazing on the other side of the river." there appear dewlap, horn, tail etc. [which are] accompanied by the forms of letters, [and which are] mostly lumped together because of the disregard for the differences between [things] of the same genus.[145] But exactly this is not a

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[143]This was stated above, § 28.

[144]Dharmakīrti's argument, according to this interpretation, was only valid for *dharma* and *dharmin* relations, which have to fulfill two criteria: first, the relata must be in contact with each other. Second, they must be properties of the same substance. The relation between objects in daylight and the light of the sun is therefore not a proper relation of *upakāraka* and *upakārya*, since the sun illuminates things at a great distance and these things are not properties of the sun.

[145]What is cognized from the word "cow" would thus appear to contain an indistinct image of a cow, in the sense that all the parts that a speaker associates with cows appear in it but in a way that obfuscates the particular characteristics that these parts have in every instance. A related notion is already mentioned by Dharmakīrti, PVSV 4,23–24: "*yathā gaur ayam sāsnādisamudāyātmakatvād iti.*" (Like [the inference] "This is a cow because it has the nature of an aggregate of dewlap and so on.") See Steinkellner 2013: I.12 for a translation of this comparison in its context. PV III 225cd: "*na hi gopratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ sāsnādīnām adarśane//*" (For a cognition of a cow is not observed without observing a dewlap and so on.)

universal.

> *§ 33.* For [the universal] "cowness" is proclaimed to be
> devoid of the forms of colour, shape, and letters.[146]

E.1.3   *§ 34.*   And precisely this mere[147] dewlap, horn etc., in being identi-
fied with the particular, though completely different in every individ-
ual thing, is called a universal. Because such an external [object] is
not obtained, this [is] only an error, like the appearance of hair.[148]
Therefore, may [such an error] either be this unfolding[149] only of
the mind itself, which has the nature of this [universal] by virtue of
the impressions [left in the mind by previous experiences], or may
[something] completely non-existent with the form of this [universal]
appear, or may the individual things themselves appear in some other
way through a disregard of the differences to that of the same genus,
because [differences amongst things] are hidden from experience, or
may [such an error] be considered a deprivation of memory.[150] In
all [of these] ways, this cognition of a universal is truly without an
object. [So] where [is there] news of a universal?

E.1.7   *§ 35.*   What is said [as an objection] again,[151] [namely] that if a
universal is non-existent, [then] the universal's cognition is accidental,
is wrong. For a causal complex, which, enriched by the assisting

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[146]Cf. section 4.1.10 for a discussion of this verse.

[147]For the import of "mere" (*mātra*) here, cf. footnote 193.

[148]This is one of the standard symptoms of a person suffering from an eye-disorder
called *timira* that causes perceptual errors. Cf. Chu 2004: 131 ff. and MacDonald
2015: II, 111 f., n. 228 for further information on *timira*.

[149]Cf. the characterization of this term in the context of the Vedāntin's error
theory, Schmithausen 1965: 102: "...d. h. der eine Geist nimmt die ihm fremde
unwirkliche Gestalt einer Mannigfaltigkeit an, ohne dabei sein Wesen zu verlieren
...."

[150]Cf. section 4.1.11 for more details on these forms of error.

[151]Cf. section 4.1.13 for who might have said this.

cause of recollecting an observation of an earlier material object,[152] generates a particular apprehension,[153] gives rise to a conceptual [cognition] of a universal that is without a [real] object. In this way,

[152]An observation of a material entity was stated to be a prerequisite for conventional agreement, cf. l. 73, p. 52 (trl. § 12). Here Ratnakīrti makes the point that it is on the basis of a complex of causes, supported by a recollection of such an observation, that a conceptual cognition of a "universal" (or non-difference, *abheda*, *aviśeṣa*) is produced.

Generally, a *sāmagrī* is a set of factors that causes a particular effect. The causal complex of perceptual cognitions has been treated very thoroughly by Steinkellner (1967: 45; 121–125, nn. 27, 28) (corresponding to HB b.12214), as well as by Kellner (1999: 197 ff.). The causal complex governing conceptual cognitions is less clear. Perceptual judgement, a conceptual cognition following a perception, is treated by Dharmakīrti in PVSV 31,26–32,12 (see Kellner 2004: 19–32 for an excellent interpretation).

Though not discussed in great detail by Ratnakīrti, the causal complex referred to here could consist in what appears on hearing the word "cow" in a sentence, as described in § 32: it conjures up a generalized shape of cows, and is accompanied by the sounds of the letters that make up the word "cow".

This position is rather similar to Dharmakīrti's explanations of the interplay of memory, convention, and real things: cf., e.g., the discussion following PV I 64 (trl. appendix A.1.6), PVSV 54,12–14 (translated and referred to in Akamatsu 1983: 247, n. 164 in this context), and see also PV I 72 and commentary (cf. the trl. in Dunne 2004: 344 f.), PVSV 42,13–22 (cf. the trl. in Dunne 2004: 346 f.),and PVSV 82,4–22 (trl. appendix A.1.11).

[153]AS_1 and AS_2, as well as all the mss available to me, read °*mānāviśeṣa*°. °*mānaviśeṣa*° in AS_3 is therefore probably a misprint. There are three ways of analysing this compound: °*mānā vi*°, °*mānā 'vi*°, and °*māna-avi*°, respectively. This could be understood either as translated above, or as "a causal complex, which, enriched by the assisting cause ..., generates a non-specific apprehension," or as "a causal complex, which generates a non-specific apprehension that is enriched by the assisting cause." The differences concern two points: what is enriched by memory, the conceptual cognition or its set of causes, and what is engendered by the causal complex mentioned–a *viśeṣapratyaya* or an *aviśeṣapratyaya*?

The first option yields the best sense. Concerning point one, memory–as an additional cause (*sahakārin*)—is more likely to be one condition in the set responsible for a conceptual cognition than a part of conceptual cognition itself; and, concerning point two, *viśeṣapratyaya* (a certain/specific apprehension) seems to be the right option, since it is what Ratnakīrti is trying to prove here: that a cognition is not arbitrary, but specific insofar as it is bound to a certain set of causes and therefore is "of" only certain objects.

therefore, a genus appears neither in a verbal apprehension nor in perception.[154]

E.2 § 36. Neither is [a genus] established inferentially, because a connected logical mark cannot be observed when [what is to be proven, the genus,] is unobservable.[155] Neither is this [genus] established like a sense faculty, because from the effect, which is a cognition, only an occasional, other reason is established.[156] Even if [someone] pointed out that, in [the case of] another material object or an intermediate space [between cows], the cognition of a cow is absent, then how should the absence of the cognition of a cow, [insofar as it] arises from the absence only of all material cow entities, such as flecked ones etc., depend on another object[, i.e., a genus]?[157] [Opponent:] Now, [it is] only because of cowness [that there is] a material cow entity, otherwise even a horse would be a material cow entity. [Proponent:] If so, [then it is] only because of the material cow entity [that there is] cowness, otherwise even horseness would be cowness. Therefore

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[154] Cf. the notes in section 4.1.13.

[155] The inference considered here aims to prove a genus (*sādhya*). Neither the reason (*hetu*) nor the locus (*pakṣa*) of the inference are specified. The counterargument is that if a genus is not observable, it cannot be proven that it is connected to the *hetu* in the first place. Given that an effect of the genus is used as a reason, as supposed in the next sentence, this argument would appeal to the impossibility of establishing the cause-effect relation between a genus and a cognition (or all its other effects). Cf. Mimaki 1976: 292, n. 321 for a concise summary of Ratnakīrti's opinion in this matter. As Patil (2011b: 24, n. 101) notes, "...the inference of other minds (*santānāntara*) and of the functioning of our sense faculties (*indriya*) ..." are instances where Ratnakīrti accepts that even though that which should be established is invisible, a *vyāpti* can be established.

[156] Cf. section 4.1.12 for some remarks on this argument.

[157] The problem of whether a genus is omnipresent (*sarvagata*), so that it might occur both in the space between its manifestations and also in other entities, is also discussed in NBhV 303,6–10 (cf. Potter 1977: 325 for a summary), and ŚV Āv 25. Both of these passages are quoted by Karṇakagomin, *ad* PVSV 76,25–77,4 (cf. the references in section 4.1.13). See also Potter 1977: 139-140 for a short sketch of the various positions held by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors in this matter, and below footnote 280.

the material cow entity [is due] solely to a succession of causes.[158] Cowness, however, may exist or not.

§ 37.   [Opponent:] Is it not [the case that], if the capacity to generate a universal's apprehension is not different from one material entity, then another material entity, which is [also] excluded from that of another genus, [would be] incapable [of generating that cognition]? But [if this capacity is] different [from the material entity], then this is the universal, [and there is] at most a dispute concerning the name. [Proponent:] This capacity is certainly not different to the real thing. But what kind of error should arise if there is a [being] that is also like another being [in terms of] having a [certain] capable nature? In the way that for you one genus is the cause of creating a term common [to multiple individual things], as well as another [genus], is [such a cause] just by its nature, independently of other genera, in that way, for us, an individual thing too, [insofar as it is also] independent of genera [and] differentiated [from other particulars] only through its own form, [is] the cause [of such a common term].[159]

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[158]Cf. ll. 65 ff. in § 11, where a causal chain such as this is also mentioned as a reason for a thing's differentiation from other things.

[159]This paragraph, giving only a very general argument, draws on many of the central ideas of the *apoha* theory as developed by Dharmakīrti:

- that a capacity is not different from the particular having that capacity is argued for in PV I 54 (cf. the trl. on page 289);

- that many particulars have a non-different capacity *śakti*, one of which is to cause the same cognition, is discussed in PV I 73 ff. (cf. Dunne 2004: 343 ff.), PV I 109 (referred to and translated by Akamatsu (1983: 248, n. 170); cf. the trl. on page 302), and PV III 163cd–164 (cf. the trl. on page 321);

- that particulars are essentially different from each other is introduced at the beginning of Dharmakīrti's discussion of *apoha* in PV I 40–42 (cf. appendix A.1.1).

The two beliefs that are ascribed to the opponent are the Nyāya positions that the genus is the cause of what is the same (see footnote 286) and that it does so independently of any other *jāti*. This latter notion might be linked to the fact that universals cannot qualify each other (cf. Halbfass 1970: 143): this implies that any

E.2.4 *§ 38.*   But what Trilocana[160] [said is this]: "Inherence of specific universals like horseness, cowness etc. in [their] own [respective] bases [is] the cause for both an appellation and apprehension as 'A universal, a universal'."[161] [Proponent:] If in such a way this very cause for such appellations and cognitions exists in the particulars too, [then] what [use is your] obsession with [making us] admit a universal? Moreover, inherence is not possible [either]:

> *§ 39.*   Inherence should be established because of the awareness "[something is] in here", and the thought "in here" [should exist] when one observes two [things, where one is in the other].
> But in no object of that [cognition] is there a perception of a pair. Therefore an agreement [to inherence] is merely [one's] personal fancy.[162]

E.2.7 *§ 40.*   Through this [verse, this following] speculation[163] of his[164] is

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cognition of sameness which is dependent on a universal is dependent on only one universal.

[160]Trilocana's texts have been lost. For more information about this Naiyāyika author, who was a teacher of Vācaspatimiśra, cf. Potter 1977: 396 ff., Solomon 1980, and Aklujkar 1999.

[161]Oberhammer reads according to JNĀ and ms. P, translating: "Das Inhärieren der besonderen Gemeinsamkeiten wie Pferdtum, Kuhtum etc. in dem jeweiligen Substrat ist die Ursache für das Benennen und Erkennen der Gemeinsamkeit." (Oberhammer 1964: 144, n. 47) He makes no comment about the reading "*sāmānyaṃ sāmānyam iti*". The repetition is in all likelihood the correct reading: the skipping of a repeated word is an error that can easily be repeated by independent scribes, and is the cause for the readings found in P and AP. In the AP 223,18–19, the repeated word is even found in a subsequent reuse of this phrase in Jñānaśrīmitra's answer. The argument also makes good sense: Cowness, horseness, and so on are each a cause for a corresponding cognition. The resulting cognitions are, according to Trilocana, repeated cognitions in the sense that they have the inherence of the same universal in (at least two) particular things as their cause. So for both things the same judgement arises: "This is the universal cowness, that is the universal cowness."

[162]This verse is in the *upendravajrā* metre (as defined in Apte 1992: Appendix A, p. 4), and in all likelihood originally from Jñānaśrī. For inherence as assumed by Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika authors, cf. the explanations in Dravid 1972: 19 ff., and the notes in section 4.1.6.

rejected: "How can this consistency of apprehensions, which accords to a consistent thing, exist where there are completely different individual things that [would] concur [only] with the presence of apprehensions of objects differentiated [from each other]?",[165] because [a] consistent apprehension deviates [also] in the case of the genera themselves, [insofar as they] are particularised due to being differentiated from each other.[166]

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[163]The masculine form *ūha* in AP 222,24 does not correspond to JNĀ_ms 17a5, which reads *ūhā*. This feminine form exists according to PW I: 1036, so a text emendation seems unnecessary here.

[164]Since no new opponent has been introduced following § 38, this passage is most likely taken from one of Trilocana's texts as well.

[165]The formulation here differs from that in the corresponding passage in AP 222,24, *vyāvṛttapratyayaviṣayabhāvānupātiniṣu*, which McCrea and Patil 2010: 83 translate (in context) as: "...in individuals, which are absolutely distinct and fall within the scope of differentiated awarenesses." In this case, the awarenesses are differentiated, whereas for Ratnakīrti the objects are what is primarily differentiated. The argument does not appear to change much, since different objects will cause different cognitions.

This passage is strongly reminiscent of NBh on NSū_Th 2.2.69 (*samānaprasa-vātmikā jātiḥ.* Trl.: "A genus has the nature of producing the same."), NBh: *yā samānāṃ buddhiṃ prasūte bhinneṣv adhikaraṇeṣu, yayā ca bahūnītaretarato na vyāvartante, yo 'rtho 'nekatra pratyayānuvṛttinimittaṃ tat sāmānyam. yac ca keṣā-ñcid abhedaṃ karoti, kutaścid bhedaṃ, tat sāmānyaviśeṣo jātir iti.* ("Which [genus] produces the same awareness for different foundations, [and] by which [genus] multiple [things] differentiate [themselves] from each other, [and] which object is the cause of a consistency of cognitions for more than one [thing], that is the universal. And what causes a non-difference of some [things], [and their] difference from some [things], that is the specific universal, the genus.") Cf. also the explanations in Halbfass 1992: 120 ff.

[166]The logical error seems to be as follows (see also Akamatsu 1983: 248 f., n. 175): Trilocana thinks that the repeated occurrence of the same cognition for multiple particulars of the same genus cannot occur without a thing that in some way consists as the same, i.e., without a universal or the different individual and temporally extended things with the same universal inhering in them. Since the cognition is dependent on these particulars as its cause, it establishes them. In other words, they are the *sādhya* of the inference in the background of this passage. But, as Ratnakīrti suggests, even the genera themselves are differentiated from each other, since they are "particularized" or, literally, "enter into the manifestations". Therefore the logical reason that Trilocana professes, the consistency of certain cognitions, goes

E.2.9 *§ 41.* What is again formulated as a [valid cognition] falsifying [the consistency of cognition] in the opposite case by him,[167] [i.e.,] "A consistency of appellation and apprehension, [insofar as] it exists only in some [cases] whilst being absent from some [others], has a cause, but there is no other cause [except a consistent real thing]." and so on, is not correct, since, even without a consistent [thing], it has been established[168] that the consistency of appellations and cognitions is [to be] necessarily accepted because of the specificity of [a thing's] own nature, which is differentiated from that of another form. Therefore:

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astray or deviates: even in Trilocana's theory, a repetition of cognitions is not a sure sign of a genus that remains the same throughout all cognitive events, because a genus in fact becomes differentiated when it enters into multiple particulars. And, the unspoken conclusion is, if differentiated things can thus cause similar cognitions, why not the particulars too, without any intermediary genera?

The interpretation of *anuvṛtti* and *anuvṛtta* here is not without its problems. Patil (2011b: 14), as well as McCrea and Patil (2010: 83) (translating AP 222,23–25), use recurrence. Another interpretation, that as "conformity", is suggested by Akamatsu 1983: 124 f., and has the advantage of highlighting the fact that the recurrence follows or corresponds to the presence of the genus.

[167]Presumably this is still Trilocana. The full formulation of the logical error Ratnakīrti is defending against here is *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*. Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 116 f. for more information, and Akamatsu 1983: 248 f., n. 175 for a lucid assessment of the logical structure based on Jñānaśrīmitra's model for this passage. Acc. to Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 116 f., n. 310, it is supposed to establish the pervasion of a separate inference by disproving other possibilities. Trilocana, as mentioned above (footnote 166), wishes to prove that a cognition of sameness is caused by, and so can prove, the sameness of its objects. Here he argues that, in the case opposite to the one he wants to prove, i.e., in the case that there are no things that stay the same due to a genus, the reason of his inference, the consistency of cognition, is not possible (or is eliminated). In this way, the fact that cognitions conform to their objects is a valid reason for inferring its only cause, a conforming thing.

[168]Ratnakīrti has argued that the non-existence of a universal does not mean that cognitions of a universal are random (§ 35), and that particulars differentiated by their own nature are able to cause a cognition of sameness (§ 37). Together, these arguments might account for the present statement that the conformity of appellations and cognitions must be accepted on the basis of the specific characteristics of particulars alone.

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§ 42. By which contact a genus spreads out into something, when [there is] the same difference [of things], but not into others, that [contact] alone should be the cause of both words and cognitions.[169]

§ 43. Furthermore, what is said about this [verse][170] in the Nyāya- bhūṣaṇa: "[What the verse says is wrong,] because it is not like this: by which contact [such things as] a stick, a string etc. extend somewhere [but] not elsewhere, that contact alone [instead of the stick, string, etc.] should be the cause of the everyday activity [concerned with] 'something with a stick', 'something on a string' etc. in cases of a man [carrying a stick], crystals [on a string] etc. [So] what use is the [actual] stick, string etc.?", is wrong, because the intention [of this verse, correctly given as follows,] was not understood [in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa]: "For it is not denied that both a stick and a string, connected to a man and a crystal, [and] observed [as such], are the reason for the apprehension of [something] having a stick or being on a string. But a universal is not observed even in a dream. Therefore, if this [universal] is [in any case only] to be imagined, then preferably only contact should be imagined as the reason for the apprehension of a universal. [But] what is the use of a fraught assumption [like this]?"

§ 44. [Opponent:] Now this inference demonstrating a univer- sal is set forth: That, which is a cognition of [something] that is qualified, [is] inseparable from the grasping of the qualifier, such as the cognition of "having a stick" [in the case of someone carrying a stick]. And this is a cognition of [something] that is qualified: "This is a cow". In fact, [this is] an effect-reason. For the cognition of [something] qualified, which is established in the example, is an effect

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[169]This verse is PV I 162 (cf. the trl. on page 316), where it also follows a discussion about the causes of cognitions and designations.

[170]NBhūṣ 261,5–7, quoted here, is a direct reply to PV I 162, which is quoted at NBhūṣ 261,3–4.

of the experience of the qualifier.[171] [Proponent:] With regard to this [inference, there is] a question: should it prove that an awareness of what is qualified is inseparable from the grasping of a qualifier that is different [from what it qualifies], or [should it prove] that [this awareness] is inseparable from the experience of a qualifier as such?

E.2.14.3 *§ 45.* In the first case, the falsification of the instance [that the inference is about] through perception does not provide an opportunity for attention towards the proving [element, the reason], because there is no appearance of the two[, i.e., a qualified thing and that qualifying it,] in a perception grasping a real thing.[172] And that there is an awareness of [something] qualified is common [to various cases of cognition]. [So] the reason is ambiguous, because [a cognition of something qualified is] observed also without grasping a differentiated qualifier, as "A pot has its own form.", or "Cowness [is] a universal."[173]

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[171]The elements used in this inference are as follows: The *pakṣa*, or locus of the inference, is cognition. The *hetu*, reason, is that the cognition is of something that is qualified, which simply means that the object that is known in a cognition is specified in some way. The *sādhya*, which is what is to be proven, is that this cognition of something qualified implies an apprehension of that which qualifies its object–on a realist account, a universal. The example, *dṛṣṭānta*, is the cognition of a person carrying a stick, which implies that there be the cognition of the stick. The reason used in this inference is a so-called effect reason, *kāryahetu*, i.e., the reason (cognition of something qualified) is an effect of what is to be established (grasping of a qualifier). This is one of three types of reasons that are admissable according to Buddhist logicians in the tradition of Dharmakīrti (cf. the explanations in Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 72 ff.).

[172]Meaning we do not apprehend the universal cowness in the perception of a specific cow. And since there is no cognition of both a qualified thing and its qualifier, it is no use paying any attention to the reason. For the exemplary inference from "smoke on a mountain" to "fire on a mountain", the corresponding argument would be that the "mountain qualified by smoke" is shown not to exist, so that the inference becomes futile. For Ratnakīrti's stance on the relation of qualifier and qualified, cf. the argument in § 27.

[173]These examples show that it is possible to have a cognition of something that is qualified without grasping a qualifier that is different from the thing: a pot is not different from its own form, and cowness is not different from the universal that it is. Since it is therefore possible that a qualified cognition (*hetu*) can occur independently of a separate qualifier (*sādhya*), the reason is ambiguous, *anaikāntika*.

§ 46. But in the second case [there is an] establishing of what is [already] established, because, in accepting a difference imagined as "A material entity possesses the genus cowness." in the same way as [one thinks] "A pot has its own form.", a relation of qualifier and qualified is postulated [even by us],[174] since everyday activity [such as] "This is a cow." comes about due to an experience of that differentiated from non-cow.

§ 47. Thus, a universal is not established in this way. And the [valid cognition] falsifying the circle of additional attributes like universal, property, action etc.,[175] [is] a sharpened perception grasping a bare particular, or the fully established non-apprehension of what is [usually] observable.[176]

§ 48. Thus, in this way,[177] only a positive element is the referent of a word. And this [positive element] is meant [to be] the external object and the form in awareness.[178] Amongst these, the form of awareness is neither affirmed nor negated, neither in reality nor conventionally, because [this form] is to be cognized [only] through the perception self-awareness[179] and is not determined. The external object is not affirmed or negated in reality either, because it does not appear in verbal apprehensions. Precisely for this [reason], all things

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[174]Cf. § 27 (trl. page 104) for this argument.

[175]I.e., all things that can be understood as qualifying a particular. Ratnakīrti here hints at the entities that, according to the ontology of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors, can inhere in substances (*dravya*). Cf. the summary in Halbfass 1992: 70 ff.

[176]Ratnakīrti here summarizes his two main lines of attack on entities that exist separately from a particular, but nevertheless are capable of qualifying it: a particular qualified by a universal is not observed as having a separate qualifier, and there is no perceptual evidence for this qualifier by itself. This corresponds to the two main lines of argumentation for refuting real universals, §§ 9–31 and §§ 32–46 respectively.

[177]Cf. section 5.3 for explanations of the issues mentioned in this paragraph.

[178]Cf. the same statement in § 15.

[179]For a discussion of Ratnakīrti's ideas about self-awareness as relevant for conceptual cognition, cf. section 5.4.

are in reality inexpressible, for neither do they appear nor are they determined. Therefore the external object alone is conventionally affirmed and negated, because otherwise it would result that all everyday activity is given up.[180]

F.1.2 *§ 49.* Thus, in this way,

> in reality no affirmation of either a form [in awareness] or an external [object] is established.
> For [the affirmation of an object] only as external [is established] conventionally, but [the affirmation] of the form not even conventionally.[181]

G.1 *§ 50.* Through this [verse], what Dharmottara says uncommonly, against scripture, and illogically: "[There is] affirmation and negation [concerning the fact] that the superimposed [thing] is external.",[182] is rejected.

G.3 *§ 51.* If it [is objected:] "If the real thing, which is to be determined, does not appear in [its] determination,[183] then what is the meaning of

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[180] Cf. footnote 200 and references given there for this unwanted consequence.

[181] Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 338 f. for more on this verse's context in the *AP*. Their translation of the verse is as follows: "There is no way of really affirming either the mental image or the external object. Conventionally [there is affirmation] only of externals, whereas even conventionally there is no [affirmation] of the mental image." (McCrea and Patil 2006: 338, and cf. McCrea and Patil 2010: 92)

[182] Cf. DhAP 244,3-4: "*sgrub pa dang dgag pa dag ni sgro bdag gang zhig phyi rol nyid du nges par byas pa de dang 'brel pa yin te.*" (Translation acc. to Frauwallner 1937: 266: "Dagegen wird eine Bejahung oder Verneinung mit dem Übertragenen verbunden, das als außen bestimmt wird.") Note that in Ratnakīrti's quote a Sanskrit equivalent for *nges par byas pa* is missing. This position is illustrated by Dharmottara with the example of a rope that is mistaken for a snake: it is with regard to the superimposed snake, which is determined as external, that there is affirmation and negation. Cf. section 4.1.14 for a translation of that example, and see McAllister 2017a for a discussion of it in its context.

[183] This criticism is expressed also in CAPV 133,23–24.

[saying] 'this [thing] is determined?'[184] If [you say] the meaning [is] that [something is] made an object of activity, even though it does not appear,[185] [then] how [could], as this non-appearance is not specific [to the cognized object], activity with a restricted object [proceed] by avoiding other objects?"[186] [Then] it is said [in answer]: even though every [real thing] is [equally] ungrasped, still there is activity only towards a restricted [object], such as water etc., because a conceptual [cognition], since [it] has a restricted form due to being produced by a restricted complex of causes, has a capacity that is restricted [to

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[184]If *tadadhyavasitam* is interpreted as a compound, one could understand "...what is the meaning of [saying] that [it is] determined through this [determination]?"

[185]This opinion is expressed, e.g., KBhSA 73,9–12 (cf. section 5.4 for a translation of the latter passage, as well as Woo 1999: 187). In CAPV 140,4–7, Ratnakīrti makes it clear that an object can be determined regardless of its ontological status and independently of its appearance in the determination of it:

> *tasmād vastu vā ghaṭapaṭādi sandigdhavastu vā sādhakabādha-kātikrāntam avastu vātmadikkālākṣaṇikādikam adhyavasitam iti, apratibhāse 'pi pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam ity arthaḥ. ayam eva cāropaikīka-raṇādhyavasāyābhedagrahādīnām arthaḥ sarvatra śāstre boddhavyaḥ.*

> Therefore, [the statement] that a real thing, like a pot, a cloth etc., or a doubtful thing, which goes beyond an establishing or falsifying [means of valid cognition], or an unreal thing, like a soul, space-time, a thing that is not momentary, etc., is determined, means that, even though there is no appearance [of any of these], [each of these things] is made the object of activity.
> And exactly this is the meaning of [terms] such as imposition, equation, determination, grasping as non-different etc., which should be heeded everywhere in the *Śāstra*.

[186]I.e., since the absence of an appearance of a horse cannot be distinguished from that of a cow, any activity based on this absence would be unable to differentiate between objects. Above (§ 15), the restriction of a thing was said to be one in its place, time, and condition: any successful activity needs an object that must be concrete in these three respects, and only the particular fulfills these requirements according to the ontology that Ratnakīrti follows.

prompting only a certain activity],[187] like smoke generates [only] the cognition of a fire [currently] beyond the senses.[188]

G.7 *§ 52.*   For entities [which] have restricted capacities[189] possess natures completely ascertained by means of valid cognition, [but] are not liable to be questioned as to a mixing of [their] capacities. Therefore, the state of determining this [object] is, because of a relation to a specific form, the state of being generative of the activity towards this [object]. But we do not speak of activity due to a superimposition because of similarity, so that there would be the possibility of falsification by means of superimposition [either] of an external object on a form [of awareness] or of a form [of awareness] on an external object;[190] rather[, we say], an awareness–arising only in virtue of the ripening of one's own remaining impressions–even though not seeing

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[187]Cf. the notes to § 35 (especially footnote 152) for Ratnakīrti's idea about how a concept is causally linked to things.

[188]The variants of this example in mss K and P are as follows:

K: "...like in the case of something that doesn't exist. Even if the three worlds [including] smoke did not exist when there is a fire, from that [fire] only smoke will arise, but nothing else." It is not obvious how *dhūmasya trailokyasyābhāvas* should be construed. Perhaps an emendation to *dhūmasya trailokyābhāvas* (understood as "absence of smoke in the three worlds") would be a good idea. For a similar idea, that from a seed only a certain sprout arises, see AP 226,5-6 (translated in McCrea and Patil 2010: 88), a passage that Ratnakīrti reused for CAPV 138,5–11.

P: "...like, even though there is no [such thing as] smoke, pot, etc. when there is fire, smoke alone is created [by fire, but] not a pot etc."

[189]Apart from the similar passages quoted in the critical edition, an emendation of *niyataviṣaya* to *niyataśakti* is suggested also by the context: things don't have objects, but they can have capacities.

[190]This paragraph builds on Ratnakīrti's discussions in CAPV, see in particular CAPV 133,23–135,4 and CAPV 138,12–16. The relevant differences between Dharmottara's and Ratnakīrti's opinions of how conceptual cognition works are investigated in McAllister 2017a. Ratnakīrti's stance in this matter (like that of his teacher) here accords with that of Prajñākaragupta, which was developed in response to Dharmottara (cf. McAllister forthcoming a).

an external object, is active towards an external object. Thus (*iti*), [this awareness] is simply confused.[191]

§ 53. Thus, in this way, a positive element is the referent, which, qualified by the absence of others, is differentiated from that of another genus. And only this [positive element which is] to be denoted by the word "exclusion" is the referent of words, and the object of activity and inactivity. So it is settled. H

§ 54. Here [there is the formulation of] a proof:[192] All that denotes [something] has as [its] object a mere thing[193] that is determined [and] distinguished from that of another form, as the expression "Water [is] here in a well."[194] And this [expression] having the form of a word like "cow" etc. does denote [something].[195] [So there is] the logical reason [consisting in] an essential property. This [reason] is

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[191]Following the passage on which Ratnakīrti based himself for the current discussion, the Jñānaśrīmitra (AP 226,14–15) quotes PV III 13b-c. Ratnakīrti quotes that verse in CAPV 138,17–18.

[192]Cf. section 5.2 for a discussion of this proof.

[193]Patil (2009: 239) translates *vastumātra* as "thing-in-general", which he takes to be the same "as 'similarity classes' and 'constructed universals'." (Patil 2009: 240) The term *vastu* is, however, used by Ratnakīrti strictly in the sense of a real thing (cf., e.g., l. 92, or the argument in § 19). So here it would have to be the word "*mātra*" by which the import of *vastu* is altered to such an extent that Ratnakīrti is not claiming that a real thing is the object of words. Below (section 5.4), an argument will be made that he does indeed mean the real thing here.

Ratnakīrti uses the word "*mātra*" like this also when describing the object of a word: in § 32, for example, he maintains that upon hearing the word "cow" no universal, but a particular image combining certain parts of cows appears, disregarding the specific differences of any cow to any other cow.

[194]For this example, cf. Krasser 1991: 55 f., n. 91. Perhaps the point is that the water in the well is not visible and is known to be there only through a conceptual cognition.

[195]Patil (2009: 239) points out that the *pakṣa* of this inference be understood as "the inferential/verbal awareness-event produced in the mind of a competent speaker of a language upon hearing a token utterance of an expression in that language." See also the explanations in section 5.3.1 aimed at illustrating the equivalence of "expression" to any conceptual state of awareness.

not unestablished, because, even though there is no real relation of a denotable and denoting [according to] the rule stated earlier,[196] [this relation], made by determination, is necessarily to be accepted by all [those] engaged in everyday activity, for otherwise [there is] the unwanted consequence of the extermination of all everyday activity.[197] Neither is that [reason] contradictory, for it is present in the similar instance.[198] Nor is [that reason] ambiguous.[199] For [it is] like this: according to the others, who are averse to [our theory that] the object of words is the mere thing which is determined [and] excluded from that of a different genus, in reality

> § 55. that denoted must be a particular, an additional attribute, a connection to an additional attribute, [something] possessing an additional attribute, or (*yadi vā*) must be a form of awareness,

I.6.3.2 § 56.   because there is no other way [for a word to have an object], and because, if there is no object [for a word], it is not possible that [a word] denotes. Regarding this [group of options,]

> § 57. there is no convention for either the first [possibility, the particular or] the last [possibility, the form of awareness] because the capacity of [giving] a result

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[196]This could be referring back to l. 167–l. 168, p. 58 (cf. also the notes on Ratnakīrti's usage of *nyāya* in section 4.1.8), or the statements at the end of § 29. Patil (2009: 241, n. 111) carefully says that "[t]his seems to be referring to what precedes '*iti sthitam*,' RNĀ (AS 66.06-66.07)", corresponding to l. 302, p. 69–l. 303. But, in this translation, *iti sthitam* is understood rather as marking the end of Ratnakīrti's presentation of his final position (§§ 50–52), and not expressing a position about the relata of denotation.

[197]The same consequence resulted in § 48.

[198]A reason is contradictory to that which it is supposed to establish when it only occurs in instances where the property to be proven is absent.

[199]See footnote 173 for what this means.

would be given up .[200] Even to the middle triad [of options, convention is] not bound because of the lack of an additional attribute.[201]

§ 58.   Thus in this way, the [property] of [having] an object that is determined [and] external[, the property that is to be established,] pervades [the reason property, which consists in] denoting [something], insofar as [this reason property] is excluded from the counter-instances [in which a different object is denoted], given that the pervading [property, generally] marked by having an object, is excluded [from those counter-instances], because, [apart from other-exclusion], no other [object] that can be denoted exists.[202] Thus, pervasion is established.

> *§ 59.* To begin with, it is the referent that is principally expressed through words. Where that [is the case], exclusion [is] to be understood, due to being a quality of that [referent].
> Furthermore, one referent[, the external object, is] posited due to determination, the other [referent, the form of awareness,] due to appearance. [But] In reality, nothing at all [is] to be expressed.[203]

§ 60.   The Proof of Exclusion is completed. This [is the] work of the venerable Mahāpaṇḍita Ratnakīrti.

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[200]A particular and the mental construct itself cannot be made an object of everyday activity, because that would not have the desired result for this activity: the particular is strictly unique, and the mental construct is private, as well as a particular. Cf. the arguments above, in § 48 (trl. page 118), and § 54 (trl. page 122): without the affirmation or negation of a temporally extended external object, everyday activity would be impossible.

[201]Cf. section 4.1.15 for some notes on this verse.

[202]By this, the ambiguity under discussion is shown not to apply to the reason. All instances of denoting are instances where the object is one that is determined and excluded. For denoting cannot occur without this sort of object, since all the other possible objects, i.e., those that the opponent is trying to promote as the word

§ 61. May[204] there be a long explanation of exclusion for clever people. But the vulnerable point is that a real thing's own nature does not appear.

There, if [that fact is] not firmly settled, everything is shattered without effort; but, if [this fact] is firmly settled, [then] is [exclusion] not well grounded to the fullest extent?

§ 62. In a full night and two watches [Ratna]kīrti's [proof of] exclusion was joyfully copied[205] by Trailokyadatta from effort grounded in the highest being. Therefore this [text] is to be protected.

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referent, have been shown to be unsuitable for denotation.

[203]This verse is taken from the opening section of Jñānaśrīmitra's AP. Its main elements have here been translated in line with Ratnakīrti's explanations, given above. The referent is thus said to have two aspects: the first is the externally constructed object, and the second is the form of awareness, cf. § 15 (trl. page 96). What Jñānaśrīmitra calls *artha* here is therefore equal to Ratnakīrti's *vidhi*. This is also supported by Jñānaśrīmitra's explanation of his own verse, since he uses the term *vidhi* in glossing *tatra*, AP 203,11–12: ...**tatrāpoha** *iti. vidhau hi mukhyatayā pratipādyamāne* ... ("**In this case, exclusion**. For, when the positive element is understood as being primary, ...")

The translations and interpretations by McCrea and Patil (2006: 341 ff.) (as well as by McCrea and Patil 2010: 51 f.) differ somewhat from the one presented here. They understand the term *artha* in the first line as referring to the external object, and thus not to the *vidhi*, which includes the notions both of an external object and of a form of awareness. In the light of Ratnakīrti's explanations in § 15, however, the *artha* here must refer to the *vidhi*, in both of its aspects. If not, Ratnakīrti would be contradicting himself. Note that Akamatsu 1983: 48 interprets *artha* as corresponding to *vidhi* even in the context of Jñānaśrīmitra's work.

For the ultimate inexpressibility of any referent, cf. the argument in § 48 (trl. page 118)

[204]Cf. the translations of this verse in Patil 2011b: n. 146 and in McCrea and Patil 2010: 97.

[205]See the remarks on page 4 and in footnote 8 for this interpretation.

4 Additional comments on the Apohasiddhi

4.1 NOTES ON INDIVIDUAL PASSAGES OF THE APOHASIDDHI

4.1.1 Analysis of anyāpoha (ad § 2)

Ratnakīrti offers four interpretations for the term *anyāpoha*, the first
three of which he explicitly calls analytical derivations (*vyutpatti*) of
the term:

1. *idam anyasmād apohyate.* (This is excluded from another.)
2. *asmād anyad apohyate.* (Another is excluded from this.)
3. *asminn anyad apohyate.* (In this another is excluded.)
4. *apohanam apohaḥ.* (Exclusion is excluding.)

These four ways of understanding *apoha* are stated to be the
reasons for calling three things *apoha*:

1. *vijātivyāvṛtta bāhya*, the external object excluded from what is
   not of its kind.
2. *buddhyākāra*, the form of awareness.
3. *anyavyāvṛttimātra*, the mere differentiation from others.

The last element here, the mere differentiation from others, is
explained by the fourth understanding of *apoha*, that is *apohana*, the
act or process of excluding, and is not related to the three derivations
of *anyāpoha*.

The question is, therefore, how *anyāpoha* as the external object and as the form of awareness should be aligned with the three analytical derivations. To answer this question, it is helpful to recall the main stages in the development of this threefold distinction.[206]

The earliest known version of these three forms of *anyāpoha* is found in the *PVṬ*. It is found, in various forms, also in the *TSP*, the *PVSVṬ*, the *AP*, and the *TBh*.

The situation presented by Śākyabuddhi in his comment on PV I 179 is rather straightforward: The external particular, excluded from everything else, corresponds to understanding *anyāpoha* as "*anyo 'pohyate 'sminn iti*" (PVṬ$_{F2}$ 207,1–2). Simple other-exclusion follows from understanding "*anyāpohanam anyāpoha iti*" (PVṬ$_{F2}$ 207,5). Lastly, an understanding of *anyāpoha* as "*anyo 'pohyate 'neneti*" (PVṬ$_{F2}$ 207,7) corresponds to exclusion as an appearance in awareness.

In the *TSP*, the situation is less clear.[207] As noted by Ishida (2011b: 202, n. 12), a statement of an analysis supporting one of the three forms of exclusion is given in TSP$_Ś$ 391,12–22. Kamalaśīla there appends it to the explanation that the name exclusion is applied to the object's reflection in awareness, because the reflection is different from other reflections.[208] The other two things that can be called exclusion, an external thing and mere exclusion, are also upheld, but no analytical explanations corresponding to those given

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[206]Akamatsu (1983: 171, n. 22) provides ample material for tracing this distinction back to Dharmakīrti, as well as a sketch of its development. Other studies on this topic include Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 122, n. 333 (but see Akamatsu 1983: 173 ff. for a criticism of some of these points), Dunne 2004: 131 f., Ishida 2011b, and Okada 2017. Cf. table 4.1 for an overview of the various positions taken by Buddhist authors.

[207]Ishida (2011b: 206) concludes that "it has become clear that Śākyabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita adopt almost the same structure to classify the *anyāpoha*, but Śāntarakṣita has a more developed understanding concerning the meaning of words." This is contested by Okada (2017: 188; 198), who maintains that all elements that Śāntarakṣita considers are present already in Śākyabuddhi, though in a somewhat different alignment. For the purpose of deciding whether the various ways of analysing *anyāpoha* relate to which object it signifies, this debate need not be decided.

[208]Cf. appendix B.10.1.

Table 4.1 – Threefold classifications of *apoha*

Text	vyāvṛttasvalakṣaṇa	anyavyavacchedamātra	buddhipratibhāsa/ākāra
PVT$_{F2}$	anyo 'pohyate 'sminn iti (207.1–2)	anyāpohanam anyāpoha iti (207.5)	anyo 'pohyate 'neneti (207.7)
PVT$_D$	'di **las** gzhan dang gzhan sel bar byed pa	gzhan gcod pa	'dis gzhan sel bar byed pa
TS$_Ś$	paryudāsa (1003b) / anya-viśleṣabhāvataḥ (1008cd)	prasajyapratiṣedha (1009a)	paryudāsa (1003c)
TSP$_Ś$	**anyas**mād vijātīyād **viśleṣo** vyāvṛttis tasya **bhāvāt** (392.8–9)		apohyata iti apoho 'nyasmād apoho 'nyāpoha iti (391.14)
PVSVṬ	apohyate 'sminn iti (114.21)	apohanam apoha ity (114.20)	apohyate 'neneti (114.19)
TBh$_I$	apohyate 'smād anyad vijātīyam iti (52.9)	apohanam apoha iti (52.12)	apohyate pṛthak kriyate 'smin buddhyākāre vijātīyam (52.10–11)

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by Śākyabuddhi are offered.[209] It would thus appear that in the *TSP*, whilst a form of threefold other-exclusion is maintained, it is not systematically linked to an analysis in such a way that it would help understand the intent of Ratnakīrti's introductory paragraph (§ 2).

Karṇakagomin also refers to three types of exclusion, but, unlike Śākyabuddhi, he does so in his comment on PV I 41 (cf. appendix A.2.1).[210] His classification corresponds to that of Śākyabuddhi: the form of awareness is called exclusion because "by it [another] is excluded", mere negation is called exclusion because "[the act of] excluding is exclusion", and a particular is called exclusion because "in it [another] is excluded".[211]

Jñānaśrīmitra explains:

> AP 202,12-14: *yat punar anyasmād apohyate, apohyate 'nyad asmin veti vijātivyāvṛttaṃ bāhyam eva buddhyākāro vānyāpoha*[212] *iti gīyate. tena na kaścid upayogaḥ, apoha-nāmnā vidher eva vivakṣitatvāt, na ca nāmāntarakaraṇe vastunaḥ svarūpaparāvṛttiḥ.*
>
> Furthermore, because of [the expressions] "it is excluded from another, another is excluded, or in this [another is excluded]",[213] *either* the external [object] itself, differentiated from that of another kind, or the form of awareness

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[209]Cf. the assessments and translated passages in Ishida 2011b: 202–203.

[210]Śākyabuddhi, however, cites PV I 40cd in his explanation, cf. PVṬ$_{F2}$ 207,3. For the gist of Karṇakagomin's commentary on PV I 179, cf. Ishida 2011b: 205, n. 21: Karṇakagomin refers only to two forms of exclusion, the particular and exclusion itself, and does not give any analytical derivations. Therefore, this passage is of little relevance for the discussion here.

[211]PVSVṬ 114,19–21: *kalpitaś cākāro 'pohāśritatvād apoha ucyate. apohyate 'neneti vā. anyanivṛttimātraṃ tv arthād ākṣiptam apohanam apoha ity ucyate(.) svalakṣaṇaṃ tv apohyate 'sminn ity apoha ucyate.* (Trl. appendix A.2.1.)

[212]JNĀ$_{ms}$ 8b6 reads *buddhyākāro vā 'nyā°* (i.e., supporting *vānyā°*) against *buddhyākāro 'nyā°* AP 202,13.

[213]I thank Hisataka Ishida for discussing this passage with me. He had the good idea of putting a lot of emphasis on the fact that *vā* is in a position that indicates three rather than two alternatives. If only two alternatives had been intended by Jñānaśrīmitra here, the placement of *vā* would be expected to be after the first word of the second alternative, perhaps resulting in something like this: ...*anyasmād*

is called other-exclusion. This [explanation] is useless, since through the designation "exclusion" only a positive element is expressed, and, if a thing is called by another name, there is no change of [its] own nature.[214]

Here, obviously, the three analytical derivations are not as clearly differentiated as in the interpretations of Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin. Basically there is the same problem as for the passage in Ratnakīrti. Both the external object and the form of awareness are understood as derived from three ways of analysing exclusion. The fourth, purely negative interpretation of exclusion, is apparently not mentioned in the *AP*.

In the *TBh*, the relevant passage runs:

[TBh$_I$ 52,7–14] *nanu ko 'yam apoho nāma? yathādhyavasāyaṃ*[215] *bāhya eva ghaṭādir artho 'poha ity abhidhīyate,*

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apohyate, apohyate vānyad asminn iti. And if understood as expressing the same three alternatives, Ratnakīrti's corresponding passage can be understood as a clearer restatement of the same point, rather than as offering a different kind of classification. The parallels would then be as follows (AP = AS$_3$): *anyasmād apohyate* = *anyasmād apohyate*, *apohyate 'nyad* = *asmād vānyad apohyate*, *asmin* = *asmin vānyad apohyate*.

[214]Cf. also Katsura 2011: 125, and the references given there: Dunne 2004, and to a Japanese article by Toru Funayama (an English summary can be found in Funayama 2000). Also see Ishida 2011b, as well as Patil 2011b: n. 15, p. 19:

> This grammatical analysis of exclusion (*apoha*) seems to have begun with Śākyabuddhi, in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, the *Pramāṇavārttika-ṭīkā* (See PVṬ ad *Pramāṇavārttika* [PV 1, ed. Gnoli] and *Svārthānumāna* v. 169). Karṇakagomin, another commentator on Dharmakīrti's text, also mentions it in his *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti-ṭīkā* (PVSVṬ), as do Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla in their independent works the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā* (TS and TSP). For a parallel passage in the work of Ratnakīrti's teacher, Jñānaśrīmitra, see JNĀ (202.12-212.14).

[215]Read *yathādhyavasāyaṃ*, instead of *yathāvyavasāyaṃ* in TBh$_K$ 28,25 and *yathādhyavasāyam* in TBh$_I$ 52,8.

apohyate 'smād anyad vijātīyam iti kṛtvā. yathāpratibhā-
saṃ buddhyākāro[216] *'pohaḥ, apohyate pṛthakkriyate 'smin*
buddhyākāre vijātīyam iti kṛtvā. yathātattvaṃ nivṛtti-
mātraṃ prasajyarūpo 'pohaḥ, apohanam apoha iti kṛtvā.
nanu yathādhyavasāyaṃ vidhir eva, tarhi kevalo viṣaya
ity āgatam. na[,] anyāpohaviśiṣṭo[217] *vidhir abhipretaḥ.*

[Opponent:] Now, what is this called exclusion? According
to determination, only an external object like a pot etc. is
designated as "exclusion", by thinking "Another, which
is of a different class, is excluded from this." According
to appearance, a form of cognition is [designated as]
exclusion, by thinking "That of another class is excluded,
[i.e.,] singled out, in this form of awareness." According
to reality, mere absence is the exclusion which has the
nature of absolute negation, by thinking "exclusion [is
the act of] excluding." Now, if according to determination
[exclusion is] only a positive element, then [the position]
that [exclusion] is simply the object is arrived at.

[Proponent:] No[, none of these is correct]. A positive
element qualified by other-exclusion is meant.[218]

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[216]TBh_I 52,10 f. reads *buddhyākāro vā ...prasajyarūpo vā ...*. Since the position
of the second *vā* is somewhat awkward (one would expect *nivṛttimātraṃ vā*), the
reading without these *vā*-s, as attested in TBh_K 28,27 f., is preferable.

[217]Read *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo* acc. to TBh_K against *apohaviśiṣṭo* TBh_I.

[218]Cf. the translation by Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 122 f.), as well as that by
Akamatsu (1983: 171 ff., n. 22) for valuable notes. Amongst other things, Akamatsu
(1983) notes that Yuichi Kajiyama (1966) did not translate the qualifier "according to
reality". Akamatsu (1983: 174 f.) then argues that Mokṣākaragupta's position reflects
that of Jñānaśrīmitra, and not that of Ratnakīrti, because the three qualifiers, i.e.,
"according to appearance, determination, and reality" are essential to the *AP*: "Pour
Jñānaśrīmitra, les trois possibilités de l'interprétation de l'apoha ont été les trois
éléments les plus importants pour composer sa théorie sur l'Apoha. ...C'est pourquoi,
ces trois sortes d'interprétation de l'apoha ne peuvent être pas fausses." (Akamatsu
1983: 175) On closer inspection, this interpretation seems unlikely. Like Ratnakīrti,
neither Jñānaśrīmitra nor Mokṣākaragupta consider any one of these options to be
correct. In the *AP*, the passage is stated by an opponent (cf. Akamatsu 1983: 172
and McCrea and Patil 2010: 51). Also, in the *AS* this is part of an objection, and is

What, then, is the conclusion that can be drawn from these passages for § 2? The first thing to note is that Ratnakīrti clarified Jñānaśrīmitra's analysis, saying "...*asmād vānyad apohyate* ...", l. 4 in § 2, instead of AP 202,12 *apohyate 'nyad*.[219]

The main question is still not answered, though: what is the relation between the analytical derivations and exclusion as an external thing or a form of awareness?

In the *TBh* there is a clear difference to all analytical interpretations other than those of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. It associates the locative construction (*apohyate ...'smin buddhyākāre vijātīyam*, "...in this form of awareness that of another genus is excluded") with the form of awareness, and not, as PVT$_{F2}$ and PVSVṬ do, with the

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answered by a clear no and Ratnakīrti's definition of what exclusion is (cf. l. 36, p. 49). So it is difficult to see how Mokṣākaragupta could have taken any one of these three interpretations to be correct. Whether this passage owes more to the *AP* than to the *AS* is also questionable: Mokṣākaragupta does not employ the first of Jñānaśrīmitra's (or Ratnakīrti's) alternatives, "*anyasmād apohyate*" (AP 202,12). Instead, he adduces the analysis "*apohyate 'smād anyad*" (TBh$_{I}$ 52,9) in order to show how an external object is meant by exclusion, which is stated in this explicit form only by Ratnakīrti. Also, the three qualifiers are not without a basis in the *AS* (cf. section 5.4 for the two qualifiers "according to appearance and determination", and § 48 for what words really refer to acc. to Ratnakīrti).

[219]Cf. footnote 213. Given that this passage is an objection, it could of course be that another text, where these variations are originally to be found, is being cited. But this passage is quite closely related to AP 202,12–13, which is a part of the introductory objection in that text. And it is unclear where that objection comes from. Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 122 f., n. 333) concludes that "...Jñānaśrīmitra ...must have cited these [passages–PMA] from an author unknown to us." Akamatsu (1983: n. 22, p. 175), on the other hand, surmises: "...mais il [le *pūrvapakṣa* de l'AP—PMA] est ...l'objection imaginaire produite par Jñānaśrīmitra lui-même, et nous ne pouvons pas le considérer comme une citation de quelque auteur." This is also the view of Patil (2003: 245, n. 7). The character of the *AS*'s textual dependence on the *AP* in this passage supports, it seems to me, Akamatsu's and Patil's conclusions: Ratnakīrti obviously feels free to rearrange the arguments found in the *AP*, whereas most of the other objections shared by the *AP* and the *AS* are actually quite clearly attributed to their authors, and, at least in the cases where the source texts can be identified, quoted very faithfully.

external object.[220] Considering how much the *TBh* is indebted to the writings of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti,[221] it seems probable that Mokṣākaragupta saw his interpretation as fully compatible with their statements. If that is the case, then one could understand Ratnakīrti (and perforce Jñānaśrīmitra) as follows: *anyasmād apohyate* and *asmād vānyad apohyate*[222] lead to an understanding of the external object as exclusion, and *asmin vānyad apohyate* to an understanding of the form of awareness as exclusion.[223] This would follow Mokṣākaragupta's understanding, and ignore the problem that he only uses two of the three possible derivations.

The alternative is this: to give Mokṣākaragupta's formulation less weight, and take the three forms of analytical derivation as summing up the tradition up to Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti concerning the external object and the form of awareness. This last option seems preferable, because the positions in the *TSP* on the one hand, and in the *PVṬ* and the *PVSVṬ* on the other, could thus be seen as loosely summarized in Ratnakīrti's statement, as follows: in whichever way one analyses *anyāpoha*—either as "exclusion from another"[224]

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[220]*TSP* is of little help here, since no derivation using the locative formulation is used. In the *TSP* the interpretation as *buddhyākāra* is associated with the ablative construction.

[221]Cf. the argument in footnote 309.

[222]The only reason for grouping these two options together is that they share ablative constructions. This is of course not a very good reason, but if one takes the *TBh* seriously on this point, there is no viable alternative. For there must be a division into two groups, and the ablative construction is associated with the external object in *TBh*, and the locative one with the form of awareness.

[223]This is also the understanding reflected in the translation of Jñānaśrīmitra's passage in Akamatsu 1983: 171, n. 22. A second possibility is that the interpretation in the *TBh* is simply not correct. It could be imagined that, Mokṣākaragupta, facing the same problem of how to understand these two explanations of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, decided to drop the first alternative, *anyasmād apohyate*, and assign the remaining two, *asmād vānyad apohyate asmin vānyad apohyate*, to the external object and the form of awareness, respectively. But I believe that the premiss, that Mokṣākaragupta misinterpreted the very two writers he drew much of his material from for the *TBh*, is very unlikely.

[224]Cf. the corresponding rows in table 4.1, and Ishida 2011b: 202, n. 12.

with the *TSP* or as "in this another is excluded." with *PVṬ* and the *PVSVṬ*—only an external thing or the form of awareness is meant by other-exclusion. The second of Ratnakīrti's alternatives, "another is excluded from this", could well have been endorsed in a text not known to us.

4.1.2 Three candidates for exclusion (ad § 3)

In this paragraph, the three positions on what it means to say that exclusion is the referent of words are refuted. The discussion of the "negative" position is rather clear, but the short and unspecific reduction, before that, of the two other options to a merely "positive" position might need some elucidation.

4.1.2.1 ONLY A POSITIVE THING

The first two positions are refuted only by pointing out that, if other-exclusion is either an external thing that is differentiated from that of another kind, or a form of awareness, then it is only a positive element, i.e., a real entity, that is meant by "exclusion."

The passage is too succinct to allow any precise determination of whose (or if anyone's) positions are meant here. But a few pointers might be in order nevertheless. That something external, excluded from what is of another kind, is the word referent, could refer to any of the external-realist theories about the word referent.[225] All three elements of the word referent as adopted in the Nyāya school of thought, the individual thing (*vyakti*), the genus (*jāti*), and the form (*ākṛti*), are external to the cognizing subject and real. For the Vaiśeṣika, the very categories of reality, "...padārthas [...] are the sum total of all that 'supports' the meaning of words and guarantees that words are not mere words, but that they have a denotative value." (Halbfass 1970: 138) Amongst the various categories recognized by Vaiśeṣikas, universals play the central role for the existence and cognition of similarity amongst things, Halbfass 1992: 71:

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[225]For a clear and general overview of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā theories, cf. J. A. Taber 1998b. The classification of these views as external-realist here is based on the discussion in Dravid 1972: chapters 2 and 3.

> Universals (*sāmānyā*), such as "substanceness," "quality-
> ness," "horseness," "whiteness," and so on, are recurrent
> generic properties in substances, qualities, and motions.
> They account for the fact that numerically different indi-
> vidual entities can be associated with an identical concept,
> referred to by a common term, identified as members of
> the same class, and distinguished from members of other
> classes.

Within the various strands of Mīmāṃsā, the form (*ākṛti*), inter-
preted as a universal, was taken to be the primary word referent.[226]
But none of these views seems to be a clean fit for the option that
apoha, and thus the word referent, is only "something external."[227]
That the form of awareness is the referent of a word is probably
Bhartṛhari's view.[228]

Additionally, there are some precursors in *apoha*-treatises to the
problem that *apoha* can be reduced to something external or the form
of awareness:

Dharmottara makes it an important point to show that *apoha* is
neither external nor internal.[229]

The position that the referent of a word is the form of awareness
is discussed in the *TSP ad* TS$_Ś$ 890 (cf. trl. in appendix B.5), where it
becomes clear that this view is very similar to Bhartṛhari's position
(or one of his positions).[230]

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[226]Cf. Dravid 1972: chapter 3, J. A. Taber 1998b, and Hattori 1979: 72, n. 21.

[227]The very similar passage in the *TBh* reads "...*bāhya eva ghaṭādyarthaḥ apoha iti
abhidhīyate*" (TBh$_I$ 52,8), unequivocal in understanding "external" as common-sense
objects, such as a pot etc.

[228]Cf. Ogawa 1999, as well as Hattori 1993, and Kataoka 2009: 489. If Ogawa
1999 is correct, then also the previous view, that an external thing is the word
referent, could be attributed to Bhartṛhari. Moreover, in the *TSP ad* TS$_Ś$ 882,
Kamalaśīla ascribes the view that a substance (*dravya*) is the referent of words to
Vyāḍi, cf. also R. Herzberger 1986: 73 f.

[229]Cf. the programmatic statement in the introductory verse to the DhAP (see
DhAP, Steinkellner 1976, Hattori 2006: 63 f., and Ishida's translation cited in
Kataoka 2009: 486, n. 17).

[230]Cf. Hattori 1993: 139 f., and Kataoka 2009: 488.

According to the exposition of the *apoha* theories as found in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM ᴀᴘᴏʜᴀ: 19–30), it could also be that a reduction to an external thing and a form of awareness was how Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's positions were, respectively, interpreted by their opponents. In the introductory essay in Kataoka 2009, the analysis of Jayanta's exposition leads to this statement: "It is evident that Jayanta makes clear the difference of the three views by distinguishing the three phases: external –> internal –> neither external nor internal." (Kataoka 2009: 483). The first phase is commonly attributed to Dignāga, the second to Dharmakīrti, and the third to Dharmottara (Watson and Kataoka 2017: 35).

Ratnakīrti's answer to the objection as a whole (§ 7) will be to the effect that none of these elements taken individually–neither an external thing, nor a form of awareness, nor exclusion–can be the word referent. In consequence, he adopts what can be seen as a combination of the three (*kin tv anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ*, l. 36 in § 7).

4.1.3 *pratibhāsabheda* and *vastubheda* (ad § 20 and § 21)

Ratnakīrti's point here is that the difference between two objects is founded on the difference of their two natures, and this difference is founded on the difference of the objects' appearance. Akamatsu (1983: 71 f.) adds the following explanation to his translation of the corresponding passage, AP 208,25:

> Donc, les objets qui ont les manifestations des images différentes dans la connaissance doivent avoir les natures propres différentes, et donc ils ne peuvent être une seule et même chose.

So, if there are different appearances, these appearances necessarily are of different objects.

Concerning the relation between the difference of appearances and the difference of real things, AP 209,4–209,14 gives the following inference:

[AP 209,2–209,14:] nanu dūrāsannadeśavartinor ekatra śākhini spaṣṭāspaṣṭapratibhāsabhede 'pi na [śākhi]bhe-daḥ, arthakriyābhedābhāvād ity arthakriyābhedopakṛta eva pratibhāsabhedo bhedakaḥ. na cehārthakriyābheda iti katham indriyaśabdābhyāṃ janitajñānaviṣayo gavādir bhedabhāg iti cet? na brūmaḥ pratibhāsabhedo bhinna-vastuniyataḥ, kiṃ tu ekaviṣayatvābhāvaniyata iti. tathā hi, yo yaḥ kvacid vastuni pratyakṣapratibhāsād viparītaḥ pratibhāso nāsau tenaikaviṣayaḥ, yathā ghaṭagrāhakāt paṭapratibhāsaḥ, yathā vā śaṅkhagrāhakāt pītaprati-bhāsaḥ. tathā ca gavi pratyakṣapratibhāsād viparītaḥ pratibhāso vikalpakāle iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ. ekaviṣayatvaṃ hi pratibhāsābhedena vyāptam, savyetara-nayanadṛṣṭavad dṛṣṭam. avyāptis[231] *tu yadi pratyakṣānta-ram api viparītapratibhāsaṃ syāt, vastu vā*[232] *dvirūpaṃ bhavet. tac ca dvayam api nāstīti vyāptir eva. āśraya-bhedabhāvini ca jñāne pakṣīkṛte tadviruddhaḥ pratibhā-sabhedaḥ siddhaḥ. tato yatrārthakriyābhedādisacivaḥ pratibhāsabhedas tatra vastubhedaḥ ghaṭapaṭavat. taṃ punaḥ sahāyaṃ vihāya pravṛtto niyamenaikaviṣayatāṃ pariharatīty eko 'tra bhrānta eva pratibhāsaḥ, śaṅkhe pītapratibhāsavat.*

[Opponent:] But surely there is no difference in a tree even in the case where one and the same tree has a difference in the appearance as clear and unclear to two [people], one close by and the other in a distant place, because there is no difference in the causal efficacy [of the tree]. [For,] the difference in appearance that is really assisted by a difference in causal efficacy is [that which] differentiates [one thing from another]. And in this case there is no difference in the causal efficacy. So how should the object of a cognition generated by the sense faculties

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[231]Read *avyāptis tu* acc. to JNĀ$_{\mathrm{ms}}$ 11b1 against *avyāptitas tu* AP 209,10.

[232]Read *vā* acc. to JNĀ$_{\mathrm{ms}}$ 11b2 against *ca* AP 209,11.

[or] words [i.e. verbal cognition], like a cow etc., involve a difference?

[Proponent:] We do not say that a difference in appearance is restricted to different things, but that [it] is restricted to the absence of the fact that there is the same object [for both appearances]. For it is so: Any appearance that, with regard to some real thing, is contrary to the appearance in a perceptual cognition does not have the same object as this [appearance in a perceptual cognition], like the appearance of a cloth [is contrary] to a [perceptual] grasping of a pot, or like the appearance of yellow [is contrary] to grasping a conch shell. And in the same way, with respect to a cow, the appearance at the time of a conceptual cognition is contrary to the appearance in a perceptual cognition. This (*iti*) [is a case of] perceiving [something] opposed to the pervading element. For, the fact of there being the same object [for both types of cognitions] is pervaded by the non-difference of appearances, observed [here] as [something] is observed by the left eye and the other [eye]. But if there were no pervasion, there would be another perception, having an opposed appearance, or there would be a real thing having two natures. And none of these two is [the case]. Therefore, there is indeed pervasion. And when a cognition, which is different according to [its] basis [that is either in the sense faculties or in concepts,] is made the locus [of pervasion], a difference of appearance is established. Therefore, where there is a difference of appearance accompanied by a difference of causal efficacy etc., there there is a difference of the real thing, as in the case of pot and cloth. Moreover, [a difference in appearance] occurring without this companion by definition refutes the fact of there being the same object. Thus here one appearance is only erroneous, like the appearance of yellow in the case of a conch shell.

