Re-Reading Spatial Citizenship
and Re-Thinking Harley’s
Deconstructing the Map

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Abstract
This paper questions Harley’s (1989) specific way of interpreting and dealing with ‘the map’. Contrasting Harley’s perspective with Derrida’s approach of deconstruction provides a more detailed understanding of the potentials and limits of Harley’s practice for a critical understanding of maps. Moreover, this paper offers an alternative practice for a critical reading of maps, rooted in Adorno’s concept of Mündigkeit and Derrida’s deconstruction.

Keywords:
deconstruction, Mündigkeit, education, spatial citizenship, map-reading

1 Introduction

After nearly ten years spent developing this approach, ‘Re-reading Spatial Citizenship’ hardly sounds exciting or a perfect pitch for a paper. Nevertheless, we are convinced that a re-reading is rewarding as a means of implementing critical cartography in educational contexts. When we are confronted with the issues which Spatial Citizenship addresses, one question is central: how can we accomplish a reading of maps that addresses a critique of domination? Spatial Citizenship’s basic, simple, well-known answer is to deconstruct the map (Gryl & Jekel, 2012; Jekel et al., 2015, p. 7), resting upon a basic application of Harley’s theory for geography education (Gryl, 2009).

The inspirational source for the attempt to deconstruct the map is based on Harley’s (1989) canonical paper Deconstructing the Map (see Jekel et al., 2015, p. 7). However, our paper’s intention is to re-think the way Spatial Citizenship frames the deconstruction of the map, and with that to re-think Harley’s own thoughts concerning this attempt.

Here, we present our reading of Derrida’s deconstructive practice to identify quite a sharp contrast between Derrida’s and Harley’s perspectives on deconstruction. Based on the comparison of these two perspectives, we argue for encouraging a shift in our educational practices of dealing with maps that goes beyond Harley’s perspective in Deconstructing the Map.
As we will show, Harley offers a way to critically interpret or understand ‘the nature of cartography’ (1989, p. 1) based on hermeneutics. Derrida’s deconstruction, in contrast, attempts to go beyond that framing offered by hermeneutics towards a specific kind of self-reflection. The Derridean mode of self-reflection aims to reveal the (re)production of ‘violent hierarchies’ (Derrida, 2004, p. 39) which are embedded implicitly in the process of understanding (hermeneutics). While Harley’s approach of critical hermeneutics evokes questions focused on understanding the map within its power relations, it does not directly question these power relations as such. In contrast, a deconstructive reading practice questions power relations fundamentally, due to its characteristic search for implicit ‘violent hierarchies’ (ibid.).

The difference between these two perspectives will become even more prominent if we look for their particular contribution to an education for Mündigkeit\(^1\) (Adorno, 1971). We argue that Harley’s approach fosters a mature way of dealing with maps, while an approach that is rooted in a Derridean practice of deconstruction has the potential to go beyond that and even contribute to an education for Mündigkeit.

To establish the argumentation for these claims, we commence this paper by presenting both theoretical concepts, namely Mündigkeit (Adorno, 1971) and deconstruction (Derrida, 1997) and their interplay. From this theoretical discussion, we then re-think our own concept of dealing with maps, based on a critical re-thinking of Harley’s Deconstructing the Map.

## 2 Mündigkeit and Deconstruction

### Mündigkeit

Spatial Citizenship (Gryl & Jekel, 2012; Jekel et al., 2015) is one approach within critical spatial learning that focuses on spatial-societal participation through the use of geomedia, such as (digital) maps. The approach has defined Mündigkeit as a normative goal of mature spatial appropriation within critical citizenship education (Gryl & Jekel, 2012; Schulze et al., 2015; Jekel et al., 2015; cf. Bennett et al., 2009). At the same time, Spatial Citizenship has already distanced itself from the debates around, and praxis of, educational politics within the logic of a capitalist mode of (re-)production (Gryl & Naumann, 2015), where Mündigkeit is often substituted with terms such as self-organization, self-responsibility or self-monitoring, which are closely intertwined with the aim of becoming a functioning, productive member of society (Pongratz, 2009). In this sense, Mündigkeit has become the ideal of an ‘active, entrepreneurial self which is highly efficient in managing their own exploitation’ (Messerschmidt, 2010, p. 128; authors translation), which is why Mündigkeit has to be regarded dialectically in such a way that its premises are always determined by the constraints of society (Adorno, 1971, cited by Messerschmidt, 2010). Consequently, the relation between awareness and constant reflection on these internalized constraints on the

