The proceedings volume of the Fifth International Dharmakirti Conference (Heidelberg, August 2014) is concerned with the logico-epistemological school of Buddhism, a long-lasting tradition that pursued the analysis of knowledge, inference and proof within a Buddhist soteriological framework based on the works of the Indian epistemologist and logician Dharmakirti (6th–7th c. CE). Having been shaped in the environment of medieval India, with its multiple mutually interacting and partly competing religio-philosophical schools, the methods and approaches of Buddhist logic and epistemology had lasting impact on the intellectual history of Tibetan Buddhism and were also received in China and Japan. The 30 papers in this volume offer a snapshot of an international research landscape with centers in Vienna and Japan. They address historical and philological problems raised by important recent manuscript discoveries, pursue specific research questions in the history of philosophy, and undertake philosophical reconstructions and critical examinations relating to individual theories and arguments. By focusing on currents in Asia that developed and applied rigorous philosophical methods, the volume aims to contribute to the formation of a better-founded global historical awareness in the field of philosophy.

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BIRGIT KELLNER, PATRICK MCALLISTER, HORST LASIC, SARA MCCLINTOCK (EDS.)

REVERBERATIONS OF DHARMAKĪRTI’S PHILOSOPHY
Reverberations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy

Proceedings of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference Heidelberg
August 26 to 30, 2014
Participants of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference, Heidelberg 2014


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Preface

This volume contains papers presented at the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference, held at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Heidelberg, August 26 to 30, 2014. Professor Katsura, one of the leading senior scholars in the field, recalled the history of the Dharmakīrti conferences in his opening speech, which is also published in this volume.

The Heidelberg Conference was organized jointly by three projects which Birgit Kellner directed at the University of Heidelberg: Project MC 13.2 “Reasoning in Buddhism between South Asia and Tibet” and Project MC 3.3 “Buddhism between South Asia and Tibet – Negotiating Religious Boundaries in Doctrine and Practice,” both financially supported by the Cluster of Excellence “Asia and Europe in a Global Context”; and the project “Systems of Epistemology in Classical Indian Philosophy,” supported by the German Research Foundation DFG. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from the sponsors of these projects that made the conference possible, as well as the efficient and kind organizational support by the Cluster’s administrative staff.

Like the previous volumes of Dharmakīrti Conference proceedings, this collection testifies to a growing and dynamic field, driven by significant discoveries of new sources, a growing body of historical knowledge, and a continually refined awareness of the sophisticated nature of the Indian, Tibetan and East Asian intellectual traditions that jointly constitute the historical reference point for Dharmakīrtian Studies. The editing of the proceedings took longer than expected, and for various reasons not all of the papers presented at the conference could be included. Contrarily, the papers by Hiroko Matsuoka and Patrick McAllister could not be presented at the conference, but were included here due to their topical relevance.

Editorial work was conducted chiefly at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, where two of the Heidelberg conference organizers, Kellner and McAllister, had in the meantime relocated (and where Horst Lasic had been working all along; our fourth editor, Sara McClintock, also spent time here in 2016). Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek of the Academy institute corrected the English of a number of the papers, and we thank her for her painstaking efforts. We also gratefully acknowledge editorial assistance by Liudmila Olalde (Heidelberg) whose sharp eyes let no missing bibliographical reference escape. Together with McAllister, Olalde also handled technical aspects in the production of the camera-ready copy.

The shorthand “Dharmakīrtian Studies” refers to the study of philosophical currents in India, China and Tibet which take the theoretical efforts of Dharmakīrti (between mid-6th and mid-7th centuries CE) and his predecessor Dignāga (ca. 480-540) in the fields of epistemology and logic as their inspiration – theoretical efforts that revolve around the explication, justification and defense of a system of “instruments of trustworthy awareness” (*pramāṇa*), and, driven by these concerns, also extend into other areas of vital
interest to Buddhist intellectuals in the context of their respective times. Such areas include problems in the philosophy of mind pertaining to the analysis of consciousness, subjects in the philosophy of language, here intertwined with the analysis of concepts and concept formation. Theoretical aspects of Buddhism as a soteriology, as a set of teachings geared towards the attainment of liberation from suffering in saṃsāra, also play a central role in Buddhist logico-epistemological discourse. Buddhist pramāṇa theories were adopted, adapted and criticized by non-Buddhists primarily in their Indian context. Dharmakīrtian Studies therefore, as a matter of course, also attend to explorations of this larger intellectual environment between the late fifth and thirteenth centuries CE, an environment shaped by mutual influence and cross-fertilization, as well as intense polemics between competing religio-philosophical currents encompassing Brahmanical traditions as well as Jains and others.

In the past decades, the history of Dharmakīrtian Studies has been significantly shaped, if not revolutionized, by the discovery of new sources and improved access to them. Within the larger area of Indian Buddhist literature, Sanskrit pramāṇa literature has been particularly profoundly affected by improved access to Sanskrit manuscripts which have been preserved in the territory of today’s Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) within the People’s Republic of China. Until the beginning of the 21st century, key works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti themselves were unknown in the language of their composition, Sanskrit. An agreement between the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the China Tibetology Research Center (CTRC) in Beijing, concluded in 2004 and renewed several times since, laid the foundation for collaborative research based on photocopies of manuscript photographs kept in the CTRC’s library. Copies of manuscripts of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya, Hetubindu and Santānāntarasiddhi became accessible, as well as of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, a commentary on Dignāga’s main logico-epistemological work, the Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti. Research on these new sources had already begun when the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference was held in Vienna (August 23-27, 2005). Ernst Steinkellner’s opening speech “News from the manuscript department” lays out the specifics of the cooperation and its (now) early history, and summarizes ongoing work and first results; the edition of the first chapter of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā arrived at the Vienna conference just fresh from the press. Steinkellner also outlined the challenges that lie ahead. Besides the enormous task of scholarly work involved in the analysis, edition and translation of these new materials, there remains the task of a full descriptive catalogue of all Sanskrit manuscripts in the TAR. The actual

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1. This is also borne out by the significant pramāṇa content in the by now three panels on Sanskrit manuscripts in China that have been held at the Beijing Seminar of Tibetan Studies, published in the three volumes Sanskrit Manuscripts in China I (edited by Ernst Steinkellner in cooperation with Duan Qing and Helmut Krasser, Beijing 2009), II (edited by Horst Lasic and Xuezhu Li, Beijing 2016), and III (edited by Birgit Kellner, Jowita Kramer and Xuezhu Li, Beijing, forthcoming). Volume II is available for download at https://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/Institute/IKGA/PDF/digitales/Lasic_Li_2016.pdf (last accessed 15 September 2019).

manuscripts are still out of bound for Chinese as well as foreign scholars. The same holds good for a reported 61-volume set of color reproductions of all these manuscripts, of which five copies are reported to have been printed. It also has not been possible, since Steinkellner’s report, to access a bundle of paper manuscripts in the Potala palace in Lhasa, which among others includes a manuscript of Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha and manuscripts of Dharmakīrti’s Sambandhapariksākārikā, Santānāntarasidhiprakāraṇa and Pramāṇaviṇiścayakārikā.3 Steinkellner’s introduction to the volume Sanskrit Manuscripts in China III (Beijing, forthcoming) summarizes the current situation and formulates a proposal for further improvement. In the three years since the keynote lecture on which that introduction is based was held in Beijing, nothing of substance has happened.

While progress in further improving access of scholars to Sanskrit manuscripts in China has been slow, editorial activities have yielded significant further results. In 2010, the monograph series Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region, founded as a joint venture of the China Tibetology Publishing House and the Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, counted eight volumes. In 2019, volumes 21 and 22 are being submitted: the diplomatic edition of the third chapter of Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayatīkā by Pascale Hugon (Vienna) in collaboration with Takashi Iwata (Tokyo) and Toshikazu Watanabe (Vienna, now Tokyo), as well as the critical edition of the first five chapters of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya by Horst Lasic, Xuezhu Li (Beijing) and Anne MacDonald (Vienna), based on preparatory work by Helmut Krasser. The sixth chapter is being edited by Anne MacDonald, while the remaining chapters are being edited by Katsura and Li.

As Katsura also recalled in his opening speech, Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya and Hetubindu are now available in critical editions by, respectively, Steinkellner (chapters 1 and 2 of the Pramāṇaviniścaya; Hetubindu), as well as Hugon and Toru Tomabechi (Tokyo) (chapter 3 of the Pramāṇaviniścaya).4 The second chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccayaatīkā has been critically edited by Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser and Horst Lasic. Further chapters are currently being edited by Katsura, Motoi Ono (Tsukuba), Yasutaka Muroya (Vienna), and Toshikazu Watanabe, with additional support by a group of younger Japanese scholars. Sections of the second chapter of Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayatīkā, preserved only in fragmentary manuscripts, have been edited in two Vienna dissertations by Hisataka Ishida and Masamichi Sakai, supervised by Helmut Krasser.5

Meanwhile, other institutions have been able to conclude cooperation agreements with the CTRC similar to the Viennese model, for individual manuscripts and texts. In the area of pramāṇa literature, mention should here be made of efforts at the University of Leipzig, where Eli Franco, Junjie Chu, Xuezhu Li and Hiroko Matsuoka are editing Yamārī’s (c. 1000-1060) important commentary on Prajñākaragupta’s (c. 750-810) Pramāṇavārttikā-lāṅkārabhāṣya, as well as rare works by Jitāri (940-1000).6 It is a promising sign that Chinese scholars are increasingly involved in these editorial activities, as attested by Li’s

3 For a full list of the contents see Steinkellner, “News from the manuscript department”, p. xxi.
4 For bibliographical references cf. Katsura’s “opening speech” below on page xvii.
5 Sakai’s 2010 dissertation (PDF download at http://othes.univie.ac.at/9623/) concerns the proof of momentariness, while Ishida’s 2011 dissertation (PDF at http://othes.univie.ac.at/13375/) deals with the subject of the logical nexus.
participation in several projects; Luo Hong (formerly CTRC, now at Sichuan University in Chengdu) is working on an edition of Ratnākāraśānti’s Prajñāpāramitopadeśa. In the long run research on these manuscripts will only be able to flourish if a new generation of Sanskritists in China carries it forward.

More recent discoveries that may serve as the basis of future projects belong to the final period of pramāṇa activities in India. There is a third manuscript of Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātrātā-siddhi, in addition to the two manuscripts described by Franco and Chu. There is also a copy of a valuable manuscript of a lengthy work on the sahopalambhanyamasamarthana-inference entitled Sahopalambhanyamasamarthana, also ascribed to Jitāri. Based on selected sample passages, this text can be assumed to be the same work referred to as Sahopalambhaprakarana in the colophon of a manuscript that both Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana and Giuseppe Tucci photographed in Ngor monastery. However, approximately one third of the Ngor manuscript is missing in Tucci’s photographs; the remainder is often out of focus. In Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s photographs, the text is almost completely illegible. A hitherto unknown manuscript of Jñānaśrīmitra’s Advaitabinduprakarana was also recently discovered; it complements the codex photographed by Sāṅkṛtyāyana in 1938 that formed the basis of Anantatāl Thakur’s edition first published in 1959 (reprinted in 1987) and allows to substantially improve the text. These are only a few of the many cases where new manuscripts from the TAR lend invaluable support to editorial work together with other materials; Śāntarakṣita’s Vādanyāyaṭīkā and Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya are another particularly prominent case in point. Lastly, there also remains the extensive manuscript of 123 folios of an otherwise unknown commentary on Arcaṭa’s Hetubinduṭīkā, in the colophon ascribed to a certain Jayabhadrā or Bhavabhadrā.

Tibetan developments inspired by Indian pramāṇa have similarly benefited from greater accessibility of sources, as demonstrated by Pascale Hugon’s extensive work on Phya pa chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) and other authors from the early period of Tibetan Buddhist Scholasticism in the 11th to 13th centuries; her paper in this volume offers an entry point into this newly opened field of enquiry. A considerable amount of pertinent manuscripts testifying to hitherto largely unknown works have surfaced recently, especially as part of the private library of the Fifth Dalai Lama Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (1617–1682) in Drepung monastery. They have been published in facsimile in the “Collected Works of the Bka’ gdams pas” (Bka’ gdams gsung ’bum), released in several installments which by now number altogether 120 volumes. Hugon and Kazuo Kano (Tokyo) have set out to

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8 In the Göttingen collection, they are preserved as COD MS SANSCR RAH Xc14/10b (Jitāri, Sahopalambhasiiddhi); cf. Bandurski, Frank: “Untersuchungen zur buddhistischen Literature” = Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, Beiheft 5, Göttingen 1994; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, p. 42.

9 A diplomatic edition of the Kundeling manuscript of the Vādanyāyaṭīkā is currently being prepared by Yasutaka Muroya at the Academy institute in Vienna, in the framework of the research project “Debate and rational argumentation in South Asian Buddhism” (P30827) supported by the Austrian Science Fund FWF.

10 Cf. Steinkellner, “News from the manuscript department”, p. xx.
produce a descriptive catalogue of this vast collection, while at the same time studies of individual texts and their contents are being undertaken.\textsuperscript{11}

Last but not least mention should be made of similarly growing research in Chinese adaptations of Indian pramāṇa. Efforts in this field are undertaken by a younger generation of scholars in China (cf. the paper by Tang Mingjun in this volume), as well as by a team of Japanese scholars comprising chiefly Shigeki Moro (Kyoto), Shinya Moriyama (Matsumoto), Yasutaka Muroya and Motoi Ono – a development facilitated by improved access to rare manuscripts of commentaries in Japanese temple libraries.\textsuperscript{12}

The contributions to this volume demonstrate that the process of exploring new sources, of utilizing them in research endeavors and reflecting on how they motivate revisions of received knowledge, is in full swing. These new discoveries have contributed to a stronger focus on manuscript research – including problems of paleography and codicology –, and they have also given precedence to philologically oriented studies. As new texts are to be edited, new translations are to be produced, and a variety of textual and fundamental historical problems need to be solved. Yet, Dharmakīrtian Studies have at the same time preserved, even strengthened, their disciplinary openness and methodological pluralism. Philological and historical studies chiefly concerned with placing texts and thinkers, theories and arguments in the context of intellectual histories that in many respects still remain to be written, dominate especially in continental Europe and Japan where such methodologies have a longer academic tradition within Asian Studies at large. But a philosophical engagement with pramāṇa ideas, an analysis and critical examination of these ideas in terms of their philosophical significance and substance – more at home in the Angloamerican sphere –, has also had a place at Dharmakīrti conferences in the past and can by now be considered an integral part of the world of Dharmakīrtian Studies.\textsuperscript{13}

To take philosophical texts seriously requires reading them as works of philosophy, just as serious studies of ancient legal literature must take this literature seriously in its legal dimensions. Many have also argued, convincingly, that a proper history of philosophy cannot be merely a descriptive account of which philosopher lived when and where and did what (as notoriously difficult such accounts may be for a field like Indian philosophy where precise external data is hard to come by). In order to be illuminating, it is to be written as a history of philosophical thought, with close attention to ideas and content, and by making plausible why it is that philosophers argue the way they do – in due consideration

\textsuperscript{11} The current state of their work is accessible at https://www.oeaw.ac.at/ikga/forschung/tibetologie/materialien/a-gateway-to-early-tibetan-scholasticism/.

\textsuperscript{12} Results of these research endeavours were among others presented at the panel “Pramāṇa across Asia: India, China, Korea, Japan”, held at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna, August 18-23, 2014, published in Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 56-57 (2015-2018). The papers presented at the panel “Transmission and Transformation of Buddhist Logic and Epistemology in East Asia” (XVIIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, University of Toronto, August 20–25, 2017) will be published in a volume bearing the panel title and edited by Shinya Moriyama (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhismische Studien, Universität Wien, forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{13} John Taber insightfully discusses these different, sometimes divergent, sometimes complementary approaches to Indian philosophy and their background in disciplinary histories in his paper “On Engaging Philosophically with Indian Philosophical Texts”, Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques 67/1 (2013) 125-163.
of other forces that drive intellectual history. Philologically oriented historical approaches and philosophical approaches – each of which may again come in different forms – may produce tensions, of course, and they often do. The philosopher may find the philologist’s reticence at wanting to know whether Dharmakīrti is right frustrating (“how could you not want to know this?”), while the philologist will in turn find the philosopher’s conviction that they have understood where Dharmakīrti is wrong hyperbolic (“shouldn’t you first examine his words more carefully before you jump to conclusions?”). The International Dharmakīrti Conferences have seen a number of discussions along these lines, as the individual proceedings volumes demonstrate. The field of Dharmakīrtian Studies is best served by keeping both parties in dialogue, by focusing on what they stand to learn from each other, and by striving to turn whatever tensions may arise into constructive critical discourse. It is only then that the seeds which the wealth of our new sources represent will be able to mature and develop.

September 2019

Birgit Kellner, Vienna
Horst Lasic, Vienna
Sara McClintock, Atlanta
Patrick McAllister, Vienna
First of all, I would like to thank all of you for coming to participate in the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference and thereby demonstrating the continued vigor and interest in the study of Dharmakīrti’s works and thought, as well as those of his predecessors and successors. Special thanks are due to the organizer of this conference, Prof. Birgit Kellner of the University of Heidelberg, and her assistant, Ms. Ina Chebbi [Buchholz], for their painstaking efforts. I would also like to thank Dr. Patrick McAllister for his technical support of all sorts.

I am delighted to see again the faces of many I have met at earlier Dharmakīrti Conferences. But I see many new faces as well, and so this may be a good occasion for me to give a brief history of the International Dharmakīrti Conferences. It was the late Prof. Yūichi Kajiyama (1925–2004) who hit upon the idea of holding such a conference. In 1982 Prof. Kajiyama invited Prof. Ernst Steinkellner to Kyōto University as a visiting professor for one semester to have him read the Vādanyāya with students in Kyōto. Just before Prof. Steinkellner returned to Vienna, Prof. Kajiyama decided to hold a one-day workshop on Buddhist logic and epistemology. He invited several Japanese scholars and students, including Prof. Hiromasa Tosaki, to present papers. Prof. Steinkellner gave a lecture on the development of the idea of viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam in Dharmakīrti’s works. Prof. Kajiyama called the event “International Dharmakīrti Conference,” despite the fact that apart from Prof. Steinkellner there was perhaps no other participant from abroad.

In 1989 Prof. Steinkellner then held the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference in Vienna. This one was truly “international” in terms of the participants. He called it “the second conference” as a mark of respect for the first one organized by Prof. Kajiyama. It was amazing to see that both Prof. Tilmann Vetter (1937–2012) from Leiden and Prof. Lambert Schmithausen from Hamburg attended the conference. Together with Prof. Steinkellner, they had both been students of Prof. Erich Frauwallner (1898–1974) at the same time as Prof. Kajiyama spent a few months in Vienna in the early 1960s. One afternoon in the middle of the conference we took a Frauwallner Memorial Walk into the Vienna Woods. I then organized the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference in Hiroshima in 1997; the fourth one was held again in Vienna in 2005. The proceedings of these three conferences were published by the Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.

In this connection I would like to emphasize the significance of *guru-śiṣya* relationships in our field. I happened to be a student of Prof. Kajiyama in the mid-1960s, just after he came back from his stays in London and Vienna. When I was preparing my MA thesis on Dharmakīrti’s theory of *svasaṃvedana*, he read the entire *svasaṃvedana* portion of the *Pramāṇavārttika* Chapter 3 (vv. 320-539) together with Manorathanandin’s commentary with me almost every Saturday afternoon of 1966–67. And the convener of the present conference, Prof. Kellner, studied in Vienna and Hiroshima in the 1990s, when both Prof. Steinkellner and I were teaching at our respective institutes in those cities’ universities. Today I am glad to see that such *guru-śiṣya* relationships have developed further and further in various parts of the world. Here I must remind you that there is neither a formal association of Dharmakīrti studies, nor any rules that govern us. These conferences have been held spontaneously and irregularly. Therefore, we do not know when and where the next Dharmakīrti conference will take place. But that does not bother me at all. As long as *guru-śiṣya* relationships continue, I believe that there will be a next one.

It is very sad that I do not see the face of our dear friend Dr. Helmut Krasser (1956–2014) among you. As you all know, Dr. Krasser passed away last March. We all miss him greatly. His untimely death is a great loss, not only for those who were immediately associated with him at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the University of Vienna, but also for everyone who is engaged in the field of Buddhist logic and epistemology. He did such a great service to the development of our field, not only through his own academic contributions but also by organizing various academic projects, such as the deciphering and editing of the Sanskrit manuscripts of Jinendrabuddhi’s *Ṭīkā* on Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* as well as other works. He will be remembered by the younger generation in our field as a most sympathetic teacher and guide, a person willing to help them with bodhisattva-like efforts.

Dr. Krasser published an edition and translation of Dharmottara’s *Laghuprāmāṇyapa-ṛiṣā* (his PhD thesis) and Śaṅkaranandana’s *Īśvarāpākaraṇasaṅkṣepa* (his Habilitation thesis). He also edited a number of proceedings of academic conferences, including those of the Second and the Fourth International Dharmakīrti conferences, as well as the two-volume Festschrift for Prof. Steinkellner entitled *Pramāṇakīrti*. From the very beginning of Prof. Steinkellner’s endeavor to open the door to the treasures of Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts found in Buddhist monasteries of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Dr. Krasser helped him, later succeeding him as the Viennese representative for the cooperation with the China Tibetology Research Center in Beijing. In that connection, together with Prof. Steinkellner and Dr. Horst Lasic, he published diplomatic and critical editions of the first two chapters of Jinendrabuddhi’s *Ṭīkā* on Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*.

Dr. Krasser also published many academic papers on Buddhist epistemology and logic and related areas. I cannot summarize all that he did in the short period of time of his active years. Instead I would like to refer to two fundamental hypotheses he left for us: the
dates of Dharmakīrti and the real nature of the Buddhist philosophical treatises attributed to individual authors.

Regarding the dates of Dharmakīrti, Prof. Frauwallner’s proposal of 600–660 C.E. had been widely accepted by modern scholars of Dharmakīrti. However, Dr. Krasser was courageous enough to challenge the authority of Prof. Frauwallner, proposing a much earlier date for Dharmakīrti, chiefly on the grounds that Bhāviveka’s proof of non-eternity by sattvānumāna was influenced by Dharmakīrti. Dr. Vincent Eltschinger has summarized the state of affairs in his most recent book as follows:

Kumārila, Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti have long been considered, ever since Frauwallner’s influential “Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic” (1961), roughly contemporary philosophers belonging to the first half of the seventh century CE. … According to Krasser, however, Bhāviveka, who can be assigned with a fair amount of certainty to 500–570, presupposes both Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. As a working hypothesis, Krasser proposes “the time of activity of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti to be the middle of the sixth century.” Hypothetical (and unpopular) as it may be, Krasser’s chronology relies in my opinion on much stronger arguments than Frauwallner’s argumentum a silentio.

Last week I attended the XVIIth conference of International Association of Buddhist Studies in Vienna, where I had an opportunity to hear a paper given by Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe titled “Buddhist Critiques of the Sāṅkhya Theory of Causality, Dharmakīrti and his Predecessors.” In that paper, referring to Dharmapāla’s commentary on the tenth chapter of Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka, he demonstrated that Dharmapāla influenced Dharmakīrti with regard to the critique of the Sāṅkhya theory of causality. He also demonstrated that Bhāviveka’s critique of the Sāṅkhya’s logical reason moves along the same lines as Dharmapāla’s. In his concluding remarks, Dr. Watanabe argued that Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka must have lived during almost the same period, i.e., the sixth century, and stated that although he does not accept Dr. Krasser’s proposal that Bhāviveka was influenced by Dharmakīrti, he sees a close relationship between these two Buddhist philosophers. He thus concluded that he is inclined to accept Dr. Krasser’s working hypothesis that Dharmakīrti’s dates could be pushed back into the middle of the sixth century, proposing the dates of 560/570–650.

Also last week in Vienna, Prof. Shinya Moriyama read a paper called “On dharmisvarū-paviparītasādhana,” in which he pointed out the resemblance between Dharmapāla’s idea of three types of reasons and Dharmakīrti’s idea of three types of śabdārtha in Pramāṇavārttika I.205. This gives supporting evidence for Dr. Watanabe’s argument that Dharmapāla

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influenced Dharmakīrti. Of course, there are other possibilities, such as Dharmakīrti having influenced Dharmapāla or both having gotten a similar idea from a common source. But in any case, it is safe to say that Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti lived at approximately the same time, as Dr. Watanabe concluded.

Again during last week’s conference, Prof. Eli Franco re-examined and rejected the earlier date of Dharmakīrti proposed by Dr. Krasser. One of his arguments is based on the silence of Xuanzang, who was in India from 625 to 645, and that of other Indian and Buddhist philosophers with regard to Dharmakīrti. Against such an argument of silence, Prof. Steinkellner rightly pointed out that there are other ways to explain this silence, referring to the well-known legend of Dharmakīrti’s unpopularity with his contemporaries.

As a student of logic, I do not endorse much power to reasoning based on silence. Silence does not prove anything; it only raises doubts. In this connection I would like to refer to my own article “On trairūpya formulae.” In that article I demonstrated the gradual development of the trairūpya formulae in Buddhist logical texts and suggested that Xuanzang was certainly acquainted with the restriction by the particle eva in the formulation of the first condition of the valid logical reason (pakṣadharmatā), which was missing in Dignāga’s formulation of trairūpya but appears in Dharmakīrti’s. It is well known that the sixth-century Naiyāyika, Uddyotakara, criticized Dignāga’s understanding of the first condition and Dharmakīrti tried to respond to his criticism by adding the eva-restriction to the first condition. It is possible that such an eva-restriction was proposed by some unknown Buddhist logician before Dharmakīrti. But considering Dharmakīrti’s position in the development of Buddhist logic, I am inclined to believe that it was Dharmakīrti who initiated this revision in the trairūpya formulae. Therefore, although Xuanzang does not mention the name of Dharmakīrti, he may well have been acquainted with one of the important revisions made by Dharmakīrti in Dignāga’s logic. And if this is the case, I believe that it is possible to refute Prof. Frauwallner’s and Prof. Franco’s argument regarding Xuanzang’s silence about Dharmakīrti.

Of course, while it is impossible to prove Krasser’s hypothesis of the earlier dates of Dharmakīrti, it cannot be easily dismissed either. As Eltschinger and Watanabe have both conjectured, it is quite possible that Dharmakīrti was active in the latter half of the sixth century, and indeed, perhaps he enjoyed little popularity among his colleagues.

Regarding the second topic left for us by Dr. Krasser, I would like to point out that in Vasudhararakṣita’s Tibetan translation of the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti on Pramāṇasamuccaya 3.21, there are instructions on how to draw a chart of a hetucakra, which clearly indicates that at least this portion of PSV is a note recorded by a student during a class given by, if not Dignāga, some teacher of Buddhist logic lecturing on the Pramāṇasamuccaya. Moreover, I have recently been reading Avalokitavrata’s Ṭīkā on Bhāviveka’s Prajñāprādīpa, and from time to time I have noticed that Avalokitavrata meticulously points out what


20 For more about the debate on the dates of Dharmakīrti, please see Dr. Elisa Freschi’s blog: Thinking about through Sanskrit (and) philosophy, http://elisafreschi.com/2014/08/26/third-day-at-the-iabs-franco-on-the-datation-of-dharmakirti-and-some-further-thoughts-on-dharmakirti-dignaga-kumarila/.

is the pakṣa, what is the sādhyadharma and what is the hetu of the relevant prayoga. This also seems in part to support Krasser’s characterization of Buddhist philosophical texts as being students’ notes taken during monastic lessons. There must be many parallel cases like this. I would also like to add that among Japanese Buddhists, a tradition existed of compiling and publishing writings known as kōroku 講録, which are students’ notes of their teachers’ lectures on certain Buddhist texts or doctrines. From this perspective, too, I believe that Krasser’s conjecture must be taken more seriously and that we should continue working on this idea.

As a Japanese Buddhist of the Jōdo-shinshū tradition, I believe that Dr. Krasser, though invisible, is somewhere among us, having ascended to the Sukhāvatī, Land of the Buddha Amitābha, and returned from there as a Bodhisattva to watch over and help us. Having heard what I just said, he would probably say, “Don’t take me too seriously. There are other nice things to do in the world, like drinking and smoking.”

Before I close my opening speech, I should refer to some of the important achievements that have been made since the last Dharmakīrti conference. In the opening speech of the last conference, Prof. Steinkellner presented “News from the manuscript department.” I would like to report now on some of the further developments in this regard, as far as I know of them. As I mentioned above, the first two chapters of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā have been published. I am responsible for editing the third and the fourth chapter of the same text; I am happy to report that I have finished working on the third chapter and am now in the middle of the fourth. Regarding the fifth chapter, as we all know, Mr. Ole Pind finally submitted his work on that apoha chapter to the University of Vienna as his dissertation and it is now available on line to benefit of us all;²² since Dr. Krasser is gone, Dr. Lasic and Dr. McAllister have taken over the task of editing the fifth chapter. Finally, regarding the sixth chapter, Prof. Motoi Ono and his colleagues have more or less worked out the whole chapter. Meanwhile, Prof. Steinkellner has published the critical edition of the first two chapters of the Pramāṇaviniścaya and Dr. Pascale Hugon has published that of the third chapter. Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe and Dr. Krasser’s students Drs. Masamichi Sakai and Hisataka Ishida have critically edited several portions of Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā. And Prof. Steinkellner is now polishing up the critical edition of the Hetubindu that was prepared by Dr. Krasser.²³

Originally I intended to mention some important recent contributions to our field; many of them come from you. But I decided not to do so because after all, my information is limited and my impressions of those publications may be biased. So this is the end of my opening speech. I hope you will all enjoy the forthcoming papers and presentations, and at the end, I hope we shall have a little better understanding of this marvelous Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti from many different angles. Thank you for your patience.

Heidelberg, 26 August 2014

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²² In the meantime published in revised form as Dignāga’s Philosophy of Language. Vienna 2016.
²³ In the meantime published as Dharmakīrti’s Hetubindu. Beijing/Vienna 2016.
Account of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference in Heidelberg, August 26 to 30, 2014

**Honorary Chairs**

- Shōryū Katsura (Ryūkoku University)
- Ernst Steinkellner (Austrian Academy of Sciences)

**Planning Committee**

- Kei Kataoka (Kyūshū University)
- Birgit Kellner (University of Heidelberg)
- Sara McClintock (Emory University)
- Hideyo Ogawa (Hiroshima University)

**Organizing Team**

- Birgit Kellner, Patrick McAllister, Ina Chebbi (now Buchholz)
Program

Monday, 25 August: Arrival Day

18:00-20:00 Registration

Tuesday, 26 August

9:00-10:00 Registration
10:00-10:30 Opening Address: Shōryū Katsura
10:30-11:00 Break

Session I chaired by Shōryū Katsura

11:00-11:30 Ernst Steinkellner: Closing a gap in the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s logic
11:30-12:00 Eli Franco: The determination of causation and the similarity between cause and effect
12:00-12:30 Horst Lasic: What is the effect of what and how can one determine it?
12:30-14:30 Lunch Break

Session II chaired by Kei Kataoka

14:30-15:00 Hideyo Ogawa: Dignāga on the view of a generic term as denoting a relation
15:00-15:30 Akane Saitō: Manḍanamisṛa’s arguments against Dharmakīrti’s ideas on language – different definitions of the convention
15:30-16:00 Break

Session III chaired by Hideyo Ogawa

16:00-16:30 Mai Miyo: Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta on the non-distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala
16:30-17:00 Hiroshi Nemoto: Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence and its impact on the Tibetan Buddhist doctrine of buddhahood
17:00-17:30 Artur Przybyslawski: The notion of valid cognition (tshad ma) in the karma bka’ brgyud tradition of Tibetan buddhism
17:30 Birgit Kellner: Buddhist philosophy at the University of Heidelberg – a short history
18:00 Get-together party

Wednesday, 27 August

Session IV chaired by Sara McClinton

09:00-09:30 Patrick McAllister: Form and content in Ratnakīrti’s writings
09:30-10:00 Sara Uckelman: *The legitimacy of inference. Argumentation strategy in Ratnakīrti’s Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇam*

10:00-10:30 Ryō Sasaki: *The significance of the Vādanyāya in the historical transition of the ‘debate’ concept*

10:30-11:00 Break

**Session V chaired by Pascale Hugon**

11:00-11:30 Kyeongjin Choi: *The indeterminate role of bādhakapramāṇa in the Pramāṇaviniścaya*

11:30-12:00 Kyō Kanō: *On viparyayabādhakapramāṇa*

12:00-12:30 Masamichi Sakai: *Dharmottara on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa and trairūpya in Dharmakīrti’s sattvānumāṇa*

12:30-14:30 Lunch Break

**Session VI chaired by Zhihua Yao**

14:30-15:00 Christian Coseru: *Consciousness and causal explanation. Śāntarakṣita against physicalism*

15:00-15:30 Zhihua Yao: *Non-activity (nirvyāpāra) in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti*

15:30-16:00 Break

**Session VII chaired by Piotr Balcerowicz**

16:00-16:30 Masaki Tamura: *The truth, the Buddha’s words, and inference. Bhāvi-veka’s theory of two truths*

16:30-17:00 Motoi Ono: *On pramāṇabhūta – the change of its meaning from Dignāga to Prajñākaragupta*

17:00-17:30 Hisataka Ishida: *The exclusion of superimposition (samāropavyavaccheda)*

17:30 Presentations and discussion of databases and digital resources

**Thursday, 28 August**

**Session VIII chaired by Leonard van der Kuijp**

09:00-09:30 Masahiro Inami: *Two kinds of causal capacity, sāmānyā śaktih and pratiniyatā śaktih*

09:30-10:00 Hisayasu Kobayashi: *Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta on svalakṣaṇa*

10:00-10:30 Yōhei Kawajiri: *The Pratyabhijñā school’s criticism of the Buddhist concept of svalakṣaṇa*

10:30-11:00 Break
Session IX chaired by Kei Kataoka

11:00-11:30 Toshikazu Watanabe: Dharmakīrti and his successors on āśrayāsiddha and prasaṅgaviparyaya
11:30-12:00 Pascale Hugon: Revisiting the prasaṅga-passage of the Pramāṇaviniścaya
12:00-12:30 Lawrence McCrea: Balancing the scales. Dharmakīrti inside and out
12:30-14:30 Lunch Break

Excursion / free afternoon, followed by joint dinner

Friday, 29 August

Session X chaired by Ernst Steinkellner

09:00-09:30 John Taber: The structure of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhanyama argument
09:30-10:00 Serena Saccone: Śubhagupta’s theory of reality in the *Bāhyārthasiddhi-kārikā
10:00-10:30 Marie-Hélène Gorisse: Jain conceptions of non-apprehension. A criticism of Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference
10:30-11:00 Break

Session XI chaired by Eli Franco

11:00-11:30 Yoichi Fukuda: Reinterpretation of the compound “svabhāva-pratibandha” in Dharmakīrti’s logical theory
11:30-12:00 Kiyotaka Yoshimizu: Another look at avinābhāva and niyama in Kumārila’s exegetic works
12:00-12:30 Kiyokuni Shiga: On the meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jine-ndrauddhī’s theories of inference
12:30-14:30 Lunch Break

Session XII chaired by Horst Lasic

14:30-15:00 Laura Guerrero: Pramāṇa as conventional truth in the work of Dharmakīrti
15:00-15:30 Kei Kataoka: How does one cognize a cow? A dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga
15:30-16:00 Break

Session XIII chaired by Birgit Kellner

16:00-16:30 Vincent Eltschinger: Buddhist epistemology as apologetics
16:30-17:00 Cristina Pecchia: Dharmakīrti on the role of rituals
17:00-17:30 Som Dev Vasudeva: Bhokṛtṛva and causation in Kṣemarāja’s response to Dharmakīrti’s critique of liberation through initiation
17:30 Presentations and discussion of databases and digital resources
Saturday, 30 August

**Session XIV chaired by John Taber**

09:00-09:30 Junjie Chu: *Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*

09:30-10:00 Hugo David: *Maṇḍana Miśra on omniscience (sarvajñatva) and the perception of yogins (yogipratyakṣa), on the early appropriation of a few Buddhist concepts in the Mīmāṃsā tradition*

10:00-10:30 Brendan Gillon: *Ṣaṭkoṭivāda in the Upāyahṛdaya*

10:30-11:00 Break

**Session XV chaired by Brendan Gillon**

11:00-11:30 Huanhuan He / Leonard van der Kuijp: *Turning the Wheels: Yet another look at the *Hetucakra*-ḍamaru*

11:30-12:00 Mingjun Tang: *The concept of sādhana in Chinese Buddhist logic*

12:00-12:30 Kensho Okada: *A way of communication between a speaker and a listener similar to the way in which two persons with eye disease equally see double moon — in the light of the apoha theory of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla*

12:30-14:30 Lunch Break

**Session XVI chaired by Lawrence McCrea**

14:30-15:00 Miyuki Nakasuka: *Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory, perceptual judgement, and lack of superimposition (samāropaviveka)*

15:00-15:30 Piotr Balcerowicz: *Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra*

15:30-16:00 Break
Participants of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference

1. Balcerowicz, Piotr (University of Warsaw)
2. Choi, Kyeongjin (University of Tokyo)
3. Chu, Junjie (Leipzig University)
4. Coseru, Christian (College of Charleston)
5. David, Hugo (University of Cambridge)
6. Eltschinger, Vincent (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
7. Franco, Eli (Leipzig University)
8. Fukuda, Yoichi (Otani University)
9. Gillon, Brendan (McGill University)
10. Gorisse, Marie-Hélène (Ghent University)
11. Guerrero, Laura (Utah Valley University)
12. Hayashi, Itsuki (Ryukoku University)
13. He, Huanhuan (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
14. Hugon, Pascale (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
15. Inami, Masahiro (Tokyo Gakugei University)
16. Ishida, Hisataka (Tokyo University)
17. Kano, Kyo (Kobe Women’s University)
18. Kataoka, Kei (Kyushu University)
19. Katsura, Shoryu (Ryukoku University)
20. Kawajiri, Yohei (Chikushi Jogakuen University)
21. Kellner, Birgit (Heidelberg University)
22. Kobayashi, Hisayasu (Chikushi Jogakuen University)
23. Kwon, Soonbeom (Dongguk University)
24. Lasic, Horst (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
25. Li, Shenghai (Harvard University)
26. Lo, King Chung (University Leipzig)
27. Luo, Hong (Peking University)
28. McAllister, Patrick (Heidelberg University)
29. McClintock, Sara (Emory University)
30. McCrea, Lawrence (Cornell University)
31. McNamara, Daniel (Emory University)
32. Miyo, Mai (Waseda University)
33. Nakasuka, Miyuki (Hiroshima University)
34. Nemoto, Hiroshi (Hiroshima University)
35. Ogawa, Hideyo (Hiroshima University)
36. Okada, Kengo (University of Tsukuba)
37. O’Leary, Joseph (Sophia University, Tokyo)
38. Ono, Motoi (University of Tsukuba)
39. Pecchia, Cristina (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
40. Prueitt, Catherine (Emory University)
41. Przysławski, Artur (Jagiellonian University)
42. Saccone, Margherita Serena (University of Naples)
43. Saito, Akane (Kyoto University)
44. Sakai, Masamichi (Kansai University)
45. Sasaki, Ryo (Waseda University)
46. Shiga, Kiyokuni (Kyoto Sangyo University)
47. Siderits, Mark (Illinois State University)
48. Steinkellner, Ernst (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
49. Stoltz, Jonathan (University of St. Thomas)
50. Sung, Chungwhan (Dongguk University)
51. Taber, John (University of New Mexico)
52. Tamura, Masaki (Hiroshima University)
53. Tang, Mingjun (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences)
54. Uckelman, Sara (Heidelberg University)
55. van der Kuijp, Leonard (Harvard University)
56. Vasudeva, Somadeva (Kyoto University)
57. Watanabe, Toshikazu (Austrian Academy of Sciences)
58. Woo, Jeson (Dongguk University)
59. Yao, Zhihua (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
60. Yoshimizu, Kiyotaka (Tohoku University)
Introduction

As we have reported elsewhere, the newly available manuscripts of Jitāri’s (fl. 940–980) contain a number of hitherto unknown works, one of them is the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. This is a short philosophical treatise that become accessible through two manuscripts of the Sanskrit text. In this treatise, Jitāri tries to establish the Yogācāra doctrine of the cognitive manifestation of the objects and refutes the “externalism” (*bahirarthavāda*) around this central topic. The basic ideas he presents can be found in Dharmakīrti’s works and commentaries on them, for instance, PV 3.320–337 and the commentaries *ad loc*.

At the beginning of the treatise, Jitāri divides the externalists into two groups, according to their opinions on whether awareness possesses the image of object or not, i.e., the *sākārajñānavādins* and the *nirākārajñānavādins*, with a short outline of the position held by each group. Jitāri’s refutation, however, focuses mainly on the *nirākārajñānavādin*-branch. The discussion is initiated with a formal reasoning (*prayoga*) aiming to prove his main thesis that all things that become manifest (*prākāśa*) – i.e., that appear in consciousness – are cognition, which has the nature of self-manifestation. This is followed by the refutation of various objections that claim the reason in Jitāri’s *prayoga* is invalid in one of the three usually recognized ways, that is, by being unestablished (*asiddha*), inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) or contradictory (*viruddha*).
In the context of countering the attack that the reason is “inconclusive,” Jitāri embarks on an excursus and refutes the opponent’s thesis that the manifestation of the external object in cognition is caused by cognition. He does so by negating all four logically possible propositions with regard to the relationship between manifestation and the object. Jitāri concludes that the manifestation of the object is merely the cognition’s self-manifestation.

After establishing that the reason is not inconclusive, in the final section, Jitāri replies to further objections against the thesis of cognition’s self-manifestation raised from the perspective of non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist systems.

In the following, I will present an analysis of Jitāri’s discussions with the aim of summarizing the main points.

1. The bahirarthavāda position with regard to the image of the object

After dividing the bahirarthavādins into sākārajñānavādins and nirākārajñānavādins at the beginning of the VMS, Jitāri describes the position of those bahirarthavādins who favor sākārajñānavāda with regard to the image of the object as follows:

All this is only the cognition which appears with the image of [object-things of the five senses respectively, such as] white color, singing voice, fragrant smell, sweet taste and [tangible] roughness; however, the external (bāhyaḥ) object-thing having a [physical] body established as entirely different from [its] product, the cognition, does not appear in its own form.6

The position described here is similar to that of the Sautrāntika. As it is well-known, the Sautrāntika is a strong proponent of sākārajñānavāda.7 Jitāri then summarizes the position of those bahirarthavādins who favor nirākārajñānavāda as follows:

Our cognition is devoid of image [of object]; the external object possesses the image, and is perceptible, for this object is apprehended by perception as connected to the external world (bahirdeśa).8

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6 VMS 14b5–6/49a1–2: jñānam evedaṃ sitagītasurabhimadhurakarkaśākāram bhāsate, bāhyaḥ* punar artho jñānakāryavativirekamātravyavasthāpitaśarīro na svena rūpeṇa caṅkāti. *Both manuscripts clearly read bāhyam. However, since bāhyaḥ appears in related passages quoted below in n. 7 and n. 9, the text should be emended to bāhyaḥ.


8 VMS 14b6–15a1/49a2–3: nirākārā no buddhīḥ, ākāravān bāhyaḥ ’rthaḥ, pratayaṃs ca, sa hi bahirdeśasambuddhāḥ pratyaṣṇopalabhyate. In the TSP, we can find a similar outline of the nirākāravāda: “Cognition is devoid of the image; however, the external thing has the image, and it is perceived distinctly as connected to the external world. In this manner, the image of cognition is rejected by us.” (TSP 313,4–6 ad TS 980: nirākārā buddhīḥ, ākāravān bāhyaḥ ’rthaḥ, sa ca bahirdeśasambuddhā vispaṣṭam upalabhyata ity evam asmāḥhir jñānakāro niṣiddhāḥ.)
This refers evidently to the Mīmāṃsā system,⁹ which is the major advocate of the nirākāravāda among the non-Buddhist systems, and probably the main opponent functioning as interlocutor in this treatise. On the other hand, among Buddhist systems, the Vaibhāṣika is usually regarded as nirākāravādin, with Śubhagupta as the main representative in the sources available to us. As we will see below, Śubhagupta is quoted and refuted by Jitāri. The Yogācāra system, as it is attested in many sources, is divided into two sub-systems, the sākāravijñaptimātratāvādin and nirākāravijñaptimātratāvādin. Ratnākaraśānti is a spokesman of the latter.¹⁰ But, needless to say, as a nirākāravijñaptimātratāvādin, Ratnākaraśānti could not have been the target of Jitāri’s refutation, since he is not a bāhyārthavādin.

2. Formal reasoning proving cognition’s self-manifestation

In the VMS, Jitāri indeed does not pay much attention to the sākārajñānavāda-branch of the bahirarthavāda, saying that the sākārajñānavādin are not in conformity with the whole set of the generally established convention and they do not provide anything except some pieces of false determination.¹¹ So, he concentrates himself on the refutation of the nirākārajñānavāda-branch of the bahirarthavāda. He starts his refutation by setting forth a formal reasoning:

What becomes manifest [in cognition] is cognition [itself], just as the conceptual construction of a blue thing; and [a sensory object] like visible matter becomes manifest [in cognition, therefore, it is cognition with the image of object]. This is a reason of essential property.¹²

The main body of the treatise is actually a proof that the reason used in this reasoning is valid. As Jitāri does in many other works, the proof takes on the form of replies to various objections that claim the reason to be fallacious according to the Dharmakīrtian threefold typology of the “pseudo-reason” (hetvābhāsa): (1) unestablished (asiddha); (2) contradictory (viruddha), and (3) inconclusive (anaikāntika).¹³

At first, Jitāri declares that, in the formal reasoning, the proving factor (sādhana), i.e., “becoming manifest,” is not unestablished, because it is proved by perception as existent in

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⁹ Cf. MSBh 28,17–18: nirākārā tu no buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo ’rthah, sa hi bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ pratyaśasam upalabhyaḥ. Cf. also TSP 101,14–15 ad TS 252: kim ca bhavato mīmāṃsakasya mate yo bhūsamānah sa ākāro na buddheḥ. kim tv asau bāhyārthasvabhāvo varṇyate, ākāravān bāhīyo ’rtho nirākārā buddhir iti vacanāt. “Further, in your Mīmāṃsaka system, it is explained that it is not the image of cognition that appears; rather, it is the nature of the external object, since it is said: ‘the external object possesses the image, the cognition is devoid of the image.’”


¹¹ Cf. VMS 15a1/49a3: parisamāptasakalavyavahārayogāvābhāvam mithyābhinniveśaleśād rte nātīṣerata iti. VMS 15a2–3/49a4–5: yat prakāśate tat jñānaṁ yathā nilavikalpaḥ, prakāśate cedam rāpādikam iti svabhāvahetuh.

¹² Dharmakīrti does not directly offer a separate definition of the pseudo-reason (hetvābhāsa). Rather, in PV 1.1 he defines the threefold valid reason and then adds at the end of the verse that reasons other than this are “pseudo-reasons” (pakṣadharmanas tadāmśena vyāpto hetu tridhatvā sah / avinābhāvaniyamād dhvetvābhāsāḥ tato ‘pare //). The verse is translated in Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 6; Hayes and Gillon 1991: 2f.; and Steinkellner 2008 [2009]: 195, 2013: 4; for further discussion see Frauwallner 1954: 145; Steinkellner 1967: 82f., 2008 [2009]: 195, 2013: 16; and PVin 3.91–131,5 (kārikā 67–68).
Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi

respect to the property-bearer (dharmin), i.e., a “[sensory object] like visible matter.”

That means, for the reason he uses, the condition of pakṣadharma is satisfied. In reply to the objection that the property-bearer is unestablished either for the internalist who regards it as internal, or for the externalist who regards it as external, Jitāri argues that the property-bearer, visible matter, is nothing but the exclusion of non-visible-matter. Its properties of being internal or external that are the subject of disagreement, are characterized with two further different exclusions (i.e., the exclusion of being internal and the exclusion of being external, respectively). However, this disagreement does lead to the non-establishment of the property-bearer, because this property-bearer is established by perception; and in no inference is the property-bearer regarded as particularized to the certain property that is subject to controversy, so that it would incur the criticism of non-establishment.

Then, Jitāri points out further that the reason, “becoming manifest,” is not contradictory, because it is found among the similar cases. He explains: A proving factor becomes contradictory when what is opposed to the factor to be proved (śādhyā),

and a pervaded factor (vyāpya) should never come forth without pervading factor (vyāpaka), otherwise it would not be pervaded (tadabhāvaprasaṅgāt). So, the reason, insofar as it is contradictory, does not occur in the similar cases.

But the opponent does not agree with this, arguing that the proving factor “becoming manifest” cannot be found in the similar instance, because cognition is not perceptible; for, when an object is cognized, the cognition is known through inference.

Here Jitāri obviously refers to the position of Śabara of the Mīmāṃsā system; in fact, he makes use of the Śābarabhāṣya verbatim, incorporating literally the passage in question.

Dharmakīrti refutes this opinion in PV 3.460ff. From his externalist’s point of view, Jitāri’s opponent says that, in a cognitive event, we perceive merely the object alone that is the externally existent thing like something blue, which becomes manifest in cognition as blue when we perceive it. Apart from this no other object can be perceived, for the grasping subject cannot be perceived in the way “I experience the internal cognition” (āntaram jñānam

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14 Cf. VMS 15a3/49a5: atra prayoge na sādhanāsiddhir adhyakṣasiddhatvād dharmiṇī prakāśamānatāyāḥ.

15 Cf. VMS 15a5–6/49b2–4: ayam evāryānapravartvīśiṣṭo dharmābhāvabhāvate tasāya vivādāpade vyārvṛtyantare, na ca tayor asidhiṁ dharmiṇo ākarṣati, tasyādyakṣasiddhatvenāsaśayāpahnavatvāt, na ca kvacid anumāne vimatyanikaranaśadharmanvīśiṣṭo dharmī yenaivaivam asiddhicodanālāṃbī syāt.

16 A similar definition of the contradictory reason can be found in RNĀ 33,21–22: tathā hi yo vipakṣa eva vargate sa khalu sādhyāviparyayavāpyātyaksādhyāviruddham sādhyāvirdham viruddho ’bhidhiyate.

17 Cf. VMS 15b1–2/49b5–4: nāpi viruddhatvāṁ sapakṣe bhāvāt, sādhyāviparyayavāpyātyaṁ hi sādhanāṁ viruddham bhavati, na ca vyāpyaṁ vyāpakāṁ antareṇa syāt tadabhāvaprasaṅgād iti sati viruddhatve na sapakṣe vargate.

18 Cf. VMS 15b2/49b5–50a1: nanu ca prakāśanāṁ nāma nāasty eva sapakṣe jñānaṁya sarvasya parokṣatvāt.


20 Cf. PV 3.460ab: api čādhyakṣatābāhāve dhiyaḥ syāl līṅgato gātīḥ / “Further, cognition should be known through an inferential sign, insofar as it is not perceptible.” Cf. PV 3.447: etenānātmavitpakṣe sarvārthādārśanena ye i apratyaksāṁ dhiyam prāhuṣe te ’pi nirvānītottarāḥ // “Through [the unwanted consequence explained above] that there is no perception of any kind of object in the thesis of non-self-awareness the reply is given to those who say that cognition is non-perceptible.” The opponent who advocates this theory is at PVV 251,17 labelled as Jaininīya: ye jaininīyā apratyaksāṁ dhiyam arthāpattigamyāṁ āhuḥ te ’pi nirvānītottarā dattottarā boddhavyāḥ.
anubhavāmīti). That is to say, the opponent does not accept the Buddhist theory that cognition of an object can be perceived through self-awareness, like the awareness of sensations such as pleasure; as it is explained by Dignāga. Jitāri’s refutation of this objection is in fact a proof of the existence of the experience of cognition of an object-referent. He argues that even if you do not have an ascertaining awareness (pratipatti) in the form “I experienced the cognition,” you cannot prove that the experience of the cognition does not exist. To support this, he quotes a verse from the Tattvasaṅgraha: The name is not equal to the characteristics (rüpa) of things, so it is not the case that the things whose characteristics have been completely apprehended (parijñāta) [through perception] remain unknown so long their name is unknown.

Jitāri argues further: If the experience of the cognition of an object-referent would not exist at all, then the pure conceptual awareness of an object like a pot, perceived as arising and disappearing, cannot be included in (antar√bhū) or assigned to anything, i.e., it has no objective substratum at all to be based on; for it can be based neither on the object nor on the cognition – because the object cannot arise and disappear according to a person’s desire (jhāvaśena) and it does not have the nature of the subjective conceptualization. Moreover, the cognition might occur, being imperceptible according to the opponent, but it could not become manifest, even if it occurs as conceptual awareness; the object is manifest, but it does not occur like the subjective cognition. To conclude, Jitāri says, if the cognition were imperceptible, there would be no conceptual awareness consisting in the experience of a cognition in concordance with the verbal designation of the object at all, but in reality it is not so.

Now, Jitāri turns to treat the problem of the reason’s inconclusiveness (anaikāntikatā), which he defines as the occurrence of reason in the dissimilar cases (vipakṣavṛttikatā). He argues that this occurrence is impossible in this case, because the proving factor, being established by valid means of cognition, leaves no room for deviation; he emphasizes also that this occurrence can never be suspected so long as there is a necessary concomitance

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21 Cf. PS(V) 1.6ab: mānasam cārtharāgādisvasaṃvittir akalpikā / mānasam api rūpādiviṣayālambanam avikalpakaṃ anubhavākārapravṛttam, rāgādiṣa ca svasaṃvedanam indriyānapekṣatvān mānasam pratipakṣam. “And the mental [perception], [i.e.] awareness of an object-referent and self-awareness of desire, etc., is free from conceptual construction. Mental [awareness], too, taking the object-field like a visible matter, etc., as its object-support, [and] occurring with image of direct experience [of that visible matter], is non-conceptual [and thus can be regarded as perception], and self-awareness in respect to the desire, etc., is [also a kind of] mental perception, because it is independent of sense faculties.” And PS(V) 1.9ab: svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra dvyaḥāśasam hi jñānam utpadyate svābhāsaṃ viṣayābhāṣaṃ ca. tasyabhāṣābhāṣasya yat svasaṃvedanam tat phalam. “Or with regard to this [perception mentioned above as a type of perception] (cf. PST 1 69,6–7: atri priyokte pratayakse) the self-awareness is the result. (9a) Cognition arises actually with two appearances, self-appearance and object-appearance. The self-awareness of this [cognition] possessing both appearances is the result.”

22 Cf. TS 1555: na nāma rūpaṃ vastūnām yat tasyātmane satī / pariṃtāmatatvānām avy ājñānātā bhaveti //

23 Cf. VMS 15b4–16a1/50a3–6: yadi hi jñānānuḥhavo nāma nāstī eva, tadā yo ’yaṃ ghatādivikalpaḥ samvidhā upayam api upayamś ca kvāntarbhaḥvātām, arthe buddhau vā. na tāvad arthe, tasyehāvaśeno-dvāstamatayogatā, asya cānevamrūpavātāvahirdhātra vivaṃtēta, sā cāpratyākṣār vivaṃtēta sā tuḥ na prakāṣēta, na ca prakāṣā ’rthas tathāvīrttitī ity abhāva evārthābhībhīlāpānākārinī ’anubhavāvānimo vikalpaśya jñānaparokṣapakṣe prasajyeta. na caivaṃ. This is in fact an adaptation of the argument presented in Dharmakīrti’s PVin 1 14,14–15,7. Cf. the German translation of the Tibetan version in Vetter 1966: 53.
between the nature of self-manifestation and the things that become manifest, which he expresses with a formal reasoning:

Everything that does not possess the nature of self-manifestation does not become manifest, just like something that never appears. And [a sensory object] like a blue thing does not have the nature of self-manifestation, if it is not cognition. This is [the reason of] non-perception of a pervading factor.24

Here, it is worth noting that this is just a repetition in the negative form of the first formal reasoning given at the beginning of the work when Jitāri starts his refutation.25 The only difference is that the word “cognition” (jñāna) is here replaced with “possessing the nature of self-manifestation” (svaprakāśasvabhāva), which Jitāri treats as synonym. This demonstrates clearly that Jitāri sets forth the discussion from the Yogācāra point of view, regarding the nature of self-manifestation as a conditio sine qua non for the arising of the object’s manifestation in the cognition as the cognitive content.

The opponent does not accept the theory of self-manifestation, holding that a thing, although not attaining (anuvābhū)26 the nature of self-manifestation, can still become manifest, for instance, a blue thing, etc., not having the nature of manifestation of itself, when placed (adhīna) near a lamp, etc., can still be manifest, and thus, the nature of self-manifestation is not a necessary condition for the state of being manifest.27 Jitāri’s reason consequently still remains inconclusive. Jitāri replies to this by simply pointing out that manifestation never takes place in any other form than self-manifestation,28 so his reason cannot be inconclusive.

In the next section, to refute the objection against the Yogācāra’s position of self-manifestation, he examines the relationship between the cognitive manifestation and the

24 Cf. VMS 16a1–3/50a6–b2: anaikāntikatāpy asya na sambhaviṇī. sā hi bhavanti drśyamānavipakṣaviryäkatayā vā sambhavet samabhūyamānavipakṣaviryäkatayā vā. tatra na tāvad agrimo grāhyah paksah, pramāṇasiddhasya vyabhicāragocarasya kasyacid abhāvāt. nāpi paśčimo vipaścītām paritośīyā yadi viparyaye bādhakam pramāṇam na bhavet, asya syād vipakṣapravārasākā, yāvath tad asti — yad yat svapprakāśasvabhāvam na bhavati tath tan na prakāśate, yathā kiñcit kādācit apratibhāsamānam. na bhavati ca svapprakāśasvabhāvam asati jānatve nīlādikam iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ.

25 Cf. the quotation above in n. 12.

26 As pointed out by Funayama (2007: 194, n. 35), the subject of the verb anuvābhū can also be a thing, and then it does not mean “to experience …” as when it is used with a human being as its subject; he translates the phrase satīṃ anubhavitā in a passage quoted from TSP 1123,6–8 as “directly manifests itself” (but, I think, in that case, the phrase could be simply translated as something like “is connected to/attains its existence”). He gives some other examples of the same expression found in TSP. Actually, examples for this use of the verb in other contexts can also be found in TSP and other texts, for instance, cf. TSP 604,12–14: sa vāyur niṣkramaṃs tālvādeḥ saṃyogavibhāgāv anubhavati. gacchaṃś ca na sa yāvad ākāśam abhigacchati. kim tarhi. yāvad vegam … “It, i.e., wind, when blowing out, attains connection or disjunction with the palate, etc., and it does not continue to move as long as there is space, but as long as the impetus (vega) [continues].” (Notably, here, the word anurudhyate in TS 2177 is paraphrased as anubhavitai).

27 Cf. VMS 16a4–6/50b3–4: svapprakāśasvabhāvatām anunabhavān api nīlādiḥ prakāśāta iti na kiñcit anupapannām nāma. ko hy atra niyamo yat svapprakāśasvabhāvenaiva kevalam prakāśītvayam iti, paraprakāśayatve ‘pi prakāśopapateḥ, sva-yam aprakāśāthanām api nīlādināṃ dipādisannidhānādhīnāprakāśarupapalambhāt.

28 Cf. VMS 16a6–16b1/50b5: bhaved ayam anaikāntiko hetuḥ, yady anyathāpi prakāśo ghaṭate, kim tu svapprakāśatām antareṇa prakāśāntareṇa prakāśo nopaṇapadyate.
object that becomes manifest in cognition, with the conclusion that his own initially presented reason is not inconclusive.

3. Examining the relationship between the “making manifest” (prakāśana) and the object

From the Yogācāra’s point of view, a cognitive event of “manifestation” refers, of course, to the fact that the cognition is manifest, so the question is raised why it is said that an object is made manifest by cognition. According to the externalist opponent, however, that statement means simply the fact that the “making manifest” (prakāśana) of an external object is performed by its cognition.29 To refute this idea, Jitāri embarks on a rather lengthy discussion to examine the relationship between the making manifest, which the opponent alleges to be created by cognition, and the external object (artha). He uses an argument in the form of “four alternative proposition” (catuṣkoti), a Buddhist favorite dialectical apparatus: He lists at first exhaustively all conceivable relations between the making manifest and the object, and then negates them all one by one: the manifestation is a different thing than the object-referent (1), it is a non-different thing than the object-referent (2), it is both different and non-different (3), it is neither different nor non-different (4).