4.1.3.1 Analysis

Jñānaśrīmitra's argument here is that the fact that perceptual and conceptual awareness do not have the same object can be ascertained through *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*, the apprehension of that opposed to the pervading element. This is one of the ways in which a person can correctly infer the absence of something, in this case, the absence of the property of "having the same object". The explanation of this type of non-perception in TBh$_I$ 30,9–11 is as follows:[233]

> *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhir yathā–nātra tuṣārasparśaḥ, dahanāt. pratiṣedhyasya tuṣārasparśasya vyāpakaṃ śītam, tasya viruddho dahanaviśeṣaḥ [...] tasyehopalabdhiḥ.*

> The perception of that opposed to the pervading element [is] like this: There is no feeling of cold here, because of a fire. Coldness is the pervader of the feeling of cold, which is to be negated; that contradictory to this [coldness] is a particular fire; of that there is a perception in this place.

A comparison of the elements involved is given in table 4.2. Accordingly, Jñānaśrīmitra's argument can be paraphrased as follows: In a perceptual and a conceptual awareness, two different appearances are observed (*hetu*). The fact that there are two different appearances is, obviously, contradictory to the fact that there are not different appearances. And since all cases in which there is the same object for two cognitions imply that there are no differences in the respective appearances, these two cognitions cannot have the same object.

So what do Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti mean by this statement: "We do not say that a difference in appearance is restricted to different things, but that [it] is restricted to the absence of the fact that there is the same object [for both appearances]"? The main intention is to state that different appearances prove the absence of

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[233]See Kellner 1997a: 103 ff. and Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 151 ff., Appendix 1 for more background on non-perception, and Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 83, n. 220 for this specific type.

Table 4.2 – Structure of *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*

logical role	TBh$_I$	AP
hetu	dahana	pratibhāsa-bheda
sādhya	a-tuṣārasparṣa	ekaviṣayatva-a-bhāva
pakṣa	iha	jñāna
vyāpaka	śīta	pratibhāsa-a-bheda
vyāpya	tuṣārasparśa	ekaviṣayatva
vyāpakaviruddha	dahana	pratibhāsa-bheda

the same object, but not the presence of two different objects.[234] This restriction has, as spelled out by Ratnakīrti in the last two sentences of § 20, consequences as to what can be known from the fact that two cognitions have different appearances of their objects: depending on whether there is causal efficacy of the appearing objects or not, the two cognitions either have different real things as their objects, as in the case of a pot and a cloth, or one of the appearances is wrong (i.e., has no real thing as its object), as the appearance of yellow in the case of the white conch. For Ratnakīrti, this differentiation will allow the argument (in § 21) that a conceptual cognition can have an object which is both different from the object of perception and not a real thing.

4.1.4 Common to existence and non-existence (bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇya ad § 21–§ 23)

About the argument that a word applies to its objects irrespective of the existence or non-existence of this object, Katsura (1986: 174 f.) wrote:[235]

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[234]For if there were two different objects, a realist can be imagined to argue that one is the particular, the other the universal. This would obviously be a very unwelcome consequence for an Apohavādin.

[235]The problem, but not the exact same argument, is also found in Kumārila's writings, cf. ŚV Vāk 310 (trl. section 4.1.5). See also J. Taber and Kataoka 2017 and Ogawa 2017 for recent examinations of this topic in the writings of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

> This argument also stems from Dharmakīrti....Dharmo-
> ttara utilized it in a skillful and systematic way in his
> Apohaprakaraṇa....Then he was severely criticized by
> Vācaspatimiśra,...who in turn was criticized by Jñānaśrī-
> mitra.

In this context, Katsura (1986: 180, n. 23) refers to PV$_M$
IV 223–236 (which is very similar to PVin II 15–28).[236] Akamatsu
1983: 211, n. 103 refers explicitly to PV$_M$ IV 228, and Ogawa 1999: 275,
n. 17 to PV$_M$ IV 226 and 228. The most relevant passage in Dharmotta-
ra's *DhAP* is, approximately,[237] DhAP 241,11–244,16. The arguments
found there were criticised by Vācaspatimiśra, esp. NVTṬ 444,2–6,
and the particular problem of a word's object being common to exis-
tence and non-existence is mentioned also by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, NM
APOHA: 24,4–5 (trl. Watson and Kataoka 2017: 63–64).

Akamatsu (1983: 211 ff., n. 103), traces the origin of the infer-
ence in the background of the discussion found in § 21 and § 23 to
DhAP 244,10–16.[238]

The argument as given by Dharmottara is as follows:

> [DhAP 244,10–24] *gang zhig dngos po dang dngos po med
> pa thun mong du zhen pas nges par 'dzin pa de ni gcig
> las ldog pa nges pa lhur byed pa yin te /dper na bum pa
> ma yin par shes pas bum pa ma yin par nges par 'dzin
> pa na yod dam med ces dngos po dang dngos po med pa
> thun mong du nges par 'dzin par byed pa bzhin no //
> rnam par rtog pa thams cad kyis kyang dngos po dang*

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[236]These verses are translated and discussed in Steinkellner 1979: 41 ff.

[237]Katsura 1986: 180, n. 24 refers to DhAP 244,10 ff. Akamatsu 1983: 212 ff.,
n. 103 draws on various passages from DhAP 241,22–244,16.

[238]Akamatsu (1983: 215) says that this inference is cited in NVTṬ 442,16–18.
He supports this claim by saying that Frauwallner 1937: 267 indicates this depen-
dency, but there is no such indication there. Nevertheless, the inference found in
NVTṬ 442,16–18 is indeed quite similar to Dharmottara's, but is not, as far as can
be judged on the basis of the Tibetan translation of Dharmottara's inference, a
faithful quotation. Cf. the trl. in section 4.1.4.

*dngos po med pa dag gi rang bzhin thun mong du nges
par 'dzin par byed do // gtan tshigs 'di ma grub pa ni ma
yin te /rnam par rtog pa gnyis ka'i thun mong gi rang
bzhin du dmigs par nyams su myong bas grub pa'i phyir
ro // sngar bshad pa'i tshul gyis thun mong du 'dzin pa'i
rgyu mtshan ni gcig las ldog pa lhur nges pa nyid yin
te /de ni rgyu mtshan med pa ma yin la /rgyu mtshan
gzhan yang mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro // de la mi mthun pa'i
phyogs la 'jug na khyab par byed pa rgyu mtshan dang
ldan pa nyid med par 'gyur ba'i phyir khyab par byed pa
mi dmigs pas mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa na thun
mong du 'dzin pa ldog pa gcig gi mthar thug pa la gnas
pa'i phyir khyab pa grub po /*

What ascertains [something] by grasping [it] as common
to existence and non-existence, that only determines the
differentiation from some [other thing], like a cognition
[of something] as not-a-pot ascertains [something], in
ascertaining [it] as not-a-pot, as common to existence
and non-existence [since one can say]"It exists or does
not exist." And all conceptual cognitions ascertain [some-
thing] as having a nature common to both existence and
non-existence. This logical reason is not unestablished,
because a conceptual cognition is established by direct
perception as apprehending [something] that has a na-
ture common to these two. In the manner previously
explained, the cause for grasping [something] as common
[to both] is the ascertainment as only different from some-
thing [else], because this [ascertainment] is not without
a cause, and another cause is not apprehended. In this
regard, when there is a differentiation [of the pervaded
element] from the counter-instance—due to not appre-
hending the pervading element, because the pervading
element[, i.e.,] the state of having a cause, does not exist

in[239] the counter-instance—the grasping as common [to existence and non-existence] occurs [only] for that based on some differentiation. Therefore, the pervasion [of an ascertaining cognition by the property of ascertaining only other-exclusion] is established.

The inference given at NVTṬ 442,16–20, which is referred to in NVTṬ 444,2–6, the passage quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 23, runs like this (in the voice of an opponent, most likely Dharmottara):

> *tathā hi–yad bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇaṃ tad anyavyāvṛtti-rūpam*[240] *eva, yathā amūrtatvam. tat khalu vijñāne ca śaśaviṣāṇe ca sādhāraṇam. tathā ca vivādādhyāsitā vi-kalpaviṣayā ghaṭapaṭādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ. gaur asti gaur nāstīti hi bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇo gāvādir vikalpavi-ṣayo vidhirūpasvalakṣaṇavad bhāvāsādhāraṇye nāstīty anena na sambadhyate virodhāt.*
>
> For [it is] so: What is common to existence and nonexistence, that has only the nature of exclusion from others, like incorporeality. That [incorporeality] indeed is common to cognition[, which exists,] and a hare's horn[, which does not exist]. And the objects of conceptual cognitions, which are subject to discussion, like pot, cloth, etc., are like this. So the logical reason [of the type] "essential property" [is used here]. For [in the sentences] "a cow is, a cow isn't", cow etc., the object of conceptual cognition, could not be connected with this [predicate], "is not", if it were specific [only] to existence, like a particular that has a positive nature, because of a contradiction.

The logical elements used here are: the reason, *hetu*, is "common to existence and nonexistence;" what is to be proven, the *sādhya*, is

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[239]The import of the phrase *'jug na*, as Frauwallner 1937: p. 266, n. 2 notes, is not clear here.

[240]Read °*rūpam eva* acc. to NVTṬ_D 476,9 instead of °*rūpayeva* in NVTṬ 442,16.

"having the nature of exclusion from others;" and the site of the inference, the *pakṣa*, is "objects of conceptual cognition." Dharmottara's inference is basically the same: cognizing something as common to the referent's existence and non-existence can only work for exclusion from others, not for a real positive entity.

In the passage quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 23, Vācaspatimiśra criticizes this inference by showing that it is possible for a genus to be the object of conceptual cognitions. For, even though it is by its nature eternal and hence exclusively existent, it can be predicated to exist or to not exist through its connection to particulars that currently exist or not. What he has thus shown is that the reason, being common to existence and non-existence, can occur in the counter-instances, i.e., when something–in this case the genus–does not have the nature of exclusion from others. The reason that Dharmottara uses to prove that exclusion must be the object of any ascertaining cognition thus becomes inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), because one cannot be certain that it does not also qualify things, in particular the objects of conceptual cognition, that do not have other-exclusion as their nature. The alternative[241] is that the reason is "established in another way," i.e., that being common to both existence and non-existence can be shown to pertain even when exclusion is not the nature of conceptual objects.[242]

4.1.5 The position of Kumārila's followers (ad § 24)

As Akamatsu (1983: 218, n. 112) has pointed out, the position that words apply to parts of their referent is found in ŚV Āv 64ab:

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[241]If one accepts the reading *veti* (l. 134, p. 56) instead of *ceti* in NVTṬ 444,6.

[242]Glossing on NBhV 62,4–5 *ad* NSū 1.1.10, NVTṬ 276,7–8 notes the following about *anyathāsiddha*: **asiddhārthatā** *anyathāsiddhārthatā* **hetoḥ** *hetuvacanasyety arthaḥ*. (The aim of the reason[, i.e.,] of the statement of the reason, is unestablished[, i.e., its] aim is established in another way. That is the meaning.) For Vācaspati, therefore, this problem is one where the reason is not established. Cf. Gokhale 1992: 83 f. for a helpful example of this fallacious reason. He also gives this definition: "The *hetu* is called *anyathāsiddha* when the existence of *hetu* is capable of full explanation without reference to *sādhya*." (Gokhale 1992: 84)

sāmānyāṃśān apoddhṛtya padaṃ sarvaṃ pravartate /
Every word applies [to its object] in extracting the parts
[that are] the universals.

Cf. also these arguments in the *ŚV*, where it is quite obvious that
there is an awareness of a closely related problem:

*ŚV Av 125: nirbhāgo 'pi hi vastvātmā śabdair bhāgena
gamyate* /
na hi sacchabdavijñānād ghaṭādyarthaḥ pratīyate //
For [something] having the nature of a real thing is
partially understood through words, even though it has
no parts. For there is no cognition of an object such as a
pot etc. from a cognition [of an object's existence] through
the word "existing."

*ŚV Vāk 309cd–311: na ca śabdena sadbhāvas tasya cā-
rthasya bodhitaḥ* //
astitvādyanapekṣaṃ hi sāmānyaṃ tena gamyate /
astiśabdaprayogo 'pi tenaivātropapadyate //
jāter astitvanāstitve na ca kaś cid vivakṣati /
nityatvāl lakṣyamāṇāyā vyaktes te hi viśeṣaṇe //
Neither is the actual existence also of this object under-
stood through a word. For a universal, which is indepen-
dent of the state "it is" etc., is understood through this
[word]. Exactly for this [reason], also the usage of the
word "it is"[243] is applicable here[, i.e., to this pot]. No one
wishes to express [either] the state "it is" [or] the state
"it is not" of a genus, because [it] is permanent. For these
two [states] are qualifiers of the individual thing that is
characterized [by that genus].

In the commentary on ŚV Vāk 309cd–310ab, Pārthasarāthimiśra
explicitly addresses the problem of a word being *sadasattvasādhāraṇa*
(which is assumed to refer to the same problem as *bhāvābhāvasādhā-
raṇya*):

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[243]"It is" translates the single Sanskrit third person present verb of existence *asti*,
lit. "he, she, or it is."

NRĀ 657,5–8: *syād evaṃ yadi ghaṭaśabdena ghaṭasya sattvaṃ bodhitaṃ syāt. sa tu sadasattvasādhāraṇaṃ ghaṭasvarūpamātram abhidhatte. tatsvarūpaṃ hi prādeśikatvād anityatvāc ca kvacit kadācic ca sat, kvacit kadācic cāsad iti sādhāraṇaṃ* **sāmānyam** *iti, sadasattvasādhāraṇam ity arthaḥ.*

It would be so[, i.e., there would be a problem about being common to existence and non-existence,] if the existence of a pot were cognized through the word "pot"; but this [word] denotes a pot's own form alone, common to the state of being and non-being. For the own form of this [pot] exists in some places and at some times, and does not exist in some [other] places and at some [other] times because [this pot] has its proper place and is not permanent. In this sense a universal is common, which means "common to being and non-being."

4.1.6 Properties and their bearers in an upakāra relation (ad § 28)

In general, *upakāra* means assistance or support (cf. PW I: 237.1; see also below, section 4.1.9). Dharmakīrti discusses the relationship of property and property-bearer under the heading of an *upakāra* relation in PVSV 29,6–31,5 (trl. pages 287–292), and in PVin II 67,4–68,2 (trl. on the basis of the Tibetan text in Steinkellner 1979: 66–69).[244]

In § 28, it is "close contact" (*pratyāsatti*) that is characterized as *upakāra*. Ratnakīrti says that the other options, such as inherence (*samavāya*) etc., for what this contact could be, have been refuted. The question is what he means by "etc." Various forms of contact between a property bearer and a property (one case of such a contact being that of a particular with the universal qualifying it) were assumed by the realist schools: *samavāya* and *saṃyoga* by the Naiyāyikas

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[244]Steinkellner (1979: 68, n. 213) notes that *upakāra* was also used in a similar sense by Kumārila, and the interpretation of *upakārāt* in VP$_R$ 3.3.5 by Houben (1995: 170, and 173 f.) is strikingly similar. See also PS(V) 5 5cd for a similar employment (*guṇopakārāt*).

and Vaiśeṣikas, and non-difference or a form of inherence by the Mīmāṃsakas.[245] Since Ratnakīrti does not discuss the Mīmāṃsakas' opinions in the following paragraphs, I take "*samavāyāder*" (l. 170, p. 58) to mean *samavāya* and *saṃyoga*, i.e., the two relations accepted by Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.

The relation called *samavāya*, explicitly mentioned by Ratna-kīrti, is the sixth category in the Vaiśeṣika system (cf. Halbfass 1992: 70–75). There, it "[...] is the relationship between entities that cannot occur separately. It is the one omnipresent principle [...] that integrates parts and wholes, particulars and universals, substances, qualities, and motions." (Halbfass 1992: 72) It was also endorsed by Naiyāyika thinkers, and in the context of the *Apohasiddhi* it is relevant specifically as the relation that a universal, that which inheres, has to the particular, in which it inheres. Cf., e.g., NBhV 305,15–17:

> *kathaṃ tarhi gotvaṃ goṣu vartate? āśrayāśrayibhāvena.*
> *kaḥ punar āśrayāśrayibhāvaḥ? samavāyaḥ. tatra vṛtti-*
> *mad gotvam, vṛttiḥ samavāya itīhapratyayahetutvād ity*
> *uktam.*

> [Opponent:] How then[246] does cowness occur in cows?
> [Proponent:] Through the relation of supporter and sup-

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[245]For the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā idea that properties and their bearers are different aspects of the same entity (e.g., *sthitaṃ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi naḥ*, ŚV Ps 141cd), cf. J. A. Taber 2005: 106–12. Cf. D'Sa 1980: chap. 12, and J. A. Taber 2005: 217 f., n. 40 for clear summaries of the ŚV *Āv*'s main points, where the specific relation of a class to its particulars is discussed in the same terms. Cf. also Dravid 1972: 64–66 for some notes regarding the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā stance that the universal and that qualified by it are really distinct and related by a non-eternal *samavāya*.

[246]NSū 2.2.64, which Uddyotakara is discussing here, is one of a row of *sūtra*s refuting that either *ākṛti*, *vyakti*, or *jāti* alone is the word referent (cf. Biardeau 1964: 229–240, Much 1994: 351–352). Here, Uddyotakara has just repeated his argument from NBhV 206,21–22 that the relation of a whole to its parts cannot be understood in terms of a unitary thing (such as a genus) existing in manifold things (such as its manifestations, *vyakti*-s). So the opponent wonders what their relationship might be. Parts of this passage are also quoted in PVSVṬ 277,3–4, and 305,6–11.

ported. [Opponent:] What then is [this] relation of supporter and supported? [Proponent:] Inherence (*samavāya*). Here, cowness is what occurs [in the particulars], [and] the occurrence is inherence. Therefore "because [inherence] is the reason for the cognition '[cowness is] here [in a cow]'" was said.

The relation called *saṃyoga* is a form of contact that is different from *samavāya* and was first assumed in Vaiśeṣika ontology. It is a quality (*guṇa*), the second category in all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. It had a rather broad scope of application,[247] but the main difference to the category of inherence was that contact exists between two things that can exist separately from each other (mainly substances, as in the example of the stick and the stick-bearer).

For a criticism of *saṃyoga* and *samavāya* as the relation between a property and its bearer in the *TS*, cf. appendix B.2.

4.1.7 True genera or additional attributes: upādhi (ad § 29)

Ratnakīrti, as well as Vācaspatimiśra in the passage quoted in § 29, uses the term *upādhi* in a way strikingly different from that commonly ascribed to Naiyāyika authors. In the following, I would like to inquire what, if any, cause this term's different employment has for the two different schools of thought, and whether any particularly important issues are attached to it.

4.1.7.1 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

An *upādhi* is usually described as a non-essential universal: "Other general characteristics such as 'cookness', 'tallness', 'blindness', etc., which are adventitious features, are recognised not as universals (jāti) but as *upādhis*." (Dravid 1972: 25; cf. also Potter 1977: 135 ff. and references given there.)

The term *upādhi*, in the context of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, is variously translated as "'nominal' properties", "superimposed

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[247]Cf. Frauwallner 1956: 127 ff., Halbfass 1992: 122 f., 147.

condition", "imposed properties", or "limiting condition".[248] Acc. to Halbfass (1970: 148), "Udayana was the first Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika author who took into full account all the difficulties involved in the jāti-upādhi problem, and the jātibhādaka doctrine in his Kiraṇāvalī became fundamental for all subsequent considerations,...for the period following the conflict with the Buddhists." This implies that before Udayana, and so also at Ratnakīrti's time, there were no fixed and conclusive criteria for what differentiated a universal proper from an imposed universal.

But it seems that, at least since Trilocana (cf. Potter 1977: 202 ff.), *upādhi* had important implications also for the Nyāya analysis of *svabhāva* inferences (cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 101, n. 271 and the reference there to RNĀ$_1$ 42,20–23[249]). The central point is, acc. to Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 100 f., nn. 270–271), that smoke always implies fire (*svābhāvikasambandha*), whereas fire only implies smoke when a specific additional attribute of fire, i.e., wet fuel, is present ("*aupādhika-* or *sopādhika-sambandha*").

As Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 101, n. 271) points out, Ratnakīrti's and Mokṣākaragupta's definition of *upādhi* as "...*arthāntaraṃ kiṃcid apekṣaṇīyam* is based on this explanation of Vācaspati and perhaps his teacher Trilocana, though it is not verbally found in NVT." (NVT = *NVTṬ*) The passage containing this definition in the *TBh* is translated by Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 101) as "...for by the word *upādhi* is meant some other thing by the dependence on which [the probans is related to the probandum, i.e. if x needs z in order to be related with y, this z is called *upādhi*]."

Buddhist logicians, on the other hand, called all universals supposed by realist schools *upādhi*.[250]

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[248]Cf., respectively, Matilal 1986: 382, Halbfass 1992: 252, Halbfass 1970: 148, and Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 101.

[249]This corresponds to ĪSD 47,6–10. Cf. section 4.1.7.1 and Patil 2009: 123 f. for translations, as well as Patil 2009: 174 ff. for a discussion of the role of *upādhi* in inferential cognitions.

[250]Akamatsu (1983: 225, n. 121) is of the same opinion. I was not able to trace the term *upādhi* in either PS(V) 5 or Hattori 1968. Dharmakīrti employs it in much

To these observations, the following two comments based on the material in the *AS* might be added:

Comment 1. In the argument of § 47 Ratnakīrti subsumes all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories except substance (*dravya*) under the heading of *upādhi*. The phrase indicating this equivocation is "for the circle of additional attributes like universal, property, action etc." (*sāmānyaguṇakarmādyupādhicakrasya*). This would also concur with the following explanation, ĪSD 47,4–10, where Ratnakīrti is attacking the "natural relation" that, for his opponent, makes inferences possible:[251]

> *tathā hi svābhāvikas tu dhūmādīnāṃ vahnyādibhiḥ sa-*
> *mbandhaḥ tadupādher anupalabhyamānatvāt, kvacid*
> *vyabhicārasyādarśanād iti tvayaivāsya lakṣaṇam uktam.*
> *etac cāsiddham, yata upādhiśabdena svato 'rthāntaram e-*
> *vāpekṣaṇīyam abhidhātavyam. na cārthāntaraṃ dṛśyatā-*
> *niyatam, adṛśyasyāpi deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya sa-*
> *mbhavāt. tataś ca dhūmasyāpi hutāśena saha sambandhe*
> *syād upādhiḥ, na copalakṣyata iti katham adarśanān*
> *nāsty eva yataḥ svābhāvikasambandhasiddhiḥ.*
>
> For it is so: "But the relation of smoke etc. with fire etc. is natural, because an additional attribute in this [relation] is not cognized, [and] a deviation [of smoke from fire] is nowhere observed."[252] This definition of that [natural relation] was given by you yourself[, an

the same sense as Ratnakīrti, cf. PV I 52–55 (trl. appendix A.1.4, cf. also footnote 454). Śāntarakṣita subsumes all categories under the term *upādhi* in TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 2ab: *guṇadravyakriyājātisamāvāyādyupādhibhiḥ* (cf. appendix B.1 for a translation).

[251]Cf. Patil 2009: 117–127 for a deeper analysis of this passage in its context.

[252]I follow the translation of this passage in Patil 2009: 123 f., and understand the two justifications to be in the same relation to the main sentence, adding an "and" to reflect this. So smoke is a sure sign of fire, because a) no additional attribute of smoke that might otherwise cause its relation to fire is perceived, and b) smoke is never seen where there is no fire. It is the first point that Ratnakīrti attacks in the next sentences.

opponent, at ĪSD 46,8–9]. But this is not established, since what is meant by the word[s] "additional attribute" is [some] required thing other than [the relation of smoke etc. with fire etc.] itself. But another thing is not limited to visible [things], because an invisible [thing], distant in location, time or essence, is possible. And therefore, there may be an additional attribute in the relation even of smoke with fire (*hutāśa*), but it is not seen. So how does [this additional attribute] not exist at all [only] because [it is] not observed, so that [you believe] there is an establishment of a natural relation?[253]

In the explication of what the word "additional attribute" means, Ratnakīrti here makes two points: it is another thing, and it is required. This can be expected to include all categories except the first, substance, since that would hardly be what is dependent on another object, whereas all other categories are dependent on substances.[254]

The example in the background of this passage[255] is that smoke is a correct reason for inferring the presence of fire. It is correct because, amongst other reasons, no additional attribute is involved in the relation between the two that causes the connection of smoke with fire.[256] This means that there is no thing, other than the relation of the two terms, which makes the inference from smoke to fire valid.

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[253]For the broader context of this passage, cf. Patil 2009: 105 ff., and see Patil 2009: 123 f. for another translation.

[254]Acc. to Ratnakīrti, the only way any kind of *dravya* (as *dharmin*) can be qualified by *sāmānyaguṇakarmādi* (as *dharma*) is in fact *upakāra*, cf. § 28.

[255]Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 100 f., n. 270 and Patil 2009: 105.

[256]It is important to note that here "relation of smoke with fire" is not the same as "relation of fire with smoke": in the first case, an inference from the relation's first term, smoke, to its second term, fire, is valid, but in the second case it is not. Cf. ĪSD 47,7–8: *tathā hi dhūmādīnāṃ vahnyādibhiḥ saha sambandhaḥ svābhāviko na tu vahnyādīnāṃ dhūmādibhiḥ.* ("For it is so: the connection of smoke and so on with fire and so on belongs to the nature [of smoke and so on]; but [the connection] of fire and so on with smoke and so on does not." See also the translation in Patil 2009: 105) Fire is not a correct reason for inferring smoke, since smoke depends on the "additional attribute" of wet fuel.

This also finds support in Ratnakīrti's somewhat ironic conclusion that "in the relation even of smoke with fire", a standard example of a correct pervasion, an additional attribute could be present if all that is required is that it not be observed.

The second point is that this additional attribute is "required". As noted above, Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 101) translates a similar passage: "...some other thing by the dependence on which [the *probans* is related to the *probandum*, i.e. if *x* needs *z* in order to be related with *y*, this *z* is called *upādhi*]." This highlights the import of the second point very nicely: there is no relation of fire with smoke without the additional element "wet fuel."

Comment 2.   In § 29, Vācaspati's phrase *ekopādhinā sattvena viśiṣṭe tasmin* suggests that he himself accepts that *sattva* is an *upādhi*. This usage of the term *upādhi* at this point is perhaps not as decisive as it looks at first sight.

The passage that Ratnakīrti quotes addresses one of the points made by Vācaspati in NVTṬ 110,2 ff. (=PV I 52; 53ab; 55), exemplified by the following objection:[257]

> NVTṬ 109,14–17: *api ca vastuniveśe jātyādīnām upādhī-nām ekasya vastunaḥ sattvaṃ ca dravyatvaṃ ca pārthiva-tvaṃ ca vṛkṣatvaṃ ca śiṃśapātvaṃ copādhaya iti dūrād ekopādhiviśiṣṭasya grahe sarvopādhiviśiṣṭagrahaprasa-ṅgaḥ.*
>
> Moreover, if additional attributes such as a genus etc. rest in a real thing, then–because a single real thing has [these] additional attributes[, i.e.,] existence, substantiality, treeness, and *śiṃśapā*ness–there is the unwanted consequence that, when that [thing] qualified by a single additional attribute is grasped from a distance, it is grasped as qualified by all additional attributes.

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[257]NVTP 274,1 explains: *yasyāpītyādi*vārttik*ārthaṃ dūṣayati–**na caikene**ti.* (With the words "Not by a single [additional attribute]" [Vācaspatimiśra] falsifies the aim of the *Vārttika* stated by the words "For whom" etc.) "Vārttika" here refers to PV I 52, which was quoted in NVTṬ 110,3–4.

Vācaspati's answer can be read as simply repeating the formulation of this objection very closely.[258] It does therefore not have to be taken as endorsing that *sattva* really is an additional attribute and not a proper *jāti*.

In conclusion, we can say with certainty that the term "*upādhi*" was used by Buddhists as a term for universals in a quite unspecific manner, as well as for other shareable attributes or features of things. It is possible that this term was used with the intention of denigrating the status accorded to proper universals in the realist system of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.

4.1.8 *svabhāvopavarṇana (ad § 29)*

The rule mentioned in this argument is invoked in various passages of Ratnakīrti's works. Two passages give more details, PABhP 103,6 f. and KBhSA 77,10 f.:[259]

> PABhP 103,1–7: *naiyāyikaparikalpitopamānanirākara-ṇārtham apy ayam eva prayogo draṣṭavyaḥ, tasyāpi ni-rviṣayatvāt. tathā hi samākhyāsambandhas tasya viṣayo varṇyate. sa ca paramārthato nāsti. sa hi sambandhaḥ sambandhibhyāṃ bhinno 'bhinno vā. yadi bhinnas tadā tayor iti kutaḥ. na ca sambandhāntarād iti vaktavyam, tad api kathaṃ teṣām iti cintāyām anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ. na ca yathā pradīpaḥ prakāśāntaram antareṇa prakāśate tathā sambandho 'pi sambandhāntareṇa sambaddho bha-viṣyatīti vaktum ucitam. pramāṇasiddhe hi vasturūpe 'yam asya svabhāva iti varṇyate, yathā pradīpasyaiva. sambandhas tu na pramāṇapratītaḥ.*

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[258]Vācaspati's answer is quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 29.

[259]Probably VyN 14*.2–3 (VyN$_2$ 111,17 f.) should also be considered here: *pramā-ṇasiddhe hi rūpe svabhāvāvalambanam. na tu svabhāvāvalambanenaiva vastusva-rūpavyavasthā.* Trl. by Lasic (2000b: 71): "Wenn nämlich ein Ding (*rūpa*) durch eine gültige Erkenntnis erwiesen ist, stützen wir uns (bei der Erklärung) auf das Wesen. Nur kraft dessen, daß man sich auf das Wesen stützt, ergibt sich aber keine Feststellung eines realen Dinges."

Exactly this inference[260] is to be observed also in order to reject comparison[, a means of valid cognition] imagined by the Naiyāyikas,[261] because that too does not have an object. For it is so: the connection with a name is described as the object of this [comparison]. But that connection does not really exist. For this connection is either different from the two [things] that have a connection, or not different. If different, then why [is it a connection] "of these two"? Neither can one say [in answer to this question] that [these two are connected] because of another connection, as, when one considers: "Also this [other connection], how [could it belong] to these?", an infinite regress would follow. Nor can it be said that, in the same way that a lamp illuminates without another illumination, so also a connection becomes connected without another connection. For if the form of a real thing has been established by a means of valid cognition, it is explained: "That [is] the nature of that.", as it indeed is for a lamp. But a connection is not known through a means of valid cognition.

KBhSA 77,10–13 *sthiratve 'py eṣa eva svabhāvas tasya yad uttarakṣaṇa eva karotīti cet. hatedānīm pramāṇapratyāśā, dhūmād atrāgnir ity atrāpi svabhāva evāsya yad idānīm atra niragnir api dhūma iti vaktuṃ śakyatvāt.*

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[260]I.e., the inference in PABhP 102,10–11:

ihāpi prayogaḥ — yasya na viṣayavattvaṃ na tasya prāmāṇyam. yathā keśoṇḍukajñānasya. na siddhaṃ ca viṣayavattvam upamānajñānasyeti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ. That which has no object[, *hetu*,] is not a means of valid cognition[, *sādhya*], as the cognition of a net of hair [has no object and is therefore not valid, *dṛṣṭānta*]. And that a cognition through resemblance has an object is not established. This [is an inference by the reason] non-apprehension of the pervader[, i.e., of being a means of valid cognition].

[261]Cf. NSū 1.1.3.

tasmāt pramāṇasiddhe svabhāvāvalambanam. na tu svabhāvāvalambanena pramāṇavyālopaḥ.

[Opponent:] Even though persisting [through time], this [thing] has precisely this nature, [namely] that it produces [an effect] only at a later moment.[262] [Proponent:] Now confidence in means of valid cognition is destroyed, because it is possible to say that even in this [inference], "[There is] fire here, because [there is] smoke.", this [smoke] has just the nature that now there is smoke here even without fire.[263] Therefore a reliance on a [thing's] nature [is justified] when [that thing] is established by a means of valid cognition. But there is no disintegration of a means of valid cognition by reliance on a nature.

Both passages, as § 29, involve the argument that when something is cognized by a means of valid cognition, its nature is made known.

The point, in both cases, is that the nature of a thing is known only after it has been established by a means of valid cognition. A merely assumed, imagined, or otherwise unestablished nature cannot be used to establish something, since that would undermine the authority of any means of valid cognition. The force of the invocation of this rule by Ratnakīrti in § 29 is that Vācaspati cannot simply posit a matter of fact, like the ontological difference of properties and their bearers, and then pretend that what results from this assumption is true (even if it is validly deduced from it). Perception, a means

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[262]I.e., *uttarakāryotpādanasvabhāva*, the nature of producing a later effect. The question is how a thing that remains identically the same during a given period of time produces an effect at a certain time (such as its last effect in its last moment), but not at others. The opponent (Bhāsarvajña in the previous two paragraphs acc. to Woo 1999: 211) thinks that a nature such as "producing an effect at a later time" could help explain how this is achieved.

[263]Here Ratnakīrti is saying that we cannot simply posit a nature at will, as the opponent does in saying that a thing simply produces an effect only at a later time, but not always. If that were possible, we could just as well posit that smoke has the nature of existing without fire in a certain case, a move by which we would end even the most basic of inferences.

of valid cognition, does not show a real thing to have a structure of property and property bearer. One cannot discard this fact merely by presupposing that things do have that internal structure.

Ratnakīrti refers to this description of a thing's nature as a rule, *nyāya*. A formulation such as this would usually appeal to a text of the highest authority, cf., e.g., SJS 21,32–22,1: *...iti nyāyaḥ. yad vārttikam...*, which is then followed by a quote of PV III 532b–d (see Bühnemann 1980: 63 for a translation of, and notes on, this passage), or ĪSD 44,10–11. But an exact source for this particular rule could not be found.

4.1.9 Grasping all that the sun is shining on (ad § 30)

The discussion found in the *NBhūṣ* about the supporter (*upakāraka*) and the supported (*upakārya*),[264] quoted in part by Ratnakīrti in § 30, is directed against Dharmakīrti's analysis of this problem in PVSV 29,7–31,1 (cf. the trl. in appendix A.1.4). After having fully quoted the passage, Bhāsarvajña says:

> NBhūṣ 246,30-247,5: *sarvopadṛśye sūryādau gṛhyamāṇe 'pi na sarvatra draṣṭṛdarśanagrahaṇam asti. anenaitad api nirākṛtam — na hy anya evānyopakārako yo na gṛhītaḥ syāt. na cāpy upakārake tathāgṛhīte upakāryāgrahaṇam tasyāpy agrahaṇaprasaṅgāt, svasvāmitvavad iti. evaṃ hi sūryagrahaṇe tadupakāryasya trailokyasyāpi grahaṇaṃ syāt. na hy upakārakatvena gṛhītād anya eva trailokyopakārako bhānur yo na gṛhītaḥ syāt. upakārakagrahaṇe copakāryāgrahaṇaṃ nāsti svasvāmitvavad ity evaṃvādinaḥ sūryopakāryatrailokyagrahaṇaṃ durnivāraṃ syāt.*

> Even if that [which is] visible everywhere, the sun etc., is grasped, there is no grasping of observers [and their] observations everywhere. By this [statement] also this [following one][265] is refuted: [Opponent:] "For there is no

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[264]See also section 4.1.6.

[265]This corresponds to PVSV 29,24–26.

really different supporter of something else that would
not be grasped. Nor is there, when a supporter is grasped
as such, no grasping of that which is supported, because
of the unwanted consequence of not grasping that [sup-
porter] either, as in the case of being property and owner."
[Proponent:] For, in this way, if the sun is grasped, the
threefold world too, which is that supported by the sun,
would be grasped. For since [the sun] is grasped as being
the supporter, there is no truly different light supporting
the threefold world which would not be grasped. And if
the supporter is grasped, that which is supported would
not be ungrasped, as in the case of being property and
owner. For [those] believing [that it is] so, the grasping of
the threefold world supported by the sun is hard to avoid.

4.1.10   *varṇākṛtyakṣarākāra ...(ad § 33, PV III 147)*

PV III 147[266] poses two problems: Whose opinion is expressed here,
and what exactly is a universal free of?

Dharmakīrti does not say who holds the opinion that the universal
is empty of colour, form, etc. Manorathanandin simply identifies
them as Sāmānyavādins, people teaching universals (PVV 161,17,
cf. appendix A.4.1). Kamalaśīla attributes the same position to the
Naiyāyika Bhāvivikta (cf. its presentation in TSP$_Ś$ *ad* TS$_Ś$ 715–717,
and its criticism in TSP$_Ś$ *ad* TS$_Ś$ 738, trl. appendix B.3).

As Akamatsu (1983: 245, n. 158) notes, a very similar thought
is also to be found in PVSV 55,9–10 (cf. trl. in appendix A.1.7). In
his commentary on this passage, Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 223,14–28)
discusses two options: a universal can be separated or unseparated
from colour (*varṇa*) and shape (*saṃsthāna*). The first argument, that
it is separated, uses an argument suitable against anyone endorsing
a Vaiśeṣika ontology: what appears in a conceptual cognition has
colour and shape; these are qualities, and universals are distinct
from them; hence, what appears in conceptual cognitions cannot be a
universal.

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[266]Cf. appendix A.3.1 for a translation.

The second argument, against universals as not separated from those qualities, is directed against *ākṛtisāmānyavādin*-s: *ākṛti* (form) is Kumārila's preferred term for a universal,[267] and the position argued against here also corresponds to his theory that this "form" is something that cannot be fully separated from the individual things. As an alternative, Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 223,22) says that the Sāṃkhya is in the habit of saying this. This fits in well with our general knowledge of those theories (see Frauwallner 1956: 154, and Vetter 1964: 43 f.).

Note that Karṇakagomin ends his explanation of this passage as follows, PVSVṬ 223,26–28:

> *tad evam udyotakarādyabhihitam abhinnapratibhāsam*
> *abhyupagamya vyatiriktasyāvyatiriktasya ca sāmānya-*
> *syāyogād bhrāntir evāyaṃ vyaktiṣv ekākārapratibhāsa ity*
> *uktaṃ.*

> Thus, having assumed in this way an undifferentiated appearance [of different individual things to cognition], as proposed by Uddyotakara etc., a universal [either] separated [or] unseparated [from particulars] is not possible; therefore it was said that this appearance of a single form for individual things is only an error.

Karṇakagomin, then, is best understood here as saying that Dharmakīrti is arguing against "everyone who endorsed a universal,

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[267]Cf. ŚV Āv 3–4ab:

jātim evākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā
sāmānyaṃ tac ca piṇḍānām ekabuddhinibandhanam
tannimittaṃ ca yatkiñcit sāmānyaṃ śabdagocaram D'Sa 1980: 151:
"[It is] the *jātiḥ* [that] they call *ākṛtiḥ* [namely that] through which an individual [of a class] is form-ed. And this commonality is the source of a unified cognition of [all] individuals [of a class]. And this source, whatever it may be, is the common object (=denotation) of a word."

See J. A. Taber 2005: 217 f., n. 40 for a short characterization of the distinctive features of Kumārila's theory of universals. For the present purpose, the main point is this: "...all entities have a dual nature: from one point of view they are particular, from another universal ...." (J. A. Taber 2005: 217, n. 40)

be it separate from qualities or not" in this passage. With "Uddyota-kara etc." Karṇakagomin, therefore, refers to all these persons, and not just the Naiyāyikas.

For the context in which Ratnakīrti quotes PV III 147, then, one should take Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas as being the target, the only ones in the various groups who clearly say a universal cannot have the qualities with which it does, according to Ratnakīrti, appear in a conceptual awareness.

The second difficulty is this: it is not clear whether Dharmakīrti's intention here is that a *sāmānya* is said to be free of the forms of colour, form, and letter, or whether it is that it is said to be free of colour, shape, and the form of a letter. Ratnakīrti uses the phrase "*akṣarākāraparikaritāḥ*" later on (l. 196, p. 60), suggesting that he understands *akṣarākāra* as a unit. But still, one could analyse the compound in Dharmakīrti's verse either as "colour, shape, and the form of letters" or "the form of colour, shape, and letters". While Kamalaśīla explains that in Bhāvivikta's position by *akṣara*-s the individual letters are meant that make up a word ("C-o-w"), he does not say how he understands the compound as a whole. Manoratha-nandin is clear (cf. appendix A.4.1): he interprets Dharmakīrti as saying that a universal is free of the appearances or forms (*ābhāsa* or *ākāra*, PVV 161,13 *ad* PV III 147ab) of colour, shape, and letters.[268] One thus has slightly better support for the understanding "the form of colour, shape, and letters".

4.1.11   Forms of khyāti (ad § 34)

In § 34, Ratnakīrti gives four explanations for the error that might account for the cognition of a universal. These four explanations are apparently closely linked to four theories of *khyāti*, appearance or false appearance, the equivalences being as follows:[269]

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[268]Karṇakagomin, glossing the similar passage in PVSV 55,9–10, mentions an opponent who tries to escape by saying that "a universal certainly has the form of colour etc." (PVSVṬ 223,17–18: *varṇādyākāram eva sāmānyam iti ced* ...) This also suggests an understanding of the compound as "forms of colour, shape, and letters."

[269]In general, see Schmithausen 1965: 141 ff. for a systematic discussion of the following (and other) error theories. Glossing over many of the finer specifics, the

1. *ātmakhyāti* (appearance of a self): that a cognition of a false universal is nothing but the unfolding of awareness itself due to mnemonic impressions (*vāsanāvaśād ...vivarto 'yam astu*, starting l. 203, p. 61).
2. *asatkhyāti* (appearance of a non-existent thing): that that which appears as a universal has no real existence at all (*asad eva vā tadrūpaṃ khyātu*, starting l. 203, p. 61).
3. *anyathākhyāti* (appearance in another way): that it is only the particulars that appear other than they are, due to their differences being concealed (*vyaktaya eva ...°vyavadhānāt*, starting l. 204, p. 61).
4. *smṛtipramoṣa* (deprivation of memory): that memory interferes with the correct cognition, but does not come to awareness as memory (*smṛtipramoṣo*, starting l. 205, p. 61).

These theories are endorsed, respectively, by authors belonging to the Yogācāra, the Madhyamaka and Vedānta, the Nyāya and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā schools.[270]

Ratnakīrti himself, even though he says here that it does not matter which of the error theories is the right one,[271] explains the

main ideas are as follows: *ātmakhyāti* means that the content (or object appearing) in an erroneous cognition is only that cognition itself, not an external object. *asatkhyāti* means that there is an appearance of a non-existing object in erroneous cognition. According to *anyathākhyāti*, something real appears differently than it is. *smṛtipramoṣa*, usually associated with the *akhyāti* (non-appearance) theory, means that the memory involved (according to this theory) in erroneous cognition does not come to awareness: "The fifth theory [of the 8 different theories of erroneous cognition discussed in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*–PMA] is held by the Prābhākaras. They maintain that the perceptual error expressed as 'this is a snake' is, in fact, partly confused with the memory of the snake, but the perceiver is not aware at that moment that it is a memory." (Potter 1977: p. 412, cf. also Schmithausen 1965: 206 f.).

[270]This is how the *VV* presents the matter, acc. to the analysis in Schmithausen 1965: 92–106. Note that Bhaṭṭa Jayanta classifies Dharmakīrti's and Dharmottara's theories of conceptual cognition as, respectively, *ātmakhyāti* and *asatkhyāti*. See Kataoka 2017a: 26, and the translation of that passage in Watson and Kataoka 2017: 67. For a discussion of the broader implications, see Kataoka 2017b and McAllister 2017a.

[271]This is only a preliminary statement, and is meant to support only the main point of this paragraph: that cognition of a real universal is entirely wrong (*bhrāntir eva āsau*, § 34).

appearance of a universal as an erroneous cognition in a way that commits him to the *ātmakhyāti* position as described in the *VV*.[272] This becomes fairly clear from an argument in § 52:

> *kiṃ tarhi svavāsanāvipākavaśād upajāyamānaiva bu-*
> *ddhir apaśyanty api bāhyaṃ bāhye pravṛttim ātanotīti*
> *viplutaiva.* (Trl. page 120)

Ratnakīrti here makes two points that are important in the *khyāti* context. First, an awareness event does not "see" an external object, and so nothing other than itself appears in it.[273] Second, an awareness comes about only by force of the ripening of its own mnemonic impressions (*vāsana*-s). These two statements, in addition to the usage of *adhyavasāya* that, based on an internal form of awareness, externalizes the object of cognition (cf. section 5.4), undoubtedly support his endorsement of *ātmakhyāti* to explain the erroneous cognition of a similarity between particulars.

Kataoka (2009: 484–482) has made it clear that, at least for Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, these error theories were of importance for describing the differences between the *apoha* theories of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, who explained the erroneous cognition of universals according to the *ātmakhyāti* and *asatkhyāti* theories, respectively.[274]

4.1.12 Proving a universal like a sense faculty (ad ll. 214–218 in § 35)

Ratnakīrti here presupposes an opponent who wishes to prove a universal in the same way as a sense faculty is proven.[275] The

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[272]Acc. to Schmithausen 1965: 233 f., this is also Dignāga's, Dharmakīrti's, and Jñānaśrī's position. For Dharmakīrti's position, also cf. PV I 68–70 (translated in Dunne 2004: 339).

[273]Cf. also the discussion of Ratnakīrti's position in § 15.

[274]Jayanta's views are translated and discussed in Watson and Kataoka 2017: 54–57; 67. Kataoka 2017b discusses the consequences for Dharmottara's epistemological framework, and McAllister 2017a investigates Ratnakīrti's evaluation of this difference in the epistemological frameworks of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara.

[275]Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 74 for a reference to such a proof of a sense faculty.

opponent is not named in this passage. This sort of proof is already referred to in PVSV 16,12–14, where an opponent wishes to show that the self or the soul (*ātman*) is inferable, like a sense faculty. The argument there is as follows:

> PVSV 16,12–14: *indriyādīnāṃ tu vijñānakāryasya kādācitkatvāt sāpekṣyasiddhyā prasiddhir ucyate — kim apy asya kāraṇam astīti. na tv evaṃbhūtam iti.*
>
> But[276] the general acceptance of the sense faculties etc., which [is] due to an establishment of [their] dependency based on [their] effect[, i.e.,] a cognition, being occasional, is stated as "This [cognition] has some sort of cause.",[277] but not as "[This cause is] just so."

Karṇakagomin's commentary on this passage is as follows:

> [PVSVṬ 73,8–16]: *yathā nityaparokṣāṇām apīndriyā-dīnām anumānaṃ tathātmano bhaviṣyatīti ced āha— indriyāṇām ityādi. ādiśabdāt smṛtibījādīnām. vijñā-nam eva kāryaṃ tasya kādācitkatvāt. tathā hi satsv api rūpālokamanaskāreṣu nimīlitalocanādyavasthāsu vi-jñānasyābhāvāt, punaś conmīlitalocanāvasthāsu bhāvāt, vijñānakāryaṃ kāraṇāntaraṃ sāpekṣaṃ sidhyati, tato 'sya sāpekṣyasiddhyā indriyādīnāṃ prasiddhir ucyate. etad uktam bhavati–yat sāpekṣam idaṃ kādācitkaṃ vi-jñānam, tat kim apy asya vijñānasya kāraṇam astīty anumīyate. tad eva cendriyam iti vyavahriyate. na tv evaṃbhūtam iti na rūpaviśeṣeṇa mūrttatvādinā yuktam indriyam anumīyata ity arthaḥ.*[278]
>
> [Opponent:] There should be [an inference] of the self in the same way as there is an inference even of what is per-manently beyond the senses, such as the sense faculties

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etc.. [Proponent:] [So Dharmakīrti] said: **Of the sense faculties** etc. From the word **etc.** [one understands also] "the seeds of memory etc." **Because** this, **a cognition**, which alone is **the effect**, **is occasional**. For it is so: because, even when form, light, [and] cognitive activity exist, [that] cognition does not exist in [certain] conditions, such as when the eyes are closed etc., and because, furthermore, it exists in [certain other] conditions[, such as when] the eyes are opened, the effect, [namely] cognition, is established as having a dependency on another [hidden] cause; therefore, **the general acceptance** of sense faculties etc. **through an establishment of its**[, i.e., the effect's, cognition's,] **dependency** is **stated**. [By this] the [following] is said: that, which is this dependent, occasional cognition, is inferred as "**This** cognition **has some kind of cause**." And only this [cause] is conventionally treated as "sense faculty." **But not** [as] "[This cause is] **just so**." meaning that a sense faculty is not inferred as connected with being corporeal etc.

According to Karṇakagomin's interpretation, sense faculties are inferred from the fact that perceptions, dependent on the sense faculties, do not occur when the sense faculties are not active. But what cannot be inferred from their non-occurrence is of what nature those faculties are: the cause is just called, or thought of as, "sense faculty", without any indication of what kind of thing this is.

In Dharmakīrti's argument it is the self (*ātman*) that is permanently beyond perception. In Ratnakīrti's passage it is the universal that, so the opponent, is permanently beyond perception (or at least not perceivable apart from its manifestation). The following points can be made about Ratnakīrti's appeal to the argument as found in the *PV I*:

The argument of Ratnakīrti's opponent seems to be: that which is imperceivable can be known by its effect. A universal is not perceivable as such, but there is the effect of a cognition of sameness

between things. This must be the effect of the universal, which proves that it exists.[279]

Ratnakīrti then counters: what is established is only an occasionally active cause in general. When the cognition "cow" occurs, that cause, a universal according to the opponent, is active, but is inactive when the cognition does not occur. But since the absence of the cognition "cow" can be explained also by the absence of all particular cows,[280] there is no justification for assuming that the actual, yet hidden, cause is a permanent and real universal.

At first sight, however, it might seem that there is an important difference between Dharmakīrti's and Ratnakīrti's arguments. For

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[279]How this last sentence follows from the previous one is very unclear, mainly since the opponent and the exact theory supporting this relation of a hidden cause and the effect are unknown.

[280] See Halbfass 1970: 146–147 for an overview of the positions that Naiyāyikas held regarding the difficulty how a single real entity, the universal, can be spread out over its particular manifestations. Essentially, there were two positions: the *jāti* is held to be either *svaviṣayasarvagatva* (present only in the individual things that count as instances of this genus), or *sarvasarvagatva* (truly omnipresent, occurring also in things and places that do not belong to the class it defines). On the former view, the unity of the universal becomes problematic, and on the latter view it is difficult to explain why a universal is not constantly cognized, even though it is present everywhere. The latter is endorsed, for example, by Vācaspati, as is mentioned in Potter 1977: 139, and also in the summary by Matilal (1977: 474 f.). The passage referred to by them might be this one, where he explains how a universal co-existent with everything is limited only to certain instances:

> NVTṬ 353,13–15: *tathā sāmānyam api sarvāsambaddham api sarvaiḥ sahāvatiṣṭhate. yās tv asya vyaktayas tābhiḥ paraṃ sambadhyate. tathā ca yatra jāyante vyaktayas tatrāsambaddhāv api staḥ sāmānyasamavāyāv iti. tāsāṃ janmaiva sāmānyasamavāyāvacchedaḥ.*

> In that way also a universal, even though not connected with everything, exists together with everything; but later (*param*) [it] is connected with its manifestations. And in such a way, a universal and inherence exist in that [place], even though [previously] not connected [to that place], where a manifestation is generated. The very generation of these [manifestations is] the limitation of universal and inherence [to a particular place].

the former, the effect is occasional, but for the latter it is the cause that is occasional.[281] But Ratnakīrti makes it clear in the next sentence (*yadā hi ...*), which is an explication of the reason "by the effect cognition" (*jñānakāryatas*), that the cognition is occasional too.

For Ratnakīrti, the inference to the existence of sense faculties is important also in the context of the discussion of *īśvara*, the god who, according to some Naiyāyikas, constructs the world out of its atomic parts. In one variant of the argument the opponent claims that, like particular properties of the visual sense faculty–that it discerns form and colour–can be inferred from visual perceptions, the specific properties of a construing agent–being omniscient–can be inferred from the specific properties of the world.[282]

4.1.13 Chance cognitions (ad § 35)

In JNĀ 221,11–16, a more detailed variant of this argument is found:

> *yat punar ākasmikatvam uktaṃ tad ayuktam, ja-*
> *nakasāmagrībhedasya bhavatāpy avaśyasvīkaraṇīya-*
> *tvāt. katham anyathā indriyārthau nirvikalpakajñā-*
> *najanananiyatau dṛṣṭau vikalpam utpādayataḥ? ta-*
> *smāt pūrvapiṇḍadarśanasmaraṇasahakāriṇātiricyamā-*
> *nasāmarthyeyaṃ sāmagrī vikalpam utpādayatīti nirvi-*
> *ṣayaṃ jñānam utpādayatīty evārthaḥ,*[283] *nirviṣayatāni-*
> *ṣṭhatvād vikalpatāyās tadaṃśena. tad varaṃ vijātīya-*
> *vikalpavad vispaṣṭapratibhāsād anubhavād bhinna eva*
> *sajātīyavikalpo 'pīty eva sādhu, tasmān na jātisiddhir*
> *adhyakṣāt.*

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[281]In a similar discussion in TS$_\text{Ś}$ 1400–1, it is also the effect, the cognition, which is occasional, and not the cause. Cf. Kunst 1939: 40 ff. for a translation of and comments on that discussion.

[282]The opponent's position in this matter is described in ĪSD 33,32–34,13, and Ratnakīrti responds in ĪSD 50,7–50,14. See Patil 2009: 3.1.2 for an examination of this argument.

[283]Corrected from the manuscript against *utpādayaty evārthaḥ* acc. to McCrea and Patil 2010: 177, n. 77.

The[284] accidentality [of a universal's cognition,] which was stated [by you], is not correct, because even you necessarily have to admit a difference of the producing collection [of causes]. How else can sense faculty and object, both observed as restricted to generating non-conceptual cognitions, produce a conceptual cognition? Therefore, that this collection [of causes], possessing a capacity enriched by the assisting cause of a memory of an earlier observation of a material thing, produces the conceptual cognition, only means that it produces a cognition without an object, because [the fact] that there is a conceptual cognition [in accordance to] a part of that [object] is based on not having a [real, and thus partless,] object. So [it would be] better that also a conceptual cognition of that of the same genus, like a conceptual cognition of that of another genus, is completely differentiated from experience[, i.e., perception,] which [alone] has a distinct appearance [of an object].[285] That alone is right. Therefore there is no proof of a genus from perception.

Note that Ratnakīrti's argument ends on a slightly different note: a genus does not appear either in perception or in verbal apprehension (cf. l. 211, p. 62).

This could simply be Ratnakīrti's explication of the intent of Jñānaśrīmitra's argument as he saw it: both verbal apprehension and perception have an aspect of direct appearance. In neither is any evidence for a real universal found.

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[284]Cf. also the translations in Akamatsu 1983: 119 f., and McCrea and Patil 2010: 81.

[285]Cf. the explanations of this argument by McCrea and Patil (2010: 166, n. 174). Apparently, the opponent here would accept that a conceptual cognition like "This is not a horse." cannot be generated from the experience of a universal, unlike the cognition "This is a cow."

That a genus is the cause for words and cognitions is argued for both by Kumārila and by Naiyāyika authors.[286] In the *Apohasiddhi*, this position is explicitly ascribed to Trilocana in § 41, and is involved in the effect-reason (*kāryahetu*) used in the inference of § 44. It is therefore very likely that Ratnakīrti is here generalizing the views of opponents who postulate real universals as causes of cognitions.

Nevertheless, a lead to a historical person might be found in NBhV 303,11 ff., where a position is presented (and argued against) that appeals to cognitions of individual things not being accidental as a proof for the genus being the word referent (*viśeṣapratyayānām anākasmikatvācca* NBhV 303,11). This passage is also quoted by Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 301,19–25) as an exemplification of the position that a universal is imagined as existing only in its proper substrates, even though it is different from them (cf. PVSV 76,25–77,4, trl. appendix A.1.10). Whoever endorsed that particular position might be expected to argue that there is the result of the accidentality of conceptual cognitions, because the genus responsible for the correctness of these cognitions is missing. Also note the similar discussion in PVSV 82,4–25 (cf. trl. appendix A.1.11), where Dharmakīrti defends himself against the objection that, without a universal, cognitions and denotations are without cause. Acc. to Frauwallner

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[286] For an argument of Kumārila's, cf. ŚV Āv 37–38, a passage also quoted by Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 320,12–15) in the context of PV I 162 (trl. appendix A.1.11).

As regards the Naiyāyika positions, this point is typically made in commenting on NSū 2.2.70: *samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ* (Trl.: "A genus has the nature of producing the same."). The question is what it is that is called "the same". Halbfass (1970: 145) underlines the realistic (as opposed to cognitive) role, translating: "It is the essence of jāti to produce common attributes." Cf. also NVTṬ 450,15–17:

> *prasūta iti **prasavaḥ**. **samāna**buddher bhinneṣu prasotrī **jātiḥ**.*
> *atra ca yā jātiḥ, sāvaśyaṃ samānapratyayaṃ prasūte. na punar yā*
> *samānapratyayaṃ prasūte sā jātiḥ, pācakādiṣu vyabhicārād iti.*

> It produces, so **production**. A **genus** is productive of the **same** awareness for different things. And here the genus is that which necessarily produces the same apprehension. But that which does not [necessarily] produce the same apprehension is not the genus, because of the deviation in such cases as cook etc.

(1933: 69, and p. 83), Dharmakīrti is arguing against Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas in these passages.

4.1.14 Dharmottara's argument (ad § 50)

DhAP 243,27–244,9:[287]

> *gal te dgag pa'i shes pa phyi rol la ni ma yin te, de mi snang ba'i phyir ro. blo dang gzung ba'i rnam pa la yang ma yin te, de gnyis ni nyams su myong bar bya ba nyid yin pa'i phyir ro. sgro btags pa la yang ma yin te, de yang de'i tshe sgro btags kyi rang bzhin du gzung ba dgag par mi nus pa'i phyir ro. de bzhin du sgrub pa'i shes pa yang phyi rol la ni ma yin te, mi snang ba'i phyir ro. blo la sogs pa rnams kyang yod pa la 'khrul pa med pa'i phyir 'di dag la mi rigs ma yin nam zhe na bden te, phyi rol dang blo dang rnam pa dang sgro btags pa la yang dgag pa dang sgrub par rtog pa ma yin no. sgrub pa dang dgag pa dag ni sgro btags gang zhig phyi rol nyid du nges par byas pa de dang 'brel pa yin te, dper na sbrul sgrub pa dang dgag pa'i shes pa thag pa'i rdzas la ni ma yin te, mi snang ba'i phyir ro. sbrul gyi blo dang gzung ba'i rnam pa dang*[288] *sgro btags kyi sbrul la yang ma yin te, de dag ni rang gi rang bzhin du yod pa la mi 'khrul pa'i phyir ro. 'on kyang sgro btags kyi sbrul gang zhig phyi rol gyi sbrul nyid du nges par byas pa de ni sgrub pa dang dgag par nges pa bzhin no.*

[Opponent:] There is no negating cognition for an external [thing], because that [thing] does not appear [in any negating, and hence conceptual, cognition]. Neither is there [a negating cognition] for an awareness and a grasped form, because these two are perceived. Nor is

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[287]Also cf. the translation in Frauwallner 1937: 265 f.

[288]Frauwallner places a *shad* after this *dang*, DhAP 244,6. It is probably only a misprint, since the *dang* has a dash affixed to it which indicates that it was not to be separated from the following word.

there [a negating cognition] for a superimposed [object], because it too–being grasped at that time with its own nature of superimposition–cannot be negated. In the same way, there is no affirming cognition for an external [object], because [it] does not appear. And because awareness and so on do not go astray with regard to what exists, [an affirming cognition] is not incorrect with regard to these[, i.e., awareness and so on].[289] [Proponent:] True. For an external [object], awareness, a form, and a superimposed [thing] there is no negating or affirming conceptual cognition. Affirming and negating are connected with some superimposed [thing] that is ascertained as being external. Like there is no cognition affirming and negating a snake for the material entity rope, since [that rope] does not appear [to that cognition]. [Such a cognition] also does not exist for the awareness of snake, the grasped form of "snake", and the snake that is superimposed, because they do not go astray with regard to what exists as their own proper nature. However, some superimposed snake that is ascertained as an external snake is ascertained as established or negated.

The main differences between Dharmottara's model, exemplified in the passage just quoted, and Ratnakīrti's model of the object everyday activity concern how determination works. While Dharmottara maintains a form of *asatkhyāti*, according to which something unreal or "fabricated" (see Kataoka 2017b) features in conceptual cognition

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[289]This interpretation is not the same as that in Frauwallner 1937: 266: "Und da auch die Erkenntnis usw. mit dem Sein fest verbunden ist (*avy[a]bhicāraḥ*), ist sie auch bei diesen nicht am Platz." The idea is here understood as follows: awareness, a grasped form, and a superimposed object cannot deceive a person with regard to something that exists. As Dharmottara explains in his answer (DhAP 244,7–8: *de dag ni rang gi rang bzhin du yod pa la mi 'khrul pa'i phyir ro.*), this means they cannot be deceiving with regard to what exists in their own form. But if these objects of an affirming cognition must exist when and as they are cognized, an affirmation of them is useless.

and is conventionally affirmed or negated, Ratnakīrti subscribes to an *ātmakhyāti* model, in which it is the erroneous grasping of the form that awareness has which produces conventional activity that is directed at external things.

The full background of this passage, and why it is that Ratnakīrti sees a difference between his and Dharmottara's positions, presuppose a deeper examination of Ratnakīrti's CAPV, which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study.[290]

4.1.15   Five candidates for *śabdārtha* (ad § 55–§ 57)

The verse, spread over § 55 and § 57 and interspersed with a prose sentence, is in the *vasantatilakā* metre (as defined in Apte 1992: Appendix A, p. 7). Frauwallner (1931: 234) doubts whether this verse was written by Jñānaśrī. It is not found in the *JNĀ*, so one should assume that it was composed by Ratnakīrti himself, who is not basing himself on Jñānaśrīmitra in his formulation of the inference establishing exclusion (starting § 54).