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\(^1\) For the specific reference to Adornos’ concept of Mündigkeit, which roughly translates to terms such as autonomy, emancipation or even maturity, all of which bear slightly different connotations, we have chosen not to translate the term but to stick with the German terminology, as there is, furthermore, no canonical translation into English.
one hand, and an evaluation of modes of, and opportunities for, resistance and dissent on the other is, according to Adorno, what constitutes *Mündigkeit* (Adorno, 1971).

To become aware of one’s internalized power-dynamics signifies a shift of identity from internalized identification with authoritarian ideals and a break from the ego-ideal that is inscribed in these ideals (Adorno, 1971, p. 140). On the other hand, *Mündigkeit* is opposed by societal power-relations which lead to internalization through several ‘intermediaries and channels’ (Adorno, 1971, p. 144; our translation). Adorno frames this process of internalization as the backdrop of an influential cultural industry, which is probably still valid today, but could also be extended to digital technologies, which ‘increase individuals’ availability while synchronically leading them to engage in continuous acts of self-projection’ (Messerschmidt, 2010, p. 131; authors translation).

When it comes to resistance and dissent, according to Adorno, these acts cannot be restricted to institutional contexts, such as demanding more student-led instances of participation (e.g. in deciding what to include in a school curriculum), which would not necessarily lead to *Mündigkeit* but rather to the aforementioned processes of self-organization. *Mündigkeit* could, following Adorno, only be achieved by ‘making powerlessness an instance of what one thinks and how one acts’ (Adorno, 1971, p. 147; our translation).

One possible way of fostering *Mündigkeit* through the communication of internalized power dynamics (and powerlessness) could be the process of deconstruction (Derrida, 1997) (see Section ‘*Mündigkeit* and Deconstruction – a perfect match?’ below).

### Deconstruction

Within this section, we would like to describe parts of our reading of Derrida, in order to build a foundation for a discussion of the potential of his deconstructive reading practice for an education for *Mündigkeit*. We will do this with a focus on a new way of dealing with maps in educational and non-educational contexts.

We read Derrida’s deconstruction as a practice of criticizing metaphysics, as expressed here:

The ‘rationality’ – but perhaps that word should be abandoned for reasons that will appear at the end of this sentence – which governs a writing thus enlarged and radicalized, no longer issues from a logos. Further, it inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition but the desedimentation, the de-construction, of all the significations that have their source in that of the logos. Particularly the signification of truth. (Derrida, 1997, p. 10)

One of the first questions that emerge when we read this paragraph is: why does Derrida write in this very indirect and complicated way? This seems characteristic of his writing, and Spivak even advocates reading Derrida in a ‘funky [way], not straight… an on-beat, off-beat, back-beat structure’ (Spivak quoted in Koram, 2016). To our mind, one reason for this specific way of writing lies in Derrida’s use of deconstruction as a writing practice: he needs to use the word ‘rationality’ to describe the constructed meaning of rationality (it ‘no longer issues from a logos’), but at the same time he tries to avoid a re-construction, i.e. he tries to avoid giving this word (*signifier*) a new fixed meaning (*signified*), instead trying to defer its
meaning. This mode of an inaccurate repetition is what Butler coined *subversion* (Butler, 2016, pp. 190–91).

In this context, we see deconstruction as a practice of criticizing metaphysics. The way Derrida performs this critique is through a subversion of language, as he sees language (logos) as a medium of metaphysical truth. Consequently, a critique of metaphysics needs to be a critique of language (see Derrida, 2009, p. 12). We argue that Derrida’s critique of the logos can be quite fruitful for our way of dealing with maps, and therefore we will discuss some aspects of his approach, including its links with the ideas of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.