Jitāri argues at first that the so-called “making manifest,” which is made by cognition, cannot be a different entity (padārtha) than the object-referent, because in that case it cannot be said that it is the object-referent that is made manifest by cognition. He explains: The object-referent cannot become manifest as itself, since this is contradictory to the thesis of other-manifestation, i.e., becomes manifest as a different thing. Moreover, the “other” cannot operate to add a different nature to the object to make it manifest, since in that case the “other” becomes identical with the object, i.e., one ends up with the second option.30 Further, in that case, since the object-referent does not undergo any change while the manifestation arises as a different entity, it would not become manifest; and a future thing, inasmuch as it is not appearing in the manifestation, cannot be distinguished from the thing itself (svārūpa) and thus cannot become manifest.31 To avoid this difficulty, the opponent may argue that the object-referent, without change, becomes manifest with the same manifestation. However, according to Jitāri, the manifestation is a temporal process, i.e., the object undergoes the changes from the state of not being manifest to being manifest; so Jitāri points out, this opponent’s argument does not hold, because in that case also this unchanging manifestation is useless when the object has already its effecting means (karaṇa)32 of a different manifestation, i.e., the effecting means of making a change; also

29 Cf. VMS 16b1–3/15a1–2: nanu jñānaprakāśatve ’pi prakāśo yujyata eva, idam eva kim uktam bhavati jñānenārthaḥ prakāśyata iti. kim atra praṣṭavyam, jñānaṇa tasya prakāśanaṃ kriyata ity ayam artho ’nenābhidhiyata iti.
30 Cf. VMS 16b3–5/51a2–5: tatra yadi jñānena prakāśānakhyaṃ kim api padārthāntaraṃ kṛtam, katham tenārthaḥ prakāśito nāma. na hy asau svayam eva prakāśate, tathāve paraprakāśatvāyogāt. tad api param asya svārūpavivēṣādhihāne na vyāpiyate, dvītyavikalpaṃprasangat, tasya ca vicāravivēṣāmāvatīr.
31 Cf. VMS 16b4–5/51a4–5: tathā ca yathābhūto ’sau prakāśānudaye, tathābhūta eva prakāśādaryasamaye ’pīti katham prakāśeta. aprakāśadrśā bhāvinah svārūpaḥ na viśeṣā eva prakāśeta ceti suvyākṛtam. aprakāśadṛśā bhāvinābhāvāntavāt. svārūpavivēṣādhihānehāt.
32 In the grammatical sense, karaṇa refers to “the most efficient causal factor.” Cf. Pāṇ 1.4.42: sādhaka- tamaṇ karaṇaṃ. and KV Part I: 557,4–5 (ad loc.): kriyāsiddhau yat prakṛṣṭopakāraṇaḥ vivakṣitaṃ
because in that case an infinite regress would result, i.e., an endless arising of manifestation, when this manifestation can never be (anupapatti) in the state of being currently manifest because of its not being distinct from its previous form, i.e., the unmanifest form, and undergoes (upagama) nevertheless the action of producing a manifestation other than that manifestation.\textsuperscript{33} That means, in that case, the manifestation would not be a momentary phenomenon, rather a never-stopping process.

Jitāri then turns to refute the second option, i.e., that the making manifest is non-different from the object, i.e., identical with object. He argues that the identity between them cannot be possible, for in that case, when, through cognition, the object-referent has the effecting means of making manifest (prakāśanakaraṇa) that is identical to itself, it itself becomes the effecting means of making manifest, and thus the action (kriyā) of making manifest becomes impossible, because it is already accomplished before by the object-referent itself.\textsuperscript{34} If the action of making manifest takes a form that is different from what is accomplished by another cause (kāraṇa), then only this different form is created, since it has not been accomplished, but this form cannot be identical with the object-referent (tadātmabhūta).\textsuperscript{35} And thus, if the object-referent ceased to exist in its previous form and arises in another form, its appeared form (vyaktarūpa) must arise from cognition, and these two must be momentary, because by accepting a different form, it follows necessarily that it exists with each action (pratikṛti) [of making manifest].\textsuperscript{36} According to Jitāri, this is the idea stated in Dharmakīrti’s PV 3.464–465ab, which he quoted.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{33}Cf. VMS 16b5–17a1/51a5–51b2: tenaiva prakāśena prakāśyata iti cet. vārttam etat, tasyāpi prakāśā-ntarakaṇe bhāve 'nupayogāt, tasya ca pūrvarūpāviśeṣāt prakāśāsamānaṇānapacaitāt tasyāpi tadapa- rampantāśaṃśakriyopagame paryavasānaśaṃśaprakāśaparamparotpādakasya puvrosthitapadārthaprakā-śamānaṭaśaṃśatāparipanthino 'navavasthānasya prasangāt.

\textsuperscript{34}Cf. VMS 17a1–2/51b2–3: jñānenārthasyātmabhūtaprakāśanakaraṇe tasyaiva karaṇam āpadyeta. yat khalv arthasyātmabhūtaḥ asāv artha eva. tac ca kriyate na cārtha iti riktā vāco yuktiḥ. na cāsya kriyā sambhaviniḥ, prāg eva nispattatvāt.

\textsuperscript{35}Cf. VMS 17a2–4/51b3–5: yena rūpeṇa sa nispanno na tena kriyā, rūpāntaretāḥ karaṇād iti cet. tad eva tarhi rūpāntaraṁ anispattatvāt kriyāt iti prāptam. tac ca tannispattāv anispattanām kāraṇāntarataḥ paścād upajāyātānāṁ kathām tadātmabhūtāṁ nāma.

\textsuperscript{36}Cf. VMS 17a4–5/51b5–52a1: tasmād yady arthasya pūrvarūpāvyayo rūpāntrodāyasaḥ ca bhavet, bhaved asya vyaktaḥ rūpāntaretāsya jñānād utpatthāv, tāu cāsya tāvāniḥ na sthā, tadapaścād prakṛtiḥ bhaṅgur- ratvaprassangāt. The phrase pratikṛti (cf. pratijñānaḥ in PV 3.465a quoted below in n. 37) reads in the manuscript B as prakṛtiḥbhaṅguratva. The phrase pratikṛti (cf. pratijñānaḥ in PV 3.465a quoted below in n. 37) reads in the manuscript B as prakṛtiḥbhaṅguratva, “perishable in their nature,” however, in this case the phrase loses the connection with PV.

\textsuperscript{37}Indeed, Dharmakīrti’s statement aims at the refutation of various opponents’ opinions against the Yogācāra thesis that cognition is cognized by itself (svavedana, cf. PV 3.425ff.). One of them says that cognition is apprehended by inference, i.e., through inferential sign (liṅga). Dharmakīrti refutes this by arguing that, the causal forces for arising of a cognition, like sense faculty, object-referent, mental factor, etc., cannot be established as the inferential sign, because either they could deviate from the causal connection with cognition or they themselves are the cognition that are to be inferred; also the appearance (vyakti) of object-referent, being the cognition, cannot be the inferential sign, because the object-referent, when not being experienced, cannot be ascertained as appearing (cf. PV 3.461’d–463cd: tatra nendriyaṃ vyabhīcārataḥ // tathārtha dhīmanaskārau jñānam taur ca na siddhyataḥ // nāprasiddhastānāṃ līṅgavatvān vyaktir arthasya cen matā // saiva nava jñānam vyakto ‘rtho ‘nena varnītaḥ / vyaktvā ananubhūtāyāṃ tadvyaktatvaviniścayat //). Dharmakīrti refutes further the objection against this argument in the next one and a half verses which are quoted by Jitāri: “Now, [the opponent] accepts that the appearance is

\textsuperscript{tat sādhakatamam kārakaṃ karaṇasamjñāṃ bhavati. Cf. also Matilal’s discussion on the topic “the doctrine of karaṇa” in 1985: 372–378.

\textsuperscript{34}Cf. VMS 16b5–17a1/51a5–51b2: tenaiva prakāśena prakāśyata iti cet. vārttam etat, tasyāpi prakāśā-ntarakaṇe bhāve 'nupayogāt, tasya ca pūrvarūpāviśeṣāt prakāśāsamānaṇānapacaitāt tasyāpi tadapa- rampantāśaṃśakriyopagame paryavasānaśaṃśaprakāśaparamparotpādakasya puvrosthitapadārthaprakā-śamānaṭaśaṃśatāparipanthino 'navavasthānasya prasangāt.

\textsuperscript{35}Cf. VMS 17a1–2/51b2–3: jñānenārthasyātmabhūtaprakāśanakaraṇe tasyaiva karaṇam āpadyeta. yat khalv arthasyātmabhūtaḥ asāv artha eva. tāc ca kriyate na cārtha iti riktā vāco yuktiḥ. na cāsya kriyā sambhaviniḥ, prāg eva nispattatvāt.

\textsuperscript{36}Cf. VMS 17a2–4/51b3–5: yena rūpeṇa sa nispanno na tena kriyā, rūpāntaretāḥ karaṇād iti cet. tad eva tarhi rūpāntaram anispattatvāt kriyāt iti prāptam. tac ca tannispattāv anispattanām kāraṇāntarataḥ paścād upajāyātānāṁ kathām tadātmabhūtāṁ nāma.

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Jitāri points out further that a momentary instance of an object-referent (arthakṣaṇa) cannot be made manifest by the cognition, for in that case the cognition needs to be either simultaneously existent or pre-existent, but both cases are impossible: When the cognition is simultaneous with the object, no causality is possible, just like between the left and right horns of a cow; again, a verse from Dharmakīrti’s PV is quoted, which argues that all causes must exist before their results.\textsuperscript{38} On the other hand, when cognition exists before, the object-referent arising from cognition with its independent nature of manifestation (prakāśasvabhāva) would become manifest to all people, since it is common to all. Moreover, the idea is also incorrect (asaṅgata) that the object-referent has the independent nature of manifestation only for the person through whose cognition such manifest form (tādṛśa) is produced, but not for the others; because the object-referents do not have a different nature (ātmabheda) for each different person (pratipuruṣa), since otherwise it would follow that they do not possess their own nature (nairātmya) on account of the absence of a fixed nature (ātmasthiti).\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{38} PV 3.246: asataḥ prāg asāmarthyāt paścāc ca na prayogataḥ / prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetunāṃ nāto ’rthah svadhiyā saha // “Because [in the case that the object-referent as the cause and cognition as the effect exist simultaneously, the object-referent], being non-existent before [the arising of the cognition as result], is not efficient [in producing the result], and after [the arising of result] it is useless [since the result has been already produced], all causes exist before [their results]; consequently, an object cannot be simultaneous with its cognition.” The context of this quotation is however not exactly the same as Jitāri’s argument. In the section of PV 3.245–247, Dharmakīrti discusses the problem of the temporal relationship between mental awareness and its object, refuting an objection against the theory that object-referent is an auxiliary factor (sahakārin) for sense faculty in producing mental cognition. The opponent maintains that the object-referent, being active simultaneously with its cognition and thus in a different time than sense faculty, cannot serve the function of auxiliary cause (sahakārin) Cf. PV 3.245: tadatulyakriyākālaḥ kathām svajñānakālikaḥ / sahakāri bhaved artha iti ced akṣacetasaḥ // PV 3.246 is the reply to this objection. Jitāri’s aim of quoting this verse seems to be merely to rule out the possibility of the simultaneous existence of cause and effect. The point here is that, if the object-referent is external, it cannot be simultaneous with cognition. The Sautrāntika, accepting the externally existent object-referent, refutes the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of the co-existent causes (sahabhūhetu). However, as an internalist (antarjñeyavādin), the Yogācāra supports the theory that the object-referent, as a cognitive aspect of cognition, and therefore existent internally, can be co-existent with cognition. Cf. Kato 1989: 309ff., Dhammajoti 2009: 154ff.

\textsuperscript{39} Cf. VMS 17b2–3/52a4–5: sumasamayasambhavinā vā jñānenārthakṣaṇah prakāśasvabhāvo ’rthah sādhāraṇatvāt sarvānta prati prakāśet, vasyayāva nipāntena sa tādṛśa nītaḥ pratiśakṣet, vasyayāva nipāntena sa tādṛśa nītaḥ pratiśakṣet. na hi pratipuruṣam arthānām ātmabhedaḥ,
For the third and fourth alternatives, i.e., that the manifestation is both different and non-different, as well as neither different nor non-different from the object-referent, Jitāri says merely that they have already been refuted through the refutation of the first two alternatives, so it is useless to exert the labor (piṣṭapeṣaṇa) of a separate refutation. He quotes two verses from the 29th chapter of Arcaṭa’s *Hetubinduṭīkā*, “Refutation of Non-absolutism” *(dravyaparyāyānekāntavādakhaṇḍanam)*, and concludes that, of things with mutually contradictory nature, negating the one implies (nāntarīyaka) affirming the other, and one cannot affirm and negate the same nature in respect to the same thing. The opponents therefore cannot defend themselves by taking this position.

After negating all possible alternative interpretations of the relationship between the cognition’s making manifest and the object, Jitāri says that, since it is not the case that one thing can be made manifest by the other thing, the conclusion must be as follows: “What becomes manifest is [cognition] itself, what is not [cognition] itself [i.e., anything other than cognition], does not have its manifestation at all.”

If we compare this conclusion with his first formal reasoning, it becomes clear that here he just repeats the idea of the pervasion (vyāpti) stated in that reasoning. In the remaining part of the text, Jitāri replies to several objections against this conclusion.

### 4. Replies to the objections against the thesis of self-manifestation

The first objection is directly directed against the above-mentioned pervasion, arguing that a blue thing, etc., can be both not cognition (i.e., external) and self-manifestation in its nature; so Jitāri’s reason is not established. Jitāri replies to this simply by indicating the self-contradiction of this argument. He explains: For a cognition, the nature of being cognition is nothing but the nature of being self-manifestation; so, by admitting the fact

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40 In that chapter the Jaina’s non-absolutism (anekāntavāda) is systematically refuted, which holds that “substance” (dravya) and “mode” (paryāya) are not contradictory or mutually exclusive; rather, they are in coherence. (For a brief description of this theory, cf. Dasgupta 1975: I 175ff.) Arcaṭa examines the relationship between the “substance” and its “mode,” also using the analytic method of the “four alternatives.” After negating the alternatives that the substance and the mode are “different” and “non-different” individually, he says in the two verses that are quoted by Jitāri that mutually contradictory properties, such as difference and non-difference between substance and mode, cannot occur in one and the same thing, but when they are accepted, the faults mentioned for each case remain, i.e., either “it cannot be a single thing,” or “it cannot have the double form,” still exist, or the faults that are attached to each single case come forth also in the case when these two are together. These faults (or “side-effects,” such as phlegm produced by sugar and bile by ginger in the examples given in HBṬĀ) that come forth in each single case of difference or non-difference between substance and modes cannot cease to exist insofar the quality exists. Cf. HBṬ 29,25 (p. 106,11–12): bhedābhedodakoṣaṇā ca tayor iṣṭau kathan na vā / pratyekāṃ ye prasajyante dvayor bhāve katham na te // and 29,30 (p. 106,21–22): ye bhedābhedodakṣānte hi dosah sambhavināḥ katham / tatsambhāve pi te na syur iti brāyādy vicākaṇaḥ // Cf. also HBṬĀ 349,8–15, 350,29, 351,3 (ad loc.).

41 Cf. VMS 18a1/52b4: anyonyapratisedhayāpānāṃ caikapratisedhayāparavidhināntarīyakatvād ekasya caikatra vidhipratisedhayor avaygā, na tatkalpanānusaranāṃ śaraṇam paresām.

42 Cf. VMS 18a2/52b5: tasmād anyasyānyena prakāśyatvānupapatiḥ, yat prakāśate tat svayam eva, yat tu na svayam tasya nāṣyaiva prakāśa iti ekāntaḥ.

43 Cf. above n. 12.
that the blue, etc., are self-manifestation, one admits also that they are cognition. The opponent is not satisfied with this reply, asserting that being cognition does not equal being reflexive manifestation (ātmaprakāśatva), rather it means simply being an agent of the action of making manifest (prakāśayitṛ). This is refuted by pointing out the fact that cognition’s being the agent of making manifest is dependent upon the object it makes manifest (prakāśya), and since that object-referent outside of cognition cannot be proved as the object to be made manifest by cognition, also cognition cannot be the agent of making manifest.

The opponent now introduces the grammatical notion of an “object of action” (karman) to prove that the object of action is separated from the agent. According to the opponent, Jitāri’s above argument might be applicable to cases where the object of action is the “object to be created” (kārya) or the “object to be modified” (vikārya). In the grammatical tradition, the object of action is divided into three types: The object to be produced, the object to be modified and the object to be attained. The opponent argues that the object made manifest by cognition could be “the object to be attained” (prāpya), which is neither the object to be produced or effected (kārya) nor the object to be modified (vikārya), like “village” in the sentence “he goes to the village” (grāmaṅ gacchatīti); so it is not contradictory to say that what is attained is made manifest, and is neither produced nor changed. This is refuted by Jitāri based on the following reasons: (1) Other than being cognition no attaining (prāpti) is possible, and without attaining no object-referent can be attained; (2) the cognition cannot be characterized as attaining, since [in the opponent’s system] the action (kriyā) and its causal factor (kāraka) cannot be the same thing.

44 Cf. VMS 18a3–4/53a1–2: ajiñāṇaṁ svaprakāśātmakaṁ ca niḥādikam iti kim atrānupapannam. tad ayam asidho hetur iti. tad asat, parasparavriddhatvāti. svaprakāśatvam eva hi jñānasya jñānatvam nānyat kiṁcit. tatāt svaprakāśatvam niḥāder abhyupan vá jñānatvam niḥāder apy upeti.

45 Cf. VMS 18a5–6/53a2–4: nātmaprakāśatvām jñānatvam, api tu prakāśayitravam iti cet. prakāśyapekṣayaḥ hi prakāśayitravam. prakāśyaḥ cārthasyānupapatimatuḥ jñānasāpi prakāśayitravam nopapadyate.

46 Cf. KV Part II 540,3 (ad Pāṇ 3.2.1: karmany añ): trividhaḥ karma, nirvartyam, vikāryaṁ prāpyam ceti. Cf. also the more detailed explanation in KVP Part II 540,30–541,25: tatra nirvartyam yad asad evopapapadyate*, yathā kumbhāṁ karoti nagaram carotīti, kumbhāḍhikam hy avidyāmānaṁ evopapadyata iti nirvartyam kāryaṁ. vikāryaṁ yasya sata eva kaścid vikārovidhiyate, tad yathā kāṇḍaṁ lūnātīti, sata eva kāṇḍaṁ lavanaṇa vikārovidhiyata iti vikāryaṁ kāryaṁ. prāpyaṁ nāśata evopādanam kriyate nāpi sata eva vikāridhānām, kevalam kriyāsambhandhamārāṇam prātyayate, tad yathā vedam adhīte carcāṁ paryayatīti. atra hy adhyāyanādinānaḥ vedādēḥ sambhandhamārāṇam prātyayate, na tv asata evopādanam, nāpi sata evanayathālakṣaṇo vikāra iti prāpyam etat karma. *-upapadāya em.;.upapadāya KVP

47 Cf. VMS 18b1–2/53a4–53b1: na hi kāryavikārye paraṁ karkaṁ, yenānupādyam anatísāyaṁ vā na karnna syāt. prāpyaṁ api karna, yat prāpyate paraṁ, na kriyate nāpi vikriyate. yathā grāmaṁ gacchatīti. prāpyakarma vārthāḥ. tad ayam akrīyaṁanā ’py avikriyāmanā ’pi prāpyaṁnaḥ prakāśyata ity aviruddham.

48 The theory of the non-difference between a causal factor of an action (kāraka) or more precisely, the means of accomplishing the action (karana), and the action (kriyā) as the result is the fundamental principle of the Yogācāra since Dignāga, which is not accepted by the opponents like the Naiyāyika who adheres to the grammatical notion of differentiating the action and its various causal factors. There is evidently a long-lasting debate between Yogācāra and the Naiyāyika on this topic. Cf. PV 3.318–319: kṛtyākaraṇayor aikyavirodha iti ced asat / dharmaḥbhidhāhyupagamad vasyābhinām itiṣyate / evamprakāra sarvaiva kriyākāracasmatthitiḥ / bhāvasya* bhāṁbhimateṣv api āropeṇa vṛttiḥ / (*Following PVA and various Tibetan translations, Tosaki reads bhāveṣu. However, the
Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi

does not operate (upayoga) on the [external] object-thing, the latter cannot become the object of action of that cognition. (4) If the object-thing becomes the object of action (karmatve) merely due to its presence at the time when the action arises, it would follow that everything at that moment (tadātana) would be the object. If it becomes the object of action due to being a cause, then the visual sense, etc., would also come to be the object of action.49

The opponent argues further for the separation between the agent of making manifest and the object to be made manifest, saying that a thing that becomes manifest can be an object of action of making manifest when the agent of making manifest occurs, i.e., when there is a causal relationship between them. Jitāri replies that an external object-referent cannot become manifest as itself, nor can it have a different nature, i.e., manifestation produced by cognition. Thus, it is just nonsense to apply the formula of causality which in this case could be expressed as: “When that occurs, this becomes manifest.”50

After negating that the relationship between object and cognition is one between object of action and agent of action, Jitāri adds that, through this negation, also Kumārila’s statement in ŚVK, Pratyakṣasūtra 54–55, is refuted. There Kumārila explains the word “birth” in the definition of “perception” in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.4: “Perception is the birth of cognition when a person’s sense faculties are connected with an existent object,”51 saying that the operation of causes is known as additional (atireka) to their birth. The word “birth” used there is intended to mean that it should not be so also in the case of valid means of cognition, and the latter cannot last even for a moment, nor is it to be produced as invalid cognition (apramā), so that the causes should operate later in apprehending of the

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49 Cf. VMS 18b2–4/53b1–3: nāviruddham, jñānasattātirekiṇyāḥ prāpter abhāvāt, prāptim antareṇa cārthasya prāpyamāṇatvāyogāt, jñānasya ca prāpirūpātāyāh kriyākārakaya eva kavatvāyogāt. ātmakartrtyakriyārūpyatve ‘pi jñānasayārthe ‘nupayogāt tasya tatprakārānapupattae, tajjāntakālasātātmātreṇa karmaṇa ca kartvaśa sarvasvasya tadātanasa vijayatvā vijñāyata ca kartvarupasā sudarśanāt tathābhāvāupapattet.


object-thing like sense faculty, etc. Jitāri explains that this is refuted because with respect to an external thing, a cognition that does nothing upon that thing cannot be valid, and that thing cannot be the object of valid cognition; also because, if cognition is valid only upon its birth, an over-excessive consequence would result (atiprasaṅga). This probably means that if a cognition were a valid cognition merely by arising, then all cognitions, or perhaps all things, would be valid cognitions merely by arising.

In the final section of the treatise, Jitāri also refutes some opponents from within the Buddhist tradition. The first opponent is probably the Sautrāntika, whose general opinion on the topic under discussion is that a cognition cognizes its object without taking any action upon the object, just by assuming the image of the object that caused it. The objection claims that a cognition can be that which makes its object-referent manifest (prakāśaka), even without doing anything; and the object-referent can be made manifest (prakāśya) even without any change made by cognition. That is to say, there can be a relationship between a manifest-maker and an object even without any action. The idea of “action-less-ness” of a cognitive event is shared by the Yogācāra, so Jitāri agrees with this completely. However, he points out that, if two things are determined as having such relationship due to an action taken by the one upon the other, then this relationship would be broken in the absence of such action; on the other hand, for a thing that is not causally connected nothing can be made in the case of the non-existence of this action. This means of course that the theory of non-activity cannot be applied in the case of an external object. According to Jitāri, in that case, in the absence of any action, the relationship between cognition and object-referent as the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest cannot exist; and further, the external object is not connected with cognition, so without action nothing can be made. That is to say, the cognition can make the object manifest only in the case that the object is internal to or inside of cognition – that is, cognition can make only itself manifest. The opponent argues against this, saying that, if cognition would make itself manifest, two things would become the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest.


\[53\] VMS 18b6/54a1 etenaitad api nirāstam yad āha kumārilaḥ … [Quotation of ŠVK, Pratyakṣasūtra 54–55] arthe kiṃcid akurvatās tatra prāmāṇyāyogāt, tasya ca prameyatvāyogāt, janmanātre ca prāma- nye 'tiprasaṅgāt. On the Sautrāntika’s opinion in this regard which can be found in the Abhidharma sources, cf. Dhammajoti 2007: 87f., Dhammajoti 2009: 263f. (cf. above n. 48). A similar opinion can also be found in PSV ad PSV 9cd: yathā yathā hy arthākāro jñāne pratibhātiśubhāsubhāditvena, tattadrūpah sa viśayah pramīyate. evam jñānasamvedanām anekākāram upādāya tathā tathā pramāṇaprameyatvatvam upacaryate. nirvyāpārās tu sarvadhamānah. “The object-field is cognized as this or that or form exactly according to the way in which the image of object (arthākāra) appears in the cognition, as being pleasant or unpleasant, etc. In this way, on account of (upādāya) the awareness of cognition in multiple forms [of grasping subject and grasped object] it is metaphorically said that there are means of cognition and the object of cognition in this or that manner, but [in reality] all phenomena are devoid of the activity [, since they are instantaneous].”

\[54\] Cf. VMS 19a2–4/54a3–4: syān matam — kiṃcid akurvid api jñānam arthasya prakāśakam, akritya- māṇaviśeṣo 'py arthah prakāṣyata iti na kiṃcid anucitam, yadi hi kasyacit kriyayā tayos tathābhāvo vyavasthitah syāt, tadā tadabhāve vighaṭeta. anibandhanasya tv asattvam na kiṃcit kriyate.
without separate auxiliary means (upakāra), and everything would be the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest with respect to everything else. Jitāri replies to this by simply pointing out that the object-subject relationship is restrained through their causal relationship, so the over-excessive consequence mentioned by the opponent would not occur.\(^{56}\)

The topic of discussion then turns to the causal relationship. An opponent from the Vaibhāṣika system argues that both cognition and object-thing, which arise from their respective collection (kalāpa) of causes in the preceding moment, will have the form of the manifest-maker and the object to be made manifest respectively. This is actually the opinion of Śubhagupta (720–780).\(^{57}\) A verse is quoted from his BSK, which says: “The causal complex in immediately preceding moment should produce the momentary instance of object-field together with cognition (sajñāna), just like a visible matter together with its light; for that reason, they should be perceived together.”\(^{58}\) The conclusion of this objection is that, since the manifestation of the object-thing occurs even in the absence of the nature of self-manifestation, so long as the invalidation of this occurrence is not conclusive, the reason used by Jitāri is not conclusive.\(^{59}\) Jitāri replies: If the object-referent produced by the collection of its own causes as something with the form to be made manifest (prakāśyarūpa), then for this object only what is to be made manifest is attained (āpanna), but not the coexistent cognition; but (ca) it is to be propounded by the opponent that the object is made manifest by the cognition. Thus, Jitāri says, whoever claims that the object is produced exclusively from its own cause as being made manifest contradicts the thesis

\(^{56}\) Cf. VMS 19a4–5/54a4–5: asaty upakāre prakāśyaparakāśakabhāve sarvam sarvasya prakāśyam prakāśakam vā bhaved iti cet. na. yadi himāv animmittāv eva svabhāvāv abhavisyatām, aniṣyamābhavisyatām. hetūnā tu punar etau niyampamānau katham atiprasajeyātām.

\(^{57}\) Cf. Frauwallner 1961: 147.

\(^{58}\) Cf. VMS 19a6/54b1: pūrvaikāva tu samāgri sajñānam visayaṃkaṇānam / sālokariṇapavat kuryād yena syāt sahavedanam // Quotation from BSK 192b2. The verse is also quoted in JNĀ 23,23–24, 351,17–18; TSP 569,15–17; and VMS(R) 308a2. In the TSP, this verse is quoted together with the verse preceding this one. The preceding verse runs: nānāv 'sti grāhako jñānāc cākṣuṣair viṣayair vināś ca sahasamavittir nābhedān nilaṭaddhiyoh // “The grasping subject cannot be other than cognition, nor is it without visual object; for this reason a blue thing and its cognition are apprehended together, not because their being non-different [as the Yogācāra holds].” Here, in these two verses, as an externalist (Dreyfuss 1997: 363 describes him as Vaibhāṣika) and a Nirākāravādin, Śubhagupta does not accept the Yogācāra’s theory of non-separation between cognition and its object. In the first verse, he explains sahavedana from the viewpoint of the subjective aspect; and then in the second verse quoted in our text he explains it again from the viewpoint of the objective aspect. So, in the second verse the central word must be visaya, not jñāna; consequently, sajñānam visayaṃkaṇānam must be the correct form. However, remarkably, in the Tibetan translation of the BSK, pāda b appears to be shes pa yul bcas skad cig ste (in the quotation of VMS(R) 308a2 it has the form: shes dang yul bcas skad cig ma), somewhat like saviṣayaṃ jñānaṃkaṇānam. This seems to me not correct. yul bcas or yul dang bcas pa is usually used as the translation of saviṣaya. Probably the Tibetan translator (or the scribe of the Sanskrit manuscript which the Tibetan translator used) misread saviṣayaṃ jñānam (cf. the phrase used in in Dignāga’s PSV ad PS 1.9b, cf. Chu 2006 [2008]: 239). In the Tibetan translation of the TSP, the phrase is correctly translated as shes bcas yul gyi skad cig. Thus, both forms prajñānam and rajañānam in the editions TSP and TSP (S), respectively, should be corrected to sajñānam, since it is not only supported by the Tibetan translation of the TSP, but also by the two quotations in JNĀ, and now, additionally by our text.

\(^{59}\) Cf. VMS 19a6–19b1/54b2: tasmāt svaprakāśasvabhāvabhāve ‘pi prakāśopapatter bādhakasyānaikāntikatāyāṃ maulyāyāpi hetor anaikāntikateti.
he proposed. Here, “produced from its own cause” refers to course of the external object that is independent of the cognition.

Now, the opponent argues that the object-referent is produced by its own cause as having the additional quality (*atiśaya*) of something whose nature is born from cognition, so that it could of course be made manifest by the cognition. The main points of Jitāri’s refutation consists in an examination of the relation between the object and the cognition from the temporal point of view. The opponent’s position that the object possesses an extra characteristic, i.e., the manifestation, given by cognition, while it arises from its own cause, implies necessarily the simultaneity between the object and cognition. This simultaneity is actually completely acceptable for the Yogācāra in the theoretical framework of self-awareness. But for the opponent who is an externalist, as Jitāri points out, the simultaneity is problematic. Jitāri says that, for two things that arise simultaneously, a relationship as supporting and supported factor is impossible; if they are not related in this manner, but merely simultaneous, it would follow that also other things born at the same time were made manifest.

The opponent has now resource to causality: being connected to the same causal complex distinguishes the object-reference from other things. But, Jitāri replies, the cognition, too, being dependent on its object, must belong to the same causal complex (*tadbhāva*). The opponent still tries to defend himself, saying that the object has to be made manifest by something else, i.e., the cognition, since it itself is not the manifest-maker. Jitāri then replies, as a coup de grâce, that the cognition, doing nothing, cannot be the manifest-maker; and if cognition, being simultaneous with and sharing the same causal complex with the object-referent, could the manifest-maker of the object-referent, the object-referent would also be manifest-maker of the cognition. Jitāri quotes also statements of Dharmakīrti (PV 3.417b–418a and 3.479’cd) to support his arguments.

The conclusion is that the fundamental reason (*maula*), i.e., “becoming manifest,” cannot be inconclusive, since the manifestation never occurs in any other way; and the

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60 Cf. VMS 19b3/54b3–4: *yady asāv arthaḥ svakāranakalāpena prakāśyatāpo janitaḥ, tasyaiva tarhi prakāśya 'yam āpannaḥ, na punah sahabhuvo jñānasya. tatprakāśyatā cāśya pareṇa pratipādyā. tad ayaṃ prastutavastuvirodhīni svahetor evārthasya prakāśyopapattis vānyann...*

61 Cf. VMS 19b5/55a1: *atha jñānajanyasvabhāvātiśaya evāsau svahetunā janitaḥ, tenāśya tatprakāśyatā syād eva.

62 Cf. VMS 19b5–20a1/55a2–3: …*upukāryopakārakayoḥ sahotpannayos tadbhāvāyogāt.*

63 Cf. VMS 20a1/55a3: *na, samānakālabhāvinām anyesāṃ apy aviśeṣena prakāśyatvaprasaṅgāt.*

64 Cf. VMS 20a1/55a4: *ekasāmagrīpratibandho niyāmaka iti cet.

65 Cf. VMS. 20a2f./55a4f.: *arthasyāprakāsakasvabhāvatvān naśa doṣa iti cet. jñānasyāpy akūntikarasya kim idam prakāsakatvam nāma. tasmād yathārthena samānakālaṃ samānasāmagrikāṃ vā jñānaṃ tatprakāśakam, tathārtho ‘pi teneti so ‘py asya prakāśakah prasajyata eva.*

66 Cf. PV 3.417b–418a: *anyasyānupakārīnaḥ / vyaktau vyajyeta sarvo ‘rthaḥ taddhetor niyamo yadi // naiśāpi kalpanā jñāne. “When some other thing that does not offer support [in producing cognition] has appearance [in cognition], [then] all things could be caused to appear. If a restriction [is assumed] on account of their [simultaneity with cognition], this assumption, too, is not possible with respect to cognition.” PV 3.479’cd: anyathā tulyadhammā viṣayo ‘pi dhiyā saha // “Otherwise, the object-field sharing the same property with the cognition [would also make the cognition manifest].”*
thesis that is ascertained through the reason free from the three fallacies like the “non-establishment [of the locus]” should be accepted.67

5. Conclusion

In this short treatise, Jitāri tries to establish the Yogācāra thesis that merely the cognitive representation exists by means of the reasoning proving the thesis that anything that becomes manifest is exclusively cognition itself. In doing so, he refutes various objections against this reasoning and its conclusion. Through these objections, opponents try to demonstrate that the reasoning is invalid and thereby defend their thesis that cognition and object are separate things, as, respectively, what makes manifest and what is to be made manifest. Like many other of Jitāri’s works, the VMS has clear polemical traits. He categorizes his opponents mainly as belonging to the nirākārajñānavāda-branch of the bāhyārthavāda, which includes representatives of non-Buddhist systems as well as Buddhists.

Through the presentation in previous sections, I hope that I was able to outline the most important points of Jitāri’s arguments in this treatise. Although it seems to me that Jitāri does not offer many innovative ideas, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi should still occupy an important place in the history of Yogācāra philosophical literature, as it summarizes the most important points of the Yogācāra position with regard to the topic of the cognitive image of the object, and reports various opponents’ ideas. It thus enriches our knowledge about later development of the Yogācāra system and its interaction with various Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents.

References and abbreviations


67 Cf. VMS 20a5–6/55b1–2: tasmād anyathā prakāśāyogād bādhakasyānaikāntikatāvirahān maulasya kuto ’naikāntikatā. tad anenāsiddhyādidoṣatrayaviyoginā hetunā yan niścitam vipaścitā tu upādeyam iti.
Derge edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka: *sDe dge Tibetan tripiṭaka*, bstan ’gyur – preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tokyo 1981.


HBṬĀ Durvekamiśra, *Hetubinduṭīkāloka*. See HBṬ.


KVP  Jīnendrabuddhi, Kāśikāvivaṇaṇapāṇiĉikā. See KV.


ŚVK Kumārila, Ślokavārttika. See NR.


TSP Kamalaśīla, Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā. See TS.


Consciousness and Causality: Dharmakīrti Against Physicalism

by
Christian Coseru

It is well known that Buddhist conceptions of personal identity entail a version of the so-called ‘bundle theory of self:’ the human individual comprises five types of aggregates that serve as the basis for what we ordinarily designate as persons. What is less known (or least explored) is the extent to which this conception of personal identity informs the Buddhist epistemological account of cognition. Specifically, the assumption is that with Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their successors, the bundle theory of personal identity is either glossed over in favor of more robust accounts of consciousness and cognition such as that provided by Yogācāra or challenged for its strict reductionism. I will argue that – rather than glossing over or challenging it – the Buddhist epistemologists uncover a structural asymmetry within the bundle theory between the mental and physical domains, and offer an alternative (if problematic) solution to account for the ineliminable aspects of phenomenal consciousness.

The following analysis focuses on Dharmakīrti’s arguments against Cārvāka physicalism in the so-called proof of rebirth in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of his magnum opus, the Pramāṇavārttika, with a focus on classical Indian philosophical attempts to address the mind-body problem. The key issue concerns the relation between cognition and the body, and the role this relation plays in causal-explanatory accounts of consciousness and cognition. Here a number of questions arise. Does the central principle of Buddhist Abhidharma reductionism apply to consciousness? Is there a causal criterion for the presence of consciousness? If there is, can this causal criterion account for the specific features of consciousness, e.g., its intentionality, phenomenality, and reflexive character (svasamvedana)? Can a causal account of phenomena be reconciled with the seeming irreducibility of consciousness? The Buddhist answer to the challenge of Cārvāka physicalism displays many of the common features of classical Indian metaphysical debates on personal identity. My aim is not to trace its exegetical contour and restate its historical significance, but to propose a philosophical reconstruction that builds on two important features presented by the Buddhist account: an expanded conception of causality and a robust account of phenomenal content that, taken together, can help us come to terms with the legacy of mind-body dualism.

1. Buddhist reductionism

In replacing the subject with a play of momentary cognitive events, the Buddhist account of personal identity emphasizes what we may call – using the language of contemporary

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1 I am grateful to Sara McClintock for her helpful advice and comments, and for suggesting many conceptual and stylistic improvements.

philosophy of mind – the dynamic, embodied, and embedded functioning of the five aggregates. However, in the schematic analysis of the five aggregates, only “body” or “form” (rūpa) is a physical aggregate stricto sensu. Sensations, apperception, and volitions can acquire an objectual aspect, but are not empirical objects proper. Nor are they things in the generic sense of the Sanskrit term vastu, that is, abstract entities with well-defined properties and functional characteristics. Thus, a sensation of pain is not reducible to the physical substrate, say a finger, in which it is instantiated (nor presumably to a mere physiological response). Rather, as object-oriented cognitive aspects (viṣayākāra), sensations and volitions are included in the broader Abhidharma category of mental factors (caitasika). Feelings may define the quality of the impressions that result from contact with an object, with the implication that they perhaps stand in a causal relation with these objects. But as internal mental states, they are also conditioned by habitual tendencies (vāsanā), which, in turn, they condition: one’s physical condition after strenuous exertion may feel pleasant or unpleasant depending on one’s level of fitness and degree of exercise frequency. Likewise, apperception (samjñā), the capacity to make intelligible or cause to be understood, although dependent on a multiplicity of psychological factors, captures the datum of experience only as fused into a single percept. Volitions too fit the same profile, with one important difference: rather than attending to the object at hand or providing a sort of transcendental unity of apperception, they bring forth future states of existence. As dispositions to act in certain ways, they cleave the mental domain into two classes of conditioned phenomena: those that are internal to consciousness (saṃprayukta-saṃskāra), such as, for instance, obsessive dispositions (paryavasthāna) like greed and delusion, and those that are dissociated from it (viprayukta-saṃskāra), usually taken to refer to latent dispositions (anuśaya) typically comprising various biological and physical traits.

This aggregate model of personal identity is not incompatible with the notion that there are phenomenal primitives (or, in epistemological terms, cognitive universals) – irreducible features of experience. The experience of vividness (spaṣṭa), for instance, marks perception apart from mental imagery, thus making it possible to identify visual qualia as irreducibly perceptual. Likewise, the experience of being dragged across the floor as opposed to

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3 Insofar as the aggregates of sensation, volition, etc. fall under the general Abhidharma category of dharma, they can be treated, at least under some scholastic interpretations (such as, for instance, of the Sthaviravāda) as substances (dravya). As Ronkin (2005: 15) has convincingly argued – taking her lead from Gombrich 1996 and Hamilton 1996 – the reductive analysis of human beings in terms of their constitutive aggregates is meant to capture not what human beings are made of, but rather what human experience is constituted as: specifically, as series of experiential events.

4 Detailed accounts of this twofold analysis of phenomena are found in Vasumitra’s Pañcavastukavibhāṣāstra [Wu shih p‘i-p‘o-sha Zun], T 28 (1555), p. 989b2, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośaśabhaśya, II, 23–34, and Yasomitra’s Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā. Cox (1995, ch. 4) offers the most detailed account to date of the citta-viprayuktasamskāra. For a broader discussion of the process by which mental factors that arise in conjunction with a given intentional object come to be associated with the qualities of the respective object, see Waldron 2003: 57ff.

5 One may extend visual tropes to the domain of imagery, rational deliberation, and introspective awareness, but these are metaphorical rather than literal uses. Dignāga’s conception of mānasa-pratyakṣa...
moving freely serves to contrast action from agency, and support the view that even unreflective and habitual practices, if consciously undertaken, are constitutively agentic. As the classical example of watching a dance performance while entertaining various thoughts demonstrates, one may be solicited to respond in ways that are wholly unreflective. Being consciously present to the situation at hand, however, means that these solicitations elicit not merely a reflex but rather a subjective response. A brilliant dance performance does not simply induce applauding; rather, the performance solicits appreciation, which serves as an appropriate and deliberate response in such circumstances.\footnote{This example is meant to support an argument for minimal agency as an ineliminable feature of cognitive awareness. The finer point is that ‘unreflective’ does not mean ‘unconscious’ or purely ‘behavioral.’ Skillful means, much like skillful coping, are treated here as modes of unreflective, but minimally conscious and implicitly subjective, agency.} Applause is not merely a participant reactive attitude, but a learned subjective response to excellence (except, perhaps, in instances where it reflects norms of audience participation).

It has been argued, most forcefully by Mark Siderits (2003, 2011), that Abhidharma reductionism entails physicalism, the view that everything is or supervenes on the physical (where “physical” stands for the world as described by our best physics). Although Dharmakīrti shares the empirical stance of Abhidharma, the naturalism that informs his epistemological project is patently anti-physicalist. According to the Sautrāntika Abhidharma account of materiality that Dharmakīrti favors, entities reduce to their phenomenal primitives: the particular (ṣvālakṣaṇa) is a token of a type, not blue in general, but this unique intensity of cerulean. Furthermore, the formal properties of material objects are analyzed either in terms of how they are impacted by contact or as factors that oppose resistance. These properties, however, do not extend to the atoms themselves, which according to the Abhidharma form the building blocks of materiality. As monadic units the atoms are seen as devoid of any formal properties (rūpaṇa). It is only as atomic compounds (saṃghātastha, samcita) that atoms are subject to the same properties of resistance and destruction as composite material entities.\footnote{See, for example, AK I 13 and AKBh ad cit. (Pradhan 1975: 9): paramāṇurūpaṃ tarhi rūpaṃ na prāpnoty arūpaṇāt / na vai paramāṇurūpaṃ ekāṃ prthag bhūtam asti / saṃghātasthaṃ tu tad rūpyata eva.}

The reductionist model of Abhidharma, like all philosophical attempts to carve reality at its joints, works against the common conception that empirical awareness provides access to an external, stable, and self-sustaining world: a world as is (captured by the notion of svabhāva) rather than as it appears to an observer. But the human mind is not (like) a clear mirror reflecting back the external world, as naïve realism would have it; rather, its image is as projected by a mind not entirely free of its own propensities and confabulations. What Abhidharma offers, then, is a metaphysics of experience, where the irreducible elements of existence and/or experience (dharma) are not fixed substances but activities, properties, or dynamic patterns of connectedness that are constitutive of the world as perceived (lokasamjñā). As the Nikāyas clearly state (e.g., SN IV , 96), our sensory organs (vision, hearing, etc.) operate in a world whose contours are disclosed in a dynamic and mutually constituted setting of objects and meaning. In practical terms, that means

\[\text{(lit. “mental perception”)}\], thus, captures the distinct introspective awareness or attentiveness that accompanies the perceptual occasion.
experience marks the boundary of what there is: the nexus of causes and conditions that set the boundaries of lived experience are determined by the operations of our cognitive architecture. Color, for instance, only exists for an organism that is sensitive to light.

How does this dynamic picture of what there is take on the characteristics of self and other? And how do these emergent phenomena in turn create the conditions for grasping and attachment? For the Buddhist, the answer does not lie primarily in the patterns of conditioning that explain the aggregation of phenomena, but in certain defining characteristics that belong to the structure of experience itself. Not only are the senses conceived as receptacles of experience (adhiṣṭhāna), they also serve as ground or support, joining the external domain of sensory activity (bāhirāyatana) with the internal domain of perception (ādhyātmikāyatana). We can make sense of Dignāga’s stance (at PS, I, 1 and PSV ad cit.) that perception gives us the particular as such, without any conceptual mediation, only insofar as the domain of sensory activity is reducible to its most basic physiological function.

Now, does the central principle of Abhidharma reductionism apply to consciousness? The principle states that things reduce to their component parts, which are ultimately real only if they are further irreducible. If something can be reduced either by breaking it down to more basic constituents or through conceptual analysis, then it is not ultimately real. Pots are not ultimately real, nor are persons real in this ultimate sense. Consciousness too is but a stream of momentary conscious events of different types (visual, auditory, introspective, etc.). But reductionism about consciousness is problematic. Why? Because it cannot explain its most basic features: its intentional, phenomenal, and self-reflexive character (svasaṃvedana). The recognition that conscious awareness has these ineliminable structural features creates a series of doctrinal problems for Buddhism in its post-Abhidharma stage of development. For Mādhyamika thinkers like Nāgārjuna, notions such as ‘intrinsic’ and ‘ineliminable’ run counter to the cardinal Buddhist view that all phenomena are momentary, impermanent, and interdependently arisen. Conceived largely as a response to Madhyamaka dialectics, Yogācāra sets out to account for the nature of consciousness and cognition itself, bracketing metaphysical assumptions about the kind of things that there are.

The relation between mind and world continues to be a subject of ongoing debate between Buddhists and their opponents, and among rival Buddhist schools up to the present day. The debates in Buddhist metaphysics of mind are not primarily exegetical (the presence of a vast commentarial literature notwithstanding); rather, they often reflect deep philosophical differences. When these differences are grounded in merely exegetical claims, the text-critical method offers the best way to find solutions. However, if these differences are also grounded in empirical and/or experiential claims, the analytic tools of contemporary philosophy and advances in our empirical investigation of cognition ought

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8 One important exception here are the Pudgalavādins, for whom persons, who are conceived in dependence upon the aggregates (although neither identical nor different from them), are nonetheless real. In Vasubandhu’s summary of this position, for the Pudgalavādin “if a consciousness is aware of a person in dependence upon a visible form known to exist by means of the eye, it is said that a person in known to exist by means of the eye” (AKBh IX in Pradhan 1975: 463). Translation per Duerlinger 2003: 77. Persons are ultimately real (for the Pudgalavādin) because, as Amber Carpenter has convincingly argued, “perception-dharmas and consciousness-dharmas … are related to one another in a … person-constituting way” (2015: 27).
to in principle help move this debate forward in more profitable directions. The mind-body problem may be as intractable now as it was for Dharmakīrti in the seventh century, but our conception of what counts as legitimate, reliable evidence, is less arbitrary, at least with regard to the sort of things that can be said to exist both in a concrete and abstract sense. Few philosophers today who are sympathetic to and influenced by Buddhist ideas find traditional Buddhist beliefs about rebirth and cosmic bodhisattvas to be live options.

2. Physicalism and its discontents

The Pramāṇasiddhi section of the Pramāṇavārttika contains Dharmakīrti’s famous proof of rebirth, better known for its ingenious attempt to answer, using mainly a priori arguments, the Čārvāka’s challenge that consciousness originates, or otherwise has its causal basis, in the body. The key verses (PV II vv. 34–72) and the extensive commentarial literature thereon (from Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta, Ravigupta, and Manorathanandin, to the Tibetan translations by Sa skya paṇḍita and Śākyaśrībhadra) have been explored at length in Eli Franco’s superb monograph, Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth (1997). Its key arguments have likewise been discussed in a series of recent, mainly philosophical, engagements with this topic. The proof is occasioned by the claim, first advanced by Dignāga in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, that the Buddha does not merely avail himself of the right sources of knowledge (pramāṇa), but rather he in some fashion embodies them. Dharmakīrti, as is well known, takes this claim one step further when he argues at PV II vv. 34–131 that the proof of the Buddha being a pramāṇabhūta lies in compassion cultivated by practice over many lifetimes, and in the veracity of his teachings (upadeśa).

Of course, the Buddhist epistemologist’s appeal to the Buddha as an enlightened knower to justify the claim that perception and inference are trustworthy sources of knowledge – because the Buddha declares them to be so – is unmistakably circular. Ernst Steinkellner clearly explains this circularity:

\[\text{\textsuperscript{9}}\text{See Vetter 1964, Hayes 1993, Taber 2003, and Arnold 2008.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{10}}\text{There are two basic ways to make the case for the Buddha being a pramāṇabhūta: (i) demonstrate the possibility of infinite compassion, and thus of previous lifetimes dedicated to perfecting such a goal, and (ii) argue for the veracity and viability of the Four Noble Truths as proof that only someone motivated by such compassionate aims could have gained this sort of knowledge. The second demonstration has Dharmakīrti employ the so-called “no alternative” (agatyā) strategy: “Given this [teaching of the Four Noble Truths], which leads to achieving human ends, which is reliable and worth practicing, [we] accept that [this teaching] must be equally so with regard to the other domain [e.g., of scriptural or imperceptible truths]. [Such teaching could] not [have been offered] with the intent of deceiving [others], because it is not an obstacle [but rather an aid to knowledge]; and also because there is no reason for the speaker to engage in aimless deception. Both instances, thus, demonstrate the validity of reasoning on the basis of scriptural sources on account of there being no [other] way” (PV I v. 217 and PVSV ad cit.: tasāsya puruṣårthopayogino bhīyogārhasyaśaṃvādād viṣayāntare ‘pi tathātāvopagamah, na vpralambhāya, anuparodhāt; nisrayojaṇavatathābhūhiḥnavaipralabdhyāc ca vaktuh. tad etad agatyobhayatāḥ anumānatvam āgamasyopavarṇitam). Tillemans (1993: 16ff.) thinks this causal relationship between compassionate undertaking and the effectiveness of embodied epistemic warrants only works for things that are empirically tractable (such as the Four Noble Truths). See also Kataoka 2005: 256–59 for an illuminating discussion of Dharmakīrti’s second argument, and the problematic issue of proving matters that fall outside the domain of empirical ascertainment.}\]
(1) Our ordinary valid cognitions (pramāṇa) establish the authority of the Buddha’s teaching (buddha-vacana); (2) the validity of our cognitions (prāmāṇya) is understood as their reliability (avisamvāditva); (3) reliability depends on successful activity (puṇuṣārtha-siddhi); (4) all human goals are determined by the “ultimate goal” (nirvāṇa); the “ultimate goal” is indicated in the Buddha’s teaching (buddha-vacana) (Steinkellner 2003: 328).

So: perception and inference are taken to be instrumentally capable of demonstrating that the Buddha is a trustworthy teacher. Because of his trustworthiness, his teachings are valid and provide further proof that only perception and inference qualify as sources of knowledge (again, to come full circle, because the Buddha has established that to be the case). Why claim that valid cognition establishes the authority of the Buddha’s teachings in the first place? Why not simply be content with establishing knowledge on the best possible foundation, whether or not the Buddha’s teachings are in agreement with it? If Buddhist epistemology can lay claim to methodological universalism on account of its reliance on perception and reason alone, reverence for the Buddha as a perfect embodiment of epistemic excellence can seem redundant (except perhaps on political or religious grounds). Does appeal to the authority of the Buddha as a true embodiment of the sources of knowledge, then, undermine the Buddhist epistemological stance? Not necessarily. Indeed, as Franco notes, “Dharmakīrti argues here … that the Buddha used perception and inference, not that they are valid because of him” (Franco 1999: 65). Precisely what it means to ‘embody’ the sources of reliable cognition remains an open question, regardless of whether Dharmakīrti’s argument is found to be circular or not. It is not enough to say that the Buddha is a true embodiment of reliable cognition: one must also show in what ways. Dharmakīrti’s own answer to this question invokes three distinct elements: the Buddha embodies the sources of knowledge by means of (i) his compassion, (ii) his knowledge, and (iii) the actions that bear testimony to this compassion and knowledge. But neither listing the Buddha’s attributes nor the fact that he reasons and acts on the basis of compassion and knowledge justify the veracity of our cognitions (and the sources thereof).

Whatever Dharmakīrti’s motives might have been in seeking to ground epistemic norms in a proof of rebirth, the arguments against the Cārvāka claim that consciousness begins and ends with the body offer interesting new ways to conceptualize the mind-body problem. I will not dwell on the preamble to the proof, which takes compassion to act as a cause in an effort to achieve the kind of knowledge Buddhhas require for accomplishing their mission. As John Taber (2003) has convincingly demonstrated, there is nothing particularly original in articulating a conception of epistemic authority grounded on reliable testimony (as provided by an āpta, a trustworthy person or, as in the case of Kumārila’s stance, of the Vedas). One gets to limit the range of reliable sources of knowledge to perception and

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11 Various formulations of this argument, first proposed by Nagatomi (1959) and Vetter (1964), are also found in Franco 1997, 1999, and Dunne 2004.

12 The rhetorical implications of this sort of appeal to the Buddha’s embodiment of epistemic excellence are well known. They concern the various models and proofs of omniscience, notwithstanding intramural debates about what exactly constitutes the content of such omniscient (hence epistemically warranted) states: the nature of things, their reality, or the knowledge of all things whatsoever. See McClintock 2010: chapters 4 & 5 for a detailed study of these proofs and their epistemic and rhetorical implications.
inference (accepted by most Indian schools of thought) and at the same time hold on to tradition by granting the foundational figure (or text) privileged epistemic status.

Instead, I want to focus on the metaphysical considerations that ground the causal account Dharmakīrti puts forward, and the specific conception of consciousness that thus emerges. As noted above, the Buddhist holds that consciousness is but a stream of conscious episodes of different types (visual, auditory, etc.). If conscious awareness is taken to be made out of these discrete units, a dilemma arises: what accounts for the sense of continuity of awareness and, more importantly, what could serve as the basis for the arising of each instance of cognitive awareness from one moment to the next? The bundle theory stipulates that every phenomenon is part of a complex causal web. Indeed, the Sanskrit notion of skandha (lit., “heap”) captures rather well the aggregated nature of phenomena – something fashioned by the collective combination of multiple causes and conditions (as Vasubandhu glosses it in AKBh ad I, 7). The constitutive factors themselves exist only as part of a causal continuum of interdependently arising phenomena. Of course, not all the constitutive factors that ground causation contribute in equal measure: some are basic or necessary and some are merely contingent. The Cārvāka claims that the body alone is the source of cognition. But on the aggregate model of personal identity, the body is just one among the five constitutive factors of agency. The principle that establishes effects as markedly different from their cause or as not pre-exiting in the cause (asatkāryavāda), which Sāṃkhya philosophers likewise confront, runs counter to empirical evidence. We observe that like causes like: cows give birth to calves, and fermented milk yields yoghurt. Atypical cases, such as the caterpillar’s metamorphosis into a butterfly, are just the exceptions that prove the rule. Central to this model of causation is the so-called principle of “similar kind(s)” (sajāti), which demands that phenomena arise not in an arbitrary manner, but thorough homogeneous causal chains.

On this principle, then, cognitive awareness cannot arise from something non-conscious, such as the physical body. As Dharmakīrti notes (PV II vv. 35–36a), there could be “unwarrented consequences” (atiprasaṅga) for presupposing otherwise, even as he does not spell out what those consequences might be. One possible interpretation is that Dharmakīrti is committed to a strict ontological difference between “cause” (kāraṇa) and “condition” or “conditioning factor” (pratyaya): the former can only give rise to a specific type of effect, while the latter can serve as a basis for the arising of multiple effects. The acorn can only grow into an oak tree, but the same soil and climactic conditions may provide support for various tree species.

On the reductionist Abhidharma model, all aggregate entities reduce to two kinds of basic constituents: elemental atoms (dravya-paramāṇu) comprising the four primary elements (mahābhūta), and the atomic totality (saṅghāta-paramāṇu), which includes the secondary elements associated with each of the four sense spheres (with the exception of sound). Although the position of the Sarvāstivāda – Vaibhāṣika differs somewhat from that of the Sautrāntika (on which Dharmakīrti relies) in terms of how the lines are drawn between primary and secondary existents, the sense spheres, as a domain of phenomenal
primitives, do belong in the Ābhidharmika’s ultimate ontology.\(^\text{13}\) It is worth noting that this elemental domain is ascertained on the basis of different types of cognitive awareness rather than as a mind-independent reality. For the Vaibhāṣika, sensible phenomena – say, the experience of a pot’s color, weight and shape – are real, despite their reducibility to more basic monadic elements of experience (e.g., phenomenal primitives). However, there is an obvious tension between treating something both as a construct and as ultimately real. In articulating the Sautrāntika position, Vasubandhu is keen to point out that shapes and colors are ultimately real only insofar as they display a certain causal or pragmatic efficacy, that is, only to the extent that they generate the appropriate cognitive event: in the case of shape and color, a corresponding visual experience.\(^\text{14}\) In perceiving a pot, it is not the pot itself that serves as the basis for the arising of the cognitive event but rather the causal efficacy of material elements and phenomenal primitives.

Here too conditioning factors play an important role. Under certain conditions something solid may become liquid, like heat causing the melting of a block of ice into water. Given the speculative nature of Abhidharma metaphysics, there should be no surprise in finding disagreements about the specific ways in which properties attach to each aggregated entity. For instance, while for the Vaibhāṣikas entities borrow their physical properties from the elements themselves, Sautrāntikas take them to be present only as mere potentialities. In a block of ice, the fire element is only potentially present, for without it, ice cannot melt into water. Dharmakīrti works out this account of causal efficacy in terms of the strict regularities that must obtain between elements in a causal series. These regularities act as a kind of “restriction in causal potential” (\(\text{śaktiniyama}\))\(^\text{15}\) – a notion that Dharmakīrti uses to argue for the limited or restricted efficacy of causal elements. For instance, a lotus seed cannot produce a cow and oil cannot be extracted from sand. The so-called essential nature (or ‘nature-\(\text{svabhāva}\)’) of the causally efficient element in a causal chain suggests that entities are not simply the product of a given causal chain or causal complex (\(\text{hetuśāmagrī}\)). Rather, they are the product of specifically active elements within that chain and of the conditions that make it possible for those active elements to manifest their potentiality.\(^\text{16}\)

However, regardless of whether ice melts because an internal principle of preponderance governs the transformation of physical substances, or because conditioning factors bolster a particular causal chain of events, it simply cannot be the case that yoghurt could just as easily come from clay as from milk and a gilt could give birth to a calf just as naturally as to

\(^{13}\) Atomism – the notion that matter reduces to some elemental constituents – finds expression for the first time in Dharmaśrī’s \(\text{Abhidharmahṛdaya}\) (2nd c. C.E.), before receiving extensive treatment in the \(\text{Mahāvibhāṣā}\).

\(^{14}\) See, for example, AK k. 10–13 and AKBh \(\text{ad cit.}\), and discussion in Hattori 1988: 39–41 and Ronkin 2005: 56–59.

\(^{15}\) This notion appears in several places on the \(\text{Pramāṇavārttika}\) and its autocommentary (see, e.g., PV I.43, I.195, and I.255 and PVSV \(\text{ad cit.}\)). As John Dunne notes, summarizing Dharmakīrti’s position, the point of the restriction is to tie the causally efficient element to its specific causal antecedent: “it is impossible for an apple seed to produce certain types of effects because it is impossible for it to arise from certain kinds of causes” (2004: 162).

\(^{16}\) On the distinction between ‘nature-\(\text{svabhāva}\)’ of an entity and its location in a causal totality, see Steinkellner 1971: 185f, and Dunne 2004: 163f. Dunne’s translation of the relevant passage from PV I.7 and PVSV \(\text{ad cit.}\), slightly altered, reads: “The arising of an effect that is inferred by way of a causal complex is characterized as a \(\text{svabhāva}\) of that causal complex, because the [the capacity for] the effect’s production does not depend on anything else.”
a piglet. Given the widespread belief in pre-modern India that sentience can have multiple origins (e.g., egg-born, sprout-born, womb-born, and moisture-born), Dharmakīrti does in principle concede that the material elements could serve as a basis for the arising of cognition. But empirical observation also yields restrictions: the principle of preponderance may well apply to all kinds, but a cow is not just a collection of elements with a certain predominant property like solidity, heat, or capacity to produce milk. Nor is it a conceptually constructed entity like a forest, or a cart, that is analytically reducible to its constitutive parts. There must be more than just the configuration of matter that accounts for the arising of cognitive awareness (PV II vv. 37–38). The structural asymmetries within this aggregate conception of personal identity are becoming obvious.