In § 55, Ratnakīrti lists five opinions on what a word referent is if it is not *anyāpoha*: a particular, an additional attribute, a connection to that additional attribute, something qualified by an additional attribute, and, lastly, a form that appears to awareness.

The verse in which he says this has thematic equivalents throughout *apoha* treatises. PS(V) 5 says that a word for a genus does not denote either particulars, a connection with a genus, a genus, or that having the genus:

> PS(V) 5 2:   *na jātiśabdo bhedānām ānantyād vyabhicāra-*
> *taḥ /*
> *vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair apṛthakśruteḥ //* [291]

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[290]Preliminary answers to these questions can be found in McAllister 2014, on what "mental content" is for these two authors, and in McAllister 2017a, on which cognitive functions are involved in conceptual cognitions. See also Kataoka 2017b for a close analysis of Dharmottara's discussion of determination.

[291]Following Pind 2015: II.8–14, we might paraphrase (a translation is difficult to give here, because the construction of the verse is heavily dependent on the surrounding prose): "A general term does not [denote] particulars, because they are

PS(V) 5 4ab: *tadvato nāsvatantratvād upacārād asa-*
mbhavāt /[292]

The same point, but with the addition that a form of awareness is not the referent of a word, is made in TS$_Ś$ 870 (cf. trl. appendix B.4):[293]

TS$_Ś$ 870 *yataḥ svalakṣaṇaṃ jātis tadyogo jātimāṃs ta-*
thā /
buddhyākāro na śabdārthe ghaṭāmañcati tattvataḥ //

4.2   The argument structure of the *Apohasiddhi*

4.2.1   *Overview*

The paragraph numbers refer to the paragraphs in the critical edition (chapter 2).

- A. § 1: Statement of the basic thesis: exclusion is the referent of words.
- B. §§ 2–6: Introductory objections and replies concerning this thesis.
- C. §§ 7–8: Revised statement of the thesis, and first explanation of it: the referent of words is a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others.
- D. §§ 9–31: Arguments showing that neither a particular nor a particular qualified by a genus can be the referent of words.

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infinite, [and] because [the term] is ambiguous. [It denotes] neither the general property nor the inherence relation, because it is not 'heard apart' from [words] whose referents are particular general properties." Cf. Hayes 1988: 255 ff., Hattori 2000: 140 f., and Pind 2015: II.8–14 for actual translations, and Hattori 1996: 387 ff. for an overview of Dignāga's arguments in this section.

[292]Following Pind 2015: II.21–27, we can paraphrase: "A word does not [denote] the [general property] possessor, because it is not self-dependent, because of transfer, [and] because [resemblance] is impossible." For translations, cf. Hayes 1988: 261 f., Hattori 2000: 142, and Pind 2015: II.21–27.

[293]The refutation of these positions is found in TS$_Ś$ 871–884.

E. §§ 32–47: Arguments showing that a universal, or genus, cannot be the referent of words.

F. §§ 48–49: Further refinement of the thesis that the referent of words is a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others.

G. §§ 50–52: Refutation of Dharmottara's view on the object of conceptual cognition.

H. § 53: Final restatement of thesis

I. §§ 54–58: A formal proof establishing the thesis.

J. § 59: Verse summarizing the main points.

K. § 60: End of text.

4.2.2 Detailed analysis

In the following, a detailed analysis of the *AS*'s argument structure is given. The numbers in the margin again refer to the paragraphs in the critical edition (chapter 2).

A [Proponent:] General statement of thesis: Exclusion is the referent of words. § 1

B Introductory objections and answers concerning the thesis. §§ 2–6

  B.1 [Opponent:] Three explanations of exclusion are presented and refuted: § 2

    B.1.1 [Proponent:] Exclusion is either

      B.1.1.1 the external object itself (*bāhya*),

      B.1.1.2 the form of awareness (*buddhyākāra*), or

      B.1.1.3 mere exclusion of others.

    B.1.2 [Opponent:] The first two alternatives (B.1.1.1,B.1.1.2) are wrong, because the word referent would only be a positive element. § 3

    B.1.3 The third (B.1.1.3) alternative is wrong,

      B.1.3.1 because conceptual cognition is perceived to have the form of a positive element, and does not make non-existence known, and

      B.1.3.2 because what is so faulted by perception cannot be saved by another proof.

§§ 4–6   B.2 Discussion of theories that the cognition of a non-existent object implies, or is somehow connected to, the cognition of non-existence.

§ 4   B.2.1 [Proponent:] A conceptual cognition does not cognize non-existence itself, but only what is non-existent.

B.2.1.1 But the cognition of a qualifier (non-existence, B.1.3.1) is implied by the cognition of that qualified by it (that which is non-existent).

B.2.1.1.1 This is an instance of the qualifier-qualified relationship.

B.2.1.2 For realists, a conceptual cognition's object is not the universal as such, but the universal as the qualifier of some instance,

B.2.1.2.1 because of the appearance of a common form in awareness.

B.2.1.3 In the same way, the cognition of what is non-existent, which implies the cognition of non-existence, justifies the everyday notion of "cognition of exclusion".

§ 4   B.2.2 [Opponent:] Why call a cognition which has a positive form (B.1.3.1) and results from the appearance of a common form in awareness (B.2.1.2.1) a cognition with a non-appearing (B.2.1), non-existent (B.2.1) form in awareness?

B.2.2.1 If a cognitive form of non-existence appeared, nobody would deny that there is a cognition of non-existence.

B.2.2.2 Otherwise, a cognitive form of one thing could be taken for the cognitive form of another.

§ 5   B.2.3 [Proponent:] Due to the qualifier-qualified relation (B.2.1.1.1), a cognition of non-existence is contained in the cognition of what is non-existent.

B.2.4 [Opponent:] Non-Existence as a qualifier is only an addition to the cognition of some positive element, so how should such a cognition be defined as a cognition of non-existence? For the qualifier "non-existence" does not appear.

§ 6   B.2.5 [Proponent:] What actually appears has a positive form (B.1.3.1), but there is also an exclusion of others for it. Therefore it is called cognition of non-existence.

B.2.6 [Opponent:] Still, exclusion is only connected, and it is only a positive element that is actually cognized.

B.2.6.1 Otherwise also direct perception would have exclusion of others for its object,

B.2.6.1.1 because it also has a single thing excluded from all others as an object.

B.3 Conceptual cognitions therefore have a positive element as object, just like perception.

C [Proponent:] Revised statement of the thesis, and first explanation of it: A word's referent is §§ 7–8

C.1 a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others. § 7

C.2 It is not the positive element as such

C.3 nor the exclusion as such.

C.4 Affirmationists/negationists think that a positive element/exclusion (c.2/c.3) is the primary object of a conceptual cognition, and that negation/an excluded thing (c.3/c.2) is understood by implication. § 8

C.5 This is wrong, since there is no sequentiality in conceptual cognitions. Cognition of the positive element *is* the cognition of that excluded from others.

C.5.1 Even though a verbal expression does not represent its object as that excluded from others (B.1.3.1), exclusion is cognized, since it is a qualifier of the conceptual cognition (B.2.1.1),

C.5.1.1 because a word is based on what is excluded from others.

C.5.2 Therefore, a conceptual cognition of a positive element is necessarily simultaneous with a cognition of exclusion.

C.5.3 Absence can be grasped in a non-implicative or implicative way both by perception and conceptual cognition.

C.5.3.1 As for perception,

C.5.3.1.1 the non-implicative form is a capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of absence, and

C.5.3.1.2 the implicative form is an awareness of a thing itself,

C.5.3.2 so for conceptual cognition

C.5.3.2.1 the non-implicative form is a capacity to impart activity in conformance to what appears in it, and

C.5.3.2.2 the implicative form is a consciousness of the thing itself, as it is for perception (C.5.3.1.2).

C.6 So if the exclusion of others were not formed simultaneously with the cognition of an object, no differentiation between objects would be possible in everyday activity.

§§ 9–31 D Arguments showing that neither a particular nor a particular qualified by a universal/genus can be a referent of words.

§ 9 D.1 Vācaspati says: The objects of a conceptual cognition are particulars qualified by a genus.

D.1.1 Since they are differentiated from that which is not of the same genus,

D.1.2 there is activity avoiding wrong objects (C.6).

D.2 [Proponent:] If it is the form of a particular that is excluded from that of another genus, then, even if it possesses a genus, how should there not be a cognition of other-exclusion?

D.2.1 For if it is only due to the particulars themselves that they are differentiated from other particulars, the genus doesn't matter.

§ 10 D.3 If the particular is not cognized as differentiated, then how could we successfully act upon particulars?

§ 11 D.4 If one cognizes a differentiated particular, then there is, in any case, a cognition of differentiation.

D.4.1 It does not matter whether the reason for the differentiation is the genus or only the particular's causal sequence (E.1.8, E.2.1.1.3),

D.5 Logical problems of exclusion being a qualifier dismissed:

§ 12 D.5.1 There is no error of mutual dependency in the theory that the positive element, which the convention of the word "x" is made for, is what is excluded from non-x,

D.5.1.1 because this error also pertains to the theory that a convention is made for a universal or that qualified by it.

D.5.1.1.1 The word "universal" does not mean a universal as such, but a specific universal. So there is the following circular dependency.

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D.5.1.1.1.1 Any cognition of a universal x-hood depends on the cognition of one of its instances, yet

D.5.1.1.1.2 any cognition of an instance of x-hood depends on the cognition of x-hood.

D.5.1.2 Therefore there is no error of mutual dependency if the conventional designation is made for a form of conceptual awareness which, preceded by a perception of a single particular, is generalized and externalized as if common to all real things of that class.

D.5.1.3 And if this manner of using a word is accepted, then it is also accepted that everything else can be designated by this word's negation.

D.5.2 Neither is there a contradiction between excluded and exclusion, nor any damage to the qualifier-qualified relationship pertaining between them, § 13

D.5.2.1 because an excluded thing and exclusion are not actually distinct entities.

D.5.2.2 For a thing contradicts its own absence, not another thing's absence.

D.6 Also a sentence is understood due to exclusion only. § 14

D.7 Therefore a positive element characterized by exclusion is understood from a word (C.1).

D.8 [Opponent:] If a positive element alone is the referent of words in this way, why is exclusion asserted (A)? § 15

D.9 [Proponent:] By the word exclusion a positive element qualified by exclusion of others (C.1) is meant.

D.9.1 This means, exclusion is simultaneously (C.5.2) understood as the qualifier in understanding a positive element.

D.9.2 Exclusion cannot be taken as the object of perception (B.2.6.1) in the same way, because there is no dispute as there is for conceptual cognition.

D.10 And by "positive element"

D.10.1 the external referent excluding others is meant according to determination, and

D.10.2 the form of awareness is meant according to appearance.

D.11 The external referent is what is to be denoted by a word because of determination only, not because an external thing appears as in perception

§ 16   D.11.1 Scriptural evidence: from a word, an object does not appear to someone as it would because of perception.

§ 17   D.11.2 [Opponent:] Even the same thing appears differently, depending on whether it is known through a sense faculty or through a word.

§ 18   D.11.3 [Proponent:] Different cognitions have their basis in different real things. So how should a single thing appear with different forms?

§ 19   D.11.3.1 For there are no two contradictory forms of a single thing, so that one could appear to perception, the other to conceptual cognition.

D.11.3.2 For there is no difference of a thing apart from the difference of its own nature.

D.11.3.3 And there is no difference of its own nature apart from the difference of appearance.

§ 20   D.11.4 [Opponent:] But there evidently are different appearances of one and the same thing, even in perception.

D.11.5 [Proponent:] A difference of appearances is not a sure sign for different things, but it is a sure sign for there not being the same object for the two cognitive faculties.

D.11.5.1 Therefore a difference of appearances accompanied by a difference of causal effectiveness etc. means a difference of the thing, and

D.11.5.2 a difference of appearances alone means that one appearance is wrong.

§ 21   D.11.6 Vācaspati: Even if both faculties have the real thing for an object, still they would apprehend it differently

D.11.6.1 because the difference between perceivable and imperceivable results from different causes.

D.11.7 [Proponent:] That's wrong, because there is no thing that is an object of the apprehension of something beyond the senses.

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D.11.7.1 The difference of causes (D.11.6.1) is fulfilled by the fact that an apprehension of an imperceivable thing (e.g., an inference) does not grasp a perceptual object.

D.11.7.2 Therefore a particular does not appear in conceptual cognition.

D.11.7.3 Moreover, if words made a real thing known, negation and affirmation of properties would be either   § 22

    D.11.7.3.1 superfluous, as when "it exists" or "it does not exist" is said of an existent or non-existent thing, respectively, or

    D.11.7.3.2 meaningless, as in the opposite case,

    D.11.7.3.3 because a thing would be completely known on hearing the word alone.

D.11.7.4 Therefore, the fact that what appears in conceptual cognition is indifferent to the existence and nonexistence of an external referent excludes the possibility that a real thing could be the object of conceptual cognitions.

    D.11.7.4.1 Vācaspati: This commonness (D.11.7.4) is possible   § 23 also for a really existing universal, because

      D.11.7.4.1.1 a universal can be qualified by existence and nonexistence in so far as it is connected to present or past and future spatio-temporal things, respectively.

    D.11.7.4.2 [Proponent:] This is not the point, and there is no harm to what we say,

      D.11.7.4.2.1 insofar as it makes clear that Vācaspati also accepts that particulars are not denoted by words.

    D.11.7.4.3 Additionally, the existential qualifications are cognized according to the nature of the particulars.

      D.11.7.4.3.1 But to say that a universal is so qualified because of a connection to a particular is foolish.

    D.11.7.4.4 There is the same error for a particular qualified by a genus (D.1).

      D.11.7.4.4.1 For, if the cognition is established because of a particular, there is always the error of this cognition, may an additional genus (D.2) be cognized or not.

    D.11.7.4.5 Kumārila's followers: This commonness (D.11.7.4)   § 24

is not erroneous because a thing has parts.

D.11.7.4.5.1 By one word one aspect is made known, e.g., a thing's treeness, independently of the thing's existence. That is another other aspect made known by another word.

D.11.7.4.6 [Proponent:] Cognition of a permanent universal independently of its existential status is not possible.

§ 25   D.11.8 [Opponent:] A word presents its object in a different way than perception because they have different capacities.

D.11.9 [Proponent:] This was proven wrong by the error of two appearances when a single nature is grasped by perception and conceptual cognition (D.11.5).

D.11.10 The difference between the capacities of these two means of valid cognition is achieved by perception directly perceiving its object, whereas conceptual cognition determines it.

D.11.10.1 So, without the same appearance, conceptual and perceptual cognition do not have the same objects.

D.11.10.2 And absence cannot be the object of perception.

§ 26   D.11.11 [Opponent:] The word "tree" refers to the part treeness, and the word "is" refers to the part existence (D.11.7.4.5).

D.11.12 [Proponent:] For a particular completely comprehended by perception, there is no possibility of affirmation or negation of another property through either another word or another means of valid cognition.

D.11.12.1 [Opponent:] The need of a different means of knowledge is observed even in perception.

D.11.12.2 [Proponent:] That need exists only when perception has an object that one is not habituated to,

D.11.12.2.1 because perception has no ascertaining nature.

D.11.12.3 But how would another means of valid cognition help in the case of conceptual cognition, which is itself of an ascertaining nature?

D.11.12.4 But the need for other words and logical marks is a fact.

D.11.13 Consequently, the nature of a real thing is not grasped by conceptual cognition.

D.12 Discussion about properties and property bearers (D.5.2).

D.12.1 [Opponent:] Properties are different from each other, and   § 27
different from the property bearer.

D.12.2 So, in conceptual cognitions, different properties are cognized through different expressions.

D.12.3 [Proponent:] This is wrong,

D.12.3.1 since perception refutes a distinction between property and property bearer, and

D.12.3.2 since otherwise everything would be everywhere.

D.12.3.2.1 Scriptural evidence: the appellations "property" and "property bearer" are only based on a conceptual difference.

D.12.4 And even if this difference were real,   § 28

D.12.4.1 the only possible relation between property and its bearer is that of proximity qualified as assistance,

D.12.4.1.1 because other relations like inherence etc. have been refuted.

D.12.4.2 And in that case (D.12.4.1), conceptual cognition would work in the same way as perception, because

D.12.4.2.1 as perception grasps all properties when grasping the property bearer due to their proximity to the sense faculties,

D.12.4.2.2 so a cognition by a word or logical mark, which are both connected to their objects in a relation such as denoting and denoted etc., would cognize all properties,

D.12.4.2.3 because there is no difference in the proximity as such.

D.12.4.3 Vācaspati: But grasping a nature as qualified by an   § 29
additional attribute, like existence, does not imply grasping all the other additional attributes also qualifying that nature, because

D.12.4.3.1 the nature of a substance is qualified by additional attributes,

D.12.4.3.2 but is not identical with either the additional attributes or being that qualified by them (D.12.1).

D.12.4.4 [Proponent:] Bad argument, because grasping the other additional attributes (D.12.4.3) does not follow from non-difference (D.12.3.1),

D.12.4.4.1 since grasping the assisted where the assisting is grasped (D.12.4.1) follows only after their difference has been assumed (D.12.4).

D.12.4.5 Additionally, a cognition of a property and property bearer is not dependent on a real property and property bearer, because they are not established by a means of valid cognition, and the rule is:

D.12.4.5.1 when established by a means of valid cognition, the thing's nature is exactly described.

§ 30   D.12.4.6 *NBhūṣ*:   Then there would be the cognition of all assisted things as soon as there is the cognition of an assisting thing like the sun etc.

D.12.4.7 [Proponent:] This is the result of misunderstanding our explanation.

D.12.4.7.1 In your view, if there is a difference between property and property bearer (D.12.1) and proximity is only assistance (D.12.4.1),

D.12.4.7.2 then only an assisted that is in the same place and has the property's form can be grasped when the assisting is grasped (D.12.4.4.1).

D.12.4.7.3 So it does not follow that that is grasped which is

D.12.4.7.3.1 an assisted in a different place and

D.12.4.7.3.2 another substance deviating from the observed.

§ 31   D.13 Therefore, whenever a thing's own nature is cognized, it is cognized as a whole.

D.14 So it is settled that a particular does not appear due to a word, a concept, or a logical mark (D.11).

§§ 32–47   E   Arguments showing that a universal, or genus, cannot by itself be the referent of words.

§ 32   E.1 Neither does a universal appear in conceptual cognition.

E.1.1 On hearing a word the generalized constituent parts of an object appear which

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E.1.1.1 are accompanied by letters, and

E.1.1.2 are mixed together because the differences of things of the same genus are disregarded.

E.1.2 This appearance is not a universal,

E.1.2.1 Scriptural Evidence: since a universal is said to be free   § 33
of colour, form, and the form of letters.

E.1.3 So a universal is only an agglomeration of an object's   § 34
generalized constitutent parts which,

E.1.3.1 although completely different for each particular,

E.1.3.2 are identified with the particular.

E.1.4 This identification is only an error,

E.1.4.1 because such an exterior object is not attainable.

E.1.5 Therefore the cognition of a universal has no object, no matter if this false cognition is due to

E.1.5.1 the external object being a transformation of the mind itself, or

E.1.5.2 the form being completely non-existent, or

E.1.5.3 the particulars themselves appearing so that the differences between them are obscured, or

E.1.5.4 a deprivation of memory that causes differences to be overlooked.

E.1.6 So, there is no indication of a universal whatsoever.

E.1.7 [Opponent:] If there is no universal, cognitions of things as   § 35
being the same would be accidental.

E.1.8 [Proponent:] Wrong. A causal complex, aided by memory, generates a cognition that overrides specific differences, and so produces the conceptual cognition of a universal.

E.1.9 So a genus appears neither in conceptual cognition (E.1) nor in perception.

E.2 A genus is not established by inference, because a logical mark   § 36
connected to the universal cannot be seen.

E.2.1 A genus is not established like a sense faculty, because by the effect, cognition, only occasional other causes are established,

E.2.1.1 because the absence of the genus cognition depends solely on the absence of all the particulars of that genus, not on the absence of the genus itself.

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E.2.1.1.1 [Opponent:] A cow is a cow only because of its cowness. If not, also a horse could be the material object cow.

E.2.1.1.2 [Proponent:] We could just as well say that cowness is cowness only because of the material object cow. If not, horseness would also be cowness.

E.2.1.1.3 Therefore a material object such as a cow exists only because of its particular sequence of causes (D.4.1), but cowness is irrelevant to the thing's existence.

§ 37   E.2.2 [Opponent:] The capacity to cause a cognition of a universal can be either

E.2.2.1 identical with a singular material object,

E.2.2.1.1 but then it is impossible that another object could make the same universal known;

E.2.2.2 or different from such an object,

E.2.2.2.1 but then this is a universal and we are only arguing about the name.

E.2.3 [Proponent:] The capacity is indeed not different for each thing.

E.2.3.1 But two things with the same capacity are no problem (E.2.2.1.1).

E.2.3.2 As for you a genus is

E.2.3.2.1 the cause of a common term, and

E.2.3.2.2 independent of all other genera,

E.2.3.3 so for us a particular is

E.2.3.3.1 independent of genera and differentiated by its own nature, and so

E.2.3.3.2 the cause of a common term.

§ 38   E.2.4 Trilocana: The cause for the cognition and appellation of universals is the inherence (D.12.4.1.1) of specific universals (D.5.1.1.1) in their respective basis.

E.2.5 [Proponent:] If only inherence in the particulars is the reason for these cognitions, what are the universals good for?

E.2.6 And even inherence (D.12.4.1.1) is not possible.

§ 39   E.2.6.1 Inherence is proven by the cognition "here in this that

inheres." And the cognition "here" results from observing two different objects, one inhering in the other.

E.2.6.2 But genus and individual are never perceived as such in any object of a conceptual cognition.

E.2.6.3 So inherence is a conceptual construct.

E.2.7 Trilocana: The consistency of cognitions is then impossible, because it depends on a consistent object. But if the particulars are completely different, how can there be a basis for such a cognition? §40

E.2.8 [Proponent:] That is a bad argument,

E.2.8.1 because the reason used by Trilocana, a consistent cognition, is invalid also when it is supposed to prove genera, as they are always only instantiated in particulars.

E.2.9 Trilocana: Apart from a consistent object, there is no reason for the occurrence of consistent cognitions in specific cases. §41

E.2.10 [Proponent:] This refutation of the opposite case is wrong, because it has been proven (E.1.8–E.2.3) that one must accept the consistency (E.2.7) of appellations and apprehensions (E.2.4) due to the specificity of a thing's own nature which is excluded from that of another nature.

E.2.10.1 Only the proximity (D.12.4.1) according to which a genus extends to some but not to other particulars is the basis for cognition. §42

E.2.11 *NBhūṣ*: In the Buddhist view then, the proximity of the thing x to the thing y is the basis of the common usage "y has x." So what use is the x then (E.2.5)? §43

E.2.12 [Proponent:] That argument is wrong, since what is meant is this:

E.2.12.1 that the observation of x in proximity to y is the reason for the cognition "y has x" is not denied.

E.2.12.2 But no universal is ever observed to be in proximity to an individual thing.

E.2.12.3 Therefore it is better, if one wants to imagine a universal at all, to only imagine proximity as the cause of consistent cognitions.

§ 44   E.2.13 [Opponent:] The following inference proves universals.
E.2.13.1 The reason property: being a cognition of something qualified by x.
E.2.13.2 The property to be proven: necessarily involving the cognition of a qualifier (x).
E.2.13.3 The instance that the inference is about: the cognition "This is qualified by x."
E.2.13.4 The supporting example: "This is qualified by a stick."
E.2.13.5 The type of logical reason: effect reason.
E.2.14 [Proponent:] What are you trying to prove:
E.2.14.1 the necessary involvement of the cognition of a separate qualifier, or
E.2.14.2 the necessary involvement of the cognition of a qualifier in general?

§ 45   E.2.14.3 In the first case (E.2.14.1):
E.2.14.3.1 perception refutes the *pakṣa* (E.2.13.3), because a perception does not grasp both a particular and the universal (E.2.6.2).
E.2.14.3.2 Additionally, the cognition of something qualified is an ambiguous reason for a universal, because it occurs also without a qualifier that is separate from the thing it qualifies.

§ 46   E.2.14.4 In the second case (E.2.14.2) there is proof of what has already been proven,
E.2.14.4.1 because, due to a difference between an individual thing and a universal as in the cognition "This individual thing possesses that universal.", we accept a qualifier-qualified relation (D.12.3.2.1),
E.2.14.4.1.1 because the common expression "This is qualified by x." is really due to an experience of that differentiated from non-x (D.5.1.2, D.5.1).

§ 47   E.2.15 So there is no proof of a universal.
E.2.15.1 The reason that refutes all the additional attributes like a universal, property, action etc. is

E.2.15.1.1 a clear perception that grasps a whole particular (discussion under D.11, D.13, E.2.6.2, E.2.14.3.1),

E.2.15.1.2 or the non-perception of something principally observable (discussion under point E).

F Restatement of thesis that the referent of words is a positive element qualified by exclusion of others, and further explanations. §§ 48–49

F.1 Thus only the positive element is the referent of a word. (C.1, D.10) § 48

F.1.1 And this referent is the external object (D.10.1) and the form of awareness (D.10.2).

F.1.1.1 The form of awareness is neither affirmed nor negated in reality or conventionally, because

F.1.1.1.1 it is directly understood through self-awareness,

F.1.1.1.2 and is not determined.

F.1.1.2 And the external object is neither affirmed nor negated in reality,

F.1.1.2.1 because it does not appear in a conceptual cognition.

F.1.1.3 In reality, all entities are inexpressible because

F.1.1.3.1 they are not determined, and

F.1.1.3.2 do not appear.

F.1.1.4 Conventionally, external things are affirmed or negated,

F.1.1.4.1 because otherwise there would not be everyday activity.

F.1.2 Therefore, neither an external object nor a form in awareness can be affirmed in reality, § 49

F.1.3 for only an external object can be conventionally proven to exist.

F.1.4 But a form in awareness is not affirmed even conventionally.

G Refutation of Dharmottara. §§ 50–52

G.1 Dharmottara: [Opponent:] There is affirmation and negation of a superimposed external thing. § 50

G.2 [Proponent:] This is also rejected by this (F).

G.3 [Opponent:] If no determinable thing appears in determination, then what does it mean to say "It is determined?" § 51

G.4 [Proponent:] It means that, even though it does not appear, it is made an object of activity.

G.5 [Opponent:] There is no difference between two things that do not appear (G.4). So how does activity, which is directed at a certain object, avoid other objects (C.6)?

G.6 [Proponent:] Even if no object is grasped, still there is only activity restricted to certain objects,

    G.6.1 because the capacity of a conceptual cognition to promote activity is limited according to the form of awareness, and

        G.6.1.1 because that form of awareness is limited by its specific set of producing factors (E.1.8).

§ 52 G.7 For objects that have particular capacities are

    G.7.1 well established through means of valid cognition, and

    G.7.2 are beyond doubt as to a mixing of their capacities.

G.8 Therefore a concept's being determined is its being productive of activity only with regard to certain objects (G.3),

    G.8.1 because it is connected to a specific form of awareness.

G.9 There is no activity through superimposition (G.1) because of similarity, since there is the

    G.9.1 possibility of an error through superimposition of an external object on an image or

    G.9.2 vice versa.

G.10 Rather, a cognition arises due to remaining impressions and extends activity towards an external object without being able to see it.

G.11 So it actually always errs.

§ 53 H Statement of thesis in its final form:

H.1 So in this sense a positive element is the referent of words, which is

    H.1.1 specified by the absence of other things, and

    H.1.2 differentiated from that of another genus.

H.2 Exactly this (H.1), which is intended by the word "exclusion", is

    H.2.1 the referent of words, and

    H.2.2 the object of everyday activity.

§§ 54–58 I Inference establishing the thesis (A,C.1, F.1,H.1):

ɪ.1 The reason property: denoting something

ɪ.2 The property to be proven: necessarily having as an object something that is

§ 54

  ɪ.2.1 determined and

  ɪ.2.2 differentiated from that of another form as its object.

ɪ.3 The supporting example: "There is water in the well here."

ɪ.4 The instance that the inference is about: an expression having the form of the word "cow" etc.

ɪ.5 This is the logical reason of the type "essential property".

ɪ.6 Defence of the reason's validity:

  ɪ.6.1 The reason, denoting, is not unestablished because

    ɪ.6.1.1 even if there is no real denoted-denoting relation (ᴅ.12.3.1, ᴅ.12.4.2.2),

    ɪ.6.1.2 the acceptance of this relationship, as it is constructed through determination, is a necessary condition for everyday activity (ꜰ.1.1.4.1).

  ɪ.6.2 Neither is the reason contradictory

    ɪ.6.2.1 as it exists in the similar instance.

  ɪ.6.3 Neither is the reason ambiguous, for the following reason:

    ɪ.6.3.1 [Opponent:] The denoted must be either a particular (ᴅ), an additional attribute (ᴅ.12.4.3), a connection to an additional attribute (ᴅ.12.4.1, ᴇ.2.4), something possessing an additional attribute (ᴅ.1, ᴅ.12.1), or must be a form of awareness (ʙ.1.1.2), § 55

    ɪ.6.3.2 because these are all possible options for what the referent could be, and everyone agrees that there must be a referent. § 56

    ɪ.6.3.3 [Proponent:] There is no convention for the particular and the form of awareness, because they are useless for convention (ꜰ.1.1.2, ꜰ.1.1.1). § 57

    ɪ.6.3.4 For the other three there is no convention, because no additional attribute like a universal and so on (ᴇ.2.15.1) exists.

    ɪ.6.3.5 So the reason property–to denote something (ɪ.1)—is pervaded by the property to be proven–to have as its object something that is determined and excluded from others § 58

(ɪ.2)—because "denoting" cannot exist where that is not the object,

ɪ.6.3.5.1 as there is no other pervading property with the quality of having an object,

ɪ.6.3.5.1.1 because nothing else that could be denoted exists.

ɪ.7 Thus, this pervasion is established.

§ 59   ᴊ Summary:

ᴊ.1 Words express an object, and exclusion is understood as that object's quality (ᴀ,ᴄ.1, ꜰ.1,ʜ.1).

ᴊ.2 One object is explained as determined (ᴅ.10.1,ꜰ.1.1.2), the other as appearing (ᴅ.10.2, ꜰ.1.1.1) directly to awareness.

ᴊ.3 But in reality nothing at all is expressed (ꜰ.1.1.3).

§ 60   ᴋ End of Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhi*.

5 The apoha theory in Ratnakīrti's Apohasiddhi

The term "*apoha* theory", as used in these pages, is intended as the equivalent to the historically attested Sanskrit term "*apohavāda*".[294] Other translations of this term could be "the teaching of *apoha*", or "the *apoha* doctrine".

This theory has been the subject of modern academic study since the early twentieth century, starting with the pioneering explorations by Stcherbatsky (1932) and Mookerjee (1935). The latter discusses several passages of Ratnakīrti's *AS*, based on the *editio princeps* in Shāstri 1910, though their presentation is somewhat inadequate due to the highly condensed arguments of Ratnakīrti and comparatively little knowledge of their background at the time. Major early insights are due also to Frauwallner's series of articles on the theory of *apoha* (1932,1933,1935), where the main tenets of the *apoha* theory were first outlined, at least as developed by Dharmakīrti.[295] From the 1960s

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[294]This term, often also encountered in the form of "someone teaching exclusion", an *apohavādin*, is easily found in historical sources. Cf., e.g., NC 674,1; 680,1 (where we also find references to *anyāpohika*-s); PVṬ_{F1} A Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā, verso, line 6.

[295]Of course, Frauwallner 1937 should also be mentioned here. There, the *apoha* theory of Dharmottara was presented through a translation and discussion of the Tibetan translation of the *DhAP*. As noted by Akamatsu (1986: 75 f.), however, this translation suffers from a systematic misinterpretation, translating *ma yin dgag* and *med dgag* as *prasajyapratiṣedha* and *paryudāsa*, respectively. Frauwallner notes this, but does not really justify it (cf. Frauwallner 1937: 263, n. 1).

onward, there has been a steady increase in ever more specialised studies on the topic.[296] It thus would seem that yet another general introduction to this theory of *apoha* is not necessary here. For one thing, plenty of the very insightful studies that have been published in recent years are certainly not to be challenged in general, even though it will be necessary to discuss some elements of these interpretations in the light of the *AS*.[297] For as we shall see below, it is on two points that the interpretation offered here differs from at least some of the previous ones: first, *apoha* is essentially an ontological concept, linked to epistemological issues such as concept formation only insofar as

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[296]Some examples, by no means comprehensive: Vetter 1964, Katsura 1979, Akamatsu 1983, Katsura 1986, Hayes 1988, Katsura 1991, Dreyfus 1997, Bronkhorst 1999, Ogawa 1999, Pind 1999, Siderits 1999, Dunne 2004, Saito 2004, Hattori 2006, McCrea and Patil 2006, Kataoka 2009, McCrea and Patil 2010, Tillemans 2011a, Tillemans 2011b, Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011, McAllister 2017b.

[297]The best place to start studying the *apoha* theory from a philosophical perspective is currently Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011. It contains several essays that present the general outline of the *apoha* theory in a way that is mostly compatible with what is said in the *AS*. General, clear, and accessible accounts of the theory as formulated by Dharmakīrti are found in Tillemans 2011b and Dunne 2011; an equally useful account that is closer to Jñānaśrīmitra's and Ratnakīrti's works is given by Patil 2011a. Reformulations of the theory that aim to appeal to a more philosophically (rather than historically or philologically) interested reader are found in Siderits 2011, Ganeri 2011, and Hale 2011, all in the same volume.

For readers more interested in the historical perspective, the last years have likewise added important studies on this topic. For Dignāga's formulation of the *apoha* theory, and Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of it, Pind 2015 is an invaluable resource. Immensely useful for Dharmakīrti's formulation of the theory is Eltschinger et al. 2018, a richly annotated translation of the first part of the *apoha* section in the *PVSV*. The authors of this study aim to translate the whole section in the next years, and this work will surely provide an opportunity for deeper insights than are possible now (most of the present monograph had, however, already been finalized before this important contribution had been published). Also the historical opponents of the *apoha* theory have become more accessible in recent years. In this regard one should mention at least the contributions in McAllister 2017b which deal with Bhaṭṭā Jayanta's criticism of the theory, mainly from the perspective of Kumārila, and the Buddhists' defense against this criticism. Another rich source, summarized in Kataoka 2018, is Sucaritamiśra's *Kāśikā* on the ŚV Av, which is becoming available starting with Kataoka 2014.

Ratnakīrti, in line with his predecessors, takes it as the object of these kinds of awareness events; second, the relation of non-conceptual and conceptual cognitions as explained by Dharmottara has somewhat clouded the issues in Ratnakīrti's writings, whereas their relation should better be seen in terms of Prajñākaragupta's theory about this relation.

A further methodological problem is that, although *anyāpohavāda* is a term used by ancient proponents and opponents of the theory alike, it does not seem to point to a unified theory. To Pind (2015: xlix), "[...] it is obvious that the expression "*apoha* theory" does not designate a uniform theory with an invariable set of theoretical presuppositions."

Apart from this, it is often not quite clear what the scope of the term "*apoha* theory" is when used by modern scholars. Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti (2011: 1) succinctly formulate the following consensus:

> The apoha theory is first and foremost an approach to the problem of universals–the problem of the one over many. [...] The apoha theory is a distinctive Buddhist approach to being a nominalist.

Whilst modern scholarship never denies this assessment, there are several instances where the boundaries of the theory are blurred and discussions extend to topics in which this theory of universals is clearly involved, but which one might hesitate to characterize as being part of the *apoha* theory. For example, Katsura (1986: 172) calls the *apoha* theory a "working hypothesis",[298] which provides a substitute for universals as really existing entities in whichever context these universals might be invoked to explain something. Yet Katsura (1986: 172) introduces this characterization with the observation that

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[298]Katsura (1986: 178, n. 10) credits Prof. Steinkellner with having the idea of a "working hypothesis". Ogawa (1999) lets an insightful examination culminate in the following assessment, implying that *apoha* is an element in a linguistic theory: "...I cannot refrain from saying that there is nothing original to be found in Buddhist epistemologists' linguistic theory, other than the theory of *apoha*." (Ogawa 1999: 284, with a typo corrected)

> Dharmakīrti freely applied the principle of *anyāpoha* to
> the various problems related to conceptual knowledge (*vi-*
> *kalpa*), such as the object, the essence, the origin, and the
> function of conceptual knowledge. Thus, to Dharmakīrti,
> the *apoha* theory was not merely the theory of meaning
> but *"Problem des Begriffs"* as named by Professor Vetter.

The *apoha* theory is thus described both as a theory for replacing
real universals and as a full theory of meaning and concept formation.

The Buddhist epistemological tradition did indeed employ the
notion of *apoha* in a large variety of contexts. Famously, the *apoha*
theory is involved in the Buddhist epistemologists' "theory of lan-
guage",[299] so that Pind (2015: xv), for example, characterizes PS(V) 5,
the earliest available systematic account of the *apoha* theory, as pre-
senting "the fundamental tenets of his [Dignāga's–PMA] philosophy
of language". At the same time, Pind (2015: xi) states that "...the
aim of PSV V, which presents the essentials of the *apoha* thesis, is
to supplement previous statements [in the same work–PMA] about
exclusion or preclusion with an exposition of the *apoha* doctrine
itself."

Dreyfus (2011: 207), basing himself on Dharmakīrti's views of the
apoha theory, maintains that "...the gist of the apoha or exclusion
theory is ...that thought and language do not relate to real things by
capturing real properties but by excluding particulars from contra-
dictory classes." Dunne 2011: 90 considers the *apoha* theory to be a
solution to "Dharmakīrti's problem [...] how concepts can provide use-
ful information without any ontological commitment to the existence
of universals [...]", and considers "the notion of particulars having
the same effect and the role of 'imprints' (*vāsanā*)" to be "details"
of the *apoha* theory. Tillemans (2011b: 56–60) gives the following
characterization:

> Apoha theory, as time goes on, has ever-expanding uses:
> for example, it provides a Buddhist account of concept

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[299]I have not been able to find a historical Sanskrit term corresponding to this
notion.

formation, of the transition from perception to conceptualization, and gives an attempt at a solution to logical problems like substitutivity of identicals for identicals in opaque contexts.

...

Fortunately, apoha qua ingenious double negation is only at most a limited part of Dharmakīrti's account of how scheme and world link and is not, I would maintain, the main theme at all. Indeed, from Dharmakīrti and his commentators on, apoha theory expands its concerns, all the while taking on considerable hybridness due to holdovers from previous authors. This is, alas, what makes later apoha theories often impossible to summarize in an easily digestible form.

All of these estimates suggest that the *apoha* theory contains a theory about the formation and application of concepts, above and beyond saying what the objects of concepts are.

The argumentative setting of the *apoha* theory is often less general, especially if it is discussed within the frame of a larger work, rather than in a treatise dedicated to it. For example, in Dharmakīrti's oeuvre, effectively more important than Dignāga for all following *pramāṇavādin*-s, the *apoha* theory makes its first appearance within a strictly logical context, as a means to prove that an inference based on a *svabhāvahetu* is not a tautology since it makes known different properties, or parts, of the object that the inference is about. This sparks a long discussion of *apoha* ranging from the ontological issue of the substantial reality of universals to the grammatical question of how adjectives and nouns (or words for properties and substrates) relate to the same object.

Another prominent example is Kamalaśīla's interpretation of the place of *apoha* within the work he is commenting upon, Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha*. In Kamalaśīla's analysis, Śāntarakṣita's ostensible reason for discussing the *apoha* theory is to show why, and to what extent, the Buddha's teachings on "dependent arising" in

everyday language can be considered true.[300] The chapter in which Śāntarakṣita establishes *apoha* is in fact a rich source for the history of the *apoha* theory, as it discusses, and refutes, many historical positions that reject or (in Śāntarakṣita's view) misrepresent the *apoha* theory. It is easy to lose sight of what Kamalaśīla sees as its overall aim.

These admittedly incomplete considerations of modern assessments of what the *apoha* theory was and of the contexts in which it appears are not intended to cast doubt on the adequacy of these assessments. Indeed, all instances referred to here do have their justifications, derived from careful and detailed studies of primary sources, and are thus not to be taken lightly. The point is, rather, that care should be taken to distinguish the *apoha* theory from the many different fields in which it appears: it surfaces in the philosophy of language and that of mind, in treatises on epistemology, in purely logical contexts, as well as in grammatical discussions. But it is not helpful to conclude that all, or any, of these fields are therefore part of the *apoha* theory. Here, following Ratnakīrti's exposition, we will carefully limit the problems that should be solved by the *apoha* theory, and differentiate them from other areas in which the theory is employed.

This way of approaching the *AS* also has consequences for the construction of the history of the *apoha* theory, because it is precisely the *AS* that has sparked what is the most persistent account of this history. In a seminal article, Akamatsu (1986) reads Ratnakīrti as presenting a short history of *apoha* along the following lines: after its initial conception by Dignāga and reformulation by Dharmakīrti, the theory bifurcated into two strands, a "positivist" one and a "negativist" one, subscribed to, respectively, by certain *vidhivādin*-s ("affirmationists") and *pratiṣedhavādin*-s ("negationists"); these two variants of the theory were reconciled by Jñānaśrīmitra, who formed a new version of the theory which is found also in the *AS*. The interpretation by Akamatsu (1986) of the theory's development in this

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[300]See appendix B.1.

way is mainly caused by Ratnakīrti's statements at the beginning of the *AS*, especially in § 8.

The basic hypothesis formulated in Akamatsu 1986, where the "affirmationists" were identified with Śāntarakṣita and the "negationists" with Dharmottara, has been modified in some important respects. Ishida (2011b) and Okada (2017) have both shown that the main criterion that Ratnakīrti uses for differentiating the two strands–whether the aspect of exclusion, or negation of others, is the main or the subsidiary element in the object of words–has been a topic for structuring discussions of *apoha* from the earliest commentators onward, with some evidence that Uddyotakara, a Naiyāyika critic of Dignāga preceding Dharmakīrti, had already argued using these categories.[301] The distinction of the two strands is thus not as neat as it would have initially seemed. Another important support for the hypothesis in Akamatsu 1986 is that Jñānaśrīmitra objects to Dharmottara on account of the latter's overly negativist interpretation of *apoha*. Whilst this is indeed the case, the accounts of *apoha* theories by two non-Buddhist authors that follow Dharmakīrti and precede Jñānaśrīmitra, Sucaritamiśra and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, force us to reevaluate what this opposition means. Both of these authors see the main difference between Dharmakīrti's and Dharmottara's accounts of *apoha* as lying in the fact that the former assumes that cognition has the form of its object (*sākāra*), whereas the latter denies that cognition has that form (*nirākāra*); both Sucaritamiśra and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta claim that the specifics of what *apoha* is and how *apoha* can be the object of a word differ between Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara

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[301]Both articles reveal strong similarities between the presentations of *apoha* by Śākyabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita. Ishida (2011b) suggests that Śākyabuddhi's understanding is deepened and systematized by (the time of) Śāntarakṣita. Okada (2017: 198–200) shows that all elements of the positive and negative interpretation of *apoha* are essentially inherited by Śāntarakṣita from Śākyabuddhi, or at least common to both authors. See Okada 2017: 189–191 for Śākyabuddhi's discussion of an argument in which Uddyotakara distinguishes the affirmative and negative content of *anyāpoha*.

on account of these theories concerning the form of cognition.[302] So what initially looked like a bifurcation and reunification of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's *apoha* theories to Akamatsu (1986) should, in the light of current sources, be seen as a result from a debate concerning the nature of awareness and its central functions. Since, on the one hand, both these non-Buddhist, intermediary sources oppose Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, and, on the other hand, several Buddhist sources suggest a continuity rather than a break between Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, there is little reason to assume that Śāntarakṣita, in his encyclopedic work, was endorsing anything but Dharmakīrti's position, even if in a somewhat simplified form. The essentially two different accounts of *apoha* that were advanced in the development of this theory before Jñānaśrīmitra thus appear now as reflections of differences in epistemological questions that do not, primarily, concern *apoha*. Ratnakīrti, true to his analytic and systematic approach, does shortly refer to these questions, but for the largest part of his essay on *apoha* does not enter into the details of this discussion.[303] It is possible that this is also the reason that the main section of the *AP* in which Jñānaśrīmitra criticises Dharmottara is removed by Ratnakīrti and inserted in the treatise that is mainly concerned with the nature of conceptual cognitions and what the forms (*ākāra*) that appear in them are, the *CAPV*. Though it can be nothing more than an argument from silence, the absence of such discussions in the *AS* could indicate that they were not, for Ratnakīrti, particularly relevant to the discussion of *apoha*.[304]

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[302]See Kataoka 2017b (with references to Watson and Kataoka 2017), and Kataoka 2018: 26–34. The first article investigates the situation in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, and the second in Sucaritamiśra. Both make it clear that Dharmottara is was interpreted as differing from Dharmakīrti. It is unclear how these authors relate to Śāntarakṣita, who must be counted as belonging to the group of Dharmakīrti on this issue. See also McAllister 2017a, where an attempt is made to read a section of the CAPV in the light of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's comments.

[303]Apart from the introductory paragraphs, it is only in § 50 that he directly addresses Dharmottara. The topics are also hinted at in his own restatements of his central thesis (see section 4.2 for an indication of the relevant paragraphs).

[304]The mention of Dharmottara's position in § 50 is followed by only two short

For these reasons, the present study of the late and concise *AS* is not the place to attempt a full exposition of the historical and intellectual development of the *apoha* theories. It is probable that the texts talking of *apoha* were shaped by concerns and considerations that do not directly concern what the *AS* is about. The following explanation of an *apoha* theory will thus base itself on the main statements that are found in the *AS*, exploring their historical and argumentative background only where it is necessary to remove doubts and uncertainty. It is intended to serve as an interpretation of the main aspects of the *apoha* theory as it appears in the *AS*, with "*apoha* theory" defined primarily in terms of what is discussed in the *AS*, and hopefully to work towards a better understanding of the development of the *apoha* theory by showing its state in the middle of the eleventh century.

5.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF *APOHA*: THE PURPOSE OF THE *APOHASIDDHI*

The title of the *AS* can be translated as "establishment of exclusion", or "proof of exclusion". Even a short glance at the analysis of the arguments given in this text (cf. section 4.2) shows that this is an adequate name for the text: After the presentation of various versions of *apoha* theories and their possible criticisms, there follows a fairly short exposition of Ratnakīrti's own opinion. This, in turn, is followed by discussions and refutations of various positions arguing for the existence of a real universal (*sāmānya*, *jāti*, or *ākṛti*) above and beyond the real particular, interspersed with ever more refined reformulations of Ratnakīrti's own position. At the end of this section, Ratnakīrti also distances himself and criticises an aspect

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paragraphs (§§ 51–52) that deal with determination in rather generic terms, using formulations that are found also in others of Ratnakīrti's writings (see the second apparatus to the mentioned paragraphs in the edition above). Most of the materials in the *AP* that correspond to these passages, and which one might have expected Ratnakīrti to use here, appear in CAPV 137,25–139,27.

of Dharmottara's (ca. eighth century) theory of *apoha*. There then
follows a formal proof (*prayoga*) establishing that every word has
as its object a thing as such (*vastumātra*) that is determined and
excluded from others. This proof is closely knit into the preceding
arguments of the text, in that they are here adduced to show that
none of the typical logical fallacies applies to this inference.[305]

In this final inference, *anyāpoha* (or, more precisely, *atadrūpapa-
rāvṛtta*, the quality of being "distinguished from that of another form")
is established as an essential part of that thing that anything that
names anything refers to or has as its object. It is in this sense that
the establishment mentioned in the title can, at first, be understood:
establishment of the exclusion which is a part of the word referent.[306]

This inference is what was called the 'guiding inference' above
(see section 1.1.3), and will be used as a guide to the structure of
the rest of the *AS*. As for many other works by Ratnakīrti, the *AS*
is constructed along the lines of this formal proof. At first, this
inference will be analysed, and then the various points in the *AS* that
are needed to fully appreciate the inference will be examined in more
detail.[307]

Before this, a methodological caution might not be out of place.
There are two groups of problems that have to be dealt with when

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[305]From this, it can also be seen that the *AS* is a carefully composed and well
structured text, even though much of it is taken essentially verbatim from the *AP* of
Jñānaśrīmitra.

[306]The other property of the word referent is *adhyavasita* (that it is determined).
The substrate of the two properties, "determined" and "differentiated from others",
is the *vastumātra*, the real thing as such, which is said to be what a word has as its
object (see footnote 193). That this is the object of words is the *sādhya*, the property
(or rather, in this case, the fact) which is to be established in this inference.

[307]Another, and more practical, reason for proceeding in this way is that the
more obvious explicatory approach, the one that follows the order of explanation
in the text fairly closely, has already been very successfully taken in both Patil
2003, and, in a broader fashion, in Patil 2009: Chapter 4, p. 197 ff., although there
it is observed that "[Ratnakīrti's] decision to conclude his essay [by providing an
inferential reason to support his view] is important, because it brings together the
various subarguments used throughout his essay and does so in a more 'formal'
context." (Patil 2009: 239) It is of course obvious that the results of both expositions
will, if correct, be the same (or both wrong in the same way).

explaining the *AS* in this way. First, what the precise import is of each of the elements of the inference, with special interest perhaps attaching to the complex quality that this supposedly central inference is supposed to prove (i.e., what this inference *means*). Second, why it is logically coherent to state that the inferential reason leads only to this consequence (i.e., why this inference is *valid*). After all, as will be seen, it is not directly a matter of logic as to why it should be the case that a word is expressive and therefore must not have any other sort of object than the one proven in Ratnakīrti's inference.

Moreover, it is difficult to explain these two groups of problems separately. On the one hand, it will not be possible to make it completely clear why the inference is valid without understanding its components and their relations, mainly because these facts are ascertained in separate, mostly ontological or epistemological, considerations of how everyday activity based on concepts works (e.g., what it means that a word refers to something). The pervasion[308] at work in this inference is one that is a matter of fact. On the other hand, and if the idea is correct that the preceding parts of the *AS* build towards this inference, an explanation of all its components and their relations should be expected to go only so far as is useful for correctly understanding the inference. This means that any analysis of a component needed for establishing any of the concerned matters of fact (the nature of words, their objects, etc.) needs to proceed only up to the point at which it is sufficient to make the inference valid. This is important for understanding the scope of the analysis, or the explanatory strategy, of the *AS*: much of it is a preparation that gives the inference its quantificational force, that *all* that is expressive has that sort of object. Thus, it could happen that, without having the inference in mind, it might be difficult to understand certain elements of the discussion of the *AS*. A second consequence to keep in mind is that the content of the discussions is limited by the form of the inference that the discussion is supposed to support. Even though unexplored philosophical alleys may branch out in many directions

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[308]For more information about this technical term, cf. section 5.2.

from Ratnakīrti's arguments, he need not follow their invitation if he deems them irrelevant with respect to the validity of the central inference. Simultaneously, it need not be that all of the preceding passages in the *AS* are directly dedicated to this aim, but it should be the case that these passages somehow have a bearing on the inference, or are superfluous (which, of course, is not a problem as such, and just means that the explanatory approach used here does not take all details into account). So as not to overstate the importance of this inference for the *AS*, it will be important to remember that its role in this text is a hypothesis. There is good reason to have it, judging from Ratnakīrti's general style, but it does not mean that any passage that does not fit the picture is somehow out of place. Each of the arguments will have to be scrutinized also for its own value, and in the immediate context in which it appears. Only then should it be decided how or whether it serves this inference.

Moreover, if the supposition formulated with regard to the structure of the *AS* should prove wrong, none of the passages preceding the inference would have the aim ascribed to them at all. But even then the interpretation of the individual passages should not suffer much, and it should be more a matter of rearrangement than reassessment that will allow one to more adequately discern Ratnakīrti's ideas.

5.2 The central inference

The inference that the *AS* is built around runs as follows (see § 54):

> All that denotes [something] has as [its] object a mere thing that is determined [and] distinguished from that of another form, as the expression "Water [is] here in a well." And this [expression] having the form of a word like "cow" etc. does denote [something]. [So there is] the logical reason [consisting in] an essential property.

The formal elements at work here are as follows:[309]

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[309]A detailed exposition of the Buddhist theory of inference is not within the scope of this study. Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: §§ 9–10.2 for an overview of this theory,

1. *hetu*, the property used as a reason in the inference (of the type "essential property"): denoting. (This *hetu* will be abbreviated as H.)

2. *pakṣa*, the instance[310] qualified by H: that which has the nature of words like "cow" etc. (This *pakṣa* will be abbreviated as p.)

3. *sādhya*, the property whose presence in p the inference purports to prove: having as an object a mere thing that is determined and distinguished from that of another form. (This *sādhya* will be abbreviated as S.)[311]

4. *dṛṣṭānta*, example: Water here in a well. (This *dṛṣṭānta* will be abbreviated as d.)

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and Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: § 12 "Logical mark of essential identity" for a succinct discussion of inference based on a thing's nature. The *TBh* will, in the following arguments, be used as a fairly normative text for interpreting some of Ratnakīrti's terms, based on the arguments given in Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 3–5. The model used there is, in all points that will be relevant in the following analysis, the same as "the orthodox scenario" described in Tillemans 1999a: 90–92. Additionally, in most cases it was possible to find passages in Ratnakīrti's texts that shed light on the logical terminology employed in this inference. But if it is true for Jñānaśrīmitra that he rarely enters into lengthy explanations of topics he presumes his audience well acquainted with (cf. Lasic 2000a: 19 f., Franco 2002: 192), the same is certainly true for Ratnakīrti, writing in a manner "more concise and logical, though not as poetical and elaborate as that of his spiritual father." (Thakur 1975a: 12) Other texts taken into consideration in the following are the *NPSū*, NB$_M$, and its commentary, the *NBṬ*.

[310]In this context, *pakṣa* is variously translated as "locus of inference" (e.g., Matilal 1985: 50 f.), "subject" (e.g., Tillemans 1999a), or "site of the inference" (e.g., Patil 2009: 60 f.). For the context that the argument under discussion works in, *pakṣa* will be translated as "instance", mainly because it fits the translations of "similar instance" for *sapakṣa* and "counter-instance" for *vipakṣa*, but not because something very different from what the other translations suggest is intended. Another consideration is that it is easier to understand the two other elements, the reason and the property which is to be established, as co-occurring in an "instance" (of something, like awareness or conceptual cognition) rather than in a subject, site, or locus of inference. "Similar instances" and "counter-instances" are cases where the property to be proven is, respectively, present and absent.

[311]Various formulations of this are used by Ratnakīrti. For the time being (until the explanation below, page 210) only this first formulation will be used.

The pervasion (*vyāpti*) governing this inference is expressible as the implication of the property "having as its object a mere thing, which is determined and distinguished from that of another form" by the property "something denotes".

The *pakṣa*, the locus of the *hetu* and consequently of the *sādhya*, is said to be what has the form or nature of "words like 'cow' etc.", a statement that seems to elicit little controversy.[312] The gist of the inference thus is that any word must, by its very nature of being something that denotes, have as its object a mere thing that is a) determined and b) differentiated from that which has a form other than its own.

This is only a part of the inference. Its validity depends on the truth of the pervasion of the property that is the reason by the property that is to be inferred. "Because p is qualified by H, it is qualified by S." is true of p if everything that is qualified by H is also qualified by S, or every instance of H is also an instance of S. Among the various factors that have an influence on the truth of this pervasion, Ratnakīrti discusses three: that the reason is not unestablished, that the reason is not contradictory, and that the reason is not ambiguous. These are the three common types of fallacious reasons or pseudo-reasons (*hetvābhāsa*).[313]

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[312]To which group of things the quality "denotes" in fact applies according to Ratnakīrti, and what this means, is discussed in section 5.3.1. For the moment, it is enough to take it for granted that words like "cow" etc. denote.

[313]The term "*hetvābhāsa*" is translated as "pseudo-reason" in Matilal 1985: 42. The *hetvābhāsa* is generally considered to be threefold, cf., e.g., NPSū 400,18 (*asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhā hetvābhāsāḥ*), NB$_M$ 3.109 (*evam eṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ rūpāṇām ekaikasya dvayor dvayor vā rūpayor asiddhau sandehe vā yathāyogam asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikās trayo hetvābhāsāḥ*), Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: § 10 (and the notes for some secondary literature), and Oetke 1994: 33 ff. Ratnakīrti himself regularly uses these distinctions to discuss the validity of inferences, e.g., SJS 29,19–20 (in an objection): *kiṃ ca sarvajñasattāsādhane sarvo hetuḥ trayīṃ doṣajātiṃ nātivartate asiddhatvaṃ viruddhatvam anaikāntikatvaṃ ceti* (cf. Bühnemann 1980: 89 for a translation), or KBhSA 67,10: *hetvābhāsāś ca asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikabhedena trividhāḥ.* Cf. Patil 2009: 70, n. 102 for a detailed list of the pseudo-reasons that the Naiyāyikas defend themselves against in the *ĪSD*.

5.2.1 The reason is not unestablished (asiddha)

In lines 308–310 in § 54, Ratnakīrti shows that H is not unestablished (*asiddha*). A *hetu* is considered unestablished when it is not certain that it actually qualifies, or is a property of, the *pakṣa*, so that the premiss in this inference, "H qualifies p .", becomes false. Ratnakīrti thus has to defend the statement "An expression, having the form of a word like 'cow' etc., denotes."

His argument here draws on various points in the *AS*:

1. A statement widely proven in an authoritative text (line 167 in § 27).
2. A statement about the denoted-denoting relation (line 173 in § 28)

The statement proven in the *śāstra* is the reason for the concessive subclause in this argument: that the distinction between properties and their substrates is a conceptual one, and thus is not true about real things. According to this rule and its consequence, it could be argued that "p is qualified by H." is not, in fact, a true statement.

But that H qualifies p is true in a "conventional" sense. Ratna-kīrti's argument is that the relation of denoting word and denoted referent is made by determination, a function of conceptual cognition which allows it to produce both a classification of its object and activity that treats the object as an external thing (cf. section 5.4). So, whereas this conceptual construction of the relation does not reflect reality, it is to be endorsed by all people who engage in worldly activity (*vyavahāra*). Two important positions are implied in this statement: first, worldly activity presupposes a distinction of denoted and denoting (as of substance and quality) in order to work. And, second, this distinction is only conceptually constructed. Accordingly, the proposition that H qualifies p must be endorsed by all people on pain of not being able to engage in normal activity, even though it is not a true statement when taken to be about reality.

In this way, Ratnakīrti can show that any conceptual cognition must be taken to have an object. Accordingly, that H qualifies p, that words denote, must be accepted by everyone. Consequently, no one can reasonably argue that H is unestablished, or that expressions do not denote anything at all.

5.2.2 The reason is not contradictory (viruddha)

Ratnakīrti's defence against this type of logical error is quite short, l. 310 in § 54:

> Neither is that [reason] contradictory, because it exists in a similar instance.

This type of error consists in the reason proving something opposite to that which someone intends to prove by an inference using it, usually the complete absence instead of presence of the intended property. If H were contradictory, then H would be a sign for what is not qualified by S, so that instead of the statement "Because H qualifies p, S qualifies p." being true, its opposite would be true: "Because H qualifies p, S does not qualify p.", i.e., if something denotes it never has the sort of object that Ratnakīrti describes (S).

Others of Ratnakīrti's explanations for why a reason is contradictory are as follows, clearer in stating why the respective *hetu* is contradictory:

1. SJS 13,8: *tathā ca sati sādhyaviparyayavyāpter viruddhatā hetoḥ.*

2. SJS 29,21–22: *asarvajñe dharmiṇi na sarvajñasiddhiḥ, hetoḥ sarvajñaviparītasādhanatvena viruddhatvāt.*

3. ĪSD 33,21–23: *nāpi viruddhaḥ. tathā hi yo vipakṣa eva vartate sa khalu sādhyaviparyayavyāpteḥ sādhyaviruddhaṃ sādhayan viruddho 'bhidhīyate. yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād iti. na cāyaṃ tathā, prasiddhakartṛkeṣu sapakṣeṣu sadbhāvadarśanāt.*[314]

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[314]For translations of the first two of these passages, cf. Bühnemann 1980: 35, and p. 84 (approximately: "And if it is so, the reason is contradictory because it pervades the opposite of what is to be proven.", and, "If a non-omniscient being is the property bearer [that is qualified by the reason property], there is no proof of being omniscient, because a reason is contradictory on account of establishing what is opposite to an omniscient one."). Patil (2009: 71) translates the last, spoken in the voice of "Ratnakīrti's Naiyāyikas" (Patil 2009: 71), as follows:

> It is well know that a [reason property] that exists in only dissimilar cases proves what is opposed to the target property, through its being

In view of these formulations, the problem Ratnakīrti is facing should be understood like this: in the inference "Because H qualifies p, S qualifies p.", H would be contradictory because H is pervaded by the absence of S, i.e., by "not having as an object a mere thing that is determined and distinguished from that of another form." So the basic charge is that the reason "to be what denotes" is contradictory because it actually occurs only in the counter-instance, i.e., in instances of denotation that have something else, like a real universal, as their object.

A logically sufficient defence against this would be to show that H does indeed coincide with S, i.e., that there is at least one instance beside p that has both the H and S. In this passage, Ratnakīrti merely states this to be the case. But why does he see himself entitled to do so?

To begin with, the problem of knowing what pervades what is not a problem of logic (at least not always), but is a problem of knowing a matter of fact. For example, a logical error of the same type is discussed at some length in the answer to an objection starting at KBhSA 67,20. There the matter is resolved through a *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* which show that both the *hetu* "existing" and the *sādhya* "momentary" are true of one *sapakṣa* instance, namely a pot (which is the example in the inference, KBhSA 67,7–8).[315] In *ĪSD* 33,21–23, quoted above (page 204), this kind of error is argued against by an appeal to a generally acknowledged matter of fact. The question must therefore be what other statements in the *AS* allow Ratnakīrti to make the claim at this point that H occurs at least once in that which is similar to p.

An answer must consist of two parts:

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pervaded by the absence of the target property, and that it is named "opposed" (*viruddha*). ...But this [reason property, "being an effect"] is not like that, since it is observed to really exist in similar cases such as a pot, for which a maker is well known.

[315]Cf. the assessment in Woo 1999: 163.