In the first half of the 20th century, Saussure (1931) was already questioning different variations of language theories which were all more or less based on an Aristotelian tradition (see Brügger & Vigsø, 2008, p. 12). Such perspectives are based on the Conception that (spoken) language represents reality:

Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. (Aristotle, 2015, p. 1; our emphasis)

Applying Saussure’s terminology (Saussure, 1931, p. 78) to this quotation from Aristotle’s *Organon* (Höffe, 2009), we can see that spoken words (signifier) would naturally represent mental experiences (signified), which represent those things – the world. One can read this imagination of language as a theory of representation, where language represents meaning derived from the mental experience, thus representing the world.

We are familiar with this idea from discussions within cartography where, until the late 1980s, maps were mostly used as an ‘objective’ representation of reality (“correct” relational model of the terrain) (Harley, 1989, pp. 1–2), which will be discussed in more detail in Section 4. For now, we would like to describe our reading of Derrida’s perspective on language in contrast to this view.

With reference to Saussure, but at the same time with a critical distance from him, Derrida radically turned the focus to language. Saussure already broke with the conception that language naturally represents the world or reality. He described meaning as an effect of the differences between signifiers. For example, the meaning of ‘active’ would be derived through the difference from ‘passive’. Saussure basically described language as a system of differences, and with that he broke with the imagining of a metaphysical presence of meaning and reality. Language doesn’t represent meaning or the world – from this perspective it is, rather, a system of differences that produces meaning and reality (Saussure, 1931).

Within this process of producing meaning through differences, *articulation* plays a central role. We read Saussure’s description of this process as the imagination of a thinking subject that actively uses this system of differences through *articulation* to express their thoughts and ideas (1931, pp. 133–34). Within Saussure’s perspective, the subject plays the dominant role and has the central agency. While Saussure breaks with the idea that language represents the
world, he sees language as a system that produces meaning and reality, implicitly based on the idea that language represents consciousness.

Derrida criticizes this imagination of a natural connection between meaning (signified) and speaker, and the connection between signifier and signified. Consequently, Derrida replaces the imagination of representation with movement: he shifts the focus with the expression ‘signifier of the signifier’ to a constant process of producing and reproducing metaphors of (hidden) meaning, what he terms ‘déference’:

‘Signifier of the signifier’ describes on the contrary the movement of language: in its origin, to be sure, but one can already suspect that an origin whose structure can be expressed as ‘signifier of the signifier’ conceals and erases itself in its own production. (p. 7)

With this shift, Derrida de-links subject, language and world (Lüdemann, 2013, p. 68). Following Saussure, Derrida rejects the imagination that language represents the world while at the same time breaking with Saussure’s imagination that meaning could be derived from a conscious articulation. Here, Derrida decentres the subject based on the concept of ‘déference’ as a constant process that precedes articulation (as an origin that erases itself in its own production).

Before we discuss the potential of this perspective for dealing with maps, the following section will discuss why Derrida puts all this effort into the criticism of language and metaphysics, and how this relates to our reading of Adorno’s concept of Mündigkeit.

Mündigkeit and Deconstruction – a perfect match?

[In a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with a peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. (Derrida, 2004, p. 39)

Obviously, Derrida’s project has a political dimension, which becomes quite clear when we apply this concept of a ‘violent hierarchy’ to oppositions such as ‘homo’/‘hetero’, ‘woman’/‘man’, etc. Engelmann, the editor of the German edition of Positions, describes deconstruction as a means to resist issues linked to a metaphysical understanding of language, and with that a resistance against the authority of unquestionable terms and therefore totalitarian ideology. He sees deconstruction as a potential answer to Adorno’s question of how Auschwitz could happen despite enlightenment (see Engelmann, 2009, p. 18).

Lüdemann describes the history of metaphysics as

a history of a practice of violence in the name of their highest values, which culminated in the totalitarianisms of the 20th century. Whether the wars of ‘the Occident’ were carried out in the name of God, the emperor, the nation or race, it was always an ideological system based on a centred structure. (Lüdemann, 2013, p. 95; our translation)

Or, in Derrida’s familiarly complicated way of writing:

It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable presence – eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject), aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth. (Derrida, 2001, p. 353; our emphasis)
Alongside all of these big terms, we basically see deconstruction as a reading practice that helps to show as constructed what claims to be ‘natural’, the ‘normal’, and linked to that the ‘abnormal’, etc. It helps to enable the reader to make the seemingly undiscussable discussable, and to make the ‘invariable presence’ variable. Based on that, deconstruction can be compared to classical enlightenment, because it criticizes totalitarian structures and implies emancipatory values (Engelmann, 2009, p. 19). But in addition, there is a new layer of reflection: deconstruction tries to constantly focus on the structural danger of the metaphysical character of language, which is at the same time the medium of its critical potential. So, it constantly reflects the risk of the critique becoming as totalitarian as what is being criticized.