3. Causation and emergence

The canonical literature presents us with a standard formula for the dependently arising phenomenon of consciousness:

Dependent on the eye and forms, visual-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what one has mentally proliferated as the source, perception and notions resulting from mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, and present forms cognizable through the eye.¹⁷

On this standard account, a specific type of consciousness accompanies each of the sense modalities. In this specific case, what is occasioned is an instance of visual awareness. No one constitutive factor in this nexus of interactions has causal priority: instead, the association between perception and thinking results from the habitual tendency of the mind towards conceptual proliferation. Note that while sense, object, and conscious apprehension come together as a consequence of past habituations and other conditioning factors, the ensuing cognitive awareness is both sustained by and sustains these factors. As stated, the principle of dependent arising would place consciousness alongside other factors in the causal web in an interrelated, symmetric, and mutually supportive system of relations. The sense would be as necessary for the arising of cognitive awareness as this awareness would for the optimum functioning of the organism. But, as Dharmakīrti points out, the class of internal mental states that comprise thoughts, memories, and affects does not appear to depend on the senses. Introspective awareness (manovijñāna), which Dharmakīrti (following Dignāga) categorizes as a distinct type of perception, specifically “mental perception” (mānasa-pratyakṣa), does not depend on the sensory systems. Rather, following the Yogācāra analysis of the afflicted mind (kliṣṭa-manas), Dharmakīrti takes introspective awareness to be mired in the same confusion and ignorance that can also cloud understanding and render sense perception ineffective. A deluded mind is incapable of providing reliable testimony about matters of fact: the believer in ghosts is more likely

to perceive the rustle in the bushes as a shadowy figure stalking them, rather than a gust of wind.

The relational asymmetry between cognitive awareness and the other contributing factors becomes obvious: for Dharmakīrti, introspective awareness cannot thus arise from “the body together with all the senses” because its occurrence is observed even when one or more of the senses are impaired (PV II v. 47). Dharmakīrti would welcome the wealth of empirical evidence from clinical neuroscience about such phenomena as the “locked-in syndrome” or the persistence of “minimal consciousness” in patients diagnosed as being in a vegetative state. This sort of evidence, it seems, lends support to his thesis that sentience, as a minimally conscious state, enjoys a certain degree of causal autonomy from more specific higher-order modes of cognitive awareness. It also suggests that, given the difficulty of diagnosing whether a patient is in a minimally conscious state rather than a permanent vegetative state, the distinction between unconscious mental states and states of consciousness with minimal cognitive and behavioral function is less clear than it may seem. Rather than being unconscious, a cognitively and behaviorally non-responsive individual could simply be minimally conscious. Most importantly, in the absence of a better understanding of the tight correlation between mental and physical (e.g., brain) states, such evidence sets the stage for developing a wider conception of causality than physicalism allows.

Recall that Dharmakīrti does not reject the idea that the body can serve as a support for cognition. Indeed, he acknowledges that in some circumstances the occurrence of a sensation, say of pain, can simply be the result of a wound in the body. The pain has both qualitative features or qualia (sharp, stingy) and intentional content, insofar as it discloses the body as the locus of tissue damage. Furthermore, the co-occurrence of bodily processes and specific mental states at best suggests that the body is a contributing factor in the arising of cognition, not that it actually causes it. Presupposing otherwise would entail that there is a closer causal connection between cognition and the body than even the physicalist is willing to admit, one that ensures, for instance, that cognition could persist in the body after death (PV II v. 51).

As Taber (2003: 492) notes in pursuing a similar line of inquiry, what we see here is a clear example of Occam’s Razor: Dharmakīrti argues against taking cognitive awareness to be a product of bodily functions because he thinks the mental domain is the natural place for consciousness. Indeed, he acknowledges that in some circumstances the occurrence of a sensation, say of pain, can simply be the result of a wound in the body. The pain has both qualitative features or qualia (sharp, stingy) and intentional content, insofar as it discloses the body as the locus of tissue damage. Furthermore, the co-occurrence of bodily processes and specific mental states at best suggests that the body is a contributing factor in the arising of cognition, not that it actually causes it. Presupposing otherwise would entail that there is a closer causal connection between cognition and the body than even the physicalist is willing to admit, one that ensures, for instance, that cognition could persist in the body after death (PV II v. 51).

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18 For a descriptive account of the varieties of locked-in syndrome, see Bauer/Gerstenbrand/Rumpel 1979 and Laureys et al. 2005. A detailed review of the literature on minimal states of consciousness experienced by coma patients, which also puts forward a model of consciousness that takes it to be an emergent property of the collective functioning of widespread frontoparietal brain networks, is found in Laureys/Schiff 2012.

19 Working out the implications of empirical research on borderline states of consciousness for a theory of consciousness, Bayne, Hohwy and Owen (2016) point out the inadequacy of models that equate global states of consciousness (e.g., alert wakefulness, dreaming, and such comatose conditions as vegetative and minimally conscious states) with levels of consciousness. Unlike local states of consciousness, typically associated with the contents of consciousness (e.g., perceptual states, thoughts, and desires), global states are supposed to indicate that consciousness comes in degrees. But, as Bayne et al. conclude, being conscious, much like being married or being a bachelor, does not come in degrees. Rather, being conscious, at a minimum, is not merely a matter of occupying the first-personal stance, but of having various cognitive capacities available for perceptual and behavioral tasks.
for cognitive awareness. The mental domain is sufficiently complex to support its own operations. No need, therefore, to bring in an incongruous factor such as the body, which obeys a different set of laws, to explain the arising and specific operations of cognitive activity (PV II vv. 33–44). Nothing is closer to each instance of cognitive awareness than a cognition immediately preceding it. Why not postulate that each state of cognitive awareness serves as the antecedent cause for cognition? Hence Dharmakīrti’s dictum: “let only what is observed as the cause always be considered the cause” (PV II v. 44cd). And what is observed is the constant stream of mental states.

Furthermore, as the literature on meditative absorption testifies, while this stream of cognitive awareness can be altered, it cannot be halted. In the Bhāvanākrama I, 212, for instance, Kamalaśīla argues against those who think meditative cultivation essentially amounts to casting aside all mental activity and achieving a state of unconscious concentration (asamjñīsamāpatti). What is achieved is a state of non-conceptual awareness, rather than the cessation of all mental activity (manasikāra). Consciousness, it seems, persists so long as the body is alive (even as the relation between life and mind remains somewhat unclear). Indeed, concepts such as bhavaṅga-citta or “life-continuum mind” hint at an intimate correlation between mind and life, despite the largely speculative nature of the Abhidharma account in which it occurs.20

Dharmakīrti’s attempt to carve out a space for the autonomy of cognition from material causation, while retaining the efficient-causal model, showcases not only his logical ingenuity but also his keen phenomenological sense. We may wonder, then, why he allows his observations to be constrained by doctrinal considerations, rather than deferring to the empirical evidence alone. The Čārvāka physicalist too is a keen observer, but – not saddled with the sort of doctrinal commitments that press the Buddhist into a defense of rebirth – paints a starker picture of the human condition. Just like fermented grain yields a liquid with the capacity to intoxicate, so also consciousness must be regarded as nothing more than a product of the type of material organization that is constitutive of biological organisms. The Čārvāka’s response to the principle of similar kinds (sajāti) is a new conception of causality: emergentism.21 Mental properties are ontologically novel emergent properties that supervene on the physical.

20 The Pāli Abhidhamma typically glosses bhavaṅga as a mode or function of consciousness that captures its receptive or transitional state, as when attention shifts from one object to another. The principal sources (Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga and Atthasālinī, Buddhadatta’s Abhidhammāvatāra, and Anuruddha Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha) are quite explicit that, like all other aspects of consciousness, bhavaṅga too is intentionally constituted, that is, it is consciousness of something. However, because it stands for consciousness in its liminal state, its intentional content is not available for reflection. It is the kind of consciousness that persists in the interval between more alert states of mind; hence, its association with the continuum of life. Cf. Gethin 2005.

21 On the appropriation of ‘emergentism’ as a category for describing the Čārvāka account of consciousness and cognition, see Ganeri 2011 and Coseru 2017.
4. The challenge of physicalism

As we noted above, Dharmakīrti’s statement about the relation between consciousness and causal explanation points to the autonomy of cognition. His view is most clearly stated in the following verse:

[Nor are the senses, or the body together with the senses, the cause of cognition, for] even when every single one of the senses is impaired, the [corresponding] cognitive awareness is not impaired. But when [the cognitive awareness] is impaired, their (i.e., the senses’) impairment is observed.22

But cognitive awareness is obviously in some kind of dependency relation to the body, as demanded by the causal principle of dependent arising. For instance, visual awareness can only emerge in organisms that are sensitive to light. The Cārvāka does grant that cognitive awareness can have novel properties not observed in the material substratum (the body) that serves as its basis. But unlike the dualist picture the Buddhist paints, the Cārvāka contends that as an awareness of a certain type (visual, auditory, etc.) consciousness must be related to the body’s specific functionality in the respective cognitive domain. Given that consciousness takes the form of an apprehension of objects (that is, given its inherently intentional structure), and given that apprehension only occurs in specific modes of cognizing such as perceiving, imagining, or remembering, consciousness can be present neither when the sensory systems are not yet developed (e.g., in the embryonic stage) nor when they are not responsive (e.g., in a state of coma). Is there a causal criterion for the presence of consciousness? And, more importantly, can the Buddhist answer the challenge of physicalism without appealing to the kind of evidence (e.g., “the remembrance of past lives”) the Cārvāka would simply not accept?

I have discussed the Cārvāka’s objection to the autonomy of consciousness in detail elsewhere (see Coseru 2017), specifically with reference to Śāntarakṣita’s Tattwasamgraha, and Kamalaśīla’s commentary thereon. Here I will simply attempt to restate the arguments in a formal description.23 The physicalist’s objection to any presumed continuity of awareness is framed by some easily recognizable arguments, all of which have key Buddhist tenets as their premise, but draw different conclusions. The first argument may be summarized as follows:

P1: An individual is nothing but a bundle of aggregates.

P2: Aggregates, including consciousness, are reducible to their material substrata (viz., atoms).

C: ∴. Conscious awareness must be an emergent property of a certain type of material aggregation (typical for biological organisms).

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22 PV II. v. 39: pratyekam upaghāte ‘pi nendriyānāṃ manomateḥ / upaghāto ‘sti bhaṅge ‘syās teṣām bhaṅgaś ca drṣyate.

23 Śāntarakṣita’s summary of the Cārvāka position on consciousness and causation is found in TS vv. 1857–1870. For a detailed study of the relevant Cārvāka fragments that survive, see Bhattacharya 2009: 33–43 and Franco 1997: 253–256.
The Cārvāka is comfortable with the aggregate conception of personal identity, and welcomes its epistemic consequences (only irreducible elements are ultimately real). Since consciousness is an aggregate phenomenon, essentially reducible to a stream of momentary conscious events, it too must be the product of a specific kind of material organization, perhaps the sort typical of organisms endowed with a nervous system. The Buddhist faces two important problems: first, that of explanatory sufficiency: why shouldn’t material organization with its emergent properties and functionality suffice as an explanatory account for the arising of consciousness? Second, that of causal relevance: what evidence is there that consciousness, as the Buddhist claims, generates cognitive activity in ways that cannot be accounted for by material causes and conditions? Empirical observation, it seems, yields an altogether different picture, one where conscious states are tightly correlated with bodily processes.

The second argument extends this critique, taking into account the intentional structure of awareness, and pointing to its conditioning factors, specifically that cognition appears to be tied to the development and maturation of the body.

P1: Consciousness is always consciousness of (i.e., it is intentional).
P2: Conscious apprehension occurs only in specific modes (perceiving, remembering, etc.).
C: ∴. Consciousness cannot be present if the cognitive systems are undeveloped (embryonic stage) or unresponsive (comatose state).

Here the Cārvāka admonishes against taking adult experience to be normative for consciousness at all stages of biological development. For in utero, when the cognitive systems are not yet formed, there is neither vision nor visual object. What sense would it make then to talk about visual awareness without a visual system? Of course, the physicalist is in no better position than the Buddhist to explain the arising of consciousness. But at least, from the physicalist’s standpoint, recognizing that material causation must play a key role in whatever properties or characteristics consciousness exhibits, is a step in the right direction.

Finally, the third argument invokes the principle of positive and negative co-variance (anvaya-vyatireka) to make the case that consciousness can only become manifest in one cognitive chain:

P1: Different types of bodies (of human and non-human animals), and different tokens of the same body, manifest different types of consciousness.
P2: Granted the principle of positive and negative co-variance.
C: ∴. Consciousness cannot apprehend that which is contrary to its mode of realization (consciousness can only be associated with the one cognitive chain of either human or non-human animals, that can serve as its basis).

If the arising of consciousness is grounded in the body, then it is specific to each body both within and across species. That is, for the Cārvāka every concrete mental state arises from a corresponding bodily process or function. The persistence of conscious awareness within
a given mental stream is only invariably concomitant with that stream as a specifically embodied individual. At least in Śāntarakṣita’s reconstruction, the Cārvāka appears to hold a version of the token identity theory of mental states: every concrete mental particular (e.g., a given sharp pain) can be identified with some concurrent physical (or neurophysiological) state. This view is supported by two key principles that inform the Cārvāka’s philosophy of mind: (i) the human being is just an aggregate of the four elements, the combination thereof instantiating its mental properties; and (ii) mental properties thus instantiated result from the specific ways in which the elements combine. But as Kamalaśīla notes in his commentary, there is disagreement among the Cārvākas on how to interpret earlier statements (attributed to Bṛhaspati) about the precise ways in which these instantiated mental properties relate to the elements, either taken in isolation or combined.

Given these considerations, the Buddhist faces a dilemma: the aggregated conception of personal identity seems to support the physicalist position that consciousness is an emergent property of certain types of material organization. Consciousness cannot be both part of this causal web and just an instance in a beginningless stream of conscious events. Can the Buddhist answer the physicalist challenge while retaining a causal-explanatory framework in accounting for the relation between cognition and the body? In a detailed analysis of the explanatory role of causal generation, Kamalaśīla identifies an important difference between the operations of causality in the physical domain and the limits models of material causation face when extended to consciousness and cognition.

Whenever an effect is dependent on a collection of causes and conditions it does not arise when even one of these conditions is absent, for it would not be dependent upon them, if it did. It could be said, “All the atoms insofar as they occur in [its] proximity are the cause of cognition.” In that case a difference should be observable between the effect produced by a non-deficient cause and that produced by a deficient cause, as the two are different. Otherwise, a distinction in the [capacity of the] cause [to bring about different effects depending on its fitness] would be futile. In effect, when a cause that has been perfect in all its aspects becomes defective in some respect, it does not occasion a difference in the mind and that which is mental (mano-mati), on account of the fact that preceding auditory and other kinds of impression continue intact [in the mental stream].

We see here a clear acknowledgement that cognitive awareness depends upon the efficacy of all underlying causal factors (perceptual, volitional, dispositional, etc.), and the recognition that, in turn, these factors reduce to their causal totality (kāranasāmagrī). On a strict

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24 See Bhattacharyya 2002, and discussion in Ganeri 2011: 5.
account of causal generation, cognitive error would track closely deficient causation. But that does not always happen. One might perceive a sparkling lake where there are only naturally occurring conditions for an optical illusion. This perceptual illusion is not simply a case of misapprehension, for the illusion persists even after it has been disambiguated (that is, after one has come to apprehend the appearance of the lake as a mirage). What the error argument targets is strict causal generation: the notion that each mental state is instantiated by a suitably relevant combination of physical elements and processes. The persistence of perceptual illusion even after disambiguation, and the possibilities of effective action such disambiguation opens up (not chasing after a mirage), work against the strict causal model of the Cārvāka physicalist, which reduces human agency to changes in the microphysical structure of each individual.

When Dharmakīrti claims that a trustworthy cognition (avisaṃvāda) must also be causally effective, he advances a different naturalistic account of cognition than the one put forth by the Cārvāka, one that takes into account the intentional structure of awareness and its phenomenal character: perception is not simply the apprehension of a unique particular as such; rather it is the apprehension of a particular as perceived, which also discloses the perceiver’s intentional stance. In the case of perceptual illusions such as mirages, it is not only the object or content of the experience that gets disclosed, but also the perceiver’s vantage point, who can ensure successful action through a shift in perspective.

5. Causality and the co-constitutive manifest

Has the Buddhist satisfactorily answered the challenge of physicalism? Before we attempt an answer to this question, let us revisit once more Dharmakīrti’s contention that the senses are rendered ineffective by an impaired consciousness. Regardless of whether we take him to be arguing from a Sautrāntika or Yogācāra position, is it clear that even when he appears to reject the notion that the intentional object is causally related to the experience of a unique particular (as he does in PV III v. 320), Dharmakīrti is in fact pressing an important phenomenological point: specifically, that considerations about the structure of awareness must play a role in settling epistemological disputes. This point is necessary to support his account of the efficacy of cognition. If one does not factor in the dual-aspect theory of mental states in mapping out the relation between consciousness and causality, then one cannot understand why causal explanation retains an element of ontological subjectivity. The justification for taking reflexivity (svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti) as a condition for the possibility of warranted cognition may indeed stem from Dharmakīrti’s commitment to

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27 The assumption behind strict models of causal generation is that a suitably efficacious causal chain generates each epistemically salient cognitive state: the state of quench is generated by water ingestion or water metabolism. Cognitive error, as in the case of water mirages and such, results from a defective cause: that is, the water in the mirage has the formal properties of real water (etc., reflectance) but lacks the latter’s efficacy: illusory water does not quench thirst.

28 As Franco (1997: 87) notes, whether we attribute it to Dharmakīrti’s genius or the versatility of the Sanskrit language, it is possible to read him as endorsing both the Yogācāra view of the luminosity of the mind (prabhāsvaram cittam) – which, consequently, means that one may have to take reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana) as the only warranted type of cognition – and the Sautrāntika notion that the appearance of objects in cognition corresponds to eternal particulars.
the self-luminosity theory of consciousness. But what is important about this theory is that it rules out the possibility of reducing cognition to subpersonal levels of explanation. Walking is a complex motor skill, which, once learned, may appear involuntary. The same can be said about language and basic perceptual function. But what ensures their epistemic and pragmatic efficacy is the ongoing active presence of an implicit awareness that attends to the object at hand.

The mind’s attentive capacity (manaskāra), then, makes a certain dimension of human cognition not merely the effect of causal chains in the physical domain but a causal factor in its own right in the domain of cognition. This self-reflexive aspect of cognition can remain constant with respect to a given object of experience (say, a column of smoke), despite it being prompted by a deficient cause (in this case, a dust column). On account of this apparent variance, consciousness is neither entirely grounded in, nor explainable in terms of, physical elements and processes. The Buddhist does not deny that cognitive states are made manifest (abhivyajyate) when the body is present, only that their manifestation is to be understood in strictly physical causal terms.

4. Conclusion or how to avoid the fallacy of ambiguity

Let me conclude by revisiting a question that was asked at the beginning of this paper: are causal accounts of generation for material phenomena reconcilable with the seeming irreducibility of consciousness? By reducing the analysis of consciousness and cognition to transactions in the physical domain, the Cārvāka, much like contemporary physicalists, is committing a category mistake: consciousness is a subjective phenomenon and thus its manifestation cannot be accounted for in the impersonal language of causality for material objects. Is it possible, then, that even Dharmakīrti, insofar as he seeks a causal explanation for the epistemic reliability of certain cognitions, is guilty of the very charge he levels against the physicalist? As I argued elsewhere (Coseru 2017), ontological reductionism is not the same as epistemological reductionism. Indeed, there is a systematic ambiguity between the ontological and the epistemic sense in using the word ‘empirical’ and its cognates to capture causal relations. Sometimes ‘empirical’ stands for contingent states of affairs, and sometimes for a method that can be used to establish something as factual. Facts about one’s subjective experience, for instance, are not empirically accessible in the way that facts about external objects (or their atomic constituents) are. The basis for the epistemic subjective-objective distinction is an ontological distinction in modes of existence.

In short, ontological subjectivity is no bar to epistemic objectivity. Consciousness, unlike its contents, is implicitly manifest. Conscious awareness does not become manifest by being reflected upon, as do its specific contents (which are only available when attended to in perception or brought under a specific concept). That is to say: consciousness has an observer-independent status. I do not become conscious by observing the occurrence of my mental states. Rather, I become aware of the contents of my experience by virtue of being conscious. Causality, on the other hand, is an observer-relative phenomenon: the very notion of ‘event’ presupposes an observer. Events thus stand in a particular kind of

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This distinction is examined at length by Searle (2015: 74ff.).
relation to their antecedents only to the extent that there is a conception of causality in place. That causality should be an observer-relative phenomenon does not mean, however, that it is arbitrary. Rather, its observer-relative status simply suggests that it contains an element of ontological subjectivity.

Dharmakīrti (and his successors) may well admit that aggregated entities reduce to their ontological primitives, which alone are real. But causally describable series of events are not incompatible with treating such basic events as irreducibly mental. Buddhist conceptual reductionism about consciousness, therefore, does not necessarily entail physicalism.

References and abbreviations

Primary sources

AK Abhidharmakośa: See AK Bh.


PSV Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti: See PS.


TSP Tattvasamgrahapañjikā: See TS.

Secondary sources


**Pradhan 1975** See AK Bh.


**Shastri 1968** See TS.


Action Theory and Scriptural Exegesis in Early Advaita-Vedānta (2): Maṇḍana Miśra’s Excursus on the Buddha’s Omniscience

by

Hugo David

1. Introduction

1.1 The proof of the Buddha’s omniscience occupies, as is well-known, a prominent place in Indian Buddhist philosophy, and also constitutes an essential part of Mahāyāna Buddhism’s dogmatic construction, both as an essential component of its soteriological ideal and as a foundation for the transmission of Buddhist teachings through Scripture. Yet, surprisingly, we do not find a systematic consideration of this topic in the ‘pramāṇa’-school until a comparatively late date. Although both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti deal in some detail with the perception of yogins, their consideration of the ‘fourth’ type of perceptual cognition is done independently of the question whether a yogin could become omniscient by this means. One must wait until the 8th century and the works of Śāntarakṣita (725–788),

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2 On the early history of the concept of omniscience in Buddhism, see in particular Pandey 1972, Griffiths 1990 and Kawasaki 1992. For an overview in English, see McClintock 2010: 23–35. As she notes, Buddhist attitudes toward omniscience might have been far more ambivalent than is the case in Jainism, especially in the early period. On this point, see also Jackson 1991: 230–232.

3 For a synthesis on the question, see Eltschinger (2009), who discusses relevant passages of PS (1.6cd), PVin 1 (27.7–28.8) and PV (3.281–286). Further references in Eltschinger 2009: 191 (n. 94).

4 By this I do not mean to say that Dharmakīrti, in particular, did not believe in the Buddha’s omniscience, which is obviously not the case. His conception of yogipratyakṣa as a “vision of the [four] Nobles’ Truths” (āryasatyadarśana – see below § 3.5) also implies a form of ‘focused’ omniscience like the one defined in PV 2.29–33. Nevertheless, omniscience did not constitute a major philosophical or religious issue for him as it would for later Buddhist authors. As pointed out by Moriyama (2014: 17), “the concept of omniscience does not occupy a special place in Dharmakīrti’s argument for establishing the Buddha as pramāṇabhūta,” a point that sharply contrasts with later understandings of this attribute of the Buddha. See also Franco 2011: 89 and Eltschinger (2005: 429–434), who explains this state of affairs in terms of a conscious apologetic strategy: “Dharmakīrti aura élaboré une structure doctrinale assez ouverte pour que les docteurs bouddhistes y lisent l’adhésion du maître à l’omniscience, mais assez implicite pour que les pourfendeurs de ce dogme ne puissent lui en faire le reproche” (p. 434). Equally significant is Dharmakīrti’s lack of interest for God’s omniscience in the section of the PV refuting the existence of īśvara (PV 2.8–28). Specialists of Dharmakīrti still disagree as to what his final position regarding total omniscience might have been, in particular in the case of the Buddha. See Jackson 1991: 232–234, Eltschinger 2005: 434 and McClintock 2010: 135–138. The main passage under discussion (PVin 2.55) is however unrelated to the definition of yogic perception formulated in PVin 1 (see preceding note).

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Maṇḍana Miśra’s Excursus on the Buddha’s Omniscience

Kamalaśīla (740–795) and Prajñākaragupta (750–810?)\(^5\) to find an articulate defence of omniscience in the school claiming Dharmakīrti’s heritage, further developed by thinkers like Śaṅkaranandana (800–980?), Jñānaśrīmitra (980–1040?) and Ratnakīrti (990–1050?).\(^6\)

1.2 It is now generally admitted that the development of this new field of investigation within the ‘epistemological’ school of Buddhism owes a lot to the critique propounded in the 6\(^{th}\)–8\(^{th}\) centuries by Brahmanical thinkers, especially those belonging to the ritualistic school of Mīmāṃsā. From an early date, these thinkers regarded the possibility for a person to grasp the totality of being perceptually as a serious threat to their conception of the Veda as the unique means to know dharma, the ritual and ethical system defining what we call ‘Brahmanism.’ As far as we know, the first Brahmanical thinker to present a systematic attack against the belief in an omniscient being is Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (600–650?),\(^7\) both in the codanā-section of the Ślokavārttika (ŚIV) (vv. 110cd–155) and in the corresponding fragments of the Brhaṭṭīkā (BT) quoted in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattva-saṃgraha (TS) (vv. 3127–3245).\(^8\) There, it is principally the idea of the Buddha as the omniscient founder of a religion which is attacked, a fact that might explain the importance accorded to Kumārila’s ideas in later Buddhist thought.\(^9\) Kumārila, however, was not the only Mīmāṃsaka to have offered a critique of the Buddha’s omniscience by the beginning of the 8\(^{th}\) century. An important examination of this concept was also carried out by Maṇḍana Miśra (660–720?) in the first, aporetical part – generally (though somewhat improperly) known as ‘the pūrvapakṣa’ – of his treatise on action and injunction, the Vidhiviveka (ViV), commented upon in the 10\(^{th}\) century by Vācaspati Miśra in the Nyāyakaṇikā (NyK).\(^10\) In

On Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s discussions of omniscience, see McClintock 2010. On Prajñākaragupta, see Moriyama 2014 and below § 4. Another early and potentially important document is the (mostly unstudied) Sarvajñaśiddhi of Subhagupta (720–78), preserved only in Tibetan (see Bühnemann 1980: viii and Watanabe 1987).

For a preliminary edition and analysis of Śaṅkaranandana’s Sarvajñaśiddhi (kārikās only), see Eltschinger 2008. See also Eltschinger (2015: 323), who mentions, besides the Sarvajñaśiddhi, a shorter work called Sarvajñaśiddhisamkṣepa, still unpublished. A study of fragments of Jñānaśrīmitra’s otherwise lost Sarvajñaśiddhi is found in Steinkellner 1977. For an in-depth study of Ratnakīrti’s treatise of the same name, see Bühnemann 1980 and Goodman 1989. On the possible contribution of Jitāri (9\(^{th}\)–10\(^{th}\) c.?) to this debate, see Bühnemann 1980: viii and Eltschinger 2008: 142.

Kumārila’s date is established in relation to that of Dharmakīrti, of whom he might have been an elder contemporary. The date 600–650 proposed by Kataoka (2011: 112) on the basis of Frauwallner’s dating of Dharmakīrti (600–660) may have to be revised in case the great Buddhist logician should be placed a few decades earlier, as proposed by Krasser (2012).

The numbering of verses in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha is that of Swami Dwarikadas Shastri’s edition (Benares, 1968) (= TS), which slightly differs from that of Embar Krishnamacharya’s earlier edition (Baroda, 1926, reprinted in 1988). For a detailed study of Kumārila’s critique of omniscience, see Kataoka 2003a and Kataoka 2011. Equally central to this debate are vv. 26–33 of the pratyakṣa-section of the ŚIV (ad Śābarabhāṣya 1.1.4), dealing with the perception of yogins (translation in Taber 2005: 54–56). Omniscience is again alluded to in ŚIV (saṃbandhākṣepaparihāra) 44ab and 114ab, but these are simple reminiscences of the codanā-section, adding no new arguments.

Only on one occasion does Kumārila allude to omniscience as conceived by the Jains (ŚIV [codanā"] 141–142). No such allusion is found in the BT. The question of God’s omniscience is not touched upon by Kumārila, and seems to have been introduced into Mīmāṃsā by Maṇḍana Miśra (see below § 1.3).

Other Mīmāṃsakas of the period might have been interested in the question of the Buddha’s omniscience, but we do not have much evidence for this. The question whether Bhavya/Bhā(va)viveka, in the ninth
this work, the existence of an omniscient being is made the subject of a lengthy refutation occupying more than a third of the whole pūrvapakṣa (ViV 15–25), which has not received much attention so far though it constitutes one of our main sources for the history of this debate in Mīmāṃsā before the time of Śāntarakṣita.11 My purpose in this essay is to give the reader a first glimpse into this important text, concentrating on its treatment of the Buddhist idea of omniscience.

1.3 Considering the ViV was written perhaps no more than a century after Kumārila’s death, one is struck by how little Maṇḍana apparently owes to the old Master, whose works he simply never quotes in that section. Kumārila’s almost exclusive preoccupation with Buddhism is also not discernible in Maṇḍana’s work. For sure, the Brahmāsiddhi (BS) (presumably Maṇḍana’s last work)12 still mentions “the Buddha, wrongly believed to be omniscient” (sarvajñābhimatabuddha) as the prototype of the false teacher of dharma.13 Vācaspati is also probably right in considering that the brief description of the Omniscient in the prose introduction to ViV^K 15 refers in priority to the Buddha: 14 “an instructor of...
creatures (*nıyökta bhūtānām*), deserving to be obeyed, directly perceiving the means for realizing the Supreme Good as prescribed [in the Scriptures] (*sāksātkṛtānuśravikāśreyahsādhana*), who loves [to do] what is useful [to others] (*hitakāma*) and is omniscient (*sarvajña*).15 But in fact, only ViV 15 is directly concerned with Buddhism,16 while the rest of the section discusses arguments from other schools17 and even contains the earliest critique of divine omniscience in a Mīmāṃsā text, if not in Indian philosophy overall (ViV 20–24).18 The tone of harsh religious polemics transpiring from Kumārila’s writings

15 ViV 15 (introduction): *anuvadhīheyo nıyökta bhūtānām sāksātkṛtānuśravikāśreyahsādhana* hitakāmaḥ *sarvajñaḥ* (S 445.1–448.1 [= M 110.2–4/G 78.3–4]). *Sākṣāt* M. This description, in itself, has nothing specifically Buddhist. Of the four main characteristics of the omniscient outlined in this passage (*nıyoktr[va], sāksātkṛta[...], sādhana[va], hitakāma, sarvajña[va]*)], the first directly follows from the context of the ViV (see below § 2.1). The second and third may, of course, refer to the first two epithets of the Buddha in the famous opening verse of Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (1.20), in Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyapadīya* (1.5 – SV 24.2) and in Bhavabhūti’s *Uttararāmacarita* (see Ruegg 1994: 307–308). As is well-known, the quality of being *sāksātkṛtadharma* is also part of Vātsyāyana/Pakṣilasvāmin’s definition of an *āpta* (“reliable speaker”) in the *Bhāṣya* to *Nyāyaśāstra* 1.1.7 and 2.1.68 (14.4 and 96.16). Pakṣilasvāmin’s commentary in *sūtra* 2.1.68 also mentions two additional qualities of the *āpta* – bhūtādaya (“compassion for beings”) and yathābhūtātthacikhyāpayīṣa (“desire to communicate about a real object”) (96.17) –, the first of which could very well be hinted at by Maṇḍana while speaking of the Omniscient’s compassion toward others. Thus, although several external clues plead for an identification of Maṇḍana’s omniscient being with the Buddha, one must keep in mind that his description remains quite unspecific and corresponds to what most philosophical traditions of his time would have expected of a reliable teacher, human or divine.

16 As Stern (1988: 28) rightly remarks, the section referred to by Vācaspati as *buddhasarvajnāparikṣā* (“examination of the Omniscient [as conceived] by the Buddhists”) on two occasions in the *NyK* (612.7–8 and 634.7, ad ViV 17) is certainly ViV 15.

17 Several of them are mentioned in Vācaspati’s commentary: “someone with a whiff of Prābhāka[r]-doctrine” (*kaś cit prābhāka[garandhī]* – *NyK* 570.10, ad ViV 16), Naiyāyikas (*NyK* 606.7–8, ad ViV 17; 679.9, ad ViV 21), “upholders of [the doctrine] of Svayambhu [i.e. Patañjali’s Yoga]” (*svayambhuvah* – *NyK* 627.14, ad ViV 21). These identifications however testify to Vācaspati’s attempt to read in the ViV a refutation of various ‘doctrines,’ while Maṇḍana’s progression is dialectic much more than doxographic, so they should be taken with much caution.

18 See Moriyama (2014: 37), who also notes Maṇḍana’s influence on immediately later Buddhist thinkers on that topic, in particular on Prajñākaragupta.
(especially the later ones)\textsuperscript{19} is also hardly discernible in Maṇḍana’s text. Thus we do not find in the ViV anything comparable to Kumārila’s critical examination of non-Vedic Scriptures (āgama) in the ‘appendix’ to Tantravārttika 1.3.4,\textsuperscript{20} a critique that also occupies a substantial part of his discourse on omniscience in the ŚIV (codanā – 118–136) and BT (= TS 3186–3213). In other words, it seems omniscience has become, in the hands of Maṇḍana, less a matter for religious preachers and apologetes than for philosophers, the latter more likely to find in his work tools to convince fellow dialecticians than the former powerful incentives to attract faithful crowds and benevolent patrons.

1.4 The purpose of this study is to show that, in spite of all this, Maṇḍana plays a key role in the early debate on the Buddha’s omniscience, and entertains an intense dialogue with his two main predecessors in the field: Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. I will show, first, how the beginning of ViV 15 can be read as a systematic rejection of Kumārila’s argumentative strategy against omniscience, based on Dharmakīrti’s newly popularised logic (§ 2); second, I will examine how Maṇḍana uses Kumārila’s main argument in terms of a relation between perception and time to introduce a new type of epistemological consideration on the nature and cause of the Omniscient’s cognition (§ 3). Finally, I will consider the possibility that this evolution of the mīmāṃsaka discourse on omniscience influenced later stages of the debate in Buddhism as well, by tracking possible echoes of Maṇḍana’s ideas in a slightly later Buddhist work, Prajñākaragupta’s Vārtikālāṃkāra on Pramāṇavārttika 2.29 (§ 4).

2. Maṇḍana Miśra on non-apprehension and the Buddha’s speech: a ‘Dharmakīrtian’ response to Kumārila?

2.1 Every discussion of omniscience in Brahmanism must start from its prototype in Kumārila’s ŚIV and BT. In these works, the great Mīmāṃsaka makes it clear that his intention is not so much to prove that a human being cannot become omniscient (a possibility he actually leaves open) but rather to maintain an absolute distinction between entities that are accessible to the senses (aṇḍriyaka) and others essentially beyond their reach (nendriyagocaraḥ), like the relation between the elements of a Vedic sacrifice (dharma) – actions, qualities and substances – and their expected result.\textsuperscript{21} What is most disturbing, then, to Kumārila is that someone who would “see all things in a [single act of] perception” (sarvapratyakṣadarśin), as he defines the Omniscient in the BT (= TS 3138c), would also know dharma(s) perceptually: being a “knower of all things” (sarva-jña), he would also be a “knower of dharma” (dharma-jña), and this would contradict the exclusivity of

\textsuperscript{19} See Kataoka (2011: 11 and n. 8), who reports the view of Harikai (1985: 63) on a possible evolution in Kumārila’s attitude towards Buddhism (less ‘logical,’ more ‘emotional’) between the ŚIV and the TV. On this topic, see also Eltschinger 2014a: 66.


\textsuperscript{21} See ŚIV (codanā) 110cd–111, BT (= TS 3127), Kataoka 2003a: 42–43 and Kataoka 2011: 320–324. On Kumārila’s understanding of dharma, see ŚIV (codanā) 13–14, translated in Kataoka 2011: 206–209. As explained in these verses, actions, substances and qualities are not considered to be dharma(s) in themselves, but only in so far as they are conducive to an expected result.
the Veda on ethico-ritual matters. Maṇḍana shares the same preoccupation: for him, the point is not the existence of an omniscient being in general, but of an “instructor of creatures” promulgating a teaching on matters inaccessible to ordinary perception in the form of injunctions (vidhilecodanā). The search for such a being is occasioned by Maṇḍana’s reflection on Prabhākara’s concept of “commandment” (niyoga) which, in his view, cannot be operative without supposing such an instructor:

A commandment is [in itself] a mere instigation (pravartanāmātra), and [only] that is the object of an injunctive suffix (linādi). What is grasped, then, through [that] speech[-unit] is [only] that “I am prompted [to do this]” (pravartito 'ham); but the awareness that “I have to do [this]” (kartavyatāvagama) comes from the fact that someone who deserves to be obeyed (anuvidheya) is the author of the commandment. [Only] when a commandment is given by such a [person] do I understand that “I have to do this;” otherwise, I feel a mere instigation, as it has been said [by Prabhākara]: “the commandment has the obligation (kartavyatā) as its content, it does not affirm (āha) the obligation.”

2.2 Given this essential agreement on the main point at stake, one would expect to find at least an echo of Kumārila’s arguments in Maṇḍana’s text. Instead of that, the prose development on ViV

22 Modern readers of Dharmakīrti’s statements on omniscience in PV 2.32–33 have rarely noticed how close he actually stands to Kumārila on this point. Thus I would not necessarily interpret these verses of the PV as a ‘response’ from Dharmakīrti to Kumārila (as suggested by Kataoka [2011 2: 321]), but rather as an essential agreement of both thinkers on the main point at stake: what matters is not the possibility for a human being to know everything, but his capacity to access ethically/soteriologically relevant matters by means of perception. As pointed out by Kataoka (2011: 321), the distinction between sarvajñā and dharmajñā is introduced by Kumārila only in the BṬ. Its use by Maṇḍana in the prose introduction to ViV 25 (S 733.4) might therefore point to his familiarity with Kumārila’s lost work.

23 ViV 15 (introduction) – S 445.1 (translated above § 1.3).

24 See ViV 12–14, David 2017 and David (forthcoming).

25 ViV 14: pravartanāmātraṃ niyogah, sa ca līnādiyarthā iti pravartito 'ham iti pratipattiḥ śabdāt. karta-

vyatāvagamas tu niyoktur anuvidheyatvāt, anuvidheyaniyoyo mameda kartavyam ity adhyavasāyāt, ītāatra tu pravartanāmātraṇapratīteh. uktaṃ ca: kartavyāvāsaya hih nīyogoḥ, na nīyogah kartavyatām āha (S 441.5–442.3 [≈ M 108.5–109.4/G 77.3–6]). a pravartito 'ham S; pravartito 'ham atra M G; b hi S: Ø M G.

26 A more literal translation would be “the awareness of an obligation.” As Vācaspati makes clear (NyK 1.1.2 (38.8–9)), the difference between a mere instigation (pravartanāmātra) and a proper obligation (kartavyatā) is that only the second can be the cause of an activity (pravṛttihetu) for a rational agent.

27 Bṛhatī 1.1.2 (38.8–9).

28 ViV 15: yady apy ātmapratyakṣanirvṛttir viprakārṣavatām abhbāvan vyabhicarati, sarvapratyakṣanirvṛttir asidhāsarvadvṛṣṭah, sakalapramāṇanirvṛtya ca nāthābhavasiddhiḥ, avyāpakaniyavṛtva avyāpyanirvṛttir anyamāt, avyāpakatvam ca, ahetuttvā, tannātrā pratibandhābhāhāvācb ca, anyathā sarvasya sarvadarśi-

travigasah, avīśeṣāī; vacanādaya ca yady apy avirodhāh anivartakāh, tathāpi kāraṇanirvṛtya kāryaniyranirvṛtiḥ pramāṇanāmapratītya tatāhāyāḥ sarvārtheṣu saṃvido 'bhāvaṃ anumānavat (S 459.1–461.2 [≈ M 115.1–116.2/G 81.4–82.6]). a "nivṛttau S: "nivṛtyā M G: "nivṛtyā ca Mss (S); b "pratibandha" S: "anubandha" M G; c avīśeṣāī S: avīśeṣāī ca M G.
Even though (1’) the absence (nivṛtti)\(^{29}\) of one’s own perception does not prove the non-existence (abhāva) of [objects] that are at a distance (viprakṛṣṭa),\(^{30}\) and [although] (1”) the absence of a perception for all [beings] is impossible to establish unless one sees everything;\(^{31}\) (2) [even though] the absence of all means of knowledge [regarding a certain object] does not prove that [this] object does not exist – for (2A) the absence of a non-pervasive [property] (avyāpaka) does not necessarily imply (nī-Śyam) the absence of the [corresponding] non-pervaded [property] (avyāpya),\(^{32}\) and (2AI) [the existence of a means of knowledge – pramāṇa] is [indeed] non-pervasive [with respect to the existence of an object to be known – prameya], for it is not the cause (hetu) [of the existence of the object to be known],\(^{33}\) and because there is [also] no essen-

\(^{29}\) Literally: the “cessation” or “non-activity,” as opposed to pravṛtti (“activity”). The term is used by Dharmakīrti in a similar context in expressions like pramāṇatrayanivṛtti (“the absence of the three means of knowledge” – PVSV 102.1), also found in Maṇḍana’s text. See Yaita (1985: 215): “the cessation of the three means of knowledge;” Steinkeller (2013: 81) “das Auffallen der drei Erkenntnismittel;” Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber (2012: 9, n. 9): “the silence of the three means of valid cognition.” This last translation is preferable, in my opinion, as the English term “cessation” implies previous activity, which is not always the case of Dharmakīrti and Maṇḍana’s use of the word nivṛtti. See for instance Maṇḍana’s (or rather, his opponent’s) definition of pleasure (sukha) as “the absence of pain” (duḥkhanivṛtti) in the Brahmāsiddhi (BS 1.1 [1.17]), which does not imply the previous existence of pain. I opt for a plainer translation (“absence”) only to avoid confusion between a proper use of the word “silence” (in the case of Scripture) and a metaphorical one (in the case of perception and inference).

\(^{30}\) According to Vācaspati (NyK 459.6–7), “distance” (viprakṛṣṭa) is threefold: in space (deśa), time (kāla) and nature (svabhāva). The same tripartition is found in chapter 2 of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin 64.9–10) and in the Nyāyabindu (NB 2.27); the Pramāṇavārttika (PVSV 102.6–7, ad PV 1.199) only mentions deśa and kāla.

\(^{31}\) Both published editions of the ViV suggest that asarvadrśah should be read with what follows, not with what precedes, a solution also adopted by M. Biardeau in her unpublished translation: “[…] [quoique l’absence de perception de tous ne soit pas établie, que l’on ne puisse établir la non-existence d’un objet par l’absence de tous les moyens de perception chez quelqu’un qui n’est pas omniscient (…)” (Ms. f. 123r). Although neither Stern’s edition nor Vācaspati’s commentary plead for either solution, I find it easier to link the genitive with what precedes, since the position of ca would otherwise be odd. The following argument (2) is directly borrowed from Dharmakīrti, as we shall see (§ 2.3), and stands perfectly well on its own. On the other hand, it makes sense to argue that only an omniscient would be able to establish a universal absence of perception concerning a given object.

\(^{32}\) In other words: the inference of the absence of a pervaded (vyāpya) property from the absence of the pervading (vyāpaka) property is valid, as when we conclude to the absence of smoke (= vyāpya) on the hill from the absence of fire (= vyāpaka): vyāpakaḥbhāva → vyāpyābhāva (“a → b” = “valid inference from a to b”). But this inference would not be valid if both properties were not in a relation of pervasion (vyāpiti), or if the pervasion was the other way round. Thus the inference of the absence of fire (= vyāpaka) on the hill from the absence of smoke (= vyāpya) is not valid, for there are exceptions to this conclusion. In the present case, the question raised is whether one can correctly conclude to the absence in the world of an omniscient being – the object to be known (prameya) – from the absence of a means to know (pramāṇa) such a being (pramānābhāva → prameyābhāva?). It follows from what precedes that the inference is valid only if pramāṇa and prameya stand in a relation of pervasion (vyāpiti), in other words if we could correctly conclude to the existence of a means of knowledge from the existence of the object of knowledge (prameya → pramāṇa?). Maṇḍana will now show that this is not the case, by excluding the two only possible grounds for pervasion or invariable concomitance in Dharmakīrti’s system: causality (tattvapatti) and identity (tādātmya) (argument 2AI).

\(^{33}\) See NyK 459.11–460.1: ahetutvād akāraṇatvāt.
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tial connection (tanmātrapratibandha) [between these two properties],

for otherwise everybody would see everything as there would be no difference

[between us and an omniscient being];

and (3) even though speech, etc. do not rule out [the existence of an omniscient] as there is no contradiction [in his making use of speech, etc.]; even so, (4) since we understand the absence

of an effect (kāryanivṛtti) from the absence of [its] cause (kāraṇanivṛtti), from

the impossibility (anupapatti) of a means of knowledge [embracing the whole

realm of being] we infer the absence of its effect, namely an awareness of all things (sarvārtheṣu saṃvid).

This dense passage is for the most part a discussion of inferential matters, and is indeed a remarkable example of how logical considerations can successfully be applied to the solution of a philosophical issue. Maṇḍana discusses here the use of the negative inferential reason (hetu), “non-apprehension” (anupalabdhi), and its capacity to establish the non-existence (abhāva) of a given object – in our case, an “awareness of all things” –, which is the property to be proved (sādhya). His theoretical background is clearly Dharmakīrti’s logical system, as the mention besides anupalabdhi of two possible grounds for ‘positive’ inference (causality and identity) suffices to prove. In substance, Maṇḍana proposes to replace a series of illegitimate uses of anupalabdhi (conclusion to the non-existence of an entity by mere lack of perception of it, etc.) (1–3) by another, legitimate one, known to Buddhist logicians as kāraṇānupalabdhi (“non-apprehension of the cause”) (4).

1. Absence of perception of an entity cannot establish its non-existence.

1’. Case of one’s own perception.

1”’. Case of everyone’s perception.

34 The compound tanmātrapratibandha is equivalent to the expression tanmārānubandha”sambandha used by Dharmakīrti on several occasions to speak of the relation underlying the use of an “essential [inferential] reason” (svabhāvahetu). See for instance PVSV 6.26, 17.20, 18.1 and 18.21 (“anubandha”), PVSV 16.28 (“sambandha). See also NyK 460.3–5: hetudharmanārānubandha hi sādhyaḥdharmanas tasya vyāpakerah, yathā vyāsate samsthapavasya. “For when the property to be proved (a) merely depends on the property which is the [inferential] reason (b), it (= a) pervades the other (= b); for instance, the quality of being a tree [pervades in this manner] the quality of being a śiṃśapā.” The reading “anubandha” (instead of “pratibandha”), found in all Mss of the ViV and in some Mss of the NyK (see Stern 1988: 1023–1024), is therefore equally plausible.

35 That is: if there was an essential connection between the existence of the object to be known (prameya) and that of a means for knowing it (pramāṇa).

36 For a possible paraphrase of this difficult argument by Prajñākaragupta, see below § 4.5.

37 On kāraṇānupalabdhi, see NB 2.39: kāraṇānupalabdhir yathā nātra dhūmaḥ, vahnyabhāvād iti; “[Es-

tablishment of the non-existence of the effect through] non-apprehension of [its] cause is for instance: ‘Here, there is no smoke, for there is no fire’” (p. 135). In his commentary, Dharmottara remarks that this particular use of anupalabdhi is restricted to cases where “the effect, even if it existed, would not be perceived” (kāryam sad adhyātmabhavati – Nyāyabinduṭīkā 136.1), which is obviously the case of an omniscient being. Although neither Manḍana nor Vācaspati uses exactly the term kāraṇānupalabdhi, its equivalent kāraṇānupalambha is found in a pūrvapakṣa of Ratnakīrti’s Sarvajñasiddhi (SSi 7.18), which presents a reasoning identical in substance to Maṇḍana’s. The parallel between these two passages would certainly require further exploration.

2. Absence of valid knowledge of an entity cannot establish its non-existence.

\[2\text{A}.\] A property \(p\)'s non-existence cannot justify positing another property \(q\)'s non-existence unless \(p\) pervades (\(\text{व्याप्त}\) \(q\)).

\[2\text{AI}.\] Valid knowledge (\(\text{प्रमाण}\)) does not pervade its object (\(\text{प्रमेय}\)).

\[2\text{AIa}.\] No relation of causality.

\[2\text{Alb}.\] No relation of identity.

3. Speech, etc. do not rule out omniscience in their possessor.

4. Omniscience can be negated, as an effect can be negated through the negation of its cause.

Now this reasoning is clearly not Maṇḍana’s invention; in fact, the very structure of the argument recalls Dharmakīrti’s ‘second’ consideration of \(\text{anupalabdhi}\) in the \(\text{Pramāṇavārttika}\) (PV) 1.198–204, especially PV 1.198–202 and the corresponding \(\text{Svavṛtti}\) (PVSV).\(^{38}\) What is comparatively new, however, is the application of these reflections to the particular case of omniscience, which is not mentioned in this section of PVSV although Dharmakīrti suggests other possible consequences of his theory for religious philosophy.\(^{39}\) The only text I could find where Dharmakīrti applies a similar reasoning to omniscience (\(\text{सर्वज्ञता}\)) is the \(\text{Nyāyabindu}\) (NB).\(^{40}\) I suspect this original and quite massive reinvestment of Dharmakīrti’s ideas must be interpreted in a polemical way. For the first victim of this exercise in

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\(^{38}\) This passage has been translated twice, into English by Yaita (1985) and, more recently, into German by Steinkellner (2013) and Tom (2013). I am much indebted to the latter’s translation and rich annotation of this text. Strictly speaking, Dharmakīrti’s discussion of \(\text{anupalabdhi}\) is much longer, finding its conclusion only with PV 1.339 (thus practically with the end of the first chapter), including also his lengthy digression on the authority of Scripture (\(\text{āgama}\)). See Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012: 9, n. 9. I am essentially concerned here with the initial part of this section.

\(^{39}\) Dharmakīrti remains quite vague in PV(SV) 1.198–204 about objects whose existence cannot be disqualified by mere silence of Scripture, like “particular things (…) which are far away in time and space” (\(\text{deśakālayavaḥitāḥ} \ldots \text{drayavyāviseśāḥ} – \text{PVSV} 102.6–7\)). He is more precise about objects whose non-existence cannot be proved by the mere fact that we cannot infer them: “a mind free of passion” (\(\text{viraktam cetas} – \text{PVSV} 103.4\)), “a particular deity” (\(\text{devatāviśeṣa} – \text{ibid.}\)), “the capacity of intentions [relative to] gifts and refraining from violent action to cause happiness” (\(\text{dānahiṃsāviraticetanānām abhyudayaḥetutā} – \text{PVSV} 103.5\); my translation of the compound in the genitive relies entirely on its interpretation by Yaita [1985: 213] and Steinkellner [2013: 84]). The closest approximation we find in the \(\text{Pramāṇavārttika}\) to Maṇḍana’s reasoning is found in PV(SV) 1.311 (I thank V. Eltschinger for drawing my attention to this important passage). In that portion of the SV, which forms a sort of ‘coda’ to his discussion on mantras, Dharmakīrti discusses possible objections against the assumption of an “extraordinary person” (\(\text{purusātiśaya}\)), which must itself be inferred from his possessing an intellect (\(\text{buddhi}\)), senses (\(\text{indriya}\)) and speech (\(\text{vacana}\)) (see PVSV 164.15). His main response is clearly similar to Maṇḍana’s principal argument: \(\text{na hy atīndriyeṣv ataddarśinaḥ pratikṣepaḥ saṃbhavati}, \text{satām apy eṣam ajñānāt}; \text{“Those who do not see supersensible [objects] cannot confute \(\text{prati-√kṣip}\) them, for even if they exist, they will not know them”}\) (PVSV 164.17–18 [I do not translate \(\text{hi}\)].

\(^{40}\) NB 3.69–71: \(\text{yathāsarva-jñatāḥ kaścid vivaktāḥ puruṣo rāgādāmin vetti sādhye vakṛtvādikō dharmah sāṃdgiḥsadvāpyavāyrtikaḥ, sarva-jño vaktā nopalabhyata ity evamprakārasya-vanupalambhasyādṛṣṭāṃvāsya-vatvena samdehāhetutvāt, tato ’sarva-jñānaviparyāyād vakṛtvādikā vyāvṛtthāṃ sām-digāhā vākṛtvāsarva-jñatavatayo vīrodbhāhāvāc ca yaḥ sarva-jñatāḥ sa vaktā na bhava-vatyād arāsane ’pi na sidhyati, samdehāḥ; “If what must be proved is, for instance, that a certain intended person is non-omniscient (\(\text{asarvajñā}\)), or is passionate, etc. (\(\text{rāgādāmin}\)), one can doubt that a property like being a speaker (\(\text{vaktṛtva}\)), etc. [establishing that conclusion] is absent from the negative instance [i.e. an omniscient
‘applied logic’ is, no doubt, Kumārila, whose arguments against omniscience are – with one exception to which I shall return later on (§ 3) – easily associated with one or the other ‘defective’ use of anupalabdhi. Thus, far from rejecting Dharmakīrti’s elaborations on adṛśyānupalabdhi as ‘Buddhist,’ Maṇḍana appropriates them and adapts them in order to free the classical Mīmāṃsaka argumentation against omniscience of some of its most flagrant weaknesses. Let us now consider in more detail a few aspects of this strategy.

2.3 Kumārila’s refutation of omniscience, in the ŚlV and BṬ similarly, takes place in three successive stages: after having established that omniscience is intrinsically impossible (ŚlV 42:112–115/TS 3157–3183), he shows that no evidence supports the assumption (kalpanā) of an omniscient being in the past (ŚlV 117–136/TS 3184–3236) and finally argues that, even if there had been such a being, he would have been unable to teach (ŚlV 137–140/TS 3237–3239). The second part of his demonstration, which is by far the longest, starts with a very simple argument showing how our main means of knowledge (pramāṇa) have no grip on an omniscient being:

First, people like us do not see an omniscient being now; nor is it possible to postulate that there was [such a being], as [one can] deny [it]. Nor [can one postulate] an omniscient being on the basis of Scripture, for his [Scripture would have the undesirable consequence of having] mutual reliance [with his being an omniscient being]. If [Scripture] is composed by others, how is it understood to be a means of valid cognition?

In a suggestive note of his recent study of PVSV (Steinkellner 2013: 45–48, n. 49), E. Steinkellner proposes to link the development of the theory of anupalabdhi in Dharmakīrti’s *Hetuprakaraṇa to the debate on omniscience as known to us in particular through the works of Kumārila. See Steinkellner 2013: “(…) ein wichtiger Anstoß für die kräftige Entwicklung der Lehre von der negativen Erkenntnis durch Kumārila und stärker noch durch Dharmakīrti [ist] in der bei Kumārila sichtbar werdenden Polemik der Mīmāṃsā gegen die Ansicht von der Existenz eines Allwissenden (sarvajña) zu identifizieren” (p. 46).

The ViV provides, in a way, a powerful confirmation of this insight, as do the passage of the Nyāyabindu translated above (n. 40) and the statement from Kamalaśīla’s Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṃkṣipta quoted by Steinkellner (p. 47). I also fully agree that most of Kumārila’s arguments against omniscience do not hold against Dharmakīrti’s elucidation of anupalabdhi (see below § 2.3–4). But one may also wonder how far the question of omniscience was present to Dharmakīrti’s mind from the very beginning and, if it was, why he never mentions it in the Pramāṇavārttika. It is not impossible that Maṇḍana’s text reflects and elaborates on developments which are characteristic of Dharmakīrti’s later work.

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All kārikā-numbers refer to the codanā-section (ad MīŚū 1.1.2).


Despite its simplicity and extreme popularity in later philosophical literature,\(^45\) the argument is not even mentioned in the ViV.\(^46\) A plausible explanation for this could lie in Dharmakīrti’s newly introduced distinction of two kinds of non-apprehension (anupalabdhi): non-apprehension in general (anupalabdhimātra [PVSV 101.23]; anupalambhamātra [PVSV 103.3]) and non-apprehension of what, under normal circumstances, would be fit for (perceptual) apprehension (upalabdhiyogya [PVSV 101.18]).\(^47\) As Dharmakīrti explains it, the first type of non-apprehension can only produce doubt (samśaya) as to the existence of the object, but cannot prove its non-existence (asattā);\(^48\) from our point of view, an object we do not perceive (say, ghosts, or a particular deity) may as well exist or not.\(^49\) The second type of non-apprehension, on the other hand, positively establishes its non-existence,\(^50\) like when we do not see a pot in front of our eyes even in the clear light of day. Following this important distinction, echoed in the passage of the ViV translated above (§ 2.2), the fact that an omniscient being “is not seen” (na drṣyate) has no value whatsoever to prove that there is no such being, regardless of whether we speak of the perception of a single person (svapratyakṣa) or of everyone’s perception (sarvapratyakṣa).\(^51\) But the point is not only about perception. Dharmakīrti further claims that even complete lack of evidence about an object cannot persuade us of its non-existence (unless, of course, it fits all conditions for present perceptual apprehension): “one cannot ascertain that [objects that are at a distance] do not exist, even in the absence of [all] three means of knowledge.

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\(^45\) See the quite impressive list of quotations of these verses in Kataoka 2011: 29–30. The fact that an omniscient being “is not seen now” (na [...] idānīṃ drṣyate) is also, as we remember, the basic argument of Bhavya’s pūrvapakṣa in the Mīmāṃsā-section of his Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā (15ab) (on Bhavya’s relation with Kumārila, see above n. 10).

\(^46\) One could read an echo of Kumārila’s argument in ViV 19, where Maṇḍana underlines that an omniscient being can neither be perceived, as he is “not within the reach of the senses” (indriyāṇāṃ na gocaraḥ [ViVª 19b]), nor inferred, for the very same reason (ata eva [ViVª 19c]). Yet we should also pay attention to the fact that Maṇḍana thereby only wants to prove our ignorance (ajñāna [S 686.2]) of an omniscient being, while its non-existence or intrinsic impossibility (anupapatti) is considered sufficiently proved by the preceding section (ViV 15–18). Kumārila, on the other hand, evaluates which supposition (kalpanā) – that of the Veda’s authorlessness or that of an omniscient being – is more dispendious (see ŚlV [codana°] 116). His reasoning is therefore against the probability for the Omniscient’s existence, while Maṇḍana’s claim is only, on an epistemic level, about our knowledge of that person.

\(^47\) On these two types of anupalabdhi, see Steinkellner (1967: 157–158), who proposes to distinguish between non-apprehension in general (“Nicht-Beobachtung im Allgemeinen”) and non-apprehension in particular (“Nicht-Beobachtung im Besonderen”) in the Pramāṇavārttika. Additional remarks on this distinction are found in Steinkellner 2013: 44.


\(^49\) See PVSV 101.11: anupalalabhyamānō na san nāsan, satām api svabhāvādviprakārṣāt kadā cid anupalambhāt; PV 1.202a: sadasannิścayaphalā [anupalabdhiḥ]; PVSV 103.1–2: yasya kasya cit svabhāvo nopalabhya deśādviprakārṣāt, na sa tadanupalabhhamātriṇāsan nāmā.

\(^50\) See PVSV 101.17–18: asattāyām (…) pramānām.

\(^51\) Although Dharmakīrti does not mention these two cases in the PVSV, the distinction is found in some of his later works, as pointed out by Stern (1988: 1023). See for instance NB 2.27 ([…] deśādviprakāṛṣṭe ‘arthesv ānānātāvyaśansūtrītārthāvādhāvāhāvāhi śūnyāt [Vādanyāya 10.12–14] (na hy anumānādīnīvīrgȳrthābhāvam gamayati, vyāhīcārāt, na sarvapratyakṣanīvīrgȳrthāh, asiddheḥ, nāmānātāvyaśansūtrītārthāvāhāvāhi śūnyāt).
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[i.e.: perception, inference, and teaching through Scripture] (pramāṇatrayanivruttāv api). Maṇḍana’s adoption of this argument without any change in the ViV can therefore be read as a rejection of Kumārila’s whole strategy for denying the existence of an omniscient being by mere lack of a pramāṇa capable of establishing it. To put it differently, Kumārila’s proof against the probability of the existence of an omniscient being – quite sufficient for the apologetic purpose of ‘weighing’ kalpanās – is systematically put aside by Maṇḍana, whose only concern is now with the intrinsic impossibility of omniscience.

2.4 The topic of non-apprehension is not the only one where Maṇḍana chooses to distance himself from Kumārila by siding with Dharmakīrti. In v. 137 of the codanā-section of the ŚīV, Kumārila famously points to a contradiction in the assumption of the Buddha’s omniscience:

had the Buddha really been omniscient, he would have been unable to teach; teaching is a form of operation (vyāpāra) that naturally implies some kind of intention to speak, thus a form of desire/passion (rāga), incompatible with the supposedly dispassionate (rāgarahita) state characterizing the Omniscient.