1. Ratnakīrti has to believe that he has already shown that it is possible that words denote this kind of object.
2. No one engaged in the discussions of the *AS* believes that words do not denote anything at all.[316]

The second requirement is fairly easy to locate. None of the opponents in the *AS* argues that there is no referent or object of words at all; Vācaspati, as quoted in § 9 (page 51), expressly states that "Particulars qualified by a class are the objects for concepts and words." Nor do the other objections contain any statements that would be to this effect. This requirement defends against the possibility of the opposite of S being "having no object at all."

The first requirement amounts to the claim that S is at least a possible way in which words can denote. This possibility is explained, in a general fashion, in the various presentations of his own view of what the word referent is: it is first given in paragraphs §§ 7–8, and repeated in § 15 (the answer to the objection that *apoha* is not the referent of a word because it is only the positive element that is called the word referent). An explicit argument that exclusion is understood also for every word in a sentence is made in § 14.

So Ratnakīrti's claim at this point is: if an expression like "There is water here in the well." denotes (is qualified by H), it is the case that it "has an object that is a mere thing which is determined and distinguished from that of another form" (is qualified by S). This defence of the inference ensures the possibility of its claim: it is the case at least in this one instance. That it is always the case is the overall aim of the next step in defending the inference.[317]

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[316]For Ratnakīrti, it is only conventionally true that words denote something. Cf. § 48 and references in the translation.

[317]This is not an uncommon tactic in Ratnakīrti's writings, cf., e.g., the objection in CAPV 130,5–6 (punctuation and paragraphs modified): *tad ayaṃ sādhyaśūnyo dṛṣṭānto hetuś ca vipakṣe paridṛśyamānaḥ. yadi tatraiva niyatas tadā viruddhaḥ, tatrāpi sambhave 'naikānta iti cet.* (Therefore this example is free of the [property] to be proven[, i.e., oneness], and the reason is observed in the counter-instance. If the [reason] is limited to this [counter-instance] alone, [it is] contradictory, [and if] limited to this [counter-instance] also, it is inconclusive.) This refers back to the

5.2.3 The reason is not ambiguous (anaikāntika)

The third error that could afflict H is that it could be ambiguous (*anaikāntika*). Put simply, a logical reason that is ambiguous is one that is at least doubtful as to the terms of its presence or absence in both similar instances and counter-instances.[318] Again, Ratnakīrti's defence against this error (see lines 311–319, p. 69) does not detail which variety of this logical error it is against. Ratnakīrti uses the three common variants of an ambiguous reason in the *RNĀ*.[319] The situation for H would be, respectively, as follows:

1. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*: "H qualifies neither v nor s." would be true.

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inference in CAPV 129,22–24, where the reason was "it appears", and the example was "the form blue amid other forms" (cf. section 1.1.3). Here the opponent states that if the faulty reason is ascertained only for the counter-instances, then the reason is contradictory, and if it is ascertained for the counter-instances as well as for the similar instances, then the reason is ambiguous. A similar link is presupposed in the argument in SJS 3,30–4,2 (cf. Bühnemann 1980: 9, and p. 102, n. 64).

[318]In practice, there are, however, several ways in which a reason can be "ambiguous". While earlier texts, such as the NPSū, distinguish six ways in which a reason can be so, the TBh$_I$ 47,19–48,1 distinguishes three: *vyāptyaniścaye hetor anaikāntiko doṣaḥ. sa ca trividhaḥ–asādhāraṇānaikāntikaḥ sādhāraṇānaikāntikaḥ sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikaś ceti* (If [there is] no ascertainment of pervasion, the reason's error is "ambiguous." And this [error] is threefold: ambiguous due to non-commonness, ambiguous due to commonness, and having a doubtful exclusion from the counter-instance.) Ratnakīrti uses these three variants to classify this type of error: *sādhāraṇānaikāntika* (e.g., KBhSA 68,25, SSD 114,16–7), *asādhāraṇa-naikāntika* (e.g., KBhSA 80,8), and *sandigdhavyatireka-hetvābhāsa* (e.g., SAD 147,4, SSD 124,23–24).

[319]See TBh$_I$ 47,19–48,1 for a short characterization that is applicable also to Ratnakīrti. Sample passages in the *RNĀ* are:

1. *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*, e.g., KBhSA 68,25, SSD 114,16–7

2. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*, e.g., KBhSA 80,8

3. *sandigdhavyatireka*, e.g., SAD 147,4, or, in a formulation as reason and consequence, e.g., *ataḥ sandigdhavyatirekitvād anaikāntikatvam eva prameyatvam.* (SSD 124,23–24)

2. *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*: "H qualifies both v and s." would be true.
3. *sandigdhavyatirekānaikāntika*: "H does not qualify v." would not be certain.

So which of these positions most closely resembles the situation in the passage under discussion?

The first candidate, ambiguity of H due to not being common to both s and v, is not acceptable, because then the opponent would have to admit that "to denote" is a quality neither of the similar nor of the counter-instances — a consequence which surely is to be avoided, since the counter-instances include all the options for the word referent endorsed by the opponent.[320]

The second candidate, ambiguity of H due to being common to both s and v, entails no such consequence, and this understanding thus seems suitable. First, the opponent is not arguing that v is not specified by H, but rather that "what denotes" must have one of a range of things as its proper object, none of which agrees with S. Second, Ratnakīrti's defence against this error consists in showing that none of the other options are viable alternatives to S, implying that the important thing to do is to show that v is not qualified by S, which is the fault defined in the typical case of the reason's ambiguity due to commonness.

This does not yet decide whether H is being criticised, because it is doubtful as to its negative concomitance with the counter-instance. But it is quite plainly not what the opponent is arguing for, since he is not criticising the way the reason's absence in all the counter-instances is shown, but rather claiming that the counter-instances are indeed also qualified by H. This argument should thus be interpreted as concerning H's ambiguity due to its being common to both s and v.

Once this is settled, the structure of the argument in this passage can be analysed as follows. There is an objection by an adversary, making three claims:

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[320]This, in itself, is not a particularly strong argument, as it is rather hypothetical. But from the discussion of the other options it will emerge that it is strong enough.

1. H, "to be denoting", can also be said of the counter-instance, i.e., instances that denote something and are qualified by having as their object either a particular, an additional attribute, a combination of these two elements, or a form of awareness.
2. These options are all the options there are.
3. If these counter-instances have no object at all, they cannot be said to be "denoting".

Ratnakīrti's answer is that all options suggested by the opponent are wrong. Neither the external particular as such nor the form of awareness can be the object of denoting instances, because no convention can be made with regard to either: they are both particulars, and any denotative convention based on them would lead to useless results.[321] All the remaining options involve an additional attribute. They are precluded because additional attributes do not exist.

In consequence of this, the pervasion of H by S is established:

1. There are no options other than S for how a denoting instance could have an object.
2. Therefore, a pervader of H qualified by having an object other than S is excluded.
3. Due to this, H, "to be what denotes", is excluded from the counter-instances.
4. Therefore, H is pervaded by S, so that "Because H qualifies p, S qualifies p." is true.

With this, the inference is shown to be formally valid and factually true: the pervasion of the reason property by the property to be proven is established, so that the inference–that the instance under discussion is qualified by the property to be proven because it is qualified by the reason property–is true.

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[321]For the referent agreed on in such a convention would be unrepeatable. This would mean that convention, and thus any everyday activity based on it, would become impossible. Cf. footnote 200.

5.2.4 *Claims made in the inference*

The above discussion of the inference's structure has, for the reasons stated in section 5.1, only superficially touched on the various claims and positions that are involved in the inference. To recapitulate, and to begin deciding on a strategy for explaining the various elements, an overview might be in order:

1. H is "to be denoting". Its characteristics are as follows:
    a) It depends on there being an object (acc. to the opponent at least, cf. l. 315, p. 69); that there is no object at all is apparently not considered a tenable position by anyone, neither Ratnakīrti nor his opponents.
    b) It is an element in the merely conceptually construed relation between denoting and denoted (l. 308, p. 69).
2. p: The instance under discussion that is claimed to be
    a) qualified by H,
    b) qualified by S,
    c) dissimilar from v, i.e., not qualified by anything opposed to S, and
    d) similar to s, i.e., qualified by S.
3. S:
    a) It is variously formulated as:
        i. *adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocara* (l. 306, p. 69).
        ii. *vācya* (l. 308, 69, and, by the opponent, l. 314, p. 69.)
        iii. *adhyavasitavijātivyāvṛttavastumātraviṣayatva* (l. 311, p. 69).
        iv. *adhyavasitabāhyaviṣayatva* (l. 318, p. 70).
    b) Its characteristics are:
        i. It is what denoting instances have as their object, or, simply, it is what is denoted.
        ii. It is an element in the merely conceptually construed relation between denoting and denoted (l. 308, p. 69).

iii. It is capable of supporting a linguistic convention (l. 316, p. 70).

iv. It is a mere thing that is:
  A. determined,
  B. differentiated from what is not the same, or, in other words, differentiated from that of another kind,
  C. external.

4. s: All instances qualified by S.

5. v: All instances not qualified by S. The alternative options discussed[322] are that what is denoted is either
  a) a particular,
  b) an additional attribute,
  c) a connection to an additional attribute,
  d) what has the same additional attribute, or
  e) a form of awareness.

Ratnakīrti does not argue for any of these claims in much detail.[323] The relevant arguments and justifications of the claims made in the inference must therefore be supplied from the passages of the *AS* that precede the inference. As stated above (section 5.1), the various elements appearing here will be interpreted as giving the *AS* its structure. A schematic overview of the relevant passages is given in table 5.1.

5.3 THE REFERENT OF WORDS

Ratnakīrti discusses what the referent of a word is in various places. A first sense of what differentiates words as objects of cognitions

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[322]There must be options, since the possibility of not having any object is not accepted. Cf. l. 315, p. 69, as well as page 209.

[323]Cf. the observation about the impossibility of a denoting instance having a particular or universal as its object: "We know this to be the case since, as Ratnakīrti has shown earlier in his essay, inferential/verbal awareness-events cannot have either particulars or real universals as their objects." (Patil 2009: 243)

Table 5.1 – Concordance between claims made in the inference and previous discussions in the *AS*

Item	Claim (line)	Discussed in paragraph(s)
H	*avisayatve vācakatvāyoga* (315)	§ 48
	vācyavācakabhāvasyābhāve 'pi adhyavasāyakrta (308)	§ 27–§ 31
p	qualified by H (308–310)	§ 48
	qualified by S (310–319)	§ 7–§ 8, § 48, § 52
S/s	*vācya* (= object of *vācaka*) (308,314)	cf. *p*'s being qualified by S
	samaya / samketa (316)	§ 12
	vastumātra (306, 311), which is	
	adhyavasita (306, 311, 318)	§ 15, § 48, § 50–§ 52
	atadrūpaparāvrtta (306, 311)	§ 1, § 7–§ 8,§ 12–§ 14, § 15, § 37, § 40–§ 41, § 48–§ 49
	bāhya (318)	§ 15, § 34, § 48–§ 49
v	*svalaksana* (314)	§ 9–§ 23, § 29 (Vācaspati); § 24–§ 28 (Kumārila's school); § 30 (*Nyāyabhūsana*)
	upādhi (314)	§ 32–§ 37; § 38–§ 42 (Trilocana); § 43 (*Nyāyabhūsana*); § 44–§ 47;
	upādhiyoga (314)	also cf. § 23;
	sopādhi (314)	also § 9, § 23, § 29;
	buddhyākrti (314)	§ 4, § 4, § 15, § 48, § 49

from the objects of other cognitions can be gleaned from the following passage in his PABhP, where he is refuting the Mīmāṃsā contention that Vedic injunctions (*codanā*) are means of valid cognition because they "are connected to" (*pratibaddha*) real things:

> PABhP 99,20–23: *nibandhanaṃ cāsyās tādātmyatadu-tpattibhyām anyaṃ nopalabhyate, atatsvabhāvasyātadu-tpatteś ca tatrāpratibaddhasvabhāvatvāt. na hi śabdā-nāṃ bahirarthasvabhāvatāsti bhinnapratibhāsāvabodha-viṣayatvāt. nāpi śabdā bahirarthād upajāyante, artham antareṇāpi puruṣasyecchāpratibaddhavṛtteḥ śabdasyo-tpādadarśanāt.*
>
> But no other connection of this [Vedic injunction to a real thing] apart from being identical with something or being caused by something is grasped, because [something that] does not have the nature of some [thing] and [something that] is not produced by some [thing] are not [such that their] nature is connected to that [thing]. For words do not have the nature of external objects, because they are the object of an awareness that has a different appearance [than an awareness of an external object]. Nor do words arise from an external object, because one observes that a word arises even without an object [being present] due to being connected to a person's intention.

Ratnakīrti is here saying that no verbal statement, including Vedic injunctions, can possibly have a connection to a real thing such that one could infer the object from the word. To have that kind of connection would require the word to satisfy one of two conditions: that it have the nature of an external object or that it be caused by such an object. But evidently it is not the case that being "Indian Rosewood" can have the same relation to being a real tree as being an Indian Rosewood (no quotes) can have to being a real tree; the actual reason that Ratnakīrti gives for this is interesting: the cognition arising from the word "fire" does not appear to our mind like the perception arising from a fire. As we shall see, it is

an internal feature of cognition (its image or form) that allows us to differentiate perceptions and verbal cognitions. The other possible type of connection required for this Mīmāṃsā position to survive would be that "smoke" relates to fire as smoke relates to fire: however, it is evident from everyday experience that the word "smoke" can occur in the absence of an actual fire.

The most concise definition in the *AS* is that the referent (*artha*) of words[324] is an affirmation or positive element qualified by exclusion from others (*anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ*, l. 36 in § 7). Since this definition does not have a direct equivalent in Jñānaśrīmitra's *AP*,[325] it is likely that it represents Ratnakīrti's own point of view on the subject in a form clearer than he considered it expressed in Jñānaśrīmitra's writings. But it is not the only definition that Ratnakīrti gives of the word referent. Some of his other explanations are collected in table 5.2. Only those have been included that use formulations significantly different from those that have been used in the passages preceding each occurrence.

Patil (2003: 230) has already presented "[...] Ratnakīrti's analysis of this complex entity [i.e., the *anyāpohaviśiṣṭavidhi* — PMA,] by describing each of its analytically separable components [...]", and here too this tactic will be followed in explaining the sense of this definition.

One thus comes to ask these four questions, one for each part of the definition *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ* (l. 36 in § 7):

1. What is meant by "referent of words" (*"...śabdānam arthaḥ"*)?
2. What is this *vidhi* or positive element?
3. What is this *vidhi*'s property, *anyāpoha*?
4. How does this property qualify its substrate, or what is the relation of *anyāpoha* and *vidhi*?

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[324]This translation of *śabdārtha* has been preferred to a possible "meaning of a word", because the latter does not make good sense in the context of section 5.3.1 and section 5.6.

[325]Cf. the apparatus to the passage just cited, as well as the table in Akamatsu 1986: Appendice A, which shows no correspondence in column "RNA (AS)" for 59,4–6.

Table 5.2 – Definitions of *śabdārtha* found in the *Apohasiddhi* (without repetitions)

Formulation	Line in edition
apohaḥ śabdārtho nirucyate.	2
...anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ.	36
...apohadharmaṇo vidhirūpasya śabdād avagatiḥ ...	85
tad evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ.	276
...anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo vijātivyāvṛtto 'rtho vidhiḥ. sa eva cāpohaśabdavācyaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ, pravṛttinivṛtti-viṣayaś ceti ...	302
yad vācakam, tat sarvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛtta-vastumātragocaram ...	306

Apart from this analysis of the definition's content, it is also important to see how far Ratnakīrti must let the explanation go: it has to be made clear that this thing is capable of being the word referent, in order to fulfil its role as S in the inference establishing *apoha*.[326] The passages that deal directly with Ratnakīrti's idea of this word referent are: §§ 7–8, §§ 48–49, and § 53.

5.3.1 What is meant with "referent of words"

What has to be understood by the expression "referent of a word" (*śabdārtha*) is not explicitly discussed in the *AS*. But several passages clearly show that Ratnakīrti follows the standard account of Dharmakīrti,[327] namely that the word referent is the same as the object of all conceptual cognitions. Thus, the discussion about the word referent is of great consequence for an understanding of what

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[326]See the arguments above, section 5.1. For the abbreviations like S, see page 200.

[327]See, e.g., PV III 183ab (cf. appendix A.3.3). There is no scholarly disagreement on this topic, cf., e.g., Steinkellner 1967: 92, n. 25, or McCrea and Patil 2006: 305 f. for a concise discussion of the two means of cognition and their objects, and of the problems involved. Dharmottara subverted this clear distinction, cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 325, n. 64. To what extent this subversion is upheld in Ratnakīrti's texts will become apparent in the course of the next sections, especially section 5.4.

conceptual awareness is, and how it operates. The following two examples show that Ratnakīrti shares Dharmakīrti's assumption:

One passage appears in the answer to Vācaspatimiśra's contention that a particular qualified by a class is what a word refers to (cf. § 9). Ratnakīrti there effectively endorses that verbal and conceptual cognitions have the same objects by using the phrase: "...those that become the object of words and concepts ..." (*śabdavikalpayor viṣayībhavantīnām*, l. 61, p. 51). It seems highly improbable that he would use such an expression without any qualification and not touch on the subject anywhere in the following if he did not accept it.

Another clear indication of this tacit equation is found at the end of the section discussing the possibility of the word referent being some sort of particular (qualified by a universal). He there says: "Therefore it is settled that a particular does not appear because of a word, a concept, or a logical mark." (cf. § 31) This statement suggests that there is an equivalence amongst verbal, conceptual, and inferential cognitions in that they do not have a particular as their object.

These two instances should suffice to show that Ratnakīrti assumes that any kind of conceptual cognition, not only one produced from words, has what he calls "*anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ*" for its object.

5.3.2 *vidhi*—The positive element

The term "*vidhi*" is explained by Ratnakīrti in various statements that, taken together, suggest it would either best be left untranslated, or can only be rendered by a very loose approximation, as the "positive" or "affirmative" element or aspect of the word referent, as opposed to its negative aspect, exclusion of others.[328] The first step in understanding

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[328]Udayana, a Naiyāyika scholar who knew Jñānaśrīmitra's and Ratnakīrti's works intimately, defines *astitva* in terms of being the object of a cognition that is directed at such a "*vidhi*" (Kir: 27). Halbfass (1970: 144) elaborates:

> The following explanation is to be found in Udayana's commentary: astitvaṃ vidhimukhapratyayaviṣayatvam/ pratiyogyanapekṣanirūpaṇatvam iti yāvat. Consequently, astitva is the character of all that is capable of determining our notions in a positive way, that

what could be meant by *vidhi* certainly must be to collect Ratnakīrti's explanations of this term and to consider what results from these. To this end, a close look at the following two passages is helpful:

> ll. 93–97, § 15: And by the word "positive element" an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according to determination, and according to appearance a form of awareness [is meant]. Amongst these, the external object is defined as that to be expressed by a word only because of determination, not because of a particular's appearance, since there is no appearance of a manifest particular that is limited as to space, time and condition, as there is in the case of perception.

> ll. 276–282, § 48: Thus, in this way, only a positive element is the referent of a word. And this [positive element] is meant [to be] the external object and the form of awareness. Amongst these, the form of awareness is neither affirmed nor negated, neither in reality nor conventionally, because [this form] is to be cognized [only] through the perception self-awareness and is not determined. The external object is not affirmed or negated in reality either, because it does not appear in verbal apprehensions. Precisely for this [reason] all things are in reality inexpressible, for neither do they appear nor are they determined. Therefore the external object alone is conventionally affirmed and negated, because otherwise it would result that all everyday activity is given up.

has a content of its own, and can be grasped without reference to a counter-positive. ...Thus the field of astitva, of positiveness and determinateness, is the field of fixed meanings of words, of word-correlates. To such a position, the Buddhists oppose their doctrine of apoha; they do not accept any immanent positivity: Determination shall be explained as mere negation and exclusion.

The main points these two passages make about the affirmative element are:

1. by *vidhi* a twofold object is meant — a form of awareness and an external object,
2. two modes of awareness are indexed to these two aspects of it — appearance and determination,
3. the *vidhi* as a determined, external object is the object of practical activities.[329]

5.3.2.1 *VIDHI* AS A TWOFOLD OBJECT

In ll. 93–97, § 15, Ratnakīrti defines what is meant by the word *vidhi*: an external object according to determination and a form of awareness according to appearance. The phrasing of the passage, *yathādhyavasāyam ...yathāpratibhāsam*, suggests that the *vidhi* is either the external object or the form of awareness, depending on the way in which a person becomes aware of it. A natural question at this point might be to ask whether this *vidhi* should be understood as a single thing that one can cognize in two ways, or whether each of these two modes of cognition has a separate "positive element" as a part of its object. In the meantime, the best answer that can be given is that they are (ontologically) different entities. However, this answer cannot be understood correctly without the points made below (section 5.4) concerning the logic of determination (*adhyavasāya*): for while this cognitive function construes the external positive object on the basis of the appearing form of awareness, it does not show it in

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[329]It is through this property that the "positive element" is connected to a notion of true and false cognitions, because it allows a cognition to direct activity at an external particular that is able to fulfill a desired aim. Cf., e.g., the succinct formulation in Krasser 1995: 247:

> Following Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara defines correct or valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as reliable cognition (*avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānam*). *Avisaṃvā-daka* is explained as causing a person to obtain (*prāpaka*) the indicated (*pradarśita*) object (*vastu*), which itself is capable of producing an effect or of fulfilling one's purpose (*arthakriyāsamartha*).

any way. Similarly to the perception of an absence of other things, determination facilitates activity towards an external object that, though conceived of in an affirmative way, is not present to awareness other than as the way or the direction in which one might direct one's activity.[330]

In the passage currently under consideration, the *vidhi* as external object is then explained as not being a particular that appears in a conceptual awareness, but as being a result of determination alone. And it is to this external object that the qualification *atadrūpaparāvṛtta*, differentiated from that of another form, is applied. This should be noted as one way in which the *anyāpohaviśiṣṭa* of the central definition in ll. 36–37 (§ 7) can be predicated of the *vidhi*. Taking into account that this *vidhi* is the one that is brought to awareness in the form of determination, a first main line of understanding the central definition comes into focus: an external object qualified by other-exclusion is the referent of words, speaking in terms of determination. In terms of appearance, it is the form that awareness has.

5.3.3 Qualified by other-exclusion (*anyāpohaviśiṣṭa*)

So, presupposing the above two sides of *vidhi*, the positive element, what can be said about its quality, the exclusion from others?

As already analysed by Patil (2003: 231 ff.), exclusion is presented by Ratnakīrti both as a quality of the positive element, and as a capacity of conceptual awareness.

That it is a quality (or property) of the positive element is clear from the definition *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ* (ll. 36–37 in § 7).

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[330]In addition, it is unclear whether the "external object" mentioned here is the external particular that might be achieved through an activity, or the continuum (*santāna*) of momentary states that constitutes an external common-sense object (like a cow). The latter is the analysis suggested, on the basis of several passages in Ratnakīrti's work, in Patil 2009: 257–258, but we also find passages in which Ratnakīrti seems to be endorsing the former option (cf., e.g., footnote 352, 252, 240). In those statements, he calls this external object the object of activity in the context of inference, and hence it must be a particular that becomes attainable through this means of valid cognition.

In ll. 49–53 in § 8, grasping exclusion as a quality of the form of awareness is stated to be a capacity (*śakti*) that conceptual awareness has. These two aspects, being the qualifier of something and being a capacity, are presented alongside a comparison of two types of negation that can be brought to bear on perceptual as well as conceptual cognition of absence.[331] The structure of the example is the following:

1. *prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*: grasping absence in a non-implicatively negating form:[332]

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[331]While the perceptual grasping of an absence is a special case of perception, the conceptual grasping of absence is not a special case of conceptual cognition. For the object of conceptual cognition is always qualified by, or contains, *anyāpoha*, cf. section 5.3.1.

[332] A useful general account of the terms *prasajya-* and *paryudāsapratiṣedha* is Staal 1962. Cardona 1967 discusses this distinction in the grammatical literature, where it probably originated. Cf. Kellner 1997a: 92, n. 135 for further literature on the topic. Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 3 f.) draws attention to the fact that Mokṣākaragupta, like Ratnakīrti, uses the difference between the two types to differentiate types of *apoha*. Whether this is faithful to the actual development of the *apoha* theory is, however, not clear (see footnote 344). Here, *paryudāsa-* and *prasajyapratiṣedha* will be rendered as "implicative" and "non-implicative negation", respectively, following Patil (2009). One way of making sense of this distinction is: "This is a non-red apple.", which implies that the subject is an apple, and "This is not a red apple.", not implying that the subject is an apple. The distinction between these two types of negation has also been employed in philosophical restatements of the *apoha* theory such that the two negations in "not a non-cow" would be analysed as non-implicative and implicative negation, respectively. The aim was to resolve the problem that the application of two negations of the same type would be redundant. See Siderits 2011 for the latest version of this theory, and Siderits 1986, Siderits 1999, and H. G. Herzberger 1975 for earlier formulations. Earlier claims that this theory was held by ancient Buddhist authors (Siderits 1999: 347 attributed it to Śāntarakṣita), have been softened, Siderits (2011: 295): "I know of no smoking gun that proves the apoha theorists modeled their 'exclusion of the other' on what happens when we combine two styles of negation. It does still strike me as plausible that they may have had some such idea in mind." Recent studies on Śāntarakṣita's usage of the two types of negation do not indicate that he used these types of negation to explain the double negation in *anyāpoha* (see Ishida 2011b and Okada 2017); its merit in saving this kind of nominalism has recently been discussed by Hale 2011: 260–262 and Gillon 2011.

a) For perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*) this is the capacity to produce a concept of absence (*abhāvavikalpotpādanaśakti*), i.e., what is meant by "perception of non-x" is the capacity to produce the conceptual cognition "There is no x here."

b) For the conceptual cognition of a positive element (*vidhivikalpa*) this is the capacity of leading to activity in conformance with the grasped absence (*tadanurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśakti*), i.e., what is meant by "conceptual cognition of non-x" is the capacity that a conceptual cognition of the positive element has for making determinate activity directed at external objects possible.[333]

2. *paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*: grasping absence in an implicatively negating form:

a) the awareness of something with a concrete form particular to it, *niyatasvarūpasaṃvedanam*, for both perception and the conceptual awareness of a positive element.

This comparison is not easy to make sense of.[334] The following arguments support a schema as shown in table 5.3.

Before analysing the example, it will be helpful to review the scholarly discussions of its model in the AP 205,12–16, which is as follows:

> *yathā vā vidhivṛtter agrahaṇaṃ nāma prasajyapakṣe niyatarūpānubhavād abhāvavikalpotpādanaśaktir eva, tathā vidhivikalpānām api tantre 'nurūpānuṣṭhānadānaśaktir*

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[333]The relevant example (l. 55) is that someone is told "Tether the cow!", and tethers a cow, but not a horse. "Tether the cow!" generates a conceptual cognition of cow, which in turn is the awareness of the absence of non-cows that makes activity with regard to *any* cow possible. In the translation of this example, it is assumed that there is only one cow present, so that the "the", without an actual Sanskrit equivalent, is justified.

[334]It seems that both in Patil 2003: 232 and Patil 2009: 213 only the first part of the example (*prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*) is translated and discussed.

Table 5.3 – The cognition of absence

	prasajya	*paryudāsa*
object of *abhāvapratyakṣa*	ghaṭābhāva	bhūtala
object of *vikalpa*	agavāpoḍha (not non-cow)	buddhyākāra
cognitive function	adhyavasāya	pratibhāsa
classification	śakti	niyatasvarūpa-saṃvedana

eva niṣedhagrahaṇam agnir mayā pratīta ity anuvyavasā-yaprasavaśaktiś ca. paryudāsapakṣe ca niyatasvarūpa-saṃvedanam evobhayatra niṣedhagrahaṇam.

Or, as the non-grasping of an occurrence of a positive element is, on the position [that the negation in this non-grasping] is a non-implicative negation, simply the capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of an absence based on the [direct] experience of a [particular] having a well-defined form, so for conceptual cognitions of a positive element, too, the grasping of a negation is simply the capacity to bestow an incitement [to an activity] that conforms to a general norm, and the capacity to produce a determination conforming to [a statements like] "I perceive a fire." And, on the position of implicative negation, the grasping of a negation is simply the apprehension of a well-defined, particular form in both cases.

The first translation and detailed scholarly discussion of this passage is found in Akamatsu 1983: 56–7, with its annotations.[335] It

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[335]Additionally, Katsura (1986: 174) notes that the context in which this comparison appears in the *AP* is based on the discussion of the *anupalabdhihetuḥ* in the *HB* (HB 26,1 ff.). The reason he gives there is that Jñānaśrīmitra cites a *HB* passage in the same context (cf. Katsura 1986: 174 and p. 180, n. 20, and footnote 91), apart from the fact that clearly the grasping of absence is a topic that would be discussed in the context of *anupalabdhi*.

corresponds largely to how the passage in the *AS* was interpreted above.

McCrea and Patil (2010: 55; 153, nn. 41,42) give a rather different interpretation of this passage. Whilst they also emphasize that Jñānaśrīmitra is here maintaining that the positive and negative elements of any verbal or inferential awareness are simultaneously known, their interpretations of the positive and negative elements, and of how the latter is linked to the two types of negation, diverge strongly from the earlier interpretation. Perhaps the basis for their interpretation is their slight emendation (against Thakur's edition) at the end of the passage under discussion: instead of the single sentence "*paryudāsapakṣe ca niyatasvarūpasaṃvedanam evobhayatra niṣedhagrahaṇam.*" (AP 205,15–16), they read "*paryudāsapakṣe ca niyatasvarūpasaṃvedanam eva. ubhayatra niṣedhagrahaṇam.*" (McCrea and Patil 2010: 103; 174, n. 20) The main difference that arises from this concerns the interpretation of what *ubhayatra* refers to.

Akamatsu (1983: 57) takes the expression as referring to perception and conceptual cognition. The sentence then says that in both those cases the grasping of a negation, in the sense of an implicative negation, is the awareness of the present object's own form. McCrea and Patil (2010: 55), however, translate: "And in the case of implicative negation, there is, of course, the awareness of a definite form (*niyata-svarūpa*). In both cases, there is the incorporation of negation." The phrase "In both cases" refers, in all likelihood, to the cases of implicative and non-implicative negation (as *ubhayam* does in the following sentence, *ubhayam caitad abhimataṃ śāstrakārasya.* AP 205,16). If this were indeed what is meant, Jñānaśrīmitra would here be explaining that these two types of negation, commonly distinguished in Sanskrit literature of this genre, each contain a negation. This would be a somewhat redundant statement on Jñānaśrīmitra's part, and one might want to consider other possibilities.

In an alternative understanding, "In both cases" might refer to two different types of conceptual cognition, that of present things and that of absent things. This interpretation rests on McCrea and

Patil 2010: 153, n. 42, where attention is drawn to the context, i.e., that Jñānaśrīmitra is here explaining why it seems to us that we have "positive" and "negative" content in cognitions, in answer to an earlier objection that all inferences would have the same type of reason, *anupalabdhihetu*, McCrea and Patil 2010: 153, n. 42:

> A conceptual awareness is considered to have positive content when the activity pursued on the basis of it and the reflective awareness that we form regarding it are taken to involve a positive object. It is considered to have negative content when the activity pursued on the basis of it and the reflective awareness that we form regarding it are taken to involve an absence."

This interpretation seems possible, as far as the text of the AP is concerned, and preferable in comparison to the redundant first option.

However, Ratnakīrti's reformulation of the passage would then be very unfaithful: first, his reformulation clarifies that the comparison is between perception and conceptual cognition, and not between "the nonincorporation of the role of the positive entity" (McCrea and Patil 2010: 56) and conceptual cognition; second, the term *ubhayor*, the equivalent to Jñānaśrī's *ubhayatra*, here certainly refers to perception and conceptual cognition, thus suggesting that the point is that, for an implicative negation, the "incorporation of a negation" is "the awareness of a definite form" (McCrea and Patil 2010: 56) in both cases–perception and conceptual cognition. In light of Ratnakīrti's reformulation, we should therefore not emend as suggested by McCrea and Patil 2010: 103; 174, n. 20, but rather construe Jñānaśrīmitra's sentence in line with Ratnakīrti's reformulation and understand that, both for non-apprehension and conceptual cognition, the grasping of an absence in an implicative form consists in the direct awareness of what appears to each of the cognitions.

If this interpretation of the model of Ratnakīrti's passage is accepted, we can focus fully on the two main problems that need to be solved for Ratnakīrti's presentation. They are as follows:

1. How is the absence in the two cases relevantly similar — how is it useful to compare the perceptually cognizable absence of a pot on a perceived stretch of floor with the conceptually cognizable absence of something's not being that, i.e., its quality "the exclusion from others"?

2. What is the relationship between the non-implicative and implicative negation? Is each just possible, so that sometimes the one and at other times the other will have to be applied in the analysis of these cognitions, or are they somehow interdependent?

What seems clear is that the absence which is grasped both by perception and conceptual cognition can be grasped in two forms: as non-implicative and implicative negation, cognized by means of that which is present to each cognition, i.e., an empty piece of floor or the form of awareness.[336] In the case of conceptual cognition, the absence which is so cognized is *anyāpoha*, exclusion from others, e.g., non-cows. In the case of perception, it is the non-existence of something in a specific, perceptually cognized place, e.g., on a stretch of floor here and now.

There seem to be two ways of interpreting these statements: either both forms of negation can occur or both must occur so that a perceptual and conceptual cognition of absence is such a cognition of absence.[337] Here the latter option will be argued for: both in a perception of absence and in conceptual awareness, which always

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[336]The absence of the pot in some place is the standard example of non-perception, used, e.g., in HB 28,16–17, as well as in § 13. That it is the form of awareness, *buddhyākāra*, that is present in conceptual awareness, is apparent from the argument that a form of awareness is not affirmed or negated because of being comprehended through self-awareness, l. 278 in 48.

[337]This grasping of absence should not be confused with a full cognition of absence. The latter is a conceptual cognition that follows a perception. It has a particular negated object, while the perception preceding it has the potential to generate a myriad of such conceptual judgements. It is this perception that Ratnakīrti is using in his comparison to conceptual cognition. The reason that Ratnakīrti can view a conceptual cognition as a case of "grasping absence" and so assign it the same potential as the perception of an empty surface, is that it is, essentially, a

has other-exclusion (*anyāpoha*, cf. section 5.3.1) as its object and thus involves the grasping of an absence, a dual absence, one in the non-implicatively negating form and the other in the implicatively negating form, is involved.

In the perception of an empty floor, for example, the absence (*abhāva*) of *all* things which are not on the floor becomes known in a non-implicatively, or absolutely, negating way. It is not actually all things that are cognized as absent (which would require a judgement like "There is no pot, no cloth, no chair, ...here on the floor."), but the absence itself of all these things (so that any judgement like "There is no pot here on the floor." or "There is no chair here on the floor" becomes *possible*). Correspondingly, in the conceptual awareness "cow", the non-implicatively negating absence (*abhāva*) of *all* things that are not cows is cognized through the appearing form of awareness (*ākāra*). In both cases this is a non-implicative negation, i.e., a negation that, upon perception, can potentially be expressed as "It is not the case that anything is here on the floor.", and, upon its conceptual cognition, can lead to activity directed towards anything of which it is true that it is not a non-cow: in the case of the perception of the empty floor, this grasping of a non-implicative absence or negative constituent, which explains the adjective "empty" (i.e., the absence of a pot on the floor, *bhūtalaghaṭābhāva*, mentioned in § 13), is analysed only as a capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of absence: "There is no pot, chair, etc. on the floor." In the case of conceptual cognition, the grasping of a non-implicatively negating element, the *anyāpoha*, becomes apparent only in the cognition's capacity to lead

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self-perception of awareness with an indistinct image.

For a careful examination of a cognition of absence, as described in HB 30,13–31,2, see McCrea and Patil 2006: 322–324. For critical editions of Jñānaśrīmitra's main texts on the subject, the *Anupalabdhirahasya* and the *Sarvaśabdābhāvacarcā*, see Kellner 2007. Kellner 1997b discusses the difference between Dharmottara's and Jñānaśrīmitra's positions on how inference and perception are involved in a cognition of absence.

to an act with regard to what is in accordance with this negation, for example, any cow.[338]

According to Ratnakīrti's comparison, one also grasps an absence in the form of an implicative negation. The result of this is the same for perception and conceptual cognition: the awareness of something with its own fixed form, *niyatasvarūpasaṃvedana*, meaning a particular. In the case of the perception of an absence, the awareness of absence is identical with the awareness of the presence of another thing: the potential to conceptually cognize absence of a certain object, or anything, is precisely the perception of the floor. It is implicative negation or absence in that it is the affirmation or presence of some other positive thing, in this case a particular piece of floor. In the case of conceptual cognition, which always has absence or the exclusion from others as its object, it is the *buddhyākāra* that is qualified by absence in an implicatively negating manner, the form of awareness which is a particular that is present in any given awareness event.

The absence in a non-implicatively negating form is determined, and the absence in an implicatively negating form is grasped — both in the perception of absence and in conceptual awareness. For it is a particular that is manifest and grasped in perceptual awareness,[339] and it is a form of awareness that is directly manifest and grasped in conceptual awareness.[340] The latter is one of the two aspects of the *vidhi* in the definition of the word referent from the side of determination. However, it is a particular that is determined in perception, and thus makes activity possible with regard to it (one

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[338]Actually, it depends somewhat on the situation: the speaker could be referring to a particular cow that she wishes to be tethered. In that case, the proper other-exclusion would be "what is not not that cow", instead of "what is not a non-cow."

[339]About this there is no dispute, so it is not expressly proven. This seems to be the argument in ll. 91 f., § 15.

[340]This is implied in the argument given in l. 278: there is no activity with regard to the form of awareness, because it is known through the form of perception that is self-awareness. This presupposes that Ratnakīrti held a notion of self-awareness very similar to that described in Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 47: self-awareness is "...[a kind of] indeterminate knowledge free from fictional constructs and unerring ...."

activity being the formation of the concept "No pot here."),[341] and it is an external object, likewise a particular, that is determined on the grounds of the appearing form of awareness in the case of conceptual cognition. The latter is the second aspect of the *vidhi* in Ratnakīrti's definition of the word referent.

Consequently, the exclusion from others that qualifies the positive or affirmative element is

1. a quality that the form of awareness has (insofar as this form is directly perceived, it is perceived with all its attributes, including this absential qualifier), and

2. the capacity that this state of awareness has (because it has a form with that quality) to make activity that accords to expectation possible

This interpretation thus suggests that, for Ratnakīrti, it is primarily an ontological, and not an epistemological, affair to say that the positive element has the quality "exclusion". A form of awareness, a particular, is qualified by *anyāpoha* just like any other particular would be qualified by it. Exclusion is literally a quality of such an image: the exclusion shared by the class of cows, that is, by all particular point-instants of every continuum that constitutes a cow, is the same as that which any cognitive form has that can be classified as constituting a cognition of "cow". It is thus not, or at least not primarily, a form of presentation of something, or a matter of knowing something, that Ratnakīrti is here concerned with.

This makes it possible for Ratnakīrti to maintain that the reason one cognizes the (conventionally correct) exclusion when a word is understood is that that word has been learned as referring to something, a certain cow particular or set thereof, insofar as it or

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[341]The question of what is determined in perception is answered differently in Patil 2009; there, it is a commonness as a "genericized-particular" (Patil 2009: 259, n. 32) that is determined by perception. This interpretation will be discussed below, section 5.4. Briefly, Ratnakīrti considers determination to be a non-representing state of awareness; its object is a "particular as such", a particular that is not directly presented with its specific place, time, or shape, but only indirectly through its exclusions. It is thus a future particular, much like Prajñākaragupta held it to be (see Kobayashi 2011, McAllister forthcoming a).

they are differentiated from non-cows (cf. § 8). Ratnakīrti wants us to believe that, on hearing two particular instances of words, like "cow" and "cow", we are disposed to judge that they mean the same, just as looking at the same stretch of floor at two different times each time disposes us to say "The floor is empty." The identity of "the same" judgements is nothing but the fact that they each dispose a person to endorse each of them as expressing the same state of affairs. And they dispose a person to such a judgement not because of what they are known to show, but because of the quality that they have. On Ratnakīrti's explanation,[342] this way of founding reference does not present more problems than the opponent's foundation of reference on a substantially existing universal. For in that case too, the word referent is supposed to be a *specific* universal, not a particular or a universal as such (one that is not cow-hood, horse-hood, etc.). The particular is not general enough for a convention regarding it to be of any use, and so the criticism against the *apoha* theory on these grounds would equally apply to the opponent; the universal as such is not useful either: that cow-hood qualifies a lump of matter means, for the opponent, that that material entity is a cow, but not that it is a universal as such or a concrete universal like "cow-hood". For Ratnakīrti, a universal cannot be known wholly independently of any instantiation.[343]

The question remains of how Ratnakīrti's definition of the referent of a word as "positive element characterized by the exclusion of others" should be understood as a whole. It is with regard to the relation of the positive and negative aspect involved in this definition that the above differentiation between the capacity aspect and the quality aspect of "exclusion from others" comes into meaningful perspective.

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[342]Cf. § 12. The point of the arguments given there is to show that *anyāpoha* does not lead to any worse logical problems than the assumption of a really existing universal.

[343]The present author was unable to find passages in Ratnakīrti's work where universals that cannot be instantiated are discussed. It is unclear whether Ratnakīrti (or his opponents) thought this might be possible.

5.3.4 *Relation between anyāpoha and vidhi*

A distinctive feature of Jñānaśrīmitra's and Ratnakīrti's version of the *apoha* theory is the stress they lay on the simultaneous cognition of the two parts of the word referent, exclusion and the positive or affirmative element:[344]

> ll. 43–49 in § 8:
> Therefore a cognition of a cow is called the cognition of that excluded from others. And even if the non-representation of the words "excluded from others" [in conceptual cognition] has been maintained, nevertheless there is no non-cognition at all of other-exclusion, which is the qualifier, because the word "cow" is founded only on that excluded from non-cow. As the appearance of blue is unavoidable at that time when there is the cognition of a water lily that is blue because of the word "*indīvara*" which is founded on a blue water lily, so also the appearance of the exclusion of non-cow is unavoidable, because it is a qualifier, in the same moment as there is the cognition of a cow from the word "cow" which is founded on that excluded from non-cow.

From this passage it follows that the cognition "cow" is equivalent to the cognition of that excluded from non-cows. In other words, the positive element, *vidhi*, is that excluded from others, *anyāpoḍha*, due to having exclusion, *anyāpoha*, as its qualifier. The example illustrates that the cognition of "*indīvara*" is impossible without

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[344]This is also the central point of the critique of the affirmationist and negationist positions (*vidhi*- and *pratiṣedhavādin* positions) in this passage. This distinction made by Ratnakīrti has been an important factor in assessing the *apoha* theory's development. The main secondary literature on how to understand this aspect is: Mookerjee 1935: 132 ff., Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 125, n. 338, Akamatsu 1986, Katsura 1986, Siderits 1986, Patil 2003: 230 f., and–given the similarity of the *AS* to Jñānaśrīmitra's *AP*—also McCrea and Patil 2006. More recently, Okada 2017 has examined Śākyabuddhi's interpretation and concluded that this distinction has its roots already in this early commentator's work.

the qualifier "blue" being cognized in the same moment as "water lily".[345] This means that what can be understood as the *vidhi*'s quality, exclusion from others, is essential to it in the sense that it cannot be grasped or cognized without it. Understanding the word "cow" is simultaneous to, and cognitively not separable from, understanding "not non-cow."

This analysis leads to the following question: given that the positive element is both present in the mode of appearance and determination (cf. section 5.3.2.1, section 5.4), is its qualifier, the exclusion from others, also present in both modes?[346] Against the background of the arguments above (section 5.3.3), this should be affirmed. Ratnakīrti unambiguously states, in § 15, that, in the context of determination, the term "positive element" refers to an external object that is differentiated from others, and that, in the context of direct appearance, the term refers to the form of awareness. Accordingly, the main constituents of the "complex entity" (Patil 2003: 230) that is the referent of words, the *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ*, might be analysed as follows: any conceptual awareness event can be analysed as possessing a positive element which is qualified by exclusion, and it can be so analysed in two respects, according to whether it is regarded as directly perceived by self-awareness or whether it is regarded as determined. Both the positive and the negative elements (the exclusion) are present in each of these modes

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[345]As mentioned in footnote 89, the Sanskrit word "*indīvara*" is not composed of parts that would correspond to "blue" and "water lily".

[346]This is not supported in the place where a direct clarification could have been given by Ratnakīrti, l. 93 ff., § 15: "And by the word "positive element" an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according to determination, and according to manifestation a form of awareness [is meant]." Here Ratnakīrti qualifies only the determined aspect of the positive element, the external object, as distinguished from that of another nature, but not the form of awareness. On the other hand, if it were not the case that differentiation from others would qualify the form of awareness also, it would be hard to see how Ratnakīrti separates his view from that of the affirmationists (*vidhivādin*), who take the positive element as the primary element, at least temporally speaking. Cf. Akamatsu 1986 for a description of their view.

of awareness; in the perceptual apprehension of the conceptual state that this awareness has, the form of cognition is the positive element and its quality, the exclusion of what is different from it (including other images), is its property. In the determination of this image, that is to say, in the potential for generating useful activity that this conceptual state has, an external object, the positive element, can be distinguished from its quality, the exclusion of other things (including other external objects). In each case, furthermore, the positive element is so called because it is known positively, in the sense of an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*), whereas its quality is known wholly negatively, in the sense of a non-implicative negation. The result of this is that the quality "other exclusion" is primarily present as the capacity that a conceptual awareness event has to generate other awareness events (some of which will produce everyday activities visible to others) which will be able to avoid the group of things so excluded.

The statement above that this complex object is "present in each of these modes of awareness" can now be refined so as to avoid a misunderstanding: the fundamental way in which one is aware of anything is through self-awareness, i.e., the awareness even of a conceptual awareness state is a perception of awareness by itself. We must thus conclude that "determination" is not an irreducible type of awareness state.[347] A conceptual cognition, in other words, must be analysed as a particular case of self-awareness. The connection between determination and appearance will be more fully examined below (section 5.4). Here, one should note that Ratnakīrti has divided the phenomenal and the causal aspects of conceptual cognitions very neatly: just like an external object is (for a Buddhist epistemologist like Ratnakīrti) differentiated from everything else, so the form of awareness is too. It is simply a particular. What it shows or what we might judge it to represent, the *vidhi*, is functional for Ratnakīrti's

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[347]We shall see below (page 253) that, in effect, the only true distinction between conceptual and perceptual awareness events lies in the distinctness of the images that they have.

theory of conceptual cognition only due to one of its qualities, other-exclusion, not due to its content. The similarity that the *apoha* theory aims to explain as the exclusion of everything that is something else, is "present" only as the capacity to direct subsequent activity in such a way as to correspond to particulars that are likewise so differentiated. It is not present in any meaningful way of "to know."[348] What it represents is not the question, though it might satisfy the common (apparently even at Ratnakīrti's time) assumption that some kind of sameness or similarity is actually apparent in many, and all conceptual, cognitions.

Furthermore, the implicative and non-implicative types of negation must be known simultaneously: this is the whole point of § 8, where it is stated that a quality (here, exclusion) and that qualified by it (the positive element, either the external object or the internal appearance) must be apprehended in one cognition. It is somewhat less obvious whether the characterization, made above, of appearance and determination pertaining to the same awareness event that follows the perception of a word, can be correct: the simultaneity of perception and determination would seem to blatantly contradict the difference between perceptions and conceptual cognitions that is central to the Buddhist logico-epistemological school's tenet that there are two, and only two, means of valid cognition, perception and inference. Indeed, there is at least one passage in which Ratnakīrti argues against the simultaneity of conceptual and non-conceptual cognition, SJS 24,5–7:

> *nanu vaktṛtvaṃ virudhyata eva sarvaviṣayanirvikalpa-jñānaviruddhavikalpakāryatvād vaktṛtvasya. naitad yu-ktam, savikalpāvikalpayor yugapad avṛtter vikalpatvena sarvajñasyāvirodhāt.*
>
> [Opponent:] Is it not so that the fact that [an omniscient being] speaks is actually contradicted [by what you have

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[348]This is the problem at the core of the discussion in §§ 51–52. Ratnakīrti's solution is built on the causal continuity that runs from previously experienced particulars through particular cognitions to future particulars.

said], because to be a speaker is the result of a conceptual cognition, which contradicts [this omniscient being's] non-conceptual cognition of all objects? [Proponent:] This is not correct, because, since conceptual and non-conceptual cognition do not occur simultaneously, an omniscient being is not contradictory to there being a conceptual cognition.[349]

This is a response to the charge that an omniscient being, as defined by the Buddhists, could not speak, since speech is the effect of conceptual cognition but omniscience is a non-conceptual cognition. Ratnakīrti's answer must be taken seriously. However, it does not make the analysis presented here impossible.

On the one hand, if the impossibility of a simultaneous conceptual and non-conceptual cognition were his final position, it would contradict the principal position that any moment of awareness is based on the perception of a form of cognition. I.e., since conceptual cognitions have forms (*sākāra*), and these forms are perceived by a perception of the type self-awareness, it follows that conceptual cognitions must be perceptions, albeit internal ones. If so, one would have to interpret Ratnakīrti's argument as saying that the perception of external things, but not that of the form of awareness by awareness itself, is never simultaneous with conceptual cognition. This interpretation would also accord with Ratnakīrti's arguments about the "distinct" and "indistinct" forms of awareness that differentiate perceptual and conceptual awareness events in §§ 17–20.

On the other hand, one should consider that Ratnakīrti also gives a second answer to the opponent's objection, based on an argument by Prajñākaragupta.[350] This answer is based on the possibility of habituated concept usage, which involves concepts only during the formation of a habit, but not when these habits are exercised. It is possible that this is the explanatory model preferred by Ratnakīrti,

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[349]Cf. Bühnemann 1980: 69–70 for an annotated translation into German.

[350]This alternative answer is found in SJS 25,11–20, see Bühnemann 1980: 72 ff. for a German translation.

though this is not examined in much detail by Bühnemann (1980). She notes only that Ratnakīrti presents different answers, and that the first one, that conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions are not contradictory because they do not occur simultaneously, is the one he endorses.[351]

We may thus conclude that the perception of the type self-awareness and conceptual cognition are, and indeed must be, simultaneous, given Ratnakīrti's arguments in § 8 and his general theory that awareness always really possesses a form (*sākāra*). The "positive element" (*vidhi*) and the exclusion (*apoha*) which qualifies it are, equally, cognized at the same moment in a conceptual cognition. They are known in the forms of an implicative and non-implicative negation, respectively. A conceptual cognition can therefore be analysed as consisting of a self-perception of an indistinct form that awareness has, and the potential in this self-awareness to generate activity consistent with the form that appears. A conceptual cognition is thus an ephemeral phenomenon, the particular state of a self-perception of awareness in which it has an indistinct form. Other-exclusion, on this interpretation, is nothing but the causal potential that qualifies the perception of an indistinct form of awareness. Just as the perception of an empty stretch of floor potentially includes a practically infinite amount of explicit negations (one for every thing that is not on that stretch of floor) without a concrete awareness of all these things that are negated, so the self-perception by awareness of its own indistinct form potentially negates all things that are not perceived there.

5.4 TWO MODES OF AWARENESS: *PRATIBHĀSA* AND *ADHYAVASĀYA*

In describing the complex object that is the word referent (cf. § 15, § 48), Ratnakīrti distinguishes the appearance and determination of that

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[351]"Nach Ratnakīrti besteht zwischen vorstellender und vorstellungsfreier Erkenntnis kein Widerspuch, weil beide nicht gleichzeitig vorkommen." Bühnemann 1980: xiv

complex object. Some comments on this distinction are necessary in order to gain a clearer picture of Ratnakīrti's general idea of cognition, its structure, and the place of verbal or conceptual cognition within that structure. The analysis of cognitions in terms of appearance and determination is, furthermore, one that is repeatedly used by Ratnakīrti, and a good understanding of it will help in exploring his other texts.[352]

Patil (2009: Chapter 5) has provided the most extensive analysis of this matter. The basic interpretation developed by Patil (2009: 250–299) is that for Ratnakīrti each type of cognition, *pratyakṣa* and *vikalpa*, has two kinds of object: a direct object, grasped in virtue of directly appearing (*pratibhāsa*) to either perceptual or conceptual awareness, and an indirect one, known to perceptual or conceptual awareness by virtue of determination (*adhyavasāya*). Patil (2009: 253) summarizes this:

> There are, therefore, three pairs of concepts that are used to classify the contents of awareness: "perceptual" or "inferential/verbal," which indicate the kind of awareness-event in which a particular object/image appears; "manifest" or "determined," which indicate the way in which it appears; and "particular" or "universal," which indicate (in retrospect) what appears.

His analysis then goes on to show how the direct and indirect objects of perception and conceptual awareness are related to these

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[352]See, for example, SJS 20,11–14: *āgamānumānayor dvividho viṣayaḥ grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. tatra grāhyaḥ svākāraḥ, adhyavaseyas tu pāramārthikavastusvalakṣaṇātmā. asya ca parokṣatve 'numānasāmagrīsambhave 'numānaviṣayatvam, pratyakṣasāmagrīsambhave ca krameṇa pratyakṣaviṣayatvaṃ dṛṣṭam eva.* (Both scriptural tradition and inference have a twofold object, grasped and determined. Amongst these, the grasped [object] is the form [of awareness] itself, but the determined [object] has the nature of a particular, an ultimately real thing. And if this [object] is beyond the senses, then it is considered the object of inference if the complete causal complex of inference comes about; but if the complete causal complex of perception comes about, it is considered the object of perception.); KBhSA 73,20: *dvividho hi pratyakṣasya viṣayaḥ, grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca.* (For perception has a twofold object, grasped and determined.), as well as CAPV 131,4–5 (see page 252).

concepts, resulting in the scheme shown in table 5.4: perception grasps, or directly knows, a particular, and determines, or indirectly knows, a universal; conceptual cognition grasps a universal and determines a particular. He thus differentiates four objects: perception has a "manifest particular" and "determined universal" as its objects, and conceptual cognition has a "manifest universal" and a "determined particular" (Patil 2009: 252–253).

In the further discussion by Patil (2009: 253–288) it becomes apparent that this interpretation entails positions that are at odds with the usual ontological categories as Dharmakīrti uses them. The result of this understanding is that, as Patil (2009: 279) puts it,

> ...for Ratnakīrti, particulars and universals are defined relative to one another–there is no object that is in and of itself either a "particular" or a "universal." The image that appears in the first stage of the perceptual process is not a "grasped object of perception" because it is a particular, rather it is a "particular" because it is the grasped object of perception. In the same way, the image that appears in the first stage of the inferential process is not a "grasped object of inference" because it is a universal, but rather it is a "universal" because it is the grasped object of inference. Objects/images are labelled as "particulars" or "universals" only in relation to a subsequent determination. Thus for Ratnakīrti "particular" and "universal" are not really ontological categories at all. Instead, they are defined contextually.

Two points are made here that will be important to the analysis given below: the first is about ontology, namely that the "determined particular" of conceptual cognition is not the particular that is defined by having causal efficacy, and that the "manifest universal" is not the universal that is defined by the lack of that efficacy. This constitutes a clear break from Dharmakīrti's fundamental differentiation between these two kinds of entities.[353] The second point, which concerns the

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[353]See PV III 1–3, recently translated and interpreted in Franco and Notake 2014.

logic of determination and therefore an epistemological matter, is that these two objects are categorized as they are due to a *subsequent* determination. The interpretation that will be proposed here differs in these two points: first, determination, at least in the context of conceptual cognitions, cannot be factually and temporally separate from the grasping, though it can be separated analytically; second, "particular" and "universal" are primarily ontological categories for Ratnakīrti, and he employs them in general accordance with Dharmakīrti's notions throughout his works. Anything he calls a "particular" is a particular insofar as it is a point-instant resulting from an immediately preceding particular and possesses the capacity to cause a new one. Universals can be reduced to relation properties that characterize such particulars, and as such they lack causal capacity (cf. section 5.3.3).

Ratnakīrti's various statements about the two kinds of cognition, perception and conceptual cognition, and their objects are not, at first sight, easy to align with each other. A problem might arise, for example, if the following statements from the *VyN* and the *KBhSA* are read alongside each other:

> VyN 8*,12–15 (VyN$_2$ 109,14–18): *yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate, tad grāhyam. yatra tu yataḥ*[354] *pravartate, tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇaṃ grā-hyam, adhyavaseyaṃ tu sāmānyam atadrūpaparāvṛtta-svalakṣaṇamātrātmakam. anumānasya tu viparyayaḥ.*

> For, what appears in some cognition, that is what is to be grasped. But with regard to which [someone] acts because of some [cognition], that is what is to be determined. Amongst these [two objects], for perception it is a particular that is to be grasped. But what is to be determined is a universal, having the nature of a mere

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[354]Read *yataḥ* acc. to VyN 8*,13, against Thakur's emendation to *tat* VyN$_2$ 109,16.

Table 5.4 – Four objects (O_{1-4}) of awareness. (Page numbers refer to Patil 2009.)

	O_1	O_2	O_3	O_4	comment/quote
grāhya (by *pratibhāsa*)	x				"...directly grasped (*grāhya*) by awareness." (p. 251)
adhyavaseya (by *adhya-vasāya*)			x	x	"similarity class", "constructed through exclusion" (p. 251)
svalakṣaṇa	x			x	"...O_1 is a manifest particular and O_4 a determined particular." (p. 252)
sāmānya		x	x		"...O_2 is a determined universal and O_3 a manifest universal." (p. 252)
mental images (*ākāra*)	x	x	x	x	"Both direct and indirect objects can also be understood as mental objects/images ...." (p. 252)
ultimately real	x				"...under the most rigorous philosophical description, only objects like O_1 really exist."(p. 253)
ultimately unreal		x	x	x	"In the final analysis, ...objects like O_2,O_3,O_4 [do not] *really* exist." (p. 253)
nirvikalpa	x				Object O_1 "...is the only object ...not necessarily associated with some form of mental construction (*vikalpa*)." (p. 253f.)
savikalpa		x	x		associated with *vikalpa* (consequence of previous item)
viṣayīkṛta		x	x	x	"...objects that appear to us as though we can act upon them (O_2/O_4) ..." (p. 256); cf. also p. 265–266
bahis		x		x	O_2 as external is "...an externally projected mental image that only appears to be independent of us." (p. 264); "O_{4e} is just the external projection of O_4." (p. 281)

Table 5.5 – Objects of *pratyakṣa* and *vikalpa*

Mode of awareness	Obj. of perception	Obj. of conc. cognition	Ontological status
grahaṇa	*svalakṣaṇa*	*svākāra*	*svalakṣaṇa* (present)
adhyavasāya	*vastumātra*	*bāhyo 'rthaḥ*	*svalakṣaṇa* (future)

particular that is excluded from that of another form. But for inference the opposite is [the case].[355]

Apparently Ratnakīrti here claims that perception and inference have the same kinds of objects, but in inverse modes of awareness. This passage, taken by itself, would thus mean that perception's grasped object, a particular, is the same as the determined object in inference, i.e., a particular, and the determined object of perception is the same commonness or universal[356] that is grasped in an inference.

On the same topic, Ratnakīrti has the following to say in KBhSA 73,8–17:

> *yac ca gṛhyate yac cādhyavasīyate te dve 'py anyanivṛttī, na vastunī, svalakṣaṇāvagāhitve 'bhilāpasaṃsargānu-papatter iti cet, na, adhyavasāyasvarūpāparijñānāt.*[357]

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[355]Cf. also the translation and note in Lasic 2000b: 63–64. This passage is closely modelled on VC 13,3–6. In the translation of that passage, Lasic (2000a: 95, n. 52) refers to Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 58, Steinkellner and Krasser 1989: 77 f. and Krasser 1991: 41 ff. for information about the view that every cognition has two objects. To this should be added the translation of the same passage and the discussion in McCrea and Patil 2006: 334–336, as well as in Patil 2009: 251, n. 7.

[356]As pointed out by Patil (2009: 259), this universal's characterization, *atadrūpa-parāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam*, is importantly reminiscent of what words have as their objects: *adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaram* (l. 306 in § 54).

[357] Cf. the close parallel of this passage in SJS 10,26–28, where it is part of a quote from NK (see Bühnemann 1980: p. 113, n. 174). Within that quote, it is an objection by a Buddhist opponent, and the corresponding passage in NVTṬ 444,22,

agṛhīte 'pi vastuni mānasādipravṛttikārakatvaṃ[358] *vi-*
kalpasyādhyavasāyitvam. apratibhāse 'pi pravṛttiviṣayī-
kṛtatvam[359] *adhyavaseyatvam. etac cādhyavaseyatvaṃ*
svalakṣaṇasyaiva yujyate, nānyasya, arthakriyārthitvād
arthipravṛtteḥ. evaṃ cādhyavasāye svalakṣaṇasyāsphura-
ṇam eva.

[Opponent:] But both that which is grasped and that
which is determined, all two, are negations of others, but
not real things, because a connection with a designation
is not possible when [a cognition] is fully immersed in
the particular.

[Proponent:] No, [that is not the case], because the nature
of determination was not fully understood [by you]. For
conceptual cognition, to determine [that real thing] is
to produce an activity, like mental [activity] and so on,
towards [that] real thing, even though it is not grasped
[by the conceptual cognition]. To be made the object
of activity, even though there is no appearance [of the
real thing the activity is directed at], is what it is [for
that thing] to be [the object] determined [by conceptual
cognition]. And this fact of being what is determined
is coherent only for the particular, [and] nothing else,
because someone with an aim acts due to having a causal
efficiency [of a real thing] as an aim. And in this way
there is absolutely no appearance of a particular in a
determination [of it].

This passage says that the object of determination is most defi-
nitely the particular. That is, it flatly contradicts one point of the

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as the position in general, can be attributed to Dharmottara (see Frauwallner
1937: 277, McCrea and Patil 2006: 333). That is to say, Ratnakīrti is here refuting a
view held by his fellow Buddhist Dharmottara.

[358]Corrected against *mānasyādi°* acc. to Woo 1999: 72.