We think deconstruction can be supportive for the struggle for Mündigkeit. As we have said, Mündigkeit is based on the tension between internalized power dynamics on the one hand, and resistance / dissent on the other. With a focus on Adorno’s concept of internalization, we see potential for an interplay between Mündigkeit and deconstruction, as deconstruction makes the seemingly ‘natural’ discussable. This we regard as the foundation for Adorno’s concept of Mündigkeit (see Section 4 for further discussion).

3 Re-reading Harley’s Deconstructing the Map

As outlined above, Spatial Citizenship (Gryl & Jekel, 2012; Jekel et al., 2015) is one approach within critical spatial learning that encourages mature societal participation through the use of geomedia. The approach focuses on the competencies of geomedia communication, technology and methodology, and on reflection and a reflexive use of geomedia. However, we argue that the deconstructive potential of the approach, which is inscribed within the competence domain of reflection and reflexivity, and based on Harley’s Deconstructing the Map, should be extended.

Published in 1989, Deconstructing the Map has certainly had a major influence on critical cartography and the history of (critical) human geography more generally. In Cartographica’s special issue in 2015 marking the 25th anniversary of Deconstructing the map, Rose-Redwood (2015) honours the essay’s canonical status that has become evident in its broad reception among social sciences, while Krygier (2015) presents us with autobiographical notes of Harley’s influence. By contrast, Harley has been criticized for his limited reading of both Derrida and Foucault (Belyea 1992), and for blank spaces within his argumentation (Dodge & Perkins 2015). Nevertheless, his paper has proven to be a blooming source of inspiration for researchers such as Harris (2015), who highlights intersections of Harley’s work with feminist, queer and post-colonial theories.

In Harley’s approach to treating maps as texts which can become an object for deconstruction (Derrida 1976, cited by Harley 1989), he highlighted the importance of maps in the social construction of space through their inherent ‘external and internal power-relations’ (Harley 1989, p. 12), where ‘internal power-relations’ refer to the ‘power internal to cartography’ – i.e. the way in which cartographers use maps to communicate specific information about space, making a map a medium in which ‘the world is normalized’ through ‘the way various rhetorical styles that also reproduce power are employed to
represent the landscape’ (p. 13). On the other hand, ‘power external to maps’ refers to power that is ‘exercised on […] [and] with cartography’ through institutions of power, such as ‘monarchs, ministers, state institutions, the Church’ (p. 12).

What caused some irritation throughout our reading is Harley’s mixture of different jargons. On the one hand, he uses postmodern jargon, such as ‘deconstruction’ (pp. 1–4, 7–10, 12), ‘metaphor’ (pp. 3, 7, 9, 10, 15), ‘rhetoric’ (pp. 1–3, 5, 8, 10, 11–15), ‘discourse’ (pp. 3–5, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15), ‘power-knowledge’ (pp. 2, 3, 7, 12, 13–15), ‘omnipresence of power’ (pp. 3, 13), ‘juridical power’ (pp. 12, 13), etc. On the other hand, he also refers, if not quite so prominently, to ‘hermeneutics’ (pp. 1, 15), using concepts such as ‘interpretation’ (pp. 3, 10, 12, 15), ‘intention’ (pp. 8, 11), ‘understanding’ (pp. 1, 3, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15), etc.

Harley describes his approach openly as ‘deliberately eclectic’ (p. 2), characterizing his eclecticism as rooted in the mixture of the two postmodern authors Foucault and Derrida (p. 3). Nevertheless, he does not explicitly state the role of hermeneutics in his argumentation, except in his conclusion, where he refers to ‘the interpretive act of deconstructing the map’ (p. 15; our emphasis) and states that ‘[postmodern theories] are neither inimical to hermeneutic enquiry nor anti-historical in their thrust’.