As is well-known, Dharmakīrti is familiar with Kumārila’s argument (or a similar one) and considers it a fundamentally flawed use of the inference from the effect (kāryānumāna). Surely, some teachings are

52 PVSV 102.10: na ca te pramāṇatrayanivruttāv api na santīti śakyante vyavasātum. The three means of knowledge (pramāṇatraya) are enumerated in PV 1.199. This point, which is developed in the whole SV on this verse, is reiterated at the very end of the first chapter of the PV. See PV 1.339cd and PV 176.11–12: tenāsanniścayaphalānupalabdhir na sidhyati // tasmān na pramāṇatrayanivruttāv api viprakṛṣṭey avahāvaniścayah; “[PV:] Therefore, it is not established that non-apprehension results in the ascertainment [of something] as non-existent. [SV:] Therefore, the non-existence of [things] beyond the reach [of ordinary cognition] cannot be ascertained even if all three means of valid cognition [should] fail to operate” (read asanniścaya° instead of asaṃniścaya°; translation: Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012: 76–77; I modify “non-perception” into “non-apprehension”).

53 The same kind of refutation also forms the basis of immediately later Buddhist defences of omniscience, like that of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. See McClintock 2010: 165–187. Śāntarakṣita’s use of Dharmakīrti’s analysis of anupalabdhimātra as productive of a mere doubt (saṁśaya) is also clear. See TS 3300–3301, translated in McClintock 2010: 186. I find it quite remarkable that Kumārila, who, according to the now (almost) consensual hypothesis of Frauwallner (1962), wrote the BT partly as a response to Dharmakīrti’s *Hetuprakaraṇa, does not modify at all his strategy in what could be his last great work. On the contrary, far from renouncing his proof of the Omniscient’s non-existence by mere lack of evidence, Kumārila brings it to its perfection in the BT by adding to the examination of perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and speech (śabda) carried out in the ŚīV a consideration of comparison (upamāna) and presumption (arthāpatti) as well. See BT (= TS 3214–3228).

54 As we have seen (§ 2.3), this constitutes the third part of Kumārila’s argument in that section.

55 ŚīV (codanā°) 137: rāgādirahite cāsmin nirvyāpāre vyavasthite i desāṇāyapraṇātiva syād rte pratya-veksanāt //; “And when he is established as having no action because he lacks desire and so on, [his] teaching could only have been composed by others without having [directly] observed [anything].” Translation: Kataoka 2011: 366–369.

56 See Kataoka 2003a: 55–63, Kataoka 2011: 366–369 (nn. 425–426). Doubts about this identification have been expressed by J. Taber (see Eltschinger/Taber/Krasser 2012: 119–120, n. 3) since Kumārila, unlike Dharmakīrti, does not mention the Buddha’s speech (vacana) but only his operation (vyāpāra). Though I agree that only a quote could settle the matter, I find the objection hardly convincing for, as already pointed out by Steinkellner (2013: 85), one fails to see to which ‘operation’ Kumārila could possibly allude if not to the Buddha’s teaching (desanā), which would otherwise have to be promulgated by others (anyapraṇātā). Further arguments in favour of Kataoka’s identification on the basis of the structure of PVSV have been voiced by Steinkellner (2013: 84–87), who carefully concludes that
made out of desire for a benefit, as we observe among worldly teachers, but this need not be the case for all teachings and does not rule out other reasons for teaching, less incompatible with the state of omniscience, such as compassion (karuṇā): “Just as a passionate [person] (rakta) speaks, so does the impassionate (virakta) one, too. Therefore it is not apprehended from speech as such [whether one is passionate or dispassionate].” That this is precisely the argument alluded to by Maṇḍana when he says in the ViV that “speech, etc. do not rule out [the existence of an omniscient being], as there is no contradiction [in his making use of speech, etc.]” (argument no. 3 in the above-quoted text) is proved, besides the explicit mention of “speech, etc.” (vacanādi), by a further allusion to the SV on PV 1.12 in the first book of the BS. In that passage, Maṇḍana distinguishes between two concepts of desire – icchā (desire in general) and rāga (passion, which is an obstacle to liberation from saṃsāra) –, and it is again Dharmakīrti’s definition of rāga in PVSV 9.5–6 that he calls for support.

Passion (rāga) is not mere desire (icchāmātra); they call “passion” that attachment to unreal qualities [of the object] brought about by nescience (avidyākṣiptam abhūtagunābhīniveśa). But the mind’s inclination (prasāda) towards reality – i.e. its delight (abhiruci) [in reality] or desire (abhīcchā) [for it] –, following [its] purification through the vision of reality, does not fall into the category of “passion” (rāga), just as aversion produced by one’s vision of reality which is the worthlessness of transmigration does not fall into the category of “hatred” (dveṣa).
2.5 As we can already see from our analysis of its initial portion, the discussion of omniscience in ViV 15 reveals Maṇḍana’s deep familiarity with the works of Dharmakīrti – especially PV 1 and the Svavṛtti, but also the Nyāyabindu and, as we shall see later on (§ 3.5), the Pramāṇaviniścaya –, far deeper in any case than that of any Mīmāṃsaka before (and perhaps even after) him. But it also testifies to the complexity of his engagement with the famous Buddhist logician, which contrasts with Kumārila’s strategy of frontal confrontation with Buddhism in general. It is noteworthy in this respect that the debate is never on matters of pure logic, an impression that can only be confirmed by the remaining part of ViV 15. The two kinds of non-apprehension, the negation of the effect through the negation of its cause (see below, § 3), even Dharmakīrti’s conclusions about fallacious uses of the inference from the effect: everything is accepted in block by Maṇḍana and never questioned again in his work. His way to consider anew the topic of the Buddha’s omniscience in the ViV is therefore to play, so to say, Dharmakīrti’s part, and to reconstruct what could have been a ‘Dharmakīrtian’ answer to Kumārila from elements scattered throughout Dharmakīrti’s works. But this is just a prelude to Maṇḍana’s real encounter with Dharmakīrti, carried out once again with his own weapons. The field of this encounter, however, would not be pure logic any more, but the epistemology of perception.

3. Time, perception and Scripture: on a mīmāṃsaka use of kāraṇānapalabdhi

3.1 If the bulk of Kumārila’s arguments against the Buddha’s omniscience, as we have seen, finds no favour in the eyes of his most immediate successor in Mīmāṃsā, a small section of the ŚlV (codanā° – 112–115) and BT (= TS 3157–3183) remains to be investigated, in which Kumārila argues for the incompatibility between omniscience and the very nature of perception. That preoccupation, at least, is well in line with Maṇḍana’s philosophical agenda and the problem is in fact at the heart of his enquiry in ViV 15. Once again, the occasion for this reflection is given to him by a logical remark by Dharmakīrti. As we have seen before (§ 2.3), Dharmakīrti insists in the PV that mere absence of perception (or even of knowledge in general) of an object that is not fit for perceptual apprehension produces no certitude (niścaya) of its non-existence, but only doubt (saṃśaya) regarding its existence. However, there are other ways to produce such a proof of the non-existence of an object, one of them being to find evidence for the absence of a cause (kāraṇa) of the object, as explained in the following passage of the PV and SV:61

[PV:] But the fact that we do not know the efficient [cause] (kāraṇakājñāna) of [a given] effect proves that [such an effect] does not exist. [SV:] In case the [property] to be proved is the non-existence (abhāva) of a [given] nature (svabhāva), [we just] said62 that the [mere] absence of apprehension of that [na-

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61 PV 1.201cd and PVSV 103.16–18: kārte tu kāraṇakājñānām abhāvasyaiva sādhakam // svabhāvabhāve sādhye tadanupalambha evaśrāmānam ucyate. kāraṇakālpamābhās tu pramāṇām eva. na hy asti saṃbhavo yad asati kāraṇe kāryam syāt.

62 See PVSV 103.1–2: yasya kasya cit svabhāvo nopalabhyate desādviprakārsan na sa tadanupalambhamātrenāsanām nāma, yathoktam prāk. On the identification of the passage alluded to by Dharmakīrti (PVSV 101.11 or 102.11–12?), see Steinkellner 2013: 273 (n. 543).
ture] does not constitute a [valid] means of knowledge (*apramāṇam*). But the non-apprehension of [its] efficient [cause] (*kārakānapalambha*) is a [valid] means of knowledge (*pramāṇam eva*), for it is impossible (*nāsti sambhavaḥ*) that an effect should take place without a cause.

Dharmakīrti’s reasoning is clearly alluded to in the passage quoted above (§ 2.2) by Maṇḍana, who does not speak, however, of “non-apprehension of a cause” (*kārāṇānupalambhaḥ*/*anupalabdhī*), but simply of the “absence of a cause” (*kārāṇanivṛtti*). And indeed, a major issue of Dharmakīrti’s reasoning – which is not entirely clear from this passage of the *SV* – is that “non-apprehension of the efficient [cause]” (*kārakānapalambha*) cannot be mere non-apprehension (*anupalabdhamātra*), but has to be non-apprehension of the second kind, where the object is fit for (perceptual) apprehension, lest the inference becomes equally inconclusive.64 This, of course, is not the case of most objects placed at a distance (*viprakṛṣṭa*) or supersensible (*atīndriya*) objects like particular deities, etc., whose cause is very likely to be also beyond the reach of the senses. The case of omniscience is somewhat peculiar, though, due to the presupposition – apparently shared by all participants in this debate – that (valid) knowledge of all things must be, to begin with, valid knowledge over all. Just as “persons of exception” (*puruṣātiśaya*) remain persons all the same, “exceptional visions” (*darśanātiśaya*) differ in degree (of precision, intensity, clarity, etc.) from ordinary perceptions, but they obey the same principles as any other perceptual cognition.65 Maṇḍana’s task is, then, to prove that the cause of perception is such that it can never produce a knowledge of all things, and thereby to undermine the very possibility (*sambhava*) of omniscience.66

3.2  Kumārila, who already had some thoughts on that topic, mostly insists on the mutual delimitation of our senses, which disqualifies a cognition of all things at once: acute as it

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63 The expression *kārakānapalambha* used in the PVSV is of course equivalent to the compound *kārāṇānupalabdhī* found in Dharmakīrti’s later works (see above n. 37).

64 This point is well made by Yāita (1985: 202, n. 65).

65 On *puruṣātiśaya* / *śātiśayo naraḥ*, see BT (= TS 3161/3159) and PV(SV) 1.311. The expression *darśanātiśaya* is used, for instance, in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s *Nyāyamañjarī* (*NM* 1: 268.3) to define the cognition of *yogin*s. A similar use of *atiśaya* applied to cognition is found in the ŚLV (*codanā° – 114) and BṬ (= TS 3386).

66 Interestingly, this seems to be precisely the point where the problem of omniscience is taken up by Śaṅkaranandana in his *Varṇaśisīḍhī*, possibly written in the 9th century. See SSt 2: *jñātakārāṇasadbhāvā sambhaviny anyakāryavat / sarvārthavīṣayā samvīt, sa hi sambhava ucye; “A consciousness encompassing all objects, like [any] other effect, is possible (sambhavin) [only] if the actual existence of its cause (kāraṇasadbhāva) is known; for this is what [we] call ‘possibility’ (sambhava).”* The corresponding prose portion, a preliminary edition of which is established by Eltschinger (2008: 140–141), is still too obscure (to me, at least) to provide any reliable information about the intellectual background of this stanza. The proximity between Maṇḍana and Śaṅkaranandana’s way of speaking of omniscience (*sarvārtheṣu samvid [Maṇḍana]/sarvārthavīṣayā samvid [Śaṅkaranandana]) need not be significant, but is nevertheless striking. The same kind of consideration is also found in Ratnakīrti’s *Varṇaśisīḍhī*: *nana kārāṇānupalambhād eva sarvārhatapratisedhah sidhiyat; “[Objection:] but, the negation of omniscience is established by the non-apprehension of its cause (kārāṇānupalambha)!”* (SS2 7.19–20). See also Moriyama 2014: 64 (n. 29).
may be, the eye – be it a Divine Eye – will never perceive sounds or smells; yet sounds or
smells are, no doubt, part of the totality of being. In order to grasp everything at once, the
senses of the Omniscient would therefore have to function simultaneously in an eminent
way, a possibility which contradicts the widely admitted principle that two cognitions
(say, the smell of a strawberry and the vision of its red colour) never take place exactly at
the same time. As before, but for reasons that are far less clear, this popular reasoning
did not find its way into the ViV. Maṇḍana prefers to concentrate on another aspect
of the mīmāṃsaka theory of perception, going back to Jaimini’s treatment of pratyakṣa
in MīŚu 1.1.4, namely its relation to the present time (vidyamāna). Perception, so the
śūtra goes, cannot be a cause (nimitta) for our knowledge of dharma “because it grasps
[something] present” (vidyamānapalambhanatvāt). Applying this conclusion to the debate

As noted by Moriyama (2014: 60–61), the quotation of scriptural passages mentioning the Buddha’s
“Divine Eye” (divyacakṣus) by commentators on ŚlV (codana) 112–115 and by Kamalaśīla while
commenting on a verse of the BT (ad TS 3159–3160) in TSP 999.12–13 is certainly not done by chance.
It is indeed likely that Kumārila had this or a similar notion in mind while discussing this topic.

Although this last part of the argument is not voiced by Kumārila, it seems nevertheless a natural
consequence of his statements about the senses and their limited domain. It is found explicitly in
Kamalaśīla’s commentary on TS 3157. See TSP 998.7–9: na caitac chakyate vaktum mā bhūd ekena jñānena
yugapad atiśaya dṛṣṭaḥ sa svārthānatilaṅghanāt / diṛsaṅskāmāt dṛṣṭaḥ sa Śyāmāna
na rūpe srotavṛttītaḥ //; “However, if [you] postulate that he knows everything through a single means
of valid cognition, he surely grasps all tastes, etc. with the eye! Even when superiority of a particular
[pramāṇa] is seen, in so far as [a sense] does not go beyond [its] own object, that [superiority] can
[happen] in perceiving things that are remote, subtle, etc., [but] it is not the case that the ear should

To the already long list of quotes of ŚlV (codana) 112–114 enumerated by Kataoka (2011: 27–29), I
can only add the (somewhat unexpected) quotation of v. 112ab in Helārāja’s Prakīrṇaprakāśa
(vol. 1, p. 54.17–54.18; I thank Vincenzo Vergiani for drawing my attention to this passage).

Helārāja’s response to Kumārila is quite unique in that the 10th-century Kashmiri grammarian directly
counters the Mīmāṃsaka’s claim that the domains of the senses are mutually impenetrable, and does so on
the basis of some hitherto unidentified Scripture (āgama): tac ca tāvam śiṣṭāṃ śiṣṭaṃ jñānām sarvendriyam,
pratītiyamānapaścanañāt, sarvajñā hindriyāntareṇaṃ hindriyāntaravāyāparāṃ kurvanti, tathā cāgamaḥ
naddānām indriyān eva paśyanti, ghrāṇataḥ śabdām śrōti, prṣṭho rūpaḥ paśyati, apy angulagreṇām
sarvendriyārthān upalaḥbyate; “And this knowledge of the Learned Ones (śiṣṭa) is [produced] by all
of the senses (sarvendriya), for omniscient [beings] accomplish the operation of a sense even by means of
another, as it is said in the [following] Scripture: ‘Now they do not see only by the senses. [In
that state,] one hears sounds by [the organ of] smell, sees forms [even] in [one’s] back. More than
that! One grasps all sensory objects even with the tip of a finger!’” (Prakīrṇaprakāśa 54.1–5).

The boldness of Helārāja’s statement appears by comparing it, for instance, to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s much milder
response to Kumārila: rasādīrāhīni api yoginām indriyāni cāksuravad atiśayavanty eveti na rasādīṣu
caksuryāpārām pariṣṭikyate; “The senses by which yogīns grasp smells, etc. are also eminent, just like
[their] eyes, so there is no need to assume an operation of the eye towards smells, etc.” (NM, 270.1–2).
It is impossible to decide if Mandana positively rejected Kumārila’s claim (and in that case, on which
basis), or simply considered it irrelevant to the present debate. I find it unlikely, in any case, that he
ignored it.
on omniscience, Maṇḍana makes it into a general statement as to the nature of sensory perception:  

Perception, when brought about by the eye, etc. [does] not [apply] to all objects, for the [eye, etc.] have a restricted domain: their domain is exclusively some particular [object], which is present (vartamāna) and related (sambaddha) [to the senses], and not all objects are like that. Now it is true that, since it is possible to be aware of all sorts of knowable objects, a restriction (niyama) [of the domain of perception] in terms of form (rūpa) is hardly defensible, and so is also [its restriction] in terms of acuity, feebleness, etc. (paṭumandatādi). [Moreover,] since we cognize (pari-√chid) objects at all sorts of distance and in [all sorts of] measures, a restriction of relation in terms of distance (deśa) [or] measure (parimāna) [is also not possible]. But [a restriction] in terms of time (kāla) is defensible (nirūpyate), for in [the view that the eye, etc.] operate by reaching [their object] (prāpyakāritve), they cannot reach it if [the object] is not present; the same [is true] in [the view that the eye, etc.] operate without reaching [their object] (aprāpyakāritve), since [in that case] one needs a [special] capacity (sāmarthya) of the object [to be known], [and objects] that have not come into being or have ceased to exist have no [such] capacity, for they are inexpressible (anupākhyeya) [in terms of being and non-being]. And therefore the eye, etc., should they have a special excellence (ati-√śī), may only make their own domain known in an eminent way (adhikam) in terms of distance, measure [and] number, but not what is beyond their domain, [namely] what has not come to existence, [and] what has ceased to exist. Therefore it is said [in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.4]: “because it grasps something present” (vidyamānopalambhanatvāt).

Both characteristics of the object of perception highlighted in this passage (sambhandhal vartamānatva) have their source in MiŚū 1.1.4, where “contact with the senses of a person” (samprayog[ah] puruṣasayendriyānām) is mentioned besides “being grasped at the present time” (vidyamānopalambhanatvān ātmanā). Yet it is obviously the second characteristic that, above all, captivates Maṇḍana’s attention. His four-fold suspension of restriction (niyama) in
Maṇḍana Miśra’s Excursus on the Buddha’s Omniscience

terms of form, acuity, measure and distance (to which number can be added) also makes
the very idea of a relation with the senses practically useless. For what kind of ‘relation’
would there be between the senses and objects placed at an extreme distance, for instance,
if not their mere coexistence in one and the same moment? And what would be the point
of restricting the object of perception to what is ‘related’ to the senses if virtually everything
can be related to them? Thus it is possible to read in this text a form of thought experiment,
allowing us to discriminate between factual limitations of perception (in terms of form,
size, etc.) which, in principle, can be suspended, and a natural limitation of perception,
i.e. its relation to the present time, which no artificial extension of our faculties can allow
us to surpass. This insistance on the temporal dimension of perception might be a natural
consequence of Maṇḍana’s main thesis in the field of ontology, voiced in ViV 12, identifying
existence (sattā) with being present (vartamānatā): if only present things are perceptible,
it is perhaps because they only ‘exist’ in the true sense of the term. But this might also
be his one true link to Kumārila, whose core argument against the possibility of foresight
(obviously an essential component of omniscience) in ŚlV (codanā°) 115 is precisely the
natural limitation of sensory perception to the present moment.

3.3 Maṇḍana’s strategy against omniscience thus appears, at this point, essentially as a
reduction of Kumārila’s arguments to a single one: perception, relying on the operation
of the senses, can only grasp things in the present. His use of this argument in ViV 15,
however, marks a radically different approach to Buddhist theories of perception. As we
have seen, all arguments of the ŚlV (codanā°) 112–114 and the corresponding verses of
the BT are based on the capacity of the senses to grasp all things in a single moment of
perception, and this may safely be extended to his remark in v. 115 as well. This presupposes
that perception can occur only through the senses, an assumption justified, in Kumārila’s
perspective, by his rejection of all kinds of supersensory perception in the chapter of the ŚlV
dealing with pratyakṣa (ad MiSū 1.1.4). Quite the opposite, Maṇḍana chooses to confront
Buddhist epistemologists on their own ground in order to show that even supersensory
perception as they conceive it is incompatible with omniscience. This ‘dialectical’ attitude,
so characteristic of Maṇḍana’s philosophical style, allows him to open an entirely new
field of philosophical enquiry into the nature of the Omniscient’s cognition, which was to
acquire some prominence in later stages of this debate.

74 Maṇḍana’s equation between being and being present forms the topic of the third study in this series.
See David (forthcoming).
75 ŚlV (codanā°) 115ac: bhaviṣyati na dṛṣṭaṃ ca pratyakṣasya manāg api / sāmarthyam; “It is never
seen that perception has even a bit (manāg api) of capacity with regard to a thing in the future.”
Translation: Kataoka 2011: 329. Unsurprisingly, Kumārila reads in MiSū 1.1.4, especially in the reason
vidyamānopalambhanatvāt, an implicit attack against the possibility of yogic perception. See ŚlV
(pratyakṣa°) 26–27ab (translated in Taber 2005: 54).
76 The earliest echo of this shift in the Mīmāṃsakas’ attitude towards omniscience in a Buddhist text
might be found in Kamalaśīla’s Pañjikā on TS 3156–3157 (= BT), where the learned Buddhist scholar
takes into consideration two hypotheses about the nature of the “complete knowledge of all things”
(sakalavastuparijñāna): sensory cognition (indriyajñāna) and mental cognition (manoviññāna). See
TSP 997.20–998.21. It is possible that Kamalaśīla’s comments on these stanzas should be read as
an effort to integrate Maṇḍana’s arguments into Śāntarakṣita’s mainly Kumārilan framework. His
examination of mental cognition (TSP 998.18–21), in particular, with his insistence on the mind’s
3.4 Three types of perceptual awareness are considered in ViV 15, corresponding to Dharmakīrti’s four types with the exception of self-awareness (svasamvedana): perception “born from the eye, etc.” (cakṣurādijanman), “mental” (mānasa) perception and perception “born from meditation” (bhāvanāmayā), which is also how Dharmakīrti defines the cognition of yogins (yogināṁ jñānam).

Among them, the greatest attention is not devoted to the last kind of perception, as we would probably expect, but to mental cognition. For sure, external senses are riveted to the present time, but the mind need not be; in fact we observe that dreams, fantasies and other creations of the mind have no evident link to the world of sensation, and also deal with past and future events. Could omniscience be a cognition of that kind? We cannot be sure whether Maṇḍana had a particular Buddhist thinker or school in mind while refuting that possibility, but I find it unlikely that his opponent should be Dharmakīrti, whose conception of mental cognition (manovijñāna [NB 1.9]) explicitly excludes independence of the mind from the senses. In fact it seems Maṇḍana chooses once again not to refute Dharmakīrti’s ideas – at least, not at first –, but skilfully to take them out of their original context to fit his own purpose. As is well-known, mental perception for Dharmakīrti does not only cover internal mental phenomena such as awareness of pleasure and pain, but also the (non-conceptual) moment of attention immediately following a sensation, that of a patch of blue for instance, in which we become aware that there is ‘something’ in front of us without yet knowing that it is ‘blue.’ His main preoccupation in PV 3.239–248 is precisely to show that the content (viṣaya) of that moment of perception is different (anyā) from what has been previously experienced (pūrvānubhūta) – so that it can be considered valid knowledge (pramāṇa) –, but is also not entirely “unseen” (adṛṣṭa), so that awareness of sound, for instance, cannot follow from a sensation of blue, or awareness...

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77 On these four types, see for instance NB 1.7–11.
79 This is, at least, the assumption made by Umbeka Bhaṭṭa (8th c.?), the oldest commentator on the ŚlV , who begins his commentary on ŚlV (codanā°) 115 with the following objection: nanu heypoḍeṣya-grāhakasya viññānasasyāstä ekam kāraṇam bhāvanā, kim ucyate kāraṇānupalabdhyā kāryābhāva iti? bhāvanājanyapratyakṣam dharmādharmagrāhakatvena tair iṣṭam!; “[Objection:] but, there is [indeed] a cause for the cognition that grasps what is to be abandoned and what is to be appropriated, [namely] meditation (bhāvanā)! Why do [you] say that ‘the effect does not exist since one does not grasp [its] cause’? They [= Buddhists] maintain that perception born from meditation (bhāvanājanyam pratyakṣam) is what grasps merit and demerit!” (Tātparyaṭīkā 74.7–8; translation: Moriyama 2014: 64 [modified]). The phrase kāraṇānupalabdhyā kāryābhāva recalls Maṇḍana’s formulation in ViV 15 (kāraṇānivṛttaṁ kāryābhāvam), and it is possible that Umbeka, who is also the author of a commentary on Maṇḍana’s Bhāvanāviveka, makes here an approximative quote of the ViV.
80 The possibility that dreams (svapna) manifest the mind’s capacity to grasp external objects independently of the senses – a hypothesis Maṇḍana eventually rules out – is the topic of a separate investigation in ViV 16 (S 583.2–590.3). This enquiry, carried out essentially with non-Buddhist arguments and only loosely related to the question of omniscience, need not concern us here.
of blue from no sensation at all, as in the case a blind man.\textsuperscript{82} Taking the best party of these remarks, Maṇḍana insists, in his turn, on the dependence (pāratantrya) of the mind (manas) on the senses when it comes to external objects (bahir):\textsuperscript{83}

Even mental perception (mānasam pratyakṣam) [cannot produce omni-
science],\textsuperscript{84} for the mind (manas) has no autonomy (asvatantratvāt) [with regard to what is] outside (bahir).\textsuperscript{85} If it had [such an] autonomy (svātattvāya), the undesired consequence would be that nobody would be blind, deaf, etc. To explain: regarding perceptive awareness (pratyakṣa[m] vedana[m]) of forms/colours, etc. (rūpādī), the [mind] is dependent (paratantra) on [senses] like the eye, [and] it is limited by their very limitation (niyama);\textsuperscript{86} otherwise, as [we have just] said, the undesired consequence would be that nobody would be blind, etc. If [you object] that [this undesired consequence, namely] that nobody would be blind, etc. does not occur, for [mental perception] depends on the [objective] correlate of [its] homogeneous and immediate cause [i.e. a cognition] born from the [senses] (tajjasamanantarapratyayasahakāryapekṣaṇād),\textsuperscript{87} [our answer is that,] in all cases, the dependence [on the operation of

\textsuperscript{82} See PV 3.239–244: pūrvānubhātagrahaṇe mānasasyāpramāṇatā / adṛṣṭagrahaṇe ‘ndhāder api syād arthadarśanam // (…) tuṣṭād indriyāvijñānānantarapratyayodbhavah / mano ‘nyam eva grahyati viṣayaṁ nāndhādik tatā // svārthāvātiḥapekṣaiḥ hetur indriyajā matiḥ / tato ‘nyagrāhane ‘py aṣya niyatagrahyatā matā //; “If mental [perception] grasps [an object] that has been experienced before (pūrvānubhāta), then it is not a means of valid knowledge (apramāṇatā); if it grasps something [entirely] unseen (adṛṣṭa), then a vision of the object would occur also to a blind man, etc. (…) Therefore, the mind [= mental cognition] (manas), born from the immediate cause (anantarapratyaya) that is a sensory cognition (indriyāvijñāna), grasps an entirely different object (anyam eva viṣayam) [with respect to that sensation], so that [the undesired consequence that is] the vision [of the object by a blind man does not] occur. [Still,] the sensory cognition (indriyajā matiḥ) that is [its] cause (hetu) is entirely dependent (apekṣaiḥ) on an object (arha) related to its own object [as its immediate cause] (svārthāvāya); so, even though it grasps something different, [we] consider that it grasps [only] a delimited object (niyatagrahyatā).” See also Vetter 1964: 40 and PVin 1.19 (19.1–7). A thorough account of Dharmakīrti’s theory of mental cognition is given by Vācaspati in the NyK (471.2–473.8); the passage has been translated into English by Stcherbatsky (1930; 318–320).

\textsuperscript{83} ViV 15: mānasam api pratyakṣam, bahir manaso ‘svatantratvāt, svātattvāya ‘ndhabhirādhyābhāvnaprasanāt, tathā hi: pratyakṣe rūpādevidane tac caṣṭarūṣatparratāram tanniṣayām eva niyayaṃ, anyathāhādihāvyābhāvaprasanād ity auktaṃ, tajjasamanantarapratyayasahakāryapekṣaṇād yadi nāndhādībhāvah sarvathā na pāratantryamṇāvartate, tadviṣayaJayāvyāsayatvāb, anyathāhādurītāntarajāsahakārino ‘py pravṛtteḥ sa evāntṛādhyābhāvah (S 468.1–474.2 [= M 119.1/G 84.3–85.5]), a na pāratantryam S: pāratantryam na M G; b tadviṣayaJayāvyāsayatvā S: tadviṣayaJayāvyāsayatvā M G; c indriyāntaraajā M G: indriyāntaraä. The order of the sentences differs widely between S and both printed editions (M/G); I do not reproduce these variants here.

\textsuperscript{84} See NyK: mānasam api pratyakṣam na sarvaṁ bodhayatī (468.13).

\textsuperscript{85} Cf. ViV\textsuperscript{k} 15d: parantarān traḥ bahir manah; “Regarding external [objects], the mind is dependent (paratantra) [on the senses]” (S 458.3 [= M 114.3/G 81.3]).

\textsuperscript{86} As we have seen before, the essential limitation of the senses, in Maṇḍana’s view, is their incapacity to grasp objects in the past or future.

\textsuperscript{87} Cf. PV 3.243ab (translated above, n. 82), PVin 1.19 (19.5–7) and NB 1.9. The latter’s definition reads as follows: svasiṣayaantararūṣatasahakāryindriyāśayena samanantarapratyayena janitam tan manovijñānām; “[M]ental perception is the product of a sense perception which forms its immediately preceding homogeneous cause, and which cooperates with the immediately succeeding facsimile [i.e. the second moment] of its proper object.” Translation: Kajiyama 1998: 45.
the senses] does not disappear, for the content [of mental perception] is born of the content of a [particular sense].\textsuperscript{88} Were it not, since [mental perception] would take place because of a [moment] that would cooperate with [the cognition] born from another sense (\textit{indriyāntarajasahakārīno} ‘pi),\textsuperscript{89} there would indeed be no blind, etc.!

Despite the presentation of the arguments in a polemical form, there is probably little here that Dharmakīrti would actually disagree with. I find it in general unlikely that a philosopher arguing for the mind’s autonomy (\textit{svātantrya}) in grasping external objects would really draw any benefit from Dharmakīrti’s theory of mental awareness, and from his distinction of two objective ‘moments’ corresponding to sensory and mental perception. Maṇḍana’s detailed discussion of that theory in the ViV (S 474.2–542.1), leading him to reaffirm the orthodox \textit{mīmāṃsaka} view that “the mind never operates directly (sākṣāt) and independently (svatantram) on an [object] that is not internal (āntara),”\textsuperscript{90} thus conscientiously fulfills the epistemologist’s task, but has little bearing on the topic of omniscience proper.

\textbf{3.5} A more profound divergence between the two philosophers comes out of Maṇḍana’s brief discussion of perception “born from meditation” (\textit{bhāvanāmayā}) at the end of ViV 15 (S 542.1–555.2). While Kumārila spoke in very general terms of “the perception of past or future objects, or of one that is very small or obstructed, believed by some to belong to yogins and liberated souls (muktātman),”\textsuperscript{91} Maṇḍana specifically addresses the Buddhist epistemologists’ conception of yogic perception, especially their belief that it results from “repeated practice” (\textit{abhyāsa}) or habituation to cognitive contents reached by some other means.\textsuperscript{92} As is well-known, Dharmakīrti thinks that the main cause of a yogin’s perception is mental cultivation or “meditation” (\textit{bhāvanā}), half way between ‘rumination’ of an idea in view of its perfect assimilation and ‘imagination’ understood as the vivid representation of something formerly conceived. In more Buddhist terms, meditation consists of the repeated

\textsuperscript{88} That is: the objective moment (\textit{kṣaṇa}) which forms the content (\textit{viṣaya}) of mental awareness of a patch of blue (K2), for instance, is not identical with the preceding objective moment (K1), the content of sensation. Yet both moments are not unrelated, since K1 is also the “homogeneous and immediate cause” (\textit{samanantarapratyaya}) of K2. In order for mental cognition to take place, then, we need two things: a (sensory) cognition which is its \textit{samanantarapratyaya} – or, in Vācaspati’s more oecumenic terms, its “material cause” (\textit{upādāna} – NyK 472.2) – and an objective correlate (\textit{sahakārin}) which is the immediate product of the objective moment (K1) grasped by that sensation. Thus, although sensation and mental awareness have different contents, they are nevertheless indissolubly intertwined.

\textsuperscript{89} I exceptionally disagree with Stern’s choice to read ‘\textit{indriyāntarasahakāriṇo}, and prefer the reading ‘\textit{indriyāntarajasahakāriṇo} transmitted in his Ms. B, in his own version of the NyK (474.5) and also chosen by both published editions of the ViV (M 120.5/G 85.4). Vācaspati’s interpretation of the compound \textit{indriyāntaraja} as referring to the cognition (\textit{indriyāntarajāviṣṇu}) which is the material cause (or \textit{samanantarapratyaya}) of mental awareness clearly supports that interpretation.

\textsuperscript{90} ViV 15: \textit{na kva cid\textsuperscript{a} anāntare manah sākṣāt svatantram pravartate} (S 541.3–4 [= M 140.6–141.1/G 100.3]). \textit{a} \textit{na kva cid S}; \textit{na kva cid api} M G. Cf. SīV (pratyakṣa\textsuperscript{a}) 160cd: \textit{pravṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkādau kevalasyaiva drśyate}; “(…) a functioning of the mind by itself is observed in respect to pleasure, pain, etc.” (text and translation: Taber 2005: 158 and 114).

\textsuperscript{91} SīV (pratyakṣa\textsuperscript{a}) 26ac: \textit{atītānāgate ‘py arthe sākṣāt pratyakṣam yoginīn īśitaṃ kaiś cin muktātmanām api} \textit{ḥi} (text: Taber 2005: 152; translation: Taber 2005: 54 [adapted]).

\textsuperscript{92} On \textit{abhyāsa} and its interpretation in Buddhist texts, see Eltschinger 2009: 184 (n. 57).
presentation to the mind of the practitioner of the four Nobles’ Truths, culminating in their direct apprehension (sākṣātkāra) or “vision” (darśana). To that activity Dharmakīrti ascribes the power – well-attested in persons subject to hallucinations born from desire, fear, madness, etc. – to produce an awareness with all external traits of perception: clarity (sphuṭābhatā [PV 3.8b]/spaṣṭa[tva] [PV 3.281d]/spaṣṭābhatā [PV 3.284c], etc.), non-conceptuality (kalpanāpo[h]a [PVinK 1.4a/PV 3.123]/akalpaka[tva] [PVinK 1.28d]/akalpa[tva] [PV 3.285d], etc.).

93 On the “vision of the [four] Nobles’ Truths” (āryasatyadarśana) as the specific goal of yogic perception for Dharmakīrti, see PVin 1.28 (27.11) and Eltschinger 2014b: 250–251. As convincingly shown by Eltschinger (2009: 199–200), that vision corresponds, in Dharmakīrti’s view, to the cognition of the Buddhist practitioner after the “revolution of the basis” (āśrayaparivṛtti) has taken place.


96 Maṇḍana alludes here to his own tripartition of Brahman-knowledge in the beginning of the Niyogakāṇḍa: “knowledge born from speech” (śabdāt pratipatītiḥ), knowledge “consisting of its continuous fixation” (tatsamānavaṃ [pratipatītiḥ]) and knowledge “consisting of a direct apprehension” (sākṣātkārarūpā [pratipatītiḥ]). See BS 74.10–13. Meditation (bhāvanā) as understood by Dharmakīrti corresponds, of course, to the second of these three stages.

97 BS 2.101–105ab (introduction): dvitiyapratipatītivisyayo hi na tattvāvadodbhavasyayah, kim tu tadabhāṣyāśīsyah (115.2–3 – I do not translate hi). Saṅkhapāṇi’s commentary (Brahmasiddhīvyākhyā 239.10–11) makes the precision that the difference between both types of knowledge (pratipatti) is equivalent to that between valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and memory (smṛti).

98 ViV 15: bhāvanāmayam apiḥ śrutānumitavasyam akasmād bhāvanāyogād āgamanumānəparatantram pūrvajānabhāṣyāśīsyah [pratipatītiḥ] and knowledge “consisting of a direct apprehension” (sākṣātkārarūpā [pratipatītiḥ]). See BS 74.10–13. Meditation (bhāvanā) as understood by Dharmakīrti corresponds, of course, to the second of these three stages.
In these lines, which I propose to read as a direct response to Dharmakīrti’s opposite statement in PVin 1.28, Maṇḍana inaugurates what would be the invariable position of the Advaita tradition on the nature of meditation or “contemplation” (nididhyāsana) for centuries to come. Meditation being only the repeated and progressively intensified thought of an object, it cannot produce by itself any knowledge of that object. So, in order to be mentally cultivated, the object must be reached by some other means, scriptural or inferential. If meditation, then, has its use as a means of assimilation or ‘realisation’ of what has been grasped, it does not bring anything new and because of that it is “not a means of valid knowledge” (apramāṇa).100 While Dharmakīrti interprets the transition from conceptual knowledge originated from Scripture and reasoning to the immediacy and non-conceptuality of the yogin’s insight as a passage from illusion to truth, Maṇḍana rather insists on the identity of content of all three cognitions: no matter how we take it, it is always the same reality that is “heard, thought and meditated upon,” as the Upaniṣad has it, and neither perception nor reasoning can grasp it without the help of Scripture. Beyond the limited controversy about the yogin’s cognition and its capacity to account for omniscience, we sense a deeper disagreement concerning the very function of Scripture and its place in the path to liberation: from a mere preliminary (and to a certain point superfluous) stage leading the adept to a more authentic and direct apprehension of reality in Dharmakīrti’s view, the audition of Scripture has become for Maṇḍana the very centre of his Vedāntic soteriology, the means of knowledge par excellence that other pramāṇas may of course supplement, but never entirely replace.

99 See PVin 1.28: yoginām api śrutamayena jñānenārthān gṛhītvā āyathāṃ tanniṣpattau yat spaṣṭāvabhāsi bhayādāv īva tad avikalpakam avitathaviśayam pramāṇam pratyakṣam; “Having first grasped objects through a cognition born from listening [to the treatises] and then ascertained [them] through a [cognition] born of reflecting [upon them] by means of rational enquiry, yogins cultivate [those objects]. The [cognition] which, at the completion of this [cultivation], appears as vividly as in such cases as fear, etc. and at the same time is non-conceptual [and] has a true object, is also a means of valid knowledge, [namely] perception” (27.9–11 – translation: Eltschinger 2009: 198 [modified]). The hypothesis of a direct response to Dharmakīrti is indirectly supported by the paraphrase of PVin 1.28 in the corresponding portion of the NyK. Interestingly, Vācaspati does not speak in general of the cognition of yogins but specifically of that of the Buddha (tathāgata), and also relates Dharmakīrti’s remarks to the question of omniscience: śrutamayena viśuddhena samastavaśtvisayam nairātmyādi gṛhītvā yuktivamya ca bhūtatām asya vyavasthiyāṣakṛcconiveśanarāiapabhāvanaprakārasparīparyantajnaṃ pratyakṣam viśuddhena anavayavennāṁdīnaśvāpavivālambanam karatāravindaviśayam ivātiviśadaṃ bhāvyayiyati tathāgataḥ; “Having first grasped the absence of a Self, etc., which concerns all beings, by means of a cognition born from listening [to the treatises] and then] established their reality by means of [a cognition] born from reasoning, the Tathāgata was able to effectuate (bhāvyayiyati) a perceptual cognition born of [His] intense meditation, consisting of a repeated presentation to [His] mind [of the objects he reflected upon]. [That vision] had for its objective correlate everything without exception possessing the property of being selfless, etc. and was as entirely clear as [the vision] of a lotus on the palm of one’s hand” (S 544.6–545.4).

100 Recall that novelty or “manifestation of an unknown object” (ajñātārthaprakāśa) is one of the definitions given by Dharmakīrti himself of “valid knowledge” in PV 2.5a. See above n. 81.

101 Brhadāraṇyakopanisad 2.4.5: ātmā vā are drṣṭavyo mūntavyo nīdhiḥśīṣṭavyaḥ; “Truly, it is the Self that must be seen, heard, thought, mediated upon.” As is well-known, this passage is taken by the later Vedāntic tradition to enunciate the three stages of the knowledge of Brahman, starting with its “audition” (śravana) in the Scripture, developing through “reflection” (manana) and “contemplation” (nididhyāsana), and eventually leading to “direct perception” (sākṣātkāra).

102 See Steinkellner 1978: 127.
3.6 With this last point it seems we have exhausted most of what Maṇḍana had to say on the topic of the Buddha’s omniscience. It is now time to enquire whether his arguments aroused any response from the Buddhist side in the following centuries, as was the case for Kumārila. Our main field of investigation will be the work of an immediately later Buddhist philosopher, Prajñākaragupta, on whom Maṇḍana’s influence – so is at least my contention – is most easily discernible.

4. An early Buddhist paraphrase of ViśV 15: Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (PVA) ad PV 2.29 (vv. 2.358–370)

4.1 Although Maṇḍana’s influence on later Buddhist thought is yet to be properly valued, it is nevertheless certain that the ViśV was read and extensively used by some at least among later Buddhist logicians. Of the several texts one could invoke in support of this claim, none is perhaps as revealing as Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on PV 2.29 (PVA 2.358–370). Prajñākaragupta is probably the first commentator on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika to regard the Buddha’s omniscience (sarvajñatva) as a central topic of the Pramāṇasiddhi-chapter (= PV 2). His commentary on PV 2.29–33 is therefore, along with chapter 26 of Śāntarakṣita’s Tatvasamgraha, among the oldest available testimonies of that debate stemming from the Buddhist pramāṇa-tradition. Prajñākaragupta’s long discussion of PV 2.29, where Dharmakīrti objects to the possibility of a knowledge of objects beyond the senses (parokṣārthajñāna) in the absence of a means (sādhana) to accomplish it, forms the pūrvapakṣa of that section, and is for the most part a web of mīmāṃsaka arguments set against the possibility of omniscience. This section of the Vārttikālaṃkāra is thus of high significance for the early history of this debate in Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā alike.

Apart from the PVA, possible echoes of Maṇḍana’s arguments have been identified so far in the works of Kamalaśīla (see above n. 76), Śaṅkaranandana (see n. 66) and Ratnakīrti (see nn. 37 and 66).

I am quoting here the recent edition of the passage by Moriyama (2014: 168–179) (= PVA), which corresponds to PVA 50.17–52.25. The numbering of kārikās is identical in both editions.

According to R. Jackson (1991: 235–236), Prajñākaragupta’s “conflating omniscience and authoritativeness” constitutes a decisive innovation of the Vārttikālaṃkāra with respect to earlier commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s work. See also Franco (2011: 90, n. 44) and Moriyama (2014: 19–26), who reach the same conclusion, the latter by an in-depth study of PVA ad PV 2.1–7. Interestingly, omniscience will be regarded by some later Tibetan commentators as the fundamental topic, not only of those kārikās, but of the whole second chapter. See Jackson (1991: 232 and 236), who mentions in particular the case of rGyal tshab (15th c.). The latter’s indebtedness to Prajñākaragupta (which of course need not be direct) is evident from the passage of his commentary on PV 2 translated in Jackson 1991: 241, which is little more than a paraphrase of PVA ad PV 2.29.

Apart from a small portion of the text (PVA 168.9–10 and PVA 2.367–369), a rather bold adaptation of an argument originally found in PV 1.335, all arguments of Prajñākaragupta’s pūrvapakṣin can be traced back to earlier Mīmāṃsā works (see table below, § 4.6). Yamārī’s tentative identification of Prajñākaragupta’s opponent as a materialist (tshu rol mdzes pa, Skt. *cārvāka?), on which Moriyama (2014: 244, n. 5) already expressed serious doubts, can therefore be entirely discarded.

As he convincingly shows (pp. 58–59), the objection given in PVA 2.359 that an omniscient would also experience the taste of impure things (aśuci), which is not found in the ŚIV, is certainly borrowed from the BT (= TS 3144). Even if some parallels he draws between the PVA and the ŚIV might be
but also notes (pp. 59–60) that this cannot account for the pūrvapakṣin’s argumentation as a whole, which has no clear equivalent in the works of the great Mīmāṃsaka. Adding to Moriyama’s remarks, I shall argue that Prajñākaragupta’s model in building his pūrvapakṣa is not only Kumārila, but also Maṇḍana, and that the first half of the text (PVA 2.358–363) in particular can be read as a paraphrase of ViV 15. 108 Incidentally, this identification of one of Prajñākaragupta’s main opponents will help us, it is hoped, to solve certain difficulties in the interpretation of that delicate passage, and also to highlight certain minor divergences between the Buddhist scholar and his Brahmanical source.

4.2 Prajñākaragupta’s fundamental distinction, to begin with, between two possible interpretations of the word sādhana (“means”) in PV 2.29bc (tatsādhanasya ca / abhāvāt) 109 – namely, as the (efficient) cause (hetul/kāraṇa) of the Buddha’s omniscience and as the (informing) cause of our certitude (niścaye hetuh) of an omniscient being’s existence – has generally been interpreted in reference to the ŚIV or BṬ. 110 Yet nowhere does Kumārila formulate such an opposition, which on the other hand closely corresponds to Maṇḍana’s distinction, already found on the threshold of ViV 15, between the (efficient) cause (hetul/kāraṇa) that should account (upa-√pad) for omniscience and the cause of our knowledge (jīnāna) of an omniscient being. 111 It is thus simpler to assume that

108 The possibility of Maṇḍana’s influence on Prajñākaragupta in this pūrvapakṣa is briefly considered by Moriyama (2014: 63–65), who does not however engage in a systematic comparison of both texts.

109 The whole text of PV 2.29 runs as follows: prāmānyaṃ ca parokṣārthajñānaṃ tatsādhanasya ca (em.; tat sādhanasya Ed) / abhāvān nästy anuṣṭhānam iti ke cit pracakṣate //; “And the reliability [of any religious authority] consists in [His/its] knowledge of objects beyond the senses, but because there is no [possible] means to complete it, there is no [successful] practice in conformity with [its teaching]. Thus claim certain [Mīmāṃsakas].” Translation: Moriyama 2014: 244.


111 See ViV K 15ab: hetvabhāve phalābhāvāt pramāne ‘sati na pramā l; “No effect [takes place] without a cause, [so] no valid knowledge [of all things takes place] without a [corresponding] means of valid knowledge” (S 458.2 [= M 114.2/G 81.2]); ViV 15: (…) kāranaivṛttyā kāryanivṛttipratīteḥ (S 460.2–461.1 – translated above, § 2.2).

112 See ViV 15: (…) na, tasyānapatītā ajñānāc ca; “No, for [an omniscient being] cannot be accounted for, and because we would have no way to know [Him]” (S 445.1–458.1 [= M 114.1/G 81.1]); ViV 19: evam tāvad anupapattih, ajñānam api; “Thus [it has been shown], first of all, that [an omniscient being] cannot be accounted for; now [we will see that] there is also no knowledge [of such a being]” (S 686.1–2 [= M 204.5/G 145.2]). a ajñānam S: jñānam M G.
Maṇḍana’s distinction is the source of Prajñākaragupta’s twofold interpretation of the word sādhana in Dharmakīrti’s verse.

4.3 The assumption of a debt to Maṇḍana further allows us better to understand the structure of Prajñākaragupta’s pūrṇapakṣa, which already caused some difficulty to its Indian commentators. Thus Yamāri (11th c.) tentatively identifies four parts in PVA 2.358–363, corresponding to four possible causes (rgyu) of the Buddha’s omniscience: sensory cognition (dbang po’i shes pa; Skt. *indriyajñāna?), the senses and the object (?) (dbang po dang don, Skt. indriyārtha?), mental cognition assisted by repeated practice (goms pa dang bcas pa’i yid kyi shes pa, Skt. *abhyāsavanmanojñāna?) and inference (rjes su dpag pa; Skt. *anumāna?). To this rather unlikely organisation of the pūrṇapakṣin’s proof, Moriyama (2014: 57–62) opposes his own twofold division, which sounds much more promising: (1) refutation of omniscience as a form of sensory perception (v. 358–359), (2) refutation of omniscience as a form of mental perception (v. 360–362). The problem is that Kumārila, whom he considers to be Prajñākaragupta’s main model, never seems to consider that omniscience could be something other than sensory perception, such as for instance mental perception. So, either one considers that Prajñākaragupta himself introduces that possibility or one has to admit that he draws from some other source, which is then very likely to be Maṇḍana’s set of three (not two) hypotheses: omniscience as a form of sensory, mental or yogic cognition (see § 3.4). The following table presents the various hypotheses in presence regarding the nature of the Omniscient’s cognition:

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<td>[indriya-pratyakṣa]</td>
<td>cakṣurādijama pratyakṣam (S 461.2–468.1)</td>
<td>indriyājñāna (1.358–359 + 50.24)</td>
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<td>mānasam pratyakṣam (S 468.1–542.1)</td>
<td>manovijñāna (1.360)</td>
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<td>bhāvanāmayaṃ pratyakṣam (S 542.1–555.2)</td>
<td>abhyāsāt [vijñānam]/bhāvanā (1.361–363)</td>
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4.4 Arguments set against omniscience as a form of sensory or mental perception are clearly similar in the ViV and PVA: the limitation of the domain (viṣaya) of sensory percep-

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114 Tibetan text quoted in Moriyama (2014: 59, n. 12). Since the original Sanskrit of Yamāri’s Supariśuddhi (on which see Steinkellner/Much 1995: xx) is still unpublished, it is not possible to check whether oddities of this classification are due to Yamāri or to his Tibetan translator. In any case, Maṇḍana’s name is not included in the list of authorities identified by M. Ono (2000: xxiv) in Yamāri’s commentary, so it is quite possible that Prajñākaragupta’s commentator did not know the ViV. My very limited knowledge of Tibetan did not allow me to consult Jayanta’s slightly earlier commentary.

115 This seems to be, in substance, the option chosen by Moriyama (2014: 59–62), who solves the difficulty by reading Prajñākaragupta’s argument as a reaction to Dharmakīrti’s newly elaborated theory of yogic perception. I am not quite convinced by this explanation since Dharmakīrti, like Dignāga before him, clearly distinguishes between mental and yogic perception, so there would be no point for Prajñākaragupta to discuss mental perception specifically if that were really the point at stake.
tion to what is related/proximate (saṃbaddha [ViV]/saṃnihita [PVA]) to the senses, the mind’s lack of autonomy (svatantra[tva]) from the senses in knowing external objects. A more delicate issue is whether there is any allusion to the perception of yogins in this passage of the Vārttikālaṃkāra, as is my contention. The three kārikās at stake (PVA 2.361–363) read as follows:

(361) The clarity (spaṣṭatā) of that [cognition acquired] through repeated practice (abhyāsa) cannot encompass all [objects]. If it (tasya) relies on Scripture, [its] erroneousness (bhrāntatā) also (api) follows; (362) on the other hand (tu), one does not reach all things (sarvaṃ vastu) as they are established by an inference (anumānaprasiddha), so there is no meditation (bhrāvanā) that can encompass everything; how [then would one become] omniscient? (363) Through repeated practice of the [sacred] treatises, etc. (śāstrādi) one can only understand what is taught by them (śāstraprabhṛti); how [then] will anyone (tasya) attain knowledge of the totality [of being] (sākalya)?

Although these verses still pose considerable problems in the detail of their interpretation, one can clearly recognize in them an elaboration on Maṇḍana’s main thesis regarding meditation (see above, § 3.5): omniscience cannot result from meditation (bhāvanā – 362cd), for it only consists in the repeated practice (abhyāsa – 361a/363a) of what has already been obtained by some other means (i.e. Scripture or inference). It is also possible that v. 363ab should be read in reference to Maṇḍana’s idea of meditation as an essentially non-productive activity, although this is far from certain. It seems in any case that Prajñākaragupta substantially changes the nature of Maṇḍana’s argumentation by insisting, above all, on the incapacity of the two ‘root-pramāṇas’ to apprehend all things, while

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116 See PVA 168.11–12: (…) indriyajñānasya saṃnihitavisayasya darśanāt; “because one observes that a sensory cognition has its object in [its] proximity.” Translation: Moriyama 2014: 245.
120 Even though this interpretation is clearly very tentative, such a solution would avoid the disturbing redundancy of v. 363ab with respect to vv. 361–362. The hypothesis of an implicit reference to Kumārila’s BT (= TS 3163), upheld by Moriyama (2014: 77), would be another way out of this difficulty, but I must say I cannot easily read in Prajñākaragupta’s half-verse Kumārila’s objection that excellence or superiority (atiśaya) in the knowledge of a treatise (śāstra) does not entail excellence in the knowledge of another treatise (śāstrāntara): evam śāstravicāreṣu dṛśyate ‘tiśayo mahān / na tu śāstrāntaraśānām tamātrenaiva labhyate // “Thus we notice [in some people] a great superiority in the knowledge of treatises, but this is not sufficient [to establish their] knowledge of other treatises.”
121 The pūrvapakṣin’s ground for refusing access to the totality of being to inference and Scripture is in itself far from clear. It is almost certain, as rightly pointed out by Moriyama (2014: 59–60, n. 14), that he discards inference in v. 362ab on the basis of Kumārila’s remark in ŚIV (codanā°) 115cd that inference and similar pramāṇas cannot grasp objects in the future (bhaviṣyant). His argument against Scripture in v. 361cd is in turn quite obscure, and I am not at all convinced by Yāmāri’s recourse to the (typically
Maṇḍana rather insisted on the “heteronomy” (pāratantrya) of meditation, preventing it from becoming a pramāṇa in the full sense of the term. So, if the general structure of this pūrvapakṣa seems to follow that of ViV 15, the detail of the argument is a blend of Kumārila’s, Maṇḍana’s and – one may think – Prajñākaragupta’s own reflections.

4.5 Assuming, as I did, that most arguments in the first part of this pūrvapakṣa are drawn from the ViV will also, it is hoped, allow us to solve problems in the detail of the interpretation of that passage of the Vārttikālāṃkāra. Two verses are particularly problematic, namely vv. 2.358 and 2.359cd. The first verse is interpreted by Moriyama (2014: 57–58 and 245, n. 12) as an allusion to ŚIV (codanā°) 112–114 which is, as we remember, a crucial group of stanzas dealing with the mutual limitation of the senses, barring them the access to the totality of being. One has some difficulty, however, to read this argument in Moriyama’s translation of PV 2.358:122

If an omniscient being arises despite the non-distinction regarding sense faculties and objects [between omniscient beings and ordinary people], everyone would become omniscient because of the non-distinction regarding sense faculties and objects. (Moriyama 2014: 245)

Although Moriyama does not provide much explanation for this, the logic behind his translation seems to be the following: since the senses of the (putative) Omniscient – the historical Buddha for instance – are not different from ours, they share the same limitations (358ab); if we suspend this limitation (admitting, for instance, that the eye could grasp sounds or smells), then there is no reason why everybody should not become omniscient (358cd). The interpretation of the compound indriyārthāviśeṣa as the “non-distinction of the senses and the object [in us and in an omniscient being]” looks quite forced though, which makes me suspect that this translation somehow misses the point. The argument becomes clearer, I think, if we relate Prajñākaragupta’s remark to Maṇḍana’s reasoning on the relation of identity (tanmātrapratibandha°anubandha) possibly underlying a relation of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) and the object to be known (prameya) (see above, § 2.2 [argument 2AIb] and nn. 31–32):123 should an object be identical with the means to know it (e.g., the senses), there would be no

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122 Buddhist) argument of an “absence of connection [of speech] with external objects” (phyi rol gyi don dang ’bre l med pa – Tibetan text quoted by Moriyama [2014: 246, n. 18]), which I find very unlikely to come from the mouth of a mīmāṃsaka opponent. Though many interpretations of this half-verse are possible, I think it would make more sense for the pūrvapakṣin to underline, while speaking of the “erroneousness” (bhrāntatā) of verbal cognition, its conceptual character. The opponent would then reject Dharmakīrti’s claim that a conceptual (i.e. erroneous) cognition arising from the audition of Buddhist Scriptures could lead by its mere repetition to a non-conceptual (i.e. non-erroneous) cognition. The Sanskrit text of PVA 2.358 reads as follows: indriyārthāviśeṣe ’pi yadi sarvavidudbhavaḥ sarvajña eva sarvah syād indriyārthāviśeṣeṣataḥ // (p. 170).

123 Recall that such a relation would allow us, in the hypothesis considered by Maṇḍana, to infer the absence of the object to be known (prameya) – i.e., an omniscient being – from the absence of a pramāṇa establishing its existence, as when we infer for instance the absence of smoke (= vyāpyu) from the absence of fire (= vyāpaka).
difference between existing and being known, and everyone would become omniscient. On that basis, we can hopefully render Prajñākaragupta’s argument in a more faithful way:

Even if an omniscient being arose out of the absence of difference between a sense and [its] object (indriyārthāviśeṣa), everybody would become omniscient because of this absence of difference between a sense and [its] object!

This is not at all a central point in Maṇḍana’s argumentation, and I am struck by the amount of knowledge of Mīmāṃsā Prajñākaragupta expects from his reader (unless, of course, Maṇḍana himself is borrowing the argument from a Buddhist source). The same impression results from another possible hint at ViV 15 in PVA 2.359cd. As we have seen above (n. 107), the first half of this verse (aśucyādirasāsvādasamgamaś cānivāritaḥ) is almost certainly a paraphrase of a verse of the BṬ (= TS 3144) arguing that an omniscient being, who would experience all things, would also experience the taste of impure things, etc. (aśucyādirasa). The second half of the verse (prāpyakārindriyatve ca sarvavit katham ucye //) is read by Moriyama (2014: 245) as a continuation of this argument, and translated as follows:

And [thus,] if [an omniscient being’s] sense faculties function after having had a direct connection [with an object], how can he be [honorably] called an omniscient being?

This translation is in itself impeccable, and it also makes perfect sense to say that the perception of impure things is especially problematic if the senses operate while reaching (prāpyakārin) their object. The presence of ca in pāda c is disturbing though, and suggests another argument may be alluded to. As we saw (§ 3.2), the difference between prāpyakārin and aprāpyakārin is also mobilised by Maṇḍana while dealing with sensory perception to establish that neither explanation of perception (i.e. with and without a contact between the senses and the object) can account for a knowledge of past and future objects (S 465.1–466.2). I find it plausible that Prajñākaragupta reminds us of this argument, a possibility that would also match our main hypothesis that he is following the chronological order of ViV 15. If this proved correct, the allusion would be even more elliptic than in the preceding case, and would presuppose a reader fully conversant with the detail of Maṇḍana’s argumentation.

124 ViV 15: (...) tanmātrapratibandhābhāvāc ca, anyathā sarvasya sarvadarśitvaprasaṅgaḥ, aviśeṣāt (S 459.4–460.1 – translated above, § 2.2). Supposing Prajñākaragupta is indeed alluding to that argument, it is possible that he interprets avīṣeṣa in ViV 15 as well as the absence of difference between the senses and the object (indriyārthāviśeṣa). This interpretation would differ from Vācaspati’s understanding of that term as referring to the absence of difference between us and the Omniscient. See NyK 460.7–8: avīṣeṣād asmādādināṃ bhavadabhimatena saha sarvavidā. My translation of the passage (above, § 2.2) follows this last interpretation.

125 PVA 2.359ab: aśucyādirasāsvādasamgamaś cānivāritaḥ; “And [for an omniscient being who perceives everything through the sense faculties], the connection with the experience of tasting an impure [thing], etc. is unavoidable.” Translation: Moriyama 2014: 245.