[359]Patil 2009: 257, n. 23 and Patil 2003: 247, n. 17 both read *pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtam*
instead of *pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtatvam*. This is probably only a typo, since neither
RNĀ 73,10 nor Woo 1999: 72 note any variants to *pravṛttiviṣayīkṛtatvam*, which is
also what RNĀ_ms 40b3 supports.

passage from the VyN (page 238), namely that perception determines a universal. In order to avoid the assumption that Ratnakīrti, a meticulous logician, trapped himself in a self-contradiction with these two passages, we will have to revise our understanding of *sāmānya* in the VyN passage (page 238). The following arguments should show that, in fact, the determined object is a particular as well.

Note, first of all, that the attribute that Ratnakīrti adds to *sāmānya* in VyN 8*,14–15 passage (page 238), that it has "the nature of a mere particular that is excluded from that of another form", can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, it could mean that, as Patil (2009: 251, n. 7) takes it, "the determined object is a universal, i.e., a genericized-particular excluded from those that do not have its form", an interpretation that underlines the generic or universal aspect so much that the particular is not a particular in the strict sense of the point-instant any more. On the other hand, it could mean that what is here stated to be a universal is really ("has the nature of") a particular, a particular that has said exclusion as its attribute; this is how it is understood by Lasic (2000b: 64).[360]

In order to decide between these options, two things should be considered: first, the model passage in VC 13,6–8 has no equivalent for the phrase "*atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmaka*", containing only the noun "*sāmānya*". So Ratnakīrti added something here on purpose. Second, Jñānaśrīmitra adds the following sentence in VC 13*6–8:

> *tatra sādhanapratyakṣaṃ tadaivārthakriyārthinaḥ kṣa-*
> *ṇavīkṣaṇe 'pi santānāpekṣayā sāmānyaviṣayam.*
> There, [amongst inference and perception], the perception
> of what accomplishes [a goal] has, with respect to the
> continuum, a universal as its [determined] object, even

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[360]The latter translates: "...das Bestimmte aber eine Gemeinsamkeit, die wesentlich nichts als das Individuelle ist, insofern es von anderen (Individuellen), die nicht seine Form haben, ausgeschlossen ist." (Lasic 2000b: 64) One could paraphrase the point in English: "For perception the determined object is a universal that is, essentially, nothing but a particular insofar as this particular is excluded from the other particulars that do not have its form."

though someone aiming for the achievement of a goal sees,
at that exact time [of the perception], only a momentary
phase [of the continuum].[361]

With this statement the "universal" determined by perception
is unambiguously equated to a continuum of point-instants that
constitutes the "object" of everyday activities. Insofar as this gen-
eralization from a single phase to a continuum of phases is not
essentially different from the generalization from one particular to a
class of particulars,[362] the use of the term "*sāmānya*" without further
qualification is, of course, perfectly justified.

The universal is then analysed by Jñānaśrīmitra as a group of
particulars in the same context, VC 13*15–20:

> *na ca sāmānyaṃ nāma kiṃ cid anyad eva. kiṃ tu sva-*
> *lakṣaṇāny eva parasparam avivecitabhedāni sāmānyam*
> *ucyante. bhedavivecane tu pratyekaṃ svalakṣaṇam iti*
> *svaśabdenaiva vyavahāraḥ.*

> But there is actually nothing else[, apart from the par-
> ticulars,] called a universal. Rather, the particulars
> as such, [insofar as] their mutual differences are not
> distinguished, are called a universal. But when [these
> mutual] differences are distinguished, each is individ-
> ually a particular, [called *svalakṣaṇa*]. So there is an
> everyday treatment [of these particulars] just through
> the word "*sva*".[363]

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[361]See the German translation by Lasic (2000a: 95): "Dabei hat die Wahrnehmung
eines Mittels [zur Zweckerfüllung] (*sādhanapratyakṣa*), obwohl der, der auf eine
Zweckerfüllung abzielt, zu eben dieser Zeit (nur) eine Phase sieht, mit Rücksicht
auf das Kontinuum eine Gemeinsamkeit zum Objekt."

[362]Cf. Patil 2003: 233 f., as well as Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: § 7.1.2

[363]See Lasic 2000a: 96 for a German translation, which differs slightly in the
interpretation of the force of the negation in the first sentence, understanding that
the so-called commonness is nothing else at all ("Und die sogenannte Gemeinsamkeit
ist ja überhaupt nichts anderes."). Though Lasic (2000a: 96) does not specify what
the universal is different from, the context suggests that it must be the particulars.

In the light of this position, there is no reason not to assume that Ratnakīrti supplied the adjective "*atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamā-trātmaka*" so as to guard against a misunderstanding of the term "*sāmānya*" in a sense other than the one intended by Jñānaśrīmitra in the corresponding passage of the VC, i.e., as a mere group of particulars.[364] The notion of a universal as a group of particulars can be applied to various useful types of such groups: a group of one or more particulars would be the least coherent group, with nothing but the decision to place the particulars in a group connecting them; a stronger connection would be found in the notion of a *santāna*, a group of particulars that is seen in the links of a cause-effect chain, where each particular is the effect of the previous link and the cause of the next; more complex groups could be construed by defining a group of such groups, such as when a herd of cows, or even the group

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[364]Patil (2009: 215, n. 44) characterizes a universal as a "collection", and analyses the positive object subsequently in terms of such a collection, Patil 2009: 236:

> It is this nonspecific collection that is mistakenly taken by some to be a real universal, and is unconsciously associated with a group of particulars in which it is mistakenly thought to be instantiated. According to Ratnakīrti, this object is a positive entity that is neither a real particular nor a real universal. It is a thing-in-general that is constructed through its essential characteristic, exclusion, and is determined to be equivalent to semantic value. According to Ratnakīrti, it is this complex positive entity that best describes what is understood from hearing a token utterance of a term.

The main difference in interpretation is that, on the understanding developed here, Ratnakīrti would not agree that "this object is a positive entity that is neither a real particular nor a real universal." (Patil 2009: 236) The positive entity has to be either a concrete (but indistinct, "nonspecific") mental image or an external particular. As such, it would indeed not be a real universal. In both variants, however, it would be a real particular, though in the former case not one that common activity would be directed at and in the latter case not one that could appear in conceptual cognition. The "collection" thus has to be taken in a purely extensional sense (cf. the comments in Patil 2009: 215, n. 44). Though not directly present to awareness, it is present to the extent that the activity of a rational agent will be directed at it, so that one of its elements can become the object satisfying the agent's expectation.

of all cows, is defined as all the momentary particulars that each belong to a *santāna* that we would be prepared to classify as a cow.

For inference, the determined and grasped object is opposite to the case of perception. That this is meant literally is evident from Jñānaśrīmitra's characterization of the objects of inference at VC 14*7–9:

> *tatrānumāne tāvad vastuno 'pratibhāsād adhyavaseyam*
> *eva svalakṣaṇam. grāhyas tu svākāraḥ. evaṃvidhaṃ*
> *nirloṭhitam asmābhir apohaprakaraṇe iti na prastūyate.*
> To begin with, for inference there [amongst all kinds of cognitions], the particular is only what is determined, since there is no appearance of a real thing [in an inference]. But what is grasped is the form [of this cognition] itself. We have explained this fully in such a manner in the *Apohaprakaraṇa*, so it will not be discussed [here].[365]

This passage equates the grasped object of inference with the form that awareness itself has in the inferential cognition. In the description of perception above (page 238 and page 243), the corresponding object, but as determined by perception, was analysed as a certain group of particulars (the type *santāna*). We will thus have to conclude from Ratnakīrti's statement that "for inference it is the opposite" (see page 238), that these are two equally valid ways of addressing this object: the group of particulars that perception determines can be called the form of awareness that an inferential cognition directly grasps.[366]

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[365]In his translation of this passage, Lasic (2000a: 97, n. 56) says that this is a reference to AP 225,12–230,8, and that that passage in turn refers back to the VC. See McCrea and Patil 2010: 87–93 for a translation of the corresponding passage. In the last section of this discussion, Jñānaśrīmitra explicitly criticizes Dharmottara's notion of the object of activity, see the references in McCrea and Patil 2010: 171, nn. 242–245, and McAllister 2014 for a closer study. This constitutes a significant difference between Dharmottara's and Jñānaśrīmitra's theories concerning what a conceptual cognition "knows" about the particular that it directs activity towards (see also above, page 240).

[366] It is still unclear how to make sense of this equivalence. It will be more fully discussed in the context of CAPV 131,4–13 (page 252), but the basic idea is that the

Ratnakīrti's phrase "*adhyavaseyaṃ tu sāmānyam atadrūpapa-rāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam*" in the VyN should thus best be interpreted as "But [the object] that is determined [by perception] is a universal, [insofar as a universal] has the nature only of particulars that are differentiated from [other particulars] that have a form different from these [particulars]." The determined object of perception is therefore to be understood only as a group of particulars. The grasped object of inference is said to be the same as this determined object of perception: a group of particulars, which we can also call a form of awareness in the case of inference.

Furthermore, VyN 8*,14–15 does not differentiate between the particular that is grasped by perception and determined by inference; this, we must then understand, is in both cases the external particular that perception grasps.[367] With this interpretation, the apparent contradiction between VyN 8*,14–15 (page 238) and KBhSA 73,8–17 (page 240) can be resolved. VyN 8*,14–15 states that perception grasps a particular and determines a group of particulars, and that inference grasps a group of particulars and determines a particular. Accordingly, KBhSA 73,8–17 states that a conceptual cognition (of which inference is a subtype) determines a particular. Furthermore, in the last sentence of the second passage (page 240), Ratnakīrti categorically ("*eva*") denies that a particular can appear in determination.

So, according to these passages, perception and conceptual cognition can both have two objects, *each of which are particulars*. Perception grasps an external particular and determines another particular[368] as contained in a collection of particulars. Conceptual

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directly grasped form of awareness in a conceptual cognition connects the cognition to the class of particulars through the same other-exclusion (*apoha*). In other words, the image appearing in awareness (the *vidhi* as a *buddhyākāra*) is qualified by an other-exclusion that corresponds to the other-exclusion qualifying the group of external objects at which a subsequent activity can be directed.

[367]This would also have to be understood from SJS 20,11–13, quoted and translated in footnote 352.

[368]Since determination has been defined as a capacity to act (see section 5.3.3), this does not mean that the perception itself should be deemed to ascertain its object.

cognition is said to grasp a collection of particulars, which means that it grasps a mental image that "represents" this collection insofar as it is qualified by a property that makes the cognition in which it is grasped capable of promoting activity in line with this property. In grasping this mental image with this property (and an indistinct appearance), conceptual cognition determines the object that will become the object of activity, a future particular, without representing it positively. In other words, Ratnakīrti's model describes cognitions as bridging one particular to another: a perception of one particular leads to activity that attains another particular, and a conceptual cognition, grasping the particular that is the form that cognition has or shows at that time, likewise leads to activity that might attain another particular. The main difference between the two types of cognition is that perception's grasped particular is a cognitive form that is distinct, directly caused by an external particular, whereas conceptual cognition's form is indistinct, having been augmented by various contributory factors such as memory, habituation, disposition, and so on. And the only difference between the grasped and determined particulars is that the first is directly present and that the other is not: it lies in the future, is the object that an activity is directed at, and is, unlike a particular that appears directly, present to awareness only through one other-exclusion that integrates the particular within a group.[369]

There is a second set of statements that complements this picture by positively characterizing inferential knowledge. They discuss inference, or conceptual cognition in general, in a form reduced to self-awareness, a type of perceptual cognition. The passages in which inference is so described often appeal to "highest reality" (*paramārtha*), here to be distinguished from the everyday reality of

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[369]See table 5.5, page 240, for a schematic overview. It might be debatable as to how being an object of intentional activity is actually a mode of awareness. Cf. footnote 75 for the various modes of activity Ratnakīrti considers. A more detailed argument about *pravṛttiviṣaya*, highlighting that determination is what *makes* something into an object of activity, is found in KBhSA 73,9–12 (cf. the references in footnote 185).

mind-external entities that are temporally and spatially extended, and with regard to which the usual means of valid cognition, sense perception and inference, can reliably regulate activity. Probably the clearest example for this reduction in Ratnakīrti's œuvre is the following, where he answers a Mīmāṃsā objection that, on Ratnakīrti's theory, inference would have to be a perceptual and non-perceptual cognition, a non-conceptual and conceptual cognition, and a superimposition and not a superimposition at the same time. Ratnakīrti's answer is this, SSD 118,8–11:[370]

> ...*[i]ty apy ayuktam. anumānasya hi paramārthataḥ svasaṃvedanapratyakṣātmano 'vikalpasyāsamāropasvabhāvasyāpratyakṣatvavikalpatvasamāropatvādeḥ parāpekṣayā prajñaptatvād viruddhadharmādhyāsābhāvāt kathaṃ bhedasiddhiḥ.*
>
> That [criticism] is not correct either. For, how should a difference of inference[, due to which it would have said contradictory properties,] be established, since, in reality, [inference]—which has the nature of the perception self-awareness, is non-conceptual, and does not have the nature of a superimposition–is not determined as having contradictory properties because being perception, conceptual cognition, super-imposition, etc., are defined in respect of each other?

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[370]Cf. the translation by Mimaki (1976: 123):

...cela ne pas juste non plus. En effet, du point de vue [de la vérité] absolue ..., l'inférence possède la nature de la perception en tant que connaissance-de-soi ..., n'est pas imagination et a la nature propre de non-surimposition .... Mais [du point de vue de la vérité conventionelle] on qualifie l'inférence, par rapport à l'autre [c.-à-d. la perception], de non-perception, imagination et surimposition. Donc, pour l'inférence on ne peut pas mettre [ces] attributs contradictoires [sur le même plan]. Ainsi comment peut-on prouver une différence dans l'inférence?

So, according to this passage, inference is reducible to a perceptual cognition of the type self-awareness: it is hence non-conceptual, has the nature of self-awareness, and does not perform any superimposition.[371] But if inference is thus reducible to perception, then how can the above distinction of two objects in two modes of awareness hold true? The answer is that, for Ratnakīrti, determination is reducible to self-awareness. Since it is only a capacity that a certain state of awareness has (§ 8), and since its object is one that is not meaningfully "presented" or "shown" by it at all,[372] it is not a temporally separate cognitive act or state of awareness. This reduction is thus an explanation of how things really are, and the prior distinction of different objects concerns how things are conventionally treated.[373]

This is also supported by § 48 of the *AS*. There, too, a double standard, "in reality" and "conventionally", is appealed to in order to explain what the word referent actually is. Neither in reality nor conventionally is a form of awareness an object of activity, because it appears in the perception self-awareness. This corresponds to the claim in SSD 118,8–11 (see page 248) that conceptual awareness is

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[371]This contradiction, or at least tension, arises also in light of formulations important for understanding central issues in the *AS*, e.g., that the objects appearing are not different for perception and conceptual cognition (l. 53 in 8: "...*ubhayor aviśiṣṭam*."); cf. also l. 278 in § 48, and the analysis of this statement in section 5.3.3.

[372]See the interpretation of KBhSA 73,8–17, above page 240.

[373]This corresponds to the well-known distinction of levels of analysis, one according to reality and one according to everyday activities. See the "sliding scales of analysis" suggested in Dunne 2004. The possible problems for using the idea of self-awareness as a "bridging concept" between contradictory theories about reality or its cognition are mentioned in Kellner 2010: 227 (for Dignāga), and more generally discussed in their relevance for Dharmakīrti in Kellner 2011 and Kellner 2017: 311–312. However, in the current context this is not really an issue. Ratnakīrti is here being interpreted as explaining the move either, in the case of perception, from a mind-external particular to another mind-external particular, by means of one generalization, or, in the case of conceptual cognition, from one mind-internal particular which is the generalization to a mind-external particular. The point is that self-awareness bridges the transition between the start and end of this process, or explains how one reaches one from the other. It is not used as a device to show that a contradiction is not, in fact, the case.

no different from perception. A true particular is the grasped object in both cases, and, since this is in both cases the perception of a particular, there is no determination (or superimposition)[374] of that particular. And an external particular is the determined object of both a conceptual and perceptual cognition, insofar as practical activity is directed at it by them. This intends to explain the conventional notion of dealing with external, temporally extended objects.

The picture presented here diverges in several respects from the distinction of four objects of cognition, a grasped and a determined object each for perception and conceptual awareness, prefigured in McCrea and Patil 2006, and fully worked out in Patil 2009: chapter 5. Whilst the solutions developed there certainly fit most of the passages considered up to this point, the analysis proposed here has made a simpler solution possible.[375] The central difference between the two interpretations is that instead of four objects, we here are attempting

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[374]Whether this equation of superimposition and determination is appropriate to Ratnakīrti's understanding of the matter is a very difficult question. Cf., e.g., CAPV 135,31–136,2 *tathā vikalpāropābhimānagrahaniścayādayo 'py adhyavasāyavat svākāraparyavasitā eva sphuranto bāhyasya vārtāmātram api na jānantīty adhyavasāyasvabhāvā eva śabdapravṛttinimittabhede 'pi, tat kathaṃ yuktyāgamabahirbhūto 'nātmāsphuraṇam ācakṣīta* (Read *śabdapravṛttinimittabhede 'pi* acc. to RNĀ$_{ms}$ 73a1 against the misprinted *śabdapravṛttimittabhede 'pi* in CAPV 136,1. The emendation by Thakur from *yuktyāgamābahir* in RNĀ$_{ms}$ 73a1 to *yuktyāgamabahir* does not seem necessary to me. Trl.: In the same way, also conceptual cognition, imposition, conceit (*abhimāna*), taking [something for something else], ascertainment and so on, like determination, only ending in the form of awareness itself [insofar as they are] appearing, know not even the merest news of the external thing. So (*iti*) [these] have the nature of determination indeed, even though there are different causes for the use of [these] words. Thus, how should someone not transgressing reasoning and scripture assert a manifestation of [something that] is not the nature [of awareness]?)

Ratnakīrti here equates forms of conceptual cognition, imposition, etc. with determination, but immediately adds the reservation that there are different causes for the employment of the different terms.

[375]As noted in Patil 2003: 237, and explicated in Patil 2009: 249, an assessment of Ratnakīrti's epistemological framework, or "...theory of mental content ..." has to proceed "...by providing an interpretation of his scattered remarks on...mental objects/images ...and does not present Ratnakīrti's position as he himself presented it ...." (Patil 2009: 249) So all attempts at outlining this framework can only be

to show that *whatever appears* to awareness is a particular, and *whatever is determined* is a universal. Thus there would be only two objects of awareness, instead of four. Furthermore, considering that a universal reduces to a particular (or several thereof) insofar as it excludes (or they exclude) other particulars, only one kind of real entity–the particular–has to be posited, with the absence of a mutual difference (through *anyāpoha*) accounting for the commonness that qualifies such entities.

A first argument can be made by reminding ourselves that, according to Ratnakīrti, perception and conceptual cognition each have a twofold object, a grasped and a determined one.[376] As explained, this in itself leads into interpretative difficulties. In some instances this object is said to be, respectively, a particular (as grasped) and a universal (as determined) for perception, and a universal (as grasped) and a particular (as determined) for conceptual cognition.[377] In other instances, especially where self-awareness is discussed or mentioned in the context of conceptual cognition, this clear differentiation is not upheld.[378] The key to resolving this puzzle lies in the fact that Ratnakīrti is able to call the grasped object of conceptual cognition a "universal", as he does the determined object of perception. The final clue to resolving this puzzle is found in Ratnakīrti's CAPV 131,4–12:

interpretations and reconstructions.

Among the passages considered until now, the four-object model does not seem to offer a clean solution for VyN 8*,14–15 (see page 238) and KBhSA 73,8–17 (see page 240). In the former case, the difference hinges on the interpretation of how the objects are inverse for perception and inference. While Patil essentially argues that this inversion does not apply on the ontological level, because perception perceives an actual particular whereas inference determines a generalized particular that is, actually, a universal, here we can maintain that both items–grasped and determined–are ultimately particulars. In the latter passage, the problem is that the determined object of inference is said to be simply the particular, without any qualifications. If this were not the actual, momentary thing that can satisfy a desire, it would be strange for Ratnakīrti to invoke Dharmakīrti as an authority: the very reason that perception and inference are means of valid cognition is that they make activity possible that can target particulars.

[376]Cf. footnote 352 for textual evidence of this claim.

[377]Cf., e.g., VyN 8*,12–15 (VyN₂ 109,14–18, quoted and translated section 5.4).

[378]Cf. the material page 248, as well as l. 278 in § 48.

*iha dvividho vijñānānāṃ viṣayaḥ grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś
ca. pratibhāsamāno grāhyaḥ. agṛhīto 'pi pravṛttiviṣayo
'dhyavaseyaḥ. tatrāsarvajñe 'numātari sakalavipakṣa-
pratibhāsābhāvān na grāhyatayā vipakṣo viṣayo vakta-
vyaḥ, sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt, sarvatra sakalavi-
pakṣapratibhāsābhāvāt tato vyatirekāsiddheḥ. pratibhāse
ca deśakālasvabhāvāntaritasakalavipakṣasākṣātkāre sā-
dhyātmāpi varākaḥ sutarāṃ pratīyata ity anumānavai-
yarthyam. tasmād apratibhāse 'py adhyavasāyasiddhād
eva vipakṣād dhūmāder vyatireko niścitaḥ. tat kim a-
rtham atra vipakṣapratibhāsaḥ prārthyate. yadi punar
asyādhyavasāyo 'pi na syāt tadā vyatireko na niścīyata iti
yuktam, pratiniyataviṣayavyavahārābhāvāt.*

Here, the object of cognitions is twofold, [one that is]
grasped and [one that is] determined. [The one that] ap-
pears is [the one that is] grasped. [The one that is] to be
determined is the object of activity, even though it is not
grasped. With regard to these [two objects], in the case
of a non-omniscient [agent] of an inference, the counter-
instance is not to be called an object on account of [its] be-
ing grasped, because there is no appearance of the whole
counter-instance; because of the [unwanted] consequence
that all inferences would be destroyed, since, because
there is no appearance of all the counter-instances in any
[inference], there is no establishment of the [reason's]
exclusion from this [whole counter-instance].

And if there were an appearance, which is a direct pre-
sentation of the whole counter-instance distant in space,
time, and its own nature, then even that which has the
nature of what is to be proven, that poor fellow, would be
easily cognized. Thus an inference would be useless.

Therefore, even though there is no appearance [of the
whole counter-instance], the exclusion of smoke etc. from
the counter-instance, which is indeed established through
determination, is ascertained. Therefore, with what

aim is the appearance of the counter-instance desired here? If, however, there were not even a determination of this [counter-instance], then the exclusion would not be ascertained. This is logically coherent, because there is no everyday activity towards an object that is limited [as to its place, time, and condition].

Ratnakīrti here explains how the counter-instance of an inference can be known.[379] It is central to the functioning of inference that this counter-instance can be known in at least one respect. It must be possible to ascertain that the reason, which establishes the presence of the intended property, is absent from these dissimilar cases. At the same time, it is impossible to know each of these dissimilar cases individually. Ratnakīrti thus emphasizes the fact that these dissimilar cases are known, or established, through determination. That is, they are known in general, through the exclusion that is common to them. The judgement that smoke is absent in each individual instance of "non-fire" is possible, without having to know each instance of fire individually.

What is it then, in the final analysis, that distinguishes a conceptual from a perceptual cognition? Ratnakīrti's concisest statement can be found in CAPV 140,18–19:

> *tatra nirvikalpakaṃ spaṣṭapratibhāsatvād grāhakaṃ vya-*
> *vasthāpyate. vikalpas tv aspaṣṭaikavyāvṛttyullekhād*[380]
> *āropakādivyavahārabhājanam.*

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[379]The counter-instance (*vipakṣa*) is the group of cases which are dissimilar to the case that an inference is considering, insofar as the property that that inference intends to establish is absent in them.

[380]Read *aspaṣṭaika* against CAPV *spaṣṭaika*. In the manuscript, the difference between *stva* and *stu* is so small as to make a decision difficult, but the parallel in SāSiŚā 395,1–3 supports *aspaṣṭaika*: *tatra nirvikalpakaṃ bhrāntam api spa-ṣṭapratibhāsavaśāt grāhakam avasthāpyate. vikalpas tu vimarśākāratayā svayam anyānapekṣapravartakatve 'py aspaṣṭaikavyāvṛttyullekhād āropakādivyavahāra-bhājanam.* ("There, non-conceptual cognition, though erroneous, is classified, in virtue of a distinct appearance, as [a cognition that directly] grasps [its object]. Conceptual cognition, however–even though it causes activity independently of another [cognition] by itself, since it has the form of a judgement–is subject to an

> There,[381] [amongst cognitions based on other words and means of valid cognition,] non-conceptual [cognition] is defined as [directly] apprehending [its object] because there is a distinct appearance [of that object]. Conceptual cognition, however, is subject to an everyday treatment as superimposing and so on, because it depicts a single, indistinct exclusion.

The difference of conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions is thus based only on what appears in them. It is important to note that the classification into conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions is not due to the mode in which something appears in them–by determination or appearance–but is, rather, due to a characteristic of the image. If it is clear or vivid, the cognition is non-conceptual; if it is not, the cognition should be deemed conceptual. With this, Ratnakīrti has broken down the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions to such a degree that he can make them independent from

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everyday treatment as [a cognition that] superimposes [something on object] and so on, because it depicts an indistinct, single exclusion.")

This would also accord with Prajñākaragupta's main reason for distinguishing inference and perception, e.g., PVABh 218,26: *pratyakṣaviṣayapravarttakatve 'pi* **spaṣṭāspaṣṭabhedāt** *pramāṇadvitayam eva.* ("Even though [inference] causes activity towards a perceptible object [like perception does], there are two means of valid cognition, because there is a difference in [that an object can be] distinct and indistinct.")

[381]In both the CAPV and the SāSiŚā, the *tatra* ("there") is somewhat unclear: it is here understood as referring to "*śabdapramāṇāntara°*", taken as "other words or means of valid cognition" Ratnakīrti is here arguing that his position does not contradict the obvious fact that in certain cognitions, other words or means of valid cognitions are necessary in order to ascertain an object correctly. The whole discussion here is close to the treatment of perception and inference, and their difference and relation, in the PVABh (see McAllister forthcoming a).

Ratnakīrti's arguments in this passage are introduced by a quote from the PVABh in the CAPV 140,10–11 (but not in the SāSiŚā): "*yad āha alaṅkārakāraḥ–kathaṃ tadviṣayatvaṃ tatra pravartanād iti*" (Which the author of the *Alaṅkāra* stated: "How is that [external thing] the object [of a conceptual cognition]? Because [there is] an activity towards it [due to this cognition]."). Cf. PVABh 221,28–29 for such a statement.

determination or appearance: it is thus possible to link them to both. In other words, Ratnakīrti is now free to claim that determination and appearance can occur simultaneously: determination is not the unique marker of a conceptual cognition any more; it has been detached from any representational function and redefined as the capacity that a cognition has with regard to a subsequent activity. It is thus possible for Ratnakīrti to describe a conceptual cognition as one that unites both "appearance" and "determination" without either a temporal distinction between the two, or a contradiction in that cognition being both perceptual and non-perceptual at the same time.

It is now possible to fully appreciate Ratnakīrti's comparison, in § 8, between the perception of absence and the conceptual cognition of something excluded, or, in other words, the quality of other-exclusion (section 5.3.3). As seen above, Ratnakīrti equates perception and conceptual awareness as to the object that directly appears in them: "*paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇaṃ tu niyatasvarūpasaṃvedanam ubhayor aviśiṣṭam.*" (ll. 52–53 in § 8) This object corresponds to the grasped form of awareness itself, which could be either distinct or indistinct, making the cognition that has this form either a non-conceptual or conceptual one. This passage also shows an equivalence between grasping absence in an implicative form (i.e., as the presence of something else) and an awareness of something having a "limited own form", meaning that this awareness has an object that is fixed as to its location, time, etc.[382] So both perception and conceptual cognition do have a particular as their object, at least in respect of the form of awareness that they each have. In the *AS*, this is

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[382] Cf., e.g., the (negative) formulation in § 15: "*...deśakālāvasthāniyata-pravyaktasvalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt.*" This is the defining characteristic of a particular: "The term *svalakṣaṇa* ...entails from the beginning that the phenomenon is individual, unique and distinct." (Yoshimizu 2004: 119) Cf. also the similar formulation SSD 124,22–23: *nanv ananuvṛttāv api tadarpitākārasvarūpasaṃvedanam eva tadvedanam. tad eva ca saviṣayatvam.* (Trl. by Mimaki (1976: 159): "[Les Bouddhistes:] Même si [l'objet] ne dure pas [jusqu'au moment de la connaissance], la connaissance de la nature propre de la forme projetée par l'[objet], c'est la connaissance de l'[objet], n'est-ce pas? Et ce fait [montre] précisément que la [connaissance] a un objet ....")

supported by Ratnakīrti's statement that a form of awareness is not positively or negatively acted towards since it is present to awareness through the perceptual mode self-awareness (l. 278 in § 48).[383] And perception has, by definition, a particular as its grasped or appearing object: again, this is only the form of awareness itself, but caused by a different set of causal factors, usually considered to involve sense faculties and external objects, which result in a cognition with a distinct form.[384]

As its determined object, conceptual cognition has a real thing, a particular which can be called a universal insofar as it is differentiated from others, just as perception has this as its determined object. Within the *AS*, a number of passages support this as far as conceptual cognition is concerned.[385] The argument for perception can be made by an interpretation of the following passage, KBhSA 73,18–24:

> tathā tṛtīyo 'pi pakṣaḥ prayāsaphalaḥ, nānākālasyaikasya vastuno vastuto 'sambhave 'pi sarvadeśakālavartinor ata-drūpaparāvṛttayor eva sādhyasādhanayoḥ pratyakṣeṇa vyāptigrahaṇāt. dvividho hi pratyakṣasya viṣayaḥ, grā-hyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. sakalātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumā-traṃ[386] sākṣād asphuraṇāt pratyakṣasya grāhyo viṣayo mā bhūt, tadekadeśagrahaṇe tu tanmātrayor vyāptini-ścāyakavikalpajananād adhyavaseyo viṣayo bhavaty eva, kṣaṇagrahaṇe santānaniścayavat, rūpamātragrahaṇe rū-parasagandhasparśātmakaghaṭaniścayavac ca. anyathā sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt.

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[383]Cf. also page 248.

[384]Cf. above, footnote 352.

[385]Cf., e.g., the guiding inference of the *AS* (cf. section 5.2): *yad vācakaṃ tat sarvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaram.* (ll.305–306 in § 54), and see also table 5.1 on page 212 for a list of passages where these points are argued for.

[386]Emend "°parāvṛttaṃ vastumātraṃ" (KBhSA 73,20) to "°parāvṛttavastumātraṃ" according to Woo 1999: 74; this is also accepted in Patil 2009: 259, n. 30.

In this way, also the third option is a result [only] of hard effort,[387] because, even though a single real thing, [existing] at different times, is not really possible, perception does grasp the pervasion of that to be established[, i.e., momentariness,] and that establishing [it, i.e., existence], which occur at all places and times, [and which] are indeed differentiated from what is not of that nature. For the object of perception is twofold, grasped and determined. The mere real thing that is differentiated from all that is not of its form cannot possibly be the grasped object of perception because it does not appear directly, but it certainly is the determined object, because, if there is a grasping of one part[, or instance,] of this [mere thing], [perception] produces a conceptual cognition that ascertains the pervasion of these two as such (*mātra*), like a continuum is ascertained when a moment is grasped, and like a pot is ascertained that has the nature of a form, a taste, a smell, [and] a feel, when only [its] form is grasped. For, [if it were] otherwise, there is the unwanted consequence that all inference is ended.

As before, Ratnakīrti here asserts that perception has two objects as well: a grasped and a determined object. But he additionally specifies that the determined object of perception is a mere thing

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[387]Acc. to Woo 1999: 189: "The third view is the objection in text [71.28–30] above that no logical reason can have a relationship with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) in terms of the proving property and the property to be proved. ...Beginning with this passage, he [i.e., Ratnakīrti–PMA] demonstrates that perception can grasp the pervasion (*vyāpti*) between existence and momentariness." The opponent there said, KBhSA 71,28–30: *yadvā sarvasyaiva hetoḥ kṣaṇikatve sādhye viruddhatvaṃ deśakālāntarānanugame sādhyasādhanabhāvābhāvāt. anugame ca nānākālam ekam akṣaṇikaṃ kṣaṇikatvena virudhyata iti.* (Or else, if momentariness is to be established, each and every reason is contradictory, because, given that [the reason] does not continue in a different place or time, there is no relation of that which is to be established and that which establishes it. But if [the reason] does continue, then one non-momentary [entity, namely, the reason, insofar as it exists] at a different time, is in contradiction with momentariness.)

that is excluded from that which is not like it (*sakalātadrūpaparā-
vṛttavastumātraṃ*), a characterization that obviously corresponds
to that of the grasped object of conceptual cognition, which is the
basis for the determined particular. So the phrase in l. 306 in § 54
containing *adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocaram* should
be understood like this: whatever denotes something, "operates on a
determined particular as such that is excluded from those particulars
which do not have its form."[388]

From a historical perspective, this position is probably the re-
sult of merging two theories developed by Dharmottara and Pra-
jñākaragupta, respectively. Dharmottara posited two objects of
cognition, and Prajñākaragupta put the future particular at the core
of his interpretation of the relation of perception and inference.[389]
Dharmottara's position has often been regarded as the theory with
the strongest influence in this regard on Jñānaśrīmitra's and Ratna-
kīrti's positions.[390] But the present investigation of Ratnakīrti's
theory of verbal cognition shows some deep differences to that of
Dharmottara: for Ratnakīrti, the object of activity is not present to
cognition in any way other than as the disposition to act in a way
that will allow one to attain that object, whereas for Dharmottara it
is a superimposed thing.[391] Ratnakīrti's position thus is very close to
a central element in Prajñākaragupta's general argument about why
perception and inference are both means of valid cognition: they make
activity possible with regard to something that is not "present" to
awareness in any way.[392] Since this historical perspective would not

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[388] Cf. also footnote 356.

[389] For Dharmottara, see Krasser 1995 and McCrea and Patil 2006; for Pra-
jñākaragupta, see Kobayashi 2011 and McAllister (forthcoming a).

[390] See, for example, McCrea and Patil 2006: 333, Patil 2009: 250–251, n. 6 and
also the present author's own article, McAllister 2015

[391] See McAllister 2014 and Kataoka 2017b. Patil (2009: 225, n. 68) notes that there
is a difference between Dharmottara's and Ratnakīrti's notions of superimposition
or determination as far as the object is concerned. This is still true also on the
current interpretation. What has changed, however, is the interpretation of what
Ratnakīrti takes as the object of determination. See also above, footnote 365.

[392] This issue is explored in McAllister (forthcoming a).

be of much use for a better understanding of Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhi* and would presuppose a deeper examination also of Jñānaśrīmitra's works, the matter will be investigated on a different occasion.

5.5 OTHER-EXCLUSION AS DOUBLE NEGATION

So far, Ratnakīrti's positions in his *Apohasiddhi* have been discussed under their ontological (section 5.3) and epistemological (section 5.4) aspects, because these two aspects are the most prominent ones in the text. All forms of the *apoha* theory have, however, puzzled both historical opponents to the Buddhists and modern authors, mostly with respect to one of their formal features. The Sanskrit word "*anyāpoha*", literally "other-exclusion", is usually analysed as "exclusion from others", or "exclusion of others", with the "others" being in a case relation to the "exclusion".[393] Taking "other" to mean "not that", or "not the same," one quickly faces the most baffling and counter-intuitive aspect of the *apoha* theory: it is a form of double negation.

Dharmakīrti expresses the situation as follows, PVSV 38,9–10:

> *uktaṃ yādṛśaṃ sāmānyam asaṃsṛṣṭānām ekāsaṃsargas tadvyatirekiṇāṃ samānateti.*
> It was explained what a universal is like: that [things] which are unmixed [with each other] are not mixed with one [thing] is the sameness of these things different from that.[394]

This passage is a succinct formulation of what *anyāpoha* does in supplying a non-substantial substitute for a substantially real universal: it hinges on a mutual difference, differentiating some things from others that are characterized primarily as differentiated from the former.

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[393]Cf. the discussion of the various options that Ratnakīrti considers (and does not later decide on) in § 2, and the materials indicated there.

[394]Cf. Vora and Ota 1980: 6–7 for another translation and the context.

On a formal level, the equation of double negation to a positive statement is unproblematic.[395] It might be counter-intuitive, unwieldy, and redundant, but a double negation certainly does not turn something true into something false. The problems are, however, not purely formal ones. They are usually considered in either an ontological or epistemological context, or even in both contexts. It is then that these problems become virulent. This has happened not only in historical discussions about other-exclusion, but also in modern scholarship, especially when attempting a philosophical restatement of the theory.[396]

Ratnakīrti briefly discusses two problems[397] that have historically been used as powerful arguments against *apoha*: a circular dependency, that the negation of non-cow is dependent on the notion of "cow", and a contradiction between that qualified by exclusion and exclusion itself which makes co-reference impossible (cf., respectively, § 12 and § 13). Both discussions are rather short and add nothing substantially new to the more lively discussion of the same problems five centuries earlier in the works of Dignāga, Uddyotakara, Kumārila, and Dharmakīrti.

Circular dependency. The problem of circular dependency is simply that the definition of "cow" as "not not cow" obviously involves and, at least according to the opponent, presupposes whatever one takes "cow" to be. Ratnakīrti's strategy to rid himself of this problem is

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[395]Cf. Quine 1980: §16(4) showing the equivalence of the schemata "∼∼p" and "p", or Goldfarb 2003: 12, using "–" as the sign for negation: "It should be clear that '– –p' amounts to the same thing as 'p'. For '– –p' is true just in case '–p' is false, and '–p' is false just in case 'p' is true. Double negations, therefore, are redundant."

[396]The most fruitful attempts by modern scholars to restate an *apoha* theory in a form that is independent from its historical manifestations are exemplified in Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011, especially in the contributions to that volume by Ganeri 2011 and Siderits 2011. A critical examination of these restatements is provided by Hale 2011 in the same volume. These interpretations by modern authors shall, however, not be discussed here in detail.

[397]For the objections of this kind that were made against *anyāpoha*, cf. footnotes 101 and 104.

quite remarkable. He counters the objection by saying that the same fault applies to the opponent's theory of real universals.[398] The parallel can be understood as follows: a realist might define a cow as "A cow is what is qualified by cowness.", and an exclusionist might do the same with this sentence: "A cow is what is qualified by exclusion from non-cow." Structurally, both statements are of the form "An x is what is qualified by x-ity."

The realist now says that, in the exclusionist approach, to know what is qualified by the exclusion from non-cow presupposes a knowledge of what a cow is. The circular dependency consists in "exclusion from non-cow" (=x-ity) being dependent on "cow" (=x), and "cow" being defined in terms of x-ity. Ratnakīrti does not, at this point, supply a reason for why someone may say this.

Ratnakīrti counters this as follows: to know what is qualified by cowness presupposes a knowledge of what a cow is. Here, the dependency consists, again, in x-ity ("cowness") being dependent on an x ("cow"), and an x being defined in terms of x-ity. For this he supplies a reason: when an x like "cow" is not known, the universal cowness (x-ity) is not known, and, when the universal cowness (x-ity) is not known, that to be designated by the word cow (i.e., an x) is not known.[399]

In other words, Ratnakīrti here shows that setting the convention "cow" for what is qualified by cowness is just as problematic as setting it for that qualified by the exclusion from non-cow.

Co-reference and the contradiction in qualification.   Ratnakīrti's explanations in § 13 concerning the contradiction are rather succinct, and any interpretation of his statements will remain tentative.

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[398]This is remarkable because Ratnakīrti is not even trying to save his own position. He merely states that it is just as wrong in this respect as that of his opponents. The same strategy is employed by Dharmakīrti, cf. the discussions in Hugon 2009: 535–540, and Hugon 2011.

[399]In accordance with this argument, the following reason could be the one that led the opponents to charge the *apoha* theory with circularity: when a cow (x) is not known, exclusion from non-cow (x-ity) is not known, and when the exclusion from cow (x-ity) is not known, a cow (x) is not known. See Watson and Kataoka 2017: 48–49 for a clear statement of this type of argument.

Extrapolating from his solution to the problem, the problem can be reconstructed as follows:[400] a blue water lily is qualified by two things, a property, blue, and a genus, water lily. Though the opponent might maintain that they are ontologically distinct kinds of entities, they are both assumed to be real entities, and must, in some way, be present in the substance that they qualify (any blue water lily). Amongst various problems[401] resulting from this notion, the contradiction that the substance so qualified would be the location of two different things at the same time is the most serious: just as it is contradictory to say "This is an oak and a fir.", so it would be contradictory to say "This is blue and a water lily." This problem, so Ratnakīrti's claim here, does not afflict the *apoha* theory: it does not assert that two things (a property and a genus) are present in a third (the material entity), but rather that two absences–that of non-blue things and that of things which are not water lilies–are present in a third.[402]

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[400]Dignāga, Kumārila, and Dharmakīrti are known for their discussions of co-reference and of the connected problem of the relation between qualifiers and that qualified by them. The presentation of the problem here draws on Hattori 2006: 62, and the lucid discussion of the matter by J. Taber and Kataoka (2017: 261–263). See Ogawa 2017 for a very detailed study of Dignāga's position on this matter in its historical context. In view of the restoration of Dignāga's text in Pind 2015, even the terminology of Ratnakīrti's statements here is reminiscent of Dignāga's first statement of the problem.

[401]See J. Taber and Kataoka 2017: 256–259 for the various incongruities that Dignāga saw in this model.

[402]To the extent that this is Ratnakīrti's explanation of why the two traditional problems of co-reference and contradiction do not apply to the *apoha* theory, one must note some important differences to the findings of scholars who have worked on Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's solutions to this problem.

For Dignāga, Ogawa 2017: 114–115 and J. Taber and Kataoka 2017: 259–260 understand that the main argument for justifying *apoha* with respect to this problem lies in the fact that "blue" and "water lily" each raise an expectation or doubt as to the other: when one hears "blue" one will ask "What is blue?", and when one hears "water lily" one will ask "What colour is it?".

For Dharmakīrti, J. Taber and Kataoka: 264–265 maintain that "the key to the solution of the problems of coreferentiality and qualification is seeing that there is no real distinction between exclusions (*vyāvṛtti*) and the thing that is excluded (*vyāvṛtta*);

5.6 CONCLUSION: DENOTATION IN RATNAKĪRTI'S *APOHA* THEORY

To conclude this investigation, we can summarize our observations in order to understand how Ratnakīrti sees the relation between something that denotes,[403] such as a word or a concept, and that which is denoted, the referent of the word or concept. From the arguments in § 27 and the statements about the denoting-denoted relation in § 54, it follows that Ratnakīrti does not believe that there really is such a relation, but that it is a conceptual construction. Two questions might be posed here: what exactly is the conceptually constructed relation of a word and its object, and why is it important to Ratnakīrti that this relation is only conceptually constructed, but does not exist in reality?

Ratnakīrti supposes that there are two aspects of a word's object: the subjective one, a form of awareness, and the objective one, an external thing. They are known in two different awareness modes, perception (of the type self-awareness) and determination, respectively. The question is what sort of relation a word has to this twofold object, and, more specifically, if it can be said to refer to, denote, or express this object.

In lines 93–97 (§ 15), as well as in § 48 and the following verse, Ratnakīrti argues that in reality no external thing is denoted by words (in the first passage), or is affirmed or negated by words (in the second passage). Rather, it is only due to the determination of a form of awareness that an external object becomes the object of any kind of

their distinction is based merely on convention. [...] In sum, Dharmakīrti's solution seems to be that coreferentiality and qualification are possible essentially because the mind *conceives* of them as possible." (See Hugon 2017 for an examination of Dharmakīrti's usage of the two terms mentioned in the quote.) Ratnakīrti, however, does not mention this element of conceptual construction, and relies solely on the ontological category of an absence of others in his answer.

[403]Patil usually translates the terms important for this discussion as follows: *vācya* and *vācaka* respectively as "expressed" and "expressor" or "expressive" (Patil 2009: e.g., p. 239, p. 241), *artha* as "meaning, object, or semantic value" (Patil 2009: 202, n. 13).

activity, including the activity of denoting it.[404] Ratnakīrti explains that an external object is said to be denoted by a word only because of determination, ll. 95–97, § 15 (for a translation see page 96):

> tatra bāhyo 'rtho 'dhyavasāyād eva śabdavācyo vyavasthā-
> pyate, na svalakṣaṇaparisphūrtyā, pratyakṣavad deśakā-
> lāvasthāniyatapravyaktasvalakṣaṇāsphuraṇāt.

Consequently, a word can be said to denote its proper object, the external thing, only by means of determination, not directly. If it were directly denotative of a real external thing, there would be the undesirable consequence that a word would make its object known in the same way as a perceptual cognition of that object.[405] The fact that Ratnakīrti expressly states that a particular is not shown by verbal cognition is important insofar as it suggests that Ratnakīrti is at least considering the possibility of verbal cognition presenting its object in the same way as perception does. Indeed, his arguments about the relation between a property and property-bearer (§§ 27–31) show that the difference is not so much in the type of the respective cognition, conceptual or perceptual, but in that of their object. These arguments mostly draw unwanted consequences from the counterfactual assumption that if a conceptual cognition were to show anything real, a particular or an actual property, it would, like perception, show the object in its entirety. That it does not is due to the fact that words or concepts have as their object, or denote, exclusions, insubstantial and relational properties of real things. Whilst they are thus able to direct a person at those real things that have the same exclusion, they do not show those things.

There is a direct reference to an exclusion, an insubstantial and relational quality, which qualifies zero or more particulars. Through this reference, the particular can be indirectly made the object of

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[404]The details of these arguments are discussed in section 5.3.2.1. For short examples of the various forms of activity that are induced by conceptual cognition, cf. CAPV 139,18–19 (trl. footnote 75). See also the references given in footnote footnote 75.

[405]Cf. the quote of PVin I 15a–c in § 16.

a word, though no appearance of this particular occurs because of understanding this word.

The other aspect of an object of a word is the form of awareness which directly appears to self-awareness, a perceptual type of cognition.[406] But there is no denoted-denoting relation between a word and this aspect of its object, because direct appearance does not support the real relation of a quality and a thing qualified by it (*dharmadharmibhedasya pratyakṣapratikṣiptatvāt*, l. 165, p. 58), under which the relation of denoting and denoted would fall according to Ratnakīrti (see § 28).[407]

A word thus denotes neither an external particular nor the form of awareness. It is only with regard to the external particular as qualified by the exclusion of others that a referential relation can properly be understood. But since this determined object, which is what everyday activity centers upon, is not present to awareness, words can be said to actually not refer to anything real.

In § 28, Ratnakīrti advances an argument that adds an important element for the correct understanding of the relation of word and object. That argument might be paraphrased as follows: if a relation of property and property-bearer were real, the connection would have to be that of supported and supporter, i.e., a property-bearer supporting its properties.[408] Perceiving a property bearer, e.g., a tree, entails perception of all its properties, e.g., its height, etc. For a particular (the proper object of perception) cannot be in contact with a sense-faculty with only one of its properties or by itself without its properties (perhaps as a substance), because a supporter is a supporter only as far as it actually is seen to support its properties.

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[406]Cf. the arguments in § 48, as well as section 5.3.2.1.

[407]If this relation were real, it would have to be presumed that a word could denote its object (e.g., the word "cow" would denote a form of awareness cow) without all aspects of that form of awareness being known to the person experiencing that cognitive event, so that self-awareness would only have partial knowledge of its own object.

[408]That the only connection is that of supported and supporter was advanced by Dharmakīrti. Cf. the references to the translation of paragraph § 28.

On the opponent's theory, both a word, e.g., "tree", and a logical reason, e.g., "presence of smoke", make something real known (a particular qualified by treeness, a particular place qualified by smokey-ness, cf. § 9). The real thing that they make known must, by the previous argument, be related to its other properties, height, colour, etc., as a supporter. And since this supporting relation is not different from the supporting relation that causes perception to always grasp the whole particular (properties and their bearer), it follows that whatever is made known by words or logical marks would also have to be grasped with all its properties at once. Therefore, if words were to make something real known, and if there really were this difference of properties and their bearer, conceptual cognition would not be discernible from perceptual cognition.

For Ratnakīrti, the theory of *apoha* in combination with the concept of determination offers a way out of this conundrum: since it is only a determined difference from other things that a word makes known,[409] it is not a real thing (an entity) that is brought to awareness. Thus the consequences involved in cognizing a real thing do not result.[410]

Furthermore, that there is no real relation of denoted and denoting should, one expects, hold for Ratnakīrti's theory as well. As the particular height of a particular tree cannot be perceived without perceiving all other perceivable characteristics of that same tree, so that which a word signifies, the twofold positive element qualified by

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[409]Here, applied to a determined object, "to make known" has to be analysed as connecting an awareness with a determined object, thereby bringing the awareness into a state from which activity conformant to expectations can result. See above, section 5.4.

[410]Cf. the notes above as to how exclusion is a capacity, section 5.3.3. Also, in perception there is a possibility of an (indirectly) perceived generality: absence. Perceiving an empty stretch of floor, an absence of many things in that place can be correctly cognized, although not every absence has to actually be cognized.

Cf. also PV III 167 (translated in A.3.2 page 322) about the word not being a part of the referent. The point there is that the referent is an external thing, and it is not possible that something in the cognition of a speaker (or hearer) really is a part of the external thing. But it can be a part, or aspect, of the conceptual cognition.

other-exclusion,[411] must be apprehended in its entirety. For the form of awareness, this is not problematic, since it comes to awareness through a direct appearance in self-awareness. An account of the external object, on the other hand, is more difficult to give. The determined external object, a particular, is known in conceptual awareness by the determination of one exclusion. As argued above, section 5.3.3, the external thing, to which activity can be successfully directed by a correct conceptual cognition, is not directly present to awareness, but is present only in terms of the capacity lying in the self-awareness that any conceptual awareness has of its own form. The external object, the second aspect of the positive element, is thus only a capacity to generate activity. Since it is nothing over and above the cognitive form (including its exclusions), it does not have to be known in any additional way. It is a factor that belongs to self-awareness as a sequence of causes and effects. But, since an external object is what everyday activity meets with, it is this object which is conventionally considered to be denoted by a word.[412]

There is thus no real denotative function at work in conceptual awareness, mainly because neither the subjective nor objective aspect of the object that a word makes known is a thing that is denotable (the form of awareness is private and a particular, the external thing is indicated only through a negation, but is not present in any meaningful way). Since denotation is therefore only conceptually constructed, it does not count as real for Ratnakīrti.[413] Its components are relata differentiated from each other only conceptually, and have the same ontological status as the relation of a quality and the thing qualified by it, i.e., they do not really have a separate existence.[414] But since the relation of denoted and denoter is necessary for the

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[411]Cf. the analysis in section 5.3.2.1.

[412]Cf. § 48. Affirmative and negative activity are there said to be applicable only to the determined external thing. See also ll. 308–310 (in § 54), where Ratnakīrti says that the relation of denoted and denoting, which does not exist in reality, does exist as something formed by determination.

[413]Cf. § 48.

[414]Cf. the discussion in § 28, and footnote 138.

functioning of everyday language and concepts, this relation has to be assumed to be real by anyone who uses such everyday language or concepts.

These users of conventional language and concepts interact with mind-external things. They are the beings considered by Ratnakīrti in the CAPV passage presented above, section 1.1.2 (page 16). It is now possible to understand better how determination instigates activity towards external things, even though those external things are not grasped in any way. Determination operates only on the basis of an image which any awareness has and which it has received in a process that is ultimately analysed as a causal one. A conceptual cognition arises with a certain form that is defined as indistinct, through the additional causes of impressions that have been collected through experiences (cf. § 35). The relative success that conceptual cognitions have in allowing an agent to act towards external particulars is due to other-exclusion. Determination, in mistakenly externalizing the other-exclusion that qualifies the cognitive form that a conceptual awareness has, restricts the activity that beings engage in based on these conceptual cognitions. There is, however, no actual knowledge of the external particular so reached. Determination, in driving this fundamentally erroneous activity, is therefore the factor which has to cease for an unenlightened being to be liberated from the cycle of birth and death.

Appendices

About the appendices

The following sections contain annotated translations of material that is helpful in understanding the *Apohasiddhi*. The purpose of these sections is therefore not to study all these passages in detail, but only to provide a basic understanding of their general intent, scope, and arguments. As a consequence of this, it will probably not be very useful to read these passages, often not more than sketches, separately from the discussions in the previous sections that reference them and define the respect in which they are interesting.

The Sanskrit literary genre of commentaries (see Tubb and Boose 2007: 1 ff.) has various characteristic techniques for explaining the text commented upon. One case that occurs often in the passages translated below is the verbatim quotation of words or phrases from the base text. In the translations below, these cases are marked graphically by **bold** face.

A *Dharmakīrti on apoha*

A.1 PASSAGES FROM THE *APOHA* SECTION IN THE *PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKASVAVṚTTI*

Dharmakīrti introduces the concept of *apoha* in an answer to the objection that there is a kind of *petitio principii* in the relation between something that one wishes to infer and the logical reason by means of which one infers this.[415] The problem is pertinent to a logical reason that is the nature or essential characteristic (*svabhāva*) of something. Dharmakīrti states that, in reality, a thing and its qualities are not different from each other, from which it follows that all its qualities are also the same. How then, the opponent asks, is an inference from one property of a thing to another property possible (e.g., from a thing's being a fir to its being a tree)? It would be as much as to say that a thing is a tree because it is a tree–an error both on Dharmakīrti's and the opponent's idea of valid reasoning. It is in his reply to this objection that Dharmakīrti introduces the *apoha* theory.[416]

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[415]See, for example, Frauwallner 1932: 248 and Siderits 1991: 89–93.

[416]Frauwallner (1932: 248) calls it "[...] Lehre von den Vorstellungen, also die Apohalehre." Also see Frauwallner 1937: 278 f. for some remarks on the relationship between "Vorstellungen" and the object of words. Steinkellner (1971: 198) says that Dharmakīrti explains the main structure of conceptuality ("wesentliche Struktur dieser Begriffslehre") in the following verses; the same point is also upheld in Steinkellner 2013: II.224.

Vincent Eltschinger, John Taber, Michael Torsten Much and Isabelle Ratié have produced an English translation of many of the passages considered below

A.1.1 PV I 40–42

[PVSV 24,16] Then precisely that which is produced is precisely that which is impermanent, because there is no difference [between these two]. [There] would be a reason that is a part of the object of the thesis.[417] [There is] no such error, for [the following reason:]

(Eltschinger et al. 2018). This precious resource became available to the present author only after he had submitted the manuscript for this book for publication, in the autumn of 2018. It was therefore not possible to systematically include its insights.

[417]Cf. PVSVṬ 108,6 f.: *tathā hi yāvad uktam anityaḥ śabdo 'nityatvād iti tāvad anityaḥ kṛtakatvād iti tathā cāsiddho hetur.* (For it is so: the proposition "Sound is impermanent because of being impermanent." [would be] as much as [the proposition] "[Sound is] impermanent because of being produced." And in this way the reason would not be established.)

Linked to this question is the further question of what type of error (*doṣa*, acc. to PVSV 24,17) *pratijñārthaikadeśa* is. T. Watanabe (2012) has argued that a reason of this type is of no practical use for an inference, since it would merely repeat the thesis, and is therefore considered *asiddha*.

It further seems that this is not the most problematic result that follows from Dharmakīrti's claim that the two properties, the one to be inferred and the one on the basis of which we can infer it, are identical. If 'being a tree' and 'being a fir' are identical, then it follows that all trees are all firs. This is a consequence Dharmakīrti can certainly not have intended. For further discussions of this matter, see Iwata 2003, who does not find a perfectly clear answer to this question in Dharmakīrti's works (Iwata 2003: 73–74), although one finds both cases where this identity is reversible (such that every fir is a tree and every tree is a fir), and cases where it is not (so that every fir is a tree but not every tree is a fir). Dunne (2004: 203–218) argues that Dharmakīrti does not subscribe to a full identity of the two properties, and suggests that either one has to understand that an instance of the property allowing one to infer the other property has the same nature as the instance of that other property (cf. Dunne 2004: 214), or, where this reading is grammatically not possible, interpret *svabhāva* as the property, and not the essence of the instance (Dunne 2004: 217). Steinkellner (2013) sides with Iwata's against Dunne's interpretation (at least for the passage around PV I 23abc), arguing that the direction of explanation is from the pervaded (proving) to the pervading (proved) concept ("...denn die vorliegende Beschreibung geht nur in eine Richtung, vom umfaßten zum umfassenden Begriff" Steinkellner 2013: II.142, n. 278).

Since all[418] entities have, through [their] own nature, a part in the differentiation from both the same and other entities[419] because each subsists in [its] own nature,// PV I 40 //

different genera, which are based on whatever the referents are differentiated from, and which fathom (*ava-√gāh*) [the particulars'] specific differences (*viśeṣa*), are construed (*pra-√klṛp*).[420] // PV I 41 //

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[418]Cf. the recent translation of these verses in Steinkellner 2013: I.60–61. Steinkellner's differentiated translation of *svabhāva* (nature, essence) as either fact or as concept, i.e., the factual nature or the concept a person may have of a thing's nature, is not adopted here. The distinction results only from a close examination of Dharmakīrti's usage of the term throughout his works, but is not explicit in the texts examined here. It is therefore of little use to make that distinction in the few passages translated here.

[419]For understanding *svabhāva* as *sajātīya* here, cf. the explanations in PVSV 25,14, and Steinkellner 1971: 198, n. 66.

[420]Here it is quite obvious that differentiation (*vyāvṛtti*), specific difference (*viśeṣa*), and also difference (*bheda*, which is substituted for *vyāvṛtti* by Dharmakīrti in his explanation of this verse in PVSV 25,15–23) comes to be a synonym for property, aspect, or quality of a thing, in the sense of something that makes it different from other things. This connotation has to be understood in the following also. Cf. also PVSVṬ 111,28–112,5: **yasmād** *ityādi. yasmāt sarvasmāt sarvabhāvā vyāvṛttās* **tasmād yato yato** *nityākṛtakādeḥ śabdādīnām* **arthānāṃ vyāvṛttis tannibandhanāḥ**, *vyāvṛttyavadhivyāvṛttinibandhanā dharma***bhedā** *anityakṛtakādayaḥ kalpyante vikalpair āropyante. kiṃviśiṣṭāḥ,* **tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ**. *tasya svalakṣaṇasya ye viśeṣā akṛtakādivyāvṛttirūpalakṣaṇās tadavagāhinas tadavagāhanaśīlāḥ, tadabhedāvabhāsanaśīlā ity arthaḥ.* (**For that reason** etc.[, i.e.,] for the reason that all entities are differentiated from everything [else, as explained in PV I 40], **therefore**, **from whatever** the **objects** of words **are differentiated from**[, e.g.,] from permanent, non-produced etc., **based on that**[, i.e.,] based on the differentiation of [their] limit[, i.e., what is not something else (cf. PVSVṬ 347,28–30),] **different** properties, such as impermanent, produced, etc., **are constructed** through differentiation[, that is,] superimposed by conceptual cognitions. How [are those different genera or properties] qualified? [As] **tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ**. [They] fathom[, that is, they] have the disposition (*śīla*) of fathoming, its[, i.e.,] a particular's, specific properties which are characterized by the form of a differentiation from [those that do not qualify this particular,] such as unproduced etc.; [in other words, these different genera or properties] have the disposition of manifesting the nondifferences of these [particulars]. This is the point [of this passage].) See also the translation of PVSVṬ to this verse in appendix A.2.1

Therefore, whichever specific difference is recognized through some property, that [specific difference is] not capable [of being recognized] through a [property] other than that one. By this (*tena*) a differentiated subsistence [of two properties with respect to the same thing is shown]. // PV I 42 //

For indeed all entities are in the state of [their] own nature. They do not mix [their] self with a different [entity], because [then] there would be the consequence of this [other entity] not being a different [entity].

Also, that nature is not theirs, which is undifferentiated for them [and] has become [their] self,[421] because then (*tadānīm*) they[, i.e., these entities with a differentiated nature,] would not exist.

[PVSV 25,1] For there would be only this [one nature for them], because [there] is an undifferentiated [nature]; and because [there] is no [other nature for the entities, which is] distinct (*vyatirikta*) from this [undifferentiated nature] and differentiated [for each of them]; and because, furthermore, a difference of exactly this [undifferentiated nature] would be contradictory. And this [undifferentiated nature,] which [should] subsist in [its] self, [would be] completely unmixed [with the particulars].

[PVSV 25,3] Also a different thing, even if connected to many [things], is not a universal to them, because of [their] not being of that [common] nature, because of the unwanted consequence [that there is a universal] also in [the case of] being two etc.,[422] connection, and

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[421]Probably the point is that this same form is identified with the particulars themselves. Karṇakagomin glosses *ātmabhūtam* with "unseparated" in PVSVṬ 115,19 f.: "***teṣām** iti bhāvānām, **abhinnam** ity ekam, **ātmabhūtam** ity avyatiriktaṃ **yad rūpam** svabhāvo ...*". (Read *ekam ātma°* acc. to PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 44b7 against printed *ekātma°*. Note that Karṇakagomin apparently read *teṣām* instead of *eṣām*.)

[422]PVSVṬ 116,21–24: *tadā **dvitvādikāryadravyeṣv api prasaṅgaḥ**. **dvitvam** api hy anekadravyasamavetam(.) ādigrahaṇād bahutvādiḥ. tathā saṃyogo 'nekadravyasamavetaḥ. kāryadravyaṃ cāvayavisaṃjñitam ārambhakadravyeṣu samavetam; ato dvitvādiṣu sāmānyarūpatāprasaṅgaḥ.* (Then **there is an unwanted consequence also** [for the case of] **being two etc.,** [as well as for the case of a] **substance**

substance as effect (*kāryadravya*). For, some [things] are not really [made] the same by another, though it has a connection [to them]; [rather, they] really have that (*tadvat*), like figures [are not made the same] by a garland [connecting them] at the neck.[423] There are no objects of non-different apprehensions, like figures [connected by a garland are not cognized as the same]. For, an awareness, mixing together their very selves, appears as having a universal as an object, but [it does] not [appear such that one could say] "There are two [objects] connected by one.", as [it does in the case of] the figures.

