The theory of universals that was developed and upheld by Buddhist philosophers in premodern India since the sixth century CE is famous for its central claim that any judgment of a similarity between things is not due to anything substantially real that the things share, but to their difference from other things (“anyāpoha”). This book investigates the theory as it is presented in the “Apohasiddhi”, a work written by the Buddhist monk and teacher Ratnakīrti in the eleventh century, during the last flowering of philosophical activity in Indian Buddhism.

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Ratnakīrti’s Proof of Exclusion

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great effort, sadly unrewarded, to locate the elusive sixth manuscript of the *Apohasiddhi*.

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Needless to say, I alone am responsible for all the errors still present in this book.
This book is an attempt to answer three questions about an eleventh-century Sanskrit work, the *Apohasiddhi* (henceforth AS) by Ratnakīrti: in what form does this work survive, what does it say, and why does it say what it does?

These questions are to be answered, primarily from the perspective of the history of philosophy in South Asia, in a critical edition of the *AS*, in its annotated translation, and in a study of some of its main arguments. These three sections, taken each by itself, do not, however, cleanly correspond to each question. In fact, the questions cannot be answered independently of each other: judging well what the text says is difficult to do, at least in non-obvious cases, without reflection on the history that a specific argument might have had; and even the choice of readings sometimes depends on an understanding of Ratnakīrti’s point (though the editorial method adopted to establish the text tries to minimize the risk of misjudgements arising from this kind of argument). In addition, the translation contains the argument for things that are not explicitly discussed in the edition of the text, e.g., the decisions about punctuation and paragraph breaks, which are not found in any of the witnesses, but are introduced to make the structure inherent in the work easier to see for modern readers. The edition (chapter 2) and the translation (chapter 3) thus answer the first and second questions. The translation, augmented by explanatory comments (section 4.1) and an analysis of the text’s argumentative structure (section 4.2), and the study of the *AS* (chapter 5) try to answer the third question.
1. Introduction

1.1 Ratnakīrti

Ratnakīrti (Tib. *rin chen grags pa*) was a Buddhist scholar active in the monastery of Vikramaśīla in the first half of the eleventh century CE.¹

He was a pupil of Jñānaśrīmitra, who he refers to as his *guru* in phrases such as “yad āhur guravah” that introduce quotations from Jñānaśrīmitra on various occasions.² Jñānaśrīmitra is recognized as the last Buddhist philosopher in ancient South Asia to produce major innovations.³ Since Ratnakīrti’s texts are closely based on those of his teacher and are generally more accessible due to their relative brevity and clear structure, they are an ideal way in which to first approach this phase of Buddhist thought, and to gather the main points that Ratnakīrti regarded his teacher as having made.

All of Ratnakīrti’s surviving works in Sanskrit belong to the logico-epistemological tradition of Buddhism.⁴ Having started with

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¹The following presentation of the most important facts about Ratnakīrti’s life, works, and intellectual environment draws on Thakur 1975a, Thakur 1987a: 29 ff., Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 7 ff., Mimaki 1976: 3 ff., and Mimaki 1992. It does not add any important new information, and the following is a synopsis of the available information. The dates of persons in the following usually follow Frauwallner 1961, unless otherwise noted.

²Cf. the comments in Thakur 1975a: 11 ff. The following list of these passages is based on the *viśiṣṭanāmasūcī* (the name index) in RNĀ 151 f.: SJS 27,5 (most probably referring to a verse in the lost *Sarvajñāsiddhi* of Jñānaśrīmitra, see Steinkellner 1977: 384, also cf. frag. 8 on p. 388), KBhSA 72,5, KBhSV 88,3, SSD 118,23; 119,9; 118,31, CAPV 132,6; 133,16; 136,23; 138,28; 141,9; 142,28. The references to RNĀ 32, 96, 135, given under the entry *guruḥ*, do not actually contain the word *guruḥ*.

³Cf. the reconstruction of his status by Frauwallner (1931), and the assessments, after his works had become known, by Thakur (1987a: 29), Jong (1962: 75), and McCrea and Patil (2006: 304 ff.).

⁴See Steinkellner and Much 1995 for the most complete bibliography of the primary texts that constitute this tradition. Though the compilers of the Tibetan Buddhist canon categorized the works in the *tshad ma* (*pramāṇa*) section, it is unclear to what extent the authors in this group that wrote in Sanskrit would have identified with it. In any case, the word “tradition” here should not be understood as an exclusive label, since we have evidence that authors assigned to this tradition were very free to write or otherwise engage in other “traditions” of Buddhism.
Dignāga (late fifth to early sixth centuries), this tradition’s most influential figure was Dharmakīrti (mid-sixth century), who all but eclipsed Dignāga and became the central authority for all those that followed in this tradition, including Ratnakīrti.\(^5\)

The attribute “logico-epistemological” means that many works from this tradition centre on logical and epistemological problems (if not as the actual topic of the text, then at least as its method). The topics covered by these treatises range from the critique, description, and foundation of correct means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*), the development and proof of ontological theories (most importantly, that of universal momentariness, *kṣaṇikatva*), and general theories of consciousness, to the possibility of omniscience and the Buddha’s being a source of knowledge. Ratnakīrti is representative for this tradition because his works touch on most of these topics. In all of his works, furthermore, there is an intense engagement with non-Buddhist, and sometimes also Buddhist, opponents: this makes his works rich sources for the investigation of South Asia’s intellectual history in general.

### 1.1.1 Previous scholarship on Ratnakīrti

Ratnakīrti’s texts were amongst the first treatises on Buddhist logic and epistemology to become the subject of modern studies. The *editio princeps* of the AS is found in Shāstri 1910.\(^6\) Mookerjee (1935: 125 ff.)

Ratnakīrti is a good example of this, since on the topics of *pramāṇa* he was the follower of Jñānaśrīmitra, whereas in matters of Tantric practice he was closer to Ratnakaraśānti—the ‘enemy’ of Jñānaśrīmitra on several key philosophical issues (see deb ther sngon po X.23a5–6, trl. in Roerich 1949–1953: 800–801, and the assessment in Mimaki 1992).

Scholars attribute at least one text surviving only in Tibetan, *mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi ‘grel pa grags pa’i cha zhes bya ba (*Kīrtikalā Abhisamayālamkāravṛttiḥ*, D: 3799, Q: 5197) to Ratnakīrti (see Tomabechi and Kano 2008 and Harter 2014).\(^5\)

\(^5\)See Krasser 2012 for the dating of Dharmakīrti, against the dating to the seventh century by Frauwallner 1961.

\(^6\)This book was reprinted as Shāstri 1989 and, for want of a better word, re-edited as Shāstri 1996. This latter publication is not very useful, because it introduced quite a few misprints, omitted some footnotes, and changed the layout, so that references to the other editions are sometimes difficult to resolve.
made an early attempt to place Ratnakīrti’s AS in its historical and argumentative context, and was also responsible for initiating a still ongoing debate about the development of the *apoha* theory.7 Before that, Stcherbatsky had noted about the AS that it was “...written in one night and, probably for this reason, lacking clearness....” (Stcherbatsky 1932 2, 404)8

Sāṅkṛtyāyana discovered a manuscript of Ratnakīrti’s collected works in 1934 in *Zha lu ri phug*,9 and on the 3rd of June, 1938, had pictures of that manuscript taken.10 Anantalal Thakur published the first edition, entitled *Ratnakirtinibandhāvalī* (henceforth RNĀ1), on the basis of these pictures in 1957, and a second, revised edition in 1975 (RNĀ).

Based on these sources, Ratnakīrti’s works have been the subject of several studies. The most noteworthy monographs, in order of publication, are as follows:11

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7 Cf. Kataoka 2009: 498–496 for a concise summary of this discussion. The hypothesis developed by Mookerjee (1935: 125 ff.) is, in a nutshell, that after Dharmakīrti the *apoha* theory was interpreted in two ways, either as primarily affirmative or as primarily negative, and that these two positions were then synthesized by Jñānaśrīmitra. The passage drawn on for this hypothesis corresponds to § 8 in the edition below. See Okada 2017 for a recent reassessment of this hypothesis.

8 This misinterpretation of the colophon was corrected by Thakur (1957a: 13, n. 1): the point of the colophon is that a scribe copied the AS in a certain amount of time, not that it was composed that quickly. See below, § 62.

9 See Kellner and Sferra 2008: 426, n. 16.

10 The discovery of the RNĀ ms is described in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 25 f. The manuscript was first catalogued as item 22 (=VIII.2, sect. III) in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 29, which means it was discovered during Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s 2nd expedition to Tibet, April 4th–November 10th, 1934 (cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 21 f.). Pictures of it might also have been taken between the 5th and 15th of August, 1936, according to the account in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1937: 14 f. As Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1938: 138) reports, “[l]ast time [i.e., in 1936—PMA] we took Photographs of some of these MSS., but we had failed to get good results.” Manuscript P is signed and dated on the empty folio 60a by “Fany Mockerjee” (the photographer as spelt in Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938: 137). The signature in fact looks more like “Fany Mockj”, but the date “3/6/38” is clear.

11 Four other books, which are of limited usefulness for the present study, should also be mentioned. Two studies concern the AS: Sharma 1969 and Chattopadhyay
Mimaki (1976) produced an edition, based on the manuscript used also by Thakur, P, a translation and careful study of the Sthi-
2002. For an appreciation of Sharma 1969, see Oberhammer 1975. Sharma 1969 provides a text based on AS\textsubscript{1} with corrections according to AS\textsubscript{2}, a translation, and a study. The study, although it is very interesting insofar as it aims at a philosophically coherent restatement of Ratnakīrti’s \textit{apoha} theory, is, for that same reason, not always informative about Ratnakīrti’s theories themselves. The translation seems to have missed a few important points. One example might suffice to prove this: the phrase “\textit{tatra na buddhyākārasya tattvatah samvṛtyā vā vidhiniśedhau, svasadanaṇapratyakṣasagamyatvād ...}” (from § 48 in the edition below) is translated as follows by Sharma (1969: 91):

In this context, affirmation and negation are applicable to the configuration (which is a passive cognition) neither in reality, nor in internal feeling (for it is neither to be desired nor to be not desired), for the self-feeling (or the internal feeling) is produced by sense-perception.

Apart from terminological disagreements, the understanding of \textit{samvṛtyā} as “in internal feeling” and the analysis of \textit{svasadanaṇapratyakṣasagamyatvā} as “the self-feeling (or the internal feeling) is produced by sense-perception” are not merely confusing but misleading (cf. § 48 for a different understanding). The proof cited for the interpretation of \textit{samvṛtyā} as “in internal feeling” by Sharma (1969: 90, n. 238) is not convincing: “\textit{samvṛtyā samvṛtti = svasadanaṇā [sic, PMA]. See PVST.\text{[=PVSVṬ, PMA], p. 121; PVP.\text{[=PVABh, PMA], p. 573: samvṛttisadeva dharmidharmalakṣaṇam.” For the rest of the footnote he cites (and paraphrases) material from Stcherbatsky 1932 2, 385 f., n. 6 (whose note only concerns \textit{svasadanaṇa}, but not \textit{samvṛti}). Neither \textit{svasadanaṇa} nor \textit{samvṛti} is mentioned in PVSVṬ 121. Although the context of the phrase “\textit{samvṛtisad eva dharmidharmalakṣaṇam}” (PVABh 573,24) has not yet been studied as closely as it deserves, it does not seem to say more than “that which is characterized as either property or property bearer exists only conventionally”.

The text edition in Chattopadhyay 2002, which draws on AS\textsubscript{1} and AS\textsubscript{3}, is generally reliable. The English translation, which is rather free, suffers a bit from terminological problems that seem to stem from not having studied more recent translations of similar works in much detail, but is usually close to the mark. The present author does unfortunately not know Bengali, and so could not form an opinion of that translation.

McDermott 1969 is a monograph on the \textit{Kṣanabhangasiddhiḥ–vyatirekātmikā} (henceforth \textit{KBḥSV}). It did not receive much critical acclaim, cf. Seyfert Ruegg 1971 (replied to in McDermott 1972) and Steinkellner 1972. A further monograph on Ratnakīrti is Feldman and Phillips 2011. I am not aware of any scholarly reviews of this work. It has not been used here, since the sections dealing with momentariness had all been completed before its appearance.
1. Introduction

rasidhidūṣaṇa (henceforth SSD), the “Refutation of the proof of permanent [entities].”

Bühnemann (1980) translated and studied the Sarvajñasiddhi (henceforth SJS), the “Proof of an omniscient one”, basing herself on SJS1, SJS, and the manuscript used by Thakur for that edition (again, this is manuscript P).\textsuperscript{12}

Lasic (2000b) critically edited, translated and annotated the Vyāptinirnaya (henceforth VyN). He based his work on the same manuscript photographed by Sāṅkṛtyāyana, and also supplied an analysis of the argument structure.

Patil (2009) follows a different aim than that of the books mentioned so far. He intends to provide a more systematic account of Ratnakirti’s Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa (henceforth ĪSD). It should be called “systematic”, since Patil shows how the various positions that Ratnakirti holds on subjects such as inference, perception, awareness, and language influence the very specific arguments of the ĪSD. To this end, he relies mainly on the AS, and to a lesser degree on the VyN, the Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi–anvayātmikā (henceforth KBhSA), the Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi–vyatirekātmikā (henceforth KBhSV), and the Citrādvaitapratikāśavāda (henceforth CAPV). These texts are not translated in their entirety, but the main passages of the ĪSD and the AS are translated and interpreted very thoroughly. Especially with regard to the AS, it should be noted that Patil used the manuscripts from Nepal used also here (manuscripts N\textsubscript{1}, N\textsubscript{2}, N\textsubscript{3}). Patil (2011b) also published a translation of the AS as a supplement to Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011. This translation is warmly recommended to the readers of the present book. The translation presented here is a rather literal one, to a large extent because its function is to support certain choices made in the Sanskrit edition (mainly those regarding punctuation and paragraph breaks). Patil’s translation, on the other hand, aims to make the AS accessible to readers who are primarily interested in the philosophical points

\textsuperscript{12}One should note here also Goodman 1989, which was not available to the present author.
of the text, and not in the historical and linguistic problems that one has to surmount in order to arrive at their understanding. The present author believes not only that these two approaches are by no means mutually exclusive, but rather that they complement each other, in that the rather more elegant translation of Patil facilitates a comparatively rapid yet philosophically stringent appropriation of the main arguments of the text, whereas the present one should let a reader sense the formality and artificiality that characterize the style of composition typical of this genre (śāstra) of Sanskrit literature in general, as well as Ratnakīrti’s logical terseness in particular. The fact that readers will have to reflect deeply on both translations to see their general agreement, as well as some small differences mainly shows how wide a range of possibilities a “translation” of this kind of text allows, and how thorough an analysis and deep a reflection Ratnakīrti and his tradition were capable of. 13

Finally, McCrea and Patil 2010 is an edition and annotated translation of the text that Ratnakīrti’s AS is based on, Jñānaśrīmitra’s Apohaprakarana (henceforth AP). In many cases, this text contains the original versions of the arguments that Ratnakīrti reproduces or summarizes. It does not, however, make the following chapters here redundant. Even though Ratnakīrti generally follows the AP, often verbatim, his rearrangement, presentation, and occasional clarification of its material constitutes a separate and coherent restatement of

13Apart from these publications, the present book was able to draw on a number of important studies that are not easily available, and even on some that had kindly been provided to this author as drafts. Akamatsu 1983, a doctoral thesis providing an annotated translation of Jñānaśrīmitra’s AP, is invaluable to any study of the apoha theory of Jñānaśrīmitra (and, by extension, Ratnakīrti). This is a pioneering work of the highest quality, and it is a matter of great regret with regard to the scholarship of Buddhist philosophy that it is not easily accessible. Even though a few of the more poetic parts of Jñānaśrīmitra’s treatise have been, perhaps, not perfectly understood in this work, the main philosophical points and historical influences of the AP are clearly outlined.

The present author has also profited from Woo 1999, a dissertation on the KBhSA, from a draft of M. T. Much’s German translation of the apoha section in PV I (Much 2008), as well as from a draft of Hisataka Ishida’s critical edition of TSg 866–871, including the Pañjikā, (Ishida 2008).
the apoha theory well worth its own investigation. Notwithstanding the excellent translation and useful comments in McCrea and Patil 2010, Akamatsu 1983 was still found to be indispensable for the more historically oriented study here.

1.1.2 Philosophical background of Ratnakīrti’s proof of exclusion

Before entering into the more detailed discussions of the AS in the following chapters, it is helpful to have an overview of the main Buddhist positions to which Ratnakīrti dedicated individual texts. This will provide the context to the often intricate individual arguments of the AS, as well as to the general role and position of the AS amongst Ratnakīrti’s philosophical works.

Ratnakīrti’s texts typically combine logical, epistemological and ontological considerations, and sometimes present them with a view to soteriological consequences. Throughout, the texts employ rational argumentation that is intended to be acceptable to Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, and aim to establish core Buddhist beliefs (e.g., the impermanence of existence, ignorance as the core cause for continued rebirth). In order to gain an overview of the most important topics covered by Ratnakīrti, the texts are best divided, following Thakur (1975a: 3–4), into three general groups: five works are aimed at positively arguing for a Buddhist position, three at refuting a position held by non-Buddhists, usually Naiyāyikas, and two correct the partially false views of opponents. The theories relevant for fully appreciating the AS are all those to which Ratnakīrti dedicated

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14 See section 1.2.2 for some of the significant changes that Ratnakīrti introduced into his discussion of the apoha theory.

15 Thakur (1975a: 3–4) classifies Ratnakīrti’s texts into three groups: “works refuting the views of the opponents”, “works expounding various Buddhist doctrines”, and “works seeking to establish the Buddhist views by refuting those of the Brahmanical Hindus on topics of common interest”. This differentiation somewhat obscures the fact, however, that there are only two basic dialectical situations, namely whether the Buddhist voice is the one that proves or refutes a position. The main difficulty is how to classify the VyN and PABhP. Lasic (2000b: 20) characterizes the former as only refuting the positions of opponents, though Ratnakīrti does end
individual proofs: the ontological theory of momentary cessation, the hybrid ontological and epistemological theories of exclusion and non-dual yet variegated cognition, and the epistemological theory of what yogic perception is.

Two texts, both entitled Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (lit. “Proof of Momentary Cessation”), establish, by two variants of the same inference (anvayātmikā and vyatirekātmikā), the central ontological position of the Buddhist logical-epistemological tradition: universal momentariness. The theory of momentariness states that to exist is to be momentary, whereby existence is here defined as the ability to cause an effect. Ratnakīrti starts his discussion with this proof, KBhSV 83,8–9:

yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ. santaś cāmī vivādā- spadībhūtaḥ padārthā iti svabhāvahetuḥ.

the presentation with a statement that, in consequence of these refutations, his own position is established. The PABhP is similarly structured, and refutes all means of valid cognition except perception and inference by showing that these others are either just a form of inference or not a means of valid cognition. It is also noteworthy that these two texts, which constitute the third group, are formally different from those of the other two groups, since they are not constructed around an inference. See section 1.1.3 for a more detailed consideration.

Ratnakīrti’s preserved philosophical works are these (following the sequence of the texts in RNĀms, the basis of Thakur 1957c, Thakur 1975c): Sarvajñasiddhi, establishing the possibility of an omniscient being, i.e., a buddha (see Bühnemann 1980); Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa, refuting the existence of a god who could have formed the world (see Patil 2009); Apohasiddhi, establishing that words refer only to the differences between things, but not to any substantially existing universal (see Patil 2009, Patil 2011b, and this book); the two Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi texts, proving, by different logical means, that real things exist only momentarily (see Feldman and Phillips 2011, McDermott 1969, Steinkellner 1972, Woo 1999); Pramāṇāntarbhā- vaprakaraṇa, showing that there are only the two means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) accepted by the Buddhists in Dharmakīrti’s tradition, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna); Vyāptinirnaya, establishing what the “pervasion” relation, which makes inference possible, consists in according to Buddhist logicians (see Lasic 2000b); Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa, refuting the proof of temporally persistent, or non-momentary, things (see Mimaki 1976); Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda, teaching that what appears to cognition is a variegated, yet single image (see Moriyama 2011, Moriyama 2012); Santānāntaradūṣaṇa, a refutation of the existence of other people’s minds (see Yūichi Kajiyama 1965).
What exists, that is momentary, like a pot. And these existing objects which have become the subject of [our] dispute do exist. So an essence reason [is used in this inference].

According to this inference, momentariness is implied by existence: to exist is to be momentary, and without being momentary nothing can exist. Anything must be momentary, if it is to be real, including particulars, universals, and cognition.

This inference works because two properties, existence and momentariness, are necessarily connected. But it does not, in and of itself, explain how these properties are connected. A simplified version of the chain of arguments that Ratnakīrti uses to establish this connection is this: existence must minimally involve the capacity to produce an effect (arthakriyāśakti), so that anything that exists does so only insofar as it is capable of producing an effect.\textsuperscript{16} This notion of the ability to produce an effect is itself further examined. Ratnakīrti questions whether it is the same thing that is both able to produce a present effect and capable of causing a future or past effect. His conclusion is that this cannot really be so: if the thing capable of both past, future, and present effects were the same, then why would it, in the present moment, generate only the present, but not the past or future effects? It can only do so, Ratnakīrti maintains, because it is different in all three respects: the thing capable of producing a current effect is not capable of the future or past effect, the thing which was capable of the past effect was not capable of the currently present and future effects, and the thing capable of a future effect will likewise not be capable of producing the other two effects. Ratnakīrti concludes that any (even temporal) change in the effect indicates a change in that which has the capability of producing that effect, the cause. To the extent that this capability is what it is to exist, the essence of a thing changes with each change in this capability, and

\textsuperscript{16}This is discussed in KBhSA 69,11–19, under the heading that “the reason, existence, is not unestablished” (tatra na tāvad ayam asiddho hetuḥ). See Woo 1999: 143–145 for a closer analysis of this passage.
the notion of any essential identity continuing throughout different states of causal capacity must be dropped.

A consequence of this argument is that this change in capacity must happen in the shortest possible time that it can happen in (a *kṣaṇa*, or moment): if a thing were identically the same at two different times, in the above sense of being capable of producing the temporally identical effect at two different times, then it would be impossible to explain why it produces that effect at one of those times, but not at the other. The only possible options are that it produces that effect at neither of the two times, and thus cannot be classified as causally active at those times, and, hence, cannot be real, or else that it would produce that effect at both times. The first possibility excludes the thing from the realm of existence, and the investigation can end there. The second possibility, however, is refuted by everyday experience (a seed does not produce the same sprout twice, just as a hammer does not destroy the same pot twice). The only alternative that is left is that, between the two moments, the thing has undergone a change in its causal capacity: it has turned from something that cannot produce said effect into something that can. And if this change happened in any amount of time longer than necessary, there would be the same problem: a thing, once having entered into a continuous state, where two subsequent moments have the same causal capacity, cannot break out of this state anymore. It must forever produce either the exact same effect, or (if there is no capacity in both moments) have ceased to exist altogether.

For Ratnakīrti, the notion of a thing’s identity at two moments is thus the strictest one: even the difference in a thing’s causal capacity allows him to see this identity as being violated.

A problem arises from our common-sense notions of temporally persistent objects: it would seem to be an unshakeable fact that a desk that existed yesterday exists also today and, in normal circumstances, will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. How can everyday activity proceed without this assumption?

Ratnakīrti’s answer to this question has two parts, an ontological one and an epistemological one. The ontological part of the
1. Introduction

answer draws on a consequence that is only implicit in the arguments presented so far. The analysis of causal capacity has shown that a thing is able to produce an effect when it produces the effect at the present time. This entails, as explicated above, that the thing cannot produce future or past effects without changing its capacity, and so its essential nature; but such a causal capacity also entails that a thing must always produce an effect immediately. If a thing were to not produce an immediate effect in any given moment, no further effects could manifest in moments following that one. It is easiest to think of a temporally extended object, as opposed to a momentary thing, as a chain of cause-effect links. Any missing link would break the chain, with the result that the following (future) causes do not arise. This chain is called a continuum, *santāna*, by Buddhist epistemologists like Ratnakīrti.

Such a continuum has several noteworthy features. First, it is constituted of real, and thus momentary, things (*vastu*), such that each thing at a given point in a continuum is the effect of the thing in the previous moment of the continuum and the cause of another thing in the following moment. Each real thing exists only for the shortest time necessary to effect anything, on pain of either constantly producing the same effect or not ever producing any effect at all. This is the final analysis of cause and effect, and anything that really exists must be so constituted. Second, it provides Buddhist epistemologists with a notion of objective difference: each moment in each continuum is absolutely different from each other moment in each other continuum. However, this difference of moments decreases with increased proximity, a moment being less different from another moment the “closer” the other moment is to the current moment. Proximity is here judged by causal proximity in a cause-effect continuum. A proximity so derived harmonizes well with common-sense notions of identity: the cow called Spotty, on the meadow now, is less different from the cow Spotty in the barn this morning than it is from the other cows on the meadow now or in the barn this morning.¹⁷ A

¹⁷ This also allows a fairly elegant distinction of natural classes that avoids the
third feature of the continuum is that such an objective difference includes the possibility of substantial changes, as in the case of a seed becoming (or, more precisely, causing) a sprout. Similar appearance is possible on this account, and perhaps an important standard case; yet one cannot call the seed moment and the sprout moment similar in the same way that one might want to say the cow this morning and the cow now have a very similar appearance. Yet, in terms of the Buddhist analysis of the cause and effect relations, there is no important difference between the two situations: in both cases, the earlier moment is one link in the causal chain that the latter belongs to, and in this sense the two moments are less different from each other than they are from links in other chains, though this might not be apparent.

This judgement of proximity, and in many cases similarity, in the face of increasing difference is the epistemological part of the answer that Ratnakīrti gives in order to explain how temporally extended objects are possible. For Ratnakīrti, as for Jñānaśrīmitra, the preferred term for this judgement is *adhyavasāya*. The explanation of this term is a central topic both in the AS and in the CAPV. For the purposes of this introduction, a rough sketch of its main functions will suffice.

The AS provides an analysis of how “determination” works in the somewhat limited context of proving the Buddhist tenet that words do not refer to real universals, but only to an insubstantial “exclusion of others” (*anyāpoha*), or, in other words, to relative non-differences attributed to things which, on closer analysis, must be said to be completely different from each other. These non-differences are insubstantial in that they are only relational, but not real, properties that things have. That they are not “real” must here be understood in the sense that is particular to Buddhists following Dharmakīrti: something is unreal if it is not capable of producing an effect. The
theory of *apoha* thus posits a negative substitute for any real sameness between things and is often understood to be the basis for nominalist tendencies in this group of Buddhist logico-epistemological scholars. This theory explains how conceptual cognition can work in a world defined by this Buddhist ontology, i.e., in the absence of any temporal, and hence essential, identity of existing things: any conceptual cognition (which all verbal cognitions are a subset of) has an *apoha* as its object and is erroneous by nature, determining its object as existing externally and continuously, when in fact it does not; this kind of cognition can be “true” only in the sense that it allows successful behaviour with regard to an agent’s aims, but not in the sense that it presents reality how it is. The *AS* defends “exclusion” by showing its conformance to various functions fulfilled by real universals as accepted by the Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka authors.

A further consequence of this notion of universals is that there is no fundamental difference between universals that qualify objects, such as cowness or existence, and these objects themselves, such as a cow or a pot: they all are simply variant results of the same generalizing error, in the first case leading to the notion of classes of objects, and in the second to the notion of an object with a certain temporal persistence. It is fundamental to understand that, for Ratnakīrti, *any* term, including “this”, is a general term.\(^{18}\)

The *CAPV* ostensibly presents the teaching that any cognition has a variegated, yet non-dual objective form. Under this rather technical heading, Ratnakīrti finds the opportunity to present the general epistemological issues that are central to his and his teacher’s philosophical positions: apart from laying the foundation for the idealism typical of the Yogācāra strand of Buddhism (*cittamātra*), the circle of existence (*saṃsāra*) is analysed as the result of determination (*adhy-avasāya*), the fundamentally erroneous cognition that continuously mistakes a particular thing for a general one and thus enables the everyday activities that tie living beings into *saṃsāra*. The riddance of this error is conceived of as liberation (*mokṣa*). Together with

\(^{18}\)See footnote 106 for some background on this.
the theory developed in the AS, determination thus appears as the fundamental philosophical concern. It enables the interaction of unenlightened beings with a world that is, ontologically, constituted only of momentary appearances, by judging them to be external and temporally extended objects. This error, common to all these beings, is the foundation for any use of concepts. Simultaneously, it is the most important manifestation of the deep-rooted nescience that afflicts all unenlightened beings and cannot be intentionally suspended, according to Buddhist doctrine; as such, determination is the driving force of transmigratory existence. Accordingly, the destruction of determination is liberation from this transmigratory existence, and hence the definition of nirvāṇa.

The last of Ratnakīrti’s texts of proof to consider here is the SJS. In the main manuscript of Ratnakīrti’s works (RNĀms), the SJS has the prominent first position. But it is unclear whether this reflects a sequence intended by Ratnakīrti, since the texts’ contents do not suggest any systematic arrangement.\(^{19}\) The SJS seeks to establish the possibility of an omniscient being against the background of the detailed ontological and epistemological system just outlined. It differentiates between the fundamentally erroneous, conceptual cognition called determination, and the principally accurate, direct perception, and suggests a way to transform merely conceptual cognition into a direct realization of what is so cognized. The means to accomplish this is a faculty called “yogic perception” (yogipratyakṣa), a form of perception that is not necessarily based on any sense organ.\(^{20}\) Ratnakīrti, as is typical for his tradition,\(^{21}\) distinguishes two kinds of omniscience: total omniscience, the knowledge of absolutely everything, and omniscience without further qualification, which is the knowledge of everything that is needed for enlightenment. Whilst

\(^{19}\) Cf. Thakur 1975a: 3.

\(^{20}\) Cf. SJS 16,28–17,8, translated in Bühnemann 1980: 46–47. Steinkellner (1977: 384), elaborating on a first observation by Thakur (1957a: 11), noted that the main section of Ratnakīrti’s SJS is, in fact, not based only on Jñānaśrīmitra’s lost work of the same name, but also on the Yoginirnayaprakarana.

Ratnakīrti does hold that a buddha is omniscient in the first sense, the bulk of his SJS is concerned with proving the possibility of a being that is omniscient in the latter sense. This kind of omniscience has the Buddha’s four noble truths as its objects: whilst these truths are first known to practitioners as statements, and hence only in conceptual cognitions, omniscience consists in making them as clear as if they were directly experienced or perceived. Omniscience is thus characterized both in terms of its content, the four noble truths, and in terms of its appearance or cognitive status, as a clear image or perception of that object.

The following paragraph from the CAPV illustrates how Ratnakīrti combines all the different concerns that have just been outlined. The passage presents epistemological issues, some of which are central also to the AS, as they relate to Buddhist soteriology:

\[
\text{CAPV 137,9–16: tathā hi samanantarapratyayabalāyā-tasvapratinibhāsaviśeṣavedanamāttrād agrhīte 'pi paratra pravrityākṣepo 'dhyavasāyāh. na cāsau pūrvoktavāgjīlaiḥ pratihantum śakyāḥ, sarva-prāṇabhrītāṃ pratyātmaviditavāt, kaiścid apy anudbhīnnatvāt. ayam eva ca samsāras tatḥṣayo mokṣa iti kvedānīṃ eva tadvārtāpi.}
\[
\text{tathā hi vicitrānādivāsanāvaśāt prabodhakapratyayaviviśeṣāpekṣayā vikalpaḥ kenacid ākāreṇopajāyamāna eva bahirmukhapravrityyanukūlām arthakriyāsmaranaḥbhilāsādiprabandham ādhatte.}
\[
\text{tataḥ puruṣārthakriyārthino bahirarthānurūpāṇi pravrtytivṛtyavadhāranāni bhavanti, prthagjanasantāna-jñānakṣaṇānāṃ tādṛśo hetuphalabhāvasya niyatavāt.}
\]

For it is so: Based on the mere knowledge of a particular appearance of [cognition] itself, which is attained by the power of an immediately [preceding] apprehension, determination incites activity toward something else, even though [that is] not grasped.
But this cannot be rejected by the nets of earlier statements,\(^{22}\) because every breathing being knows [this incitement to activity] for itself, [and] because [this activity] is not broken through by any [of these beings]. And exactly this [determination] is the circle of existence, [and] its destruction [is] liberation. So where is there now even news of this [error of immediate liberation]? For it is so: a conceptual cognition, simply in arising with a certain form in dependence on a particular condition awakening [this conceptual cognition] because of variegated impressions that have no beginning, receives a [certain] connection to causal efficacy, [such as] a memory [of it], a desire [for it], and so on, which is conducive to activity towards an external object. Because of this, there exist restrictions for the positive and negative activities that correspond to the external things for someone aiming to bring about human aims, because, for the moments [making up] the continuous flow of an unenlightened being, the causal relation [between two moments in that flow] in such a way, [i.e., as allowing activity towards an external thing], is fixed.

An adequate understanding of this passage will be possible only after having studied the AS and its background. For now, it will suffice to highlight its most important aspects: they outline the range of philosophical problems that Ratnakīrti was engaged with, and an important subset of these problems is constituted by the topics considered in the AS.

The first sentence roughly defines determination (adhyavasāya): it is the cognitive function that prompts a person to act towards a “something else” (paratra), something that is not actually grasped by cognition; what is in fact grasped is only a particular appearance of

\(^{22}\)This refers back to the various other explanations of adhyavasāya that were discussed and rejected in CAPV 133 ff. See Kataoka 2017b and McAllister 2017a for details on these other options.
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awareness itself. Ratnakīrti thus characterizes determination as an error, a deficient form of cognition insofar as what it shows, its own form, is not the same as that towards which it directs the activity of normal, that is, unenlightened, persons or beings.

Ratnakīrti calls this error, the determination of cognition’s appearance to itself, *sāṃsāra*, the circle in which all unenlightened beings wander from one existence to the next. The release from this circle, *mokṣa*, is occasioned by the destruction of determination. Ratnakīrti thus explains two soteriological notions central not only to Buddhism, but to most of South Asia’s religious traditions,—*sāṃsāra* and the liberation from it—in epistemological terms. Ignorance (*avidyā*), the first and foremost cause for suffering in the Buddhist analysis of *sāṃsāra*, is not so much defined in terms of its content as by its structure: it is the erroneous, deeply ingrained belief that there are objects which are external to the mind and persist temporally. The determination of “the forms of cognition” (*buddhyākāra*) in this way is what constitutes *sāṃsāra*.

Ratnakīrti’s further exposition introduces several other terms that reinforce this interpretation: the most prominent are *vikalpa*, *pravṛtti*, and *arthakriyā*, which, in this combination, are unmistakably indebted to Dharmakīrti.

The concept of *arthakriyā*, that something produces an effect which satisfies an agent’s aim, is Dharmakīrti’s touchstone of reality: only real things can produce an effect, and to produce an effect is to be a real thing. This causal efficacy is the ultimate aim of any agent acting with foresight, and the achievement of which decides whether an act was successful or not.

Causal efficacy also decides whether a cognition is correct or not, insofar as its regular attainment by certain cognitions allows us to classify them as means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). If cognitions do not lead to activity that reliably results in such a satisfaction, then they cannot be counted as a means of valid cognition.

Conceptual cognitions play a pivotal role for activity: even though not all conceptual cognitions, but only inferences, are means of valid cognitions, all means of valid cognitions need conceptual cognitions
to result in activity. The reason that conceptual cognitions are always required is that activity of the kind that engages with mind-external, temporally persistent objects can, in general, not occur without a generalized concept that guides it. The result of inference is unproblematic in this regard: it is a determinate cognition that (at least in the cases usually considered by Ratnakīrti) has an object determined in such a way, meaning that it has an object that is imagined as temporally extended and not identical with cognition itself. Perception, however, is different; it differs from conceptual cognition in that it is not erroneous, and shows reality as it is. Precisely for this reason, however, it is also useless, in and of itself, for generating such activity as characterizes our everyday life. If perception were not distorted by a conceptual cognition following it, one would not act at all: an unenlightened being would simply be a passive recipient of sensory impressions that remain uninterpreted. It is for this reason that determinations are at the centre of the Buddhist analysis of everyday activity; without them, it could not even exist. Determination mistakenly externalizes and generalizes what appears in it, mistakenly construing one thing, the immediately present, unrepeatable particular form that cognition has, as another, *viz.* a repeatable entity; it is this double object of conceptual cognition that is the subject of the AS.

This passage further specifies that the moments of the cognitive continuum constituting a being are related to each other as cause and effect. This is, broadly speaking, a causal theory of the mind. The conceptual cognitions that arise and enable activity are thus causally determined. The preceding cognitions, along with mnemonic imprints, habits, and other factors, result in determinations that guide and cause activity. Whilst each of these factors becomes efficacious in causal terms, it does not quite mean that they are fully determined like a merely mechanical cascade of domino stones; rather, they are part of a complex of causal relations that, as a whole, can change. This complex can change quite fundamentally, so Ratnakīrti, in that the core element in everyday activity, determination, can end, and liberation can be attained in this manner.
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1.1.3 Ratnakīrti’s style

In order to fully appreciate Ratnakīrti’s works, one has to be aware of several stylistic features that characterize them. Regarding the level of composition, the passage from the CAPV illustrates one of these characteristics of Ratnakīrti’s writings: he will silently use material from his teacher, Jñānaśrīmitra, embedding it into the context of his own text with only minor changes. In this example, the explanation given with the sentences *tathā hi vicitrānādivāsanāvaśāt ... niyatavāt* corresponds nearly verbatim to a passage from the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* (henceforth *SāSiŚā*), *SāSiŚā* 393,10–14. Whereas in this case it is difficult to judge whether the argument has been repurposed by Ratnakīrti because the source text, the *SāSiŚā*, is not well understood, for the AS the situation is usually clearer, because Akamatsu 1983 and McCrea and Patil 2010 provide a good understanding of the AS’s basis, the *AP*.

Ratnakīrti’s style of writing has been characterized as quite distinctive by several scholars. As mentioned above, Stcherbatsky (1932) considered the AS to be very unclear. Thakur (1957a: 14) draws on the conspicuous unity of “style and [...] mode of argument in all these ten works [...]” to argue that Ratnakīrti is the author also of those texts in the manuscript that do not explicitly name him as such, and notes that “[t]he tracts of Ratnakīrti are written in a style that is more common to neo-logic than in the old system.” Steinkellner (1977: 385), furthermore, has drawn attention to the fact that Ratnakīrti “is using the logical forms in the macro-structure of his texts.”

A short look at the table of contents of the *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali* shows that the titles of the texts share only a few different endings: four end in °siddhi, three end in °dūṣaṇa, and one each ends in °prakaraṇa, °nirṇaya, and °vāda. A detailed investigation of the argument structure of each of these texts is beyond the scope of the

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23 Thakur (1975a: 5) already observed that the “[...] tracts of Ratnakīrti are written in a style that is more common in neo-logic than in the old system.”

24 See also footnote 15.
current work, but even a superficial examination of their outlines reveals that, except for the SSD, all the śiddhi and dūṣana texts, as well as the CAPV, show an inferential structure in the sense that, first, the whole text is structured around a “guiding inference” and, second, each major section of the text corresponds to one of the possible logical deficiencies of that inference (these are the “logical forms” mentioned in Steinkellner 1977: 385; see table 1.1).

The VyN and Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa (henceforth PABhP) do not show this structure: they both consist mainly of refutations of various opposing theories, thus establishing (ex negativo) that the Buddhist position is the correct one. The main distinction of these texts from the other two kinds is, as Thakur (1975a: 4) appears to imply, that they focus on “topics of common interest.” They are here classified as correcting false views on these topics, that is, pervasion and the number and nature of acceptable means of valid cognition. The SSD, the third text that does not conform to the inferential structure, focuses on the various proofs that non-Buddhists employed to establish things with temporal extension, and is explicitly linked by Ratnakīrti to the inferential establishment of momentariness.25 The Santānāntaradūṣana (henceforth SAD) is formally somewhat different from the other texts with regard to a guiding inference: the opponent’s position is not presented in the form of an actual inference, but in the form of a description of the elements that would make an inference proving the existence of other minds valid.26 The SAD is therefore listed in table 1.1 as “practically” having a guiding inference. The text is, furthermore, introduced by Ratnakīrti as concerned with investigating the existence or non-existence of other mental continuai
Table 1.1 – Ratnakīrti’s texts: types and inferential structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Guiding inference?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarvajñasiddhiḥ</td>
<td>siddhi</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇaṃ</td>
<td>dūṣaṇa</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apohasisiddhiḥ</td>
<td>siddhi</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ-Anvayātmikā</td>
<td>siddhi</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ-Vyatirekātmikā</td>
<td>siddhi</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pramāṇāntarbhāvaparakaraṇam</td>
<td>corrective</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vyāptinirṇayaḥ</td>
<td>corrective</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇaṃ</td>
<td>dūṣaṇa</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrādvaitapraṇāśavādāḥ</td>
<td>siddhi</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santānāntaradūṣaṇaṃ</td>
<td>dūṣaṇa</td>
<td>practically</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

after non-duality has been established, that is, after the work of the CAPV has been done.

The CAPV illustrates how Ratnakīrti uses an inference and its possible problems to structure his texts. It is constructed around this central inference (the outline of the CAPV is summarized in table 1.2):

CAPV 129,22–24: yat prakāśate tad ekam, yathā citrākā- racakramadhyavartī nilākāraḥ. prakāśate cedam gaura- gāndhāramadhursturasurabhisukumārasātetarādidivicitrā- kārakadambakam iti svabhāvahetuḥ.

What appears [to cognition], that is one, like the form of blue occurring in the middle of a circle of various forms. And this collection (kadambaka) of various forms, such as white (gaura), the sound “ga” (gāndhāra), sweet (madhura), fragrant (surabhi), soft (sukumāra), pleasure and its opposite (sātetara), etc. appears. [This is a proof using] an essence-reason.

Similarly, as shown by Woo (1999: 126 ff.; 141 f.), the KBhSA is structured around the following inference, KBhSA 67,7–8: “yat sat tat
Table 1.2 – General outline of the *Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Logical category</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>≈ % of whole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>maṅgalaśloka</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>129.05</td>
<td>129.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main topic of text</td>
<td></td>
<td>129.07</td>
<td>129.11</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introductory objection and answer</td>
<td></td>
<td>129.12</td>
<td>129.21</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central inference</td>
<td><em>anumāna</em></td>
<td>129.22</td>
<td>129.24</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of <em>hetu</em> in general</td>
<td><em>asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika</em></td>
<td>129.25</td>
<td>130.32</td>
<td><strong>6.69</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of <em>hetu</em> (relation to <em>vipakṣa</em>)</td>
<td><em>sādhāraṇānaikāntika</em> or <em>sandigdha-vyatirekin</em></td>
<td>130.33</td>
<td>141.08</td>
<td><strong>67.19</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verses from <em>Jñānaśrīmitra</em></td>
<td>(same as previous)</td>
<td>141.09</td>
<td>141.29</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of <em>drstānta</em></td>
<td><em>viruddhadharma</em></td>
<td>141.30</td>
<td>143.05</td>
<td><strong>10.94</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing discussion</td>
<td></td>
<td>143.06</td>
<td>144.30</td>
<td>7.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭah, santaś cāmī vivādāspadibhūtāḥ padārthā iti.” For the SJS, the main structure at least of the first part of the text is entitled “Der Beweis und seine Verteidigung” by Bühnemann (1980: XXIX ff.), i.e., the formal proof and its defence. But the next two sections are also closely related to this inference: sections 2 and 3 consist of a systematic defence against accusations that what the inference is about (the pakṣa) or the reason used in it (hetu) suffer from faults that would make this inference invalid.27 Lastly, the AS itself also uses this structure (see section 4.2.1), although it is less rigidly governed by it than any of the other °siddhi texts.28

A second distinctive feature of Ratnakīrti’s texts is that they are, to a large extent, a rearrangement of other texts, mainly those of his teacher’s.29 For the text edited below, at least 75% is taken verbatim from Jñānaśrīmitra’s AP.

A final point to note is that, even though Ratnakīrti organized his texts around the logical relations of various positions to a central inference, he always presented these positions as spoken discussions, in a manner typical for Sanskrit śāstra. In this context, Thakur observed for all the works contained in RNĀ that “the discussion

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28 It might be helpful for a chronology of Ratnakīrti’s works to remember that of all of Ratnakīrti’s °siddhi texts (SJS, AS, KBhSA, KBhSV, as well as CAPV, cf. the classification in Thakur 1975a: 3–4), the AS has two specific characteristics within that group: it is the only text that has the inference summing up its main purpose at its end, and it is least strictly built around that inference.

29 The textual evidence for this can be found in the editions, see the discussion by Bühnemann (1980: §1 III f.), and the edition in Lasic 2000b and the present edition.
1.2. The Apohasiddhi

is started just in the way of a formal debate, as if the opponent is present before the author.” (Thakur 1957a: 14) This applies also to the AS.

1.2 **The Apohasiddhi**

1.2.1 **Title of the Apohasiddhi**

According to the colophon of manuscript P, the title of the text is *Apohaprakaraṇa*, the same as Jñānaśrīmitra’s work on the same subject (AP). All the other manuscripts support the name *Apohasiddhi*. Since Ratnakīrti himself refers to the AS as “…iti apohasiddhau prasādhitam” (“…so it is fully established in the Apohasiddhi”) in SSD 122,18–19, preference is given to the title *Apohasiddhi*.

1.2.2 **Characteristics of the Apohasiddhi**

Ratnakīrti does not say what kind of text the AS is supposed to be. The first impression certainly is that it is little more than a condensed version of Jñānaśrīmitra’s *Apohaprakaraṇa*, or even only a rearrangement of passages from that work. But a closer examination reveals at least two interesting points of difference between the AS and the AP. First, Ratnakīrti, at least in the AS, does not use Jñānaśrīmitra’s interpretatorial technique of “a conditionally adopted position (vyavasthā)” (Patil 2007: 598), whereby certain theories can be provisionally accepted “for only specific and philosophically legitimate purposes” (Patil 2007: 603), just to be abandoned or at least

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30 At least the CAPV is an exception to this rule, however. It starts with the statement of Ratnakīrti’s own claim and various other views (CAPV 129,7–21), presents the central inference (CAPV 129,22–24), and then starts a discussion of this inference. SJS 1,1–1,17 also conforms to Thakur’s statement (see the translation in Bühnemann 1980: 1–2), since Ratnakīrti opens this work with a dialogue between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti.

31 Cf. the remarks in Lasic 2000b for examples of differences between Jñānaśrīmitra’s VC and Ratnakīrti’s VyN, and cf. Thakur 1975a: 12 for a general assessment, as well as the beginning of McAllister 2015.
substantially altered when those purposes change. The central term used by Jñānaśrīmitra in this context is vyavasthā. In the AS, this connotation of the term cannot be found, and it simply means definition or classification. A second noticeable difference lies in the arrangement of the texts. The AP is organized according to the introductory verse, as has been shown by Akamatsu (1983: 35–38) and Katsura (1986: 179, n. 15). The AS is arranged according to more “logical” principles, in particular according to the requirements of the inference found at its end (§§ 54–58).

As pointed out by Thakur (1975a: 12), Ratnakīrti states his intention in writing texts comparable to the AS at the end of the SJS and at the beginning of the ĪSD, SJS 31.24–27 and ĪSD 32.5–8 respectively:

\[
durvāraprativādivikramam anādṛtya pramāpraudhitaḥ sarvajño jagadekacakṣur udagād eṣa prabhāvo 'tra ca /

dambuddhasthitimedinīkulagirer asmadguroh kin tv a-\text{yam samkṣepo mama ratnakīrtikṛtinas tadvistaratrāsinaḥ} //
\]

Disregarding the strength of opponents who are hard to repress, through the full development of [his] means of valid cognition, this omniscient one, the single eye of the world, arose. And the mastery over this [subject, omniscience,] is [that] of my revered teacher, [who, like] the chief mountain [upholding] the earth, [upholds] the teaching of the fully enlightened one. But this compendium of mine, the scholar Ratnakīrti’s, [is meant] for [the person] fearful of [my teacher’s] extensive treatise.

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32 Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006 and Patil 2007 for two excellent studies on this technique.

33 Cf. for instance the arguments in 4 and 15.

34 This point has been argued in the study of the AS, cf. section 5.1. This general stylistic mark of Ratnakīrti’s works, that the logical categories are used as structuring devices, was first observed by Thakur (1957a: 13, n. 1, and pp. 14 f.).

35 Cf. also the German translation by Bühnemann (1980: 90):
1.2. The Apohasiddhi

Having retrieved some [jewels] to remember from that ocean of words, the revered teacher, who has surpassed [that] mine of jewels, [the ocean], by [himself] being a repository of jewels that are [his] beautiful expressions, this [treatise] is written.\textsuperscript{36}

This stream [of words] is a reservoir of nectar for a venerable one occupying the centre, [it is] a poisonous torch for a hostile one, but [it is] nothing at all for someone knowing a little.

To these passages one should add the verses introducing the \textit{Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa} and the \textit{Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda}, SSD 112,4–5 and CAPV 129,5–6 respectively:

\begin{quote}
yadyogād andhavad viśvam saṃsāre bhramad iṣyate /  
sā kṛpāvaśagaiḥ pāpā sthirasiddhir apāsyate //
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Respektlos vor der Stärke der schwer abzuwehrenden Gegner ist durch (seine) Vollendung in der richtigen Erkenntnis dieser Allwissende, die Sonne der Welt, hervorgetreten.

Und die Überlegenheit mit Bezug auf diesen (Gegenstand) gebührt meinem Lehrer, dem Kontinentgebirge der Erde, auf der ein vollkommener Erleuchteter (seinen) Wohnsitz genommen hat; diese Zusammenfassung aber kommt mir, dem fromm-gelehrten Ratnakīrti zu, der des (Lehrers) Ausführlichkeit vermeiden will.
\end{quote}

I thank Harunaga Isaacson and Toru Tomabechi for discussing this verse with me in March 2019.

\textsuperscript{36}The word \textit{ratnākara} is commonly used to refer to the ocean (see PW VI: 252 f.). Acc. to McCrea and Patil (2010: 3), \textit{ratnākara} in the phrase \textit{jitaratnākarād} should be understood also as an allusion to Ratnākaraśānti, a Buddhist contemporary and opponent (in certain epistemological matters) of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. The second meaning of the phrase would be that Jñānaśrīmitra “has surpassed [his opponent] Ratnākaraśānti” with his literary compositions.
1. Introduction

That wicked proof of permanence, in consequence of which the whole world, as if blind, is assumed to be wandering in the course of existence, is driven away by those under the power of compassion.\textsuperscript{37}

\textit{dig eṣā svaparāsēṣaṣaprativādiprasādhani / citrādvaitamatābodhadhvāntastomakadarthinī //}

This short instruction overpowers all opponents, whether internal or external,\textsuperscript{38} [and] repels the mass of ignorance [that is due] to not knowing the doctrine of variegated non-duality (\textit{citrādvaita}).\textsuperscript{39}

From these verses, even though the above translations are far from secure, the following intentions can be attributed to Ratnakīrti’s texts: they intend to restate the main points of Jñānaśrīmitra’s much longer treatises, they should abolish wrong opinions, held by internal (Buddhist) and external (non-Buddhist) opponents, they should strengthen correct opinions, and, through this, they should aid in deliverance from the cycle of existence. Apart from their being summaries, Ratnakīrti’s texts thus reflect the apologetic and polemical motivations (or causes) driving the epistemological tradition that Eltschinger (2012: 473–479) portrays; there is the apologetic aspect that shows how enlightenment and liberation are achievable, even though, by the simple measure of the amount of text dedicated to these issues, they are not the central concerns of these texts. The polemic aspect of refuting both Buddhist and non-Buddhist views that might hinder liberation is ubiquitous.


\textsuperscript{38}I.e., whether they are Buddhists or not.

\textsuperscript{39}The late Dr. Abhijit Ghosh, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, gave me his very helpful opinion on this verse in May 2009.
1.3 Manuscripts of the Apohasiddhi

1.2.3 Persons and texts mentioned in the Apohasiddhi

The following texts and persons (or groups of persons) are mentioned by name in the Apohasiddhi and its colophon (§ 61 and following):

**Persons.**
- Dharmottara: § 50 (referring to the Apohaprakarana (henceforth DhAP))
- Followers of Kumārila (i.e., Sucaritamiśra): § 24
- Ratnakīrti: § 60
- Trailokyadatta (scribe): § 62
- Trilocana: § 38
- Vācaspati: § 9, § 21, § 23, § 29 (all references to Nyāyavārttika-tātparyatikā (henceforth NVTT))
- Vidhivādin: § 8
- Pratiṣedhavādin: § 840

**Texts.**
- Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: § 30 and § 43.
- Śāstra: § 27.

1.3 Manuscripts of the Apohasiddhi

Five of six41 known manuscripts of the AS have been used for this edition:

1. Manuscript K.42

40 Unnamed persons are referred to in the following paragraphs: § 4, § 30 (Bhāsarvajña), § 37, § 40 (probably Trilocana), § 41 (probably Trilocana), § 54. References to the Siddhāntin are found in § 7 and § 37.

41 Two manuscripts were used in Shāstri 1910 for the first modern edition of the AS: The first is manuscript “G 4711” in the collection of the Asiatic Society in Kolkata (cf. Shāstri 1917: 32 ff.). This is manuscript K in the present edition. The other manuscript (Ś) was in Shāstri's private possession, and it was not available to the author.

42 These keys to the entries are used to reference the source in the critical apparatus.
1. Introduction

- This is manuscript number “G 4711” in the collection of the Asiatic Society in Kolkata (cf. the description in Shāstri 1917: 32 f.).
- Its script is characterized by Shāstri (1917: 32) as Bengali of the 12th century.

2. Manuscript P:

- This manuscript was available as copies of the prints catalogued as “Xc 14/26” in the *Sammlung des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde in Göttingen* (Collection of the Seminar for Indology and Buddhist studies in Göttingen). 43 This manuscript is reported by Bandurski (1994: 60) to be in Beijing, under the signature “Pek.-L., Nr. 52–58.”, and is described in Bandurski 1994: 58 ff.
- The text of the *Apohasiddhi* is found on folios 32b–36b. The manuscript was discovered by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in *Zha lu ri phug* during his second expedition to Tibet. 44 In his note on the manuscript he called the script Purāṇa-Maithili, which he seems to have used synonymously with Nevārī and Vartula. 45 Thakur (1975a: 11) states that the manuscript convolute of which the *Apohasiddhi* is a part “...consists of eighty-six folia in clear Maithil script of *circa* 1200 A.D.” 46
- This manuscript is the basis of the editions AS$_2$ and AS$_3$.

3. Manuscripts N$_1$, N$_2$, and N$_3$ were microfilmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project (NGMPP). Their microfilm numbers in the Nepal-German Manuscript Cataloguing

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44 Cf. the comments in footnote 10.


46 Kellner (2007: 21) gives a succinct overview of the various classifications of the very similar script in JNĀ$_{ms}$.  

30
Project (NGMCP) are A109/12, D35/1, and A117/7, respectively. The descriptions given on their scanned catalogue cards are as follows (my additions are in square brackets, the values are written in Devanāgarī on the cards of manuscripts N_1 and N_3):

- **Manuscript N_1**, corresponding to NGMCP: A109/12 and written in Newari:
  - [Number, probably of the microfilm]: A109/12
  - **Subject**: bauddhadarśana
  - **Manuscript-Name**: apohasiddhi
  - **C. No.** [=accession number of the National Archives of Kathmandu] 3–717
  - **S. No.** 2
  - **Folio No.** 13
  - **Size**: 34.5 × 10 [cm]

- **Manuscript N_2**, corresponding to NGMCP: D35/1 (this manuscript is not in the National Archives of Kathmandu, and the scanned catalogue card is written in English) and written in Newari:
  - **Short Title**: Apohasiddhi
  - **Running No.** 764D
  - **Subject**: Baudd. Nyāya
  - **Title (acc. to Colophon)**: Apohasiddhi
  - **Author**: Ratnakīrti (c. 10th cent. AD)
  - **No. of leaves**: 14 complete
  - **Size in cm**: 32.5 × 8.4
  - **Reel No.**: D35/1
  - **Date of filming**: 2 Mar 1976
  - **Script**: Newari
  - **Remarks**: paper [and a note to the effect that the manuscript is undamaged]
  - **Script**: Newari
1. Introduction

- Manuscript N₃, corresponding to NGMCP: A117/7 and written in Devanāgarī:
  - [Number on front:] A117/7
  - Subject: bauddhadarśana
  - Manuscript-Name: apohasiddhiḥ
  - C. No. [=accession number of the National Archives of Kathmandu] 5-256
  - S. No. 2 (kha)
  - Folio No. 11
  - Size: 32,5 × 11 [cm]

We know little about the missing manuscript, Ś, apart from the fact that it was in the private possession of Shāstri and that it is “written in the Bengali hand of the 12th century” (Shāstri 1910: vii), like K. It will, however, be important to consider its readings as reported in Shāstri 1910 for determining the relation of the manuscripts to each other.

1.3.1 Relation of the manuscripts

Before the relation between the available manuscripts can be established, the following points should be noted:

1. In the opening line, N₁, N₂, N₃, K pay homage to Śrīlokanātha, P to Tārā.
2. N₁, N₂, N₃, K share a practically identical colophon.
3. N₂ and N₃ have several significant features in common (most of these are documented in the list of variants for the Nepalese manuscripts, starting on page 72). Most importantly, they both repeat ll. 48 to 59.

Furthermore, it seems natural to assume that N₃ might have misread some of the unclarer passages in N₂. For example, “śabdāt in l. 196, is found in N₃ as “śa(+b)dat”. The aksara dā is the last one on line 1 of N₂ 9b. As there was not enough space there to write the long ā in the usual way, it was written
1.3. Manuscripts of the *Apohasiddhi*

with a small hook above the base *aksara, da*. The scribe of N₃ might have missed the hook (cf. figs. 1.13 and 1.14).

Similarly, the evidence presented below for *śabdāntarāvakāṭena* (see notes to l. 143) suggests that in N₂ 7b1 it was first emended from *śabdāntarāvābhābhāvamgatena* to *śabdāntarābhāvābhāvamgatena*, by placing the numbers 2 and 1 over the syllables vā and bhā, and then corrected to *śabdāntarāvamgatena*, deleting vābhābhā (and forgetting to delete the remaining anusvāra) by marking the initial vā and the final bhā. The reading found in N₃ 6a6 is *śabdāntarābhāvābhāvagatena*. The simplest explanation is that the scribe of N₃ correctly understood the first correction in N₂, but missed the deletion marks.⁴⁷

A last example is the case of °sāṃkarya° (l. 297, cf. figs. 1.15 and 1.16), where N₃ apparently mistook aṅka for kā. N₂ has a prefixed ṅ that looks like a sign for a long ā in its script.⁴⁸

The evidence suggests therefore that N₃ is directly dependent on N₂. For this reason, no variants that are due only to its particularities have been noted in the edition below. Its readings are reported, however, when one of the other manuscripts has occasioned a note.

4. N₁ and N₂ in turn appear closer to K than to P: apart from the common colophon, cf. the cases listed in table 1.3.

To these points we have to add observations about the the last manuscript, Ś, which was not available for the following edition. It can be evaluated only on the basis of the readings and variants presented in Shāstri 1910 (see table 1.3): clearly, it is closer to P than K, showing only a few differences which can be explained either as copying errors (*nimitta°, viprakīrṇa, a missing tad*) or as attempts at improving the text (*śūtratvā°, sarvasya vyava°*). The only problematic

⁴⁷The other important possibility is that N₂ and N₃ had a common ancestor reading *śabdāntarābhāvābhāvagatena*, which N₂ initially reproduced, and then, having corrected a slight mistake made during copying, changed to something more meaningful.

⁴⁸Cf. figs. 1.13–1.16.
Table 1.3 – Variants in Ś, compared to material available for the edition. “Line” refers to the line number in the present edition. Readings accepted in the edition are set in bold face.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Ś</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>N₁, N₂, N₃</th>
<th>AS₁</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>nimittapratyayā°</td>
<td>nivṛttapratyayā°</td>
<td>nivṛttapratyayā°</td>
<td>as K = P</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>viśeṣaṇabhāvakṣa</td>
<td>viśeṣaṇakṣa</td>
<td>viśeṣaṇabhāvakṣa</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>prakṛta</td>
<td>aprakṛta</td>
<td>prakṛta</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>ekasyaivārthasya</td>
<td>ekasyaiva</td>
<td>ekasyaivārthasya</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>asadbhāve tu</td>
<td>asadbhāve</td>
<td>asadbhāve tu</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>viprakīrṇa° (?)</td>
<td>viprakīrṇā°</td>
<td>viprakīrṇā°</td>
<td>as K = P</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>tāvatā tāvan na</td>
<td>tāvan na</td>
<td>tāvatā tāvan na</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>svarūpeṇaiva (svalakṣaṇarūpeṇaiva?)</td>
<td>svalakṣaṇa-</td>
<td>svarūpeṇaiva</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>sattvena</td>
<td>sattve</td>
<td>sattvena</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177</td>
<td>viśiṣyate</td>
<td>viśeṣyate</td>
<td>viśiṣyate</td>
<td>as Ś = P</td>
<td>as Ś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>asad eva vā tad°</td>
<td>asad evātad°</td>
<td>asad eva vā tad°</td>
<td>as Ś = P</td>
<td>as Ś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>eva vā</td>
<td>eva</td>
<td>eva vā</td>
<td>as Ś = P</td>
<td>as Ś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>pīṇḍadarśana°</td>
<td>pīṇḍadandaṅdarśana°</td>
<td>pīṇḍadarśana°</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.3 – Variants in Ś, compared to material available for the edition. “Line” refers to the line number in the present edition. Readings accepted in the edition are set in bold face. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Ś</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>N₁, N₂, N₃</th>
<th>AS₁</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>231</td>
<td>svāśrayeṣu</td>
<td>svāśraye</td>
<td>svaviṣayeṣu</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>daṇḍasūtravādinā</td>
<td>daṇḍasūtrādineti</td>
<td>daṇḍasūtrādineti</td>
<td>as K = P</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273</td>
<td>tad evaṃ na sāmānyasiddhiḥ</td>
<td>tad eva na sāmānya-buddhiḥ</td>
<td>tad evaṃ na sāmānyasiddhiḥ</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275</td>
<td>vā prasiddhaḥ</td>
<td>prasiddhaḥ</td>
<td>vā prasiddhaḥ</td>
<td>as Ś = P</td>
<td>as Ś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>284</td>
<td>vidhibādhanaṃ</td>
<td>vidhisādhanam</td>
<td>vidhibādhanaṃ</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>286</td>
<td>bāhyatvavidhi</td>
<td>bāhyatva(+syav)vidhi</td>
<td>bāhyatvavidhi</td>
<td>as K p.c.</td>
<td>as K p.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>294</td>
<td>dhūmasya ...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>as Ś; proba-bly = K a.c.;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297</td>
<td>tasmād adhya°</td>
<td>tasmāt tadadhya°</td>
<td>tasmāt tadadhya°</td>
<td>as K</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308</td>
<td>vācyavāca-kabhā-vasyābhāve</td>
<td>vācyavāca-kasyābhhāve</td>
<td>vācyavāca-kabhā-vasyābhāve</td>
<td>as Ś = P</td>
<td>as Ś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310</td>
<td>sarvasya vyava°</td>
<td>sarvavyava°</td>
<td>sarvavyava°</td>
<td>as K = P</td>
<td>as K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>final verse (post) colophon</td>
<td>no equiv.</td>
<td>present (p.c.)</td>
<td>no equiv.</td>
<td>present</td>
<td>as K p.c.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
element is the example: Ś has the shortest exemplification; that it
shares this with the Nepalese manuscripts shall be discussed below;
K, though it is possible (judging from the available space in the ms)
that it contained this example ante correctionem, was changed to a
much longer version; and P shows yet another reading. The problem
is that none of these three variants can be explained as a corruption
or transmission error of any of the others:

- Ś: dhūmasya parokṣāgnijñānajananavanat.
- K:
  - ante correctionem (inferred only from available space):
    dhūmasya parokṣāgnijñānajananavanat.
  - post correctionem: asadutpattivat. yady api vahnaudhū-
    masya trailokyasyābhāvas tathāpi tato dhūmasyaevotpādo
    nānyasya.
- P: yathā vahnaudhūmaghaṭādyor asatve 'pi dhūma evotpadyate
  na ghaṭādiḥ.

The decision in the critical edition to favour the shortest reading
stems from two considerations: first, it is likely that K supported
this reading ante correctionem; second, the appearance of the more
elaborate exemplifications could be explained as attempting to clarify
a terser original formulation. It must be admitted, however, that
neither argument is decisive.

One might be tempted, at this point, to take the evidence of the
Nepalese manuscripts (N₁, N₂, N₃) into account. Looking at the
variants presented in table 1.3, it seems that they mostly accord with
K, and that any reading shared by the Nepalese manuscripts and the
unrelated Ś should be the preferred one. For it is usually less likely
that an unoriginal reading would have found its way into otherwise
distinct branches of the text’s tradition rather than that an original
reading changed into the same reading twice.
1.3. Manuscripts of the Apohasiddhi

But the closest match for the Nepalese manuscripts is not K. Rather, it is the first edition, AS$_1$.\footnote{I would like to thank Elliot Stern for alerting me to the possibility that the Nepalese manuscripts might have been copied not from earlier manuscripts but from a printed source. This has allowed me to substantially revise the interpretation of the dependencies between the various manuscripts that I had proposed in McAllister 2011. The critical edition below has been adjusted accordingly.} To see this, one has to consider the last two columns in table 1.3: the first shows which of the other manuscripts the Nepalese ones are closest to, and the second lists the source of the readings that Shāstri chose for the constituted text in AS$_1$. It is evident that the Nepalese manuscripts deviate from K only when AS$_1$ accepts the reading of Ś. One explanation for this state of affairs is that Ś and K share an ancestor which is common also to N$_1$, N$_2$ and N$_3$. Another explanation is that an edition, AS$_1$, was the exemplar for the Nepalese manuscripts.

Based on the few variants that are recorded in AS$_1$ for Ś, it would probably be impossible to decide this issue. Fortunately, a closer examination of the appearance of the Nepalese manuscripts provides enough evidence to ascertain that the latter explanation is the better one.\footnote{Since it was shown above that N$_3$ depends on N$_2$, the following comments pertain only to N$_1$ and N$_3$.} A distinctive feature of these manuscripts is their use of apparently random dots between akṣaras. For example, compare the phrase “asmin vānyad apohyata iti vypattā vijātyāvṛttam bāhyam eva vivaksitam” (starting in line 4 of the edition below) as written in N$_1$ and in AS$_1$.\footnote{The transcriptions are in Devanāgarī because it is closer to the manuscript’s script, and makes the following argument clearer. The passage from N$_1$ could be transliterated into IAST as follows:}

\begin{verbatim}
1. N$_1$ 1b2: “असमिन्•वान्यदपोह्यताति•क्युन्यत्त्वा•
विजयात्यावृत्ताय•मेवविवक्षिताय”
\end{verbatim}

\footnote{See also fig. 1.9, on page 44.}
1. **Introduction**

![Dependency diagram](image)

Figure 1.1 – Dependency relations between the manuscripts and main editions of the *Apohasiddhi*

2. **AS₁ 1,5–6:** "अस्मिन् वान्यद्पोष्यत (linebreak) इति व्युत्पत्त्या विज्ञातिव्यावृत्तं बाह्य[2]भेव विविधित्वं,”

It is clear that the dots in N₁ show a close correspondence to specific features of AS₁: every dot corresponds to a space added between words; a dot was used for the “[2],” showing the linebreak in manuscript K, as well as for the final semicolon in AS₁. One space, between *apohyata* and *iti*, was missed by the scribe of N₁ because a linebreak occurs at that point in AS₁. The scribe was perhaps not accustomed to the convention, employed also in AS₁, of adding hyphens when breaking a word across lines. A second space, after *eva* was not recorded in N₁. This usage of the dots carries on throughout the whole manuscript, and is the same also in N₂.⁵³ This agreement of N₁ and N₂ to formal features of AS₁ makes it all but certain that these two manuscripts do not derive from a common ancestor of K and Š, but rather from AS₁. Since N₃ is, in turn, derived from N₂, it can be concluded that the Nepalese manuscripts offer no historically

⁵³N₃ does also employ dots, but they are used rather sparingly there and mainly for the disambiguation of vowel *samādhi* and as a punctuation device.
independent evidence that could be used for the constitution of the text of the *Apohasiddhi*. The evidence collected from the Nepalese manuscripts has therefore been excluded from the main apparatus, so as not to overburden the printed pages.\(^{54}\)

In consequence, the relation as shown in fig. 1.1 can be determined, the top node “α” standing for the archetype or the reconstructable version of the *Apohasiddhi* closest to the original.\(^{55}\) The connecting lines mean “descended from”, without claiming directness. This diagram also shows the general limitations of editing the *Apohasiddhi*: where K and P do not agree, we have to decide on a reading based on factors besides the witnesses (e.g., internal coherence of the argument or similar formulations in other texts by Ratnakīrti or Jñānaśrīmitra).

### 1.4 Notes on the critical edition

#### 1.4.1 Conventions and abbreviations used in the critical apparatus

The following conventions are used in the critical edition:

1. Names are emphasized: *vācaspatiḥ*.
2. (×*ka*) means that “*ka*” was deleted or marked as erroneous in the ms.
3. (+*ka*) means that “*ka*” was added to the original flow of text. There is no implicit specification as to where this addition is placed (i.e., above, below, in the margin, etc.)
4. “*ka v ga*” indicates that there is an insertion mark between *ka* and *ga*.
5. (?*ka*) means that “*ka*” was not read with certainty.
6. Some\(^{56}\) scribal corrections are marked as in *anyāpodhovadhārya*(t(×e)→*ta*), meaning that the scribe wrote *te* and then deleted the vowel sign for *e*, so that the result was *ta*.

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\(^{54}\)For readers interested in their variants, however, there is a section appended to the critical edition which collects these notes (see section 2.1, starting on page 72).

\(^{55}\)The term “archetype” is used here as defined by Maas (1960: §5).

\(^{56}\)I.e., those where a simple note of the correction would not provide useful or clear information. In the example given, a simple report of the correction as “*t*(×*e*)” could be misunderstood as a correction to “*t*” instead of “*ta*”.

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1. Introduction

7. An arrow as in *katham apohah* signifies the beginning of a folio, with the manuscript shorthand and the folio number printed in the margin; in this case it would be the beginning of the recto of leaf 33 in manuscript P after the *akṣara* “*ma*”.

8. A half arrow as in *tatpratītivyavasthā* shows the end of a line in K. It is put after the last whole *akṣara* in the line.

9. A half arrow as in *athaivammatiḥ* marks the start of a new line (start of line 3 in K). If this coincides with the end of the previous line, so that nothing is missing, only this sign will be recorded.\(^57\)

10. *anaikāntika mbhā℠* indicates that there is a space of one *akṣara* between *ka* and *mbhā*.

11. A “⋯” indicates an illegible sign with the width of one *akṣara*.

12. "bāhya~~~viṣayatvena" indicates that there are three filling signs between *ya* and *vi* (cf. section 1.4.4).

13. A “•” indicates that there is a dot in the ms (occurs in the Nepalese manuscripts, see page 38).

14. Punctuation used in the edition does not reflect the punctuation of the mss. Some special signs are:
   a) Maṇgala sign:\(^58\) ☯
   b) Siddhā sign: ∗
   c) Ornamental sign at the end of ms: ☪

15. Variants concerning only *avagraha*-s have not been reported,\(^59\) and their introduction may be only editorial.

16. The gemination of consonants after, and the degemination before, a semi-vowel (*y,v,r,l*) is not reported, and its normalization may be only editorial.

An entry in the critical apparatus is typically as follows:

\(^{57}\)Cf. item 6 on page 42 for the usefulness of marking the end of line and start of line in K.

\(^{58}\)Cf. G. Roth 1986 for a discussion of these signs, and see section 1.4.4 for examples of the signs used in the manuscripts of the AS.

\(^{59}\)With the exception of a variant to *anyathā’sati* (l. 21), where the more reliable manuscripts’s scribes explicitly inserted an *avagraha* to avoid confusion.
1.4. Notes on the critical edition

1. The line number or range of line numbers that the entry is indexed to is given.

2. The lemma is printed. This is a quotation of a text string as found in the edition, and its purpose is to index the entry to the text. If it is not unique within the line, a raised number following the lemma indexes it to the relevant occurrence in the referenced line.

3. Next come the sigla of the witnesses supporting the reading accepted in the edition (save for the neglected errors mentioned in section 1.4.3). If no witness supports the reading, it is an emendation and is marked as “em.” As mentioned, the only edition that had access to Ś is AS₁. The readings found in this edition are therefore mentioned when it is reasonably certain that they indicate a variant of Ś: this is the case when the reading in AS₁ stands against the accepted reading, against K, and no variants are reported for it in AS₁, or when the reading in AS₁ supports the chosen reading against all other witnesses; in both of these cases, it is likely that Ś read as this edition reads. Ś, when it is directly cited as witness in a critical note, is always based on the evidence found in AS₁.

4. Next, the variants found in the other manuscripts are given. These readings (in contrast to the lemma) reflect the text as it is found in the manuscripts. They are separated from each other (and the lemma) either by
   a) a colon, which indicates that the reading following it is different from the one accepted, or
   b) a comma, which indicates that the following reading partially or indirectly supports the accepted reading, or
   c) a semicolon, indicating that the following variant (usually an omission) does not provide decisive evidence.

These signs always express the relation that the variant has to the accepted reading, and not the relation between two subsequent variants.

5. Following the readings, an additional explanation may be given. It is typeset like this: “— A comment”
6. On most folios of K, a few _akṣaras_ at the end of each line are missing. When the surviving material supports a reading or a variant only partially, it has nevertheless been added as a witness. The reader will easily be able to see which part of the reading is actually supported or not supported by looking at the end-of-line and start-of-line marks (cf. items 8 and 9, page 40). When the remaining material does not have any value for deciding the reading, this has been noted by entering “no ev. K” (meaning “no evidence in K”).

1.4.2 Textual references in the critical edition

Two symbols are used to show textual relations (as opposed to content relations) of the _AS_ to other texts:

1. A “=” is used to show that the passage has a close parallel.
2. A “≈” indicates a loose parallel.

1.4.3 Differences not reported in critical edition

Discrepancies between the manuscripts that result from any of the following factors have not been noted as variant readings:

1. P, N₁, N₂, K do not usually degeminate _tt_ following _ṛ_. N₃ does.
2. P, N₁, N₂, N₃ degeminate _tt_ before a semi-vowel, K does not.
3. All manuscripts irregularly geminate _m, t, and y_ after _r_.
4. _avagraha_-s are not always written in the mss. When their correctness is beyond doubt and does not change the meaning, they have silently been added.

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An example is the reading _cānyāpoḍḥānyāpohayorvirodho_ at the beginning of 13: K reads °dhānyāpohayorvirodho, starting on line 6, and _cānyāpo°_ was, presumably, at the end of the previous, damaged line. This has been taken as evidence in K for the reading adopted in the edition, because the relevant information, °dhānyāpoha° vs. °hānyapodha° is found in K. That _cānyāpo°_ is not found in K can easily be gathered from the end-of-line and start-of-line marks in the edition. This way of presenting the information does not clutter the apparatus with irrelevant notes. Another example is the reading _aprāpter bhrāntir_ as against _aprāpte bhrānti_ (cf. l. 202). There K reads _prā_, then the folio is torn, and the next folio starts with °rbhrānti°. This is taken as support in K for the reading _aprāpter bhrāntir_.
1.4. Notes on the critical edition

5. Substitution of a nasal with an *anusvāra*.

6. Additional *anusvāra* before nasals.

7. N₁, N₂, N₃ insert dots (see fig. 1.9) between *akṣaras* at apparently random places, separating meaningful as well as meaningless units. These dots do not usually influence *samādhi*. They are only reported (as “•”) when they are useful for understanding a variant. As shown above, they correspond closely to spaces or separators inserted in AS₁.

8. In order not to clutter the edition with the many irrelevant differences in N₃, all of which are errors particular to this manuscript, they are not separately mentioned in the edition here. But the readings of N₃ are added in the apparatus entries for other readings.

1.4.4 Particularities of the scripts

Noteworthy peculiarities of the scripts encountered in the manuscripts are as follows:

1. Siddham signs (∗) used: cf. figs. 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.⁶¹

2. Ornamental signs (†) used: cf. figs. 1.7 and 1.8.

3. Spacing (~) in K 8b1: cf. fig. 1.5.

4. P sometimes (e.g., l. 47, p. 50) uses a stylized *ma* with *virāma* as shown in, cf. fig. 1.6.⁶²

5. Deletion markers: K sometimes “brackets” wrong text, e.g., in l. 148 (p. 57): cf. fig. 1.12.

6. N₁ and N₂ sometimes use a special correction mark, a sort of tilde above an *akṣara*, to transform that *akṣara* within its class. Cf. the following corrections: (*śa → sa*) in l. 216 (p. 62, cf. fig. 1.11), (*śa → ṣa*) in l. 226 (p. 62), (*ma → ṇa*) in l. 161 (p. 58, cf. fig. 1.10), (*na → ṇa*) in l. 259 (p. 65), (*ṣye → sye*) in l. 271 (p. 65).

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⁶¹ All references in this list are to p. 44.

⁶² For a discussion of this letter, cf. MacDonald 2005: xxii, and the references given there. See also Kouda 2004: 110, “Characters with ṃ\_.”

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1. Introduction

1.4.5 Usage of previous editions

As mentioned above, the Apohasiddhi has already been edited twice. Shāstri (1910) contains readings of a manuscript not available to the present author, and could therefore not be ignored here. The editions by Thakur, AS_2 and AS_3, have also been consulted throughout, because, although they are not based on more material than used for the edition below, Thakur’s great expertise in reading and editing these kinds of texts means that his readings and (sometimes silent) corrections cannot and should not be ignored. All differences to any of Shāstri’s or Thakur’s readings which could not be easily resolved as misprints or similar circumstantial errors have therefore been noted, and their observations discussed in the following edition.
1.4. Notes on the critical edition

- **Figure 1.11**: Correction of śa to sa, N₂ 10a5
- **Figure 1.12**: Deletion, N₂ 4b6
- **Figure 1.13**: “śabdā” in N₂ 9b1 before end of line.
- **Figure 1.14**: “śa(+b)dat.” in N₃ 7b6.
- **Figure 1.15**: “sāṅkaryya” N₂ 13b1.
- **Figure 1.16**: “sākāryya” in N₃ 10b5.
- **Figure 1.17**: Usual bha in N₂.
- **Figure 1.18**: Second version of bha in N₂ 11a4.
2 Text of the Apohasiddhi

namah srilokanaṭhaya.

[§ 1] apohah śabdārtho nirucyate.

[§ 2] nanu ko ’yam apoho nāma. kim idam anyasmād apohyate, 
asmād vānyad apohyate, asmin vānyad apohyata iti vyutpattyā vi-

jātivyāvṛttam bāhyam eva vivakṣitam, buddhyākāro vā, yadi vāpoha-
nam apoha ity anyavyāvṛttimātram iti trayāḥ pakṣāḥ.

[§ 3] na tāvad ādimau pakṣau, apohanāmnā vidher eva vivakṣi-
tatvāt. antimo ’py asaṅgatah, pratītibāḥditavāt. tathā hi parvato-
ddeśe vahnir astīti śābdī pratītir vidhirūpam evollikhantī laksyate,

---

1 [ K; n.e. P — Cf. article of Dr. Gustav Roth”.
1 namah srilokanaṭhaya ] == K <->
1 namas tārāyai P
3 idam ] == K <-> n.e. P
G. Roth 1986 plate “Signs used in the

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1 In K, the Apohasiddhi begins with the first line on folio 1b, in P in the middle of line 1 on folio 32b.
3–5 anyasmād …buddhyākāro vā ] ≈ AP 202,12–13
3–6 nanu ko …pakṣāḥ ] Cf. TBhI 52,7–12
7–8 apohanāmnā …vivakṣitavāt ] = AP 202,13–14
nānagnir na bhavatīti nivṛttimātram āmukhayantī. yac ca pratya-
kṣabādhitam, na tatra sādhanāntarāvakāśa ity atiprasiddham.

[§ 4] atha yady api nivṛttim aham pratyemīti na vikalpāḥ, tathāpi
nivṛttapadārthollekha eva nivṛttyullekhaḥ. na hy antantarbhāvitavi-
śeṇaṇapratītir viśiṣṭapratītih. tato yathā sāmānyam aham pratyemīti
vikalpābhāve 'pi sādhaṁaṅkārāparisphuranād vikalpabuddhiḥ sā-
māṇyaḥ buddhāḥ paresām, tathā nivṛttapratyayāksiptā nivṛttibuddhir
apohapratītivyavahāram ātano tītītītī tītītītī. nanu sādhaṁaṅkārāpari-
ṣphuranāṃ vidhirūpatayā yadi sāmānyabodhavyavasthā, tat kim āyātām
asphuradabhāvakāre cetasi nivṛttipratītivyavasthāyāḥ. tato nivṛttim
aham pratyemīti evamāṅkārābhāve 'pi nivṛttyāṅkārasphuranāṃ yadi
syāt, ko nāma nivṛttipratītisthītim apalapet. anyathāsati pratītibhāse
tatpratītivyavahārīt iti gavākāre 'pi cetasi turagabodha ity astu.

[§ 5] atha viśeṣaṅtayāntarbhūtā nivṛttipratītīr ity uktām, ta-
thāpi yady agavāpodya itīdrśākāro vikalpāḥ, tado viśeṣaṅtayaḥ
tadanupraveśo bhavatu, kim tu gaur iti pratiṣṭhī. tado ca sato 'pi

13 °padārtho° ] == K; pa((xthā)→ (+dā))rtho P
15 °pari° ] == K ←→ n. e. P
16 nivṛtta° ] == KP ←→ nimitta Š — Š acc. to ASi 1, n. 2.
21 apalapet ] em. ←→ apalepet P;
25 ca ] == K ←→ n. e. P

8–10 parvatoddése ...āmukhayantī ] Cf. ĀTV 112,9–10 (ĀTV 1 278,6–8)
8–11 pratibādhitaivāt ...sādhanāntarāvakāśa ] ≈ AP 201,9–12
12–19 yady api ...vyavasthāyāḥ ] ≈ĀTV 112,11–113,7 (ĀTV 1 279,17–280,6)
19–22 tato ...astu ] ≈ĀTV 1 113,8–12 (ĀTV 1 282,2–5)
24–25 agavāpo° ...pratītī ] ≈ĀTV 1 113,7–8 (ĀTV 1 282,1)
nīvṛttilakṣaṇasya viśeṣaṇasya tatrānutkalanat katham tatpratītvyavasthā.

§ 6 athaiwam matih — yad vidhirūpaṃ sphuritam, tasya parāpohopanyastithī tatpratītir ucyate, tathāpi sambandhamātram apohasya. vidhir eva sāksaṃnirbhāsī. api caivam adhyakṣasyāpya apohaviṣayatvam anivāryam, viśeṣato vikalpād ekavyāvṛttollekhino 'khilānyavyāvṛttam īkṣaṃmānasya. tasmād vidhyākārāvrahād adhyakṣasad vikalpasyāpi vihivisayatvatvam eva, nānyāpohaviṣayatvam iti katham apohah śabdārtho ghūṣyate.

§ 7 atrābhidhīyate — nāsmābhīr apohaśabdena vidhir eva kevalo 'bhipretah, nāpy anyāvyyāvṛttimātram, kin tv anyāpohaviṣiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānāṃ arthāḥ. tataś ca na pratyekapakṣopanipātidosāvakāśaḥ.

§ 8 yat tu goḥ pratītau na tadātmā parātmeti sāmarthyād apohah paścān niścīyata iti vidhivādināṃ matam, anyāpohapratītau va sāmarthyād anyāpoḍho 'vadhāryata iti pratisedhavādināṃ matam,

26 viśeṣaṇasya ] == P, viśeṣa(+ṇa)
27 yad vidhirūpaṃ ] == P — that this is also how Ś read.
28 sphuritam ] == K<–> P<–> vyā(×··)vṛttollekhino
29 astīti ] == K<–> P<–> asti(x(i)ti K
28 sphuritam ] == K<–> P<–> sphurati P
29 astīti ] == K<–> P<–> astī K
29 tathāpi ] == K<–> P— tadhāpi P
30 vidhir ] == K<–> P— vidher P
30–31 →syāpy apo° em. — →syāpo P;
31 °vyāvṛttollekhino ] == P,
32 'khilānyavyāvṛttam ] == P,
33 'khalānya(?vyāvṛ)ttam K — Worm
34 śabdārtho ] == K<–> P— uda P
35 anyāpohaviṣiṣṭo ...arthaḥ ] Cf. TBh₁ 52,14
36–37 nāpy anyāpohaviṣiṣṭo ...arthaḥ ] Cf. TS₃ 1013a.
38 na tadātmā parātmeti ] Cf. TS₃ 1013a.
38–39 yat tu ...matam ] ≈ AP 206,15–16

12–27 atha ...°pratītvyavasthā ] = AP 201,17–202,4
28–33 yad vidhirūpaṃ ...nānyāpohaviṣayatvam ] ≈ AP 202,7–202,11
36–37 anyāpohaviṣiṣṭo ...arthaḥ ] Cf. TBh₁ 52,14
2. **Text of the *Apohasiddhi***

K2b  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Text of the Apohasiddhi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **tad asundaram**, prāthamikasyāpi pratipattikramādarśanāt. na hi vidhim pratipadya kaścid arthāpattitah paścād apoham avagacchati, apohām vā pratipadyānyāpodham. tasmād goh pratipattir ity anyāpodhapratipattir ucyate. yady api cānyāpodhaśabdānulālekha utkha, tathāpi nāpratipattir eva visēṣanabhubhātasyānyāpohasya, agavāpodha eva gośabdasya nivesitatvāt. yathā nioltpale nivesitād indīvaraś-a-
| **bdān nioltpalapratitau** tatkāla eva nilimaspuruṇam anivāryam, tathā gośabdād apy agavāpodehe nivesitād gopratītaiu tulyakkālam eva visēṣanatvād ago’pohaspuruṇam anivāryam. yathā praty-
| kṣasasya prasajyarūpaḥbhāvavgraṇaḥam abhāvavikalpātādanaaśaktir eva, tathā vidhivikalpānaṁ api tadanurūpānuṣṭhānadānaaśaktir evabhāvavgraṇaḥam abhidhīyate. paryūdāsarūpābhāvavgraṇaḥam tu niyatāsvarūpasamvedanam ubhayor aviṣīṣṭam. anyathā yadi śabdād |

| reads as chosen here, suggesting that | nāpratītir P |
| Š also supports this decision. | 45 °anya° ] == P ←→ (xyā) K |
| 42 pratipadya ] == P, prati(p(ā)→ | 49 ago’poha° ] == K ←→ apoha P |
| pa)dyā K | 51 °dāna° ] == K ←→ n. e. P |

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41 tad asundaram ...ādarśanāt ] ≈ AP 206,16
42 apoham ] AS3 59, n. 2 states that AS1 reads artham, which is not true. Also all the mss support apoham.
43–44 tasmād ...ucyate ] ≈ AP 206,19–20
44–46 yady api ...nivesitatvāt ] ≈ AP 203,16–17
48 nivesitād ] Acc. to AS3 59, n. 4, P reads nivesitatvād. This is not the case.
46–49 yathā nioltpale ...anivāryam ] ≈ AP 203,20–22
38–52 yat tu goh ...abhidhīyate ] ≈ TBh1 52,14–53,12
49–53 yathā pratyakṣasasya ...aviṣīṣṭam ] ≈ AP 205,12–16

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50
arthapratipattikāle kalito na parāpohah, katham anyaparihāreṇa
pravr̥ttih. tato gām badhāneti codito ’śvādīn api badhnīyat.