126 As rightly pointed out by Moriyama (2014: 246).
4.6 All this suggests that the ViV was not only known to Buddhist scholars, but that its contents were also fairly widespread in learned Buddhist circles by the end of the 8th century. The following table, which also integrates evidence found in previous scholarship, summarizes my hypotheses concerning the sources of this pūrvapakṣa:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ĪŚV/BṬ/PV/ViV</th>
<th>PVA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ViV 15 (S 445.1–458.1)</td>
<td>2.358–370 (prose introd.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ViV 15a/ViV 15 (S 461.2–462.1)</td>
<td>2.358–370 (prose introd.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ViV 15 (S 459.4–460.1)</td>
<td>2.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT (= TS 3144)</td>
<td>2.359ab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idem/ViV 15 (S 465.1–466.2)</td>
<td>2.359cd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ViV 15d/ViV 15 (S 468.1–470.1)</td>
<td>2.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ViV 15 (S 542.1–555.2)</td>
<td>2.361–363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ĪŚV (cod°) 115cd/BṬ (= TS 3173cd)</td>
<td>2.362ab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ĪŚV (cod°) 134/BṬ (= TS 3191)</td>
<td>2.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ĪŚV (cod°) 137/BṬ (= TS 3238–3240)</td>
<td>2.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≈ TS 3249/ViV 18 (S 675.1–676.1)</td>
<td>2.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PV(SV) 1.335</td>
<td>2.358–370 (prose introd.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ViV 18 (S 676.1–3)</td>
<td>2.370/PVAŚ 114.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Conclusion

Having reached the term of this enquiry, Maṇḍana Miśra appears to us, without contest, as the other great voice of Mīmāṃsā in the early debate on the Buddha’s omniscience. Less massive, less uncompromising, less influential also than Kumārila’s, his critique is nevertheless more complex, and philosophically more ambitious. It may also have served a slightly different purpose. For sure, Maṇḍana’s final view essentially coincides with that of his predecessor: no Omniscient can legitimately claim to instruct people about their religious duties, their origin or destiny, or about the path leading them to beatitude. Yet this reaffirmation of the basic Mīmāṃsā position on religious authority does not imply, in the case of Maṇḍana, a complete hostility to the ideal of omniscience, as shown by the following passage of the Brahmasiddhi:127

127 BS 2.106cd–107: nanu prapaṇcaśānyasyayādaitasya brahmarūpasya jñeyabhāvād īśitavyābhāvāc ca vijñānam anāśvamyām cānupapannam, tatra sarvajñah, sarveśvara ity api śrutāḥ samādheya eva. – naitat sāram, yato neśītavyākṛtam īśartāvatam, jñeyākṛtam va jñātṛtvam, kim tu siddhena jñānaraṇaṃ siddhayā caśāntakāyā jñeyam avipnoti, īśitavyam ca vinīyukte prāśasti ca, prakāśadhāvat. siddhena hi prakāśarāpāna prakāśaṃ prakāśyati vyāvat, na tu prakāśadhāhīnaṃ tasya prakāśarūpam, dāhyādhīnaḥ vaṅger dāhāṣaktih, thathā ca tacecātyenaiva kṛtvanaprapaṇcasyāvabhāstanāt tasya bhāṣā sarvam idam vībhūti, nānyo ‘to ‘sti draṣṭetadīśruteḥ sarvajñatvam (127.5–13).
[Objection:] but, for that non-dual [entity] having the nature of Brahman, for whom there is no proliferating [universe], there is nothing to be known (jñeya) and nothing to be ruled over (īśitavya), so knowledge (vijñāna) and sovereignty (aiśvarya) are unaccountable [in its case]. If it is so, scriptural passages [mentioning Brahman as] “omniscient” (sarvajña) and “lord of all” (sarveśvara) must be trusted blindly! – This is not true, because sovereignty is not brought about by those who are ruled over, nor is it the known [object] that makes one into a knower (jñātṛ). Quite the contrary! [Only] when the form of knowledge is established, or the ability to reign, may one attain a knowable [object] or assign tasks and govern those to be ruled over. [It all happens] as in the case of light (prakāśa) and burning (dāha): [only] when the sun’s luminosity is established may it shed light on [objects] to be illuminated; its luminosity is not due to [there being] something to illumine, no more than a fire’s capacity to burn is due to [there being] something to burn. Thus, since the whole proliferating [universe] manifests itself only thanks to His consciousness, as stated in scriptural passages like “All this shines only through His splendour,”128 “There is no other seer than Him [= the ātman],”129 [Brahman] is [said to be] omniscient (sarvajña).

In this text, quite unique in Maṇḍana’s work, we see the lineaments of an alternative concept of omniscience, virtually escaping the objections raised in the ViV. Omniscience for Maṇḍana is not a matter of apprehending past and future, or perceiving the extremely large or extremely small; indeed it is not at all about knowing objects. Omniscience is understood here, in a negative way, as the absence of obstruction of the natural property of awareness (jñāna) pertaining to Brahman, inversely proportional to the presence of a multitude of knowable objects (jñeya).130 As such it would be vain to ask for its cause, and the means to ascertain it is, of course, none but the eternal Veda. To put it differently, we can read in ViV 15–25 an attempt to release omniscience from its ties with the problem of dharma, which are as tight in the case of the Buddha as they are in the case of Īśvara for those who uphold Him. In that sense, his critique certainly contributes to Kumārila’s apologetic enterprise of (re)affirming the Veda as the one source of all religious authority. But at the same time it also paves the way for a reevaluation of omniscience as part of a Vedāntic soteriology, and thereby for its integration into the conceptual architecture of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā.

References and abbreviations


128 Kathopanisad 5.15. 129 Brhadāraṇyakopanisad 3.7.23. 130 See also Ānandapūrṇa’s comment: jāḍyapāratantryābhāvopalaksitam rūpam jītānādi, na tu saviṣayam; “Knowledge and [sovereignty] are natures marked by the absence of insensibility and dependence, they do not imply [the existence of] an object” (Bhāvaśuddhi 446.11).
Maṇḍana Miśra’s Excursus on the Buddha’s Omniscience


**Brahmasiddhiyākhyā** See BS.


**BT** Bṛhaṭṭīkā (Kumārila). See TS.


PV 2–4 See Miyasaka 1972.

PVA See Moriyama 2014.

PVAs Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālankāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (being a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikam), ed. R. Sāṅkrityāyana. Patna 1953.


ŚIV Mīmāṃsāślokavārttikam. śrīmatkumārilabhaṭṭapādaviracitam (…)śrīmatpārthasārthimishrāpranātayā nyāyaratnāmārakābhīyā vyākhyāyānugatam, ed. Mānavallyupālahvātailaṅgarāmasāstrī. Benares (Kāśi) 1898.

ŚIV (codanā°) See Kataoka 2011.


Stern 1988 E. Stern, Vidhi vivekaḥ of Maṇḍana Miśraḥ, with commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspatimīśraḥ and supercommentaries Juṣadhvāṅkaraṇī and Śvaditāṅkaraṇī

**SV svavṛtti**


**TSP** See TS.

Vādanāya See Much 1991.


On the Determination of Causation by Dharmakīrti

by

Eli Franco

One of the benefits of reading new translations is not only to learn new things, but also to find out that things one took for granted and thought to be generally accepted were not at all so. I had such an experience last year when reading the awe-inspiring translation of the logical portions of the PVSV by Ernst Steinkellner.¹ To my surprise, his interpretation of the relationship between cause and effect, and especially their putative resemblance in the famous discussion in PVSV on v. 34, were not quite what I took to be the case when I wrote on the same passage some twenty five years ago. I am, therefore, very grateful to Steinkellner to have inspired me to take a fresh look at an old problem. My (not insubstantial) disagreement with Steinkellner on the topic of this paper detracts neither from my admiration for the great scholar who has been a singular force in our discipline for the past half a century nor from my gratitude for his friendship and support ever since I took his seminar on Vādanyāya at the University of Vienna in 1981.

On the alleged similarity between cause and effect

The passage in Steinkellner’s book that took me by surprise concerns the determination of the relationship between cause and effect, where Steinkellner argues at some length that cause and effect must be of the same kind rather than similar. I do not know to what extent this opinion is prevalent. He refers specifically to John Taber and Toshikazu Watanabe,² who propose different notion of similarity. However in Watanabe’s case, I fail to see that he assumes the similarity or identity to be between causes and effects. Taber informs me in personal communication that his suggestion of similarity was only tentative. It is based on the fact that in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter Dharmakīrti argues that cognition can only arise from cognition, senses only from senses, breath only from breath and so on. This is certainly true, but the question that I want to raise here is whether such similarity is essential or accidental to causal relationship.

Summarising his interpretation that cause and effect must belong to the same kind, Steinkellner concludes (2013 II: 213):


¹ Steinkellner 2013.
Put differently, “smoke” is a species of the genus “fire.” That is to say, it is something “fiery.” It is thus not “similar” or “equal” to [its] cause; rather, because it owes its special properties to its cause, it can be judged to be as a species of the genus of the cause.

My first contention does not only concern the understanding of the similarity – whether it means appertaining to the same kind, the same species or the same genus – but is more radical: Cause and effect are not, or do not have to be, of the same species or the same kind. They don’t even have to be similar. Furthermore, I claim that this question is not at all addressed in the passage in question (PVSV on v. 34). Rather, what Dharmakīrti maintains in this passage is that causes of the same kind produce effects of the same kind. In other words, the similarity, or the appertainment to same kind, is between causes among themselves and effects among themselves, not between causes and effects.\(^3\) To substantiate this claim I suggest to take a close look at the passage in question (PVSV 22.10–19 on 34cd):

\[
\text{anyahetukatvān nāhetukatvam iti cet / na / tatrāpi tulyatvāt / tadabhāve 'py aagnau bhavati / katham vā tato 'nyato vātajjananasvabhāvād bhavet / svayam atatsvabhāvasyājananāt / tasyāhetutā syāt / na vai sa eva bhavati tādṛśasya bhāvād / anyādṛśād bhavan katham tādṛśaḥ syāt / tādṛśād dhi bhavan tādṛśaḥ syāt / anyādṛśād api tādṛśo bhāve taccakṣiṇiyamābhāvān na hetubheda bhe-daka ity akāraṇam viśvasya vaisvārūpyam syāt / sarvaṁ vā sarvasmāj jāyet (read: jāyeta) / tasmāt kāraṇabhedābhāvādābhāvān ṣyāt / anyādṛśād api tādṛśo bhāve taccakṣiṇiyamābhāvāvān na hetubheda bhe-daka ity akāraṇam viśvasya vaisvārūpyam syāt / sarvaṁ vā sarvasmāj jāyet (read: jāyeta) / tasmāt kāraṇabhedābhāvādābhāvān ṣyāt /}
\]

Steinkellner’s translation\(^4\) (2013 I: 55):

(Einwand:) “Weil er eine andere Ursache haben (kann), ist er [auch dann, wenn er ohne Feuer vorhanden ist] nicht ohne Ursache.” (Antwort:) (Das ist) nicht (der Fall), denn auch im Falle dieser (anderen Ursache) [wäre die Ursachelosigkeit] die gleiche, denn, auch wenn diese (andere Ursache) fehlt, ist (der Rauch) beim (Vorhandensein von) Feuer (dennoch) vorhanden. Oder weshalb könnte er aus diesem oder einem anderen entstehen, wenn (beide) nicht das Wesen\(^N\) haben ihn hervorzubringen? Weil das, was selbst nicht dieses Wesen\(^N\) (ihn hervorzubringen) hat, ihn nicht hervorbringt, wäre dieser (Rauch) nichts als) ursachelos.

(Einwand:) (Aus der anderen Ursache) entsteht ja nicht gerade dieser (gewöhnlich vom Feuer hervorgebrachte Rauch), denn es entsteht ein derartiger (tādṛśa). (Antwort:) Wieso ist er ein derartiger (tādṛśa), wenn er aus einem nicht Derartigen entsteht? Weil er aus Derartigem entsteht, wäre dieser

\(^3\) Though the formulation is a bit ambiguous, I believe that this is what Mookerjee and Nagasaki also mean in their translation (Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 84): “There is no exception to the rule that similars produce similars and dissimilars produce dissimilars.” Dunne (2004: 335–336) also does not seem to share Steinkellner’s interpretation. Gillon’s translation (2009: 202) leaves the possibility open.

\(^4\) The emphasis indicates where our interpretations differ.

My tentative translation:

[Objection:] Because [smoke] has [also] another cause [than fire], it is not without a cause [when it arises without fire].

[Reply:] No, because it’s the same in this case too. [In this case, one would consider that smoke] arises when fire is present, even when that [other cause] is absent.

Or [given different causes of smoke, which have different natures, if the one, e.g., fire, has the nature of producing smoke, the other, having a different nature, would not have the nature of producing smoke. Thus] how could [smoke] arise either from that [fire that has the nature of producing smoke] or from something else, which does not have the nature of producing it? What itself does not have this nature [of producing smoke] does not produce [it]. Consequently [since that the other thing does not produce smoke, if smoke would arise without fire] it would have no cause.

[Objection:] It is not the case that exactly that [smoke] arises [from the other thing] because something of the same kind [as smoke] arises.

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5 I thank Karin Preisendanz for making this translation more precise.
6 For instance, a termite mound or an anthill.
7 The argument is not entirely clear to me. How does it differ from the second argument which begins with kathāṃ vā? Perhaps one can understand the first argument epistemologically: If smoke arises also from other cause than fire, then just as one would not be able to infer smoke from fire, one would equally not be able to infer smoke from the other cause, for one knows that even when the other cause is absent, smoke could arise from fire. Thus, what Dharmakīrti would be claiming in the first argument (up to kathāṃ vā) is not that smoke would actually be without a cause, but that its cause would not be inferable. The second argument is clearer. Dharmakīrti defines (or in fact reduces) fire to that whose nature is to produce smoke. If smoke arises from non-fire, it would arise from something whose nature is not to produce smoke and thus without a cause. One may mention here that Dharmakīrti recognizes that the determination of causation is not always possible. In a case of a so-called general effect, or effect common to more than one causal complex (kāryasāmānya), the determination of the cause may not be possible, for instance in PVSV on v. 12, the fact that one speaks may be based on desire or on compassion (see also Franco 2012). Similarly, activity after rest, a special configuration (saṃsthānaviśeṣa) and so on (see PV II 10f.) may prove a conscious agent, but not that this agent is an eternal God and not a human being. How are such statements compatible with what is stated here?
[Reply:] Inasmuch as it arises from something of a different kind [than fire], how could it be of the same kind [as smoke]? Indeed, inasmuch as it arises from something of the same kind [as fire], it is/must be of the same kind (i.e., not the same kind as the cause, but of the same kind as the other effects of fire, namely, smoke; viz., effects of the same kind must arise from causes of the same kind). If [an effect] of the same kind [as smoke] would also arise from [a cause] of a different kind [than fire], a difference in cause would not distinguish [effects] because there would be no restriction to the capacity of its [cause to produce all kinds of effects]. Thus, the diversity of the world would be without a cause, or everything would arise from everything. Therefore, the difference and identity of effects are due to difference and identity of causes. Therefore, smoke does not arise from something which is of a different kind than that thing whose form has been observed [before whenever smoke arose] because [in this case smoke] would be without a cause.

The upshot of Dharmakīrti’s argument in this passage is that if causes of different kinds can produce the same effect, we will not be able to infer the cause from the effect. To make such inference, the question whether the effect is similar to the cause is quite irrelevant. The effect does not have to be similar or of the same kind as the cause in order to enable such an inference. The fact that Dharmakīrti does not assume that the effect is similar to the cause in all cases is more than clear in the example of the lotus and the cow dung, which appears a bit later in this context. Dharmakīrti refers to an apparently wide-spread belief that some lotuses do not arise from a lotus seed but from cow dung. It will be difficult to maintain that a lotus and the cow dung are similar or of the same kind, all the more so when Dharmakīrti himself expressly says that they belong do different kinds (vījātīya). If one were to maintain that even cow dung and lotus belong to the same kind, the notion of appertaining to same kind would become arbitrary, tautological, and circular when used for the determination of causation. For if appertaining to same kind means, as Steinkellner argues, the fact that the properties of the effect are due to the cause, then to be of the same kind as something simply means to be produced by that thing. In other words, if we then argue that a cause must be of the same kind as the effect, we would actually argue that the cause must be a cause.

**Modes of causation**

My second and perhaps more important contention is that what Dharmakīrti states at the beginning of PV I (and in the parallel passages in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, Hetubindu and Vādanyāya) is not meant as complete doctrine of determination of causality. I do not wish

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8 See the emendations suggested by Steinkellner (2013 I: 55, nn. 30–31).

9 See PVSV 22: 22–23: yad api kimcid vijātīyād bhavād drṣṭam gomayādeḥ śalūkādi. Karnakagomin (PVSVT 106: 13–14) adds the example of śara grass (?) arising from a cow horn and a scorpion arising from cow dung: adiśabdād gauśṛṅgāc charo gomayād vrśākah. Note that the discussion here concerns everyday practice. In Abhidharma causality one could indeed maintain similarity between cause and effect and Dharmakīrti certainly accepts the notion of samanantarapratyaya. This is however not relevant to the present context, which deals with inferences in everyday practice.
to deny the importance of these passages, or even their paradigmatic role, but they do not tell us the whole story. Curiously, studies of Dharmakīrti’s notion of causation\textsuperscript{10} have not raised the question as to how Dharmakīrti puts his own theory into practice. I suggest, therefore, to broaden the scope of the discussion and open up some new perspectives. It is important to note that Dharmakīrti’s practice in determining causation is considerably more complex and varied than his statement in PVSV on v. 34 and in the parallel passages in his later works would suggest.

**Determining permanent causes**

According to the usual interpretation, Dharmakīrti’s suggestion for the determination of causation (as based on PVSV on v. 34) consists in identifying a cause in a given situation by isolating it from the environment. Given that all other conditions remain the same, and upon the introduction of a certain new element the effect arises, while when this element is removed, the effect does not arise, one can determine that the one is the cause of the other.\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, according to this statement, one would not be able to determine causal relation, if an entity is permanent or constantly present, for one would be unable to observe whether the effect is absent when the cause is absent. Yet Dharmakīrti admits that the earth, of course along with other factors, is a cause of the sprout. For all practical purposes, the earth is eternal and always present. How could it be determined as a cause of sprouts? Dharmakīrti’s reply indicates that presence and absence are indeed not necessary to determine causation in all cases. In the case of earth, it suffices to observe a transformation that brings about changes in the result. For instance, by perfecting the earth with manure, ploughing it and so forth, one observes changes in the quality of the sprout (PV II 25). These changes allow one to determine that the earth is part of the causal complex of the sprout. (So when it comes to God, the reason why he – at least for Dharmakīrti and his opponents it’s a he – cannot be determined as a cause is, in the final analysis, not because he is eternal and all-pervasive, but because he is changeless.)

**Determining a “permanent” material cause**

Similarly, one would hardly expect the process of introducing and removing the cause in the case of a material cause (upādāna). In this case, just like the case of the earth and the sprout, it’s the transformation in the material cause which allows its identification. This is stated several times and in various forms, for instance in PV II 60–61: Without transformation in the material cause (upādāna), there is no transformation in the effect, just as a plate does not change without transformation in the clay. One would not seriously expect the enquirer to remove the clay in order to observe whether the plate continues to exist.

\textsuperscript{10} The most important studies are mentioned in Steinkellner 2013 II: 185–186.

\textsuperscript{11} PVSV 22.3–5: yeṣāṁ upalambhe tallaṅkṣaṇaṁ anupalabdhaṁ yad upalabhyaṁ, tatraikābhāve 'pi nopalabhyaṁ, tat tasya kāryaṁ. See the translation below.
Determining a “permanent” non-material cause

Dharmakīrti’s notion of causation is often apparent when he denies causal connection in specific cases and we must pay attention to such cases as well. For instance, cognition and body are always present together, at least throughout one’s life. How can one deny that the body is the cause of cognition or that they are causes of each other? In this case too Dharmakīrti relies on the same principle: a transformation of a cause must bring about a transformation in the effect. Thus, if we observe a transformation of the one without a transformation in the other, we can exclude the possibility that the two are causally related. Therefore, when one observes a change in the cognition without a change in the body, one can conclude that the cognition does not produce the body and vice versa. This does not mean that the body is not at all a cause of cognition, but that it is not its so-called material cause.

Temporality

Cause and effect are also connected by a temporal aspect: The effect must last as long as its cause. For instance, if the body were the cause of cognition, the cognition would last as long as the body, and thus there would be no dead body (PV II 51). Further, temporality allows one to distinguish between material/main cause and auxiliary cause (upakāraka). Fire may change the color of a pot, but the pot and its new color, unlike smoke, continues to exist when the fire ceases (PV II 50). The auxiliary cause is responsible for some specific aspect of the result, not for the result as such.

The influence of the body on cognition is explained by Dharmakīrti in this way, that is, as an auxiliary cause. For instance, the transformation of the body due to poison causes a mental transformation in the form of pain. Dharmakīrti claims that in this case the body is only the object of cognition and the pain results from perceiving the body, not directly from the body (PV II 48). He does not explain though why perceiving someone else’s body does not cause pain in the same manner; one may assume that he would anchor the distinction in the false apprehension of the body as belonging to oneself.

Gradation

Another important aspect to which cause and effect have to conform is the gradual arising. If the cause does not change, the effect cannot arise gradually (or after a time). Thus, lack in gradation allows one to exclude causal relation between breath and body: “How can breath be gradual without its cause be gradual?” (PV II 107) Similarly, if the body is constant throughout one’s life, cognitions cannot arise from it one after the other. They would have to arise all at once. The gradual arising cannot be due to co-producers unless they bring about changes in the cause (e.g., the body, PV II 43). I am not sure how Dharmakīrti would justify this statement in some cases. For instance, light, senses and object, which are co-producers of a cognition, do not bring about changes in the previous cognition.
Locating or locative cause (special case of auxiliary cause)

Dharmakīrti’s causal theory uses not only upakāraka, but also ādhāralāśraya, which may be translated as locating cause. Dharmakīrti considers this cause from two aspects. If things are momentary, the ādhāra causes them to be located in the same place. For instance, the plate causes the berries, which would tend to fall on the floor and disperse in all directions, to be produced in the same place. Similarly, the jug keeps the water from spilling (PV I 144, see also PV II 67–68, 74). If things are not momentary, the ādhāra is the cause that prevents their movement. In this manner, Dharmakīrti explains the role of the body in mental phenomena such as amnesia (smṛtibhraṃśa, PV II 76).

Reversibility of process

Reversibility of process also allows one to determine causation. For instance, the Cārvākas argue that changes in the humours can account for the changing capacity of the body to produce cognitions, i.e., when the humours are in strong disequilibrium which causes death, the body is no longer capable of producing cognitions, just like a wick becomes incapable to produce a flame, but Dharmakīrti retorts that when the humours of a dead body regain their equilibrium, just as they do when fever is cured, life would arise again (PV II 54–55). If the Cārvāka argues that the process is not reversible, like the transformation of wood into charcoal, this is not correct because one applies medicine to reverse the transformation of humours.

Increase and decrease

An important aspect for the determination of something as a cause is whether its increase and decrease brings about the corresponding increase and decrease in the result. For instance, lamp and light. However, one observes increase in the properties of cognition such as wisdom, compassion, etc., without increase or decrease in the body. Therefore, the body cannot be the support/cause of cognition (PV II 73). It is impossible that the effect would be destroyed when the cause increases, e.g., when pitta increases, fever does not go away (PV II 151). (The anomaly of water and homeopathic medicine would have presented a challenge in this case.)

The Cārvāka claims that when the humours are balanced, the production of sperm increases, which causes the increase of desire. This would be a valid argument, but Dharmakīrti retorts that a sick person may have strong desires and a healthy person none. Further, one may have strong desires even without sperm. Increase in desire arises from increase in pleasure, even when there is no increase in the humours (PV II 151). Further, one observes sick persons with unbalanced humours and strong desires, and also that one ejaculates blood when sperm is exhausted (PV II 153). (I’m afraid I cannot vouch for this observation.)

Another case where increase and decrease are used to reject causal relation is this: Even if the material elements were the cause of consciousness, they cannot be the cause of desire. The causal mode of the elements is not characterized by increase and decrease because one cannot say that one living being is more alive or less alive than another, but some living being have strong desires and some weak. Therefore the cause of desire must be characterized by increase and decrease (PV II 167–169).
Generality and specificity

This is an argument that I have only seen once. The modal correspondence between cause and effect presupposed by Dharmakīrti is so strong that if the cause is general, the effect cannot be specific. Sperm does not explain the nature of desire which is directed towards a specific woman. If the Čārvāka claims that the beauty of the woman also plays a role, this is not correct because one desires also ugly women. The argument looks like an aside, but if we take it seriously, Dharmakīrti claims that if desire is specific towards a single woman, so should also be the sperm (PV II 154).

The numerical aspect

If the cause, or causal complex, is one, the effect is one, if the causes are many, the effects are also many: If each atom is capable of producing a cognition, there would be as many cognitions as there are atoms in the body. Similarly, if breath is a product of the atoms of the body singly, there would be as many breaths as atoms (PV II 103–104).

Restricting, hindering and regulating aspects of causality

It is theoretically possible that although each atom of the body is capable of producing a cognition, and thus there would be as many cognitions as atoms, the breath in the body restricts the capacity of atoms to produce only one cognition at the time (PV II 103–104). Dharmakīrti is not explicit about how this could work, but one can assume perhaps that breath, being a part of the causal complex with one atom, cannot be a part of a causal complex with another atom. The possibility is of course rejected by Dharmakīrti. There is no restriction that one breath produces one cognition because one observes that several cognitions arise during one long breath.

Mental properties such as compassion grow out of their own seed (svabīja); consequently since samsāra has no beginning, everyone should have become a Buddha by now. This would indeed be the case if the same did not apply to the opposite negative properties as well. Just as compassion arises from its own seed, so do hatred or aversion (dveṣa), and so on. Thus, compassion and aversion obstruct each other’s development. It is for this reason that great effort is needed to suppress aversion, etc., with their antidotes (pratipakṣa) so that compassion can flow unhindered and reach its utmost degree, as in the case of the Buddha (PV II 131).

Limited and unlimited causal processes

Interesting is Dharmakīrti’s distinction between limited and unlimited causal process. The distinction depends on whether or not the causal process has a stable or an unstable result. Certain results continue by themselves, by their own essence (svarasena pravartate), e.g., the change of color in burned wood or the increase in mental properties such as compassion. Certain are limited because their causes are limited like jumping and its causes force and effort. Others like boiling water have unstable support. Some are reversible, like heating gold (PV II 124–126).
Presence and absence

Finally, we should not forget our starting point. As long as the cause remains, the result does not cease to exist (PV III 133cd). This is indeed the principle discussed in PVSV 34 and applied to smoke and fire.

Intermediary conclusion

To conclude this section, we see all kinds of correspondences between cause and effect. For lack of a better word, I would like to call them modal correspondences. Existence and inexistence or presence and absence are just one of them; others are transformation, gradation, increase and decrease, reversibility and non-reversibility, generality and specificity, temporal aspects, numerical aspects and so on. I do not pretend to be exhaustive here. However, what we do not see is similarity or appertaining to the same kind as an argument or a consideration in the determination of causal relationship or in its denial. 12

Nowhere is it said, for instance, that the body cannot be the cause of cognition because it is of different kind than the cognition.

If we would like to generalise the underlying principle behind the different modalities, we could say that a change in the cause must bring about a change in the effect. PV II 111 puts it explicitly: if A is the cause of B, B changes when A changes. Or more literally: “What does not change because of the change of something else is not the result of that thing” (na hi tat tasya kāryaṃ yad yasya bhedān na bhidyate).

The problem of induction

I come now to my third contention, which concerns the problem of induction. Steinkellner suggested two new interpretations of Dharmakīrti’s words, which he sees as complementary rather than contradictory (2013 II: 210). The core of the discussion is Dharmakīrti’s famous and enigmatic statement in PVSV 22.3–5 (German transl. in Steinkellner 2013 I: 54): yeśām upalambhe tallaṅgaṇam anupalabdham yad upalabhyaṃ, tatraikābhāve ’pi nopalabhye, tat tasya kāryaṃ “When a perceptible thing unperceived [before] is perceived when several [other things] are perceived, and is not perceived when even one among these [things] is absent, it is the effect of that [one of these things]/of these [several things].”

No matter whether one understands tat to refer to tatra or to eka, the straightforward reading of this statement does not single out one thing such as fire as the cause of smoke, and this in contradistinction to the verse on which this statement comments: kāryaṃ dhūmo hutabhujah. “Smoke is the result of fire” (as well as to later formulations where the plural is changed to singular). Rather, it is clear that Dharmakīrti focuses here on a causal complex. Perhaps for this reason, Steinkellner suggests that fire in the verse should be taken for the

12 Again, this is not to deny Dharmakīrti’s acceptance of samanatapratyaya and Abhidharma causality. The discussion above deals with inference on the level of everyday practice.

13 Steinkellner’s translation opts for the first alternative, as do Mookerjee and Nagasaki (1964: 82); Gillon (2009: 201) opts for the second: “their effect.” Grammatically eka is subordinate and should not be referred to by tat, but we know that Dharmakīrti does not respect this rule (e.g., Nyāyabindu 1.1). For the time being, I would like to leave this issue open.
entire causal complex, namely, fire (i.e., “heat atoms”), wood, air and so on (2013 II: 189, 199). He further argues that each of the causes referred to by yeṣām, tatra, etc., is not a single thing, but a causal complex. In other words, Dharmakīrti’s statement means that several causal complexes are perceived and then any one of them may be absent and not be perceived. I am not sure what we would gain by this hypothesis; I am also not sure that we don’t have a terminological problem here. Usually according to Dharmakīrti one causal complex, being complete and unhindered, is alone capable to produce an effect (see also “the numerical aspect” above). If several complexes cooperate in producing something, this means, according to Dharmakīrti, that they form one larger and encompassing causal complex. Be that as it may, Steinkellner’s interpretation goes clearly against the straightforward understanding of the verse and is contradicted by the commentaries. Nevertheless, it could be accepted if it would have some advantage, for instance, in making Dharmakīrti’s statements clearer or more persuasive. However, the contrary is the case. If accepted, it would make the determination of the causal relation practically impossible. How could one ascertain that even one of the causal complexes is absent? Steinkellner himself says (2013 II: 189) that every causal complex is “in principle quantitatively infinite” (“grundsätzlich quantitativ unendlich”). Thus, one would be able to ascertain at most that a causal complex is incomplete; not that it is absent.14 It is of course true that in the final analysis causes for Dharmakīrti are not individual things, but complexes, but going down to this atomic level of analysis when considering inferences of everyday practice such as from smoke to fire is counter-productive, for it would mean that for practical purposes in everyday practice causation could never be determined.

Whatever the case may be, Steinkellner considers this to be the first step of a proof, which has an inductive character (2013 II: 201). The second step, which consists in a prasāṅga (34cd+Vṛtti), is supposed to bestow the necessity and general validity (2013 II: 201: “Notwendigkeit und allgemeiner Gültigkeit verleihen” with references to Dunne 2004: 174f. and Lasic 2003: 186–191) upon the cognition gained from the first step. This may be true, but one should note the price, and a very high price it is. Basically the prasāṅga argument makes non-fire into fire. For fire is now not what looks like fire, heats like fire and burns like fire, but whatever produces smoke. If it is an anthill, then an anthill is fire,15 if it arises from rubbing together two pieces of wood (PVin II 85.9) then the invisible heat atoms are fire, and if it is water then water is fire. Thus, the understanding and definition of fire becomes arbitrary, and Dharmakīrti more or less admits it. Furthermore, Dharmakīrti

14 Consequently under this interpretation absence (abhāva) of causal complex and its incompleteness (vaikalya) become, at least in practice, conflated.

15 See PV I, v. 36. Dharmakīrti probably refers to a popular belief that anthills or termite mounds contain fire and emit smoke. As termite mounds are humid, one can imagine that vapors, that look like smoke, rise out of them when they are heated by the sun. Dharmakīrti may also be alluding to the fire ritual, where an anthill or termite mound symbolizes the head of the sacrifice. On the role of anthills or termite mounds in the “establishing of fire” (agnyādheya), see Krick 1982: 139ff., esp. 141–142 and König 1984: 170ff.; the belief that fire, as well as the god of fire (Agni), and the sun reside in termite mounds appears already in Vedic literature, cf. König 1984: 171. The Majjhimanikāya 23 (Valmīkisutta) mentions an anthill that “smokes by night and blazes up by day” (Horner 2004 I: 183, repeated with explanation p. 185; I owe this reference to Antonio Rigopoulos): ayaṃ vammiko rattiṃ dhūpāyati divā pajjalati. However, this may refer to an unusual appearance and normally it would be the other way round.
admits that certain effects may arise from different causes; would he admit that the lotus seed and the cow dung have the same nature inasmuch as they produce lotuses? His suggestion that the nature of lotuses produced by seeds is different from the nature of lotuses produced by cow dung (PVSV 23.23–24) sounds like an axiomatic assumption rather than one based on observation. And would scorpions and lotuses have the same nature inasmuch as they are both produced by cow dungs or would one have to distinguish between different types of cow dung? Put differently, Dharmakīrti’s prasāṅga makes the inference from smoke to fire certain, but arbitrary and tautological. If we call fire whatever smoke arises from, then the inference of fire from smoke is only an inference that smoke has a cause. We are not actually inferring fire from smoke, but only that smoke has a cause, which we call fire.

Steinkellner considers Dharmakīrti’s proof to be a stroke of genius (2013 II: 204: “… nichts weniger als für genial”) and that Dharmakīrti may have solved or ‘avoided’ the problem of induction “at least for his own purposes.” It goes without saying that Dharmakīrti did neither avoid nor solve the problem of induction. It would be naïve to expect him to solve what is clearly an insoluble problem. Moreover, the basis of Dharmakīrti’s proof is not particularly original. What he actually does is to revive an old Abhidharma idea which appears in the AKBh. Furthermore, the way Vasubandhu mentions the determination of causation as a matter of course indicates that he too is not its original author, but relies on a well-known Abhidharma definition:

AKBh 461:8–9: tatredam anumānam sati kāraṇe kāraṇāṇtrasyābhāve kārasya-syābhāvo dṛṣṭo bhāve ca punar bhāvas, tadyathāṅkurasya.

There is an inference in relation to these [senses]: When cause(s are) present and another cause is absent, the effect is observed not to arise, and on the other hand when [that other cause] is present, [the effect] arises, for instance [the seed] for the sprout.16

However, this does not mean that Dharmakīrti is simply repeating Vasubandhu. Certainly the philosophical problems he faced in the seventh century were different from those of Vasubandhu in the fourth. Rather, we have to appreciate Dharmakīrti’s advance upon the doctrine of his predecessors (especially Kumārila and Īśvarasena), who, like many philosophers in the Western tradition up to the 21st century, seem to have regarded the inductive process as merely or basically cumulative. While sporadic accumulation of facts is certainly used in everyday practice to form general judgements, Dharmakīrti’s (and in that respect also Vasubandhu’s) method depicts not only what we actually often do in everyday practice, but resembles the one used (of course with much more elaboration and refinement) in scientific determination of causality, for instance, by pharmaceutical companies to determine the causes of pathologies, the effect(s) of particular substances.

See also AKV 1190.22–24 thereon: sati kāraṇe kṣetrodakādike, kāraṇāṇtrasyābhāve kārasya-āṅkurasyābhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ. bhāve ca īasya biṣaya punarbhāvo (read punar bhāvo; it does not make sense to say that the sprout arises again) āṅkurasya dṛṣṭaḥ. “When causes such as the field, water and so on are present [and] another cause such as the seed is absent, the absence of the effect, namely the sprout, is observed, and on the other hand when this seed is present the presence of the sprout is observed.”
and so on. Dharmakīrti’s advance over the older Abhidharmic formulation can be seen not only in his reformulation in PVSV on v. 34 and the repeated insistence that mere non-observation is an unreliable basis for inference, but also in the supplements of this procedure by multiple other aspects such as increase and decrease, gradation, and so on, as indicated above. Although rudimentary and unsystematic in its formulation, the various aspects of causation that Dharmakīrti uses in practice contain in a nutshell the procedure we still employ today: experiment, strength of association, consistency, specificity, temporality, gradation and coherence. Interestingly, we should also note what it does not contain: plausibility and probability. To repeat, Dharmakīrti neither circumvented the problem of induction, nor did he solve it. Yet, in his perception that inductive knowledge is not merely an accumulation of observations, he comes as close to dealing with the problem of induction as we are today.

What is it all about?

Finally, my fourth and last contention: What is it all about? In the second part of his study, Steinkellner suggests that Dharmakīrti’s statements (in PVSV 22.2–4) can be understood as having an entirely different purpose (Zielrichtung, 2013 II: 205). They are not at all aiming at explaining how to determine a causal connection, but what should be understood under the words “cause” and “effect.” In other words, what Dharmakīrti is talking about are the conditions for the usage of the words. Steinkellner calls this “the linguistic turn” (2013 II: 210 “linguistische Wende”) and justifies this move by the statement the objects one investigates are not real entities, but only conceptual constructions of something as “cause” and as “effect.” Under certain conditions one can conceptualize something as a “cause” or as an “effect.”

To be sure, the term “linguistic turn” has more meanings than one. The article about Relativism in the SEP (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) considers the linguistic turn to be characterized by “questions about properties and concepts being replaced by questions about words and linguistic usage.” For example, some philosophers spoke of the role of language or, more generally, “systems of symbols in structuring our experience, thought, or even reality itself.” In a lengthy introduction to a volume entitled The Linguistic Turn (1967), Rorty characterized the linguistic turn as the opinion that “a ‘philosophical problem’ was a product of the unconscious adoption of a set of assumptions built into the vocabulary in which the problem was stated – assumptions which were to be questioned before the problem itself was taken seriously.” (SEP s.v. Richard Rorty, see Ramberg 2009). In this sense, Dharmakīrti should not be considered to introduce a linguistic turn into the

17 The example of pathologies was suggested to me by John Taber in a personal conversation and I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to him for many stimulating conversations. However, Taber has his own opinion on the problem of induction (or indeed the lack thereof) in Indian philosophy and is not to be held responsible for anything suggested here. For the determination of causation in medical sciences see for instance the often quoted Hill 1965. Among the criteria specified, Hill mentions the strength of the association, its consistency, specificity, temporality, biological gradient (which corresponds to “gradation” in Dharmakīrti’s terminology), plausibility (as far as I can see, not used, at least not explicitly, by Dharmakīrti or anyone else in the Indian tradition), coherence, experiment and analogy.
problem of causation. At least I cannot see him distinguishing concepts from words and linguistic usage or that the assumption built into a vocabulary would have to be articulated and questioned before the problem could be solved. I also fail to see that Dharmakīrti would fit into the linguistic turn of the Vienna Circle, which considers representation as the proper subject matter of philosophy (Vienna Circle, SEP).

The key to our question lies in Dharmakīrti’s purpose. What does he aim to achieve with his new theory of reason in PVSV? As far as I can see, he neither aims at “saving the phenomena,” nor was he concerned with establishing any scientific theory (in sense of natural sciences), nor was he a pure logician concerned with the logical problems per se, nor did he aim at establishing the validity of everyday practice, which involves inferences from smokes to fires. I think that what really troubled him were inferences on doctrinal matters. Such inferences appear in the beginning of the PVSV, and in this sense we cannot say that he keeps his cards close to the chest. Already in v. 11 he addresses the Mīmāṁsā inference: The Buddha had desires because he had a body, like a common man. And immediately after that (v. 12) we have an extensive discussion of a somewhat similar inference: The Buddha was not free from desires (vītarāga) because he spoke, like a common man. Another inference, perhaps put forward by a Naiyāyika, appears in v. 18: The living body is not without a soul because otherwise it would not have breath and so forth. Such inferences were unacceptable to the Buddhists, and yet they were valid in the sense of complying with the trairūpya theory. I suggest that it is probably in response to such inferences that Dharmakīrti developed his theory of three kinds of reasons, and the primary aim of his theory was to show why these and similar inferences were not valid.

Dharmakīrti’s dealing of the vyavahāra inference from smoke to fire may be seen therefore just a by-product for his doctrinal concerns. For in classical India, no theory of inference would get off the ground without dealing with this paradigmatic inference. However, it is clear that his interest lies elsewhere. As Lasic (2003: 190) has already noticed, “[h]e [Dharmakīrti] does not seem to have aimed [in PVSV 22.2–4, etc.] at a detailed discussion of the procedure of establishing the causal dependence in an individual case.” On the other hand, he was very much interested in the pragmatic situation of what should count as a valid proof in the inter-religious debate. His interest in causation was thus not directed at causation in natural phenomena, but in causal connection between body and consciousness, between desires, compassion and speech, between body and soul. And in dealing with these topics, he was as much interested in the possibility of denying a causal relation (notably between body and cognition) as in establishing one.

References and abbreviations


Reinterpretation of the Compound svabhāva-pratibandha in Dharmakīrti’s Logical Theory

by

Yoichi Fukuda

Introduction

Many scholars agree that svabhāva-pratibandha forms the actual basis of Dharmakīrti’s logical theory. However, there are different opinions about what svabhāva-pratibandha means.¹

In his article “Svabhāvapratibandha Again,” Steinkellner wrote that “since the word pratibandha has only a formal meaning, the word svabhāva is responsible for connecting the reality needed” (1984: 458). He does not distinguish the meaning of sambandha from that of pratibandha, understanding both as having only the formal meaning of “connection.”

Before examining the usage of the word svabhāva-pratibandha in Dharmakīrti’s texts, I would like to consult how pratibandha/pratibaddha is presented in the Mahāvyutpatti and Abhidharmakośa, two authoritative texts on Buddhist terminology. As the Tibetan equivalents for pratibandha, the Mahāvyutpatti lists phyir ’jil ba’am byegs byed pa’ am bar chad byed pa, which mean hindrance or obstruction (Mahāvyutpatti, 6483). The same is the case in the Abhidharmakośa, where pratibandha is translated into Tibetan as byegs byed pa / byegs su gyur pa and into Chinese as 障, 障礙, 遮 (Index to the Abhidharmakośa, p. 248).

On the other hand, in Mahāvyutpatti 6481, rag lus pa’ am ’brel ba’ am byegs su gyur pa are given as the Tibetan equivalents of pratibandha, while in the Abhidharmakośa (Index, p. 248) in four cases “X-pratibaddha” is translated into Tibetan as “X la rag luslas pa,” and in one case as “X dang ’brel ba.” In five cases, it is translated into Chinese as 黇属, 属, 隨. These translations in the Abhidharmakośa all mean “dependence upon.” Thus, in these traditional texts, pratibandha is never used to mean connection, but is rather chiefly used to mean dependence.

In one-third of the cases where pratibandha is used in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika-svavyrtti (hereinafter referred to as PVSV), the word means “obstruction,” translated into Tibetan as byegs/gags byed (pa). However, in two-thirds of the cases pratibandha is translated as ’brel ba or rag lasluss pa. I have collected fifty-one passages that use the latter meaning for pratibandhalpratibaddha (List C). There is no distinction between pratibandha and pratibaddha in these Tibetan translations. The only difference between them is the syntactic

¹ Most articles on svabhāva-pratibandha have been published in Japanese. A historical survey of these discussions was written by Kei Kataoka (2012). The idea I present here dates back thirty years. At that time I wrote two short papers on this theme in Japanese (“An Inquiry into the Structure of Dharmakīrti’s Logic,” 1987; “On the meaning of svabhāvapratibandha in Dharmakīrti’s Logic,” 1989). In 2012, I wrote two additional longer papers (“On the Interpretation of the Compound svabhāvapratibandha,” 2012a; “On the Meaning of pratibandha in Pramāṇavārttika-svavyrtti,” 2012b), in which I rearranged the former presentations and supplemented them with more citations to demonstrate my idea.
difference in Sanskrit. In twenty-seven of these passages, pratibandhal/pratibaddha is explicitly related to expressions of the logical nexus, for example, gamya, gamaka, gamayate, gamyate, avyabhicāra, avisamvāda, vyāpti, anvaya, vyatireka, ekanivrtyānyavṛtti, and so on. Another eighteen passages mention pratibandhal/pratibaddha without svabhāva. From these usages I could conclude that pratibandha has a more important role than svabhāva as the basis of the logical nexus.

Of these fifty-one examples of pratibandhal/pratibaddha in the PVSV, I believe that none conflicts with the meaning of dependence, which is the traditional meaning of pratibaddha as seen above. Later I would like to return to this point and add another piece of indirect evidence.

**Analysis of the compound svabhāva-pratibandha**

To understand the meaning of the compound svabhāva-pratibandha, I will discuss the assumptions regarding the syntactical value of svabhāva in this compound. Until now, there have been three interpretations of this compound, namely as instrumental tatpurusā, genitive tatpurusā, and locative tatpurusā. The first interpretation is the most common and the one used by Dharmottara in paraphrasing the compound in the Nyāyabinduṭīkā: svabhāvena pratibandhaḥ svabhāvapratibandhaḥ (NBT 110,1). However, I could not find any textual evidence in Dharmakīrti confirming that pratibandha is used with words in the instrumental case. Dharmakīrti mentions pratibandha with one word in the genitive case and another in the locative case; the former indicates a possessor of pratibandha and the latter indicates an object upon which the possessor of pratibandha is dependent. A similar situation can be seen in the example of pratibaddha, which is used with a word in the locative case indicating the object of dependence and a notional subject in the appositional case. In order to explain the usage of related words used with pratibandha, I would like to consult the Nyāyabindu (NB) instead of the PVSV for reasons of simplicity.

\[\begin{align*}
\text{NB 2.19: } & \text{svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho(Y) arthaṃ(Y) gamayet} \\
\text{NB 2.20: } & \text{tad(Y)-apratibaddhasya(X) tad(Y)-avyabhicāraniyamābhāvāt} \\
\text{NB 2.21: } & \text{sa ca pratibandhaḥ sādhye arthe(Y) liṅgasya(X)} \\
\text{NB 2.22: } & \text{[liṅgasya(X)] vastutas tād(Y)-ātmyāt tad(Y)-utpatteś ca} \\
\text{NB 2.23: } & \text{a-tad(Y)-svabhāvasya(X) a-tad(Y)-utpatteś(X) ca tatra(Y) apratibaddha-svabhāvatvāt} \\
\end{align*}\]

In these statements, X (= hetu or liṅga) is the object that infers another thing, and Y (= sādhya) is the object to be inferred.

According to NB 2.21, X (liṅga) in the genitive case is a notional subject of pratibandha, which is the repetition of svabhāva-pratibandha in NB 2.19. In other words, X (liṅga)

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2 Hereinafter I will mention these terms as pratibandhal/pratibaddha without distinction.
3 In the actual texts of Dharmakīrti, these words are often part of negative expressions.
4 Cf. PVSV 2.19–20: svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho arthaṃ na vyabhicārati l.
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is a possessor of pratibandha. sādhye arthe (= Y) of the locative case in NB 2.21 and its substitute pronoun tatra in NB 2.23 represent the object, which is connected to or dependent upon X (liṅga). In other words, Y (sādhya) is an object upon which X (liṅga) is dependent. According to NB 2.23, X (liṅga), which is implicitly assumed to be in the same case (genitive) as tatsvabhāvasya or tadutpatteś, is a notional subject of the bahuvṛti compound pratibaddha-svabhāva. The same usage of pratibaddha-svabhāva is found in PVSV: apratibaddha-svabhāvasyāvinābhāvanīyamābhāvāt (8,12f), or na ca tadapratibaddhasvabhāvo bhāvo anyam gamayati (107,25). In both cases, X (liṅga or hetu) is supplemented in the appositional case.

One could naturally interpret this compound as meaning that something (X = liṅga) has its svabhāva, which is dependent upon another thing (Y = sādhya); in other words, this would mean that the svabhāva of X (liṅga) is dependent upon Y (sādhya). From these usages of pratibaddha-svabhāva, one could conclude that the first component of the compound svabhāva-pratibandha is the svabhāva of X (liṅga) and that the compound is a genitive tātpuruṣa.

However, and inconveniently, one exceptional passage exists that possibly suggests that svabhāva expresses the dependent object.6 In this case svabhāva-pratibandha must be interpreted as a locative tātpuruṣa. These examples show that Dharmakīrti was not particularly rigorous in his interpretation of the compound, but that he generally considered svabhāva to be a liṅga and the compound thus a genitive tātpuruṣa.

The meaning of pratibandha

Next, I would like to return to the investigation into the meaning of the dependence of X (liṅga) upon Y (sādhya). Because Dharmakīrti does not explain the meaning of pratibandha explicitly, we must try to understand it from its context. The word is very closely related to ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti (PVSV 10,23; PV I.24), which is an improved version of avinābhāva, itself a traditional expression for a logical nexus. While avinābhāva means the inevitable absence of one thing (X = hetu) in the sphere of the absence of another thing (Y = sādhya), ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti means that the disappearance of one thing (X) is caused by the disappearance of another thing (Y).7 This causality of disappearance is expressed by the instrumental case or the causative verb, while the inclusive relation of the absence of two things is expressed by the locative case. Dharmakīrti introduces this causality of disappearance as a condition of an inevitable logical nexus, and insists that the causality of disappearance necessarily requires the pratibandha relation, meaning the dependence of the existence of one thing (X = hetu) upon another thing (Y = sādhya). If X is dependent in this way upon Y, the disappearance of Y will inevitably cause the disappearance of X.

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6 PVSV 17,1–3: svam ca svabhāvam parityajya katham bhāvo bhavet i svabhāvasyaiva bhāvatvād iti tasya (= līngasya) svabhāvapratibandhād avyabhicāraḥ / In this case, svabhāva is consistently the object to be conferred and bhāva is the object conferring it. Śākyabuddhi commented on the second sentence: tasyāmbabhitaśa sādhaśaṁ śiṃśapadeḥ svabhāvapratibandhād eva svabhāve śadhyābhimate vṛksādau … pratibandhād evyavyabhicāraḥ / (KG 75,3ff = PVṬ 39b7f).

7 The Tibetan equivalent of avinābhāva is med na mi ‘byung ba, while on the other hand the equivalent of ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti is gcig log pas gzhan ldog pa. As will be shown below, in Tibetan logic the expression corresponding to the latter is de ldog pa’i stobs kyi khyod ldog pa.
Such dependence is, in itself, a connection between real objects and therefore to express this meaning Dharmakīrti does not need to mention svabhāva.

\[ tasmād ekanivṛttyā 'nyanivṛttim icchatā tayoh kaścit svabhāvapratibandho 'py eṣṭavyaḥ / anyathā 'gamako hetuḥ syāt / (PVSV 10,23–25) \]

This passage shows that the logical reason (= hetu) is based on the relation of ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti and, in turn, this relation is based on svabhāva-pratibandha. Conversely, if svabhāva-pratibandha exists between two objects, the disappearance of one object causes the disappearance of the other and thus one can infer the existence of the former object from the existence of the latter. One can find this used in a similar way several times in the PVSV, as detailed below.

PVSV 16,28f: tanmātrasambandaḥ svabhāvo (= sādhya) bhāvam (= liṅga) eva nivartayet (k.23a–c) /.

PVSV 17,5: kāraṇam nivartamānam kāryam nivartayati /.

PVSV 17,7f: ubhayathā (= tādāmyena tadutpattā vā) svabhāvapratibandhād eva nivṛttih / anyathā ekanivṛttyānyanivṛttiḥ kathāṃ bhavet (k.24ab) /.

PVSV 19,25: tāv (= kāraṇa and vyāpaka) eva hi nivartamānau svapratibandhām (= kārya and vyāpya) nivartayata iti /.

PVSV 20,1f: apratibandhe hi katham ekasya nivṛttir anyasya nivṛttim sādha-yet /.

This nivartaka power does not represent a kind of logical nexus, but rather the power to affect another object existentially. Based on these expressions, I would like to suggest that pratibandha, or existential dependence, is confirmed by means of the realization of the causality between the disappearances of two objects. If svabhāva-pratibandha does not exist, then it is not possible to confirm the causality between the two disappearances. Conversely, if one can find causality between the two disappearances, then svabhāva-pratibandha must exist.

This is the very idea evoked by Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432) when he said

\[ byas pa mi rtag pa la 'brel ba'i don ldog gi phyogs gcig de gnyis tha dad mgon sum gyis grub cing / mi rtag pa log pa'i stobs kyis byas pa ldog pa'i tshul ni mi rtag pa log pa'i gzhī la byas pa 'gog pa'i gnod pa can gyi rtags la brten nas bsgrub pa yin \ldots \]

\footnote{According to Śākyabuddhi, KG 75,23.}

\footnote{The translation “existential dependence” coincides with the translation by F. Th. Stcherbatsky (1930). He translated the first occurrence of svabhāva-pratibandha in NB II.19 (p. 69) as “Because one thing can convey the (existence of) another one when it is existentially dependent (on the latter)” (my emphasis, Y. F.).}

\footnote{rGyal tshab rje Dar ma rin chen, tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa, Zhol ed., cha, 22b4–5. That the defining character of 'brel pa is closely related to the causality of two disappearances was first pointed out in the presentation “rGyal tshab’s Understanding of Svabhāvapratibandha” by Choi Kyeon-jin at the Conference of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, 2013, Ulaanbaatar.}
don ldog is an equivalent of mtshan nyid, that is, the “defining character.” Therefore in this passage Dar ma rin chen is postulating that there are two conditions that define the character of the dependence of the produced object upon an impermanent object: (1) the two objects must be different, and (2) the disappearance of the former object is caused by force of the disappearance of the latter object.

It is obvious that the second condition is based on ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti. don ldog literally means the distinguishing character in the object, and therefore this ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti is a distinguishing character of pratibandha. This is indirect evidence of the close relationship between pratibandha and ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti.

**Problems in the Tibetan translation of the PVSV and the commentaries on Dharmakīrti**

As shown above, there is little that remains speculative about the meaning of pratibandha in the texts of Dharmakīrti. Now I would like to point out some interesting matters that can be drawn from the Tibetan translation of the PVSV and its commentary.

I have already mentioned that in the Abhidharmakośa and Mahāvyutpatti, pratibaddha is in most cases translated as rag las pa. In passages no. 1 to no. 25 of fifty-one citations in List C, below with the exception of no. 5, pratibaddha is translated as ’brel balpa and in the rest of the passages, with the exception of nos. 27 and 34, it is translated as rag las/lus pa. The same situation is found in the Tibetan translation of the commentary on the PVSV by Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ). In half of the cases translated into rag las/lus pa, pratibandha/pratibaddha is used in the context of the basis for the logical nexus. For example, svabhāva-pratibandha in passages nos. 44 and 46 is translated as rang bzhin la/gyi rag lus pa, not as rang bzhin (dang) ’brel ba, which is the translation in the first half of the cases of svabhāva-pratibandha/pratibaddha-svabhāva. In passage no. 40, tadapratibaddhasvabhāva is properly translated as de la rag lus pa med pa’i rang bzhin can gyi, with the meaning of the bahuvrīhi compound. As mentioned above, there is no distinction made between svabhāva-pratibandha and pratibaddha-svabhāva in the Tibetan translation. This transition of the Tibetan translation of the PVSV and PVṬ might mean that the translator(s)\(^{11}\) of these two texts realized Dharmakīrti’s intentions behind this term in the process of their translation work, and changed their translation of pratibandha/pratibaddha halfway through.

But other Tibetan scholars who did not consult the Sanskrit texts must not have noticed that rag las/lus pa was the translation of pratibandha. Amazingly, they properly recorded the defining character of ’brel pa as I have mentioned above, even in such a restricted or incomplete situation. I cannot but concede that they had a very profound ability to understand Dharmakīrti’s intentions.

This change in the Tibetan translation of pratibandha/pratibaddha may have been influenced by an annotation of Śākyabuddhi, which paraphrases pratibaddha as āyatta and

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\(^{11}\) The colophon of the PVSV does not mention a translator, but that of the PVṬ mentions lo ts’a ba rma dge ba’i blo gros. Perhaps he also translated the PVSV during the same period.
pratibandha as āyattatva on several occasions (passages nos. 1, 5, 24, 32, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 46).

In the midst of paraphrasing pratibandha in NB II.21: sa ca pratibandhaḥ sādhye 'rthe lingasya, Dharmottara comments that lingam parāyattatvāt pratibaddham / sādhyas tv artho' parāyattatvāt pratibandhaviṣayo na tu pratibaddha ity arthaḥ / (NBṬ 112,1f); “linga is pratibaddha because it is dependent upon another [object], while on the other hand sādhyā artha – because it is not dependent upon the other [namely the linga] – is an object of pratibandha, [but] it is not pratibaddha.” Dharmottara clearly interprets pratibaddha as āyattatva and pratibandha as āyattatva. He also puts linga and pratibaddha in the appositional case and explains that sādhyā is pratibandhaviṣaya. Moreover, Durvekamīśra annotates pratibandha three times with pratibandhaḥ pratibaddhatvam āyattatvam (NBṬ 96,21; 110,20; 115,15f). These explanations correspond with what I have explicated above in this paper.

Conclusion

To summarize my arguments in this paper:

1. pratibandha is more significant than svabhāva in the compound svabhāva-pratibandha.

2. Generally svabhāva-pratibandha is interpreted as pratibaddha-svabhāvatva, which is an abstract noun of a bahuvrīhi compound. Therefore, svabhāva stands for the linga’s svabhāva and svabhāva-pratibandha should be understood as a genitive tatpurusa compound.

3. pratibandha/pratibaddha is closely related to the causality of the dual disappearance of two objects (ekanivṛttyanyanivṛtti).

4. Therefore, pratibandha/pratibaddha express the existential dependence of one object upon another, of which the former is linga or hetu and the latter is sādhyā.

References and abbreviations


AKBhT Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa. Derge ed. Tohoku No. 4090. mNgon pa'i bstan bcos, gu 27b6–ngu 109a8.


Dar ma rin chen rGyal tshab rje Dar ma rin chen, tshed ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa. Zhol ed.

12 At this first mention of svabhāva-pratibandha, Śākyabuddhi annotates that rang bzhin bsgrub par bya ba'i dngos po dang 'brel pa ni de la rag las pa nyid de yod na'o. But Karnakagomin comments differently, that svabhāvena pratibandhaḥ sādhanaṃ kṛtaī samāsa / svabhāvena pratibaddhatvam / pratibaddhasvabhāvatvam iti yāvat / (KG 13,18f), which is the almost same paraphrase as that in Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā (NBṬ 110,1f).
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NB Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabindu. See NBṬ.


PV Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttikā. See PVSV.