[Objection:] This is an error of [the awareness] seeing [only] this [universal].[424] [Answer:] Why "[an awareness] seeing [only] this"? [Objection:] Because an error not having a cause is impossible. [Answer:] Only those having this same effect are the cause, because [such an error] does not exist for [a cognition of things] possessing

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as effect. For [the state of] being two also inheres in multiple substances. From using [the word] "etc." many-ness etc. [is understood]. In the same way, contact inheres in multiple substances. And a substance as effect, called a whole, inheres in the producing substances. Therefore, there is the unwanted consequence of being a universal for [the state of] being two etc.)

The point is that all these things are not universals in Vaiśeṣika ontology, which can here be taken to be endorsed by Dharmakīrti's opponent. Plurality and contact are qualities, and the *kāryadravya*, here equated with the whole (*avayavin*), is a kind of derivative and passing substance. Cf. the general explanations in Halbfass 1992: 93 f., and 122 f., as well as in Franco and Preisendanz 1998: § 4.

[423]Karṇakagomin explains that the figures are connected by a thread for the purpose of worship (PVSVṬ 116,28–117,4): **bhūtāni** *grahanakṣatrāṇi teṣāṃ* **kaṇṭhe** *dīrgho* **guṇo** *'rccanārthaṃ nibadhyate. tenaikena kaṇṭhe guṇena yathā bhūtāni tadvanti, na tv ekībhavanti, tadvad vyaktayo 'pi.* (Read *dīrgho* acc. to PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 45a7 instead of *dīrghā* PVSVṬ 116,28. Trl.: **The figures**[, that is,] planets and stars; a long **string** is bound **to** their **neck** in order to worship [them]. Thus, like the figures [connected] by one [string] at the neck have that [string], but do not become one [through it], so also the instances [of a universal are not one because of being connected by it].)

[424]Cf. PVSVṬ 118,5–6: *sāmānyaṃ kevalaṃ paśyaty eva buddhiḥ. tasyās tu* **tadda-rśinyāḥ** *samavāyasya sūkṣmatvāt* **sā bhrāntir** *yad etad vyaktīnāṃ sāmānyābhedena grahaṇam iti cet.* (Awareness really sees only the universal. But for this [awareness] **seeing this** there is, because of the fineness of inherence, **this error**, such that there is exactly this grasping of the particulars without a difference to [their] universal.)

number, connection, substance as effect, plurality etc., nor for the figures etc.[425] Therefore, because in this way there is no influence [of a universal] on the cognition of a universal, a universal is not something other [than the things]. Or if it is, it would not be mixed with anything else because of subsisting in its own self (*svātman*). Therefore these entities are distinct (*vyatirikta*) from that considered (*abhimata*) to be of the same genus and from something else, because, by [their] nature, they are [each] of only one [individual] nature.

[PVSV 25,15] Based[426] on the difference from whatever [things are] different from, multiple properties are cognized through words which are settled upon (*kṛtasaṃniveśa*) for causing the apprehension of these differences, even though there is no difference in [a thing's] own nature. These words also are only based on this particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), because, even though [they] do not indicate (*anākṣepa*) all differences [of that particular], they indicate a single difference, [so that][427] there is a difference for this [particular] also from that

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[425]The argument is that a cognition as the same can exist for things which are not qualified by any real, common thing inhering in them. This shows that a commonness is cognizable without such a universal being the cause of that cognition, which in turn is an error because particulars do not, in fact, have anything real in common with each other. The question is, of course, what "real" means here. As far as this discussion is concerned, only the same effect has been admitted too. Both a common nature, identical with the individuals, and a thing separate from the particulars but connecting them, have been considered and rejected.

[426]The following passage is also translated and discussed in Hugon 2017.

[427]PVSVṬ 119,20: **tadekasmād api** *yato yato vyāvṛtto 'rthaḥ śabdair viṣayīkriyate tasmāt tasmād atatkāraṇād atatkāryāc caikasmād api* **tasya** *svalakṣaṇasyāneka-vyāvṛttasya* **bhedo 'stīti** *kṛtvā tadviṣayā ucyante na tu tadviṣayā eva.* (Read °*ānekavyāvṛttasya* acc. to PVSVṬ_{ms} 46a6. Trl.: **This**, a particular which is differentiated from many [differences with other causes and effects], **is different also from this single** [thing, i.e.,] from whatever has another cause and has another effect, differentiated from which an [external] object is made the object [of a cognition] by words. Thinking so, [words] are said to have this [external thing] as an object, but they do not really have it as an object.) In PVSVṬ 119,13–14, *ekabhedacodanāt* from PVSV 25,17–18 was glossed by *ekaikasya binnasya svabhāvasya codanāt* (...because they indicate some differentiated nature [of a particular]). So in these passages, Karṇakagomin equates "difference" (*bheda*) with a certain aspect of a particular's real being. It is thus permissible to understand the somewhat awkward phrase

single [thing]. Therefore, as many [things having] different natures [there are] for a single entity, so many differentiations [are there] with regard to these [things of different natures], because [what] has an effect and a cause which cannot occur for this [other thing] is different from that [other thing].[428] [PVSV 25,21] And as many differentiations [there are], so many words (*śruti*) [are there] with the purpose of everyday activity (*vyavahārārtha*) [that proceeds] by avoiding [that having] another (*atat*) cause and effect. Like [this expression:] "A sound following immediately on an effort is audible." has the purpose of avoiding [that having] another cause and effect.[429] Therefore, even though the [a thing's] own nature is without difference, which characteristic (*viśeṣa*) difference is known through some property [or] name, that [difference] cannot be made known by another [property

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"differentiated from a difference" simply as "having a certain quality". We could then render PVSVṬ 119,20 as "This, a particular which has many qualities, has also only one quality insofar as it is different from a single other thing, that is, from some thing that has another cause and effect ...."

[428]PVSVṬ 119,26–28: *kiṃ kāraṇam. tasmin vyāvarttye 'vidhibhūte dharmiṇy asambhavi kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ ca yasya vivakṣitasya dharmiṇaḥ, sa **tadasambha-vikāryakāraṇaḥ**, tasya **tadbhedāt**, tasmād atatkāryād atatkāraṇāc ca **bhedād** vyāvṛttatvāt.* (What is the cause? **Because of a difference of** this[, i.e.], [of] that [property bearer] which **has an effect and cause that do not occur there**; [this] property bearer, which one wishes to express, has an effect and cause that do not occur where [there is] this property bearer that is to be excluded[, or, in other words,] is the limit; ["because of a difference from this" must be understood like this:] because of a difference[, i.e.], because of being excluded, from that[, i.e.], from that which does not have that effect and that which does not have that cause.)

I think the argument works like this: A, which one wants to express, has an effect and cause (properties, for example), neither of which occurs in the case of B. So B is the limit of A, or that which one wishes to exclude. In this sense, A is different from B.

[429]As explained in PVSVṬ 120,10–13, and clearly understood by Hugon (2017), the differentiation "preceded by effort" enables activity avoiding things of a different cause, i.e., not preceded by any human activity, like lightning, and "audible" excludes what has a different result, i.e., something other than an auditory cognition (*śrotrajñāna*).

or name]. So words do not all have the same referent. Therefore the reason is not a part of the object of the thesis.[430]

A.1.2 PV I 43–45

[PVSV 25,26] [Question:][431] How then is this understood: through both a word and a logical mark a removal (*vyavaccheda*) is cognized, [but] not, in an affirmative way (*vidhi*),[432] the form of a real thing?

[Answer: It is known] because of the use of another means of valid cognition and another word. For [it is] so:

> Which other part of an object's single nature that is itself directly perceived could be unobserved, [so that] it [would have to be] examined by [other] means of valid cognitions? // PV I 43 //

[PVSV 26,4] For the nature (*ātman*) of an object (*artha*) is one. It is directly perceived, because it is impossible to establish [something] when that having the property [to be established] is unestablished; like sound [has to be established] in order to prove its impermanence. Because this [nature of a thing] is established through perception alone, [there is] an establishment of all [its] forms (*ākāra*), because there is no unestablished [nature] other than this [nature of the thing]. Or, if it exists, [it is] not the nature [of that thing]. For what does not exist as having the same subsistence (*yogakṣema*) as something [else], that cannot have the nature of that,[433] because everyday treatment [of things] as different is bound (*nibandhana*) to

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[430]As pointed out by Much 2008: 8, n. 9, this is the preliminary end of the discussion starting at PVSV 24,16 f., and the same point is made at the end of the *apoha* section, PVSV 93,4–5.

[431]Cf. Kellner 2004: 4 f. for another translation of the next few sentences. Nakasuka 2019 discusses the following verses up to k. 49 in greater detail.

[432]See the discussion of how to take *vidhinā* here in Kellner 2004: 5, n. 3.

[433]PVSVṬ 121,28–29 explains: *alabdhadharmānuvṛttir* **yogaḥ**. *labdhadharmā-nuvṛttiḥ* **kṣemaḥ**. **eko** *yogaḥ kṣemaś ca yasya sa tathā*. *tulyadharmeti yāvat*. (**Acquisition** [is] an activity towards unobtained properties, **keeping** [is] an activity towards obtained properties. That which has **the same** acquisition and keeping is [called] so. [It means] as much as "having the same property.") Much (2008: 9,

this alone[, i.e., to the sameness in subsistence]; for otherwise there is the consequence of non-existence [of everyday activity]. [This] has been said.[434] Therefore, because in the case of a perceived property bearer there is a complete discernment of its nature, the use of another means of cognition does not have any opportunity [to add anything] here,

> unless a cause for an error causes [someone] to attach a different quality (*guṇa*) [to something], like[435] the form "silver" [could be attached] to mother of pearl (*śukti*) because of observing a similarity in their forms. // PV I 44 //[436]

[PVSV 26,14] [This means that another means of valid cognition is not possible] if the cause of an error, which obstructs the ascertainment (*niścaya*) of an entity as [it is], even though it is seen with [its] complete reality, does not cause another quality to be attached, like the form of silver to mother of pearl. For there are not two forms for mother of pearl, one common [to it and silver] and a specific [one], because of the [unwanted] consequence [that there would be] a cognition as such;[437] [also] because, if, alternatively, [these two forms are] not cognized separately, this concept of being two would be wrong; and because of an overreaching consequence.[438] Therefore, someone

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n. 32) cites the following explanation given in Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 99, n. 1: "This is the commonplace *cliché* in philosophical parlance. Things supposed to be identical must have identical *yoga* and *kṣema*. ...That which has the same incidents, gain or loss with another, is identical with the other."

[434]Gnoli 1960: 189 notes that PVSVṬ 122,7 says that this refers to PVSV 20,21.

[435]For *vā* as *iva*, cf. Gnoli 1960: 26, note to line 13.

[436]Cf. also the translation in Steinkellner 1971: 194, n. 55.

[437]PVSVṬ 123,14–15: **tathā** *sāmānyaviśeṣarūpeṇa śavalābhāsāyāḥ* **pratipatteḥ** *sarvadā* **prasaṅgāt**. (...**because of the unwanted consequence** that there is always **a cognition like that**[, i.e.,] a multifarious appearance in a both common and particular form.)

[438]As Karṇakagomin explains, this consequence goes too far for the following reason: if qualities or forms could be two without having a difference in appearance, cases where oneness (or identity) is assumed on account of a single appearance

seeing the form of mother of pearl sees [it] only [as] specific[, i.e., as a particular]. But because of the defectiveness of the conditions (*pratyaya*) for an ascertainment [that person], without ascertainment, thinks "I see the similarity to this [form of silver]." Therefore, there is the superimposition of silver for him. In the same way, [there is] the error [of a cognition of] persistence for [someone] because of the superimposition of that state[, i.e., persistence], [since that person] does not notice that [two moments of a causal continuum] are different due to the production of a different [moment], similar [to the preceding one]. As many other states there are for this[, a thing's own nature,] exactly as many superimpositions there are, coming into existence according to their own cause.[439] So the means of valid cognition, being what removes these [superimpositions from the objects], do indeed have a result. But these [means of cognition] resulting in [such a] removal are not applied in order to let one apprehend an uncognized part of a thing, because that [part] has [already] been perceived; for, moreover, perceiving a partless [thing] by [only] one part is not correct.[440]

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would become dubious–since there would be no difference between one and two appearances. Also, it is wrong because the negating judgement, "this is not silver," could not arise. (Cf. PVSVṬ 123,17–19: *pratibhāsabhedam antareṇa dvitvakalpanā-yām* **atiprasaṅgāt**. *anyatrāpy ekatvābhimate dvitvakalpanā syāt. nedaṃ rajatam iti bādhakasyānutpādaprasaṅgāc ca.*)

[439]PVSVṬ 124,12–14: *tasmād* **yāvanto 'sya** *śabdādeḥ kṣaṇikānātmādisvabhā-vasya* **parabhāvā** *nityādayas* **tāvanta eva yathāsvaṃ nimittabhāvinaḥ** *yasya yad anurūpaṃ nimittaṃ tadbhāvinaḥ* **samāropā iti** | (Read *yathāsvaṃ* acc. to PVSVṬ_ms 48a1 against *yathāsva°* in PVSVṬ 124,12. Trl.: From this, i.e., from a word etc., **as many other states**, i.e., permanent etc., **of this**, i.e., of that having a nature such as momentary, without self, etc., **exactly so many superimpositions** [are there], **which have come into existence according to their own cause**, i.e., which have come into existence from a cause according to it.)

[440]Apart from the evidence in the Tibetan tradition mentioned by Gnoli (1960: note to 27,1), PVSVṬ 124,17 attests to a version where these two reasons are not linked by *ca*: *...dṛṣṭatvāt. kiṃ karaṇam. anaṃśasyaikadeśena darśanāyogāt.* Since this seems to make quite good sense, I have not taken the two ablatives to be in the same, supporting, relation to the main sentence, but instead understand that the second supports the first (which is the primary reason for the statement). A free

> Therefore each quality of an observed entity is indeed
> observed, [but] is not ascertained because of an error. So
> a logical reason is applied.[441] // PV I 45 //

This is the recapitulating verse. Therefore no other means of
valid cognition is applied to [what was] observed in order to grasp
something that was not observed.

A.1.3   *PV I 46–51*

> And if a real thing [were] grasped because of an inference,
> [there would be] a grasping of all [the thing's] properties
> when [only] a single property is ascertained. This defect
> does not follow in the case of exclusion. // PV I 46 //

[PVSV 27,9] Not only is there no application of another means
of valid cognition for something [that] has been observed by direct
perception, but also, if inference caused the apprehension of a thing
in an affirmative [form], [and did] not perform [only] a removal [of a
wrong superimposition],[442] then all properties would be ascertained
when one property is ascertained, because [they] are not completely
distinct from this [one property]. So there [would be] no application
of another means of valid cognition. For it is not correct that the
self of this [one property] is not ascertained if this [one property] is
ascertained. Furthermore, if it is the removal of a superimposition
[from an object] that is performed by inference, then, because of this
removal of one superimposition, another would not be removed. So,
to this end [of removing another imposition] another [means of valid
cognition] is applied. [Objection:] Now,[443] an ascertainment of an

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rendering would be: "Other means of valid conceptual cognitions only ever remove
wrong ideas about an object, but never make anything about a real thing known,
because that must already have been perceived. And it must have been perceived if
the thing was perceived at all, because it is not possible to perceive a partless thing
by only one of its parts."

[441]Cf. the translation of this verse in Steinkellner 1971: 198, n. 70.

[442]For this notion, cf. the formulation *anyāpohakṛt* going back to Dignāga in PV
III 164 (see appendix A.3.2 for a translation).

[443]For more on the context and a translation of this passage, cf. Kellner 2004: 11 f.

uncognized [thing] is not necessarily preceded by a mistake. [It is] like [there] suddenly[444] [is] a cognition of fire because of smoke. For in this case an [earlier] superimposition of non-fire is not possible. Therefore, a removal is not performed in every case [of conceptual cognition]. [Answer:] To this it was said:[445] "When a property bearer is cognized, there is the cognition of all [properties] because they are not different [from the property bearer]. Or, if different, there is, in this [case of cognizing a property bearer], no cognition of an unconnected [property]." Therefore, also here [in this example of yours where there is a sudden cognition of fire upon seeing smoke] there is no ascertainment of the nature of this [fiery place as fiery] for someone seeing that [smoke]. Why? Because of a mistake.[446] And how should he, who ascertains that place as having a nature free of this [fire] through an awareness that is free of the consideration of fire being [there], be called unmistaken? And someone who is free of both a superimposition of this cognitive form [of nonfire onto a smokey place] and doubt[447] would not follow the [logical] mark [smoke] in the case of this cognition. Neither would he respect its concomitance [with fiery places] and separation [from places without fire].

> Therefore the logical mark is proclaimed to have exclusion as an object. [For] otherwise, if the property bearer

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[444]PVSVṬ 126,7–8 explains: **akasmād** *ity atarkitopasthitāt. sahasaiva kvacit pradeśe* **dhūmād agnipratipattiḥ**. (**Suddenly**[, i.e.,] having come about without having been considered. The cognition of fire because of smoke in some place [occurs] just suddenly.)

[445]As Much (2008: 12, n. 43) observes, this point was made in PVSV 26,5–7, although not in the exact same words.

[446]Acc. to PVSVṬ 126,18: *viparyāsād evānagnimatā pradeśena tulyatvagrahaṇād eva.* (Only **because of a mistake**[, i.e.,] only because of grasping [this place] as being the same as a place without fire.) The argument is, probably, that because the cognition of fire is inadvertently (*akasmād*) arrived at, there is no proper ascertainment of this fact, and therefore there is no difference between this place and one where there is no fire.

[447]PVSVṬ 126,30–127,6: *anagny***ākārasamārope***ṇa* **saṃśaye***na ca* **rahitaś** *ca puruṣas ...*

is established, what apart from it would [still] be unestab-
lished? // [PV I 47] //

This[, above,] is a summary verse.

Even when something is observed, a cognition having a
universal as an object, [i.e., a] conceptual [cognition], has,
when another part is not superimposed, exclusion of that
[other part] in general as [its] field [of activity].[448] // [PV
I 48] //

[PVSV 28,8] [Objection:] How can an ascertaining cognition,
which follows immediately on seeing a form etc. [and] has no logical
mark [as its basis], have removal as an object, insofar as it arises
when there is no superimposition? [Answer:] [It has removal as an
object] because this [ascertaining cognition] does not exist for the
object of a superimposition. For there is no [correct] ascertainment
concerning that particular aspect (*bheda*) onto which a [person]
superimposes [some wrong aspect like] "persistent" or "having a self",

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[448]Cf. the translation of this verse and the next half-verse in Steinkellner 1971: 199,
n. 71.

The argument here is that an ascertainment (*niścaya*), even when not based on
a logical mark and therefore not a result of a full inference, but when occurring
right after seeing something, has the exclusion of a superimposition as its range
of activity: even though that imposition has not happened, the mere presence of
an ascertainment (that it is otherwise) is the exclusion of that imposition. This is
so, since an ascertainment is what precludes, or falsifies, an imposition. A person
seeing mother of pearl might think either "Oh, mother of pearl." or "Oh, silver." In
the first case, an immediate (and correct) recognition, that is, an ascertainment,
excludes any other wrong ideas at least about that aspect of the object. The person
might still be mistaken as to, e.g., the size of the piece of mother of pearl. In the
second case, a superimposition of silver has happened. This is an incorrect cognition,
and one that will have to be corrected by a subsequent cognition. It is the kind of
wrong cognition–a superimposition (*samāropa*)—that is removed by a valid means
of cognition resulting in a correct ascertainment (*niścaya*).

because there is the relation of defeated and defeating between an understanding by ascertainment and by imposition.[449] // [PV I 49ab] //

[PVSV 28,13] For an entity, even though it is observed as differentiated from everything, is not understood just like that; because a covering is possible for some particular aspect, like in the case of mother of pearl's mother-of-pearlness [which is then thought to be its silverness]. But precisely for that [particular aspect], for which a cognizer has no cause of an error, a remembered ascertainment exists, even though this person does not perceive this [aspect] differently [than the other aspects of the same thing]. Because of the defeated-defeating relationship between superimposition and ascertainment, [there is], for ascertainment,

an application of it when there is a removal (*viveka*) of a superimposition. This is understood. // [PV I 49cd] //

[PVSV 28,19] And precisely the removal of this is other-exclusion. Therefore this [ascertaining cognition] too[450] has the exclusion of this in general as its object. [It] does not have the nature of ascertaining a thing's own nature. Indeed [it is] so, because, even if some [part] is ascertained, the non-cognition of another is observed, and because if its own nature were ascertained, this [cognition of one part but not another] would not be consistent.[451]

As many superimpositions of parts [there are], just that many clear ascertainments and words [there are] in order to remove them. Therefore they[, different words and

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[449]The relation is such that an ascertainment "defeats"—shows to be wrong or prevents–a wrong imposition. The translation reflects the structure of the two compounds "*niścayāropamanasor*" and "*bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ*", inverted for metrical reasons but paraphrased with the expected sequence at the end of the following prose paragraph.

[450]*tad api* refers to *niścayajñāna* in PVSV 28,8.

[451]Cf. also the argument in PVSV 26,24–27,2. The construction *tathā hi* plus two ablative clauses and no main sentence strikes me as somewhat awkward.

ascertainments,] have different fields of activity. // [PV I 50] //

Otherwise, if a single real thing were pervaded by a single word or by an awareness, [there would] not be any other [uncognized] object.[452] Thus there would be synonymity [of all words and conceptual cognitions]. // [PV I 51] //

[PVSV 29,5] These are two intermediary verses.

A.1.4 PV I 52–55

Also for whom[453] a cognition (*dhī*) grasps an object that has different additional attributes[454] [and] is differentiated [from those attributes], // [PV I 52ab] //

[PVSV 29,7] Whoever thinks this: "Additional attributes [are] different from each other and from their basis. Words,[455] which are based on them, apply to substrata (*ādhāra*) of these [additional attributes], or to these [additional attributes] alone. Therefore there is no such unwanted consequence [as synonymity]." For that [person] also,

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[452]Cf. PVV 306,11–12: ...**nānyo 'pratipanno viṣayo 'stīti** ... (...**not any other**[, i.e.,] an uncognized, **object** ...). Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 131,26–132,8, see appendix A.2.2) discusses two ways of understanding this "any other": the first results in an interpretation as given here; according to the second, one would have to understand that there is no object for another word or cognition.

[453]PVSVṬ 132,4 identifies this as *"vaiśeṣikasya"* ("for a Vaiśeṣika"). PVV 306,17 identifies the opinion as *"naiyāyikāder mate"*, i.e., as held "in the theory of the Naiyāyikas and so on". This "and so on" is paraphrased as *"vaiśeṣikāder"*, "for a Vaiśeṣika and so on" in Vibhū 306, n. 3.

For PVSV 29,6–47,13 (kk. 52–94), cf. also the translation in Vora and Ota 1979, Vora and Ota 1980, and Vora and Ota 1982.

[454]*upādhi*, a non-essential attribute or pseudo universal in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theories, is glossed as meaning the proper universals "substance-ness, etc." by both PVSVṬ 132,9 (*upādhayo dravyatvādayaḥ*) and PVV 306,17 (*nānopādher dravyatvā-dyanekadharmaviśiṣṭasyā° ...*).

[455]See footnote 560.

if that, which has a nature undifferentiated from the
capacities that are an auxiliary (*aṅga*) to the different
additional attributes' support, is grasped with all its self,
which difference of [that which is] supported would not
be ascertained? // [PV I 52cd–53ab] //

[PVSV 29,12] Even if the additional attributes, which are indeed
different [from each other and their basis], [were] the cause of other
words and cognitions about an object, still only this single [object]
having these [additional attributes] is clung to[456] by these [words and
cognitions]. [There is] no difference in the proper self of a [property
possessor] whose nature [consists in] the capacities for supporting the
various additional attributes; therefore, if grasping [this supporter]
with all its self, which particular additional attribute indeed would
not be ascertained? For one grasps [this supporter] as being what
supports all the additional attributes.[457] For [it is] not [the case that]
a completely different supporter-state of that grasped with its own
form is not really grasped. Therefore, exactly that, which is grasped
with its own nature, [is grasped] also as being a support. So [it is
stated].

Because of a connection of these two[, supported and
supporter,] in [their] natures, both [would be] grasped in
the cognition of one. // [PV I 53cd] //

[PVSV 29,20] Because of grasping the state of supported and
supporter, which is[, respectively,] the nature[458] of the additional
attribute and that having it, all two are grasped in the cognition of
one. So (*iti*) where this[, which has an additional property,] is grasped,

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[456]PVSVṬ 133,29: "…*upalīyate viṣayīkriyate*." ("…**clung to**, i.e., made an object.")

[457]In other words, a thing's nature is not different from the capacities by which it
can support its attributes. Therefore the thing, grasped with its own nature, cannot
be grasped without being grasped as supporting these additional attributes. And
since there cannot be two separate supporting states for the same thing, it must be
grasped as the supporter of *all* its additional attributes.

[458]Cf. the comment above, footnote 421. The idea here is that a supported thing
and a supporting thing are so only in virtue of their relation to each other.

even if [it is] characterized by [only] one additional attribute, there there is a grasping of all additional attributes, because grasping that possessing additional attributes is not separable (*nāntarīyakatva*) from grasping that [single additional attribute]. Otherwise, it would not even be grasped as such.[459]

For there is not one supporter of some other [supported thing, such that] this [supporter] would not be grasped. Neither is there a non-grasping of the supported when the supporter is grasped in this way[, i.e., as a supporter], because of the [unwanted] consequence that this [supporter] would not be grasped [as a supporter] either, as in the case of being owner and property.[460] Therefore, even in the teaching that an additional attribute is a different object [than its supporter], there is the same consequence.[461]

Even if [there should be this objection:] "Nevertheless, the capacities through which [something] supports additional attributes are completely different from that which has those capacities. Therefore this consequence [does] not [follow]." [the answer is:]

> Given there is a difference of the capacities that are the support of the properties, why are these [the capacities] of this [having these capacities], if there is no support of those [capacities] by that [possessing them]? In this way there would be an infinite regress. // [PV I 54] //

[PVSV 30,3] If the states of being a supporter for each additional attribute are not really the proper self of this [which has the additional attributes], and (*api*) do not experience support from this, why are they called "its"? Or, if there is [this] support, this single [supporter], [which] supports capacities by capacities that have become its own self, is, when grasped even by only a single additional attribute, certainly grasped with its whole self. For [it is] so: if a single additional

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[459]PVSVṬ 234,25 f. comments: *upādhīnām upakāraka upādhimān ity evam api na gṛhyeta*. ("[It] would not even be grasped in this way: that supporting the additional attributes [is] what has the additional attributes.")

[460]For the criticism of this argument by Bhāsarvajña, cf. section 4.1.9.

[461]I.e., that of synonymity of all words and concepts. Cf. PVSVṬ 135,16–17.

attribute is grasped, the capacity supporting it is grasped. If that is grasped, the entity supporting it–having as its nature the complete support for the capacities [supporting its attributes][462] [and] being grasped–causes [a person] to grasp all [these supported] capacities; and these [capacities cause the grasping of] their own additional attributes. So the consequence remains.[463]

[PVSV 30,10] If [you assume] that also these capacities that support the capacities [supporting the attributes] are really different from an entity, it [still] is the same, because [there is] an endless connection (*ghaṭana*) of the additional attributes and their [supporting] capacities to ever different capacities. [So] this single [entity having additional attributes], not being grasped [together] with these [capacities] at any time, [yet] having a self [consisting in] the support of those [capacities],[464] is not grasped as having these [capacities]. [Objection:] If, on the other hand, words and cognitions were to adhere exclusively to the additional attributes, then, because there

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[462]The *bahuvrīhi* compound *svātmabhūtasakalaśaktyupakārah* can be analysed in various ways. Karṇakagomin's analysis is as follows (PVSVṬ 136,18–20): *kiṃ bhūtaḥ?* **svātmabhūtasakalaśaktyupakāraḥ** *svātmabhūtāḥ sakalā upādhyupakāriṇīnāṃ śaktīnām upakārāḥ śaktayo yasya sa tathābhūto* **bhāvo gṛhītaḥ**. (Read °*śaktyupakāraḥ* acc. to PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 52a2 instead of the misprint °*śaktyapakāraḥ* in PVSVṬ 136,19. Trl.: What is [this grasped entity like]? **svātmabhūtasakalaśaktyupakāraḥ**[, that is,] **the grasped entity** is so [that it is one] whose supports—[that is,] capacities–for the capacities supporting additional attributes are its proper nature [, and are] complete.) This analysis is also supported by the Tibetan translation (PVSV$_D$ 277b1 = PVSV$_Q$ 423b6): *nus pa la phan pa rang gi bdag nyid du gyur pa mtha' dag dang ldan pa*.

[463]PVSVṬ 136,22 points out: **tadavasthaḥ prasaṅgaḥ** *ko bhedaḥ syād aniścita iti ya uktaḥ*. (So the consequence remains, which was stated by [the words] "Which difference would not be ascertained?" [in PV I 53b].) Indeed, the infinite regress mentioned in PV I 54 does not follow from this argument, but is discussed in the next few lines.

[464]I.e., the secondary capacities, PVSVṬ 137,7–8 ...**tadupakārātmā.** *śaktyupakārātmā. upādhyupakārikāṇāṃ śaktīnāṃ yāḥ śaktayas tadātmeti yāvat* (...**having a self consisting in the support of those**[, i.e.,] having a self consisting in the support of those capacities. That is to say, having a self consisting in those which [are] the capacities of the capacities supporting additional attributes.)

is no inclusion of this [entity having the attributes],[465] there is no cognition of all [additional attributes] by means of the cognition of that [which has the attributes]. [Answer:] Nevertheless, because that [having attributes] is not indicated by words, [one] would not act towards it [due to a word]. So the usage of words would be useless.[466] For all everyday activity [engaged] with[467] affirmation and negation has [its] basis in causal efficacy. And, since additional attributes [are] without power as to this [causal efficacy], and that having the power[, i.e., a specific particular,] is not named, what [is achieved by] the usage of words? And therefore the additional attributes would not be additional attributes. For it is with respect to some primary thing that [additional attributes] are so called, because, when [a word] applies to something, [additional attributes] are a part of this [primary thing].

But, since this [primary thing] would not be indicated by words, these [additional attributes] would not be parts of any [thing]. So why [would they be] additional attributes? If this [is said]: "There is no error, because [a thing] is indicated through the [additional attributes] indicated [by words].",[468] then there is [that] same consequence.[469] First of all, that [having additional properties]—which, due to being

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[465]PVSVṬ 137,14: ***tasyo****pādhimataḥ śabdajñānair* **asamāveśād** *aviṣayīkaraṇāt.* (**Because [there is] no inclusion of this**[, i.e.,] because words and cognitions do not make that having additional attributes [their] object.)

[466]*vyartha*, useless, can also literally mean "without a referent".

[467]This is a qualifying instrumental according to PVSVṬ 137,21–22: *itthaṃbhūta-lakṣaṇā (pāṇiniḥ) ceyaṃ tṛtīyā ....* Also see Speijer 1886: § 67.

[468]PVSVṬ 138,13–14: *yady upādhimātraṃ codyate tathāpi śabdair* **lakṣitā** *ye upādhayas tair upādhimato* **lakṣaṇāt** *paricchedād* **adoṣaḥ.** *śabdaprayogavaiya-rthyadoṣo neti cet.* (If it [is said by an opponent]: If only the additional attribute is meant, still [there is] **no such error**, i.e., there is no error of word usage being useless, because of an **indication**, i.e., a delimitation of that having additional attributes by those additional attributes which are **indicated** by words.)

[469]I.e., the consequence of grasping all of the thing's additional properties. Cf. PVSVṬ 138,15: *...****tadavasthaḥ*** *sarvopādhigrahaṇa****prasaṅgaḥ****.*

inseparable [from the additional attributes][470] is indicated by these additional attributes–is, if [it] is indicated by even [only] one [additional attribute], indicated with its whole self. So the [unwanted] consequence remains. For what difference (*viśeṣa*) is there here [in this matter], whether words should let [a person] indicate that [having additional attributes], or the additional attributes indicated by these [words should let a person indicate that having attributes]? [PVSV 31,1] For, [it is] to that [same] extent that this [thing having the additional attributes] is ascertained as supporting all [additional attributes] at that time. So this [explanation of yours][471] is nothing at all. Therefore,

> if that supporting a single [additional attribute] is to be grasped, [there are] no supports that are different (*apara*) from it, which would be unobserved if it is observed. If it is grasped, the whole is grasped. // [PV I 55] //

This is a recapitulating verse.[472]

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[470]This was also argued in PVSV 29,22 f. Cf. also PVSVṬ 138,16: *nāntarīyakatayety upādhyupādhimator avyabhicāreṇa*. (Due to not being separable, i.e., since there is no deviation of additional attribute and that having an additional attribute.) This means additional attributes and that having them do not occur separately from each other.

[471]I.e., the objection in PVSV 30,22.

[472]This repeats the main intent of the section starting at PV I 52ab (trl. on page 287).

A.1.5 PV I 59

Moreover,[473] in this [case][474] words as well as ascertainments, even though [they name and cognize] a differentiation from another and [that] differentiated from another, only conform (*anu-√rudh*) to convention.[475] // PV I 59 //

[PVSV 32,15] There also, in [the case that] other-exclusion [is the word referent], the differentiation [is] not one, and truly another that [which is] differentiated, because of the unwanted consequence that that which is being turned away from the differentiation of this, is this.[476] In this way, furthermore, there would not be a differentiation

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[473]This verse and a part of the *PVSV* concerning it are translated and discussed in Hattori 1996: 392 f. Hugon 2017 analyses some of the following passages to show in which sense Dharmakīrti says that *vyāvṛtti* and *vyāvṛtta* are not different things.

[474]PVSVṬ 143,14: **tatrāpi cā**nyāpohe śabdārthe. (**Moreover, in that** [case], i.e., when other-exclusion is the referent of a word.) For the discussion preceding this verse, cf. Kellner 2004: 19 f. The main point that Dharmakīrti was trying to prove in the preceding passages (starting with PV I 52, trl. on page 287) was that in all cases of a word denoting a real thing (property or property bearer), the result is an understanding of the whole thing in all its aspects. Dharmakīrti now proceeds to show that this problem does not exist when words denote exclusion.

[475]Cf. PVSVṬ 143,16–17, explaining *saṃketam anurundhate*: *ye **śabdā** dharmadharmivācanāḥ **niścayāś co**bhayaviṣayāḥ, te **saṅketam anurundhate**. saṅketānuvidhānenaiṣāṃ dharmadharmiviṣayavibhāgaḥ kalpitaḥ. paramārthatas tu vyāvṛttir eva nāstīty arthaḥ.* (**Words**, naming properties and property bearers, **and ascertainments**, which have these two as [their] objects, **conform to convention**. This means that, in conformity with convention, their[, the words' and ascertainments',] separation of objects [into] properties and property bearers is conceptually constructed. But in reality there is no [such] differentiation at all. That is the meaning [of Dharmakīrti's statement].)

[476]This passage is also translated and discussed in Hattori 1996: 392 f. and Kataoka 2009: 491. According to these interpretations (which I agree with), the unwanted consequence is that the thing differentiated from others becomes identical to these others, because its differentiation is not identical with it itself, under the assumption that the property and property bearer are distinct entities. E.g.: A cow (property bearer) has the property "excluded from horse", and is different from that property. This is as much as to say: a cow is not "excluded from horse". A horse, in turn, has the property "not excluded from horse", which then makes it identical to a cow, equally not "excluded from horse". (The way the quotation marks

[between different things]. Therefore exactly that which is differentiated is a differentiation. But the [according] difference in [both] a word and a cognition [which is due to a word exists] because of a difference in convention. There is no difference of that designated.

A.1.6   PV I 64

Therefore[477] the description [of the errors occurring for] the opinion [that a thing] possesses that [genus] when

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move around in the qualifiers shows that the argument banks on equating "is not something" with "not excluded from something".) Put a bit more schematically, one could say: Cow (*dharmin*1) is qualified by, and different from, non-horse (*dharma*1). Horse (*dharmin*2) is qualified by, and different from, not non-horse (non-*dharma*1). If *dharmin*1 is not *dharma*1, then *dharmin*1 is *dharmin*2, because *dharmin*2 is qualified by "non-*dharma*1".

This is also how PVSVṬ 143,21–24 understands this passage: *yadi cāśvād vyāvṛttir anaśvatā godravyasyānyā syāt tadāśvavyāvṛtter api godravyeṇa nivartti-tavyam bhedāt. tataś ca **tadvyāvṛtter** anaśvatāyāḥ sakāśān **nivartamānasya** gos **tadbhāvaprasaṅgāt**, aśvabhāvaprasaṅgād aśvavat. evaṃ hy aśvavyāvṛtter anaśvatvalakṣaṇāyā gaur vyāvṛtto bhavati yady asyāśvatvaṃ syāt.* (And if the material entity cow's differentiation from horse, [its] non-horseness, were different [from this cow], then the material entity cow will have to be turned away also from the exclusion from horse, because of a difference [between the cow and its quality, being excluded from horse]. And because, therefore, for a cow[, which is] **that turned away** from non-horseness[, that is,] **from the differentiation from this**[, i.e., horse], **there is the consequence of being this**[, i.e.,] the consequence of being a horse, like a horse. For in that way a cow would become differentiated from the differentiation from a horse, which is characterized as non-horseness.)

[477] This verse is discussed in Hattori 1996: 393, Kataoka 2009: 493(6), and Tille-mans 2011a: 452 ff. Kataoka (2009: 493(6)) interprets "...*tadvatpakṣopavarṇanam / pratyākhyātam*..." as "...the [opponent's] explanation of the [Buddhist] view of *tadvat* (a locus qualified by *apoha*) is refuted ...". This concurs with the understanding of the same phrase in Hattori 1996: 393: "mention (made by Kumārila) in reference to (the theory of) *anyāpoha*, of (the faults to be found with) the *tadvat* theory (viz., the theory maintaining that a word denotes that which is qualified by the universal) has been rejected." Both authors thus understand that the agent of the criticism (the "descrip-tion", in my translation) to be an opponent, Kumārila. Tillemans (2011a: 452–453; 453, n. 11) takes the agent to be Dignāga. The differences in interpretation are mainly due to how the conditional is construed: either one translates "the description of the errors in the *tadvat*-theory is refuted when exclusion is the word-referent," or "the description of the errors in the *tadvat*-theory [that result also] when exclusion is the word-referent is refuted." Judging from Dharmakīrti's following prose passage,

the [word's] object [is] other-exclusion is rejected. For
[this] error would exist [only] if there is a separation of
genus and that possessing it.[478] // PV I 64 //

[PVSV 34,19] What was said [as an objection]: "Also if other-
exclusion is the object of a word, every [unwanted] consequence stated
for the position that [a thing] possesses that[, i.e., a genus,] [would
be the] same, because that qualified by this [exclusion of others]
is designated [by words].", that also is defended against by that
[explanation].[479] For, in this [theory of a thing possessing a genus], a
word applying to some [object, that possessing the genus,] in taking
up another object[, i.e., referring to the genus,] is oppressed by the

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the latter is more likely, and it would thus indicate that Dharmakīrti is rejecting
the errors that Kumārila had accused Dignāga of. The difference is a small one,
since Dignāga had previously levelled the criticism at the Naiyāyika's *tadvatpakṣa*.
PVSVṬ 153,17–19 comments: *yataś ca vyāvṛttivyāvṛttimator abhedas **tena** kāraṇe-
nānyāpohaviṣaye jātimān śabdair abhidhīyata iti tadvatpakṣaḥ. tatra yo doṣaḥ, so
'nyāpohe 'pi syād iti **tadvatpakṣopavarṇanaṃ pratyākhyātam**. (°*viṣaye* corr.
acc. to PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 57b7 against °*viṣayo* in PVSVṬ 153,18. Trl.: And for the [reason
that there is] no difference between differentiation and differentiated [thing], **due
to that**, as a cause, **given that other-exclusion is the object** [of words], [the]
depiction [of these errors occurring] **for the position of "[a thing] possessing
that [genus]" is rejected**[, i.e., the depiction which consist in this statement]:
the error, which [exists] for this[, i.e., for] the position [that a thing] possesses this
[genus][, expressed as] "Words designate that having this [genus].", would exist also
for other-exclusion.)

[478] As explained by Frauwallner (1932: 260–263), it was Kumārila's objection
against Dignāga's *apoha* theory that it entailed all the same errors levelled against
the *tadvat*-theory by him. Cf. the references in Frauwallner 1932: 261, n. 2, the
explanations and the references in Kataoka 2009: 493(6), as well as the references
in footnote 477.

[479]I.e., by the explanation that there is no difference between the differenti-
ated thing and the differentiation qualifying it. Cf. PVSVṬ 153,26–27: *anene*ti
*vyāvṛttivyāvṛttimator ananyatvena **prativyūḍhaṃ** pratyākhyātam.*

errors of not being independent etc.[480] But[481] differentiation from another is not an object other than that differentiated, because both designate the same. This was explained.[482]

[PVSV 34,23] [Objection:] How then, [when a differentiated thing and its differentiation are one, could] a differentiation from another [be] a universal, since the one differentiated[, being a particular,] does not correspond to another? [Answer:] Because there is an appearance in this way[, that is, as corresponding to another,] in the awareness of this [universal].[483] Indeed, there is nothing called a universal at all. An awareness based on words is generated as mixing together actually unmixed[484] properties, because of the capacity of beginningless mental impressions. In virtue of the appearance for this [awareness], a universal and coreference are defined, no matter [that everyday activity based on them] has objects that are non-existent,[485] because objects neither mix [amongst themselves, so as to justify a universal, nor] are they differentiated [into various qualities, so as to justify coreference].[486]

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[480]PVSVṬ 153,29 (*asamā*° corrected to *asāmā*): **ādiśabdād asāmānādhikaraṇyo- pacāradoṣaparigrahaḥ**. (From the word "etc." the errors of not being co-referential and metaphor [should be] understood.) Cf. Much 1997 for a discussion of the first problem, whether and how words can denote the same thing, and cf. Pind 2015: §5 for a translation of Dignāga's discussion of all three problems. Ogawa 2017 has studied Dignāga's position in light of Bhartṛhari's positions.

[481]For another translation of PVSV 34,22–35,7, see Tillemans 2011a: 453, n. 12.

[482]Cf., e.g., PVSV 32,15–17 (trl. page 293).

[483]Cf. PVSVṬ 154,7 f.: *sāmānya**buddhau** vikalpikāyāṃ **tathai**kākāreṇa **prati- bhāsanād** ekākāra eva vyāvartyate 'neneti vyāvṛttiḥ sāmānyam ucyate*. (Because **it appears in this way**[, i.e.,] with the same (*eka*) form, to the conceptual **awareness** of a universal, exactly the same form is differentiated by this [appearance]. So differentiation, [defined as the process] "This causes just the same form to be differentiated." is called a universal.)

[484]For "mixing" in this sense, cf. PVSV *ad* PV I 40 (trl. appendix A.1.1).

[485]Acc. to PVSVṬ 154,24 *asadartho 'pi* refers to a *vyavahāra* involving universals and coreference. See also the other options discussed in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 64, n. 189. Their translation also follows Karṇakagomin's analysis.

[486]Cf. PVSVṬ 154,24–26 for this interpretation.

[PVSV 35,2] The basis for all this [conventional activity, such as the ideas of a universal and coreference, are] the objects differentiated from others by having this cause and this effect,[487] and words allow one to act while avoiding the unwanted. Therefore it is said [that a word] has other-exclusion as an object. In this [theory], [an object], whose external reality is disregarded [by words and concepts], which is one, and differentiated from many in virtue of the appearance in awareness, is made an object by words, [as also] by concepts, [which] have [their] origin in the awakening of impressions that were imparted by the experience of this [singular thing and that] have objects [which are] determined as being so[, i.e., as externally existing things]. And only to these [appearances in awareness] does the everyday usage of property and property-bearer extend itself, [a usage] that cannot be talked about [in terms of the property and property bearer] being the same as, or different from, each other. For there is no property different from a property bearer because [the two] do not [each] denote a different object. Neither is this [property] just [the property bearer], because, as for that denoting this [property bearer], it would follow that also that which denotes a property indicates other distinctions.[488] And in this way[, that is, given that the property is just the property bearer,] no particular convention would be made, because that which [a person] desires [to express with a word for a property] would not be made clear by [that word, since it would express a property bearer]. This, then (*iti*), is the fact that property and property bearer cannot be talked of[489] with regard to the object of a word. But, with regard to a real thing,

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[487]The interpretation here follows the analysis in PVSVṬ 154,28–155,5.

[488]Which means that by saying "blue" about something, also other qualities would be known (such as that the thing is a water lily, a plant, etc.).

[489]Acc. to PVSVṬ 156,28–29:   ***etad** anantaroktam tattvānyatvābhyām **avācya-tvaṃ dharmadharmiṇoḥ śabdārthe** buddhipratibhāsiny arthe uktam.*   (**This**, which was just explained, **is the fact that property and property bearer cannot be talked of** as being [the same as,] or different [from, each other], [which] has been explained **for the word referent**[, i.e.,] for the object appearing in awareness.) This argument thus shows that even though property and property bearer are differentiated in everyday activity, this is not really true with regard to the word

a particular, a common characteristic cannot be talked of because [this universal] does not exist.

A.1.7 PV I 107ab

> If this is thought [by an opponent]: There is no cognition of different [things] with an undifferentiated appearance. // PV I 107ab //

[PVSV 54,18] We [opponents] do not say: what is not the same (*aneka*) does not create the same (*eka*) effect. Rather [we say: given that there are] different objects, an awareness, into which their forms have been thrown, should not have an undifferentiated appearance. [Answer:] Indeed, there is no appearance of particulars in [awareness events][490] grasping a universal, because[491] these [awareness events] exist even if those [particulars] do not exist, and because they appear in a cognition of [the particular] itself[, i.e., in a perceptual cognition,] with another form[, i.e., other than the form of the universal], and because [there is] an overreaching consequence,[492] since a single [thing] is not consistent with multiple forms. Thus this [conceptual

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referent as the object appearing in awareness. And since there is, ultimately, no difference or identity between property and property bearer in this way, the errors that Kumārila thought arose for Dignāga's *apoha* theory (cf. PV I 64) are shown not to pertain to it.

[490]Cf. PVSVṬ 221,24 **sāmānyagrāhiṇīṣu** *buddhiṣu* (**In [those] grasping a universal**, i.e., in [those] awareness events.)

[491]The three reasons given now are, according to PVSVṬ 221,25–222,10, aimed against three different opinions about the relation between what appears to awareness on the one hand, and particulars or universals on the other: first, that the form in which a particular appears to perception is the same as the form in which it appears to conceptual cognition; second, that the form appearing in the awareness of a universal is the form of the particulars; and third, that the same particular has a twofold form–with one it appears to perception, with the other to conceptual cognition.

[492]PVSVṬ 222,8–10: *tṛtīyam pakṣaṃ nirākartum āha–***anekākārāyogād** *iti.* ***ekasyā****nekatvam ayuktam ekānekatvayor virodhāt.* **atiprasaṅgāc ce***ty ekasyāneka-tvakalpanāyāṃ na kvacid ekatvaṃ syād ity arthaḥ.* (In order to refute the third position (cf. footnote 491), [Dharmakīrti] said: "**Because it is not consistent with multiple forms.**" Being many is not consistent **for one**, because being one

awareness] is not [one that could], grasping particulars, appear with an undifferentiated form, [and] arise from these [particulars].[493] Even though [it] has no appearance of these [particulars], [conceptual awareness] causes the world to engage in everyday activity because of the confusion that is determination. But this form, appearing in this [conceptual awareness], does not exist amongst the objects, other

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and being many are contradictory. **And because there is the overreaching consequence**[, i.e.,] there would not be oneness for anything when there is the option that one [thing] is many [things]. This is the meaning.)

[493]Cf. PVSVṬ 222,11–14: *yata evaṃ tasmān neyaṃ sāmānyākārā buddhiḥ bhinnārthagrāhiṇy āhitasvalakṣaṇākārā saty abhinnākārā bhāti, tadudbhavā bhinnapadārthodbhavā. kiṃ tu svalakṣaṇagrāhiṇo 'nubhavenāhitāṃ vāsanām āśritya prakṛtyā bhrāntaiveyam utpadyate. pāramparyeṇa ca vyaktayas tasyāḥ kāraṇaṃ kathyante.* (Emend *pāramparye ca* to *pāramparyeṇa ca*, the *ṇa* perhaps having gone missing due to the line ending on *pāramparye*. Cf. the very similar sentence in PVṬ_D je 122b7–123a1 = PVṬ_Q je 145a6–7: *'di ni ...rang bzhin gyis 'khrul pa kho nar skye* la brgyud pas *ni....* Trl.: Since it is so[, i.e., since the three reasons just mentioned are true,] **therefore this** awareness having the form of a universal is not [one that]—**grasping differentiated objects**[, i.e.,] being one into which the form of a particular has been placed–appears as having a form undifferentiated [from the particulars, or one that] arises from this[, i.e., one that] arises from differentiated things. Rather, this [awareness]—by [its] nature completely erroneous–arises based on mental traces that have been put [there] through the experience of [a cognition] grasping a particular. And, indirectly, the particulars are called the cause of this [conceptual awareness].)

Cf. also the the Tibetan translation, supporting Karṇakagomin's understanding especially of the relation between *bhinnārthagrāhiṇī* and *pratibhāti*, PVSV_D 292a3 = PVSV_Q 441b5–6: *de'i phyir 'di ni de las byung zhing don tha dad pa 'dzin pa yin na tha mi dad par snang bar mi 'gyur ro.*

Note how the three attributes negated here align with the three reasons just mentioned:

1. a conceptual awareness occurs even though the particulars do not exist, hence this awareness does not arise from them (*tadudbhavā*);

2. a conceptual awareness does not appear with the same form as a perception of a particular does, hence it does not appear with an undifferentiated (or the same) form (*abhinnā pratibhāti*);

3. one thing cannot have many forms, hence a conceptual awareness (grasping many forms, like green, tall, leafy) does not grasp the particular.

(*anyatra*) than as a difference that has no difference.[494] And[495] this [common form] is unreal. In this way this [awareness] grasping only this [unreal common form] goes astray. This was already explained.[496]

[PVSV 55,6] Moreover, even for those teaching a universal as a real thing, the [individual] manifestations [of such a real universal] are completely differentiated. How [should there be] an awareness having an undifferentiated form with regard to these [particulars]? This is to be questioned in the same manner.[497] [Objection:] [It is] not

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[494]For this way of construing *anyatra*, cf. PW I: 265–266, *anyatra*, 7. A difference that has no difference is nothing but other-exclusion. Cf. PVSVṬ 222,22–25: *ka-tham tarhi vyaktiṣv abhinnākārapratibhāsa ity āha–**anyatra bhedād abhedina** iti. bhedo 'nyāpohaḥ sa eva prativyaktyabhedī. tathā hi yathaikā govyaktir agovyāvṛttā tathānyāpi. tad anena prakāreṇa svalakṣaṇāny eva vijātīyavyāvṛttāny abhedīni bheda ity ucyante. anyatraśabdaś cāyaṃ vibhaktyantapratirūpako nipātaḥ. anya-śabdasamānārthaḥ. na tv ayaṃ tralpratyayāntaḥ, saptamyarthasyāvivakṣitatvāt. tenāyam artho–yathoktena prakāreṇa svalakṣaṇātmakād bhedād abhedino 'nyaḥ pratibhāsamāna ākāro 'rtheṣu nāsti kiṃ tu svalakṣaṇātmaka eva bhedo vijātīya-vyāvṛtter abhedī sarvatra vidyate 'bhedādhyavasāyāt. abhedādhyavasāyasya ca sa eva bhedaḥ pāramparyeṇa nimittam.* (Because of [the question]: "How then is there an appearance of a non-different form in particulars?", [Dharmakīrti] said: **other than a difference that has no difference**. This difference[, i.e.,] other-exclusion alone, has no difference for [particular] manifestations. For [it is] so: as one cow-manifestation is differentiated from non-cow, so also another [cow-manifestation is differentiated from non-cow]. Thus, in this way, the particulars alone, which are differentiated from [manifestations] of another genus[, and, in that sense, are] undifferentiated [from each other], are called "difference." And this word "*anyatra*" is an indeclinable that accords to a case ending. It has the same meaning as the word "other." But this is not the *tral* ending[, i.e., *tra*,] because the sense of the seventh[, locative,] case is not meant. Thus this is the meaning: an appearing form, which is different from the non-different difference that has the nature of a particular in the way explained, does not exist among the objects; rather, a difference, which only has the nature of a particular, [and which is] without difference due to a differentiation from [things] of a different kind, is seen in all [particulars of the same class] because non-difference is determined. And for a determination of non-difference precisely this difference is, indirectly, the cause.)

[495]PVSVṬ 222,31 glosses *ca* as *hi* ("since") here: *hyarthe caśabdaḥ*.

[496]As pointed out in Gnoli 1960: 190, acc. to PVSVṬ 223,9–10 the reference is to PVSV 50,16–17.

[497]I.e., in the same manner that Dharmakīrti's theory was questioned in PV I 107a: *abhinnapratibhāsā dhīr na bhinneṣv iti cen matam.*

[to be questioned] in the same manner, because an undifferentiated universal really exists there [amongst the particulars]. [Answer:] Is it not [so that][498] the appearance of this universal amongst those [particulars],[499] even though it [may] exist, is not noticed? For this [conceptual awareness] is regarded as having an appearance of colour [and] constellation. But the universal is not like this [, i.e., it does not have colour and constellation], nor is there any undifferentiated form separated from this [colour and constellation]. Also for one teaching shape (*ākṛti*) as the universal, there is no occurrence [of this kind of universal] in another object because, like a particular characteristic, this universal is not separated [from the particular].Therefore (*iti*), because of the difference,[500] an undifferentiated appearance is not consistent [with manifestations of universals].

A.1.8 PV I 108cd–110

> [Objection:] Now,[501] a cognition is their [the particulars']
> effect and it is differentiated // PV I 108c"d //

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[498]Karṇakagomin says that "*nanu*" here introduces the Siddhāntavādin's, i.e., Dharmakīrti's statement (*nanvityādi siddhāntavādī*, PVSVṬ 223,14).

[499]PVSVṬ 223,14–16 gives two interpretations of *tatra*: first, *vyaktiṣu*, "amongst the individual manifestations"; second, *vikalpikāvikalpikāyāṃ buddhau*, "in a conceptual [or?] non-conceptual awareness". This should probably be emended to *vikalpikāyāṃ buddhau* (the error perhaps due to an eye-skip in the ms?). It can then be understood as "in a conceptual awareness". Both options are feasible, though I think the first fits the context better.

[500]The difference here could be understood in two ways: either that between the particulars, which would mean that a universal known through them would not really be the same, or that between the undifferentiated appearance (the common form in a conceptual cognition) and the form that the opponent said is not really different from the particulars (and can therefore not figure in conceptual awareness).
Cf. PVSVṬ 223,24–25: ***iti*** hetos tad api sāmānyaṃ svalakṣaṇam eva jātam. tato **bhedād** dhetor vidyamānasya **nābhinnaḥ pratibhāso yujyate**. vyaktiṣv ity adhyāhāraḥ. (**Therefore**, for that reason, this universal too[, i.e., the *ākṛti*] becomes only a particular. Because of the difference of what exists from this [shape], **an undifferentiated appearance is not consistent**. [To this] one supplies "for manifestations" [in order to understand the sentence].)

[501]Also cf. the translation and discussion of this and the next verse in Dunne 2004: 120–126.

[PVSV 56,11] according to [its] object, because, like this [particular], a cognition, too, in which this [particular] appears is different. How [can particulars] have the same (*eka*) effect? For this [cognition] is their effect and differentiated. Whatever is the same effect of [something like] a pot etc., such as carrying water etc., that also is differentiated because of the difference according to the thing [causing that effect]. Therefore different [things] do not have the same effect. [Answer:] This error [does] not [exist], for [this reason]:

> Because[502] of being the cause for the same judgement
> (*pratyavamarśa*), a cognition (*dhī*) is without difference.
> Through being the cause for the same cognition, the
> particulars also are not differentiated. // PV I 109 //

Earlier, it was made known (*nivedita*)[503] how there is no mixing of entities' own natures. An awareness (*buddhi*) having a mixed-together form with regard to these [entities] is merely an error. And this (*iti*) [was also made known]:[504] "But the different objects (*padārtha*),[505] in becoming causes for a conceptual cognition, indirectly[506] generate this

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[502]Cf. also the translation of this verse and the following commentary up to PVSV 57,7 in Steinkellner 1971: 190, n. 46.

[503]Acc. to Gnoli (1960: 190, note to 56,18) and PVSVṬ 227,26–27, this refers to PV I 40. Dunne 2004: 122, n. 111: "a likely candidate is PVI.68–75 and PVSV *ad cit.*".

[504]PVSVṬ 228,7–8 **ca**kāro niveditam ity āsyānukarṣaṇārthaḥ. etad api tatraiva prastāve niveditam. (The word "*ca* (and)" has the purpose of pulling over this [phrase]: "it was made known". This too was made known in that same passage[, i.e., PV I 40].)

[505]*padārtha* here cannot mean the object of a word, because that cannot be the cause of anything. Accordingly, PVSVṬ 227,30 glosses: "...**bhedinaḥ padā-rthā** *vyāvṛttāni svalakṣaṇāni*..." (...**the different objects**, that is, the particulars differentiated [from others] ...).

[506]The word *krameṇa* could qualify either the immediately following compounded adjective, so that one would have to understand "indirectly becoming a cause for a conceptual cognition" (which is how it is understood in Dunne 2004: 122), or the main verb of the sentence, as translated above. PVSVṬ 227,30 clearly understands it as qualifying the main verb: "**tāṃ** *bhrāntiṃ* **bhedinaḥ padārthā** *vyāvṛttāni svalakṣaṇāni* **krameṇa janayanti**, *na sākṣāt.*" After some further comments, there is the following explanation, PVSVṬ 228,8–10: **krameṇe**ti yad uktam, tasya

[awareness] because of [their] own nature." But this discrimination (*viveka*) from the natures causing non-that[, i.e., different effects], [is] called[507] their [the things'] undifferentiated difference, because [it is] the cause for some [effect] which is the same, [i.e., the same] cognition etc. This [same effect, such as a cognition etc.,] too, though [it is] differentiated according to the thing (*pratidravya*), appears (√*khyā*) as undifferentiated, insofar as it is (*bhavat*) by [its] nature the reason for the same judgement which covers (°*avaskandin*) [different things] with non-difference. Because of being the cause for an end (*artha*) such as a cognition etc., [which a) is] the cause for such a judgement, [and b) is one] in which a non-difference appears, even particulars generate, by [their] own nature, the same (*eka*) cognition [through which] a form (*ākāra*) is mixed together [with the forms of other things, and for which] the difference [of the thing's] own nature is the real object. This has often been said.[508] Therefore the non-difference of entities is only that [they] have the same effect.

> And this[, that they have the same effect,] is the separa-
> tion (*viśleṣa*) from [things having] other (*atat*) effects // PV
> I 110a //

indeed,

> because one does not observe, and [even] negates, // PV
> I 110c //

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vyākhyānaṃ **vikalpahetavo bhavanta** *iti. vikalpakāraṇatvād anubhavajñānaṃ vikalpaḥ, vikalpahetor anubhavajñānasya hetavo bhavanta ity arthaḥ. vyaktayo 'nubhavajñānaṃ janayanti. tac caikākārāṃ bhrāntim ity ayaṃ kramārthaḥ.* (Trl.: The explanation of what is said by "**indirectly**" is "**becoming causes for a conceptual cognition**". A cognition based on the experience [of some particular] is a conceptual cognition because it causes a conceptual cognition. The meaning is that, from "cause for a conceptual cognition", [one understands that particulars are qualified as] being causes for an experiential cognition. Particulars generate an experiential cognition. And this [cognition in turn causes] an erroneous [cognition] that has the same form [as other erroneous cognitions]. Such is this meaning of "indirectly".)

[507]See, for example, PVSV 55,4–5: *anyatra bhedād abhedinaḥ*.

[508]Gnoli 1960: 190, to 57,6: "see f. ex. the words *tāṃ tu bhedinaḥ padārthāḥ*, etc. (above p. 56, ll. 19–20) and stanzas 73–74."

a real thing

> other than that [particular], [such that that other real
> thing would] be repeated [in different instances] // PV
> I 110b //

[PVSV 57,13] This has been said: "For a separately observable
[thing] does not appear."[509] Or [also]: "If [it] exists, how [could it,]
having no basis in any [particular, be] the reason for a cognition?",
and [also this was said]: "And because of the orderly presentation
(*vidhāna*) of [its] negation it is wrong to fantasize about it."[510]

Therefore it is correct that

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[509]Acc. to Gnoli 1960: 190, note to 57,13: "[...] see the stanzas 71–75." Cf. Dunne
2004: 341–352 for a translation of these verses and Dharmakīrti's auto-commentary.

[510]There are three statements here, each of which is said to have already been
explained. **Statement 1**: an observable thing separated from the particulars does not
appear. This is directed at a universal which is supposed to be a real thing qualifying
multiple particulars, but never appears separately from any particular. As Gnoli
notes (see footnote 509), this was said in PV I 71–75. Especially PV I 71ab makes
this point clearly: *vyaktayo nānuyanty anyad anuyāyi na bhāsate |* (Particulars
do not conform [to each other]; something else [other than the particulars] which
conforms [to them] does not appear.)

The auto-commentary for the second part makes the same point as our quote in
very similar terminology, PVSV 39,21–23: *anyac ca na tābhyo vyatiriktaṃ kiṃcit
tathā buddhau pratibhāty apratibhāsamānaṃ ca katham ātmanā 'nyaṃ grāhayed
vyapadeśayed vā.*

Statement 2: or if that thing exists, it is of no consequence for cognition. If
a universal should exist, however, it would not be a cause for a cognition. This
is reminiscent of PV I 75d and its auto-commentary (here quoted without sepa-
ration of verse and prose): *dhrauvyāc ca / sāmānyasya anupakārataḥ / yadi hy
upakuryād anādheyaviśeṣasyānanyāpekṣaṇāt sakṛt sarvaṃ svakāryaṃ janayet. na
vā tajjananasvabhāvam.* (..., and because a universal, since it is constant, is of no
service [in producing some effect]. For, if a universal were to render a service, every
effect of it would be generated at once since [something], which is such that nothing
can be added to it, does not depend on something else [for producing an effect]. Or
else[, if it does not produce those effects all at once,] it would not have the nature of
producing those [effects at all].)