[§ 9] yad apy avocad vācaspatiḥ — jātimatyo vyaktyayo vikalpānām
śabdānām ca gocaraḥ. tāsām ca tadvatānām rūpam atajātiyaparā-
vr̥ttam ity arthatas tadvagater na gām badhāneti codito ’śvādīn
badhnāti, tad apy anenaiva nirastam. yato jāter adhikāyāḥ prakṣepe

’pi vyaktinām rūpam atajātiyavyāvṛttam eva cet, tadā tenaiva rūpeṇa
śabdavikalpator viṣayibhavanānām katham atadvyāvṛtttiparihāraḥ. K3a

[§ 10] atha na vijātiyavyāvṛttam vyaktrūpam tathāpratītām vā,
tadā jātiprasāda esa iti katham arthato ’pi tavadagatir ity ukta-
prāyam.

[§ 11] atha jātibalād evānyato vyāvṛttam, bhavatu jātibalāt svahetuparamparābalād vānyavyāvṛttam. ubhayathāpi vyāvṛttapratī-

53–54 śabdād artha°] == P <-> 59 anenaiva nirastam ] == P <->
śabdārtha K anenenaiva nirastam K
54 °kāle kalito ] == K <-> 60 °vyāvṛttam eva ] ==
kālakalito P vyā(×(?·))vṛttam e(×tyarthabha)va K
54 katham ] == P, ka(?tha)m K 60 parāvṛttam eva P — AS3 59, n. 9
57 tāsām ca ] == K <-> tāsām P claims “vyāvṛtta” for P. The reference
pa(×rihāre)rāvṛttam K reads as chosen here.
58 arthatas ] == K <-> arthas P — 62 na vijātiyavyāvṛttam ] == K <->
Read as atas in AS3.
59 badhnāti ] == P, ba(×___)dhnāti 65 bhavatu ] == P; bhavatu (×kodo)
K na vijātiyavyāvṛttam P

53–55 yadi śabdād ...badhnīyat ] ≈AP 206,13–14; cf. also AP 206, n. 2
53–55 anyathā ...badhnīyat ] ≈ TBh1 53,12–15
56–59 jātimatyo ...badhnāti ] ≈ NVTT 443,23–444,2
56–64 yad apy ...uktaprāyam ] = AP 206,25–207,4
65 atha ...vyāvṛttam ] ≈ AP 207,5
pattau vyāvṛttyipratipatti asty eva.

P33b  

[§ 12] na cāgo’podhe gośabdasamketavidhāv anyonyāśrayadosaḥ,  
sāmānye tadvati vā samkete ’pi taddośāvakāsāt. na hi sāmānyam  
nāma sāmānyamātram abhipretam, turage ’pi gośabdasamketapra-  
saṅgat, kim tu gotvam. tāvatā ca sa eva doṣaḥ, gavāparijñāne  
gotvasāmānyāparijñānāt, gotvasāmānyāparijñāne gośabdavācyāpari-  
>jñānāt. tasmād ekapiṇḍadaršanapūrvako yaḥ sarvavyaktisādhārana  
iva bahir adhyasto vikalpabuddhākārah, tatrāyaṁ gaur iti samke-  
takarane netaretarāśrayadosaḥ. abhimate ca gośabdapravṛttāv  
agośabdena śeṣasyāpy abhidhānam ucitam.

[§ 13] na cānyāpoḍhānyāpoḥahayor virodho viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇa-  
bhāvakṣatir vā, parasparavyāvacedābhāvāt, sāmānādhikaranyasa-  
dbhāvāt bhūtalaghatābhāvavat. svābhāvena hi virodhaḥ, na parā-  
bhāvenety abālaprasiddham.

[§ 14] eṣa panthāḥ śrughnam upatiṣṭhata ity atrāpy apoho ga-  
myata eva, prakṛtapatathāntarāpekṣāya eṣa eva, śrughnapratyanī-

66–67 °pratipattau  
vyāvṛtтипратипаттir ] = K ↔  
pratipattau vyāvrūttripatitir P  
reads as accepted here, suggesting  
that Ś also supports this reading.
68 cāgo’podhe ] = K ↔  
viśeṣaṇabhāva° ] = P Ś ↔  
cāgavāpodha P — AS3 reads  
visēṣana K — Ś acc. to AS1 5, n. 1.
73 °pindada° ] = P, p(?i)nda(d(xe)  
81 eṣa ] = K ↔ āyam P  
→da) K  
82 prakṛta° ] = prakṛta P prakṛta  
Ś ↔ aprakṛta K — Ś acc. to AS1 5, 
77 °āpoḍhānyāpoḥahayor ] = K ↔  
n. 2  
āpoḍhānyāpoḥahayor P — AS1 5,14

68–73 na cā°...°vācyāparijñānāt } ∼ AP 203,23–204,2  
73–75 tasmād °doṣaḥ ] Cf. AP 204,2–12  
75–76 abhimate °abhidhānam } ∼ AP 204,13–14  
77–80 na cā °prasiddham ] Cf. AP 206,1
kāniṣṭasthāṇāpekṣayā śrughnam eva, aranyamārgavad vicchedābhāvā upatiṣṭhata eva, sārthadūtādvivaṭham eva, pratipādām vyavacchedasya sulabhatvāt. tasmād apohadharmano vidhirūpasya śabdād avagathī, pūndarikaśabdād īva śvetimaviśiṣṭasya padmasya.

[§ 15] yady evam vidhir ēva śabdārtho vaktum ucitah, katham apoḥo gīyata iti cet, uktam ātra — apohaśabdenānyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhir ucyrate. tatra vidhau pratīyamāne viśeṣanatayā tulyakālam anyāpohapratītir iti. na caivaṃ pratyakṣasyāpy apohavisayatvavyavasthā kartum ucitā, tasya śabdapratyayasyeva vastuvisayatve vi-vādābhāvāt. vidhisābdena ca yathādhyavasāyam atādṛūpaparā-vrtto bāhyo ’rtho ’bhimateh, yathāpratibhāsām buddhākāraś ca. tatra bāhyo ’rtho ’dhyavasāyād eva śabdāvācyo vyavasthāpyate, na svalakṣanda pariṣṭhyā, pratyakṣavad desakālāvasthāniyataprayaktasvalakṣandāphurāṇāt. yac chāśaṛ —

[§ 16] śabdenāvyāpṛtākṣasya buddhāv apratibhāsanāt | arthasya drśṭāv ivā


2. **Text of the *Apohasiddhi***

iti.

[§ 17] indriyaśabdasvabhāvopāyabhedād ekasyaivārthasya prati-

bhāsabhedā iti cet. atrāpy uktam —

[§ 18] jāto nāmāśrayo 'nyānyaś cetasām tasya vastunāḥ |

ekasyaiva kuto rūpam bhinnākārāvabhāsi tat |

[§ 19] na hi spaṣṭāspaṣte dve rūpe parasparaviruddhe ekasya

vastunāḥ staḥ, yata ekenendriyabuddhau pratibhāsetānyena vikalpe,

P34a
tathā satī vastuna eva bhedaprāpte. na hi svarūpabhedād aparā va-

K4a

vastubhedāḥ. na ca pratibhāsabhedād aparāh svarūpabhedāḥ. anyathā
trailokyam ekam eva vastu syāt.

[§ 20] dūrāsannadeśavartinoḥ puruṣayakatra śākhini spaṣṭa-

spaṣṭapratibhāsabhede 'pi na śākhibheda iti cet. na brūmah — prati-
bhāsabhede bhinnavastunityataḥ, kim tv — ekvāyatvabhāvaniyata

iti. tato yatārthakriyābhedādisacivāḥ pratibhāsabhedah, tatra

vastubhedah, ghaṭavat. anyatra punar niyamanvākvisayatām pari-


syaiwa K — Ś acc. to AS, 6, n. 1 106 yata ] == K <-> yad P


avabhāsi yat P 114 ghaṭavat ] == K <-> n. e. P


95–100 bāhyo ...iti ] ≈ TBhI 53,15–54,2
97–102 yac chāstram ...iti cet ] ≈ AP 208,16–19
103–104 jāto ...bhinnākārāvabhāsi tat ] = PV III 235
102–109 atrāpy ...vastu syāt ] = AP 208,20–209,1
110–111 dūrāsannadeśa ...na śākhibheda ] ≈ AP 209,2
111–113 na brūmah ...niyata iti ] = AP 209,5–6
haratīty ekapratibhāso bhrāntaḥ.

[§ 21] etena yad āha vācaspatiḥ — na ca śabdapratyakṣayor vastugocaratve prayayābhedah, kāraṇabhedena pāroksyāpāroksyabhedopapatter iti, tan nopayogi, parokṣapratrayayasya vastugocaratvāsamarthanat. parokṣatāśrayas tu kāraṇabheda indriyagocaragrahaṇavirāheṇaiva kṛtārthaḥ. tan na śabd bhāvaye svalakṣanam pariṣphurati.

[§ 22] kim ca svalaṅkṣanatmanī vastunī vācye sarvātmanā prati-patter vidhiniśedhayor ayogaḥ. tasya hi sadbhāve ’stīti vyartham, nāstīty asamartham. asadbhāve tu nāstīti vyartham, astīty asamartaḥ. astī cāstīyādipadaprayogaḥ. tasmāc chābdapratibhāsasya bāhyārthabhāvabhāvasādhāranyam na tadvisayatāṁ kṣamate.

[§ 23] yac ca vācaspatinā jātimadvayaktivacyatāṁ svavācaiva prastutyānantaram eva — na ca śabdārthasya jāter bhāvabhāvasādhāranyam nopapadyate. sā hi svarūpato nityāpi deśakālavi

116 śabdapratyakṣayor ] == K \(<->\) 125 cāstyādi° ] == K \(<->\) cātyādi P
śabdapratyakṣayor P — JNĀ, ms 11b6
supports śabdapratyakṣayor, but
AS1 7,14–15 (and perhaps also Ś) 125 tasmāc chābdā° ] == P \(<->\)
supports accepted reading.
122–123 pratipatter vidhi° ] == K
<-> pratipatte vidhe P
124 tu ] == P Ś \(<->\) n. e. K — Ś
acc. to AS1 8, n. 1.

113–115 tato ...bhrāntaḥ ] ≈ AP 209,12–14
116–118 na ca śabdā°...bhedopapatter ] ≈ NVTT 115,8–10
116–120 etena ...kṛtārthaḥ ] ≈ AP 210,3–5
120–121 tan na ...parisphurati ] Cf. AP 210,1–2
122–125 kim ca ...prayogah ] ≈ TBh1 54,3–6
122–126 kim ...kṣamate ] Cf. AP 211,1–6
127–128 svavācaiva prastutyānantaram ] Cf. line 56 on p. 51
prakīrṇānekavyaktyāśrayatayā bhāvabhāvasādhāranībhavanty a-

K4b

130 stināsambandhayogyā. vartamānavyaktisambandhitā hi jāter

130 astitā, atītānāgatavyaktisambandhitā ca nāstiteti sandīghavyatire-

kitvād anaiakāntikam bhāvabhāvasādhāranyam, anyathāsiddham

veti vilapitam, tad aprastutam. tāvatā tāvan na prakṛtakṣatih,

jātau bharam nyasyatā svalakṣanāvācyatvasya svayam svīkārāt.

kim ca sarvatra padārthasya svalakṣaṇasvarūpenaivāstitvādikam

cintyate. jātes tu vartamānādityaktyaśambandho ’stitvādikam iti tu

bālapratāraṇam. evam jātimadyaktivacane ’pi doṣah. vyakteś cet

131 stinā stisambandhayogyā. vartamānavyaktisambandhitā hi jāter

131 astitā, atītānāgatavyaktisambandhitā ca nāstiteti sandīghavyatire-

kitvād anaiakāntikam bhāa. vartamānavyaktisambandhitā hi jāter

131 astitā, atītānāgatavyaktisambandhitā ca nāstiteti sandīghavyatire-

kitvād anaiakāntikam bhāa. vartamānavyaktisambandhitā hi jāter

Judging from the amount of space,

the first option is more likely: on

average, six aksaras are missing on
each line of this folio, and without a
tāvatā, there would be approximately
enough space for

vi-la-pi-tām-ta-da-pra-stu-ta-m, i.e.,

ca. nine aksaras. A tāvatā would

hardly have fit in addition.

135 bharam nyasyatā } == K <->
bharam nyasyatāpi P

136 svalakṣaṇasvarūpenaivā° } == K

<-> svarūpenaivā P — The intent of

AS1, 8, n. 4 is somewhat unclear,
suggesting that Ś reads either

svalakṣaṇarūpenaivā, or, possibly,

sva”rūpenaivā here. It simply says

ru”penaivā (and the ṇai is so badly

legible it could also be interpreted as

a ne).

128–134 na ca ...anyathāsiddham ve° } ≈ NVTT 444,2–6

127–135 yacca vācaspatinā ...svīkārāt } ≈ AP 211,7–13

137 iti tu ] In his handwritten notes on AS1, Frauwallner questions the tu here.
pratītisiddhiḥ, jātir adhikā pratīyatām mā vā, na tu vyaktipratītidosān muktīḥ.

[§ 24] etena yad ucyate kaumārilaiḥ — sabhāgatvād eva vastuno na sādhāranyadoṣaḥ. vrksatvam hy anirdhāritabhāvabhbhavam sabdād avagamyate. tayor anyatareṇa ṣabdāntarāvagatena sambadhya iti, tad apy asaṅgatam, sāmānyasya nityasya pratipattāv anirdhārita-bhāvabhbhāvatvāyogāt.

[§ 25] yac cedam — na ca pratyakṣasyeva ṣabdāṇām arthaprātya-yanapraṇāraḥ, yena taddṛṣṭa ivāṣṭyādiṣabdāpeksā na syāt, vicitraśaktitvāt pramāṇānām iti, tad apy aindriyakaśabdapratībhāsayaero ekasvarūpāgrāhitve bhinnāvabhāsādūṣṣaṇena dūṣitam. vicitraśaktivtvām ca pramāṇānāṃ sāksātkaṃdhavyavasāyābhāyām api caritārtham. tato yadi pratyakṣārthapratipādanam śabdāna, tadvad evāvabhāhā syāt. abhavamś ca na tadviṣayakhyāpanam kṣamate.

[§ 26] nanu vrksāsabdena vrksatvāṁse codite sattvādyamśani-ścayanārtham astyādīpadaprayoga iti cet, nirṇāṃsātvena pratyakṣa.
2. Text of the *Apohasiddhi*

kṣasamadhigatasya svalakṣaṇasya ko ’vakāṣaḥ padāntareṇa dhammāntaravidhiniḥdahayoh pramāṇāntareṇa vā. pratyakṣe ’pi pramāṇāntarāpekṣā dṛṣṭetī cet, bhavatu, tasyāniścayātmatkavād anabhyaastasvarūpaviṣaye. vikalpas tu svayaṃ niścayātmako yatra grāhī, tatra kim apanēṇa. asti ca śabdaliṅgāntarāpekṣā. tato na vastusvarūpagrahaḥ.

[§ 27] nanu bhinnā jātyādayo dharmāḥ parasparam dharmiṇaḥ ceti jātilakṣaṇaikadharmadvāreṇa praṭīte ’pi śākhini dharmāntara-vattayā na praṭītītītir ikiṃ na bhinnābhīdhānādhiṇo dharmāntarasya nīlaloccaistataravāder avabodhaḥ. tad etad asaṅgatam, akhaṇḍa-tmanāḥ svalakṣaṇasya pratyakṣe pratibhāsād drṣyasya dharmadharmibhedasya pratyaksapratikṣiptvatvā. anyathā sarvam sarvatra syād ity atiprasaṅgaḥ. kālpanikabhedāśrayas tu dharmadharmivyavahāra iti prasādhitam śāstre.

[§ 28] bhavatu vā pāramārthiko dharmadharmibhedah, tathāpy anayoḥ samavāyāder duṣitatvād upakāralakṣaṇaiva pratyāsattir

ātmatvād K — AS, 15,14 reads as K. ⁰ārthiko ’pi dharma P
<→ pratyakṣe ’pi pratibhāsanāt | P 169 dharma° ] == P, dharmm(o→a)
— AS, 1 opts for pratyakṣe ’pi pratibhāsāt. K

154–155 nirāṃśatvena ...svalakṣaṇasya ] Cf. AP 213,10
155–160 ko ’vakāṣaḥ ...vastusvarūpagrahaḥ ] ≈ AP 213,11–14
157–159 tasyā°...aparena ] ≈ TBh 54,11–14
161–164 bhinnā ...avabodhaḥ ] ≈ AP 213,15–17
167–168 kālpanikabhedā ...vyavahāra ] Cf. PVSV 2,22–3,1, and see translation of § 27 for more material.

58
eṣitavyā. evaṃ ca yathendriyapratyāsattāḥ pratyakṣeṇa dharmipratipattau sakalataddharmapratipattih, tathā śabdāṇāṅgabhyaṃ api vācyavācakādisambandhapratibaddhābhyaṃ dharmipratipattau niravaśeṣataddharmapratipattir bhavet, pratyāsattimātrasyāviśeṣat.

[§ 29] yac ca vācaspatiḥ — na caikopādhinā sattvena viśiṣṭe tasmin grhīta upādhyantaraviśiṣṭatadgrahah. svabhāvo hi dravyasyopādhibhir viśisyaṭe, na tūpādhayo vā viśesyatvam vā tasya svabhāva iti, tad api plavata eva. na hy abhedaḥ upādhyantaragrahanām āsaṅjitam, bhedam puraskṛtya ipvāpakārakagrahahān upākāryagrahaṇapradaṇjanāt. na cāgṇidhūmayoh kāryakaranaḥbāva iva svabhavata eva dharmadharminoḥ pratipattiniyamakalpanam ucitam, tayor api pramāṇāsiddhatvāt. pramāṇasiddhe ca svabhāvopavaranānam iti nyāyaḥ.

[§ 30] yac cātra nyāyabhūṣaṇena sūryādigrahaṇaṃ tadupakāryāṣeṣavasturāṣigrahaṇapradaṇjanānman uktam, tad abhiprāyānavaṇaḥ-

173 prati K  178–179 grahaṇam āsaṅjitam ] ==
pratibaddhābhyaṃ P; no ev. K — Since there is no
dharmi K evidence in K, Ś apparently read
gṛhīte(× vi)upādhibhir K
175 sattvena ] == P Ś <− satve K —
vā ṣ 177 viśeṣyatvaṃ ] == P <−
Ś acc. to AS1 10, n. 1. Also
176 gṛhīta ] == K gṛhite(× ) P 179 grahaṇa ] <− grahane K
gṛhite P
176 viśiṣṭatad ] == K <− viśiṣṭas
tad P
181 pratīpatti ] == P <− prati K —
176–177 dravyasyopādhibhir ] == P 182 tayor api ] == K <−
dravyasya(xv)upādhibhir K
tayorāyāpi P
177 viśisyaṭe ] == P <− viśeṣyate K
181–182 tayor api ] == K <−
presas(×ṅgaḥ)ṇjanam K

175–177 na caikopādhinā ...svabhāva ] ≈ NVṬṭ 115,10–13
175–180 yac ca ...prasāṇjanāt ] ≈ AP 215,3–6
184–185 sūryādigrahaṇaḥ ...prasāṇjanānman ] ≈ NBhūṣ 247, 2
phalam. tathā hi tvanmate dharman dharmāṁśor bheda upakārala-
<kṣanaiva ca pratyāsattih. tadopakārakagrāhane samānadeśasyaiva
dharmarūpasyaiva copākāryasya grahaṇam āśāṅjitam. tat kathām
sūryopakāryasya bhinnadeśasya dravyāntarasya vā drṣṭavyabhicā-
rasya grahaṇaprasaṅgāḥ saṅgataḥ.

[§ 31] tasmād ekadharmadvāreṇāpi vastusvarūpaprātipattau
sarvāṅmaprātiṣeṣṭa kva śabdāntareṇā vaidhiniṣedhāvakaśaḥ. asti
tva. tasmān na svalakṣaṇasya śabdavikalpaṅgaprātipāḥsvitvam iti
sthitam.

[§ 32] nāpi sāmānyam śabdaprātyayaprātipāḥsvi. saritaḥ pāre
gāvaś carantīti gavāśīsword sāsnāśringalāṅguḷādayo 'ksarākārapa-
rikaritāḥ sajātyabhedāparāmarśanāt sampiṇḍitaprāyāḥ pratibhā-
sante. na ca tad eva sāmānyam.

186 tvanmate dharma] == K <-->
197 əparāmarśanāt] == K <-->
tvanmate yadā dharmma P
āparāmarśāt P — AS₃ 63, n. 4
reports the reading vamarśāt for P.
192 əprātiṣeṭ] == K <-->
197 sampiṇḍita] == K <-->
pratipattih.
p — Acc. to AS₃ 63, n. 3, P reads
sampiṇḍita P — In P, the point
pratipatteh.
where the āksara in the bottom
195 əprātipāḥsvi] == P (+prati)bhāsi
margin is to be inserted is not clearly
K
marked, but this is the most likely
196 əlāṅguḷādayo 'ksarā] == K <-->
place.
lāṅguḷādayo 'ksarā P
184–186 yac cātra ...əphalam] ≈ AP 215,8–9
191–192 tasmād ...əavakāśaḥ] ≈ AP 218,22–23
193–194 tasmān na ...sthitam] ≈ AP 219,23–24
[§ 33] varṇākṛtyaśarākāraśūnyam gotvaṁ hi kathyate

[§ 34] tad eva ca sāsnāśrigādimātram akhilavyaktāv atyantavi-
laksanam api svalaksanenaikīkriyamānanāṃ sāmāyan ity ucyate.
tādrāsya bāhzyāprāptā bhṛantir evāsau keśapratibhāsavat. ta-
smād vāsanāvaśād buddher eva tadātmanā vivarto ’yam astu, asad
eva vā tadrūpam khyātu, vyaktyaya eva vā sajātīyabhedatiraskā-
renānyathā bhāsantām anubhavavyavadhānāt, smṛtipramoṣo vābhi-
dhīyatām. sarvathā nirvisayāḥ khalv ayam sāmānyapratyayah. kva
sāmānyavārtā.

[§ 35] yat punah sāmānyābhave sāmānyapratyayasyā-
kasmikatvam uktam, tad ayuktam, yataḥ pūrvapiṇḍadarśana-
raṇasahakāriṇātiricyamānā viśeṣapratyayajanikā sāmagrī nirvi-

199 kathyate] == K <> vakṣyate P
200 ca ] == K <> n. e. P
202 °āprāptā bhṛantir ] == K <>
āprāpte bhṛantir P
202 evāsau ] == P, e(×ṣai)vāsau K
204 eva vā tad° ] == P Ś <> evātad
K — Ś acc. to AS1 12, n. 1.
204 vā2 ] == P Ś <> n. e. K — Ś
acc. to AS1 12, n. 2.
205 anubhava° ] == K <>
anubhava(+sya4) P — The addition in
P is written in the top margin, directly above this passage. The

199 varnā ...kathyate] ≈PV III 147cd (varṇyate instead of kathyate)
195–199 nāpi ...kathyate] ≈ AP 220,2–5
200–201 tad eva ca ...ucyate ] ≈ AP 220,8–9
202 tādrāsya ...°bhāsavat] ≈ AP 220,15–16
202–207 tasmād ...sāmānyavārtā] ≈ AP 220,23–221,1
208–209 yat punah ...tad ayuktam] ≈ AP 221,11
Text of the *Aphoasiddhi*

ência samayavikalpam utpadayati. tad evaḥ na sabdaratyaye jātih pratiḥāti, nāpi pratyakṣe.

[§ 36] na cānumāṇato ’pi siddhiḥ, adṛṣyatve pratibhaddhalinggā-darśānāt. nāpindriyavad asyāḥ siddhiḥ, jñānakāryataḥ kādācitka-syaiva nimittāntarasya siddheḥ. yadāpi piṇḍāntare ’ntarāle vā gobuddher abhāvam darśayet, tadā śābaleyādisakalagopinḍānām evābhāvād abhāvo gobuddher upapadyamānāḥ katham arthaṃtaram ākṣipet. atha gotvād eva govinḍaḥ, anyathā turago ’pi govinḍaḥ syāt.

P35b yady evam, govinḍaḥ eva gotvam, anyathā turagatvam api gotvam syāt. tasmāt kāraṇaparamparāta eva govinḍaḥ, gotvam tu bhavatu mā vā.

[§ 37] nanu sāmanyakratyayajananasāmartyaṃ yady ekasmāt pinnād abhinnam, tadā vijātiyavyāvrtaṃ piṇḍāntaram asamārtham. atha bhinnam, tadā tad eva sāmanyam, nāmni param vivāda iti cet, abhinnāiva sā saktiḥ prati vastu. yathā tv ekah śaktasvabhāvo bhāvah, tathāno ’pi bhavan kidṛṣaṃ doṣaṃ āvahati. yathā bhavatāṃ jātīr ekāpi samānadhvaniprasavahetuḥ, anyāpi svarūpenaiva jātyanta-

215 yadāpi | == K <-> yadā P
218 gotvād | == gotvād P
219 turagatvam | == K, tura(+(?ga))
220 tu | == K <-> n. e. P

209–211 yataḥ ...utpadayati] ≈ AP 221,13–14
213–215 na cā...siddheḥ] Cf. AP 221,17–20
215–221 yadāpi ...bhavatu mā vā] ≈ AP 221,20–25
226–227 jātīr ...prasavahetuḥ] ≈ NSūTh 2.2.69
ranirapekṣā, tathāsmākaṃ vyaktir api jātinirapekṣā svarūpeṇaiva bhinnā hetuḥ.

[§ 38] yat tu trilocanaḥ — aśvatvagotvādināṃ sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ svāśrayeṣu samavāyāḥ sāmānyam sāmānyam ity abhidhānapratya-yayor nimittam iti. yady evam vyaktiṣv apy ayam eva tathābhi-dhānapratyayahetur astu, kim sāmānyasvīkārapramādena. na ca samavāyāḥ sambhavī —

[§ 39] iheti buddheḥ samavāyasiddhir iheti dhīś ca
dvayadarśane syāt | na ca kvacit tadviṣaye dvayekṣā svakalpanāmātram ato
'bhyupāyah | |

[§ 40] etena yeṣam pratyayānuvṛttir anuvṛttavastvanuyā-yini katham atyantabhedinīṣu vyaktisu vyāvṛttaviṣayapratyaya-bhāvānupātiniṣu bhavitum arhatity āhāpravartanam asya pratyā-

230 aśvatva°] == P <-> aśvatvaṃ K
evācanena P
231 svāśrayeṣu ] == Ś <-> svāśraye K <-> svavāśrayeṣu P — Ś acc. to
darśanena P
AS1 13, n. 1.
231 sāmānyam ] == K <-> n. e. P
— K puts a danda after this
sāmānyam.

222–229 nanu...hetuḥ ] ≈ AP 222,3–8
230 yat tu ] All available mss support yat tu, but Thakur 1975a: 64, n. 1 reports the reading yac ca for P.
230–232 yat tu ...nimittam iti ] ≈ AP 222,10–11
235–236 iheti ...bhyupāyah ] = KBhV 70,13–14
2. Text of the *Aphohasiddhi*

\[ \text{§ 41] yat punar anena viparyaye bādhakam utkam — abhidhānapratyayānuvrīttīḥ kutaścīn nivrtya kvacid eva bhavantī nimmattavati, na cānyan nimittam ityādi, tan na samyak, anuvṛttam antarenāpy abhidhānapratyayānuvrītter atadrūpaparāvṛttasvarūpavīśeśād avaśyam svīkārasya sādhitatvāt. tasmāt — } \]

\( K7a \)

\[ \text{§ 42] tulye bhede yāyā jātiḥ pratyāsattāḥ prasarpati | kvacīn nānyatra saivaśtu śabdajñānanibandhanam | | } \]

\[ \text{§ 43] yat punar atra nyāyabhūṣanenoktam — na hy evaṃ bhavati — yaya pratyāsattāḥ daṇḍasūtrādikam prasarpati kvacīn, nānyatra, saiva pratyāsattīḥ puruṣasphatikādīsu daṇḍisūtritvādivyavaḥāranibandhanam astu. kim daṇḍasūtrādineti, tad asaṅgatam — daṇḍasūtrayor hi puruṣasphatikapratyāsannayor drṣṭayor daṇḍisūtripratyayahetutvaṃ nāpalapyate. sāmānya tu svapne 'pi na drṣṭam. tad yadīdām parikalpanīyam, tadā varāṃ pratyāsattīr eva } \]

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242 anena ] == K ↔ anana P
250 °sūtrādikam ] == K ↔ sūtrādi
P — In the pictures of P, the position of the label identifying the batch of folios ("5B") in the top margin of P 35b covers the place where a marginal correction should be expected.

237–241 etena ...vyabhicārāt ] ≈ AP 222,23–25
242–246 yat punar ...tasmāt ] ≈ AP 223,15–18
247–248 tulye bhede ..."nibandhanam ] = PV I 162 = AP 224,6–7
249–252 yat punar ...daṇḍasūtrādineti ] ≈ AP 224,10–12
249–252 na hy evaṃ ...kim daṇḍasūtrādineti ] = NBhūṣ 261,5–7
sāmānyapratyayahetuḥ parikalpyatām. kim gurvyā parikalpanayety abhiprayaparijñānāt.

§ 44 athedaṃ jātiprasādhakam anumānam abhidhiyate — yad viśeṣajñānam, tad viśeṣanagrāhānāntarīyakam, yathā dandi- jñānām. viśeṣajñānam cedām gaur ayam ity arthataḥ kāryahetuḥ. viśeṣanānubhavakāryam hi drśṭante viśeṣabuddhiḥ siddheti. atrā- nuyogah — viśeṣabuddher bhinnaviśeṣanagrāhānāntarīyakatvam vā sādhyam viśeṣanamātrānubhavānāntarīyakatvam vā.

§ 45 prathamapakṣe pakṣasya prayākṣabādāhā śādhanāva- dhānam anavakāsāyati, vastugrāhiṇaḥ prayākṣasyabhāyapyra- bhāsābhāvāt. viśeṣabuddhitvam ca sāmānyam. hetur aikāntikāh, bhinnaviśeṣanagrāhānam antarenāpi darśanāt, yathā svarūpavān ghataḥ, gotvam sāmānyam iti vā.

§ 46 dvitīyapakṣe tu siddhasādhanam, svarūpavān Ghana ityādi- vād gotvajātīmān pinda iti parikalpitaḥ bhedam upāḍāya viśeṣan- viśeṣyabhāvasyeṣṭatvād agovyāvṛttānubhavabhāvitvād gaur ayam iti

265 pratyakṣaṃabhādāhā śādhanāva- dhānam anavakāsāyati, vastugrāhiṇaḥ pratyakṣaṃabhāyapyrabhāsābhāvāt. viśeṣabuddhitvam ca sāmānyam. hetur aikāntikāh, bhinnaviśeṣanagrāhānam antarenāpi darśanāt, yathā svarūpavān ghataḥ, gotvam sāmānyam iti vā.

§ 46 dvitīyapakṣe tu siddhasādhanam, svarūpavān ghaṭa ityādi-

vād gotvajātimān pinda iti parikalpitaḥ bhedam upāḍāya viśeṣana-
viśeṣyabhāvasyeṣṭatvād agovyāvṛttānubhavabhāvitvād gaur ayam iti

266 sāmānyam. hetur ] == K <->
267 sāmānyahetur P
268 gotvam ] == K <-> gotva P
269 dvitīya° ] == K <-> dvitīye P
270 gotva° ] == P, go(+tva7) K
271 °anubhavabhāvitvād ] == K,

258–260 athedaṃ ...°hetuḥ ] ≈ TBh 55,17–56,1
vyavahārasya.

[§ 47] tad evaṃ na sāmānyasiddhiḥ. bādhakam ca sāmānyagunakarmādyupādhicakrasya kevalavyaktigrāhakaṃ paṭupratyakṣam drśyānupalambho vā prasiddhah. 275

[§ 48] tad evaṃ vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ. sa ca bāhyo ’rtho buddhyākāraś ca vivakṣītaḥ. tatra na buddhyākārasya tattvatah sāṃvṛtyā vā vidhiniṣedhau, svasamvedanapratyakṣagamyatvād anadhyavasāyāc ca. nāpi tattvato bāhyasyāpi vidhiniṣedhau, tasya śābde pratyaye ’pratibhāsanāt. ata eva sarvadharinām tattvato ’nabhilāpyatvam, 280

pratibhāsādhyavasāyābhāvāt. tasmād bāhyasyaiva sāṃvṛtau vidhiniṣedhau, anyathā saṃvyavahārahāniprasaṅgāt.

[§ 49] tad evaṃ

258–272 athedaṃ...vyavahārasya] ≈ AP 225,1–9
261–272 atrānuyogah...vyavahārasya] ≈ TBh I 56,2–10
276–279 tad evaṃ...vidhiniṣedhau] Cf. AP 229,6–15
282 anyathā...°prasaṅgāt] = AP 229,15
nākārasya na bāhyasya tattvato vidhisādhanam |

bahir eva hi saṃvṛtyā saṃvṛtyāpi tu nākṛteḥ ||

[§ 50] etena yad dharmottaraḥ — āropitasya bāhyatvavidhini-

śedhāv ity alaukikam anāgāmam atārkikiyam kathayati, tad

apahastitam.

[§ 51] nanv adhyavasāye yady adhyavaseyam vastu na sphurati,

tadā tad adhyavasitam iti ko ’rthah. apratibhāse ’pi pravṛttiviṣa-
yikrtam iti yo ’rthah, apratibhāsāviṣeṣe viṣayāntaraparihāreṇa

kathāṃ niyatavisṇyā pravṛttir iti cet, ucyate — yady api viśvam

agrhītam, tathāpi vikalpaśya niyatāsamagrīprasūtātvena niyatā-
kāratavyā niyatāsaktīvāt niyata eva jalādau pravṛttih, dhūmasya

| 284 °sādhanam | em. <-> | 287 alaukikam | == P, |
| sādhanama K <-> bādhanam P | alaukika(×h)m K |
| bādhanām Ś — Ś acc. to AS₁ 16, n. 3. | 287–288 tad apa° | == | tad apa K |
| 286 etena | == P, ete((×nāropita)→ na) K | <-| tad apya P |
| 286 bāhyatvavidhi° | == | P — It is not certain that the addition |
| bāhyatvavidhi P Ś <-> | belongs here. |
| 286 °viṣeṣe | == | 291 °viṣeṣe | == K <-> viṣeṣe (?(+pi)) |
| 290–291 apratibhāse...°kṛtam | == | 292–294 yadyapi...pravṛttiḥ | == niyata eva P, |
| apratibhāse viṣeṣe viṣayāntaraparihāreṇa | niyata (+°evat) K — AS₁ reads niyatā |
| kathāṃ niyatavisṇyā pravṛttir iti cet, | eva, without noting variants. |
2. Text of the *Apohasiddhi*

paroksāñjñānānajanānanavat.

K8a  [§ 52] niyataśaktayo hi bhāvāḥ pramanāpariniśthitasvabhāvāḥ,

P36b  na śaktisāmkaryaparyanuyogabhājāḥ. tasmāt tadadhyaivasāyitvam
akāraviśeṣayogat tatpravṛttijanakatvam. na ca sādrśyād āropena
pravṛttim brūmah, yenākāre bhyasya bhyhe vākārasyāropadvārena
duṣanāvakāsāḥ, kim tarhi svavāsanāvipākavāsād upajāyamānaiva

294–295 dhūmasya
paroksāñjñānānajanānanavat] == Ś
<→ (+v(?asadut)pattivat7) yadyapi
vahnav dhūmasya
trailokyasyābhāvas tathāpi tato
dhūma(+syaitotpādo nānasya) K
<→ yathā vahnav dhūmaghatādyor
asatvepi dhūma evotpadyate na
ghaṭādīh P — Ś acc. to AS1 17,9–10,
and n. 1. Concerning K: The phrase is
written over an older, deleted version.
The new writing is much more
condensed than in the rest of the ms.
This suggests that the reading now
found in K is significantly longer than
the one replaced by it, and makes it
hard to judge whether it was written
in a different hand. AS1 17, n. 1
reports “asadāpattivat.” for K. This
addition in the bottom margin of K 7b
is not clearly legible. Cf. also
AP 226,5, asadatpattivat. Contrary to
the presentation in AS1, no danda is
visible after the addition, but only a
“7”, indexing the addition to the line
where it should be entered.

296 niyataśaktayo] em. <→
niyatavisayā K niyatavisayā P — Cf.
CAPV 138,5–6: “niyataśaktayo bhāvā
hi pramanāpariniśthitasvabhāvāḥ,
na śaktisāmkaryaparyanuyogabhājāḥ
...”; AP 226,3–4: “niyataśaktayo hi
bhāvāḥ
pramanāpariniśthitasvabhāvā na
śaktisāmkaryaparyanuyogabhājāḥ ....”
The context is the same as here in
both cases.

297 tadadhyaivasāyitvam] == P,
tadadhya(+vasā)yitvam K <→
adhyasāyitvam Š — Š reads tasmāt
acc. to AS1 17, n. 2.

298 “viśeṣayo”] == P,
viṣe(xsay)soy K
300 svavāsanā°] == K <→ vāsanā
P
300 “vipāka”°] == K <→ paripāka P

296–297 niyataśaktayo ...“bhājāḥ] = AP 226,3–4; Cf. CAPV 138,5–6
buddhir apaśyanty api bāhyam bāhye pravṛttim ātanotīti viplutaiva.

[§ 53] tad evam anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo vijātivyāṛṭto 'ṛtho vidhiḥ. sa eva cāpohasaṃbadavācayaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ pravṛttinivṛttiveṣayaḥ ceti sthitam.

[§ 54] atra prayogaḥ — yad vācakam, tat sarvam adhyavasitādṛṣṭaparavṛttavastumātraghocaram, yatheha kūpe jalam iti vacanam. vācakam cedam gavādiśabdarūpam iti svabhāvahetuh. nāyam asiddhaḥ, pūrvoktena nyāyena pāramārthikavācyavācaka-bhāvasyābhāve 'py adhyāvasāyakṛtasyaiva sarvavyavahāribhir ava-śya svīkārtyaavatāt, anyathā sarvavyavahārochchedaprāsaṅgāt. nāpi viruddhaḥ, sapakṣe bhāvāt. na cānakāntikaḥ. tathā hi śabdānām adhyāvastīvijātivyāṛttavastumātravisayatvatvam anicchadbhiḥ paramārthato

[§ 55] vācyam svalaṃśanam upādhir upādhiyogah sopādhir astu yadi vākṛtir astu buddheḥ |

[§ 56] gatyantarābhaṃvād avisayatve ca vācakatvāyogat. tatra

298–301 na ca ...viplutaiva. ] ≈ AP 226,9–12
308 pūrvoktena nyāyena ] Cf. ll. 167–168.
2. Text of the Apohasiddhi

[§ 57] ādyantayor na samayaḥ phalaśaktihāner madhye 'py upādhivirahāt tritaye na yuktah ||

[§ 58] tad evam vācyāntarasyabhāvād visayavattvalakṣaṇasya vāpakasya nivṛttau vipakṣato nivartamānam vācakatvam adhya-vasitabāhyaviṣayatvena vyāpyata iti vyāptisiddhiḥ.

[§ 59] śabdais tāvan mukhyam ākhyāyate 'rthas tatrāpohas tadgunatvena gamyāḥ |

arthaś caiko 'dhyāsato bhāsato 'nyaḥ sthāpyo vācyas tattvato naiva kaścit ||

Colophon

[§ 60] apohasiddhiḥ samāptā. kṛtir iyaṃ mahāpaṇḍitaratnakīrtipā- dānām.

[§ 61] bhavatv apohe kṛtināṃ prapañco vastusvarūpāśphurānaṃ tu marma |

tatrādṛḍhesarvam ayatnaśirnaṃ drṛthe tu sausthyāṃ nanu tāvataiva ||

317–318 ṣaṃkṣaṇasya vyāpakasya] colophon, i.e., after parirakṣaṇiyah in l. 327, and marked as an insertion that should follow siddhiḥ, l. 319.

em. <-> lakṣaṇasya vyākasya K <-> lakṣaṇavyāpakasya P — 322 ṣaṃpanḍita] == P; pand(?i)ta K 322–323 apohasiddhiḥ


319 ṣaṃkṣaṇasya vyāpakasya] == P, n.e. Ś — Ś acc. to AS1, 19, 1. In K n.e. śaṃkṣaṇasya vyāpakasya K <-> n.e. P this verse is written after the

320–321 śabdais ...kaścit] = AP 203,1–4 = SR 712,4–6

324–325 bhavatv apohe ...tāvataiva] = AP 232,12–15

70
§ 62] sampūrṇarātriprahāradvayena kīrter aṣṭavyā likhitāḥ
sukhena |
trailokyadattena parātmahetor yatnād ato 'yaṁ
parirakṣāṇīyaḥ ||

324–327 bhavatv apohe
...parirakṣāṇīyaḥ ] == K <->
and torya), I follow the suggestions in
n. e. P n. e. Ś — Ś acc. to ASI 19, n.
327 parirakṣāṇīyaḥ ] == n. e. P
2. For the syllables missing in K (va
<->  •  ||  * K

71
2. Variants in the Nepalese manuscripts

This section lists the main variants found in the manuscripts N₁ and N₂, alongside the material presented in the critical edition above. Even though the Nepalese manuscripts derive from the edition AS₁ (see above, section 1.3.1) and therefore do not provide evidence useful for the present critical edition, the material shown here provides insight into how an edition of a Sanskrit text, AS₁, was copied in fairly recent times (after 1910).

1 [variant] == K [variant] N₁; N₂ N₃; n. e. P
1 namah śrīlokanāthāya] == K N₁, namah śrīlokanāthāyah N₂, namah śrīlokanāthāyi(?xh)) N₃ <-> namas tārayai P
2 apohaḥ śabdārtho] == K P N₂ N₃ <-> apohaśabdārtha N₁
3 apohyaṭe] == K P <-> apohyateḥ N₁ apohyaṭeh N₂ <-> ayohyateḥ N₃
4 apohyaṭe] == K P <-> apohyateḥ N₁ apohyateḥ N₂ <-> ayohyateḥ N₃ — AS₁ 1.5 separates the variants with semicolons, graphically similar to the visarga.
6 apoha] == K P N₂ N₃, a((xha(+2) | po(+1))→(+poha)) N₁
9 evolikhanti] == K P <-> evolikhayanti N₁ <-> evolikhanti N₂ <-> evolikhantī N₃
9 lakṣyate] == K P N₂ <-> lakṣyateḥ N₁ <-> lakṣate N₃
13 anantarbhāvita°] == K P N₂ N₃ <-> anantabhāvita N₁
14 °pratītir] == K P <-> pratīti N₁ pratīti N₂ pratīti N₃
16 nivrṭta°] == K P N₁ N₂ N₃ <-> nimitta Ś
18 °vyavasthā] == K P N₂ N₃ <-> vyavasthāḥ N₁
21 nivrṭtiprātīti°] == K P N₁ <-> nivrṭtīti N₂ <-> nivrṭi N₃ — In N₂, both i and ī are attached as vowel signs to the same base letter, tt.
23 °tayāntarbhūtā] == K P N₁ <-> tāyā antabhūtā N₂ tāyā antabhūtā N₃
24 āgavāpoda] == P N₂ N₃ <-> āgadāpoda N₁; no ev. K
31 °viṣayatvam anivāryam] == K P N₂ N₃ <-> viṣayanirvāyam N₁
31 °vyāvrvtollekhino] == P N₂, vyā(×··)vṛttollekhino K <-> vyāvṛ(?)tto)lleśino
32 'khilānya(?yāvṛ)ttam K <-> likhānya-vṛtam N₃
35–36 kevalo 'bhipretah] == N₁ P <-> kevalo 'pretah N₂ <-> kevalopretah N₃; no ev. K
38 yat] == K P N₂ <-> yatu N₁ <-> yata N₃
38 parātmeti] == K P N₂ N₃ <-> parātme N₁
38 sāmarthyād] == P N₂ N₃ <-> sāmarthyad N₁; no ev. K
2.1. Variants in the Nepalese manuscripts

40 °dhāryata] == P N; dhārya(t(xe)→ta) K ↔ dhāryate N₂ ↔ dhāryate N₃

41 pratipattikramā°] == N₁ N₂ ↔ pratītikramā P ↔ pratipatikramā N₃; no ev. K

42 vidhim] == K P N₂ N₃ ↔ vidhi N₁

43 goh] == K P ↔ agoh N₁ agoh N₂ ↔ ago N₃

43–44 anyāpodha°] == K P N₂ N₃ ↔ anyāpodho N₁

45 nāpratipattir] == K N₁ N₂ ↔ nāpratītir P ↔ nāpīratipatir N₃

46–47 °śabdānīlotpala°] ==KP(N₁ N₂ N₃ N₄)

47 nilima°] == K P N₂ ↔ nilama N₁ ↔ nilima N₃

48–59 gopratītau ...jāteradhikāyāḥ] Both N₂ and N₃ repeat this passage: N₂ 3b1–6 equals N₂ 4a1–6, and N₃ 3a1–7 equals N₃ 3a7–3b5. Note that “gopratītau” is the first word both on folio N₂ 3b and N₃ 4a, which makes it more likely that the repetition originated in N₂ rather than in N₃, where “gopratītau” is found in positions less prone to error. In this section of the edition, variants found in the first occurrence of this passage will be referenced by the usual N₂ or N₃, while variants found in the second occurrence will be referenced by N₂ b and N₃ b respectively.

50 prasajyarūpā°] == PN;

50–52 abhāvavikalpotpādanaśaktir...grahaṇam] == KPN

51 vidhivikalpānām] == K P N₂ N₃ ↔ vidhikalpānām N₂ b N₃ b

51 °dāna°] == KN;

53 niyata°] == KPN;

53 anyathā] == KPN;

53–54 śabdārtha°] == PN;

54 katham] == KPN;

55–56 vācaspatiḥ] == KPN;

56–57 vikalpānāṃ...gocaraḥ] == KPN;

57 atajjātiya°] == KPN;

57–58 °parāvṛttam] == KPN;

58 tadavagater] == KPN;
2. Text of *Aphonesiddhi*

58 'śvādin] == KP <-> 'ścādīn N1 'ścādīn N2 N2 b <-> ścodīna N3 N2 b
59 anenaiva nirastam] == PN1 N2 N2 b <-> anenaiva nirastam K <-> ateneva nirasta N3
60 atajātiya° ] == KP N1 <-> atajajītiya N2 <-> atajātiya N3
60 'ścādīnN2 <-> ścodīnaN2 b
61 anenaivanirastam ] == PN1 N2 N2 b <-> anenaivanirastam K <-> parāvṛttam eva P <-> vāvṛtttem eva N2
60 tenaiva ] == KP N2 N3 <-> tainai N1
61 'śvā(×tyarthabha)va K <-> vāvṛttameva
60 atajjātīya° ] == KP N1 <-> atajjātīya N2 <-> atajātīya N3
60 °vyāvṛttameva ] == N1 N2 vyā(×tyarthabha)va K <-> parāvṛttameva
60 tainai ] == KP N2 N3 <-> tainai N1
61 viṣayibhavantīnāṃ ] == KP N2 <-> višaryobhavantīnāṃ N1 <-> višayibhava(?p)īnā N3
62 na vijātiyavāyvr̥̃t̥̃am ] == KN1 N2 <-> na vijātivyāvṛttam P <-> na vijātivyāvṛttam
63 arthato 'pi ] == KP N1 <-> athatopa N2 atathopī N3
65 jātibalād ] == KP N2 <-> jātibalād N1 <-> jātibalsād N3
65 bhavatu ] == PN1 N2; bhavatu (×skodo) K <-> evabhu N3
66 °paramparābalād ] == KP P <-> parāsparābalād N1 parāsparābalād N2 parāsparābalād N3
66 udbhayathāpi ] == KP N1 N3 <-> udbhayathāpi N2
66–67 °pratipattau vyāvṛttipratipattir ] == KN2 <-> pratipattau vyāvṛttipratipattir P <-> pratipattau vyāvṛttripratipatītir N1 <-> pratipatītir N3
68 cāgo'poḍhe ] == KN1 N2 <-> cāgavāpoḍha P <-> rāgopāte N3
72 °parijñāne ] == KN2 N1 <-> (pari)jñānām N3
73 tasmād ] == KP N2 N3 <-> tasmā N1
76 āpoḍhayor ] == K; āpoḍhayor N1 <-> āpoḍhayor N2 <-> āpoḍhayor N2
77 °pratyanīkāniṣṭa° ] == KN1 N2 <-> āpoḍhayor N1 <-> āpoḍhayor N1
77 °vīṣeṣaṇabhāva° ] == KN1 N2 <-> vīṣeṣaṇabhāva N1 <-> vīṣeṣaṇabhāva N2
78 sāmānyādhi° ] == KP N1 <-> sāmānyādhi N2 <-> sāmānyādhi N3
78 °vyavacchedena ] == KN1 N2 <-> sāmānyādhi N2 <-> sāmānyādhi N3
78 sāmānyādhi° ] == KP N1 <-> sāmānyādhi N2 <-> sāmānyādhi N3
79 hi ] == KP N2 N3 <-> n. e. N1
82 prakṛta° ] == prakṛta P prakṛta Ś <-> aprakṛta K aprakṛta N1 aprakṛta N2 aprakṛta N3
82 °pathā° ] == KP N2 <-> pathā N1 <-> paṭā N3
82–83 °pratyayikaśta° ] == KN1 N2 <-> pratyayikaśta N2 <-> pratyayikaśta N3
83 śrughnam ] == KP N2 N3 <-> śrughnam N1
84 °vyavacchedena ] == KN1 N2 <-> vyavacchedena P <-> vyavacchedena N3
85 vyavacchedasya sulabhavatvāt ] == KP N2 <-> vyavacchedasya sulabhavatvāt N1 <-> vyavacchedasubhalatvāt N3
86 viśeṣaṇabhāva° ] == KN1 N2 <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N1 <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N2
86 viśeṣaṇabhāva° ] == KN1 N2 <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N1 <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N2
86 viśeṣaṇabhāva° ] == KN1 N2 <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N1 <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N2
86 viśeṣaṇabhāva° ] == KP P <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N1 <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N2
86 viśeṣaṇabhāva° ] == KN1 N2 <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N1 <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N2
86 viśeṣaṇabhāva° ] == KN1 N2 <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N1 <-> viśeṣaṇabhāva N2
2.1. Variants in the Nepalese manuscripts

85 apoha°] == KN1 N2 <-> anyāpoha P <-> amoha N3
91 °pratītīr iti] == KN2 N3 <-> pratītī P <-> pratīr iti N1
91 pratīkṣasyāpya apoha°] == KP, pratīkṣasyāpya a((x ho+2) po+(+1))→(+po ho)
) N2 <-> pratīkṣasyāpya aho N1 <-> pratīkṣasyāpyahop N3
92 śābda°] == K <-> śābda P <-> śābda N1 <-> śābda N2 <-> śābda N3
93 atadrūpa°] == KP N1 <-> antadrūpa N2 antadrūpa N3 antadrūpa N3b
Probably an eye-skip from `dhyavasāyād to yathādhyavasāyam, further corroborated by N3's `dhyavasāyām at the end of this passage's first occurrence. Variants found in repetition are noted as N3 b (cf. note to l. 48).
94 bāhyo `rtho `bhimataḥ] == KP N2 <-> bāhyorthorbhimatah N1 <-> bāhyārthobhimatah N3b
94 °pratībhāsaṃ] == KP N1 N3b <-> pratībhāsaṃ N2 pratībhāsaṃ N3
96–97 °pravyaktasva°] == KP N2 N3 <-> pravyaktas sva N1
98 °āvabhāsi tat] == KN <-> āvabhāsi yat P <-> āvabhāsit N
101–102 pratībhāsa°] == KP N2 <-> pratībhāva N1 <-> pratībhāva N2 pratībhāva
N3
102 atrāpy] == KN1 N3, a(+)trāpy N2 <-> tatrāpy P
103 cetasāṃ tasya] == KP N1, ce(t→ta) sāntasya N2 <-> cetsāntasya N3 — N2 deleted virāma, resulting in ta
104 °āvabhāsi tat] == KN1 <-> āvabhāsi yat P <-> āvabhāsit N2 <-> āvabhāsita N3
106 vastunah] == KN1 N2 <-> vastunah P <-> v(?e)stunah N3
106 yata] == KN1 N2 <-> yad P <-> yetaḥ N3
106 ekenaṅdiya°] == KP N1 <-> ekenaṅdiya N2 ekenaṅdiya N3
106 pratībhāsetānyena] == KP N2 <-> pratībhāvatānyena N1 <-> pratībhāsataneyena N3
107 °prāpteh] == KP N1 <-> prāpteh N2 prāpteh N3
108 pratībhāsa°] == KP N1 N3 <-> pratībhāsa N2
109 trailokya] == KP N1 <-> trelokya N2 trelokya N3
109 ekam eva vastu] == KP N2 <-> ekam eva vastu N1 <-> eva vastu N3
109 syāt] == KP <-> na syāt N1 na syāt N2 na syāt N3
112 ekaviṣayatvā°] == KP N2 N3 <-> viṣayatvā N1
113 °saciva] == KP N3 <-> saciva N1 <-> sacivah N2
113–114 pratībhāsbhedah ...`viṣayatām] == KP N2 N3 <-> pratībhāsyatam
N1
114 ghaṭavat] == KN2 <-> ghaṭavata N3 <-> n. e. P
114 °viṣayatām] == KP <-> viṣayatām N2 <-> viṣatā N3
115 eka°] == P <-> n. e. N1 <-> eva N2 eva N3; no ev. K
117 pārokṣyāpārokṣya°] == KP <-> parākṣyāpārokṣya N1 <-> parākṣyāpārokṣya N2 <-> parātmāparokta N3
2. Text of the *Apohasiddhi*

120 virahenaiva] == K P N₁ -> viraheneva N₂ -> vihareneva N₃
120 pratyaye svalakṣānam] == K P N₁ N₃ -> pratyayasvalanam N₂
122 sarvātmanā] == K P N₁ -> savatmanā N₂ savatmanā N₃
122–123 pratipatter vidhi°] == K N₂ N₃ -> pratipatte vidhi N₁ -> pratipatte vidhe P
124 tu] == P Ś -> n. e. K n. e. N₁ n. e. N₂ n. e. N₃
124–125 asamartham] == K P -> asamartha N₁ -> asamatham N₂ -> asamartham astity asamartham N₃
125 tasmāc chābdā°] == P -> tasmāc chabda K tasmāc chabda N₁ tasmāc chabda N₃ -> tasmātaśabda N₂
128 prastutyānāntaram] == K P -> prastutyānāntaram N₁ prastutyānāntaram N₂ prastutyānāntaram N₃
128 jāter] == K P -> jate N₁ jate N₂ jate N₃
130 °bhavanty] == P -> bhavan N₁ bhavan N₂ -> bhavan N₃; no ev. K
130–131 astināstisambandhayogyā] == K N₂ -> astyādisambandhayogyā P
132 astitā] == K P N₂ N₃ -> astitāh N₁
133 anaiṅkāntikam bhā°] == P N₁ -> anaiṅkāntika_mbhā K -> anaiṅkāntikabhā N₂ anaiṅkāntikabhā N₃
134 tad aprastutam] == P -> n. e. N₁ n. e. N₂ n. e. N₃; no ev. K
135 bharām nyasyatā] == K N₁, bharām ((xṛya(+2)nya(+1))→(+nyasya))tā N₂
136 kim ca sarvatram] == K P N₂ N₃ -> kiṃ ca savatram N₁
136 svalakṣānasvarūpenaivā°] == K N₁ N₃ -> svarūpenaivā P -> svalakṣānasvarūpenaivā N₃
137 °sambandho 'stītvādikam] == K P N₁ -> sambandhāstītvādikam N₂ sambandhāstītvādikam N₃
138 evam] == K P N₁ -> eva N₂ eva N₃
138 jātimad°] == K P N₂ N₃ -> jāmad N₁
139 pratītisiddhiḥ] == K P N₂ -> pratītisiddhi N₁ pratītisiddhi N₃
141 ucyate] == K P N₁ -> ucy N₂ ucy N₃
141 kaumārilaih] == K P N₁ -> komārilaih N₂ komārilaih N₃
142 hy anirdhārita bhāvāvām P -> hy anirdhārita bhāvāvām P
143 śabdāntarāvagatena] == P N₁ -> śabdāntarā((xvā(+2)bhā(+1))→(+bhāvā))bhāvam N₂ -> śabdāntarābhāvāvām N₃; no ev. K — See comments above, page 33.
146 pratyaṅkaśyeva] == K P N₁ N₃, prayaṅkaśyeva (xyṛs(+2)tya(+1))→(+tyaŋka) N₂
147 taddṛṣṭa] == P -> taddṛṣṭa N₁ taddṛṣṭa N₂ taddṛṣṭa N₃; no ev. K

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2.1. Variants in the Nepalese manuscripts

148 aindriyaka°] == KP N2 N3 <-> endriyaka N1

150 sākṣāt°] == KP N2 N3 <-> sākṣā N1

151 yadi] == KP N1 <-> yahi N2 <-> yadbhi N3

151 *pratipādanām] == KP N1 <-> pratipādanām N2 <-> pratipādanām N3

152 abhavaṃ ca] == KP <-> abhavaśca N1 abhavaśca N2 <-> abhaveś ca

N3

152 kṣamate] == PN N2 N3 <-> kṣamah te N1; no ev. K

153 vrksatvāśe] == KP N2 <-> vṛksatvāśe N1 vrksatvāśe N3

157 dṛṣṭeti] == KP N1 <-> dṛṣṭi N2 dṛṣṭi N3

157 *ātmakatvād] == P <-> ātmakatvād K <-> ātmatvāt N1 ātmatvāt N2 <-> ātmatvāt N3

157–158 anabhyastavarūpa°] == KP N1 <-> anabhyasvarūpa N2 <-> anityasvarūpa N3

158 vikalpas] == KP N2 N3 <-> vikapas N1

158 svayam ni°] == KP N2, ((xya(+2)sva(+1))→(+svaya))nī N1 <-> svaya nī N3

159 grāhi] == KP N2 <-> grāhī N1 <-> grāhi N3 — N1 did not delete the prefix for the short i.

161–162 dharminaś ceti] == KP N2 <-> dharmmi(ma→ṇa)(?··)ti N1 <-> dharmanāṣeeti N3 — N1 is smudged here.

163 *ābhidhānādhīnī ] == KP N1 <-> abhidhānādhīnī N2 <-> abhidhānādhīnī N3

163 dhammāntarasya] == KP N1 N3 <-> dhammāntarasya N2

164 nilalaccaistaravāder] == KP N1 <-> nilalāccaistaratvāt der N2 <-> nilalāccaistaratvāt. der N3

164–165 akhandātmanah] == KP N1 <-> akhadātmanah N2 <-> akhādātmana N3

165 pratyakṣe pratibhāsād] == K <-> pratyakṣe ’pi pratibhāsanāt | P <-> pratyakṣe pratibhāsāt | N1 <-> prāt(×kṣa(+2)tya(+1))→(+tyakṣa)pratisāt | | N2 <-> pratyekṣapratisāt | | N3

166 pratyakṣa°] == KP N2 N3 <-> pratyakṣah N1

167 ity atiprasaṅgah] == KP N2 <-> ity ati | | prasaṅghah N1 <-> ity a • pratisargajah N3

168 iti] == KP N2 <-> i N1 <-> iti | | iti N3 — N1 has a linebreak after i.

170 pratyāsattir] == KP <-> pratyāsantir N1 pratyāsantir N2 pratyāsantir N3

172 *taddharmā°] == KP N2 <-> taddharmma N1 <-> saddharmma N3

173 *pratibaddhbhyām dharmi°] == P N1 N2 <-> pratibaddhā bhyām dharmi K <-> pratibaddhātyādharmi N3

174 *pratipattir bhavet] == KP N1 <-> pratipattibhavet N2 pratipattibhavet N3

174 pratyāsattimātrasyāviśeṣah] == KP N1 <-> pratyāsattimātrasyāpi viśeṣāt N2 <-> pratyāsattimātrasyāpi viśeṣāt N3

77
175 sattvena] == P Š ↔ satve K satve N₁ satve N₂ ↔ satva N₃
176 grihita] == K grihite (× I) P ↔ grihite N₁ grihite N₂ grihite N₃
176–177 dravyasopādhbir] == P dravyasya(vi)upādhbir K ↔ dravyasya upādhbir N₁ dravyasya upādhbir N₂ ↔ dravyasya upādhbir N₂
177 višeṣyatvam] == K N₁ N₂ ↔ višeṣatvam P ↔ višeṣyatva N₃
178–179 °grahaṇam āsaṅjitam] == P ↔ grahaṇa ca māsaṅjitam N₁ grahaṇa ca māsaṅjitam N₂ ↔ grahanam ca māsaṅjitam N₃; no ev. K
179 °grahaṇa] ↔ grahane K grahane P grahane N₃ graha(na→n(e)) N₂
181 pratipatti*] == P ↔ prati K prati N₁ prati N₂ prati N₃
185 °prasāñjanam] == P N₁, prasa(ṅgaḥ)ñjanam K pramañjanam N₁ pramañjanam N₂
186 tvanmate] == KPN
187 °pratīteḥ] == KN
192 °pratīteḥ] == KN
196 °āprāpterbhrāntir] == KPN
200 atyanta*)] == KPN
202 °āprāpterbhrāntir] == KPN
209 °pindadāśana*)] == KPN
209–210 °smaraṇa*)] == KPN

2. Text of the Apohasiddhi
210 sāmagrī] == KP <=> sāmagrī N₁ sāmagrī N₂ sāmagrī N₃
210–211 nirviṣayaṃ] == KP N₂ N₃ <=> nirviṣayaṃ N₁
215 yadāpi] == K <=> yadā P <=> N₁ N₂ N₃
216 “sakala”] == KP N₁ <=> (śa→sa)kala N₂; šakala N₃
217 arthāntaram] == KP N₁ <=> aryāntaram N₂ <=> aryāntaram N₃
218 atha gotvād] == atha gotvād P <=> gotvād K gotvād N₁ gotvād N₂ gotvād N₃
218 gopiṇḍah] == KP N₁ <=> gopiṇḍa N₂ gopiṇḍa N₃
219 evagotvam] == KPN
220 °sāmarthyaṃ] == KPN
222 °sāmarthyam] == KP N₁ N₃ <=> sāmārthyaṃ N₂
223 °tvapekṣā] == KP N₂ N₃ <=> tvapekṣā N₁
223 °pratyayabhāvā] == KPN
224 °aivabhinnā] == KPN
225 svāśrayeṣu] == Ś <=> svaviṣaye P => svāśraye N₁ svāśraye N₂ svāśraye N₃
226 °pratyayayornimittam] == KPN
227 °darśanesyāt] == KN
228 °svīkāra°] == PN
229 °pramādena] == KN
230 °bhavantī] == KPN
231 °pratyayabhāvā] == KPN
232 °svāśrayeṣu] == Ś <=> svāśraye N₁ svāśraye N₂ svāśraye N₃
233 °kisāmānya°] == KPN
234 °vyaktīyamānāsv] == KPN
235 °pratyayayornimittam] == KPN
236 °pratyayayornimittam] == KPN
237 °svāśrayeṣu] == Ś <=> svāśraye N₁ svāśraye N₂ svāśraye N₃
238 °pratyayabhāvā] == KPN
239 °bhavantī] == KPN
240 °pratyayabhāvā] == KPN
241 °svīkāra°] == PN
242 °pramādena] == KN
243 °bhavantī] == KPN
244 °pratyayabhāvā] == KPN
245 °svāśrayeṣu] == Ś <=> svāśraye N₁ svāśraye N₂ svāśraye N₃
246 °kisāmānya°] == KPN
247 °vyaktīyamānāsv] == KPN
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2. Text of the *Apohasiddhi*

247 bhide yāyā] == K P N₂ N₃ <-> bhedena yathā N₁
247 pratyāsattāyā] == K P N₂ N₃ <-> pratyayāsattāyā N₁
247 prasarpati] == K P N₁ <-> prasarṣati N₂ prasarṣati N₃
250 pratyāsattāyā] == K P N₂ N₃ <-> pratyayāsattāyā N₁
251 pratyāsattā[ti] == K P N₂ N₃ <-> pratyayāsattāti N₁
252 *sūtrādineti] == K P N₁ N₂ <-> sūtrāṇeti N₃ <-> sūtravādinā Ś
253 dandāsūtrayor] == K P <-> dandāsūtrayo N₁ dandāsūtrayo N₂ dandāsūtrayo N₃
253 drṣṭayor] == K, drṣṭayoh N₁ drṣṭayoh N₂ <-> drṣṭayoh N₃ <-> drṣṭatvād P
254 *hetutvam nāpalapyate] == K P N₁, hetu((×m(+2)tva(+1))→(tvam)) nāppalapyate N₂ <-> hetum utpānam upalat(?)ya(te) N₃ — N₃ is smudged here.
255 tād varam pratyāsattir] == K P N₂, tād varam pratyā(xy)ā)sattir N₁ <-> (?————)āsatir N₁ — N₁ is smudged here.
259 viśeṣana°] == K P N₂; višeṣa(na→ṇa) N₁ <-> višeṣena N₃
260 jīnānam cedam] == K N₁ N₂, jīnāna(?nce)dam N₃ <-> grahanam (+jīnā-nam)₁ cedam P
260 arthataḥ] == K P N₁ <-> artham N₂ artham N₃
262 *graḥaṇaṅaṅtarīya°] == K P N₂, graha((×ṇā→na)nāntarīya N₁ <-> grahaṇaṅantarīya N₃
263 *ānubhavānā] == K P N₁ <-> ānubhavāta N₂ ānubhavāta N₃
265 pratyakṣasyo°] == P N₁ N₃, pra(tha)tyakṣasyo N₂ <-> prakṣasyo K
266 sāmānyam. hetur] == K N₁ N₂ <-> sāmānyam hetur N₃ <-> sāmānya-
266 hetur P
268 ghataḥ] == K P N₂ <-> ghata N₁ ghata N₃
268 gotvam] == K N₂ N₃ <-> gotva P <-> n. e. N₁
270 gotva°] == P N₁, got(+tva7) K <-> gitva N₂ gitva N₃
271 *bhāvasyeṣtatvād] == K P N₂, bhāva(sye→sy)eṣtatvād N₁ <-> bhāvasye-
271 stvatād N₃
271 ago°] == K P N₂ N₃ <-> davyo go N₁
273 evaṃ] == K Ś <-> eva K eva N₁ eva N₂ eva N₃
273 *siddhiḥ] == K Ś <-> buddhiḥ K buddhiḥ N₁ buddhiḥ N₂ <-> buddhi N₃
273 bādhakam] == K P N₂ N₃ <-> bādhaka N₁
274 *u[pa]dhih[aka]craṣya] == K P, upādh[hih(×kra(+2)ca(+1))→(ca+kra)]sysa N₁ <-> upādhikaka[ckraṣya N₂ upādhikaka[ckraṣya N₃
275 prasiddhaḥ] == K N₁ N₂ <-> siddhaḥ P <-> praddha N₁
276–277 buddhyākāraś] == K P N₁ <-> buddhyāraś N₂ buddhyāraś N₃
278 anadhya[sāyāc] == K P N₁ <-> anadhya[sāyāc N₂ anadhya[sāyāc N₃
279 śābde] == K N₂ N₃ <-> śābda P <-> śabde N₁
2.1. Variants in the Nepalese manuscripts

280 'pratibhāsanāt] == KN2 <-> 'pratibhāsāt P <-> pratibhāsanāt N1 <->
pratibhāsanāt N3
280 'nabhilāpyatvam] == KN2 <-> 'nabhilāpyatvam P <-> 'nabhilāpyatva
N1 'nabhilāpyatva N3
281 sāṃvṛttau] == KP N1 <-> sāvṛttau N2 <-> sāvṛtto N3
282 °prasāṅgāt] == KP N1 <-> prāsaṅgāt N2 prāsaṅgāt N3
284 °sādhanam] == N2 N3 <-> sādhanama K <-> bādhanam P bādhanam Š
 <-> sādhanammm N1
286 dharmottaraha] == KP N1 <-> dharmmottaraḥ N2 <-> dharmottara
N3
286 bāhyatvavidhi°] == bāhyatvavidhi P Š <-> bāhyatv(+vy)sya5 vidhi K <->
bāhyatvasya vidhi N1 bāhyatvasya vidhi N2 bāhyatvasya vidhi N3
287 alaukikam] == P N1 N2, alaukika(xh)m K <-> alokikam N3
287 atārkikīyam] == KP N1 <-> atākiriyaṃ N2 <-> atākirttiyam N3
291 °višeṣe] == KN1 N2 <-> višeṣe (?(+pi)) P <-> viṣaye N3
292 katham niyatavișiṣavayā] == KP N2 <-> kathaniyatavișiṣavayā N1 <-> ka-
thamnniyatavișiṣavayā N3
294 niyata eva] == niyata eva P, niyata (+'eva?7) K <-> niyāta eva N1 niyātā
eva N3 <-> niyāta evam N2
296 niyatasāktayo] em. <-> niyatavișiṣavayā K niyatavișiṣavayā P niyatavișiṣavayā
N1 niyatavișiṣavayā N2 niyatavișiṣavayā N3
296 °niśṭhita] == KP N1 <-> niśṭita N2 niśṭita N3
297 °paryanuyoga°] == KP N2 N3 <-> nuyoga N1
297 tadadhyavasāyitvam] == P N1 N3, tadadhya(+vasā)yitvam K <-> adhya-
vāsāyitvam Š <-> tadadhyavasāyitvam N2
298 āropeṇa] == KP N1 <-> āroṣeṇa N2 āroṣena N3
300 svavāsanā°] == KN2 <-> vāsanā P <-> svavāsa N1 <-> svavānā N3
300 upajāyamāṇaiva] == KP N1 <-> upajāyamāṇaiva N2 upajāyamāṇaiva
N3
301 apasāntyanty] == KP <-> apasyanty N1 apasyanty N2 apasyanty N3
301 pravṛttim] == (+'pra)vṛttim P <-> vṛttim K vṛttim N1 vṛttim N2
vṛttim N3
302 °vyāvṛtto 'rtho] == KP N1 <-> vyāvṛttārtho N2 vyāvṛttārtho N3
303 eva cāpohā°] == KN2 N3 <-> evāpohā P <-> ecāpohā N1
305 vācakam] == KP <-> vācakram N1 vācakram N2 vācakram N3
307 vācakam ce°] == KP N1 <-> vācakaṣe N2 vācakaṣa ce N3
308 pāramārthika°] == KP <-> pāramārthaka N1 pāramārthaka N2 pāra-
mārthaka N3
309 °kṛtasyaiva] == kṛtasyaiva P <-> kṛtasya K kṛtasya N2 kṛtasya N3 <->
kṛtatasya N1
309 °vyavahāribhir] == KP N1 <-> vyavahāribhir N2 vyavahāribhir N3
311 viruddhah, sapakṣe] == KP N1 <-> viruddhaḥ mapakṣe N2 <-> viru-
dham apekṣa N3

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2. Text of the *Apophasiddhi*

314 sopādhir astu ] == P N₂ N₃ ←→ sopādhipastu K ←→ sopādhirusta N₁
314 vākṛtir ] == P N₁ N₂, vā (+vā)kṛtir K ←→ kṛtivār N₃
316 ṛhāner madhye ’py ] == K P ←→ hāne mardhyepy N₁ ←→ hāner madhyapy N₂
316 ṛvirahāṭ tritaye na ] == K P ←→ virahāṃ tritaye na N₁ virahāṃ tri(?ta)ye na N₂ virahāṃ tritaye na N₃
320 śabdais ] == K N₁ ←→ śabdes N₂ śabdes N₃
320 tāvan mukhyam ] == K N₂ N₃ ←→ tāvat mukhyam N₁
320 ṛrthas ] == K N₂ N₃ ←→ rtthe N₁
321 bhāsato ] == K ←→ bhāsato N₁ bhāsato N₂ bhāsato N₃
321 ’nyah ] == K N₂, (×naiva kaścit) ’nyah N₁ ←→ n.e. N₃
321 tattvato ] == K N₁ ←→ tattato N₂ tattato N₃
327 parirakṣāniyah ] == n.e. P ←→ | • | * K ←→ parirakṣāniyah | | subham N₂ ←→ parirakṣāniyah | | subham N₁ ←→ parirakṣāniyah | | (× (?subham) ) N₃
3 Translation of the Apohasiddhi

Oṃ. Hommage to Śrīlokanātha!

§ 1. [Proponent:] Exclusion is declared the referent of words.

§ 2. [Opponent:] Now, what is this so-called exclusion? Is—through a derivation [of the word apoha] such as “this is excluded

63 Tārā in P. The letters and numbers printed in the margins of this translation are those used in the analysis of the argument structure, section 4.2.

64 What is at stake in this definition is the kind of object that every conceptual state of cognition has. Cf. the explanations in section 5.3. The Sanskrit compound śabdārtha is expanded as śabdānām arthah in l. 37, p. 49. The most common translations are: meaning, object, or referent of words, cf., e.g., “meaning of words” for śabdasya svārtha” Ishida 2011b: 204 f., “objects ...of expressions” for śabdārthasya Dunne 2004: 359, “referent of the word” for śabdārthah” Pind 2015: II.65. As indicated by Patil (2003: 245, n. 6), artha covers all of these semantic possibilities, and more. Here artha shall be translated as “referent”, with the intention of expressing the object that words refer to. By not translating this artha as “meaning”, the suggestion that it might correspond to “sense” in a rigorously philosophical (Fregean) interpretation can be avoided. Ratnakirti does not consider this interpretation in his following treatment of apoha. For some material on the Tibetan discussion of śabdārtha, cf. Dreyfus 1997: 220 ff.

65 Acc. to Patil (2003: 245, n. 7) this objection continues to 7. This is feasible not only because of the content, but also stylistically: all Buddhist viewpoints are introduced by atha (cf. § 4, § 5, § 6), and are embedded in a discussion led from the opponent’s point of view. For an example of this technique in another text, cf. also the notes on the VyN, 1.1.3. Another example is found in the opening section of the SSD (cf. the overview in Mimaki 1976: 11).
from another,” or “another is excluded from this,” or “another is excluded in this,”—only [something] external, differentiated from that of another genus meant [by exclusion]; or [is] the form of awareness [meant by it], or else [is]—if [one analyses] “exclusion [is the act of] excluding”—the mere differentiation from something else [meant by exclusion]? Such are the three positions.67

§ 3. To begin with, the first two positions are not [correct], because by the name “exclusion” only a positive element68 is meant. The last [position] is inconsistent as well, because it is invalidated by a cognition. For [it is] so: The verbal cognition “There is a fire on the upper part of the hill.” is observed as representing [something] with a positive nature, but not as making a mere rejection apparent,69

66 This position is mentioned PVV 169,13 ad PV III 169 (cf. trl. on page 322, and appendix A.4.2.8). It is one of the theories about the word referent discussed in the TSP, cf. the detailed discussion in B.5. Generally, buddhyākāra will here be translated literally as “form of awareness”, meaning that the awareness has the form of its object. But in phrases where this would be misleading or sound strange, as in “the form of awareness of blue”, the term “cognitive form” will be used. At least for Ratnakīrti, the notion of an ākāra is not limited to the visual shape or figure of a thing: as evidenced by CAPV 129,22–24 (cf. section 1.1.3), this form that awareness has can be anything perceived by the six sense faculties—visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, somatic, and mental. See Kellner 2014 for a recent treatment of this term in Abhidharma and pramāṇa literature.

67 That is, the three main positions that were usually discussed by Buddhist philosophers as the candidates for apoha. Cf. section 4.1.1 for the background of this paragraph.

68 For the scope of the term vidhi, cf. 5.3.2.

69 In Patil 2011b: 5, as well as in the translation of this section’s model by McCrea and Patil (2010: 49–50), nivṛtti is treated as fully synonymous with apohana or apoha. Even though these terms do seem mostly synonymous within the apoha theory, a differentiation in this particular text nevertheless seems useful, because derivations of ni-√vṛt are not used as equivalents of the corresponding apa-√uh derivatives (as apoha is one) in those passages of the AS where Ratnakīrti outlines his own theory, in contrast to derivatives from vy-ā-√vṛt. If this is not a mere coincidence, the reason for it may be that the connotation of ni-√vṛt was too close to the “negationist” position (pratishedhavādināṃ matam, § 8) that Ratnakīrti explicitly rejects. A similar consideration might also have influenced the slight change in the
§ 4. If [a Buddhist replies:] “Even though there is no conceptual cognition such as (iti) ‘I cognize a non-occurrence’, still, the representation of the non-occurrence is precisely the representation of the object that does not occur.” For there certainly is no cognition of [something] that is qualified that does not contain the cognition of a qualifier. Therefore, in the same way as a conceptual awareness is, for others, an awareness of a universal because a common form appears, even though there is not the concept “I cognize a universal.”

formulation *nivṛttyapohāvādināṃ matam* that is found in TBhū 52.17, which uses much of the material here. These thoughts do not apply to passages where *nivṛtti* and related forms are used in a sense not related to *apoha*, see, e.g., § 58.

This argument is based on the idea that perception is more authoritative than inference. This position was held by all parties that Ratnakīrti is concerned with in this treatise: for Kumārila, cf. Mimaki 1976: 16 and notes, and J. A. Taber 2005: 84–92. Acc. to J. A. Taber (2005: 198, n. 101), NSū 1.1.5, too, maintains that “…inference, at least, is dependent on perception …” (J. A. Taber 2005: 198, n. 101) Cf. also Angot 2009: 280 f. Ratnakīrti himself invokes this rule below, § 45.

This objection, that exclusion is refuted as the word referent by the mere experience of a verbal cognition, has been traced back to Kumārila by Akamatsu (1983: 159–164, n. 4), based on the following passages: ŚV Av 38–39; TSū 909–910 (which he convincingly argues are verses from Kumārila’s *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, being quoted as of Kumārila in PVSVṬ 114.7–11); TSū 1012–1013a (cf. appendix B.10); PVSVṬ 114.7–17 (trl. appendix A.2.1). Cf. also Akamatsu 1981: 54 f.

This argument is also used in an interjection against ŚV Av 88 after its quotation as TSū 947 (cf. appendix B.8, and footnote 77).

Since this passage is found also in the ĀTV₁, it is helpful to consult its commentaries. Acc. to ĀTVK 280.16 (*pareśāṃ naiyāyikānāṃ*), the others in this passage
in that same way the awareness of a non-occurrence, which is implied by the apprehension of what does not occur, stretches out through [all] everyday treatment\textsuperscript{75} of conceptual cognition as a cognition of exclusion.",\textsuperscript{76} [then we opponents say:] is it not so: if, when a common form appears [in a conceptual cognition], one classifies [this

are the Naiyāyikas. Acc. to ÁTVP 283.10 (\textit{paresām naivyāyiśadīnām}), the Naiyāyikas et al. are meant. Since this passage is not very specific, and its exact source is not known (cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 122 f., n. 333), the latter interpretation seems more likely. The others would thus be all those who think that a concept’s object is a universal. This is the position, at least, of the Naiyāyika authors (cf., e.g., NSū 2.2.66, and Dravid 1972: chapter 2) and of the Mimāṃsaka authors (cf. Dravid 1972: chapter 3) that Ratnakīrti is engaging with in the AS\textsubscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{75}The term \textit{vyavahāra} has the broad connotation of “everyday activity.” Acc. to Schmithausen (1965: 268, n. 215) and Steinkellner (1967: 156, n. 3, section 1), a threefold and fourfold classification of “everyday activity” can be made: that into a cognitive, linguistic, and physical dealing with something, and that which adds causal efficacy to these three types. According to Steinkellner (1967: 156, note 3, section 1, subnote 3) this 4th sense of the term is already present in Dharmakīrti’s writings. See Dreyfus 1997: 269 ff. and Dunne 2004: 258, n. 58 for \textit{vyavahāra} as “convention.” Ratnakīrti uses the more common distinction into mental, verbal, and bodily activity, as can be gleaned from the beginning of Ratnakīrti’s answer to the objection that conceptual cognition does not exist, since it does not refer to an external object in CAPV 139,17–19: \textit{atrābhidhiyate. ihāgnir atrety adhyavasāyo yathā kāyikim vṛttim prasūte tathāgnir mayā pratiyata iti vācikīṃ api prasūte, etadākārānuvyavasāyarūpāṃ mānasīm api prasavati.} (To this it is said [by us]: Here, as the determination “Here’s fire.” brings forth bodily activity, so [it] brings forth also the verbal [activity, which consists in saying] “I recognize fire.”, [and] also brings forth this mental [activity] that has the nature of a determination according to the form of awareness.) Note that Ratnakīrti treats all these activities as results of a conceptual determination, and that in this sense mental, verbal, and bodily activity are on an equal footing (though mental activity, unlike verbal or bodily activity, can itself have the nature of a determination.

\textsuperscript{76}McCrea and Patil (2010: 50) translate the last part of this comparison as: “In just the same way, the awareness of the exclusion implied by the awareness of the excluded thing makes it possible for us to be aware of and to talk about exclusion.” A difference may lie in the understanding of \textit{ātanoti}. In the translation presented here, this verb is interpreted as alluding to the logical relation of pervasion: any case of a cognition of exclusion must, for this Buddhist, be a case of a cognition of a non-occurrence or absence. If one understands “makes possible” in this sense, as saying that a cognition of \textit{nivṛtti} is the necessary precondition for treating any conceptual cognition as a cognition of exclusion, then there is no significant difference in the
conceptual cognition] as an awareness of a universal because [it] is of a positive form, then what is achieved by classifying a thought in which the form of non-existence does not [actually] appear as the cognition of a non-occurrence?\textsuperscript{77} Therefore, if there should be an appearance of a form of non-occurrence, even though there is no form such as “I cognize a non-occurrence.”, who indeed would deny the existence of a cognition of a non-occurrence?\textsuperscript{78} Otherwise, [if one were to deny this,] there would be the everyday usage of a cognition of something when there is no manifestation [of that thing], so that [the following] might be [the case]: even though a thought has the form “cow”, there is the awareness “horse”.

\textbf{§ 5.} If it is said [by the Buddhists] that a cognition of non-occurrence is contained [in the cognition of something qualified] due to being [its] qualifier, [then] nevertheless, if [there were] a concept having a form such as “excluded by non-cow”, then there may be an involvement of this [non-occurrence] due to being the qualifier [of the form]; but still the cognition [is] “cow.” And then, since a qualifier characterized as non-occurrence does not blossom forth in this [cognition], even though it [may] exist [there implicitly], how [can this cognition] be classified as a cognition of this [non-occurrence]?\textsuperscript{79}

\textbf{§ 6.} If this thought [is entertained by a Buddhist]: “For that, which appears in a positive form, there is also an exclusion from [that which is] different. Therefore [it] is called cognition of this translations. This passage also makes it useful to distinguish between “exclusion” as a translation of \textit{apoha} and as a translation of \textit{nivṛtti}: the latter refers to the process of excluding (\textit{apohana}), or not occurring; this “not occurring” is how the former, more general case of exclusion could be analysed.

\textsuperscript{77} Akamatsu (1983: 168, n. 9) refers to ŚV Av 88 (as cited in TS\textsubscript{S} 947) for this position. Cf. appendix B.8.

\textsuperscript{78} Cf. ŚV Av 164, also discussed in PVSVṬ 114 f. (cf. appendix A.2.1).

\textsuperscript{79} Acc. to Akamatsu 1983: 169, n. 13, this objection corresponds to ŚV Av 41. Again, this is found in TS\textsubscript{S} 923, cf. appendix B.6.
3. **Translation of the *Apuhasiddhi***

[exclusion].”  

80 Then nevertheless there is only a mere connection to exclusion. Only a positive element actually appears. And additionally, in this way it is unavoidable that exclusion [would be] the object also for perception, specifically, because [there would be] a concept for [a perceptual cognition] that, seeing what is different from all others, represents a single excluded thing. Therefore, because of the apprehension of a positive form, only a positive element is, as for perceptual cognition, the object of a conceptual cognition also; but the exclusion of others is not its object. So, how is it that exclusion is announced as the referent of words?  

§ 7. [Proponent:] To this [the following] is replied: By the word “exclusion” we do not mean a fully positive element alone, nor the mere differentiation from others; rather, a positive element qualified by exclusion from others is the referent of words. And therefore, there

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80 Akamatsu (1983: 170, n. 16) takes this to be the opinion expressed in the TS, and refers, in Akamatsu 1983: n. 4, p. 162, to TSŚ 1012–1013a as the central passage that supports this interpretation (cf. trl. on page 355). This seems to be the last, and weakest, option for someone endorsing exclusion as the word referent. The argument of the defender of apoha thus goes through four variations: exclusion, in the sense of mere differentiation from others, is the word referent (stated and attacked in § 2–§ 3); there is no representation of a pure exclusion in awareness, but the representation of an excluded object is the representation of the exclusion (discussed § 4); a cognition of exclusion is contained as a qualifier (§ 5); a positive representation possesses, or is connected to, an exclusion of others (§ 6).  

81 No precursor to this specific objection could be found in either PV I, TSPŚ or DhAP. Kamalaśīla, in commenting on TSŚ 1060–1062, explicitly states that exclusion, in the sense of the particular, is the object of sense perception: *tatra svalakṣaṇātmā tāvad apoha indriyair avagamyata eva.* (TSPŚ 407,15, for a trl. cf. appendix B.11). Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 340–56 for Jñānaśrīmitra’s position.  

82 The introductory objection ends here, questioning the programmatic statement in § 1. See footnote 65.  

83 As discussed in § 2, the compound “other-exclusion” (*anyāpoha*) can be analysed in various ways. Though it is not altogether clear which analysis Ratnakīrti himself endorses, or even if he thinks they are all possible, *anyāpoha* will here be rendered as “exclusion from others,” or simply “other-exclusion,” unless the context suggests another interpretation. Cf. also the comments in section 4.1.1.
is no possibility for the errors afflicting each individual position.\textsuperscript{84}

§ 8. But the idea of the affirmationists that, in the cognition of a cow, exclusion is ascertained subsequently because of the implication that “That of the nature of this [is] not of the nature of another.”, or the idea of the negationists that, in the cognition of an other-exclusion, that excluded from others is understood because of implication,\textsuperscript{85} is incorrect, because not even a first time [learner of a word] observes a sequence in cognition. For neither does anyone, upon having cognized a positive element, understand exclusion later by implication, nor [does anyone], upon having cognized exclusion[, understand] that excluded from others. Therefore a cognition of a cow is called the cognition of that excluded from others.\textsuperscript{86} And even if the non-representation of the words “excluded from others” [in conceptual cognition] has been maintained,\textsuperscript{87} nevertheless there is no non-cognition at all of other-exclusion, which is the qualifier, because the word “cow” is founded only on that excluded from non-cow.\textsuperscript{88} As the

\textsuperscript{84}Cf. the three positions in § 2: An external thing, a form of awareness, and exclusion as such.

\textsuperscript{85}Acc. to Akamatsu 1986, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are the affirmationists (cf. especially the evidence in TS$_3$ 1013a, trl. on page 355), and Dharmottara is a negativist. This analysis by Ratnakīrti has been very influential on modern studies of the development of the apoha theory. Cf. footnote 344 for more comments on this passage and secondary literature.