List A: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

1. **AKBh**
   
   *icchāmātrapratabuddho* hi teṣāṃ sarvaguṇasampatsaṃmukhībhāvaḥ / (Ch.2, 70.23)
   
   **AKBhT**
   
   *de dag gi yon tan 'byor ba mngon sum du 'gyur ba thams cad ni bzhed pa tsam la rag lus pa yin pas …* (Ku, 76a7)
   
   一切圓德，隨樂而起故。

2. **AKBh**
   
   *yasya yatpratibaddha updādah sa tasyānantaram up padyate /* (Ch.2, 99.13)
   
   **AKBhT**
   
   *gang zhig gang la rag las te skye ba de ni de'i 'jug thogs su skye ste /* (Ku 100a5)
   
   若此法生，繫屬彼法，要彼無間，此乃得生。如芽等生，要藉種等。

3. **AKBh**
   
   *tatra pañcavidhamanaskārānantaram āryamārgasammukhībhavo ‘nyatropapati pratilambhikebhyaḥ / prayoga pratibaddhatvāt /* (Ch.2, 109.1f)
   
   **AKBhT**
   
   *de la skyes nas thob pa dag ma gtogs pa yid la byed pa rnam pa lnga'i mjug thogs su 'phags pa'i lam mngon du 'gyur te / sbyor ba la rag lus pa'i phyir ro //* (Ku 107b5f)
   
   此中五種，作意無間，聖道現前。除生所得聖道。繫屬加行心故。

4. **AKBh**
   
   *yadā cāsyāśrayo vipariṇantum ārabhate tadāvaśyam asya tadāśraya pratibaddham cittaṃ sammukhībhūya paścāt prayavet nānyathā /* (Ch.3, 156.6f)
   
   **AKBhT**
   
   *gang gi tshe de'i lus yongs su 'jug par rtsom pa de'i tshe yang de las gdon mi za bar de'i lus dang 'brel pa'i sens mngon du gyur nas phyis 'chi 'pho bar 'gyur gyi gzhal du ni ma yin no //* (Ku, 143a1f)
   
   若所依身將欲變壞，必定還起屬所依心。然後命終。更無餘理。

5. **AKBh**
   
   *icchāmātrapratabuddhah sarvaguṇasampatsaṃmukhībhāvaḥ /* (Ch.7, 421.3)
   
   **AKBhT**
   
   *de dag gi yon tan 'byor ba thams cad mngon du 'gyur ba ni bzhed pa tsam la rag lus so //* (Khu, 122b5)
   
   諸佛功德・・隨欲能引現前。

List B: Mahāvyutpatti

6483  | *pratibandhah / phyir 'jil ba’am bgegs byed pa’am bar chad byed pa /
6481  | *pratibaddhah / rag lus pa’am 'brel ba’am bgegs su gyur pa /
List C: PVSV, commentaries of Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin

1. PVSV  
svabhāvapratibandhe hi satyartho 'rthaḥ na vyabhicarat / (2,19)  
SVTib  
rang bzhin dang 'brel pa yod pa don gyis don 'khrul pa med de / (262a6f)  
KG  
svabhāvena pratibandhaḥ sādhanam kṛteti samāsah / svabhāvena pratibandhavatam / pratibandha-svabhāvatvam iti yāvat / (23,16f)  
PVT  
(≠) rang bzhin bsgrub par bya ba'i dngos po dang 'brel pa ni de la rag las pa nyid de de yod na'o // (10a7)  

2. PVSV  
kāryasyāpi svabhāvapratibandhaḥ / (3,3f)  
SVTib  
'bras bu yang rang bzhin dang 'brel pa yin te / (262b2)  
KG  
– (24,25); PVT: – (11a2)  

3. PVSV  
tatrānubhayasyāpratibandhāt tadabhāve anyena na bhavitavam iti kuta etat / (5,19f)  
SVTib  
de la gnyis ka ma yin pa ni 'brel pa med pa'i phyir te / de med na gzhan med par 'gyur ro // zhes bya ba der lta ga la 'gyur // (263b7)  
KG  
amabhāyasākāryaśārāniṁ kāryaśārāniṁ nisṛdhīṣyena saḥa pratibandhābhāvāt tadbhāve pratibandhābhāvāt / (38,17f)  
PVT  
gnyi ga ma yin pa ste rgyu yang ma yin la 'bras bu yang ma yin pa'i bdag nyid ni dagag par bya ba dang lhan cig 'brel pa med pa'i phyir de med na ste 'brel pa med pa med na ... (16b2)  

4. PVSV  
apratibandhasvabhāvāsākāryaśārāṇyāvinābhāvaniyamābhāvāt / (8,12f)  
SVTib  
rang bzhin ma 'brel pa ni med na mi 'byung bar nges pa med pa'i phyir ro // (265a6)  
KG  
tādāmyatadatuṇḍitaḥ sākāyānāṃ linginy apratibandhasvabhāvāsākāryaśārāṇaṇyāvinābhāvaniyamābhāvāt / (49,12)  
PVT  
de'i bdag nyid dang de las byung ba dag gi rtags can dang / rang bzhin ma 'brel pa ni med na ma 'byung bar nges pa med pa'i phyir ro // (22b2f)  

5. PVSV  
nāntarīyakam eva kāryaṃ kāraṇam anumāpayati / tatpratibandhāt / (10,5f)  
SVTib  
med na mi 'byung ba'i 'bras bu kho nas rgyu rjes su dpog par byed do // de la rag las pa yin pa'i phyir ro // (266a6)  
KG  
tatpratibandhāt / tatra kāraṇe āyattatvāt / (55,4f)  
PVT  
med na mi 'byung ba'i 'bras bu kho nas zhes bya ni rgyu med na mi 'byung ba kho nas so // de la rag las pa yin pa'i phyir zhes bya na ni rgyu de la rag las pa yin pa'i phyir ro // (26b2f)  

6. PVSV  
ekanīrśītyā 'nyanirśītim icchatā tayoḥ kaścit svabhāvapratinādhaḥ 'py eṣṭāvyah / anyathā 'gamakō hetuḥ syāt / (10,23f)  
SVTib  
gcig log pas gzhan ldog par 'dod pas ni de gyis rang bzhin 'brel pa 'ga' zhis kyang 'dod par bya ba dgos so // de lta ma yin na gan tshigs go bar byed pa ma yin par 'gyur ro // (266b6)  
KG  
tayoḥ sādhyasādhanayoḥ kaścit svabhāvena pratibandhas tādāmyataduuṭpattilakṣaṇo ']|py eṣṭāvyah / (57,7f)
Reinterpretation of the Compound svabhāva-pratibandha

7. PVṬ na hy asati pratibandhe 'nvayavyatirekaniśca 'sti / (10,28)
   SVṬib 'brel pa med par ni rjes su 'gro ba dang ldog pa nges pa med de / (266b7)
   KG – (59,27); PVṬ: – (28a6)

8. PVSV anyathā hy asati pratibandhe 'darśanamātreṇa vyatireke / (11,5)
   SVṬib de lta ma yin te / 'brel pa med par ma mthong ba tsam gyis ldog na / (267a2)
   KG – (58,23); PVṬ: – (28b6)

9. PVSV anupalambhā tu kvacid abhāvasiddhāv apy apratibaddhya tadabhāve sarvatra bhāvāvāsiddheḥ / (12,23f)
   SVṬib mi dmigs pa'i sgo nas ni 'ga' zhig la med pa grub tu zin kyang 'brel pa med pa ni de med kyang thams cad la med pa mi grub pas / (267b4f)
   KG apratibaddhaya hetoh sādhye / tadabhāve sādhyābhāve sarvatra vipakṣe bhāvāvāsiddheḥ... (62,9f)
   PVṬ gtan tshigs bsgrub par bya ba dang 'brel pa med pa ni sgrub par byed pa de med kyang mi mthun pa'i phyogs su gyur ba'i dngos po thams cad la med pa mi 'grub pa'i gtan tshigs kyis na the tshom za ba yin no / (31a5)

10. PVSV tannivṛtttau kvacid nivṛttāv api prāṇādīnām apratibandhāt / sarvatra nivṛttyasiddhāatra agamakatvam / (13,10f)
    SVṬib 'ga' zhig la de log ste / srog la sogs pa log kyang 'brel pa med pa'i phyir / thams cad las ldog pa mi 'grub pas rtogs par byed pa ma yin pa nyid do / (268a2)
    KG nivṛttāv api prāṇādīnām apratibandhād atmanā saha sambandhābhāvāvā / (63,23f)
    PVṬ srog la sogs pa log kyang 'brel pa med pa'i phyir / bdag dang lhan cig 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ... (32a4)

11. PVSV yadi kathamcid vipakṣe 'darśanamātreṇa apratibaddhasyāpi tadavyabhicāraḥ / (15,11)
    SVṬib gal te ji zhig ltar mi mthun pa'i phyogs la ma mthong ba tsam gyis 'brel pa med pa yang de 'khrul pa med do zhe na / (269a1)
    KG yadi vipakṣe hetor adarśanamātreṇāpratibaddhasya svasādhye tadavyabhicāraḥ sādhyābhāve sādhyāvabhisamāyate / (69,2f)
    PVṬ gal te mi mthun pa'i phyogs la gtan tshigs ma mthun ba tsam gyis bsgrub par bya ba dang 'brel pa med pa'i yang bsgrub par bya ba der 'khrul pa med par 'dod na ni ... (35a6f)

12. PVSV svam ca svabhāvam parityajyā katham bhāvo bhavet / svabhāvasyaiva bhāvātvād iti tasya svabhāvā-pratibandhād avyabhicārāḥ / (17,1f)
    SVṬib rang gi ngo bo yongs su bor nas kyang ji ltar yod par 'gyur te / rang gi ngo bo kho na ngo bo yin pa'i phyir ro / de'i phyir de ni rang bzhin 'brel pa'i phyir 'khrul pa med do / (270a3)
    KG tasyātmabhisāya sādhanasya śimśapadeh svabhāvapratibandhād eva svabhāve sādhyābhāvam evyāvabhi-cāraḥ / (75,3f)
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PVṬ

sgrub pa shing sha pa la sogs pa bdag nyid du gyur pa de ni rang bzhin 'brel pa kho na'i phyir te / rang bzhin bsgrub par bya bar 'dod pa shing la sogs pa dang ji skad bshad pa'i rnam pas 'brel pa kho nas 'khrul pa med do // (39b7f)

13. PVSV

ubhayathā svabhāvapratibandhād eva nivṛttiḥ / (17,7)

SVTib

gnyis ga rang bzhin 'brel pa kho nas ldog go // (270a4f)

KG

ubhayathehi tādāmyena tadutpatyāvā yah svabhāvapratibandhas tasmād eva / sādhyanivṛttiḥhetor nivṛttiḥ / anyathethi yadi pratibandho neṣyate / ekasyāpratibandhakasya sādhyaṁ yatvānivṛttiḥ / apratibandhasya sādhanadharmasya nivṛttiḥ katham bhavet / (75,11f)

PVṬ

(=) gnyi gar zhes bya ba ni de'i bdag nyid dang la de las byung ba'i mtshan nyid kyis rang bzhin 'brel pa kho nas bsgrub par bya ba bo log pas gan tshigs ldog go lp de Ita mìn na gcig log pas zhes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba ma 'brel pa log pas l ji ltar gzhan mi ldog par 'gyur sgrub pa'i chos ma 'brel pa ldog par 'gyur mi 'gyur ba kho na ste / (40a3f)

14. PVSV

svabhāvapratibandhād eva hetuḥ sādhyāgamayati / sa ca tadbhāvalakaṇas tadutpattilakaṇo vā // (17,12f)

SVTib

rang bzhin 'brel pa kho nas tshigs kyis bsgrub par bya ba go bar byed de lp de'i ngo bo'i mtshan nyid dam lp de las byung ba'i mtshan nyid yin no lp (270a6)

KG

svabhāvapratibandhādh eva sādhyābhimate vastuni pratibandhatvād eva hetuḥ svasaṭṭhyāgamayati / (76,1f)

PVṬ

rang bzhin 'brel pa kho nas bsgrub par bya bar 'dod pa'i dngos po dang 'brel pa kho nas tshigs kyis bsgrub par bya ba go bar byed do // (40a6)

15. PVSV

yadā punar dyātānena nāgniḍhūmayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ pradarśyate / tadā yatra dhūmas trāṭrāgniḥ ity eva na syāt / pratibandhābhāvaḥ svabhāvaṃ gamayati / (19,16f)

SVTib

gang gi tshe dpes me dang du ba dag rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po mi ston pa de'i tshe ni 'brel pa med pa'i phyir / gang na du ba yod pa de na me yod do zhes bya ba nyid du yang mi 'gyur na / (271a7)

KG

– (85,5f); PVṬ: – (44a2f)

16. PVSV

dyātānena eva yathoktasvabhāvapratibandhādh pradarśyate / (19,21f)

SVTib

dpes ji skad bshad pa'i rang bzhin 'brel pa 'di kho na rab tu ston pa / (271b1f)

KG

– (85,8f); PVṬ: – (44a4)

17. PVSV

tā eva hi niḥvartāmanau svaprabhādiprāpanavāsya / (19,25)

SVTib

tā eva hi kārāṇayāpakaḥ niḥvartāmāṇau svaprabhādiprāpanaḥ kāryaṃ vyāpyaṃ ca svabhāvāṃ niḥvartayata / (85,14f)

PVṬ

rgyu dang khyab par byed pa de dag kho na ldog pa na rang gi 'brel pa zlog par byed pas … (271b2)

KG

– (85,18f); PVṬ: – (44a5f)

18. PVSV

aprabhādiprāpano hi katham ekasya nivṛttir anyasya nivṛttiṁ sādhayaḥ / (20,1f)

SVTib

ma 'brel na ji ji ltar gcig log pas gzhan ldog pa sgrub par byed / (271b3)

KG

– (85,18f); PVṬ: – (44a7)

19. PVSV

yadi nāmaite śabdāḥ purusāṅghaṃ kvačit prāṇiniśitaḥ api na śakyante prāṇetum vastuprabhādiprāpano dhūmādivati / (35,20f)
Reinterpretation of the Compound svaḥāva-pratibandha

SVTib  
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gal te sgra 'di dag skyes bu rnams kyis 'ga' zhig la bya bar 'dod du zin kyang du ba la sogs pa bzhin du dang 'brel pa'i phyir bya bar mi nus na …  
(280b4f)

KG  
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vastupratibandhāt / vastvāyattatvāt / dhūmādvit / na hy agnipratibaddho dhūmo vahnipratyāyanasamarthas tadvaiśparītīyena jalapratyāyane nityoktuṃ pāryate / tadā vastupratibaddhatve śabdānām ayam upālambhaḥ syād asati vyatireke katham śaṣṭhīyādaya iti // (157,14f)

PVṬ  
(=)  
dngos po dang 'brel pa'i phyir  
dngos po tha dad pa la rag las pa'i phyir bya bar mi nus na / sgra rnams dngos po dang 'brel pa de'i tshe / tha dad pa med na ji ltar drug pa la sogs par 'gyur zhes bya ba'i klan ka 'di 'gyur ba zhig na / (80a1f)

20. PVSV  
sarvaḥ cāyam svalakṣaṇānām eva darśanāḥtavāsaṇākṛto viplava iti tatpratibhāsīte 'pi vastuny avisamvādo …  
(43,2f)

SVTib  
---

'di thams cdang gi mtshan nyid dag kho na mthong bas gzhag pa'i bag chags kyis byas pa'i bslad pa yin pa las de dang 'brel pa las skye ba'i rnam par rtog pa rnams ni de snang ba nyid ma yin yang dngos po la mi bslu ste / (285a2f)

KG  
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sarvaḥ cāyam ityādi / sarvo viplava iti sambandhaḥ / viplavo bhṛṇṭhī / ayam iti sāmānyādīrūpaḥ / vālasākṣaṇānām eva yaḥ darśanaṇaḥ tathāhi yā vāsana ta-tkṛtaḥ / paramparāyā sarvavikalpānām vastudarśanadvārāyāvatvāt / tathā hi nityādvikalpā api vastudarśanenaivotpannāḥ sadyāparāparotpattidarśanāvātāt / tatra tulye sarvavikalpānām vastudarśanadvārāyatvāt / tātpratibhādha'janmanām anityādvikalpānām atatpratibhāsīte [']pi svalakṣaṇāpratibhāsīte [']pi vastuny avismvādaḥ / (183,4f)

PVṬ  
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'di thams cd es bya ba la sogs pa smos te / 'di zhes bya ba ni rtog pa la sogs pa'i rnam par rtog po'o // thams cd bslad pa yin no zhes bya bar sbyar te / bslad pa'i rnam par rtog pa o'o // rang gi mtshan nyid dag kho na mthong ba gang yin pa des gzhag pa'i bag chags des byas pa yin te / rnam par rtog pa thams cd ni dngos po mthong ba'i sgo nas brgyud de 'ongs pa'i phyir ro ll 'di ltar rtog pa la sogs pa'i rnam par rtog pa yang dngos po mthong ba kho na las byung ba yin te / 'dra ba gzhân 'byang ba la sogs pas 'khrul ba 'ba' zhig tu zad do / de la rnam par rtog pa thams cd dang dngos po mthong ba'i sgo nas 'ongs pa ni dngus du 'dra ba las de dang 'brel pa las skye ba mi rtog pa la sogs pa'i rnam par rtog pa rnams ni de snang ba nyid ma yin yang / rang gi mtshan nyid snang ba nyid ma yin yang ni mti rtog pa nyid la sogs pa'i ngo bo de dngos po la yod pa'i phyir dngos po la mi slu ste / (95b4f)

21. PVSV  
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vastusamvādas tu vastūtpattāyā tatpratibandhe sati bhavati / (49,2)

SVTib  
---

dngos po 'thob pa ni dngos po las skye bas de dang 'brel pa yin na 'gyur gyi … (288b6f)

KG  
---

tasmin sādhye pratibandhe sati (/) pratibandhe eva kutaḥ / vastūtpattāyā sādhyā- 
vastūtpattāyā hetubbhātayā anyathety asati pratibandhe / (204,8f)

PVṬ  
(=)  
brgyud de dngos po las skye ba'i rgyu gyur pas dngos po dngos po de dang 'brel te / de lta yin na dngos po 'thob par 'gyur gyi zhes bya bar sbyar ro / (110a1)
22. PVSV  
vikalpānām arthapratibandhāniyahamābhāvāt / na hi vikalpā yathārtham eva 
   jāyante // (51,8f)

SVTib  
rnam par rtog pa rnams don dang 'brel par nges pa med pa’i phyir te / rnam 
   par rtog pa ni don ji lta ba bzhiin skye ba med pa nyid do // (290a4f)

KG  
arthaprabaddho ‘rthākārānudhānenaotpattih // (212,10)

PVT  
don dang 'brel pa ni don gyi rnam pa’i rjes su byed par skye ba’o // (116a2)

23. PVSV  
upakāre ‘pi tatraiva tatkaranāt tadupakārī // (53,24f)

SVTib  
phan ’dogs na yang de kho na la de 'brel pas de byed pa’i phyir de la phan par 
   byed pa gzhan ci dgos // (291b1)

KG  
upakāre vā sāmānyakṛte upakārasyābhhyupaganyamāne / tatraiva sāmānye 
   tasyopakārasya pratibandha iti kim anyo vyaktibhedas tasyopakārasya karanāt 
   tasya sāmānyasyopakārī … (218,15f)

PVT  
phan ’dogs na yang zhes bya ba ni spyis byas pa’i phan pa khas len na spyi de 
   kho na la phan pa de 'brel pas de byed pa’i phyir spyi de la phan par byed pa 
   gsal ba’i khyad par gzhan ci dgos te … (120a1f)

24. PVSV  
tadupattidharmā bhāvāh svabhāvapratibandhād apekṣate nāma // (53,26f)

SVTib  
de las skye ba’i chos can ni rang bzhin 'brel pa’i phyir llos pa zhes bya’o // 
   (291b2)

KG  
tasmād apekṣaṇīyād utpattih sā dharmaḥ svabhāvo yasya sa tadupattidharmma- 
   bhāvāh / svabhāvasya pratibandhād ayattatvād apekṣate nāma upakārīṇaṃ … 
   (218,20f)

PVT  
gang la chos de’i ngo bo nyid yod pa de ni de las skyes ba’i chos can gyi dngos 
   po’o // rang bzhin 'brel cing rag las pa’i phyir phan par byed pa la llos pa zhes 
   bya ste // (120a3f)

25. PVSV  
 yaḥ kaścit kasyacit kvacit pratibandhāḥ sa sarvo janyatāyām evāntarbhavati // 
   (54,1f)

SVTib  
gang cung zad ‘ga’ zhig la lar 'brel pa de thams cad ni bskyped par bya ba’i 
   khangs su gtogs so // (291b3)

KG  
yah kaścit bhāvaḥ pratibandhāḥ kasyacid vastunāḥ kvasid āśraye sa sarvo 
   janyatāyām kāryatāyām evodbhavati // (219,3f)

PVT  
gang cung zad dngos po ‘ga’ zhig rten la lar 'brel pa dngos po las gyur pa 
   de thams cad ni bskyped par bya ba ste / ‘bras bu kho na’i khongs su gtogs 
   so // (120a6f)

26. PVSV  
katham anyonyasya sāmyam / tatsambandhād iti cet / na / apratibaddhasya 
   sambandhayogāt // (55,18f)

SVTib  
ji ltar gzhan dang gzhan du mtshungs pa yin / gal te de dag dang 'brel pa’i 
   phyir ro // zhe na ma yin te // rang ma las pa la ‘brel par mi rung ba’i phyir 
   dang // (292b1f)

KG  
apratibaddhaya vyaktāv anāyattasya tābhir anupakṛṣṭasya arthaḥ // (224,21f)

PVT  
rang ma las pa la gsal ba la rag ma las pa la ste / de dag gis phan ma byags pa 
   la zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go // (125a1f)
Reinterpretation of the Compound svabhāva-pratibandha

27. PVSV
\[ \text{tathābhūtārthadarśanadvāreṇāyaṃ nānaikadharmabhedābhedapratibhāsavi-
\text{plavānusāri vyavahārāra iti tasya atāpratibandhe sati tadavyabhicāraḥ} \]
\[ (65,3f) \]

SVTib
\[ \text{tha snyad 'di ni yang dag pa'i don de bzhin du mthong ba'i sgo nas chos du ma-
\text{dang l gcig dang l tha dad pa dang l tha dad pa ma yin par snang ba 'khrul-
\text{pa'i rjes su 'brang ba'i phyir l de dang der 'brel par 'gyur ba la de (DN: las-
\text{du) ma 'khrul pa yin no // (297a5f)}} \]

KG
\[ \text{tasya vyavahārasya tāpratibandhe tasmims tathābhūte svalakṣaṇe pārampa-
\text{ryenotpratibandhe sati tadavyabhicāraḥ / vastvyabhicāraḥ} \]
\[ (260,12f) \]

PVṬ
\[ \text{de ste tha snyad der 'brel par 'gyur pa de la bur gyur pa'i rang gi mtshan
\text{nyid der brygyad pas 'byung ba'i 'brel pa yod na de ma 'khrul te l dngos
\text{po la ma 'khrul pa yin no // (153b3f)}} \]

28. PVSV
\[ \text{samavāyasaṃyogāv ekārthasamavāyādayo 'pi vastusaṃbandhāḥ kāryakāraṇ-
\text{bhāvān na vyatiricyante / parasparam anyato vānupakārināṁ apratibandhāṭ /}
\text{aprapattadhāsyaya ca asambandhāṭ} \]
\[ (70,3f) \]

SVTib
\[ \text{phrod pa 'du ba dang ldan pa dang l don gcig la 'du ba zhes bya ba la sos-
\text{g po'i 'brel pa dag kyang rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po las tha dad pa ma yin
\text{no // gcig la gcig gm gzan dag gis phan 'dogs pa med pa ni rag
\text{lus pa med pa'i phyir dang / raglus pa med pa yang 'brel pa med pa'i phyir
\text{ro // (300a6f)}}} \]

KG
\[ \text{parasparam anyonyam upakārināṁ anyato va śrayābhimatād anupakārināṁ
\text{aprapattadhād anāyattatvāt / aprapattadhannasya [=aprapattadhāsa] cāsa-
\text{mbandhāḥ kāraṇāḥ ... (278,1f)}} \]

PVṬ
\[ \text{gcig la gcig te l phan tshun nam rten du mgon par 'dod pa gzan gyis phan
\text{btags pa med pa'o // phan btags pa med pa ni rag
\text{lus pa med pa'i phyir te l ltos
\text{pa med pa'i rgyu'i phyir ... (167a5)}}} \]

29. PVSV
\[ \text{tatrāpi kāryakāraṇabhāvakṛta eva pratibandhaḥ} \]
\[ (70,9f) \]

SVTib
\[ \text{de la yang rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos por byas pa kho na rag
\text{lus pa yin no // (300b1)}} \]

KG
\[ \text{tatrāpy ekārthasamavāyini kāryakāraṇabhāvakṛta evāśrayeṇa saha yah kārya-
\text{kāraṇabhāvas tatkṛta eva yaddvārenaśropita eva sambandhāḥ / (278,15f)}} \]

PVṬ
\[ \text{(=) don gcig dang 'phrod pa 'du ba de la yang rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos por
\text{byas pa kho na ste l rten dang bcas pa'i rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po gang yin
\text{pa des byas shing des sbyar ba kho na rag lus pa'i 'brel pa yin no // (167b4f)}}} \]

30. PVSV
\[ \text{tām eva sa āśrayaḥ karoti l sā cāprapattadāḥ sāmānya iti kim sāmānyasyāśra-
\text{yeṇa / (72,2f)}} \]

SVTib
\[ \text{de nyid de'i rten byed pa yin la l de yang spyi la rag ma lus pa'i phyir l spyi'
\text{rten gyis ci zhig byed l} \]

KG
\[ \text{sety arthāntarabhūtā sthitiḥ / na hi tasyāḥ sāmānye pratibandhāḥ kāraṇaṃ kiṁcid
\text{asti ... (285,18)}} \]

PVṬ
\[ \text{de zhes bya ba ni gnas pa don gshan du 'gyur pa'o l de la spyi la rag lus pa'i
\text{rgyu cung zhig kyang yod pa ma yin no // (172a1f)}} \]

31. PVSV
\[ \text{pratibandhāḥ vā kah pratibandha iti vācyam / (72,3f)} \]

SVTib
\[ \text{rag las pa kho na la rag las pa zhes ji ltar brjod por bya / (301b2)} \]

KG
\[ \text{abhyupagamayata eva sthiteḥ sāmānye pratibandha iti ced āha / (285,10)} \]
Yoichi Fukuda

PVṬ

32. PVSV
apekṣeti hi ta-pratibandhaḥ sa cānādheyaviśeṣasya sāmānyasyāyukta iti / (72,7f)

SVTib
ltos pa zhes bya ba ni de la rag lus pa yin na de yang spyi khyad par med pa la mi rigs pa dang ... (301b3f)

KG
asmin vastuny asyāpekṣeti yeyam apekṣā sā tasminn apekṣye pratibhandhas tadāyattatā / (286,2f)

PVT
dngos po 'di la 'di ltos pa zhes bya la laitos pa gang yin pa de ni litos par bya ba 'di dang 'brel cing de la rag lus pa nyid de // (172b3)

33. PVSV
nāpi vyatirekinas tasya kvacid anāśrayād anyasyāpi vyantyavyatitakabhāvādeḥ sambandhaya senaḥ anupakārasyāpratibandhenābhāvā // (75,27f)

SVTib
tha dad pa las kyang ma yin te / de 'ga' zhis la yang brten pa med pa'i phyir ro // 'ga' zhis gis phan btags pa med par rag lus pa med pas na bsal bar bya ba dang / bsal bar byed pa'i ngo bo la sogs pa las 'brel pa gzhan yang med pa'i phyir (303b6f)

KG
kiṃ kāraṇaṃ / nityatvāt senaḥ vyaktihedānunupakārasya sāmānyasyāpratibandhena / na hy pratibandhasya kaścit sambandho 'ṣity uktaṃ / (297,8f)

PVT
ci'i phyir zhe na / rtag pa nyid kyis gsal ba'i khyad par 'ga' zhis gis phan btags pa med pa'i spyi rag lus pa med pa'i phyir ro // rag lus pa med pa'i 'brel pa 'ga' zhis kyang yod pa ma yin no // (180b3f)

34. PVSV
kvacid avisaṃvādo 'syā vastuny kāryakāraṇabhāva pratibandhān ... (76,20f)

SVTib
'ga' zhis la 'di' mi slu ba ni dngos po la rgyu dang 'bras bu'i ngo bo'i (D adds 'bras bu'i) 'brel pa las yin te / (304a6)

KG
kvacid vastuny asya buddheḥ sakāśād avisaṃvādo yasmāt kāryakāraṇasambandhā ... (300,4f)

PVT
dngos po 'ga' zhis la 'di la blo las mi bslu ba gang yin pa de ni / rgyu dang 'bras bu'i 'brel pa las yin te / (182b6)

35. PVSV
tad dhi kicam upalīyeta na vā yasya yatra kicita pratibbhandham apratibbhaṃ vā / (99,27f)

SVTib
de ni cung zhis 'ga' zhis la 'brel pa ma yin te / (D: no //) gang gang la cung zhis rag las pa ma yin no / (317a6f)

KG
tad dhi vasti / kicam upalīyet aśrayet / yasya yatra kicita upadjādikam pratibbham āyattām / na copalīyeta yasya yatra pratibbhaṃ / (366,2f)

PVT
dngos po de ni rien du gyur pa 'ga' zhis la 'brel ba ste brten par 'gyur ba'am / gang gang la skyed par byed pa po la sogs pa la cung zhis rag lus pa ste litos pa'am / 'brel pa med pa ma yin zhis gang gang la rag lus pa ma yin no // (226b1f)

36. PVSV
seyam satata apratibandhini cet / niyamavatī na syāt / (99,28f)

SVTib
gal te yod pa nyid de 'di ni 'ga' zhis la rag lus pa can ma yin no zhe na / nges pa can du mi 'gyur ro // (317a7)

KG
seyam satata kvacid apratibandhini cet / dravyakālāpekṣayā na niyamavatī syāt / (366,4)
Reinterpretation of the Compound svabhāva-pratibandha

PVṬ  
**gal te yod pa nyid de ’di ni ’ga’ chig** la rag lus pa can ma yin no zhe na / rdzas dang yul dang dus la ltos par nges pa can du mi ’gyur te / (226b2)

37. PVŚV  
yathāsvam vyāpini sādhye tayor eva **pratibandhāt** lingayor lingini (101,1f)

SVṬib  
bdag nyid ji lta ba bzhi du khyab (D: khyad) par byed pa bsgrub par bya ba’i rtags can la rtags de dag **rag las pa’i phyir** ... (318a1f)

KG  
kāryasya kāraṇam vyāpakam sādhyam (l) svabhāvasyāpi svabhāvo vyāpakah sādhyas tasmin sādhye lingini tayor eva kāryasvabhāvayor lingayoḥ **pratibandhāt** / (370,5f)

PVṬ  
’bras bu’i rgyu khyab par byed pa bsgrub par bya ba yin la / rang bzhi yin gyi yang rang bzhi khyab par byed pa bsgrub par bya ba yin te / bsgrub par bya ba rtags can de la ’bras bu dang / rang bzhi yin gyi rtags de dag de nyid **rag las pa’i phyir** ro // (228a2f)

38. PVŚV  
sadasatpaksabhedena śabdārthānapavādibhiḥ // vastv eva cintyate hy atra **pratibaddhāḥ** phalodayah // (106,27f)

SVṬib  
sgra don bsnyon pa med rnams kyis // yod med phyogs kyi bye brag gis // dngos po nyid ni dp Yad bya ste // ’di la ’bras byung **rag las phyir** // (321b1f)

KG  
yasmād atra vastunī **pratibaddhāḥ** phalodayah / (387,11)

PVṬ  
ci’i phyir zhe na l / ’di ltar dngos po ’di la ’bras bu **rag las phyir** sgra’i don la ni ma yin no // (240b7f)

39. PVŚV  
tad ayaṃ pravartamānāḥ sarvadā sadasaccintāyām avadhīritavikalpaprati- 

PVṬ  
ci’ phyir zhe na l / ’di ltar dngos po ’di la ’bras bu **rag las phyir** sgra’i don la ni ma yin no // (240b7f)

38. PVŚV  
sadasatpaksabhedena śabdārthānapavādibhiḥ // vastv eva cintyate hy atra **pratibaddhāḥ** phalodayah // (106,27f)

SVṬib  
sgra don bsnyon pa med rnams kyis // yod med phyogs kyi bye brag gis // dngos po nyid ni dp Yad bya ste // ’di la ’bras byung **rag las phyir** // (321b1f)

KG  
yasmād atra vastunī **pratibaddhāḥ** phalodayah / (387,11)

PVṬ  
ci’i phyir zhe na l / ’di ltar dngos po ’di la ’bras bu **rag las phyir** sgra’i don la ni ma yin no // (240b7f)

39. PVŚV  
tad ayaṃ pravartamānāḥ sarvadā sadasaccintāyām avadhīritavikalpaprati- 

PVṬ  
ci’ phyir zhe na l / ’di ltar dngos po ’di la ’bras bu **rag las phyir** sgra’i don la ni ma yin no // (240b7f)

SVṬib  
sgra don bsnyon pa med rnams kyis // yod med phyogs kyi bye brag gis // dngos po nyid ni dp Yad bya ste // ’di la ’bras byung **rag las phyir** // (321b1f)

KG  
yasmād atra vastunī **pratibaddhāḥ** phalodayah / (387,11)

PVṬ  
ci’i phyir zhe na l / ’di ltar dngos po ’di la ’bras bu **rag las phyir** sgra’i don la ni ma yin no // (240b7f)

39. PVŚV  
tad ayaṃ pravartamānāḥ sarvadā sadasaccintāyām avadhīritavikalpaprati- 

PVṬ  
ci’ phyir zhe na l / ’di ltar dngos po ’di la ’bras bu **rag las phyir** sgra’i don la ni ma yin no // (240b7f)

SVṬib  
sgra don bsnyon pa med rnams kyis // yod med phyogs kyi bye brag gis // dngos po nyid ni dp Yad bya ste // ’di la ’bras byung **rag las phyir** // (321b1f)

KG  
yasmād atra vastunī **pratibaddhāḥ** phalodayah / (387,11)

PVṬ  
ci’i phyir zhe na l / ’di ltar dngos po ’di la ’bras bu **rag las phyir** sgra’i don la ni ma yin no // (240b7f)

39. PVŚV  
tad ayaṃ pravartamānāḥ sarvadā sadasaccintāyām avadhīritavikalpaprati- 

PVṬ  
ci’ phyir zhe na l / ’di ltar dngos po ’di la ’bras bu **rag las phyir** sgra’i don la ni ma yin no // (240b7f)

SVṬib  
sgra don bsnyon pa med rnams kyis // yod med phyogs kyi bye brag gis // dngos po nyid ni dp Yad bya ste // ’di la ’bras byung **rag las phyir** // (321b1f)

KG  
yasmād atra vastunī **pratibaddhāḥ** phalodayah / (387,11)

PVṬ  
ci’i phyir zhe na l / ’di ltar dngos po ’di la ’bras bu **rag las phyir** sgra’i don la ni ma yin no // (240b7f)

40. PVŚV  
a ca tadapratibaddhasvabhāvo bhāvo ’nyam gamayati / (107,25)

SVṬib  
de la rag las pa med pa’i rang bzhi can gyi dngos po ni gzhan go bar byed pa ma yin no // (322a3)

KG  
tasmin vastuny apratibaddhāḥ svabhāvo yasya śabdalakaśasasya / anyam ya- 

PVṬ  
(≡) dngos po de la rag las pa med pa’i rang bzhi gyi sgra’i bdag nyid can gyi dngos po gang la yod pa zhes bya bar ishig rnam par sbyar ro / gang la rag las pa med pa ni gzhan de’i go bar byed pa ma yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro // (242b2f)

41. PVŚV  
paryavasthānajanmatadapratibaddhāḍuḥkavivekāt / (111,5)

SVṬib  
kun nas dkris pa dang skye ba la rag las pa’i sdug bsgal dang bral ba’i phyir 

KG  
tayor yat pratibaddhan duḥkhan tasya vivekāt / rāgādyutpattikāle yad duḥkham käyacittaparidhālahalakaṣanat taryavasthānapatparatibaddhan jātijāravyādhyādi- 

PVṬ  
(≒) dngos po de la rag las pa med pa’i rang bzhi gyi sgra’i bdag nyid can gyi dngos po gang la yod pa zhes bya bar ishig rnam par sbyar ro / gang la rag las pa med pa ni gzhan de’i go bar byed pa ma yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro // (242b2f)

41. PVŚV  
paryavasthānajanmapratibaddhāḍuḥkavivekāt / (111,5)

SVṬib  
kun nas dkris pa dang skye ba la rag las pa’i sdug bsgal dang bral ba’i phyir 

KG  
tayor yat pratibaddhan duḥkhan tasya vivekāt / rāgādyutpattikāle yad duḥkham käyacittaparidhālahalakaṣanat taryavasthānapatparatibaddhan jātijāravyādhyādi- 

PVṬ  
(≒) dngos po de la rag las pa med pa’i rang bzhi gyi sgra’i bdag nyid can gyi dngos po gang la yod pa zhes bya bar ishig rnam par sbyar ro / gang la rag las pa med pa ni gzhan de’i go bar byed pa ma yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro // (242b2f)

41. PVŚV  
paryavasthānajanmapratibaddhāḍuḥkavivekāt / (111,5)

SVṬib  
kun nas dkris pa dang skye ba la rag las pa’i sdug bsgal dang bral ba’i phyir 

KG  
tayor yat pratibaddhan duḥkhan tasya vivekāt / rāgādyutpattikāle yad duḥkham käyacittaparidhālahalakaṣanat taryavasthānapatparatibaddhan jātijāravyādhyādi- 

PVṬ  
(≒) dngos po de la rag las pa med pa’i rang bzhi gyi sgra’i bdag nyid can gyi dngos po gang la yod pa zhes bya bar ishig rnam par sbyar ro / gang la rag las pa med pa ni gzhan de’i go bar byed pa ma yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro // (242b2f)
PVṬ  
**de dag la rag lus pa'i** sdug bsngal gang yin pa de dang bral ba'i phyir ro // 'dod chags la sogs pa'i skye ba'i tshe lus dang sens yongs su gdung ba'i mtshan nyid can gyi sdug bsngal gang yin pa de ni kun nas akris pa **la rag lus pa'o** // skye ba dang rga ba dang na ba'i sdug bsngal ni skye ba **la rag lus pa'o** // (251b3f)

42. **PVSV**  
*tataḥ katham idānīṃ tatpratiniyamasaṃsādhyaṃ tadanvayaṃ sādhayeyuḥ* / na hy apratibaddhas tatsādhana iti / (114,28f)

**SVTib**  
de bas na de la so sor nges par bsgrub par bya ba de'i rjes su 'gro ba ji ltar sgrub par byed par 'gyur te / **rag las pa med pa** de'i (D adds ni) sgrub par byed pa ma yin no // (326a7)

**KG**  
*bāhye 'ṛthe pratibandhena* niyamābhāvāt / (417,5)

**PVṬ**  
(=) don gang **la rag lus pa med pa** de ni sgrub par byed pa'i rigs pa ma yin no // (260b2)

43. **PVSV**  
**parāśrayo hi sambandho** 'pratibandhe tayoḥ sambandhitā 'yogāt / (115,14)

**SVTib**  
gzhan la (D adds /) rten pa can 'brel pa yin na ni **rag las pa med pa** la de dag gi 'brel pa nyid mi rung ba'i phyir ro // (326b4)

**KG**  
parāśraya iti parasambandhī aśrayo [']syeti kṛtvā / sambandhini sambandhā-śvāpratibandhe sati tayoh sambandhinos sambandhītāyā 'yogāt / na hy aprati-baddhena kenacid kaścit tadvān bhavati gaur ivāsvena / (418,15f)

**PVṬ**  
(=) gzhan la brten pa can 'brel pa yin te / 'brel pa 'di la gzhan la brten pa yod pa'i phyir ro // ni'i sgras (D adds ni) nges par gzung ba'o // ci'i phyir zhe na / 'brel pa can la 'brel pa **rag las pa med pa** yin na 'brel pa can de dag gi 'brel pa nyid mi rung ba'i phyir ro // rta ba lang dang 'dra bar **ltos pa med pas** don 'ga' zhig de dang ldan par mi 'gyur ro // (261b3f)

44. **PVSV**  
svabhāvapratibandho 'nyattvam iti cet / (147,3f)

**SVTib**  
gal te **rang bzhin la rag lus pa med pa** ni gzhan nyid yin no zhe na / (346b5f)

**KG**  
nanv atatsvabhāvate 'pi parasparam svabhāvapratibandho [']nyattvam iti cet / sa ca **pratibandhah** pudgalasya skandhesy asti tato tatsvabhāvate ['']pi nānyattvam skandhebhyaḥ pudgalasyeti / (527,16f)

**PVṬ**  
gal te **rang bzhin la rag lus pa med pa** ni gzhan nyid yin na gang zag gi **rag lus pa** de yang phung po dag la yod pa de bas na de'i rang bzhin ma yin kyang phung po dag las gang zag gzhan nyid ma yin no zhe na / (326a6f)

45. **PVSV**  
ko 'yaṃ **pratibandho** nāma yena sa ca na syāt / nānyasvabhāvaś ca / (147,4f)

**SVTib**  
**rag lus pa** zhes bya ba 'di gang yin / gang gis der yang mi 'gyur ba dang / rang bzhin gzhan du'ang mi 'gyur / (346b6)

**KG**  
ko ['']yam **pratibandho** nāma pudgalasya skandhesu yena **pratibandhena** / sa ca na syād iti skandha-svabhāvaś ca pudgalo na syāt / nānyasvabhāvaś ca skandhebhyaḥ / (527,19f)

**PVṬ**  
phung po dag **la gang zag** gi **rag lus pa** zhes bya ba 'di'i gang yin / **rag las pa'i** rgyu gang gis der yang mi 'gyur ba zhes bya ba gang zag phung po'i rang bzhin du mi 'gyur ba dang gzhan gyi rang bzhin can du mi 'gyur ba ste / (326a7f)

46. **PVSV**  
na ca tajjamalaṃkaṇāti svabhāvapratibandhād anyaḥ **pratibandho** nāma / anā-yattasya vyabhicārā-virodhāt / (147,10f)
Reinterpretation of the Compound svabhāva-pratibandha

SVTib  de’i skye ba’i mtshan nyid kyi rang bzhi gni rang las pa las rag las pa gzhan yang yod pa ma yin te / rag las pa med pa’i ‘khrul pa la ’gal ba med pa’i phyir ro / (347a1f)

KG  na cānyaḥ pratibandhaḥ pudgalasya skandheṣu / yasmān na hi janmalakṣanāj janmasvabhāvāt svabhāvapratibandhād anyah pratibandho nāma / kim kāra-ṇam (I) anāyattasya tadutpaṭṭiyā tatṛāpratibaddhasya / tena saha yo vyabhicāras tasyāvirodhāt / (528,8f)

PVṬ  (=) gal te skye ba’i mtshan nyid can gnyi rang las pas phung po dag las gang zag gzhan nyid du yod pa ni ma yin mod kyi ‘on kyang rag las pa gzhan nyid du yod do zhe na / de’i zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / skye ba’i mtshan nyid can te / skye ba’i dbang po can gnyi rang bzhi gni rang las pa las rag las pa zhes bya ba gzhan yod pa ma yin no / ci’i phyir zhe na / de las byung ba’i rag las pa med pa de ni de la rag las pa med pa de dang lhan cig ‘khrul pa gang yin pa de la ’gal ba med pa’i phyir ro / gang zhiq gang la rag las pa med pa de ni der ‘khrul pa’i phyir zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go / (326b5f)

PVṬ  ( *)) phung po dag las gang zag gi shes pas byas pa’i rag las pa yin no zhe na / de ltar ni ‘gyur na gang rtogs pa med na mi ‘byung ba’i shes pa gang yin de des rtogs pa la nges pa de snang ba’i phyir de de’i ngo bo ma yin du zin kyang / brjod par bya ba ma yin no zhe na / (347a2f)

KG  pudgalasya skandheṣu jñānakṛtaḥ pratibandha iti cet / … / yasya rūpādeḥ pratipattir yatpratipattis tayā nāntāryakam avinābhāvi yajjñānam yasya pudgalasya jñānam / tadgatāv iti rūpādigatau niyamena tasya pudgalasya pratibhāsānāt / jñānakṛtaḥ pratibandhaḥ … / tena jñānakṛtāt pratibandhāt / (528,13f)

PVṬ  ( **) phung po dag las gang zag gi shes pas byas pa’i rag las pa yin no zhe na / … (327a4)

47. PVЅV  jñānakṛtaḥ pratibandha iti cet / syād etat / yatpratipattināntāryakam yajjñānam tadgatau niyamena pratibhāsānāt tat atadṛsāpam apy avācyam iti / (147,12f)

SVTib  gal te shes pas byas pa’i rang las pa yin no zhe na / de ltar ni ‘gyur na gang rtogs pa med na mi ‘byung ba’i shes pa gang yin de des rtogs pa la nges pa de snang ba’i phyir de de’i ngo bo ma yin du zin kyang / brjod par bya ba ma yin no zhe na / (347a2f)

KG  pudgalasya skandheṣu jñānakṛtaḥ pratibandha iti cet / … / yasya rūpādeḥ pratipattir yatpratipattis tayā nāntāryakam avinābhāvi yajjñānam yasya pudgalasya jñānam / tadgatāv iti rūpādigatau niyamena tasya pudgalasya pratibhāsānāt / jñānakṛtaḥ pratibandhaḥ … / tena jñānakṛtāt pratibandhāt / (528,13f)

PVṬ  (**) phung po dag las gang zag gi shes pas byas pa’i rag las pa yin no zhe na / … (327a4)

48. PVЅV  nanu saivāsatī pratibandha na yuktety ucye / (147,26)

SVTib  de nyid rag las pa (DN inserts med pa) med par rigs pa ma yin no zhes brjod pa ma yin nam / (347a6)

KG  nanu saiva pratīties tannāntāryakatā / rūpādiṣu pudgalasyāsati pratibandhe na yuktety ucye / (530,4f)

PVṬ  de med na mi ‘byung ba’i shes pa de nyid ni gzugs la sogs pa gang zag rag las pa med par rigs pa ma yin no zhes brjod pa ma yin nam / (328a4)

49. PVЅV  nākāryakāraṇayoḥ kaścit pratibandha iti coktam / (148,1)

SVTib  rgyu dang ‘bras bu ma yin pa dag la ni rag las pa cung zad kyang ma yin no zhes bya ba yang bshad zin to / (347a6f)

KG  akāryakāraṇayor na kaścid vāstavaḥ pratibandha ity asakṛd uktaṃ … (530,7)

PVṬ  rgyu dang ‘bras bur gyur pa ma yin pa dag la ni drgos su ‘brel pa cung zad kyang yod pa ma yin no zhes mang du bshad zin to / (328a5)

50. PVЅV  vivākṣayā šābdo ‘rthe niyamaye / na svabhāvataḥ / tasya kvacid apratibandhena sarvatra tulyatvā / yatṛāpi pratibandhas tadabhidhānaniyamābhāvāt / (172,19f)
SVTib  brjod par ’dod pas sgra ni don dag la nges par bya ba yin gya ngo bo nyid kyis ni ma yin te l de ni ’ga’ zhig la yang rag las pa med par thams cad la mtshungs pa nyid kyi phyir ro lI gang la rag las pa yin na yang de rjod par byed pa’i nges pa med pa’i phyir ro lI (363a4f)

KG  tasya śabdasya kvacid vastuny apratibandhena sambandharahitavena kāraṇena sarvārthaḥ tattvamasya sambandhaḥ sthānakarāṇesa tataḥ śabdānām utpattati abhivyakti vā l (606,3f)

PVŢ  de ni dngos po ’ga’ zhig la rag las pa med pa ste l ’brel pa med par don thams cad la mtshungs pa nyid kyi phyir ro lI gang la sgra’i rag las pa gnas dang byed pa dag gi yin te l de las (DN: la) sgra rnams skye ba’i phyir ram rtug par smra ba’i gzhung gis mgon par gsal ba’i phyir ro lI (nye 61a4f)

51. PVS V  uktam atrāpratibandhād aniyama iti lI (172,27)
SVTib  ’dir rag las pa med pa’i phyir l nges pa yod pa ma yin no zhes bshad zin to lI (363a6f)

KG  uktam atrottaram l kvacid vastuny apratibandhād aniyata iti l (606,17)

PVŢ  dir lan ni dngos po ’ga’ zhig la yang rag las pa med pa’i phyir nges pa yod pa ma yin no zhes bshad zin to lI (nye 61b3)
1. Introduction

1.1. Philosophical background

This paper aims at presenting and comparing the way non-cognition can serve as the basis of inference according to Buddhist and Jain philosophers, as well as to indicate the philosophical relevance of the main divergences between the two conceptions. I will focus on the view of the Buddhist Dharmakīrti, as it is found in his *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* and *Nyāyabindu*, as well as on the view of the Jains Akalaṅka in his *Laghīyastraya* and Māṇikyanandi in his *Parīkṣāmukham*.

First of all, the teachings of Akalaṅka (720–780) represent an important step in the development of Jain philosophy, especially in the constitution of a paradigm clearly distinct from the Buddhist one. More precisely, Akalaṅka has founded a systematic Jain theory of knowledge in answer to Dharmakīrti’s attacks against the Jain theory of non-one-sidedness. Following the style of his Buddhist opponent, Akalaṅka expresses his theses in a very concise way. For example, in his *Laghīyastraya* (henceforth LT), the *Three Short Treatises*, instead of presenting all the types of inference he grants, he presents only the discrepancies between the ones Dharmakīrti accepts and the one he himself accepts. This concise style explains our recourse to his commentators. Firstly, the Jain Māṇikyanandi (9th c.) has organized Akalaṅka’s mature philosophy in the *Parīkṣāmukham* (PM), the *Introduction to Philosophical Investigation*. What is more, this work has itself been commented on by the Jain Prabhācandra (980–1065) in his *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* (PKM), the *Sun that Grows the Lotus of Knowable*, as well as by Vādi Devasūri (12th c.) in his *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṃkāra* (PNT), the *Commentary on the Explanation of the Nature of Knowledge and Viewpoints*. These three works constitute a lineage of commentaries and share the same conception of inference. I will refer to them as “the tradition of Akalaṅka.” Since PM is the first work in this tradition, I will mainly refer to this text, and will quote from PKM and PNT respectively only when considering matters which are absent from earlier works.

Dharmakīrti’s texts are implicitly referred to in the sections on inference in LT and in PM, and explicitly in PKM and PNT. There, the most frequently quoted work of Dharmakīrti is the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (PVsV), the *Auto-commentary on the Essay on Knowledge*. In this paper, following Prabhācandra and Vādi Devasūri, I will mainly refer to the PVsV. But I will also make use of Dharmakīrti’s *Nyāyabindu* (NB), the *Drop of Logic*, because one finds there the most extensive list of correct types of inference he grants.

To begin with, it is useful to sketch the aforementioned framework of theories of inference, so as to agree on concepts as well as on the means to express them. First of all, inference is the cognitive process by which an epistemic agent acquires new knowledge.
using reasoning. It is specifically used in situations in which cognitive processes like perception fail. Entities being dealt with in metaphysical inquiries are typical examples of such situations. Inferential reasoning consists more precisely of the transmission of certainty from the established knowledge of the fact that a property, referred to as “the evidence-property” (hetu), is ascribed to a given object, to the new knowledge of the fact that another property, referred to as “the target-property” (sādhyā), is ascribed to the same object.\(^1\) For example, from the previous knowledge that there is smoke on the hill, a person can know that there is fire on the hill.\(^2\) As Shah (1967: 248) noticed, the Sanskrit expression for inference, anumāna, refers to this transmission, since it means “the knowledge that follows [another knowledge].” And this transmission of certainty is based on the vyāpti between the target-property and the evidence-property. Vyāpti means “pervasion” and is traditionally translated by the technical expression “invariable concomitance” in order to refer to the situation in which whenever the evidence-property is present, the target-property is present too. Because such a situation is usually granted by the fact that the target-property is pervading the evidence-property, as we find, for example, between the property of being a tree and the property of being a Sissoo tree.

What is more, stating such an inferential reasoning is the core mechanism of philosophical debates, in which the aim is to convince the interlocutor that a given piece of knowledge, even if not directly agreed on, is a valid one. In consequence, since every participant in such a debate is to seek convincing inclusions, the determination of the extension of the domains of predicates is one of the core issues in those debates.

### 1.2. Types of inferential evidence in Buddhism and in Jainism

In this conceptual framework, philosophers were aiming towards a theory of the proper relationship between the target-property and the evidence-property. That is to say that they considered it insufficient that the target-property is always present when the evidence-property is present, and they wanted to be able to distinguish between arbitrary and necessary universal relationships. An important step towards such an achievement was Dignāga’s introduction of the particle eva, which functions similarly to the operator of focus “only.”\(^3\)

One of Dharmakīrti’s subsequent breakthroughs in this dynamic was to seek the precise reasons why a target-property is always present when its evidence-property is present, and as a consequence to accept as good evidence only the properties that are ‘essentially’ connected to the target-property. The requirement that inferential reasoning relies only on

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1. In the following, I will abbreviate sentences as “the property of ‘being endowed with fire’ is ascribed to the subject ‘here’” by saying simply “there is fire here.”
2. In my presentation of inferential reasoning, I make explicit the epistemic conditions by writing “the knowledge that there is smoke on the hill,” and not “there is smoke on the hill.” But I defend the position that although these epistemic conditions are present, it is important to keep them implicit in a formal representation. I do so because in contemporary logic, expressing these epistemic conditions within the object language is usually a technique used in order to have a level of description in which it is possible to deal only with the pure relation between propositions. But this is important to keep in mind that logic in India is concerned with the relation between an epistemic subject and a proposition.
3. Dignāga introduced this particle in his attempt to combine the theory of the triple characteristic of the evidence-property (trairūpya) with the theory of the necessity of the absence of the target-property when the evidence-property is absent (avinābhāva).
necessary relationships led Dharmakīrti to consider only two types of essential connections as ensuring correct inferences: the connection between an effect and its cause, and the connection between two natural properties. In doing so, Dharmakīrti provides “the ontic foundation for valid reasoning” (Katsura 1992: 224). More concretely, only three types of inferential evidence are granted: (i) natural properties (svabhāva); (ii) effects (kārya); and (iii) non-cognitions (anupalabdhi). Indeed, with such a conception, it is not accidental that whenever there is a Sissoo tree, there is also a tree. This is due to the very nature of the Sissoo, for which being a tree is a natural property. And this is also not accidental that whenever there is smoke, there is also fire. This is due to the very nature of smoke, which is the effect of fire. What is more, cases of non-cognition are consequences of this state of affairs also, since it is not accidental that whenever there is no tree, there is also no Sissoo and that whenever there is no fire, there is no smoke.

Two remarks are important for what follows. First of all, we should keep in mind the difference between the first two types of evidence, which are used to infer a presence; and the last one, which is used to infer an absence. The second remark is that when Dharmakīrti speaks about “natural property” he first intends the relation between, e.g., the property of being a cow and the property of being an animal. In other words, he intends a relation between two predicates that do not have the same extension. If we consider that these predicates denote natural kinds, then “pervaded properties” are species, and “pervasive properties” are genera.4 What is more, only pervaded properties are good evidence to infer the presence of their respective pervasive properties, and not the other way around, since knowing that there is a Sissoo is sufficient to know that there is a tree, but knowing that there is a tree is not sufficient to know that there is a Sissoo, for there might be an oak. Contrary to this, only pervasive properties are good evidence to infer the absence of their respective pervaded properties, and not the other way around, since knowing that there is not a tree is sufficient to know that there is no Sissoo, but knowing that there is no Sissoo is not sufficient to know that there is no tree, for there might be an oak. What is more, when Dharmakīrti speaks about “natural property” he also intends to speak about the relation between, e.g., the property of being perishable (anityatva) and the property of being a product (kṛtakatva). In this case, we have a relation in which the two predicates are co-extensive. Here, no restriction needs to be done in order to draw correct inferences. Both conceptions are in the same category “natural property,” because in both cases it concerns the description of the nature of a thing, and because in both cases there is a numerical identity between what is characterized by the pervaded property and what is characterised by the pervasive property.

Jain philosophers of Akalaṅka’s lineage have a different conception of evidence. More precisely, they consider that there are especially six situations in which the presence of an invariable concomitance is unquestionable, namely when the evidence-property is (i) a property pervaded (vyāpya) by the target-property; (ii) an effect (kārya) of it; (iii) a cause (kāraṇa) of it; (iv) a predecessor (pūrvacara) of it; (v) a successor (uttaracara) of it; or (vi) a co-existent (sahacara) with it. My paper deals with the causes and consequences

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4 We are used to conceiving the species ‘cow’ as the set of all cows. But in Vaiśeṣika, the universal ‘cowness’ is a characteristic possessed by all cows. This is how genus and species should be considered here also.
of one discrepancy between Akālaṅka’s tradition and that of Dharmakīrti, namely the fact that “non-cognition” is not part of this list. In fact, instead of being considered as good inferential evidence, as it is by Dharmakīrti, “non-cognition” is considered by Jain philosophers as part of the general form an inference might have.

1.3. Non-cognition as a cognitive or as a linguistic process

In order to understand why “non-cognition” is not listed by Jain philosophers as good evidence, but as part of the general form an inference might have, let us consider the motivations of its introduction for both Dharmakīrti and Akālaṅka. First, when introducing non-cognition as a type of evidence, Dharmakīrti’s program is quite specific: he intends to prove the possibility of knowing absences from inference. Such a possibility is essential for Buddhist soteriology, which relies on the awareness of the absence of a persistent soul. This, in turn, enables him not to commit himself to the existence of a third kind of means of knowledge in addition to perception and inference, since everything – absences included – can be known from one of these two means. Therefore, he is only interested in non-cognition as good evidence to infer an absence. Contrary to this, Jain philosophers additionally investigate the situations in which it is possible, from non-cognition, to infer a presence. Such considerations on the possibility to infer presences from absences are not new. They can already be found in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.1.9 and, approximately at the same period, in Jain canonical literature in the Ṭhāṇāṅgasūtra (Sthānāṅgasūtra, Possibilities) 4.3.336. Besides, Dharmakīrti criticizes these conceptions in his PVsV in the chapter on inference for oneself, svārthānumānapariccheda 20ff. If we compare Akālaṅka, Māṇikyanandi, Prabhācandra and Vādi Devasūri, we can see an evolution of their focus.

First, Akālaṅka in his LT is clearly responding to Dharmakīrti. He does refer to non-cognition also as a means to know absences and diverges from his Buddhist opponent mainly on the following:

LT.15. People [think they] know the non-existence of the mind of others because of its invisibility. [But this is incorrect,] because the modifications of the forms of this [mind] would be impossible otherwise [than with the postulation of the existence of their minds].

The relevance of this quote is intelligible only if we recall that Dharmakīrti claimed that it is only the non-cognition of something that is usually perceptible and that meets the conditions for cognition that can be used as the basis of an inference. In LT 15, Akālaṅka is criticizing this on the ground that it is wrong to think that non-cognition can be used to infer the absence only of perceptible entities, since it can be used to infer the absence of imperceptible entities as well. For example, from the absence of the recognised characteristics of human cognitive abilities at the moment of death, it is possible to infer the absence of the mind.

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5 For a more thorough survey of Jain theories of inference in Akālaṅka’s tradition, see Gorisse 2017.
6 For more on this topic, see Katsura 1992: 228.
8 For more on this topic, see Kellner 2003.
that causes them (see Shah 1967: 276). We won’t go further in this discussion, as it is sufficient for our purpose to understand that for both authors, the concern is primarily an epistemological one.

Contrary to this, non-cognition is by the time of Māṇikyanandin primarily conceived as a negative premise in the stated form of an inference. We have mentioned the fact that inference is not only a cognitive process by which one can acquire knowledge, it is also the rational means used in debates in order to be assured that from a true input, the output is always true as well. In this context of convincing, the inferential process has to be stated, and when this is done so it is commonly followed by a regulated argumentation aiming to defend or refute it. The stated form of an inference is what Indian philosophers call “inference for others” (parārthānumāna), in opposition to “inference for oneself” (svārthānumāna). And whereas Dharmakīrti has introduced non-cognition already in the section presenting the inference for oneself, Māṇikyanandi and after him Prabhācandra and Vādi Devasūri introduce non-cognition only in the section presenting the inference for others, that is to say, in the section that deals with inference firstly as a linguistic device to transfer values with certainty. And this switch from an epistemological to a formal concern becomes fully explicit with Vādi Devasūri, who introduces cognition and non-cognition in terms of basis for, respectively, affirmation and negation:

PNT.3.55. Cognition and non-cognition are the basis for the establishment of affirmation and negation.9

This focus on the linguistic form of inference is what explains why in this precise section of the treatises of Māṇikyanandi, Prabhācandra and Vādi Devasūri, nothing is said concerning epistemological problems related to the knowledge of absences. In other words, the Jain focus is on non-cognition as a negation, that is to say as a linguistic device usable to reverse the truth value of a sentence. This work on the relationship between negative (respectively affirmative) premises and negative (respectively affirmative) conclusions led them to single out four forms an inference might have, namely:

(i) Cognition of [evidence] compatible [with the target-property] in the case of affirmation [of the thesis] (aviruddha-upalabdhir vidhau);
(ii) Cognition of [evidence] incompatible [with the target-property] in the case of negation [of the thesis] (viruddha-upalabdhiḥ pratihatāhe);
(iii) Non-cognition of [evidence] compatible [with the target-property] in the case of negation [of the thesis] (aviruddha-anupalabdhiḥ pratihatāhe);

Since the goal of this paper is to compare what can be inferred from non-cognition within this classification of forms of inference with what can be inferred from non-cognition in Dharmakīrti’s classification of types of evidence, it is important to have his classification in mind before we explain the Jain one.

1.4. Types of non-cognition in Dharmakīrti

First of all, according to Dharmakīrti, there are several means to infer that a property does not pertain to a given object. On one hand, this can be achieved from the previous knowledge that another property does not pertain to this object as well. For example, if there is no tree in a given place, then there is also no Sissoo in this place. This first type of non-cognition is “non-cognition” (anupalabdhi) properly speaking. Here, knowledge of absence is gained by means of absence of knowledge. On the other hand, to infer that a property does not pertain to a given object can also be achieved from the previous knowledge that a property incompatible with the one that one seeks to know does pertain to the object under discussion. For example, it is sufficient to know that there is a fire in the room, in order to know that the room is not cold. This is so because there cannot be heat and cold at the same place at the same time. For this second type of non-cognition, even though the process does involve a cognition (of the fire) properly speaking, Dharmakīrti speaks also about “non-cognition,” because the cognition of the presence of a property incompatible with another one is equivalent to the knowledge of the impossibility for at least one of the conditions of existence of this other property to be the case. And this, in turn, amounts to the non-cognition of this precise condition.

Now, next to this distinction between non-cognition properly speaking and cognition of a property incompatible with the one that one seeks to know, Dharmakīrti also grants that it is possible to know absence of different types of thing. For example, one may know the absence of something, the absence of its effect, or the absence of its cause. From these distinctions, eleven types of non-cognition are recognised in NB. Again, I have chosen the presentation of types of non-cognition as it is in NB, because it is the most comprehensive list, so it furnishes more material to work with in the line of a comparison. But other presentations are found in the different texts of Dharmakīrti. Especially, three types of evidence involving non-cognition are granted in HB; and four types in PVsV.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognition of an [evidence] incompatible [with the target-property]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type 1</strong> (viruddha-x-upalabdhi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ix) Cognition of a [property] pervaded by a [property] incompatible [with the target-property] (viruddha-vyāpta-upalabdhi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x) Cognition of the effect of [something] incompatible [with the target-property] (viruddha-kārya-upalabdhi)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Type 2</strong> (x-viruddha-upalabdhi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vii) Cognition of a [property] incompatible with the effect [of the target-property] (kārya-viruddha-upalabdhi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(viii) Cognition of a [property] incompatible with the cause [of the target-property] (kāraṇa-viruddha-upalabdhi)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Non-cognition [of an evidence for the target-property] (anupalabdhi)
(i) Non-cognition of [the target-property] itself (svabhāva-anupalabdhi)
(ii) Non-cognition of a [property] pervading [the target-property] (vyāpaka-anupalabdhi)
(iii) Non-cognition of the effect [of the target-property] (kārya-anupalabdhi)
(iv) Non-cognition of the cause [of the target-property] (kāraṇa-anupalabdhi)

Complex cognition of an [evidence] incompatible [with the target-property]
(xi) Cognition of the effect of a [property] incompatible with the cause [of the target-property] (kāraṇa-viruddha-kārya-upalabdhi)

We will examine these types of negative evidence one by one in the course of the presentation of the classification offered by Māṇikyanandi.