Statement 3: Contriving the notion of a universal is wrong, because it has
been refuted. This seems to be a very general remark. It might be referring to PV
I kk. 40–42, which can be read as a definition of all that can possibly exist. See also
the material referenced from the translation of §§ 32–48, where Ratnakīrti refutes
universals.

convention (*saṃketa*) // PV I 110d' //

also

has a knowledge of that [difference] as [its] purpose // PV
I 110d" //

alone. Also the convention which is made should shine forth
(√*śubh*) only for the [sake of the] cognition of that which is this mu-
tual discrimination of entities, since [convention] serves [successful]
activity by [means of] discriminating [that] causing non-that [from
what does cause a desired aim].

If there is no convention with the purpose of cognizing this [dis-
crimination], then, because there is no contact [to that discrimination]
even at the time of everyday usage of this [discrimination], one would
not act by avoiding other [things than the ones desired]. For [then]
a discrimination of these [things have the same effect] from those
[having different effects] would not be indicated by a word.[511]

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[511]The argument here is that if a verbal convention were to be made for something
real, then that thing would not exist anymore when that convention is used. This
would happen if words did not indicate a difference (*viveka*) of things, as they do in
the *apoha* theory.

PVSVṬ 230,18–21 explains: *etad uktam bhavati. yadā vidhirūpeṇānyavyāvṛtto
'rtho viṣayīkṛtas tadānyavyavacchedaḥ pratīyeta. etad evāha — **na hī**tyādi. **viveka**
iti viviktaḥ svabhāvaḥ, **teṣāṃ** tatkāriṇāṃ, **tebhya** ity atatkāryebhyaḥ. yadi hi tasya
viviktasya svabhāvasya pratītaye saṅketaḥ kṛtaḥ syād evaṃ vyavahāre 'pi **śabdena**
codyeta. tathā cānyaparihāreṇa pravarteteti saṅketo 'pi tadvidarthika eva yuktaḥ.*
([By this] the [following] is said: if an object differentiated from others were made an
object [of conceptual cognition] in a positive form, then [its] separation from another
would be cognized. Exactly this [Dharmakīrti] said: "**For not**" etc. **Discrimination**,
i.e., a discriminated nature **of these**, i.e., which have that effect, **from those**,
meaning those with different effects. For, if a convention were made in order to
cognize this discriminated nature [itself], it would be indicated **by a word** in the
same way also in everyday activity. And in the same way one would act by avoiding
what is other [than what one wants]. So it is correct that[, as stated in PV I 110d,]
convention also has a knowledge of this discrimination as its object.)

A.1.9   PV I 113cd–121

> [Objection:] If one grasps the object [of the word] "tree"[512]
> through the exclusion of non-trees, the two[513] are depen-
> dent on each other. So, if one [of them] is not grasped,
> neither is grasped. Convention is impossible because of
> that. So some (*kecit*) say.[514] // PV I 113cd–114 //

[PVSV 58,22] [Objection:] If tree is the difference from non-trees,
[then] convention is not possible for [this] object, [which] has not
arisen in awareness because this [tree] cannot be grasped in this way

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[512]This discussion must be understood as being about the object of the word "tree"
and other objects, but not about particular trees. I try to convey this by, somewhat
artificially, not adding articles: instead of translating "grasping a tree", I translate
"grasping tree", which for the opponent here means "grasping something qualified
by the universal 'tree-hood'", and for Dharmakīrti means "grasping something
differentiated from non-trees", i.e., the referent of words. Cf. PVSVṬ 233,12–13:
avṛkṣavyatirekeṇa vṛkṣārthagrahaṇe *vṛkṣaśabdasya yo 'rthas tasya grahaṇe
'bhyupagamyamāne, [...]* (**If one grasps the object of tree by the exclusion of
non-trees,** [i.e.,] if one grasps, [or] intends to designate, the object of the word
"tree", ...)

[513]Karṇakagomin's interpretation of *dvayam* differs from my translation. Accord-
ing to PVSVṬ 233,13–14, ***dvayaṃ*** *vṛkṣāvṛkṣagrahaṇam* ***anyonyāśrayam***, it is the
two graspings, that of tree and non-tree, that depend on each other. A translation
would then be:

> If the grasping of the object "tree" [happens] through the exclusion of
> non-trees, the two[, the grasping of tree and the grasping of non-tree,]
> are dependent on each other. So when one is not grasped, neither is
> grasped.

Whilst the first statement makes good sense, it would seem a bit odd that in the
next one Dharmakīrti uses (in a consequence drawn from the first statement), *eka*
and *dvaya* again, but this time as referring to the things grasped. Karṇakagomin
sees no big problem here, and glosses, PVSVṬ 233,18, ***ekasya*** *vṛkṣasyāvṛkṣasya vā*
grahābhāve dvayāgrahaḥ.

[514]PVSVṬ 233,20–28 cites both Uddyotakara (NBhV 314,5–7) and Kumārila
(ŚV Av 83–85ab, cf. appendix B.7 for a trl. of ŚV Av 83–84) as maintaining that
other-exclusion as a word referent leads into a circular dependency between A (e.g.,
"cow") and non-A (e.g., "non-cow"). Hugon (2009, 2011) discusses this matter (along
with this verse and some following passages) extensively.

without grasping non-tree, [and] because also non-tree, [as] it has the form of a distinction from that [tree], is not known by [someone who] does not know tree. [Answer:] So some [say].

> For these [people], are non-trees distinguished in convention or not? // PV I 115ab' //

[PVSV 59,2] For those [persons], who, assuming a universal as a single real thing, thus question (√*cud*) the mutual dependency when convention [is made] through distinction (*vyavaccheda*) from others, [is it the case for them], when a convention is made also for this [real universal], that non-trees [are] distinguished or not?

> If [non-trees are] distinguished, how [are they] known without first grasping tree? // PV I 115b"cd //

[PVSV 59,7] For at that time[515] a cognizer (*pratipattṛ*) does not know tree, nor non-tree, because [the cognizer] starts off due to a desire for [learning] this [convention] only in order to know that[, what tree and non-tree are]. How should this unknowing [person] understand the distinction from non-tree when a convention [is made]? And

> if a convention is without negation [of what is other], because[516] a word that, if [the distinction of tree from non-tree] is not understood, is based on [an object] in which that other than that [which is desired] is not excluded, those engaged in everyday activity would not act avoiding that [which is other than what they want to attain], as

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[515]Acc. to PVSVṬ 234,25–26: **tade***ti saṃketakāle,* **pratipattā***, yasmai saṃketaḥ kriyate.* (**At that time**[, i.e.,] at the time a convention [is made], **a cognizer**[, i.e.,] one for whose sake a convention is made.)

[516]The reason given here for a convention not containing a negation of what is other is not actually part of the verse in the Sanskrit text. But I was not able to translate in a way that this is clear.

one does not act avoiding certain kinds of trees.[517] // PV
I 116 //

[PVSV 59,13] For it is not coherent that, at [the time of] everyday
usage [of a word], one acts–due to a word that, at [the time of]
convention, was founded without distinction of what is other [than
the intended object]—by avoiding that [which is undesired], as in the
case of particular kinds of trees, such as a *Śiṃśapā* etc.[518]

Moreover, should [this] be [said by an opponent]:

> [As, contrary to your opinion,] one does not affirm [any-
> thing] upon negating another [object], [it is] upon showing
> a single [thing][519] placed before one that the convention
> "This [here] is a tree." is made. This [object that a con-
> vention is based on] one cognizes also at [the time of]
> everyday usage [of the word]. So [there is] not this error
> [of mutual dependency]. // PV I 117–118ab' //

[PVSV 59,18] Indeed, by someone teaching that universal is an
existing real thing, nothing is affirmed through the distinction of

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[517]PVV 328,17–18 gives the following interpretation: *yathā vṛkṣaviśeṣāṇāṃ vṛkṣasaṃkete 'vyavacchinnatvāt pravṛttiviṣayatvam evam avṛkṣāṇām api syāt.* (In the same way that [different] kinds of trees are[, correctly,] the object of activity because, in the convention for tree, [these kinds of tree] are not differentiated, so also non-trees would be[, erroneously, the object of activity because they are not differentiated in setting the convention for tree].)

This is also how the comparison is understood by Hugon (2011: 114). Accordingly, the argument can be paraphrased as follows: in learning the word "tree", there is no differentiation of tree species. When one acts on hearing the word "tree", one, correctly, does not differentiate between kinds of trees. In the current discussion, there is no distinction between tree and non-tree, just as there is none between tree and kinds of tree. So the consequence–undifferentiated activity–has to be the same in both cases.

[518]The example can be understood as follows: if a person has correctly understood the convention for "tree", she will in future act correctly towards all kinds of trees, since none of these kinds of trees was excluded at the time the convention was set. Accordingly, one can generalize and say that if something is not excluded at the time of the convention, activity will be directed towards it also at a later time.

[519]PVSVṬ 236,18 **ekam** *iti sāmānyam.* (**One**[, i.e.,] a universal.)

something. Rather, clearly seeing a single real thing positioned in front [of one], the convention "This is a tree." is made. Also, at [the time of] everyday activity just this object, as seen at the time of the convention, or that connected with that [object],[520] is cognized. So [there is] no similar [unwanted] consequence[, i.e., that tree and non-tree are interdependent]. [Answer:] There is no dissimilar [consequence]. For also here[, when a convention is made for a real thing, by saying]

> "This also [is] a tree", [or] "only this [is a tree]", the [unwanted] consequence is not averted. // PV I 118b"cd //

Also someone saying "This is a tree.", [while] pointing out a single [thing], does not go beyond these two options: "That also [is a tree]." [or] "That only [is a tree]." And for both of these there is precisely this error. [Objection:] [There is] no error, because what is opposed to that seen is easily cognized. For, in someone seeing one [thing and then] experiencing an awareness [with a form] distinct from that [thing's form], an ascertainment of difference, which distinguishes these [things], arises according to the experience "[this is] other than that." For, someone who has been taught "Only this is a tree." while being shown [a tree] cognizes all by himself exactly this non-tree just where he does not see this [tree]. This is not possible for someone teaching exclusion, because a form observed in one [instance] does not continue in some [other instance].[521] [So,] when there is a cognition

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[520]I.e., the particular which is connected to a universal, cf. PVSVṬ 236,22–23: **tatsambandhinaṃ ve**ti sāmānyasaṃbandhinam āśrayam. (**Or that connected to it**[, i.e.,] the basis which has a connection to a universal.)

[521]Following the Tibetan translation, *ananvayāt* should be understood as giving the reason for this sentence, that this is not possible for someone adhering to an exclusion theory, PVSV$_D$ 294b1 = PVSV$_Q$ 444b1–2: *rnam par gcod pa smra ba la ni 'di mi srid de, gcig na mthong ba'i ngo bo ni gang la yang rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i phyir ro.* This is also reflected in PVSVṬ 237,22–29 (the opponent is speaking): *anyāpohavādino 'py evam iti cet. āha — **nedam** ityādi. **ekatra** saṃketakāle **dṛṣṭasyā**sādhāraṇasya **rūpasya kvacid** vyaktyantare **'nanvayād** ananugamāt.* But it would also make good sense to take it as Gnoli did, and construe it as a reason for the next sentence: because a thing's form is unique, a cognition of it in another instance is impossible.

[of tree and non-tree] through observation, there would not be a cognition in this way[, i.e., as a tree,] even for another particular. [Answer:] In this way then, also here it is the same, for the [following reason]:

> For, based (*sthita*) on the same cognition–called the same judgement–a cognizer (*prapattṛ*) divides the referents which are reasons for this [cognition] and for another (*atad*) [cognition] by himself. // PV I 119 //

[PVSV 60,16] As this has been made known earlier,[522] certain entities, even though different as to [their] original nature (*prakṛti*), produce the same effect, like a cognition etc., [but] not others. These [things] this [cognizer] cognizes there[, at the time a convention is made], all by herself distinguishing causes for that [same effect] and causes for what is not that [same effect].[523]

> [The learner of a convention] will, by herself, cognize the entities present to her[524] in an awareness of them—[which] appear as the cognition's cause, [which] lack the form of not [being that] cause, [and so are] as if of the same form–as different [from those which do not cause that cognition].[525] So an expression is bound to a difference. A cognition, cognizing this [difference] because of this [expression], beholds [this difference] as if it were the same real thing due to an error. // PV I 120–1 //

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[522]PV I 73–74 acc. to Gnoli (1960: 190, note to 60,13 (sic!)); cf. Dunne 2004: 344–345 for a translation. Also see PVSV 25,15–23, and Hugon 2009: 537, n. 9.

[523]The following verses and prose are examined in McAllister (forthcoming b).

[524]*tasya* is not part of the verse, but I could not find a construction that would have made this clear.

[525]Cf. PVSVṬ 239,23: ...*atatkāribhyo* **bhedena** ...

[PVSV 60,23] [It is] due to the very nature[526] of these [things] that the causes for such[527] a conceptual cognition–which[, in turn,] is due to an experience [of these things]—are continuous. Because of

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[526]This passage is also translated and discussed in McCrea and Patil 2006: 312 ff. The translation presented here follows Karṇakagomin's analysis of the passage (PVSVṬ 240,10–241,25), and is (sometimes for that reason) different from the one by McCrea and Patil (2006) in various details. The main difference lies in our interpretation of the *atathābhūta-tathādhyavasita* clause. McCrea and Patil (2006: 312) translate:

> These things, which are not really so [i.e., do not really have the same appearance in his own and the other person's conceptual awareness] are determined to be so, ...in virtue of their being the causes of that conceptual awareness, and in virtue of the exclusion of what is other than them [i.e., what does not cause that conceptual awareness].

They take the two instrumental phrases to be reasons for the determination, and determination to be the identification of what appears in their own and the other person's conceptual cognition. Whilst this is possible, and I do think that this identification is actually a form of determination, Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 240,23–28) explains the determination mentioned by Dharmakīrti as follows:

> **tajjñānahetutayā** tasya vikalpajñānasya hetutayā **tadanyavyā-vṛttyā ce**ty ekākārapratyabhijñānahetubhyo ye 'nye tathābhūtavi-kalpāhetavaḥ, tebhyo vyāvṛttyā ca, **atathābhūtān api**. na hi te vikalpārūḍhās taddhetavaḥ, bahiravidyamānatvāt. ata evāheturū-pavikalatvam* apy asat, teṣām avastusattvāt. **tathādhyavasitān** tajjñānahetutayā tadanyavyāvṛttyā cāropitān. anena **bhāto hetu-tayā dhiyaḥ. aheturūpavikalān ive**ti vyākhyātam. (*Emendation against PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 88b5 *aheturūpavikalpatvam* acc. to PVṬ$_D$ je 135a4 = PVṬ$_Q$ je 159b4: *rgyu ma yin pa'i ngo bo dang bral ba nyid*.)

Karṇakagomin is here saying that this passage explains PV I 120bc (*bhāto hetutayā dhiyaḥ. aheturūpavikalān ivā*). But I believe his interpretation of the two instrumental clauses should not be taken causally here: in the paraphrase of **tathādhyavasitān** by *tajjñānahetutayā tadanyavyāvṛttyā cāropitān*, "being the reason of this cognition" and "excluding (or as exclusion of) that different from this" are most naturally taken as explicating the "*tathā*".

[527]I.e., the conceptual cognition of a thing as the same as another, "called the same judgement" (*ekapratyavamarśākhya* PV I 119a).

this [continuity in the causes of a conceptual cognition], a learner[528] cognizes the reasons for this [conceptual] cognition as different [from others]—[those reasons which] occur in the mind of someone seeing this [thing producing the same effect], are determined as being a reason for this cognition and as excluding what is other than this [reason for this cognition], even though they are not really like [this], [and] have a difference of external and internal [form] that is not distinguished; [the learner does this] in accordance with [her] cognition that "These are trees."[, as she is] based upon a conceptual cognition after having been shown those [things] appearing as the same in her own and the other's conceptual cognition.

Therefore [the learner] binds an expression to the difference [of these things] from those [things which are] not reasons for that[, i.e., which are not a reason for the conceptual cognition of tree].

[It is] only in virtue of an error [that] a conceptual awareness, understanding this [difference] because of that [expression], appears as if grasping one single real thing[, i.e., a universal]. Further, no [such] single thing is visible there [amongst the particulars], because of seeing and not seeing[529] which [a learner], even though seeing differentiated [things],[530] could make a distinction between tree and non-tree, because [she] does not grasp it [the single real thing, e.g., treeness,] separately from the appearances of branch etc. like [she grasps] a stick where [there is] a stick-bearer; also, because [such a single thing] which is not grasped as separate (*pravibhāga*) from others (*āpara*) is not noticed (*anupalakṣaṇa*). Because also a shape (*ākṛti*) seen in one [thing] cannot be seen in another,[531] only a single particular would be a tree, given that [that] having that [shape] and

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[528]PVSVṬ 241,7: *yasmai saṃketaḥ kriyate, sa **pratipattā***. (For whose sake a convention is made, that is a **learner**.)

[529]Emend *darśānādarśaṇābhyaṃ* PVSV 61,3–4 to *darśanādarśanābhyaṃ*, supported by PVSVṬ 242,14.

[530]That is, the learner sees the particular things. Cf. PVSVṬ 242,13–15.

[531]According to PVSVṬ 242,22 f., this is an argument against an *anarthāntara-sāmānyavādin*. Cf. also the reference to an *ākṛtisāmānyavādin* in PVSV 55,21 (cf. PVSVṬ 223,20–25).

[that] not having that [shape] are[, respectively,] a tree and not a tree.

A.1.10   PV I 152ab

[PVSV 76,25] Moreover, some [person] imagining a universal as an object different [from a particular] will imagine [it] either as being in (*gata*) its own basis alone,[532] or as being in everything, as [in the case of] ether etc.[533] If, amongst these [options], [it is imagined] as being in its own basis alone, [then], if [things like] pot etc. come into being in places that are free from potness etc., how is a universal, which occurs in substances in different places, possible where these [are]? For this [universal]

does not go // PV I 152a' //

from a previous[534] substance into a substance planning to arise, because you assume that [a universal] is without movement. For an entity occurring in another substance, which does not move from this, [and] which does not pervade the intermediate space between the two, cannot be connected with an entity having a different place. This [entity], at an earlier [time],

was not there, [but] is there later // PV I 152a"b' //

and it has not arisen there, nor come from anywhere. So who is capable of shouldering (*ud-√vah*) this burden of obstacles, except out of stupidity (*jāḍya*)?

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[532]PVSVṬ 301–302 refers to discussions found with Kumārila (ŚV Āv 25–29a and ŚV Vv 30 and 32, with variations) and Uddyotakara (NBhV 302,21–303,13, approximately; I could not find the last few sentences (following *nīlapratyayas*, PVSVṬ 301,21) in the *NBhV*) for the first position, that a universal exists only in its manifestations.

[533]Ether (*ākāśa*) is taken to be ubiquitous in Vaiśeṣika, cf. Halbfass 1992: 74, and see also footnotes 157 and 280.

[534]That is, it does not move on from a substance in which it was previously inhering. Cf. PVSVṬ 302,16: **pūrvadravyād** *yatra tat [=sāmānyaṃ] pūrvaṃ samavetaṃ tasmād....*

A.1.11 PV I 162

[PVSV 82,4] [Objection:] How then,[535] when there is no undifferenti-ated real thing[, i.e., no universal], is there now an occurrence of a cognition and a word which conform [to many things]? [Answer:] [In the same way] as in the case of a cook etc.[536] [Objection:] But just this is considered: how [can a cognition and a word apply] to these [cooks etc.] also? [Answer:] This has been considered, in which way [this occurrence of a concept and a word for multiple things] is not possible.[537]

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[535]In the preceding discussion, Dharmakīrti has eliminated all possibilities suggested by the opponent for what the cause of the consistency of words and cognitions in face of mere particulars could be. The opponent has suggested universals (*jāti*/*sāmānya*, PVSV 69,9–79,15, corresponding to PV I 149–157b, cf. Frauwallner 1933: 68–78) activity (*karman*, PVSV 79,15–81,4), and a capacity (*śakti*, PVSV 81,4–82,4) for that activity as causes for the same cognition. All of these have been disproved by Dharmakīrti, and the opponent is now throwing the question back at him.

[536]PVSVṬ 317,30–318,10 **yathā pācakādiṣu** *pācakatvādisāmānyan nāsti, tathā prasādhitam. atha ca tatra pravartete anvayinau jñānaśabdau. tathānyatrāpy antareṇa sāmānyan tau bhaviṣyataḥ.* (Correct *bhivaṣyataḥ* in PVSVṬ 318,10 to *bhaviṣyataḥ* acc. to PVSVṬ_ms 117a1. Trl.: **As for cook etc.** there is no universal such as "cookness" etc., as is well established. But still (*atha ca*), conforming words and concepts apply to this cook etc., so also for another [thing] they will exist without a universal.)

[537]Whether the universal cookness qualifies cooks was discussed following PV I 63 and again in PVSV 80,18–81,23 (cf. the translation of these verses from the Tibetan and their explanation in Frauwallner 1933: 79 ff.).

Taking the sentence this way, we can suppose that Dharmakīrti is hinting at the fact that cookness was not admitted by the opponent as a real universal inhering in things. This could lead the opponent to ask the following question, namely what the reason then is, if we discount the possibility of a real thing causing the same cognitions.

According to Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 318,11–13), however, the subject in the sentence in PVSV 82,7, *yathā na teṣu sambhavati*, is "universal" (*sāmānya*), and not "occurrence" (*vṛtti*) any more:

nanv *ityādi paraḥ.* **teṣv** *iti pācakādiṣu sāmānyaṃ vinā* **katham** *anvayinor jñānaśabdayor vṛttir iti. tato 'nvayijñānaśabdavṛtteḥ pācakādiṣv api pācakatvādisā-mānyam astīti.* **cintitam etad** *anantaram,* **yathā teṣu** *pācakatvādi sāmānyaṃ* **na sambhavatī***ti.*

[Objection:] So, then, would these two[, a word and a cognition,] be without a cause? [Answer:] [The two are] not without a cause, but, rather, they do not have a cause that is an external reality. The generation of a concept is due to an awakening–according to [its] self[538]—of mnemonic imprints. From this [generation of a concept], words [follow]. Further, the basis of a concept and a designation is not the existence of a real thing. This was explained often,[539] because one observes continuous [concepts and words] since–even though one observes [only things] different from each other–contradictory forms co-exist[540] in virtue of the mnemonic imprints, each in its own way, [resulting from] conventions. But amongst these there is no own nature at all to which [a word and a cognition] are bound, because a co-existence of two [things], contradictory to each other, in one [thing] at the same time is not possible.

[Objection:] Then [a word and a cognition] would be without any restriction (*aniyama*). For, what exists without a cause is not capable of restriction such that [it could be said:] "[It] exists somewhere, [it] does not exist somewhere [else]."

(Read *nanv* acc. to PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 117a1 against tadvad PVSVṬ 318,11; *'nvayijñāna°* acc. to PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 117a1 against *'nvayajñāna°* PVSVṬ 318,12; *yathā* acc. to PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 117a1 against *tathā* PVSVṬ 318,13; *sāmānyaṃ na* acc. PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 117a1 against *sāmānyaṃ sa na* PVSVṬ 318,13. Note that PVSVṬ has importantly different punctuation: *...astīti cintitam ...anantaram. tathā ....*)

One could assume some shift like this, with perhaps one of the real things, the *vastu*-s from PVSV 82,5, becoming the subject. The argument would not change significantly.

[538]I understand that every conceptual cognition is due to the awakening of a mnemonic imprint with a nature particular to itself; i.e., the imprint left by a mental continuum's encounters with cows is different from that left by its encounters with pots.

[539]Cf., e.g., PVSV 35,2–9 (appendix A.1.6).

[540]Acc. to PVSVṬ 318,21–22, one has to understand that different, mutually exclusive ideas are superimposed on objects, such as when one says that the world either is the effect of some primary matter or of god, or is without a cause, or is merely conventionally existent (...***virodhirūpasamāveśena*** *parasparaviruddharūpādhyāropeṇa pradhānakāryam īśvarakāryam ahetukaṃ saṃvṛttimātraṃ jagad ity evaṃ* ...).

[Answer:] That[, i.e., a cognition as well as a word,] is not truly without a cause, because a particular mnemonic imprint is a cause. But an external [thing] that exists in such a way[, i.e., as a cause for the same cognition,] is not observable. This is what we say. Nor must [a conceptual cognition or a word] not exist, when this [external cause] does not exist,[541] because such a concept is generated when objects are non-existent, grasped by sleepers and [persons suffering from the eye disease] *timira*, and when there are specific forms that are superimposed [due to] mnemonic imprints [resulting] from a convention.[542] And it is not [the case that] all forms [occur] everywhere because these [concepts] arise for non-existent [objects], since those [objects] which are perceived in such a way[, i.e., separately,] are [also] conceptualized as entirely separate. And about this something was said[543] by us: even by the nature [of things there are] certain causes for the same cognition, because of a difference in [these things'] own nature.

Moreover,

> by which contact a genus spreads out[544] into something
> when [there is] the same difference of things, but not into

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[541]Additions acc. to PVSVṬ 319,14–15: **na cāsati tasminn** anvayini bāhye nimitte vikalpena **na bhavitavyaṃ** bhavitavyam eva. (**Nor, when this does not exist**, i.e., the continuous external cause [of a cognition], **must** a conceptual cognition **not exist**[, i.e.,] it really must exist.)

[542]Note that Karṇakagomin glosses both occurrences of *samayavāsanā* in this passage (PVSV 82,11,19) with *samavāyavāsanā* (PVSVṬ 318,20; 319,17), each time explaining that one should understand that the impressions left accord to one's doctrine.

[543]According to PVSVṬ 319,28–29 and Gnoli (1960: 191), this refers to PV I 73.

[544]McCrea and Patil 2010: 85, translating this verse in the context of its quotation by Jñānaśrīmitra (AP 224,6–7), understand *prasarpati* cognitively: "...given that they are similarly distinct, the basis of verbal awareness is just the connection by which the universal comes to mind in the case of one individual but not another." Whilst a recurring cognition is, within Dharmakīrti's and Jñānaśrīmitra's arguments, certainly one of the central effects that a *jāti* has according to the opponents, the verse seems to be speaking primarily about the ontological relation obtaining between individual things and a genus or universal. PVSVṬ 320,10 glosses: **prasarpati**. *vyāpya vartate*. (Trl.: "[A *jāti*] **spreads out**, that is, [a *jāti*] occurs having pervaded [a group of individual things].")

another, that [contact] alone should be the basis of both words and cognitions. // PV I 162 //

[PVSV 82,25] This is an intermediate verse.[545]

A.2 MATERIAL FROM THE *PVSVṬ*

A.2.1 *PVSVṬ 114,9–115,9 ad PV I 41*

Because of this[546], that which was said by Kumārila[, i.e.]:[547]

"But there is no word which performs other-exclusion,[548] as described on your position. Mere negation is simply not understood[549] in this appearance.

Rather, from words, such as "cow," "gayal" (*gavaya*), "elephant," [or] "tree," a verbal awareness (*mati*) arises through a determination having an affirmative form.

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[545]Acc. to Frauwallner (1933: 69; 83), this verse ends the section, beginning PV I 143, in which Dharmakīrti argues against the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya notion of a universal. Cf. also the introduction of PV I 163 in PVSVṬ 320,25, presenting a new speaker: "*atra sāṃkhyaḥ prāha.*" On the other hand, the objection that Karṇakagomin quotes while commenting on this verse, at PVSVṬ 320,13–16, is ŚV Āv 37–38 by Kumārila, who of course is not a Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika writer. It could be that after having discussed Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika positions, Dharmakīrti touched on Kumārila's two verses. This would find slight support in this verse being called an "intermediary verse" (*antaraśloka*), which can mean that it does not necessarily have much to do with the context in which it appears (cf. Mimaki 1980). But probably Frauwallner's assessment of the opponents' identities in this passage is not quite adequate, since Karṇakagomin repeatedly quotes Kumārila (e.g., PVSVṬ 301,4 ff., 305,4 ff.) in the section characterized as refuting Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika positions by Frauwallner.

[546]The reference is to PV I 126, which Karṇakagomin has just quoted. This passage appears towards the end of a three page elaboration on PV I 41.

[547]As pointed out by Akamatsu (1983: 159–164, n. 4), the first two of the following three verses are not found in the *ŚV*, and might therefore be from Kumārila's lost *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*. The last verse corresponds to ŚV Av 164.

[548]Cf. PV III 164 (trl. on page 321) and the references to Dignāga given there.

[549]The words have been awkwardly separated here, read *pratibhāse 'vagamyate* instead of *pratibhāseva gamyate* in PVSVṬ 114,11.

Therefore, only for those words, to which the [negat-
ing particle] *nañ* is joined, shall there be an element of
negation of another. For others[, i.e., words that are not
negated,] only[550] the nature [of their object] is under-
stood.",

establishes only what is [already] established [for us], because
it is assumed [by us] that the referent of a word has an affirmative
form.[551]

How then is the Buddhist opinion different from the opinion
of others? Or, why is the object of word and [logical] mark called
exclusion?

Now, there is a big difference between [these two opinions],
because conceptual cognition, which is postulated by the others as
being [something that] has a real thing as [its] object, is postulated
by the Buddhists as being [something that] has an imagined [thing]
as its object. And[552] the imagined form (*ākāra*), because of being
based on exclusion, is called exclusion, or [one states this fact with
the words] "[Another] is excluded by this." But the mere negation
of another, which is implicitly (*arthāt*) referred to [in the previous
statement], is called [exclusion] since [one says] "[the act of] excluding
[is] exclusion." But the particular is called exclusion since [one says]
"In this [particular the other] is excluded."

A.2.2 PVSVṬ 131,24–132,10 ad PV I 51

Otherwise[, i.e., assuming] the nature of a real thing were grasped
by a [conceptual] awareness or a word[, then,] **if a single [thing]
were pervaded by a single word**[, i.e.,] if one [thing] were made
an object with its whole form, or pervaded **by an awareness** which
has an ascertaining nature, there would **not be another object**.
Another object [is analysed as]: this form is another and it is an

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[550]Read *svātmaivānyatra* acc. to PVSVṬ$_{ms}$ 44b2 against *svātmevānyatra* in
PVSVṬ 114,15.

[551]Cf. the argument in PVSVṬ 113,6–7.

[552]For the rest of this paragraph, cf. the material in PVṬ$_{F2}$.

object. No other form of this real thing, which is the object [and] is to be made known, exists. Or else, there is no object for another word or cognition that makes this real thing known. **So**, for this reason [that is], words which are used after the object [of the first word] has been cognized would be **synonymous**, like the words "tree", "root-drinker", etc.[553] There would be no usage of an awareness that corresponds to a different object such as sweet taste, soft, heavy, cold. So there would be the unwanted consequence that there is only one object for awareness.

A.3   Material from *PV III*

The most detailed modern study of the *PV III* as a whole was carried out in Japanese by Tosaki (1979–1985). I do not understand Japanese, but my friend and colleague Masamichi Sakai was so kind as to discuss with me the main differences he found between Tosaki's and my interpretations.

A.3.1   PV III 147

Even[554] if [there is] a continuous (*anvayin*) cognition,[555] it [is a cognition possessing] the manifestation (*avabhāsi*) of a word [and] a particular. [But the universal] cowness is indeed declared [to be] free of the form (*ākāra*) of colour (*varṇa*), shape (*ākṛti*), [and] letter (*akṣara*).[556] // PV III 147 //

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[553]In Sanskrit, the words "*vṛkṣa*" and "*pādapa*" are synonyms. Since I do not know any English synonym for "tree", I translate the compound "*pādapa*" according to the meaning of its parts.

[554]For Manorathanandin's commentary on this verse, cf. appendix A.4.1.

[555]"Continuous cognition" should express that a cognition remains the same for various objects. For example, seeing cows on two different occasions, a person might think "A cow!" each time. The literal idea seems to be that this cognition is concomitant with different particulars.

[556]See section 4.1.10, for Ratnakīrti's understanding of the compound *varṇākṛtya-kṣarākāraśūnyam*, and cf. the translation of § 33.

A.3.2 PV III 161–173

Objects,[557] even though [there is] a difference [between them], are causes for such a cognition only due to their nature [of being] a real thing. This cognition, which [occurs] for some [objects], cognizes these [objects] as such[, as being the same]. // PV III 161 //

In the same way, cognitions too, [even though there is a] difference [between them],[558] [are a cause] for a judgement of a non-difference. So the continuity of a separation (*viśleṣa*) from what does not have that effect, but not of a single real thing, exists for real things.[559] Therefore a word,[560] referring to this [separation, applies] to a real

[557]The section PV III 163cd–173 is titled *anyāpohacintā* ("A Consideration of Other-Exclusion") by Sāṅkṛtyāyana (cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940: iv), and Miyasaka (1971–1972: 62) probably adopted this title. But it seems natural to understand the question of "continuity" (a word can repeatedly refer to similar objects) and the relation between word, its object, and the real thing, starting in PV III 163cd, as following from the context of PV III 161–163ab. These verses are thus included here.

The translation presented here depends strongly on Manorathanandin's commentary (PVV 166,16–170,26, trl. appendix A.4.2). Tosaki (1979: 263–272) lets the section start at PV III 163ab (but Tosaki 1979: 262, n. 141 notes, as Masamichi Sakai explained to me, that it can be understood to start with PV III 161). Dreyfus (1997: 225–232) translates and discusses PV III 163cd–170, adding plenty of information about Tibetan interpretations of these verses.

[558]This interpretation follows that of Tosaki (1979: 259 f.) as explained to me by Masamichi Sakai.

[559]Tosaki does not, as Masamichi Sakai told me, construe *vastūnāṃ vidyate* with *anvayaḥ* as I do (and as I think PVV sees it, cf. appendix A.4.2.2), but with a supplied *anyāpohaḥ*. Probably this is due to the fact that, according to Tosaki, a new section starts before PV III 163ab, and I see no substantial difference in meaning (since a uniform difference is exclusion). Also PVABh 261,22 understands the structure like Tosaki, taking "a universal that is differentiated from that having another effect" (*atatkāryebhyo vyāvarttamānaṃ sāmānyam*) as the subject.

[560]*śruti* is a synonym for *śabda*, and will not be differentiated in the translation here. This is also how Tosaki 1979: 263 understands it here (according to Masamichi Sakai). Note that a more adequate translation of the two terms might be "sound complex", since Dharmakīrti considers that also sub-units of full words convey meaning (in the cases of compounds or certain suffixes, for example). Cf., for example, PVSV 34,7–15.

thing. // PV III 162–163ab //

Even though it is not based (*niṣṭhā*) on a distinction of a capacity of external [things], a word [agreed on as expressive] of this [distinction] is bound to [those] reflections in conceptual cognitions [which] are based on that [distinction]. Therefore, because it is based on an exclusion from others, a word was called "making an exclusion [from] others" [by Dignāga].[561] // [PV III 163cd–164] //

Which reflection[562] of an object appears in a cognition [arising] because of a word, as if separate [from a cognition], that also [is] not the nature of [that] object. This [is an] error arising from impressions.[563] // [PV III 165] //

[Objection:][564] If this [reflection] is designated by words, [then] which part is understood as regards the object?

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[561]Cf. PS(V) 5 11d, and see the corresponding passages in Pind 2015: II.54 ff. and the references to TS$_\text{Ś}$. According to Pind (2015: II.54–55, n. 182) this phrase is part of the last verse in the first part of Dignāga's exposition of the *apoha* theory, where all realist alternatives for what the word referent could be are shown to be untenable, and *anyāpohakṛt* remains as the only alternative.

[562]The word "*pratibimbaka*" is here understood as a noun (equal to *pratibimba*), which is also how it is understood in Tosaki 1979. If it is taken as a *bahuvrīhi*, one could understand "as if separate and as if reflecting an object", but it would be unclear what it is that appears in such a way. However, this latter interpretation has some support in the *PVV$_S$*, cf. appendix A.4.2.4.

[563]The idea is that mental impressions or imprints (*vāsanā*), usually said to be without a beginning, accumulate and shape a mind continuum's inclinations in various ways, e.g., as a propensity towards generalizations (mixing different things together) or as identifying things wrongly. Cf., e.g., Dunne 2004: n. 139, 140–141 for some representative passages from Dharmakīrti, and see Mikogami 1989 for a discussion between realists and *vijñānavādin*-s about how these kinds of impressions can arise (that they do is not doubted by either of them). They are also instrumental in explaining phenomenal variety in Buddhist idealism, as well as in dreams, as has been clearly explained by Ratié 2010: 453. See § 34 and § 52 for examples of Ratnakīrti's use of this term.

[564]According to the interpretation in Dreyfus 1997: 228–229, this verse is Dharmakīrti's answer to a Buddhist's objection. I follow the interpretation in the *PVV$_S$* and

But if that [part] is not understood, making a convention would be meaningless [as it] has that purpose.[565] // [PV III 166] //

[Answer:] To this [question that was just raised:] "Which part of an object does a word express?", exclusion from others is said [in answer]. But this form does not exist in the object. How [should a word] expressing that [form] partake of the object? // [PV III 167] //

A continuous word's occupation (*kārya*) is with a continuous object. But this [form of awareness], formed by the repetition of [a thing's] observation, [is] discontinuous, because it is not different from thought. // [PV III 168] //

However,[566] because that differentiated from others is understood by means (*gatyā*) of a superimposition of that form, there is no contradiction if [there is] this formulation: "That object alone (*eva*)[, the form of awareness,] is the object of a word." // [PV III 169] //

Or, the apprehensions which are formed by words have an erroneous appearance. And since [these apprehensions] accord to this part of an object, a word [is called] "performing exclusion."[567] // [PV III 170] //

the explicit identification of the *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa* in Vibhū 168, nn. 4 and 6 (cf. appendices A.4.2.5–A.4.2.6), according to which PV III 166 is spoken from an opponent's point of view. One text-immanent argument for this is that the question introducing PV III 167 (*śabdo 'rthāṃśaṃ kam āheti*) seems to make more sense this way, since it can be understood as taking up the central concern of the objection.

[565]Cf. PV I 110d, referred to in Tosaki 1979: 266, n. 151 (cf. trl. on page 305), where Dharmakīrti says that the purpose of convention is to make exclusion known, which is understood as a part of an object (e.g., a thing's difference from all non-red things, its difference from all non-chair things etc.).

[566]See also appendix B.5.1 for a quotation of this verse by Kamalaśīla in the voice of an opponent.

[567]See footnote 561.

Therefore, even at the time [of forming] a convention, exclusion from others–which has been connected with an indicated object [and which] results in one's own cognition [of that exclusion][568]—is connected to the word. // [PV III 171] //

In dependence on a non-observation of this [word] for one [thing and] in dependence on an observation [of this word][569] for another [thing], exclusion is bound to a word. This [double dependency] is not coherent in [the case of] a real thing. // [PV III 172] //

Therefore a genus etc., [and] a connection to these, do not exist in an object, and a word is [therefore] not bound to these, because words indeed[570] are joined to differentiation from others. // [PV III 173] //

A.3.3   PV III 183ab

Words designate a universal, and a conceptual construction has the same referent [as words]. // PV III 183ab //

A.3.4   PV III 233–235

Even[571] if [a universal such as] whiteness etc. exists, this, [which is] such an object of the sense faculties, is not designated by words, because of the difference of the form [appearing in] the two cognitions[, a perception and a conceptual awareness]. // PV III 233 //

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[568]I.e., an object (e.g., a red apple) is pointed out to a person who is learning a convention (e.g., "red"), and this object causes that person's own cognition of the relevant object's exclusion from others ("is red", or different from all non-red things).

[569]This addition follows Tosaki 1979 (as explained to me by Masamichi Sakai). In a convention, a word is bound to some things, but not to others.

[570]Note that PVV 170,26 reads *anyavyāvṛttāv eva*, resulting in "because words are joined only to differentiation from others." This is also how Tosaki 1979 understands this passage.

[571]See appendix A.4.3 for Manorathanandin's commentary on these verses.

If [this is said:] "Even though awareness [events all] have the same object, this [difference does exist], since there is a different basis [for these awareness events].", then why is it that cognitions (*citta*) [based on] hearing etc. have different objects?[572] // PV III 234 //

The basis of thoughts (*cetas*) is truly different [in each case]. [So] why does a real thing , that is in fact only one, have this nature that appears [to awareness] with different forms ? // PV III 235 //

A.3.5   PV III 407ab

[That an object is] manifest [or] non-manifest [to awareness] cannot be due to a difference such as distant, near, etc. // PV III 407ab //

A.4   Material from the PVV_S

A.4.1   PVV 161,9–18 ad PV III 147

[Objection:] If universals do not exist, then how [can there be] a continuous (*anvayin*) cognition for completely differentiated particulars? So [Dharmakīrti] said: **Even [that] continuous cognition**,[573] which arises, that also (*ca*) is cognized as having that[, i.e., as possessing] **an appearance**[, or] the form, **of a word** (*śabda*) such as "cow" etc., and **of a particular** with a specific colour (*varṇa*) [and] composition (*saṃsthāna*); [but it is] not [cognized] as having an appearance of a genus (*jāti*).

   [Objection:] What then, is [there] no [cognition] at all having an appearance of a universal? So [Dharmakīrti] said: **For cowness is**

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[572]The point is that, if the difference of awareness events were not due to different objects, but to a difference in the basis of the cognitions, i.e., the corresponding cognitive faculty, the perceptions by different sense faculties could not be shown to have different objects.

[573]Note that PVV (as well as PVV$_{ms}$ 31a5) reads *yad apy* ("Also which") instead of the *yady apy* ("Even if") accepted in PV III 147.

explained by the Sāmānyavādins to be empty (*śūnya*) **of the form**, cognized as such, of these[, i.e., of the form of] **colour**[, i.e.,] blue etc., **shape**[, i.e.,] figure, **letter**[, i.e.,] the word "cow." Therefore, that appearing in a continuous cognition with colour, shape, etc. is not a universal.

A.4.2 *PVV 166,20–170,26 ad PV III 161–173*

A.4.2.1 PVV 166,20–167,3 *AD* PV III 161

[Objection:] If a universal is not differentiated from the particulars (*vyakti*),[574] then how [can] an apprehension [be] continuous (*anugā-min*) [for various particulars]? So [Dharmakīrti] said: Some **objects, even though there is a difference** between them, are **the cause for such a**, [i.e.,] continuous, **cognition**[, i.e., a cognition] that has the differentiation from that not having that effect as its object, **only due to their nature [of being] a real thing**[, i.e.,] only due to [their] basic nature (*prakṛti*).

   The cognition which accords **to some** objects **cognizes these**, i.e., the objects which are without differences, **as such**, as being the same. But there is no cognition as such in virtue of a single universal.[575]

A.4.2.2 PVV 167,4–167,13 *AD* PV III 162–163ab

[Objection:] May it be that also cognitions are differentiated according to [each] particular. How [then can] a cognition [be] continuous [with regard to these particulars]? So [Dharmakīrti] said:

   Cognitions too, [even though there is] **a difference** between them, are, **in the same way**[, i.e.,] like the objects, due to their nature [of being] a real thing,[576] **a cause for a judgement of a**

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[574]The result would be that there are as many universals as there are particulars.

[575]Read °*sāmānyaṃ balāt* in PVV 167,3 as *sāmānyabalāt* acc. to PVV_{ms} 32a7, as suggested by Sāṅkṛtyāyana. The manuscript is difficult to read here, and I was not able to find any decisive clues for separating these two words.

[576]Read *vastudharmatayā* acc. to PVV_{ms} 32a7 against *vastudharmitayā* acc. to PVV 167,7.

non-difference. Therefore, cognitions also are called continuous apprehensions due to having as their object the same judgement of this [difference]. **So**, i.e., in this way, **a continuity** of **a separation**[, i.e.,] of a distinction of an object from that not having that effect amongst the different things, exists. **But a continuity of a single real thing**[, i.e.,] of a universal **does not exist for real things**,[577] [i.e.,] for individuals (*viśeṣa*), because that [universal] is refuted by non-perception[, a means of valid cognition]. **Therefore a word, referring to this**[, i.e.,] which has [that] distinction as its object, applies **to a real thing**.

A.4.2.3   PVV 167,16–168,3 *AD* PV III 163CD–164

[Objection:] Now, the differentiation from [that having] a different (*atat*) effect is the proper nature of real things. Therefore, given that the object [of a word] is distinction, only the real thing would be the object of a word.[578] So [Dharmakīrti] said:[579] **a distinction of a capacity**, such as not having that effect etc., **of an external** real thing; **a reference to this**[, i.e.,] the state of having [that] as an object; **even though** that **does not exist, a word for this**[, i.e.,] a word designating this distinction,[580] **is bound** at the time a convention[581] [is made] **to those reflections of conceptual cognitions**[582][, i.e.,] to those forms of awareness, **which are bound to these**[, i.e.,] which have a constancy (*vyavasthiti*) for everyday activity concerning those

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[577]Vibhūticandra (Vibhū 167, n. 1) glosses "for real things" as: "Amongst the real things."

[578]Vibhū 167, n. 2: "This [objection] is considered contradictory to this statement: A word does not touch a real thing."

[579]The verses of the *PV III* printed in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940 are not actually part of the PVV, cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940: iv. For their translation, cf. appendix A.3.2.

[580]Vibhū 167, n. 3: *katham iti na vṛttena sambandhanīyaḥ* "[This statement] is not to be connected with the mentioned [word] 'how.'" (I.e., this is not an answer anymore to the question raised in PVV 167,4.)

[581]Vibhū 167, n. 4: "Due to the mistake of [thinking] that a particular and an object of conceptual cognition are one."

[582]I take the sixth, genitive, case as possessive here, i.e., reflections of external things that a conceptual cognition has.

[things] due to the fact that a classification (*vyavasthā*) [of these things] has an object since the differentiation of these [things from that not having that effect] is real.

Therefore, because reflections of conceptual cognitions are the object of everyday activity due to being of the nature of the external [thing][583] which is differentiated[, that is to say,] **because of being based on to an exclusion from others**[, i.e.,] because of [this] cause, **a word was called "making an exclusion from others."** [I.e.,] because of the generation of a conceptual cognition through a form that is differentiated from others, and because of the application[584] to those [real things] differentiated from others, a word is called "making an exclusion from others."

A.4.2.4   PVV 168,4–10 *AD* PV III 165

[Someone objects]: Now, that to be grasped in a verbal cognition is recognized only as an external [thing], not as being the image in cognition. So [Dharmakīrti] said: **What appears in a cognition**, which arises **because of a word**, **as if reflecting an object** [and] **as if separate**[, i.e.,] as if differentiated [and] external, **that also [is] not the nature of [that] object**[, i.e.,] does not have the own form of an externally [existing] object; rather, **this [is an] error arising from impressions**.[585]

Everyday activity that [treats] the form of conceptual cognition [as] external in virtue of ignorance is like the mistake [of treating objects like] the hair etc., which are seen by someone [suffering from] *timira*, as external. Such (*iti*) [is] the meaning [of this verse].

A.4.2.5   PVV 168,11–18 *AD* PV III 166

 Then the form of cognition,[586] which is a real thing, would be what is to be denoted. [So, explaining the objection,] [Dharmakīrti] said

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[583]Vibhū 168, n. 1: "Because of being based on the distinction of a real thing."

[584]Vibhū 168, n. 2: "Because of identifying a visible [thing] and a concept."

[585]Vibhū 168, n. 3: "The reason [being] the impression [left by] the experience of particulars."

[586]Vibhū 168, n. 4: "The verse introduced (*sāvatāra*) [here] is an objection."

[as follows:]⁵⁸⁷ **If this** form of a cognition **is designated by words,
which part is understood as regards the object**, which is differ-
entiated from that not having that effect [and] not named by a word?
None at all. **But if that**[, i.e.,] an object that is excluded from that
which does not have that effect⁵⁸⁸ **is not understood**, truly **making
a convention would be meaningless** because⁵⁸⁹ this [making of a
convention] is assumed **to have that purpose**[, i.e.,] to result in a
cognition of an object differentiated from that not having that [same]
effect. In this way, then, if a convention is made, even with regard
to the exclusion from others, there would be no activity towards the
referents, because this [exclusion from others] lacks the nature of a
referent.⁵⁹⁰

A.4.2.6   PVV 168,18–24 AD PV III 167

[Answer:] Because of that [objection, Dharmakīrti] said: **to this**
question: "**Which part of an object does a word express?**", **exclu-
sion from others**[, i.e.,] a differentiation from that not having that
effect, which is possible for all distinctions, **is said**[, or declared] as
that which is to be designated. Therefore a person who has grasped
a convention with regard to other-exclusion, which has the nature of

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⁵⁸⁷According to Śākyabuddhi, this is the objection of a Buddhist, PVṬ_D nye
191b4–6 = PVṬ_Q nye 236a8–236b2: *de nyid kyi phyis bstan par bzhed nas, de lta na
yang don gyi rnam pa 'dzin pa zhes bya ba la sogs pas re zhig rang gi sde pa la
brgal zhing brtags (P: brtag) pa byed pa yin te, gang dag rnam par rtog pa la snang
ba'i ngang tshul can gyi rnam pa dngos su sgra'i brjod par bya ba yin no zhes de ltar
zhugs pa'o. don gyi rnam pa zhes 'dzin pa ni don gyi rnam pa 'dzin pa ste, rnam
par rtog pa'i rnam par shes pa la snang ba'i gzugs brnyan no. don gyi zhes bya ba ni
phyi rol gyi rang gi mtshan nyid kyi'o. gang gi tshe de las gzhan pa las ldog pa
zhes bya ba ni dngos po la gnas pa'i (P: pa) gzhan sel ba'i rang gi mtshan nyid kyi
bdag nyid can no.* Acc. to Dreyfus 1997: 228 f., also Go rams pa understands this as
an objection by a Buddhist.

⁵⁸⁸Perhaps °*ścittadakārya*°, appearing in both PVV_ms 32b3 and PVV 168,15, should
be emended to °*ścitatadkārya*°. The meaning would be the same in both cases.

⁵⁸⁹Vibhū 168, n. 5: "[Asked] 'Why?' he says."

⁵⁹⁰Vibhū 168, n. 6: "To this the Siddhantin says."

[being] a part of an object, acts towards that [object], having recognized the object because of an uttered word.[591] This is correct. **But**[592] which form of awareness is to be grasped,[593] **that does not exist in the object**. **How** should a word, **expressing that** form of awareness, **partake of the object**[, i.e.,] be qualified by expressing the external object?

A.4.2.7   PVV 169,1–6 *AD* PV III 168

Moreover: **A continuous word's occupation**[594] [is] **in a continuous object**, [, i.e., a word's] purpose has the character of a cognition [of the same object] at the time of everyday activity. **But this** form of awareness **is formed** from impressions **through the repetition of observing** particulars, [and is] **discontinuous**,[595] **because it is not different from thought** which is [itself] not continuous.

A.4.2.8   PVV 169,7–14 *AD* PV III 169

[Opponent:] Now, if the [real] object is not the word's object, then how can other-exclusion, even though it is of the nature of a part of that [object], [be] what is to be designated? So [Dharmakīrti] said: **By means of a superimposition of that form**[, i.e.,] of the exclusion which is a part of the object, onto the form of awareness,[596] [that is,] through a determination [of exclusion and form of awareness] as being one, the object,[597] **differentiated from another, is understood**;

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[591]Read *śabdād uccaritād arthaṃ pratītya* (PVV$_{ms}$ 32b4) against *śabdād uccaritā-rthaṃ pratītya* (PVV 168,22).

[592]Read *yas tu grāhyākāraḥ* acc. to PVV$_{ms}$ 32b4 against *yas tatrākṣarākāraḥ* PVV 169,23.

[593]Vibhū 168, n. 7: "What was attained (*āyāta*) by the repetition of observing an external blue [thing] etc. is to be known."

[594]Vibhū 169, n. 1 glosses *śabda* as: "Cow, cow." Probably the point is that the word "cow" can be used twice with the same meaning, and is so continuous.

[595]Vibhū 169, n. 2: *yatra buddhau bhāsate tato 'bhinnaḥ jñānavat.* "[The cognitive form (?)] is not different from that awareness in which it appears, like a cognition." This short phrase is not quite clear to me.

[596]Vibhū 169, n. 3: *vināropaṃ vyavahārābhāvāt yathā saṃgatis tasya tathāha* Tentatively: "Because there is no everyday activity without imposition, [Dharma-kīrti] spoke so as if it is applicable to this [form of awareness]."

[597]Vibhū 169, n. 4: "A particular [...is understood]."

because [of this understanding,] exclusion, which is a part of the object of a word,[598] is called word object. But an object is not understood from a word because of a universal. If, **however**, because of cognizing a form of awareness as being the differentiated object, **this very** form of awareness is metaphorically called **"word referent"** by someone proclaiming that the form of awareness is the word referent (*buddhy-ākāraśabdārthavādin*),[599] then, **if there is such a formulation**, **there is no contradiction** at all, because there is no assumption by [Dharmakīrti] that a form of awareness, which is not qualified by continuity, is the word referent.

A.4.2.9   PVV 169,17–170,3 *ad* PV III 170

Or, the apprehensions which are formed by words have an erroneous appearance. For [it is] so: first of all a [real] object is not the object of an awareness [that is] due to a word, because the own form of this [object] does not appear [in that awareness], and because for this [object] there is no convention of words. Neither [is] the form of awareness [the object of a word], even though there is an awareness of this [form], because [this form] is not determined as being the object, because it is a particular, and because there is no convention [with regard to it]. For the form of awareness is not external, nor is an external [thing] a form of awareness, due to which an appearance as "like"[600] would be a true appearance. In reality, therefore, verbal apprehensions do not let a real thing appear.

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[598]Perhaps *śabdārthāṃśāpohaḥ* should be emended. One possibility is an emendation to *śabdārthānyāpohaḥ* ("...other-exclusion, which is the word object..."). This is, as Masamichi Sakai informs me, also how Tosaki 1979: 269, n. 160 translates this passage, albeit without making an emendation in the text.

[599]A similar position is shown to be different from that of an exclusion theorist in TSP$_Ś$ 352,5 ff. (cf. appendix B.5.1), where PV III 169 is also quoted. Manorathanandin is here saying that Dharmakīrti's explanation is not contradictory to the position that the word referent is the form of awareness, but qualifies that position as metaphorical usage. This qualification is not made in the *TSP*.

[600]I.e., either the external thing would be like the form of awareness, or vice versa.

[Opponent:] In this case then, how is a word called performing an exclusion [that is] a part of the referent?[601] [Proponent:] So **Dharma-kīrti** said: Words, even though they do not have an appearance of that [object], **accord to this**, exclusion from others, [that is to say,] **a part of the object**, [meaning they] cause a classification as being the object of activity (*vṛtti*), because [they] are indirectly connected with it due to being arrived at by an observation of an [external] object.[602] **And so a word [is characterized as] "performing exclusion"**.[603]

A.4.2.10   PVV 170,5–12 *AD* PV III 171

For the [reason] that, due to a word, [there is] a cognition of that separated from another [thing] at the time of everyday activity, **therefore also at the time [of forming] a convention** is **the exclusion from others connected to the word** as that to be designated [by that word], [but] nothing else.

[Objection:] Now, a convention is made indicating an object. So how [can it be] called exclusion? So [Dharmakīrti] said:

Connected with an indicated object[, i.e.,] [an object] that is excluded from others, [and] whose **result**[, i.e.,] purpose, is **[one's] own a cognition** [of that exclusion] at the time of everyday activity—[connected with such an object, i.e.,] made identical [with that object] because of a determination of non-difference [between the two object's exclusions], **other-exclusion**, having the nature of a form of awareness, is connected to a word, [but] the [external] object itself (*eva*) [is not connected to a word].

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[601]Vibhū 169, n. 5: *aniṣṭaṃ parityajya iṣṭe pravartanāt śabdāḥ.* "Words [perform exclusion], because of activity towards that which is desired avoiding that which is not desired."

[602]Read *paraṃparayā* acc. to PVV$_{ms}$ 32b7 against *parasparaṃ yā* in PVV 170,2.

[603]Vibhū 170, n. 1: "Dignāga [said]: 'Not to these, [but] to the object should they apply.'" I was unable to locate this statement in Dignāga's works.

A.4.2.11 PVV 170,13–21 AD PV III 172

For [it is] so:[604] **In a convention's dependency** on [a word] not being observed **for one** [thing, i.e.,] for a non-tree that is to be distinguished [from trees, and] **in [its] dependence on an observation of this** [word] **for another** [thing, i.e.,] for one instance (*ekadeśa*) of a tree that is not to be distinguished, **exclusion is bound to a word**. This is ascertained.

   In [the case of] **a real thing**[, i.e.,] for an object of convention [such as] a universal etc., [this] dependence on the observation and non-observation of that to be distinguished and that not to be distinguished **is not coherent.**[605] If a real thing is to be cognized in an affirmative way, what use is the dependence on the non-observation in some other place? But it depends [on this observation]. Therefore, only a distinction from others is to be cognized. This is understood. If [an opponent says] that distinction from others depends on [such things as] a universal etc., which have the aim of an apprehension by avoiding a dissimilar instance,[606] then [we say] enough with [this] universal. Because only by the distinction from others is everyday activity fully achieved.

A.4.2.12 PVV 170,22–26 AD PV III 173

And for the [reason that] qualifiers such as genus, quality, movement, etc. do not appear in a cognition grasping a real thing, **therefore genus etc., and a connection to these**[607] **do not exist in an object**.[608] **And**, therefore, **a word is not bound to these, because words are joined only to a differentiation from others** that is established by cognition.

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[604]Vibhū 170, n. 2: "[Manorathanandin] states the error in the case of the application of a word caused by a universal [existing] in an affirmative way[, i.e., in the case of a real universal]."

[605]Vibhū 170, n. 3: "For it is so: in the case of a universal[, which is a real thing]." (Introducing the following argument.)

[606]Vibhū 170, n. 4: "Grasping an object that is filled with constructions."

[607]Vibhū: "Connection (*sambandha*)." He is giving a synonym for *yoga*, which I have also translated by "connection" here.

[608]Vibhū 170, n. 6: "In the object of sense faculties."

A.4.3 PVV 189,14–190,9 ad PV III 233–235

Or may it be that a universal truly is a real entity, nevertheless, this is not an object of words and concepts. So [Dharmakīrti] said: **Even if whiteness etc.**, i.e., a universal, **exists**, in a property bearer such as a garment etc., **such an object of the sense faculties**, which has a clear form of whiteness etc., [nevertheless] **this**[, i.e.,] an object that is the object of a cognition of the sense faculties, **is not designated by words**, **because** there is a **difference** [between the two objects] due to the clarity or vagueness of the **form**, i.e., the form of awareness, **of these two cognitions**, which are generated by the sense faculties [and] words.

 If [this is said by an opponent]: "**Even though awareness events**, which are generated by sense faculties and words, **have the same object**[, i.e., even though] they have the same object,[609] [there is] **this**, a difference of the forms of awareness which has the nature of the difference of their cause[, i.e.,] **since there is a different basis** [for these awareness events.]" , **then**[, i.e.,] in such a situation, this is explained: **cognitions** [based on different] sense faculties such as **hearing etc. have different objects**[, i.e.,] have different objects such as sound (*śabda*), shape, smell etc. **Why is that**[, i.e.,] from [which] means of valid cognition is this ascertained?

 Also, what is not contrived [in this result of your thesis]: "These cognitions, even though there is no different object for them, have different forms of awareness because of the difference of the sense faculties that are their basis."?

 Moreover, **the basis of cognitions** of universals etc.[, i.e., their] cause **is truly different**[, i.e.,] a sense faculty and a word. Nevertheless, **why does a real thing that is in fact only one**, like a universal etc., **have this nature that appears with different forms [to awareness]**[, i.e., a nature that] appears as clear and unclear[, or, a nature having] a clear and unclear appearance? For insofar as a single [thing] appears with its own form, [its] having a differentiated appearance is not coherent.

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[609]Manorathanandin glosses *artha* with *viṣaya*, both of which have to be translated as "object" here.

B Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on apoha

For the following translations, the editions in Krishnamacharya 1926 and Śāstrī 1981 were used. In addition, Hisataka Ishida kindly granted me access to a part of a draft version of his edition of the *śabdārthaparīkṣā* chapter, corresponding to TS$_Ś$ 866–871. This is referred to as Ishida 2008. In the library of the Institute for South Asian, Tibetan, and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna, furthermore, there is a copy of Krishnamacharya 1926 which was originally in Erich Frauwallner's personal library. This copy contains many annotations, probably by Frauwallner. Where relevant, these have been considered below. The two sets of manuscripts for these two texts, TSP$_{msP}$, TS$_{msP}$ on the one hand, and TSP$_{msJ}$, TS$_{msJ}$ on the other, were not read in their entirety, but only when the existing editions seemed doubtful.

B.1 TS$_Ś$ 2; 5–6

[TS$_Ś$ 5–6] This *Tattvasaṃgraha* is composed, having bowed to the omniscient one, who, [being] the best of the teachers [and] not hanging on to an autonomous teaching,[610] taught, due to a wish for what is beneficial for

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[610]I.e., Vedic teachings: TSP$_Ś$ 18,20–21: ***svatantrā śrutiḥ*** = *svataḥ pramāṇabhūto vedaḥ, nityaṃ vacanam iti yāvat*. (**An autonomous teaching**, [meaning] the Veda, which is a means of valid cognition by itself, which is to say, [it is] an eternal statement.)

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the world–he had great compassion which had become his
nature over a large number of time-periods—dependant
arising, which ...[611]

[TS$_Ś$ 2] is devoid of additional attributes such as quality,
substance, activity, genus, inherence etc., [and in which]
the range [of objects that] a [conceptual] cognition and
a word [act towards has the nature of] a superimposed
form.[612]

B.1.1   TSP$_Ś$ ad TS$_Ś$ 2

[TSP$_Ś$ 14,15] [Opponent:] Now, substance, quality, movement etc. are
real things. Why is it not [the case that] they [arise in dependence on
other factors]?[613]

   [Proponent:] To this [objection Śāntarakṣita] said "**quality**" etc.
"Qualities, substances, movements, genus, as well as inherence", that
is a copulative compound. Through the word "genus" a universal
in all [of its] two forms, the primary (*para*) and secondary (*apara*)

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[611]TS$_Ś$ 1–4 are to be construed with TS$_Ś$ 6ab (cf. TSP$_Ś$ 13,13–14). A full translation
of these verses, along with a general appreciation for their role in the *TS*, can be
found in McClintock 2010: 96 ff. Cf. also the translation in Jhā 1937: 1 ff.