\textsuperscript{86}This is a synthesis of the two positions mentioned: goḥ pratipatti and anyāpoha prostitution. So there is no temporal relation as primary and secondary between the positive and negative elements that the object of a verbal cognition is composed of, they are known simultaneously. For a further discussion, cf. section 5.3.4.

\textsuperscript{87}Apparently this refers back to § 4. AP 203,16 supports anyāpohādiśabdānullekhe here, so we would have to understand that there is no “representation of the words ‘exclusion from others’ and so on”. But JNĀms 9a5, though it is hard to be certain, seems to read anyāpohādiśabdānullekhe, so that the main difference to the AS$_4$ is the presence of ādi.

\textsuperscript{88}Immediately after this passage in AP, Jñānaśrīmitra cites PV I 124 (cf. a translation from the Tibetan in Frauwallner 1933: 58). Akamatsu 1983: 184 ff., n. 34 translates PV I 124–127, and then states that in these verses and the commentary Dharmakīrti presents the four points constituting his theory of apoha. Akamatsu
appearance of blue is unavoidable at that time when there is the
cognition of a water lily that is blue because of the word “indīvara” which is founded on a blue water lily, so also the appearance of the exclusion of non-cow is unavoidable, because it is a qualifier, in the same moment as there is the cognition of a cow from the word “cow” which is founded on that excluded from non-cow. As, for perception, the grasping of absence in a purely negating form is only the capacity to generate the concept of absence, so also, for a conceptual cognition of the positive element, the grasping of absence [in a purely negating form] is considered [to be] only the capacity of granting activity in conformance to this [positive element]. But the grasping of absence in an implicative form is the awareness

(1983: 185–6, n. 34) says:

1) Le mot exprime l’affirmation et la négation à la fois. ...2) C’est pourquoi, la désignation de l’objet affirmatif (A) et la différenciation-négation de non-A ne sont pas en relation réelle du “déterminé” et du “déterminant”. ...3) Par suite de la simultanéité de la désignation affirmative de A et de la négation de non-A, la critique de Bhāmaha contre Dignāga ne sera plus valable. ...4) un tel caractère différentiel ...est irréel.

The word indīvara is used for Nymphaea stellata and cyanea (acc. to PW I: 800), a water lily with blue flowers (cf. also Rau 1954). The point is that this name cannot be analysed into the units conveying “blue” and “water lily”, respectively, unlike nilotpala, lit. “blue-water-lily”.

See footnote 332 for an explanation of this and the following type of negation.

The parallel passage in AP 205,12–16 is preceded by a reference to a Śāstric source, i.e., Dharmakīrti. Akamatsu (1983: 195, n. 49) and Katsura (1986: 180, n. 20) trace it to a passage in the anupalabdhihetu discussion of the HB. The statement they are referring to is as follows (Jñānaśrimitra’s reference ends in ityādi, and omits the subject of the sentence, so it is not clear how far this should go), HB 32,5–7: ...kvacit pramāṇam pravṛttam tat paricchinatti, tato ‘nyad vyavacchinatti, trīyaprakārahbāvam ca śucayatity ekapramāṇavyāpāra eṣah. (Trl., following the German one in Steinkellner 1967: 67 and McCrea and Patil 2010: 55 f.: “A means of valid cognition demarcates that[, i.e., its object], excludes what is other than that, and makes the absence of a third possibility known. This is the activity of a single means of valid cognition.”) The point of the argument is that a single means of valid cognition, in this case an inference using a logical reason of the type non-apprehension, may perform multiple functions, most importantly an
of [something] with a limited form particular [to this object], [and this awareness] is not different for either [perception or conceptual cognition]. Otherwise, if the exclusion of others were not formed at the time of the cognition of a referent because of a word, how could [there be] activity\(^92\) that avoids other [things]?\(^93\) Consequently someone instructed “Tether the cow!” would also tether horses etc.\(^94\)

§ 9. Furthermore, what Vācaspati said: “Individual things qualified by a genus\(^95\) are the range [of objects] for concepts and words. And

affirmative one—defining its object—, and a negative one—excluding objects other than the one at hand. For Katsura (1986: 180, n. 20), the reference to this passage is an important factor in making the case that “...Jñānaśrimitra’s idea of simultaneous understanding of affirmation and negation is not necessarily unique to him, for a similar idea is already found in the Hetubindu.” (Katsura 1986: 174) For a closer analysis of this comparison in the AS, see section 5.3.3.

\(^92\) See footnote 75.

\(^93\) AP 206,3 quotes PV I 96 in this context. Cf. Vetter 1964: 61 for an explanation of the context and a translation. Akamatsu (1983: 200 ff., nn. 60 and 62) links the discussion in the AP to the objection in ŚV Av 143cd and the answers to it in PV I 122–123a, as well as in TS Ś 1159–1161.

\(^94\) Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 342 for a discussion of the model in the AP of these last two sentences.

\(^95\) For more on the history of this topic, see Hattori 1996. The notion of jāti, as held by the Naiyāyika authors with whom Ratnakīrti enters into debates, corresponds in several respects to core features that are often ascribed to universals in traditions of philosophy broadly following Aristotle: it is “eternal (nitya), unitary (eka), and present in many particulars (anekavṛtti).” (Halbfass 1992: 120) As such, a universal or genus is capable of entering into a one-to-many relation that causes the cognition of similarity between individual things and so founds the applicability of certain words to certain things. Even in early Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya texts, the capability of causing the same cognition is the central function of the jāti (cf. Halbfass 1992: 118; 120–1).

But below this superficial similarity, there are essential differentiating factors, the most important of which is clarified by Matilal (1985: 174) as follows:

The Naiyāyikas thought of this jāti as something real and indestructible, occurring in individuals (vyakti). It is as real as an ordinary particular object, say, a pot. [As any two material particulars can’t be in the same place at the same time—PMA], so also only one jāti can occur in one individual and no other jāti can occur in that individual,
thus, because of implicitly understanding this [exclusion by realizing that] the form of these [individuals] so qualified is distinguished from what is not of that genus, someone instructed “Tether the cow!” does not tether horses etc.”.\(^96\) that also has been refuted exactly by this.\(^97\) Because, if what is actually differentiated from that of another genus is the form of the individual things, even though an additional genus is thrown in, then how [should there be] an escape from the differentiation from what is not that for [those things, insofar as they] become the object of both word and concept only due to this form?\(^98\)

§ 10. Or, if the form of the individual things is not differentiated from that of a different genus or cognized in that way, then is this [differentiation or cognition] a gift of the genus?\(^99\) So how could there

unless it is either included in, or is inclusive of, the former jāti.

Many of the following arguments will make little sense if this peculiarity, that a jāti is not in any way an abstract entity, is disregarded.

This translation will also differentiate between jāti and sāmānya, using “genus” for the former and “universal” for the latter, even though Halbfass (1992: 121) says that “...the uses of jāti and sāmānya tend to coincide in classical Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika”, and thus also for the NVTṬ.

\(^96\) Note the differences (marked by emphasis) of the quote found here from the text as it appears in NVTṬ 443,23–444,2: \textit{tasmā jātimatyo vyaktayo vikalpānāṃ ca śabdānāṃ ca gocarāḥ, tāsāṃ tadvatīnāṃ rūpaṃ atajjātīyavyāvṛttam ity arthaḥ. atas tadavagater na gāṃ badhāneti codito śvādīn badhnāti.} There is no reason to suppose that \textit{arthatas}, supported also by AP 206,26, is a corruption of \textit{arthah} | atas.

\(^97\) This probably refers to the general point made in § 8, according to which exclusion and the positive element are cognized simultaneously, and not sequentially.

\(^98\) AP 207,3 reads \textit{atadvyāvṛttipratiṣṭiparihārāḥ} instead of \textit{atadvyāvṛttiparihārāh}. Ratnakīrti here reduces Vācaspati’s opinion to the point that exclusion from others is the only relevant factor in cognizing a particular as belonging to a genus. For, thus Ratnakīrti, the genus of a thing is irrelevant for the thing’s classification, since it is the particular’s form alone that its classification (and hence the cognition of its genus) depends on.

\(^99\) I.e., the genus makes it possible that particulars are differentiated from others and that they are cognized in such a way, thus facilitating correct activity. It is not very likely that \textit{eṣa} refers to \textit{parihāra} (“escape”), as that would not make good sense.
be a conception of this [form of the particulars] even implicitly? Thus most has been said.\textsuperscript{100}

§ 11. Or, if that differentiated from another [is so] only by virtue of the genus, [then] let it be differentiated from others either by virtue of the genus or by virtue of its uninterrupted series of causes. Given a cognition of that which is differentiated, [may it arise in] any of the two ways, there certainly is a cognition of differentiation.

§ 12. And there is no error of mutual dependence when the positive element of the verbal convention of the word “cow” [is] that excluded from non-cow, because this error is possible even in the case of the conventional designation of a universal or that qualified by it.\textsuperscript{101} For the so-called universal is not meant [to be] a universal in general,

In his translation of the corresponding passage in AP, Akamatsu 1983: 64 adds “connaissance de la différenciation des autres hétérogènes” in brackets, thus taking eṣa (analysed as eśā) to refer to atadvayavṛttraprāti (cf. footnote 98).

\textsuperscript{100}Lasic (2000a: 127) translates this phrase (together with a preceding iti) as “Damit ist das Wesentliche gesagt.”

McCrea and Patil (2010: 59) translate as “This has been effectively explained already.”, but do not note where this was done. However, if uktaprāyam were understood in this way, the subject would be unclear. If understood as referring to Ratnakīrti (“this was generally said by me”), it is not obvious which preceding passages he would be referring to here (the past participle, ukta, can hardly be taken as pointing to subsequent arguments). Since this passage is taken from AP, it could also be that uktaprāyam there had Jñānaśrīmitra as its subject, and was reused by Ratnakīrti somewhat imprecisely. But also in the AP the preceding discussions do not deal with this question in much depth (cf. the synopsis in Katsura 1986: 179, n. 15, acc. to which the section against sāmānya (and jāti) as the word referent is found later in the text).

It is also possible that this should be taken as a statement referring to previous authors: “It was generally said”, with no particular subject intended.

Furthermore, cf. the gloss of uktaprāyam at PVSVT 280,23 to PVSV 71,2: prāyasabdo bāhulyavacanah, prāyenoktam uktaprāyam. (The word prāya expresses “abundance.” It was said for the largest part[, thus,] most has been said (uktaprāyam).) Karnakagomin then states that the word prāya is at the end of the compound because it is to be analysed acc. to Pāṇi 2.2.31.

\textsuperscript{101}That the cognition of “exclusion from non-cow” presupposes the cognition of “cow” was an objection to Dignāga by Kumārila (ŚV Av 83–84, quoted in TS\textsubscript{3} 942–943,
since there is the unwanted consequence that even for a horse there is the verbal convention of the word “cow”;\textsuperscript{102} rather, [the universal is meant to be a particular one, like] cowness. And to this extent there is exactly this error [of mutual dependence], because without the cognition of a cow [there is] no cognition of the universal cowness, [and] because without the cognition of the universal cowness [there is] no cognition of what is to be denoted by the word “cow”. Therefore there is no error of mutual dependence when making the conventional designation “This is a cow.” for a form of conceptual awareness that, preceded by the observation of a single material object, is spread out externally as if common to all individual things. And if [this] application of the word “cow” is admitted, the denomination of all the rest by the word “non-cow” is accepted.

§ 13. And there is also no contradiction between that excluded from others and the exclusion from others, nor damage to the relation of that qualified and the qualifier, because they are not [really] separate from each other, since for them there really is co-referentiality, as [there is] for a pot’s absence on the floor.\textsuperscript{103} For there is a contradiction and refuted in TS\textsubscript{S} 1063–1064, cf. appendix B.12) and Uddyotakara (NBhV 324,1–7). Dharmakīrti’s refutation is found in PV I 113cd–121 (cf. appendix A.1.9). An accessible version of this argument is found in NM apoha: 14,7–15,4 (translated in Watson and Kataoka 2017: 48–49 ). Cf. also Akamatsu 1983: 187, n. 37 for a trl. of ŚV Av 83–84, and Much 1994: 361 for the context of Uddyotakara’s argument. See also section 5.5 for some comments on this argument.

The term samketa (“verbal convention”) is the act of establishing that a certain word refers to a certain object. Acc. to Dharmakīrti, there is convention only for exclusion, cf. PV I 72cd (trl. Dunne 2004: 343 f.), as well as PV I 110 (trl. appendix A.1.8). Cf. Hugon 2011 for a discussion of samketa and the problem of circularity as it appears in PV I (also discussed in Hugon 2009) and the TSP. See Arnold 2006 for some of the broader philosophical issues that are involved.

\textsuperscript{102}Cf. the similar argument at the end of § 35 (trl. on p. 110).

\textsuperscript{103}I.e., it is not the case that what is excluded from others, or the object that is qualified, and exclusion from others, or the qualifier, preclude or contradict each other. This is equivalent to Dharmakīrti’s solution to the problem of co-referentiality in the context of the apoha theory, see J. Taber and Kataoka 2017: 264. Cf. section 5.5.
with its own absence, but not with the absence of another [object]. This is established [for everyone] down to children.\textsuperscript{104}

\textbf{§ 14.} Also here [in the sentence] “This road leads to Śrughna.”\textsuperscript{105} exclusion is indeed cognized, because a distinction can easily be understood for each word: with respect to other roads that are under discussion, [one understands] only this;\textsuperscript{106} with respect to the location

\textsuperscript{104} It was Kumārila who criticized the \textit{apoha} theory for not being compatible with a relation of qualifier and qualified, and for not allowing any co-reference (cf. the references in Hattori 2006: 62, and see Ogawa 2017 and J. Taber and Kataoka 2017 for two recent contributions). \textit{sāmānādhikaraṇya}, the co-referentiality that two words may have, was much debated in earlier texts on \textit{apoha}, cf., e.g., Much 1997, and the passages referred to there in which Dharmakīrti discusses co-referentiality: PVSV 34,25–35,4; 42,12–43,18; 65,19–66,1 (cf. the translation of the second passage in Dunne 2004: 346 ff., as well as appendix A.1.6 for a translation of the first of these passages). The present passage is the only time Ratnakīrti explicitly mentions this issue. But, as Much (1997: 170) notes, already “Dharmakīrti does not repeat Dignāga’s treatment of \textit{sāmānādhikaraṇya}, but concentrates on discussing the preclusion (\textit{apoha}, \textit{vyāṛṛ̱tti}) and the precluded (\textit{apoḍha}, \textit{vyāṛṛ̱tta}).” So the problem of co-referentiality was apparently subsumed under the more general debate of qualifier and qualified, as is also suggested by such formulations as: PVSV 42,12–13: \textit{jñānapratibhāsiny arthe sāmānyasāmānādhikaraṇyadharmadharmavyavahārāḥ}, where Dharmakīrti says that universal, co-referentiality, as well as property and property bearer are used with regard to an object that appears in a cognition; or TS Ś 1100: \textit{viśeṣanavisesyatvasāmānādhikaraṇayayoh / tasmād apohe śabdārthe vyavasthā na virudhyate //} (cf. appendix B.13 for a trl.).

\textsuperscript{105} Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 57 f., n. 132 for the background of this example in the theory of three kinds of \textit{vyavaccheda}. The problem of a sentence having exclusion as its object was already clearly seen by Kumārila, cf. appendix B.9.

\textsuperscript{106} R. Herzberger claims that for Dignāga “…the \textit{apoha}-operation is confined to names and does not apply to demonstratives.” (R. Herzberger 1986: 107 f.) If this is true, then this passage would show a very clear break that occurred at some point between Dignāga and Ratnakīrti. Acc. to Hattori 1968: 25, and 83–85, n. 1.27, Dignāga accepts proper names (\textit{yadṛcchā-}), genus words (\textit{jāti-}), quality words (\textit{guṇa-}), activity words (\textit{kriyā-}), and substance words (\textit{dravyaśabda}). This conclusion is also arrived at in Hayes 1988: 203, and accepted in Pind 2015: II.177, n. 600. Pind 2015: § 65 discusses Dignāga’s theory on the denotation of demonstrative pronouns. Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation, as cited and translated in Pind 2015: II.184, n. 627, implies that demonstrative pronouns refer to exclusion: they are used in the same way as a general term, e.g., “tree”, might be used to refer to a particular tree.
of undesired places opposed to Śrughna, only Śrughna; because of not being cut off like a forest track, the road is understood to really lead to; through the distinction from a caravan or a messenger on it, one understands only the road. Therefore, that supporting exclusion [and] possessing a positive form is understood from a word, as from the word puṇḍarīka a lotus characterized by white is understood.\textsuperscript{107}

§ 15. If [an opponent asks:] “If it is thus acceptable to call the positive element alone the referent of words, how is exclusion to be asserted?”, [then we answer that] to this it was said\textsuperscript{108} that by the word “exclusion” a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others is meant. There, when a positive element is cognized, one simultaneously cognizes other-exclusion since [that] is [the positive element’s] qualifier. And the classification that for perception, too, the object is exclusion cannot be made, because there is no dispute about the real thing being the object of this [perception], like [there is about the real thing being the object] of verbal apprehension. And by the word “positive element” an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature\textsuperscript{109} is meant according to determination, and according to appearance a form of awareness [is meant]. Amongst these, the external object is defined as that to be expressed by a word only because of determination, not because of a particular’s appearance, since there is no appearance of a manifest particular that is limited to a [certain] place, time and condition as [there is in the case of] perception. [This is] what the treatise [says, too]:

\textsuperscript{107}As traced by Akamatsu (1983: 200 ff., n. 62), it was Kumārila who objected that other-exclusion cannot be what a sentence expresses (cf. ŚV Av 143cd = TŚg 977cd, trl. appendix B.9). For the difference between Dignāga and Śāntarakṣita concerning whether a sentence makes exclusion known, cf. Hattori 1979. Patil (2009: 208 ff.) argues that Ratnakīrti’s argument in this passage makes it seem “...as if a compositional theory of semantics is assumed to explain how word-meanings are related to sentence-meaning and vice versa.” (Patil 2009: 210)

\textsuperscript{108}This paragraph repeats Ratnakīrti’s own theory of what the word referent is in broader lines than above (see § 7). Cf. section 5.2.2, footnote 382, and section 5.6 for further discussions of these descriptions.

\textsuperscript{109}Cf. PVin II 8 for a very prominent occurrence of the phrase atadrūpaparāvṛtta.
§ 16. Because an object does not appear due to a word in the awareness of [someone having] an inactive sense organ in the same way as [it does] in perception[,...].

§ 17. [Opponent:] There is a difference in the appearance of [what is in fact] a single object, because the ways [of apprehending an object, according] to the nature of a sense faculty [or] a word, are different. [Proponent:] Also with regard to this it was said:

§ 18. The basis of thoughts is certainly different [in each case. So] why would a real thing, which is in fact only one, have this nature that appears [to awareness] with different forms?

§ 19. For a single thing does not have two forms, “distinct” and “indistinct”, [which are] contradictory to each other, so that [that single thing] would appear with one [form] to the cognition of the sense faculties, with another in a conceptual cognition, since, if it were so, [that single real] thing itself would obtain [this] difference. For the difference of a real thing is nothing but the difference of [its]

110 The full verse PV in I 15 is:
śabdenāvyāpṛtākṣasya buddhāv apratibhāsanāt /
arthasya drṣṭāv iva tad anirdeśyasya vedakam //

Ratnakirti only quotes the ablative clause giving the reason for the main sentence, i.e., for the fact that “this [perception] makes known [something] that cannot be designated [by words].” Cf. the notes to PV in I 15 for other texts where this verse is found, as well as Vetter 1966: 55 for a translation of this verse’s context. For the fundamental difference between the objects of perception and conceptual awareness, cf., e.g., the expositions in Dunne 2004: 79–84 or J. A. Taber 2005: 31 ff., and see Krasser 1995: 252 ff. and McCrea and Patil 2006 for a study of the revisions that this strict distinction underwent with Dharmottara and Jñānaśrīmitra, respectively.

111 This argument is also found in ĀTV 2 237,8 ff. (ĀTV 1 330,14 ff.). Concerning the parallel passage in AP 208,16–19, Akamatsu (1983: 206, n. 86) notes that the same discussion is found in PV III 233cd–234ab. Cf. appendix A.3.4 for a translation.

112 This is PV III 235 (cf. appendix A.3.4 for the context). PV III 235a is also cited in Jñānaśrīmitra’s SāSiŚā 396,10.

113 This cannot be the case, because a real thing is a partless entity, the relation of property and property bearer being only conceptually constructed. Cf. footnote 136.
own form. And the difference of its own form is nothing but the difference of its appearance. Otherwise, the threefold world would be only one thing.\textsuperscript{114}

\section{Translation of the A\textit{pohasiddhi}}

§ 20. [Opponent:] There is no difference in a tree, even if there is, in the case of a tree in a single place, a difference in its appearance as “distinct” and “indistinct” to two people, [one] situated in a far away [and the other in a] nearby place.\textsuperscript{115} [Proponent:] We do not say that a difference in appearance is limited to different things, but rather that it is limited to it not being the case that there is the same object [for the two cognitions]. Therefore, there is a difference in the real thing when there is a difference in appearance that is accompanied by a

\textsuperscript{114}A slightly clearer version of this consequence is found in SSD 118,4–7 (where it answers a Mīmāṃsā objection, see Mimaki 1976: 120–123):

\begin{quote}
\textit{vīruḍhāyor dharmayoh padmarāgād anyatve ‘pi vīruḍhadharmayo-
gāt padmarāgasya bhedāḥ katham apahnīyate, trailokyaikatvaprasa-
ṅasya durvāratvāt. na hi dharmadharminor anyatve ‘pi brāhmaṇa-
ṭvavāndālatve ekādhāre bhavitum arhata iti padmarāgasya bheda 
duratikramah.}
\end{quote}

Even if two contradictory properties, e.g., here and there, or earlier and later, are different from a ruby, how can a difference of the ruby itself be excluded since it is connected with these contradictory properties? For, if that difference of the ruby could be excluded, the unwanted consequence of the threefold world being one would be difficult to avoid. For even though property and property bearer are different, “being a Brahmin, i.e., of the highest caste,” and “being a candāla, i.e., of the lowest caste,” cannot exist in the same subject. So the difference of the ruby due to having contradictory properties is difficult to overcome.

The consequence in this passage seems to be that if two contradictory properties can qualify the same thing without that thing having to be recognized as being two different things, then all things in all worlds, though qualified at least by different times and places, would not have to be considered different. The same argument would apply to the case under discussion, a single thing having both a clear and unclear form.

\textsuperscript{115}Akamatsu (1983: 207, n. 89) refers to PV III 407ab (cf. appendix A.3.5), where a similar statement is negated.
difference in causal effectiveness etc., as in the case of a pot.\textsuperscript{116} In the other case, however, [i.e., when there is a difference in appearance but none in causal effectiveness,] one appearance is wrong because it is certainly\textsuperscript{117} refuted that there is the same object.\textsuperscript{118}

§ 21. Due to this, what Vācaspati said[, i.e.]: “[Even though]\textsuperscript{119} the two [types of cognition], word and perception, have a real thing as [their] object, the [two] apprehensions are not without a difference, because the difference between being imperceptible and being perceptible can arise due to a difference in the cause.”\textsuperscript{120} is not relevant, because of the impossibility that a cognition of [something] imperceptible has a real thing as [its] object. Rather, the difference in causes, which is based on [the real thing’s] being imperceptible [or not], fulfills [its] aim simply by lacking any grasping of the object of the sense faculties. Thus, the particular does not appear in verbal apprehension.

§ 22. Moreover, if a thing that has the nature of a particular [were] what is to be denoted, both affirmation\textsuperscript{121} and negation would be impossible, because [the thing] would be observed with its whole

\textsuperscript{116}In the corresponding passage of Jñānaśrīmitra (cf. section 4.1.3) the example is: “…like the appearance of a cloth [is contrary] to grasping a pot.”

\textsuperscript{117}Instead of reading niyamena adverbially, it could also be understood that there is a refutation through the restriction mentioned, i.e., due to the the fact that a difference in appearances is restricted to there not being the same object.

\textsuperscript{118}For a discussion of this paragraph and Jñānaśrī’s version of this argument, cf. section 4.1.3.

\textsuperscript{119}This concessive construction is much clearer in NVTT 115,8–10 : na ca śabda-pratyakṣayor vastugoçaratve saty api pratyayābhedaḥ, kāraṇabhedena pāroksyāpāroksyabhedopapatteḥ.

\textsuperscript{120}The different causes referred to here are probably the two types of cognitions that, according to Vācaspati, apprehend the same real object, i.e., perception and conceptual cognitions.

\textsuperscript{121}In the dvandva compound vidhiniṣedha, vidhi is not used in the technical sense of “positive element.” Cf. the argumentation in § 48, where vidhiniṣedha appears alongside vidhi in its technical sense.
3. Translation of the *Aphohasiddhi*

nature.\(^\text{122}\) For if this [thing] really exists, [the expression] “it exists” is useless and [the expression] “it does not exist” is impossible. But if [it] does not really exist, [the expression] “it does not exist” is useless and [the expression] “it does exist” is impossible. But [there] is the usage of the words “is” etc. Therefore, the fact that the appearance of a verbal [cognition] is common to [both] the presence and absence of an external referent does not allow that this [external referent should] be the object [of verbal cognitions].\(^\text{123}\)

\(\text{d.11.7.4.1} \) § 23. And what Vācaspati uttered, right after having announced the fact [that] that which is to be denoted is an individual thing possessing a genus\(^\text{124}\) with his very own words, [namely]: “And that a genus, [which is] a word’s referent, is common to the presence and absence [of an external object] is not impossible, since this [genus], insofar as it, although permanent by its own nature, becomes common to presence and absence by being based on many individual things scattered in space and time, is fit for a connection [to] “it is” and “it is not”. For the connectedness to a present individual thing is the state “it is” for a genus, and the connectedness to past and future individual things is the state “it is not”. Thus, because [the reason’s] negative concomitance is doubtful, [the reason] “commonness to the presence and absence” [of an external object] is [either] ambiguous or established in a different way.”,\(^\text{125}\) that is not to the point. To the

\(^{122}\) I.e., if a word made a particular known (as perception does), every statement about a thing would be either impossible or superfluous: e.g. “A cow exists.” is a pointless statement if the word “cow” made a particular, and therefore existing, cow known. Conversely, the statement “A cow does not exist.” would be impossible (or at least nonsense), if the word “cow” here would refer to an existing, particular cow.

\(^{123}\) The obvious fact that words can refer to their objects irrespective of the objects’ existence was an important concern already for Bhārtrhārī: cf. Houben 1995: 257 ff., and Ogawa 1999: 275 (esp. n. 17), where Bhārtrhārī’s explanation of secondary or mental existence (*upacārasattā*) is given. As noted by Frauwallner (1937: 262, n. 2), the discussion here and in the following paragraph is very similar to DhAP 241,11–242,6 (trl. Frauwallner 1937: 262 f.).

\(^{124}\) Cf. § 9.

\(^{125}\) Cf. section 4.1.4 for the inference that Vācaspati is discussing here.

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extent [of what has been said there is], first of all, no damage to what has been put forth [by us], because by laying (nyāsyat) the burden on the genus [Vācaspati] has himself accepted the fact that the particular is not what is to be designated [by words]. Furthermore, in every case the state “it is” etc. of a word’s referent is considered only according to the nature proper to the particular. But [this statement]: “But the genus’s connection to present etc. individual things [is considered to be] the state “it is” etc.” [is] a trick for a child. In the same manner, there is an error also in [thinking a word] denotes an individual thing possessing a genus. If a cognition is established because of an individual thing, [then] an additional universal may be cognized or not; but there is no liberation from the error [that there is] a cognition of an individual thing.

§ 24. Due to this [explanation], what is said by the Kumārilites: “It is only because of a thing’s having parts that there is no error in [a permanent universal] being common [to present and absent things]. For treeness, unspecified as to presence or absence, is understood from [some] word. It is connected with one or the other of these [properties, presence or absence, either of] which is understood through another word.” is also false, because, when there is a cognition of a permanent universal, it is not possible that the state of [its] presence [or] absence is not specified.

§ 25. And also this [statement by the opponent]: “But the way of words to cause the apprehension of referents is not like [the way] of perception, so that there would not be a requirement of the words ‘is’ etc. as in the case of an [object] observed by this [perception], because the means of valid cognition have different capacities.” has

126 This repeats the point of § 9.
128 Cf. section 4.1.5 for some material on this position.
been falsified by the falsification\textsuperscript{129} of different appearances, when two appearances, perceptual and verbal, grasp one and the same nature. And \textit{the requirement} that there are diverse capacities of the means of valid cognition is achieved even by direct perception and determination.\textsuperscript{130} Therefore, if the object of perception were made known through verbal \textit{cognition}, there would be an appearance in exactly the same way \textit{as for perception}. And something non-existing does not tolerate being made known as an object of this, i.e., of perception.

\textbf{§ 26.} If \textit{an opponent asks:} “Is it not \textit{the case that}, when the part “treeness” has been indicated by the word “tree”, the words “is” etc. are applied for the purpose of ascertaining \textit{other} parts, \textit{like} existence etc.?”, then \textit{we answer:} What opportunity \textit{could there be} for an affirmation or negation of another property through another word or another means of valid cognition for a particular that is, since it is partless, completely comprehended by perception?\textsuperscript{131} If \textit{an opponent says:} “Even in \textit{the case of} perception, the requirement of a different means of valid cognition is observed.”, \textit{we answer that} that may be \textit{the case} when a \textit{thing’s} own form that has not been repeatedly experienced is the object, because this \textit{perception} does not have the

\textsuperscript{129}Cf. the discussion in § 20.

\textsuperscript{130}Ratnakīrti is here rephrasing his model, \textit{tad asyāpi vicitraśaktitvaṃ pramā-nānām vastusvarūpānubhavādhyavasāyamātrakṛtam eva} (AP213,7). McCrea and Patil (2010: 68) translate: “Thus even for him, the notion that the modes of valid awareness have different capacities is produced merely by the determination that one has experienced the form of a real thing.” This interpretation is not possible for Ratnakirți’s text, which suggests that we should understand Jñānaśrīmitra to be saying that the difference in capacities is produced merely by an experience of the form of a real thing and determination. Akamatsu (1983: 90) understands the AP in a third way, translating: “...est produit par la seule [différence entre l’]expérience immédiate ...et la détermination conceptuelle ...par rapport à la nature propre de l’objet existant ....”

\textsuperscript{131}As noted in Akamatsu 1983: 223 f., n. 119 this argument is found in PV I 43, cf. appendix A.1.2.
nature of ascertainment. But what would another means of valid cognition be where a conceptual cognition, itself of the nature of ascertainment, is grasping a real, partless thing? But there is a requirement for another word and a logical mark. Therefore, a real thing’s own form is not grasped by a conceptual cognition.

§ 27. [Opponent:] Are properties such as a genus etc. not different from each other and from the property bearers? So in the case of a tree, although cognized by means of a single property that has the character of a genus, there is no cognition of it as possessing other properties. Therefore, why shouldn’t there be a cognition–dependent

132 In the tradition following Dignāga, perception itself does not ascertain its object (cf., e.g., the programmatic statements in Hattori 1968: 25–27, p. 36 (III.Bc–1), and see McCrea and Patil 2006: 318 ff. for a concise review of research on this matter), insofar as “ascertainment” (niścaya) is synonymous with determination (adhyavasāya). Ratnakīrti is here referring to habituated perceptions, which are discussed in PVSV 27.15 ff. and PVSV 32.5–12, passages closely analysed in Kellner 2004: 11–29 (see especially Kellner 2004: 26 for a note on Jñānaśrīmitra’s view of habituation and inference). So Ratnakīrti’s statement must not be understood as implying that when an object is familiar, perception itself does ascertain it (which one might conclude from the translation by McCrea and Patil (2010: 69) of Jñānaśrīmitra’s model for this statement: “…since even perception is not decisive in the case of an object whose form we are not accustomed to.”). It is only a conceptual awareness event that can ascertain something. This also finds support in the phrase “svayam niścayātmako”, qualifying conceptual cognition in the next sentence, because it suggests that it is opposed (tu) to perception in so far as it has the nature of ascertaining something of its own accord (svayam), i.e., without an additional (ascertaining) means of cognition. For the difference of this position to Kumārila’s, cf. J. A. Taber 1998a: 96–101. The Naiyāyika’s position is discussed in Matilal 1986: 330 ff. Vācaspatimiśra’s discussion of perception as ascertaining its object is found in NVTT 107.8–117.6 (a passage translated, or at least paraphrased, in the pioneering work, Stcherbatsky 1994 2, 257–298). McAllister (forthcoming a) investigates Prajñākaragupta’s treatment of the relation between inference, perception, and habituation.

133 As noted in Akamatsu 1983: 224, n. 121, cf. PVSV 29.7 ff. for a discussion of the same objection (appendix A.1.4). The opponents there are Naiyāyikas or Vaiśeṣikas or both (cf. footnote 453). The relation between the separated dharma and dharmin is called samavāya. Cf. Halbfass 1992: 147 ff. for a short characterization of this concept.
on different expressions—of another property [of a tree], like its being green, swaying, being quite tall etc.? [Proponent:] Precisely this is unsuitable, because a perceivable difference of property and property bearer is refuted by perception, since in perception a particular with an indivisible nature appears. Otherwise there is the overreaching consequence that everything would be everywhere. But that the everyday activity [concerned with] properties and property bearers has [its] basis in a conceptual difference, is well established in the treatise.

§ 28. Alternatively, may the difference of property and property bearer be real, nevertheless [their] contact is to be assumed [by

134 Cf. PV I 43 (and Frauwallner 1932: 249 f., as well as the trl. on page 280).
135 This unwanted consequence is not clear. “Otherwise” can be taken as “if a particular separable into parts such as treeness, height, swaying, etc., appeared in perception.” In this case, where an instance of treeness appears as separated from an instance of height, etc., we could probably not say which particular tree these various properties belonged to, and so they might be said to occur everywhere. If, on the other hand, “otherwise” means that the refutation of a difference between property and property bearer by perception could be wrong, then it could be understood that anything that is cognized by perception could be wrong, so that a tree appearing to be in some place might as well be somewhere else. (This last explanation was suggested by Parimal Patil.) Finally, anyathā could just be referring to the general principle that if something refuted by perception could be true, anything could be said to be anywhere, since we would have lost a basic tool for verifying the truth of a statement against reality.

136 Cf. PVSV 2.21–3.1: na. dharmabhedaparikalpanād iti vakṣyāmah. tathā cāha—sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavavahāro buddhyārūdhena dharmadharma bhedeneti. (Trl.: “No, [the proving property and the property to be proven are not identical], because a difference of properties is conceptually constructed. We will explain this [below]. In the same way, [Dignāga] said: all this everyday activity [concerned with] inference and that to be inferred is due to a difference of property and property bearer which is founded [only] in awareness.” ) This passage is also found in PVin II 56.12–57.1. As noted in Steinkellner 2007: n. to 56.13 f., Dharmakīrti is invoking Dignāga as the authority here: “tathā cāha ...”. For other translations of this passage, see Steinkellner 1979: 45 and Steinkellner 2013: I.7 f. Note also that acc. to Gnoli (1960: 189, n. to p. 2, l. 22), iti vaksyāmah refers to the apoha section. PVSV 32–35 is particularly relevant in this context, see below appendix A.1.5 and appendix A.1.6. Cf. also PVSVT 143,15–16 (see footnote 475).
you] only as one of assistance, because [other types of contact such as] inherence etc. between them have been falsified.\textsuperscript{137} And so, in the same way as, when a property bearer is cognized through perception, a complete cognition of its properties [arises] through the [simultaneous] contact [of these properties] with the sense faculties, so, when a property bearer is cognized through a word or a logical mark, which are [both] connected [to their object] by a connection such as denoted and denoting etc.,\textsuperscript{138} a complete cognition of its properties [would arise], because there is no difference in contact as such.

§ 29. What Vācaspati [said]: “But if that [real thing] is grasped [which is] qualified by [what a Buddhist opponent calls] a single

\textsuperscript{137}Cf. the comments in section 4.1.6. In § 38, Ratnakīrti says that inherence is not possible, and then reproduces KBhV 70,13–14 (corresponds to § 39).

As shown by Akamatsu (1983: 229 ff., n. 129), this and the following passage (§§ 27–29) closely follow the arguments in PV I 46 and PV I 52cd–55 (cf. trl. on page 283 and appendix A.1.4, respectively). PV I 52cd, where the unwanted consequence under discussion is introduced under the hypothetical assumption that there really is a difference between properties and their bearers, cf. the phrase that starts the auto-commentary on PV I 52cd, PVSV 29,12 ff.: \textit{yady apy upādhayo bhinnā eva ...} (For a trl. of this passage, cf. appendix A.1.4). The opponent in Jñānaśrīmitra’s text argues that Dharmakīrti has stated that there is no difference between a capacity to support an attribute and the thing which has that capacity (probably PVSV 29,13–16, cf. appendix A.1.4 for a trl.). The opponent’s point is that there would be a contradiction to the hypothetical acceptance of a difference. But Jñānaśrīmitra simply says that this point is not touched on by this discussion.

\textsuperscript{138}In the case of the logical mark, the connection would be between a logical mark (\textit{liṅga}), such as having smoke or being a \textit{śimśapā}, and the \textit{pakṣa} (or \textit{liṅgin}), something qualified by the logical mark, such as a mountain or a tree. Note that this amounts to an equation of the relation of both \textit{vācya-vācaka} and \textit{liṅga-liṅgin} with the relation of \textit{dharma-dharmin} in the following respect: knowledge of a denoter (\textit{vācaka}) or a logical mark (\textit{liṅga}), like that of a \textit{dharma}, cannot be had without knowledge of the denoted (\textit{vācya}) or that having the logical mark (\textit{liṅgin}), which thus resemble the property bearer \textit{dharmin}. This equation is, of course, an unwanted consequence (\textit{prasaṅga}), because it is formulated under the unaccepted assumption that this relation is real, i.e., that the relata really exist as relata. It is only on the theory that a word and a logical mark do not refer to or designate any real thing that this consequence does not arise.

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additional attribute,\textsuperscript{139} [e.g.,] existence, then there is no grasping of it as qualified by other additional attributes. For the nature of a substance is characterized through additional attributes, but neither the additional attributes nor the state of being qualified [by them is] its nature.”, that, too, simply flows away. For the grasping of the other additional attributes does not follow from a non-difference, since a grasping of that which is assisted when that assisting [it] is grasped follows only after [their] difference has been presupposed. And it is not appropriate to imagine, as [it is] in the case of the cause and effect relation of fire and smoke, that a cognition is limited to a property and property bearer only due to [their] own nature, because neither is established by a means of valid cognition.\textsuperscript{140} And the rule [is] that [only] when [something] is established by a means of valid cognition [is there] a depiction of [a thing’s] nature.\textsuperscript{141} § 30. And what the \textit{Nyāyabhūṣaṇa} said about this, [namely:] “If [such a thing as] the sun and so on is grasped, there is the consequence of grasping the multitude of all [other] things assisted by it[, i.e., the sun etc.].”\textsuperscript{142} that is the result of not fathoming the intent [of what was said by Dharmakīrti]. For it is so: in your opinion, [there is] a difference of property and property bearer, and [their] contact [is]

\textsuperscript{139}See section 4.1.7, page 147, for some explanations of the term \textit{upādhi}, and the justification for the translation presented here.

\textsuperscript{140}For fire and smoke, the cause-effect relation is ultimately established to result from their nature. For the property and its bearer, this is not the case: they are just helpful constructions (insofar as they make everyday activity possible), but they do not reflect reality. The key to the argument presented here is \textit{svabhāva}: the relation between property and its bearer does not follow from the nature of the things involved, but is only imagined. Even though what Vācaspatimiśra claims is true—namely that neither the additional attributes nor their qualifying a material thing constitute that thing’s nature—it is true only once one has admitted a difference between properties and their bearers. Thus, whereas the distinction of cause and effect holds in reality, this distinction does not.

\textsuperscript{141}Cf. section 4.1.8, page 152.

\textsuperscript{142}In this unwanted consequence, the sun is what \textit{assists} the cognition of all other objects, i.e., those \textit{assisted} by the sun, because a person sees things by the light, or assistance, of the sun. Cf. the translation of the passage in section 4.1.9.
only characterized as assistance.\footnote{143}{This was stated above, \S 28.} When the assisting \[thing\] is grasped, the grasping of the assisted \[thing\] at that time follows only for an assisted thing that has] the same place and only [when it has] the nature of a property \[of the assisting thing\]. Therefore, how would the unwanted consequence ensue that one would grasp \[everything that is\] assisted by the sun, \[everything, that is,\] which, being either in a different place or being a different substance, has been observed to deviate \[from being grasped when the sun is grasped]\footnote{144}{Dharmakīrti's argument, according to this interpretation, was only valid for dharma and dharmin relations, which have to fulfill two criteria: first, the relata must be in contact with each other. Second, they must be properties of the same substance. The relation between objects in daylight and the light of the sun is therefore not a proper relation of upakāraka and upakārya, since the sun illuminates things at a great distance and these things are not properties of the sun.}?

\section*{\S 31.} Therefore, since \[a thing\] would be cognized with its whole nature if the nature of a real thing were apprehended, even by means of \[only\] one property, what opportunity of an affirmation or negation by another word \[could there be]\footnote{145}{What is cognized from the word “cow” would thus appear to contain an indistinct image of a cow, in the sense that all the parts that a speaker associates with cows appear in it but in a way that obfuscates the particular characteristics that these parts have in every instance. A related notion is already mentioned by Dharmakīrti, PVSV 4,23–24: “yathā gaur ayam sāsnādisamudāyātmatvād iti.” (Like \[the inference\] “This is a cow because it has the nature of an aggregate of dewlap and so on.”) See Steinkellner 2013: I.12 for a translation of this comparison in its context. PV III 225cd: “na hi gopratyayo drṣṭaḥ sāsnādinām adarśane!” (For a cognition of a cow is not observed without observing a dewlap and so on.)}? But \[there\] is \[this opportunity\]. Therefore it is established that a particular does not appear because of a word, a concept, or a logical mark.

\section*{\S 32.} Neither does a universal appear in a verbal apprehension. Because of a word such as “cow” etc. in \[the sentence\] “Cows are grazing on the other side of the river.” there appear dewlap, horn, tail etc. \[which are\] accompanied by the forms of letters, \[and which are\] mostly lumped together because of the disregard for the differences between \[things\] of the same genus.\footnote{145} But exactly this is not a
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universal.

§ 33. For [the universal] “cowness” is proclaimed to be devoid of the forms of colour, shape, and letters.\footnote{146}{Cf. section 4.1.10 for a discussion of this verse.}

§ 34. And precisely this mere\footnote{147}{For the import of “mere” (*mātra*) here, cf. footnote 193.} dewlap, horn etc., in being identified with the particular, though completely different in every individual thing, is called a universal. Because such an external [object] is not obtained, this [is] only an error, like the appearance of hair.\footnote{148}{This is one of the standard symptoms of a person suffering from an eye-disorder called *timira* that causes perceptual errors. Cf. Chu 2004: 131 ff. and MacDonald 2015: II, 111 f., n. 228 for further information on *timira*.} Therefore, may [such an error] either be this unfolding\footnote{149}{Cf. the characterization of this term in the context of the Vedāntin’s error theory, Schmithausen 1965: 102: “...d. h. der eine Geist nimmt die ihm fremde unwirkliche Gestalt einer Mannigfaltigkeit an, ohne dabei sein Wesen zu verlieren ....”} only of the mind itself, which has the nature of this [universal] by virtue of the impressions [left in the mind by previous experiences], or may [something] completely non-existent with the form of this [universal] appear, or may the individual things themselves appear in some other way through a disregard of the differences to that of the same genus, because [differences amongst things] are hidden from experience, or may [such an error] be considered a deprivation of memory.\footnote{150}{Cf. section 4.1.11 for more details on these forms of error.} In all [of these] ways, this cognition of a universal is truly without an object. [So] where [is there] news of a universal?

§ 35. What is said [as an objection] again,\footnote{151}{Cf. section 4.1.13 for who might have said this.} [namely] that if a universal is non-existent, [then] the universal’s cognition is accidental, is wrong. For a causal complex, which, enriched by the assisting
cause of recollecting an observation of an earlier material object,\textsuperscript{152} generates a particular apprehension,\textsuperscript{153} gives rise to a conceptual [cognition] of a universal that is without a [real] object. In this way,

\textsuperscript{152}An observation of a material entity was stated to be a prerequisite for conventional agreement, cf. l. 73, p. 52 (trl. §12). Here Ratnakirti makes the point that it is on the basis of a complex of causes, supported by a recollection of such an observation, that a conceptual cognition of a “universal” (or non-difference, \textit{abheda}, \textit{aviśeṣa}) is produced.

Generally, \textit{a sāmagrī} is a set of factors that causes a particular effect. The causal complex of perceptual cognitions has been treated very thoroughly by Steinkellner (1967: 45; 121–125, nn. 27, 28) (corresponding to HB b.12214), as well as by Kellner (1999: 197 ff.). The causal complex governing conceptual cognitions is less clear. Perceptual judgement, a conceptual cognition following a perception, is treated by Dharmakirti in PVSV 31,26–32,12 (see Kellner 2004: 19–32 for an excellent interpretation).

Though not discussed in great detail by Ratnakirti, the causal complex referred to here could consist in what appears on hearing the word “cow” in a sentence, as described in §32: it conjures up a generalized shape of cows, and is accompanied by the sounds of the letters that make up the word “cow”.

This position is rather similar to Dharmakirti’s explanations of the interplay of memory, convention, and real things: cf., e.g., the discussion following PV I 64 (trl. appendix A.1.6), PVSV 54,12–14 (translated and referred to in Akamatsu 1983: 247, n. 164 in this context), and see also PV I 72 and commentary (cf. the trl. in Dunne 2004: 344 f.), PVSV 42,13–22 (cf. the trl. in Dunne 2004: 346 f.), and PVSV 82,4–22 (trl. appendix A.1.11).

\textsuperscript{153}AS\textsubscript{1} and AS\textsubscript{2}, as well as all the mss available to me, read \textit{°mānāviśeṣa°}. \textit{mānāviśeṣa} in AS\textsubscript{3} is therefore probably a misprint. There are three ways of analysing this compound: \textit{°mānā vi°}, \textit{°mānā ‘vi°}, and \textit{°māna-avi°}, respectively. This could be understood either as translated above, or as “a causal complex, which, enriched by the assisting cause ... , generates a non-specific apprehension,” or as “a causal complex, which generates a non-specific apprehension that is enriched by the assisting cause.” The differences concern two points: what is enriched by memory, the conceptual cognition or its set of causes, and what is engendered by the causal complex mentioned—a \textit{viśesapratyaya} or an \textit{aviśesapratyaya}?

The first option yields the best sense. Concerning point one, memory—as an additional cause (\textit{sahakārīn})—is more likely to be one condition in the set responsible for a conceptual cognition than a part of conceptual cognition itself; and, concerning point two, \textit{viśesapratyaya} (a certain/specific apprehension) seems to be the right option, since it is what Ratnakirti is trying to prove here: that a cognition is not arbitrary, but specific insofar as it is bound to a certain set of causes and therefore is “of” only certain objects.
therefore, a genus appears neither in a verbal apprehension nor in perception.154

§ 36. Neither is [a genus] established inferentially, because a connected logical mark cannot be observed when [what is to be proven, the genus,] is unobservable.155 Neither is this [genus] established like a sense faculty, because from the effect, which is a cognition, only an occasional, other reason is established.156 Even if [someone] pointed out that, in [the case of] another material object or an intermediate space [between cows], the cognition of a cow is absent, then how should the absence of the cognition of a cow, [insofar as it] arises from the absence only of all material cow entities, such as flecked ones etc., depend on another object[, i.e., a genus]?157 [Opponent:] Now, [it is] only because of cowness [that there is] a material cow entity, otherwise even a horse would be a material cow entity. [Proponent:] If so, [then it is] only because of the material cow entity [that there is] cowness, otherwise even horseness would be cowness. Therefore

154 Cf. the notes in section 4.1.13.

155 The inference considered here aims to prove a genus (sādhyā). Neither the reason (hetu) nor the locus (pakṣa) of the inference are specified. The counter-argument is that if a genus is not observable, it cannot be proven that it is connected to the hetu in the first place. Given that an effect of the genus is used as a reason, as supposed in the next sentence, this argument would appeal to the impossibility of establishing the cause-effect relation between a genus and a cognition (or all its other effects). Cf. Mimaki 1976: 292, n. 321 for a concise summary of Ratnakirti’s opinion in this matter. As Patil (2011b: 24, n. 101) notes, “...the inference of other minds (santānāntara) and of the functioning of our sense faculties (indriya) ...” are instances where Ratnakirti accepts that even though that which should be established is invisible, a vyāpti can be established.

156 Cf. section 4.1.12 for some remarks on this argument.

157 The problem of whether a genus is omnipresent (sarvagata), so that it might occur both in the space between its manifestations and also in other entities, is also discussed in NBhV 303.6–10 (cf. Potter 1977: 325 for a summary), and ŚV Āv 25. Both of these passages are quoted by Karnakagomin, ad PVSV 76.25–77.4 (cf. the references in section 4.1.13). See also Potter 1977: 139-140 for a short sketch of the various positions held by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors in this matter, and below footnote 280.
the material cow entity [is due] solely to a succession of causes.\textsuperscript{158}

Cowness, however, may exist or not.

§ 37. [Opponent:] Is it not [the case that], if the capacity to generate a universal’s apprehension is not different from one material entity, then another material entity, which is [also] excluded from that of another genus, [would be] incapable [of generating that cognition]? But [if this capacity is] different [from the material entity], then this is the universal, [and there is] at most a dispute concerning the name. [Proponent:] This capacity is certainly not different to the real thing. But what kind of error should arise if there is a [being] that is also like another being [in terms of] having a [certain] capable nature? In the way that for you one genus is the cause of creating a term common [to multiple individual things], as well as another [genus], is [such a cause] just by its nature, independently of other genera, in that way, for us, an individual thing too, [insofar as it is also] independent of genera [and] differentiated [from other particulars] only through its own form, [is] the cause [of such a common term].\textsuperscript{159}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{158} Cf. ll. 65 ff. in § 11, where a causal chain such as this is also mentioned as a reason for a thing’s differentiation from other things.

\textsuperscript{159} This paragraph, giving only a very general argument, draws on many of the central ideas of the \textit{apoha} theory as developed by Dharmakīrti:

\begin{itemize}
  \item that a capacity is not different from the particular having that capacity is argued for in PV I 54 (cf. the trl. on page 289);
  \item that many particulars have a non-different capacity \textit{śakti}, one of which is to cause the same cognition, is discussed in PV I 73 ff. (cf. Dunne 2004: 343 ff.), PV I 109 (referred to and translated by Akamatsu (1983: 248, n. 170); cf. the trl. on page 302), and PV III 163cd–164 (cf. the trl. on page 321);
  \item that particulars are essentially different from each other is introduced at the beginning of Dharmakīrti’s discussion of \textit{apoha} in PV I 40–42 (cf. appendix A.1.1).
\end{itemize}

The two beliefs that are ascribed to the opponent are the Nyāya positions that the genus is the cause of what is the same (see footnote 286) and that it does so independently of any other \textit{jāti}. This latter notion might be linked to the fact that universals cannot qualify each other (cf. Halbfass 1970: 143): this implies that any
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e.2.4 § 38. But what Trilocana\(^{160}\) [said is this]: “Inherence of specific universals like horiness, cowiness etc. in [their] own [respective] bases [is] the cause for both an appellation and apprehension as ‘A universal, a universal’.\(^{161}\) [Proponent:] If in such a way this very cause for such appellations and cognitions exists in the particulars too, [then] what [use is your] obsession with [making us] admit a universal? Moreover, inherence is not possible [either]:

§ 39. Inherence should be established because of the awareness “[something is] in here”, and the thought “in here” [should exist] when one observes two [things, where one is in the other].

But in no object of that [cognition] is there a perception of a pair. Therefore an agreement [to inherence] is merely [one’s] personal fancy.\(^{162}\)

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160 Trilocana’s texts have been lost. For more information about this Naiyāyika author, who was a teacher of Vācaspatimiśra, cf. Potter 1977: 396 ff., Solomon 1980, and Aklujkar 1999.

161 Oberhammer reads according to *JNĀ* and ms. *P*, translating: “Das Inhärieren der besonderen Gemeinsamkeiten wie Pferdtum, Kuhtum etc. in dem jeweiligen Substrat ist die Ursache für das Benennen und Erkennen der Gemeinsamkeit.” (Oberhammer 1964: 144, n. 47) He makes no comment about the reading “*sāmānyam sāmānyam iti*”. The repetition is in all likelihood the correct reading: the skipping of a repeated word is an error that can easily be repeated by independent scribes, and is the cause for the readings found in *P* and *AP*. In the AP 223,18–19, the repeated word is even found in a subsequent reuse of this phrase in Jñānaśrīmitra’s answer. The argument also makes good sense: Cowness, horiness, and so on are each a cause for a corresponding cognition. The resulting cognitions are, according to Trilocana, repeated cognitions in the sense that they have the inherence of the same universal in (at least two) particular things as their cause. So for both things the same judgement arises: “This is the universal cowness, that is the universal cowness.”

162 This verse is in the *upendravajrā* metre (as defined in Apte 1992: Appendix A, p. 4), and in all likelihood originally from Jñānaśrī. For inherence as assumed by Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika authors, cf. the explanations in Dravid 1972: 19 ff., and the notes in section 4.1.6.
rejected: “How can this consistency of apprehensions, which accords to a consistent thing, exist where there are completely different individual things that [would] concur [only] with the presence of apprehensions of objects differentiated [from each other]?”, because [a] consistent apprehension deviates [also] in the case of the genera themselves, [insofar as they] are particularised due to being differentiated from each other.  
166

163 The masculine form ūha in AP 222,24 does not correspond to JNĀms 17a5, which reads ūhā. This feminine form exists according to PW I: 1036, so a text emendation seems unnecessary here.

164 Since no new opponent has been introduced following § 38, this passage is most likely taken from one of Trilocana’s texts as well.

165 The formulation here differs from that in the corresponding passage in AP 222,24, cyāvṛttapratyayavisayabhāvānupātiniṣu, which McCrea and Patil 2010: 83 translate (in context) as: “…in individuals, which are absolutely distinct and fall within the scope of differentiated awarenesses.” In this case, the awarenesses are differentiated, whereas for Ratnakīrti the objects are what is primarily differentiated. The argument does not appear to change much, since different objects will cause different cognitions.

This passage is strongly reminiscent of NBh on NSūTh 2.2.69 (samānaprasa-vātmikā jātiḥ. Trl.: “A genus has the nature of producing the same.”), NBh: yā samānāṃ buddhiṃ prasūte bhinneṣu adhikaraṇeṣu, yayā ca bahūnitaretarato na vyāvartante, yo ‘rtho ’nekatra pratyayānuvṛttinimittam tat sāmānyam. yac ca kesā-ñcid abhedam karoti, kutasaṣcid bhedam, tat sāmānyaviśeṣo jātir iti. (“Which [genus] produces the same awareness for different foundations, [and] by which [genus] multiple [things] differentiate [themselves] from each other, [and] which object is the cause of a consistency of cognitions for more than one [thing], that is the universal. And what causes a non-difference of some [things], [and their] difference from some [things], that is the specific universal, the genus.”) Cf. also the explanations in Halbfass 1992: 120 ff.

166 The logical error seems to be as follows (see also Akamatsu 1983: 248 f., n. 175): Trilocana thinks that the repeated occurrence of the same cognition for multiple particulars of the same genus cannot occur without a thing that in some way consists as the same, i.e., without a universal or the different individual and temporally extended things with the same universal inhering in them. Since the cognition is dependent on these particulars as its cause, it establishes them. In other words, they are the sādhya of the inference in the background of this passage. But, as Ratnakīrti suggests, even the genera themselves are differentiated from each other, since they are “particularized” or, literally, “enter into the manifestations”. Therefore the logical reason that Trilocana professes, the consistency of certain cognitions, goes
§ 41. What is again formulated as a \[valid cognition\] falsifying \[the consistency of cognition\] in the opposite case by him,\(^{167}\) \[i.e.,\] “A consistency of appellation and apprehension, \[insofar as\] it exists only in some \[cases\] whilst being absent from some \[others], has a cause, but there is no other cause \[except a consistent real thing\].” and so on, is not correct, since, even without a consistent \[thing\], it has been established\(^{168}\) that the consistency of appellations and cognitions is \[to be\] necessarily accepted because of the specificity of \[a thing’s\] own nature, which is differentiated from that of another form. Therefore:

astray or deviates: even in Trilocana’s theory, a repetition of cognitions is not a sure sign of a genus that remains the same throughout all cognitive events, because a genus in fact becomes differentiated when it enters into multiple particulars. And, the unspoken conclusion is, if differentiated things can thus cause similar cognitions, why not the particulars too, without any intermediary genera?

The interpretation of anuvṛtti and anuvṛtta here is not without its problems. Patil (2011b: 14), as well as McCrea and Patil (2010: 83) (translating AP 222,23–25), use recurrence. Another interpretation, that as “conformity”, is suggested by Akamatsu 1983: 124 f., and has the advantage of highlighting the fact that the recurrence follows or corresponds to the presence of the genus.

\(^{167}\) Presumably this is still Trilocana. The full formulation of the logical error Ratnakīrti is defending against here is sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa. Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 116 f. for more information, and Akamatsu 1983: 248 f., n. 175 for a lucid assessment of the logical structure based on Jñānaśrīmitra’s model for this passage. Acc. to Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 116 f., n. 310, it is supposed to establish the pervasion of a separate inference by disproving other possibilities. Trilocana, as mentioned above (footnote 166), wishes to prove that a cognition of sameness is caused by, and so can prove, the sameness of its objects. Here he argues that, in the case opposite to the one he wants to prove, i.e., in the case that there are no things that stay the same due to a genus, the reason of his inference, the consistency of cognition, is not possible (or is eliminated). In this way, the fact that cognitions conform to their objects is a valid reason for inferring its only cause, a conforming thing.

\(^{168}\) Ratnakīrti has argued that the non-existence of a universal does not mean that cognitions of a universal are random (§ 35), and that particulars differentiated by their own nature are able to cause a cognition of sameness (§ 37). Together, these arguments might account for the present statement that the conformity of appellations and cognitions must be accepted on the basis of the specific characteristics of particulars alone.
§ 42. By which contact a genus spreads out into something, when [there is] the same difference [of things], but not into others, that [contact] alone should be the cause of both words and cognitions.\textsuperscript{169}

§ 43. Furthermore, what is said about this [verse]\textsuperscript{170} in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: “[What the verse says is wrong,] because it is not like this: by which contact [such things as] a stick, a string etc. extend somewhere [but] not elsewhere, that contact alone [instead of the stick, string, etc.] should be the cause of the everyday activity [concerned with] ‘something with a stick’, ‘something on a string’ etc. in cases of a man [carrying a stick], crystals [on a string] etc. [So] what use is the [actual] stick, string etc.?”, is wrong, because the intention [of this verse, correctly given as follows,] was not understood [in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa]: “For it is not denied that both a stick and a string, connected to a man and a crystal, [and] observed [as such], are the reason for the apprehension of [something] having a stick or being on a string. But a universal is not observed even in a dream. Therefore, if this [universal] is [in any case only] to be imagined, then preferably only contact should be imagined as the reason for the apprehension of a universal. [But] what is the use of a fraught assumption [like this]?"

§ 44. [Opponent:] Now this inference demonstrating a universal is set forth: That, which is a cognition of [something] that is qualified, [is] inseparable from the grasping of the qualifier, such as the cognition of “having a stick” [in the case of someone carrying a stick]. And this is a cognition of [something] that is qualified: “This is a cow”. In fact, [this is] an effect-reason. For the cognition of [something] qualified, which is established in the example, is an effect

\textsuperscript{169} This verse is PV I 162 (cf. the trl. on page 316), where it also follows a discussion about the causes of cognitions and designations.

\textsuperscript{170} NBhūṣ 261,5–7, quoted here, is a direct reply to PV I 162, which is quoted at NBhūṣ 261,3–4.
of the experience of the qualifier.\textsuperscript{171} [Proponent:] With regard to this [inference, there is] a question: should it prove that an awareness of what is qualified is inseparable from the grasping of a qualifier that is different [from what it qualifies], or [should it prove] that [this awareness] is inseparable from the experience of a qualifier as such?

§ 45. In the first case, the falsification of the instance [that the inference is about] through perception does not provide an opportunity for attention towards the proving [element, the reason], because there is no appearance of the two[, i.e., a qualified thing and that qualifying it,] in a perception grasping a real thing.\textsuperscript{172} And that there is an awareness of [something] qualified is common [to various cases of cognition]. [So] the reason is ambiguous, because [a cognition of something qualified is] observed also without grasping a differentiated qualifier, as “A pot has its own form.”, or “Cowness [is] a universal.”\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{171}The elements used in this inference are as follows: The \textit{pakṣa}, or locus of the inference, is cognition. The \textit{hetu}, reason, is that the cognition is of something that is qualified, which simply means that the object that is known in a cognition is specified in some way. The \textit{sādhya}, which is what is to be proven, is that this cognition of something qualified implies an apprehension of that which qualifies its object—on a realist account, a universal. The example, \textit{drṣṭānta}, is the cognition of a person carrying a stick, which implies that there be the cognition of the stick. The reason used in this inference is a so-called effect reason, \textit{kāryahetu}, i.e., the reason (cognition of something qualified) is an effect of what is to be established (grasping of a qualifier). This is one of three types of reasons that are admissible according to Buddhist logicians in the tradition of Dharmakīrti (cf. the explanations in Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 72 ff.).

\textsuperscript{172}Meaning we do not apprehend the universal cowness in the perception of a specific cow. And since there is no cognition of both a qualified thing and its qualifier, it is no use paying any attention to the reason. For the exemplary inference from “smoke on a mountain” to “fire on a mountain”, the corresponding argument would be that the “mountain qualified by smoke” is shown not to exist, so that the inference becomes futile. For Ratnakīrti’s stance on the relation of qualifier and qualified, cf. the argument in § 27.

\textsuperscript{173}These examples show that it is possible to have a cognition of something that is qualified without grasping a qualifier that is different from the thing: a pot is not different from its own form, and cowness is not different from the universal that it is. Since it is therefore possible that a qualified cognition (\textit{hetu}) can occur independently of a separate qualifier (\textit{sādhya}), the reason is ambiguous, \textit{anaikāntika}. 116
§ 46. But in the second case [there is an] establishing of what is [already] established, because, in accepting a difference imagined as “A material entity possesses the genus cowness.” in the same way as [one thinks] “A pot has its own form.”, a relation of qualifier and qualified is postulated [even by us],\(^{174}\) since everyday activity [such as] “This is a cow.” comes about due to an experience of that differentiated from non-cow.

§ 47. Thus, a universal is not established in this way. And the [valid cognition] falsifying the circle of additional attributes like universal, property, action etc.,\(^{175}\) [is] a sharpened perception grasping a bare particular, or the fully established non-apprehension of what is [usually] observable.\(^{176}\)

§ 48. Thus, in this way,\(^{177}\) only a positive element is the referent of a word. And this [positive element] is meant [to be] the external object and the form in awareness.\(^{178}\) Amongst these, the form of awareness is neither affirmed nor negated, neither in reality nor conventionally, because [this form] is to be cognized [only] through the perception self-awareness\(^{179}\) and is not determined. The external object is not affirmed or negated in reality either, because it does not appear in verbal apprehensions. Precisely for this [reason], all things

\(^{174}\) Cf. § 27 (trl. page 104) for this argument.

\(^{175}\) I.e., all things that can be understood as qualifying a particular. Ratnakīrti here hints at the entities that, according to the ontology of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors, can inhere in substances (dravya). Cf. the summary in Halbfass 1992: 70 ff.

\(^{176}\) Ratnakīrti here summarizes his two main lines of attack on entities that exist separately from a particular, but nevertheless are capable of qualifying it: a particular qualified by a universal is not observed as having a separate qualifier, and there is no perceptual evidence for this qualifier by itself. This corresponds to the two main lines of argumentation for refuting real universals, §§ 9–31 and §§ 32–46 respectively.

\(^{177}\) Cf. section 5.3 for explanations of the issues mentioned in this paragraph.

\(^{178}\) Cf. the same statement in § 15.

\(^{179}\) For a discussion of Ratnakīrti’s ideas about self-awareness as relevant for conceptual cognition, cf. section 5.4.
are in reality inexpressible, for neither do they appear nor are they
determined. Therefore the external object alone is conventionally
affirmed and negated, because otherwise it would result that all
everyday activity is given up.\(^{180}\)

f.1.2 § 49. Thus, in this way,

in reality no affirmation of either a form [in awareness]
or an external [object] is established.
For [the affirmation of an object] only as external [is
established] conventionally, but [the affirmation] of the
form not even conventionally.\(^{181}\)

g.1 § 50. Through this [verse], what Dharmottara says uncommonly,
against scripture, and illogically: “[There is] affirmation and negation
[concerning the fact] that the superimposed [thing] is external.”\(^{182}\)
is rejected.

g.3 § 51. If it [is objected:] “If the real thing, which is to be determined,
does not appear in [its] determination,\(^{183}\) then what is the meaning of

\(^{180}\) Cf. footnote 200 and references given there for this unwanted consequence.

\(^{181}\) Cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 338 f. for more on this verse’s context in the AP.
Their translation of the verse is as follows: “There is no way of really affirming
either the mental image or the external object. Conventionally [there is affirmation]
only of externals, whereas even conventionally there is no [affirmation] of the mental

\(^{182}\) Cf. DhAP 244,3-4: “sgrub pa dang dgag pa dag ni sgrö bdag gang zhig phyi rol
nyid du nges par byas pa de dang 'brel pa yin te.” (Translation acc. to Frauwallner
1937: 266: “Dagegen wird eine Bejahung oder Verneinung mit dem Übertragenen
verbunden, das als außen bestimmt wird.”) Note that in Ratnakīrti’s quote a
Sanskrit equivalent for nges par byas pa is missing. This position is illustrated by
Dharmottara with the example of a rope that is mistaken for a snake: it is with
regard to the superimposed snake, which is determined as external, that there is
affirmation and negation. Cf. section 4.1.14 for a translation of that example, and
see McAllister 2017a for a discussion of it in its context.

\(^{183}\) This criticism is expressed also in CAPV 133,23–24.
If you say the meaning is that something is made an object of activity, even though it does not appear, then how could, as this non-appearance is not specific to the cognized object, activity with a restricted object proceed by avoiding other objects? [then] it is said [in answer]: even though every real thing is equally ungrasped, still there is activity only towards a restricted object, such as water etc., because a conceptual cognition, since it has a restricted form due to being produced by a restricted complex of causes, has a capacity that is restricted to

184 If *tadādhyavasitam* is interpreted as a compound, one could understand “...what is the meaning of [saying] that [it is] determined through this [determination]?”

185 This opinion is expressed, e.g., KBhSA 73,9–12 (cf. section 5.4 for a translation of the latter passage, as well as Woo 1999: 187). In CAPV 140,4–7, Ratnakīrti makes it clear that an object can be determined regardless of its ontological status and independently of its appearance in the determination of it:

\[
\begin{align*}
tasmād \text{ vastu vā ghaṭapaṭādi sandīgdhavastu vā sādhakabādha-} \\
kāṭikrāntam avastu vātmadikkālākṣaṇikādikam adhyavasitam iti, \\
\text{apratiḥbhāse } '\text{pi pravr̥tiṣvivaśyikr̥tam ity arthah. ayam eva ca} \\
\text{ropaikikara-} \\
\text{ṛaṇādhyavasāyābhedagrahādīnām arthah sarvatra śāstre boddhavyah.}
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore, the statement that a real thing, like a pot, a cloth etc., or a doubtful thing, which goes beyond an establishing or falsifying means of valid cognition, or an unreal thing, like a soul, space-time, a thing that is not momentary, etc., is determined, means that, even though there is no appearance of any of these, each of these things is made the object of activity.

And exactly this is the meaning of terms such as imposition, equation, determination, grasping as non-different etc., which should be heeded everywhere in the Śāstra.

186 I.e., since the absence of an appearance of a horse cannot be distinguished from that of a cow, any activity based on this absence would be unable to differentiate between objects. Above (§ 15), the restriction of a thing was said to be one in its place, time, and condition: any successful activity needs an object that must be concrete in these three respects, and only the particular fulfills these requirements according to the ontology that Ratnakīrti follows.
prompting only a certain activity],\textsuperscript{187} like smoke generates [only] the cognition of a fire [currently] beyond the senses.\textsuperscript{188}

$§$ 52. For entities [which] have restricted capacities\textsuperscript{189} possess natures completely ascertained by means of valid cognition, [but] are not liable to be questioned as to a mixing of [their] capacities. Therefore, the state of determining this [object] is, because of a relation to a specific form, the state of being generative of the activity towards this [object]. But we do not speak of activity due to a superimposition because of similarity, so that there would be the possibility of falsification by means of superimposition [either] of an external object on a form [of awareness] or of a form [of awareness] on an external object;\textsuperscript{190} rather[, we say], an awareness–arising only in virtue of the ripening of one’s own remaining impressions—even though not seeing

\textsuperscript{187}Cf. the notes to $§$ 35 (especially footnote 152) for Ratnakīrti’s idea about how a concept is causally linked to things.

\textsuperscript{188}The variants of this example in mss K and P are as follows:

K: “...like in the case of something that doesn’t exist. Even if the three worlds [including] smoke did not exist when there is a fire, from that [fire] only smoke will arise, but nothing else.” It is not obvious how $\textit{dhūmasya trailokyasyābhāvas}$ should be construed. Perhaps an emendation to $\textit{dhūmasya trailokyābhāvas}$ (understood as “absence of smoke in the three worlds”) would be a good idea. For a similar idea, that from a seed only a certain sprout arises, see AP 226,5-6 (translated in McCrea and Patil 2010: 88), a passage that Ratnakīrti reused for CAPV 138,5–11.

P: “...like, even though there is no [such thing as] smoke, pot, etc. when there is fire, smoke alone is created [by fire, but] not a pot etc.”

\textsuperscript{189}Apart from the similar passages quoted in the critical edition, an emendation of $\textit{niyatavisaya to niyataśakti}$ is suggested also by the context: things don’t have objects, but they can have capacities.

\textsuperscript{190}This paragraph builds on Ratnakīrti’s discussions in CAPV, see in particular CAPV 133,23–135,4 and CAPV 138,12–16. The relevant differences between Dharmottara’s and Ratnakīrti’s opinions of how conceptual cognition works are investigated in McAllister 2017a. Ratnakīrti’s stance in this matter (like that of his teacher) here accords with that of Prajñākāragupta, which was developed in response to Dharmottara (cf. McAllister forthcoming a).
an external object, is active towards an external object. Thus (iti), [this awareness] is simply confused.\textsuperscript{191}

§ 53. Thus, in this way, a positive element is the referent, which, qualified by the absence of others, is differentiated from that of another genus. And only this [positive element which is] to be denoted by the word "exclusion" is the referent of words, and the object of activity and inactivity. So it is settled.

§ 54. Here [there is the formulation of] a proof.\textsuperscript{192} All that denotes [something] has as [its] object a mere thing\textsuperscript{193} that is determined [and] distinguished from that of another form, as the expression "Water [is] here in a well."\textsuperscript{194} And this [expression] having the form of a word like "cow" etc. does denote [something].\textsuperscript{195} [So there is] the logical reason [consisting in] an essential property. This [reason] is

\textsuperscript{191}Following the passage on which Ratnakīrti based himself for the current discussion, the Jñānaśrīmitra (AP 226,14–15) quotes PVIII 13b-c. Ratnakīrti quotes that verse in CAPV 138,17–18.

\textsuperscript{192}Cf. section 5.2 for a discussion of this proof.

\textsuperscript{193}Patil (2009: 239) translates vastumātra as "thing-in-general", which he takes to be the same "as 'similarity classes' and 'constructed universals'." (Patil 2009: 240) The term vastu is, however, used by Ratnakīrti strictly in the sense of a real thing (cf., e.g., l. 92, or the argument in § 19). So here it would have to be the word "mātra" by which the import of vastu is altered to such an extent that Ratnakīrti is not claiming that a real thing is the object of words. Below (section 5.4), an argument will be made that he does indeed mean the real thing here.

Ratnakīrti uses the word "mātra" like this also when describing the object of a word: in § 32, for example, he maintains that upon hearing the word "cow" no universal, but a particular image combining certain parts of cows appears, disregarding the specific differences of any cow to any other cow.

\textsuperscript{194}For this example, cf. Krasser 1991: 55 f., n. 91. Perhaps the point is that the water in the well is not visible and is known to be there only through a conceptual cognition.

\textsuperscript{195}Patil (2009: 239) points out that the pakṣa of this inference be understood as "the inferential/verbal awareness-event produced in the mind of a competent speaker of a language upon hearing a token utterance of an expression in that language." See also the explanations in section 5.3.1 aimed at illustrating the equivalence of "expression" to any conceptual state of awareness.

121
not unestablished, because, even though there is no real relation of a
denotable and denoting [according to] the rule stated earlier,\textsuperscript{196} [this
relation], made by determination, is necessarily to be accepted by
all [those] engaged in everyday activity, for otherwise [there is] the
unwanted consequence of the extermination of all everyday activity.\textsuperscript{197}
Neither is that [reason] contradictory, for it is present in the similar
instance.\textsuperscript{198} Nor is [that reason] ambiguous.\textsuperscript{199} For [it is] like this:
according to the others, who are averse to [our theory that] the object
of words is the mere thing which is determined [and] excluded from
that of a different genus, in reality

\textit{§ 55.} that denoted must be a particular, an additional
attribute, a connection to an additional attribute, [some-
thing] possessing an additional attribute, or (\textit{yadi vā})
must be a form of awareness,

\textit{1.6.3.2 § 56.} because there is no other way [for a word to have an object],
and because, if there is no object [for a word], it is not possible that
[a word] denotes. Regarding this [group of options,]

\textit{§ 57.} there is no convention for either the first [possibility, the particular or] the last [possibility, the form
of awareness] because the capacity of [giving] a result

\textsuperscript{196}This could be referring back to l. 167–l. 168, p. 58 (cf. also the notes on
Ratnakirti’s usage of nyāya in section 4.1.8), or the statements at the end of § 29.
Patil (2009: 241, n. 111) carefully says that “[t]his seems to be referring to what
precedes \textit{iti sthitam,}” RNĀ (AS 66.06-66.07”), corresponding to l. 302, p. 69–l. 303.
But, in this translation, \textit{iti sthitam} is understood rather as marking the end of
Ratnakirti’s presentation of his final position (§§ 50–52), and not expressing a
position about the relata of denotation.

\textsuperscript{197}The same consequence resulted in § 48.

\textsuperscript{198}A reason is contradictory to that which it is supposed to establish when it only
occurs in instances where the property to be proven is absent.

\textsuperscript{199}See footnote 173 for what this means.
would be given up. 200 Even to the middle triad [of options, convention is] not bound because of the lack of an additional attribute. 201

§ 58. Thus in this way, the [property] of [having] an object that is determined [and] external[, the property that is to be established,] pervades [the reason property, which consists in] denoting [something], insofar as [this reason property] is excluded from the counter-instances [in which a different object is denoted], given that the pervading [property, generally] marked by having an object, is excluded [from those counter-instances], because, [apart from other-exclusion], no other [object] that can be denoted exists. 202 Thus, pervasion is established.

§ 59. To begin with, it is the referent that is principally expressed through words. Where that [is the case], exclusion [is] to be understood, due to being a quality of that [referent]. Furthermore, one referent[, the external object, is] posited due to determination, the other [referent, the form of awareness,] due to appearance. [But] In reality, nothing at all [is] to be expressed. 203

§ 60. The Proof of Exclusion is completed. This [is the] work of the venerable Mahāpaṇḍita Ratnakīrti.

200 A particular and the mental construct itself cannot be made an object of everyday activity, because that would not have the desired result for this activity: the particular is strictly unique, and the mental construct is private, as well as a particular. Cf. the arguments above, in § 48 (trl. page 118), and § 54 (trl. page 122): without the affirmation or negation of a temporally extended external object, everyday activity would be impossible.

201 Cf. section 4.1.15 for some notes on this verse.

202 By this, the ambiguity under discussion is shown not to apply to the reason. All instances of denoting are instances where the object is one that is determined and excluded. For denoting cannot occur without this sort of object, since all the other possible objects, i.e., those that the opponent is trying to promote as the word
§ 61. May there be a long explanation of exclusion for clever people. But the vulnerable point is that a real thing’s own nature does not appear. There, if [that fact is] not firmly settled, everything is shattered without effort; but, if [this fact] is firmly settled, [then] is [exclusion] not well grounded to the fullest extent?

§ 62. In a full night and two watches [Ratna]kīrti’s [proof of] exclusion was joyfully copied by Trailokyadatta from effort grounded in the highest being. Therefore this [text] is to be protected.

The translations and interpretations by McCrea and Patil (2006: 341 ff.) (as well as by McCrea and Patil 2010: 51 f.) differ somewhat from the one presented here. They understand the term artha in the first line as referring to the external object, and thus not to the vidhi, which includes the notions both of an external object and of a form of awareness. In the light of Ratnakīrti’s explanations in § 15, however, the artha here must refer to the vidhi, in both of its aspects. If not, Ratnakīrti would be contradicting himself. Note that Akamatsu 1983: 48 interprets artha as corresponding to vidhi even in the context of Jñānaśrīmitra’s work.

For the ultimate inexpressibility of any referent, cf. the argument in § 48 (trl. page 118)

Cf. the translations of this verse in Patil 2011b: n. 146 and in McCrea and Patil 2010: 97.

See the remarks on page 4 and in footnote 8 for this interpretation.
4 Additional comments on the Apohasiddhi

4.1 Notes on individual passages of the Apohasiddhi

4.1.1 Analysis of anyāpoha (ad § 2)

Ratnakīrti offers four interpretations for the term anyāpoha, the first three of which he explicitly calls analytical derivations (vyutpatti) of the term:

1. idam anyasmād apohyate. (This is excluded from another.)
2. asmād anyad apohyate. (Another is excluded from this.)
3. asminn anyad apohyate. (In this another is excluded.)
4. apohanam apohah. (Exclusion is excluding.)

These four ways of understanding apoha are stated to be the reasons for calling three things apoha:

1. vijātivyāvṛtta bāhya, the external object excluded from what is not of its kind.
2. buddhyākāra, the form of awareness.
3. anyavyāvṛttimātra, the mere differentiation from others.

The last element here, the mere differentiation from others, is explained by the fourth understanding of apoha, that is apohana, the act or process of excluding, and is not related to the three derivations of anyāpoha.
The question is, therefore, how anyāpoha as the external object and as the form of awareness should be aligned with the three analytical derivations. To answer this question, it is helpful to recall the main stages in the development of this threefold distinction.206

The earliest known version of these three forms of anyāpoha is found in the PVT. It is found, in various forms, also in the TSP, the PVSVT, the AP, and the TBh.

The situation presented by Śākyabuddhi in his comment on PV I 179 is rather straightforward: The external particular, excluded from everything else, corresponds to understanding anyāpoha as “anyo ’po- hyate ’sminn iti” (PVT_F2 207,1–2). Simple other-exclusion follows from understanding “anyāpohananam anyāpoha iti” (PVT_F2 207,5). Lastly, an understanding of anyāpoha as “anyo ’pohyte ’neneti” (PVT_F2 207,7) corresponds to exclusion as an appearance in awareness.

In the TSP, the situation is less clear.207 As noted by Ishida (2011b: 202, n. 12), a statement of an analysis supporting one of the three forms of exclusion is given in TSP 391,12–22. Kamalaśīla there appends it to the explanation that the name exclusion is applied to the object’s reflection in awareness, because the reflection is different from other reflections.208 The other two things that can be called exclusion, an external thing and mere exclusion, are also upheld, but no analytical explanations corresponding to those given

206 Akamatsu (1983: 171, n. 22) provides ample material for tracing this distinction back to Dharmakīrīti, as well as a sketch of its development. Other studies on this topic include Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 122, n. 333 (but see Akamatsu 1983: 173 ff. for a criticism of some of these points), Dunne 2004: 131 f., Ishida 2011b, and Okada 2017. Cf. table 4.1 for an overview of the various positions taken by Buddhist authors.

207 Ishida (2011b: 206) concludes that “it has become clear that Śākyabuddhi and Śāntaraksita adopt almost the same structure to classify the anyāpoha, but Śāntaraksita has a more developed understanding concerning the meaning of words.” This is contested by Okada (2017: 188; 198), who maintains that all elements that Śāntaraksita considers are present already in Śākyabuddhi, though in a somewhat different alignment. For the purpose of deciding whether the various ways of analysing anyāpoha relate to which object it signifies, this debate need not be decided.

208 Cf. appendix B.10.1.
### Table 4.1 – Threefold classifications of apoha

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text</th>
<th>vyāyattasvaaksāna</th>
<th>anyayavachademātra</th>
<th>buddhiprathbhāsa/ākāra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PVT,F₂</td>
<td>anyo 'pohyate 'sminn iti</td>
<td>anyāpohanam anyāpoha iti (207.5)</td>
<td>anyopohyate neneti (207.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVT,D</td>
<td>‘di las ghan dang ghan sel</td>
<td>ghan good pa</td>
<td>'di ghan sel bar byed pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS,S</td>
<td>paryudāsa (1003b) / anyavishēsabhavātaḥ (1008cd)</td>
<td>paryudāsa (1003c)</td>
<td>paryudāsa (1003c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS,P</td>
<td>anyasmād vijāyād viśleso vyāvṛtti tasya bhāvāt</td>
<td>vyāvṛtīs tasya viśleṣo</td>
<td>vyāvṛtīs tasya viśleṣo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVT,T</td>
<td>apohyate 'sminn iti (114.21)</td>
<td>apohanam apoha iti (114.20)</td>
<td>apohanam apoha iti (114.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBH,T</td>
<td>apohyate 'sminn iti (114.21)</td>
<td>apohanam apoha iti (52.12)</td>
<td>apohanam apoha iti (52.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>apohyate'neneti (114.19)</td>
<td>apohyate prthak kriyate 'smin buddhyakāre viśjāyam (52.10–11)</td>
<td>apohyate prthak kriyate 'smin buddhyakāre viśjāyam (52.10–11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
by Śākyabuddhi are offered. It would thus appear that in the TSP, whilst a form of threefold other-exclusion is maintained, it is not systematically linked to an analysis in such a way that it would help understand the intent of Ratnakirti’s introductory paragraph (§ 2).

Karnakagomin also refers to three types of exclusion, but, unlike Śākyabuddhi, he does so in his comment on PV I 41 (cf. appendix A.2.1). His classification corresponds to that of Śākyabuddhi: the form of awareness is called exclusion because “by it [another] is excluded”, mere negation is called exclusion because “[the act of] excluding is exclusion”, and a particular is called exclusion because “in it [another] is excluded”.

Jñānāśrīmitra explains:

AP 202,12-14: yat punar anyasmād apohyate, apohyate 'nyad asmin vēti vijātiuyārıtavam bāhyam eva buddhyākāro vānyāpoha212 itī gīyate. tena na kaścid upayogah, apohanāṁnā vādher eva vivākṣitavāt, na ca nāmāntararakanēe vastunah svarūpāparāvṛttiḥ.

Furthermore, because of [the expressions] “it is excluded from another, another is excluded, or in this [another is excluded]”, either the external [object] itself, differentiated from that of another kind, or the form of awareness

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210Śākyabuddhi, however, cites PV I 40cd in his explanation, cf. PVṬF2 207,3. For the gist of Karnakagomin’s commentary on PV I 179, cf. Ishida 2011b: 205, n. 21: Karnakagomin refers only to two forms of exclusion, the particular and exclusion itself, and does not give any analytical derivations. Therefore, this passage is of little relevance for the discussion here.

211PVSVṬ 114,19–21: kalpitaś cākāro 'pohāṣritatvād apoha ucyate. apohyate 'neneti vā. anyaniyārtimātraṃ tu arthād ākṣiptam apohanam apoha ity ucyate(. svalakṣanam tu apohyate 'sminn ity apoha ucyate. (Trl. appendix A.2.1.)

212JNĀms 8b6 reads buddhyākāro vā 'nyā° (i.e., supporting vānyā°) against buddhyākāro 'nyā° AP 202,13.

213I thank Hisataka Ishida for discussing this passage with me. He had the good idea of putting a lot of emphasis on the fact that vā is in a position that indicates three rather than two alternatives. If only two alternatives had been intended by Jñānāśrīmitra here, the placement of vā would be expected to be after the first word of the second alternative, perhaps resulting in something like this: ...anyasmād
is called other-exclusion. This [explanation] is useless, since through the designation “exclusion” only a positive element is expressed, and, if a thing is called by another name, there is no change of [its] own nature.\textsuperscript{214}

Here, obviously, the three analytical derivations are not as clearly differentiated as in the interpretations of Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin. Basically there is the same problem as for the passage in Ratnakīrti. Both the external object and the form of awareness are understood as derived from three ways of analysing exclusion. The fourth, purely negative interpretation of exclusion, is apparently not mentioned in the \textit{AP}.

In the \textit{TBh}, the relevant passage runs:

\begin{quote}
\textit{[TBh\textsubscript{I} 52,7–14]} \textit{nanu ko 'yam apoho nāma? yathādhyavasa-}
\textit{sāyam\textsuperscript{215}} bāhya eva ghaṭādir artho 'poha ity abhidhiyate,
\end{quote}

\textit{apohyate, apohyate vānyad asminn iti.} And if understood as expressing the same three alternatives, Ratnakīrti’s corresponding passage can be understood as a clearer restatement of the same point, rather than as offering a different kind of classification. The parallels would then be as follows (\textit{AP} = \textit{AS\textsubscript{3}}):\textit{ anyasmād apohyate = anyasmād apohyate, apohyate ’nyad = asmād vānyad apohyate, asmin = asmin vānyad apohyate.}

\textsuperscript{214}Cf. also Katsura 2011: 125, and the references given there: Dunne 2004, and to a Japanese article by Toru Funayama (an English summary can be found in Funayama 2000). Also see Ishida 2011b, as well as Patil 2011b: n. 15, p. 19:

This grammatical analysis of exclusion (\textit{apoha}) seems to have begun with Śākyabuddhi, in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s \textit{Pramāṇavārttika}, the \textit{Pramāṇavārttika-ṭīkā} (See \textit{PVT} ad \textit{Pramāṇavārttika} [PV 1, ed. Gnoli] and \textit{Śvārthānumāna} v. 169). Karṇakagomin, another commentator on Dharmakīrti’s text, also mentions it in his \textit{Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti-ṭīkā} (PVSVṬ), as do Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla in their independent works the \textit{Tattvasaṃgraha} and \textit{Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā} (TS and TSP). For a parallel passage in the work of Ratnakīrti’s teacher, Jñānaśrimitra, see \textit{JNĀ} (202.12-212.14).

\textsuperscript{215}Read \textit{yathādhyavasāyam}, instead of \textit{yathāvyavasāyam} in \textit{TBh\textsubscript{K} 28,25} and \textit{yathādhyavasāyam} in \textit{TBh\textsubscript{I} 52,8}. 