2. The four forms of inference according to Māṇikyanandi

In what follows, I will focus on Māṇikyanandi, because Akalaṅka does not offer such an extensive list of the forms of inference and of the different types of evidence valid in each form. In addition, the conceptions of Prabhācandra and Vādi Devasūri on this topics are substantively the same as those of Māṇikyanandi.


The first pattern is the plain affirmative one. This is the form I have been using by default until now. It is used to express inferences of the presence of a property due to knowledge of appropriate evidence for it. As we have seen, Jain philosophers grant six types of evidence as being appropriate in this context. In Māṇikyanandi’s words:

PM.3.59. In the case of affirmation [of the thesis], there are six kinds of cognition of [evidence] compatible [with the target-property], namely [the evidence can be a property] pervaded (vyāpya) [by it], an effect [of it], a cause [of it], a predecessor [of it], a successor [of it] or [a property] co-existent [with it].

Māṇikyanandi gives the example “sound is subject to change, because it is a product.” In the Indian paradigm of philosophy, this is an example with co-extensive predicates. But it is important to recall that with predicates of different extensions, only the one which is pervaded constitutes correct evidence in this first form. To compare with Dharmakīrti’s theory, this is in this plain affirmative form that he acknowledges evidence-properties that are natural properties (svabhāva) or effects of the target-property. In PVsV.1.1.6, as in NB.16–17, the examples are, respectively, “this is a tree, because this is a Sissoo” and “there

12 pariṇāmi śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt / Ghoshal (1940: 127).
is fire there, because there is smoke.”\(^{13}\) In conclusion, cognition of evidence compatible with the target-property in the case of affirmation of the thesis is twofold in Dharmakīrti’s theory and sixfold in the Jain one.

I will not discuss predecessor, successor or co-existent in this paper,\(^{14}\) which focuses on the divergences between the two frameworks only when non-cognition is involved, because Dharmakīrti never accepts predecessor, successor or co-existent as correct evidence, no matter whether a non-cognition is involved or not or whether the conclusion of the inference is being stated in a positive or in a negative form. Contrary to this, there are interesting divergences to reflect upon when cause is being considered, because the efficiency of causal evidence is not the same for affirmative and negative forms. Therefore, we will have a special focus on it. First of all, in the affirmative form, Dharmakīrti and Māṇikyanandi agree on the fact that the presence of something can be inferred from the knowledge of the presence of its effect, as in “there is intelligence in this living being, because [it shows activities] like speech.”\(^{15}\) And the divergence appears when the Jain tradition considers as well that the presence of something can be inferred from the knowledge of the presence of its cause, like in “there is shade here, because there is an umbrella.”\(^{16}\) In consequence, the causal relationship is a symmetric one as far as the Jain conception is concerned, whereas for Dharmakīrti, only the effect, and not the cause, can serve as evidence in a correct inference. The fact that, e.g., the presence of a seed is not sufficient evidence for the future presence of a plant, is due to the fact that it is impossible to be sure that no impediment is blocking the potency of the given cause to produce its effect.\(^{17}\) If combinatory considerations alone are being developed, the same divergence, namely the fact that the Jain tradition under consideration accepts both cause and effect, and that Dharmakīrti accepts only the effect, as correct evidence, should be seen in the second form of inference as well. Let us have a look at this second form to see if this is what happens.


The second form is used to express inference of the absence of a property from knowledge of evidence incompatible with it.

\(^{13}\) ta ete kārya-svabhāva-anupalabdhi-lakṣanās trayo hetavah / yathā ’gnir atra dhūmāt / vrkṣo ’yam śiṃśapātvāt / Gnoli (1960: 2); svabhāvah […] yathā vrkṣo ’yam śiṃśapātvād iti / kāryam yathā vahnir atra dhūmūd iti / Desai (1991: 52).

\(^{14}\) This has been done in Gorisse 2015.

\(^{15}\) asty atra dehini buddhir vyāhāra-ādeḥ / Translated by Ghoshal (1940: 128).

\(^{16}\) asty atra chāyā chatrāt / Ibid.

\(^{17}\) This discussion exceeds the aim of this paper. Let me just indicate that Māṇikyanandi, as well as Naiyāyika philosophers, will counter-attack Dharmakīrti by offering a more finely grained definition of a ‘cause’ as being what already consists of the totality of conditions needed for the emergence of the effect. In other words, as what already ensures that the pre-requisite that nothing is blocking its potency is fulfilled. Since this conception implies that the effect is already present when the cause is being investigated, both conceptions actually agree.
2.2.1. What is an incompatible (viruddha) evidence?

In all Dharmakīrti’s examples, something is incompatible with the target-property if it is its precise contrary. For example, “constant” (dhruva) is incompatible with “inconstant” (adhruva), or “cold” (śīta-sparśā) with “fire/heat” (agni). As far as pervasion and causality are concerned, Māṇikyanandī also uses contraries to illustrate incompatibility. But when it comes to succession, a property recognised as being incompatible with the target-property is not necessarily its contrary. For example, the present rising of the star Revatī is recognised as being incompatible with the rising of the star Rohiṇī in a muhūrta, because Revatī is the group of stars in the constellation of Pisces which is the last group of stars to rise in the sky. And in this way, it is impossible for Rohiṇī to rise after it:

PM.3.75. Rohiṇī won’t rise in a muhūrta, because Revatī has just risen.

As a consequence, at least for Māṇikyanandī and his commentators, what is incompatible with the target-property is “anything whose presence prevents the presence of the target-property.” This being understood, the types of incompatible evidence which ensure inferential knowledge are exactly the same types of evidence as in the previous form. In Māṇikyanandī’s words:

PM.3.71. In the case of negation [of the thesis], the types of cognition of evidence incompatible [with the target-property] are the same [as the types of cognition of evidence compatible with the target-property in the case of affirmation of the thesis].

To state it in an explicit way, a property pervaded by something incompatible with the target-property, an effect, a cause, a predecessor or a successor of something incompatible with the target-property, as well as a property co-existent with something incompatible with the target-property, all these are correct evidence of the absence of the target-property. In PM.3.72, the example “there is no feeling of cold here, because there is warmth” is found. In this example, warmth is a species of heat, which is incompatible with cold.

This form of inference with negative conclusions is a means to know absences. As such, it should interest Dharmakīrti. And indeed, he recognizes as correct evidence two types which belong to this form, namely the cognition of a property pervaded by something incompatible with the target-property and the cognition of an effect of something incompatible with the target-property. The example presented in NB.2.36 is not the same as that found in PM.3.72: the disappearance of a being – even of one that has come into

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18 A muhūrta is a unit of measurement in classical Indian astrology, representing approximately 48 minutes.
19 na-udeṣyati muhūrta-ante śakaṭaṃ revat-udayō / Ghoshal (1940: 130). Śakaṭaṃ (the Chariot) is another name for Rohiṇī (the Rising one). Its Arabic name is Aldebaran (the Follower), because its rise follows the one of the famous Pleiades. Concerning Revatī, it means “the Prosperous.”
21 na asty atra śīta-sparśā auspyāt / Ghoshal (1940: 129).
22 See paragraph 1.4 of this paper.
being – is not inevitable, because it requires a further cause.\(^{23}\) In this example, “requiring a further cause” is pervaded by “being evitable;” and the properties of “being evitable” and of “being inevitable” are incompatible ones. As for the cognition of an effect of something incompatible with the target-property, the example in NB.2.35 is the same as that found in PM.3.73, namely “there is no feeling of cold, because there is smoke here.”\(^{24}\) Here, “being endowed with smoke” is an effect of “being endowed with fire/heat;” and the properties of “being endowed with heat” and of “being endowed with cold” are incompatible ones.

To sum up, Māṇikyanandi accepts the same six types of evidence for the first and for the second form of an inference. In the same way, my presentation of Dharmakīrti’s theory indicates that he accepts pervaded (\(\text{vyāpta}\))\(^{25}\) properties and effects of a given target-property as sufficient evidence to infer its absence, as he did in the affirmative form. This means that here again, the Buddhist and the Jain tradition disagree on the status of the cause, since Māṇikyanandi recognizes the cause as correct evidence, as in PM.3.74 “there is no happiness in this creature, because it has grief,”\(^{26}\) whereas for Dharmakīrti, only the effect, and not the cause, can serve as incompatible evidence to infer an absence:

\textbf{PV.1.5.} The cognition of the causal conditions of what is incompatible with that [property which is to be established] is erratic when used when there is no incompatibility between the causal conditions [of the property to be disestablished and the property that is incompatible with it].

\textbf{PVS.V.1.5.1.} For example, [a bad inference based on this kind of erratic sign is]: because there is firewood here, there is no feeling of cold.\(^{27}\)

In other words, it is not sufficient to know the presence of the cause of what is incompatible with a given target-property in order infer the absence of the latter, because something might block the potency of the cause. On the contrary, knowing the presence of what is incompatible with the cause of a given target-property is sufficient in order to infer the absence of the latter, since it cannot be present without its cause.\(^{28}\) First, Māṇikyanandi is avoiding this problem, since in PM.3.74 he provides with an example of the cause of what is incompatible with a given target-property, which turns out to be also what is incompatible with the cause of this target-property. Second, the discrepancies between the cause of what is incompatible with a given target-property and what is incompatible with the cause of this target-property calls for another type of non-cognition evidence, as we will see in the next paragraph.


\(^{24}\) \textit{viruddha-kārya-upalabdhir yathā na atra śīta-sparśo dhūmād iti} / Desai (1991: 70).

\(^{25}\) The difference between natural property (\(\text{svabhāva}\)) and pervaded (\(\text{vyāpta}\)) will be considered in the section on non-cognition.

\(^{26}\) \textit{na asmin śarīrīni sukham asti hṛdaya-śalyāt} / Ghoshal (1940: 130).


\(^{28}\) In the next paragraph, examples of these types of inference will be considered and schemata will be provided.
By the way, these complex inferential forms are not needed in this framework, since they can be dealt with thanks to transitivity. Indeed, when we know how to get new knowledge from previous knowledge of the effect, and that we know how to get new knowledge from previous knowledge of a property incompatible with the target-property, then we know how to get new knowledge from previous knowledge of what is incompatible with the effect of this target-property. And Māṇikyanandi explicitly accepts transitivity when he writes:

PM.3.90. The pieces of evidence which arise one after the other should be included here (in this list).

2.2.2. Dharmakīrti’s extra type of incompatibility

If we go through the eleven types of non-cognition listed by Dharmakīrti in his NB, then we notice that he deals with a second type of incompatibility, in which what is at stake is not the effect, etc. of what is incompatible with the target-property, but rather what is incompatible with the effect, etc. of it. Strangely enough, Jain philosophers do not even mention this second type of incompatibility. In this type of form of inference, not two, but four sub-types depending on the type of evidence are granted by Dharmakīrti, namely what is incompatible with the target-property itself, what is incompatible with a pervader of it, what is incompatible with an effect of it and what is incompatible with a cause of it. Let us only consider the third situation of this list, namely what is incompatible with an effect of the target-property. This situation is interesting, because in NB.2.37, Dharmakīrti uses the example “there are no causes of cold whose potency is unimpeded here, because there is fire,” and this example is easily comparable to the one “there is no feeling of cold, because there is smoke here” he used in NB.2.35 for the effect of what is incompatible with the target-property. More precisely, let us draw a schemata representing the cause and effect of heat in the first line, and the cause and effect of cold in the second line. The elements in bold in this schemata are the ones being considered in NB.2.35:

Causes of fire → heat/fire → smoke
Causes of cold → cold → goose flesh

Whereas NB.2.37 is concerned with the following elements:

Causes of fire → heat/fire → smoke

Causes of cold → cold → goose flesh

By the way, it is interesting to notice that in the second example, there is the restriction “whose potency is unimpeded.” This means that in a normal case, the presence of a fire in a room is a sufficient sign for the absence of cold in this room. Another example using this restriction, is found in NB.2.32 on the occasion of a situation displaying non-cognition as evidence, namely: “there is no fire (lit., ‘causes of smoke’) whose potency has not been

\[ \text{param-parayā sambhavat sādhanam atra eva antarbhāvanīyam / Ghoshal (1940: 135).} \]
\[ \text{na iha apratibuddha sāmarthyāni śīta-kāraṇāni santi vahner iti / Desai (1991: 74).} \]
obstructed, because there is no smoke.”

This example illustrates the fact that in a normal case, that is to say in a case in which no external parameter is blocking the spreading of the smoke, its absence is a sufficient sign for the absence of the fire.

As we explained, Dharmakīrti accepts four sub-types of such incompatible evidence. The extra two are due, first to the fact that he distinguishes between natural property (svabhāva) and pervaded property (vyāpta); and second, to the fact that he here accepts not only the effect, but also the cause, as correct evidence. These two differences are important ones. Since they are also present in the non-cognition type of evidence; and since Jain philosophers do not develop the second type of incompatibility, but develop the non-cognition one, we will investigate their importance when considering non-cognition.


The third form advocated by Māṇikyanandi is the one used to express inferences of the absence of a property from the non-cognition of appropriate pieces of evidence. This is non-cognition properly speaking. According to Māṇikyanandi, there are six types of evidence that ensure inferential knowledge in this form:

PM.3.78. In the case of negation [of the thesis], there are seven kinds of non-cognition of [evidence] compatible [with the target-property], namely [the evidence can be the target-property] itself, a [property] pervading (vyāpaka) [it], an effect [of it], a cause [of it], a predecessor [of it], a successor [of it] or a [property] co-existent [with is].

Two main differences with the precedent forms are to be noticed. First, only a property pervading the target-property can function as correct evidence, whereas only a pervaded property could in the previous forms. The reason for this has been fully developed in 1.2.

The second difference from the previous forms is that “the target-property itself” is added to the list of correct evidence. Indeed, in reasonings aiming at inferring an absence from a non-cognition, knowledge is gained through the inference from “I do not know the presence of the target-property” to “I know that the target-property is absent.” But in the affirmative, nothing would have been gained through the inference from “I know the target-property” to “I know the target-property.” As for incompatibility, the situation is more complex and we need to come back to Dharmakīrti in order to understand what happens. In Dharmakīrti’s presentation, whereas he is speaking of natural property (svabhāva) in general for the first type of evidence, he distinguishes between svabhāva and vyāpaka in the situations involving non-cognition and cognition of incompatible properties. I have therefore translated svabhāva-viruddha-upalabdhi by “cognition of [a property] incompatible with [the target-property] itself,” and vyāpaka-viruddha-upalabdhi by “cognition of [a property] incompatible with [a property] pervading [the target-property].” Now, we have seen that the two inferential forms involving incompatibility which are granted by Dharmakīrti are,

on one hand, cognition of a [property] pervaded by, etc. a [property] incompatible [with the target-property] and, on the other hand, cognition of a [property] incompatible with a [property] pervading, etc. [the target-property]. And when it comes to “[with the target-property] itself,” the difference between the two types of incompatibilities vanishes. This is probably the reason why Dharmakīrti, in NB.2.34 “there is no feeling of cold, because there is fire/heat,”\(^{33}\) has treated this type of evidence only one time, as an incompatible of the own nature of the target-property (and not as the own nature of something incompatible with it). This, in turn, might be what explains that “incompatible with the target-property itself” is not being considered as correct evidence in the second form by Jain philosophers either, since they do not consider at all the second type of incompatibility presented by Dharmakīrti.

Now that we have seen the two differences between this third form and the two previous ones in the Jain framework, let us consider Dharmakīrti’s conception on the matter. When it comes to the knowledge of absence of the target-property from the non-cognition of sufficient evidence for it, Dharmakīrti grants more types of properties that can function as sufficient inferential evidence than in the two previous forms. Indeed, non-cognition of the target-property itself, non-cognition of a property pervading it, non-cognition of an effect of it and non-cognition of a cause of it are all correct evidence to infer its absence. First, we have already said one word on the non-cognition of a property pervading the target-property (vyāpaka-anupalabdhi), for which NB.2.33 gives the same example as PM.3.80, namely “there is no Sissoo here, because there is no tree.”\(^{34}\) Second, we have also presented non-cognition of the target-property itself. In NB.2.31 the following example is found “[It is known that] there is no smoke here, because there is non-cognition of that which meets the conditions for cognition,”\(^{35}\) which is equivalent to the example in PM.3.79 “there is no pot here, because it is not known.”\(^{36}\) Third, concerning causality, something unexpected happens. More precisely, we are used to reading Dharmakīrti’s writings on the fact that an effect can be used as good evidence for the presence of its cause. We are less used to seeing him write that a cause may also be one. And yet, in NB.2.39 and PM.3.82, the inference of the absence of the target-property from the non-cognition of its cause (kāraṇa-anupalabdhi) is presented with the following correct example “there is no smoke, because there is no fire.”\(^{37}\) Second, the inference of the absence of the target-property from the non-cognition of its effect (kārya-anupalabdhi) is presented in NB.2.32 and PM.3.81 with the following correct example “there are no causes of smoke whose potentials are unimpeded here, because there is no smoke.”\(^{38}\) If we conceive negations as inverting the values, how then are we to give an account of the fact that Dharmakīrti accepts the non-

\(^{33}\) svabhāva-viruddha-upalabdhir yathā na atra śīta-sparśo vahner iti / In Desai 1991: 70.
\(^{34}\) na atra śīṃśapā vrēṣa-abhāvāt iti / In Desai 1991: 69. na asty atra śīṃśapā vrēṣa-anupalabdheḥ / In Ghoshal 1940: 132.
\(^{35}\) na atra dhūma upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptasya anupalabdhir iti / In Desai 1991: 67.
\(^{36}\) na asty atra bhūtale ghato ’nupalabdheḥ / In Ghoshal 1940: 132.
\(^{37}\) na atra vahny agny-abhāvāt iti / In Desai 1991: 75. na asty atra dhūmo ’n-agneḥ / In Ghoshal 1940: 132.
cognition of the effect of a target-property as good evidence for its absence? Indeed, if only combinatorial purposes are intended, then:

\[ A \rightarrow B \text{ is equivalent to } \neg B \rightarrow \neg A \]  

Therefore:

\[ K(\text{cause } x) \rightarrow Kx \]  

is equivalent to \( \neg Kx \rightarrow \neg K(\text{cause } x) \)

Which, by definition of a cause and of an effect, is equivalent to:

\[ \neg K(\text{effect } x) \rightarrow \neg Kx \]

It seems therefore suspicious to accept that the non-cognition of the effect of a target-property entails the knowledge of its absence, without accepting that the knowledge of the presence of the cause of a target-property entails the knowledge of its presence, as we have seen in 2.1. But if we have a closer look at Dharmakīrti’s refusal of the fact that cause constitutes correct evidence in the affirmative form, we see that the point of disagreement is elsewhere. Indeed, in his PVsV, Dharmakīrti accepts the following:

PVsV.1.7.1. For in that case, it is only the possibility of the effect’s arising from the complete cause that is inferred, because there is an inference of the aptitude of the collected [causes] to produce an effect. And the aptitude is dependent on nothing more than the totality [of causes], so it is only a virtual natural property (svabhāva-bhūta) that is inferred.

In other words, Dharmakīrti accepts that one is legitimised to infer the potentiality of the effect from the presence of its cause. Because when we deal with future events, we deal with potential phenomena, not actual ones, since “the beautifully coloured apple that showed promise of tasting sweet may turn out to have a bitter taste.” Therefore, Dharmakīrti rescued cause as good piece of evidence given appropriate restrictions. What he is saving in doing so is our ability to make predictions. Indeed, if cause could never be used as an evidence in order to infer its future effects, no prediction could be made by means of inference. And since inference and perception are the only two ways to acquire knowledge according to Buddhist philosophers, and since perception can be of no use in relation with future events, it would not have been possible for us to make predictions at all. And this, in turn, would have had bad consequences, especially for Buddhist soteriology. In conclusion, what Dharmakīrti does not accept is not that the causality relation is not symmetric, but that it is possible to speak about a future event as if it was an actual one. And since in the form exemplified by “there is no smoke, because there is no fire,” no knowledge of a

\[ \neg B \rightarrow \neg A \]  

is to be read “non B entails non A.”

\[ K \text{cause } x \]  

is to be read “knowledge of the presence of the cause of x.”


future event is concerned, there is no reason why it should not be accepted as a correct form of inference. In conclusion, also epistemological considerations and not only formal ones are here guiding Dharmakīrti’s choices. By the way, a possible explanation for the fact that Jain philosophers do not mention the second form involving incompatibility is that they are more concerned with formal considerations and that this is a form which, as far as the transmission of truth values is concerned, is redundant with the one involving non-cognition.


And finally, the last form advocated by Māṇikyanandi is the one used to infer the presence of a target-property from the non-cognition of evidence incompatible with it. In such a challenging form, inference can rely on only three types of evidence, namely the target-property itself, its cause and its effect. In Māṇikyanandi’s words:

PM.3.86. In the case of affirmation [of the thesis], there are three kinds of non-cognition of [evidence] incompatible [with the target-property], namely the non-cognition of [evidence] incompatible with [the target-property] itself, an effect [of it], or a cause [of it].

This last form involves both non-cognition and incompatibility. It is considered that such a combination of two negations entails an affirmation. In this form, one cannot draw as many types of correct inferences as in the other forms, because there exist situations in which “non-non-\(A\)” does not equal “\(A\).” This is especially a problem for Jain philosophers, who considered the present rising of the star Revatī as being incompatible with the present rising of the star Rohiṇī. Let us take an intuitive example to see the problem: if Tuesday can be considered as non-Monday, then non-non-Monday may admittedly be Monday, but it might also be Wednesday, or any day of the week provided it is not Tuesday. Actually, the only way for “non-non-\(A\)” to be the equivalent of “\(A\)” is if “non-\(A\)” refers to the whole list of things that are non-A, and not only to one item of this list. To escape this problem, Māṇikyanandi deals only with predicates that divide the domain into two parts when he investigate this last form. More precisely, the example presented in PM.3.89 to illustrate the inference of the presence of a target-property from the absence of something incompatible with it is the following one “all things possess several aspects, because something having only one aspect is never found.”

Second, the example presented in PM.3.87 to illustrate the inference of the presence of a target-property from the absence of the effect of something incompatible with it is the following one “as for example, some disease exists in this animal, because the actions of a healthy body are not found.”

43 viruddha-anupalabdhiḥ vidhau tredhā viruddha-kārya-kāraṇa-svabhāva-anupalabdhi-bhedāt / Ghoshal (1940: 133).
45 yathā asmin prāṇini vyādhi-viśeṣa asti nirāmaya-ceṣṭa-anupalabdheḥ / Ibid.
inference of the presence of a target-property from the absence of the cause of something incompatible with it is the following one: "there is pain in this individual, because he has no connection with his dear ones." In these three examples, the incompatible properties are, respectively, unique/non-unique (ekāantasvarūpa/anekāantasvarūpa), healthy/non-healthy (āmayanirāmaya) and happiness/unhappiness (sukham/duḥkham). That is to say, couples of contraries whose contrary nature is reflected already in the grammatical formation of the words. In this way, there is no third option. Someone is either happy or unhappy. In consequence, in this framework not-unhappy is happy, and nothing else.

As for Dharmakīrti, we have seen that his aim in PVsV is to give an account on the means to know absences by means of inference. From this, it is only natural that this form leading to an affirmative conclusion did not receive his attention in this passage.

3. Conclusion

After having compared the way non-cognition is involved in the inferential process in the Buddhist and in the Jain traditions, I would like to summarize their main points of divergence, as well as to address the consequences of these divergences.

First, Dharmakīrti considers non-cognition as a type of evidence employable to infer the absence of a normally perceptible entity, and Akalaṅka extends this conception to non-perceptible entities as well. In distinction to this, Māṇikyanandi and his commentators consider non-cognition mainly as a negative premise in the stated form of an inference, without being specifically concerned with the possibility to know that something is absent thanks to inference. In this new dynamic, non-cognition is introduced only in the section on inference for others, whereas Dharmakīrti introduced it already in the section on inference for oneself. In other words, the concern on non-cognition in Jainism lies more in the fact that its linguistic counterpart is a negation, that is to say as a linguistic device usable to reverse the truth value of a sentence.

The second line of divergence concerns the forms of inference involving non-cognition on which each tradition focuses. Only Dharmakīrti distinguishes between the cognition of a property incompatible with the effect of the target-property and the cognition of the effect of a property incompatible with the target-property. It is interesting to notice that the first type of incompatibility is strictly equivalent to non-cognition as far as the transmission of truth values is concerned, which might be one explanation of the Jain disinterest for it. Conversely, only Māṇikyanandi is interested in the possibility of inferring the presence of the target-property from the non-cognition of a property incompatible with it since, again, Dharmakīrti here focuses on the possibility of inferring an absence.

The third important line of divergence between the two frameworks concerns the types of evidence that are active in inferences involving non-cognition. Whereas 11 forms of inference involving non-cognition are admitted in Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu, 16 forms are admitted in Māṇikyanandi’s Parīkṣāmukham. First, this is due to the fact that Dharmakīrti rejects succession and coexistence as inferential evidence, therefore he also rejects non-cognition of succession and non-cognition of coexistence. Second, when it comes to the cognition of evidence incompatible with the target-property, which is considered by both

\[astī atra dehini duḥkham iṣṭa-saṃyoga-abhāvāt / \text{iIbid.}\]
As expected, Dharmakīrti accepts to infer the absence of a given target-property only from an effect incompatible with it. What is less expected is that he considers both the non-cognition of the cause and the non-cognition of the effect of a target-property as correct evidence for its absence. My hypothesis is that this is due to the fact that when the absence of a target-property is known thanks to the non-cognition of its effect or of its cause, no discourse on future event is involved; and that this was Dharmakīrti’s main objection concerning cause as correct inferential evidence. By the way, this is also probably one good explanation for the fact that the material implication used by contemporary logicians is not a good candidate to express in a formal way the relationship between the evidence-property and the target-property. Indeed, material implication has several properties, amongst which is symmetry, and this epistemological concern that no discourse should be made on future events prevents such a symmetry. Actually, in an attempt towards a formal representation of these theories, as many logical connectors as there are types of evidence would be needed. I would like to stress the fact that these considerations are really at the junction between logic (recognition of certain patterns, and rules describing them, such as transitivity, types and functions of negations), epistemology (what a person can know) and argumentation (how to convince a given interlocutor).

In conclusion, this presentation is conceived as a first step for a more thorough analysis of the divergences between Jain and Buddhist conceptions of inference after Dharmakīrti. What would be especially useful, in relation to the conceptions of non-cognition in this line of analysis, would be to see if later Buddhist philosophers adopt a classification into different forms of inference; whether they drop the second type of incompatibility (viruddha-upalabdhi); whether they gain an interest in the non-cognition of properties incompatible with one another; or whether they state a rule of transitivity.

References and abbreviations

Bhattacharya 1967 See PNT.
Desai 1991 See NB.
Ghoshal 1940 See PM.
Gnoli 1960 See PV and PVsV.


Jain 1939  See LT.


PM  Māṇikyanandin’s *Parīkṣāmukham*, ed. and tr. S.C. Ghoshal. Lucknow 1940.


PV and PVsV  Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. Chapter 1, ed. R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.


Shastri 1912  See PKM.
Universals, Demons’ Pots, and Demons’ Permanent Pots: Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Unestablished Subjects in Arguments by Consequence

by
Pascale Hugon

Introduction

According to Dharmakīrti, *prasaṅga* arguments – i.e., arguments that rely on a logical reason that is merely accepted by the opponent to draw an unacceptable conclusion – are legitimate means of proof provided that they are indicative of a correct, i.e., triply characterized, logical reason on which the reverse form of the *prasaṅga* (the *prasaṅgaviparyaya*) is based.¹ The relevant passage of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (hereafter: PVin) has been subject to conflicting interpretations by Indian commentators who notably disagree about the nature of the example that Dharmakīrti gives in this context – namely, whether it is meant to illustrate a *prasaṅga* argument or its reverse form – and about the status to ascribe to the subject in this example – i.e., whether the subject “universal” is a real universal (as upheld by the intended addressee of the argument) or a non-entity (as accepted by the Buddhist proponent).² The second point is crucial for the acceptance of the *prasaṅga* as a probative argument insofar as the validity of the reverse form would be threatened by the non-existence of the subject. Indeed, the non-existence of the subject would prevent the fulfillment of a required characteristic of the logical reason, being a property of the subject (*pakṣadharma-tva*) – a fallacy known as that of the “unestablished basis” (*āśrayāsiddha*).

Whereas this fallacy allows the Buddhists to discard proofs by opponents upholding, for instance, the reality of space (*ākāśa*), primordial nature (*pradhāna*) or universals (*sāmānya*), it also threatens their own arguments aimed at the refutation of such pseudo-entities. The logical reason in the Buddhist proof would indeed also fail to satisfy the requirement of *pakṣadharman*ta.³ The status of the subject poses a similar problem in the

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¹ Dharmakīrti’s short mention of such arguments in PV 4.12 (on which see Tillemans 2000: 21–24) is supplemented by a longer discussion in the PVin (PVin 3 4,4–6,12; the references to the Tibetan translation of this discussion in the sDe dge, Peking and sNar Thang bstn ’gyur are: D188a5–189a5; P286a5–287a5; N300a6–301b1).

² For an in-depth study see Iwata 1993. The main points appear in a summarized form in English in Iwata 1997a.

³ In NB 3.65 dharmyasiddha (“non-establishment of the property-possessor”) is listed as one type of fallacy of the logical reason. An additional issue with such proofs is that the Buddhist proponent could be accused of annulling his own thesis when negating the subject.
Madhyamaka proof establishing the emptiness of all things, and also impacts arguments for the establishment of the negative entailment of logical reasons, typically in the proof of momentariness. Various answers to the problem of the unestablished basis have been developed in the Buddhist tradition. The question of the subject in the context of prasaṅga arguments was taken up in particular by Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta.

The present paper deals with the views on this topic of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169). Phya pa, as can be expected, was influenced by the discussions of Indian thinkers but he nevertheless came up with his own creative method to deal with this issue. The examination of his views also sheds light on later Tibetan developments that obviously heavily borrowed from his works. In what follows I examine Phya pa’s commentary on the prasaṅga passage of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya (‘Od zer 149a5–150b3) to establish his take on the question of the nature of Dharmakīrti’s example and on the status of the subject. I then situate his interpretation within the framework of his overall theory of arguments by consequence (thal ‘gyur) – of which we find two parallel versions in his commentary on the PVin (‘Od zer 145a2–149a5) (preceding his commentary on the prasaṅga passage) and in his epistemological summa (Mun sel 83a1–95b5) – and relate this issue to discussions relevant to the problem of the “unestablished basis” (āśrayāsiddha) in the broader context of inference.

Before turning to Phya pa’s view, it will be useful to provide some references to the solutions developed by Indian thinkers to the problem of the unestablished basis.

Some methods developed by Indian thinkers to solve problems caused by unestablished subjects

I refer the reader to Watanabe’s paper in this volume for a detailed discussion of the solutions developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and their link to the context of prasaṅga, as well as for further references to primary and secondary literature. I list below (adopting Watanabe’s terminology) some solutions that will be mentioned in my discussion of Phya pa’s position:

The ‘Method of Conceptual Subject’: the actual or intended subject is the conceptual representation of the entity in question. This method is adopted by Dharmakīrti in the passage of PVin 3 dealing with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya’s primordial nature (to


5 For a panorama see Iwata 1999 and Watanabe in this volume. For the views of specific authors see also Tillemans 1999, chap. 8, Tillemans and Lopez 1998, and the articles mentioned in n. 4.

6 In addition to Iwata 1993 and 1997a, see Watanabe’s paper in this volume, which discusses the various solutions to the problem of āśrayāsiddha developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and their connection with prasaṅga arguments. I summarize some of them below.

7 Since the surfacing of eighteen of his works, the views of this thinker have been the subject of an increasing number of publications, so that a formal introduction may no longer be needed. For a recapitulation of the information available on his life and works the reader may refer to my “Compiled information on the life and works of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and bibliographical ressources,” which is available online at https://www.oeaw.ac.at/ikga/forschung/tibetologie/materialien/materials-for-the-study-of-phya-pa-chos-kyi-seng-ge-1109-1169/.
which I will refer as the “pradhāna passage”). The core idea can be traced to Dignāga’s discussion on the refutation of pradhāna in the Nyāyamukha, where he describes the subject as “imagined” (kalpita). Dharmakīrti makes clear in what way one can prove the non-existence of pradhāna without negating the subject in a way that would make the proof liable to a fallacy: what is being proven is not that the subject qua concept is inexistent, but that this concept does not have a real substratum. The concept itself is well established for both debaters and not liable to refutation. It is not actually the concept that is targeted by the discussion but the substratum (the entity) which, unlike the concept, is apt to fulfill some human goal.

The ‘Method of Paraphrase:’ the reasoning is reformulated in such a way that the actual subject is acceptable to the proponent. This idea, found in PV 4.136–148 in the commentary on the word svadharmiṇi in Dignāga’s definition of the thesis in PS 3.2, is linked to the distinction between nominal subject (kevaladharmin) and actual subject (svadharmin) when discussing the fallacy of the non-established basis as a fallacy of the thesis. I will refer to this context as the “svadharmin passage.”

The ‘Method of Simple Negation:’ the attribution of negative properties does not require the subject to exist, so no fault occurs as long as the properties attributed to the non-existent subject are simple negations (prasajyapratiṣedha). This method was adopted by Dharmottara in the context of prasaṅga and by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi when discussing the svadharmin passage. Prajñākaragupta criticized this position, arguing that it does not resolve the fallacy of the unestablished subject because an inexistent subject cannot be qualified by any property whatsoever.

Iwata (1999) discerns two other methods found in the Madhyamaka works of Śāntaraksīta and Kamalaśīla along with the Method of the Conceptual Subject and the Method of Simple Negation; they consist in taking the subject to be existent (i) as a convention (vyavahāra) and (ii) as an appearance. In Śāntaraksīta’s Madhyamakālaṅkāra (vṛtti) and in Kamalaśīla’s Madhyamakālaṅkārapañjikā one finds the idea that the verbal designations of the elements of the inference are based on a subject that appears in the cognition of both disputants – for instance for the subject “sound,” the appearance in the auditive cognition upon hearing a sound. In these texts the authors restrict the notion of “appearance” to the context of perception and do not deal with non-existent subjects such as pradhāna. The issue is mainly to avoid that the subject becomes unestablished when it is proven to be essenceless.

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8 PVin 3 67.4–70.6; Tib. P306a6, D208b3. This passage is parallel to PVSV 105.15–107.14. In both texts it is part of the anupalabdhi section. Verses PVin 3.53–54 = PV 1.205–206 are, however, frequently cited in discussions pertaining to the apoha theory.

9 Cf. PVin 3.54 = PV 1.206 and the auto-commentary. The property to be ascertained is thus not bhāva or abhāva but bhāvopādānatvat/bhāvānupādānatva (cf. PVin 3 68,6–7: kim ayam pradhānaśabdapratibhāsy artho bhāvopādāno na veti).

10 Cf. PVin 3 68,7–8: tasya bhāvānupādānatve sādhye sa ca pratvāmavedvatvād apratikṣeṣpārha ’rtho dharmin and 69,5: na tu punar arāyam eva śabdavikalpapratibhāsy artho ’pahānyate.


12 See Iwata 1999: 165.
Kamalaśīla addresses the issue of the inexistent subject in his *Madhyamakāloka*. In this work he mainly invokes the Method of Simple Negation to deal with such subjects. But he also draws a parallel between the previous idea of positing as the subject a commonly shared appearance and the refutation of *pradhāna* in which one posits as a subject “something existing in the mind” (*blo la yod pa nyid*). Actually, the idea that the subject can be a mental appearance is well represented in the *pradhāna* passage of the PVin. Notably, in his prose commentary to PVin 3.53–54 Dharmakīrti reformulates the notion of the concept qua “object of words” (*śabdārtha*) in terms of “the object that appears to conceptual thought,” an appearance that emerges upon hearing a given word. This method is thus akin to the Method of Conceptual Subject but emphasizes the mental appearance of the concept rather than the nature of conceptual construction. I will refer to it in terms of ‘Method of Conceptual Appearance.’ As mentioned above, Dharmakīrti clearly indicated that the subject in this form is established for both disputants and not liable to refutation. Among Madhyamaka authors, Jñānagarbha similarly points out that appearances are not negated insofar as they are established to be experienced.

1. Phya pa on the *prasaṅga* passage of the *Pramāṇa-viniścaya*

1.1. Phya pa’s interpretation of the example in the *prasaṅga* passage of the *Pramāṇa-viniścaya*

In the *prasaṅga* passage of the PVin, Dharmakīrti introduces with the words “for example” (*yathā*) an argument against Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika opponents who accept the reality of universals. This argument is complex enough that one cannot avoid, for its very translation, relying on a commentarial interpretation. My tentative translation follows here the understanding of the role of various portions of the Sanskrit sentence by Dharmottara, an interpretation which is also adopted by Phya pa.

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14 The latter view is presented in the form of an objection by an Alīkākāravādin, but is accepted by Kamalaśīla. See the translation and notes in Keira 2004: 142–145 (objection) and 146–148 (reply).
16 See, for instance, the passage of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā* and *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* translated in Keira 2004: 35–37.
17 A degree of interpretation is already present in the Tibetan translation by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab and Parahitabhadra, which was the reference for Tibetan interpreters who relied on the Tibetan version of the PVin. In this regard one can note that the Tibetan version known to Phya pa, which one can partially reconstruct from his direct quotes of the text, occasionally differs from the version preserved in the canonical collections. The absence of corresponding direct quotes by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab leaves open the question of the original translation and whether it was Phya pa or the editors of the canon (or maybe both) who adopted a slightly modified version of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s translation.
18 Translations of the *prasaṅga* passage of the PVin can be found in Tani 1987 (in English) and Iwata 1997b (in German). See also Watanabe’s translation and his discussion in this volume. For the details of Dharmottara’s interpretation see Iwata 1993: 50 and Iwata 1997a: 429–430. I will present the details of Phya pa’s interpretation in a forthcoming paper.
A single thing that occurs in many, because it is devoid of another essential property which is not characterized [as] mixed (or: which is not separate, due to being mixed) with a single instance determined in location, time and status, cannot be connected with something else that differs in location, etc.

(PVin 3 4,4–7: desākādūvasthāviśeṣanivyataikadravyasyamñasaṃsargāvyavacchi-
nassvabhāvāntaravirahād a→ anekavṛtter ekasya e→ na desādīviśeṣavatā-
nyena yogah)

Phya pa notably follows the broad lines of Dharmottara’s interpretation on the following points:

1. This example is taken to illustrate the reverse form of a prasaṅga (i.e., a prasaṅga-viparyaya);
2. The portion marked as “a→ …→a” represents the subject, that marked as “b→ …→b” represents the logical reason of the prasaṅga-viparyaya, and that marked as “c→ …→c” the property to be proven of the prasaṅga-viparyaya;
3. The type of the logical reason of the prasaṅga-viparyaya consists in the non-apprehension of the pervader (vyāpakānupalabdhi);
4. The type of the logical reason of the prasaṅga is an essential property (svabhāva).

When commenting on this passage of the PVin, Dharmottara and Phya pa also similarly reformulate the subject, logical reason and property to be proven (respectively, the derived conclusion), as indicated in the schematic representation provided below. According to them, the above passage should be understood as the prasaṅga-viparyaya:

A universal does not occur in many, because it is not multiple.

Iwata (1993: 50) notes that this interpretation is shared by Jhānaśrībhadra, Bu ston and Gyal tshab Dar ma rin chen. This interpretation qualifies as counter-intuitive insofar as the topic of discussion in this passage of the PVin is prasaṅga. One would thus expect the example introduced by the expression “for example” to illustrate a prasaṅga, not a prasaṅga-viparyaya. The option that Dharmakīrti exemplifies a prasaṅga is considered by Prajñākaragupta and, reportedly, by Vinītadeva and Sāntabhadra. The ascription to these two authors of alternative interpretations (which are discussed by Dharmottara) of Dharmakīrti’s example as a prasaṅga is made by Bu ston (Iwata 1993: 51) and found also in an anonymous interlinear note in the manuscript of Zhang Thang sag pa’s dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka (Yoshimizu and Nemoto 2013: 58). Phya pa ascribes the first alternative interpretation to Vinītadeva, the second to Prajñākaragupta.

Dharmottara’s reformulation of the prasaṅga-viparyaya is as schematized in Iwata 1993: 42. The reformulation of its logical reason as na cānekam is found in PVinṬ-Skt 7a5. In PVinṬ-Skt 6b3 Dharmottara speaks of the logical reason and the property to be proven in terms of “the absence of the pervader ‘multiplicity’” (vyāpakānātvābhāva) and the “absence of the pervaded property ‘occurrence in many’” (vyāpyasyānekevṛttitvasyābhāva). For Dharmottara’s formulation of the prasaṅga, see PVinṬ-Skt 6a1: sāmānyāder anekavṛttitva ihṣe ‘nękavam anistam āsamyate and PVinṬ-Skt 7a5: yad anekadesādīvṛttī tad anekam tathā ca sāmānyam ity anekam svān. For Phya pa’s reformulation see ’Od zer 149a6–7: spyi gcig gsal ba du ma dang ’brel par kun brtags pas du mar thal zhes bsgrub pa thal bar bsgrub pa’o ’il des rang rgyud gas ’phem zhe na l du ma stong pas du ma dang ’brel pas stong zhes pa khyab byed mi dmigs pa ’phem te l
which is induced by the *prasaṅga* (not stated by Dharmakīrti):

Because (according to you) a universal occurs in many, it follows that it is multiple.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>prasaṅga</em></th>
<th>Dharmottara</th>
<th>Phya pa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subject</strong></td>
<td>universal</td>
<td>sāmānyādi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason</strong></td>
<td>occurrence in many</td>
<td>anekavyāttītva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Derived property</strong></td>
<td>multiplicity</td>
<td>anekatva</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dharmakīrti’s example** (= *prasaṅgaviparyaya*)

| **Subject** | universal | sāmānya |
| **Reason** | non-multiplicity | na...aneka = anekatvābhhā- \(\text{vanātra, nānātvābhhāva}\) | du mas stong pa |
| **Property to be proven** | non-occurrence in many | *na anekavyāttītva, anekavyāttītvasyābhhāva* | du ma dang ’brel pas stong, gsal ba du ma dang ma ’brel ba |

### 1.2 Phya pa on the subject “universal” in Dharmakīrti’s example

A key issue in Dharmakīrti’s example is the nature of the subject “universal.” Indeed, the Buddhist proponent does not accept the reality of universals and the non-existence of the subject would threaten the validity of the logical reason in the reverse form: the fault of “non-establishment of the basis” (āśrayāsiddha) could be invoked. The case under consideration is typical of the drawbacks of the fallacy of the unestablished basis, which Buddhist scholars have attempted to palliate through various methods.

In the *prasaṅga* passage of the PV in the question of the subject arises indirectly in an objection pointing out that the logical reason of the *prasaṅga* is unestablished (*asiddha*), i.e., it does not satisfy the first characteristic of a correct reason – being a property of the subject (*pakṣadharmatva*). This, is, according to Dharmottara, because the Buddhist proponent does not accept that “a universal occurs in many” insofar as he does not accept that universals exist in the first place.²¹ Although here the non-establishment of the logical reason is a consequence of the non-existence of the subject, the argument appears to be hinting at a more general issue: in any proper *prasaṅga*, whether the subject is accepted to be existent by both debaters or not, the qualification of the subject by the logical reason is only accepted by the opponent and corresponds to the opposite of what the proponent wishes to establish.²² Accordingly, in my understanding, Dharmakīrti’s answer does not touch on the

²¹ See PVin 3 5.1–6.1: \(\text{nanu tathāpy asiddhir hetoh...}\) and PVinṬ-Skt 8a6: \(\text{bauddho hi sāmānyābhāvavāde sthitah prasaṅgasādhanam āha / taddārayāsiddher asiddham anekavyāttītvam nāma hetuḥ /}\)

²² For instance, in the proof of the presence of fire on a hill where smoke is perceived via the *prasaṅga* “if there were (as you claim) no fire on the hill, there would be no smoke,” the status of the ‘hill’ is not
way to deal with an inexistent subject, but first of all invokes the indeterminacy that should prevail in an inquiry pertaining to a given subject. In the given argument, the “universal” should not be taken either as “the Buddhists’ universal” or “the Naiyāyika/Vaiśeṣika’s universal.” Further, Dharmakīrti points to the hypothetical nature of the pakṣadharmatva in the prasaṅga – it is not something that is required to be established by a valid cognition as it is in a direct proof.

The discussion in this context revolves solely around the prasaṅga. The question of the subject in the reverse form is not addressed by Dharmakīrti, thus leaving the interpreters free to opt for their preferred scenario on this point. Dharmottara applied the Method of Simple Negation in this context (Iwata 1997a: 430). While Phya pa follows the major lines of Dharmottara’s interpretation of the prasaṅga passage and, like Dharmottara, identifies the logical reason and the property to be proven in the prasaṅgaviparyaya as simple negations (using the formulation “void of…”), he does not invoke this as a solution to the potential problem of the unestablished subject. His solution is not influenced by Prajñākaragupta either.

Phya pa’s solution, when commenting on the prasaṅga passage, is to appeal conjointly to the Method of Conceptual Subject and the Method of Conceptual Appearance, both of which find support in the pradhāna passage of the PVin.

The Method of Conceptual Appearance stands out notably in his commentary on the passage of the PVin referred to above discussing a potential non-establishment of the logical reason:

When one investigates the nature of things, at the time of an initial examination of philosophical tenets, one has not [yet] accepted the Buddhist philosophical tenets and one does not accept the non-Buddhist tenets. Therefore one does not posit as a basis a universal that is either an entity or a non-entity. The mental appearance is the basis. Therefore, even though [the universal] is not controversial, but the “absence of fire on the hill” is not established for the proponent, who precisely aims at establishing the opposite.

23 Obviously it was a concern to ascribe legitimacy to an argument that had the same form as an inference-for-others but whose logical reason did not satisfy the requirements of the former.

24 While it is doubtful that Phya pa would have been well acquainted with Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on the PV on a first hand basis, he might have known about his position via rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s commentarial work on the Pramāṇavārttika cum Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra or rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s discussion of prasaṅga in his larger PVin commentary (both works are currently not available to us). rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s explanation of the difficult points of the PVin (dKa’ gnas 393). It is thus certain that rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s position did not match that of Prajñākaragupta. In his 1997a paper (433–435) Iwata evokes the possibility that Prajñākaragupta influenced the Tibetan classification of arguments by way of a consequence, in which a distinction is made between arguments in which the subject is non-established – i.e., those that are “non-probative” – and arguments in which it is established, i.e., that qualify as probative. This suggestion, however, must be rejected. The classification in question, whether that made by gTsang nag pa (considered in Iwata’s paper) or Phya pa (see below § 2.1), does not distinguish between two ways of dealing with the subject in a single given argument in the way Prajñākaragupta does, but rather distinguishes those arguments in which the subject is established by a valid cognition (for instance the subject “hill” when refuting the absence of fire) from those in which it is not (gTsang nag pa does not give an example – see § 2.3 for Phya pa’s example).
established as an entity for the Buddhist and is not established as a non-entity for the non-Buddhist, this mere mental appearance is established for both.\textsuperscript{25}

As for the Method of Conceptual Subject, it is visible in Phya pa’s reference to the subject as the “object of a word” (\textit{sgra don}, Skt. \textit{śabdārtha}), i.e., the concept,\textsuperscript{26} on the basis of which the characteristic of the logical reason being a property of the subject (\textit{pakṣadharmatva}) is established:

Our [i.e., the Buddhist’s] position is correct: That the \textit{pakṣadharmatva} of [the logical reason] ‘void of multiplicity’ for the object of the word [as it is] accepted is established by reflexive awareness [is explained by Dharmakīrti] in the passage “But the singular thing…” (PVin 6.6–7: \textit{ekasya tu…}).\textsuperscript{27}

Phya pa’s commentary also refers the subject “the singular thing” as an object of the word for which the property of “appearing as singular” can be established by reflexive awareness.\textsuperscript{28}

Using this joint method Phya pa is able to guarantee the legitimacy of Dharmakīrti’s example in spite of the problematic status of the subject “universal:” whether universals exist in reality or not, debaters who use the term \textit{sāmānya} have a conceptual representation, the appearance of which can be established by reflexive awareness and cannot be refuted.

The Method of Conceptual Appearance and/or Conceptual Subject is successful when dealing with cases where the author wants to avoid the fallacy of the unestablished basis. But such a method appears to have far-reaching consequences. Indeed, if all verbal expressions generate conceptual representations and just any conceptual representation may qualify as being “established” insofar as its appearance can be established by reflexive awareness, there should be no unestablished bases, and hence no occasion for the fallacy of \textit{āśrayāsiddha} to arise.\textsuperscript{29} However, as I discuss in what follows, Phya pa preserves this fallacy in the context of inference-for-oneself, and the requirement that the subject must be established also plays a role in the identification of probative consequences (i.e., instances of arguments by consequence whose features correspond to Dharmakīrti’s understanding of a legitimate \textit{prasaṅga}).

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{25}] ‘Od zer 150b2–3: \textit{shes bya’i gnas lugs dpyad nas} (read: \textit{na}) \textit{grub mtha’} gzod tshol ba’i dus su sangs rgyas pa’i grub mha khas blangs pa myed la / mu stegs pa’i grub mha khas myi len pas spyi dngos po dang dngos med gzhir ma bkod de blo snang gzhi’ yin pas dngos por sangs rgyas pa la ma grub la dngos myed du mu stegs pa la ma grub kyang blo snang tsam de gnyi’ ga la grub po zhes pa’o.\textsuperscript{26}
\item [\textsuperscript{26}] One may note that Phya pa does not use the term “concept” (\textit{don spyi}) in this context. Cf. n. 65.
\item [\textsuperscript{27}] ‘Od zer 150a9: \textit{rang gi lugs la ’thad pa ni khas blangs pa’i sgra don} la du mas stong pa’i phyogs chos rang rig pa’i shugs la grub pa […] gcig la ni zhes pa […].
\item [\textsuperscript{28}] ‘Od zer 149a7: \textit{chos can ni du ma la yod pa’i gcig po ste gcig du snang pa’i chos sgra don} la yod par rang rig pa’i shugs la grub pa’o / The establishment of the properties of “unicity” and “void of multiplicity” by reflexive awareness evoked in these passages stands out in a more detailed way in the portion of Phya pa’s excursus on arguments by consequence dealt with in § 3.
\item [\textsuperscript{29}] This is not to say that other fallacies would not arise, allowing the Buddhist to criticize his opponent’s proof.
\end{itemize}
2. Unestablished subjects in Phya pa’s theory of argumentation by consequence

2.1 Phya pa’s classification of arguments by consequence

Phya pa’s theory of arguments by consequence includes a much broader range of arguments than the type of prasaṅga taken into account by Dharmakīrti as a legitimate argument. According to Phya pa, arguments by consequence include any argument of the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q.”30 A distinction is then made between genuine (rnal ma) arguments by consequence and fallacious ones (ltar snang). Fallacious consequences are to be understood as “non-pertinent.” They are arguments to which the opponent is able to retort that he does not accept the premises – he does not accept that S is P and/or that everything that is P is Q, in which case he is not bound to accept the conclusion “therefore S is Q” – or is able to retort that he accepts the conclusion (S is Q), which the proponent intended to be ‘absurd’ or at least unacceptable for the opponent. If the opponent is unable to retort, the consequence is qualified as “genuine.” Genuine consequences are then divided into probative and non-probative consequences. Only the first type, in which Dharmakīrti’s prasaṅga is to be included, amounts to an inference-for-others that proves something. The logical reason of its reverse form satisfies the triple characteristic (trairūpa) – put shortly, the qualification of the subject (pakṣadharmatva) and the pervasion (vyāpti) are ascertained by a valid cognition.31

2.2 The definition of a probative consequence

Phya pa gives as a definition of a probative consequence:

The indication of a logical reason pertaining to a subject in the context such that the pervasion is determined by a valid cognition and the explicit conclusion is eliminated by a valid cognition.32

This definition brings two requirements to the fore. For a consequence of the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q” to be probative,

(a) the pervasion of the consequence (P is pervaded by Q) must be established by a valid cognition;
(b) the derived conclusion (S is Q) must be eliminated by a valid cognition.33

30 For an overview of Phya pa’s theory of argumentation by consequence see Hugon 2013. As I make clear in this paper (675–676), the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q” is a reference to a consequence statement, which should not be confused with the actual consequence statement, that typically should have the form “all that is P is Q, S is P.”
31 This classification of consequences and the various issues linked with it are analyzed in details in Hugon 2016.
32 Mun sel 90a9–b1, ‘Od zer 146b6: skabs su bab pa’i chos can la dngos kyi dam bca’ (Mun sel sgrub bya, to be emended to dam bca’) la tshad ma’s bsal pa dang l khyab pa tshad ma’s nges pa’i rtags ston pa’o ll
33 Note that this definition does not include any explicit requirement pertaining to the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in the consequence (i.e., to the premise “S is P”). Phya pa disagrees in this regard with some of his predecessors. See below n. 44. But according to Phya pa’s gloss of the terms of
These requirements guarantee that the reverse form of the consequence, which has the form “Since S is notQ, it is notP,” is a correct proof: (a) guarantees that its pervasion (notQ is pervaded by notP) is established, (b) guarantees that its logical reason qualifies the subject (S is notQ).

There is no explicit requirement pertaining to the establishment of the subject in this definition nor is there any mention of this issue in Phya pa’s gloss of the individual terms. Only in a later section of the Mun sel does one finds the mention that the expression used in this definition for the subject, i.e., “property-possessor” (chos can), implies that the basis is established by a valid cognition.34 This requirement is otherwise highlighted in Phya pa’s classification of arguments by consequence.35

Why is the establishment of the subject required? From the point of view of the reverse form, it is required in order to avoid the fallacy of the “unestablished subject,” which would affect the characteristic of pakṣadharmatva of the “root logical reason.” From the point of view of the consequence, the non-establishment of the subject does not affect its qualification by the logical reason, because the premise “S is P” merely needs to be accepted by the opponent.36 But it can affect the negation of the conclusion of the consequence, so that the requirement (b) present in the definition of a probative consequence will not be fulfilled.

2.3 Example of a consequence failing to be probative due to an unestablished subject

In his classification of consequences Phya pa adduces the following example to illustrate the category of arguments by consequence that fail to be probative because of the non-establishment of the subject:

(1) “Because an ultimate entity is produced, it follows that it is impermanent.”

The reverse form of this consequence would be:

(1’) “Since an ultimate entity is not impermanent, it is not produced”

According to Phya pa, the pakṣadharmatva of (1’) fails to be established. Indeed, one cannot establish that “an ultimate entity is not impermanent” due to the non-establishment of the subject “ultimate entity.” This is in line with his take on unestablished subjects when discussing inference-for-oneself. There Phya pa lists seven cases where the “qualification

34 Mun sel 91a7–8: chos can zhes pas gzhi la tta bu tshad mas grub par bsttan “With the word ‘property-possessor’ one indicates that a basis such as ‘a mountain pass’ is established by a valid cognition.”
35 For the details see Hugon 2016.
36 Phya pa seldom uses the term phyogs chos (the Tibetan rendering of pakṣadharmatva) for this feature in the argument by consequence. He just speaks of “the nature of the reason being established” or “the reason being established.” See Hugon 2013: 679.
of the subject” (phyogs chos) is not fulfilled for the logical reason.\(^\text{37}\) The first three are due to the subject (or basis):

i. Unfounded basis (gzhi gtan med pa), for instance, ‘ultimate sound’ or a ‘self consisting in a pudgala;’ \(^\text{38}\)

ii. Basis not ascertained by valid cognition (gzhi tshad mas ma nges pa), for instance, ‘a demon’s pot’ or ‘a nymph’s song;’

iii. Basis with regard to which there is no desire to know (gzhi la shes ’dod med pa), for instance, ‘sound’ when proving audibility.

The first two are relevant to the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha (even though Phya pa does not use the corresponding term gzhi ma grub here). Phya pa does not explain in detail the distinction between (i) and (ii), but a passage in the discussion pertaining to demons’ pots in the context of arguments by consequence suggests that instances of the second category are things that may exist, but whose existence cannot be known to (human)\(^\text{39}\) cognizers.\(^\text{40}\)

The subject of the consequence (1) under consideration (“ultimate entity”) would fit into the first category: “unfounded basis” by analogy with the example ‘ultimate sound.’ In the section on inference, the subject is posited as something that the proponent wants to prove to be impermanent via the logical reason ‘produced.’\(^\text{41}\) In the reverse form of the consequence (1’), however, both the property to be proven and the logical reason are simple negations. This does not prevent the non-establishment of pakṣadharmatva: Phya pa rejects the possibility that an unestablished subject may be qualified by any property whatsoever, even a simple negation. We can note here a major difference to Dharmottara and other proponents of the Method of Simple Negation.

If the non-establishment of the subject “ultimate entity” affects the establishment of pakṣadharmatva, it does not prevent the elimination of the conclusion of the consequence by a valid cognition. According to Phya pa, it is possible to refute that “ultimate entity is impermanent.” This is achieved by way of negating the conjunction of ultimate entity and impermanent (mi rtag pa don dam pa'i dngos po dang tshogs pa khogs). To do so, one considers the fact that what is produced is pervaded by impermanence, which is itself pervaded by emptiness. There can thus be no connection between impermanence and something outside the range of what is empty, such as an ultimate entity; hence

\(^\text{37}\) See Mun sel 46a3–5, ‘Od zer 84b6–8.

\(^\text{38}\) In Mun sel 28.1a6, the “unfounded definitional basis” (mtshan gzhi gtan med pa) is similarly responsible for the fault of “impossible definiens” (mi srid pa'i mtshan nyid). It is exemplified by the definitional basis “permanent pot” to which someone applies the definiens “causally active” to define it as real.

\(^\text{39}\) Possibly demons can see their own pots and nymphs can hear their own songs.

\(^\text{40}\) Cf. ‘Od zer 147a4: rtag pa'i sha za'i bum pa dang spyi gcig po'i dngos pochos can du byed na gzh i de dag myed pa dang yod kyang shin du lkog du gyur pas de la 'jug pa'i tshad mas dam bca' la bsal pa myed pa bden pa zhi g na /

\(^\text{41}\) This is the case for the other examples of (i) and (ii). Also, the formal applications mentioned here are (i) “Ultimate sound is impermanent because it is produced” (don dam pa'i sgra byas pa'i phyir mi rtag), or “A self consisting in a pudgala is impermanent because it is produced” (gang zagi bdag gzhir byas te byas pas myi rtag pa bsgrub pa lta bu'oo); (ii) “A demon’s pot is impermanent because it is produced” (sha za'i bum pa byas pa'i phyir mi rtag), or “A nymph’s song is impermanent because it is produced” (dri za'i dbyangs chos can du byas te byas pas myi rtag pa bsgrub pa lta bu'oo).
one can negate the association of these two. But this does not amount to establishing *pakṣadharmatva*. Phya pa holds (contra to some of his predecessors) that *pakṣadharmatva* must consist in the attribution of a property (here consisting in a simple negation) to a basis. In dealing with this example, he thus acknowledges a difference between *pakṣadharmatva* and the elimination of the conclusion. The distinction amounts to the one we may draw in terms of “internal negation” and “external negation” when considering the form of the elimination of the conclusion and that of the *pakṣadharmatva*:

| Consequence: Because S is P, it follows that it is Q | Elimination of the conclusion = it is not the case that S is Q |
| Reverse form: Since S is not Q, it is not P | *Pakṣadharmatva* = S is not Q |

The distinction mostly goes unnoticed in the formulation of the examples in Tibetan: apart from the context where Phya pa speaks of “negation of the conjunction,” the formulation of the elimination of the conclusion in examples is not usually distinguished from that of the *pakṣadharmatva*. And the distinction is not actually crucial since apart from cases involving a non-existent subject, the two features are either both ascertained or both not ascertained by a valid cognition. For instance, a hill is either a thing-with-smoke or a thing-without-smoke. By eliminating, for instance by a perception, the conclusion “there is no smoke on the hill” that derives from the acceptance that there is no fire, one also warrants the establishment that “there is smoke on the hill.”

2.4 Comparison of four examples of consequences with potentially unestablished subjects

It would obviously be problematic if Dharmakīrti’s example were to fall into the same category as case (1) due to the nature of the subject “universal.” We have already seen in § 1.2 that the Method of Conceptual Appearance would enable Phya pa to ‘save’ this case. In what follows, I will consider two further examples of consequences with problematic subjects in an attempt to establish whether there is a criterion that directs the application or non-application of this method.