As Harley does not really address the role of hermeneutics in the paper as a whole, it seems surprising that this approach receives such prominent attention in his conclusion. This raises two questions. First, why is it so important for Harley to merge hermeneutics and deconstruction? And, more importantly, what role does hermeneutics implicitly play in his argumentation? Our surprise (or irritation) is driven by our perception that hermeneutics and deconstruction are in sharp opposition to each other, as the first is oriented towards understanding and interpretation (see Gadamer, 2010, p. 373). Hermeneutics asks for an author’s intention or objective, for a hidden core or an absolute idea, for what are regarded as ‘metaphysical speculations’ by deconstructionists (Feustel, 2015, p. 58; own translation), or the search for a ‘metaphysics of presence’ (Derrida, 2006, p. 425; 1990, p. 114). Deconstructive perspectives, on the other hand, are interested in the integral deferral of meaning and sense (see Lüdemann, 2013, p. 71), and with that the uncovering and deferral of the hidden ‘violent hierarchy’ (Derrida, 2004, p. 39).

Driven by irritation at Harley’s attempt to hide this tension between hermeneutics and deconstructive approaches, we re-read Deconstructing the Map with a focus on the implicit role of hermeneutics in his argumentation. We argue that Harley preserves ‘the map’ as an ontological category – described by Derrida as ‘metaphysics of presence’ (2006) – and he only uses the concepts of Derrida and Foucault as tools for a better interpretation of ‘maps’. Obviously, this needs further discussion, but the thesis we are going to put forward is that Harley keeps ‘the map’ as an object – thereby offering the potential for reflection on it – and does not treat it as ‘text’ in a Derridean way. Therefore, he utilizes Foucauldian concepts such as ‘discourse’ and ‘power-knowledge’ to develop what we heuristically call critical hermeneutics.

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2 We read what follows in Harley’s conclusion (?) as a representation of his attempt to merge hermeneutics and deconstruction (‘the interpretive act of deconstructing the map’ (p. 15; our emphasis)), because we read ‘interpretation’ as a metaphor for hermeneutics.
Reconsidering the argumentation from Section ‘Deconstruction’ and comparing it with our reading of Harley, we can see that Harley broke with the imagination that maps (language) represent the world. Harley describes maps as ‘texts’ (p. 7), offering the perspective that maps are constructed. He decouples maps and the world. Maps no longer ‘objectively’ represent the world. Thus, Harley shifts the focus onto their potential to produce meaning and reality, as we outlined with reference to Saussure’s argumentation. Harley describes part of his shift as follows: ‘We can talk about the power of the map just as we already talk about the power of the word’ (p. 13). Following on from this quotation, which is very evocative of Saussure’s linguistics, we argue that Harley sees maps as (spoken) language in the way Saussure does, and not as ‘text’ in a Derridean way, where the process of ‘différance’ takes place before articulation.

We would like to pause for a moment at this point to emphasize that Harley fulfilled an epistemic break by using Derrida’s concepts such as ‘text’, ‘metaphor’, ‘rhetoric’ on the one hand, while at the same time implicitly utilizing Saussure’s concept of (spoken) language. He abandons the Derridean episteme and therefore deconstruction. Driven by the question of why he broke with deconstruction, we would like to follow this ‘trace’ (Derrida 1997) to examine the potentials and limitations which are linked to that ‘rhetoric’ in order to build a solid foundation for further discussions, with a specific focus on education for Mündigkeit.

As argued, we do not read Harley’s Deconstructing the Map as a deconstructive approach. However, we do think that his break with deconstruction offers potential which deconstruction itself cannot offer. The central difference between Harley’s approach and a deconstructive one is that Harley preserves ‘the map’ as an ontic entity, which is required to rescue ‘the map’ as an object for reflection and interpretation. The map starts to play an important role in Harley’s argumentation. It serves as a method to interpret and understand ‘the map’, but Harley obviously provides far more than a simple method for doing this. He offers a method that helps to critically interpret ‘the map’ based on Foucauldian concepts such as ‘discourse’ and ‘power-knowledge’, concepts which helped Harley to develop the perspectives of ‘external and internal power in cartography’ (p. 12). Moreover, Harley enriches the method for a critical interpretation of maps with tools like ‘metaphors’ and ‘rhetoric’ that are specifically designed for the ‘cartographic text’ (p. 7) and inspired by Derrida.