\textbf{129}
Additional comments on the *Apohasiddhi*

\[ \text{apohyate 'smād anyad vijātiyam iti kṛtvā. yathāpratibhāsam buddhyākāro}^{216} \text{'pohah, apohyate prthakkriyate 'smin buddhyākāre vijātiyam iti kṛtvā. yathātattvāṃ niyṛttimātram prasajyarūpo 'pohah, apohanam apoha iti kṛtvā. nanu yathādhyavasāyanāṃ vidhir eva, tarhi kevalo viṣayā ity āgatam. na[,] anyāpohaviśiṣṭo}^{217} \text{vidhir abhipretaḥ.} \]

[Opponent:] Now, what is this called exclusion? According to determination, only an external object like a pot etc. is designated as “exclusion”, by thinking “Another, which is of a different class, is excluded from this.” According to appearance, a form of cognition is [designated as] exclusion, by thinking “That of another class is excluded, [i.e.,] singled out, in this form of awareness.” According to reality, mere absence is the exclusion which has the nature of absolute negation, by thinking “exclusion [is the act of] excluding.” Now, if according to determination [exclusion is] only a positive element, then [the position] that [exclusion] is simply the object is arrived at.

[Proponent:] No[, none of these is correct]. A positive element qualified by other-exclusion is meant.\[218\]

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216TBh₁ 52,10 f. reads buddhyākāro vā ...prasajyarūpo vā .... Since the position of the second vā is somewhat awkward (one would expect niyṛttimātram vā), the reading without these vā-s, as attested in TBh₂ 28,27 f., is preferable.

217Read anyāpohaviśiṣṭo acc. to TBh₂ against apohaviśiṣṭo TBh₁.

218Cf. the translation by Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 122 f.), as well as that by Akamatsu (1983: 171 ff., n. 22) for valuable notes. Amongst other things, Akamatsu (1983) notes that Yuichi Kajiyama (1966) did not translate the qualifier “according to reality”. Akamatsu (1983: 174 f.) then argues that Moksākara-gupta’s position reflects that of Jñānasrīmitra, and not that of Ratnakīrti, because the three qualifiers, i.e., “according to appearance, determination, and reality” are essential to the *AP*: “Pour Jñānasrīmitra, les trois possibilités de l’interprétation de l’apoha ont été les trois éléments les plus importants pour composer sa théorie sur l’Apoha. ...C’est pourquoi, ces trois sortes d’interprétation de l’apoha ne peuvent être pas fausses.” (Akamatsu 1983: 175) On closer inspection, this interpretation seems unlikely. Like Ratnakīrti, neither Jñānasrīmitra nor Moksākara-gupta consider any one of these options to be correct. In the *AP*, the passage is stated by an opponent (cf. Akamatsu 1983: 172 and McCrea and Patil 2010: 51). Also, in the *AS* this is part of an objection, and is
What, then, is the conclusion that can be drawn from these passages for § 2? The first thing to note is that Ratnakīrti clarified Jñānaśrīmitra’s analysis, saying “...asmād vānyad apohyate ...”, l. 4 in § 2, instead of AP 202,12 apohyate ‘nyad.\textsuperscript{219}

The main question is still not answered, though: what is the relation between the analytical derivations and exclusion as an external thing or a form of awareness?

In the TBh there is a clear difference to all analytical interpretations other than those of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. It associates the locative construction (apohyate ...’smin buddhyākāre vijātiyam, “...in this form of awareness that of another genus is excluded”) with the form of awareness, and not, as PVṬ\textsubscript{F2} and PVSVṬ do, with the answered by a clear no and Ratnakīrti’s definition of what exclusion is (cf. l. 36, p. 49). So it is difficult to see how Mokṣākaragupta could have taken any one of these three interpretations to be correct. Whether this passage owes more to the AP than to the AS is also questionable: Mokṣākaragupta does not employ the first of Jñānaśrīmitra’s (or Ratnakīrti’s) alternatives, “anysmād apohyate” (AP 202,12). Instead, he adduces the analysis “apohyate ’smād anyad” (TBh\textsubscript{I} 52,9) in order to show how an external object is meant by exclusion, which is stated in this explicit form only by Ratnakīrti. Also, the three qualifiers are not without a basis in the AS (cf. section 5.4 for the two qualifiers “according to appearance and determination”, and § 48 for what words really refer to acc. to Ratnakīrti).

\textsuperscript{219}Cf. footnote 213. Given that this passage is an objection, it could of course be that another text, where these variations are originally to be found, is being cited. But this passage is quite closely related to AP 202,12–13, which is a part of the introductory objection in that text. And it is unclear where that objection comes from. Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 122 f., n. 333) concludes that “...Jñānaśrīmitra ...must have cited these [passages–PMA] from an author unknown to us.” Akamatsu (1983: n. 22, p. 175), on the other hand, surmises: “...mais il [le pūrvapakṣa de l’AP—PMA] est l’objection imaginaire produite par Jñānaśrīmitra lui-même, et nous ne pouvons pas le considérer comme une citation de quelque auteur.” This is also the view of Patil (2003: 245, n. 7). The character of the AS’s textual dependence on the AP in this passage supports, it seems to me, Akamatsu’s and Patil’s conclusions: Ratnakīrti obviously feels free to rearrange the arguments found in the AP, whereas most of the other objections shared by the AP and the AS are actually quite clearly attributed to their authors, and, at least in the cases where the source texts can be identified, quoted very faithfully.
external object.\textsuperscript{220} Considering how much the \textit{TBh} is indebted to the writings of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti,\textsuperscript{221} it seems probable that Mokṣākaragupta saw his interpretation as fully compatible with their statements. If that is the case, then one could understand Ratnakīrti (and perforce Jñānaśrīmitra) as follows: \textit{anyasmād aposhyate} and \textit{asmād vānyad aposhyate}\textsuperscript{222} lead to an understanding of the external object as exclusion, and \textit{asmin vānyad aposhyate} to an understanding of the form of awareness as exclusion.\textsuperscript{223} This would follow Mokṣākaragupta’s understanding, and ignore the problem that he only uses two of the three possible derivations.

The alternative is this: to give Mokṣākaragupta’s formulation less weight, and take the three forms of analytical derivation as summing up the tradition up to Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti concerning the external object and the form of awareness. This last option seems preferable, because the positions in the \textit{TSP} on the one hand, and in the \textit{PVT} and the \textit{PVSVT} on the other, could thus be seen as loosely summarized in Ratnakīrti’s statement, as follows: in whichever way one analyses \textit{anyāpoha}—either as “exclusion from another.”\textsuperscript{224}

\textsuperscript{220}\textit{TSP} is of little help here, since no derivation using the locative formulation is used. In the \textit{TSP} the interpretation as \textit{buddhyākāra} is associated with the ablative construction.

\textsuperscript{221}Cf. the argument in footnote 309.

\textsuperscript{222}The only reason for grouping these two options together is that they share ablative constructions. This is of course not a very good reason, but if one takes the \textit{TBh} seriously on this point, there is no viable alternative. For there must be a division into two groups, and the ablative construction is associated with the external object in \textit{TBh}, and the locative one with the form of awareness.

\textsuperscript{223}This is also the understanding reflected in the translation of Jñānaśrīmitra’s passage in Akamatsu 1983: 171, n. 22. A second possibility is that the interpretation in the \textit{TBh} is simply not correct. It could be imagined that, Mokṣākaragupta, facing the same problem of how to understand these two explanations of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, decided to drop the first alternative, \textit{anyasmād aposhyate}, and assign the remaining two, \textit{asmād vānyad aposhyate asmin vānyad aposhyate}, to the external object and the form of awareness, respectively. But I believe that the premiss, that Mokṣākaragupta misinterpreted the very two writers he drew much of his material from for the \textit{TBh}, is very unlikely.

\textsuperscript{224}Cf. the corresponding rows in table 4.1, and Ishida 2011b: 202, n. 12.
with the TSP or as “in this another is excluded.” with PVT and the PVSVT—only an external thing or the form of awareness is meant by other-exclusion. The second of Ratnakīrti’s alternatives, “another is excluded from this”, could well have been endorsed in a text not known to us.

4.1.2 Three candidates for exclusion (ad § 3)

In this paragraph, the three positions on what it means to say that exclusion is the referent of words are refuted. The discussion of the “negative” position is rather clear, but the short and unspecific reduction, before that, of the two other options to a merely “positive” position might need some elucidation.

4.1.2.1 Only a positive thing

The first two positions are refuted only by pointing out that, if other-exclusion is either an external thing that is differentiated from that of another kind, or a form of awareness, then it is only a positive element, i.e., a real entity, that is meant by “exclusion.”

The passage is too succinct to allow any precise determination of whose (or if anyone’s) positions are meant here. But a few pointers might be in order nevertheless. That something external, excluded from what is of another kind, is the word referent, could refer to any of the external-realist theories about the word referent. All three elements of the word referent as adopted in the Nyāya school of thought, the individual thing (vyakti), the genus (jāti), and the form (ākṛti), are external to the cognizing subject and real. For the Vaiśeṣika, the very categories of reality, “…padārthas […] are the sum total of all that ‘supports’ the meaning of words and guarantees that words are not mere words, but that they have a denotative value.” (Halbfass 1970: 138) Amongst the various categories recognized by Vaiśeṣikas, universals play the central role for the existence and cognition of similarity amongst things, Halbfass 1992: 71:

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225 For a clear and general overview of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṁsā theories, cf. J. A. Taber 1998b. The classification of these views as external-realist here is based on the discussion in Dravid 1972: chapters 2 and 3.
Universals (sāmānyā), such as “substanceness,” “quality-ness,” “horseness,” “whiteness,” and so on, are recurrent generic properties in substances, qualities, and motions. They account for the fact that numerically different individual entities can be associated with an identical concept, referred to by a common term, identified as members of the same class, and distinguished from members of other classes.

Within the various strands of Mīmāṃsā, the form (ākṛti), interpreted as a universal, was taken to be the primary word referent. But none of these views seems to be a clean fit for the option that apoha, and thus the word referent, is only “something external.”

That the form of awareness is the referent of a word is probably Bhartṛhari’s view.

Additionally, there are some precursors in apoha-treatises to the problem that apoha can be reduced to something external or the form of awareness:

Dharmottara makes it an important point to show that apoha is neither external nor internal.

The position that the referent of a word is the form of awareness is discussed in the TSP ad TS₈ 890 (cf. trl. in appendix B.5), where it becomes clear that this view is very similar to Bhartṛhari’s position (or one of his positions).
4.1. Notes on individual passages of the Aposidaddi

According to the exposition of the apoha theories as found in the Nyāyamañjarī (NM apoha: 19–30), it could also be that a reduction to an external thing and a form of awareness was how Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s positions were, respectively, interpreted by their opponents. In the introductory essay in Kataoka 2009, the analysis of Jayanta’s exposition leads to this statement: “It is evident that Jayanta makes clear the difference of the three views by distinguishing the three phases: external –> internal –> neither external nor internal.” (Kataoka 2009: 483). The first phase is commonly attributed to Dignāga, the second to Dharmakīrti, and the third to Dharmottara (Watson and Kataoka 2017: 35).

Ratnakīrti’s answer to the objection as a whole (§ 7) will be to the effect that none of these elements taken individually—neither an external thing, nor a form of awareness, nor exclusion—can be the word referent. In consequence, he adopts what can be seen as a combination of the three (kin tv anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ, l. 36 in § 7).

4.1.3 pratibhāsabheda and vastubheda (ad § 20 and § 21)

Ratnakīrti’s point here is that the difference between two objects is founded on the difference of their two natures, and this difference is founded on the difference of the objects’ appearance. Akamatsu (1983: 71 f.) adds the following explanation to his translation of the corresponding passage, AP 208,25:

Donc, les objets qui ont les manifestations des images différentes dans la connaissance doivent avoir les natures propres différentes, et donc ils ne peuvent être une seule et même chose.

So, if there are different appearances, these appearances necessarily are of different objects.

Concerning the relation between the difference of appearances and the difference of real things, AP 209,4–209,14 gives the following inference:
4. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THE APHASISDDHI

[AP 209,2–209,14:] nanu dūrāsannadeśavartinor ekatra śākhini spaṣṭāspaṣṭapratibhāsabhede 'pi na [śākhī]bhedāḥ, arthakriyābhedābhāvād ity arthakriyābhedopakṛta eva pratibhāsabhedo bhedakah. na cehārthakriyābheda iti katham indriyaśabdābhāyām janitajñānānaviṣayo gavādir bhedabhāg iti cet? na brūmah pratibhāsabhedo bhinnavastuniyataḥ, kim tu ekaviṣayatvābhāvaniyata iti. tathā hi, yo yaḥ kvacid vastuni pratyakṣapratibhāsād viparītaḥ pratibhāso nāsau tenaikaviṣayah, yathā ghaṭagrāhakāt paṭapratibhāsāḥ, yathā vā śāṅkhagrāhakāt pītapratibhāsāḥ. tathā ca gavi pratyakṣapratibhāsād viparītaḥ pratibhāso vikalpakāle iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ. ekaviṣayatvam hi pratibhāsabhedena vyāptam, savyetaranayanaṇādrīṣṭavad drīṣtam. avyāptis231 tu yadi pratyakṣāntaram api viparītapratibhāsāṃ syāt, vastu vā232 dvīrūpaṃ bhavet. tac ca dvayam api nāṣṭiti vyāptir eva. āśrayabhādabhāvini ca jñāne pakṣikrte tadviruddhāḥ pratibhāsabhedaḥ siddhāḥ. tato yatrārthakriyābhēdādisacive pratibhāsabhedaḥ vastubhedaḥ ghaṭapatavat. tam punah sahāyam vihāya pravṛttī niyamenaikaviṣayatām pariḥaratīty eko 'tra bhrānta eva pratibhāsāḥ, śāṅkhe pītapratibhāsavat.

[Opponent:] But surely there is no difference in a tree even in the case where one and the same tree has a difference in the appearance as clear and unclear to two [people], one close by and the other in a distant place, because there is no difference in the causal efficacy [of the tree]. [For,] the difference in appearance that is really assisted by a difference in causal efficacy is [that which] differentiates [one thing from another]. And in this case there is no difference in the causal efficacy. So how should the object of a cognition generated by the sense faculties

231 Read avyāptis tu acc. to JNĀms 11b1 against avyāptitas tu AP 209,10.
232 Read vā acc. to JNĀms 11b2 against ca AP 209,11.
Notes on individual passages of the *Apohasiddhi*

[or] words [i.e. verbal cognition], like a cow etc., involve a difference?  
[Proponent:] We do not say that a difference in appearance is restricted to different things, but that [it] is restricted to the absence of the fact that there is the same object [for both appearances]. For it is so: Any appearance that, with regard to some real thing, is contrary to the appearance in a perceptual cognition does not have the same object as this [appearance in a perceptual cognition], like the appearance of a cloth [is contrary] to a [perceptual] grasping of a pot, or like the appearance of yellow [is contrary] to grasping a conch shell. And in the same way, with respect to a cow, the appearance at the time of a conceptual cognition is contrary to the appearance in a perceptual cognition. This (*iti*) [is a case of] perceiving [something] opposed to the pervading element. For, the fact of there being the same object [for both types of cognitions] is pervaded by the non-difference of appearances, observed [here] as [something] is observed by the left eye and the other [eye]. But if there were no pervasion, there would be another perception, having an opposed appearance, or there would be a real thing having two natures. And none of these two is [the case]. Therefore, there is indeed pervasion. And when a cognition, which is different according to [its] basis [that is either in the sense faculties or in concepts,] is made the locus [of pervasion], a difference of appearance is established. Therefore, where there is a difference of appearance accompanied by a difference of causal efficacy etc., there there is a difference of the real thing, as in the case of pot and cloth. Moreover, [a difference in appearance] occurring without this companion by definition refutes the fact of there being the same object. Thus here one appearance is only erroneous, like the appearance of yellow in the case of a conch shell.
4.1.3.1 Analysis

Jñānaśrīmitra’s argument here is that the fact that perceptual and conceptual awareness do not have the same object can be ascertained through vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi, the apprehension of that opposed to the pervading element. This is one of the ways in which a person can correctly infer the absence of something, in this case, the absence of the property of “having the same object”. The explanation of this type of non-perception in TBḥI 30,9–11 is as follows:\textsuperscript{233}

vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ yathā–nātra tuṣārasparśaḥ,

dahanāt. pratīṣedhyasya tuṣārasparśasya vyāpakam śī-
tam, tasya viruddho dahanaviśeṣaḥ [...] tasyehopala-
bdhiḥ.

The perception of that opposed to the pervading element
[is] like this: There is no feeling of cold here, because of a
fire. Coldness is the pervader of the feeling of cold, which
is to be negated; that contradictory to this [coldness] is a
particular fire; of that there is a perception in this place.

A comparison of the elements involved is given in table 4.2. Accordingly, Jñānaśrīmitra’s argument can be paraphrased as follows: In a perceptual and a conceptual awareness, two different appearances are observed (hetu). The fact that there are two different appearances is, obviously, contradictory to the fact that there are not different appearances. And since all cases in which there is the same object for two cognitions imply that there are no differences in the respective appearances, these two cognitions cannot have the same object.

So what do Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakirti mean by this statement: “We do not say that a difference in appearance is restricted to different things, but that [it] is restricted to the absence of the fact that there is the same object [for both appearances]”? The main intention is to state that different appearances prove the absence of

4.1. Notes on individual passages of the Apohasiddhi

Table 4.2 – Structure of vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhī

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>logical role</th>
<th>TBhI</th>
<th>AP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hetu</td>
<td>dahana</td>
<td>pratibhāsa-bhedā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sādhya</td>
<td>a-tuṣārasparṣa</td>
<td>ekaviṣayatva-a-bhāva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pakṣa</td>
<td>iha</td>
<td>jñāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vyāpaka</td>
<td>śīta</td>
<td>pratibhāsa-a-bhedā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vyāpya</td>
<td>tuṣārasparṣa</td>
<td>ekaviṣayatva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vyāpakaviruddha</td>
<td>dahana</td>
<td>pratibhāsa-bhedā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the same object, but not the presence of two different objects. This restriction has, as spelled out by Ratnakīrti in the last two sentences of § 20, consequences as to what can be known from the fact that two cognitions have different appearances of their objects: depending on whether there is causal efficacy of the appearing objects or not, the two cognitions either have different real things as their objects, as in the case of a pot and a cloth, or one of the appearances is wrong (i.e., has no real thing as its object), as the appearance of yellow in the case of the white conch. For Ratnakīrti, this differentiation will allow the argument (in § 21) that a conceptual cognition can have an object which is both different from the object of perception and not a real thing.

4.1.4 Common to existence and non-existence
(bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇya ad § 21–§ 23)

About the argument that a word applies to its objects irrespective of the existence or non-existence of this object, Katsura (1986: 174 f.) wrote:

235 The problem, but not the exact same argument, is also found in Kumārila’s writings, cf. ŚV Vāk 310 (trl. section 4.1.5). See also J. Taber and Kataoka 2017 and Ogawa 2017 for recent examinations of this topic in the writings of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

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This argument also stems from Dharmakīrti....Dharmottara utilized it in a skillful and systematic way in his "Apohaparakarana....Then he was severely criticized by Vācaspatimiśra,...who in turn was criticized by Jñānaśrīmitra.

In this context, Katsura (1986: 180, n. 23) refers to PV\textsuperscript{M} IV 223–236 (which is very similar to PV\textsuperscript{in} II 15–28).\textsuperscript{236} Akamatsu 1983: 211, n. 103 refers explicitly to PV\textsuperscript{M} IV 228, and Ogawa 1999: 275, n. 17 to PV\textsuperscript{M} IV 226 and 228. The most relevant passage in Dharmottara's DhAP is, approximately,\textsuperscript{237} DhAP 241,11–244,16. The arguments found there were criticized by Vācaspatimiśra, esp. NVTT 444,2–6, and the particular problem of a word's object being common to existence and non-existence is mentioned also by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, NM apoha: 24,4–5 (trl. Watson and Kataoka 2017: 63–64).

Akamatsu (1983: 211 ff., n. 103), traces the origin of the inference in the background of the discussion found in § 21 and § 23 to DhAP 244,10–16.\textsuperscript{238}

The argument as given by Dharmottara is as follows:

\[\text{DhAP 244,10–24}] \text{gang zhig dngos po dang dngos po med pa thun mong du zhen pas nges par 'dzin pa de ni gcig las i} \text{dog pa nges pa lhur byed pa yin te / dper na bum pa ma yin par shes pas bum pa ma yin par nges par 'dzin pa na yod dam med ces dngos po dang dngos po med pa thun mong du nges par 'dzin par byed pa bzhin no / / rnam par rtog pa thams cad kyis kyang dngos po dang}\]

\textsuperscript{236} These verses are translated and discussed in Steinkellner 1979: 41 ff.

\textsuperscript{237} Katsura 1986: 180, n. 24 refers to DhAP 244,10 ff. Akamatsu 1983: 212 ff., n. 103 draws on various passages from DhAP 241,22–244,16.

\textsuperscript{238} Akamatsu (1983: 215) says that this inference is cited in NVTT 442,16–18. He supports this claim by saying that Frauwallner 1937: 267 indicates this dependency, but there is no such indication there. Nevertheless, the inference found in NVTT 442,16–18 is indeed quite similar to Dharmottara's, but is not, as far as can be judged on the basis of the Tibetan translation of Dharmottara's inference, a faithful quotation. Cf. the trl. in section 4.1.4.
What ascertains [something] by grasping [it] as common to existence and non-existence, that only determines the differentiation from some [other thing], like a cognition [of something] as not-a-pot ascertains [something], in ascertaining [it] as not-a-pot, as common to existence and non-existence [since one can say] “It exists or does not exist.” And all conceptual cognitions ascertain [something] as having a nature common to both existence and non-existence. This logical reason is not unestablished, because a conceptual cognition is established by direct perception as apprehending [something] that has a nature common to these two. In the manner previously explained, the cause for grasping [something] as common [to both] is the ascertainment as only different from something [else], because this [ascertainment] is not without a cause, and another cause is not apprehended. In this regard, when there is a differentiation [of the pervaded element] from the counter-instance—due to not apprehending the pervading element, because the pervading element[, i.e.,] the state of having a cause, does not exist...
in the counter-instance—the grasping as common [to existence and non-existence] occurs [only] for that based on some differentiation. Therefore, the pervasion [of an ascertaining cognition by the property of ascertaining only other-exclusion] is established.

The inference given at NVṬṬ 442,16–20, which is referred to in NVṬṬ 444,2–6, the passage quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 23, runs like this (in the voice of an opponent, most likely Dharmottara):

\[ tathā hi–yad bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇaṃ tad anyavyāvrtti-rūpam\textsuperscript{240} eva, yathā amūrtatvam. tat khalu vijñāne ca śaśaviśaṇe ca sādhāraṇam. tathā ca vivādādyāsitā vikalpaviśayā ghaṭatpātādaya iti svabhāvahetuh. gaur asti gaur nāstīti hi bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇo gāvādir vikalpaviṣayo vidhirūpasvalaśaṇavat bhāvāsādhāraṇye nāstīty anena na sambadhyate virodhāt. \]

For [it is] so: What is common to existence and nonexistence, that has only the nature of exclusion from others, like incorporeality. That [incorporeality] indeed is common to cognition[, which exists,] and a hare’s horn[, which does not exist]. And the objects of conceptual cognitions, which are subject to discussion, like pot, cloth, etc., are like this. So the logical reason [of the type] “essential property” [is used here]. For [in the sentences] “a cow is, a cow isn’t”, cow etc., the object of conceptual cognition, could not be connected with this [predicate], “is not”, if it were specific [only] to existence, like a particular that has a positive nature, because of a contradiction.

The logical elements used here are: the reason, hetu, is “common to existence and nonexistence;” what is to be proven, the sādhyā, is

\textsuperscript{239}The import of the phrase ‘jug na’, as Frauwallner 1937: p. 266, n. 2 notes, is not clear here.

\textsuperscript{240}Read ‘rūpam eva acc. to NVṬṬ\textsubscript{D} 476,9 instead of ‘rūpayeva’ in NVṬṬ 442,16.
“having the nature of exclusion from others;” and the site of the inference, the pakṣa, is “objects of conceptual cognition.” Dharmottara’s inference is basically the same: cognizing something as common to the referent’s existence and non-existence can only work for exclusion from others, not for a real positive entity.

In the passage quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 23, Vācaspatimiśra criticizes this inference by showing that it is possible for a genus to be the object of conceptual cognitions. For, even though it is by its nature eternal and hence exclusively existent, it can be predicated to exist or to not exist through its connection to particulars that currently exist or not. What he has thus shown is that the reason, being common to existence and non-existence, can occur in the counter-instances, i.e., when something—in this case the genus—does not have the nature of exclusion from others. The reason that Dharmottara uses to prove that exclusion must be the object of any ascertaining cognition thus becomes inconclusive (anaikāntika), because one cannot be certain that it does not also qualify things, in particular the objects of conceptual cognition, that do not have other-exclusion as their nature. The alternative241 is that the reason is “established in another way,” i.e., that being common to both existence and non-existence can be shown to pertain even when exclusion is not the nature of conceptual objects.242

4.1.5 The position of Kumārila’s followers (ad § 24)

As Akamatsu (1983: 218, n. 112) has pointed out, the position that words apply to parts of their referent is found in ŚV Āv 64ab:

241 If one accepts the reading veti (l. 134, p. 56) instead of ceti in NVTṬ 444.6.
242 Glossing on NBhV 62,4–5 ad NSū 1.1.10, NVTṬ 276,7–8 notes the following about anyathāsiddha: asiddhārthatā anyathāsiddhārthatā hetoh hetuvacanasyety arthah. (The aim of the reason, i.e., of the statement of the reason, is unestablished, i.e., its aim is established in another way. That is the meaning.) For Vācaspati, therefore, this problem is one where the reason is not established. Cf. Gokhale 1992: 83 f. for a helpful example of this fallacious reason. He also gives this definition: “The hetu is called anyathāsiddha when the existence of hetu is capable of full explanation without reference to sādhya.” (Gokhale 1992: 84)
sāmānyāmsān apoddhṛtya padam sarvam pravartate /
Every word applies [to its object] in extracting the parts
[that are] the universals.
Cf. also these arguments in the ŚV, where it is quite obvious that
there is an awareness of a closely related problem:

ŚV Av 125: nirbhāgo 'pi hi vastvātmā śabdāir bhāgena

na hi sacchabādvijñānād ghaṭādyarthah pratīyate //
For [something] having the nature of a real thing is
partially understood through words, even though it has
no parts. For there is no cognition of an object such as a
pot etc. from a cognition [of an object’s existence] through
the word “existing.”

ŚV Vāk 309cd–311: na ca śabdena sadbhāvas tasya cā-
rhasya bodhitaḥ //
astitvādyanaapekṣam hi sāmānyam tena gamyate /
astiśabdaprāvoyo 'pi tenaivātropapadīyate //</
jāter astitvanāstitve na ca kaś cid vivakṣati /
nityatvāl lakṣyamānāyā vyaktes te hi viśeṣane //</
Neither is the actual existence also of this object under-
stood through a word. For a universal, which is indepen-
dent of the state “it is” etc., is understood through this
[word]. Exactly for this [reason], also the usage of the
word “it is”243 is applicable here[, i.e., to this pot]. No one
wishes to express [either] the state “it is” [or] the state
“it is not” of a genus, because [it] is permanent. For these
two [states] are qualifiers of the individual thing that is
characterized [by that genus].

In the commentary on ŚV Vāk 309cd–310ab, Pārthasarāṭhimishra
explicitly addresses the problem of a word being sadasattvasādhārana
(which is assumed to refer to the same problem as bhāvabhāvasādhā-
ranya):

243 “It is” translates the single Sanskrit third person present verb of existence asti, lit. “he, she, or it is.”

144
NRĀ 657,5–8: syād evaṃ yadi ghaṭaśabdena ghaṭasya sattvam bodhitam syāt. sa tu sadasattvasādhāraṇam ghaṭasvarūpamātram abhidhatte. tatsvarūpam hi prādeṣikatvād anityatvāc ca kvacit kadācic ca sat, kvacit kadācic cāsad iti sādhāraṇam sāmānyam iti, sadasattvasādhāraṇam ity arthaḥ.

It would be so[, i.e., there would be a problem about being common to existence and non-existence,] if the existence of a pot were cognized through the word “pot”; but this [word] denotes a pot’s own form alone, common to the state of being and non-being. For the own form of this [pot] exists in some places and at some times, and does not exist in some [other] places and at some [other] times because [this pot] has its proper place and is not permanent. In this sense a universal is common, which means “common to being and non-being.”

4.1.6 Properties and their bearers in an upakāra relation (ad § 28)

In general, upakāra means assistance or support (cf. PW I: 237.1; see also below, section 4.1.9). Dharmakīrti discusses the relationship of property and property-bearer under the heading of an upakāra relation in PVSV 29,6–31,5 (trl. pages 287–292), and in PVin II 67,4–68,2 (trl. on the basis of the Tibetan text in Steinkellner 1979: 66–69).244

In § 28, it is “close contact” (pratyāsatti) that is characterized as upakāra. Ratnakīrti says that the other options, such as inherence (samavāya) etc., for what this contact could be, have been refuted. The question is what he means by “etc.” Various forms of contact between a property bearer and a property (one case of such a contact being that of a particular with the universal qualifying it) were assumed by the realist schools: samavāya and samyoga by the Naiyāyikas

244 Steinkellner (1979: 68, n. 213) notes that upakāra was also used in a similar sense by Kumārila, and the interpretation of upakārāt in VP R 3.3.5 by Houben (1995: 170, and 173 f.) is strikingly similar. See also PS(V) 5 5cd for a similar employment (guṇopakārāt).
4. **Additional comments on the Apohasiddhi**

and Vaiśeṣikas, and non-difference or a form of inherence by the Mīmāṃsakas.\(^{245}\) Since Ratnakīrti does not discuss the Mīmāṃsakas’ opinions in the following paragraphs, I take “samavāya” (l. 170, p. 58) to mean *samavāya* and *samyoga*, i.e., the two relations accepted by Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.

The relation called *samavāya*, explicitly mentioned by Ratnakīrti, is the sixth category in the Vaiśeṣika system (cf. Halbfass 1992: 70–75). There, it “[…] is the relationship between entities that cannot occur separately. It is the one omnipresent principle […] that integrates parts and wholes, particulars and universals, substances, qualities, and motions.” (Halbfass 1992: 72) It was also endorsed by Naiyāyika thinkers, and in the context of the *Apohasiddhi* it is relevant specifically as the relation that a universal, that which inheres, has to the particular, in which it inheres. Cf., e.g., NBhV 305,15–17:

\[
\text{**katham tarhi gotvam go\text{s}u vartate? āśrayāśrayibhāvena.**} \\
\text{**kah\text{=}punar āśrayāśrayibhāvaḥ? samavāyah. tatra vṛtti-**} \\
\text{**mad gotvam, vṛttiḥ samavāya itīhapratyayahetuvād ity**} \\
\text{**uktam.**} \\
\text{[Opponent:]} \text{How then\textsuperscript{246} does cowness occur in cows?} \\
\text{[Proponent:]} \text{Through the relation of supporter and sup-}
\]

\(^{245}\) For the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā idea that properties and their bearers are different aspects of the same entity (e.g., *sthitaṃ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvam vyaktito hi nah*, ŚV Ps 141cd), cf. J. A. Taber 2005: 106–12. Cf. D’Sa 1980: chap. 12, and J. A. Taber 2005: 217 f., n. 40 for clear summaries of the ŚV Āv’s main points, where the specific relation of a class to its particulars is discussed in the same terms. Cf. also Dravid 1972: 64–66 for some notes regarding the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā stance that the universal and that qualified by it are really distinct and related by a non-eternal *samavāya*.

\(^{246}\) NSū 2.2.64, which Uddyotakara is discussing here, is one of a row of *sūtras* refuting that either *ākṛti*, *vyakti*, or *jāti* alone is the word referent (cf. Biardeau 1964: 229–240, Much 1994: 351–352). Here, Uddyotakara has just repeated his argument from NBhV 206,21–22 that the relation of a whole to its parts cannot be understood in terms of a unitary thing (such as a genus) existing in manifold things (such as its manifestations, *vyakti*-s). So the opponent wonders what their relationship might be. Parts of this passage are also quoted in PVSVṬ 277,3–4, and 305,6–11.
4.1. Notes on individual passages of the *Apohasiddhi*

ported. [Opponent:] What then is [this] relation of supporter and supported? [Proponent:] Inherence (*sama-vāya*). Here, cowness is what occurs [in the particulars], [and] the occurrence is inherence. Therefore “because [inherence] is the reason for the cognition ‘[cowness is] here [in a cow]’” was said.

The relation called *saṃyoga* is a form of contact that is different from *samavāya* and was first assumed in Vaiśeṣika ontology. It is a quality (*guna*), the second category in all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. It had a rather broad scope of application, but the main difference to the category of inherence was that contact exists between two things that can exist separately from each other (mainly substances, as in the example of the stick and the stick-bearer).

For a criticism of *saṃyoga* and *samavāya* as the relation between a property and its bearer in the TS, cf. appendix B.2.

4.1.7 True genera or additional attributes: *upādhi* (ad § 29)

Ratnakīrti, as well as Vācaspatimiśra in the passage quoted in § 29, uses the term *upādhi* in a way strikingly different from that commonly ascribed to Naiyāyika authors. In the following, I would like to inquire what, if any, cause this term’s different employment has for the two different schools of thought, and whether any particularly important issues are attached to it.

4.1.7.1 General observations

An *upādhi* is usually described as a non-essential universal: “Other general characteristics such as ‘cookness’, ‘tallness’, ‘blindness’, etc., which are adventitious features, are recognised not as universals (jāti) but as *upādhis*.” (Dravid 1972: 25; cf. also Potter 1977: 135 ff. and references given there.)

The term *upādhi*, in the context of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, is variously translated as “nominal’ properties”, “superimposed

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condition”, “imposed properties”, or “limiting condition”.248 Acc. to Halbfass (1970: 148), “Udayana was the first Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika author who took into full account all the difficulties involved in the jāti-upādhi problem, and the jātibhādaka doctrine in his Kiranāvali became fundamental for all subsequent considerations,...for the period following the conflict with the Buddhists.” This implies that before Udayana, and so also at Ratnakīrti’s time, there were no fixed and conclusive criteria for what differentiated a universal proper from an imposed universal.

But it seems that, at least since Trilocana (cf. Potter 1977: 202 ff.), upādhi had important implications also for the Nyāya analysis of svabhāva inferences (cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 101, n. 271 and the reference there to RNĀ₁ 42,20–23249). The central point is, acc. to Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 100 f., nn. 270–271), that smoke always implies fire (svābhāvīkasambandha), whereas fire only implies smoke when a specific additional attribute of fire, i.e., wet fuel, is present (“aupādhika- or sopādhika-sambandha”).

As Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 101, n. 271) points out, Ratnakīrti’s and Mokṣākaragupta’s definition of upādhi as “...arthāntaraṃ kiṃcid apekṣaniyam is based on this explanation of Vācaspati and perhaps his teacher Trilocana, though it is not verbally found in NVT.” (NVT = NVTṬ) The passage containing this definition in the TBh is translated by Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 101) as “...for by the word upādhi is meant some other thing by the dependence on which [the probans is related to the probandum, i.e. if x needs z in order to be related with y, this z is called upādhi].”

Buddhist logicians, on the other hand, called all universals supposed by realist schools upādhi.250

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250 Akamatsu (1983: 225, n. 121) is of the same opinion. I was not able to trace the term upādhi in either PS(V) 5 or Hattori 1968. Dharmakīrti employs it in much
4.1. Notes on individual passages of the *Apohasiddhi*

To these observations, the following two comments based on the material in the *AS* might be added:

*Comment 1.* In the argument of § 47 Ratnakīrti subsumes all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories except substance (*dravya*) under the heading of *upādhi*. The phrase indicating this equivocation is “for the circle of additional attributes like universal, property, action etc.” (*sāmānyagunaṅkarmādyupādhicakrasya*). This would also concur with the following explanation, ĪSD 47.4–10, where Ratnakīrti is attacking the “natural relation” that, for his opponent, makes inferences possible:251

\[
tathā hi svābhāvikas tu dhūmādīnāṃ vahnyādibhiḥ sa-
mbandhaḥ tadupādher anupalabhyamānātvāt, kvacid
vyabhicārasyādarśanāṇāḥ iti tvayaivāsya lakṣaṇam uktaṃ.
etac cāsiddham, yata upādhiśabdēna svato ’rthāntaram e-
vāpeksaṇāyam abhidhātavyam. na cārthāntaram drṣyāt-
nyatam, adṛṣyāyāpi desākālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya sa-
mbhavāt. tataś ca dhūmasyāpi hutāśena saha sambandhe
syād upādhiḥ, na copalakṣyata iti katham adarśanān
nāsty eva yataḥ svābhāvikasambandhasiddhiḥ.
\]

For it is so: “But the relation of smoke etc. with fire etc. is natural, because an additional attribute in this [relation] is not cognized, [and] a deviation [of smoke from fire] is nowhere observed.”252 This definition of that [natural relation] was given by you yourself, an

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252 I follow the translation of this passage in Patil 2009: 123 f., and understand the two justifications to be in the same relation to the main sentence, adding an “and” to reflect this. So smoke is a sure sign of fire, because a) no additional attribute of smoke that might otherwise cause its relation to fire is perceived, and b) smoke is never seen where there is no fire. It is the first point that Ratnakīrti attacks in the next sentences.
opponent, at ĪSD 46,8–9]. But this is not established, since what is meant by the word[s] “additional attribute” is [some] required thing other than [the relation of smoke etc. with fire etc.] itself. But another thing is not limited to visible [things], because an invisible [thing], distant in location, time or essence, is possible. And therefore, there may be an additional attribute in the relation even of smoke with fire (hutāśa), but it is not seen. So how does [this additional attribute] not exist at all [only] because [it is] not observed, so that [you believe] there is an establishment of a natural relation?\footnote{253}

In the explication of what the word “additional attribute” means, Ratnakīrti here makes two points: it is another thing, and it is required. This can be expected to include all categories except the first, substance, since that would hardly be what is dependent on another object, whereas all other categories are dependent on substances.\footnote{254}

The example in the background of this passage\footnote{255} is that smoke is a correct reason for inferring the presence of fire. It is correct because, amongst other reasons, no additional attribute is involved in the relation between the two that causes the connection of smoke with fire.\footnote{256} This means that there is no thing, other than the relation of the two terms, which makes the inference from smoke to fire valid.

\footnote{253}{For the broader context of this passage, cf. Patil 2009: 105 ff., and see Patil 2009: 123 f. for another translation.}
\footnote{254}{Acc. to Ratnakirti, the only way any kind of dravya (as dharmin) can be qualified by sāmānyagunakarmādi (as dharma) is in fact upakāra, cf. § 28.}
\footnote{256}{It is important to note that here “relation of smoke with fire” is not the same as “relation of fire with smoke”: in the first case, an inference from the relation’s first term, smoke, to its second term, fire, is valid, but in the second case it is not. Cf. ĪSD 46,7–8: tathā hi dhūmādīnāṃ vahnyādibihīḥ saha sambandhāḥ svābhāviko na tu vahnyādīnāṃ dhūmādibihīḥ. (“For it is so: the connection of smoke and so on with fire and so on belongs to the nature [of smoke and so on]; but [the connection] of fire and so on with smoke and so on does not.” See also the translation in Patil 2009: 105) Fire is not a correct reason for inferring smoke, since smoke depends on the “additional attribute” of wet fuel.}
This also finds support in Ratnakīrti’s somewhat ironic conclusion that “in the relation even of smoke with fire”, a standard example of a correct pervasion, an additional attribute could be present if all that is required is that it not be observed.

The second point is that this additional attribute is “required”. As noted above, Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 101) translates a similar passage: “...some other thing by the dependence on which [the probans is related to the probandum, i.e. if x needs z in order to be related with y, this z is called upādhi].” This highlights the import of the second point very nicely: there is no relation of fire with smoke without the additional element “wet fuel.”

Comment 2. In § 29, Vācaspati’s phrase ekopādhiṇā sattvena viśiṣṭe tasmin suggests that he himself accepts that sattva is an upādhi. This usage of the term upādhi at this point is perhaps not as decisive as it looks at first sight.

The passage that Ratnakīrti quotes addresses one of the points made by Vācaspati in NVTT 110,2 ff. (=PV I 52; 53ab; 55), exemplified by the following objection:²⁵⁷

NVTT 109,14–17: api ca vastuniveṣe jātyādīnām upādhīnām ekasya vastunāḥ sattvaṁ ca dravyatvaṁ ca pārthivatvaṁ ca vrksatvaṁ ca śimśapātvam copādhaya iti dūrād ekopādhiṇiṣṭhasya grahe sarvopādhiṇiṣṭagrahaprasanāṅgaḥ.

Moreover, if additional attributes such as a genus etc. rest in a real thing, then—because a single real thing has [these] additional attributes[, i.e.,] existence, substantiality, treeness, and śimśapāness—there is the unwanted consequence that, when that [thing] qualified by a single additional attribute is grasped from a distance, it is grasped as qualified by all additional attributes.

²⁵⁷NVTP 274,1 explains: yasyāpyādīdivārttikārtham dūṣayati—na caiketī. (With the words “Not by a single [additional attribute]” [Vācaspatimiśra] falsifies the aim of the Vārttika stated by the words “For whom” etc.) “Vārttika” here refers to PV I 52, which was quoted in NVTT 110,3–4.
Vācaspāti’s answer can be read as simply repeating the formulation of this objection very closely.\textsuperscript{258} It does therefore not have to be taken as endorsing that sattva really is an additional attribute and not a proper jāti.

In conclusion, we can say with certainty that the term “upādhi” was used by Buddhists as a term for universals in a quite unspecific manner, as well as for other shareable attributes or features of things. It is possible that this term was used with the intention of denigrating the status accorded to proper universals in the realist system of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.

\subsection*{4.1.8 svabhāvopavargṇana (ad § 29)}

The rule mentioned in this argument is invoked in various passages of Ratnakīrti’s works. Two passages give more details, PABhP 103,6 f. and KBhSA 77,10 f.\textsuperscript{259}

PABhP 103,1–7: naiyāyikaparikalpitopamānanirākaranārtham apy ayam eva prayogo draṣṭavyah, tasyāpi nirviṣayatvat. tathā hi samākhyaśambandhas tasya viṣayo varṇyate. sa ca paramārthato nāsti. sa hi sambandhaḥ sambandhibhyāṁ bhinno ‘bhinno vā. yadi bhinnaś tadā tayor iti kutaḥ. na ca sambandhāntarād iti vaktavyam, tad api katham tesām iti cintāyāṁ anavasthāprasāṅgāḥ. na ca yathā pradīpāḥ prakāśāntaram antareṇa prakāśate tathā sambandho ‘pi sambandhāntareṇa sambaddho bha- viṣyatīti vaktum ucitam. pramāṇasiddhe hi vasturūpe 'yam asya svabhāva iti varṇyate, yathā pradīpasyaiva. sambandhas tu na pramāṇapratītaḥ.

\textsuperscript{258}Vācaspāti’s answer is quoted by Ratnakīrti in § 29.

\textsuperscript{259}Probably VyN 14*.2–3 (VyN2 111,17 f.) should also be considered here: pramāṇasiddhe hi rūpe svabhāvavālambanam. na tu svabhāvavālambanenaiva vastusvavārūpavyavasthā. Trl. by Lasic (2000b: 71): “Wenn nämlich ein Ding (rūpa) durch eine gültige Erkenntnis erwiesen ist, stützen wir uns (bei der Erklärung) auf das Wesen. Nur kraft dessen, daß man sich auf das Wesen stützt, ergibt sich aber keine Feststellung eines realen Dinges.”

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4.1. Notes on individual passages of the Apohasiddhi

Exactly this inference\(^{260}\) is to be observed also in order to reject comparison[, a means of valid cognition] imagined by the Naiyāyikas,\(^{261}\) because that too does not have an object. For it is so: the connection with a name is described as the object of this [comparison]. But that connection does not really exist. For this connection is either different from the two [things] that have a connection, or not different. If different, then why [is it a connection] “of these two”? Neither can one say [in answer to this question] that [these two are connected] because of another connection, as, when one considers: “Also this [other connection], how [could it belong] to these?” an infinite regress would follow. Nor can it be said that, in the same way that a lamp illuminates without another illumination, so also a connection becomes connected without another connection. For if the form of a real thing has been established by a means of valid cognition, it is explained: “That [is] the nature of that.”, as it indeed is for a lamp. But a connection is not known through a means of valid cognition.

KBhSA 77,10–13  

\textit{sthiratve 'py esa eva svabhāvas tasya yad uttarakṣana eva karotīti cet. hatedānīṃ pramāṇapratyāśā, dhūmād atrāgnir ity atrāpi svabhāva evāsyā yaś idānīṃ atra niragnir api dhūma iti vaktum śakyatvāt.}

\(^{260}\)I.e., the inference in PABhP 102,10–11: \textit{ihāpi prayogah — yasya na visayavattvam na tasya prāmānyam. yathā keśondukāguntaḥ. na siddham ca visayavattvam upamāṇaṁ āsanasyeti vyāpakānupalambhāḥ.} That which has no object[, hetu,] is not a means of valid cognition[, sādhya], as the cognition of a net of hair [has no object and is therefore not valid, drṣṭānta]. And that a cognition through resemblance has an object is not established. This [is an inference by the reason] non-apprehension of the pervader[, i.e., of being a means of valid cognition].

\(^{261}\)Cf. NSū 1.1.3.
tasmāt pramāṇasiddhe svabhāvāvalambanam. na tu svabhāvāvalambanena pramāṇavyālopah.

[Opponent:] Even though persisting [through time], this [thing] has precisely this nature, [namely] that it produces [an effect] only at a later moment.262 [Proponent:] Now confidence in means of valid cognition is destroyed, because it is possible to say that even in this [inference], “[There is] fire here, because [there is] smoke.”, this [smoke] has just the nature that now there is smoke here even without fire.263 Therefore a reliance on a [thing’s] nature [is justified] when [that thing] is established by a means of valid cognition. But there is no disintegration of a means of valid cognition by reliance on a nature.

Both passages, as § 29, involve the argument that when something is cognized by a means of valid cognition, its nature is made known.

The point, in both cases, is that the nature of a thing is known only after it has been established by a means of valid cognition. A merely assumed, imagined, or otherwise unestablished nature cannot be used to establish something, since that would undermine the authority of any means of valid cognition. The force of the invocation of this rule by Ratnakīrti in § 29 is that Vācaspati cannot simply posit a matter of fact, like the ontological difference of properties and their bearers, and then pretend that what results from this assumption is true (even if it is validly deduced from it). Perception, a means

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262 I.e., uttarakāryotpādanāsvabhāva, the nature of producing a later effect. The question is how a thing that remains identically the same during a given period of time produces an effect at a certain time (such as its last effect in its last moment), but not at others. The opponent (Bhāsarvajña in the previous two paragraphs acc. to Woo 1999: 211) thinks that a nature such as “producing an effect at a later time” could help explain how this is achieved.

263 Here Ratnakirti is saying that we cannot simply posit a nature at will, as the opponent does in saying that a thing simply produces an effect only at a later time, but not always. If that were possible, we could just as well posit that smoke has the nature of existing without fire in a certain case, a move by which we would end even the most basic of inferences.
of valid cognition, does not show a real thing to have a structure of property and property bearer. One cannot discard this fact merely by presupposing that things do have that internal structure.

Ratnakīrti refers to this description of a thing’s nature as a rule, nyāya. A formulation such as this would usually appeal to a text of the highest authority, cf., e.g., SJS 21,32–22,1: ...iti nyāyah. yad vārttikam..., which is then followed by a quote of PV III 532b–d (see Bühnemann 1980: 63 for a translation of, and notes on, this passage), or ĪSD 44,10–11. But an exact source for this particular rule could not be found.

4.1.9 Grasping all that the sun is shining on (ad § 30)

The discussion found in the NBhūṣ about the supporter (upakāraka) and the supported (upakārya),264 quoted in part by Ratnakīrti in § 30, is directed against Dharmakīrti’s analysis of this problem in PVSV 29,7–31,1 (cf. the trl. in appendix A.1.4). After having fully quoted the passage, Bhāsarvajña says:

NBhūṣ 246,30-247,5: sarvopadṛśye sūryādau grhyamāne ’pi na sarvatra draṣṭādarśanagrahaṇam asti. anena itad api nirākṛtam — na hy anya evānyopakārako yo na grhitah syāt. na cāpy upakārake tathāgrhitte upakāryāgrahaṇam tasyāpy agrahanaprasaṅgāt, svavāmitvavad iti. evam hi sūryagrahaṇe tadupakārasya trailokyasyāpi grahaṇam syāt. na hy upakārakatvena grhitād anya eva trailokyopakārako bhānur yo na grhitah syāt. upakārakagrahaṇe copakāryāgrahaṇam nāsti svavāmitvavad ity evamvādi-nāh sūryopakāryatrailokyagrahaṇam durnivāram syāt.

Even if that [which is] visible everywhere, the sun etc., is grasped, there is no grasping of observers [and their] observations everywhere. By this [statement] also this [following one]265 is refuted: [Opponent:] “For there is no

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264See also section 4.1.6.

265This corresponds to PVSV 29,24–26.
really different supporter of something else that would not be grasped. Nor is there, when a supporter is grasped as such, no grasping of that which is supported, because of the unwanted consequence of not grasping that [supporter] either, as in the case of being property and owner.”

[Proponent:] For, in this way, if the sun is grasped, the threefold world too, which is that supported by the sun, would be grasped. For since [the sun] is grasped as being the supporter, there is no truly different light supporting the threefold world which would not be grasped. And if the supporter is grasped, that which is supported would not be ungrasped, as in the case of being property and owner. For [those] believing [that it is] so, the grasping of the threefold world supported by the sun is hard to avoid.

4.1.10 varṇākṛtyakṣarākāra ...(ad § 33, PV III 147)

PV III 147\textsuperscript{266} poses two problems: Whose opinion is expressed here, and what exactly is a universal free of?

Dharmakīrti does not say who holds the opinion that the universal is empty of colour, form, etc. Manorathanandin simply identifies them as Sāmānyavādins, people teaching universals (PVV 161,17, cf. appendix A.4.1). Kamalaśīla attributes the same position to the Naiyāyika Bhāvivikta (cf. its presentation in TSP\$ ad TS\$ 715–717, and its criticism in TSP\$ ad TS\$ 738, trl. appendix B.3).

As Akamatsu (1983: 245, n. 158) notes, a very similar thought is also to be found in PVSV 55,9–10 (cf. trl. in appendix A.1.7). In his commentary on this passage, Karnakagomin (PVSVT 223,14–28) discusses two options: a universal can be separated or unseparated from colour (varṇa) and shape (samsthāna). The first argument, that it is separated, uses an argument suitable against anyone endorsing a Vaiśeṣika ontology: what appears in a conceptual cognition has colour and shape; these are qualities, and universals are distinct from them; hence, what appears in conceptual cognitions cannot be a universal.

\textsuperscript{266}Cf. appendix A.3.1 for a translation.
The second argument, against universals as not separated from those qualities, is directed against ākṛtisāmānyavādin-s: ākṛti (form) is Kumārila’s preferred term for a universal, and the position argued against here also corresponds to his theory that this “form” is something that cannot be fully separated from the individual things. As an alternative, Karnakagomin (PVSVṬ 223,22) says that the Sāṃkhya is in the habit of saying this. This fits well in our general knowledge of those theories (see Frauwallner 1956: 154, and Vetter 1964: 43 f.).

Note that Karnakagomin ends his explanation of this passage as follows, PVSVṬ 223,26–28:

\[ \text{tad evam udyotarakādyabhihitam abhinnapratibhāsam} \]
\[ \text{abhyupagamyavatiriktasyāvayatiriktasya ca sāmānya-} \]
\[ \text{syāyogād bhrāntir evāyam vyaktir ēkākārapratibhāsa ity} \]
\[ \text{uktam.} \]

Thus, having assumed in this way an undifferentiated appearance [of different individual things to cognition], as proposed by Uddyotakara etc., a universal [either] separated [or] unseparated [from particulars] is not possible; therefore it was said that this appearance of a single form for individual things is only an error.

Karnakagomin, then, is best understood here as saying that Dharmakīrti is arguing against “everyone who endorsed a universal,

\[ \text{267 Cf. ŚV Āv 3–4ab:} \]
\[ \text{jātim evākṛtim prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā} \]
\[ \text{sāmānyam tac ca pindaḥ evaiva ēkābuddhīnibandhanam} \]
\[ \text{tannimittam ca yatkiṇcit sāmānyam śabdagocaram} \]
\[ \text{D’Sa 1980: 151:} \]
\[ \text{“[It is] the jātih [that] they call ākṛtiḥ [namely that] through which an} \]
\[ \text{individual [of a class] is form-ed. And this commonality is the source} \]
\[ \text{of a unified cognition of [all] individuals [of a class]. And this source,} \]
\[ \text{whatever it may be, is the common object (=denotation) of a word.”} \]

See J. A. Taber 2005: 217 f., n. 40 for a short characterization of the distinctive features of Kumārila’s theory of universals. For the present purpose, the main point is this: “...all entities have a dual nature: from one point of view they are particular, from another universal ....” (J. A. Taber 2005: 217, n. 40)
be it separate from qualities or not” in this passage. With “Uddyotakara etc.” Karnañkagomin, therefore, refers to all these persons, and not just the Naiyayikas.

For the context in which Ratnakirti quotes PV III 147, then, one should take Naiyayikas and Vaiśeṣikas as being the target, the only ones in the various groups who clearly say a universal cannot have the qualities with which it does, according to Ratnakirti, appear in a conceptual awareness.

The second difficulty is this: it is not clear whether Dharmakirti’s intention here is that a sāmānya is said to be free of the forms of colour, form, and letter, or whether it is that it is said to be free of colour, shape, and the form of a letter. Ratnakirti uses the phrase “aṅkarākāraparikaritāḥ” later on (l. 196, p. 60), suggesting that he understands aṅkarākāra as a unit. But still, one could analyse the compound in Dharmakirti’s verse either as “colour, shape, and the form of letters” or “the form of colour, shape, and letters”. While Kamalaśīla explains that in Bhāviviktas position by aṅkara-s the individual letters are meant that make up a word (“C-o-w”), he does not say how he understands the compound as a whole. Manorañthanandin is clear (cf. appendix A.4.1): he interprets Dharmakirti as saying that a universal is free of the appearances or forms (ābhāsa or ākāra, PVV 161,13 ad PV III 147ab) of colour, shape, and letters.268 One thus has slightly better support for the understanding “the form of colour, shape, and letters”.

4.1.11 Forms of khyāti (ad § 34)

In § 34, Ratnakirti gives four explanations for the error that might account for the cognition of a universal. These four explanations are apparently closely linked to four theories of khyāti, appearance or false appearance, the equivalences being as follows:269

268 Karnañkagomin, glossing the similar passage in PVSV 55,9–10, mentions an opponent who tries to escape by saying that “a universal certainly has the form of colour etc.” (PVSVT 223,17–18: vṛṇādyākāraṁ eva sāmāṇyaṁ iti ced ...) This also suggests an understanding of the compound as “forms of colour, shape, and letters.”

269 In general, see Schmithausen 1965: 141 ff. for a systematic discussion of the following (and other) error theories. Glossing over many of the finer specifics, the
1. ātmakhyāti (appearance of a self): that a cognition of a false universal is nothing but the unfolding of awareness itself due to mnemonic impressions (vāsanāvaśād ...vivarto 'yam astu, starting l. 203, p. 61).

2. asatkhyāti (appearance of a non-existent thing): that that which appears as a universal has no real existence at all (asad eva vā tadrūpam khyātu, starting l. 203, p. 61).

3. anyathākhyāti (appearance in another way): that it is only the particulars that appear other than they are, due to their differences being concealed (vyaktaya eva ...vyavadhānāt, starting l. 204, p. 61).

4. smṛtipramoṣa (deprivation of memory): that memory interferes with the correct cognition, but does not come to awareness as memory (smṛtipramoṣo, starting l. 205, p. 61).

These theories are endorsed, respectively, by authors belonging to the Yogācāra, the Madhyamaka and Vedānta, the Nyāya and Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā schools. 270

Ratnakīrti himself, even though he says here that it does not matter which of the error theories is the right one, 271 explains the main ideas are as follows: ātmakhyāti means that the content (or object appearing) in an erroneous cognition is only that cognition itself, not an external object. asatkhyāti means that there is an appearance of a non-existing object in erroneous cognition. According to anyathākhyāti, something real appears differently than it is. smṛtipramoṣa, usually associated with the akhyāti (non-appearance) theory, means that the memory involved (according to this theory) in erroneous cognition does not come to awareness: “The fifth theory [of the 8 different theories of erroneous cognition discussed in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa–PMA] is held by the Prābhākaras. They maintain that the perceptual error expressed as ‘this is a snake’ is, in fact, partly confused with the memory of the snake, but the perceiver is not aware at that moment that it is a memory.” (Potter 1977: p. 412, cf. also Schmithausen 1965: 206 f.).

270 This is how the VV presents the matter, acc. to the analysis in Schmithausen 1965: 92–106. Note that Bhaṭṭa Jayanta classifies Dharmakīrti’s and Dharmanottara’s theories of conceptual cognition as, respectively, ātmakhyāti and asatkhyāti. See Kataoka 2017a: 26, and the translation of that passage in Watson and Kataoka 2017: 67. For a discussion of the broader implications, see Kataoka 2017b and McAllister 2017a.

271 This is only a preliminary statement, and is meant to support only the main point of this paragraph: that cognition of a real universal is entirely wrong (bhrāntir eva āsau, § 34).
appearance of a universal as an erroneous cognition in a way that commits him to the ātmakhyāti position as described in the VV.\textsuperscript{272} This becomes fairly clear from an argument in § 52:

\begin{quote}
\textit{kiṁ tarhi svavāsanāvipākavaśād upajāyamānaiva buddhir apāsyanty api bāhyam bāhye pravrētīm ātanotīti viplutaiva.}
\end{quote}

(Trl. page 120)

Ratnakīrti here makes two points that are important in the khyāti context. First, an awareness event does not “see” an external object, and so nothing other than itself appears in it.\textsuperscript{273} Second, an awareness comes about only by force of the ripening of its own mnemonic impressions (vāsana-s). These two statements, in addition to the usage of adhyavasāya that, based on an internal form of awareness, externalizes the object of cognition (cf. section 5.4), undoubtedly support his endorsement of ātmakhyāti to explain the erroneous cognition of a similarity between particulars.

Kataoka (2009: 484–482) has made it clear that, at least for Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, these error theories were of importance for describing the differences between the apoha theories of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, who explained the erroneous cognition of universals according to the ātmakhyāti and asatkhyāti theories, respectively.\textsuperscript{274}

4.1.12 Proving a universal like a sense faculty (ad ll. 214–218 in § 35)

Ratnakīrti here presupposes an opponent who wishes to prove a universal in the same way as a sense faculty is proven.\textsuperscript{275} The

\textsuperscript{272}Acc. to Schmithausen 1965: 233 f., this is also Dignāga’s, Dharmakīrti’s, and Jñānaśrī’s position. For Dharmakīrti’s position, also cf. PV I 68–70 (translated in Dunne 2004: 339).

\textsuperscript{273}Cf. also the discussion of Ratnakīrti’s position in § 15.

\textsuperscript{274}Jayanta’s views are translated and discussed in Watson and Kataoka 2017: 54–57; 67. Kataoka 2017b discusses the consequences for Dharmottara’s epistemological framework, and McAllister 2017a investigates Ratnakīrti’s evaluation of this difference in the epistemological frameworks of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara.

\textsuperscript{275}Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 74 for a reference to such a proof of a sense faculty.
 opponent is not named in this passage. This sort of proof is already referred to in PVSV 16,12–14, where an opponent wishes to show that the self or the soul (atman) is inferable, like a sense faculty. The argument there is as follows:

PVSV 16,12–14: \( \text{indriyādināṃ tu vijñānakāryasya kādācitkatvāt sāpeksyasiddhyā prasiddhir ucyate — kim apy asya kāranam astīti. na tv evambhūtam iti.} \)

But\(^{276}\) the general acceptance of the sense faculties etc., which is due to an establishment of [their] dependency based on [their] effect[, i.e.,] a cognition, being occasional, is stated as “This [cognition] has some sort of cause.,”\(^{277}\) but not as “[This cause is] just so.”

Karnakagomin’s commentary on this passage is as follows:

[PVSVṬ 73,8–16]: \( \text{yathā nityaparokṣānām apīndriyā-}
\text{dinām anumānaṃ tathātmano bhaviṣyatīti ced āha—}
\text{indriyānāṃ ityādi. ādiśabdāt smṛtibījnādināṃ. vijñā-}
\text{nam eva kāryam tasya kādācitkatvāt. tathā hi satśv}
\text{api rūpālokamanaskāreṣu nimīlitalocanāvasthāsu vi-
\text{jñānasvabhāvāvāt, punaś conṃśīlitalocanāvasthāsu bhāvāt,}
\text{vijñānakāryam kāraṇāntaram sāpeksam sidhyati, tato}
\text{śya sāpeksyasiddhyā indriyādināṃ prasiddhir ucyate.}
\text{etad uktam bhavati—yat sāpeksam idam kādācitkāṃ vi-
\text{jñānam, tat kim apy asya vijñānasvā kāraṇastity}
\text{anumāyate. tad eva cendriyam iti vyavahriyate. na tv}
\text{evambhūtam iti na rūpaviśeṣena mūrttavādinā yuktam}
\text{indriyam anumāyata ity arthaḥ.}^{278} \)

[Opponent:] There should be [an inference] of the self in the same way as there is an inference even of what is permanently beyond the senses, such as the sense faculties

\(^{276}\)This passage is also translated in Gillon and Hayes 2008: 347, and in Steinkellner 2013: I.40.

\(^{277}\)This sentence seems to have been skipped in Gillon and Hayes 2008: 347.

\(^{278}\)I have changed the text’s punctuation in part according to handwritten marks in Frauwallner’s copy of Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1943.
etc. [Proponent:] [So Dharmakīrti] said: Of the sense faculties etc. From the word etc. [one understands also] “the seeds of memory etc.” Because this, a cognition, which alone is the effect, is occasional. For it is so: because, even when form, light, [and] cognitive activity exist, [that] cognition does not exist in [certain] conditions, such as when the eyes are closed etc., and because, furthermore, it exists in [certain other] conditions, such as when] the eyes are opened, the effect, [namely] cognition, is established as having a dependency on another [hidden] cause; therefore, the general acceptance of sense faculties etc. through an establishment of its[, i.e., the effect’s, cognition’s,] dependency is stated. [By this] the [following] is said: that, which is this dependent, occasional cognition, is inferred as “This cognition has some kind of cause.” And only this [cause] is conventionally treated as “sense faculty.” But not [as] “[This cause is] just so.” meaning that a sense faculty is not inferred as connected with being corporeal etc.

According to Karṇakagomin’s interpretation, sense faculties are inferred from the fact that perceptions, dependent on the sense faculties, do not occur when the sense faculties are not active. But what cannot be inferred from their non-occurrence is of what nature those faculties are: the cause is just called, or thought of as, “sense faculty”, without any indication of what kind of thing this is.

In Dharmakīrti’s argument it is the self (ātman) that is permanently beyond perception. In Ratnakīrti’s passage it is the universal that, so the opponent, is permanently beyond perception (or at least not perceivable apart from its manifestation). The following points can be made about Ratnakīrti’s appeal to the argument as found in the PV I:

The argument of Ratnakīrti’s opponent seems to be: that which is imperceivable can be known by its effect. A universal is not perceivable as such, but there is the effect of a cognition of sameness
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between things. This must be the effect of the universal, which proves that it exists.\(^{279}\)

Ratnakīrti then counters: what is established is only an occasionally active cause in general. When the cognition “cow” occurs, that cause, a universal according to the opponent, is active, but is inactive when the cognition does not occur. But since the absence of the cognition “cow” can be explained also by the absence of all particular cows,\(^{280}\) there is no justification for assuming that the actual, yet hidden, cause is a permanent and real universal.

At first sight, however, it might seem that there is an important difference between Dharmakīrti’s and Ratnakīrti’s arguments. For

\(^{279}\) How this last sentence follows from the previous one is very unclear, mainly since the opponent and the exact theory supporting this relation of a hidden cause and the effect are unknown.

\(^{280}\) See Halbfass 1970: 146–147 for an overview of the positions that Naiyāyikas held regarding the difficulty how a single real entity, the universal, can be spread out over its particular manifestations. Essentially, there were two positions: the jāti is held to be either suvīśayasaṛvagatva (present only in the individual things that count as instances of this genus), or sarvasaṛvagatva (truly omnipresent, occurring also in things and places that do not belong to the class it defines). On the former view, the unity of the universal becomes problematic, and on the latter view it is difficult to explain why a universal is not constantly cognized, even though it is present everywhere. The latter is endorsed, for example, by Vācaspati, as is mentioned in Potter 1977: 139, and also in the summary by Matilal (1977: 474 f.). The passage referred to by them might be this one, where he explains how a universal co-existent with everything is limited only to certain instances:

NVTT 353,13–15: \textit{tathā sāmānyam api sarvāsambaddham api sarvaih sahāvatiṣṭhate. yās tv asya vyaktayas tābhīḥ param sambadhyate. tathā ca yatra jāyante vyaktayas tatrāsambaddhāv api stah sāmā- nyasamavāyāv iti. tāsām janmaiva sāmānyasamavāyāvacchedah.}

In that way also a universal, even though not connected with everything, exists together with everything; but later (param) it is connected with its manifestations. And in such a way, a universal and inherence exist in that [place], even though [previously] not connected [to that place], where a manifestation is generated. The very generation of these [manifestations is] the limitation of universal and inherence [to a particular place].

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the former, the effect is occasional, but for the latter it is the cause that is occasional. But Ratnakīrti makes it clear in the next sentence (yadā hi ...), which is an explication of the reason “by the effect cognition” (jñānakāryatas), that the cognition is occasional too.

For Ratnakīrti, the inference to the existence of sense faculties is important also in the context of the discussion of īśvara, the god who, according to some Naiyāyikas, constructs the world out of its atomic parts. In one variant of the argument the opponent claims that, like particular properties of the visual sense faculty—which it discerns form and colour—can be inferred from visual perceptions, the specific properties of a construing agent—being omniscient—can be inferred from the specific properties of the world.

4.1.13 Chance cognitions (ad § 35)

In JNĀ 221,11–16, a more detailed variant of this argument is found:

\[
yat punar ākasmikatvam uktam tad auyktam, ja-

nakasāmagrībhedasya bhavatāpy avasāvakaranīya-
tvāt. katham anyathā indriyārthau nirvikalpakajñā-
najananananiyatau drṣṭau vikalpam utpādayataḥ? ta-

śmāt pūrvapindadarśanasmarasahakārinātiricyamā-
nasāmarthyeyam sāmagrī vikalpam utpādayatīti nirvi-

şayam jñānam utpādayatīty evārthah, nirviṣayatāni-

śhatvād vikalpam utpādayatīty evārthah, nirviṣayatāni-

śhatvād vikalpatāyās tadāmśena. tad varam vijātiya-

vikalpavad vispaṣṭapratibhāsād anubhavād bhinnā eva

sañāṭiyavikalpo ʹpīty eva sādhu, tasmān na jātisiddhir

adhyakṣāt.
\]

283 Corrected from the manuscript against utpādayatī evārthah acc. to McCrea and Patil 2010: 177, n. 77.
The accidentality [of a universal’s cognition,] which was stated [by you], is not correct, because even you necessarily have to admit a difference of the producing collection [of causes]. How else can sense faculty and object, both observed as restricted to generating non-conceptual cognitions, produce a conceptual cognition? Therefore, that this collection [of causes], possessing a capacity enriched by the assisting cause of a memory of an earlier observation of a material thing, produces the conceptual cognition, only means that it produces a cognition without an object, because [the fact] that there is a conceptual cognition [in accordance to] a part of that [object] is based on not having a [real, and thus partless,] object. So [it would be] better that also a conceptual cognition of that of the same genus, like a conceptual cognition of that of another genus, is completely differentiated from experience[, i.e., perception,] which [alone] has a distinct appearance [of an object]. That alone is right. Therefore there is no proof of a genus from perception.

Note that Ratnakīrti’s argument ends on a slightly different note: a genus does not appear either in perception or in verbal apprehension (cf. l. 211, p. 62).

This could simply be Ratnakīrti’s explication of the intent of Jñānaśrīmitra’s argument as he saw it: both verbal apprehension and perception have an aspect of direct appearance. In neither is any evidence for a real universal found.

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285 Cf. the explanations of this argument by McCrea and Patil (2010: 166, n. 174). Apparently, the opponent here would accept that a conceptual cognition like “This is not a horse.” cannot be generated from the experience of a universal, unlike the cognition “This is a cow.”
That a genus is the cause for words and cognitions is argued for both by Kumārila and by Naiyāyika authors. In the *Apharṣiddhi*, this position is explicitly ascribed to Trilocana in § 41, and is involved in the effect-reason (*kāryahetu*) used in the inference of § 44. It is therefore very likely that Ratnakīrti is here generalizing the views of opponents who postulate real universals as causes of cognitions.

Nevertheless, a lead to a historical person might be found in NBhv 303,11 ff., where a position is presented (and argued against) that appeals to cognitions of individual things not being accidental as a proof for the genus being the word referent (*viśeṣapratyānām anākasmikatvāc ca NBhv 303,11*). This passage is also quoted by Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 301,19–25) as an exemplification of the position that a universal is imagined as existing only in its proper substrates, even though it is different from them (cf. PVSV 76,25–77,4, trl. appendix A.1.10). Whoever endorsed that particular position might be expected to argue that there is the result of the accidentality of conceptual cognitions, because the genus responsible for the correctness of these cognitions is missing. Also note the similar discussion in PVSV 82,4–25 (cf. trl. appendix A.1.11), where Dharmakīrti defends himself against the objection that, without a universal, cognitions and denotations are without cause. Acc. to Frauwallner

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286 For an argument of Kumārila’s, cf. ŚVĀv 37–38, a passage also quoted by Karṇakagomin (PVSVṬ 320,12–15) in the context of PV I 162 (trl. appendix A.1.11).

As regards the Naiyāyika positions, this point is typically made in commenting on NSū 2.2.70: *samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ* (Trl.: “A genus has the nature of producing the same.”). The question is what it is that is called “the same”. Halbfass (1970: 145) underlines the realistic (as opposed to cognitive) role, translating: “It is the essence of jāti to produce common attributes.” Cf. also NVTT 450,15–17:

`prasūta iti prasavaḥ. samāna buddher bhinnesu prasotro jātiḥ. atra ca yā jātiḥ, sāvaśyam samānapratyayaṃ prasūte. na punar yā samānapratyayaṃ prasūte sā jātiḥ, pācakādiṣu vyabhicārād iti.`

It produces, so production. A genus is productive of the same awareness for different things. And here the genus is that which necessarily produces the same apprehension. But that which does not necessarily produce the same apprehension is not the genus, because of the deviation in such cases as cook etc.
(1933: 69, and p. 83), Dharmakīrti is arguing against Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas in these passages.

4.1.14 Dharmottara’s argument (ad § 50)

DhAP 243,27–244,9.\(^\text{287}\)

\[gal \, te \, dgag \, pa'i \, shes \, pa \, phyi \, rol \, la \, ni \, ma \, yin \, te, \, de \, mi \, snang \, ba'i \, phyir \, ro. \, blo \, dang \, gzung \, ba'i \, rnam \, pa \, la \, yang \, ma \, yin \, te, \, de \, gnyis \, ni \, nyams \, su \, myong \, bar \, bya \, ba \, nyid \, yin \, pa'i \, phyir \, ro. \, sgro \, btags \, pa \, la \, yang \, ma \, yin \, te, \, de \, yang \, de'i \, tshe \, sgro \, btags \, kyi \, rang \, bzhin \, du \, gzung \, ba \, dgag \, par \, mi \, nus \, pa'i \, phyir \, ro. \, de \, bzhin \, du \, sgrub \, pa'i \, shes \, pa \, yang \, phyi \, rol \, la \, ni \, ma \, yin \, te, \, mi \, snang \, ba'i \, phyir \, ro. \, blo \, la \, sogs \, pa \, rnam\, s kyang \, yod \, pa \, la \, 'khrul \, pa \, med \, pa'i \, phyir \, 'di \, dag \, la \, mi \, rigs \, ma \, yin \, nam \, zhe \, na \, bden \, te, \, phyi \, rol \, dang \, blo \, dang \, rnam \, pa \, dang \, sgrub \, pa \, la \, yang \, dgag \, pa \, dang \, sgrub \, par \, rtog \, pa \, ma \, yin \, no. \, sgrub \, pa \, dang \, dgag \, pa \, dag \, ni \, sgrub \, pa \, yang \, phyi \, rol \, la \, ni \, ma \, yin \, te, \, mi \, snang \, ba'i \, phyir \, ro. \, sbrul \, gyi \, blo \, dang \, gzung \, ba'i \, rnam \, pa \, dang\]

\[288\]

\[sgro \, btags \, kyi \, sbrul \, la \, yang \, ma \, yin \, te, \, de \, dag \, ni \, rang \, gi \, rang \, bzhin \, du \, yod \, pa \, la \, mi \, 'khrul \, pa'i \, phyir \, ro. \, 'on \, kyang \, sgro \, btags \, kyi \, sbrul \, gang \, zhig \, phyi \, rol \, gyi \, sbrul \, nyid \, du \, nges \, pa \, byas \, pa \, de \, ni \, sgrub \, pa \, dang \, dgag \, par \, nges \, pa \, bzhin \, no.\]

[Opponent:] There is no negating cognition for an external [thing], because that [thing] does not appear [in any negating, and hence conceptual, cognition]. Neither is there [a negating cognition] for an awareness and a grasped form, because these two are perceived. Nor is

\(^{287}\) Also cf. the translation in Frauwallner 1937: 265 f.

\(^{288}\) Frauwallner places a shad after this dang, DhAP 244,6. It is probably only a misprint, since the dang has a dash affixed to it which indicates that it was not to be separated from the following word.
there [a negating cognition] for a superimposed [object], because it too—being grasped at that time with its own nature of superimposition—cannot be negated. In the same way, there is no affirming cognition for an external [object], because [it] does not appear. And because awareness and so on do not go astray with regard to what exists, [an affirming cognition] is not incorrect with regard to these[, i.e., awareness and so on].

[Proponent:] True. For an external [object], awareness, a form, and a superimposed [thing] there is no negating or affirming conceptual cognition. Affirming and negating are connected with some superimposed [thing] that is ascertained as being external. Like there is no cognition affirming and negating a snake for the material entity rope, since [that rope] does not appear [to that cognition]. [Such a cognition] also does not exist for the awareness of snake, the grasped form of “snake”, and the snake that is superimposed, because they do not go astray with regard to what exists as their own proper nature. However, some superimposed snake that is ascertained as an external snake is ascertained as established or negated.

The main differences between Dharmottara’s model, exemplified in the passage just quoted, and Ratnakīrti’s model of the object everyday activity concern how determination works. While Dharmottara maintains a form of asatkhyāti, according to which something unreal or “fabricated” (see Kataoka 2017b) features in conceptual cognition.

\[289\] This interpretation is not the same as that in Frauwallner 1937: 266: “Und da auch die Erkenntnis usw. mit dem Sein fest verbunden ist (avyābhicāraḥ), ist sie auch bei diesen nicht am Platz.” The idea is here understood as follows: awareness, a grasped form, and a superimposed object cannot deceive a person with regard to something that exists. As Dharmottara explains in his answer (DhAP 244,7–8: de dag ni rang gi rang bzhin du yod pa la mā ‘khrul pa’i phyir ro.), this means they cannot be deceiving with regard to what exists in their own form. But if these objects of an affirming cognition must exist when and as they are cognized, an affirmation of them is useless.
and is conventionally affirmed or negated, Ratnakīrti subscribes to an ātmakhyāti model, in which it is the erroneous grasping of the form that awareness has which produces conventional activity that is directed at external things.

The full background of this passage, and why it is that Ratnakīrti sees a difference between his and Dharmottara’s positions, presuppose a deeper examination of Ratnakīrti’s CAPV, which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study.  

4.1.15  Five candidates for śabdārtha (ad § 55–§ 57)

The verse, spread over § 55 and § 57 and interspersed with a prose sentence, is in the vasantatilakā metre (as defined in Apte 1992: Appendix A, p. 7). Frauwallner (1931: 234) doubts whether this verse was written by Jñānaśrī. It is not found in the JNĀ, so one should assume that it was composed by Ratnakīrti himself, who is not basing himself on Jñānaśrīmitra in his formulation of the inference establishing exclusion (starting § 54).

In § 55, Ratnakīrti lists five opinions on what a word referent is if it is not anyāpoha: a particular, an additional attribute, a connection to that additional attribute, something qualified by an additional attribute, and, lastly, a form that appears to awareness.

The verse in which he says this has thematic equivalents throughout apoha treatises. PS(V) 5 says that a word for a genus does not denote either particulars, a connection with a genus, a genus, or that having the genus:

\[ \text{PS(V) 5 2: } \text{na jātiśabdo bhedānām ānantyād vyabhicārataḥ } / \]
\[ \text{vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthaî aprthakśruteh } / \]  

Preliminary answers to these questions can be found in McAllister 2014, on what “mental content” is for these two authors, and in McAllister 2017a, on which cognitive functions are involved in conceptual cognitions. See also Kataoka 2017b for a close analysis of Dharmottara’s discussion of determination.

Following Pind 2015: II.8–14, we might paraphrase (a translation is difficult to give here, because the construction of the verse is heavily dependent on the surrounding prose): “A general term does not [denote] particulars, because they are
4. Additional comments on the *Apohasiddhi*

**PS(V) 5 4ab:** *tadvato nāsvatantratvād upacārād asambhavāt* /\(^{292}\)

The same point, but with the addition that a form of awareness is not the referent of a word, is made in *TS*_\S_ 870 (cf. trl. appendix B.4):\(^{293}\)

*TS*_\S_ 870 *yataḥ svalakṣaṇaṃ jātis tadyogo jātimāṃs tat-thā /

*buddhyākāro na śabdārthe ghaṭāmañcati tattvataḥ* //

4.2 The argument structure of the *Apohasiddhi*

4.2.1 Overview

The paragraph numbers refer to the paragraphs in the critical edition (chapter 2).

A. § 1: Statement of the basic thesis: exclusion is the referent of words.

B. §§ 2–6: Introductory objections and replies concerning this thesis.

C. §§ 7–8: Revised statement of the thesis, and first explanation of it: the referent of words is a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others.

D. §§ 9–31: Arguments showing that neither a particular nor a particular qualified by a genus can be the referent of words.

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\(^{293}\) The refutation of these positions is found in *TS*_\S_ 871–884.
4.2. The argument structure of the *Apohasiddhi*

**E. §§ 32–47:** Arguments showing that a universal, or genus, cannot be the referent of words.

**F. §§ 48–49:** Further refinement of the thesis that the referent of words is a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others.

**G. §§ 50–52:** Refutation of Dharmottara’s view on the object of conceptual cognition.

**H. § 53:** Final restatement of thesis

**I. §§ 54–58:** A formal proof establishing the thesis.

**J. § 59:** Verse summarizing the main points.

**K. § 60:** End of text.

### 4.2.2 Detailed analysis

In the following, a detailed analysis of the *AS*’s argument structure is given. The numbers in the margin again refer to the paragraphs in the critical edition (chapter 2).

**A.** [Proponent:] General statement of thesis: Exclusion is the referent of words. § 1

**B. Introductory objections and answers concerning the thesis.** §§ 2–6

**B.1.** [Opponent:] Three explanations of exclusion are presented and refuted:

**B.1.1.** [Proponent:] Exclusion is either

- **B.1.1.1.** the external object itself (*bāhya*),
- **B.1.1.2.** the form of awareness (*buddhyākāra*), or
- **B.1.1.3.** mere exclusion of others.

**B.1.2.** [Opponent:] The first two alternatives (B.1.1.1,B.1.1.2) are wrong, because the word referent would only be a positive element. § 3

**B.1.3.** The third (B.1.1.3) alternative is wrong,

- **B.1.3.1.** because conceptual cognition is perceived to have the form of a positive element, and does not make non-existence known, and
- **B.1.3.2.** because what is so faulted by perception cannot be saved by another proof.
4. Additional comments on the *Apohasiddhi*

§§ 4–6  b.2 Discussion of theories that the cognition of a non-existent object implies, or is somehow connected to, the cognition of non-existence.

§ 4  b.2.1 [Proponent:] A conceptual cognition does not cognize non-existence itself, but only what is non-existent.

b.2.1.1 But the cognition of a qualifier (non-existence, b.1.3.1) is implied by the cognition of that qualified by it (that which is non-existent).

b.2.1.1.1 This is an instance of the qualifier-qualified relationship.

b.2.1.2 For realists, a conceptual cognition’s object is not the universal as such, but the universal as the qualifier of some instance,

b.2.1.2.1 because of the appearance of a common form in awareness.

b.2.1.3 In the same way, the cognition of what is non-existent, which implies the cognition of non-existence, justifies the everyday notion of “cognition of exclusion”.

§ 4  b.2.2 [Opponent:] Why call a cognition which has a positive form (b.1.3.1) and results from the appearance of a common form in awareness (b.2.1.2.1) a cognition with a non-appearing (b.2.1), non-existent (b.2.1) form in awareness?

b.2.2.1 If a cognitive form of non-existence appeared, nobody would deny that there is a cognition of non-existence.

b.2.2.2 Otherwise, a cognitive form of one thing could be taken for the cognitive form of another.

§ 5  b.2.3 [Proponent:] Due to the qualifier-qualified relation (b.2.1.1.1), a cognition of non-existence is contained in the cognition of what is non-existent.

b.2.4 [Opponent:] Non-Existence as a qualifier is only an addition to the cognition of some positive element, so how should such a cognition be defined as a cognition of non-existence? For the qualifier “non-existence” does not appear.

§ 6  b.2.5 [Proponent:] What actually appears has a positive form (b.1.3.1), but there is also an exclusion of others for it. Therefore it is called cognition of non-existence.
4.2. The argument structure of the Apohasiddhi

b.2.6 [Opponent:] Still, exclusion is only connected, and it is only a positive element that is actually cognized.
   b.2.6.1 Otherwise also direct perception would have exclusion of others for its object,
   b.2.6.1.1 because it also has a single thing excluded from all others as an object.

b.3 Conceptual cognitions therefore have a positive element as object, just like perception.

(c) [Proponent:] Revised statement of the thesis, and first explanation of it: A word’s referent is a positive element qualified by the exclusion of others. §7
   c.1 It is not the positive element as such
   c.3 nor the exclusion as such.
   c.4 Affirmationists/negationists think that a positive element/exclusion (c.2/c.3) is the primary object of a conceptual cognition, and that negation/an excluded thing (c.3/c.2) is understood by implication.
   c.5 This is wrong, since there is no sequentiality in conceptual cognitions. Cognition of the positive element is the cognition of that excluded from others.
   c.5.1 Even though a verbal expression does not represent its object as that excluded from others (b.1.3.1), exclusion is cognized, since it is a qualifier of the conceptual cognition (b.2.1.1),
   c.5.1.1 because a word is based on what is excluded from others.
   c.5.2 Therefore, a conceptual cognition of a positive element is necessarily simultaneous with a cognition of exclusion.
   c.5.3 Absence can be grasped in a non-implicative or implicative way both by perception and conceptual cognition.
   c.5.3.1 As for perception,
   c.5.3.1.1 the non-implicative form is a capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of absence, and
   c.5.3.1.2 the implicative form is an awareness of a thing itself,
   c.5.3.2 so for conceptual cognition
c.5.3.2.1 the non-implicative form is a capacity to impart activity in conformance to what appears in it, and
c.5.3.2.2 the implicative form is a consciousness of the thing itself, as it is for perception (c.5.3.1.2).
c.6 So if the exclusion of others were not formed simultaneously with the cognition of an object, no differentiation between objects would be possible in everyday activity.

§§ 9–31  d Arguments showing that neither a particular nor a particular qualified by a universal/genus can be a referent of words.

§ 9  d.1 Vācaspāti says: The objects of a conceptual cognition are particulars qualified by a genus.
   d.1.1 Since they are differentiated from that which is not of the same genus,
   d.1.2 there is activity avoiding wrong objects (c.6).

d.2 [Proponent:] If it is the form of a particular that is excluded from that of another genus, then, even if it possesses a genus, how should there not be a cognition of other-exclusion?
   d.2.1 For if it is only due to the particulars themselves that they are differentiated from other particulars, the genus doesn’t matter.

§ 10  d.3 If the particular is not cognized as differentiated, then how could we successfully act upon particulars?

§ 11  d.4 If one cognizes a differentiated particular, then there is, in any case, a cognition of differentiation.
   d.4.1 It does not matter whether the reason for the differentiation is the genus or only the particular’s causal sequence (e.1.8, e.2.1.1.3),

d.5 Logical problems of exclusion being a qualifier dismissed:

§ 12  d.5.1 There is no error of mutual dependency in the theory that the positive element, which the convention of the word “x” is made for, is what is excluded from non-x,
   d.5.1.1 because this error also pertains to the theory that a convention is made for a universal or that qualified by it.
   d.5.1.1.1 The word “universal” does not mean a universal as such, but a specific universal. So there is the following circular dependency.
4.2. The argument structure of the Apohasiddhi

\[d.5.1.1.1\] Any cognition of a universal x-hood depends on the cognition of one of its instances, yet
\[d.5.1.1.2\] any cognition of an instance of x-hood depends on the cognition of x-hood.

\[d.5.1.2\] Therefore there is no error of mutual dependency if the conventional designation is made for a form of conceptual awareness which, preceded by a perception of a single particular, is generalized and externalized as if common to all real things of that class.

\[d.5.1.3\] And if this manner of using a word is accepted, then it is also accepted that everything else can be designated by this word’s negation.

\[d.5.2\] Neither is there a contradiction between excluded and exclusion, nor any damage to the qualifier-qualified relationship pertaining between them,
\[d.5.2.1\] because an excluded thing and exclusion are not actually distinct entities.
\[d.5.2.2\] For a thing contradicts its own absence, not another thing’s absence.

\[d.6\] Also a sentence is understood due to exclusion only.
\[d.7\] Therefore a positive element characterized by exclusion is understood from a word (c.1).

\[d.8\] [Opponent:] If a positive element alone is the referent of words in this way, why is exclusion asserted (a)?

\[d.9\] [Proponent:] By the word exclusion a positive element qualified by exclusion of others (c.1) is meant.
\[d.9.1\] This means, exclusion is simultaneously (c.5.2) understood as the qualifier in understanding a positive element.
\[d.9.2\] Exclusion cannot be taken as the object of perception (b.2.6.1) in the same way, because there is no dispute as there is for conceptual cognition.

\[d.10\] And by “positive element”
\[d.10.1\] the external referent excluding others is meant according to determination, and
\[d.10.2\] the form of awareness is meant according to appearance.
d.11 The external referent is what is to be denoted by a word because of determination only, not because an external thing appears as in perception

§ 16  

d.11.1 Scriptural evidence: from a word, an object does not appear to someone as it would because of perception.

§ 17  

d.11.2 [Opponent:] Even the same thing appears differently, depending on whether it is known through a sense faculty or through a word.

§ 18  

d.11.3 [Proponent:] Different cognitions have their basis in different real things. So how should a single thing appear with different forms?

§ 19

  d.11.3.1 For there are no two contradictory forms of a single thing, so that one could appear to perception, the other to conceptual cognition.
  d.11.3.2 For there is no difference of a thing apart from the difference of its own nature.
  d.11.3.3 And there is no difference of its own nature apart from the difference of appearance.