[612]McClintock (2010: 96 ff.), as well as Yoshimizu (2011: 153, n. 7), understand
the compound *āropitākāraśabdapratyayagocaram* (TS$_Ś$ 2c'd) as an adjective to
pratītyasamutpāda, and translate the phrase to the effect of "dependent arising that
is the sphere of words and cognitions which have a superimposed form." Kapstein
(2001: 11 f.) translates the phrase as "Empty ..., But within the scope of words
and concepts relating to posited features ...". Kamalaśīla's interpretation, at least
as I understand it, does not seem to support either of these interpretations:
āropitākāraḥ śabdapratyayor gocaro viṣayo yatra pratītyasamutpāde, sa tathoktaḥ.
(TSP$_Ś$ 15,2–3, cf. the trl. on page 337). It is clearly understood here as a locative
bahuvrīhi, i.e., that the dependent arising is something, *in which* the sphere of
words and conceptual cognition is such and such. The authors mentioned do not, as
far as I can see, argue for their respective interpretations.

[613]Cf.   TSP$_Ś$ 14,13–14:   *sa punar ayaṃ pratītyasamutpādaḥ skandhadhātv-
āyatanānāṃ draṣṭavyaḥ, teṣām eva pratītyasamutpannatvāt.* (Moreover, exactly this
dependent arising is to be observed for the aggregates, the elements, and the sense
spheres[, but nothing else], because only they have arisen in dependence.)

[one], is included.[614] By the word "**etc.**" there is an inclusion of those properties of the specific characteristics occurring in the lowest substances which, separate from a property bearer, are described by some [as] beginning in such a way as "For all six categories, is-ness (*astitva*) is the state of being an object of a means of valid cognition that grasps [the property] 'existing'."[615] [These are] both qualities etc. and additional attributes[, which are the] qualifiers [of qualities, substances, etc.]. This is a modifier compound (*viśeṣaṇasamāsa*). **Empty** means void of these. With regard to this, this was said by the Lord: "Altogether everything, o Brahmin, [that means] just as far as the five aggregates (*skandha*), the twelve sense spheres (*āyatana*), the eighteen elements (*dhātus*) [go]!"[616] And this is a hint at the investigation of the six categories.[617]

[TSP$_{\acute{S}}$ 14,23] [Opponent:] Now, if there are no additional attributes, then how can dependent arising be made an object through both words and concepts? And what is not made an object through these cannot be denoted, nor is there [any] usage of word and concept without an additional attribute. [So] how did the Bhagavat teach this [dependant arising to people]?

[Proponent:] [In answer Śāntarakṣita] said: **Superimposed form** etc. Superimposed, [meaning] imposed as being external; form, [meaning] nature; the range [of objects that] words and cognition [apply to which has] that [nature], that is so called[, i.e., *āropitākāraśabdapratyayagocaraḥ*]. In which dependant arising [there is this] **range [of objects]** (*gocara*)[, i.e.,] **a word's and a cognition's** object (*viṣaya*) which has a superimposed form, that is so called[,

[614]Cf. Halbfass 1992: 117 explains the general notion of these two types of universals (calling them "ultimate" and "nonultimate") as follows: "'Reality' (*sattā*) constitutes the 'ultimate universal' or 'supreme generality.' It is all-inclusive and pervades all substances, qualities, and motions. Nonultimate universals, on the other hand, pervade and include certain entities and exclude others."

[615]Cf. the comments on *astitva* in Halbfass 1992: 144 f., and 156 ff.

[616]This means everything that exists is contained in these factors.

[617]These, as Jhā 1937: 18 notes, are the topics of the 10th–15th chapter (*Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā–Samavāyapadārthaparīkṣā*) of TS$_{\acute{S}}$.

i.e., *āropitā...gocaraḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ*]. The word "cognition", because of its close connection with the word "word" [in the compound *śabdapratyaya*] is to be understood as [meaning] the particular cognition "concept," which has the nature of an internal expression (*āviṣṭābhilāpa*), because both [word and conceptual cognition] go together [in the compound] since they don't deviate with regard to having the same object. By this the [following] is said: even if additional attributes do not exist, still that conceptual cognition [which is] attained by means of the observation of real things differentiated from each other, [which is] determined as being of an external form, has the nature of a reflection,[618] [and] is the referent of a word, [that conceptual cognition] exists here [in dependent arising]. For this is not really the object of words, because here [in dependent arising] all conceptual cognitions have passed. Rather, exactly as a word referent is established for people due to beauty (*ramaṇīyatā*) that is not [further] considered, so also the Bhagavats, aiming at the reality which is disregarded [by them during teaching], explain [dependent arising to others] by closing their eyes like an elephant [and so] veiling [their] insight into it,[619] for the sake of introducing [people] to the highest truth, because there is no other way [to do this]. Even though the word referent is a superimposed form, it is, because of an indirect connection with the real thing, truly a reason for the attainment of this [real thing]. Therefore, in this manner the real thing becomes taught indeed, because of their[, the word referents',] ability [to lead to that real thing]. Thus deception (*vipralambha*) is not possible. With regard to this the Protector said:

> For whichever thing is denoted by some name, that [name] does not exist in that [thing] at all. For that is the nature

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[618]Emend to *pratibimbātmakam* against *pratibandhātmakam* found in TSP$_{msP}$ 6a1, TSP$_K$ 12,6, TSP$_Ś$ 15,6–7 . Cf. *rnam par rtog pa'i gzugs brnyan gyi bdag nyid* TSP$_D$ 143a3 (= TSP$_Q$ Ḥe 172b6), as well as the formulation *pratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ* in TS$_Ś$ 1027.

[619]Cf. Kyuma 2005: 80 f., n. 101 for the background of this metaphor, and see also Dunne 2004: 410.

of things.[620]

And this is a hint at the [16th chapter, the] *Śabdārthaparīkṣa*.

B.2 TS$_\text{Ś}$ 573–574

[TS$_\text{Ś}$ 573–574] [Opponent:] These property bearers[, i.e., the categories,] were proclaimed to be six.[621] The properties are indeed assumed to be distinct from them. [Proponent:] If that [is said], what is this relation of this [property] with these [property bearers] that is assumed? Connection (*saṃyoga*) is not correct,[622] because it is limited to substances, and there is no other inherence, and another relation is not accepted by the others.

B.2.1 TSP$_\text{Ś}$ ad TS$_\text{Ś}$ 573–574

[TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 239,24] [Opponent:] There is no [such] error, because that is accepted.[623] [Proponent:] If so, how [can it be that] "six categories" are taught? Therefore [Śāntarakṣita] formulated [a *pūrvapakṣa* starting

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[620]Cf. Hoornaert 2002: 125 f. and Eckel 2008: 276 f. for other translations and pointers to other occurrences of this verse. It is quoted again in TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 339,22–23 *ad* TS$_\text{Ś}$ 869, which reads: *yasya yasya hi śabdasya yo yo viṣaya ucyate / sa sa saṃghaṭate naiva vastūnāṃ sā hi dharmatā //* See below, appendix B.4.

[621]The six categories postulated by the Vaiśeṣika system are, as listed by Halbfass 1992: 70–71: "There are six fundamental categories, or divisions of reality: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*)." This list has its own rather complex history (cf. Halbfass 1992: 70–80), but seems to have stabilized somewhat by the time of Śāntarakṣita. For the purpose of the argument here, it is important to not confuse the "properties" that Śāntarakṣita is debating with the "qualities" of the Vaiśeṣika list. Śāntarakṣita is trying to show that the opponent, if he wishes to attribute a property (such as *astitva*, lit. "is-ness", cf. Halbfass 1992: 77) to the six categories that is not identical with them, has to explain the ontological status of this property and thereby accept that it must constitute a seventh category.

[622]Read *yukto* acc. to TS$_\text{msP}$ 12a1 instead of *yuktā*. This is also how *yuktā* is emended in Frauwallner's copy of Krishnamacharya 1926, and by Hishida 1971: 13.

[623]The opponent has just explained (TS$_\text{Ś}$ 572a–c) that the is-ness (*astitva*) of the six categories is the reality in the case of an object of a means of valid cognition

with] "**These are six**." Only those things that are of the nature of a property bearer are taught as "six categories", but those [things] that are of the nature of properties are assumed to be different [from] the six categories.[624] For a passage in the *Padārthapraveśaka* states: "In such a way, this explanation of the property bearers was given without the properties."[625] "**What is this**" etc. was said in answer. [The relation] "**of this**"[, meaning] "of a property such as is-ness and so on;"[626] "**with these**"[, i.e.,] with the six categories. What is the relation on account of which this is a property of those [six categories]? For without a relation, being property and property bearer is not possible, because of the overreaching consequence. For in such a way there would be every property for every [property bearer]; for there is no relation at all with these [property bearers]. For it is so: [this] relation is[, according to Vaiśeṣika authors,] of two kinds, [one] characterized as connection and [the other] characterized as inherence. Of these [two types of relation], to begin with, there is no [relation of a property to anything belonging to the six categories which could be] characterized as connection, because this [connection] is restricted to substances alone since it is a quality.[627] Neither is

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that lets a person cognize "existing" about a thing. (For some remarks on *astitva*, cf. Halbfass 1992: 143 ff.) Śāntarakṣita's reply was that this forces the opponent to assume a seventh category in addition to the standard six. The opponent counters here that he accepts that there are *dharma*s separate from the six categories.

[624]In Frauwallner's copy, the text is emended to *ṣaṭpadārthavyatiriktā* instead of the printed *ṣaṭpadārthā vyatiriktā* (in both TSP$_K$ and TSP$_Ś$, as well as TSP$_{msP}$ 61a10). This emendation (or one to *ṣaṭpadārthebhyo vyatiriktā*, as in Hishida 1971: 13, n. 66) is also supported by TSP$_D$ Ze 262b6 (=TSP$_Q$ Ḥe 323b5): *tsig gi don drug las ma gtogs pa 'dod pa kho na'o.*

[625]This seems to refer to PDhS$_D$ 15,20: "*evaṃ dharmair vinā dharmiṇām uddeśaḥ kṛtaḥ.*" Cf. Chemparathy 1970 and the notes to Potter 1977: 282 for more information on this text and its author. The import of *uddeśa* in this passage is discussed in Halbfass 1992: 78 f., 96 ff.

[626]Is-ness, denotability, and cognizability are the three characteristics common to all categories. Cf. PDhS$_D$ 16: *ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni.* See Halbfass 1992: 158 ff. for a discussion of this sentence, and Halbfass 1970: 143 f. for how it applies to universals.

[627]Cf. the explanations in Halbfass 1970: 122 f. The relation "connection" would have been considered one of the qualities (*guṇa*) by the opponent here. As such, the

there [such a relation that could be] characterized as inherence, because that [inherence] is assumed as singular, like being.[628] But, if there were a relation of the type inherence with inherence, a second inherence would be endorsed.[629]

B.3 TS$_\text{Ś}$ 738

[TS$_\text{Ś}$ 738] For a recurring cognition has an appearance of words and particulars. But a genus is declared [to be] free of colour, shape, and the form of letters.

B.3.1 TSP$_\text{Ś}$ ad TS$_\text{Ś}$ 738

[TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 300,23] Showing also that the thesis is defeated by an inference, [Śāntarakṣita] said: "**Recurring**" etc. [With this] the following is said:[630] you wish to prove that repeated apprehensions have a cause that is different from the individual things etc. [and] that is really the basis [for these cognitions]. And this is wrong, because that [cause, postulated by you,] does not appear, and because colour, shape, etc., [all] different from this [cause], do appear. For it is so: a universal

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opponent will maintain that it qualifies only substances (*dravya*), and so cannot be what enables properties to qualify things of all six categories.

[628]Cf. PDhS$_\text{D}$ 16,18: "*dravyādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ samavāyitvam anekatvaṃ ca.*"

[629]The explanation of ŚV Ps 148 given in J. A. Taber 2005: 109 is remarkably close to this passage. Since he thinks it is "...better, rather, for the translator to provide his or her own commentary, after thoroughly studying and digesting the available classical ones ..." (J. A. Taber 2005: xiii), these arguments might actually be related.

[630]This is a paraphrase of the thesis of Bhāvivikta's inference, given in TS$_\text{Ś}$ 715ab. This thesis is, as formulated in TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 294,24–295,9: *tatra bhāviviktaḥ prāha— gavāśvamahiṣavarāhamātaṅgādiṣu gavādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ samayākṛtipi- ṇḍādivyatiriktasvarūpānurūpasaṃsarginimittāntaranibandhanā ity avaghoṣaṇā.* (To this Bhāvivikta said: In the case of cow, horse, buffalo, boar, elephant, etc., the particular cognitions and names such as "cow" etc. depend on another cause mixed together with [and] according to the own nature [of these things, but] separated from convention, shape, material body, etc.—This is the declaration [of what Bhāvivikta wants to prove].) After giving a slightly different second interpretation of the phrase *samayā°...°nibandhanā*, TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 295,19 clarifies: *avaghoṣaṇeti pratijñā* (Declaration means thesis.). For Bhāvivikta, cf. Potter 1977: 281.

such as cowness etc. is declared by you to be completely empty of colour, shape, and the forms of letters, but a cognition that conforms to the appearance of colour etc. is experienced. So how should the basis of this [cognition] be empty of colour etc.? For there cannot be one (*anya*) basis for a cognition that has another (*anya*) form, because of an unwanted consequence [that goes] too far. A [formal] proof: that cognition, which has an appearance of an object different from some [other object], never grasps that [other object], as a cognition through a word does not grasp the [visual] form [of a thing]. And a recurring cognition has an appearance of colour etc., [all of] which are different from a genus. This [is] due to apprehending that opposed to the pervader.[631] [The phrase] "**it has an appearance of words and particulars**" [is analysed:] "word" is the denomination "a cow" etc.; "particular" is what has the nature of colour, shape, etc.; this appearance of these two belongs to [cognition], so: "it has [that appearance]." **Letters** are the letter "c", the letter "o", the letter "w", etc.[632]

B.4   TS$_Ś$ 870

> [TS$_Ś$ 870] For[633] particular, class, the connection to this [class], that having a class, as [also] a form of awareness do not really assemble[634] where the word referent [is].

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[631]For Bhāvivikta, the pervader, which is what he wanted to prove, was the fact that there must be a cause other than the perceptible qualities of a thing due to which there is the same cognition about different things of the same class, and that this can only be a genus (cf. TSP$_Ś$ 295,12–13: *yāni ca tāni nimittāntarāṇi tāni gotvādīnīti siddham.* "And those which are these other causes are cowness etc. That is established."). The *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi* here consists in showing that in these cognitions something that is not a genus appears, and that, since cognitions can only be based on what appears in them, they can therefore not be caused (or have their basis in) a genus.

[632]Literally: "The letter "*ga*", the letter "*au*", the *visarga*, and so on." The first three spell the Sanskrit word "*gauḥ*" ("cow").

[633]This verse gives the reason for the preceding verse, where it was claimed that whatever a word refers to is not a real thing (cf. footnote 620).

[634]Literally, the phrase *ghaṭām añcati* means "it enters a group/collection". It is translated as *sgra don du /de kho na nyid du mi 'thad /* ("...is not really correct as

B.4.1 TSP$_{\acute{S}}$ ad TS$_{\acute{S}}$ 870

[TSP$_{\acute{S}}$ 340,4] If [it is asked:] [Opponent:] Now, which means of valid cognition [is there] for the fact that a verbal cognition[635] [is] both erroneous and without object? [Proponent:] We have stated the means of valid cognition for this, which is [as follows] (*yad ...iti*): Each and every verbal cognition is erroneous because it occurs by means of a determination of non-difference for different [things].[636]

For [it is] so: the cognition "this" with regard to what is not this is erroneous, like the cognition of water where there is a mirage. And this verbal cognition, which determines non-difference with regard to different referents, is thus. [So there is] the logical reason [consisting in] an essential property. And neither does this [verbal cognition] grasp a universal that has the nature of a real thing, due to which the reason [used in this inference] would not be established; for this [universal] has earlier been refuted at length.[637] Or may a universal [really] exist, still, given that this [universal] is an object different from the differences[, i.e., the different things], the determination of non-difference with regard to differentiated [things] would be only erroneous. For some things similar to something else, [and so] connected to it, would not be said to possess that [other thing,

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the word referent.") in TS$_{D}$ Ze 33a2 (=TS$_{Q}$ He 40b6). I understand it to mean that the particular etc. do not belong to what is rightly categorized as the word referent.

[635]For the reading *śābdapratyayasya* see also Ishida 2008: 4.

[636]Cf., e.g., TSP$_{\acute{S}}$ 338,10–13: *apohavādināṃ tu na paramārthataḥ śabdānāṃ kiñcid vācyaṃ vastusvarūpam asti. sarva eva hi śābdaḥ pratyayo bhrāntaḥ, bhinneṣv artheṣv abhedākārādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ. yatra tu pāramparyeṇa vastupratibandhaḥ, tatrārthasaṃvādo bhrāntatve 'pīti darśanam.* (But for those proclaiming exclusion [as the referent of words] the view [is this]: "For words there is in reality nothing denotable at all that has the nature of a real thing. For every verbal apprehension is erroneous, because [it] applies to different referents due to the determination of a non-different form. But for which [conceptual cognition] there indirectly is a connection to a real thing, for that there is concurrence with the referent, even though [the cognition] is erroneous.")

I follow the emendation in Ishida 2008: 1 to *tatrārthasaṃvādo*, against *tatrārthā-saṃvādo* in both TSP$_{K}$ and TSP$_{\acute{S}}$.

[637]As Śāstrī (1981: 340, n. 2) points out, this was the general topic of chapter 13, the *Sāmānya(padārtha)parīkṣā*, of the *TS*.

i.e., a universal]. [Alternatively,] even if [you were to say that] a universal is not an object different [from the particulars], [then] the entire universe (*viśva*) would in reality be only one (*eka*) real thing; so the cognition of a universal there [amongst the things] is entirely erroneous. For the cognition of a universal does not have the same real thing as an object, because this [cognition] requires the grasping of a difference. And if [this cognition's] erroneousness is established, [its] lack of an object is also established; for[, in the case of a wrong cognition,] there is no referent at all which fulfills the criteria of a basis [for cognition], in that [it is] productive [of the cognition] through a projection of its form [into cognition].

[TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 340,15] Or else: in another way the lack of an object [for a conceptual cognition] is proven. For only with regard to which referent sounds are agreed upon, that alone is consistent as their referent, [and] nothing else, because of an overreaching consequence. And an agreement on these [sounds] for any real thing cannot exist in reality. Therefore sounds [producing] a cognition are without objects. A [formal] proof: whichever [sounds] do not, in reality (*bhāvatas*), become agreed upon with regard to something, those do not truly denote that, like the word "horse" is not agreed upon with regard to a material entity having a dewlap etc.[, i.e., a cow]. And in reality no sounds at all become agreed upon with regard to any real thing. This is because of a non-observation of the pervading element.[638] Because [a word] which denotes is pervaded by the fact that [it has] an agreed upon convention; and this [pervading element] does not exist here[, i.e., words are not agreed upon for real things].[639]

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[638]Consider also the emendation of *vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* to *vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ* in Ishida 2008: 5. But *iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* does occur a few times (e.g., TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 119,13; 137,8–9; 198,12), although not as frequently as *iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ*. So it could be that it is a usage particular to Kamalaśīla. Also, the next sentence's construction is not straightforward, looking more like a gloss on *vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* than an additional statement. The Tibetan is not much clearer: ...*mi dmigs pa ste. brda byas pa nyid rjod par byed pa la khyab pa'i phyir la de 'di la med do.* (TSP$_\text{D}$ Ze 313a1–2 = TSP$_\text{Q}$ He 389a4–5).

[639]I think the argument is as follows: *abhidhāyaktva*, therefore *kṛtasamaya-*

And, making it clear that this reason is not unestablished etc.[, i.e., that a word does not denote any real thing], [Śāntarakṣita] said "**for**" etc. [in TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 870].

For it is so:[640] a real thing, which an agreement is grasped for, is defined as being the word referent, [i.e., it is] the **particular** that is sometimes defined [as word referent], or the **class**, or the **connection with it**—with it[, meaning] with the class, **connection**[, meaning] relation–or the thing[641] **having a class**, or the **form of awareness**. These are the alternatives. For none of these is it consistent that [it] is the referent of a word, because a convention is impossible [for any of them]. By [saying] **really**, [he] shows that a conventional referent of words is not negated. Because of this there is no inconsistency (*vyāghāta*) in [his] own words. For otherwise [if he had not added "really"] there would be a contradiction of the thesis to [his] own words. For it is so: without conveying these, particular etc., through a word it is not possible to convey their not being the referent of a word etc. And [someone] showing these, a particular etc., with words, wishing to convey this [that they are not the word referents] would admit that [they] are word referents. Furthermore, precisely this is negated by the thesis. So there would be an inconsistency in [his] own words.

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tva, or *a-kṛtasamayatva*, therefore *an-abhidāyakatva*. This understanding follows the schema found in TBh$_{\text{I}}$ 31,16–18: *vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā–nātra śiṃśapā, vṛkṣābhāvāt. pratiṣedhyāyāḥ śiṃśapāyāḥ vyāpako vṛkṣaḥ, tasyehānupalabdhiḥ* (A non-observation of the pervading element is like this: "There is no *Śiṃśapā* tree here, because there is no tree [here]." Here, there is no observation of a tree, which is the pervading element of a *Śiṃśapā* tree, which is to be negated. Cf. also the translation and note in Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 82.) This means that the following two arguments are correct: *śiṃśapā*, therefore *vṛkṣa*, and *a-vṛkṣa*, therefore *a-śiṃśapā*.

[640]Read *tathā hi* acc. to Ishida 2008: 5, TSP$_{\text{K}}$ 276,20 instead of *yathā hi* TSP$_{\text{Ś}}$ 340,22.

[641]In the copy I am using, there is a handwritten note, in all likelihood by Erich Frauwallner, to the effect of reading *padārtho*, probably according to TSP$_{\text{D}}$ Ze 313a3 (=TSP$_{\text{Q}}$ Ḥe 389a6): "...*rigs dang ldan pa'i dngos po pa'am, blo'i rnam pa*...." This emendation is also made in Ishida 2008: 5, and a correction in TSP$_{\text{msP}}$ 86a7 can be interpreted as "ḥ /", also supporting *padārthaḥ, ...*

By this also what was said by Uddyotakara: "If words do not denote [anything], [there is] inconsistency both of the thesis and the reason."[642] is answered. For we do not deny the word referent in every way, because there is a thorough cognition[643] of this [conventional word referent] right down to the cow-herdsman (*ā-gopāla*). Rather, the property "being in accordance with reality" is negated, which is superimposed by [others] onto this [word referent], but [we do] not [negate] the bearer of [that] property[, i.e., the word referent itself].

B.5 TS$_Ś$ 890 (=VP$_R$ 2.132)

[TS$_Ś$ 890] Or[644] that object, which is the object of aware-ness [and] has a founding in an external real thing, is assumed by some [to be] the word referent cognized as "external real thing."

B.5.1 TSP$_Ś$ ad TS$_Ś$ 890

[TSP$_Ś$ 351,20] But others state the word referent to be a form that is a) only placed on (*āruḍha*) awareness, b) belongs to (*viṣaya*) the external real things, c) is grasped as being an external real thing, [and] d) appears as being [of] the nature of awareness. This [opinion] he explains[, saying] "**Or that**" etc. **Object of awareness**[, i.e.,] that going around in awareness, that is to say, situated in awareness. **Has a founding in an external real thing**[, meaning:] that has a founding in an external real thing, for which a real thing, which exists [or] does not exist [and is] external, is undertaken to be shown

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[642]As pointed out in Ishida 2008: 6, n. 2, this is a quote of NBhV 312,21–22.

[643]Read *atipratītatvāt*, as suggested by TSP$_Ś$ 341,13 against *api pratītatvāt* TSP$_K$ 277,2. Cf. also *āgopālam atipratītam eva* in TSP$_Ś$ 1072,11.

[644]This is the last in a series of options of what the word referent could be, starting TS$_Ś$ 887. This verse is obviously very close to VP$_R$ 2.132 (or practically the same as VP II 132). It is translated in Rau 2002: 71. Houben (1995: 159) notes in this context that he sees "...no objective reason to assume that in Bhartṛhari's eyes this view in which superimposition is the crucial notion took a foremost position among the various views [expressed in VP$_R$ 2.119–142—PMA]."

as the basis[, i.e.,] the own nature having its place in the letter signs (*akṣaracihna*).[645] **Cognized as "external real thing"**, this means: manifest as having the nature of awareness [and] determined as being external. For it is so: to the extent that what has the nature of awareness, which is not projected amongst the objects, is grasped as "only having the form of awareness" due to the presence of a consideration of [its] real state,[646] to that extent its being the word referent is not determined, because there is no connection to a specific activity concerning it. For activities, such as "Bring the cow!" or "Eat the curd!", are not possible for that having the form of awareness in such a way; rather, words denote an object that is capable of a connection to an activity. Thus this which is grasped as having the form of awareness is not the word referent. But if it becomes projected onto an external real thing, then someone erroneously cognizing this [form] as being external, thinks [there is] a capacity for establishing action. Thus it becomes the word referent.

[TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 352,5] [Opponent:] But now, what difference of this is there from the position of an Apohavādin? For it is so: also by an Apohavādin the form of awareness, grasped as having the nature of an external [thing], is indeed proclaimed as the word referent. As it was said [in PV III 169:]

> However,[647] because of understanding[648] that differentiated from others by means (*gatyā*) of a superimposition of that form, there is no contradiction if [there is] this formulation: "That object alone (*eva*)[, the form of awareness,] is the object of a word."[649]

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[645]This phrase is unfortunately not clear to me.

[646]Both manuscripts support *tattvabhāvanatayā*: TSP$_\text{msP}$ 89a6 reads *tattvabhāvanatayā* (corrected from *tattvabhāvanayatayā*), and TSP$_\text{msJ}$ 123a2–3 reads *tattvabhāvanatayā*. TSP$_\text{K}$ 285,14 read *tattvabhāvanayā*, which still seems preferable to *sattvabhāvanayā* in TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 351,26.

[647]See also

[648]Read °*vyāvṛttādhigateḥ* acc. to PV III 169 against °*vyāvṛttyadhigateḥ* TSP$_\text{K}$ 285,20 and °*vyāvṛttyadhigate* in TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 352,7.

[649]See above, appendix A.3.2.

[Proponent:] That is not [so]. For a Buddhyākāravādin[650] assumes a form of awareness, which a) is non-erroneous[651] with regard to the external real thing, b) belongs to [the external things], and c) is imposed on real [things] such as substance etc., to be the word referent in reality. But[652] he does not assume [it to be a form of cognition] that is a) without basis, b) erroneous because of [its] occurrence due to a determination of non-difference for differentiated [things], [and] c) based on the [particulars'] differences from each other. But if [he] says, as we [do, in PV I 72]:

> A wholly (*sarva*) false appearance is this grasping of the things as having the same nature. A mutual difference [of things], which an expression has as its object, is the seed of this [grasping].

then that to be established is [already] established. And he[, Śāntarakṣita] will say so [in TS$_Ś$ 904]:[653]

> If [someone says:] "a mutual difference is the seed of this [grasping]," [then] that is our position.

But an Apohavādin [does not postulate that there is] anything denotable for words in reality, neither a form of awareness nor anything else. For it is so: what appears in verbal apprehension due to being what is to be determined, that is the word referent. But the form of awareness is not determined[654] by verbal cognition, but rather a completely (*eva*) external real thing performing a causal effect. But

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[650]This doctrine is also mentioned in PVV 169,13 (appendix A.4.2.8).

[651]Read *vastuny abhrāntam* acc. to TSP$_K$ 285,22 against *vastubhrāntam* TSP$_Ś$ 352,9.

[652]This sentence, TSP$_K$ 285,24–25, is not found in TSP$_Ś$. Read *na tu* acc. to TSP$_{msP}$ 89a11 instead of *nanu*, as also noted by Frauwallner's handwritten emendation, and reflected in TSP$_D$ Ze 319a5 (=TSP$_Q$ Ḥe 397a7–8): *...sgra'i don du 'dod kyi. tha dad pa dag la tha mi dad par zhen nas 'jug pa'i 'khrul pa phan tshun ldog pa'i rgyu mtshan can (TSP$_D$: n.e. TSP$_Q$) 'dod pa ni ma yin no.*

[653]Cf. Hattori 1993: 139 f. for a translation and discussion of this verse.

[654]Read *vyavasīyate* acc. to TSP$_K$ 286,2 against the obvious misprint *vvaprasīyate* TSP$_Ś$ 352,18.

even an external [thing] is not really determined by it, because there is no determination corresponding to reality, [and] because there is no reality corresponding to determination.[655] Thus the word referent is only superimposed. And what is superimposed, that isn't anything.[656] Thus nothing is really denoted by words. What was further said [in PV I 72], "Exactly this object is the word referent.", that [was said] intending (*abhisandhāya*) only the superimposed object. But by a Buddhyākāravādin a form of cognition is assumed as denotable in reality. This is a big difference [between his view and that of an Apohavādin].

B.6   TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 923 (=ŚV Av 41)

[TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 923] [Opponent:] And[657] a distinction of an awareness event from another awareness event is not cognized. And this awareness event does not carry any element apart from the arising of its own nature.[658]

B.6.1   TSP$_{\text{Ś}}$ ad TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 923

[TSP$_{\text{Ś}}$ 364,11] This might be [said by an Apohavādin]: "There is a differentiation of an appearance [to awareness] from another appearance that is of a different kind; thus exclusion is constructed." So [Kumārila] said: "**From another awareness event** etc." To this [reply:] "Even though this [distinction of one awareness event from another] is not cognized, nevertheless it really exists.", [Kumārila] said: **because it arises with its own nature** etc. Even if there is a differentiation of one awareness event from another awareness event, nevertheless, there is no functioning of a word regarding this

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[655]Cf. NM ᴀᴘᴏʜᴀ: 28,8–29,3 (trl. in Watson and Kataoka 2017: 71–73), and see AP 219,16–17.

[656]Cf. also DhAP 239,15 f.: *cung zad kyang ma yin no zhes smra'o.*

[657]This verse is part of a series of objections made by Kumārila in the *ŚV Av*, and quoted by Śāntarakṣita. See Jhā 1985: 303 ff. and Jhā 1937: 498 ff. for translations.

[658]I follow Okada 2003: 68 in reading *nānyam aṃśam bibharti sā* against *nānyam saṃjñam bibhartti sā* in TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ and "*(vidhirūpāvasāyinī)*" in TS$_{\text{K}}$.

[differentiation]. For it is so: this awareness event that arises because of a word is not observed as carrying another element, [which is] qualified as a differentiation from another awareness, [and] determined because of a word, apart from the arising of its own nature; rather, this means that it arises only as determining what has a positive nature. And that part of a real thing that is not determined because of a word cannot be the referent of a word, because of an overreaching consequence.[659] Therefore, the thesis [that exclusion is the word referent] is refuted by [experiential] knowledge.

B.7   TS$_Ś$ 942–943 (=ŚV Av 83–84)

[TS$_Ś$ 942] [Opponent:] And a non-cow would be excluded which was established and has the nature of a negation of cow. In this [expression, "non-cow,"] only that cow is expressed which is negated by the [negative] particle *na*.

[TS$_Ś$ 943] And if that [cow] had the nature of an absence of non-cow, one would have a connection to the other. If [you say] cow has been established for the sake of exclusion, [then] the assumption of exclusion is vain.

B.7.1   TSP$_Ś$ ad TS$_Ś$ 942–943

[TSP$_Ś$ 370,15] [Opponent:] Therefore, because of the unwanted consequence of an error of mutual dependence, a convention for exclusion cannot be made. Explaining this, [Kumārila] said: "**And the established**" etc. There is a cognition of cow through the differentiation

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[659]I emend to "*śabdād anavasīyamāno*" against *śabdād avasīyamāno* in TSP$_{msP}$ 91b17, TSP$_Ś$ 364,17 and TSP$_K$. Cf. TSP$_D$ Ze 324b3–4 (=TSP$_Q$ He 404a8): *sgras ma zhen pa'i dngos po'i cha yang sgra'i don du rigs pa ma yin te ....* The copy of TSP$_K$ with emendations by Frauwallner has "*na*?" written above "*śabdādavasīyamāno*", suggesting a similar expectation. The translation of Jhā 1937: 498 also reflects such an understanding, even though there is no note as to why this is assumed. It is not quite clear which unwanted consequence is supposed to result. An error commonly noted in these contexts is that, if a word makes something other than its proper object known, it could make any object known. Cf., e.g., the unwanted consequences mentioned in TSP$_Ś$ 301,11 (appendix B.3.1) and TSP$_Ś$ 373,9–10 (appendix B.8.1).

from non-cow, and **that non-cow has the nature of a negation of cow**. Therefore, in [this expression] here, "non-cow", the latter word referent is what is to be expressed, which is negated by the negative particle *na* as in [this case] here: "A non-cow[, or,] not a cow." For something that has a nature that is not clearly known cannot be negated.

Moreover, now [this] might be [said by an Apohavādin]: "Is that to be expressed here the cow which has the nature of an absence of non-cow?" Because of this [question Kumārila] said: "**And if that** ...."[660] "That" [refers to] cow. For it is so: A cognition of cow [comes about] only by means of a cognition of non-cow, because [it] has the essence of an absence of non-cow; and a cognition of non-cow has its very means in a cognition of cow, because [non-cow] consists in a negation of cow. So (*iti*) a dependence on each other very clearly presents itself.

Moreover, [this] might be [said by an Apohavādin]: "A cow, which is negated by the word non-cow, is established only as having the form of an affirmation for the sake of exclusion[, i.e.,] for the sake of an establishment of exclusion as qualified by a distinction from non-cow. Due to this, there will not be a dependency on each other." Therefore [Kumārila] said: "If cow is established ...."[, meaning:] If it is so, then a construction of exclusion in such a way as [this]: "For all words the object is exclusion."[661] is vain, because the referent of a word has the form of an affirmation. Therefore, no established word referent at all which has the form of an affirmation should be made an element [in exclusion]. But if not making that [positive word referent] an element, the error of dependence on each other is hard to avoid.

B.8 TS$_{\acute{S}}$ 947–949 (=ŚV Av 88–90)

[TS$_{\acute{S}}$ 947] [Opponent:] Neither is an awareness of exclusion generated from words such as "horse" etc. In this

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[660] Read *sa ced ity ādi* acc. to TSP$_{msP}$ 93a14 against *sa cety ādi* TSP$_{\acute{S}}$ 370,19, TSP$_K$ 300,18.

[661] Read °*āpohārtha* acc. to TSP$_{\acute{S}}$ against °*āpoho 'rtha* in TSP$_K$.

[world], an awareness of something that is qualified is not assumed to be one in which the qualifier [remains] unknown.

[TS$_\text{Ś}$ 948] Neither should a qualifier having one form cause a cognition of another kind.[662] But how is this [exclusion, being of one kind,] called a qualifier for a cognition of another kind?[663]

[TS$_\text{Ś}$ 949] If a qualifier were assumed even though the qualified [thing] is [classified] in a different way, then, if it were so, any qualifier whatsoever could follow.

B.8.1   TSP$_\text{Ś}$ ad TS$_\text{Ś}$ 947

[TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 372,11]   And this mode[664] [of qualifying] is not possible for exclusion. [Kumārila's] words: "**neither** etc." show this. For exclusion is not determined through an awareness of "horse" etc., but rather only the real thing. And for that [reason], because an awareness of exclusion cannot occur, horse etc. is not coloured with this [exclusion] by the awareness of [horse etc.] itself.

Should this be [said by an Apohavādin]:[665] "Exclusion, even though not cognized, becomes the qualifier [of a real thing, like horse etc.]," then this is said [in answer]: **of that qualified** etc. For, an **awareness** of **a qualified** [thing] **that does not grasp a qualifier** does **not** exist. That [awareness] is so called[, i.e., called

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[662]I.e., exclusion or difference should not lead to a cognition of a positively characterized thing.

[663]ŚV Av 89 reads *jñāte* instead of *jñāne* found in TS$_\text{K}$ 949 and TS$_\text{Ś}$ 948.

[664]In TS$_\text{Ś}$ 946 (=ŚV Av 87) it was argued that the mere existence of a qualifier is not sufficient for it to be a qualifier of something. Rather, a qualifier (*apoha*) has to "colour" ($\sqrt{rañj}$) that which it qualifies (in this case, exclusion has to qualify the object of conceptual cognition). TS$_\text{Ś}$ 946cd: *svabuddhyā rajyate yena viśeṣyaṃ tad viśeṣaṇam.* (A qualifier is that by which a qualified [thing] is coloured in the awareness of [this qualified thing] itself.) See Watson and Kataoka 2017: 57 ff. for this notion of "colouring awareness".

[665]Cf. the argument in § 4.

non-existent,] which does not know the qualifier [but knows something that is qualified].

[TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 372,16 Or] may it really be that there is an awareness of exclusion, nevertheless, because there is no awareness with a form of that [exclusion] when there is a real object [that is being cognized], this qualifier[, exclusion,] for that [thing supposedly qualified by it,] is not coherent. Showing this, [Kumārila] said [in ŚV Av 89]: "**Neither should [a qualifier] having one form**" etc. For every qualifier, corresponding to its own form, is seen to generate an awareness with regard to the [thing] qualified. But a qualifier of a different kind does not generate an awareness of [yet] another kind with regard to the specified [thing]. For, [the qualifier] blue does not bring about an awareness "red" with regard to a water lily, or a stick [the awareness] "an earring-possessing one." Neither is a verbal awareness for [the words] "horse" etc. produced here that is tainted by the absence [of a thing]. Rather, it determines the form of an existing thing (*bhāva*).

Should this be [said]: "[It] is called qualifier, even [if] it produces a cognition [that is] of another kind.", [Kumārila] said: "**But how, when something of another kind** ...." For a [cognition] of another kind [, that is,] for a [cognition] not conforming to the qualifier.

[TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 373,8] Because [of the question of an Apohavādin:] "If it were so, what error [would there be]?", [Kumārila] said [in ŚV Av 90]: **if [...] otherwise** etc. If, for you[, Apohavādin], there should be[, i.e.,] when [there is], an assumption as the qualifier with regard to a specific quality, even though it is classified in a different way[, i.e.,] as not conforming to the qualifier, [then,] if that is so, everything indeed, blue etc., would be a qualifier of everything. And therefore there would be no classification [of anything].

B.9   TS$_\text{Ś}$ 977cd (=ŚV Av 143cd)

[TS$_\text{Ś}$ 977cd] And[666] it is not possible to show absence of another in the referent of a sentence.

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[666]This verse is also discussed in Hattori 1979: 69 f., as is Śāntarakṣita's answer (TS$_\text{Ś}$ 1159–1161); for the latter also see the discussion in Siderits 1985: 143 ff.

B.9.1 TSP$_\text{Ś}$ *ad* TS$_\text{Ś}$ 977cd

[TSP$_\text{Ś}$ 384,15] Moreover, the referent of a sentence is assumed to have a single multifarious form, like the colour spotted black (*kalmāṣa*). Therefore, absence of others cannot be shown in that [referent] because there is no cognition of an opposite [to this sentence's object] having a completed nature. And the absence of others having the form of a distinction from non-Caitra etc., which is described [by you] in cases like "Caitra, bring [the] cow!" etc., by grasping the parts [of the sentence], that is only the meaning of a word, not the meaning of a sentence, because this [referent of a sentence], which does not have parts, cannot be divided. Thus, the definition of the word referent [as exclusion] is not comprehensive.[667]

B.10 TS$_\text{Ś}$ 1004–1014

[TS$_\text{Ś}$ 1004] The[668] reasons for the same judgement [about different things], which were earlier explained [in the chapter called *Sāmānyaparīkṣa*],[669] are similar objects such as [an] *abhayā* [tree], which are differentiated from others by [their] very (*eva*) nature.

[TS$_\text{Ś}$ 1005–8ab] To call that object's reflection, which, based on these objects, appears in a conceptual cognition, [and] is ascertained just as the object,[670] even though not being of the essence (*ātmatā*) of an [external] object, by the name "exclusion" is well founded, because of [its] difference from another appearance, because of [its] being the cause of the attainment of real things that are

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[667] I.e., it does not cover all cases of language usage. If taken in a more technical sense as "does not pervade", *avyāpin* could mean that there are some cases where a linguistic referent (*hetu*) occurs without exclusion as an object (*sādhya*).

[668] For these verses I follow the edition in Ishida 2011b: 201 ff., where they are also translated.

[669] See the references in Ishida 2011b: 201, n. 10 (TS$_\text{Ś}$ 722–725).

[670] Read *artha ity* acc. Ishida 2011b: 201.

differentiated from others, as well as (*api*) because of [its] origination by means of a real thing not connected [to other things], and[671] because the confused determine this [reflection] as identical in nature (*tādātmya*) to the particular which is differentiated from that of another class, [and] has that [reflection] as a result.

[TS$_{\acute{S}}$ 1008cd] Also [to call] a particular that is the reason for this [reflection by the name "exclusion" is reasonable], because [a particular] is differentiated from others.

[TS$_{\acute{S}}$ 1009] And the absolute negation is this: "A cow is not a non-cow." This is evidently understood as exclusion from others.[672]

[TS$_{\acute{S}}$ 1010] Amongst these [three sorts of exclusion], the first exclusion[, a reflection in cognition,] is made known by words, because an awareness that determines an external thing arises from a word.

[TS$_{\acute{S}}$ 1011] And, given that, because of a word, there is an arising of a cognition possessing a reflection of that having that form[, i.e., of that determined as external,] this relationship of denoted and denoting has resulted as having the nature of cause and effect.

[TS$_{\acute{S}}$ 1012–1014] And if this form is directly cognized in this way[, i.e., as the effect of a word,] also absolute negation is understood by implication, as "That of this nature is not of another nature." Given that there is a connection with real things, also a cognition of an excluded real thing arises by implication (*arthāt*). Thereby, this [exclusion][673]

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[671]Read *ca* instead of *vā* according to Ishida 2011b: 201.

[672]The translation follows the emendation in Ishida 2011b: 202 of *ativispaṣṭa* to *iti vispaṣṭam*.

[673]*ayam* here refers to the kind of *apoha* being discussed, the one having the nature of a particular. Cf. TSP$_{\acute{S}}$ 393,23: ***ayam** iti svalakṣaṇātmā*. The import of the following "also" (*api*) is that the *apoha* having the nature of negation is metaphorically called the word referent, TSP$_{\acute{S}}$ 393,23–24: ***api**śabdāt prasajyātmā ca*.

word exclusion] occurs [for the reflection] together with the fourfold foundation (*nibandhana*) explained with [the words] "**because of a difference from another appearance**" etc. So [it is] well founded.

B.11 TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 1060–1061

[TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 1060–1061] And a real thing, differentiated from non-cow, is what is cognized through the sense faculties. A reflection, imposed on it, is cognized by self-awareness. And having observed this [differentiated thing], a word is used for this [thing] by people. Also an experience of the connection of this [word] with that [thing] clearly arises.

B.11.1 TSP$_{\text{Ś}}$ ad TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 1060–1061

[TSP$_{\text{Ś}}$ 407,13] And what was said, "**by sense perceptions**" etc.[675], is not established. Showing this, [Śāntarakṣita] said: "**And** [a real thing] **differentiated from non-cow**" etc. Here, first of all, exclusion, which has the nature of a particular, is indeed understood by the sense faculties. And this[676] exclusion, which has the nature of a reflection of the object, is established by the very perception self-awareness, because [it, exclusion as a reflection,] is in reality of the nature of awareness. The uninflected word "and" [is spoken] in order to include the meanings [of exclusion] not mentioned. Thereby, also that [exclusion] having the nature of absolute negation is indeed understood by implication. [This] was shown [in TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 1013a] with [the words] "That of this nature is not of another nature." Thus **having observed**, and cognized,[677] only **this** exclusion that has the nature

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[675]This was said in TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 938 = ŚV Av 78. Kumārila's argument was that the exclusion of non-cow is not apprehended by the sense faculties when a linguistic convention is being made, and that consequently the word would not refer to anything.

[676]Read *yaścā*° acc. to TSP$_{\text{Ś}}$ 407,16, instead of *yat svā*° TSP$_{\text{K}}$ 331,14.

[677]TSP$_{\text{Ś}}$ 407,18 reads *dṛṣṭvā jñātvā ca*, noting that *jñātvā ca* is not found in TSP$_{\text{msP}}$ (where it is, in fact, found, TSP$_{\text{msP}}$ 101b13) and TSP$_{\text{K}}$. TSP$_{\text{msJ}}$ 139a4 equally

of a particular etc.,[678] a word is used by people, but not [on having observed] a real universal, because that is non-existent and because it does not appear to awareness. A connection of this [word] with that [exclusion] alone is understood, upon the observation of which people use a word; but no [connection] with another [exclusion is understood], because of an overreaching consequence [that then a word would refer to everything].[679]

B.12 TS$_Ś$ 1063–1064

[TS$_Ś$ 1063–1064] Cows and non-cows are fully established because of different judgements. But a word, not established itself, is used as one wants.

For a real thing differentiated [from all other real things] does not, for [the sake of] an awareness [of this thing], depend on the grasping of another [thing]. Therefore, this error of dependence on each other is out of place here.

B.12.1 TSP$_Ś$ ad TS$_Ś$ 1063–1064

[TSP$_Ś$ 407,23] And to that which was said [by Kumārila]: "And non-cow, which was established, would be excluded" etc.,[680] [Śāntarakṣita] said "**Cows and non-cows**" etc. For it is on [their] very own [accord] that things like cows etc., which generate different judgements, are correctly ascertained as separated.[681] To these things normal speakers apply, according to [their] wish, an unestablished word

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supports the longer reading. The *jñātvā ca* is also not reflected in TSP$_D$ Ze 345a5 (TSP$_Q$ Ḥe 430b3–4): *de'i phyir rang gi mtsan nyid la sogs pa'i ngo bo'i sel ba 'di nyid* **mthong na** *ste shes nas 'jig rten gyis (TSP$_Q$: gyi TSP$_D$) sgra sbyor gyi spyi dngos por gyur pa la ni ma yin te.*

[678]By "etc." here exclusion in all senses just described is meant.

[679]Cf. footnote 659.

[680]This was objected in ŚV Av 83–84, quoted in TS$_Ś$ 942–943, cf. appendix B.7.

[681]Cf., e.g., PV I 119 (see trl. on page 310).

for the sake of everyday language usage. For it is so: if that having the nature of a real thing differentiated [from all other real things] depends, for the sake of [its] cognition, on a grasping of another object, then there would be the error of mutual dependence. [But] insofar as a differentiated real thing is known without any grasping of another [thing], the convention "cow and non-cow" is made as one wishes, given that this [differentiated real thing] is established as separate [from other real things] due to being the reason for a judgement [having] a form differentiated [from the forms of other cognitions]. So in what way would there be a dependency on each other? "**For an awareness**" [in TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 1064b means] "for the sake of an awareness [of this thing]."

B.13   TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 1097–1100

[TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 1097] From[682] words such as "blue", "water lily" etc. only a single [object] is determined. What is differentiated from non-blue, non-water-lily, etc. is a reflection [of a real thing in the mind].

[TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 1098] But, a real thing endowed with exclusion from others is not postulated by us as what is to be denoted. For us differentiation is not different from the thing that is differentiated from others.[683]

[TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 1099] Thus, this error of dependency does not, as [it does] for a genus, come about for the [object of a word] as

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[682]This verse is an answer to ŚV Av 115–117 (corresponding to TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 966–968). There, Kumārila had pointed out that if it were only other-exclusion that a word refers to, words could not have co-reference or be in a qualifier-qualified relation to each other.

[683]Read, respectively, *bhāvān* and *anyā vyāvṛttir* acc. to TS$_{\text{msP}}$ 21a14 instead of *'bhāvān* and *anyād vyāvṛttir* acc. to TS$_{\text{K}}$ 1097cd, TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 1098cd. Cf. also TS$_{\text{D}}$ Ze 41a1 (TS$_{\text{Q}}$ 'e 50a4): *gzhan las ldog pa'i dngos po las /gzhan pa'i ldog pa'i nga la med //* .

explained by the clear minded [Dignāga].[684] For there is
no separation [of a word's object, which is qualified by
exclusion, from the object excluded from others.]

[TS$_{\text{Ś}}$ 1100] Therefore a classification of being qualifier
and qualified, [as well as] of co-referentiality, is not con-
tradictory for the word referent that is exclusion.

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[684]Read *avadātamatiprokte* acc. to TS$_{\text{msP}}$ 21a14 instead of the *avadātamiti prokte*
as printed in TS$_{\text{K}}$ and TS$_{\text{Ś}}$. Cf. TS$_{\text{D}}$ Ze 41a2 (= TS$_{\text{Q}}$ Ḥe 50a6): *blo gros bzang pos
gsungs pa ni*. Also in the copy of TS$_{\text{K}}$ used by Frauwallner, this phrase is emended
to *avadātamati-prokte*, as is the *TSP*'s quote "*avadātamiti prokta iti*."

Bibliography

Primary sources and abbreviations

Note: Unless the meaning would have been changed, quotations from primary literature have been harmonized silently as regards punctuation, euphonic combination (*saṃdhi*), spelling variations, and transliteration. The titles shown for works of primary literature do not always follow the ones printed in the editions used. The titles for subunits (chapters etc.) of these works are often not found in the works themselves, and have been abstracted from colophons or scholarly conventions. The chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* are counted as follows: 1. *svārthānumāna*, 2. *pramāṇasiddhi*, 3. *pratyakṣa*, and 4. *parārthānumāna*.

AP Jñānaśrīmitra. "Apohaprakaraṇa". In: JNĀ, 201–232.

AS₁ Ratnakīrti. "Apohasiddhi". In: Shāstri 1910, 1–19.

AS₂ Ratnakīrti. "Apohasiddhi". In: RNĀ₁, 53–61.

AS₃ Ratnakīrti. "Apohasiddhi". In: RNĀ, 58–66.

AS₄ Ratnakīrti. "Apohasiddhi". In: The critical edition in chapter 2 of the present publication.

ĀTV₁ Udayana. "Ātmatattvaviveka". In: Dvivedin and Dravida 1986.

ĀTV₂ Udayana. "Ātmatattvaviveka". In: Sastri 1997.

ĀTVK Śaṅkaramiśra. "Kalpalatā". In: Dvivedin and Dravida 1986.

ĀTVP   Bhagīratha Ṭakkura. "Ātmatattvavivekaprakāśikā". In: Dvivedin and Dravida 1986.

CAPV   Ratnakīrti. "Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda". In: RNĀ, 129–144.

D   Kyōshō Hayashima et al., eds. (1977–1981). *Tibetan Tripiṭaka Sde dge Edition. Bstan ḥgyur; Preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*. 20 vols. Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai Co., Ltd., for the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo.

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DhAP   Dharmottara. "Apohaprakaraṇa". In: Frauwallner 1937, 235–254.

HB   Dharmakīrti. "Hetubindu". In: Steinkellner 2016, 1–41.

ĪSD   Ratnakīrti. "Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa". In: RNĀ, 32–57.

JNĀ   Anantalal Thakur, ed. (1987b). *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali. Buddhist Philosophical Works of Jñānaśrīmitra*. 2nd ed. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 5. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.

JNĀ₁   Anantalal Thakur, ed. (1959). *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali. Buddhist Philosophical Works of Jñānaśrīmitra*. 2nd ed. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 5. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.

JNĀ_ms   Jñānaśrīmitra. *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*. A manuscript photographed by Sāṅkṛtyāyana. The negatives are kept in Patna (cf. Much 1988). I had available to me scans showing the AP (folios 8a–20b). These scans are based on the copies of the Patna negatives kept in the "Sammlung des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde in Göttingen." Cf. the description of item "Xc 14/25" in Bandurski 1994: 57–58.

K   Ratnakīrti. *Apohasiddhi*. Manuscript number 4711 in the Collection of the Asiatic Society, Kolkata. See section 1.3 for more details.

Kāś apoha Sucaritamiśra. "Kāśikā ad Ślokavārttika apoha v. 1". In: Kataoka 2014, 328–289.

KBhSA Ratnakīrti. "Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ–anvayātmikā". In: RNĀ, 67–82.

KBhSV Ratnakīrti. "Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ–vyatirekātmikā". In: RNĀ, 83–95.

KBhV Jñānaśrīmitra. "Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyaye vyatirekādhikāraḥ". In: JNĀ, 60–106.

Kir Udāyana. "Kiraṇāvalī". In: Dvivedī and Śāstri 1919.

N₁ Ratnakīrti. *Apohasiddhi*. Microfilm A109/12 in NGMCP. Cf. section 1.3. National Archives of Kathmandu (NAK) accession number: 3/717.

N₂ Ratnakīrti. *Apohasiddhi*. Microfilm D35/1 in NGMCP. Cf. section 1.3.

N₂ᵇ Ratnakīrti. *Apohasiddhi*. Microfilm D35/1 in NGMCP. Repeated passages in N₂.

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N₃ᵇ Ratnakīrti. *Apohasiddhi*. Microfilm A117/7 in NGMCP. Repeated passages in N₃.

NBh Vātsyāyana. "Nyāyabhāṣya". In: Thakur 1997a.

NBhūṣ Bhāsarvajña. "Nyāyabhūṣaṇa". In: Yogīndrānandaḥ 1968.

NBhV Uddyotakara. "Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika". In: Thakur 1997b, 1–530.

NBᴍ Dharmakīrti. "Nyāyabindu". In: Malvania 1971.

NBṬᴍ Dharmottara. "Nyāyabinduṭīkā". In: Malvania 1971.

NC Mallavādi. "Dvādaśāram Nayacakram". In: Muni Śrī Jambūvijayajī 1966–1977.

NGMCP The Nepalese-German Manuscript Cataloguing Project, ed. (2016). *Database of Indic Manuscripts*. Cited by reel number. 2016. URL: https://catalogue.ngmcp.uni-hamburg.de/content/search/ngmcpdocument.xed (visited on 11/03/2017).

NK   Vācaspatimiśra. "Nyāyakaṇikā". In: Goswami 1984.

NM ᴀᴘᴏʜᴀ   Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. "Nyāyamañjarī. Apohaśabdārthapakṣadū-ṣaṇam & Bauddhair Apohadūṣaṇoddharaṇam". In: Kataoka 2017a, 9–30.

NPSū   Śaṅkarasvāmin. "Nyāyapraveśakasūtram". In: Muni Śrī Jambūvijayajī 2007, 399–406.

NRĀ   Pārthasārathi Miśra. "Nyāyaratnākara". In: Śāstrī 1978.

NSū   Akṣapāda Gotama (?) "Nyāyasūtra". In: Sen 2003, 1–382.

NSū_Th   Akṣapāda Gotama (?) "Nyāyasūtra". In: Thakur 1997a.

NVTP   Udayanācārya. "Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi". In: Thakur 1996a.

NVTṬ   Vācaspatimiśra. "Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā". In: Thakur 1996b.

NVTṬ_D   Vācaspatimiśra. "Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā". In: Drāviḍ 1989.

P   Ratnakīrti. *Apohasiddhi*. RNĀ_ms 32b1–36b6. See section 1.3 for details.

PABhP   Ratnakīrti. "Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa". In: RNĀ, 96–105.

Pāṇ   Pāṇini. "Pāṇini's Sūtra". In: Böhtlingk 1887.

PDhS_D   Praśastapāda. "Praśastapādabhāṣya (=Padārthadharmasaṃgraha)". In: Dvivedin 1895.

PS(V) 5   Dignāga. "Restored Sanskrit Text of Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti V §§1–66. " In: Pind 2015, Appendix 1.

PV I   Dharmakīrti. "Pramāṇavārttike svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ prathamaḥ". In: Gnoli 1960, 1–176.

PV III   Dharmakīrti. "Pramāṇavārttika. Chapter on perception". In: Tosaki 1979–1985.

PVABh   Prajñākaragupta. "Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārabhāṣya". In: Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1953.

PVin I   Dharmakīrti. "Pramāṇaviniścaye pratyakṣaparicchedaḥ prathamaḥ". In: Steinkellner 2007, 1–44.

PVin II   Dharmakīrti. "Pramāṇaviniścaye svārthānumānaparicchedo dvitīyaḥ". In: Steinkellner 2007, 45–101.

PV_M IV   Dharmakīrti. "Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā. Parārthānumānam". In: Miyasaka 1971–1972, 164–206.

PVSV   Dharmakīrti. "Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti". In: Gnoli 1960, 1–176.

PVSV_D   Dharmakīrti. "Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa". In: D, ce 261b1–365a7 (No. 4216).

PVSV_Q   Dharmakīrti. "Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel pa". In: Q, ce 404b3–535a4 (No. 5717a).

PVSVṬ   Karṇakagomin. "Pramāṇavārttikavṛttiṭīkā". In: Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1943.

PVSVṬ_{ms}   Karṇakagomin. "Karṇakagomin's Pramāṇavārttika(sva)vṛtti-ṭīkā. Manuscript A". in: Ihara 1998, 1–56.

PVṬ_D   Śākyabuddhi. "Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel bshad". In: D, je 1b1–nye 282a7 (No. 4220).

PVṬ_{F1}   Śākyabuddhi. "Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Fragments)". In: Inami, Matsuda, and Tani 1992, 1–47.

PVṬ_{F2}   Śākyabuddhi. "Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Fragment)". In: Ishida 2011b, 207–208.

PVṬ_Q   Śākyabuddhi. "Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi 'grel bshad". In: Q, je 1b1–nye 348a8 (No. 5718).

PVV   Manorathanandin. "Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti". In: Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940.

PVV_{ms}   Manorathanandin. "Manorathanandin's Pramāṇavārttikavṛttiḥ. Manuscript". In: S. Watanabe 1998.

PW   Otto Böhtlingk and Rudolph Roth, eds. (1855–1875). *Sanskrit Wörterbuch*. 7 vols. St. Petersburg: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften.

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RNĀ₁   Anantalal Thakur, ed. (1957c). *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī. Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti*. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 3. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.

RNĀ$_{ms}$ Ratnakīrti. *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali*. This manuscript is the basis for the two editions RNĀ₁ and RNĀ. See section 1.3 for details.

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SāSiŚā   Jñānaśrīmitra. "Sākārasiddhiśāstra". In: JNĀ, 367–513.

SJS   Ratnakīrti. "Sarvajñasiddhi". In: RNĀ, 1–31.

SJS₁   Ratnakīrti. "Sarvajñasiddhi". In: RNĀ₁, 1–28.

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SSD   Ratnakīrti. "Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa". In: RNĀ, 112–128.

ŚV   Kumārila. "Ślokavārttika". In: Śāstrī 1978.

ŚV Av   Kumārila. "Apohavāda". In: Śāstrī 1978, 400–435.

ŚV Āv   Kumārila. "Ślokavārttika. Ākṛtivāda". In: Śāstrī 1978, 385–399.

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ŚV Vv   Kumārila. "Ślokavārttika. Vanavāda". In: Śāstrī 1978, 435–453.

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TBh_K   Mokṣākaragupta. "Tarkabhāṣā". In: Krishnamacharya 1942.

TS_D   Śāntarakṣita. "De kho na nyid bsdus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa. Tattvasaṃgrahakārikā". In: D, ze 1b1–133a6 (No. 4266).

TS_K   Śāntarakṣita. "Tattvasaṅgraha". In: Krishnamacharya 1926.

TS_msJ   Śāntarakṣita. *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Jinabhadra Jñāna Bhandar 3997, Jaisalmer. Catalogued in Muni Shri Punyavijayaji 1972: 160, item 377.

TS_msP   Śāntarakṣita. *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Pāṭaṇa manuscript of the *TS*. Pāṭaṇa No. 6679, catalogued in Muni Śrī Puṇyavijayajī and Muni Jambūvijayajī 1991b: 199.

TSP_D   Kamalaśīla. "De kho na nyid bsdus pa'i dka' 'grel. Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā". In: D, ze 133b1–'e 331a7 (No. 4267).

TSP_K   Kamalaśīla. "Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā". In: Krishnamacharya 1926.

TSP_msJ   Kamalaśīla. *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjīkā*. Jaisalmer manuscript of the *TSP*. Jinabhadra Jñāna Bhandar (number unknown), Jaisalmer. Catalogued in Muni Shri Punyavijayaji 1972: 160, item 378.

TSP_msP   Kamalaśīla. *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjīkā*. Pāṭaṇa manuscript of the *TSP*. Pāṭaṇa No. 6680, catalogued in Muni Śrī Puṇyavijayajī and Muni Jambūvijayajī 1991b: 199. This manuscript is referenced by the folio numbers in the lower right hand corner of each verso.

TSP_Q   Kamalaśīla. "De kho na nyid bsdus pa'i dka' 'grel. Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā". In: Q, 'e 159b2–ye 405a7 (No. 5765).

TSP_Ś   Kamalaśīla. "Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā". In: Śāstrī 1981.

TS_Q   Śāntarakṣita. "De kho na nyid bsdus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa. Tattvasaṃgrahakārikā". In: Q, 'e 1–159a2 (No. 5764).

TS_Ś   Śāntarakṣita. "Tattvasaṅgraha". In: Śāstrī 1981.

VC   Jñānaśrīmitra. "Vyāpticarcā". In: Lasic 2000a.

Vibhū   Vibhūticandra. "[Marginal Notes to Pramāṇavārttikavṛttiḥ]". In: Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940.

VP II   Bhartṛhari. "Vākyapadīye Dvitīyaṃ Kāṇḍam". In: Iyer 1983.

VP$_R$ Bhartṛhari. "Vākyapadīya". In: Rau 1977.

VV   Maṇḍanamiśra. "Vibhramaviveka". In: Schmithausen 1965, 19–43.

VyN   Ratnakīrti. "Vyāptinirṇaya". In: Lasic 2000b.

VyN$_2$ Ratnakīrti. "Vyāptinirṇaya". In: RNĀ, 106–111.

YNP   Jñānaśrīmitra. "Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇa". In: JNĀ$_1$, 323–343.

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The theory of universals that was developed and upheld by Buddhist philosophers in premodern India since the sixth century CE is famous for its central claim that any judgment of a similarity between things is not due to anything substantially real that the things share, but to their difference from other things ("anyāpoha"). This book investigates the theory as it is presented in the "Apohasiddhi", a work written by the Buddhist monk and teacher Ratnakīrti in the eleventh century, during the last flowering of philosophical activity in Indian Buddhism.

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