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3 As discussed, Saussure argues that language doesn’t naturally represent the world. He shifted the focus to the potential of language to produce meaning (see Section ‘Mündigkeit and Deconstruction – a perfect match?’).

4 ‘The map’ as an ontic entity would be criticized as ‘metaphysical speculation’ (Feustel 2015, p. 58) or as a ‘metaphysics of presence’ (Derrida, 2006, p. 425; 1990, p. 114) from a deconstructivist perspective.

5 In the section entitled ‘deconstruction and the cartographic text’ (pp. 7–11), Harley (using Derrida’s terminology) describes the potential of the search for ‘metaphors’ and ‘rhetoric’ in maps. But Harley tries to define ‘metaphors’ and ‘rhetoric’ with respect specifically to the ‘cartographic text’ (p. 7). For example, he defines cartographic rhetoric as ‘selection, omission, simplification, classification’ (p. 11). He also offers tools for ‘a rhetorical close-reading of maps’ (p. 11) which are inspired by Derrida and can help for a better ‘understanding’ (hermeneutics) of ‘the map’ as an ontological entity.
To sum up: We read *Deconstructing the Map* as a source that very fruitfully helps towards a better ‘understanding of the power of cartographic representation’ (p. 15) but ignores the potential of deconstruction.

In the next section, we discuss this potential of deconstruction, with a specific focus on education for *Mündigkeit*.

## 4 Re-thinking ‘deconstructing the map’ for education

As discussed in the last section, Harley’s approach opens up critical potential. It fosters critical questions regarding the map-producers’ intentions (‘power internal to cartography’) or the power which is ‘exercised on […] [and] with cartography’ (‘power external to maps’).

While these issues – particularly the second one – seem to imply a huge critical potential, this viewpoint is at the same time limited. Harley limits his critique with hermeneutics (understanding). His aim is necessarily focused on understanding – particularly on understanding the map within its power relations. He also hints at the potentials and limits of his aim to understand maps in this way: he describes the influence of institutions like ‘monarchs, ministers, state institutions, the Church’ on the map (p. 12). With his focus on understanding, he limits himself to understand, for example, the influence of state institutions on the map, but he is far from questioning these state institutions as such. It is merely their influence that is questioned. Furthermore, this to persist in a strictly Harleyan approach would be to ignore new, fluent forms of power beyond formalized institutions, as within web communities, as well as internalized forms of power.

Derrida, on the other hand, tries to go beyond a critical interpretation, attempting to shift the questions and the focus to *différance*, the process before articulation:

> [T]he writer writes in a language and in a logic whose proper system, laws, and life his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely. He uses them only by letting himself, after a fashion and up to a point, be governed by the system. And the reading must always aim at a certain relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not command of the patterns of the language that he uses. This relationship is not a certain quantitative distribution of shadow and light, of weakness or of force, but a signifying structure that critical reading should produce. (Derrida, 1997, p. 158)

Again, this quotation is quite dense. We see two aspects, two ideas. In the first part, we recognize a contrast to Harley’s *Deconstructing the Map*. Harley describes the process of producing and communicating the map as driven by different actors, and he basically argues that if we understand their intentions, we will understand the map in the context of its power relations. Derrida on the other hand describes the subject as decentered: ‘the writer [cartographer, institutions, etc.] writes in a language and in a logic whose proper system […] by definition cannot dominate absolutely’. As already outlined, Harley misses the *différance*, the process before *articulation* (from Derrida’s perspective).

In the second part of the quotation, we see a hint for how to deal with maps with respect to *différance* as Derrida shifts the focus onto the process of reading: It is a ‘signifying structure...
[we read it as context, or context of meaning] that critical reading should produce’. One could argue that this could fit to hermeneutics at the same time. The difference from hermeneutics should become obvious through the next quotation:

if by that [reading] we understand an interpretation that takes us outside of the writing toward a psychobiographical signified, […] that could rightly be separated from the signifier. (Derrida, 1997, p. 159)