§ 20

  d.11.4 [Opponent:] But there evidently are different appearances of one and the same thing, even in perception.
  d.11.5 [Proponent:] A difference of appearances is not a sure sign for different things, but it is a sure sign for there not being the same object for the two cognitive faculties.
  d.11.5.1 Therefore a difference of appearances accompanied by a difference of causal effectiveness etc. means a difference of the thing, and
  d.11.5.2 a difference of appearances alone means that one appearance is wrong.

§ 21

  d.11.6 Vācaspati: Even if both faculties have the real thing for an object, still they would apprehend it differently
  d.11.6.1 because the difference between perceivable and imperceivable results from different causes.
  d.11.7 [Proponent:] That’s wrong, because there is no thing that is an object of the apprehension of something beyond the senses.
4.2. The argument structure of the *Apohasiddhi*

\[\text{d.11.7.1}\] The difference of causes (d.11.6.1) is fulfilled by the fact that an apprehension of an imperceivable thing (e.g., an inference) does not grasp a perceptual object.

\[\text{d.11.7.2}\] Therefore a particular does not appear in conceptual cognition.

\[\text{d.11.7.3}\] Moreover, if words made a real thing known, negation and affirmation of properties would be either

\[\text{d.11.7.3.1}\] superfluous, as when “it exists” or “it does not exist” is said of an existent or non-existent thing, respectively, or

\[\text{d.11.7.3.2}\] meaningless, as in the opposite case,

\[\text{d.11.7.3.3}\] because a thing would be completely known on hearing the word alone.

\[\text{d.11.7.4}\] Therefore, the fact that what appears in conceptual cognition is indifferent to the existence and nonexistence of an external referent excludes the possibility that a real thing could be the object of conceptual cognitions.

\[\text{d.11.7.4.1}\] Vācaspati: This commonness (d.11.7.4) is possible also for a really existing universal, because

\[\text{d.11.7.4.1.1}\] a universal can be qualified by existence and nonexistence in so far as it is connected to present or past and future spatio-temporal things, respectively.

\[\text{d.11.7.4.2}\] [Proponent:] This is not the point, and there is no harm to what we say,

\[\text{d.11.7.4.2.1}\] insofar as it makes clear that Vācaspati also accepts that particulars are not denoted by words.

\[\text{d.11.7.4.3}\] Additionally, the existential qualifications are cognized according to the nature of the particulars.

\[\text{d.11.7.4.3.1}\] But to say that a universal is so qualified because of a connection to a particular is foolish.

\[\text{d.11.7.4.4}\] There is the same error for a particular qualified by a genus (d.1).

\[\text{d.11.7.4.4.1}\] For, if the cognition is established because of a particular, there is always the error of this cognition, may an additional genus (d.2) be cognized or not.

\[\text{d.11.7.4.5}\] Kumārila’s followers: This commonness (d.11.7.4)
is not erroneous because a thing has parts.

**d.11.7.4.5.1** By one word one aspect is made known, e.g., a
thing’s treeness, independently of the thing’s existence.
That is another other aspect made known by another word.

**d.11.7.4.6** [Proponent:] Cognition of a permanent universal
independently of its existential status is not possible.

**§ 25**

**d.11.8** [Opponent:] A word presents its object in a different way
than perception because they have different capacities.

**d.11.9** [Proponent:] This was proven wrong by the error of two
appearances when a single nature is grasped by perception and
conceptual cognition (d.11.5).

**d.11.10** The difference between the capacities of these two means
of valid cognition is achieved by perception directly perceiving its
object, whereas conceptual cognition determines it.

**d.11.10.1** So, without the same appearance, conceptual and
perceptual cognition do not have the same objects.

**d.11.10.2** And absence cannot be the object of perception.

**§ 26**

**d.11.11** [Opponent:] The word “tree” refers to the part treeness,
and the word “is” refers to the part existence (d.11.7.4.5).

**d.11.12** [Proponent:] For a particular completely comprehended
by perception, there is no possibility of affirmation or negation of
another property through either another word or another means
of valid cognition.

**d.11.12.1** [Opponent:] The need of a different means of knowl-
edge is observed even in perception.

**d.11.12.2** [Proponent:] That need exists only when perception
has an object that one is not habituated to,

**d.11.12.2.1** because perception has no ascertaining nature.

**d.11.12.3** But how would another means of valid cognition help
in the case of conceptual cognition, which is itself of an ascer-
taining nature?

**d.11.12.4** But the need for other words and logical marks is a
fact.

**d.11.13** Consequently, the nature of a real thing is not grasped by
conceptual cognition.
4.2. The argument structure of the *Apohasiddhi*

**d.12** Discussion about properties and property bearers (d.5.2).

**d.12.1** [Opponent:] Properties are different from each other, and different from the property bearer.

**d.12.2** So, in conceptual cognitions, different properties are cognized through different expressions.

**d.12.3** [Proponent:] This is wrong,

**d.12.3.1** since perception refutes a distinction between property and property bearer, and

**d.12.3.2** since otherwise everything would be everywhere.

**d.12.3.2.1** Scriptural evidence: the appellations “property” and “property bearer” are only based on a conceptual difference.

**d.12.4** And even if this difference were real,

**d.12.4.1** the only possible relation between property and its bearer is that of proximity qualified as assistance,

**d.12.4.1.1** because other relations like inherence etc. have been refuted.

**d.12.4.2** And in that case (d.12.4.1), conceptual cognition would work in the same way as perception, because

**d.12.4.2.1** as perception grasps all properties when grasping the property bearer due to their proximity to the sense faculties,

**d.12.4.2.2** so a cognition by a word or logical mark, which are both connected to their objects in a relation such as denoting and denoted etc., would cognize all properties,

**d.12.4.2.3** because there is no difference in the proximity as such.

**d.12.4.3** Vācaspati: But grasping a nature as qualified by an additional attribute, like existence, does not imply grasping all the other additional attributes also qualifying that nature, because

**d.12.4.3.1** the nature of a substance is qualified by additional attributes,

**d.12.4.3.2** but is not identical with either the additional attributes or being that qualified by them (d.12.1).
4. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THE *APOHASIDHDI*

d.12.4.4 [Proponent:] Bad argument, because grasping the other additional attributes (d.12.4.3) does not follow from non-difference (d.12.3.1),

d.12.4.4.1 since grasping the assisted where the assisting is grasped (d.12.4.1) follows only after their difference has been assumed (d.12.4).

d.12.4.5 Additionally, a cognition of a property and property bearer is not dependent on a real property and property bearer, because they are not established by a means of valid cognition, and the rule is:

d.12.4.5.1 when established by a means of valid cognition, the thing’s nature is exactly described.

§ 30 d.12.4.6 *NBhūś:* Then there would be the cognition of all assisted things as soon as there is the cognition of an assisting thing like the sun etc.

d.12.4.7 [Proponent:] This is the result of misunderstanding our explanation.

d.12.4.7.1 In your view, if there is a difference between property and property bearer (d.12.1) and proximity is only assistance (d.12.4.1),

d.12.4.7.2 then only an assisted that is in the same place and has the property’s form can be grasped when the assisting is grasped (d.12.4.4.1).

d.12.4.7.3 So it does not follow that that is grasped which is

d.12.4.7.3.1 an assisted in a different place and

d.12.4.7.3.2 another substance deviating from the observed.

§ 31 d.13 Therefore, whenever a thing’s own nature is cognized, it is cognized as a whole.

d.14 So it is settled that a particular does not appear due to a word, a concept, or a logical mark (d.11).

§§ 32–47 e Arguments showing that a universal, or genus, cannot by itself be the referent of words.

§ 32 e.1 Neither does a universal appear in conceptual cognition.

e.1.1 On hearing a word the generalized constituent parts of an object appear which

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4.2. The argument structure of the *Apohasiddhi*

**e.1.1** are accompanied by letters, and
**e.1.2** are mixed together because the differences of things of the same genus are disregarded.

**e.1.2** This appearance is not a universal,
- **e.1.2.1** Scriptural Evidence: since a universal is said to be free of colour, form, and the form of letters.
- **e.1.3** So a universal is only an agglomeration of an object’s generalized constituent parts which,
  - **e.1.3.1** although completely different for each particular,
  - **e.1.3.2** are identified with the particular.

**e.1.4** This identification is only an error,
- **e.1.4.1** because such an exterior object is not attainable.

**e.1.5** Therefore the cognition of a universal has no object, no matter if this false cognition is due to
- **e.1.5.1** the external object being a transformation of the mind itself, or
- **e.1.5.2** the form being completely non-existent, or
- **e.1.5.3** the particulars themselves appearing so that the differences between them are obscured, or
- **e.1.5.4** a deprivation of memory that causes differences to be overlooked.

**e.1.6** So, there is no indication of a universal whatsoever.

**e.1.7** [Opponent:] If there is no universal, cognitions of things as being the same would be accidental.

**e.1.8** [Proponent:] Wrong. A causal complex, aided by memory, generates a cognition that overrides specific differences, and so produces the conceptual cognition of a universal.

**e.1.9** So a genus appears neither in conceptual cognition (e.1) nor in perception.

**e.2** A genus is not established by inference, because a logical mark connected to the universal cannot be seen.

**e.2.1** A genus is not established like a sense faculty, because by the effect, cognition, only occasional other causes are established,
- **e.2.1.1** because the absence of the genus cognition depends solely on the absence of all the particulars of that genus, not on the absence of the genus itself.
e.2.1.1 [Opponent:] A cow is a cow only because of its cow-ness. If not, also a horse could be the material object cow.

e.2.1.2 [Proponent:] We could just as well say that cowness is cowness only because of the material object cow. If not, horseness would also be cowness.

Therefore a material object such as a cow exists only because of its particular sequence of causes (d.4.1), but cowness is irrelevant to the thing’s existence.

§ 37

e.2.2 [Opponent:] The capacity to cause a cognition of a universal can be either

e.2.2.1 identical with a singular material object,

e.2.2.1.1 but then it is impossible that another object could make the same universal known;

e.2.2.2 or different from such an object,

e.2.2.2.1 but then this is a universal and we are only arguing about the name.

e.2.3 [Proponent:] The capacity is indeed not different for each thing.

e.2.3.1 But two things with the same capacity are no problem (e.2.2.1.1).

e.2.3.2 As for you a genus is

e.2.3.2.1 the cause of a common term, and

e.2.3.2.2 independent of all other genera,

e.2.3.3 so for us a particular is

e.2.3.3.1 independent of genera and differentiated by its own nature, and so

e.2.3.3.2 the cause of a common term.

§ 38

e.2.4 Trilocana: The cause for the cognition and appellation of universals is the inherence (d.12.4.1.1) of specific universals (d.5.1.1.1) in their respective basis.

e.2.5 [Proponent:] If only inherence in the particulars is the reason for these cognitions, what are the universals good for?

e.2.6 And even inherence (d.12.4.1.1) is not possible.

§ 39

e.2.6.1 Inherence is proven by the cognition “here in this that
inheres.” And the cognition “here” results from observing two different objects, one inhering in the other.

**e.2.6.2** But genus and individual are never perceived as such in any object of a conceptual cognition.

**e.2.6.3** So inherence is a conceptual construct.

**e.2.7** Trilocana: The consistency of cognitions is then impossible, because it depends on a consistent object. But if the particulars are completely different, how can there be a basis for such a cognition?

**e.2.8** [Proponent:] That is a bad argument,

**e.2.8.1** because the reason used by Trilocana, a consistent cognition, is invalid also when it is supposed to prove genera, as they are always only instantiated in particulars.

**e.2.9** Trilocana: Apart from a consistent object, there is no reason for the occurrence of consistent cognitions in specific cases.

**e.2.10** [Proponent:] This refutation of the opposite case is wrong, because it has been proven (e.1.8–e.2.3) that one must accept the consistency (e.2.7) of appellations and apprehensions (e.2.4) due to the specificity of a thing’s own nature which is excluded from that of another nature.

**e.2.10.1** Only the proximity (d.12.4.1) according to which a genus extends to some but not to other particulars is the basis for cognition.

**e.2.11** NBhūṣ: In the Buddhist view then, the proximity of the thing x to the thing y is the basis of the common usage “y has x.” So what use is the x then (e.2.5)?

**e.2.12** [Proponent:] That argument is wrong, since what is meant is this:

**e.2.12.1** that the observation of x in proximity to y is the reason for the cognition “y has x” is not denied.

**e.2.12.2** But no universal is ever observed to be in proximity to an individual thing.

**e.2.12.3** Therefore it is better, if one wants to imagine a universal at all, to only imagine proximity as the cause of consistent cognitions.
§ 44  e.2.13 [Opponent:] The following inference proves universals.
    e.2.13.1 The reason property: being a cognition of something qualified by x.
    e.2.13.2 The property to be proven: necessarily involving the cognition of a qualifier (x).
    e.2.13.3 The instance that the inference is about: the cognition “This is qualified by x.”
    e.2.13.4 The supporting example: “This is qualified by a stick.”
    e.2.13.5 The type of logical reason: effect reason.

§ 44  e.2.14 [Proponent:] What are you trying to prove:
    e.2.14.1 the necessary involvement of the cognition of a separate qualifier, or
    e.2.14.2 the necessary involvement of the cognition of a qualifier in general?

§ 45  e.2.14.3 In the first case (e.2.14.1):
    e.2.14.3.1 perception refutes the pakṣa (e.2.13.3), because a perception does not grasp both a particular and the universal (e.2.6.2).
    e.2.14.3.2 Additionally, the cognition of something qualified is an ambiguous reason for a universal, because it occurs also without a qualifier that is separate from the thing it qualifies.

§ 46  e.2.14.4 In the second case (e.2.14.2) there is proof of what has already been proven,
    e.2.14.4.1 because, due to a difference between an individual thing and a universal as in the cognition “This individual thing possesses that universal.”, we accept a qualifier-qualified relation (d.12.3.2.1),
    e.2.14.4.1.1 because the common expression “This is qualified by x.” is really due to an experience of that differentiated from non-x (d.5.1.2, d.5.1).

§ 47  e.2.15 So there is no proof of a universal.
    e.2.15.1 The reason that refutes all the additional attributes like a universal, property, action etc.
4.2. The argument structure of the *Apohasiddhi*

*E.2.15.1.1* a clear perception that grasps a whole particular (discussion under *d.11, d.13, e.2.6.2, e.2.14.3.1*),
*E.2.15.1.2* or the non-perception of something principally observable (discussion under point *e*).

**F** Restatement of thesis that the referent of words is a positive element qualified by exclusion of others, and further explanations.

**F.1** Thus only the positive element is the referent of a word. (c.1, §48, *d.10*)

**F.1.1** And this referent is the external object (*d.10.1*) and the form of awareness (*d.10.2*).

**F.1.1.1** The form of awareness is neither affirmed nor negated in reality or conventionally, because

**F.1.1.1.1** it is directly understood through self-awareness,
**F.1.1.1.2** and is not determined.

**F.1.1.2** And the external object is neither affirmed nor negated in reality,

**F.1.1.2.1** because it does not appear in a conceptual cognition.

**F.1.1.3** In reality, all entities are inexpressible because

**F.1.1.3.1** they are not determined, and
**F.1.1.3.2** do not appear.

**F.1.1.4** Conventionally, external things are affirmed or negated,

**F.1.1.4.1** because otherwise there would not be everyday activity.

**F.1.2** Therefore, neither an external object nor a form in awareness can be affirmed in reality,

**F.1.3** for only an external object can be conventionally proven to exist.

**F.1.4** But a form in awareness is not affirmed even conventionally.

**G** Refutation of Dharmottara.

**G.1** Dharmottara: [Opponent:] There is affirmation and negation of a superimposed external thing.

**G.2** [Proponent:] This is also rejected by this (*F*).

**G.3** [Opponent:] If no determinable thing appears in determination, then what does it mean to say “It is determined?”

§§50–52
4. Additional comments on the *Apohasiddhi*

c.4 [Proponent:] It means that, even though it does not appear, it is made an object of activity.
c.5 [Opponent:] There is no difference between two things that do not appear (g.4). So how does activity, which is directed at a certain object, avoid other objects (c.6)?
c.6 [Proponent:] Even if no object is grasped, still there is only activity restricted to certain objects,
c.6.1 because the capacity of a conceptual cognition to promote activity is limited according to the form of awareness, and
c.6.1.1 because that form of awareness is limited by its specific set of producing factors (e.1.8).

§ 52

c.7 For objects that have particular capacities are
c.7.1 well established through means of valid cognition, and
c.7.2 are beyond doubt as to a mixing of their capacities.
c.8 Therefore a concept’s being determined is its being productive of activity only with regard to certain objects (g.3),
c.8.1 because it is connected to a specific form of awareness.
c.9 There is no activity through superimposition (g.1) because of similarity, since there is the
c.9.1 possibility of an error through superimposition of an external object on an image or
c.9.2 vice versa.
c.10 Rather, a cognition arises due to remaining impressions and extends activity towards an external object without being able to see it.
c.11 So it actually always errs.

§ 53

Statement of thesis in its final form:

h.1 So in this sense a positive element is the referent of words, which is
h.1.1 specified by the absence of other things, and
h.1.2 differentiated from that of another genus.
h.2 Exactly this (h.1), which is intended by the word “exclusion”, is
h.2.1 the referent of words, and
h.2.2 the object of everyday activity.

§§ 54–58 Inference establishing the thesis (A,c.1, f.1,h.1):
4.2. The argument structure of the *Apohasiddhi*

1.1 The reason property: denoting something
1.2 The property to be proven: necessarily having as an object something that is
   1.2.1 determined and
   1.2.2 differentiated from that of another form as its object.
1.3 The supporting example: “There is water in the well here.”
1.4 The instance that the inference is about: an expression having the form of the word “cow” etc.
1.5 This is the logical reason of the type “essential property”.
1.6 Defence of the reason’s validity:
   1.6.1 The reason, denoting, is not unestablished because
      1.6.1.1 even if there is no real denoted-denoting relation (d.12.3.1, d.12.4.2.2),
      1.6.1.2 the acceptance of this relationship, as it is constructed through determination, is a necessary condition for everyday activity (f.1.1.4.1).
   1.6.2 Neither is the reason contradictory
      1.6.2.1 as it exists in the similar instance.
   1.6.3 Neither is the reason ambiguous, for the following reason:
      1.6.3.1 [Opponent:] The denoted must be either a particular (a), an additional attribute (d.12.4.3), a connection to an additional attribute (d.12.4.1, e.2.4), something possessing an additional attribute (d.1, d.12.1), or must be a form of awareness (b.1.1.2),
      1.6.3.2 because these are all possible options for what the referent could be, and everyone agrees that there must be a referent.
      1.6.3.3 [Proponent:] There is no convention for the particular and the form of awareness, because they are useless for convention (f.1.1.2, f.1.1.1).
   1.6.3.4 For the other three there is no convention, because no additional attribute like a universal and so on (e.2.15.1) exists.
   1.6.3.5 So the reason property—to denote something (1.1)—is pervaded by the property to be proven—to have as its object something that is determined and excluded from others
(1.2)—because “denoting” cannot exist where that is not the object,
1.6.3.5.1 as there is no other pervading property with the quality of having an object,
1.6.3.5.1.1 because nothing else that could be denoted exists.  
1.7 Thus, this pervasion is established.

§ 59  j Summary:
  j.1 Words express an object, and exclusion is understood as that object’s quality (a,c.1, f.1,h.1).
  j.2 One object is explained as determined (d.10.1,f.1.1.2), the other as appearing (d.10.2, f.1.1.1) directly to awareness.
  j.3 But in reality nothing at all is expressed (f.1.1.3).

§ 60  k End of Ratnakirti’s Apohasiddhi.
5 The apoha theory in Ratnakīrti’s Apohasiddhi

The term “apoha theory”, as used in these pages, is intended as the equivalent to the historically attested Sanskrit term “apohavāda”. Other translations of this term could be “the teaching of apoha”, or “the apoha doctrine”.

This theory has been the subject of modern academic study since the early twentieth century, starting with the pioneering explorations by Stcherbatsky (1932) and Mookerjee (1935). The latter discusses several passages of Ratnakīrti’s AS, based on the editio princeps in Shāstri 1910, though their presentation is somewhat inadequate due to the highly condensed arguments of Ratnakīrti and comparatively little knowledge of their background at the time. Major early insights are due also toFrauwallner’s series of articles on the theory of apoha (1932,1933,1935), where the main tenets of the apoha theory were first outlined, at least as developed by Dharmakīrti. From the 1960s...

294 This term, often also encountered in the form of “someone teaching exclusion”, an apohavādin, is easily found in historical sources. Cf., e.g., NC 674,1; 680,1 (where we also find references to anyāpohika-s); PVT F1 A Pramāṇavārttikāṭīkā, verso, line 6.

295 Of course, Frauwallner 1937 should also be mentioned here. There, the apoha theory of Dharmottara was presented through a translation and discussion of the Tibetan translation of the DhAP. As noted by Akamatsu (1986: 75 f.), however, this translation suffers from a systematic misinterpretation, translating ma yin dgag and med dgag as prasajyapratisedha and paryudāsa, respectively. Frauwallner notes this, but does not really justify it (cf. Frauwallner 1937: 263, n. 1).
onward, there has been a steady increase in ever more specialised studies on the topic.\textsuperscript{296} It thus would seem that yet another general introduction to this theory of \textit{apoha} is not necessary here. For one thing, plenty of the very insightful studies that have been published in recent years are certainly not to be challenged in general, even though it will be necessary to discuss some elements of these interpretations in the light of the AS.\textsuperscript{297} For as we shall see below, it is on two points that the interpretation offered here differs from at least some of the previous ones: first, \textit{apoha} is essentially an ontological concept, linked to epistemological issues such as concept formation only insofar as


\textsuperscript{297} The best place to start studying the \textit{apoha} theory from a philosophical perspective is currently Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011. It contains several essays that present the general outline of the \textit{apoha} theory in a way that is mostly compatible with what is said in the AS. General, clear, and accessible accounts of the theory as formulated by Dharmakīrti are found in Tillemans 2011b and Dunne 2011; an equally useful account that is closer to Jñānaśrīmitra’s and Ratnakīrti’s works is given by Patil 2011a. Reformulations of the theory that aim to appeal to a more philosophically (rather than historically or philologically) interested reader are found in Siderits 2011, Ganeri 2011, and Hale 2011, all in the same volume.

For readers more interested in the historical perspective, the last years have likewise added important studies on this topic. For Dignāga’s formulation of the \textit{apoha} theory, and Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation of it, Pind 2015 is an invaluable resource. Immensely useful for Dharmakīrti’s formulation of the theory is Eltschinger et al. 2018, a richly annotated translation of the first part of the \textit{apoha} section in the \textit{PVSV}. The authors of this study aim to translate the whole section in the next years, and this work will surely provide an opportunity for deeper insights than are possible now (most of the present monograph had, however, already been finalized before this important contribution had been published). Also the historical opponents of the \textit{apoha} theory have become more accessible in recent years. In this regard one should mention at least the contributions in McAllister 2017b which deal with Bhaṭṭā Jayanta’s criticism of the theory, mainly from the perspective of Kumārila, and the Buddhists’ defense against this criticism. Another rich source, summarized in Kataoka 2018, is Sucaritamiśra’s \textit{Kāśikā} on the ŚV Av, which is becoming available starting with Kataoka 2014.
Ratnakīrti, in line with his predecessors, takes it as the object of these kinds of awareness events; second, the relation of non-conceptual and conceptual cognitions as explained by Dharmottara has somewhat clouded the issues in Ratnakīrti’s writings, whereas their relation should better be seen in terms of Prajñākaragupta’s theory about this relation.

A further methodological problem is that, although anyāpohavāda is a term used by ancient proponents and opponents of the theory alike, it does not seem to point to a unified theory. To Pind (2015: xlix), “[...] it is obvious that the expression “apoha theory” does not designate a uniform theory with an invariable set of theoretical presuppositions.”

Apart from this, it is often not quite clear what the scope of the term “apoha theory” is when used by modern scholars. Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti (2011: 1) succinctly formulate the following consensus:

The apoha theory is first and foremost an approach to the problem of universals—the problem of the one over many. [...] The apoha theory is a distinctive Buddhist approach to being a nominalist.

Whilst modern scholarship never denies this assessment, there are several instances where the boundaries of the theory are blurred and discussions extend to topics in which this theory of universals is clearly involved, but which one might hesitate to characterize as being part of the apoha theory. For example, Katsura (1986: 172) calls the apoha theory a “working hypothesis”,² ninety which provides a substitute for universals as really existing entities in whichever context these universals might be invoked to explain something. Yet Katsura (1986: 172) introduces this characterization with the observation that

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² Katsura (1986: 178, n. 10) credits Prof. Steinkellner with having the idea of a “working hypothesis”. Ogawa (1999) lets an insightful examination culminate in the following assessment, implying that apoha is an element in a linguistic theory: “...I cannot refrain from saying that there is nothing original to be found in Buddhist epistemologists’ linguistic theory, other than the theory of apoha.” (Ogawa 1999: 284, with a typo corrected)
Dharmakīrti freely applied the principle of *anyāpoha* to the various problems related to conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*), such as the object, the essence, the origin, and the function of conceptual knowledge. Thus, to Dharmakīrti, the *apoha* theory was not merely the theory of meaning but “Problem des Begriffs” as named by Professor Vetter.

The *apoha* theory is thus described both as a theory for replacing real universals and as a full theory of meaning and concept formation.

The Buddhist epistemological tradition did indeed employ the notion of *apoha* in a large variety of contexts. Famously, the *apoha* theory is involved in the Buddhist epistemologists’ “theory of language”, so that Pind (2015: xv), for example, characterizes PS(V) 5, the earliest available systematic account of the *apoha* theory, as presenting “the fundamental tenets of his [Dignāga’s–PMA] philosophy of language”. At the same time, Pind (2015: xi) states that “...the aim of PSV V, which presents the essentials of the *apoha* thesis, is to supplement previous statements [in the same work–PMA] about exclusion or preclusion with an exposition of the *apoha* doctrine itself.”

Dreyfus (2011: 207), basing himself on Dharmakīrti’s views of the *apoha* theory, maintains that “...the gist of the *apoha* or exclusion theory is ...that thought and language do not relate to real things by capturing real properties but by excluding particulars from contradictory classes.” Dunne 2011: 90 considers the *apoha* theory to be a solution to “Dharmakīrti’s problem [...] how concepts can provide useful information without any ontological commitment to the existence of universals [...]”, and considers “the notion of particulars having the same effect and the role of ‘imprints’ (*vāsanā*)” to be “details” of the *apoha* theory. Tillemans (2011b: 56–60) gives the following characterization:

*Apoha* theory, as time goes on, has ever-expanding uses: for example, it provides a Buddhist account of concept

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299 I have not been able to find a historical Sanskrit term corresponding to this notion.
formation, of the transition from perception to conceptualization, and gives an attempt at a solution to logical problems like substitutivity of identicals for identicals in opaque contexts.

Fortunately, apoha qua ingenious double negation is only at most a limited part of Dharmakīrti’s account of how scheme and world link and is not, I would maintain, the main theme at all. Indeed, from Dharmakīrti and his commentators on, apoha theory expands its concerns, all the while taking on considerable hybridness due to holdovers from previous authors. This is, alas, what makes later apoha theories often impossible to summarize in an easily digestible form.

All of these estimates suggest that the apoha theory contains a theory about the formation and application of concepts, above and beyond saying what the objects of concepts are.

The argumentative setting of the apoha theory is often less general, especially if it is discussed within the frame of a larger work, rather than in a treatise dedicated to it. For example, in Dharmakīrti’s oeuvre, effectively more important than Dignāga for all following pramāṇavādin-s, the apoha theory makes its first appearance within a strictly logical context, as a means to prove that an inference based on a svabhāvahetu is not a tautology since it makes known different properties, or parts, of the object that the inference is about. This sparks a long discussion of apoha ranging from the ontological issue of the substantial reality of universals to the grammatical question of how adjectives and nouns (or words for properties and substrates) relate to the same object.

Another prominent example is Kamalaśīla’s interpretation of the place of apoha within the work he is commenting upon, Śāntaraksita’s Tattvasaṅgraha. In Kamalaśīla’s analysis, Śāntaraksita’s ostensible reason for discussing the apoha theory is to show why, and to what extent, the Buddha’s teachings on “dependent arising” in
everyday language can be considered true. The chapter in which Śāntarakṣita establishes *apoha* is in fact a rich source for the history of the *apoha* theory, as it discusses, and refutes, many historical positions that reject or (in Śāntarakṣita’s view) misrepresent the *apoha* theory. It is easy to lose sight of what Kamalaśīla sees as its overall aim.

These admittedly incomplete considerations of modern assessments of what the *apoha* theory was and of the contexts in which it appears are not intended to cast doubt on the adequacy of these assessments. Indeed, all instances referred to here do have their justifications, derived from careful and detailed studies of primary sources, and are thus not to be taken lightly. The point is, rather, that care should be taken to distinguish the *apoha* theory from the many different fields in which it appears: it surfaces in the philosophy of language and that of mind, in treatises on epistemology, in purely logical contexts, as well as in grammatical discussions. But it is not helpful to conclude that all, or any, of these fields are therefore part of the *apoha* theory. Here, following Ratnakīrti’s exposition, we will carefully limit the problems that should be solved by the *apoha* theory, and differentiate them from other areas in which the theory is employed.

This way of approaching the AS also has consequences for the construction of the history of the *apoha* theory, because it is precisely the AS that has sparked what is the most persistent account of this history. In a seminal article, Akamatsu (1986) reads Ratnakīrti as presenting a short history of *apoha* along the following lines: after its initial conception by Dignāga and reformulation by Dharmakīrti, the theory bifurcated into two strands, a “positivist” one and a “negativist” one, subscribed to, respectively, by certain *vidhivādin*-s (“affirmationists”) and *pratīṣedhavādin*-s (“negationists”); these two variants of the theory were reconciled by Jñānaśrīmitra, who formed a new version of the theory which is found also in the AS. The interpretation by Akamatsu (1986) of the theory’s development in this

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300 See appendix B.1.
way is mainly caused by Ratnakīrti’s statements at the beginning of
the AS, especially in § 8.

The basic hypothesis formulated in Akamatsu 1986, where the
“affirmationists” were identified with Śāntarakṣita and the “negationists” with Dharmottara, has been modified in some important
respects. Ishida (2011b) and Okada (2017) have both shown that
the main criterion that Ratnakīrti uses for differentiating the two
strands—whether the aspect of exclusion, or negation of others, is the
main or the subsidiary element in the object of words—has been a topic
for structuring discussions of *apoha* from the earliest commentators
onward, with some evidence that Uddyotakara, a Naiyāyika critic of
Dignāga preceding Dharmakīrti, had already argued using these
categories. The distinction of the two strands is thus not as neat
as it would have initially seemed. Another important support for the
hypothesis in Akamatsu 1986 is that Jñānaśrīmitra objects to Dhar-
mottara on account of the latter’s overly negativist interpretation of
*apoha*. Whilst this is indeed the case, the accounts of *apoha* theories
by two non-Buddhist authors that follow Dharmakīrti and precede
Jñānaśrīmitra, Sucaritamiśra and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, force us to reeval-
uate what this opposition means. Both of these authors see the main
difference between Dharmakīrti’s and Dharmottara’s accounts of
*apoha* as lying in the fact that the former assumes that cognition
has the form of its object (*sākāra*), whereas the latter denies that
cognition has that form (*nirākāra*); both Sucaritamiśra and Bhaṭṭa
Jayanta claim that the specifics of what *apoha* is and how *apoha* can
be the object of a word differ between Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara

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301 Both articles reveal strong similarities between the presentations of *apoha*
by Śākyabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita. Ishida (2011b) suggests that Śākyabuddhi’s
understanding is deepened and systematized by (the time of) Śāntarakṣita. Okada
(2017: 198–200) shows that all elements of the positive and negative interpretation
of *apoha* are essentially inherited by Śāntarakṣita from Śākyabuddhi, or at least
common to both authors. See Okada 2017: 189–191 for Śākyabuddhi’s discussion
of an argument in which Uddyotakara distinguishes the affirmative and negative
content of *anyāpoha*. 

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on account of these theories concerning the form of cognition.\textsuperscript{302} So what initially looked like a bifurcation and reunification of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's apoha theories to Akamatsu (1986) should, in the light of current sources, be seen as a result from a debate concerning the nature of awareness and its central functions. Since, on the one hand, both these non-Buddhist, intermediary sources oppose Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, and, on the other hand, several Buddhist sources suggest a continuity rather than a break between Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, there is little reason to assume that Śāntarakṣita, in his encyclopedic work, was endorsing anything but Dharmakīrti's position, even if in a somewhat simplified form. The essentially two different accounts of apoha that were advanced in the development of this theory before Jñānaśrīmitra thus appear now as reflections of differences in epistemological questions that do not, primarily, concern apoha. Ratnakīrti, true to his analytic and systematic approach, does shortly refer to these questions, but for the largest part of his essay on apoha does not enter into the details of this discussion.\textsuperscript{303} It is possible that this is also the reason that the main section of the AP in which Jñānaśrīmitra criticises Dharmottara is removed by Ratnakīrti and inserted in the treatise that is mainly concerned with the nature of conceptual cognitions and what the forms (ākāra) that appear in them are, the CAPV. Though it can be nothing more than an argument from silence, the absence of such discussions in the AS could indicate that they were not, for Ratnakīrti, particularly relevant to the discussion of apoha.\textsuperscript{304}

\textsuperscript{302} See Kataoka 2017b (with references to Watson and Kataoka 2017), and Kataoka 2018: 26–34. The first article investigates the situation in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, and the second in Sucaritamiśra. Both make it clear that Dharmottara is was interpreted as differing from Dharmakīrti. It is unclear how these authors relate to Śāntarakṣita, who must be counted as belonging to the group of Dharmakīrti on this issue. See also McAllister 2017a, where an attempt is made to read a section of the CAPV in the light of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s comments.

\textsuperscript{303} Apart from the introductory paragraphs, it is only in § 50 that he directly addresses Dharmottara. The topics are also hinted at in his own restatements of his central thesis (see section 4.2 for an indication of the relevant paragraphs).

\textsuperscript{304} The mention of Dharmottara’s position in § 50 is followed by only two short
For these reasons, the present study of the late and concise AS is not the place to attempt a full exposition of the historical and intellectual development of the apoha theories. It is probable that the texts talking of apoha were shaped by concerns and considerations that do not directly concern what the AS is about. The following explanation of an apoha theory will thus base itself on the main statements that are found in the AS, exploring their historical and argumentative background only where it is necessary to remove doubts and uncertainty. It is intended to serve as an interpretation of the main aspects of the apoha theory as it appears in the AS, with “apoha theory” defined primarily in terms of what is discussed in the AS, and hopefully to work towards a better understanding of the development of the apoha theory by showing its state in the middle of the eleventh century.

5.1 Establishment of Apoha: The Purpose of the Apohasiddhi

The title of the AS can be translated as “establishment of exclusion”, or “proof of exclusion”. Even a short glance at the analysis of the arguments given in this text (cf. section 4.2) shows that this is an adequate name for the text: After the presentation of various versions of apoha theories and their possible criticisms, there follows a fairly short exposition of Ratnakīrti’s own opinion. This, in turn, is followed by discussions and refutations of various positions arguing for the existence of a real universal (sāmānya, jāti, or ākṛti) above and beyond the real particular, interspersed with ever more refined reformulations of Ratnakīrti’s own position. At the end of this section, Ratnakīrti also distances himself and criticises an aspect paragraphs (§§ 51–52) that deal with determination in rather generic terms, using formulations that are found also in others of Ratnakīrti’s writings (see the second apparatus to the mentioned paragraphs in the edition above). Most of the materials in the AP that correspond to these passages, and which one might have expected Ratnakīrti to use here, appear in CAPV 137,25–139,27.
of Dharmottara’s (ca. eighth century) theory of apoha. There then follows a formal proof (prayoga) establishing that every word has as its object a thing as such (vastumātra) that is determined and excluded from others. This proof is closely knit into the preceding arguments of the text, in that they are here adduced to show that none of the typical logical fallacies applies to this inference.  

In this final inference, anyāpoha (or, more precisely, atadrūpaparpārtta, the quality of being “distinguished from that of another form”) is established as an essential part of that thing that anything that names anything refers to or has as its object. It is in this sense that the establishment mentioned in the title can, at first, be understood: establishment of the exclusion which is a part of the word referent.  

This inference is what was called the ‘guiding inference’ above (see section 1.1.3), and will be used as a guide to the structure of the rest of the AS. As for many other works by Ratnakīrti, the AS is constructed along the lines of this formal proof. At first, this inference will be analysed, and then the various points in the AS that are needed to fully appreciate the inference will be examined in more detail.  

Before this, a methodological caution might not be out of place. There are two groups of problems that have to be dealt with when

305 From this, it can also be seen that the AS is a carefully composed and well structured text, even though much of it is taken essentially verbatim from the AP of Jñānaśrīmitra.

306 The other property of the word referent is adhyavasita (that it is determined). The substrate of the two properties, “determined” and “differentiated from others”, is the vastumātra, the real thing as such, which is said to be what a word has as its object (see footnote 193). That this is the object of words is the sādhya, the property (or rather, in this case, the fact) which is to be established in this inference.

307 Another, and more practical, reason for proceeding in this way is that the more obvious explicatory approach, the one that follows the order of explanation in the text fairly closely, has already been very successfully taken in both Patil 2003, and, in a broader fashion, in Patil 2009: Chapter 4, p. 197 ff., although there it is observed that “[Ratnakīrti’s] decision to conclude his essay [by providing an inferential reason to support his view] is important, because it brings together the various subarguments used throughout his essay and does so in a more ‘formal’ context.” (Patil 2009: 239) It is of course obvious that the results of both expositions will, if correct, be the same (or both wrong in the same way).
5.1. Establishing *apoha*

explaining the *AS* in this way. First, what the precise import is of each of the elements of the inference, with special interest perhaps attaching to the complex quality that this supposedly central inference is supposed to prove (i.e., what this inference *means*). Second, why it is logically coherent to state that the inferential reason leads only to this consequence (i.e., why this inference is *valid*). After all, as will be seen, it is not directly a matter of logic as to why it should be the case that a word is expressive and therefore must not have any other sort of object than the one proven in Ratnakīrti’s inference.

Moreover, it is difficult to explain these two groups of problems separately. On the one hand, it will not be possible to make it completely clear why the inference is valid without understanding its components and their relations, mainly because these facts are ascertained in separate, mostly ontological or epistemological, considerations of how everyday activity based on concepts works (e.g., what it means that a word refers to something). The pervasion\(^{308}\) at work in this inference is one that is a matter of fact. On the other hand, and if the idea is correct that the preceding parts of the *AS* build towards this inference, an explanation of all its components and their relations should be expected to go only so far as is useful for correctly understanding the inference. This means that any analysis of a component needed for establishing any of the concerned matters of fact (the nature of words, their objects, etc.) needs to proceed only up to the point at which it is sufficient to make the inference valid. This is important for understanding the scope of the analysis, or the explanatory strategy, of the *AS*: much of it is a preparation that gives the inference its quantificational force, that *all* that is expressive has that sort of object. Thus, it could happen that, without having the inference in mind, it might be difficult to understand certain elements of the discussion of the *AS*. A second consequence to keep in mind is that the content of the discussions is limited by the form of the inference that the discussion is supposed to support. Even though unexplored philosophical alleys may branch out in many directions

\(^{308}\)For more information about this technical term, cf. section 5.2.
from Ratnakīrti’s arguments, he need not follow their invitation if he deems them irrelevant with respect to the validity of the central inference. Simultaneously, it need not be that all of the preceding passages in the AS are directly dedicated to this aim, but it should be the case that these passages somehow have a bearing on the inference, or are superfluous (which, of course, is not a problem as such, and just means that the explanatory approach used here does not take all details into account). So as not to overstate the importance of this inference for the AS, it will be important to remember that its role in this text is a hypothesis. There is good reason to have it, judging from Ratnakīrti’s general style, but it does not mean that any passage that does not fit the picture is somehow out of place. Each of the arguments will have to be scrutinized also for its own value, and in the immediate context in which it appears. Only then should it be decided how or whether it serves this inference.

Moreover, if the supposition formulated with regard to the structure of the AS should prove wrong, none of the passages preceding the inference would have the aim ascribed to them at all. But even then the interpretation of the individual passages should not suffer much, and it should be more a matter of rearrangement than reassessment that will allow one to more adequately discern Ratnakīrti’s ideas.

5.2 The central inference

The inference that the AS is built around runs as follows (see § 54):

All that denotes [something] has as [its] object a mere thing that is determined [and] distinguished from that of another form, as the expression “Water [is] here in a well.” And this [expression] having the form of a word like “cow” etc. does denote [something]. [So there is] the logical reason [consisting in] an essential property.

The formal elements at work here are as follows.\(^{309}\)

\(^{309}\) A detailed exposition of the Buddhist theory of inference is not within the scope of this study. Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: §§ 9–10.2 for an overview of this theory.
5.2. The central inference

1. *hetu*, the property used as a reason in the inference (of the type “essential property”): denoting. (This *hetu* will be abbreviated as *H*.)

2. *pakṣa*, the instance\(^{310}\) qualified by *H*: that which has the nature of words like “cow” etc. (This *pakṣa* will be abbreviated as *p*.)

3. *sādhyā*, the property whose presence in *p* the inference purports to prove: having as an object a mere thing that is determined and distinguished from that of another form. (This *sādhyā* will be abbreviated as *S*.)\(^{311}\)

4. *drṣṭānta*, example: Water here in a well. (This *drṣṭānta* will be abbreviated as *d*.)

and Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: § 12 “Logical mark of essential identity” for a succinct discussion of inference based on a thing’s nature. The *TBh* will, in the following arguments, be used as a fairly normative text for interpreting some of Ratnakīrti’s terms, based on the arguments given in Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 3–5. The model used there is, in all points that will be relevant in the following analysis, the same as “the orthodox scenario” described in Tillemans 1999a: 90–92. Additionally, in most cases it was possible to find passages in Ratnakīrti’s texts that shed light on the logical terminology employed in this inference. But if it is true for Jñānaśrīmitra that he rarely enters into lengthy explanations of topics he presumes his audience well acquainted with (cf. Lasic 2000a: 19 f., Franco 2002: 192), the same is certainly true for Ratnakīrti, writing in a manner “more concise and logical, though not as poetical and elaborate as that of his spiritual father.” (Thakur 1975a: 12) Other texts taken into consideration in the following are the *NPSū*, *NB₇*, and its commentary, the *NBT*.

\(^{310}\)In this context, *pakṣa* is variously translated as “locus of inference” (e.g., Matilal 1985: 50 f.), “subject” (e.g., Tillemans 1999a), or “site of the inference” (e.g., Patil 2009: 60 f.). For the context that the argument under discussion works in, *pakṣa* will be translated as “instance”, mainly because it fits the translations of “similar instance” for *sapakṣa* and “counter-instance” for *vipakṣa*, but not because something very different from what the other translations suggest is intended. Another consideration is that it is easier to understand the two other elements, the reason and the property which is to be established, as co-occurring in an “instance” (of something, like awareness or conceptual cognition) rather than in a subject, site, or locus of inference. “Similar instances” and “counter-instances” are cases where the property to be proven is, respectively, present and absent.

\(^{311}\)Various formulations of this are used by Ratnakīrti. For the time being (until the explanation below, page 210) only this first formulation will be used.
The pervasion (vyāpti) governing this inference is expressible as the implication of the property “having as its object a mere thing, which is determined and distinguished from that of another form” by the property “something denotes”.

The pakṣa, the locus of the hetu and consequently of the sādhya, is said to be what has the form or nature of “words like ‘cow’ etc.,” a statement that seems to elicit little controversy.\textsuperscript{312} The gist of the inference thus is that any word must, by its very nature of being something that denotes, have as its object a mere thing that is a) determined and b) differentiated from that which has a form other than its own.

This is only a part of the inference. Its validity depends on the truth of the pervasion of the property that is the reason by the property that is to be inferred. “Because \( p \) is qualified by \( H \), it is qualified by \( S \)” is true of \( p \) if everything that is qualified by \( H \) is also qualified by \( S \), or every instance of \( H \) is also an instance of \( S \). Among the various factors that have an influence on the truth of this pervasion, Ratnakīrti discusses three: that the reason is not unestablished, that the reason is not contradictory, and that the reason is not ambiguous. These are the three common types of fallacious reasons or pseudo-reasons (hetvābhāsa).\textsuperscript{313}

\textsuperscript{312}To which group of things the quality “denotes” in fact applies according to Ratnakīrti, and what this means, is discussed in section 5.3.1. For the moment, it is enough to take it for granted that words like “cow” etc. denote.

\textsuperscript{313}The term “hetvābhāsa” is translated as “pseudo-reason” in Matilal 1985: 42. The hetvābhāsa is generally considered to be threefold, cf., e.g., NPSū 400,18 (asiddhānaikāṅtikāviruddhā hetvābhāsāḥ), NB\textsubscript{M} 3.109 (evam eśāṃ trayānāṁ rūpānam ekaikasya dvayor dvayor vā rūpayor asiddhau sandehe vā yathāyogam asiddhaviruddhānaikāṅtikās trayo hetvābhāsāḥ), Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: §10 (and the notes for some secondary literature), and Oetke 1994: 33 ff. Ratnakīrti himself regularly uses these distinctions to discuss the validity of inferences, e.g., SJS 29,19–20 (in an objection): \textit{kiṃ ca sarvajñasattāsādhane sarvo hetuḥ trayīṃ dosajātīm nātivartate asiddhatvam viruddhatvam anaiṇāṅkāṅkatvam cetī} (cf. Bühnemann 1980: 89 for a translation), or KBhSA 67,10: \textit{hetvābhāsāḥ ca asiddhaviruddhānaikāṅkāṅkabhedena trividhāḥ}. Cf. Patil 2009: 70, n. 102 for a detailed list of the pseudo-reasons that the Naiyāyikas defend themselves against in the \textit{ISD}.  

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5.2. The central inference

5.2.1 *The reason is not unestablished (asiddha)*

In lines 308–310 in §54, Ratnakīrti shows that $H$ is not unestablished (asiddha). A *hetu* is considered unestablished when it is not certain that it actually qualifies, or is a property of, the *pakṣa*, so that the premiss in this inference, “$H$ qualifies $p$.”, becomes false. Ratnakīrti thus has to defend the statement “An expression, having the form of a word like ‘cow’ etc., denotes.”

His argument here draws on various points in the AS:

1. A statement widely proven in an authoritative text (line 167 in §27).
2. A statement about the denoted-denoting relation (line 173 in §28)

The statement proven in the śāstra is the reason for the concessive subclause in this argument: that the distinction between properties and their substrates is a conceptual one, and thus is not true about real things. According to this rule and its consequence, it could be argued that “$p$ is qualified by $H$.” is not, in fact, a true statement.

But that $H$ qualifies $p$ is true in a “conventional” sense. Ratnakīrti’s argument is that the relation of denoting word and denoted referent is made by determination, a function of conceptual cognition which allows it to produce both a classification of its object and activity that treats the object as an external thing (cf. section 5.4). So, whereas this conceptual construction of the relation does not reflect reality, it is to be endorsed by all people who engage in worldly activity (vyavahāra). Two important positions are implied in this statement: first, worldly activity presupposes a distinction of denoted and denoting (as of substance and quality) in order to work. And, second, this distinction is only conceptually constructed. Accordingly, the proposition that $H$ qualifies $p$ must be endorsed by all people on pain of not being able to engage in normal activity, even though it is not a true statement when taken to be about reality.

In this way, Ratnakīrti can show that any conceptual cognition must be taken to have an object. Accordingly, that $H$ qualifies $p$, that words denote, must be accepted by everyone. Consequently, no one can reasonably argue that $H$ is unestablished, or that expressions do not denote anything at all.
5.2.2 The reason is not contradictory (viruddha)

Ratnakirti’s defence against this type of logical error is quite short, l. 310 in § 54:

Neither is that [reason] contradictory, because it exists in a similar instance.

This type of error consists in the reason proving something opposite to that which someone intends to prove by an inference using it, usually the complete absence instead of presence of the intended property. If \( H \) were contradictory, then \( H \) would be a sign for what is not qualified by \( S \), so that instead of the statement “Because \( H \) qualifies \( p \), \( S \) qualifies \( p \)” being true, its opposite would be true: “Because \( H \) qualifies \( p \), \( S \) does not qualify \( p \)”, i.e., if something denotes it never has the sort of object that Ratnakirti describes \((S)\).

Others of Ratnakirti’s explanations for why a reason is contradictory are as follows, clearer in stating why the respective hetu is contradictory:

1. SJS 13,8: \( \text{tathā ca sati sādhyaviparyayavyāpter viruddhatā hetoḥ} \).
2. SJS 29,21–22: \( \text{asarvajñe dharmini na sarvajñasiddhiḥ, hetoḥ sarvajñaviparītasādhanatvena viruddhatvāt} \).
3. ĪSD 33,21–23: \( \text{nāpi viruddhaḥ. tathā hi yo vipakṣa eva vartate sa khalu sādhyaviparyayavyāpteḥ sādhyaviruddhaṃ sādhayan viruddho 'bhidhiyate. yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād iti. na cāyaṃ tathā, prasiddhakartṛkeṣu sapakṣeṣu sadbhāvadarśanāt} \).\(^{314}\)

\(^{314}\)For translations of the first two of these passages, cf. Bühnemann 1980: 35, and p. 84 (approximately: “And if it is so, the reason is contradictory because it pervades the opposite of what is to be proven.”), and, “If a non-omniscient being is the property bearer [that is qualified by the reason property], there is no proof of being omniscient, because a reason is contradictory on account of establishing what is opposite to an omniscient one.”). Patil (2009: 71) translates the last, spoken in the voice of “Ratnakirti’s Naiyāyikas” (Patil 2009: 71), as follows:

It is well know that a [reason property] that exists in only dissimilar cases proves what is opposed to the target property, through its being
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In view of these formulations, the problem Ratnakīrti is facing should be understood like this: in the inference “Because \( H \) qualifies \( p \), \( S \) qualifies \( p \),” \( H \) would be contradictory because \( H \) is pervaded by the absence of \( S \), i.e., by “not having as an object a mere thing that is determined and distinguished from that of another form.” So the basic charge is that the reason “to be what denotes” is contradictory because it actually occurs only in the counter-instance, i.e., in instances of denotation that have something else, like a real universal, as their object.

A logically sufficient defence against this would be to show that \( H \) does indeed coincide with \( S \), i.e., that there is at least one instance beside \( p \) that has both the \( H \) and \( S \). In this passage, Ratnakīrti merely states this to be the case. But why does he see himself entitled to do so?

To begin with, the problem of knowing what pervades what is not a problem of logic (at least not always), but is a problem of knowing a matter of fact. For example, a logical error of the same type is discussed at some length in the answer to an objection starting at KBhSA 67,20. There the matter is resolved through a \textit{prasaṅga} and \textit{prasaṅgaviparyaya} which show that both the \textit{hetu} “existing” and the \textit{sādhya} “momentary” are true of one \textit{sapakṣa} instance, namely a pot (which is the example in the inference, KBhSA 67,7–8).\(^{315}\) In ÍSD 33,21–23, quoted above (page 204), this kind of error is argued against by an appeal to a generally acknowledged matter of fact. The question must therefore be what other statements in the AS allow Ratnakīrti to make the claim at this point that \( H \) occurs at least once in that which is similar to \( p \).

An answer must consist of two parts:

\begin{quote}

pervaded by the absence of the target property, and that it is named “opposed” \textit{(viruddha)}. ...But this [reason property, “being an effect”] is not like that, since it is observed to really exist in similar cases such as a pot, for which a maker is well known.
\end{quote}

\(^{315}\)Cf. the assessment in Woo 1999: 163.
5. The *apoha* theory in Ratnakīrti’s *Aphoasiddhi*

1. Ratnakīrti has to believe that he has already shown that it is possible that words denote this kind of object.
2. No one engaged in the discussions of the AS believes that words do not denote anything at all.\[316]\n
The second requirement is fairly easy to locate. None of the opponents in the AS argues that there is no referent or object of words at all; Vācaspati, as quoted in § 9 (page 51), expressly states that “Particulars qualified by a class are the objects for concepts and words.” Nor do the other objections contain any statements that would be to this effect. This requirement defends against the possibility of the opposite of *S* being “having no object at all.”

The first requirement amounts to the claim that *S* is at least a possible way in which words can denote. This possibility is explained, in a general fashion, in the various presentations of his own view of what the word referent is: it is first given in paragraphs §§ 7–8, and repeated in § 15 (the answer to the objection that *apoha* is not the referent of a word because it is only the positive element that is called the word referent). An explicit argument that exclusion is understood also for every word in a sentence is made in § 14.

So Ratnakīrti’s claim at this point is: if an expression like “There is water here in the well.” denotes (is qualified by *H*), it is the case that it “has an object that is a mere thing which is determined and distinguished from that of another form” (is qualified by *S*). This defence of the inference ensures the possibility of its claim: it is the case at least in this one instance. That it is always the case is the overall aim of the next step in defending the inference.\[317]\n
\[316]\ For Ratnakīrti, it is only conventionally true that words denote something. Cf. § 48 and references in the translation.

\[317]\ This is not an uncommon tactic in Ratnakīrti’s writings, cf., e.g., the objection in CAPV 130,5–6 (punctuation and paragraphs modified): *tad ayāṁ sādhyasūnyo drśtānto hetuṣ ca vipakse paridṛṣyamānah. yadi tatraiva niyatas tada viruddhah, tatrāpi sambhave ’naikānta iti cet.* (Therefore this example is free of the [property] to be proven[, i.e., oneness], and the reason is observed in the counter-instance. If the [reason] is limited to this [counter-instance] alone, [it is] contradictory, [and if] limited to this [counter-instance] also, it is inconclusive.) This refers back to the
5.2. The central inference

5.2.3 The reason is not ambiguous (anaikāntika)

The third error that could afflict $H$ is that it could be ambiguous (anaikāntika). Put simply, a logical reason that is ambiguous is one that is at least doubtful as to the terms of its presence or absence in both similar instances and counter-instances.\textsuperscript{318} Again, Ratnakīrti’s defence against this error (see lines 311–319, p. 69) does not detail which variety of this logical error it is against. Ratnakīrti uses the three common variants of an ambiguous reason in the RNĀ.\textsuperscript{319} The situation for $H$ would be, respectively, as follows:

1. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*：“$H$ qualifies neither $v$ nor $s$.” would be true.

\textsuperscript{318}In practice, there are, however, several ways in which a reason can be “ambiguous”. While earlier texts, such as the NPSū, distinguish six ways in which a reason can be so, the TBh\textsubscript{I} 47,19–48,1 distinguishes three: *vyāptyaniścaye hetor anaikāntiko doṣaḥ. sa ca trividhaḥ-asādhāraṇānaikāntikah sādhāraṇānaikāntikah sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikāḥ ceti* (If [there is] no ascertainment of pervasion, the reason’s error is “ambiguous.” And this [error] is threefold: ambiguous due to non-commonness, ambiguous due to commonness, and having a doubtful exclusion from the counter-instance.) Ratnakīrti uses these three variants to classify this type of error: *sādhāraṇānaikāntika* (e.g., KBhSA 68,25, SSD 114,16–7), *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* (e.g., KBhSA 80,8), and *sandigdhavyatireka-hetvābhāsa* (e.g., SAD 147,4, SSD 124,23–24).

\textsuperscript{319}See TBh\textsubscript{I} 47,19–48,1 for a short characterization that is applicable also to Ratnakīrti. Sample passages in the RNĀ are:

1. *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*, e.g., KBhSA 68,25, SSD 114,16–7
2. *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*, e.g., KBhSA 80,8
3. *sandigdhavyatireka*, e.g., SAD 147,4, or, in a formulation as reason and consequence, e.g., *ataḥ sandigdhavyatirekitvād anaikāntikatvam eva prameyatvam*.

(SSD 124,23–24)
5. The *apoha* theory in Ratnakīrti’s *Aphoasiddhi*

2. *sādhāraṇānaikāntika*: “*H* qualifies both *v* and *s.*” would be true.

3. *sandigdhavyatirekānaikāntika*: “*H* does not qualify *v.*” would not be certain.

So which of these positions most closely resembles the situation in the passage under discussion?

The first candidate, ambiguity of *H* due to not being common to both *s* and *v*, is not acceptable, because then the opponent would have to admit that “to denote” is a quality neither of the similar nor of the counter-instances — a consequence which surely is to be avoided, since the counter-instances include all the options for the word referent endorsed by the opponent.\(^{320}\)

The second candidate, ambiguity of *H* due to being common to both *s* and *v*, entails no such consequence, and this understanding thus seems suitable. First, the opponent is not arguing that *v* is not specified by *H*, but rather that “what denotes” must have one of a range of things as its proper object, none of which agrees with *S*. Second, Ratnakīrti’s defence against this error consists in showing that none of the other options are viable alternatives to *S*, implying that the important thing to do is to show that *v* is not qualified by *S*, which is the fault defined in the typical case of the reason’s ambiguity due to commonness.

This does not yet decide whether *H* is being criticised, because it is doubtful as to its negative concomitance with the counter-instance. But it is quite plainly not what the opponent is arguing for, since he is not criticising the way the reason’s absence in all the counter-instances is shown, but rather claiming that the counter-instances are indeed also qualified by *H*. This argument should thus be interpreted as concerning *H*’s ambiguity due to its being common to both *s* and *v*.

Once this is settled, the structure of the argument in this passage can be analysed as follows. There is an objection by an adversary, making three claims:

\(^{320}\)This, in itself, is not a particularly strong argument, as it is rather hypothetical. But from the discussion of the other options it will emerge that it is strong enough.
5.2. The central inference

1. \( H \), “to be denoting”, can also be said of the counter-instance, i.e., instances that denote something and are qualified by having as their object either a particular, an additional attribute, a combination of these two elements, or a form of awareness.
2. These options are all the options there are.
3. If these counter-instances have no object at all, they cannot be said to be “denoting”.

Ratnakīrti’s answer is that all options suggested by the opponent are wrong. Neither the external particular as such nor the form of awareness can be the object of denoting instances, because no convention can be made with regard to either: they are both particulars, and any denotative convention based on them would lead to useless results.\(^{321}\) All the remaining options involve an additional attribute. They are precluded because additional attributes do not exist.

In consequence of this, the pervasion of \( H \) by \( S \) is established:

1. There are no options other than \( S \) for how a denoting instance could have an object.
2. Therefore, a pervader of \( H \) qualified by having an object other than \( S \) is excluded.
3. Due to this, \( H \), “to be what denotes”, is excluded from the counter-instances.
4. Therefore, \( H \) is pervaded by \( S \), so that “Because \( H \) qualifies \( p \), \( S \) qualifies \( p \).” is true.

With this, the inference is shown to be formally valid and factually true: the pervasion of the reason property by the property to be proven is established, so that the inference— that the instance under discussion is qualified by the property to be proven because it is qualified by the reason property—is true.

\(^{321}\) For the referent agreed on in such a convention would be unrepeatable. This would mean that convention, and thus any everyday activity based on it, would become impossible. Cf. footnote 200.
5.2.4 Claims made in the inference

The above discussion of the inference’s structure has, for the reasons stated in section 5.1, only superficially touched on the various claims and positions that are involved in the inference. To recapitulate, and to begin deciding on a strategy for explaining the various elements, an overview might be in order:

1. $H$ is “to be denoting”. Its characteristics are as follows:
   a) It depends on there being an object (acc. to the opponent at least, cf. l. 315, p. 69); that there is no object at all is apparently not considered a tenable position by anyone, neither Ratnakīrti nor his opponents.
   b) It is an element in the merely conceptually construed relation between denoting and denoted (l. 308, p. 69).

2. $p$: The instance under discussion that is claimed to be
   a) qualified by $H$,
   b) qualified by $S$,
   c) dissimilar from $v$, i.e., not qualified by anything opposed to $S$, and
   d) similar to $s$, i.e., qualified by $S$.

3. $S$:
   a) It is variously formulated as:
      i. adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātragocara (l. 306, p. 69).
      ii. vācyā (l. 308, 69, and, by the opponent, l. 314, p. 69.)
      iii. adhyavasitavijātivyāvṛttavastumātraviṣayatva (l. 311, p. 69).
      iv. adhyavasitabāhyaviṣayatva (l. 318, p. 70).
   b) Its characteristics are:
      i. It is what denoting instances have as their object, or, simply, it is what is denoted.
      ii. It is an element in the merely conceptually construed relation between denoting and denoted (l. 308, p. 69).
5.3. The referent of words

iii. It is capable of supporting a linguistic convention (l. 316, p. 70).

iv. It is a mere thing that is:
   A. determined,
   B. differentiated from what is not the same, or, in other words, differentiated from that of another kind,
   C. external.

4. $s$: All instances qualified by $S$.

5. $v$: All instances not qualified by $S$. The alternative options discussed\(^{322}\) are that what is denoted is either
   a) a particular,
   b) an additional attribute,
   c) a connection to an additional attribute,
   d) what has the same additional attribute, or
   e) a form of awareness.

Ratnakīrti does not argue for any of these claims in much detail.\(^{323}\) The relevant arguments and justifications of the claims made in the inference must therefore be supplied from the passages of the $AS$ that precede the inference. As stated above (section 5.1), the various elements appearing here will be interpreted as giving the $AS$ its structure. A schematic overview of the relevant passages is given in table 5.1.

### 5.3 The referent of words

Ratnakīrti discusses what the referent of a word is in various places. A first sense of what differentiates words as objects of cognitions

\(^{322}\) There must be options, since the possibility of not having any object is not accepted. Cf. l. 315, p. 69, as well as page 209.

\(^{323}\) Cf. the observation about the impossibility of a denoting instance having a particular or universal as its object: “We know this to be the case since, as Ratnakīrti has shown earlier in his essay, inferential/verbal awareness-events cannot have either particulars or real universals as their objects.” (Patil 2009: 243)
Table 5.1 – Concordance between claims made in the inference and previous discussions in the AS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Claim (line)</th>
<th>Discussed in paragraph(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H$</td>
<td>avśayatve vācaktvāyoga (315)</td>
<td>§ 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vācyavācakabhbāvasyabhāve 'pi adhyavasāyakṛta (308)</td>
<td>§ 27–§ 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>qualified by $H$ (308–310)</td>
<td>§ 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>qualified by $S$ (310–319)</td>
<td>§ 7–§ 8, § 48, § 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S/s$</td>
<td>vācyā (= object of vācaka) (308,314)</td>
<td>cf. p’s being qualified by $S$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>samaya / saṃketa (316)</td>
<td>§ 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vastumātra (306, 311), which is</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>adhyavasita (306, 311, 318)</td>
<td>§ 1, § 7–§ 8, § 12–§ 14, § 15, § 37, § 40–§ 41, § 48–§ 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>atadrūpaṇaparāṛṛta (306, 311)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bāhyā (318)</td>
<td>§ 15, § 34, § 48–§ 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$v$</td>
<td>svalakṣaṇa (314)</td>
<td>§ 9–§ 23, § 29 (Vācaspati); § 24–§ 28 (Kumārila’s school); § 30 (Nyāyabhūṣaṇa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>upādhi (314)</td>
<td>§ 32–§ 37; § 38–§ 42 (Trilocana); § 43 (Nyāyabhūṣaṇa); § 44–§ 47; also cf. § 23;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>upādhiyoga (314)</td>
<td>also § 9, § 23, § 29;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sopādhi (314)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>buddhyākṛti (314)</td>
<td>§ 4, § 4, § 15, § 48, § 49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
from the objects of other cognitions can be gleaned from the following passage in his PABhP, where he is refuting the Mīmāṃsā contention that Vedic injunctions (codanā) are means of valid cognition because they “are connected to” (pratibaddha) real things:

PABhP 99,20–23: *nibandhanam cāsyās tādātmyatadupattibhyām anyam nopalabhyate, atatsvabhāvasvabhāvatvām anyaṃ nopalabhyate, atatsvabhāvasvabhāvatvāt. na hi śabdānāṃ bahirarthasvabhāvatāsti bhinnapratibhāsāvabodhaviṣayatvāt. nāpi śabdā bahirarthād upajāyante, artham antarenāpi purusasyecchāpratibaddhavṛttteḥ śabdasyotpādadārśanāt.*

But no other connection of this [Vedic injunction to a real thing] apart from being identical with something or being caused by something is grasped, because [something that] does not have the nature of some [thing] and [something that] is not produced by some [thing] are not [such that their] nature is connected to that [thing]. For words do not have the nature of external objects, because they are the object of an awareness that has a different appearance [than an awareness of an external object]. Nor do words arise from an external object, because one observes that a word arises even without an object [being present] due to being connected to a person’s intention.

Ratnakīrti is here saying that no verbal statement, including Vedic injunctions, can possibly have a connection to a real thing such that one could infer the object from the word. To have that kind of connection would require the word to satisfy one of two conditions: that it have the nature of an external object or that it be caused by such an object. But evidently it is not the case that being “Indian Rosewood” can have the same relation to being a real tree as being an Indian Rosewood (no quotes) can have to being a real tree; the actual reason that Ratnakīrti gives for this is interesting: the cognition arising from the word “fire” does not appear to our mind like the perception arising from a fire. As we shall see, it is
an internal feature of cognition (its image or form) that allows us to
differentiate perceptions and verbal cognitions. The other possible
type of connection required for this Mīmāṃsā position to survive
would be that “smoke” relates to fire as smoke relates to fire: however,
it is evident from everyday experience that the word “smoke” can
occur in the absence of an actual fire.

The most concise definition in the AS is that the referent (arthā) of
words\(^\text{324}\) is an affirmation or positive element qualified by exclusion
from others (anyāpohaviśīṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthāḥ, l. 36 in §7). Since
this definition does not have a direct equivalent in Jñānaśrīmi-
mitra’s AP,\(^\text{325}\) it is likely that it represents Ratnakīrti’s own point of
view on the subject in a form clearer than he considered it expressed
in Jñānaśrīmitra’s writings. But it is not the only definition that
Ratnakīrti gives of the word referent. Some of his other explanations
are collected in table 5.2. Only those have been included that use
formulations significantly different from those that have been used
in the passages preceding each occurrence.

Patil (2003: 230) has already presented “[...] Ratnakīrti’s analysis
of this complex entity [i.e., the anyāpohaviśīṣṭavīdhi — PMA,] by
describing each of its analytically separable components [...]”, and
here too this tactic will be followed in explaining the sense of this
definition.

One thus comes to ask these four questions, one for each part of
the definition anyāpohaviśīṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthāḥ (l. 36 in §7):

1. What is meant by “referent of words” (“...śabdānam arthāḥ”)?
2. What is this vīdhi or positive element?
3. What is this vīdhi’s property, anyāpoha?
4. How does this property qualify its substrate, or what is the
   relation of anyāpoha and vīdhi?

\(^{324}\)This translation of śabdārtha has been preferred to a possible “meaning of a
word”, because the latter does not make good sense in the context of section 5.3.1 and
section 5.6.

\(^{325}\)Cf. the apparatus to the passage just cited, as well as the table in Akamatsu

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5.3. The referent of words

Apart from this analysis of the definition’s content, it is also important to see how far Ratnakīrti must let the explanation go: it has to be made clear that this thing is capable of being the word referent, in order to fulfil its role as $S$ in the inference establishing *apoha*.

The passages that deal directly with Ratnakīrti’s idea of this word referent are: §§7–8, §§48–49, and §53.

5.3.1 What is meant with “referent of words”

What has to be understood by the expression “referent of a word” (śabdārtha) is not explicitly discussed in the *AS*. But several passages clearly show that Ratnakīrti follows the standard account of Dharmakīrti, namely that the word referent is the same as the object of all conceptual cognitions. Thus, the discussion about the word referent is of great consequence for an understanding of what...

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Footnotes:

326 See the arguments above, section 5.1. For the abbreviations like $S$, see page 200.

327 See, e.g., PV III 183ab (cf. appendix A.3.3). There is no scholarly disagreement on this topic, cf., e.g., Steinkellner 1967: 92, n. 25, or McCrea and Patil 2006: 305 f. for a concise discussion of the two means of cognition and their objects, and of the problems involved. Dharmottara subverted this clear distinction, cf. McCrea and Patil 2006: 325, n. 64. To what extent this subversion is upheld in Ratnakīrti’s texts will become apparent in the course of the next sections, especially section 5.4.
conceptual awareness is, and how it operates. The following two examples show that Ratnakīrti shares Dharmakīrti’s assumption:

One passage appears in the answer to Vācaspatimiśra’s contention that a particular qualified by a class is what a word refers to (cf. § 9). Ratnakīrti there effectively endorses that verbal and conceptual cognitions have the same objects by using the phrase: “...those that become the object of words and concepts ...” (śabdavikalpayor viṣayibhavantīnām, l. 61, p. 51). It seems highly improbable that he would use such an expression without any qualification and not touch on the subject anywhere in the following if he did not accept it.

Another clear indication of this tacit equation is found at the end of the section discussing the possibility of the word referent being some sort of particular (qualified by a universal). He there says: “Therefore it is settled that a particular does not appear because of a word, a concept, or a logical mark.” (cf. § 31) This statement suggests that there is an equivalence amongst verbal, conceptual, and inferential cognitions in that they do not have a particular as their object.

These two instances should suffice to show that Ratnakīrti assumes that any kind of conceptual cognition, not only one produced from words, has what he calls “anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ” for its object.

5.3.2 vidhi—The positive element

The term “vidhi” is explained by Ratnakīrti in various statements that, taken together, suggest it would either best be left untranslated, or can only be rendered by a very loose approximation, as the “positive” or “affirmative” element or aspect of the word referent, as opposed to its negative aspect, exclusion of others. The first step in understanding

Udayana, a Naiyāyika scholar who knew Jñānaśrīmitra’s and Ratnakīrti’s works intimately, defines astitva in terms of being the object of a cognition that is directed at such a “vidhi” (Kir: 27). Halbfass (1970: 144) elaborates:

The following explanation is to be found in Udayana’s commentary: astitvam vidhimukhapratyayavisayatvam/ pratiyogyanapeksanirūpanatvam iti yāvat. Consequently, astitva is the character of all that is capable of determining our notions in a positive way, that
what could be meant by *vidhi* certainly must be to collect Ratnakīrti’s explanations of this term and to consider what results from these. To this end, a close look at the following two passages is helpful:

ll. 93–97, § 15: And by the word “positive element” an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according to determination, and according to appearance a form of awareness [is meant]. Amongst these, the external object is defined as that to be expressed by a word only because of determination, not because of a particular’s appearance, since there is no appearance of a manifest particular that is limited as to space, time and condition, as there is in the case of perception.

ll. 276–282, § 48: Thus, in this way, only a positive element is the referent of a word. And this [positive element] is meant [to be] the external object and the form of awareness. Amongst these, the form of awareness is neither affirmed nor negated, neither in reality nor conventionally, because [this form] is to be cognized [only] through the perception self-awareness and is not determined. The external object is not affirmed or negated in reality either, because it does not appear in verbal apprehensions. Precisely for this [reason] all things are in reality inexpressible, for neither do they appear nor are they determined. Therefore the external object alone is conventionally affirmed and negated, because otherwise it would result that all everyday activity is given up.

has a content of its own, and can be grasped without reference to a counter-positive. ...Thus the field of astitva, of positiveness and determinateness, is the field of fixed meanings of words, of word-correlates. To such a position, the Buddhists oppose their doctrine of apoha; they do not accept any immanent positivity: Determination shall be explained as mere negation and exclusion.
The main points these two passages make about the affirmative element are:

1. by *vidhi* a twofold object is meant — a form of awareness and an external object,
2. two modes of awareness are indexed to these two aspects of it — appearance and determination,
3. the *vidhi* as a determined, external object is the object of practical activities.\(^{329}\)

### 5.3.2.1 *Vidhi* as a Twofold Object

In ll. 93–97, § 15, Ratnakīrti defines what is meant by the word *vidhi*: an external object according to determination and a form of awareness according to appearance. The phrasing of the passage, *yathādhyavasāyam ...yathāpratibhāsam*, suggests that the *vidhi* is either the external object or the form of awareness, depending on the way in which a person becomes aware of it. A natural question at this point might be to ask whether this *vidhi* should be understood as a single thing that one can cognize in two ways, or whether each of these two modes of cognition has a separate “positive element” as a part of its object. In the meantime, the best answer that can be given is that they are (ontologically) different entities. However, this answer cannot be understood correctly without the points made below (section 5.4) concerning the logic of determination (*adhyavasāya*): for while this cognitive function construes the external positive object on the basis of the appearing form of awareness, it does not show it in

\(^{329}\)It is through this property that the “positive element” is connected to a notion of true and false cognitions, because it allows a cognition to direct activity at an external particular that is able to fulfill a desired aim. Cf., e.g., the succinct formulation in Krasser 1995: 247:

Following Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara defines correct or valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as reliable cognition (*avisamvādakam jñānam*). *Avisamvādaka* is explained as causing a person to obtain (*prāpaka*) the indicated (*pradarśita*) object (*vastu*), which itself is capable of producing an effect or of fulfilling one’s purpose (*arthakriyāsamartha*).
any way. Similarly to the perception of an absence of other things, determination facilitates activity towards an external object that, though conceived of in an affirmative way, is not present to awareness other than as the way or the direction in which one might direct one’s activity.\footnote{In addition, it is unclear whether the “external object” mentioned here is the external particular that might be achieved through an activity, or the continuum \((\text{santāna})\) of momentary states that constitutes an external common-sense object (like a cow). The latter is the analysis suggested, on the basis of several passages in Ratnakirti’s work, in Patil 2009: 257–258, but we also find passages in which Ratnakirti seems to be endorsing the former option (cf., e.g., footnote 352, 252, 240). In those statements, he calls this external object the object of activity in the context of inference, and hence it must be a particular that becomes attainable through this means of valid cognition.}

In the passage currently under consideration, the \textit{vidhi} as external object is then explained as not being a particular that appears in a conceptual awareness, but as being a result of determination alone. And it is to this external object that the qualification \textit{atadrūpapa-rāvṛtta}, differentiated from that of another form, is applied. This should be noted as one way in which the \textit{anyāpohaviśiṣṭa} of the central definition in ll. 36–37 (§ 7) can be predicated of the \textit{vidhi}. Taking into account that this \textit{vidhi} is the one that is brought to awareness in the form of determination, a first main line of understanding the central definition comes into focus: an external object qualified by other-exclusion is the referent of words, speaking in terms of determination. In terms of appearance, it is the form that awareness has.

\textbf{5.3.3 Qualified by other-exclusion (anyāpohaviśiṣṭa)}

So, presupposing the above two sides of \textit{vidhi}, the positive element, what can be said about its quality, the exclusion from others?

As already analysed by Patil (2003: 231 ff.), exclusion is presented by Ratnakirti both as a quality of the positive element, and as a capacity of conceptual awareness.

That it is a quality (or property) of the positive element is clear from the definition \textit{anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthah} (ll. 36–37 in § 7).
In ll. 49–53 in § 8, grasping exclusion as a quality of the form of awareness is stated to be a capacity (śakti) that conceptual awareness has. These two aspects, being the qualifier of something and being a capacity, are presented alongside a comparison of two types of negation that can be brought to bear on perceptual as well as conceptual cognition of absence. The structure of the example is the following:

1. *prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*: grasping absence in a non-implicatively negating form.

While the perceptual grasping of an absence is a special case of perception, the conceptual grasping of absence is not a special case of conceptual cognition. For the object of conceptual cognition is always qualified by, or contains, *anyāpoha*, cf. section 5.3.1.

A useful general account of the terms *prasajya*- and *paryudāsapratि़sedha* is Staal 1962. Cardona 1967 discusses this distinction in the grammatical literature, where it probably originated. Cf. Kellner 1997a: 92, n. 135 for further literature on the topic. Yuichi Kajiyama (1998: 3 f.) draws attention to the fact that Mokşākaragupta, like Ratnakirti, uses the difference between the two types to differentiate types of *apoha*. Whether this is faithful to the actual development of the *apoha* theory is, however, not clear (see footnote 344). Here, *paryudāsa*- and *prasajyapratiṣedha* will be rendered as “implicative” and “non-implicative negation”, respectively, following Patil (2009). One way of making sense of this distinction is: “This is a non-red apple.”, which implies that the subject is an apple, and “This is not a red apple.”, not implying that the subject is an apple. The distinction between these two types of negation has also been employed in philosophical restatements of the *apoha* theory such that the two negations in “not a non-cow” would be analysed as non-implicative and implicative negation, respectively. The aim was to resolve the problem that the application of two negations of the same type would be redundant. See Siderits 2011 for the latest version of this theory, and Siderits 1986, Siderits 1999, and H. G. Herzberger 1975 for earlier formulations. Earlier claims that this theory was held by ancient Buddhist authors (Siderits 1999: 347 attributed it to Śāntarakṣita), have been softened, Siderits (2011: 295): “I know of no smoking gun that proves the apoha theorists modeled their ‘exclusion of the other’ on what happens when we combine two styles of negation. It does still strike me as plausible that they may have had some such idea in mind.” Recent studies on Śāntarakṣita’s usage of the two types of negation do not indicate that he used these types of negation to explain the double negation in *anyāpoha* (see Ishida 2011b and Okada 2017); its merit in saving this kind of nominalism has recently been discussed by Hale 2011: 260–262 and Gillon 2011.
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a) For perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*) this is the capacity to produce a concept of absence (*abhāvavikālapotpādanaśakti*), i.e., what is meant by “perception of non-x” is the capacity to produce the conceptual cognition “There is no x here.”

b) For the conceptual cognition of a positive element (*vīdhivikalpa*) this is the capacity of leading to activity in conformance with the grasped absence (*tadanurūpānusṭhānadānaśakti*), i.e., what is meant by “conceptual cognition of non-x” is the capacity that a conceptual cognition of the positive element has for making determinate activity directed at external objects possible.\(^{333}\)

2. *paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*: grasping absence in an implicatively negating form:

a) the awareness of something with a concrete form particular to it, *niyatasvarūpasamvedanam*, for both perception and the conceptual awareness of a positive element.

This comparison is not easy to make sense of.\(^{334}\) The following arguments support a schema as shown in table 5.3.

Before analysing the example, it will be helpful to review the scholarly discussions of its model in the AP 205,12–16, which is as follows:

\[
yathā vā vidhivṛttter agrahaṇam nāma prasajyapakṣe niyatārūpānubhāvād abhāvavikālapotpādanaśaktir eva, tathā vidhivikalpānām api tantre 'nurūpānusṭhānadānaśaktir
\]

\(^{333}\)The relevant example (l. 55) is that someone is told “Tether the cow!”, and tethers a cow, but not a horse. “Tether the cow!” generates a conceptual cognition of cow, which in turn is the awareness of the absence of non-cows that makes activity with regard to any cow possible. In the translation of this example, it is assumed that there is only one cow present, so that the “the”, without an actual Sanskrit equivalent, is justified.

\(^{334}\)It seems that both in Patil 2003: 232 and Patil 2009: 213 only the first part of the example (*prasajyarūpābhāvagrahaṇa*) is translated and discussed.
Table 5.3 – The cognition of absence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>prasajya</th>
<th>paryudāsa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>object of abhāvapratyakṣa</td>
<td>ghaṭābhāva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>object of vikalpa</td>
<td>agavāpoḍha (not non-cow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cognitive function</td>
<td>adhyāvasāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>classification</td>
<td>śakti</td>
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<td>bhūtala</td>
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<td></td>
<td>buddhyākara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>niyatasvarūpasamvedana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...eva nisedhagrahanam agnir mayā pratīta ity anuvyavasā-yapasasaṇaktiṣ ca. paryudāsapakṣe ca niyatasvarūpa-samvedanam evobhayatra nisedhagrahanam.

Or, as the non-grasping of an occurrence of a positive element is, on the position [that the negation in this non-grasping] is a non-implicative negation, simply the capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of an absence based on the [direct] experience of a [particular] having a well-defined form, so for conceptual cognitions of a positive element, too, the grasping of a negation is simply the capacity to bestow an incitement [to an activity] that conforms to a general norm, and the capacity to produce a determination conforming to [a statements like] “I perceive a fire.” And, on the position of implicative negation, the grasping of a negation is simply the apprehension of a well-defined, particular form in both cases.

The first translation and detailed scholarly discussion of this passage is found in Akamatsu 1983: 56–7, with its annotations.335 It

335 Additionally, Katsura (1986: 174) notes that the context in which this comparison appears in the AP is based on the discussion of the anupalabdhihetuḥ in the HB (HB 26,1 ff.). The reason he gives there is that Jñānasrīmitra cites a HB passage in the same context (cf. Katsura 1986: 174 and p. 180, n. 20, and footnote 91), apart from the fact that clearly the grasping of absence is a topic that would be discussed in the context of anupalabdhi.
corresponds largely to how the passage in the AS was interpreted above.

McCrea and Patil (2010: 55; 153, nn. 41,42) give a rather different interpretation of this passage. Whilst they also emphasize that Jñānaśrīmitra is here maintaining that the positive and negative elements of any verbal or inferential awareness are simultaneously known, their interpretations of the positive and negative elements, and of how the latter is linked to the two types of negation, diverge strongly from the earlier interpretation. Perhaps the basis for their interpretation is their slight emendation (against Thakur’s edition) at the end of the passage under discussion: instead of the single sentence “paryudāsapakṣe ca niyatasvarūpasamvedanam evabhayatra niṣedhagrahaṇam.” (AP 205,15–16), they read “paryudāsapakṣe ca niyatasvarūpasamvedanam eva. ubhayatra niṣedhagrahaṇam.” (McCrea and Patil 2010: 103; 174, n. 20) The main difference that arises from this concerns the interpretation of what ubhayatray refers to.

Akamatsu (1983: 57) takes the expression as referring to perception and conceptual cognition. The sentence then says that in both those cases the grasping of a negation, in the sense of an implicative negation, is the awareness of the present object’s own form. McCrea and Patil (2010: 55), however, translate: “And in the case of implicative negation, there is, of course, the awareness of a definite form (niyata-svarūpa). In both cases, there is the incorporation of negation.” The phrase “In both cases” refers, in all likelihood, to the cases of implicative and non-implicative negation (as ubhayam does in the following sentence, ubhayam caitad abhimatam śāstrakārasya. AP 205,16). If this were indeed what is meant, Jñānaśrīmitra would here be explaining that these two types of negation, commonly distinguished in Sanskrit literature of this genre, each contain a negation. This would be a somewhat redundant statement on Jñānaśrīmitra’s part, and one might want to consider other possibilities.

In an alternative understanding, “In both cases” might refer to two different types of conceptual cognition, that of present things and that of absent things. This interpretation rests on McCrea and
Patil 2010: 153, n. 42, where attention is drawn to the context, i.e.,
that Jñānaśrīmitra is here explaining why it seems to us that we
have “positive” and “negative” content in cognitions, in answer to
an earlier objection that all inferences would have the same type of
reason, anupalabdhihetu, McCrea and Patil 2010: 153, n. 42:

A conceptual awareness is considered to have positive
content when the activity pursued on the basis of it and
the reflective awareness that we form regarding it are
taken to involve a positive object. It is considered to have
negative content when the activity pursued on the basis
of it and the reflective awareness that we form regarding
it are taken to involve an absence.”

This interpretation seems possible, as far as the text of the AP
is concerned, and preferable in comparison to the redundant first
option.

However, Ratnakīrti’s reformulation of the passage would then be
very unfaithful: first, his reformulation clarifies that the comparison
is between perception and conceptual cognition, and not between “the
nonincorporation of the role of the positive entity” (McCrea and Patil
2010: 56) and conceptual cognition; second, the term ubhayor, the
equivalent to Jñānaśrī’s ubhayatra, here certainly refers to perception
and conceptual cognition, thus suggesting that the point is that, for
an implicative negation, the “incorporation of a negation” is “the
awareness of a definite form” (McCrea and Patil 2010: 56) in both
cases—perception and conceptual cognition. In light of Ratnakīrti’s
reformulation, we should therefore not emend as suggested by McCrea
and Patil 2010: 103; 174, n. 20, but rather construe Jñānaśrīmitra’s
sentence in line with Ratnakīrti’s reformulation and understand that,
both for non-apprehension and conceptual cognition, the grasping of
an absence in an implicative form consists in the direct awareness of
what appears to each of the cognitions.

If this interpretation of the model of Ratnakīrti’s passage is
accepted, we can focus fully on the two main problems that need to
be solved for Ratnakīrti’s presentation. They are as follows:
5.3. The referent of words

1. How is the absence in the two cases relevantly similar — how is it useful to compare the perceptually cognizable absence of a pot on a perceived stretch of floor with the conceptually cognizable absence of something’s not being that, i.e., its quality “the exclusion from others”?

2. What is the relationship between the non-implicative and implicative negation? Is each just possible, so that sometimes the one and at other times the other will have to be applied in the analysis of these cognitions, or are they somehow interdependent?

What seems clear is that the absence which is grasped both by perception and conceptual cognition can be grasped in two forms: as non-implicative and implicative negation, cognized by means of that which is present to each cognition, i.e., an empty piece of floor or the form of awareness.³³⁶ In the case of conceptual cognition, the absence which is so cognized is anyāpoha, exclusion from others, e.g., non-cows. In the case of perception, it is the non-existence of something in a specific, perceptually cognized place, e.g., on a stretch of floor here and now.

There seem to be two ways of interpreting these statements: either both forms of negation can occur or both must occur so that a perceptual and conceptual cognition of absence is such a cognition of absence.³³⁷ Here the latter option will be argued for: both in a perception of absence and in conceptual awareness, which always

³³⁶ The absence of the pot in some place is the standard example of non-perception, used, e.g., in HB 28,16–17, as well as in § 13. That it is the form of awareness, buddhyākāra, that is present in conceptual awareness, is apparent from the argument that a form of awareness is not affirmed or negated because of being comprehended through self-awareness, l. 278 in 48.

³³⁷ This grasping of absence should not be confused with a full cognition of absence. The latter is a conceptual cognition that follows a perception. It has a particular negated object, while the perception preceding it has the potential to generate a myriad of such conceptual judgements. It is this perception that Ratnakirti is using in his comparison to conceptual cognition. The reason that Ratnakirti can view a conceptual cognition as a case of “grasping absence” and so assign it the same potential as the perception of an empty surface, is that it is, essentially, a
has other-exclusion (*anyāpoha*, cf. section 5.3.1) as its object and thus involves the grasping of an absence, a dual absence, one in the non-implicatively negating form and the other in the implicatively negating form, is involved.

In the perception of an empty floor, for example, the absence (*abhāva*) of all things which are not on the floor becomes known in a non-implicatively, or absolutely, negating way. It is not actually all things that are cognized as absent (which would require a judgement like “There is no pot, no cloth, no chair, ...here on the floor.”), but the absence itself of all these things (so that any judgement like “There is no pot here on the floor.” or “There is no chair here on the floor” becomes possible). Correspondingly, in the conceptual awareness “cow”, the non-implicatively negating absence (*abhāva*) of all things that are not cows is cognized through the appearing form of awareness (*ākāra*). In both cases this is a non-implicative negation, i.e., a negation that, upon perception, can potentially be expressed as “It is not the case that anything is here on the floor.”, and, upon its conceptual cognition, can lead to activity directed towards anything of which it is true that it is not a non-cow: in the case of the perception of the empty floor, this grasping of a non-implicative absence or negative constituent, which explains the adjective “empty” (i.e., the absence of a pot on the floor, *bhūtalaghatābhāva*, mentioned in § 13), is analysed only as a capacity to generate a conceptual cognition of absence: “There is no pot, chair, etc. on the floor.” In the case of conceptual cognition, the grasping of a non-implicatively negating element, the *anyāpoha*, becomes apparent only in the cognition’s capacity to lead

self-perception of awareness with an indistinct image.