We see quite a marked contrast to hermeneutics in this quotation: reading is no longer primarily about the writers’ intention and the discourses which inform the map’s production; at the same time, reading is about what the recipient sees in the text when they are reading (‘psychobiographical signified’). Lüdemann describes this way of reading as the production of a new text, which is closely linked to the text that we read but which at the same time has a specific character due to the reader’s particularities and experience (Lüdemann, 2013, p. 78). This nicely links the deconstruction of maps to MacEachren’s (1992) observation of the map reader’s own hypothesis-construction. From a deconstructivist perspective, this ‘reading’ of a map can be seen as the production of a ‘new text’, while the re-reading of deconstruction within this paper provides the instrument to realize the necessity of deconstructing one’s own map-guided hypothesis-construction (Gryl & Jekel, 2012). Furthermore, it links much more closely the former differentiation between reflection on the map and reflexivity (i.e. thinking about one’s own thinking), and the acting with maps suggested by Gryl (2012), based on Schneider (2010). There, it is empirically indicated that reflexivity is the basis for a more sophisticated and less superficial reflection (Gryl, 2012), while our re-reading illustrates that both aspects are two sides of the same coin – or, better, should be indistinguishable, as there is no map available to deconstruct outside the subjective reading.

We think this offers potential for our way of dealing with maps in educational contexts. If we focus on the question ‘What do we read in the map?’ and try to reflect on this new ‘text’, we produce a new layer for reflection. We see this new layer as being closely linked to Adorno’s concept of what is internalized: this ‘text’ shows what is seen subjectively as normal. With that, we gain the potential to turn the map’s normalizing effects upside down, for this new ‘text’ as an object for reflection – reflecting on what has been internalized – becomes discussable. Imagine, for example, a political map of Europe. What would you see? Nation-states? If we reflect on ‘the nation-state’ as a ‘text’ produced through our reading, we reflect on the normalizing effects of the map based on uncovering what is subjectively normal, internalized (‘the nation-state’) – we wouldn’t be able to recognize the nation-state in the map if we hadn’t already internalized a concept of the nation-state.

We think that this shift has potential to foster Mündigkeit through the ability to see something as discussable, changeable or constructed, which we regard as a foundation of Adorno’s concept of Mündigkeit.
6 Summary

Through re-reading Spatial Citizenship (Gryl & Jekel, 2012; Jekel et al., 2015) and re-thinking Harley’s Deconstructing the Map, we have provided a shift in focus from a hermeneutical approach of understanding the map within its power relations, to a more self-reflective approach which offers the potential to question the internalized (ab)normal. As discussed, Harley’s approach has significant critical potential, but through its hermeneutical character its critique is limited to the ‘external and internal power’ (p. 12) of ‘the map’ as the object of reflection, and not the power-relations within social relations, as the following table should illustrate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>potentials</th>
<th>limits</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potential to question the influence of e.g. institutions on ‘the map’…</td>
<td>but not the institutions as such;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential to understand ‘the map’ as an instrument of power…</td>
<td>but power-relations are treated as a means to an end, to…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>question and uncover implied ideologies of ‘the map’…</td>
<td>but not power-relations as such;</td>
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<tr>
<td>With the focus on the creation and the impact of ‘the map’, Harley’s approach enables a critical interpretation of ‘the map’ …</td>
<td>but its critical potential is focused on the specific map itself.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Derridean way of deconstruction, on the other hand, shifts the focus from reflecting on ‘the map’ within its power relations to a specific kind of self-reflection. By reflecting on the ‘text’ produced through reading the map, one pays respect to *différance* – the process prior to articulation – and with that to Adorno’s concept of internalization. This kind of self-reflection helps to question the seemingly normal or even natural, to then conceive it as constructed, historically grown, discussable.

As we illustrated with reference to a political map of Europe, a potential result of our reading of a map could be the ‘text’ ‘the nation-state’. This ‘text’ could serve as a ‘trace’ (Derrida, 1997) to question the idea of the nation-state as such, based on self-reflection with regard to what has been *internalized*. With that, one questions what could have seemed natural, to conceive it as constructed.

There is still further work to be done to develop a method for educational contexts that helps to increase the potential of this ‘trace’. However, we think the shift to focus on the question ‘What do we read in a map?’ helps to uncover what is regarded as (ab)normal (mirrored in the reading of ‘the map’), and therefore to uncover what has been *internalized*, as contributions to an education for *Mündigkeit*. 
References


Lehner et al