For a careful examination of a cognition of absence, as described in HB 30,13–31,2, see McCrea and Patil 2006: 322–324. For critical editions of Jñānaśrīmitra’s main texts on the subject, the *Anupalabdhirahasya* and the *Sarvaśabdābhāvacarca*, see Kellner 2007. Kellner 1997b discusses the difference between Dharmottara’s and Jñānaśrīmitra’s positions on how inference and perception are involved in a cognition of absence.
5.3. The referent of words

to an act with regard to what is in accordance with this negation, for example, any cow.\footnote{Actually, it depends somewhat on the situation: the speaker could be referring to a particular cow that she wishes to be tethered. In that case, the proper other-exclusion would be “what is not not that cow”, instead of “what is not a non-cow.”}

According to Ratnakīrti’s comparison, one also grasps an absence in the form of an implicative negation. The result of this is the same for perception and conceptual cognition: the awareness of something with its own fixed form, \textit{niyatasvarūpasamvedana}, meaning a particular. In the case of the perception of an absence, the awareness of absence is identical with the awareness of the presence of another thing: the potential to conceptually cognize absence of a certain object, or anything, is precisely the perception of the floor. It is implicative negation or absence in that it is the affirmation or presence of some other positive thing, in this case a particular piece of floor. In the case of conceptual cognition, which always has absence or the exclusion from others as its object, it is the \textit{buddhyākāra} that is qualified by absence in an implicatively negating manner, the form of awareness which is a particular that is present in any given awareness event.

The absence in a non-implicatively negating form is determined, and the absence in an implicatively negating form is grasped — both in the perception of absence and in conceptual awareness. For it is a particular that is manifest and grasped in perceptual awareness,\footnote{About this there is no dispute, so it is not expressly proven. This seems to be the argument in ll. 91 f., § 15.} and it is a form of awareness that is directly manifest and grasped in conceptual awareness.\footnote{This is implied in the argument given in l. 278: there is no activity with regard to the form of awareness, because it is known through the form of perception that is self-awareness. This presupposes that Ratnakīrti held a notion of self-awareness very similar to that described in Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 47: self-awareness is “[a kind of] indeterminate knowledge free from fictional constructs and unerring ....”} The latter is one of the two aspects of the \textit{vidhi} in the definition of the word referent from the side of determination. However, it is a particular that is determined in perception, and thus makes activity possible with regard to it (one
activity being the formation of the concept “No pot here.”),341 and it is an external object, likewise a particular, that is determined on the grounds of the appearing form of awareness in the case of conceptual cognition. The latter is the second aspect of the *vidhi* in Ratnakīrti’s definition of the word referent.

Consequently, the exclusion from others that qualifies the positive or affirmative element is

1. a quality that the form of awareness has (insofar as this form is directly perceived, it is perceived with all its attributes, including this absential qualifier), and

2. the capacity that this state of awareness has (because it has a form with that quality) to make activity that accords to expectation possible.

This interpretation thus suggests that, for Ratnakīrti, it is primarily an ontological, and not an epistemological, affair to say that the positive element has the quality “exclusion”. A form of awareness, a particular, is qualified by *anyāpoha* just like any other particular would be qualified by it. Exclusion is literally a quality of such an image: the exclusion shared by the class of cows, that is, by all particular point-instants of every continuum that constitutes a cow, is the same as that which any cognitive form has that can be classified as constituting a cognition of “cow”. It is thus not, or at least not primarily, a form of presentation of something, or a matter of knowing something, that Ratnakīrti is here concerned with.

This makes it possible for Ratnakīrti to maintain that the reason one cognizes the (conventionally correct) exclusion when a word is understood is that that word has been learned as referring to something, a certain cow particular or set thereof, insofar as it or

341 The question of what is determined in perception is answered differently in Patil 2009; there, it is a commonness as a “genericized-particular” (Patil 2009: 259, n. 32) that is determined by perception. This interpretation will be discussed below, section 5.4. Briefly, Ratnakīrti considers determination to be a non-representing state of awareness; its object is a “particular as such”, a particular that is not directly presented with its specific place, time, or shape, but only indirectly through its exclusions. It is thus a future particular, much like Prajñākaragupta held it to be (see Kobayashi 2011, McAllister forthcoming a).
they are differentiated from non-cows (cf. § 8). Ratnakīrti wants us to believe that, on hearing two particular instances of words, like “cow” and “cow”, we are disposed to judge that they mean the same, just as looking at the same stretch of floor at two different times each time disposes us to say “The floor is empty.” The identity of “the same” judgements is nothing but the fact that they each dispose a person to endorse each of them as expressing the same state of affairs. And they dispose a person to such a judgement not because of what they are known to show, but because of the quality that they have. On Ratnakīrti’s explanation, this way of founding reference does not present more problems than the opponent’s foundation of reference on a substantially existing universal. For in that case too, the word referent is supposed to be a specific universal, not a particular or a universal as such (one that is not cow-hood, horse-hood, etc.). The particular is not general enough for a convention regarding it to be of any use, and so the criticism against the apoha theory on these grounds would equally apply to the opponent; the universal as such is not useful either: that cow-hood qualifies a lump of matter means, for the opponent, that that material entity is a cow, but not that it is a universal as such or a concrete universal like “cow-hood”. For Ratnakīrti, a universal cannot be known wholly independently of any instantiation.

The question remains of how Ratnakīrti’s definition of the referent of a word as “positive element characterized by the exclusion of others” should be understood as a whole. It is with regard to the relation of the positive and negative aspect involved in this definition that the above differentiation between the capacity aspect and the quality aspect of “exclusion from others” comes into meaningful perspective.

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342Cf. § 12. The point of the arguments given there is to show that anyāpoha does not lead to any worse logical problems than the assumption of a really existing universal.

343The present author was unable to find passages in Ratnakīrti’s work where universals that cannot be instantiated are discussed. It is unclear whether Ratnakīrti (or his opponents) thought this might be possible.
5. The apoha theory in Ratnakīrti’s Apohasiddhi

5.3.4 Relation between anyāpoha and vidhi

A distinctive feature of Jñānaśrīmitra’s and Ratnakīrti’s version of the apoha theory is the stress they lay on the simultaneous cognition of the two parts of the word referent, exclusion and the positive or affirmative element.344

ll. 43–49 in § 8:

Therefore a cognition of a cow is called the cognition of that excluded from others. And even if the non-representation of the words “excluded from others” [in conceptual cognition] has been maintained, nevertheless there is no non-cognition at all of other-exclusion, which is the qualifier, because the word “cow” is founded only on that excluded from non-cow. As the appearance of blue is unavoidable at that time when there is the cognition of a water lily that is blue because of the word “indīvara” which is founded on a blue water lily, so also the appearance of the exclusion of non-cow is unavoidable, because it is a qualifier, in the same moment as there is the cognition of a cow from the word “cow” which is founded on that excluded from non-cow.

From this passage it follows that the cognition “cow” is equivalent to the cognition of that excluded from non-cows. In other words, the positive element, vidhi, is that excluded from others, anyāpodha, due to having exclusion, anyāpoha, as its qualifier. The example illustrates that the cognition of “indīvara” is impossible without

344 This is also the central point of the critique of the affirmationist and negationist positions (vidhi- and pratīṣedhavādin positions) in this passage. This distinction made by Ratnakīrti has been an important factor in assessing the apoha theory’s development. The main secondary literature on how to understand this aspect is: Mookerjee 1935: 132 ff., Yuichi Kajiyama 1998: 125, n. 338, Akamatsu 1986, Katsura 1986, Siderits 1986, Patil 2003: 230 f., and—given the similarity of the As to Jñānaśrīmitra’s AP—also McCrea and Patil 2006. More recently, Okada 2017 has examined Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation and concluded that this distinction has its roots already in this early commentator’s work.
the qualifier “blue” being cognized in the same moment as “water lily”.\footnote{As mentioned in footnote 89, the Sanskrit word “indīvara” is not composed of parts that would correspond to “blue” and “water lily”.} This means that what can be understood as the *vidhi*’s quality, exclusion from others, is essential to it in the sense that it cannot be grasped or cognized without it. Understanding the word “cow” is simultaneous to, and cognitively not separable from, understanding “not non-cow.”

This analysis leads to the following question: given that the positive element is both present in the mode of appearance and determination (cf. section 5.3.2.1, section 5.4), is its qualifier, the exclusion from others, also present in both modes?\footnote{This is not supported in the place where a direct clarification could have been given by Ratnakīrti, l. 93 ff., § 15: “And by the word “positive element” an external object that is distinguished from that of another nature is meant according to determination, and according to manifestation a form of awareness [is meant].” Here Ratnakīrti qualifies only the determined aspect of the positive element, the external object, as distinguished from that of another nature, but not the form of awareness. On the other hand, if it were not the case that differentiation from others would qualify the form of awareness also, it would be hard to see how Ratnakīrti separates his view from that of the affirmationists (*vidhivādin*), who take the positive element as the primary element, at least temporally speaking. Cf. Akamatsu 1986 for a description of their view.} Against the background of the arguments above (section 5.3.3), this should be affirmed. Ratnakīrti unambiguously states, in § 15, that, in the context of determination, the term “positive element” refers to an external object that is differentiated from others, and that, in the context of direct appearance, the term refers to the form of awareness. Accordingly, the main constituents of the “complex entity” (Patil 2003: 230) that is the referent of words, the *anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ*, might be analysed as follows: any conceptual awareness event can be analysed as possessing a positive element which is qualified by exclusion, and it can be so analysed in two respects, according to whether it is regarded as directly perceived by self-awareness or whether it is regarded as determined. Both the positive and the negative elements (the exclusion) are present in each of these modes.
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of awareness; in the perceptual apprehension of the conceptual state that this awareness has, the form of cognition is the positive element and its quality, the exclusion of what is different from it (including other images), is its property. In the determination of this image, that is to say, in the potential for generating useful activity that this conceptual state has, an external object, the positive element, can be distinguished from its quality, the exclusion of other things (including other external objects). In each case, furthermore, the positive element is so called because it is known positively, in the sense of an implicative negation (paryudāsa), whereas its quality is known wholly negatively, in the sense of a non-implicative negation. The result of this is that the quality “other exclusion” is primarily present as the capacity that a conceptual awareness event has to generate other awareness events (some of which will produce everyday activities visible to others) which will be able to avoid the group of things so excluded.

The statement above that this complex object is “present in each of these modes of awareness” can now be refined so as to avoid a misunderstanding: the fundamental way in which one is aware of anything is through self-awareness, i.e., the awareness even of a conceptual awareness state is a perception of awareness by itself. We must thus conclude that “determination” is not an irreducible type of awareness state.\textsuperscript{347} A conceptual cognition, in other words, must be analysed as a particular case of self-awareness. The connection between determination and appearance will be more fully examined below (section 5.4). Here, one should note that Ratnakīrti has divided the phenomenal and the causal aspects of conceptual cognitions very neatly: just like an external object is (for a Buddhist epistemologist like Ratnakīrti) differentiated from everything else, so the form of awareness is too. It is simply a particular. What it shows or what we might judge it to represent, the vidhi, is functional for Ratnakīrti’s

\textsuperscript{347} We shall see below (page 253) that, in effect, the only true distinction between conceptual and perceptual awareness events lies in the distinctness of the images that they have.
5.3. The referent of words

theory of conceptual cognition only due to one of its qualities, other-
exclusion, not due to its content. The similarity that the apoha theory
aims to explain as the exclusion of everything that is something
else, is “present” only as the capacity to direct subsequent activity
in such a way as to correspond to particulars that are likewise so
differentiated. It is not present in any meaningful way of “to know.”

What it represents is not the question, though it might satisfy the
common (apparently even at Ratnakīrti’s time) assumption that some
kind of sameness or similarity is actually apparent in many, and all
conceptual, cognitions.

Furthermore, the implicative and non-implicative types of nega-
tion must be known simultaneously: this is the whole point of § 8,
where it is stated that a quality (here, exclusion) and that qualified
by it (the positive element, either the external object or the internal
appearance) must be apprehended in one cognition. It is somewhat
less obvious whether the characterization, made above, of appearance
and determination pertaining to the same awareness event that
follows the perception of a word, can be correct: the simultaneity of
perception and determination would seem to blatantly contradict
the difference between perceptions and conceptual cognitions that
is central to the Buddhist logico-epistemological school’s tenet that
there are two, and only two, means of valid cognition, perception and
inference. Indeed, there is at least one passage in which Ratnakīrti
argues against the simultaneity of conceptual and non-conceptual
cognition, SJS 24,5–7:

\[
\text{nanu vakṛtvam virudhyata eva sarvaviṣayanirvikalpa-
jñānaviruddhavikalpakāryatvād vakṛtvasya. naitad yu-
ktam, savikalpāvikalpayor yugapad avṛtter vikalpatvena
sarvajñāsyaśāvirodhāt.}
\]

[Opponent:] Is it not so that the fact that [an omniscient
being] speaks is actually contradicted [by what you have

\[348\]

This is the problem at the core of the discussion in §§ 51–52. Ratnakīrti’s
solution is built on the causal continuity that runs from previously experienced
particulars through particular cognitions to future particulars.
The apoha theory in Ratnakīrti’s Apohasiddhi

said], because to be a speaker is the result of a conceptual cognition, which contradicts [this omniscient being’s] non-conceptual cognition of all objects? [Proponent:] This is not correct, because, since conceptual and non-conceptual cognition do not occur simultaneously, an omniscient being is not contradictory to there being a conceptual cognition.349

This is a response to the charge that an omniscient being, as defined by the Buddhists, could not speak, since speech is the effect of conceptual cognition but omniscience is a non-conceptual cognition. Ratnakīrti’s answer must be taken seriously. However, it does not make the analysis presented here impossible.

On the one hand, if the impossibility of a simultaneous conceptual and non-conceptual cognition were his final position, it would contradict the principal position that any moment of awareness is based on the perception of a form of cognition. I.e., since conceptual cognitions have forms (sākāra), and these forms are perceived by a perception of the type self-awareness, it follows that conceptual cognitions must be perceptions, albeit internal ones. If so, one would have to interpret Ratnakīrti’s argument as saying that the perception of external things, but not that of the form of awareness by awareness itself, is never simultaneous with conceptual cognition. This interpretation would also accord with Ratnakīrti’s arguments about the “distinct” and “indistinct” forms of awareness that differentiate perceptual and conceptual awareness events in §§ 17–20.

On the other hand, one should consider that Ratnakīrti also gives a second answer to the opponent’s objection, based on an argument by Prajñākaragupta.350 This answer is based on the possibility of habituated concept usage, which involves concepts only during the formation of a habit, but not when these habits are exercised. It is possible that this is the explanatory model preferred by Ratnakīrti,

350 This alternative answer is found in SJS 25,11–20, see Bühnemann 1980: 72 ff. for a German translation.
5.4 Two modes of awareness

though this is not examined in much detail by Bühnemann (1980). She notes only that Ratnakīrti presents different answers, and that the first one, that conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions are not contradictory because they do not occur simultaneously, is the one he endorses.351

We may thus conclude that the perception of the type self-awareness and conceptual cognition are, and indeed must be, simultaneous, given Ratnakīrti’s arguments in § 8 and his general theory that awareness always really possesses a form (sākāra). The “positive element” (vidhi) and the exclusion (apoha) which qualifies it are, equally, cognized at the same moment in a conceptual cognition. They are known in the forms of an implicative and non-implicative negation, respectively. A conceptual cognition can therefore be analysed as consisting of a self-perception of an indistinct form that awareness has, and the potential in this self-awareness to generate activity consistent with the form that appears. A conceptual cognition is thus an ephemeral phenomenon, the particular state of a self-perception of awareness in which it has an indistinct form. Other-exclusion, on this interpretation, is nothing but the causal potential that qualifies the perception of an indistinct form of awareness. Just as the perception of an empty stretch of floor potentially includes a practically infinite amount of explicit negations (one for every thing that is not on that stretch of floor) without a concrete awareness of all these things that are negated, so the self-perception by awareness of its own indistinct form potentially negates all things that are not perceived there.

5.4 TWO MODES OF AWARENESS: PRATIBHĀSA AND ADHYAVASĀYA

In describing the complex object that is the word referent (cf. § 15, § 48), Ratnakīrti distinguishes the appearance and determination of that

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351“Nach Ratnakīrti besteht zwischen vorstellender und vorstellungsfreier Erkenntnis kein Widerspuch, weil beide nicht gleichzeitig vorkommen.” Bühnemann 1980: xiv
complex object. Some comments on this distinction are necessary in order to gain a clearer picture of Ratnakīrti’s general idea of cognition, its structure, and the place of verbal or conceptual cognition within that structure. The analysis of cognitions in terms of appearance and determination is, furthermore, one that is repeatedly used by Ratnakīrti, and a good understanding of it will help in exploring his other texts.352

Patil (2009: Chapter 5) has provided the most extensive analysis of this matter. The basic interpretation developed by Patil (2009: 250–299) is that for Ratnakīrti each type of cognition, pratyakṣa and vikalpa, has two kinds of object: a direct object, grasped in virtue of directly appearing (pratibhāsa) to either perceptual or conceptual awareness, and an indirect one, known to perceptual or conceptual awareness by virtue of determination (adhyavasāya). Patil (2009: 253) summarizes this:

There are, therefore, three pairs of concepts that are used to classify the contents of awareness: “perceptual” or “inferential/verbal,” which indicate the kind of awareness-event in which a particular object/image appears; “manifest” or “determined,” which indicate the way in which it appears; and “particular” or “universal,” which indicate (in retrospect) what appears.

His analysis then goes on to show how the direct and indirect objects of perception and conceptual awareness are related to these

352 See, for example, SJS 20,11–14: āgamānumānayor dvividho visayah grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. tatra grāhyāḥ svākārah, adhyavaseyas tu pāramārthikavastusvalakṣanātmā. asya ca parokṣatve 'numānasāmagrīśaṁbhave 'numānaviṣayatvam, pratyakṣasāmagrīśambhave ca kramena pratyakṣaviṣayatvam dṛṣṭam eva. (Both scriptural tradition and inference have a twofold object, grasped and determined. Amongst these, the grasped [object] is the form [of awareness] itself, but the determined [object] has the nature of a particular, an ultimately real thing. And if this [object] is beyond the senses, then it is considered the object of inference if the complete causal complex of inference comes about; but if the complete causal complex of perception comes about, it is considered the object of perception.); KBhSA 73,20: dvividho hi pratyakṣasasya visayah, grāhyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. (For perception has a twofold object, grasped and determined.), as well as CAPV 131,4–5 (see page 252).
5.4. Two modes of awareness

concepts, resulting in the scheme shown in table 5.4: perception grasps, or directly knows, a particular, and determines, or indirectly knows, a universal; conceptual cognition grasps a universal and determines a particular. He thus differentiates four objects: perception has a “manifest particular” and “determined universal” as its objects, and conceptual cognition has a “manifest universal” and a “determined particular” (Patil 2009: 252–253).

In the further discussion by Patil (2009: 253–288) it becomes apparent that this interpretation entails positions that are at odds with the usual ontological categories as Dharmakīrti uses them. The result of this understanding is that, as Patil (2009: 279) puts it, ...for Ratnakīrti, particulars and universals are defined relative to one another—there is no object that is in and of itself either a “particular” or a “universal.” The image that appears in the first stage of the perceptual process is not a “grasped object of perception” because it is a particular, rather it is a “particular” because it is the grasped object of perception. In the same way, the image that appears in the first stage of the inferential process is not a “grasped object of inference” because it is a universal, but rather it is a “universal” because it is the grasped object of inference. Objects/images are labelled as “particulars” or “universals” only in relation to a subsequent determination. Thus for Ratnakīrti “particular” and “universal” are not really ontological categories at all. Instead, they are defined contextually.

Two points are made here that will be important to the analysis given below: the first is about ontology, namely that the “determined particular” of conceptual cognition is not the particular that is defined by having causal efficacy, and that the “manifest universal” is not the universal that is defined by the lack of that efficacy. This constitutes a clear break from Dharmakīrti’s fundamental differentiation between these two kinds of entities. 353 The second point, which concerns the

353See PV III 1–3, recently translated and interpreted in Franco and Notake 2014.
logic of determination and therefore an epistemological matter, is that these two objects are categorized as they are due to a subsequent determination. The interpretation that will be proposed here differs in these two points: first, determination, at least in the context of conceptual cognitions, cannot be factually and temporally separate from the grasping, though it can be separated analytically; second, “particular” and “universal” are primarily ontological categories for Ratnakīrti, and he employs them in general accordance with Dharmakīrti’s notions throughout his works. Anything he calls a “particular” is a particular insofar as it is a point-instant resulting from an immediately preceding particular and possesses the capacity to cause a new one. Universals can be reduced to relation properties that characterize such particulars, and as such they lack causal capacity (cf. section 5.3.3).

Ratnakīrti’s various statements about the two kinds of cognition, perception and conceptual cognition, and their objects are not, at first sight, easy to align with each other. A problem might arise, for example, if the following statements from the VyN and the KBhSA are read alongside each other:

VyN 8*,12–15 (VyN2 109,14–18): *yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate, tad grāhyam. yatra tu yataḥ*\(^\text{354}\) pravartate, *tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇam grā-ḥyam, adhyavaseyam tu sāmānyam atadrūpaparāvṛtta-svalakṣaṇamātṛātmakam. anumānasya tu viparyayaḥ.*

For, what appears in some cognition, that is what is to be grasped. But with regard to which [someone] acts because of some [cognition], that is what is to be determined. Amongst these [two objects], for perception it is a particular that is to be grasped. But what is to be determined is a universal, having the nature of a mere

\(^{354}\)Read *yataḥ* acc. to VyN 8*,13, against Thakur’s emendation to *tat* VyN2 109,16.
Table 5.4 – Four objects (O_{1-4}) of awareness. (Page numbers refer to Patil 2009.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>O₁</th>
<th>O₂</th>
<th>O₃</th>
<th>O₄</th>
<th>comment/quote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>grāhya (by pratibhāsa)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“...directly grasped (grāhya) by awareness.” (p. 251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adhyavaseya (by adhya-vasāya)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“similarity class”, “constructed through exclusion” (p. 251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svalaśaṇa</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“...O₁ is a manifest particular and O₄ a determined particular.” (p. 252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sāmānya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>“…O₂ is a determined universal and O₃ a manifest universal.” (p. 252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mental images (ākāra)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Both direct and indirect objects can also be understood as mental objects/images ....” (p. 252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ultimately real</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“…under the most rigorous philosophical description, only objects like O₁ really exist.”(p. 253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ultimately unreal</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“In the final analysis, …objects like O₂,O₃,O₄ [do not] really exist.” (p. 253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nirvikalpa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Object O₁ “...is the only object ...not necessarily associated with some form of mental construction (vikalpa).” (p. 253f.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>savikalpa</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>associated with vikalpa (consequence of previous item)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viśayikṛta</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“...objects that appear to us as though we can act upon them (O₂/O₄) ...” (p. 256); cf. also p. 265–266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bahis</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O₂ as external is “...an externally projected mental image that only appears to be independent of us.” (p. 264); “O₄e is just the external projection of O₄.” (p. 281)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. The *apoha* theory in Ratnakīrti’s *Apohasiddhi*

Table 5.5 – Objects of *pratyakṣa* and *vikalpa*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of awareness</th>
<th>Obj. of perception</th>
<th>Obj. of conc. cognition</th>
<th>Ontological status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>grahaṇa</em></td>
<td><em>svalakṣaṇa</em></td>
<td><em>svākāra</em></td>
<td><em>svalakṣaṇa</em> (present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>adhyavasāya</em></td>
<td><em>vastumātra</em></td>
<td><em>bāhyo ‘ṛthah</em></td>
<td><em>svalakṣaṇa</em> (future)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

particular that is excluded from that of another form. But for inference the opposite is [the case].\(^{355}\)

Apparently Ratnakīrti here claims that perception and inference have the same kinds of objects, but in inverse modes of awareness. This passage, taken by itself, would thus mean that perception’s grasped object, a particular, is the same as the determined object in inference, i.e., a particular, and the determined object of perception is the same commonness or universal\(^{356}\) that is grasped in an inference.

On the same topic, Ratnakīrti has the following to say in KBhSA 73,8–17:

\[ yac ca grhyate yac cādhyavasīyate te dve ’py anyaniivrtti, na vastunī, svalakṣaṇāvagāhitve ’bhīlaḥpasaṃsargānu- papatter iti cet, na, adhyavasāyasvarūpāparijñānāt. \(^{357}\)\]


\(^{356}\) As pointed out by Patil (2009: 259), this universal’s characterization, *atadrūpa-parāvrittasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam*, is importantly reminiscent of what words have as their objects: *adhyavasātātadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātraṇakam* (l. 306 in § 54).

\(^{357}\) Cf. the close parallel of this passage in SJS 10,26–28, where it is part of a quote from NK (see Bühnemann 1980: p. 113, n. 174). Within that quote, it is an objection by a Buddhist opponent, and the corresponding passage in NVṬṬ 444,22,
5.4. Two modes of awareness

agrīhte 'pi vastuni mānasādipraṇvttikārakatvam\textsuperscript{358} vi-
kalpasyādhyāvasāyitvam. apratibhāse 'pi pravṛttivisayī-
kṛtatvam\textsuperscript{359} adhyāvasayatvatvam. etac cādhyāvasayatvam
svaḷaśaṇasyaiva yuyate, nānyasya, arthakriyārthitvād
arthipraṇvttēḥ. evaṃ cādhyāvasāye svalaśaṇasyāśphu-
ram eva.

[Opponent:] But both that which is grasped and that
which is determined, all two, are negations of others, but
not real things, because a connection with a designation
is not possible when [a cognition] is fully immersed in
the particular.

[Proponent:] No, [that is not the case], because the nature
of determination was not fully understood [by you]. For
conceptual cognition, to determine [that real thing] is
to produce an activity, like mental [activity] and so on,
towards [that] real thing, even though it is not grasped
[by the conceptual cognition]. To be made the object
of activity, even though there is no appearance [of the
real thing the activity is directed at], is what it is [for
that thing] to be [the object] determined [by conceptual
cognition]. And this fact of being what is determined
is coherent only for the particular, [and] nothing else,
because someone with an aim acts due to having a causal
efficiency [of a real thing] as an aim. And in this way
there is absolutely no appearance of a particular in a
determination [of it].

This passage says that the object of determination is most defi-
nitely the particular. That is, it flatly contradicts one point of the

\textsuperscript{358}Corrected against mānasyādi° acc. to Woo 1999: 72.

\textsuperscript{359}Patil 2009: 257, n. 23 and Patil 2003: 247, n. 17 both read pravṛttivisayīkṛtatvam
instead of pravṛttivisayīkṛtatvam. This is probably only a typo, since neither
RNĀ\textsubscript{73,10} nor Woo 1999: 72 note any variants to pravṛttivisayīkṛtatvam, which is
also what RNĀ\textsubscript{ms 40b3} supports.
passage from the VyN (page 238), namely that perception determines a universal. In order to avoid the assumption that Ratnakīrti, a meticulous logician, trapped himself in a self-contradiction with these two passages, we will have to revise our understanding of sāmānya in the VyN passage (page 238). The following arguments should show that, in fact, the determined object is a particular as well.

Note, first of all, that the attribute that Ratnakīrti adds to sāmānya in VyN 8*,14–15 passage (page 238), that it has “the nature of a mere particular that is excluded from that of another form”, can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, it could mean that, as Patil (2009: 251, n. 7) takes it, “the determined object is a universal, i.e., a genericized-particular excluded from those that do not have its form”, an interpretation that underlines the generic or universal aspect so much that the particular is not a particular in the strict sense of the point-instant any more. On the other hand, it could mean that what is here stated to be a universal is really (“has the nature of”) a particular, a particular that has said exclusion as its attribute; this is how it is understood by Lasic (2000b: 64).

In order to decide between these options, two things should be considered: first, the model passage in VC 13,6–8 has no equivalent for the phrase “atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātrātmaka”, containing only the noun “sāmānya”. So Ratnakīrti added something here on purpose. Second, Jñānaśrīmitra adds the following sentence in VC 13*6–8:

\[
\text{tatra sādhanapratyākṣaṃ tadaivārthakriyārthinaḥ kṣanāvīkṣaṇe 'pi santānāpekṣayā sāmānyaviṣayam.}
\]

There, [amongst inference and perception], the perception of what accomplishes [a goal] has, with respect to the continuum, a universal as its [determined] object, even

\[\text{360The latter translates: "...das Bestimmte aber eine Gemeinsamkeit, die wesentlich nichts als das Individuelle ist, insofern es von anderen (Individuellen), die nicht seine Form haben, ausgeschlossen ist." (Lasic 2000b: 64) One could paraphrase the point in English: "For perception the determined object is a universal that is, essentially, nothing but a particular insofar as this particular is excluded from the other particulars that do not have its form."}\]
though someone aiming for the achievement of a goal sees, at that exact time [of the perception], only a momentary phase [of the continuum].\(^{361}\)

With this statement the “universal” determined by perception is unambiguously equated to a continuum of point-instants that constitutes the “object” of everyday activities. Insofar as this generalization from a single phase to a continuum of phases is not essentially different from the generalization from one particular to a class of particulars,\(^{362}\) the use of the term “sāmānya” without further qualification is, of course, perfectly justified.

The universal is then analysed by Jñānaśrīmitra as a group of particulars in the same context, VC 13\(^*\)15–20:

\[
na ca sāmānyam nāma kim cid anyad eva. kim tu svalakṣaṇāny eva parasparam avivecitabhedāni sāmānyam ucyante. bhedavivecane tu pratyekam svalakṣaṇam iti svāsabdenaiva vyavahāraḥ.
\]

But there is actually nothing else[, apart from the particulars,] called a universal. Rather, the particulars as such, [insofar as] their mutual differences are not distinguished, are called a universal. But when [these mutual] differences are distinguished, each is individually a particular, [called svalakṣana]. So there is an everyday treatment [of these particulars] just through the word “sva”\(^{363}\).

\(^{361}\) See the German translation by Lasic (2000a: 95): “Dabei hat die Wahrnehmung eines Mittels [zur Zweckerfüllung] (sādhanapratyakṣa), obwohl der, der auf eine Zweckerfüllung abzielt, zu eben dieser Zeit (nur) eine Phase sieht, mit Rücksicht auf das Kontinuum eine Gemeinsamkeit zum Objekt.”


\(^{363}\) See Lasic 2000a: 96 for a German translation, which differs slightly in the interpretation of the force of the negation in the first sentence, understanding that the so-called commonness is nothing else at all (“Und die sogenannte Gemeinsamkeit ist ja überhaupt nichts anderes.”). Though Lasic (2000a: 96) does not specify what the universal is different from, the context suggests that it must be the particulars.
In the light of this position, there is no reason not to assume that Ratnakīrti supplied the adjective “atadrūpaparāvṛttasvalakṣanamā-trātmaka” so as to guard against a misunderstanding of the term “sāmānya” in a sense other than the one intended by Jñānaśrīmitra in the corresponding passage of the VC, i.e., as a mere group of particulars. The notion of a universal as a group of particulars can be applied to various useful types of such groups: a group of one or more particulars would be the least coherent group, with nothing but the decision to place the particulars in a group connecting them; a stronger connection would be found in the notion of a santāna, a group of particulars that is seen in the links of a cause-effect chain, where each particular is the effect of the previous link and the cause of the next; more complex groups could be construed by defining a group of such groups, such as when a herd of cows, or even the group

---

364 Patil (2009: 215, n. 44) characterizes a universal as a “collection”, and analyses the positive object subsequently in terms of such a collection, Patil 2009: 236:

It is this nonspecific collection that is mistakenly taken by some to be a real universal, and is unconsciously associated with a group of particulars in which it is mistakenly thought to be instantiated. According to Ratnakīrti, this object is a positive entity that is neither a real particular nor a real universal. It is a thing-in-general that is constructed through its essential characteristic, exclusion, and is determined to be equivalent to semantic value. According to Ratnakīrti, it is this complex positive entity that best describes what is understood from hearing a token utterance of a term.

The main difference in interpretation is that, on the understanding developed here, Ratnakīrti would not agree that “this object is a positive entity that is neither a real particular nor a real universal.” (Patil 2009: 236) The positive entity has to be either a concrete (but indistinct, “nonspecific”) mental image or an external particular. As such, it would indeed not be a real universal. In both variants, however, it would be a real particular, though in the former case not one that common activity would be directed at and in the latter case not one that could appear in conceptual cognition. The “collection” thus has to be taken in a purely extensional sense (cf. the comments in Patil 2009: 215, n. 44). Though not directly present to awareness, it is present to the extent that the activity of a rational agent will be directed at it, so that one of its elements can become the object satisfying the agent’s expectation.
of all cows, is defined as all the momentary particulars that each belong to a santāna that we would be prepared to classify as a cow.

For inference, the determined and grasped object is opposite to the case of perception. That this is meant literally is evident from Jñānaśrīmitra’s characterization of the objects of inference at VC 14*7–9:

\[
\text{tatṛānumāne tāvad vastuno 'pratibhāsād adhyavaseyam eva svalakṣaṇam. grāhyas tu svākārah. evamvīḍham nirloṭhitam asmābhir apohaprakaraṇe iti na prastūyate.}
\]

To begin with, for inference there [amongst all kinds of cognitions], the particular is only what is determined, since there is no appearance of a real thing [in an inference]. But what is grasped is the form [of this cognition] itself. We have explained this fully in such a manner in the Apohaprakaraṇa, so it will not be discussed [here].\textsuperscript{365}

This passage equates the grasped object of inference with the form that awareness itself has in the inferential cognition. In the description of perception above (page 238 and page 243), the corresponding object, but as determined by perception, was analysed as a certain group of particulars (the type santāna). We will thus have to conclude from Ratnakīrti’s statement that “for inference it is the opposite” (see page 238), that these are two equally valid ways of addressing this object: the group of particulars that perception determines can be called the form of awareness that an inferential cognition directly grasps.\textsuperscript{366}

\textsuperscript{365} In his translation of this passage, Lasic (2000a: 97, n. 56) says that this is a reference to AP 225,12–230,8, and that that passage in turn refers back to the VC. See McCrea and Patil 2010: 87–93 for a translation of the corresponding passage. In the last section of this discussion, Jñānaśrīmitra explicitly criticizes Dharmottara’s notion of the object of activity, see the references in McCrea and Patil 2010: 171, nn. 242–245, and McAllister 2014 for a closer study. This constitutes a significant difference between Dharmottara’s and Jñānaśrīmitra’s theories concerning what a conceptual cognition “knows” about the particular that it directs activity towards (see also above, page 240).

\textsuperscript{366} It is still unclear how to make sense of this equivalence. It will be more fully discussed in the context of CAPV 131,4–13 (page 252), but the basic idea is that the
Ratnakīrti’s phrase “adhyavaseyaṃ tu sāmānyam atadrūpapa-rāvṛttasvalaksiṇamātrātmakam” in the VyN should thus best be interpreted as “But [the object] that is determined [by perception] is a universal, [insofar as a universal] has the nature only of particulars that are differentiated from [other particulars] that have a form different from these [particulars].” The determined object of perception is therefore to be understood only as a group of particulars. The grasped object of inference is said to be the same as this determined object of perception: a group of particulars, which we can also call a form of awareness in the case of inference.

Furthermore, VyN 8*,14–15 does not differentiate between the particular that is grasped by perception and determined by inference; this, we must then understand, is in both cases the external particular that perception grasps. With this interpretation, the apparent contradiction between VyN 8*,14–15 (page 238) and KBhSA 73,8–17 (page 240) can be resolved. VyN 8*,14–15 states that perception grasps a particular and determines a group of particulars, and that inference grasps a group of particulars and determines a particular. Accordingly, KBhSA 73,8–17 states that a conceptual cognition (of which inference is a subtype) determines a particular. Furthermore, in the last sentence of the second passage (page 240), Ratnakīrti categorically (“eva”) denies that a particular can appear in determination.

So, according to these passages, perception and conceptual cognition can both have two objects, each of which are particulars. Perception grasps an external particular and determines another particular as contained in a collection of particulars. Conceptual directly grasped form of awareness in a conceptual cognition connects the cognition to the class of particulars through the same other-exclusion (apoha). In other words, the image appearing in awareness (the vidhi as a buddhyākāra) is qualified by an other-exclusion that corresponds to the other-exclusion qualifying the group of external objects at which a subsequent activity can be directed.

367 This would also have to be understood from SJS 20,11–13, quoted and translated in footnote 352.

368 Since determination has been defined as a capacity to act (see section 5.3.3), this does not mean that the perception itself should be deemed to ascertain its object.
cognition is said to grasp a collection of particulars, which means that it grasps a mental image that “represents” this collection insofar as it is qualified by a property that makes the cognition in which it is grasped capable of promoting activity in line with this property. In grasping this mental image with this property (and an indistinct appearance), conceptual cognition determines the object that will become the object of activity, a future particular, without representing it positively. In other words, Ratnakirti’s model describes cognitions as bridging one particular to another: a perception of one particular leads to activity that attains another particular, and a conceptual cognition, grasping the particular that is the form that cognition has or shows at that time, likewise leads to activity that might attain another particular. The main difference between the two types of cognition is that perception’s grasped particular is a cognitive form that is distinct, directly caused by an external particular, whereas conceptual cognition’s form is indistinct, having been augmented by various contributory factors such as memory, habituation, disposition, and so on. And the only difference between the grasped and determined particulars is that the first is directly present and that the other is not: it lies in the future, is the object that an activity is directed at, and is, unlike a particular that appears directly, present to awareness only through one other-exclusion that integrates the particular within a group.\textsuperscript{369}

There is a second set of statements that complements this picture by positively characterizing inferential knowledge. They discuss inference, or conceptual cognition in general, in a form reduced to self-awareness, a type of perceptual cognition. The passages in which inference is so described often appeal to “highest reality” (paramārtha), here to be distinguished from the everyday reality of

\textsuperscript{369}See table 5.5, page 240, for a schematic overview. It might be debatable as to how being an object of intentional activity is actually a mode of awareness. Cf. footnote 75 for the various modes of activity Ratnakirti considers. A more detailed argument about pravṛttiviṣaya, highlighting that determination is what makes something into an object of activity, is found in KBhSA 73,9–12 (cf. the references in footnote 185).
mind-external entities that are temporally and spatially extended, and with regard to which the usual means of valid cognition, sense perception and inference, can reliably regulate activity. Probably the clearest example for this reduction in Ratnakīrti’s œuvre is the following, where he answers a Mīmāṃsā objection that, on Ratnakīrti’s theory, inference would have to be a perceptual and non-perceptual cognition, a non-conceptual and conceptual cognition, and a superimposition and not a superimposition at the same time. Ratnakīrti’s answer is this, SSD 118,8–11:\[370\]

\[...[i]ty apy ayuktam. anumānasya hi paramārthathah svasamvedanapratyakṣatmano ’vikalpasyāsamāropasva-bhāvyāpratyakṣatvatvaśikalpatvasamāropatvādeḥ para-peksayā praṇaptatvād viruddhadharmādhyāsvābhāvāt katham bhedasiddhiḥ.\]

That [criticism] is not correct either. For, how should a difference of inference[,] due to which it would have said contradictory properties[,] be established, since, in reality, [inference]—which has the nature of the perception self-awareness, is non-conceptual, and does not have the nature of a superimposition—is not determined as having contradictory properties because being perception, conceptual cognition, super-imposition, etc., are defined in respect of each other?

\[370\] Cf. the translation by Mimaki (1976: 123):

...cela ne pas juste non plus. En effet, du point de vue [de la vérité] absolue ..., l’inférence possède la nature de la perception en tant que connaissance-de-soi ..., n’est pas imagination et a la nature propre de non-surimposition .... Mais [du point de vue de la vérité conventionnelle] on qualifie l’inférence, par rapport à l’autre [c.-à-d. la perception], de non-perception, imagination et surimposition. Donc, pour l’inférence on ne peut pas mettre [ces] attributs contradictoires [sur le même plan]. Ainsi comment peut-on prouver une différence dans l’inférence?
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So, according to this passage, inference is reducible to a perceptual cognition of the type self-awareness: it is hence non-conceptual, has the nature of self-awareness, and does not perform any superimposition. But if inference is thus reducible to perception, then how can the above distinction of two objects in two modes of awareness hold true? The answer is that, for Ratnakīrti, determination is reducible to self-awareness. Since it is only a capacity that a certain state of awareness has (§ 8), and since its object is one that is not meaningfully “presented” or “shown” by it at all, it is not a temporally separate cognitive act or state of awareness. This reduction is thus an explanation of how things really are, and the prior distinction of different objects concerns how things are conventionally treated.

This is also supported by § 48 of the AS. There, too, a double standard, “in reality” and “conventionally”, is appealed to in order to explain what the word referent actually is. Neither in reality nor conventionally is a form of awareness an object of activity, because it appears in the perception self-awareness. This corresponds to the claim in SSD 118,8–11 (see page 248) that conceptual awareness is

\[\text{371 This contradiction, or at least tension, arises also in light of formulations important for understanding central issues in the AS, e.g., that the objects appearing are not different for perception and conceptual cognition (l. 53 in 8: \text{"...ubhayor aviśiṣṭam."}); cf. also l. 278 in § 48, and the analysis of this statement in section 5.3.3.}

\[\text{372 See the interpretation of KBhSA 73,8–17, above page 240.}

\[\text{373 This corresponds to the well-known distinction of levels of analysis, one according to reality and one according to everyday activities. See the \text{“sliding scales of analysis”} suggested in Dunne 2004. The possible problems for using the idea of self-awareness as a \text{“bridging concept”} between contradictory theories about reality or its cognition are mentioned in Kellner 2010: 227 (for Dignāga), and more generally discussed in their relevance for Dharmakīrti in Kellner 2011 and Kellner 2017: 311–312. However, in the current context this is not really an issue. Ratnakīrti is here being interpreted as explaining the move either, in the case of perception, from a mind-external particular to another mind-external particular, by means of one generalization, or, in the case of conceptual cognition, from one mind-internal particular which is the generalization to a mind-external particular. The point is that self-awareness bridges the transition between the start and end of this process, or explains how one reaches one from the other. It is not used as a device to show that a contradiction is not, in fact, the case.}\]
no different from perception. A true particular is the grasped object in both cases, and, since this is in both cases the perception of a particular, there is no determination (or superimposition)\(^{374}\) of that particular. And an external particular is the determined object of both a conceptual and perceptual cognition, insofar as practical activity is directed at it by them. This intends to explain the conventional notion of dealing with external, temporally extended objects.

The picture presented here diverges in several respects from the distinction of four objects of cognition, a grasped and a determined object each for perception and conceptual awareness, prefigured in McCrea and Patil 2006, and fully worked out in Patil 2009: chapter 5. Whilst the solutions developed there certainly fit most of the passages considered up to this point, the analysis proposed here has made a simpler solution possible.\(^ {375}\) The central difference between the two interpretations is that instead of four objects, we here are attempting

\(^{374}\)Whether this equation of superimposition and determination is appropriate to Ratnakīrti’s understanding of the matter is a very difficult question. Cf., e.g., CAPV 135.31–136.2: tatha vikαlpāropābhimānagranahaniścayādayo ’py adhyavaśaśayayat svākāraparyavasitā eva sphuranto bāhyasya vārtāmātram api na jānantīty adhyava-

\(^{375}\)As noted in Patil 2003: 237, and explicated in Patil 2009: 249, an assessment of Ratnakīrti’s epistemological framework, or “...theory of mental content...” has to proceed “...by providing an interpretation of his scattered remarks on...mental objects/images ...and does not present Ratnakīrti’s position as he himself presented it ....” (Patil 2009: 249) So all attempts at outlining this framework can only be
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to show that whatever appears to awareness is a particular, and whatever is determined is a universal. Thus there would be only two objects of awareness, instead of four. Furthermore, considering that a universal reduces to a particular (or several thereof) insofar as it excludes (or they exclude) other particulars, only one kind of real entity—the particular—has to be posited, with the absence of a mutual difference (through anyāpoha) accounting for the commonness that qualifies such entities.

A first argument can be made by reminding ourselves that, according to Ratnakīrti, perception and conceptual cognition each have a twofold object, a grasped and a determined one. As explained, this in itself leads into interpretative difficulties. In some instances this object is said to be, respectively, a particular (as grasped) and a universal (as determined) for perception, and a universal (as grasped) and a particular (as determined) for conceptual cognition. In other instances, especially where self-awareness is discussed or mentioned in the context of conceptual cognition, this clear differentiation is not upheld. The key to resolving this puzzle lies in the fact that Ratnakīrti is able to call the grasped object of conceptual cognition a “universal”, as he does the determined object of perception. The final clue to resolving this puzzle is found in Ratnakīrti’s CAPV 131,4–12:

Among the passages considered until now, the four-object model does not seem to offer a clean solution for VyN 8*,14–15 (see page 238) and KBhSA 73,8–17 (see page 240). In the former case, the difference hinges on the interpretation of how the objects are inverse for perception and inference. While Patil essentially argues that this inversion does not apply on the ontological level, because perception perceives an actual particular whereas inference determines a generalized particular that is, actually, a universal, here we can maintain that both items—grasped and determined—are ultimately particulars. In the latter passage, the problem is that the determined object of inference is said to be simply the particular, without any qualifications. If this were not the actual, momentary thing that can satisfy a desire, it would be strange for Ratnakīrti to invoke Dharmakīrti as an authority: the very reason that perception and inference are means of valid cognition is that they make activity possible that can target particulars.

Footnotes:
376 Cf. footnote 352 for textual evidence of this claim.
377 Cf., e.g., VyN 8*,12–15 (VyN 2 109,14–18, quoted and translated section 5.4).
378 Cf. the material page 248, as well as l. 278 in § 48.
5. The apoha theory in Ratnakīrti’s *Apohasiddhi*

aha duvidho vijñānānāṃ viṣayāḥ grāhyo ’dhyavaseyaś ca. pratibhāsamāno grāhyah. agrhiito ’pi pravrctivisayo ’dhyavaseyaḥ. tatrāsarvajñe ’numātari sakalavipakṣa-pratibhāsābhāvān na grāhyatayā vipakṣo viṣayo vaktyavyaḥ, sarvānumānocchedaprasangāt, sarvatra sakalavipaksapratibhāsābhāvāhāt tato vyatirekāsiddheḥ. pratibhāse ca deśakālasvabhāvāntaritasakalavipakṣasākṣāthkāre sā-dhyātmāpi varākaḥ sutarāṃ pratiyata ity anumānavairthyam. tasmād apratibhāse ’py adhyavasāyasiddhād eva vipakṣād dhūmāder vyatireko niścitāḥ. tat kim artham atra vipakṣapratibhāsah prārthyate. yadi punar asyādhyavasāyō ’pi na syat tadā vyatireko na niścyata iti yuktam, pratiniyatavisayavavahārābhāvāt.

Here, the object of cognitions is twofold, [one that is] grasped and [one that is] determined. [The one that] appears is [the one that is] grasped. [The one that is] to be determined is the object of activity, even though it is not grasped. With regard to these [two objects], in the case of a non-omniscient [agent] of an inference, the counter-instance is not to be called an object on account of [its] being grasped, because there is no appearance of the whole counter-instance; because of the [unwanted] consequence that all inferences would be destroyed, since, because there is no appearance of all the counter-instances in any [inference], there is no establishment of the [reason’s] exclusion from this [whole counter-instance].

And if there were an appearance, which is a direct presentation of the whole counter-instance distant in space, time, and its own nature, then even that which has the nature of what is to be proven, that poor fellow, would be easily cognized. Thus an inference would be useless. Therefore, even though there is no appearance [of the whole counter-instance], the exclusion of smoke etc. from the counter-instance, which is indeed established through determination, is ascertained. Therefore, with what
aim is the appearance of the counter-instance desired here? If, however, there were not even a determination of this [counter-instance], then the exclusion would not be ascertained. This is logically coherent, because there is no everyday activity towards an object that is limited [as to its place, time, and condition].

Ratnakīrti here explains how the counter-instance of an inference can be known.\textsuperscript{379} It is central to the functioning of inference that this counter-instance can be known in at least one respect. It must be possible to ascertain that the reason, which establishes the presence of the intended property, is absent from these dissimilar cases. At the same time, it is impossible to know each of these dissimilar cases individually. Ratnakīrti thus emphasizes the fact that these dissimilar cases are known, or established, through determination. That is, they are known in general, through the exclusion that is common to them. The judgement that smoke is absent in each individual instance of “non-fire” is possible, without having to know each instance of fire individually.

What is it then, in the final analysis, that distinguishes a conceptual from a perceptual cognition? Ratnakīrti’s concise statement can be found in CAPV 140,18–19:

\begin{quote}
tatra nirvikalpakaṃ spaṣṭapratisatvād grāhakaṃ vyavasthāpyate. vibhalpa tv aspaṣṭaikavyāvṛttyulękhaḥ
dāropakādivyavahārabhājanam.\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{379}The counter-instance (\textit{vipakṣa}) is the group of cases which are dissimilar to the case that an inference is considering, insofar as the property that that inference intends to establish is absent in them.

\textsuperscript{380}Read \textit{aspaṣṭaika} against CAPV \textit{spaṣṭaika}. In the manuscript, the difference between \textit{stva} and \textit{stu} is so small as to make a decision difficult, but the parallel in SāSiŚā 395,1–3 supports \textit{aspaṣṭaika}: \textit{tatra nirvikalpakaṃ bhrāntam api spaṣṭapratisavasthaṣat grāhakaṃ avasthāpyate. vibhalpa tv vimarsākāratayā svayam anyānapeksaprawartakatve 'py aspaṣṭaikavyāvṛttyulękhaḥ āropakādivyavahārabhājanam.} (“There, non-conceptual cognition, though erroneous, is classified, in virtue of a distinct appearance, as [a cognition that directly] grasps [its object]. Conceptual cognition, however–even though it causes activity independently of another [cognition] by itself, since it has the form of a judgement–is subject to an
There, non-conceptual cognition is defined as directly apprehending its object because there is a distinct appearance of that object. Conceptual cognition, however, is subject to an everyday treatment as superimposing and so on, because it depicts a single, indistinct exclusion.

The difference of conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions is thus based only on what appears in them. It is important to note that the classification into conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions is not due to the mode in which something appears in them—by determination or appearance—but is, rather, due to a characteristic of the image. If it is clear or vivid, the cognition is non-conceptual; if it is not, the cognition should be deemed conceptual. With this, Ratnakīrti has broken down the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions to such a degree that he can make them independent from everyday treatment as [a cognition that] superimposes [something on object] and so on, because it depicts an indistinct, single exclusion.”)

This would also accord with Prajñākaragupta’s main reason for distinguishing inference and perception, e.g., PVABh 218,26: pratyakṣavisāya pravarttakatve ’pi spaṣṭāspaṣṭabhedat pramāṇadvitayam eva. (“Even though [inference] causes activity towards a perceptible object [like perception does], there are two means of valid cognition, because there is a difference in [that an object can be] distinct and indistinct.”)

In both the CAPV and the SāSiŚā, the tatra (“there”) is somewhat unclear: it is here understood as referring to “śabdapramāṇāntara”, taken as “other words or means of valid cognition” Ratnakirti is here arguing that his position does not contradict the obvious fact that in certain cognitions, other words or means of valid cognitions are necessary in order to ascertain an object correctly. The whole discussion here is close to the treatment of perception and inference, and their difference and relation, in the PVABh (see McAllister forthcoming a).

Ratnakīrti’s arguments in this passage are introduced by a quote from the PVABh in the CAPV 140,10–11 (but not in the SāSiŚā): “yad oha alaṅkārakārah–katham tadvisayatvam tatra pravartanāḥ iti” (Which the author of the Alāṅkāra stated: “How is that [external thing] the object [of a conceptual cognition]? Because [there is] an activity towards it [due to this cognition].”). Cf. PVABh 221,28–29 for such a statement.
5.4. Two modes of awareness

determination or appearance: it is thus possible to link them to both. In other words, Ratnakīrti is now free to claim that determination and appearance can occur simultaneously: determination is not the unique marker of a conceptual cognition any more; it has been detached from any representational function and redefined as the capacity that a cognition has with regard to a subsequent activity. It is thus possible for Ratnakīrti to describe a conceptual cognition as one that unites both “appearance” and “determination” without either a temporal distinction between the two, or a contradiction in that cognition being both perceptual and non-perceptual at the same time.

It is now possible to fully appreciate Ratnakīrti’s comparison, in § 8, between the perception of absence and the conceptual cognition of something excluded, or, in other words, the quality of other-exclusion (section 5.3.3). As seen above, Ratnakīrti equates perception and conceptual awareness as to the object that directly appears in them: “paryudāsarūpābhāvagrahaṇam tu niyatasvarūpasamvedanam ubhayor aviśiṣṭam.” (ll. 52–53 in § 8) This object corresponds to the grasped form of awareness itself, which could be either distinct or indistinct, making the cognition that has this form either a non-conceptual or conceptual one. This passage also shows an equivalence between grasping absence in an implicative form (i.e., as the presence of something else) and an awareness of something having a “limited own form”, meaning that this awareness has an object that is fixed as to its location, time, etc.382 So both perception and conceptual cognition do have a particular as their object, at least in respect of the form of awareness that they each have. In the AS, this is

382 Cf., e.g., the (negative) formulation in § 15: “…deśakālavasthāniyata-pravyaktasvalaksanāsphuranāt.” This is the defining characteristic of a particular: “The term svalaksana …entails from the beginning that the phenomenon is individual, unique and distinct.” (Yoshimizu 2004: 119) Cf. also the similar formulation SSD 124,22–23: nanu ananuvṛttāv api tadarpitākārasvarūpasamvedanam eva tadvedanam. tad eva ca savisayatvam. (Trl. by Mimaki (1976: 159): “[Les Bouddhistes:] Même si [l’objet] ne dure pas [jusqu’au moment de la connaissance], la connaissance de la nature propre de la forme projetée par l’[objet], c’est la connaissance de l’[objet], n’est-ce pas? Et ce fait [montre] précisément que la [connaissance] a un objet ....”)
supported by Ratnakirti’s statement that a form of awareness is not positively or negatively acted towards since it is present to awareness through the perceptual mode self-awareness (l. 278 in § 48).\(^{383}\) And perception has, by definition, a particular as its grasped or appearing object: again, this is only the form of awareness itself, but caused by a different set of causal factors, usually considered to involve sense faculties and external objects, which result in a cognition with a distinct form.\(^{384}\)

As its determined object, conceptual cognition has a real thing, a particular which can be called a universal insofar as it is differentiated from others, just as perception has this as its determined object. Within the AS, a number of passages support this as far as conceptual cognition is concerned.\(^{385}\) The argument for perception can be made by an interpretation of the following passage, KBhSA 73.18–24:

\[
\text{tathā tṛtiyo 'pi pakṣah prayāsaphalah, nānākālasyaikasya vastuno vastuto 'sambhave 'pi sarvadesākālavartinor atadṛūpaparāvrṛttayor eva sādhyasādhhanayoh pratyakṣena vyāptigrahanāt. dvividho hi pratyakṣasya viṣayah, grā-hyo 'dhyavaseyaś ca. sakalatadrūpaparāvrṛttavastumā-tram.}\(^{386}\) sākṣād asphuranāt pratyakṣasya grāhya viṣayo mā bhūt, tadekadeśaagrahaṇe tu tanmātrayor vyāptini-scāyakvikalpajananād adhyavaseyo viṣayo bhavaty eva, kṣaṇagrahaṇe santānaniścayavat, rūpamātragrahaṇe rūparasaṅgandhasparṣātmakahāṭaniścayavac ca. anyathā sarvānunānocchedaprasaṅgāt.}
\]

\(^{383}\) Cf. also page 248.

\(^{384}\) Cf. above, footnote 352.

\(^{385}\) Cf., e.g., the guiding inference of the AS (cf. section 5.2): \text{yad vācakam tat sarvam adhyavasitadṛūpaparāvrṛttavastumātragocaram.} (ll.305–306 in § 54), and see also table 5.1 on page 212 for a list of passages where these points are argued for.

\(^{386}\) Emend “\text{parāvrṛttavastumātram}” (KBhSA 73.20) to “\text{parāvrṛttavastumātram}” according to Woo 1999: 74; this is also accepted in Patil 2009: 259, n. 30.
In this way, also the third option is a result [only] of hard effort,\footnote{Acc. to Woo 1999: 189: “The third view is the objection in text [71.28–30] above that no logical reason can have a relationship with momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) in terms of the proving property and the property to be proved. ...Beginning with this passage, he [i.e., Ratnakīrti–PMA] demonstrates that perception can grasp the pervasion (vyāpti) between existence and momentariness.” The opponent there said, KBhSA 71.28–30: yadva sarvasyaiva hetoh kṣaṇikatve sādhya viruddhatvam desakālāntarānanugame sādhyasādhanabhavebhāvābhāvāt. anugame ca nānākālam ekam aksanikam kṣaṇikatvena virudhyata iti. (Or else, if momentariness is to be established, each and every reason is contradictory, because, given that [the reason] does not continue in a different place or time, there is no relation of that which is to be established and that which establishes it. But if [the reason] does continue, then one non-momentary [entity, namely, the reason, insofar as it exists] at a different time, is in contradiction with momentariness.)} because, even though a single real thing, [existing] at different times, is not really possible, perception does grasp the pervasion of that to be established[, i.e., momentariness,] and that establishing [it, i.e., existence], which occur at all places and times, [and which] are indeed differentiated from what is not of that nature. For the object of perception is twofold, grasped and determined. The mere real thing that is differentiated from all that is not of its form cannot possibly be the grasped object of perception because it does not appear directly, but it certainly is the determined object, because, if there is a grasping of one part[, or instance,] of this [mere thing], [perception] produces a conceptual cognition that ascertains the pervasion of these two as such (mātra), like a continuum is ascertained when a moment is grasped, and like a pot is ascertained that has the nature of a form, a taste, a smell, [and] a feel, when only [its] form is grasped. For, [if it were] otherwise, there is the unwanted consequence that all inference is ended.

As before, Ratnakīrti here asserts that perception has two objects as well: a grasped and a determined object. But he additionally specifies that the determined object of perception is a mere thing
that is excluded from that which is not like it (sakalātadrūpaparā-vrttavastumātram), a characterization that obviously corresponds to that of the grasped object of conceptual cognition, which is the basis for the determined particular. So the phrase in l. 306 in § 54 containing adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvrttavastumātragocaram should be understood like this: whatever denotes something, “operates on a determined particular as such that is excluded from those particulars which do not have its form.”

From a historical perspective, this position is probably the result of merging two theories developed by Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta, respectively. Dharmottara posited two objects of cognition, and Prajñākaragupta put the future particular at the core of his interpretation of the relation of perception and inference. Dharmottara’s position has often been regarded as the theory with the strongest influence in this regard on Jñānaśrimitra’s and Ratnakīrti’s positions. But the present investigation of Ratnakīrti’s theory of verbal cognition shows some deep differences to that of Dharmottara: for Ratnakīrti, the object of activity is not present to cognition in any way other than as the disposition to act in a way that will allow one to attain that object, whereas for Dharmottara it is a superimposed thing. Ratnakīrti’s position thus is very close to a central element in Prajñākaragupta’s general argument about why perception and inference are both means of valid cognition: they make activity possible with regard to something that is not “present” to awareness in any way. Since this historical perspective would not

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388 Cf. also footnote 356.

389 For Dharmottara, see Krasser 1995 and McCrea and Patil 2006; for Prajñākaragupta, see Kobayashi 2011 and McAllister (forthcoming a).

390 See, for example, McCrea and Patil 2006: 333, Patil 2009: 250–251, n. 6 and also the present author’s own article, McAllister 2015

391 See McAllister 2014 and Kataoka 2017b. Patil (2009: 225, n. 68) notes that there is a difference between Dharmottara’s and Ratnakīrti’s notions of superimposition or determination as far as the object is concerned. This is still true also on the current interpretation. What has changed, however, is the interpretation of what Ratnakīrti takes as the object of determination. See also above, footnote 365.

392 This issue is explored in McAllister (forthcoming a).
be of much use for a better understanding of Ratnakīrti’s *Apohasiddhi* and would presuppose a deeper examination also of Jñānaśrīmitra’s works, the matter will be investigated on a different occasion.

## 5.5 Other-exclusion as double negation

So far, Ratnakīrti’s positions in his *Apohasiddhi* have been discussed under their ontological (section 5.3) and epistemological (section 5.4) aspects, because these two aspects are the most prominent ones in the text. All forms of the *apoha* theory have, however, puzzled both historical opponents to the Buddhists and modern authors, mostly with respect to one of their formal features. The Sanskrit word “*anyāpoha*”, literally “other-exclusion”, is usually analysed as “exclusion from others”, or “exclusion of others”, with the “others” being in a case relation to the “exclusion”. Taking “other” to mean “not that”, or “not the same,” one quickly faces the most baffling and counter-intuitive aspect of the *apoha* theory: it is a form of double negation.

Dharmakīrti expresses the situation as follows, PVSV 38,9–10:

> uktam yādṛṣaṁ sāmānyam asaṃsṛṣṭānām ekāsaṃsargas
tadvyatirekiṇāṁ samānateti.

It was explained what a universal is like: that [things] which are unmixed [with each other] are not mixed with one [thing] is the sameness of these things different from that. \(^{394}\)

This passage is a succinct formulation of what *anyāpoha* does in supplying a non-substantial substitute for a substantially real universal: it hinges on a mutual difference, differentiating some things from others that are characterized primarily as differentiated from the former.

\(^{393}\text{Cf. the discussion of the various options that Ratnakīrti considers (and does not later decide on) in § 2, and the materials indicated there.}\)

\(^{394}\text{Cf. Vora and Ota 1980: 6–7 for another translation and the context.}\)
On a formal level, the equation of double negation to a positive statement is unproblematic.\textsuperscript{395} It might be counter-intuitive, unwieldy, and redundant, but a double negation certainly does not turn something true into something false. The problems are, however, not purely formal ones. They are usually considered in either an ontological or epistemological context, or even in both contexts. It is then that these problems become virulent. This has happened not only in historical discussions about other-exclusion, but also in modern scholarship, especially when attempting a philosophical restatement of the theory.\textsuperscript{396}

Ratnakīrti briefly discusses two problems\textsuperscript{397} that have historically been used as powerful arguments against \textit{apoha}: a circular dependency, that the negation of non-cow is dependent on the notion of “cow”, and a contradiction between that qualified by exclusion and exclusion itself which makes co-reference impossible (cf., respectively, §12 and §13). Both discussions are rather short and add nothing substantially new to the more lively discussion of the same problems five centuries earlier in the works of Dignāga, Uddyotakara, Kumārila, and Dharmakīrti.

\textit{Circular dependency}. The problem of circular dependency is simply that the definition of “cow” as “not not cow” obviously involves and, at least according to the opponent, presupposes whatever one takes “cow” to be. Ratnakīrti’s strategy to rid himself of this problem is

\textsuperscript{395}Cf. Quine 1980: §16(4) showing the equivalence of the schemata “~ ~p” and “p”, or Goldfarb 2003: 12, using “~” as the sign for negation: “It should be clear that ‘~ ~p’ amounts to the same thing as ‘p’. For ‘~ ~p’ is true just in case ‘~ p’ is false, and ‘~ p’ is false just in case ‘p’ is true. Double negations, therefore, are redundant.”

\textsuperscript{396}The most fruitful attempts by modern scholars to restate an \textit{apoha} theory in a form that is independent from its historical manifestations are exemplified in Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti 2011, especially in the contributions to that volume by Ganeri 2011 and Siderits 2011. A critical examination of these restatements is provided by Hale 2011 in the same volume. These interpretations by modern authors shall, however, not be discussed here in detail.

\textsuperscript{397}For the objections of this kind that were made against \textit{anyāpoha}, cf. footnotes 101 and 104.
quite remarkable. He counters the objection by saying that the same fault applies to the opponent’s theory of real universals.\textsuperscript{398} The parallel can be understood as follows: a realist might define a cow as “A cow is what is qualified by cowness.”, and an exclusionist might do the same with this sentence: “A cow is what is qualified by exclusion from non-cow.” Structurally, both statements are of the form “An x is what is qualified by x-ity.”

The realist now says that, in the exclusionist approach, to know what is qualified by the exclusion from non-cow presupposes a knowledge of what a cow is. The circular dependency consists in “exclusion from non-cow” (=x-ity) being dependent on “cow” (=x), and “cow” being defined in terms of x-ity. Ratnakīrti does not, at this point, supply a reason for why someone may say this.

Ratnakīrti counters this as follows: to know what is qualified by cowness presupposes a knowledge of what a cow is. Here, the dependency consists, again, in x-ity (“cowness”) being dependent on an x (“cow”), and an x being defined in terms of x-ity. For this he supplies a reason: when an x like “cow” is not known, the universal cowness (x-ity) is not known, and, when the universal cowness (x-ity) is not known, that to be designated by the word cow (i.e., an x) is not known.\textsuperscript{399}

In other words, Ratnakīrti here shows that setting the convention “cow” for what is qualified by cowness is just as problematic as setting it for that qualified by the exclusion from non-cow.

Co-reference and the contradiction in qualification. Ratnakīrti’s explanations in § 13 concerning the contradiction are rather succinct, and any interpretation of his statements will remain tentative.

\textsuperscript{398}This is remarkable because Ratnakīrti is not even trying to save his own position. He merely states that it is just as wrong in this respect as that of his opponents. The same strategy is employed by Dharmakīrti, cf. the discussions in Hugon 2009: 535–540, and Hugon 2011.

\textsuperscript{399}In accordance with this argument, the following reason could be the one that led the opponents to charge the apoha theory with circularity: when a cow (x) is not known, exclusion from non-cow (x-ity) is not known, and when the exclusion from cow (x-ity) is not known, a cow (x) is not known. See Watson and Kataoka 2017: 48–49 for a clear statement of this type of argument.
Extrapolating from his solution to the problem, the problem can be reconstructed as follows: a blue water lily is qualified by two things, a property, blue, and a genus, water lily. Though the opponent might maintain that they are ontologically distinct kinds of entities, they are both assumed to be real entities, and must, in some way, be present in the substance that they qualify (any blue water lily). Amongst various problems resulting from this notion, the contradiction that the substance so qualified would be the location of two different things at the same time is the most serious: just as it is contradictory to say “This is an oak and a fir.”, so it would be contradictory to say “This is blue and a water lily.” This problem, so Ratnakīrti’s claim here, does not afflict the *apoha* theory: it does not assert that two things (a property and a genus) are present in a third (the material entity), but rather that two absences—that of non-blue things and that of things which are not water lilies—are present in a third.  

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400 Dignāga, Kumārila, and Dharmakīrti are known for their discussions of co-reference and of the connected problem of the relation between qualifiers and that qualified by them. The presentation of the problem here draws on Hattori 2006: 62, and the lucid discussion of the matter by J. Taber and Kataoka (2017: 261–263). See Ogawa 2017 for a very detailed study of Dignāga’s position on this matter in its historical context. In view of the restoration of Dignāga’s text in Pind 2015, even the terminology of Ratnakīrti’s statements here is reminiscent of Dignāga’s first statement of the problem.

401 See J. Taber and Kataoka 2017: 256–259 for the various incongruities that Dignāga saw in this model.

402 To the extent that this is Ratnakīrti’s explanation of why the two traditional problems of co-reference and contradiction do not apply to the *apoha* theory, one must note some important differences to the findings of scholars who have worked on Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s solutions to this problem.

For Dignāga, Ogawa 2017: 114–115 and J. Taber and Kataoka 2017: 259–260 understand that the main argument for justifying *apoha* with respect to this problem lies in the fact that “blue” and “water lily” each raise an expectation or doubt as to the other: when one hears “blue” one will ask “What is blue?”, and when one hears “water lily” one will ask “What colour is it?”.

For Dharmakīrti, J. Taber and Kataoka: 264–265 maintain that “the key to the solution of the problems of coreferrviality and qualification is seeing that there is no real distinction between exclusions (*vyāvṛtti*) and the thing that is excluded (*vyāvṛtta*);
5.6 Conclusion: denotation in Ratnakīrti’s APOHA Theory

To conclude this investigation, we can summarize our observations in order to understand how Ratnakīrti sees the relation between something that denotes, such as a word or a concept, and that which is denoted, the referent of the word or concept. From the arguments in §27 and the statements about the denoting-denoted relation in §54, it follows that Ratnakirti does not believe that there really is such a relation, but that it is a conceptual construction. Two questions might be posed here: what exactly is the conceptually constructed relation of a word and its object, and why is it important to Ratnakirti that this relation is only conceptually constructed, but does not exist in reality?

Ratnakīrti supposes that there are two aspects of a word’s object: the subjective one, a form of awareness, and the objective one, an external thing. They are known in two different awareness modes, perception (of the type self-awareness) and determination, respectively. The question is what sort of relation a word has to this twofold object, and, more specifically, if it can be said to refer to, denote, or express this object.

In lines 93–97 (§15), as well as in §48 and the following verse, Ratnakīrti argues that in reality no external thing is denoted by words (in the first passage), or is affirmed or negated by words (in the second passage). Rather, it is only due to the determination of a form of awareness that an external object becomes the object of any kind of their distinction is based merely on convention. [...] In sum, Dharmakīrti’s solution seems to be that coreferentiality and qualification are possible essentially because the mind conceives of them as possible.” (See Hugon 2017 for an examination of Dharmakīrti’s usage of the two terms mentioned in the quote.) Ratnakīrti, however, does not mention this element of conceptual construction, and relies solely on the ontological category of an absence of others in his answer.

403 Patil usually translates the terms important for this discussion as follows: vācya and vācaka respectively as “expressed” and “expressor” or “expressive” (Patil 2009: e.g., p. 239, p. 241), artha as “meaning, object, or semantic value” (Patil 2009: 202, n. 13).
activity, including the activity of denoting it. Ratnakīrti explains that an external object is said to be denoted by a word only because of determination, ll. 95–97, § 15 (for a translation see page 96):

\[
\text{tatra bāhyo 'ṛtho 'dhyavāsāyād eva śabdavācyo vyavasthā-}
\text{pyate, na svalakṣaṇaparisphūrtyā, pratyakṣavad deśakā-}
\text{lāvasthāniyataprayuktasvalakṣaṇāsphuranāt.}
\]

Consequently, a word can be said to denote its proper object, the external thing, only by means of determination, not directly. If it were directly denotative of a real external thing, there would be the undesirable consequence that a word would make its object known in the same way as a perceptual cognition of that object. The fact that Ratnakīrti expressly states that a particular is not shown by verbal cognition is important insofar as it suggests that Ratnakīrti is at least considering the possibility of verbal cognition presenting its object in the same way as perception does. Indeed, his arguments about the relation between a property and property-bearer (§§ 27–31) show that the difference is not so much in the type of the respective cognition, conceptual or perceptual, but in that of their object. These arguments mostly draw unwanted consequences from the counterfactual assumption that if a conceptual cognition were to show anything real, a particular or an actual property, it would, like perception, show the object in its entirety. That it does not is due to the fact that words or concepts have as their object, or denote, exclusions, insubstantial and relational properties of real things. Whilst they are thus able to direct a person at those real things that have the same exclusion, they do not show those things.

There is a direct reference to an exclusion, an insubstantial and relational quality, which qualifies zero or more particulars. Through this reference, the particular can be indirectly made the object of

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404 The details of these arguments are discussed in section 5.3.2.1. For short examples of the various forms of activity that are induced by conceptual cognition, cf. CAPV 139.18–19 (trl. footnote 75). See also the references given in footnote footnote 75.

405 Cf. the quote of PV in I 15a–c in § 16.
a word, though no appearance of this particular occurs because of understanding this word.

The other aspect of an object of a word is the form of awareness which directly appears to self-awareness, a perceptual type of cognition. But there is no denoted-denoting relation between a word and this aspect of its object, because direct appearance does not support the real relation of a quality and a thing qualified by it (dharmadharmaḥbhedasya pratyakṣapratikṣiptatvāt, l. 165, p. 58), under which the relation of denoting and denoted would fall according to Ratnakīrti (see § 28).

A word thus denotes neither an external particular nor the form of awareness. It is only with regard to the external particular as qualified by the exclusion of others that a referential relation can properly be understood. But since this determined object, which is what everyday activity centers upon, is not present to awareness, words can be said to actually not refer to anything real.

In § 28, Ratnakīrti advances an argument that adds an important element for the correct understanding of the relation of word and object. That argument might be paraphrased as follows: if a relation of property and property-bearer were real, the connection would have to be that of supported and supporter, i.e., a property-bearer supporting its properties. Perceiving a property bearer, e.g., a tree, entails perception of all its properties, e.g., its height, etc. For a particular (the proper object of perception) cannot be in contact with a sense-faculty with only one of its properties or by itself without its properties (perhaps as a substance), because a supporter is a supporter only as far as it actually is seen to support its properties.

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406 Cf. the arguments in § 48, as well as section 5.3.2.1.

407 If this relation were real, it would have to be presumed that a word could denote its object (e.g., the word “cow” would denote a form of awareness cow) without all aspects of that form of awareness being known to the person experiencing that cognitive event, so that self-awareness would only have partial knowledge of its own object.

408 That the only connection is that of supported and supporter was advanced by Dharmakīrti. Cf. the references to the translation of paragraph § 28.
On the opponent’s theory, both a word, e.g., “tree”, and a logical reason, e.g., “presence of smoke”, make something real known (a particular qualified by treeness, a particular place qualified by smokey-ness, cf. §9). The real thing that they make known must, by the previous argument, be related to its other properties, height, colour, etc., as a supporter. And since this supporting relation is not different from the supporting relation that causes perception to always grasp the whole particular (properties and their bearer), it follows that whatever is made known by words or logical marks would also have to be grasped with all its properties at once. Therefore, if words were to make something real known, and if there really were this difference of properties and their bearer, conceptual cognition would not be discernible from perceptual cognition.

For Ratnakīrti, the theory of *apoha* in combination with the concept of determination offers a way out of this conundrum: since it is only a determined difference from other things that a word makes known, it is not a real thing (an entity) that is brought to awareness. Thus the consequences involved in cognizing a real thing do not result.

Furthermore, that there is no real relation of denoted and denoting should, one expects, hold for Ratnakirti’s theory as well. As the particular height of a particular tree cannot be perceived without perceiving all other perceivable characteristics of that same tree, so that which a word signifies, the twofold positive element qualified by

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409 Here, applied to a determined object, “to make known” has to be analysed as connecting an awareness with a determined object, thereby bringing the awareness into a state from which activity conformant to expectations can result. See above, section 5.4.

410 Cf. the notes above as to how exclusion is a capacity, section 5.3.3. Also, in perception there is a possibility of an (indirectly) perceived generality: absence. Perceiving an empty stretch of floor, an absence of many things in that place can be correctly cognized, although not every absence has to actually be cognized.

Cf. also PV III 167 (translated in A.3.2 page 322) about the word not being a part of the referent. The point there is that the referent is an external thing, and it is not possible that something in the cognition of a speaker (or hearer) really is a part of the external thing. But it can be a part, or aspect, of the conceptual cognition.
other-exclusion,\textsuperscript{411} must be apprehended in its entirety. For the form of awareness, this is not problematic, since it comes to awareness through a direct appearance in self-awareness. An account of the external object, on the other hand, is more difficult to give. The determined external object, a particular, is known in conceptual awareness by the determination of one exclusion. As argued above, section 5.3.3, the external thing, to which activity can be successfully directed by a correct conceptual cognition, is not directly present to awareness, but is present only in terms of the capacity lying in the self-awareness that any conceptual awareness has of its own form. The external object, the second aspect of the positive element, is thus only a capacity to generate activity. Since it is nothing over and above the cognitive form (including its exclusions), it does not have to be known in any additional way. It is a factor that belongs to self-awareness as a sequence of causes and effects. But, since an external object is what everyday activity meets with, it is this object which is conventionally considered to be denoted by a word.\textsuperscript{412}

There is thus no real denotative function at work in conceptual awareness, mainly because neither the subjective nor objective aspect of the object that a word makes known is a thing that is denotable (the form of awareness is private and a particular, the external thing is indicated only through a negation, but is not present in any meaningful way). Since denotation is therefore only conceptually constructed, it does not count as real for Ratnakīrti.\textsuperscript{413} Its components are relata differentiated from each other only conceptually, and have the same ontological status as the relation of a quality and the thing qualified by it, i.e., they do not really have a separate existence.\textsuperscript{414} But since the relation of denoted and denoter is necessary for the

\textsuperscript{411}Cf. the analysis in section 5.3.2.1.

\textsuperscript{412}Cf. § 48. Affirmative and negative activity are there said to be applicable only to the determined external thing. See also II. 308–310 (in § 54), where Ratnakīrti says that the relation of denoted and denoting, which does not exist in reality, does exist as something formed by determination.

\textsuperscript{413}Cf. § 48.

\textsuperscript{414}Cf. the discussion in § 28, and footnote 138.
functioning of everyday language and concepts, this relation has to be assumed to be real by anyone who uses such everyday language or concepts.

These users of conventional language and concepts interact with mind-external things. They are the beings considered by Ratnakīrti in the CAPV passage presented above, section 1.1.2 (page 16). It is now possible to understand better how determination instigates activity towards external things, even though those external things are not grasped in any way. Determination operates only on the basis of an image which any awareness has and which it has received in a process that is ultimately analysed as a causal one. A conceptual cognition arises with a certain form that is defined as indistinct, through the additional causes of impressions that have been collected through experiences (cf. § 35). The relative success that conceptual cognitions have in allowing an agent to act towards external particulars is due to other-exclusion. Determination, in mistakenly externalizing the other-exclusion that qualifies the cognitive form that a conceptual awareness has, restricts the activity that beings engage in based on these conceptual cognitions. There is, however, no actual knowledge of the external particular so reached. Determination, in driving this fundamentally erroneous activity, is therefore the factor which has to cease for an unenlightened being to be liberated from the cycle of birth and death.
Appendices
About the appendices

The following sections contain annotated translations of material that is helpful in understanding the *Apohasiddhi*. The purpose of these sections is therefore not to study all these passages in detail, but only to provide a basic understanding of their general intent, scope, and arguments. As a consequence of this, it will probably not be very useful to read these passages, often not more than sketches, separately from the discussions in the previous sections that reference them and define the respect in which they are interesting.

The Sanskrit literary genre of commentaries (see Tubb and Boose 2007: 1 ff.) has various characteristic techniques for explaining the text commented upon. One case that occurs often in the passages translated below is the verbatim quotation of words or phrases from the base text. In the translations below, these cases are marked graphically by **bold** face.
A Dharmakīrti on apoha

A.1 Passages from the apoha section in the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti

Dharmakīrti introduces the concept of *apoha* in an answer to the objection that there is a kind of *petitio principii* in the relation between something that one wishes to infer and the logical reason by means of which one infers this. The problem is pertinent to a logical reason that is the nature or essential characteristic (*svabhāva*) of something. Dharmakīrti states that, in reality, a thing and its qualities are not different from each other, from which it follows that all its qualities are also the same. How then, the opponent asks, is an inference from one property of a thing to another property possible (e.g., from a thing’s being a fir to its being a tree)? It would be as much as to say that a thing is a tree because it is a tree—an error both on Dharmakīrti’s and the opponent’s idea of valid reasoning. It is in his reply to this objection that Dharmakīrti introduces the *apoha* theory.

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415 See, for example, Frauwallner 1932: 248 and Siderits 1991: 89–93.
416 Frauwallner (1932: 248) calls it “[...] Lehre von den Vorstellungen, also die Apohalehre.” Also see Frauwallner 1937: 278 f. for some remarks on the relationship between “Vorstellungen” and the object of words. Steinkellner (1971: 198) says that Dharmakīrti explains the main structure of conceptuality (“wesentliche Struktur dieser Begriffsllehre”) in the following verses; the same point is also upheld in Steinkellner 2013: II.224.

Vincent Eltschinger, John Taber, Michael Torsten Much and Isabelle Ratié have produced an English translation of many of the passages considered below.
A. Dharmakīrti on apoha

A.1.1 PV I 40–42

[PVSV 24,16] Then precisely that which is produced is precisely that which is impermanent, because there is no difference [between these two]. [There] would be a reason that is a part of the object of the thesis.417 [There is] no such error, for [the following reason:]

(Eltschinger et al. 2018). This precious resource became available to the present author only after he had submitted the manuscript for this book for publication, in the autumn of 2018. It was therefore not possible to systematically include its insights.

417 Cf. PVSVT 108,6 f.: tathā hi yāvad uktam anityah śabdo ’nityatvād iti tāvad anityah kṛtakatvād iti tathā cāsiddho hetur. (For it is so: the proposition “Sound is impermanent because of being impermanent.” [would be] as much as [the proposition] “[Sound is] impermanent because of being produced.” And in this way the reason would not be established.)

Linked to this question is the further question of what type of error (dosa, acc. to PVSV 24,17) pratijñārthaikadeśa is. T. Watanabe (2012) has argued that a reason of this type is of no practical use for an inference, since it would merely repeat the thesis, and is therefore considered asiddha.

It further seems that this is not the most problematic result that follows from Dharmakīrti’s claim that the two properties, the one to be inferred and the one on the basis of which we can infer it, are identical. If ‘being a tree’ and ‘being a fir’ are identical, then it follows that all trees are all firs. This is a consequence Dharmakīrti can certainly not have intended. For further discussions of this matter, see Iwata 2003, who does not find a perfectly clear answer to this question in Dharmakīrti’s works (Iwata 2003: 73–74), although one finds both cases where this identity is reversible (such that every fir is a tree and every tree is a fir), and cases where it is not (so that every fir is a tree but not every tree is a fir). Dunne (2004: 203–218) argues that Dharmakīrti does not subscribe to a full identity of the two properties, and suggests that either one has to understand that an instance of the property allowing one to infer the other property has the same nature as the instance of that other property (cf. Dunne 2004: 214), or, where this reading is grammatically not possible, interpret svabhāva as the property, and not the essence of the instance (Dunne 2004: 217). Steinkellner (2013) sides with Iwata’s against Dunne’s interpretation (at least for the passage around PV I 23abc), arguing that the direction of explanation is from the pervaded (proving) to the pervading (proved) concept (“...denn die vorliegende Beschreibung geht nur in eine Richtung, vom umfaßten zum umfassenden Begriff” Steinkellner 2013: II.142, n. 278).
Since all\(^{418}\) entities have, through \[their\] own nature, a part in the differentiation from both the same and other entities\(^{419}\) because each subsists in \[its\] own nature,\(^{418}\) // PV I 40 //

different genera, which are based on whatever the referents are differentiated from, and which fathom (ava-√gāh) \[the particulars’\] specific differences (viṣeṣa), are constructed (pra-√klṛp).\(^{420}\) // PV I 41 //

\(^{418}\) Cf. the recent translation of these verses in Steinkellner 2013: I.60–61. Steinkellner’s differentiated translation of svabhāva (nature, essence) as either fact or as concept, i.e., the factual nature or the concept a person may have of a thing’s nature, is not adopted here. The distinction results only from a close examination of Dharmakīrti’s usage of the term throughout his works, but is not explicit in the texts examined here. It is therefore of little use to make that distinction in the few passages translated here.

\(^{419}\) For understanding svabhāva as sajātiya here, cf. the explanations in PVSV 25,14, and Steinkellner 1971: 198, n. 66.

\(^{420}\) Here it is quite obvious that differentiation (vyāvṛtti), specific difference (viṣeṣa), and also difference (bheda, which is substituted for vyāvṛtti by Dharmakīrti in his explanation of this verse in PVSV 25,15–23) comes to be a synonym for property, aspect, or quality of a thing, in the sense of something that makes it different from other things. This connotation has to be understood in the following also. Cf. also PVSVṬ I11,28–112,5: yasmād ityādi. yasmāt sarvāsam sarvabhāvā vyāvṛttās tasmād yato yato nityākṛtakādeḥ sabdādinām arthānām vyāvṛttīs tannibandhanāh, vyāvṛttyāvadhivyāvṛttitinibandhanā dharmabhedā anityakṛtakādayah kalpyante vikalpyantyāropayante. kimvisisṭhā, tadviveṣaunāgāhināh. tasya svalakṣaṇasya ve viṣeṣā akṛtakādiṣvāvṛttīs taddāvagāhinās taddāvaunāgāhit, taddabhedāvabhāsanāsālāḥ ity arthah. (For that reason etc., i.e.,) for the reason that all entities are differentiated from everything [else, as explained in PV I 40], therefore, from whatever the objects of words are differentiated from, e.g., from permanent, non-produced etc., based on that, i.e., based on the differentiation of [their] limit, i.e., what is not something else (cf. PVSVṬ 347,28–30), different properties, such as impermanent, produced, etc., are constructed through differentiation, that is, superimposed by conceptual cognitions. How [are those different genera or properties] qualified? [As] tadviveṣaunāgāhināh. [They] fathom, that is, they have the disposition (śīla) of fathoming, its, i.e., a particular’s, specific properties which are characterized by the form of a differentiation from [those that do not qualify this particular,] such as unproduced etc.; [in other words, these different genera or properties] have the disposition of manifesting the nondifferences of these [particulars]. This is the point [of this passage].) See also the translation of PVSVṬ to this verse in appendix A.2.1

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\(\)\(^{418}\)\(^{419}\)\(^{420}\)
Therefore, whichever specific difference is recognized through some property, that [specific difference is] not capable [of being recognized] through a [property] other than that one. By this (tena) a differentiated subsistence [of two properties with respect to the same thing is shown]. // PV I 42 //

For indeed all entities are in the state of [their] own nature. They do not mix [their] self with a different [entity], because [then] there would be the consequence of this [other entity] not being a different [entity].

Also, that nature is not theirs, which is undifferentiated for them [and] has become [their] self,\textsuperscript{421} because then (tadānīm) they[, i.e., these entities with a differentiated nature,] would not exist.

[PVSV 25,1] For there would be only this [one nature for them], because [there] is an undifferentiated [nature]; and because [there] is no [other nature for the entities, which is] distinct (vyatirikta) from this [undifferentiated nature] and differentiated [for each of them]; and because, furthermore, a difference of exactly this [undifferentiated nature] would be contradictory. And this [undifferentiated nature,] which [should] subsist in [its] self, [would be] completely unmixed [with the particulars].

[PVSV 25,3] Also a different thing, even if connected to many [things], is not a universal to them, because of [their] not being of that [common] nature, because of the unwanted consequence [that there is a universal] also in [the case of] being two etc.,\textsuperscript{422} connection, and

\textsuperscript{421} Probably the point is that this same form is identified with the particulars themselves. Karṇakagomin glosses ātmabhūtam with “unseparated” in PVSVT 115,19 f.: “\textit{teṣām iti bhāvānāṁ, abhinnam ity ekam, ātmabhūtam ity avyatiriktam yad rūpaṁ svabhāvo ...}”. (Read ekam ātma\textsuperscript{°} acc. to PVSVT ms 44b7 against printed ekātma\textsuperscript{°}. Note that Karṇakagomin apparently read \textit{teṣām} instead of \textit{eṣām}.)

\textsuperscript{422} PVSVT 116,21–24: \textit{tadā dvitvādikāryadravyeṣv api prasaṅgaḥ. dvitvam api hy anekadravyasamavetam(,) ādigranād bahuvādih. tathā samyogo ’nekadra-vyasamavetāḥ. kāryadravyam cāvayavisamjñitām ārambhakadra-vyeṣu samavetam; ato dvitvādiṣu sāmānyarūpatāprasaṅgah.} (Then \textbf{there is an unwanted consequence also} [for the case of] being two etc., \textbf{as well as for the case of a} substance
A.1. apoha in the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti

substance as effect (kāryadravya). For, some things are not really made the same by another, though it has a connection to them; rather, they really have that (tadvat), like figures are not made the same by a garland connecting them at the neck.423 There are no objects of non-different apprehensions, like figures connected by a garland are not cognized as the same. For, an awareness, mixing together their very selves, appears as having a universal as an object, but it does not appear such that one could say “There are two objects connected by one.”, as it does in the case of the figures.

[Objection:] This is an error of [the awareness] seeing only this universal.424 [Answer:] Why “[an awareness] seeing only this”? [Objection:] Because an error not having a cause is impossible. [Answer:] Only those having this same effect are the cause, because [such an error] does not exist for [a cognition of things] possessing as effect. For [the state of] being two also inhere in multiple substances. From using [the word] “etc.” many-ness etc. is understood. In the same way, contact inhere in multiple substances. And a substance as effect, called a whole, inhere in the producing substances. Therefore, there is the unwanted consequence of being a universal for [the state of] being two etc.)

The point is that all these things are not universals in Vaiśeṣika ontology, which can here be taken to be endorsed by Dharmakīrti’s opponent. Plurality and contact are qualities, and the kāryadravya, here equated with the whole (avayavin), is a kind of derivative and passing substance. Cf. the general explanations in Halbfass 1992: 93 f., and 122 f., as well as in Franco and Preisendanz 1998: § 4.

423Karṇakagomin explains that the figures are connected by a thread for the purpose of worship (PVSVṬ116,28–117,4): bhūtāni grahanakṣatrāṇi teṣāṃ kaṇṭhe dirgho guṇo ‘rccanārthaṃ nibadhyate. tenaikena kaṇṭhe gunena yathā bhūtāni tadvanti, na tu ekābhaṃ, tadvad vyaktayo ‘pi. (Read dirgho acc. to PVSVṬms 45a7 instead of dirghā PVSVṬ116,28. Trl.: The figures, that is, planets and stars; a long string is bound to their neck in order to worship them. Thus, like the figures connected by one string at the neck have that string, but do not become one through it, so also the instances of a universal are not one because of being connected by it.)

424Cf. PVSVṬ118,5–6: sāmānyaṃ kevalam paśyaty eva buddhiḥ. tasyāḥ tu taddārśinyāḥ samavāyasya sūkṣmatvāt sā bhṛṇtir yad etad vyaktinām sāmānyābhedena grahaṇam iti cet. (Awareness really sees only the universal. But for this awareness seeing this there is, because of the fineness of inherence, this error, such that there is exactly this grasping of the particulars without a difference to [their] universal.)
number, connection, substance as effect, plurality etc., nor for the figures etc.\textsuperscript{425} Therefore, because in this way there is no influence [of a universal] on the cognition of a universal, a universal is not something other [than the things]. Or if it is, it would not be mixed with anything else because of subsisting in its own self (svātman). Therefore these entities are distinct (vyatirikta) from that considered (abhimata) to be of the same genus and from something else, because, by [their] nature, they are [each] of only one [individual] nature.

Based\textsuperscript{426} on the difference from whatever [things are] different from, multiple properties are cognized through words which are settled upon (kṛtasaṃniveśa) for causing the apprehension of these differences, even though there is no difference in [a thing’s] own nature. These words also are only based on this particular (svalakṣaṇa), because, even though [they] do not indicate (anākṣepa) all differences [of that particular], they indicate a single difference, [so that]\textsuperscript{427} there is a difference for this [particular] also from that.

\textsuperscript{425}The argument is that a cognition as the same can exist for things which are not qualified by any real, common thing inhering in them. This shows that a commonness is cognizable without such a universal being the cause of that cognition, which in turn is an error because particulars do not, in fact, have anything real in common with each other. The question is, of course, what “real” means here. As far as this discussion is concerned, only the same effect has been admitted too. Both a common nature, identical with the individuals, and a thing separate from the particulars but connecting them, have been considered and rejected.

\textsuperscript{426}The following passage is also translated and discussed in Hugon 2017.

\textsuperscript{427}PVSVṬ119,20: \textit{tadekasmād api yato yato vyāvṛtto 'rthaḥ śabdair visayikriyate tasmāt tasmād atatkāraṇād atatkāryāc caikasmād api tasya svalakṣaṇasyāneka-vyāvṛttasya bhedo 'stīti krtvā tadvisayā ucyante na tu tadvisayā eva.} (Read \textit{ānekavyāvṛttasya} acc. to PVSVṬ\textsubscript{ms} 46a\textsubscript{6}. Trl.: \textbf{This}, a particular which is differentiated from many [differences with other causes and effects], \textbf{is different also from this single} [thing, i.e.,] from whatever has another cause and has another effect, differentiated from which an [external] object is made the object [of a cognition] by words. Thinking so, [words] are said to have this [external thing] as an object, but they do not really have it as an object.) In PVSVṬ 119,13–14, \textit{ekabhedaśodanāt} from PVSV 25,17–18 was glossed by \textit{ekākasya binnasya svabhāvasya codanāt} (...because they indicate some differentiated nature [of a particular]). So in these passages, Karnakagomin equates “difference” (bheda) with a certain aspect of a particular’s real being. It is thus permissible to understand the somewhat awkward phrase
single [thing]. Therefore, as many [things having] different natures [there are] for a single entity, so many differentiations [are there] with regard to these [things of different natures], because [what] has an effect and a cause which cannot occur for this [other thing] is different from that [other thing]. And as many differentiations [there are], so many words (śruti) [are there] with the purpose of everyday activity (vyavahārārtha) [that proceeds] by avoiding [that having] another (atat) cause and effect. Like [this expression:] “A sound following immediately on an effort is audible.” has the purpose of avoiding [that having] another cause and effect. Therefore, even though the [a thing’s] own nature is without difference, which characteristic (viśeṣa) difference is known through some property [or] name, that [difference] cannot be made known by another [property “differentiated from a difference” simply as “having a certain quality”. We could then render PVSVT 119,20 as “This, a particular which has many qualities, has also only one quality insofar as it is different from a single other thing, that is, from some thing that has another cause and effect ....”

PVSVṬ119,26–28: kiṃ kāraṇaṃ. tasmin vyāvarttye 'vidhibhūte dharmīny asambhavi kāryam kāraṇam ca yasya vivaksitasya dharminah, sa tadasambha-vikāryakāraṇah, tasya tadbhedāt, tasmād atatkāryād atatkāraṇāc ca bhedād vyāvṛttatvāt. (What is the cause? Because of a difference of this[, i.e.,] [of] that [property bearer] which has an effect and cause that do not occur there; [this] property bearer, which one wishes to express, has an effect and cause that do not occur where [there is] this property bearer that is to be excluded[, or, in other words,] is the limit; [“because of a difference from this” must be understood like this:] because of a difference[, i.e.,] because of being excluded, from that[, i.e.,] from that which does not have that effect and that which does not have that cause.)

I think the argument works like this: A, which one wants to express, has an effect and cause (properties, for example), neither of which occurs in the case of B. So B is the limit of A, or that which one wishes to exclude. In this sense, A is different from B.

As explained in PVSVT 120,10–13, and clearly understood by Hugon (2017), the differentiation “preceded by effort” enables activity avoiding things of a different cause, i.e., not preceded by any human activity, like lightning, and “audible” excludes what has a different result, i.e., something other than an auditory cognition (śrotajñāna).
or name]. So words do not all have the same referent. Therefore the reason is not a part of the object of the thesis.\textsuperscript{430}

\textbf{A.1.2 PV I 43–45}

[PVSV 25,26] [Question:]\textsuperscript{431} How then is this understood: through both a word and a logical mark a removal (\textit{vyavaccheda}) is cognized, [but] not, in an affirmative way (\textit{vidhi}),\textsuperscript{432} the form of a real thing?

[Answer: It is known] because of the use of another means of valid cognition and another word. For [it is] so:

Which other part of an object’s single nature that is itself directly perceived could be unobserved, [so that] it [would have to be] examined by [other] means of valid cognitions? // PV I 43 //

[PVSV 26,4] For the nature (\textit{ātman}) of an object (\textit{artha}) is one. It is directly perceived, because it is impossible to establish [something] when that having the property [to be established] is unestablished; like sound [has to be established] in order to prove its impermanence. Because this [nature of a thing] is established through perception alone, [there is] an establishment of all [its] forms (\textit{ākāra}), because there is no unestablished [nature] other than this [nature of the thing]. Or, if it exists, [it is] not the nature [of that thing]. For what does not exist as having the same subsistence (\textit{yogakṣema}) as something [else], that cannot have the nature of that,\textsuperscript{433} because everyday treatment [of things] as different is bound (\textit{nibandhāna}) to

\textsuperscript{430}As pointed out by Much 2008: 8, n. 9, this is the preliminary end of the discussion starting at PVSV 24,16 f., and the same point is made at the end of the \textit{apoha} section, PVSV 93,4–5.

\textsuperscript{431}Cf. Kellner 2004: 4 f. for another translation of the next few sentences. Nakasuka 2019 discusses the following verses up to k. 49 in greater detail.

\textsuperscript{432}See the discussion of how to take \textit{vidhinā} here in Kellner 2004: 5, n. 3.

\textsuperscript{433}PVSVT 121,28–29 explains: \textit{alabdhadharmānuvṛttir yogah, labdhadharmānuvṛttih kṣemah. eko yogah kṣemaś ca yasya sa tathā. tulyadharmeti yāvat.} (\textbf{Acquisition} [is] an activity towards unobtained properties, \textbf{keeping} [is] an activity towards obtained properties. That which has \textbf{the same} acquisition and keeping is [called] so. [It means] as much as “having the same property.”) Much (2008: 9,
this alone[, i.e., to the sameness in subsistence]; for otherwise there is the consequence of non-existence [of everyday activity]. [This] has been said. Therefore, because in the case of a perceived property bearer there is a complete discernment of its nature, the use of another means of cognition does not have any opportunity [to add anything] here,

unless a cause for an error causes [someone] to attach a different quality (guna) [to something], like the form “silver” [could be attached] to mother of pearl (śukti) because of observing a similarity in their forms. // PV I 44 //

[PVSV 26,14] [This means that another means of valid cognition is not possible] if the cause of an error, which obstructs the ascertainment (niścaya) of an entity as [it is], even though it is seen with [its] complete reality, does not cause another quality to be attached, like the form of silver to mother of pearl. For there are not two forms for mother of pearl, one common [to it and silver] and a specific [one], because of the [unwanted] consequence [that there would be] a cognition as such; also because, if, alternatively, [these two forms are] not cognized separately, this concept of being two would be wrong; and because of an overreaching consequence.

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n. 32) cites the following explanation given in Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 99, n. 1: “This is the commonplace cliché in philosophical parlance. Things supposed to be identical must have identical yoga and kṣema. ...That which has the same incidents, gain or loss with another, is identical with the other.”

434 Gnoli 1960: 189 notes that PVSVT 122,7 says that this refers to PVSV 20,21.


436 Cf. also the translation in Steinkellner 1971: 194, n. 55.

437 PVSVT 123,14–15: tathā sāmānyaviśeṣarūpeṇa śavalābhāsāyāḥ pratipateḥ sarvadā prasaṅgāt. (...because of the unwanted consequence that there is always a cognition like that[, i.e.,] a multifarious appearance in a both common and particular form.)

438 As Karnakagomin explains, this consequence goes too far for the following reason: if qualities or forms could be two without having a difference in appearance, cases where oneness (or identity) is assumed on account of a single appearance

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seeing the form of mother of pearl sees [it] only [as] specific[, i.e., as a particular]. But because of the defectiveness of the conditions (pratyaya) for an ascertainment [that person], without ascertainment, thinks “I see the similarity to this [form of silver].” Therefore, there is the superimposition of silver for him. In the same way, [there is] the error [of a cognition of] persistence for [someone] because of the superimposition of that state[, i.e., persistence], [since that person] does not notice that [two moments of a causal continuum] are different due to the production of a different [moment], similar [to the preceding one]. As many other states there are for this[, a thing’s own nature,] exactly as many superimpositions there are, coming into existence according to their own cause.\(^{439}\) So the means of valid cognition, being what removes these [superimpositions from the objects], do indeed have a result. But these [means of cognition] resulting in [such a] removal are not applied in order to let one apprehend an uncognized part of a thing, because that [part] has [already] been perceived; for, moreover, perceiving a partless [thing] by [only] one part is not correct.\(^{440}\)

would become dubious—since there would be no difference between one and two appearances. Also, it is wrong because the negating judgement, “this is not silver,” could not arise. (Cf. PVSVṬ 123,17–19: pratibhāsaḥḥedam antareṇa dvitvakałpanāyām atīprasāṅgāt. anyatrāpy ekavābhimate dvitvakaḷpanā syāt. nedam rajatam iti bādhakasyanutpādaprasāṅgāc ca.)

\(^{439}\)PVSVṬ 124,12–14: tasmād yāvanto ’syā śabdādeḥ kṣaṇikānātmādīswabhāvasya parabhāvā nityādayas tāvanta eva yathāsvaṁ nimittabhāvināḥ yasya yad anurūpam nimittam tadbhāvinah samāropā iti | (Read yathāsvaṁ acc. to PVSVṬ\(_{ms}\) 48a1 against yathāsva° in PVSVṬ 124,12. Trl.: From this, i.e., from a word etc., as many other states, i.e., permanent etc., of this, i.e., of that having a nature such as momentary, without self, etc., exactly so many superimpositions [are there], which have come into existence according to their own cause, i.e., which have come into existence from a cause according to it.)

\(^{440}\)Apart from the evidence in the Tibetan tradition mentioned by Gnoli (1960: note to 27,1), PVSVṬ 124,17 attests to a version where these two reasons are not linked by ca: ...drṣṭatvāt. kim karanam. anamsasyaikadesēna darṣanāyogāt. Since this seems to make quite good sense, I have not taken the two ablatives to be in the same, supporting, relation to the main sentence, but instead understand that the second supports the first (which is the primary reason for the statement). A free
Therefore each quality of an observed entity is indeed observed, [but] is not ascertained because of an error. So a logical reason is applied.\textsuperscript{441} // PV I 45 //

This is the recapitulating verse. Therefore no other means of valid cognition is applied to [what was] observed in order to grasp something that was not observed.

\textbf{A.1.3 PV I 46–51}

And if a real thing [were] grasped because of an inference, [there would be] a grasping of all [the thing’s] properties when [only] a single property is ascertained. This defect does not follow in the case of exclusion. // PV I 46 //

[PVSV 27,9] Not only is there no application of another means of valid cognition for something [that] has been observed by direct perception, but also, if inference caused the apprehension of a thing in an affirmative [form], [and did] not perform [only] a removal [of a wrong superimposition],\textsuperscript{442} then all properties would be ascertained when one property is ascertained, because [they] are not completely distinct from this [one property]. So there [would be] no application of another means of valid cognition. For it is not correct that the self of this [one property] is not ascertained if this [one property] is ascertained. Furthermore, if it is the removal of a superimposition [from an object] that is performed by inference, then, because of this removal of one superimposition, another would not be removed. So, to this end [of removing another imposition] another [means of valid cognition] is applied. [Objection:] Now,\textsuperscript{443} an ascertainment of an

\textsuperscript{441} Cf. the translation of this verse in Steinkellner 1971: 198, n. 70.

\textsuperscript{442} For this notion, cf. the formulation anyāpohakṛt going back to Dignāga in PV III 164 (see appendix A.3.2 for a translation).

\textsuperscript{443} For more on the context and a translation of this passage, cf. Kellner 2004: 11 f.
uncognized [thing] is not necessarily preceded by a mistake. [It is] like [there] suddenly [is] a cognition of fire because of smoke. For in this case an [earlier] superimposition of non-fire is not possible. Therefore, a removal is not performed in every case [of conceptual cognition]. [Answer:] To this it was said: “When a property bearer is cognized, there is the cognition of all [properties] because they are not different [from the property bearer]. Or, if different, there is, in this [case of cognizing a property bearer], no cognition of an unconnected [property].” Therefore, also here [in this example of yours where there is a sudden cognition of fire upon seeing smoke] there is no ascertainment of the nature of this [fiery place as fiery] for someone seeing that [smoke]. Why? Because of a mistake. And how should he, who ascertains that place as having a nature free of this [fire] through an awareness that is free of the consideration of fire being [there], be called unmistaken? And someone who is free of both a superimposition of this cognitive form [of nonfire onto a smokey place] and doubt would not follow the [logical] mark [smoke] in the case of this cognition. Neither would he respect its concomitance [with fiery places] and separation [from places without fire].

Therefore the logical mark is proclaimed to have exclusion as an object. [For] otherwise, if the property bearer

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444 PVSVṬ 126,7–8 explains: akasmād ity atarkitopasthitāt. sahasaiwa kvacit pradeśe dhūmād agnipratipattiḥ. (Suddenly[, i.e.,] having come about without having been considered. The cognition of fire because of smoke in some place [occurs] just suddenly.)

445 As Much (2008: 12, n. 43) observes, this point was made in PVSV 26,5–7, although not in the exact same words.

446 Acc. to PVSVṬ 126,18: viparyāsād evānagnimatā pradeśena tulyatvagrahanād eva. (Only because of a mistake[, i.e.,] only because of grasping [this place] as being the same as a place without fire.) The argument is, probably, that because the cognition of fire is inadvertently (akasmād) arrived at, there is no proper ascertainment of this fact, and therefore there is no difference between this place and one where there is no fire.

447 PVSVṬ 126,30–127,6: anagnyākārasamāropeṇa samśayena ca rahitaś ca puruṣas ...
is established, what apart from it would [still] be unestablished? // [PV I 47] //

This[, above,] is a summary verse.

Even when something is observed, a cognition having a universal as an object, [i.e., a] conceptual [cognition], has, when another part is not superimposed, exclusion of that [other part] in general as [its] field [of activity].

[PVSV 28,8] [Objection:] How can an ascertaining cognition, which follows immediately on seeing a form etc. [and] has no logical mark [as its basis], have removal as an object, insofar as it arises when there is no superimposition? [Answer:] It has removal as an object] because this [ascertaining cognition] does not exist for the object of a superimposition. For there is no [correct] ascertainment concerning that particular aspect (bheda) onto which a [person] superimposes [some wrong aspect like] “persistent” or “having a self”,

448 Cf. the translation of this verse and the next half-verse in Steinkellner 1971: 199, n. 71.

The argument here is that an ascertainment (niścaya), even when not based on a logical mark and therefore not a result of a full inference, but when occurring right after seeing something, has the exclusion of a superimposition as its range of activity: even though that imposition has not happened, the mere presence of an ascertainment (that it is otherwise) is the exclusion of that imposition. This is so, since an ascertainment is what precludes, or falsifies, an imposition. A person seeing mother of pearl might think either “Oh, mother of pearl.” or “Oh, silver.” In the first case, an immediate (and correct) recognition, that is, an ascertainment, excludes any other wrong ideas at least about that aspect of the object. The person might still be mistaken as to, e.g., the size of the piece of mother of pearl. In the second case, a superimposition of silver has happened. This is an incorrect cognition, and one that will have to be corrected by a subsequent cognition. It is the kind of wrong cognition—a superimposition (samāropa)—that is removed by a valid means of cognition resulting in a correct ascertainment (niścaya).
because there is the relation of defeated and defeating between an understanding by ascertainment and by imposition.\textsuperscript{449} // [PV I 49ab] //</p>

[PVSV 28,13] For an entity, even though it is observed as differentiated from everything, is not understood just like that; because a covering is possible for some particular aspect, like in the case of mother of pearl’s mother-of-pearlness [which is then thought to be its silverness]. But precisely for that [particular aspect], for which a cognizer has no cause of an error, a remembered ascertainment exists, even though this person does not perceive this [aspect] differently [than the other aspects of the same thing]. Because of the defeated-defeating relationship between superimposition and ascertainment, [there is], for ascertainment,

an application of it when there is a removal (viveka) of a superimposition. This is understood. // [PV I 49cd] //</p>

[PVSV 28,19] And precisely the removal of this is other-exclusion. Therefore this [ascertaining cognition] too\textsuperscript{450} has the exclusion of this in general as its object. [It] does not have the nature of ascertaining a thing’s own nature. Indeed [it is] so, because, even if some [part] is ascertained, the non-cognition of another is observed, and because if its own nature were ascertained, this [cognition of one part but not another] would not be consistent.\textsuperscript{451}

As many superimpositions of parts [there are], just that many clear ascertainments and words [there are] in order to remove them. Therefore they[, different words and

\textsuperscript{449}The relation is such that an ascertainment “defeats”—shows to be wrong or prevents—a wrong imposition. The translation reflects the structure of the two compounds “niścayāropamanasor” and “bādhyabādhakahāvataḥ”, inverted for metrical reasons but paraphrased with the expected sequence at the end of the following prose paragraph.

\textsuperscript{450}tad api refers to niścayajñāna in PVSV 28,8.

\textsuperscript{451}Cf. also the argument in PVSV 26,24–27,2. The construction tathā hi plus two ablative clauses and no main sentence strikes me as somewhat awkward.
ascertainties,] have different fields of activity. // [PV I 50] //

Otherwise, if a single real thing were pervaded by a single word or by an awareness, [there would] not be any other [uncognized] object.\(^{452}\) Thus there would be synonymity [of all words and conceptual cognitions]. // [PV I 51] //

[PVSV 29,5] These are two intermediary verses.

**A.1.4 PV I 52–55**

Also for whom\(^{453}\) a cognition (\(dhī\)) grasps an object that has different additional attributes\(^{454}\) [and] is differentiated [from those attributes], // [PV I 52ab] //

[PVSV 29,7] Whoever thinks this: “Additional attributes [are] different from each other and from their basis. Words,\(^{455}\) which are based on them, apply to substrata (\(ādhāra\)) of these [additional attributes], or to these [additional attributes] alone. Therefore there is no such unwanted consequence [as synonymity].” For that [person] also,

\(^{452}\) Cf. PVV 306,11–12: ...\(nānyo \text{'pratipanno viṣayo 'stīti ... (...not any other, i.e.,} an uncognized, \text{object ...)}. Karnakagomin (PVSVṬ 131,26–132,8, see appendix A.2.2) discusses two ways of understanding this “any other”: the first results in an interpretation as given here; according to the second, one would have to understand that there is no object for another word or cognition.

\(^{453}\) PVSVṬ 132,4 identifies this as “\(vaiśeṣikasya\)” (“for a Vaiśeṣika”). PVV 306,17 identifies the opinion as “\(naiyāyikāder mate\)”, i.e., as held “in the theory of the Naiyāyikas and so on”. This “and so on” is paraphrased as “\(vaiśeṣikāder\)”, “for a Vaiśeṣika and so on” in Vibhū 306, n. 3.

For PVSV 29,6–47,13 (kk. 52–94), cf. also the translation in Vora and Ota 1979, Vora and Ota 1980, and Vora and Ota 1982.

\(^{454}\) \(upādhi\), a non-essential attribute or pseudo universal in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theories, is glossed as meaning the proper universals “substance-ness, etc.” by both PVSVṬ 132,9 (\(upādhayo dravyatvādayah\)) and PVV 306,17 (\(nānopādher dravyatvā-\)dyanekadharmaviśiṣṭasyā° ...).

\(^{455}\) See footnote 560.
if that, which has a nature undifferentiated from the capacities that are an auxiliary (aṅga) to the different additional attributes’ support, is grasped with all its self, which difference of [that which is] supported would not be ascertained? // [PV I 52cd–53ab] //

[PVSV 29,12] Even if the additional attributes, which are indeed different [from each other and their basis], [were] the cause of other words and cognitions about an object, still only this single [object] having these [additional attributes] is clung to by these [words and cognitions]. [There is] no difference in the proper self of a [property possessor] whose nature [consists in] the capacities for supporting the various additional attributes; therefore, if grasping [this supporter] with all its self, which particular additional attribute indeed would not be ascertained? For one grasps [this supporter] as being what supports all the additional attributes. For [it is] not [the case that] a completely different supporter-state of that grasped with its own form is not really grasped. Therefore, exactly that, which is grasped with its own nature, [is grasped] also as being a support. So [it is stated].

Because of a connection of these two[, supported and supporter,] in [their] natures, both [would be] grasped in the cognition of one. // [PV I 53cd] //

[PVSV 29,20] Because of grasping the state of supported and supporter, which is[, respectively,] the nature of the additional attribute and that having it, all two are grasped in the cognition of one. So (iti) where this[, which has an additional property,] is grasped,

456 PVSVṬ 133,29: “...upalīyate viṣayikriyate.” (“...clung to, i.e., made an object.”)

457 In other words, a thing’s nature is not different from the capacities by which it can support its attributes. Therefore the thing, grasped with its own nature, cannot be grasped without being grasped as supporting these additional attributes. And since there cannot be two separate supporting states for the same thing, it must be grasped as the supporter of all its additional attributes.

458 Cf. the comment above, footnote 421. The idea here is that a supported thing and a supporting thing are so only in virtue of their relation to each other.

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even if [it is] characterized by [only] one additional attribute, there is a grasping of all additional attributes, because grasping that possessing additional attributes is not separable (nāntariyakatva) from grasping that [single additional attribute]. Otherwise, it would not even be grasped as such.459

For there is not one supporter of some other [supported thing, such that] this [supporter] would not be grasped. Neither is there a non-grasping of the supported when the supporter is grasped in this way[, i.e., as a supporter], because of the [unwanted] consequence that this [supporter] would not be grasped [as a supporter] either, as in the case of being owner and property.460 Therefore, even in the teaching that an additional attribute is a different object [than its supporter], there is the same consequence.461

Even if [there should be this objection:] “Nevertheless, the capacities through which [something] supports additional attributes are completely different from that which has those capacities. Therefore this consequence [does] not [follow].” [the answer is:]

Given there is a difference of the capacities that are the support of the properties, why are these [the capacities] of this [having these capacities], if there is no support of those [capacities] by that [possessing them]? In this way there would be an infinite regress. // [PV I 54] //</p>

[PVSV 30,3] If the states of being a supporter for each additional attribute are not really the proper self of this [which has the additional attributes], and (api) do not experience support from this, why are they called “its”? Or, if there is [this] support, this single [supporter], [which] supports capacities by capacities that have become its own self, is, when grasped even by only a single additional attribute, certainly grasped with its whole self. For [it is] so: if a single additional

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459PVSVṬ 234,25 f. comments: upādhīnām upakāraka upādhimān ity evam api na grhyeta. (“It] would not even be grasped in this way: that supporting the additional attributes [is] what has the additional attributes.”)

460For the criticism of this argument by Bhāsarvajña, cf. section 4.1.9.

461I.e., that of synonymity of all words and concepts. Cf. PVSVṬ 135,16–17.
attribute is grasped, the capacity supporting it is grasped. If that is grasped, the entity supporting it—having as its nature the complete support for the capacities [supporting its attributes]⁴⁶² [and] being grasped—causes [a person] to grasp all [these supported] capacities; and these [capacities cause the grasping of] their own additional attributes. So the consequence remains.⁴⁶³

[PVSV 30,10] If [you assume] that also these capacities that support the capacities [supporting the attributes] are really different from an entity, it [still] is the same, because [there is] an endless connection (ghaṭana) of the additional attributes and their [supporting] capacities to ever different capacities. [So] this single [entity having additional attributes], not being grasped [together] with these [capacities] at any time, [yet] having a self [consisting in] the support of those [capacities],⁴⁶⁴ is not grasped as having these [capacities].

[Objection:] If, on the other hand, words and cognitions were to adhere exclusively to the additional attributes, then, because there

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⁴⁶² The bahuvrīhi compound svātmabhūtasakalāśaktyupakārah can be analysed in various ways. Kānakagomin’s analysis is as follows (PVSVṬ 136,18–20): kim bhūtaḥ? svātmabhūtasakalāśaktyupakārah svātmabhūtāḥ sakalā upādhyupakārinām śaktinām upakārāḥ śaktayo yasya sa tathābhūto bhāvo gṛhitāḥ. (Read śaktyupakārah acc. to PVSVṬ₅ms 52a2 instead of the misprint śaktyapakārah in PVSVṬ 136,19. Trl.: What is [this grasped entity like]? svātmabhūtasakalāśaktyupakārah [that is,] the grasped entity is so [that it is one] whose supports—[that is,] capacities—for the capacities supporting additional attributes are its proper nature [and are] complete.) This analysis is also supported by the Tibetan translation (PVSVṬ 277b1 = PVSVQ 423b6): nus pa la phan pa rang gi bdag nyid du gyur pa mtha’ dag dang ldan pa.

⁴⁶³ PVSVṬ 136,22 points out: tadavasthā prasaṅgah ko bhedah syād anīścita iti ya uktah. (So the consequence remains, which was stated by [the words] “Which difference would not be ascertained?” [in PV I 53b].) Indeed, the infinite regress mentioned in PV I 54 does not follow from this argument, but is discussed in the next few lines.

⁴⁶⁴ I.e., the secondary capacities, PVSVṬ 137,7–8 ...tadupakārātmā. śaktyupakārātmā. upādhyupakārikānām śaktinām yāḥ śaktayas tadātmeti yāvat (...having a self consisting in the support of those capacities. That is to say, having a self consisting in those which [are] the capacities of the capacities supporting additional attributes.)
is no inclusion of this [entity having the attributes], there is no cognition of all [additional attributes] by means of the cognition of that [which has the attributes]. [Answer:] Nevertheless, because that [having attributes] is not indicated by words, [one] would not act towards it [due to a word]. So the usage of words would be useless. For all everyday activity [engaged] with affirmation and negation has [its] basis in causal efficacy. And, since additional attributes [are] without power as to this [causal efficacy], and that having the power, i.e., a specific particular, is not named, what [is achieved by] the usage of words? And therefore the additional attributes would not be additional attributes. For it is with respect to some primary thing that [additional attributes] are so called, because, when [a word] applies to something, [additional attributes] are a part of this [primary thing].

But, since this [primary thing] would not be indicated by words, these [additional attributes] would not be parts of any [thing]. So why [would they be] additional attributes? If this [is said]: “There is no error, because [a thing] is indicated through the [additional attributes] indicated [by words].” then there is [that] same consequence. First of all, that [having additional properties]—which, due to being not make that having additional attributes [their] object.)

vyartha, useless, can also literally mean “without a referent”.

This is a qualifying instrumental according to PVSVṬ 137,21–22: itthambhūta-lakṣanā (paṇiniḥ) ceyam tṛtiyā .... Also see Speijer 1886: §67.

If it [is said by an opponent]: If only the additional attribute is meant, still [there is] no such error, i.e., there is no error of word usage being useless, because of an indication, i.e., a delimitation of that having additional attributes by those additional attributes which are indicated by words.)

I.e., the consequence of grasping all of the thing’s additional properties. Cf. PVSVṬ 138,15: ...tadavasthāh sarvopādhigrahanaprāsaṅgah.
inseparable [from the additional attributes] is indicated by these additional attributes—is, if [it] is indicated by even [only] one [additional attribute], indicated with its whole self. So the [unwanted] consequence remains. For what difference (viśeṣa) is there here [in this matter], whether words should let [a person] indicate that [having additional attributes], or the additional attributes indicated by these [words should let a person indicate that having attributes]?

[PVSV 31,1] For, [it is] to that [same] extent that this [thing having the additional attributes] is ascertained as supporting all [additional attributes] at that time. So this [explanation of yours] is nothing at all. Therefore,

if that supporting a single [additional attribute] is to be grasped, [there are] no supports that are different (apara) from it, which would be unobserved if it is observed. If it is grasped, the whole is grasped. // [PV I 55] //

This is a recapitulating verse.\(^{472}\)

\(^{470}\)This was also argued in PVSV 29,22 f. Cf. also PVSVṬ 138,16: nāntariyakatayety upādhyupādhimator avyabhicārena. (Due to not being separable, i.e., since there is no deviation of additional attribute and that having an additional attribute.) This means additional attributes and that having them do not occur separately from each other.

\(^{471}\)I.e., the objection in PVSV 30,22.

\(^{472}\)This repeats the main intent of the section starting at PV I 52ab (trl. on page 287).
Moreover, in this [case] words as well as ascertainments, even though [they name and cognize] a differentiation from another and [that] differentiated from another, only conform (anu-√rudh) to convention. // PV I 59 //

[PVSV 32,15] There also, in [the case that] other-exclusion [is the word referent], the differentiation [is] not one, and truly another that [which is] differentiated, because of the unwanted consequence that that which is being turned away from the differentiation of this, is this. In this way, furthermore, there would not be a differentiation

473 This verse and a part of the PVSV concerning it are translated and discussed in Hattori 1996: 392 f. Hugon 2017 analyses some of the following passages to show in which sense Dharmakīrti says that vyārtti and vyāvṛtta are not different things.

474 PVSVṬ 143,14: tatrāpi cā nyāpohe śabdārthe. (Moreover, in that [case], i.e., when other-exclusion is the referent of a word.) For the discussion preceding this verse, cf. Kellner 2004: 19 f. The main point that Dharmakīrti was trying to prove in the preceding passages (starting with PV I 52, trl. on page 287) was that in all cases of a word denoting a real thing (property or property bearer), the result is an understanding of the whole thing in all its aspects. Dharmakīrti now proceeds to show that this problem does not exist when words denote exclusion.

475 Cf. PVSVṬ143,16–17, explaining saṃketam anurundhate: ye śabdā dharma-dharminvācanāḥ niścayās cobhayavīṣayāḥ, te saṅketam anurundhate. saṅketanuvīdānenaśām dharmadharminvīśayāvīśhāgaha kalpitāḥ. paramārthatas tu vyāvṛtī eva nāstīty arthāḥ. (Words, naming properties and property bearers, and ascertainments, which have these two as [their] objects, conform to convention. This means that, in conformity with convention, their[, the words’ and ascertainments’,] separation of objects [into] properties and property bearers is conceptually constructed. But in reality there is no [such] differentiation at all. That is the meaning [of Dharmakīrti’s statement].)

476 This passage is also translated and discussed in Hattori 1996: 392 f. and Kataoka 2009: 491. According to these interpretations (which I agree with), the unwanted consequence is that the thing differentiated from others becomes identical to these others, because its differentiation is not identical with it itself, under the assumption that the property and property bearer are distinct entities. E.g.: A cow (property bearer) has the property “excluded from horse”, and is different from that property. This is as much as to say: a cow is not “excluded from horse”. A horse, in turn, has the property “not excluded from horse”, which then makes it identical to a cow, equally not “excluded from horse”. (The way the quotation marks
[between different things]. Therefore exactly that which is differentiated is a differentiation. But the [according] difference in [both] a word and a cognition [which is due to a word exists] because of a difference in convention. There is no difference of that designated.

A. 1.6  PV I 64

Therefore\(^{477}\) the description [of the errors occurring for] the opinion [that a thing] that possesses that [genus] when move around in the qualifiers shows that the argument banks on equating “is not something” with “not excluded from something”). Put a bit more schematically, one could say: Cow (\textit{dharmin}1) is qualified by, and different from, non-horse (\textit{dharma}1). Horse (\textit{dharmin}2) is qualified by, and different from, not non-horse (non-\textit{dharma}). If \textit{dharmin}1 is not \textit{dharma}1, then \textit{dharmin}1 is \textit{dharmin}2, because \textit{dharmin}2 is qualified by “non-\textit{dharma}”.

This is also how PVSVṬ 143,21–24 understands this passage: \textit{yadi cāśvād vyāvṛttr ānaśvātā godravyasyānyā syāt tadbāśvāvyāvṛttler api godravyena nivartti-tavyam bhedāt}. \textit{tataś ca tadbhāvyāprasangāt, aśvabhāvyaprasangād aśvavat. evam hy aśvabhāvyāvṛtler ānaśvāvalaksanāyā gaur vyāvṛtto bhavati yady asyāśvavatvam syāt}. (And if the material entity cow’s differentiation from horse, [its] non-horseness, were different [from this cow], then the material entity cow will have to be turned away also from the exclusion from horse, because of a difference [between the cow and its quality, being excluded from horse]. And because, therefore, for a cow[, which is] that turned away from non-horseness[, that is,] from the differentiation from this[, i.e., horse], there is the consequence of being this[, i.e.,] the consequence of being a horse, like a horse. For in that way a cow would become differentiated from the differentiation from a horse, which is characterized as non-horseness.)

This verse is discussed in Hattori 1996: 393, Kataoka 2009: 493(6), and Tillemans 2011a: 452 ff. Kataoka (2009: 493(6)) interprets “...\textit{tadvatpakṣopavarnanam / pratyākhyātam...}” as “...the [opponent’s] explanation of the [Buddhist] view of \textit{tadvat} (a locus qualified by \textit{apoha}) is refuted ...”. This concurs with the understanding of the same phrase in Hattori 1996: 393: “mention (made by Kumārila) in reference to (the theory of) \textit{anyāpoha}, of (the faults to be found with) the \textit{tadvat} theory (viz., the theory maintaining that a word denotes that which is qualified by the universal) has been rejected.” Both authors thus understand that the agent of the criticism (the “description”, in my translation) to be an opponent, Kumārila. Tillemans (2011a: 452–453; 453, n. 11) takes the agent to be Dignāga. The differences in interpretation are mainly due to how the conditional is construed: either one translates “the description of the errors in the \textit{tadvat}-theory is refuted when exclusion is the word-referent,” or “the description of the errors in the \textit{tadvat}-theory [that result also] when exclusion is the word-referent is refuted.” Judging from Dharmakīrti's following prose passage,
the [word’s] object [is] other-exclusion is rejected. For
[this] error would exist [only] if there is a separation of
 genus and that possessing it.\footnote{A.1.} // PV I 64 //

[PVSV 34,19] What was said [as an objection]: “Also if other-
exclusion is the object of a word, every [unwanted] consequence stated
for the position that [a thing] possesses that[, i.e., a genus,] [would
be the] same, because that qualified by this [exclusion of others]
is designated [by words].”, that also is defended against by that
[explanation].\footnote{A.2.} For, in this [theory of a thing possessing a genus], a
word applying to some [object, that possessing the genus,] in taking
up another object[, i.e., referring to the genus,] is oppressed by the

the latter is more likely, and it would thus indicate that Dharmakīrti is rejecting
the errors that Kumārila had accused Dignāga of. The difference is a small one,
since Dignāga had previously levelled the criticism at the Naiyāyika’s \textit{tadvatpakṣa}. PVSVṬ 153,17–19 comments: \textit{yataś ca vyāvṛttiyāvṛttimator abhedas tena kārane-nānyāpohaviśaye jātimān śabdair abhidhiyata iti tadvatpakṣah. tatra yo doṣaḥ, so ‘nyāpohe ’pi syād iti tadvatpakśopavarananam pratyākhyaṭam.} (\textit{viśaye} corr. acc. to PVSVṬ ms 57b7 against \textit{viṣayo} in PVSVṬ 153,18. Trl.: And for the [reason that there is] no difference between differentiation and differentiated [thing], \textbf{due to that}, as a cause, \textbf{given that other-exclusion is the object} of words, [the]
\textbf{depiction} [of these errors occurring] \textbf{for the position of “[a thing] possessing that [genus]” is rejected}, i.e., the depiction which consist in this statement]:
the error, which [exists] for this[, i.e., for] the position [that a thing] possesses this [genus][, expressed as] “Words designate that having this [genus].”, would exist also for other-exclusion.)

\footnote{As explained by Frauwallner (1932: 260–263), it was Kumārila’s objection against Dignāga’s \textit{apoha} theory that it entailed all the same errors levelled against the \textit{tadvat}-theory by him. Cf. the references in Frauwallner 1932: 261, n. 2, the explanations and the references in Kataoka 2009: 493(6), as well as the references in footnote 477.}

\footnote{I.e., by the explanation that there is no difference between the differentiated thing and the differentiation qualifying it. Cf. PVSVṬ 153,26–27: \textit{aneneti vyāvṛttiyāvṛttimator ananyatvena prativyūḍham pratyākhyaṭam.}}
errors of not being independent etc. But differentiation from another is not an object other than that differentiated, because both designate the same. This was explained.

[PVSV 34,23] [Objection:] How then, when a differentiated thing and its differentiation are one, could a differentiation from another be a universal, since the one differentiated, being a particular, does not correspond to another? [Answer:] Because there is an appearance in this way, that is, as corresponding to another, in the awareness of this universal. Indeed, there is nothing called a universal at all. An awareness based on words is generated as mixing together actually unmixed properties, because of the capacity of beginningless mental impressions. In virtue of the appearance for this awareness, a universal and coreference are defined, no matter that everyday activity based on them has objects that are non-existent, because objects neither mix amongst themselves, so as to justify a universal, nor are they differentiated [into various qualities, so as to justify coreference].

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480 PVSVṬ153,29 (asamā° corrected to asāmā): ādiśabdād asāmānādhikaranyopacāradoṣaparigrahaḥ. (From the word “etc.” the errors of not being co-referential and metaphor should be understood.) Cf. Much 1997 for a discussion of the first problem, whether and how words can denote the same thing, and cf. Pind 2015: §5 for a translation of Dignāga’s discussion of all three problems. Ogawa 2017 has studied Dignāga’s position in light of Bhartṛhari’s positions.

481 For another translation of PVSV 34,22–35,7, see Tillemans 2011a: 453, n. 12.

482 Cf., e.g., PVSV 32,15–17 (trl. page 293).

483 Cf. PVSVṬ154,7 f.: sāmānyabuddhau vikalpikāyām tathākāhāreṇa prati-bhāsanād ekākāra eva vyāvartya teneti vyāvṛttih sāmānyam ucyate. (Because it appears in this way, i.e., with the same (eka) form, to the conceptual awareness of a universal, exactly the same form is differentiated by this [appearance]. So differentiation, [defined as the process] “This causes just the same form to be differentiated.” is called a universal.)

484 For “mixing” in this sense, cf. PVSV ad PV I 40 (trl. appendix A.1.1).

485 Acc. to PVSVṬ154,24 asadartho ’pi refers to a vyavahāra involving universals and coreference. See also the other options discussed in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 64, n. 189. Their translation also follows Karṇakagomin’s analysis.

486 Cf. PVSVṬ154,24–26 for this interpretation.
The basis for all this conventional activity, such as the ideas of a universal and coreference, are the objects differentiated from others by having this cause and this effect, and words allow one to act while avoiding the unwanted. Therefore it is said that a word has other-exclusion as an object. In this theory, an object, whose external reality is disregarded by words and concepts, which is one, and differentiated from many in virtue of the appearance in awareness, is made an object by words, as also by concepts, which have origin in the awakening of impressions that were imparted by the experience of this singular thing and that have objects determined as being so, i.e., as externally existing things. And only to these appearances in awareness does the everyday usage of property and property-bearer extend itself, a usage that cannot be talked about in terms of the property and property bearer being the same as, or different from, each other. For there is no property different from a property bearer because the two do not denote a different object. Neither is this property just the property bearer, because, as for that denoting this property bearer, it would follow that also that which denotes a property indicates other distinctions. And in this way, that is, given that the property is just the property bearer, no particular convention would be made, because that which a person desires to express with a word for a property would not be made clear by that word, since it would express a property bearer. This, then, is the fact that property and property bearer cannot be talked of with regard to the object of a word. But, with regard to a real thing,

487 The interpretation here follows the analysis in PVSVṬ 154,28–155,5.
488 Which means that by saying “blue” about something, also other qualities would be known (such as that the thing is a water lily, a plant, etc.).
489 Acc. to PVSVṬ 156,28–29: etad anantaroktam tattvānyatvābhyyām avācya- tvam dharmaḥdmahārmiḥ śabdārthe buddhipratibhāsiny arthe uktam. (This, which was just explained, is the fact that property and property bearer cannot be talked of as being the same as, or different from, each other, which has been explained for the word referent, i.e., for the object appearing in awareness.) This argument thus shows that even though property and property bearer are differentiated in everyday activity, this is not really true with regard to the word.
A particular, a common characteristic cannot be talked of because [this universal] does not exist.

A.1.7  PV I 107ab

If this is thought [by an opponent]: There is no cognition of different [things] with an undifferentiated appearance. // PV I 107ab //

[PVSV 54,18] We [opponents] do not say: what is not the same (aneka) does not create the same (eka) effect. Rather [we say: given that there are] different objects, an awareness, into which their forms have been thrown, should not have an undifferentiated appearance. [Answer:] Indeed, there is no appearance of particulars in [awareness events] grasping a universal, because these [awareness events] exist even if those [particulars] do not exist, and because they appear in a cognition of [the particular] itself, i.e., in a perceptual cognition, with another form, i.e., other than the form of the universal, and because [there is] an overreaching consequence, since a single [thing] is not consistent with multiple forms. Thus this [conceptual referent as the object appearing in awareness. And since there is, ultimately, no difference or identity between property and property bearer in this way, the errors that Kumārila thought arose for Dignāga's apoha theory (cf. PV I 64) are shown not to pertain to it.

490 Cf. PVSVT 221,24 sāmānyagrāhiṇīṣu buddhiṣu (In [those] grasping a universal, i.e., in [those] awareness events.)

491 The three reasons given now are, according to PVSVT 221,25–222,10, aimed against three different opinions about the relation between what appears to awareness on the one hand, and particulars or universals on the other: first, that the form in which a particular appears to perception is the same as the form in which it appears to conceptual cognition; second, that the form appearing in the awareness of a universal is the form of the particulars; and third, that the same particular has a twofold form— with one it appears to perception, with the other to conceptual cognition.

492 PVSVT 222,8–10: tṛtiyam pakṣam nirākārtum āha–anekākārāyogād iti. ekasyānekatvam ayuktam ekānekatvayor virodhāt. atiprasaṅgac cety ekasyānękā- tvakalpanāyām na kvacid ekatvam syād ity arthah. (In order to refute the third position (cf. footnote 491), [Dharmakīrti] said: “Because it is not consistent with multiple forms.” Being many is not consistent for one, because being one
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Awareness is not [one that could], grasping particulars, appear with an undifferentiated form, [and] arise from these [particulars].\(^{493}\)

Even though [it] has no appearance of these [particulars], [conceptual awareness] causes the world to engage in everyday activity because of the confusion that is determination. But this form, appearing in this [conceptual awareness], does not exist amongst the objects, other and being many are contradictory. **And because there is the overreaching consequence**, [i.e.,] there would not be oneness for anything when there is the option that one [thing] is many [things]. This is the meaning.

\(^{493}\) Cf. PVSVṬ 222,11–14: *yata evaṃ tasmān neyam sāmānyākārā buddhiḥ bhinnārthagrāhiṇy āhitaswalaksanākārā saty abhinnākārā bhāti, tadudbhavā bhinnadārthodbhavā. kim tu svalaksanagrāhino ’nubhavenāhitām vāsanām āśriyā prakṛtyā bhrāntaiveyam utpadyate. pāramparyena ca vyaktayas tasyāḥ kāraṇam kathyante.* (Emend *pāramparye ca to pāramparyena ca*, the *na* perhaps having gone missing due to the line ending on *pāramparye*. Cf. the very similar sentence in PVT\(_D\) je 122b7–123a1 = PVṬ\(_Q\) je 145a6–7: *’di ni ...rang bzhin gyis ’khrol pa kho nar skye la brgyud pas ni....* Trl.: Since it is so, [i.e., since the three reasons just mentioned are true,] therefore this awareness having the form of a universal is not [one that]—**grasping differentiated objects**, [i.e.,] being one into which the form of a particular has been placed—appears as having a form undifferentiated [from the particulars, or one that] arises from this[, i.e., one that] arises from differentiated things. Rather, this [awareness]—by [its] nature completely erroneous—arises based on mental traces that have been put [there] through the experience of [a cognition] grasping a particular. And, indirectly, the particulars are called the cause of this [conceptual awareness].

Cf. also the the Tibetan translation, supporting Karnakagomin’s understanding especially of the relation between *bhinnārthagrāhinī* and *pratibhāti*, PVSV\(_D\) 292a3 = PVSV\(_Q\) 441b5–6: *de’i phyir ’di ni de las byung zhing don tha dad pa ’dzin pa yin na tham dad par snang bar mi ’gyur ro.*

Note how the three attributes negated here align with the three reasons just mentioned:

1. a conceptual awareness occurs even though the particulars do not exist, hence this awareness does not arise from them (*tadudbhavā*);
2. a conceptual awareness does not appear with the same form as a perception of a particular does, hence it does not appear with an undifferentiated (or the same) form (*abhinnā pratibhāti*);
3. one thing cannot have many forms, hence a conceptual awareness (grasping many forms, like green, tall, leafy) does not grasp the particular.

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(anyatra) than as a difference that has no difference.\textsuperscript{494} And\textsuperscript{495} this [common form] is unreal. In this way this [awareness] grasping only this [unreal common form] goes astray. This was already explained.\textsuperscript{496}

[PVSV 55.6] Moreover, even for those teaching a universal as a real thing, the [individual] manifestations [of such a real universal] are completely differentiated. How [should there be] an awareness having an undifferentiated form with regard to these [particulars]? This is to be questioned in the same manner.\textsuperscript{497} [Objection:] [It is] not

\textsuperscript{494}For this way of construing anyatra, cf. PW I: 265–266, anyatra, 7. A difference that has no difference is nothing but other-exclusion. Cf. PVSVṬ 222,22–25: ka-tham tarhi vyaktir abhinnākārapratībhāsa ity āha–anyatra bhedād abhedina iti. bhedo ‘nyāpohaḥ sa eva prativyaktyabhedi. tathā hi yathāikā govyaktīr agovyārvṛtā tathāyāpi. tad anena prakāreṇa svalakṣaṇānāpy eva vijātiivyārvṛtānāpy abhedīnāpy bhedā ity ucyante. anyatrasabdād cāyam vibhaktantaprātriṇāpakā niptātā. anya-sabdasaṃānārthāḥ. na tu ayam tralpratayāntāḥ, saptamārthaśyāvivāksitvatvāt. tenāyam artho–yathoktena prakāreṇa svalakṣaṇātmakād bhedād abhedino ‘nyāḥ pratibhāsāmānāḥ ākāro ‘rtheṣu nāṣti kim tu svalakṣaṇātmaka eva bhedo vijāti-vyārvṛtter abhedī sarvatra vidyate bhedādhyavasāyaḥ. abhedādhyavasāyas ca sa eva bhedāḥ pāramprāyenā nimittam. (Because of [the question]: “How then is there an appearance of a non-different form in particulars?”, [Dharmakīrти] said: other than a difference that has no difference. This difference, i.e., other-exclusion alone, has no difference for [particular] manifestations. For [it is] so: as one cow-manifestation is differentiated from non-cow, so also another [cow-manifestation is differentiated from non-cow]. Thus, in this way, the particulars alone, which are differentiated from [manifestations] of another genus, and, in that sense, are undifferentiated [from each other], are called “difference.” And this word “anyatra” is an indeclinable that accords to a case ending. It has the same meaning as the word “other.” But this is not the tral ending, i.e., trā, because the sense of the seventh, locative, case is not meant. Thus this is the meaning: an appearing form, which is different from the non-different difference that has the nature of a particular in the way explained, does not exist among the objects; rather, a difference, which only has the nature of a particular, [and which is] without difference due to a differentiation from [things] of a different kind, is seen in all [particulars of the same class] because non-difference is determined. And for a determination of non-difference precisely this difference is, indirectly, the cause.)

\textsuperscript{495}PVSVṬ 222,31 glosses ca as hi (“since”) here: hyarthe caśabdaḥ.

\textsuperscript{496}As pointed out in Gnoli 1960: 190, acc. to PVSVṬ 223,9–10 the reference is to PVSV 50,16–17.

\textsuperscript{497}I.e., in the same manner that Dharmakīrtti’s theory was questioned in PV I 107a: abhinna-pratibhāsā dhīr na bhinnaśv iti cen matam.
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[to be questioned] in the same manner, because an undifferentiated universal really exists there [amongst the particulars]. [Answer:] Is it not [so that] the appearance of this universal amongst those [particulars], even though it [may] exist, is not noticed? For this [conceptual awareness] is regarded as having an appearance of colour [and] constellation. But the universal is not like this [i.e., it does not have colour and constellation], nor is there any undifferentiated form separated from this [colour and constellation]. Also for one teaching shape (ākṛti) as the universal, there is no occurrence [of this kind of universal] in another object because, like a particular characteristic, this universal is not separated [from the particular]. Therefore (iti), because of the difference, an undifferentiated appearance is not consistent [with manifestations of universals].

A.1.8 PV I 108cd–110

[Objection:] Now, a cognition is their [the particulars’] effect and it is differentiated // PV I 108c”d //

498 Karnakagomin says that “nanu” here introduces the Siddhāntavādin’s, i.e., Dharmakīrti’s statement (nanvityādi siddhāntavādī, PVSVṬ 223,14).

499 PVSVṬ 223,14–16 gives two interpretations of tatra: first, vyaktisu, “amongst the individual manifestations”; second, vikalpikāvikalpikāyāṃ buddhau, “in a conceptual [or?] non-conceptual awareness”. This should probably be emended to vikalpikāyāṃ buddhau (the error perhaps due to an eye-skip in the ms?). It can then be understood as “in a conceptual awareness”. Both options are feasible, though I think the first fits the context better.

500 The difference here could be understood in two ways: either that between the particulars, which would mean that a universal known through them would not really be the same, or that between the undifferentiated appearance (the common form in a conceptual cognition) and the form that the opponent said is not really different from the particulars (and can therefore not figure in conceptual awareness).

Cf. PVSVṬ 223,24–25: iti hetos tad api sāmānyaṃ svalaṣṭanam eva jātam. tato bhedād dhetoḥ vidyamānasya nābhinnah pratibhāhāyāṃ buddhau. (Therefore, for that reason, this universal too[, i.e., the ākṛti] becomes only a particular. Because of the difference of what exists from this [shape], an undifferentiated appearance is not consistent. [To this] one supplies “for manifestations” [in order to understand the sentence].)

501 Also cf. the translation and discussion of this and the next verse in Dunne 2004: 120–126.
[PVSV 56,11] according to its object, because, like this particular, a cognition, too, in which this particular appears is different. How can particulars have the same (eka) effect? For this cognition is their effect and differentiated. Whatever is the same effect of something like a pot etc., such as carrying water etc., that also is differentiated because of the difference according to the thing causing that effect. Therefore different things do not have the same effect. [Answer:] This error does not exist, for this reason:

Because of being the cause for the same judgement (pratyavamarṣa), a cognition (dhī) is without difference. Through being the cause for the same cognition, the particulars also are not differentiated. //PV I 109//

Earlier, it was made known (nivedita) how there is no mixing of entities’ own natures. An awareness (buddhi) having a mixed-together form with regard to these entities is merely an error. And this (iti) was also made known: “But the different objects (padārtha), in becoming causes for a conceptual cognition, indirectly generate this

502Cf. also the translation of this verse and the following commentary up to PVSV 57,7 in Steinkellner 1971: 190, n. 46.
503Acc. to Gnoli (1960: 190, note to 56,18) and PVSVṬ 227,26–27, this refers to PV I 40. Dunne 2004: 122, n. 111: “a likely candidate is PVI.68–75 and PVSV ad cit.”.
504PVSVṬ 228,7–8 ca[kāro niveditam ity āsyāyukarsanārthah. etad api tatraiva prastāve niveditam. (The word “ca (and)” has the purpose of pulling over this phrase: “it was made known”. This too was made known in that same passage, i.e., PV I 40).)
505padārtha here cannot mean the object of a word, because that cannot be the cause of anything. Accordingly, PVSVṬ 227,30 glosses: “...bhedināḥ padārthā vyāvṛtāni svalakṣanāni...” (...the different objects, that is, the particulars differentiated [from others]...).
506The word krameṇa could qualify either the immediately following compounded adjective, so that one would have to understand “indirectly becoming a cause for a conceptual cognition” (which is how it is understood in Dunne 2004: 122), or the main verb of the sentence, as translated above. PVSVṬ 227,30 clearly understands it as qualifying the main verb: “tāṃ bhrāntiṃ bhedināḥ padārthā vyāvṛtāni svalakṣanāni krameneti yan uktam, tasya
[awareness] because of [their] own nature.” But this discrimination (viveka) from the natures causing non-that[, i.e., different effects], [is] called\(^{507}\) their [the things’] undifferentiated difference, because [it is] the cause for some [effect] which is the same, [i.e., the same] cognition etc. This [same effect, such as a cognition etc.,] too, though [it is] differentiated according to the thing (pratidravya), appears (\(\sqrt{\text{vikhyā}}\)) as undifferentiated, insofar as it is (bhavat) by [its] nature the reason for the same judgement which covers (\(\text{avaskandin}\)) [different things] with non-difference. Because of being the cause for an end (artha) such as a cognition etc., [which a] is the cause for such a judgement, [and b] is one [in which a non-difference appears, even particulars generate, by [their] own nature, the same (eka) cognition [through which] a form (\(\text{ākāra}\)) is mixed together [with the forms of other things, and for which] the difference [of the thing’s] own nature is the real object. This has often been said.\(^{508}\) Therefore the non-difference of entities is only that [they] have the same effect.

And this[, that they have the same effect,] is the separation (viśleṣa) from [things having] other (atat) effects // PV I 110a //

indeed,
because one does not observe, and [even] negates, // PV I 110c //

\(^{507}\)See, for example, PVSV 55,4–5: anyatra bhedād abhedināḥ.

\(^{508}\)Gnoli 1960: 190, to 57,6: “see f. ex. the words tām tu bhedināḥ padārthāḥ, etc. (above p. 56, ll. 19–20) and stanzas 73–74.”
a real thing

other than that [particular], [such that that other real thing would] be repeated [in different instances] // PV I 110b //

[PVSV 57,13] This has been said: “For a separately observable [thing] does not appear.”⁵⁰⁹ Or [also]: “If [it] exists, how [could it,] having no basis in any [particular, be] the reason for a cognition?”, and [also this was said]: “And because of the orderly presentation (vidhāna) of [its] negation it is wrong to fantasize about it.”⁵¹⁰

Therefore it is correct that


⁵¹⁰ There are three statements here, each of which is said to have already been explained. **Statement 1**: an observable thing separated from the particulars does not appear. This is directed at a universal which is supposed to be a real thing qualifying multiple particulars, but never appears separately from any particular. As Gnoli notes (see footnote 509), this was said in PV I 71–75. Especially PV I 71ab makes this point clearly: *vyaktayo nānuyanty anyad anuyāyi na bhāsate | (Particulars do not conform [to each other]; something else [other than the particulars] which conforms [to them] does not appear.)*

The auto-commentary for the second part makes the same point as our quote in very similar terminology, PVSV 39,21–23: *anyac ca na tābhyo vyatiriktam kimcit tathā buddhau pratibhāty apratibhāsamānaṃ ca katham ātmanā ’nyaṃ grāhayed vyapadesāyed vā.*

**Statement 2**: or if that thing exists, it is of no consequence for cognition. If a universal should exist, however, it would not be a cause for a cognition. This is reminiscent of PV I 75d and its auto-commentary (here quoted without separation of verse and prose): *dhrauvyāc ca / sāmānyasya anupakārataḥ / yadi hy upakuryād anādheyavīśesasyānyaşıkṣanāt sakṛt sarvam svakāryam janayet. na vā tajjananasvabhāvam. (..., and because a universal, since it is constant, is of no service [in producing some effect]. For, if a universal were to render a service, every effect of it would be generated at once since [something], which is such that nothing can be added to it, does not depend on something else [for producing an effect]. Or else, if it does not produce those effects all at once,] it would not have the nature of producing those [effects at all].)*

**Statement 3**: Contriving the notion of a universal is wrong, because it has been refuted. This seems to be a very general remark. It might be referring to PV I kk. 40–42, which can be read as a definition of all that can possibly exist. See also the material referenced from the translation of §§ 32–48, where Ratnakīrti refutes universals.
A.1. *apoха* in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*

Convention (saman karma) // PV I 110d` //
also

has a knowledge of that [difference] as [its] purpose // PV
I 110d” //

alone. Also the convention which is made should shine forth
(√śubh) only for the [sake of the] cognition of that which is this mu-
tual discrimination of entities, since [convention] serves [successful]
activity by [means of] discriminating [that] causing non-that [from
what does cause a desired aim].

If there is no convention with the purpose of cognizing this [dis-
crimination], then, because there is no contact [to that discrimination]
even at the time of everyday usage of this [discrimination], one would
not act by avoiding other [things than the ones desired]. For [then]
a discrimination of these [things have the same effect] from those
[having different effects] would not be indicated by a word.⁵¹¹

The argument here is that if a verbal convention were to be made for something
real, then that thing would not exist anymore when that convention is used. This
would happen if words did not indicate a difference (viveka) of things, as they do in
the *apoха* theory.

PVSVT 230,18–21 explains: etad uktam bhavati. yadā vidhirūpenānyavayāṛtto
ṛtho visayikṛtas tadānyavyavacchedah pratiyeta. etad evāḥ — na hītyādi. viveka
iti viviktaḥ svabhāvah, teśām tatkarinām, tebhya ity atatkāryebhyaḥ. yadi hi tasya
viviktasya svabhāvasya pratitaye sanketah kṛtah syād evam vyavahāre ’pi śabdena
codyeta. tathā cānyaparihāreṇa pravarteteti sanketo ’pi tadvidarthika eva yuktah.
( [By this] the [following] is said: if an object differentiated from others were made an
object [of conceptual cognition] in a positive form, then [its] separation from another
would be cognized. Exactly this [Dharmakīrti] said: “For not” etc. Discrimination,
i.e., a discriminated nature of these, i.e., which have that effect, from those,
meaning those with different effects. For, if a convention were made in order to
cognize this discriminated nature [itself], it would be indicated by a word in the
same way also in everyday activity. And in the same way one would act by avoiding
what is other [than what one wants]. So it is correct that[, as stated in PV I 110d,]
convention also has a knowledge of this discrimination as its object.)
A. Dharmakīrti on āpoha

A.1.9  PV I 113cd–121

[Objection:] If one grasps the object [of the word] “tree” through the exclusion of non-trees, the two are dependent on each other. So, if one [of them] is not grasped, neither is grasped. Convention is impossible because of that. So some (kecit) say.514 // PV I 113cd–114 //

[PVSV 58,22] [Objection:] If tree is the difference from non-trees, convention is not possible for [this] object, [which] has not arisen in awareness because this [tree] cannot be grasped in this way

512This discussion must be understood as being about the object of the word “tree” and other objects, but not about particular trees. I try to convey this by, somewhat artificially, not adding articles: instead of translating “grasping a tree”, I translate “grasping tree”, which for the opponent here means “grasping something qualified by the universal ‘tree-hood’”, and for Dharmakīrti means “grasping something differentiated from non-trees”, i.e., the referent of words. Cf. PVSVṬ 233,12–13: 
avṛkṣayatirekena vrkṣārthagrahaṇe vrkṣaśabdasya yo ’rthas tasya grahaṇe ’bhupagamyamāne, […] (If one grasps the object of tree by the exclusion of non-trees, [i.e.,] if one grasps, [or] intends to designate, the object of the word “tree”, …)

513Kārṇakagomin’s interpretation of dvayaṃ differs from my translation. According to PVSVṬ 233,13–14, dvayaṃ vrkṣāvrkṣagrahaṇam anyonyāśrayam, it is the two graspings, that of tree and non-tree, that depend on each other. A translation would then be:

If the grasping of the object “tree” [happens] through the exclusion of non-trees, the two[, the grasping of tree and the grasping of non-tree,] are dependent on each other. So when one is not grasped, neither is grasped.

Whilst the first statement makes good sense, it would seem a bit odd that in the next one Dharmakīrti uses (in a consequence drawn from the first statement), eka and dvaya again, but this time as referring to the things grasped. Kārṇakagomin sees no big problem here, and glosses, PVSVṬ 233,18, ekasya vrkṣasyavrkṣasya vā grahābhāve dvayāgraḥah.

514PVSVṬ 233,20–28 cites both Uddyotakara (NBhV 314,5–7) and Kumārila (ŚV Av 83–85ab, cf. appendix B.7 for a trl. of ŚV Av 83–84) as maintaining that other-exclusion as a word referent leads into a circular dependency between A (e.g., “cow”) and non-A (e.g., “non-cow”). Hugon (2009, 2011) discusses this matter (along with this verse and some following passages) extensively.
A.1. *apoha* in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvāvṛtti*

without grasping non-tree, [and] because also non-tree, [as] it has the form of a distinction from that [tree], is not known by [someone who] does not know tree. [Answer:] So some [say].

For these [people], are non-trees distinguished in convention or not? // PV I 115ab’ //

[PVSV 59,2] For those [persons], who, assuming a universal as a single real thing, thus question (√cud) the mutual dependency when convention [is made] through distinction (vyavaccheda) from others, [is it the case for them], when a convention is made also for this [real universal], that non-trees [are] distinguished or not?

If [non-trees are] distinguished, how [are they] known without first grasping tree? // PV I 115b”cd //

[PVSV 59,7] For at that time a cognizer (pratipattr) does not know tree, nor non-tree, because [the cognizer] starts off due to a desire for [learning] this [convention] only in order to know that[, what tree and non-tree are]. How should this unknowing [person] understand the distinction from non-tree when a convention [is made]? And

if a convention is without negation [of what is other], because a word that, if [the distinction of tree from non-tree] is not understood, is based on [an object] in which that other than that [which is desired] is not excluded, those engaged in everyday activity would not act avoiding that [which is other than what they want to attain], as

515 Acc. to PVSVT 234,25–26: *tadeti samketakāle, pratipattā, yasmai samketaḥ kriyate.* (At that time[, i.e.,] at the time a convention [is made], a cognizer[, i.e.,] one for whose sake a convention is made.)

516 The reason given here for a convention not containing a negation of what is other is not actually part of the verse in the Sanskrit text. But I was not able to translate in a way that this is clear.
one does not act avoiding certain kinds of trees.\textsuperscript{517} // PV I 116 //

[PVSV 59,13] For it is not coherent that, at [the time of] everyday usage [of a word], one acts—due to a word that, at [the time of] convention, was founded without distinction of what is other [than the intended object]—by avoiding that [which is undesired], as in the case of particular kinds of trees, such as a Śiṃśapā etc.\textsuperscript{518}

Moreover, should [this] be [said by an opponent]:

[As, contrary to your opinion,] one does not affirm [anything] upon negating another [object], [it is] upon showing a single [thing]\textsuperscript{519} placed before one that the convention “This [here] is a tree.” is made. This [object that a convention is based on] one cognizes also at [the time of] everyday usage [of the word]. So [there is] not this error [of mutual dependency]. // PV I 117–118ab’ //

[PVSV 59,18] Indeed, by someone teaching that universal is an existing real thing, nothing is affirmed through the distinction of

\textsuperscript{517}PVV 328,17–18 gives the following interpretation: \textit{yathā vr̥kṣaviśeṣāṇāṃ vr̥kṣasaṃkete 'vyavacchinnatvāt pravṛttiḥśayayatvam evam vr̥kṣāṇām api syāt.} (In the same way that [different] kinds of trees are, correctly, the object of activity because, in the convention for tree, [these kinds of tree] are not differentiated, so also non-trees would be, erroneously, the object of activity because they are not differentiated in setting the convention for tree.)

This is also how the comparison is understood by Hugon (2011: 114). Accordingly, the argument can be paraphrased as follows: in learning the word “tree”, there is no differentiation of tree species. When one acts on hearing the word “tree”, one, correctly, does not differentiate between kinds of trees. In the current discussion, there is no distinction between tree and non-tree, just as there is none between tree and kinds of tree. So the consequence—undifferentiated activity—has to be the same in both cases.

\textsuperscript{518}The example can be understood as follows: if a person has correctly understood the convention for “tree”, she will in future act correctly towards all kinds of trees, since none of these kinds of trees was excluded at the time the convention was set. Accordingly, one can generalize and say that if something is not excluded at the time of the convention, activity will be directed towards it also at a later time.

\textsuperscript{519}PVSVṬ 236,18 \textit{ekam iti sāmānyam}. (\textbf{One}, i.e.,] a universal.)
something. Rather, clearly seeing a single real thing positioned in front [of one], the convention “This is a tree.” is made. Also, at [the time of] everyday activity just this object, as seen at the time of the convention, or that connected with that [object], is cognized. So [there is] no similar [unwanted] consequence[, i.e., that tree and non-tree are interdependent]. [Answer:] There is no dissimilar [consequence]. For also here[, when a convention is made for a real thing, by saying]

“This also [is] a tree”, [or] “only this [is a tree]”, the [unwanted] consequence is not averted. // PV I 118b’cd //

Also someone saying “This is a tree.”, [while] pointing out a single [thing], does not go beyond these two options: “That also [is a tree].” [or] “That only [is a tree].” And for both of these there is precisely this error. [Objection:] [There is] no error, because what is opposed to that seen is easily cognized. For, in someone seeing one [thing and then] experiencing an awareness [with a form] distinct from that [thing’s form], an ascertainment of difference, which distinguishes these [things], arises according to the experience “[this is] other than that.” For, someone who has been taught “Only this is a tree.” while being shown [a tree] cognizes all by himself exactly this non-tree just where he does not see this [tree]. This is not possible for someone teaching exclusion, because a form observed in one [instance] does not continue in some [other instance].

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520 I.e., the particular which is connected to a universal, cf. PVSVT 236,22–23: *tatsambandhinam* ve *ti sāmānyasambandhinam āśrayam*. (Or that connected to it[, i.e.,] the basis which has a connection to a universal.)

521 Following the Tibetan translation, *ananvayāt* should be understood as giving the reason for this sentence, that this is not possible for someone adhering to an exclusion theory, PVSVD 294b1 = PVSVQ 444b1–2: *rnam par geod pa smra bo la ni ’di mi srid de, gcig na mthong ba’i ngo bo ni gang la yang rjes su ’gro ba med pa’i phyir ro*. This is also reflected in PVSVT 237,22–29 (the opponent is speaking): *ananyāpohavādino ’py evam iti cet. āha — nedam ityādi. ekatra samketakāle drṣṭasyāśādhāranasya rūpasya kvacīd vyaktyantare ’nanvayād ananugamāt.*

But it would also make good sense to take it as Gnoli did, and construe it as a reason for the next sentence: because a thing’s form is unique, a cognition of it in another instance is impossible.
A. Dharmakīrti on apoha

[of tree and non-tree] through observation, there would not be a cognition in this way[, i.e., as a tree,] even for another particular. [Answer:] In this way then, also here it is the same, for the [following reason]:

For, based (sthita) on the same cognition—called the same judgement—a cognizer (prapattṛ) divides the referents which are reasons for this [cognition] and for another (atad) [cognition] by himself. // PV I 119 //

[PVSV 60,16] As this has been made known earlier, certain entities, even though different as to [their] original nature (prakṛti), produce the same effect, like a cognition etc., [but] not others. These things this [cognizer] cognizes there[, at the time a convention is made], all by herself distinguishing causes for that [same effect] and causes for what is not that [same effect].

[The learner of a convention] will, by herself, cognize the entities present to her in an awareness of them—[which] appear as the cognition’s cause, [which] lack the form of not [being that] cause, [and so are] as if of the same form—as different [from those which do not cause that cognition]. So an expression is bound to a difference. A cognition, cognizing this [difference] because of this [expression], beholds [this difference] as if it were the same real thing due to an error. // PV I 120–1 //

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523 The following verses and prose are examined in McAllister (forthcoming b).
524 tasya is not part of the verse, but I could not find a construction that would have made this clear.
525 Cf. PVSVṬ 239,23: ...atatkāribhyo bhedena ...
A.1. *apoha* in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavrtti*

([PVSV 60,23] [It is] due to the very nature\(^{526}\) of these [things] that the causes for such\(^{527}\) a conceptual cognition—which[, in turn,] is due to an experience [of these things]—are continuous. Because of

\(^{526}\)This passage is also translated and discussed in McCrea and Patil 2006: 312 ff. The translation presented here follows Karnakagomin’s analysis of the passage (PVSVṬ 240,10–241,25), and is (sometimes for that reason) different from the one by McCrea and Patil (2006) in various details. The main difference lies in our interpretation of the *atathābhūta-tathādhyavasita* clause. McCrea and Patil (2006: 312) translate:

These things, which are not really so [i.e., do not really have the same appearance in his own and the other person’s conceptual awareness] are determined to be so, ...in virtue of their being the causes of that conceptual awareness, and in virtue of the exclusion of what is other than them [i.e., what does not cause that conceptual awareness].

They take the two instrumental phrases to be reasons for the determination, and determination to be the identification of what appears in their own and the other person’s conceptual cognition. Whilst this is possible, and I do think that this identification is actually a form of determination, Karnakagomin (PVSVṬ 240,23–28) explains the determination mentioned by Dharmakīrti as follows:

\[\text{tajjñānahetutayā tasya vikalpajñānasya hetutayā tadanyavyā- vṛttyā cety ekākārapratyabhijñānahetubhyo ye ’nve tathābhūtavi- kalpāhetavah, tebhyo vyāvṛttyā ca, atathābhūtān api. na hi te vikalpārūdhās taddhetavah, bahiravidyamānatvāt. ata evāheturū- pavikalatvam* apy asat, teśām avastusattvāt. tathādhyavasitān tajjñānahetutayā tadanyavyāvṛttyā cāropitān. anena bhāto hetu- tayā dhiyāh. aheturūpavikalān iveti vyākhyātam.} \]

(*Emendation against PVSVṬ ms 88b5 aheturūpavikalatvam acc. to PVṬD je 135a4 = PVṬQ je 159b4: rgyu ma yin pa’i ngo bo dang bral ba nyid. *)

Karnakagomin is here saying that this passage explains PV I 120bc (*bhāto hetutayā dhiyāh. aheturūpavikalān ivā*). But I believe his interpretation of the two instrumental clauses should not be taken causally here: in the paraphrase of *tathādhyavasitān* by *tajjñānahetutayā tadanyavyāvṛttyā cāropitān*, “being the reason of this cognition” and “excluding (or as exclusion of) that different from this” are most naturally taken as explicating the “*tathā*”.

\(^{527}\)I.e., the conceptual cognition of a thing as the same as another, “called the same judgement” (*ekapratyavamarśākhyā* PV I 119a).
this [continuity in the causes of a conceptual cognition], a learner\textsuperscript{528} cognizes the reasons for this [conceptual] cognition as different [from others]—[those reasons which] occur in the mind of someone seeing this [thing producing the same effect], are determined as being a reason for this cognition and as excluding what is other than this [reason for this cognition], even though they are not really like [this], [and] have a difference of external and internal [form] that is not distinguished; [the learner does this] in accordance with [her] cognition that “These are trees.”[as she is] based upon a conceptual cognition after having been shown those [things] appearing as the same in her own and the other’s conceptual cognition.

Therefore [the learner] binds an expression to the difference [of these things] from those [things which are] not reasons for that[, i.e., which are not a reason for the conceptual cognition of tree].

[It is] only in virtue of an error [that] a conceptual awareness, understanding this [difference] because of that [expression], appears as if grasping one single real thing[, i.e., a universal]. Further, no [such] single thing is visible there [amongst the particulars], because of seeing and not seeing\textsuperscript{529} which [a learner], even though seeing differentiated [things],\textsuperscript{530} could make a distinction between tree and non-tree, because [she] does not grasp it [the single real thing, e.g., tree], separately from the appearances of branch etc. like [she grasps] a stick where [there is] a stick-bearer; also, because [such a single thing] which is not grasped as separate (pravibhāga) from others (āpara) is not noticed (anupalakṣaṇa). Because also a shape (ākṛti) seen in one [thing] cannot be seen in another,\textsuperscript{531} only a single particular would be a tree, given that [that] having that [shape] and

\textsuperscript{528} PVSVṬ 241,7: \textit{yasmai samketaḥ kriyate, sa pratipattā}. (For whose sake a convention is made, that is a learner.)

\textsuperscript{529} Emend \textit{darśānādarśaṇābhyaṃ} PVSV 61,3–4 to \textit{darśanādarśaṇābhyaṃ}, supported by PVSVṬ 242,14.

\textsuperscript{530} That is, the learner sees the particular things. Cf. PVSVṬ 242,13–15.

\textsuperscript{531} According to PVSVṬ 242,22 f., this is an argument against an \textit{anarthāntarasāmānyavādin}. Cf. also the reference to an \textit{ākṛtisāmānyavādin} in PVSV 55,21 (cf. PVSVṬ 223,20–25).
that] not having that [shape] are[,] respectively[,] a tree and not a
tree.

A.1.10  PV I 152ab

[PVSV 76,25] Moreover, some [person] imagining a universal as an
object different [from a particular] will imagine [it] either as being
in (gata) its own basis alone,\(^{532}\) or as being in everything, as [in the
case of] ether etc.\(^{533}\) If, amongst these [options], [it is imagined] as
being in its own basis alone, [then], if [things like] pot etc. come into
being in places that are free from potness etc., how is a universal,
which occurs in substances in different places, possible where these
[are]? For this [universal]

does not go // PV I 152a’ //

from a previous\(^{534}\) substance into a substance planning to arise,
because you assume that [a universal] is without movement. For an
entity occurring in another substance, which does not move from
this, [and] which does not pervade the intermediate space between
the two, cannot be connected with an entity having a different place.
This [entity], at an earlier [time],

was not there, [but] is there later // PV I 152a”b’ //

and it has not arisen there, nor come from anywhere. So who is
capable of shouldering (ud-√vah) this burden of obstacles, except out
of stupidity (jāḍya)?

\(^{532}\)PVSVṬ 301–302 refers to discussions found with Kumārila (ŚV Āv 25–29a
and ŚV Vv 30 and 32, with variations) and Uddyotakara (NBhV 302,21–303,13,
approximately; I could not find the last few sentences (following
nilapratyayas, PVSVṬ 301,21) in the NBhV) for the first position, that a universal exists only in its
manifestations.

\(^{533}\)Ether (ākāśa) is taken to be ubiquitous in Vaiśeṣika, cf. Halbfass 1992: 74, and
see also footnotes 157 and 280.

\(^{534}\)That is, it does not move on from a substance in which it was previously inhering.
Cf. PVSVṬ 302,16: pūrvaradvayād yatat /=sāmānyam/ pūrvaṃ samavetam
tasmād....
A. Dharmakīrti on apoḥa

A.1.11 PV I 162

[PVSV 82,4] [Objection:] How then, when there is no undifferentiated real thing[, i.e., no universal], is there now an occurrence of a cognition and a word which conform [to many things]? [Answer:] [In the same way] as in the case of a cook etc.536 [Objection:] But just this is considered: how [can a cognition and a word apply] to these [cooks etc.] also? [Answer:] This has been considered, in which way [this occurrence of a concept and a word for multiple things] is not possible.537

535 In the preceding discussion, Dharmakīrti has eliminated all possibilities suggested by the opponent for what the cause of the consistency of words and cognitions in face of mere particulars could be. The opponent has suggested universals (jāti/sāmānya, PVSV 69,9–79,15, corresponding to PV I 149–157b, cf. Frauwallner 1933: 68–78) activity (karman, PVSV 79,15–81,4), and a capacity (śakti, PVSV 81,4–82,4) for that activity as causes for the same cognition. All of these have been disproved by Dharmakīrti, and the opponent is now throwing the question back at him.

536 PVSVṬ 317,30–318,10 yathā pācakādiṣu pācakatvādisāmānyan nāsti, tathā prasādhitam. atha ca tatra pravartete anvayinau jñānaśabdau. tathānyatra nāvījñānasabdavṛttir antareṇa sāmānyaṃ tau bhaviṣyataḥ. (Correct bhivaṣyataḥ in PVSVṬ 318,10 to bhaviṣyataḥ acc. to PVSVṬ ms 117a1. Trl.: As for cook etc. there is no universal such as “cookness” etc., as is well established. But still (atha ca), conforming words and concepts apply to this cook etc., so also for another [thing] they will exist without a universal.)

537 Whether the universal cookness qualifies cooks was discussed following PV I 63 and again in PVSV 80,18–81,23 (cf. the translation of these verses from the Tibetan and their explanation in Frauwallner 1933: 79 ff.).

Taking the sentence this way, we can suppose that Dharmakīrti is hinting at the fact that cookness was not admitted by the opponent as a real universal inhering in things. This could lead the opponent to ask the following question, namely what the reason then is, if we discount the possibility of a real thing causing the same cognitions.

According to Karnakagomin (PVSVṬ 318,11–13), however, the subject in the sentence in PVSV 82,7, yathā na teṣu sambhavati, is “universal” (sāmānya), and not “occurrence” (vṛtti) any more:

nanv ityādi paraḥ. teṣu iti pācakādiṣu sāmānyam vinā katham anvayinor jñānaśabdavṛttir iti. tato ’nvayijñānasabdavṛttteḥ pācakādiṣu api pācakatvādisāmānyam astīti. cintitam etad anantarām, yathā teṣu pācakatvādi sāmānyam na sambhavatīti.
[Objection:] So, then, would these two [a word and a cognition] be without a cause? [Answer:] [The two are] not without a cause, but, rather, they do not have a cause that is an external reality. The generation of a concept is due to an awakening—according to [its] self\(^{538}\)—of mnemonic imprints. From this [generation of a concept], words [follow]. Further, the basis of a concept and a designation is not the existence of a real thing. This was explained often,\(^{539}\) because one observes continuous [concepts and words] since—even though one observes [only things] different from each other—contradictory forms co-exist,\(^{540}\) in virtue of the mnemonic imprints, each in its own way, [resulting from] conventions. But amongst these there is no own nature at all to which [a word and a cognition] are bound, because a co-existence of two [things], contradictory to each other, in one [thing] at the same time is not possible.

[Objection:] Then [a word and a cognition] would be without any restriction (aniyama). For, what exists without a cause is not capable of restriction such that [it could be said:] “[It] exists somewhere, [it] does not exist somewhere [else].”

(Read nanv acc. to PVSVT\(_\text{ms}\) 117a1 against tadvad PVSVT 318,11; ’nvayijñāna° acc. to PVSVT\(_\text{ms}\) 117a1 against ’nvayajñāna° PVSVT 318,12; yathā acc. to PVSVT\(_\text{ms}\) 117a1 against tathā PVSVT 318,13; sāmānyam na acc. PVSVT\(_\text{ms}\) 117a1 against sāmānyam sa na PVSVT 318,13. Note that PVSVT has importantly different punctuation: …astīti cintitam …anantaram. tathā …)

One could assume some shift like this, with perhaps one of the real things, the vastu-s from PVSV 82,5, becoming the subject. The argument would not change significantly.

\(^{538}\) I understand that every conceptual cognition is due to the awakening of a mnemonic imprint with a nature particular to itself; i.e., the imprint left by a mental continuum’s encounters with cows is different from that left by its encounters with pots.

\(^{539}\) Cf., e.g., PVSV 35,2–9 (appendix A.1.6).

\(^{540}\) Acc. to PVSVT 318,21–22, one has to understand that different, mutually exclusive ideas are superimposed on objects, such as when one says that the world either is the effect of some primary matter or of god, or is without a cause, or is merely conventionally existent (…virodhirūpasamāveśena parasparaviruddhārū-pādhyāropena pradhānakāryam iśvarakāryam ahetukam samvarttimātram jagad ity evam …).
A. Dharmakīrti on apoha

[Answer:] That[, i.e., a cognition as well as a word,] is not truly without a cause, because a particular mnemonic imprint is a cause. But an external [thing] that exists in such a way[, i.e., as a cause for the same cognition,] is not observable. This is what we say. Nor must [a conceptual cognition or a word] not exist, when this [external cause] does not exist,⁵⁴¹ because such a concept is generated when objects are non-existent, grasped by sleepers and [persons suffering from the eye disease] timira, and when there are specific forms that are superimposed [due to] mnemonic imprints [resulting] from a convention.⁵⁴² And it is not [the case that] all forms [occur] everywhere because these [concepts] arise for non-existent [objects], since those [objects] which are perceived in such a way[, i.e., separately,] are [also] conceptualized as entirely separate. And about this something was said⁵⁴³ by us: even by the nature [of things there are] certain causes for the same cognition, because of a difference in [these things’] own nature.

Moreover,

by which contact a genus spreads out⁵⁴⁴ into something when [there is] the same difference of things, but not into

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⁵⁴¹ Additions acc. to PVSVṬ319,14–15: na cāsati tasminna anvayini bāhye nimitte vikalpena na bhavitavyam bhavitavyam eva. (Nor, when this does not exist, i.e., the continuous external cause [of a cognition], must a conceptual cognition not exist[, i.e.,] it really must exist.)

⁵⁴² Note that Karnākagomin glosses both occurrences of samayavāsanā in this passage (PVSV82,11,19) with samavāyavāsanā (PVSVṬ318,20; 319,17), each time explaining that one should understand that the impressions left accord to one’s doctrine.

⁵⁴³ According to PVSVṬ319,28–29 and Gnoli (1960: 191), this refers to PV I 73.

⁵⁴⁴ McCrea and Patil 2010: 85, translating this verse in the context of its quotation by Jñānaśrīmitra (AP 224,6–7), understand prasarpati cognitively: “...given that they are similarly distinct, the basis of verbal awareness is just the connection by which the universal comes to mind in the case of one individual but not another.” Whilst a recurring cognition is, within Dharmakīrti’s and Jñānaśrīmitra’s arguments, certainly one of the central effects that a jāti has according to the opponents, the verse seems to be speaking primarily about the ontological relation obtaining between individual things and a genus or universal. PVSVṬ320,10 glosses: prasarpati. vyāpya vartate. (Trl.: “[A jāti] spreads out, that is, [a jāti] occurs having pervaded [a group of individual things].”)

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A.2 Material from the *PVSVṬ*

Another, that [contact] alone should be the basis of both words and cognitions. // PV I 162 //

[PVSV 82,25] This is an intermediate verse.\footnote{Acc. to Frauwallner (1933: 69; 83), this verse ends the section, beginning PV I 143, in which Dharmakirti argues against the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya notion of a universal. Cf. also the introduction of PV I 163 in *PVSVṬ* 320,25, presenting a new speaker: “atra sāṃkhyaḥ prāha.” On the other hand, the objection that Karṇakagomin quotes while commenting on this verse, at *PVSVṬ* 320,13–16, is ŚV Āv 37–38 by Kumārila, who of course is not a Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika writer. It could be that after having discussed Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika positions, Dharmakirti touched on Kumārila’s two verses. This would find slight support in this verse being called an “intermediary verse” (*antaraśloka*), which can mean that it does not necessarily have much to do with the context in which it appears (cf. Mimaki 1980). But probably Frauwallner’s assessment of the opponents’ identities in this passage is not quite adequate, since Karṇakagomin repeatedly quotes Kumārila (e.g., *PVSVṬ* 301,4 ff., 305,4 ff.) in the section characterized as refuting Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika positions by Frauwallner.}

\footnote{The reference is to PV I 126, which Karṇakagomin has just quoted. This passage appears towards the end of a three page elaboration on PV I 41.}

\footnote{As pointed out by Akamatsu (1983: 159–164, n. 4), the first two of the following three verses are not found in the ŚV, and might therefore be from Kumārila’s lost *Bṛhatṭīkā*. The last verse corresponds to ŚV Av 164.}

\footnote{Cf. PV III 164 (trl. on page 321) and the references to Dignāga given there.}

\footnote{The words have been awkwardly separated here, read *pratibhāṣe vagamyate* instead of *pratibhāseva gamyate* in *PVSVṬ* 114,11.}

\footnote{The reference is to PV I 126, which Karṇakagomin has just quoted. This passage appears towards the end of a three page elaboration on PV I 41.}

A.2 Material from the *PVSVṬ*

A.2.1 *PVSVṬ* 114,9–115,9 ad PV I 41

Because of this\footnote{As pointed out by Akamatsu (1983: 159–164, n. 4), the first two of the following three verses are not found in the ŚV, and might therefore be from Kumārila’s lost *Bṛhatṭīkā*. The last verse corresponds to ŚV Av 164.} that which was said by Kumārila[, i.e.]:\footnote{Cf. PV III 164 (trl. on page 321) and the references to Dignāga given there.}

“But there is no word which performs other-exclusion,\footnote{The words have been awkwardly separated here, read *pratibhāṣe vagamyate* instead of *pratibhāseva gamyate* in *PVSVṬ* 114,11.} as described on your position. Mere negation is simply not understood\footnote{The reference is to PV I 126, which Karṇakagomin has just quoted. This passage appears towards the end of a three page elaboration on PV I 41.} in this appearance.

Rather, from words, such as “cow,” “gayal” (*gavaya*), “elephant,” [or] “tree,” a verbal awareness (*mati*) arises through a determination having an affirmative form.
Therefore, only for those words, to which the [negating particle] nañ is joined, shall there be an element of negation of another. For others[, i.e.,] words that are not negated[,] only the nature of their object is understood.

establishes only what is [already] established [for us], because it is assumed [by us] that the referent of a word has an affirmative form.

How then is the Buddhist opinion different from the opinion of others? Or, why is the object of word and [logical] mark called exclusion?

Now, there is a big difference between [these two opinions], because conceptual cognition, which is postulated by the others as being [something that] has a real thing as [its] object, is postulated by the Buddhists as being [something that] has an imagined [thing] as its object. And the imagined form (ākāra), because of being based on exclusion, is called exclusion, or [one states this fact with the words] “[Another] is excluded by this.” But the mere negation of another, which is implicitly (artha) referred to [in the previous statement], is called [exclusion] since [one says] “[the act of] excluding [is] exclusion.” But the particular is called exclusion since [one says] “In this [particular the other] is excluded.”

A. 2.2  PVSVT 131,24–132,10 ad PV I 51

Otherwise[, i.e., assuming] the nature of a real thing were grasped by a [conceptual] awareness or a word[, then,] if a single [thing] were pervaded by a single word[, i.e.,] if one [thing] were made an object with its whole form, or pervaded by an awareness which has an ascertaining nature, there would not be another object. Another object [is analysed as]: this form is another and it is an

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550 Read svātmāvānyatra acc. to PVSVTms 44b2 against svātmevānyatra in PVSVT 114,15.

551 Cf. the argument in PVSVT 113,6–7.

552 For the rest of this paragraph, cf. the material in PVTp2.
object. No other form of this real thing, which is the object [and] is to be made known, exists. Or else, there is no object for another word or cognition that makes this real thing known. So, for this reason [that is], words which are used after the object [of the first word] has been cognized would be synonymous, like the words “tree”, “root-drinker”, etc. There would be no usage of an awareness that corresponds to a different object such as sweet taste, soft, heavy, cold. So there would be the unwanted consequence that there is only one object for awareness.

A.3 Material from PV III

The most detailed modern study of the PV III as a whole was carried out in Japanese by Tosaki (1979–1985). I do not understand Japanese, but my friend and colleague Masamichi Sakai was so kind as to discuss with me the main differences he found between Tosaki’s and my interpretations.

A.3.1 PV III 147

Even if [there is] a continuous (anvayin) cognition, it [is a cognition possessing] the manifestation (avabhāsi) of a word [and] a particular. [But the universal] cowness is indeed declared [to be] free of the form (ākāra) of colour (varṇa), shape (ākṛti), [and] letter (akṣara). // PV III 147 //

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553 In Sanskrit, the words “vṛkṣa” and “pādapa” are synonyms. Since I do not know any English synonym for “tree”, I translate the compound “pādapa” according to the meaning of its parts.

554 For Manorathanandin’s commentary on this verse, cf. appendix A.4.1.

555 “Continuous cognition” should express that a cognition remains the same for various objects. For example, seeing cows on two different occasions, a person might think “A cow!” each time. The literal idea seems to be that this cognition is concomitant with different particulars.

556 See section 4.1.10, for Ratnakirti’s understanding of the compound varnākṛtya-ksarākāraśūnyam, and cf. the translation of § 33.
A. Dharmakīrti on apoha

A.3.2 PVIII 161–173

Objects,\(^{557}\) even though [there is] a difference [between them], are causes for such a cognition only due to their nature [of being] a real thing. This cognition, which [occurs] for some [objects], cognizes these [objects] as such [, as being the same]. // PVIII 161 //

In the same way, cognitions too, [even though there is a] difference [between them],\(^{558}\) [are a cause] for a judgement of a non-difference. So the continuity of a separation (viśleṣa) from what does not have that effect, but not of a single real thing, exists for real things.\(^{559}\) Therefore a word,\(^{560}\) referring to this [separation, applies] to a real

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\(^{557}\) The section PVIII 163cd–173 is titled anyāpohacintā (“A Consideration of Other-Exclusion”) by Sāṅkṛtyāyana (cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940: iv), and Miyasaka (1971–1972: 62) probably adopted this title. But it seems natural to understand the question of “continuity” (a word can repeatedly refer to similar objects) and the relation between word, its object, and the real thing, starting in PVIII 163cd, as following from the context of PVIII 161–163ab. These verses are thus included here.

The translation presented here depends strongly on Manorathanandin’s commentary (PVV 166,16–170,26, trl. appendix A.4.2). Tosaki (1979: 263–272) lets the section start at PVIII 163ab (but Tosaki 1979: 262, n. 141 notes, as Masamichi Sakai explained to me, that it can be understood to start with PVIII 161). Dreyfus (1997: 225–232) translates and discusses PVIII 163cd–170, adding plenty of information about Tibetan interpretations of these verses.

\(^{558}\) This interpretation follows that of Tosaki (1979: 259 f.) as explained to me by Masamichi Sakai.

\(^{559}\) Tosaki does not, as Masamichi Sakai told me, construe vastūnāṃ vidyate with anvayaḥ as I do (and as I think PVV sees it, cf. appendix A.4.2.2), but with a supplied anyāpohah. Probably this is due to the fact that, according to Tosaki, a new section starts before PVIII 163ab, and I see no substantial difference in meaning (since a uniform difference is exclusion). Also PVABh 261,22 understands the structure like Tosaki, taking “a universal that is differentiated from that having another effect” (atatkārye bhyyo vyāvarttamānaṃ sāmānyam) as the subject.

\(^{560}\) śruti is a synonym for śabda, and will not be differentiated in the translation here. This is also how Tosaki 1979: 263 understands it here (according to Masamichi Sakai). Note that a more adequate translation of the two terms might be “sound complex”, since Dharmakīrti considers that also sub-units of full words convey meaning (in the cases of compounds or certain suffixes, for example). Cf., for example, PVSV 34,7–15.
Even though it is not based (niṣṭhā) on a distinction of a capacity of external [things], a word [agreed on as expressive] of this [distinction] is bound to [those] reflections in conceptual cognitions [which] are based on that [distinction]. Therefore, because it is based on an exclusion from others, a word was called “making an exclusion [from] others” [by Dignāga].

Which reflection of an object appears in a cognition [arising] because of a word, as if separate [from a cognition], that also [is] not the nature of [that] object. This [is an] error arising from impressions.

[Objection:] If this [reflection] is designated by words, [then] which part is understood as regards the object?

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561 Cf. PS(V) 5 11d, and see the corresponding passages in Pind 2015: II.54 ff. and the references to TSŚ. According to Pind (2015: II.54–55, n. 182) this phrase is part of the last verse in the first part of Dignāga’s exposition of the apoha theory, where all realist alternatives for what the word referent could be are shown to be untenable, and anyāpohakṛt remains as the only alternative.

562 The word “pratibimbaka” is here understood as a noun (equal to pratibimba), which is also how it is understood in Tosaki 1979. If it is taken as a bahuvrīhi, one could understand “as if separate and as if reflecting an object”, but it would be unclear what it is that appears in such a way. However, this latter interpretation has some support in the PVVS, cf. appendix A.4.2.4.

563 The idea is that mental impressions or imprints (vāsanā), usually said to be without a beginning, accumulate and shape a mind continuum’s inclinations in various ways, e.g., as a propensity towards generalizations (mixing different things together) or as identifying things wrongly. Cf., e.g., Dunne 2004: n. 139, 140–141 for some representative passages from Dharmakīrti, and see Mikogami 1989 for a discussion between realists and vijñānavādin-s about how these kinds of impressions can arise (that they do is not doubted by either of them). They are also instrumental in explaining phenomenal variety in Buddhist idealism, as well as in dreams, as has been clearly explained by Ratié 2010: 453. See § 34 and § 52 for examples of Ratnakīrti’s use of this term.

564 According to the interpretation in Dreyfus 1997: 228–229, this verse is Dharmakīrti’s answer to a Buddhist’s objection. I follow the interpretation in the PVVS and
But if that [part] is not understood, making a convention would be meaningless [as it] has that purpose.\textsuperscript{565} // [PV III 166] //</p>

[Answer:] To this [question that was just raised:] “Which part of an object does a word express?”’, exclusion from others is said [in answer]. But this form does not exist in the object. How [should a word] expressing that [form] partake of the object? // [PV III 167] //</p>

A continuous word’s occupation (kārya) is with a continuous object. But this [form of awareness], formed by the repetition of [a thing’s] observation, [is] discontinuous, because it is not different from thought. // [PV III 168] //</p>

However,\textsuperscript{566} because that differentiated from others is understood by means (gatyā) of a superimposition of that form, there is no contradiction if [there is] this formulation: “That object alone (eva), the form of awareness,] is the object of a word.” // [PV III 169] //</p>

Or, the apprehensions which are formed by words have an erroneous appearance. And since [these apprehensions] accord to this part of an object, a word [is called] “performing exclusion.”\textsuperscript{567} // [PV III 170] //</p>

\textsuperscript{565} Cf. PV I 110d, referred to in Tosaki 1979: 266, n. 151 (cf. trl. on page 305), where Dharmakirti says that the purpose of convention is to make exclusion known, which is understood as a part of an object (e.g., a thing’s difference from all non-red things, its difference from all non-chair things etc.).

\textsuperscript{566} See also appendix B.5.1 for a quotation of this verse by Kamalaśīla in the voice of an opponent.

\textsuperscript{567} See footnote 561.
A.3. Material from *PV III*

Therefore, even at the time [of forming] a convention, exclusion from others—which has been connected with an indicated object [and which] results in one’s own cognition [of that exclusion]—is connected to the word. // [PV III 171] //

In dependence on a non-observation of this [word] for one [thing and] in dependence on an observation [of this word] for another [thing], exclusion is bound to a word. This [double dependency] is not coherent in [the case of] a real thing. // [PV III 172] //

Therefore a genus etc., [and] a connection to these, do not exist in an object, and a word is [therefore] not bound to these, because words indeed are joined to differentiation from others. // [PV III 173] //

**A.3.3 PV III 183ab**

Words designate a universal, and a conceptual construction has the same referent [as words]. // PV III 183ab //

**A.3.4 PV III 233–235**

Even if [a universal such as] whiteness etc. exists, this, [which is] such an object of the sense faculties, is not designated by words, because of the difference of the form [appearing in] the two cognitions, a perception and a conceptual awareness]. // PV III 233 //

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568 I.e., an object (e.g., a red apple) is pointed out to a person who is learning a convention (e.g., “red”), and this object causes that person’s own cognition of the relevant object’s exclusion from others (“is red”, or different from all non-red things).

569 This addition follows Tosaki 1979 (as explained to me by Masamichi Sakai). In a convention, a word is bound to some things, but not to others.

570 Note that PVV 170,26 reads *anyavāvṛttāv eva*, resulting in “because words are joined only to differentiation from others.” This is also how Tosaki 1979 understands this passage.

571 See appendix A.4.3 for Manorathananandin’s commentary on these verses.
If [this is said:] “Even though awareness [events all] have the same object, this [difference does exist], since there is a different basis [for these awareness events].”, then why is it that cognitions (citta) [based on] hearing etc. have different objects? 

The basis of thoughts (cetas) is truly different [in each case]. [So] why does a real thing, that is in fact only one, have this nature that appears [to awareness] with different forms? // PV III 235 //

A.3.5 PV III 407ab

[That an object is] manifest [or] non-manifest [to awareness] cannot be due to a difference such as distant, near, etc. // PV III 407ab //

A.4 Material from the PVVs

A.4.1 PVV 161,9–18 ad PV III 147

[Objection:] If universals do not exist, then how [can there be] a continuous (anvayin) cognition for completely differentiated particulars? So [Dharmakīrti] said: Even [that] continuous cognition,\(^{573}\) which arises, that also (ca) is cognized as having that, i.e., as possessing an appearance, or the form, of a word (śabda) such as “cow” etc., and of a particular with a specific colour (varṇa) [and] composition (samsthāna); [but it is] not [cognized] as having an appearance of a genus (jāti).

[Objection:] What then, is [there] no [cognition] at all having an appearance of a universal? So [Dharmakīrti] said: For cowness is

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\(^{572}\)The point is that, if the difference of awareness events were not due to different objects, but to a difference in the basis of the cognitions, i.e., the corresponding cognitive faculty, the perceptions by different sense faculties could not be shown to have different objects.

\(^{573}\)Note that PVV (as well as PVV\(_ms\) 31a5) reads yad apy (“Also which”) instead of the yady apy (“Even if”) accepted in PV III 147.
explained by the Sāmānyavādins to be empty (śūnya) of the form, cognized as such, of these[, i.e., of the form of] colour[, i.e.,] blue etc., shape[, i.e.,] figure, letter[, i.e.,] the word “cow.” Therefore, that appearing in a continuous cognition with colour, shape, etc. is not a universal.

A.4.2  PVV 166,20–170,26 ad PV III 161–173

A.4.2.1 PVV 166,20–167,3 AD PV III 161

[Objection:] If a universal is not differentiated from the particulars (vyakti),\textsuperscript{574} then how [can] an apprehension [be] continuous (anugā-min) [for various particulars]? So [Dharmakīrti] said: Some objects, even though there is a difference between them, are the cause for such a[, i.e.,] continuous, cognition[, i.e., a cognition] that has the differentiation from that not having that effect as its object, only due to their nature [of being] a real thing[, i.e.,] only due to [their] basic nature (prakṛti).

The cognition which accords to some objects cognizes these, i.e., the objects which are without differences, as such, as being the same. But there is no cognition as such in virtue of a single universal.\textsuperscript{575}

A.4.2.2 PVV 167,4–167,13 AD PV III 162–163ab

[Objection:] May it be that also cognitions are differentiated according to [each] particular. How [then can] a cognition [be] continuous [with regard to these particulars]? So [Dharmakīrti] said:

Cognitions too[, even though there is] a difference between them, are, in the same way[, i.e.,] like the objects, due to their nature [of being] a real thing,\textsuperscript{576} a cause for a judgement of a

\textsuperscript{574}The result would be that there are as many universals as there are particulars.

\textsuperscript{575}Read °sāmānyaṃ balāt in PVV 167,3 as sāmānyabalāt acc. to PVV\textsubscript{ms} 32a7, as suggested by Sāṅkṛtyāyana. The manuscript is difficult to read here, and I was not able to find any decisive clues for separating these two words.

\textsuperscript{576}Read vastudharmatayā acc. to PVV\textsubscript{ms} 32a7 against vastudharmitayā acc. to PVV 167,7.
non-difference. Therefore, cognitions also are called continuous apprehensions due to having as their object the same judgement of this [difference]. So, i.e., in this way, a continuity of a separation[, i.e.,] of a distinction of an object from that not having that effect amongst the different things, exists. But a continuity of a single real thing[, i.e.,] of a universal does not exist for real things[, i.e.,] for individuals (viśeṣa), because that [universal] is refuted by non-perception[, a means of valid cognition]. Therefore a word, referring to this[, i.e.,] which has [that] distinction as its object, applies to a real thing.

A.4.2.3 PVV 167,16–168,3 AD PV III 163cd–164

[Objection:] Now, the differentiation from [that having] a different (atat) effect is the proper nature of real things. Therefore, given that the object [of a word] is distinction, only the real thing would be the object of a word. So [Dharmakīrti] said: a distinction of a capacity, such as not having that effect etc., of an external real thing; a reference to this[, i.e.,] the state of having [that] as an object; even though that does not exist, a word for this[, i.e.,] a word designating this distinction, is bound at the time a convention is made to those reflections of conceptual cognitions[, i.e.,] to those forms of awareness, which are bound to these[, i.e.,] which have a constancy (uyavasthiti) for everyday activity concerning those

577 Vibhūticandra (Vibhū 167, n. 1) glosses “for real things” as: “Amongst the real things.”
578 Vibhū 167, n. 2: “This [objection] is considered contradictory to this statement: A word does not touch a real thing.”
580 Vibhū 167, n. 3: katham iti na vṛttena sambandhanīyah “[This statement] is not to be connected with the mentioned [word] ‘how.’” (I.e., this is not an answer anymore to the question raised in PVV 167,4.)
581 Vibhū 167, n. 4: “Due to the mistake of [thinking] that a particular and an object of conceptual cognition are one.”
582 I take the sixth, genitive, case as possessive here, i.e., reflections of external things that a conceptual cognition has.
[things] due to the fact that a classification (vyavasthā) [of these things] has an object since the differentiation of these things from that not having that effect] is real.

Therefore, because reflections of conceptual cognitions are the object of everyday activity due to being of the nature of the external [thing] \(^{583}\) which is differentiated[, that is to say,] because of being based on to an exclusion from others[, i.e.,] because of [this] cause, a word was called “making an exclusion from others.” \(^{584}\) [I.e.,] because of the generation of a conceptual cognition through a form that is differentiated from others, and because of the application\(^{584}\) to those [real things] differentiated from others, a word is called “making an exclusion from others.”

A.4.2.4 PVV 168,4–10 AD PV III 165

Someone objects]: Now, that to be grasped in a verbal cognition is recognized only as an external [thing], not as being the image in cognition. So [Dharmakīrti] said: What appears in a cognition, which arises because of a word, as if reflecting an object [and] as if separate[, i.e.,] as if differentiated [and] external, that also [is] not the nature of [that] object[, i.e.,] does not have the own form of an externally [existing] object; rather, this [is an] error arising from impressions.\(^{585}\)

Everyday activity that [treats] the form of conceptual cognition [as] external in virtue of ignorance is like the mistake [of treating objects like] the hair etc., which are seen by someone [suffering from] timira, as external. Such (iti) [is] the meaning [of this verse].

A.4.2.5 PVV 168,11–18 AD PV III 166

Then the form of cognition,\(^{586}\) which is a real thing, would be what is to be denoted. [So, explaining the objection,] [Dharmakīrti] said

\(^{583}\)Vibhū 168, n. 1: “Because of being based on the distinction of a real thing.”

\(^{584}\)Vibhū 168, n. 2: “Because of identifying a visible [thing] and a concept.”

\(^{585}\)Vibhū 168, n. 3: “The reason [being] the impression [left by] the experience of particulars.”

\(^{586}\)Vibhū 168, n. 4: “The verse introduced (sāvatāra) [here] is an objection.”
If this form of a cognition is designated by words, which part is understood as regards the object, which is differentiated from that not having that effect [and] not named by a word? None at all. But if that[, i.e.,] an object that is excluded from that which does not have that effect is not understood, truly making a convention would be meaningless because this [making of a convention] is assumed to have that purpose[, i.e.,] to result in a cognition of an object differentiated from that not having that [same] effect. In this way, then, if a convention is made, even with regard to the exclusion from others, there would be no activity towards the referents, because this [exclusion from others] lacks the nature of a referent.

A.4.2.6 PVV 168,18–24 AD PV III 167

[Answer:] Because of that [objection, Dharmakīrti] said: to this question: “Which part of an object does a word express?”, exclusion from others[, i.e.,] a differentiation from that not having that effect, which is possible for all distinctions, is said[, or declared] as that which is to be designated. Therefore a person who has grasped a convention with regard to other-exclusion, which has the nature of

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587 According to Śākyabuddhi, this is the objection of a Buddhist, PVT₁₀ nye 191b4–6 = PVT₁₀ nye 236a8–236b2: de nyid kyi phyis bstan par bzhed nas, de lta na yang don gyi rnam pa ’dzin pa zhes bya ba la sogs pas re zhig rang gi sde pa la brgyal zhing brtags (P: brtag) pa byed pa yin te, gang dag rnam par rtog pa la snang ba’i ngang tshul can gyi rnam pa dngos su sgra’i brjod par bya ba yin no zhes de ltar zhugs pa’o. don gyi rnam pa zhes ’dzin pa ni don gyi rnam pa ’dzin pa ste, rnam par rtog pa’i rnam par shes pa la snang ba’i gzugs brnyan no. don gyi zhes bya ba ni phyi rol gyi rang gi mtshan nyid kyi’o. gang gi tshe de las gzhans pa las ldog pa zhes bya ba ni dngos po la gnas pa’i (P: pa) gzhans sel ba’i rang gi mtshan nyid kyi bdag nyid can no. Acc. to Dreyfus 1997: 228 f., also Go rams pa understands this as an objection by a Buddhist.

588 Perhaps “ścittadakārya”, appearing in both PVV₃₃ 32b3 and PVV 168,15, should be emended to “ścitatadkārya”. The meaning would be the same in both cases.

589 Vibhū 168, n. 5: “[Asked] ‘Why?’ he says.”

590 Vibhū 168, n. 6: “To this the Siddhantin says.”
[being] a part of an object, acts towards that [object], having recognized the object because of an uttered word.\(^{591}\) This is correct. But\(^{592}\) which form of awareness is to be grasped,\(^{593}\) that does not exist in the object. How should a word, expressing that form of awareness, partake of the object[,] i.e.,[.] be qualified by expressing the external object?

A.4.2.7 PVV 169,1–6 AD PV III 168

Moreover: A continuous word’s occupation\(^{594}\) [is] in a continuous object, [i.e., a word’s] purpose has the character of a cognition [of the same object] at the time of everyday activity. But this form of awareness is formed from impressions through the repetition of observing particulars, [and is] discontinuous,\(^{595}\) because it is not different from thought which is [itself] not continuous.

A.4.2.8 PVV 169,7–14 AD PV III 169

[Opponent:] Now, if the [real] object is not the word’s object, then how can other-exclusion, even though it is of the nature of a part of that [object], [be] what is to be designated? So [Dharmakīrti] said: By means of a superimposition of that form[,] i.e.,[.] of the exclusion which is a part of the object, onto the form of awareness,\(^{596}\) [that is,] through a determination [of exclusion and form of awareness] as being one, the object,\(^{597}\) differentiated from another, is understood;

\(^{591}\) Read śabdād uccaritād arthaṃ pratītya (PVV\(_{ms}\) 32b4) against śabdād uccaritārthaṃ pratītya (PVV 168,22).

\(^{592}\) Read yas tu grāhyākāraḥ acc. to PVV\(_{ms}\) 32b4 against yas tatrākṣarākāraḥ PVV 169,23.

\(^{593}\) Vibhū 168, n. 7: “What was attained (āyāta) by the repetition of observing an external blue [thing] etc. is to be known.”

\(^{594}\) Vibhū 169, n. 1 glosses śabda as: “Cow, cow.” Probably the point is that the word “cow” can be used twice with the same meaning, and is so continuous.

\(^{595}\) Vibhū 169, n. 2: yatra buddhau bhāsate tato ‘bhinnah jñānavat. “[The cognitive form (?)] is not different from that awareness in which it appears, like a cognition.” This short phrase is not quite clear to me.

\(^{596}\) Vibhū 169, n. 3: vināropam vyavahārābhāvāt yathā samgatis tasya tathāha Tentatively: “Because there is no everyday activity without imposition, [Dharmakīrti] spoke so as if it is applicable to this [form of awareness].”

\(^{597}\) Vibhū 169, n. 4: “A particular [...] is understood.”
because [of this understanding,] exclusion, which is a part of the object of a word,\textsuperscript{598} is called word object. But an object is not understood from a word because of a universal. If, however, because of cognizing a form of awareness as being the differentiated object, this very form of awareness is metaphorically called "word referent" by someone proclaiming that the form of awareness is the word referent (buddhayākārasabdārthavādin),\textsuperscript{599} then, if there is such a formulation, there is no contradiction at all, because there is no assumption by [Dharmakīrti] that a form of awareness, which is not qualified by continuity, is the word referent.

A.4.2.9 PVV 169,17–170,3 AD PV III 170

Or, the apprehensions which are formed by words have an erroneous appearance. For [it is] so: first of all a [real] object is not the object of an awareness [that is] due to a word, because the own form of this [object] does not appear [in that awareness], and because for this [object] there is no convention of words. Neither [is] the form of awareness [the object of a word], even though there is an awareness of this [form], because [this form] is not determined as being the object, because it is a particular, and because there is no convention [with regard to it]. For the form of awareness is not external, nor is an external [thing] a form of awareness, due to which an appearance as "like"\textsuperscript{600} would be a true appearance. In reality, therefore, verbal apprehensions do not let a real thing appear.

\textsuperscript{598}Perhaps śabdārthāṃśāpohaḥ should be emended. One possibility is an emendation to śabdārthānyāpohaḥ ("...other-exclusion, which is the word object..."). This is, as Masamichi Sakai informs me, also how Tosaki 1979: 269, n. 160 translates this passage, albeit without making an emendation in the text.

\textsuperscript{599}A similar position is shown to be different from that of an exclusion theorist in TSP,\textsuperscript{S} 352,5 ff. (cf. appendix B.5.1), where PV III 169 is also quoted. Manorathanandin is here saying that Dharmakīrti’s explanation is not contradictory to the position that the word referent is the form of awareness, but qualifies that position as metaphorical usage. This qualification is not made in the TSP.

\textsuperscript{600}I.e., either the external thing would be like the form of awareness, or vice versa.
[Opponent:] In this case then, how is a word called performing an exclusion [that is] a part of the referent? \(^601\) [Proponent:] So Dharma-kīrti said: Words, even though they do not have an appearance of that [object], according to this, exclusion from others, [that is to say,] a part of the object, [meaning they] cause a classification as being the object of activity (vṛtti), because [they] are indirectly connected with it due to being arrived at by an observation of an [external] object. \(^602\) And so a word [is characterized as] “performing exclusion”. \(^603\)

A.4.2.10 PVV 170,5–12 AD PV III 171

For the [reason] that, due to a word, [there is] a cognition of that separated from another [thing] at the time of everyday activity, therefore also at the time [of forming] a convention is the exclusion from others connected to the word as that to be designated [by that word], [but] nothing else.

[Objection:] Now, a convention is made indicating an object. So how [can it be] called exclusion? So [Dharmakīrti] said:

Connected with an indicated object [i.e.,] [an object] that is excluded from others, [and] whose result [i.e.,] purpose, is [one’s] own a cognition [of that exclusion] at the time of everyday activity—[connected with such an object, i.e.,] made identical [with that object] because of a determination of non-difference [between the two object’s exclusions], other-exclusion, having the nature of a form of awareness, is connected to a word, [but] the [external] object itself (eva) [is not connected to a word].

\(^601\) Vibhū 169, n. 5: anिṣṭaṃ parityajya iṣṭe pravartanāt śabdāḥ. “Words [perform exclusion], because of activity towards that which is desired avoiding that which is not desired.”

\(^602\) Read paramparayā acc. to PVV ms 32b7 against parasparaṃ yā in PVV 170,2.

\(^603\) Vibhū 170, n. 1: “Dignāga [said]: ‘Not to these, [but] to the object should they apply.’” I was unable to locate this statement in Dignāga’s works.
A.4.2.11  PVV 170,13–21 AD PV III 172

For [it is] so,\(^{604}\) In a convention’s dependency on [a word] not being observed for one [thing, i.e.,] for a non-tree that is to be distinguished from trees, and in [its] dependence on an observation of this [word] for another [thing, i.e.,] for one instance (ekadeśa) of a tree that is not to be distinguished, exclusion is bound to a word. This is ascertained.

In [the case of] a real thing[, i.e.,] for an object of convention [such as] a universal etc., [this] dependence on the observation and non-observation of that to be distinguished and that not to be distinguished is not coherent.\(^{605}\) If a real thing is to be cognized in an affirmative way, what use is the dependence on the non-observation in some other place? But it depends [on this observation]. Therefore, only a distinction from others is to be cognized. This is understood. If [an opponent says] that distinction from others depends on [such things as] a universal etc., which have the aim of an apprehension by avoiding a dissimilar instance,\(^{606}\) then [we say] enough with [this] universal. Because only by the distinction from others is everyday activity fully achieved.

A.4.2.12  PVV 170,22–26 AD PV III 173

And for the [reason that] qualifiers such as genus, quality, movement, etc. do not appear in a cognition grasping a real thing, therefore genus etc., and a connection to these\(^{607}\) do not exist in an object.\(^{608}\) And, therefore, a word is not bound to these, because words are joined only to a differentiation from others that is established by cognition.

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\(^{604}\) Vibhū 170, n. 2: “[Manorathanandin] states the error in the case of the application of a word caused by a universal [existing] in an affirmative way[, i.e., in the case of a real universal].”

\(^{605}\) Vibhū 170, n. 3: “For it is so: in the case of a universal[, which is a real thing].” (Introducing the following argument.)

\(^{606}\) Vibhū 170, n. 4: “Grasping an object that is filled with constructions.”

\(^{607}\) Vibhū: “Connection (sambandha).” He is giving a synonym for yoga, which I have also translated by “connection” here.

\(^{608}\) Vibhū 170, n. 6: “In the object of sense faculties.”
A.4.3 PVV 189,14–190,9 ad PV III 233–235

Or may it be that a universal truly is a real entity, nevertheless, this is not an object of words and concepts. So [Dharmakīrti] said: **Even if whiteness etc., i.e., a universal, exists, in a property bearer such as a garment etc., such an object of the sense faculties, which has a clear form of whiteness etc., [nevertheless] this[, i.e.,] an object that is the object of a cognition of the sense faculties, is not designated by words, because** there is a difference [between the two objects] due to the clarity or vagueness of the form, i.e., the form of awareness, of these two cognitions, which are generated by the sense faculties [and] words.

If [this is said by an opponent]: “**Even though awareness events, which are generated by sense faculties and words, have the same object[, i.e., even though] they have the same object,** [there is] this, a difference of the forms of awareness which has the nature of the difference of their cause[, i.e.,] since there is a different basis [for these awareness events].” **Then[, i.e.,] in such a situation, this is explained: cognitions [based on different] sense faculties such as hearing etc. have different objects[, i.e., ] have different objects such as sound (śabda), shape, smell etc. Why is that[, i.e.,] from [which] means of valid cognition is this ascertained?

Also, what is not contrived [in this result of your thesis]: “These cognitions, even though there is no different object for them, have different forms of awareness because of the difference of the sense faculties that are their basis.”?

Moreover, the basis of cognitions of universals etc.[, i.e., their] cause is truly different[, i.e.,] a sense faculty and a word. Nevertheless, **why does a real thing that is in fact only one, like a universal etc., have this nature that appears with different forms [to awareness][, i.e., a nature that] appears as clear and unclear[, or, a nature having] a clear and unclear appearance?** For insofar as a single [thing] appears with its own form, [its] having a differentiated appearance is not coherent.

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609 Manorathananandin glosses artha with viśaya, both of which have to be translated as “object” here.
B Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on apoha

For the following translations, the editions in Krishnamacharya 1926 and Śāstrī 1981 were used. In addition, Hisataka Ishida kindly granted me access to a part of a draft version of his edition of the śabdārthaparīkṣā chapter, corresponding to TSŚ 866–871. This is referred to as Ishida 2008. In the library of the Institute for South Asian, Tibetan, and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna, furthermore, there is a copy of Krishnamacharya 1926 which was originally in Erich Frauwallner’s personal library. This copy contains many annotations, probably by Frauwallner. Where relevant, these have been considered below. The two sets of manuscripts for these two texts, TSPmsP, TSmsP on the one hand, and TSPmsJ, TSmsJ on the other, were not read in their entirety, but only when the existing editions seemed doubtful.

B.1 TSŚ 2; 5–6

[TSS 5–6] This Tattvasamgraha is composed, having bowed to the omniscient one, who, [being] the best of the teachers [and] not hanging on to an autonomous teaching, taught, due to a wish for what is beneficial for

\[610\] I.e., Vedic teachings: TSPŚ 18,20–21: svatanträ śrutih = svataḥ pramāṇabhūto vedah, nityam vacanam iti yāvat. (An autonomous teaching, [meaning] the Veda, which is a means of valid cognition by itself, which is to say, [it is] an eternal statement.)
the world—he had great compassion which had become his nature over a large number of time-periods—dependant arising, which ...611

[TS₅ 2] is devoid of additional attributes such as quality, substance, activity, genus, inherence etc., [and in which] the range [of objects that] a [conceptual] cognition and a word [act towards has the nature of] a superimposed form.612

B.1.1 TSPₛ ad TSₛ 2

[TSPₛ 14,15] [Opponent:] Now, substance, quality, movement etc. are real things. Why is it not [the case that] they [arise in dependence on other factors]?613

[Proponent:] To this [objection Śāntarakṣita] said “quality” etc. “Qualities, substances, movements, genus, as well as inherence”, that is a copulative compound. Through the word “genus” a universal in all [of its] two forms, the primary (para) and secondary (apara)

611TSₛ 1–4 are to be construed with TSₛ 6ab (cf. TSPₛ 13,13–14). A full translation of these verses, along with a general appreciation for their role in the TS, can be found in McClintock 2010: 96 ff. Cf. also the translation in Jhā 1937: 1 ff.

612McClintock (2010: 96 ff.), as well as Yoshimizu (2011: 153, n. 7), understand the compound āropitākāraśabdapratyayagocaram (TSₛ 2c’d) as an adjective to pratītyasamutpāda, and translate the phrase to the effect of “dependent arising that is the sphere of words and cognitions which have a superimposed form.” Kapstein (2001: 11 f.) translates the phrase as “Empty ..., But within the scope of words and concepts relating to posited features ...”. Kamalaśīla’s interpretation, at least as I understand it, does not seem to support either of these interpretations: āropitākārah śabdapratyayor gocaro viṣayo yatra pratītyasamutpāde, sa tathoktaḥ. (TSPₛ 15,2–3, cf. the trl. on page 337). It is clearly understood here as a locative bahuvrīhi, i.e., that the dependent arising is something, in which the sphere of words and conceptual cognition is such and such. The authors mentioned do not, as far as I can see, argue for their respective interpretations.

613Cf. TSPₛ 14,13–14: sa punar ayaṃ pratītyasamutpādaḥ skandhadhātv-āyatānaṁ draṣṭavyah, teṣām eva pratītyasamutpannāvat. (Moreover, exactly this dependent arising is to be observed for the aggregates, the elements, and the sense spheres[,] but nothing else[,] because only they have arisen in dependence.)
[one], is included.614 By the word “etc.” there is an inclusion of those properties of the specific characteristics occurring in the lowest substances which, separate from a property bearer, are described by some [as] beginning in such a way as “For all six categories, is-ness (astitva) is the state of being an object of a means of valid cognition that grasps [the property] ‘existing’.”615 [These are] both qualities etc. and additional attributes[, which are the] qualifiers [of qualities, substances, etc.]. This is a modifier compound (višeṣaṇasamāśa). Empty means void of these. With regard to this, this was said by the Lord: “Altogether everything, o Brahmin, [that means] just as far as the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve sense spheres (āyatana), the eighteen elements (dhātus) [go]!”616 And this is a hint at the investigation of the six categories.617

[TSP§ 14.23] [Opponent:] Now, if there are no additional attributes, then how can dependent arising be made an object through both words and concepts? And what is not made an object through these cannot be denoted, nor is there [any] usage of word and concept without an additional attribute. [So] how did the Bhagavat teach this [dependantarising to people]?

[Proponent:] [In answer Śāntarakṣita] said: Superimposed form etc. Superimposed, [meaning] imposed as being external; form, [meaning] nature; the range [of objects that] words and cognition [apply to which has] that [nature], that is so called[, i.e., āropitā-kāraśabdapratyayagocaraḥ]. In which dependant arising [there is this] range [of objects] (gocara)[, i.e.,] a word’s and a cognition’s object (viṣaya) which has a superimposed form, that is so called[,}

614 Cf. Halbfass 1992: 117 explains the general notion of these two types of universals (calling them “ultimate” and “nonultimate”) as follows: “‘Reality’ (sattā) constitutes the ‘ultimate universal’ or ‘supreme generality.’ It is all-inclusive and pervades all substances, qualities, and motions. Nonultimate universals, on the other hand, pervade and include certain entities and exclude others.”

615 Cf. the comments on astitva in Halbfass 1992: 144 f., and 156 ff.

616 This means everything that exists is contained in these factors.

617 These, as Jhā 1937: 18 notes, are the topics of the 10th–15th chapter (Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā–Samavāyapadārthaparīkṣā) of TS₈.
i.e., ṛopitā...gocaraḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ]. The word “cognition”, because of its close connection with the word “word” [in the compound śabdapratyaya] is to be understood as [meaning] the particular cognition “concept,” which has the nature of an internal expression (āviṣṭābhilāpa), because both [word and conceptual cognition] go together [in the compound] since they don’t deviate with regard to having the same object. By this the [following] is said: even if additional attributes do not exist, still that conceptual cognition [which is] attained by means of the observation of real things differentiated from each other, [which is] determined as being of an external form, has the nature of a reflection,\textsuperscript{618} and is the referent of a word, [that conceptual cognition] exists here [in dependent arising]. For this is not really the object of words, because here [in dependent arising] all conceptual cognitions have passed. Rather, exactly as a word referent is established for people due to beauty (ramaṇīyatā) that is not [further] considered, so also the Bhagavats, aiming at the reality which is disregarded [by them during teaching], explain [dependent arising to others] by closing their eyes like an elephant [and so] veiling [their] insight into it,\textsuperscript{619} for the sake of introducing [people] to the highest truth, because there is no other way [to do this]. Even though the word referent is a superimposed form, it is, because of an indirect connection with the real thing, truly a reason for the attainment of this [real thing]. Therefore, in this manner the real thing becomes taught indeed, because of their [the word referents’,] ability [to lead to that real thing]. Thus deception (vipralambha) is not possible. With regard to this the Protector said:

\begin{quote}
For whichever thing is denoted by some name, that [name] does not exist in that [thing] at all. For that is the nature
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{618}Emend to pratibimbātmakam against pratibandhātmakam found in TSP\textsubscript{mb} 6a1, TSP\textsubscript{k} 12,6, TSP\textsubscript{S} 15,6–7 . Cf. rnam par rtog pa’i gzugs brnyan gyi bdag nyid TSP\textsubscript{D} 143a3 (= TSP\textsubscript{Q} He 172b6), as well as the formulation pratibimbātmako ’pohaḥ in TS\textsubscript{S} 1027.

\textsuperscript{619}Cf. Kyuma 2005: 80 f., n. 101 for the background of this metaphor, and see also Dunne 2004: 410.
of things.\(^{620}\)

And this is a hint at the [16th chapter, the] Śabdārthaparīkṣa.

### B.2  TS\(_S\) 573–574

[TS\(_S\) 573–574] [Opponent:] These property bearers[, i.e., the categories,] were proclaimed to be six.\(^{621}\) The properties are indeed assumed to be distinct from them. [Proponent:] If that [is said], what is this relation of this [property] with these [property bearers] that is assumed? Connection (samyoga) is not correct,\(^{622}\) because it is limited to substances, and there is no other inherence, and another relation is not accepted by the others.

#### B.2.1  TSP\(_S\) ad TS\(_S\) 573–574

[TSP\(_S\) 239,24] [Opponent:] There is no [such] error, because that is accepted.\(^{623}\) [Proponent:] If so, how [can it be that] “six categories” are taught? Therefore [Śāntarakṣita] formulated [a pūrvapakṣa starting

\(^{620}\) Cf. Hoornaert 2002: 125 f. and Eckel 2008: 276 f. for other translations and pointers to other occurrences of this verse. It is quoted again in TSP\(_S\) 339,22–23 ad TS\(_S\) 869, which reads: *yasya yasya hi śabdasya yo yo viśaya ucyate / sa sa saṃghaṭate naiva vastūnāṃ sā hi dharmatā //* See below, appendix B.4.

\(^{621}\) The six categories postulated by the Vaiśeṣika system are, as listed by Halbfass 1992: 70–71: “There are six fundamental categories, or divisions of reality: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), motion (*karman*), universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*).” This list has its own rather complex history (cf. Halbfass 1992: 70–80), but seems to have stabilized somewhat by the time of Śāntarakṣita. For the purpose of the argument here, it is important to not confuse the “properties” that Śāntarakṣita is debating with the “qualities” of the Vaiśeṣika list. Śāntarakṣita is trying to show that the opponent, if he wishes to attribute a property (such as *astitva*, lit. “is-ness”, cf. Halbfass 1992: 77) to the six categories that is not identical with them, has to explain the ontological status of this property and thereby accept that it must constitute a seventh category.

\(^{622}\) Read *yukto* acc. to TS\(_{msP}\) 12a1 instead of *yuktā*. This is also how *yuktā* is emended in Frauwallner’s copy of Krishnamacharya 1926, and by Hishida 1971: 13.

\(^{623}\) The opponent has just explained (TS\(_S\) 572a–c) that the is-ness (*astitva*) of the six categories is the reality in the case of an object of a means of valid cognition
with] “These are six.” Only those things that are of the nature of a property bearer are taught as “six categories”, but those [things] that are of the nature of properties are assumed to be different [from] the six categories.624 For a passage in the Padārthapraśvaśaka states: “In such a way, this explanation of the property bearers was given without the properties.”625 “What is this” etc. was said in answer. [The relation] “of this”[, meaning] “of a property such as is-ness and so on,”626 “with these”[, i.e.,] with the six categories. What is the relation on account of which this is a property of those [six categories]? For without a relation, being property and property bearer is not possible, because of the overreaching consequence. For in such a way there would be every property for every [property bearer]; for there is no relation at all with these [property bearers]. For it is so: [this] relation is[, according to Vaiśeṣika authors,] of two kinds, [one] characterized as connection and [the other] characterized as inherence. Of these [two types of relation], to begin with, there is no [relation of a property to anything belonging to the six categories which could be] characterized as connection, because this [connection] is restricted to substances alone since it is a quality.627 Neither is that lets a person cognize “existing” about a thing. (For some remarks on astitva, cf. Halbfass 1992: 143 ff.) Śāntarakṣita’s reply was that this forces the opponent to assume a seventh category in addition to the standard six. The opponent counters here that he accepts that there are dharmas separate from the six categories.

624 In Frawallner’s copy, the text is emended to satpadārthavatiriktā instead of the printed satpadārthā vyatiriktā (in both TSPK and TSPb, as well as TSPmaP 61a10). This emendation (or one to satpadārthebhyo vyatiriktā, as in Hishida 1971: 13, n. 66) is also supported by TSPD Ze 262b6 (=TSPQ He 323b5): tsi gi don drug las ma gtogs pa ’dod pa kho na’o.


626 Is-ness, denotability, and cognizability are the three characteristics common to all categories. Cf. PDhS 16: saṅnām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatuvaṇṇeyatvāni. See Halbfass 1992: 158 ff. for a discussion of this sentence, and Halbfass 1970: 143 f. for how it applies to universals.

627 Cf. the explanations in Halbfass 1970: 122 f. The relation “connection” would have been considered one of the qualities (guna) by the opponent here. As such, the
there such a relation that could be] characterized as inherence, because that inherence is assumed as singular, like being.\textsuperscript{628} But, if there were a relation of the type inherence with inherence, a second inherence would be endorsed.\textsuperscript{629}

**B.3 TS\textsubscript{Ś} 738**

[TS\textsubscript{Ś} 738] For a recurring cognition has an appearance of words and particulars. But a genus is declared [to be] free of colour, shape, and the form of letters.

**B.3.1 TSP\textsubscript{Ś} ad TS\textsubscript{Ś} 738**

[TSP\textsubscript{Ś} 300,23] Showing also that the thesis is defeated by an inference, [Śāntarakṣita] said: “Recurring” etc. [With this] the following is said:\textsuperscript{630} you wish to prove that repeated apprehensions have a cause that is different from the individual things etc. [and] that is really the basis [for these cognitions]. And this is wrong, because that [cause, postulated by you,] does not appear, and because colour, shape, etc., [all] different from this [cause], do appear. For it is so: a universal opponent will maintain that it qualifies only substances (dravya), and so cannot be what enables properties to qualify things of all six categories.

\textsuperscript{628}Cf. PDhS\textsubscript{D} 16,18: “dravyādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ samavāyitvam anekatvam ca.”

\textsuperscript{629}The explanation of ŚV Ps 148 given in J. A. Taber 2005: 109 is remarkably close to this passage. Since he thinks it is “...better, rather, for the translator to provide his or her own commentary, after thoroughly studying and digesting the available classical ones ...” (J. A. Taber 2005: xiii), these arguments might actually be related.

\textsuperscript{630}This is a paraphrase of the thesis of Bhāvivikta’s inference, given in TS\textsubscript{Ś} 715ab. This thesis is, as formulated in TSP\textsubscript{Ś} 294,24–295,9: tatra bhāviviktah prāha—gavāśvamahiṣavarāhamātaṅgādiṣu gavādyabhidhānaprajiñānaviśeṣāḥ samayākṛtipi-ndādyatiriktasvarūpānurūpasaṃsarginimitāntaranibandhanā ity avaghoṣānā. (To this Bhāvivikta said: In the case of cow, horse, buffalo, boar, elephant, etc., the particular cognitions and names such as “cow” etc. depend on another cause mixed together with [and] according to the own nature [of these things, but] separated from convention, shape, material body, etc.—This is the declaration [of what Bhāvivikta wants to prove.] After giving a slightly different second interpretation of the phrase samayā... nibandhanā, TSP\textsubscript{Ś} 295,19 clarifies: avaghoṣaneti pratijñā (Declaration means thesis.). For Bhāvivikta, cf. Potter 1977: 281.
such as cowness etc. is declared by you to be completely empty of colour, shape, and the forms of letters, but a cognition that conforms to the appearance of colour etc. is experienced. So how should the basis of this [cognition] be empty of colour etc.? For there cannot be one (anya) basis for a cognition that has another (anya) form, because of an unwanted consequence [that goes] too far. A [formal] proof: that cognition, which has an appearance of an object different from some [other object], never grasps that [other object], as a cognition through a word does not grasp the [visual] form [of a thing]. And a recurring cognition has an appearance of colour etc., [all of] which are different from a genus. This [is] due to apprehending that opposed to the pervader.631 [The phrase] “it has an appearance of words and particulars” [is analysed:] “word” is the denomination “a cow” etc.; “particular” is what has the nature of colour, shape, etc.; this appearance of these two belongs to [cognition], so: “it has [that appearance].” Letters are the letter “c”, the letter “o”, the letter “w”, etc.632

B.4 TSŚ 870

[TSS 870] For633 particular, class, the connection to this [class], that having a class, as [also] a form of awareness do not really assemble634 where the word referent [is].

631 For Bhāvivikta, the pervader, which is what he wanted to prove, was the fact that there must be a cause other than the perceptible qualities of a thing due to which there is the same cognition about different things of the same class, and that this can only be a genus (cf. TSSŚ 295,12–13: yāni ca tāni nimittāntarāṇi tāni gotvādīnīti siddham. “And those which are these other causes are cowness etc. That is established.”). The vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi here consists in showing that in these cognitions something that is not a genus appears, and that, since cognitions can only be based on what appears in them, they can therefore not be caused (or have their basis in) a genus.

632 Literally: “The letter “ga”, the letter “au”, the visarga, and so on.” The first three spell the Sanskrit word “gauḥ” (“cow”).

633 This verse gives the reason for the preceding verse, where it was claimed that whatever a word refers to is not a real thing (cf. footnote 620).

634 Literally, the phrase ghatām añcati means “it enters a group/collection”. It is translated as sgra don du /de kho na nyid du mi ‘thad / (“...is not really correct as
B.4.1 TSP₅ ad TS₅ 870

[TSP₅ 340,4] If [it is asked:] [Opponent:] Now, which means of valid cognition [is there] for the fact that a verbal cognition [is] both erroneous and without object? [Proponent:] We have stated the means of valid cognition for this, which is [as follows] (yat . . . iti): Each and every verbal cognition is erroneous because it occurs by means of a determination of non-difference for different [things].

For [it is] so: the cognition “this” with regard to what is not this is erroneous, like the cognition of water where there is a mirage. And this verbal cognition, which determines non-difference with regard to different referents, is thus. [So there is] the logical reason [consisting in] an essential property. And neither does this [verbal cognition] grasp a universal that has the nature of a real thing, due to which the reason [used in this inference] would not be established; for this [universal] has earlier been refuted at length. Or may a universal [really] exist, still, given that this [universal] is an object different from the differences[, i.e., the different things], the determination of non-difference with regard to differentiated [things] would be only erroneous. For some things similar to something else, [and so] connected to it, would not be said to possess that [other thing, the word referent.”] in TSD Ze 33a2 (=TS♭ He 40b6). I understand it to mean that the particular etc. do not belong to what is rightly categorized as the word referent.

For the reading śābdapratyayasya see also Ishida 2008: 4.

Cf., e.g., TSP₅ 338,10–13: apohavādinām tu na paramārthataḥ śabdānāṃ kiिऊic vācyam vastusvarūpam asti. sarva eva hi śābdah pratyayo bhrāntah, bhinneṣv artheṣv abhedākārādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ. yatra tu pāramparyena vastupratibandhah, tatrārthasamvādo bhrāntatve ‘pīti darśanam. (But for those proclaiming exclusion [as the referent of words] the view [is this]: “For words there is in reality nothing denotable at all that has the nature of a real thing. For every verbal apprehension is erroneous, because [it] applies to different referents due to the determination of a non-different form. But for which [conceptual cognition] there indirectly is a connection to a real thing, for that there is concurrence with the referent, even though [the cognition] is erroneous.”)

I follow the emendation in Ishida 2008: 1 to tatrārthasamvādo, against tatrārthā- samvādo in both TSP₅ and TSP₅.

As Śāstrī (1981: 340, n. 2) points out, this was the general topic of chapter 13, the Sāmānya(padārtha)parīkṣā, of the TS.
B. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on *apoha*

...i.e., a universal]. [Alternatively,] even if [you were to say that] a universal is not an object different [from the particulars], [then] the entire universe (*viśva*) would in reality be only one (*eka*) real thing; so the cognition of a universal there [amongst the things] is entirely erroneous. For the cognition of a universal does not have the same real thing as an object, because this [cognition] requires the grasping of a difference. And if [this cognition’s] erroneousness is established, [its] lack of an object is also established; for[, in the case of a wrong cognition,] there is no referent at all which fulfills the criteria of a basis [for cognition], in that [it is] productive [of the cognition] through a projection of its form [into cognition].

[TSP§ 340,15] Or else: in another way the lack of an object [for a conceptual cognition] is proven. For only with regard to which referent sounds are agreed upon, that alone is consistent as their referent, [and] nothing else, because of an overreaching consequence. And an agreement on these [sounds] for any real thing cannot exist in reality. Therefore sounds [producing] a cognition are without objects. A [formal] proof: whichever [sounds] do not, in reality (*bhāvatas*), become agreed upon with regard to something, those do not truly denote that, like the word “horse” is not agreed upon with regard to a material entity having a dewlap etc.[, i.e., a cow]. And in reality no sounds at all become agreed upon with regard to any real thing. This is because of a non-observation of the pervading element.\(^{638}\) Because [a word] which denotes is pervaded by the fact that [it has] an agreed upon convention; and this [pervading element] does not exist here[, i.e., words are not agreed upon for real things].\(^{639}\)

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638 Consider also the emendation of *vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* to *vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ* in Ishida 2008: 5. But *iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* does occur a few times (e.g., TSP§ 119,13; 137,8–9; 198,12), although not as frequently as *iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ*. So it could be that it is a usage particular to Kamalaśīla. Also, the next sentence’s construction is not straightforward, looking more like a gloss on *vyāpakānupalabdheḥ* than an additional statement. The Tibetan is not much clearer: ...mi dmigs pa ste. brda byas pa nyid rjod par byed pa la khyab pa’i phyir la de ’di la med do. (TSP_D Ze 313a1–2 = TSP_Q He 389a4–5).

639 I think the argument is as follows: *abhidhāyaktva*, therefore *kṛtasamaya-
And, making it clear that this reason is not unestablished etc., i.e., that a word does not denote any real thing, [Śāntarakṣita] said “for” etc. [in TS₈ 870].

For it is so.⁶⁴⁰ a real thing, which an agreement is grasped for, is defined as being the word referent, [i.e., it is] the particular that is sometimes defined [as word referent], or the class, or the connection with it—[with it], meaning] with the class, connection[, meaning] relation—or the thing⁶⁴¹ having a class, or the form of awareness. These are the alternatives. For none of these is it consistent that [it] is the referent of a word, because a convention is impossible [for any of them]. By [saying] really, [he] shows that a conventional referent of words is not negated. Because of this there is no inconsistency (vyāghāta) in [his] own words. For otherwise [if he had not added “really”] there would be a contradiction of the thesis to [his] own words. For it is so: without conveying these, particular etc., through a word it is not possible to convey their not being the referent of a word etc. And [someone] showing these, a particular etc., with words, wishing to convey this [that they are not the word referents] would admit that [they] are word referents. Furthermore, precisely this is negated by the thesis. So there would be an inconsistency in [his] own words.

⁶⁴⁰ Read tathā hi acc. to Ishida 2008: 5, TSP₉ 276,20 instead of yathā hi TSP₈ 340,22.

⁶⁴¹ In the copy I am using, there is a handwritten note, in all likelihood by Erich Frauwallner, to the effect of reading padārtho, probably according to TSP₉ Ze 313a3 (=TSP₉ He 389a6): “…rīgs dang ldan pa’i dngos po pa’am, blo’i rnam pa’...” This emendation is also made in Ishida 2008: 5, and a correction in TSP₉ maP 86a7 can be interpreted as “ḥ’”, also supporting padārthah, ....
By this also what was said by Uddyotakara: “If words do not denote [anything], [there is] inconsistency both of the thesis and the reason.”\textsuperscript{642} is answered. For we do not deny the word referent in every way, because there is a thorough cognition\textsuperscript{643} of this [conventional word referent] right down to the cow-herdsman (ā-gopāla). Rather, the property “being in accordance with reality” is negated, which is superimposed by [others] onto this [word referent], but [we do] not [negate] the bearer of [that] property[, i.e., the word referent itself].

B.5 \textit{TS}_Ś 890 (=\textit{VP}_R 2.132)

[\textit{TS}_Ś 890] Or\textsuperscript{644} that object, which is the object of awareness [and] has a founding in an external real thing, is assumed by some [to be] the word referent cognized as “external real thing.”

B.5.1 \textit{TSP}_Ś ad \textit{TS}_Ś 890

[\textit{TSP}_Ś 351,20] But others state the word referent to be a form that is a) only placed on (ārudha) awareness, b) belongs to (viṣaya) the external real things, c) is grasped as being an external real thing, [and] d) appears as being [of] the nature of awareness. This [opinion] he explains[, saying] “Or that” etc. \textbf{Object of awareness[, i.e.,] that going around in awareness, that is to say, situated in awareness. Has a founding in an external real thing[, meaning:] that has a founding in an external real thing, for which a real thing, which exists [or] does not exist [and is] external, is undertaken to be shown

\textsuperscript{642} As pointed out in Ishida 2008: 6, n. 2, this is a quote of NBhV 312,21–22.

\textsuperscript{643} Read atipratītatvāt, as suggested by \textit{TSP}_Ś 341,13 against api pratītatvāt \textit{TSP}_K 277,2. Cf. also āgopālam atipratītam eva in \textit{TSP}_Ś 1072,11.

\textsuperscript{644} This is the last in a series of options of what the word referent could be, starting \textit{TS}_Ś 887. This verse is obviously very close to \textit{VP}_R 2.132 (or practically the same as \textit{VP} II 132). It is translated in Rau 2002: 71. Houben (1995: 159) notes in this context that he sees “…no objective reason to assume that in Bhartṛhari’s eyes this view in which superimposition is the crucial notion took a foremost position among the various views [expressed in \textit{VP}_R 2.119–142—PMA].”
as the basis, i.e.,] the own nature having its place in the letter signs (akṣaracihna).\(^{645}\) Cognized as “external real thing”, this means: manifest as having the nature of awareness [and] determined as being external. For it is so: to the extent that what has the nature of awareness, which is not projected amongst the objects, is grasped as “only having the form of awareness” due to the presence of a consideration of [its] real state,\(^{646}\) to that extent its being the word referent is not determined, because there is no connection to a specific activity concerning it. For activities, such as “Bring the cow!” or “Eat the curd!”, are not possible for that having the form of awareness in such a way; rather, words denote an object that is capable of a connection to an activity. Thus this which is grasped as having the form of awareness is not the word referent. But if it becomes projected onto an external real thing, then someone erroneously cognizing this [form] as being external, thinks [there is] a capacity for establishing action. Thus it becomes the word referent.

[TSP\(_S\) 352,5] [Opponent:] But now, what difference of this is there from the position of an Apohavādin? For it is so: also by an Apohavādin the form of awareness, grasped as having the nature of an external [thing], is indeed proclaimed as the word referent. As it was said [in PV III 169:]

However,\(^{647}\) because of understanding\(^{648}\) that differentiated from others by means (gatyā) of a superimposition of that form, there is no contradiction if [there is] this formulation: “That object alone (eva)[, the form of awareness,] is the object of a word.”\(^{649}\)

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\(^{645}\)This phrase is unfortunately not clear to me.

\(^{646}\)Both manuscripts support tattvabhāvanatayā: TSP\(_{maP}\) 89a6 reads tattva-bhāvanatayā (corrected from tattvabhāvanayatayā), and TSP\(_{maJ}\) 123a2–3 reads tattvabhāvanatayā. TSP\(_K\) 285,14 read tattvabhāvanayā, which still seems preferable to sattvabhāvanayā in TSP\(_S\) 351,26.

\(^{647}\)See also

\(^{648}\)Read “vyāvṛttyadhigate” acc. to PV III 169 against “vyāvṛttyadhitgate” TSP\(_K\) 285,20 and “vyāvṛttyadhitgate” in TSP\(_S\) 352,7.

\(^{649}\)See above, appendix A.3.2.
[Proponent:] That is not [so]. For a Buddhākāravādin⁶⁵⁰ assumes a form of awareness, which a) is non-erroneous⁶⁵¹ with regard to the external real thing, b) belongs to [the external things], and c) is imposed on real [things] such as substance etc., to be the word referent in reality. But⁶⁵² he does not assume [it to be a form of cognition] that is a) without basis, b) erroneous because of [its] occurrence due to a determination of non-difference for differentiated [things], [and] c) based on the [particulars’] differences from each other. But if [he] says, as we [do, in PV I 72]:

A wholly (sarva) false appearance is this grasping of the things as having the same nature. A mutual difference [of things], which an expression has as its object, is the seed of this [grasping].

then that to be established is [already] established. And he[, Śāntarakṣita] will say so [in TS §904]:⁶⁵³

If [someone says:] “a mutual difference is the seed of this [grasping],” [then] that is our position.

But an Apohavādin [does not postulate that there is] anything denotable for words in reality, neither a form of awareness nor anything else. For it is so: what appears in verbal apprehension due to being what is to be determined, that is the word referent. But the form of awareness is not determined⁶⁵⁴ by verbal cognition, but rather a completely (eva) external real thing performing a causal effect. But

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⁶⁵⁰This doctrine is also mentioned in PVV 169,13 (appendix A.4.2.8).
⁶⁵¹Read vastuny abhrāntam acc. to TSPK 285,22 against vastubhrāntam TSP § 352,9.
⁶⁵²This sentence, TSPK 285,24–25, is not found in TSP. Read na tu acc. to TSP map 89a11 instead of nanu, as also noted by Frauwallner’s handwritten emendation, and reflected in TSPD Ze 319a5 (=TSPQ He 397a7–8): ...sgra’i don du ’dod kyi. tha dad pa dag la tha mi dad par zhen nas ’jug pa’i ’khrul pa phan tshun ldog pa’i rgyu mtshan can (TSPD: n.e. TSPQ) ’dod pa ni ma yin no.
⁶⁵³Cf. Hattori 1993: 139 f. for a translation and discussion of this verse.
⁶⁵⁴Read vyavasāyiye acc. to TSPK 286,2 against the obvious misprint uvapraśiyate TSP § 352,18.
even an external [thing] is not really determined by it, because there is no determination corresponding to reality, [and] because there is no reality corresponding to determination. Thus the word referent is only superimposed. And what is superimposed, that isn’t anything. Thus nothing is really denoted by words. What was further said [in PV I 72], “Exactly this object is the word referent.”, that [was said] intending (abhisandhāya) only the superimposed object. But by a Buddhaśakaravādin a form of cognition is assumed as denotable in reality. This is a big difference [between his view and that of an Apohavādin].

B.6 TSŚ 923 (=ŚV Av 41)

[TSŚ 923] [Opponent:] And a distinction of an awareness event from another awareness event is not cognized. And this awareness event does not carry any element apart from the arising of its own nature.

B.6.1 TSPŚ ad TSŚ 923

[TSPŚ 364,11] This might be [said by an Apohavādin]: “There is a differentiation of an appearance [to awareness] from another appearance that is of a different kind; thus exclusion is constructed.” So [Kumārila] said: “From another awareness event etc.” To this [reply:] “Even though this [distinction of one awareness event from another] is not cognized, nevertheless it really exists.”, [Kumārila] said: because it arises with its own nature etc. Even if there is a differentiation of one awareness event from another awareness event, nevertheless, there is no functioning of a word regarding this

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656 Cf. also DhAP 239,15 f.: cung zad kyang ma yin no zhes smra’o.
657 This verse is part of a series of objections made by Kumārila in the ŚV Ac, and quoted by Sāntaraksita. See Jhā 1985: 303 ff. and Jhā 1937: 498 ff. for translations.
658 I follow Okada 2003: 68 in reading nänyam amśam bibharti sā against nänyam samjñan bibhartī sā in TSŚ and “(vidhirūpāvasāyini)” in TSKr.
[differentiation]. For it is so: this awareness event that arises because of a word is not observed as carrying another element, [which is] qualified as a differentiation from another awareness, [and] determined because of a word, apart from the arising of its own nature; rather, this means that it arises only as determining what has a positive nature. And that part of a real thing that is not determined because of a word cannot be the referent of a word, because of an overreaching consequence.\footnote{I emend to “śabdād anavasīyamāno” against śabdād avasīyamāno in TSPₚₙₙₚ 91b17, TSPₘ 364,17 and TSPₚ. Cf. TSP₉ Ze 324b3–4 (=TSP₉ He 404a8): sgras ma zhen pa’i dngos po’i cha yang sgra’i don du rigs pa ma yin te .... The copy of TSPₚ with emendations by Frauwallner has “na?” written above “śabdādavasīyamāna”, suggesting a similar expectation. The translation of Jhā 1937: 498 also reflects such an understanding, even though there is no note as to why this is assumed. It is not quite clear which unwanted consequence is supposed to result. An error commonly noted in these contexts is that, if a word makes something other than its proper object known, it could make any object known. Cf., e.g., the unwanted consequences mentioned in TSPₘ 301,11 (appendix B.3.1) and TSPₘ 373,9–10 (appendix B.8.1).} Therefore, the thesis [that exclusion is the word referent] is refuted by [experiential] knowledge.

B.7 TSₕ 942–943 (=ŚV Av 83–84)

[TSₕ 942] [Opponent:] And a non-cow would be excluded which was established and has the nature of a negation of cow. In this [expression, “non-cow,”] only that cow is expressed which is negated by the [negative] particle na.

[TSₕ 943] And if that [cow] had the nature of an absence of non-cow, one would have a connection to the other. If [you say] cow has been established for the sake of exclusion, [then] the assumption of exclusion is vain.

B.7.1 TSPₕ ad TSₕ 942–943

[TSPₚ 370,15] [Opponent:] Therefore, because of the unwanted consequence of an error of mutual dependence, a convention for exclusion cannot be made. Explaining this, [Kumārila] said: “And the established” etc. There is a cognition of cow through the differentiation.
from non-cow, and **that non-cow has the nature of a negation of cow**. Therefore, in [this expression] here, “non-cow”, the latter word referent is what is to be expressed, which is negated by the negative particle *na* as in [this case] here: “A non-cow[, or,] not a cow.” For something that has a nature that is not clearly known cannot be negated.

Moreover, now [this] might be [said by an Apohavādin]: “Is that to be expressed here the cow which has the nature of an absence of non-cow?” Because of this [question Kumārila] said: **“And if that ....”**660 “That” [refers to] cow. For it is so: A cognition of cow [comes about] only by means of a cognition of non-cow, because [it] has the essence of an absence of non-cow; and a cognition of non-cow has its very means in a cognition of cow, because [non-cow] consists in a negation of cow. So (*iti*) a dependence on each other very clearly presents itself.

Moreover, [this] might be [said by an Apohavādin]: “A cow, which is negated by the word non-cow, is established only as having the form of an affirmation for the sake of exclusion[, i.e.,] for the sake of an establishment of exclusion as qualified by a distinction from non-cow. Due to this, there will not be a dependency on each other.” Therefore [Kumārila] said: “If cow is established ....”[, meaning:] If it is so, then a construction of exclusion in such a way as [this]: “For all words the object is exclusion.”661 is vain, because the referent of a word has the form of an affirmation. Therefore, no established word referent at all which has the form of an affirmation should be made an element [in exclusion]. But if not making that [positive word referent] an element, the error of dependence on each other is hard to avoid.

**B.8  TS$_S$ 947–949 (=ŚV Av 88–90)**

[TS$_S$ 947] [Opponent:] Neither is an awareness of exclusion generated from words such as “horse” etc. In this

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660 Read *sa ced ity ādi* acc. to TSP$_{mP}$ 93a14 against *sa cety ādi* TSP$_S$ 370,19, TSP$_K$ 300,18.

661 Read *āpohārtha* acc. to TSP$_S$ against *āpoho ’rtha* in TSP$_K$. 351
[world], an awareness of something that is qualified is not assumed to be one in which the qualifier [remains] unknown.

[TS$_8$ 948] Neither should a qualifier having one form cause a cognition of another kind.\textsuperscript{662} But how is this [exclusion, being of one kind,] called a qualifier for a cognition of another kind?\textsuperscript{663}

[TS$_8$ 949] If a qualifier were assumed even though the qualified [thing] is [classified] in a different way, then, if it were so, any qualifier whatsoever could follow.

\textbf{B.8.1 TSP$_8$ ad TS$_8$ 947}

[TSP$_8$ 372,11] And this mode\textsuperscript{664} [of qualifying] is not possible for exclusion. [Kumārila’s] words: “\textit{neither} etc.” show this. For exclusion is not determined through an awareness of “horse” etc., but rather only the real thing. And for that [reason], because an awareness of exclusion cannot occur, horse etc. is not coloured with this [exclusion] by the awareness of [horse etc.] itself.

Should this be [said by an Apohavādin]:\textsuperscript{665} “Exclusion, even though not cognized, becomes the qualifier [of a real thing, like horse etc.],” then this is said [in answer]: \textit{of that qualified} etc. For, an \textbf{awareness of a qualified [thing] that does not grasp a qualifier} does not exist. That [awareness] is so called[, i.e., called

\textsuperscript{662} I.e., exclusion or difference should not lead to a cognition of a positively characterized thing.

\textsuperscript{663} ŚV Av 89 \textit{reads jñāte} instead of \textit{jñāne} found in TS$_R$ 949 and TS$_8$ 948.

\textsuperscript{664} In TS$_8$ 946 (=ŚV Av 87) it was argued that the mere existence of a qualifier is not sufficient for it to be a qualifier of something. Rather, a qualifier (\textit{apoha}) has to “colour” (√rañj) that which it qualifies (in this case, exclusion has to qualify the object of conceptual cognition). TS$_8$ 946cd: \textit{svabuddhyā rajyate yena viśeṣyam tad viśeṣaṇam}. (A qualifier is that by which a qualified [thing] is coloured in the awareness of [this qualified thing] itself.) See Watson and Kataoka 2017: 57 ff. for this notion of “colouring awareness”.

\textsuperscript{665} Cf. the argument in § 4.
non-existent,] which does not know the qualifier [but knows something that is qualified].

[TSP $\text{Ś}_372,16$] Or may it really be that there is an awareness of exclusion, nevertheless, because there is no awareness with a form of that [exclusion] when there is a real object [that is being cognized], this qualifier[[], exclusion,] for that [thing supposedly qualified by it,] is not coherent. Showing this, [Kumārila] said [in ŚV Av 89]: “Neither should [a qualifier] having one form” etc. For every qualifier, corresponding to its own form, is seen to generate an awareness with regard to the [thing] qualified. But a qualifier of a different kind does not generate an awareness of [yet] another kind with regard to the specified [thing]. For, [the qualifier] blue does not bring about an awareness “red” with regard to a water lily, or a stick [the awareness] “an earring-possessing one.” Neither is a verbal awareness for [the words] “horse” etc. produced here that is tainted by the absence [of a thing]. Rather, it determines the form of an existing thing (bhāva).

Should this be [said]: “[It] is called qualifier, even [if] it produces a cognition [that is] of another kind.”, [Kumārila] said: “But how, when something of another kind ....” For a [cognition] of another kind [, that is,] for a [cognition] not conforming to the qualifier.

[TSP $\text{Ś}_373,8$] Because [of the question of an Apohavādin:] “If it were so, what error [would there be?]”, [Kumārila] said [in ŚV Av 90 ]: if [...] otherwise etc. If, for you[, Apohavādin], there should be[, i.e.,] when [there is], an assumption as the qualifier with regard to a specific quality, even though it is classified in a different way[, i.e.,] as not conforming to the qualifier, [then,] if that is so, everything indeed, blue etc., would be a qualifier of everything. And therefore there would be no classification [of anything].

B.9 TS$_\text{Ś}_977$cd (＝ŚV Av 143cd)

[TS$_\text{Ś}_977$cd] And$^{666}$ it is not possible to show absence of another in the referent of a sentence.

$^{666}$This verse is also discussed in Hattori 1979: 69 f., as is Śāntarakṣita’s answer (TS$_\text{Ś}_1159$–1161); for the latter also see the discussion in Siderits 1985: 143 ff.
B. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on apoha

B.9.1  TSP₅ ad TS₅ 977cd

[TSP₅ 384,15] Moreover, the referent of a sentence is assumed to have a single multifarious form, like the colour spotted black (kalmāśa). Therefore, absence of others cannot be shown in that [referent] because there is no cognition of an opposite [to this sentence’s object] having a completed nature. And the absence of others having the form of a distinction from non-Caitra etc., which is described [by you] in cases like “Caitra, bring [the] cow!” etc., by grasping the parts [of the sentence], that is only the meaning of a word, not the meaning of a sentence, because this [referent of a sentence], which does not have parts, cannot be divided. Thus, the definition of the word referent [as exclusion] is not comprehensive.⁶⁶⁷

B.10  TS₅ 1004–1014

[TS₅ 1004] The reasons for the same judgement [about different things], which were earlier explained [in the chapter called Sāmānyaparīkṣa],⁶⁶⁹ are similar objects such as [an] abhayā [tree], which are differentiated from others by [their] very (eva) nature.

[TS₅ 1005–8ab] To call that object’s reflection, which, based on these objects, appears in a conceptual cognition, [and] is ascertained just as the object,⁶⁷⁰ even though not being of the essence (ātmatā) of an [external] object, by the name “exclusion” is well founded, because of [its] difference from another appearance, because of [its] being the cause of the attainment of real things that are

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⁶⁶⁷ I.e., it does not cover all cases of language usage. If taken in a more technical sense as “does not pervade”, avyāpin could mean that there are some cases where a linguistic referent (hetu) occurs without exclusion as an object (śādhya).

⁶⁶⁸ For these verses I follow the edition in Ishida 2011b: 201 ff., where they are also translated.

⁶⁶⁹ See the references in Ishida 2011b: 201, n. 10 (TS₅ 722–725).

⁶⁷⁰ Read artha ity acc. Ishida 2011b: 201.
differentiated from others, as well as (api) because of [its] origination by means of a real thing not connected [to other things], and because the confused determine this [reflection] as identical in nature (tādātmya) to the particular which is differentiated from that of another class, [and] has that [reflection] as a result.

[TS Ś 1008cd] Also [to call] a particular that is the reason for this [reflection by the name “exclusion” is reasonable], because [a particular] is differentiated from others.

[TS Ś 1009] And the absolute negation is this: “A cow is not a non-cow.” This is evidently understood as exclusion from others.672

[TS Ś 1010] Amongst these [three sorts of exclusion], the first exclusion[, a reflection in cognition,] is made known by words, because an awareness that determines an external thing arises from a word.

[TS Ś 1011] And, given that, because of a word, there is an arising of a cognition possessing a reflection of that having that form[, i.e., of that determined as external,] this relationship of denoted and denoting has resulted as having the nature of cause and effect.

[TS Ś 1012–1014] And if this form is directly cognized in this way[, i.e., as the effect of a word,] also absolute negation is understood by implication, as “That of this nature is not of another nature.” Given that there is a connection with real things, also a cognition of an excluded real thing arises by implication (arthāt). Thereby, this [exclusion]673

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671 Read ca instead of vā according to Ishida 2011b: 201.
672 The translation follows the emendation in Ishida 2011b: 202 of ativispaṣṭa to iti vispaṣṭam.
673 ayam here refers to the kind of apoha being discussed, the one having the nature of a particular. Cf. TSP Ś 393,23: ayam iti svalakṣaṇātmā. The import of the following “also” (api) is that the apoha having the nature of negation is metaphorically called the word referent, TSP Ś 393,23–24: apiśabdāt prasajyātmā ca.
is also figuratively called the proper referent of a word. But this twofold exclusion is not directly expressed by words.

**B.10.1 TSP₅ ad TS₅ 1006–7**

[TSP₅ 391,12] [Opponent: ] Now, why is there this designation “exclusion” for this [appearance in awareness]? [Proponent: ] Because [of this question, Śāntarakṣita, in TS₅ 1006] said: “[because of the difference] from another appearance” etc. [It is] due to four reasons that this [appearance] is named exclusion. Primarily, [this is the case because this appearance] itself appears as different from other appearances imposed by other conceptual cognitions. [This is] because of such a derivation: “It is excluded.”, thus exclusion; “exclusion from another,” thus other-exclusion. But due to metaphorical usage [the name “exclusion” is given to this appearance] for three reasons: either because of the imposition of the property⁶⁷⁴ of an effect[, i.e., a particular,] onto a cause[, a conceptual cognition,] which was stated by [the words] “due to being the reason for the attainment of a real thing differentiated from others”; or because of the metaphorical usage of the property of a cause[, which is a particular,] for an effect[, which is a conceptual cognition,] this being explained by “as well as because of [its] origination by means of a real thing not connected [to other things],”—not connected[, i.e.,] not related to another, meaning that differentiated from another. Just this [quality of not being connected with others] is the means[, or] the method, of a real thing [to produce a conceptual cognition], because, in virtue of an experience of this [real thing], a conceptual cognition corresponding [to that thing] arises. And [an appearance is rightly called exclusion] because [this appearance] is determined by erring cognizers as one with the object excluded from that of another class. This is the fourth cause. This is explained: “that of another class” etc. Its [determination], i.e., [a determination] of the object’s reflection contained in conceptual awareness. **Well founded**, i.e., the

⁶⁷⁴Read ⁰dharmāropitād acc. to TSP₅ instead of ⁰dharmyāropitād in TSP₅.
word exclusion] occurs [for the reflection] together with the fourfold foundation (nibandhana) explained with [the words] “because of a difference from another appearance” etc. So [it is] well founded.

B.11 TS$_S$ 1060–1061

[TS$_S$ 1060–1061] And a real thing, differentiated from non-cow, is what is cognized through the sense faculties. A reflection, imposed on it, is cognized by self-awareness. And having observed this [differentiated thing], a word is used for this [thing] by people. Also an experience of the connection of this [word] with that [thing] clearly arises.

B.11.1 TSP$_S$ ad TS$_S$ 1060–1061

[TSP$_S$ 407,13] And what was said, “by sense perceptions” etc.$^{675}$, is not established. Showing this, [Śāntarakṣita] said: “And [a real thing] differentiated from non-cow” etc. Here, first of all, exclusion, which has the nature of a particular, is indeed understood by the sense faculties. And this exclusion, which has the nature of a reflection of the object, is established by the very perception self-awareness, because [it, exclusion as a reflection,] is in reality of the nature of awareness. The uninflected word “and” [is spoken] in order to include the meanings [of exclusion] not mentioned. Thereby, also that [exclusion] having the nature of absolute negation is indeed understood by implication. [This] was shown [in TS$_S$ 1013a] with [the words] “That of this nature is not of another nature.” Thus having observed, and cognized, only this exclusion that has the nature

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$^{675}$This was said in TS$_S$ 938 = ŚV Av 78. Kumārila’s argument was that the exclusion of non-cow is not apprehended by the sense faculties when a linguistic convention is being made, and that consequently the word would not refer to anything.

$^{676}$Read yaścā° acc. to TSP$_S$ 407,16, instead of yat svā° TSP$_K$ 331,14.

$^{677}$TSP$_S$ 407,18 reads dṛṣṭvā jñātvā ca, noting that jñātvā ca is not found in TSP$_{msP}$ (where it is, in fact, found, TSP$_{msP}$ 101b13) and TSP$_K$. TSP$_{msJ}$ 139a4 equally
of a particular etc., a word is used by people, but not [on having observed] a real universal, because that is non-existent and because it does not appear to awareness. A connection of this [word] with that [exclusion] alone is understood, upon the observation of which people use a word; but no [connection] with another [exclusion is understood], because of an overreaching consequence [that then a word would refer to everything].

B.12  TS§ 1063–1064

[TS§ 1063–1064] Cows and non-cows are fully established because of different judgements. But a word, not established itself, is used as one wants.

For a real thing differentiated [from all other real things] does not, for [the sake of] an awareness [of this thing], depend on the grasping of another [thing]. Therefore, this error of dependence on each other is out of place here.

B.12.1  TSP§ ad TS§ 1063–1064

[TSP§ 407,23] And to that which was said [by Kumārila]: “And non-cow, which was established, would be excluded” etc., [Śāntarakṣita] said “Cows and non-cows” etc. For it is on [their] very own [accord] that things like cows etc., which generate different judgements, are correctly ascertained as separated. To these things normal speakers apply, according to [their] wish, an unestablished word supports the longer reading. The jñātvā ca is also not reflected in TSP₉ Ze 345a5 (TSP₉ He 430b3–4): de’i phyir rang gi mtsan nyid la sogs pa’i ngo bo’i sel ba ‘di nyid mthong na ste shes nas ‘jig rten gyis (TSP₉: gyi TSP₉) sgra sbyor gyi spyi dngos por gyur pa la ni ma yin te.

678 By “etc.” here exclusion in all senses just described is meant.
679 Cf. footnote 659.
680 This was objected in ŚV Av 83–84, quoted in TS§ 942–943, cf. appendix B.7.
681 Cf., e.g., PV I 119 (see trl. on page 310).
for the sake of everyday language usage. For it is so: if that having the nature of a real thing differentiated [from all other real things] depends, for the sake of [its] cognition, on a grasping of another object, then there would be the error of mutual dependence. [But] insofar as a differentiated real thing is known without any grasping of another [thing], the convention “cow and non-cow” is made as one wishes, given that this [differentiated real thing] is established as separate [from other real things] due to being the reason for a judgement [having] a form differentiated [from the forms of other cognitions]. So in what way would there be a dependency on each other? “For an awareness” [in TS § 1064b means] “for the sake of an awareness [of this thing].”

B.13 TS § 1097–1100

[TS § 1097] From words such as “blue”, “water lily” etc. only a single [object] is determined. What is differentiated from non-blue, non-water-lily, etc. is a reflection [of a real thing in the mind].

[TS § 1098] But, a real thing endowed with exclusion from others is not postulated by us as what is to be denoted. For us differentiation is not different from the thing that is differentiated from others.683

[TS § 1099] Thus, this error of dependency does not, as [it does] for a genus, come about for the [object of a word] as

682 This verse is an answer to ŚV Av 115–117 (corresponding to TS § 966–968). There, Kumārila had pointed out that if it were only other-exclusion that a word refers to, words could not have co-reference or be in a qualifier-qualified relation to each other.

683 Read, respectively, bhāvān and anyā vyāvṛttir acc. to TS maP 21a14 instead of bhāvān and anyād vyāvṛttir acc. to TSk 1097cd, TS § 1098cd. Cf. also TSb Ze 41a1 (TSq ’e 50a4): gzhan las ldog pa’i dngos po las /gzhan pa’i ldog pa’i nga la med // .
explained by the clear minded [Dignāga]. For there is no separation [of a word’s object, which is qualified by exclusion, from the object excluded from others.]

[TS$_S$ 1100] Therefore a classification of being qualifier and qualified, [as well as] of co-referentiality, is not contradictory for the word referent that is exclusion.

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684 Read avadātamatiprokte acc. to TS$_{ms}$P 21a14 instead of the avadātamiti prokte as printed in TS$_K$ and TS$_S$. Cf. TS$_D$ Ze 41a2 (= TS$_Q$ He 50a6): blo gros bzang pos gsungs pa ni. Also in the copy of TS$_K$ used by Frauwallner, this phrase is emended to avadātamati-prokte, as is the TSP’s quote “avadātamiti prokta iti.”
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*Note:* Unless the meaning would have been changed, quotations from primary literature have been harmonized silently as regards punctuation, euphonic combination (*samādhi*), spelling variations, and transliteration. The titles shown for works of primary literature do not always follow the ones printed in the editions used. The titles for subunits (chapters etc.) of these works are often not found in the works themselves, and have been abstracted from colophons or scholarly conventions. The chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika* are counted as follows: 1. *svārthānumāna*, 2. *pramāṇasiddhi*, 3. *pratyakṣa*, and 4. *parārthānumāna*.

**AP** Jñānaśrīmitra. “Apohaprakaraṇa”. In: *JNĀ*, 201–232.

**AS**

4. Ratnakīrti. “Apohasiddhi”. In: *The critical edition in chapter 2 of the present publication*.

**ĀTV**

1. Udayana. “Ātmattattvaviveka”. In: *Dvivedin and Dravida 1986*.
2. Udayana. “Ātmattattvaviveka”. In: *Sastri 1997*.

**ĀTVK** Śaṅkaramiśra. “Kalpalatā”. In: *Dvivedin and Dravida 1986*.

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ĀTVP  Bhagīratha Ṭakkura. “Ātmatattvavivekaprakāśikā”. In: Dvivedin and Dravida 1986.


ĪSD  Ratnakirti. “Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa”. In: RNĀ, 32–57.


JNĀms  Jñānaśrīmitra. Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali. A manuscript photographed by Sāṅkṛtyāyana. The negatives are kept in Patna (cf. Much 1988). I had available to me scans showing the AP (folios 8a–20b). These scans are based on the copies of the Patna negatives kept in the “Sammlung des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde in Göttingen.” Cf. the description of item “Xc 14/25” in Bandurski 1994: 57–58.

K  Ratnakirti. Apohasiddhi. Manuscript number 4711 in the Collection of the Asiatic Society, Kolkata. See section 1.3 for more details.
Kāś apoha  Suca ritamiśra. “Kāśikā ad Ślokavārttika apoha v. 1”. In: Kataoka 2014, 328–289.


KBhV  Jñānaśrīmitra. “Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyaye vyatirekādhikāraḥ”. In: JNĀ, 60–106.

Kir  Udāyana. “Kiraṇāvalī”. In: Dvivedi and Śāstri 1919.


N2  Ratnakīrti. Apohasiddhi. Microfilm D35/1 in NGMCP. Cf. section 1.3.

N2b  Ratnakīrti. Apohasiddhi. Microfilm D35/1 in NGMCP. Repeated passages in N2.


NBh  Vātsyāyana. “Nyāyabhāṣya”. In: Thakur 1997a.


NBhV  Uddyotakara. “Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika”. In: Thakur 1997b, 1–530.

NBm  Dharmakīrti. “Nyāyabindu”. In: Malvania 1971.


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PVSVD Dharmakīrti. “Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel pa”. In: D, ce 261b1–365a7 (No. 4216).


PVSVṬ Karnakagomin. “Pramāṇavārttikatīkā”. In: Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1943.


PVT D Śākyabuddhi. “Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel bshad”. In: D, je 1b1–nye 282a7 (No. 4220).

PVT F1 Śākyabuddhi. “Pramāṇavārttikatīkā (Fragments)”. In: Inami, Matsuda, and Tani 1992, 1–47.

PVT F2 Śākyabuddhi. “Pramāṇavārttikatīkā (Fragment)”. In: Ishida 2011b, 207–208.

PVT Q Śākyabuddhi. “Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel bshad”. In: Q, je 1b1–nye 348a8 (No. 5718).

PVV Manorathanandin. “Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti”. In: Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938–1940.


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RNĀₘₛ  Ratnakīrti. Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali. This manuscript is the basis for the two editions RNĀ₁ and RNĀ. See section 1.3 for details.

Ś  Ratnakīrti. Apohasiddhi. Manuscript once in the possession of Shāstri. Used for the edition in AS₁, where it has the siglum “B”. Not available to the present author, cf. footnote 41.

SAD  Ratnakīrti. “Santānāntaradūṣaṇa”. In: RNĀ, 145–149.


SJS₁  Ratnakīrti. “Sarvajñasiddhi”. In: RNĀ₁, 1–28.


SSD  Ratnakīrti. “Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa”. In: RNĀ, 112–128.


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TS D  Śāntarakṣita. “De kho na nyid bsdus pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa. Tattvasaṃgrahakārikā”. In: D, ze 1b1–133a6 (No. 4266).

TSK  Śāntarakṣita. “Tattvasaṃgraha”. In: Krishnamacharya 1926.


TS msP  Śāntarakṣita. Tattvasamgraha. Pāṭaṇa manuscript of the TS. Pāṭaṇa No. 6679, catalogued in Muni Śrī Punyavijayaji and Muni Jambūvijayaji 1991b: 199.

TSP D  Kamalaśīla. “De kho na nyid bsdus pa’i dka’ ’grel. Tattvasaṃgrahapañjīkā”. In: D, ze 133b1–e331a7 (No. 4267).


TSP msP  Kamalaśīla. Tattvasamgrahapañjīkā. Pāṭaṇa manuscript of the TSP. Pāṭaṇa No. 6680, catalogued in Muni Śrī Punyavijayaji and Muni Jambūvijayaji 1991b: 199. This manuscript is referenced by the folio numbers in the lower right hand corner of each verso.

TSP Q  Kamalaśīla. “De kho na nyid bsdus pa’i dka’ ’grel. Tattvasaṃgrahapañjīkā”. In: Q, ’e 159b2–ye405a7 (No. 5765).


TS Q  Śāntarakṣita. “De kho na nyid bsdus pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa. Tattvasamgrahakārikā”. In: Q, ’e 1–159a2 (No. 5764).


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**VP R**  Bhartṛhari. “Vākyapadiya”. In: Rau 1977.

**VV**  Maṇḍanamiśra. “Vibhramaviveka”. In: Schmithausen 1965, 19–43.


**VyN₂**  Ratnakīrti. “Vyāptinirṇaya”. In: RNĀ, 106–111.

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The theory of universals that was developed and upheld by Buddhist philosophers in premodern India since the sixth century CE is famous for its central claim that any judgment of a similarity between things is not due to anything substantially real that the things share, but to their difference from other things (“anyāpoha”). This book investigates the theory as it is presented in the “Apohasiddhi”, a work written by the Buddhist monk and teacher Ratnakīrti in the eleventh century, during the last flowering of philosophical activity in Indian Buddhism.

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