Altogether, there are four examples of consequences in Phya pa’s excursus that are relevant to the question of the subject. The first is case (1) considered above; the fourth corresponds to Dharmakīrti’s example. I list below their constitutive elements and those of their putative reverse form. Note that all four examples are genuine consequences –

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42 Mun sel 85b4–5: *dang po ni don dam pa’i dngos po byas pa yin no zhes smra ba la don dam pa’i dngos po byas pa’i phyir mi rtog par thal lo zhes brjod pa na byas pa la mi rtog pas khyab pa tshad mas nges la mi rtog pa la stong pa nyid khyis khyab pa nges pas mi rtog pa stong pa nyid khyo na la yod par nges pas don dam pa’i dngos po dang tshogs pa khogs pas dam bca’ la tshad mas bsal yang gzhis don dam pa’i dngos po nyid med pas de la mi rtog pas stong pas byas pas stong zhes pa ‘phen mi nus pa yin no // Curiously, the question of the subject is not pointed out in Mun sel in the discussion on “correspondence” (*gnad cig*) preceding the classification of arguments by consequence, where Phya pa establishes that the negation of the conclusion of the consequence and the *pakṣadharmatva* of the reverse form are either both established or both not established. In *’Od zer* it appears in an interlinear note that, to my opinion, represents a later addition to the text. See Hugon 2016 for the details.
arguments to which the opponent is unable to retort. It must therefore be granted that the opponent accepts the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in the consequence and does not agree with the derived property that comes to be ascribed to the subject. In all four cases the pervasion must be taken to be established by a valid cognition for both debaters.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consequence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subject</strong></td>
<td>ultimate entity</td>
<td>demon’s pot</td>
<td>demon’s permanent pot</td>
<td>singular universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason</strong></td>
<td>produced</td>
<td>existent</td>
<td>existent</td>
<td>linked with multiple instances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Derived property</strong></td>
<td>impermanent</td>
<td>impermanent</td>
<td>impermanent</td>
<td>multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reverse form</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subject</strong></td>
<td>ultimate entity</td>
<td>demon’s pot</td>
<td>demon’s permanent pot</td>
<td>singular universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason</strong></td>
<td>void of impermanence</td>
<td>void of impermanence</td>
<td>void of impermanence</td>
<td>void of multiplicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Property to be proven</strong></td>
<td>void of being produced</td>
<td>void of existence</td>
<td>void of existence</td>
<td>void of link with multiple instances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first sight these four cases look very similar:

1. They are all consequences that a Buddhist could put forward to refute an opponent and/or negate in a proactive way the attribution of a property.
2. In all four cases the subject appears to be non-established. In particular, in Phya pa’s discussion of pakṣadharmaṭva in the inference-for-oneself, ‘demon’s pot,’ the subject of (2), is mentioned as an instance of a basis that is not established by a valid cognition, and ‘ultimate entity,’ the subject of (1), is akin to the example illustrating an unfounded basis. Note that the distinction between these two types of unestablished basis does not play a role in the section on arguments by consequence: Phya pa does not differentiate in this context between bases that are termed “not determined by valid cognition” (tshad mas nges pa med pa), “unfounded” (gtan myed pa), or simply “not established” (gzhi ma grub).
3. The logical reason and the derived property of the consequence are positive properties, whereas the logical reason and the property to be proven of the reverse form have the form of a simple negation. As we have seen in the analysis of case (1), this is not a feature that justifies the application of the property to an unestablished subject.
4. Hence in all four cases one can expect that pakṣadharmaṭva is not established, so that the reverse form is not correct.

But Phya pa treats these four cases very differently: (3) and (4) are held to be probative consequences, while (1) and (2) are held to be non-probative due to a failure to establish
pakṣadharmatva in the reverse form. Further, (1) and (2) differ as to the possibility of eliminating the conclusion of the consequence.

The difference between the four cases in terms of elimination of the conclusion and establishment of the pakṣadharmatva of the reverse form can be summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elimination of the conclusion</th>
<th>Establishment of the pakṣadharmatva of the reverse form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Rejection of the conjunction of impermanence and ultimate entity</td>
<td>✔ Establishment that an ultimate entity is void of impermanence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Refutation that the demon’s pot is impermanent</td>
<td>✗ Establishment that a demon’s pot is void of impermanence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Refutation that the demon’s permanent pot is impermanent</td>
<td>✔ Establishment that a demon’s permanent pot is void of impermanence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Refutation that the singular universal is multiple</td>
<td>✔ Establishment that a singular universal is void of multiplicity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is understandable that Phya pa would want (4) to be probative since it is the case discussed in the prasaṅga passage of the PV in. But what distinguishes it from (1) and (2)? Can the method adopted for (4) in the commentary on the prasaṅga passage not also be applied to (1) and (2)? And further, what distinguishes (2) from (3)?

(2) “Because the demon’s pot is (according to you) existent, it follows that it is impermanent.”

The second example (2) appears in two contexts in the Mun sel (there is no parallel for the second context in the ’Od zer). In the first Phya pa uses this example to refute the definition of probative consequence given by other scholars in terms of “qualification of the subject merely accepted by the opponent and pervasion established by a valid cognition,” in the second he argues that his own definition of probative consequence (which he inherits from rNgog Blo ldan shes rab) does not allow for the inclusion of this case.

The main argument in both discussions revolves around the fact that the conclusion of the consequence “the demon’s pot is impermanent” cannot be eliminated by a valid cognition. As we have seen in case (1), the non-establishment of the subject does not necessarily prevent the elimination of the conclusion – there may be a way to negate the conjunction of the subject and the derived property. But no similar solution is offered here.

The failure to satisfy the feature of elimination of the conclusion disqualifies this example from being probative according to Phya pa’s definition, which includes it as a

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44 Mun sel 90a7–9; ’Od zer 146b4–6. Their definition, he argues, would lead them to include this case among “probative consequences,” whereas it cannot be so. The discussion has a precedent in rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s dKa’ gnas 385.

45 Mun sel 91b3.

46 The formulation in Mun sel is sha’ za’i bum pa mi rtag pa la tshad ma’i gnod pa med pa; in ’Od zer on the other hand, the formulation matches rather that of the pakṣadharmatva of the reverse form: myi rtag pas stong par tshad mas ma nges pa.
necessary criterion. For other scholars who do not include it in the definition, this failure may threaten the consequence to become fallacious. Indeed, unless the opponent is convinced of the permanence of demons’ pots,\(^{47}\) he is likely to retort that he accepts the derived conclusion that the demon’s pot is impermanent. The consequence would hence not even be genuine.

As a final blow, Phya pa points out that the logical reason of the reverse form would be unestablished (\(\text{rtags ma grub}\)). Although it is not specified explicitly what makes the reason unestablished, the fallacy of the non-established basis is a likely candidate as it was in (1).

(3) “Because the demon’s permanent pot is existent, it follows that it is impermanent.”

(4) “Because a singular universal is linked with multiple instances, it follows that it is multiple.”

Demons’ permanent pots were probably not a significant topic of debate in philosophical circles but universals certainly were. Nevertheless, case (3) is the key to understanding the difference between cases where the nature of the subject is problematic from those where it is not. On the one hand, its form and constitutive elements are considered by Phya pa to be perfectly parallel to the fourth application – the results obtained from the analysis of this example thus apply to the example from Dharmakīrti’s \(\text{prasaṅga}\) passage.\(^{48}\) On the other hand, it only differs from (2) in one aspect, namely the subject is “demon’s permanent pot” rather than “demon’s pot” – a detail that turns out to be of major importance.

The argument by consequence about the demon’s permanent pot is introduced as a potential counter-example to Phya pa’s definition of a probative consequence. Phya pa’s definition, as we have seen, includes the requirement of “elimination of the conclusion by a valid cognition,” which is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the establishment of the \(\text{pakṣadharma}\) in the reverse form. Phya pa invoked this criterion to exclude case (2) from the range of probative consequences. A (hypothetical) opponent now argues that cases (3) and (4) should be excluded for the same reason: the subject being unestablished, there can be no elimination of the conclusion by a valid cognition.\(^{49}\) Phya pa thus sets out to show how the conclusion can nevertheless be eliminated in case (3), and hence in (4).

\(^{47}\) The specification pertaining to what the opponent accepts is only found in ‘\(\text{Od zer}\). In the list of consequences that induce a reverse form in which the logical reason is of a different type than the logical reason of the consequence, case (3) illustrates a consequence based on a logical reason qua essential property, the reverse form of which is based on the non-apprehension of the pervader, like (4) (see § 1.1). Cf. Mun sel 86a6: \(\text{rtag pa’i sha za’i bum pa yod pa’i phyir mi rtag par thal zhes pa rang bzhin gyi rtags kyi thal ’gyur gyis mi rtag pas stong pas na yod pas stong zhes pa khyab byed mi dmigs pa’i rang rgyud ’phen ste gnyis so }\).’

\(^{48}\) ‘\(\text{Od zer 147a3–4: gzhi rtag pa’i sha za’i bum pa dang spyi gcig po nyid ma grub pas gzhi de la ’jug pa’i tshad ma’i bsal pa myed pa bsgrub pa’i thal ba mtshan nyid myed pas de la ma khyab po zhe na. The objection in Mun sel is more precise. For (3) it states that there is no elimination by valid cognition because the basis is completely inaccessible (Mun sel 91b4: gzhi shin du lkgod du gyur pas dam bca’ la tshad ma’i bsal pa med pas grub (em: sgrub) pa’i thal ba de la ma khyab). For (4), it examines two options: the conclusion is eliminated by the opponent’s belief, or it is eliminated by establishing by valid cognition that there is no such thing as a universal. In the former case the corresponding member of the reverse form, \(\text{pakṣadharma}\), will not be established by valid cognition; in the latter case the intended
The problem had been acknowledged by earlier scholars – in particular rNgog Blo ldan shes rab – who came up with a solution and answered various objections. But Phya pa does not agree with this solution and also claims that these scholars did not satisfactorily answer the objections addressed to them. The presentation of his own solution to the problem is thus to be understood against the background of this earlier debate: in addition to presenting his own account of a valid cognition able to eliminate the conclusion, Phya pa must show that his solution is not liable to the objections addressed to the view of his predecessors.

Leaving the details aside, let me attempt here to provide a summary of this long and complex discussion (Mun sel 91b3–95b5, ’Od zer 147a3–148a4):

According to Phya pa’s predecessors, to eliminate a conclusion – “S is Q” – a valid cognition must grasp the contradiction between the derived property (Q) ascribed to the subject and a property that is part of the subject (S), either by definition or through the formulation of the subject (for instance “singular” in the case of the subject “singular universal” or “permanent” in the case of the subject “demon’s permanent pot”). When the subject is not established, the contradiction must simply be ascertained on the basis of another instance, and can then be applied to the problematic subject. For instance, the contradiction between “permanent” and “impermanent” can be established on the basis of a pot, and then applied to the case of the demon’s permanent pot.

Phya pa’s solution is to appeal to appearances. The subject of (3) is “just what appears as a demon’s permanent pot,” that of (4) is “just what appears as a singular universal.” This appearance is established by reflexive awareness. Thus, technically speaking, the subject is no longer unestablished. The appeal to another basis to ascertain the contradiction (which was the solution advocated by Phya pa’s predecessors) is not needed. The ascertainment of contradiction can be made on the basis of the appearance: The reflexive awareness that establishes an appearance as X also establishes “aspects” or “features” (rnam pa) of this appearance in such a way that the establishment of a feature induces the rejection of the direct or indirect contrary feature (see §3 for more details).

Thus in the case of the demon’s permanent pot (3), the formulation of the subject in terms of “demon’s permanent pot” generates a conceptual cognition which reflexive awareness can establish to be an “appearance as a demon’s permanent pot” involving,...
among other things, the feature of “permanence.” The establishment of the feature of “permanence” in this appearance allows one to reject the feature of “impermanence.” Thereby the conclusion of the consequence, “the demon’s permanent pot is impermanent” is eliminated, and the qualification of the demon’s permanent pot as “void of impermanence” is established. Hence both the elimination of the conclusion of the consequence and the pakṣadharmatva of the reverse form are established by the same valid cognition: reflexive awareness. The same method can be applied in case (3): the mental appearance of the subject “singular universal” allows for the establishment of the feature of “singularity,” which rejects “multiplicity” and establishes the “void of multiplicity.”

3. Method of conceptual appearance and ascertainment of features

In dealing with cases (3) and (4), Phya pa thus relies on his version of the Method of Conceptual Subject which highlights the mental appearance. This Method of Conceptual Appearance allows him to remove the potential failure of non-establishment of the subject in the reverse form. Further, it allows the establishment of the pakṣadharmatva and the elimination of the conclusion thanks to an extension brought to the function of reflexive awareness: not only does it establish that there is a mental appearance (by which the subject is no longer unestablished), it also establishes features (rnam pa) that are an integral part of this mental appearance.

The notion of “feature” (rnam pa) that comes into play here appears to be related to a distinction between appearances of properties “with a form” (rnam ldan) and “without a form” (rnam med) (as I translated it in a previous article)\(^5\) invoked by Phya pa in his discussion on perception to explain why opposite superimpositions can be eliminated by perception itself for some properties of a perceived object but not for others. For instance, in the case of the perception of an impermanent blue object, the superimposition as “non-blue” can be eliminated but not the superimposition “non-impermanent.” This, according to Phya pa, because the property “blue” is “endowed with a form” (rnam ldan) whereas the property “impermanence” cannot be ascertained as such because it is “without a form” (rnam med). One could, as in the present discussion, speak of properties being “featured” or “not featured” in the mental appearance. Phya pa also applies this distinction in ’Od zer when commenting on the passage of PVin 1 related to reflexive awareness, including the cognition of “pleasure, etc.”\(^5\) It is in this context also that the terms are already found to be used by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab. The question of a possible Indian source for this terminology remains unanswered so far.\(^5\)

The description of the exact process for eliminating the conclusion of the consequence and establishing the pakṣadharmatva of the reverse form based on these features involves first the establishment of a given cognition (1 in the table below). Based on the reciprocal link between mind (blo) and the object of mind (yul), the establishment of the cognition enables the establishment of its apprehended object as being endowed with the features


\(^5\) ’Od zer 59a2 ad PVin 1.19d etc.

that were represented in the cognition (2). Then, the ascertainment of features of what appears enables the negation of opposite features (3a). Phya pa adds that it also enables what I have translated in the table below as “the negation of the [object being] true with regard to the opposite property.” (3b) Expressions such as *mi rtag par bden pa* (“true with regard to impermanence”) and *du mar bden pa* (“true with regard to multiplicity”) must be understood in the framework of Phya pa’s characterization of objects and cognitions as it is found in the section of Mun sel on apprehended objects (see in particular Mun sel 1b7–1b9): objects (*yul*) are characterized as “true” (*bden pa*) or “false” (*brdzun pa*), and the cognitions that apprehend them (*blo*) as, respectively, “non-erroneous” (*ma ’khrul ba*) and “erroneous” (*’khrul ba*). In subsequent discussions, Phya pa builds on this initial correspondence between the characterization of objects and cognitions, notably by adding specifications to the characterization as “true:” an object is “true” in a specific way (or with regard to a given property) when the cognition to which it appears as such is non-erroneous, and *vice versa*. Its being “true” in this specific way prevents its being true in the opposite way. For instance, when debating whether two things X and Y are distinct or identical, Phya pa considers whether the cognition to which they appear as distinct is erroneous or non-erroneous. In the latter case, the object (i.e., X and Y) is qualified as “true with regard to being distinct” (*tha dad du bden pa*), and its being “true with regard to being one” is negated (*gcig du bden pa khegs*). The “negation of the feature x” (*x kyi rnam pa khegs pa*) (3a) and the “negation of [the object being] true with regard to x” (*x+loc. bden pa khegs pa*) (3b) are also mentioned together by Phya pa in other contexts as following from the establishment of the feature opposite to x.

Although Phya pa is not explicit on the issue in the context under consideration, it would appear that step (3b) supports step (4a) – the elimination of the acceptance that the object has the property whose feature was negated – in view of the relation between the characterization of the object as true and of the mind that cognizes it as non-erroneous: by negating that the object is true with regard to property x, one also negates that the mind that apprehends this object as having the property x is non-erroneous.

Step (4b) – the establishment of the *pakṣadharmatva* of the reverse form – is to be understood as deriving from 3a/3b as well insofar as the logical reason is expressed in the form “void of property x” (e.g., void of impermanence, void of multiplicity), an explicit negation which echoes the “negation of the feature x” (3a) and the “negation of the object being true with regard to x” (3b) rather than the establishment of the object appearing as being positively qualified by the opposite property (e.g., permanence, unicity) (2).

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54 “True” and “false” correspond in this context to the characterization of the objects as, respectively, “real” (*dngos po*) and “unreal” (*dngos med*). For instance, hallucinated objects are “false” and the non-conceptual cognitions in which they appear are “erroneous.” But in other contexts, such as the definition of valid cognition in terms of “the understanding of a true object” (*bden pa rtogs pa*), “true” takes up the meaning of “non-opposed” (*gnod pa med pa*), and “true object” is not paired with “non-erroneous cognition,” but with “valid cognition.” See Hugon 2011.

55 See for instance Mun sel 3a6, where Phya pa discusses the case of the appearance of “white” and “visual consciousness” in parallel with the case of the appearance of “pleasure” and “suffering.”

56 See for instance Mun sel 62b8 and the passage cited in n. 66 for the feature of “momentariness” (*skad cig gis stong pa’i rnam pa yongs gcod la grub pas / skad cig ma’i rnam pa khegs pas skad cig mar bden pa’ang khegs pa yin no l/), 63b8 for the feature of “multiplicity” (*du mar bden pa*), 65b9 for the features of “momentariness” and “reality” (*skad cig dang dngos por bden pa*).
Thus in the case of the demon’s permanent pot and, respectively, of the singular universal, we find the following steps:\(^{57}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experience, by reflexive awareness, that conceptual cognition (i.e., the mind) is something that apprehends a demon’s permanent pot</th>
<th>Experience, by reflexive awareness, that conceptual cognition is something that apprehends a singular universal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The object is established to be the appearance as a (demon’s) permanent pot (i.e., it has the feature of a permanent pot)</td>
<td>The object is established to have the feature of a singular universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Negation of the feature of impermanence</td>
<td>Negation of the feature of multiplicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>Negation of [the object being] true with regard to impermanence</td>
<td>Negation of [the object being] true with regard to multiplicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>Elimination of the acceptance of the derived consequence that [the demon’s permanent pot] would be impermanent</td>
<td>Elimination of the acceptance of the derived consequence that [the singular universal] is multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a</td>
<td>Establishment of the pakṣadharmatva of [the reason] void of impermanence</td>
<td>Establishment of the pakṣadharmatva of [the reason] void of multiplicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. Other applications of the method of conceptual appearance in Phya pa’s works

The method adopted by Phya pa in his commentary on the *prasaṅga* passage and in his own theory of arguments by consequence is also applied in his works in other contexts.

One of those is linked with Dharmakīrti’s discussion in the *svadharmin* passage, which, as pointed out in the introduction, is one of the two main contexts in which Dharmakīrti deals with cases where he wants to rescue arguments from the fallacy of the unestablished basis.\(^{58}\)

In the *svadharmin* passage, Dharmakīrti discusses the Buddhist refutation of the Vaiṣeṣika’s permanent space and the Vaiṣeṣika’s objection that the Buddhist's argument would be faulty because by refuting the existence of the subject the Buddhist would invalidate his own thesis.\(^{59}\) This passage has no direct equivalent in the PVin. But Dharmakīrti

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57 Mun sel 95a3–4: rang rig pas rtog pa rtog pa'i sha za'i bum pa 'dzin pa dang spyi gcig du 'dzin pa tsam myong pa na yul yang rtag pa'i bum par snang par grub pas mi rtag pa'i rnam pa khegs te mi rtag par bden pa'ang khegs pas mi rtag par thal ba 'dod pa la des sel te mi rtag pas stong pa'i phyogs chos kyang rang rig pa'i shugs la grub la / yul spyi gcig gi rnam par grub pa na'ang du ma'i rnam pa khegs te du mar bden pa'ang khegs pas du mar thal ba 'dod pa'ang rang rig pa'i shugs la bsal la du mas stong pa'i phyogs chos kyang rang rig pa'i shugs la grub pa yin no //

58 The second context is the *pradhāna* passage, discussed both in the PV and the PVin, which was Phya pa’s main source. But Phya pa does not supplement his commentary on the *pradhāna* passage with an excursus, and the refutation of *pradhāna* does not come forth in his Mun sel.

hints to this issue at the end of the discussion on the word *iṣṭa* in the definition of the thesis (PVin 3 18,9–19,1). It is when commenting on this part of the PVin that Phya pa introduces in his commentary an excursus on logical reasons “refuting the nature of the subject” (*chos can gyi ngo bo ’gog pa, Skt. dharmisvairūpaviparītasādhana*) (’Od zer 157b6–159b7). This excursus has an equivalent in the Mun sel within Phya pa’s discussion of the four categories of contradictory reasons.  

Note that in Phya pa’s discussion, the argument under consideration is not the Buddhist’s refutation of the Vaiśeṣika’s permanent space, but the Vaiśeṣika’s proof of the permanence of space by the logical reason “void of being produced.” Phya pa’s intention is to establish that this proof is subject to the fault of “refuting the nature of the subject” all the while arguing that the fallacy of the unestablished basis does not apply. Phya pa invokes in this discussion the Method of Conceptual Appearance: the subject is “the (mere) appearance as space” (*nam mkhar snang pa/’nam mkhar snang pa tsam*), that is established by reflexive awareness and for which the property “void of being produced” can be established. Hence *pakṣadharmatva* holds. But if the logical reason is thus not faulty by reason of non-establishment, it is, however, faulty in that it is contradictory. This is because, according to Phya pa, the Vaiśeṣika proponent of the proof additionally applies to the mental appearance as space an intentional determination as “real space” via an erroneous cognition. Due to the incompatibility of the property to be proven, “void of impermanence,” with a subject assumed to have such a real nature, the proof ends up refuting the nature of the subject.

A further passage worth considering occurs in the context of the establishment of pervasion in the proof of momentariness by the logical reason “produced” or “existent.” This involves a secondary inference proving that what is permanent (or not momentary) is not produced or not existent via the reason “void of instantaneous or gradual causal efficacy.” Phya pa identifies the subject in this secondary inference as “the simple negation ‘void of momentariness’” (skad cig gis stong pa/i med dgag). This simple negation is to be

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60 The four categories listed in Mun sel 54a8 are: *chos kyi ngo bo ’gog pa; chos kyi khyad par ’gog pa; chos can gyi khyad par ’gog pa; chos can gyi ngo bo ’gog pa*. This distinction can be traced to the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (3.27 = Nyāyamukha 9), and the terminology to *Nyāyapraveśa* 3.2.3, where one finds the terms: *dharmisvarūpa*, *dharmasvarūpa*, *dharmaviśeṣa*, *dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana* (see Tachikawa 1971: 125–126). Note that Dharmakīrti does not identify the fallacy occurring in the refutation of the permanence of space in terms of *dharmisvabhāvaviparītasādhana*. On Dharmakīrti’s silence on this fallacy see Moriyama 2019.

61 The proof of the permanence of space is given as an example of *dharmisvabhāvaviparītasādhana* by Dharmottara (PVinṭ-Skt 24a5, PVinṭ-Tib D26a1). As Moriyama 2019 reveals, the Vaiśeṣika proof is also given as an example of *dharmisvabhāvaviparītasādhana* by Jinendrabuddhi and Dharmapāla – both argue that the fault of the unestablished subject does not apply in this case. Before presenting his own view Phya pa makes an extensive presentation and refutation of another view ascribed to Kamalaśīla etc. In Kamalaśīla’s works (notably *Madhyamakālāka* and *Madhyamakālākārapāṇījikā*) one finds a discussion which may have been the source of Phya pa’s presentation of Kamalaśīla’s position. Yet Kamalaśīla does not discuss the faulty Vaiśeṣika proof, but the Buddhist refutation of a permanent space, which is the case discussed by Dharmakīrti in the *svadharmin* passage, a case that escapes the fault of *dharmisvabhāvaviparītasādhana* as well as the fault of āśrayāsiddha. Kamalaśīla appeals in this regard to the Method of Simple Negation (see Iwata 1999: 167).

62 By invoking the “intentional determination” (*zhen pa*) Phya pa identifies a subject that corresponds to Dharmakīrti’s *svadharmin*.

63 Starting at Mun sel 62b5.
established for a verbal object (sgra don) or, as Phya pa rephrases, a concept (don spyi). More precisely, Phya pa invokes the appearance of a concept that has the feature of void of momentariness (Mun sel 63a9: skad cig mas stong pa’i rnam pa can gyi don spyi). Only in such a case can the void of momentariness be ascertained by mere experience (myong pa) – this amounts to reflexive awareness.

The description of the process is the same as in the case of the demon’s permanent pot and the singular universal: experience establishes what the apprehending mind is like – in this case, it apprehends something that is not momentary – and thereby what the object of the apprehending mind is like – the object has the feature of being non-momentary. This in turns leads to the negation of the aspect of momentariness and the negation of the object as being “true with regard to momentariness,” and to the establishment of the simple negation “void of momentariness.”

Phya pa specifies that the experience by which one establishes the property “void of momentariness” does not simultaneously establish or eliminate the property to be proven, i.e., the property “void of existence.” This is because to establish that the object (yul) is existent or non-existent, one must be able to establish that the mind (blo) is erroneous or non-erroneous (see above and n. 54) – but this property is not something that is featured (rnam med) in the appearance and hence cannot be established by reflexive awareness. In other words, introspection does not allow one to ascertain whether the mental appearance as “something void of momentariness” is erroneous or non-erroneous with regard to the properties of existence or void of existence, and therefore whether the object of such a cognition is unreal or real.

Conclusion: When does the fault of the unestablished subject actually apply?

As mentioned at the end of § 2, the adoption of the Method of Conceptual Subject or Method of Conceptual Appearance seems to leave no room for unestablished bases –

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65 This rephrasing is worth noting since, as indicated in n. 26, Phya pa does not use the term “concept” (don spyi) when applying the Method of Conceptual Appearance in his commentary on the prasānta passage. He does not use the term either when commenting on the pradhāna passage in spite of a visible influence of the pradhāna passage of the PVin 3 pertaining to Phya pa’s characterization of the don spyi, something I intend to come back to on another occasion. On the other hand, in his commentary on the Madhyamakāloka Phya pa glosses Kamalaśīla’s identification of the subject in the refutation of pradhāna as “something imagined that exists in the mind” (i.e., btsan pa’i blo la yod pa) in terms of “the feature of pradhāna that is present in the appearance of the concept to conceptual thought” (dBus ma snang bshad 38b4: rtog pa’i don spyi snang pa’i yod pa’i gtsos’ bo’i rnam par tsam chos can yin no ches bya pa’o).

66 Mun sel 63a9–63b1: skad cig mas stong pa’i rnam pa can gyi don spyi la skad cig mas dhen par rges pa yin te / blo skad cig ma ma yin pa’i dzin par myong pa na yul skad cig ma ma yin pa’i rnam pa grub la skad cig gi rnam pa’i khags pa na skad cig du bden pa’i ang myong pa’i shugs la khags pa’i gis stong pa’i med dga’i grub pas gzhi’i ldog pa grub la /

67 The inability to ascertain the erroneous or non-erroneous character of mind by reflexive awareness – and thereby whether the corresponding object is false or true – is discussed by Phya pa in Mun sel 36a7–8, with the conclusion that the establishment that an object is true and that the corresponding mind has a true object, is achieved by the cognition of an object (don rig) other than mind itself.
anything can be established as a mental appearance since there is no restriction as to what can be said and thought about. And if there are no unestablished bases, the fault of āśrayāsiddha would never take place. Logical reasons would never lack pakṣadharmanatva because of the lack of establishment of the basis. Still, unestablished bases (unfounded or not ascertained by valid cognition) are listed by Phya pa among the reasons for the absence of pakṣadharmanatva in inference and come into play in rejecting the fulfillment of the pakṣadharmanatva of the reverse form of some arguments by consequence (such as case (1) and case (2) considered above). Failure of pakṣadharmanatva is not exclusively linked with the attribution of a positive property to a non-existent subject. Indeed, the pakṣadharmanatva of the reverse form of consequences (1) and (2) is faulty although the logical reason is a simple negation. One could suggest that this fault is restricted to proofs formulated by opponents of the Buddhist, while Buddhist proofs can be ‘saved’ by the application of the Method of Conceptual Appearance. However, we have seen in § 4 that Phya pa also applies this method to argue that the Vaiśeṣika’s proof of the permanence of space is not subject to the fault of āśrayāsiddha.

Is there another criterion that distinguishes cases where the Method of Conceptual Appearance applies and those where the fault of āśrayāsiddha is brought forward? Or should one, as uncharitable as it may seem, conclude that the fault of the unestablished basis is advocated whenever it is convenient for the author to do so, whereas in other cases the Method of Conceptual Appearance is called to the rescue? Before jumping to such a conclusion, let us consider what could be achieved by the application of this method in the cases where Phya pa invokes this fallacy.

Consequence (2) is relevant in this regard because its formulation only differs from consequence (3) by a small detail regarding the subject, but while the argument by consequence about the “demon’s permanent pot” (3) is probative, that about the “demon’s pot” (2) is not: it is possible, according to Phya pa, to establish that “the demon’s permanent pot is void of impermanence” but not to establish that “the demon’s pot is void of impermanence.” What happens if the Method of Conceptual Appearance is applied to consequence (2)? It would indeed remove the potential fallacy of āśrayāsiddha in the pakṣadharmanatva, i.e., the establishment that “the demon’s pot is void of impermanence.” However, consequence (2) would remain non-probative (and even possibly not genuine) because this would still not enable one to establish that the property “void of impermanence” qualifies the demon’s pot or to eliminate the connection between the demon’s pot and impermanence. Indeed, the establishment of these two features in consequence (3) is enabled by the fact that reflexive awareness could establish the aspect of “permanence” on the basis of the mental appearance as a “demon’s permanent pot.” Consequence (2) is different in this regard: the feature of “permanence” cannot be established by reflexive awareness because it is not an integral part of the mental appearance of a demon’s pot. This is because it was not explicated in the verbal formulation “demon’s pot” and is also not a feature associated by definition with demons’ pots.

Asking a similar question about Dharmakīrti, Tillemans (2000: 197) concluded that the fault of āśrayāsiddha can be invoked unproblematically unless it would involve self-refutation for the Buddhist proponent. Only in the latter case is the method distinguishing svadharmin and kevaladharmin worth applying. This conclusion, however, concerns the fault of āśrayāsiddha as a fault of the thesis and leaves open the question of āśrayāsiddha as a fault of the logical reason.
The appearance as a demon’s pot can also not be ascertained to have the feature of impermanence. One must not be fooled here by the potential impact of the word “pot:” it only allows for the ascertainment of the feature of “being a pot” (one could thus refute the claim that “the demon’s pot is not a pot”), but not of the features of “impermanence,” “existence,” or “causal efficacy” that one typically associates with pots – an association that is erroneous because it fails to take into account that the category of “pots” is not restricted to real pots (it also includes dream pots, etc., that are not real).

It seems that the same analysis could be applied to the other cases where the fault of āśrayāsiddha is invoked, that is, the pakṣadharmaṇa of the reverse form of consequence (1) – “ultimate entity is void of impermanence” – and the examples adduced in the chapter on inference – “ultimate sound is produced” or “demon’s pot is produced.” In all these cases the Method of Conceptual Appearance would certainly remove the fault of āśrayāsiddha but would still not enable the establishment of the pakṣadharmaṇa because the mental appearance would not have the explicit features that would be relevant in this regard.

One could in conclusion propose that the problem of āśrayāsiddha has been transformed into a failure of the establishment of the pakṣadharmaṇa that has nothing to do with the ontological status of the subject, but is a matter of the features of the mental appearance that can or cannot be ascertained by reflexive awareness. However, such an interpretation of the examples where āśrayāsiddha is invoked is not suggested by Phya pa. One could deplore the lack of a unifying theory on this point or, more charitably, envisage that Phya pa is applying a principle of economy in the identification of fallacies.

References and abbreviations


dBu ma snang bshad Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, dBu ma snang ba’i ’grel pa rgya cher bshad pa. See bKa’ gdamgs gsung ’bum, vol. 6, 266–428.


Hugon 2016 P. Hugon, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Argumentation by Consequence (thal ’gyur) (2): The analysis of the correspondence between a consequence and its reverse form and the thirteenfold typology of consequences. Journal of the


Mun sel Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, Tshad ma yid kyi mun pa sel pa. See bKa’ gdamgs gsung ’bum, vol. 8, 434–626.

N Narthang (snar thang) edition of the Buddhist canon in Tib.


‘Od zer Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ’grel bshad yi ge dang rigs pa’i gned la ’jug pa’i shes rab kyi ’od zer. See bKa’ gdamgs gsung ’bum, vol. 8, 35–427.


PS Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya, Tibetan translation in D4203, P5700.

PV Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika.


PVin Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇaviniścaya.


PVin-Tib Tib. translation of the third chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya. D4211 ce 187a6–230a7; P5710 ce 285a7–329b1; N3701 ce 299a6–347a7.

PVin-T-Skt Dharmottara, Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, copy of the manuscript (see the introduction to PVin 1 & 2 and PVin 3 for the details).

PVin-T-Tib Dharmottara, Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, Tibetan translation in D4227, P5727.
PVSV  Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti. See PV 1.
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Tani 1987  T. Tani, The Problem of Interpretation on Pramāṇaviniścaya III vv. 1–3 – with
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Tshad ma bsdus pa  Anonymous (attributed to Klong chen Rab ’byams pa), Tshad ma’i
Yoshimizu and Nemoto 2013  Ch. Yoshimizu and H. Nemoto, Zhang Thang sag pa
’Byung gnas ye shes, dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka, Part I, folios 1a–26a3 on Candra-
kīrti’s Prasannapadā ad Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1.1. Tokyo 2013.
Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ

by
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1. Introduction

Dharmakīrti and his followers define real things as those that have some causal capacity (arthakriyāśakti), and consider those that cannot produce any effect, such as the universal (sāmānya) and the whole (avayavin), as merely conceptual constructions. In connection with this capacity, as is well known, they refer to the two kinds of causal capacity: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ.

According to the examination of these two kinds of causal capacity by modern scholars, Dharmakīrti and his followers consider external objects, such as jars (ghaṭa, water jar), to have two different causal powers: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ. The sāmānyā śaktiḥ is the causal power common to other objects of the same kind, and the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ is the causal power not common to any other object. For example, a jar has the causal power or capacity of containing water, which is common to other jars, but at the same time it has the unique power of producing its own particular perception as well. Of these, the sāmānyā śaktiḥ is regarded as the useful function for the fulfillment of human purposes, and is therefore not “causal capacity” in a strict sense. In contrast, the pratiniyatā śaktiḥ is regarded as the causal efficiency that real things have.

1 The present paper is a revised English version of a Japanese publication entitled “Nishu no ingakōryoku –sāmānyaśakti to pratiniyataśakti–” [Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śakti and pratiniyatā śakti] (=Inami 2012). Almost all of the passages from Indian texts being treated here were translated into Japanese in another paper entitled “Pramāṇavārttika Pramāṇasiddhi-shō no kenkyū (13)” (=Inami 2014). I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Tom J. F. Tillemans for correcting the English of the present paper.

2 Esho Mikogami was the first scholar to pay attention to the Buddhist theory of two kinds of causal capacity. He examined PV II 100–102 and Prajñākaragupta’s commentary and concluded that the sāmānyaśakti is the useful function possessed by things in our daily life and that it is related to the sāmānyalakṣaṇa; the pratiniyataśakti is the causal efficiency that gives rise to the perception of color, etc., and it is related to the svalakṣaṇa. Mikogami understood that these two correspond with the two meanings of arthakriyā as pointed out by Nagatomi 1967/68 (Mikogami 1978, 1979). After Mikogami’s study, Shoryu Katsura considered these two kinds of causal capacity several times. According to his first examination of this theory (Katsura 1983: 97–100), the pratiniyataśakti is the unique capacity that momentary existence has, and should be regarded as the primary meaning of the word arthakriyā. In contrast, the sāmānyaśakti is, for example, a pot’s capacity for containing water, something common to other pots, thus meaning “a useful function for the fulfillment of a human purpose.” It is related to the conceptual cognition of the universal or of the continuum. It is not causal capacity in a strict sense, and therefore should be regarded as the secondary meaning of the word arthakriyā. In this paper, Katsura concluded that the pratiniyataśakti is the causal capacity to produce a direct perception and the sāmānyaśakti is the causal capacity to produce an indirect or judgmental cognition. This understanding also appears in a later study published in English (Katsura 1984: 218–219).

In addition to this, scholars have presented various other interpretations concerning these two notions. Some scholars understand the \textit{sāmānyā śaktiḥ} to be related to common characteristics or universals (\textit{sāmānyalakṣaṇa}) and the \textit{pratiniyatā śaktiḥ} to be related to unique characteristics or particulars (\textit{svalakṣaṇa}).\footnote{Mikogami 1978, 1979; Katsura 1983, 1984.} Some scholars explain that the \textit{sāmānyā śaktiḥ} belongs to the jar as a continuum (\textit{santāna}) and the \textit{pratiniyatā śaktiḥ} belongs to the jar as a momentary thing (\textit{kṣaṇa}).\footnote{Katsura 1983, 1984. See n. 1. Cf. Dreyfus 1997: 361; Funayama 2012: 109.} Other scholars remark that the \textit{sāmānyā śaktiḥ} belongs only to conventional existence (\textit{samvṛtisat}), but that \textit{pratiniyatā śaktiḥ} belongs to both conventional existence and ultimate existence (\textit{paramārthasat}).\footnote{Katsura 2012: 22–23 explains that Dharmakīrti classifies two kinds of causal capacity: one is the capacity to produce one’s own cognition, which belongs both to ultimate existence and to conventional existence, and the other is the capacity to fulfill human purpose, which belongs only to conventional existence.} And some attribute this theory to Prajñākaragupta, a commentator on Dharmakīrti’s \textit{Pramāṇavārttika} (PV), and not to Dharmakīrti.\footnote{Katsura 2002 points out that because it was problematic whether a pot, which Dharmakīrti had explained as possessing the two kinds of causal capacity, could be regarded as an ultimate existence, Prajñākaragupta later explained that both of these capacities belong to atoms. According to Bae 2011: 92–93, Dharmakīrti thinks that the \textit{svalakṣaṇa} has a causal capacity and the \textit{sāmānyalakṣaṇa} has the ability to fulfill human purposes. Of these, Prajñākaragupta divides causal capacity into two kinds: common capacity and specific capacity.}

However the following questions arise: How can a jar have a causal capacity if it is regarded as a conceptual construction such as a universal or a continuum? How can conventional existence, such as the whole, have a causal capacity? Does the \textit{sāmānyā śaktiḥ} represent a useful function for the fulfillment of human purposes? Did Dharmakīrti not advocate these two kinds of causal capacity? Previous studies have not yielded sufficient results concerning these matters or, rather, they seem to contain some misunderstandings. The aim of this paper is to clarify the Buddhist theory of the two kinds of causal capacity by rigorously reexamining various materials.

### 2. \textit{Pramāṇavārttika} II 100–102 and commentaries

First of all, we shall examine Dharmakīrti’s PV II 100–102, where the theory of two kinds of causal capacity is presented. In order to prove the transmigration (\textit{saṃsāra}) of living beings against materialists, Dharmakīrti explains that the mind is not crucially dependent on the body. Then, he examines whether the body, which is regarded as the direct cause of the mind by materialists, is a single entity, i.e. the whole (\textit{avayavin}), or an aggregate of many parts. He denies the first alternative by pointing out that the whole never exists distinctly from parts, and concludes that the body is nothing but an aggregate of many parts. Next, he argues that, even if the body is an aggregate of many parts, it cannot be the direct cause of the mind.\footnote{For an outline of PV II, see Inami and Tillemans 1986. On the details of the arguments in PV II 1–102, see my serial studies on PV II.}
objection is raised: “A jar as a whole exists distinctly from its parts, such as color atoms, because people appropriately use genitive expressions such as ‘the color and so on of a jar’ (ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ), which indicates that there are different referents.”

Responding to this objection, Dharmakīrti explains that the atoms constituting a jar have two different kinds of causal capacity.

[1] Without implying the individual causal powers (śaktibhedā) of the color and other [atoms that constitute a jar], the word “jar” (ghaṭa) [simply] serves to express the exclusion of those things that are not the cause of their common effects [such as containing water] (tatsamānaphala). Therefore, [despite the fact that a jar is not distinct from its parts, including color atoms,] coreferential expressions such as “a color that is a jar” (rūpaṃ ghaṭaḥ) cannot be used.

[2] The individual causal powers of the [color and other atoms], which have their aggregate (tatsāmānya) [i.e. a jar] as a qualifier (upasarjana), are expressed by [the genitive expression] “the color and so on of a jar” (ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ).

According to Dharmakīrti, when referring to aggregated atoms we use the word “jar” to mean that they can cooperatively produce common effects such as containing water. It...
should be noted that the word \textit{tatsamānaphala} (PV II 100c) is said to mean the effect common to all the constituents of the same jar, but not the effect common to all jars. Dharmakīrti seems to apply the theory of causal complex (\textit{hetusāmagrī}) to this case.

Each constituent atom has an individual causal power or capacity (\textit{saktibheda}) as well. The word “color” is used to define the unique power of the color atoms. Thus, each constituent atom of the same jar has two different kinds of causal capacity: one is the capacity common to all constituent atoms, and the other is the capacity not common to other kinds of atoms.

The word “jar” is used to mean the capacity common to all constituents of the same jar, without implying each individual capacity meant by a word such as “color.” Therefore, we use genitive expressions such as “the color of a jar” (\textit{ghaṭasya rūpam}) and not coreferential expressions such as “*a color that is a jar” (\textit{rūpam ghaṭah}). In this way, Dharmakīrti insists that a genitive expression such as “the color and so on of a jar” (\textit{ghaṭasya rūpādayah}) is used not because two different entities exist, viz. the whole and its parts, but because the parts have two different causal powers. This expression means that the atoms that can cooperatively produce common effects such as containing water also have individual powers, such as the power to produce a visual perception. By the word \textit{tatsāmānaya} (PV II 102b), Dharmakīrti does not mean universals such as “jarness” (\textit{ghaṭatva}), but rather the

11 The word \textit{ghaṭa} in the expression \textit{ghaṭasya rūpādayah} is regarded as a “term for an aggregate” (\textit{samudāyaśabda}). It is also considered a “generic term” (\textit{jāṭisabda}) depending on context. Dharmakīrti explains the difference between \textit{jāṭisabda} and \textit{samudāyaśabda} in PV II 101cd: bhedāś cāyam mato jāṭisamudāyāḥbhidhānayoḥ // [I tentatively adopt this reading of the Sanskrit text of PV II 101cd. See PVmsH 17v1; Ms. B of PVA 40b8.] “This difference [in implication] is found between ‘generic terms’ (\textit{jāṭyabhidhāna}) and ‘terms for aggregate’ (\textit{samudāyabhidhāna}), as well.” In PV II 98–99, Dharmakīrti has already explained the difference in implication between “words for property” (\textit{dharmaśabda}) and “words for property-possessor” (\textit{dharmaśabda}). According to him, the non-coreferential expression \textit{āṅgulyā yogah} (connection of a finger) is made because the property word \textit{yogah} (connection) is conventionally used to mean one property without implying other properties of the finger and its property-possessor, i.e. the finger. On the other hand, the coreferential expression \textit{yuktā ‘ṅgulī} (a connected finger) is made because the property-possessor word \textit{yuktā} (connected) is conventionally used to mean the property-possessor with the implied property of the finger. The same is said of \textit{samudāyaśabda} and \textit{jāṭisabda}. The word \textit{ghaṭa} will be a \textit{samudāyaśabda} in relation to the word that is used to refer to its constituents, such as colors. In this case, it is used to mean the common capacity of the constituents without implying their specific capacities. That is why non-coreferential expressions such as \textit{ghaṭasya rūpādayah} are used. On the other hand, it will be a \textit{jāṭisabda} in relation to the word that is used to refer to a particular jar and in contradistinction to words that are used to refer to other kinds of aggregates, such as trees. In this case, since it implies particulars or other aggregates that have the same capacity, a coreferential expression such as \textit{ghaṭah svavarnah} (a golden jar) can be made appropriately. Then the word \textit{ghaṭa} can also be understood to indicate the capacity of containing water, which is common to all jars. However, it is clear that Dharmakīrti, in the context of refuting the existence of the whole, mentions the capacity of the constituent atoms of the same aggregate. See PVP D44b6–45a5, P50b3–51a3; PVA 98, 25–28; PVV(R) D342a4–5, P195b8–196a2; VNṬV 32,7–12.

12 Dharmakīrti remarks that this explanation is also applicable to other cases. PV II 102d: \textit{vācyo ‘nyo ‘pi diśā ‘nyātā\textasciitilde{}} ‘‘Other [expressions such as ‘fragrance of sandalwood’ (\textit{candanasya gandhaḥ}) should be explained in this manner.’’ Cf. PVP D45b3–4, P51b1–2: \textit{phyogs ‘dis gzhann la’ang brjod par bya} \textit{ia dper na tsandan gyi dri zhes bya ba ‘di la yang l tsandan zhes bya ba’i rdzas cung zad kyang dri la sogs pa las tha dad pa ma yin pa la bu’o} \textit{ia ‘no na ci yin zhe na l dri du ma’i bdag nyid can las tsandan gyi rang bzhin gyi dri gang yin pa des de ltar ston par ‘gyur ro\textasciitilde{}} \textit{ia (Parallel sentences are found in Haribhadra’s \textit{Anekāntajayapātikā.} See AJP II 40,9–11: \textit{eten’i} ‘\textit{candanasya gandha ity atrāpi na candanam nāma gandhavyatiriktam kiñcid dravyam asti l kim tarhī? anekāmakasya gandhasya candanavabhāvo yo}}
commonness between the constituents with regard to cooperatively producing the same single effect. He means the aggregate (samudāya) of the atoms.  

The commentators call these two kinds of causal capacity sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyātā śaktiḥ for example. Devendrabuddhi explains PV II 100 in his Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (PVP) as follows:

[3] The color and other [atoms] have two kinds of causal capacity [viz. the common capacity and the specific capacity]. [Among these, the first one, i.e.] the common [capacity of the atoms] is, for instance, the capacity to [cooperatively] produce a [common] effect, such as containing water, which the color and other atoms forming a jar have. [The second one, i.e.] the specific [capacity] is, for instance, the capacity to [separately] produce a specific effect, such as a visual cognition. … There are many substances [in this world]. [However, when one says the word ghaṭa] it serves to exclude those things which are not the cause of a single effect, such as containing water, e.g. a tree (vrkṣa), among them. Why [is the word ghaṭa used in this manner]? It is because the word ghaṭa is conventionally agreed to mean those atoms which have the causal power to cooperatively produce a single effect [such as containing water]. Intending to say that multiple things [i.e. color and other atoms] have the single [common] capacity [to produce a single effect, such as containing water], one uses the singular word ghaṭaḥ in accordance with conventional agreement. Therefore, the singular word can be used to refer even to multiple things without inconsistency.  

It seems to me that Manorathanandin’s explanation is of doubtful accuracy. PVV(M) 48,4–5 (=Ms 10a7–b1): tattsvamopasarjanā ghatatvasāmānyaviseśītās teṣāṃ rūpaṁśaḥ śaktibhedā rajanādāyaḥ khyāpyānte / Cf. PVP D45a7–b3, P51a6–b1: bum pa’i ni gzugs sogs shes / tha snyad byed pa na ’de’i spyi nye bar byas pa can yin / bum pa’i spyi nye bar byas pa’i byeq brag de’i nus pa’i khyad par gang la yod pa zhes ba bar tshig rnam par sbyar ro // de’i nus pa’i khyad par te / gzugs la sogs pa de dag gi so sor nges pa’i nus pa’i khyad par ci ’dra ba de ’dra ston par byed do // bum pa la sogs pa gsal ba’i khyad par la yod pa can gzugs la sogs pa mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa ’bras bu so sor nges pa can gly bsdag nyid bum pa’i khyad par gyi sgras rnas pa gcod par byed de / chu’dzin la pa sogs pa’i khyad par can gyi rung bzhiin ston par byed ces bya ba’i don to //, PVP(R) D342a7–b1, P196a4–6: bum pa’i gzugs la sogs pa zhes brdar btags pa ’dis ni bum pa’i spyi de khyad par du dmigs kyis ’ger ba gang yin pa’i gzugs la sogs pa de rnam ki nus pa so sor nges pa’i bye brag mig gi rnam par shes pa skyed par byed par ston te // gzugs la sogs pa chu len pa la sogs pa’i dgos pa can zhes bya ba’i tha snyig go //

13 PVP D44b1–5, P50a5–b2: gzugs la sogs pa’i nus pa ni (pa ni D; pa’i P) rnam pa gnyis te / spyi ni’i dper na bum pa’i dhyibs can dag chu la sogs pa’i dzin pa la sogs pa’i ’bras bu byed pa’i nus pa la tsa bu’o // so sor nges pa’i ni dper na mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa’i ’bras bu byed pa’i nus pa lta bu’o ll // so sor nges pa’i ni dper na mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa’i ’bras bu byed pa’i nus pa lta bu’o ll // … rzas da ma yod na yang gzugs la sogs pa de dag gi (gi Corr.; gis DP) chu la sogs pa’i dzin pa la sogs pa’i ’bras bu gcig gang yin pa de’i rgyu ma yin pa shing la sogs pa gang yin pa de’i bzhag pa’i phyir ’jug par ’gyur ro** // ci’i phyir zhe na’i ’bras bu gcig byed par nus par bstan pa’i phyir**** / de ltar brdar byas pa nyid ki phyir ro // gzugs la sogs pa mang po dag la yang la nus pa gcig yod pa de brjod par ’dod pa la la’i rjes su byed pas bum ba zhes bya ba’i tshig gcig la’gal ba yod pa ma yin no // (*Cf. Vibh p. 48, n. 1: dvidhā rūpaṁśaḥ śaktimāḥ sāmānyā yathā ghatāder udakāharānaḥ-janikā? // pratinīayata ca caksurviṇānādijanikā // **Cf. TR 23*,29–25*,1: teṣām eva rūpaṁśāḥ sādharānaṃ yat phalam uda-
Devendrabuddhi distinguishes between the two kinds of causal capacity with the respective terms “the common capacity” (sāmānyā śaktiḥ) and “the specific capacity” (pratiniyatā śaktiḥ). According to him, both of them belong to the color and so on (rūpādi) that constitute a jar, and not to a jar that can be regarded as the whole or as conventional existence. Namely the color atoms that constitute a jar together with other atoms have both the causal capacity common to other constituent atoms and the causal capacity not common to other kinds of constituent atoms. The common capacity is for producing a single effect, such as containing water, cooperatively with other atoms, and therefore it is common to other constituent atoms such as “smell” atoms. On the other hand, the specific capacity is for producing a specific effect, such as visual cognition, and therefore it is not common to other kinds of constituent atoms such as smell atoms.

It is also significant that a singular expression is applicable to a plural referent. The assumption that a word in singular form must reflect its referent’s singularity is denied here. According to Devendrabuddhi, the singular expression ghaṭaḥ can be used to refer to the multiple atoms that can cooperatively produce a single effect. In this respect, the singular form corresponds to the single capacity or to the capacity of producing a single effect, not to a single referent.

Although a number of modern scholars have attributed the theory of two kinds of causal capacity to Prajñākaragupta, it is clear that before Prajñākaragupta, Devendrabuddhi had already explained Dharmakīrti’s theory using the terms sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ.

Next, we turn to Prajñākaragupta’s explanation in his Pramāṇavārttikālāṅkāra (PVA).

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15 The word pratiniyatā śaktiḥ literally means “the causal capacity separately fixed for each [type of cause].”

16 Haribhadra Sūri, in his auto-commentary on AJP, explains the Buddhist theory of two kinds of causality as follows: AJSV 36,24–28: tatra sāmānyā śaktiḥ yathā ghaṭasanniveśinām rūpādiḥ udakā-dyāharanaṇidākāraṇāsaktiḥ, yathā sarvair eva ghaṭair etat kriyate / pratiniyatā tu rūpāniḥ śaktiḥ yathā caṇsurvijñānādīkāraṇāsaktiḥ iti / rūpam hi caṇsurvijñānāmīnaejaṃ, na rasā-dīvijñānum, evam rasādavo ‘pi rasādīvijñāna eveti / According to this passage, he understands that the common capacity of color and so on is the capacity common to all jars. Judging from the context of PV II, it is clear that this is a misunderstanding.
Therefore, a coreferential expression such as “the color and so forth are a jar” (rūpādayo ghaṭaḥ) cannot be used. Thus, intending to define some causal power of the aggregate (samudāyaśakti), we use such an aggregate-word (samudāyaśabda) [like the word “jar”]. … [Then, the following question may be raised:] How is the [non-coreferential] expression “the color and so on of a jar” (rūpādayo ghaṭasya) used? [We answer this as follows: It is used to] mean that each of those things that can cooperatively produce a common effect, i.e. containing water, can separately produce its own specific effect, such as visual cognition.

We should notice that Prajñākaragupta paraphrases the common capacity as “the causal power of the aggregate” (samudāyaśakti) here. This makes it clear that the common capacity is a causal capacity of the aggregated atoms.

As for the pratiniyataḥ śaktiḥ, Śākyabuddhi gives a more detailed explanation in his Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (PVṬ):

[5] The sentence “The specific [capacity] is, for instance, …” [in PVP] can be explained as follows: Color [atoms] can produce [their specific] effect, visual cognition, and smell [atoms] can produce [their specific] effect, olfactory cognition. In the same way, for the other [types of atoms, such as taste atoms, their specific capacity] should be mentioned in accordance with their own cognition.

The pratiniyataḥ śaktiḥ has been understood by scholars to mean a unique power belonging to a certain object, such as a jar, to produce its own particular perception. However, this passage clearly shows that, in the case of a jar, the pratiniyataḥ śaktiḥ is the causal capacity that is separately fixed for each type of cause; this belongs to each constituent atom. For example, the color atoms of a jar have the causal capacity of producing a visual sensation, which is separately fixed for the color atoms, and the smell atoms of a jar have the causal capacity of producing an olfactory sensation, which is separately fixed for the smell atoms.

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17 As pointed out by Katsura 2002: 270, Prajñākaragupta additionally remarks that expressions such as rūpādayaḥ ghaṭaḥ and rūpādīnāṃ ghaṭaḥ are accepted by people who have learned the Buddhist system of knowledge and have arrived at correct understandings, but not by ordinary people who blindly follow other systems of knowledge. According to Prajñākaragupta, someone who has learned the Buddhist theory will be convinced that a jar is nothing but the color and other atoms that have the causal capacity of producing their common effect, such as containing water, or that a jar is the color atoms and so on, which are arranged in a specific shape to produce such an effect. See PVA 98,17–21.

18 PVṬ D110b6–7, P135a7–8: so sor nges pa ni dper na mig gi rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba la sog pa la / gzugs ni ‘bras bu mig gi rnam par shes pa byed par nus pa yin pa la / dri ni sna’i rnam par shes pa byed par nus pa yin no // de bzhin du gzhon day gi (g Corc.; gis DP) yang rang gi rnam par shes pa la ltos (llos D; bllos P) nas brjod par bya’o //
Accordingly, the term *pratiniyatā śaktiḥ* is used from the viewpoint that these different roles are performed by different constituents of the same aggregate.\(^{20}\)

The above examination of the commentaries makes it clear that in PV II 100–102, Dharmakīrti introduced the theory of two kinds of causal capacity to account for non-coreferential expressions such as *ghaṭasya rūpādayaḥ* (the color and so on of a jar) without admitting the existence of a whole. Dharmakīrti believes that these two words are used to refer to the two different types of causal capacity, of which both belong to the aggregated atoms. Namely, the word *ghaṭa* (jar) is used to mean their common capacity, and the word *rūpādi* (color and such) is used to mean their specific capacities. The non-coreferential expression can be made because the word *ghaṭa* simply means the common capacity without implying any specific capacity. And besides, the singular word *ghaṭasya* can be used to refer to the multiple aggregated atoms because they commonly have a single effect.

### 3. Dharmakīrti’s other works

Next, we will examine whether this concept of two kinds of causal capacity is found in Dharmakīrti’s other works. I would like to show here that there are several passages related to this concept.

When discussing the relationship between words and the causal capacity of objects in PV I and in his auto-commentary (PVSV), Dharmakīrti explicates the causal capacities of the respective causes and their complex.\(^{21}\) He explains that the reason why a single word is applied to a plural referent is because manifold things share the capacity of producing a single effect. According to him, someone who wants to simplify one’s practical action can collectively designate such manifold things by using a single word in conformity with verbal conventions.\(^{22}\) Dharmakīrti classifies such manifold things as one of three types: 1) aggregate (*samūha*), 2) continuum (*santāna*), and 3) a particular state (*avasthāviśeṣa*).\(^{23}\)

Of these, he illustrates the case of an aggregate using the example of a jar as follows:

> [6] In the case where an entire set of causes produces some single effect [e.g. containing water], a worldly person, who thinks that there is no use to express

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\(^{20}\) The specific capacity of a color atom is often explained by commentators to be the causal capacity to produce visual sensation. However, in explaining the specific capacity of a color atom, a few commentators refer to the causal capacity for coloring things such as clothes. Cf. PVV(M) 47,12: *ghaṭavyapadeśabhājīmān rūpādinām avāntara-rañjanādiśaktibhedānām anākṣepaṇa ...*; PVV(M) 48,5–6: ... *tēṣāṁ rūpādinām saktihedā rañjanādāyata khyāpyante* / ghaṭavyapadeśaviśayasya samudāyāntaṃ rañjanakṣamarūpaṃ niṣkṛṣyocyata ity arthāḥ /; TSP ad TS 323: *vividhāḥ nānāprakārāḥ arthakriyāḥ* rūpādinām paryayānām samānāsāmānābhedaḥ tatra samānā jañalamāraṇādilakṣanāḥ asamānā vastrarāgalokanādi-jñānātārakṣanāḥ ...; HBṬ 98,22–23: ghaṭenodakāharaṇaṃ kriyate, rūpādibhiḥ punar vastraraṅga* (Corr.; vasturāga S) iti kāryabhedah / It has been explained by modern scholars that specific capacity means the causal capacity to produce sense perception. However, this is not strictly true. The capacity to produce sense perception must be understood as a typical example of the specific capacity.


\(^{22}\) See PV I 137–138; 141–142.

\(^{23}\) As is well known, these three were argued as being non-existent by Dignāga in his Qu yin jia she lun (取因假設論 *Upādānopādāyaprajñānaptiśāstra*). See Ui 1958.
the differences among them because all of them have no difference in this respect, uses a single word, e.g. “jar” (ghaṭa), to refer to all of them at once. Though they are all [ultimately] distinct from their respective homologues and heterologues, [we conventionally consider] there to be no difference among them for the reason that, in terms of their causing that single effect, they are equally differentiated from others [that do not contribute to the production of that effect]. Therefore, all of them are understood by the single word “jar” without distinguishing one from another.24

[7] [Question: If you insist that a jar is nothing but an aggregate of color and other atoms and reject that a jar as the whole (avayavin) exists distinctly from its parts, how do you explain a non-coreferential expression such as “the color and so on of a jar” (ghaṭasya rūpādayāḥ)? Answer:] In that case, even if the genitive expression “the color and so on of a jar” is used, [it does not indicate that a jar exists distinctly from color and so on]. It simply means that the color and other [atoms together] have the nature of a jar. In other words, this means that [the color and other atoms] can [cooperatively] produce a [single] effect such as “a specific way of containing water” (udakadhāraṇaviśeṣa).25 Those [atoms] are known to have the nature to produce an effect [e.g. visual sensation] common (sāmānyakārya) to other atoms of the same kind, and are established by the words “the color and so on” (rūpādi) as well. Such things are meant by the words “the color and so on of a jar” (ghaṭasya rūpādayāḥ). However, in the case [of the word ghaṭa], distinctly [from the color and other atoms], there does not exist any substance [such as a whole] having characteristics just as you described them, because such a substance cannot be perceived at all. Moreover, the reason why the singular word ghaṭaḥ is used [for a plurality of things] is because it refers to their capability of cooperatively producing a single effect [such as containing water], or, rather, just because it depends on the verbal convention (saṃketa).26

24 PVSV 68, 7–13: ye samastāḥ kimcid ekam kāryam kurvanti teśām tatra viśeṣābhāvād apārthikā višeṣacodaneti sakṛt sarvesām niyojanārtham ekam ayaṁ lokāḥ śabdam teṣu niyakte ghaṭa iti l te ‘pi sajātīyād anyataś ca bhedāviśeṣe ‘pi tatprayaṇāṅgaṇātayā tadanye bhidayante ity abhedāt tato višeṣena pratīyante /

25 It should be noted that the example of common capacity is expressed by the word udakāhāraṇaviśeṣādi-. “Containing water” regarded as the effect means a specified effect, not a general one. Namely, the common capacity is, for example, a certain jar’s capacity for containing water in its particular way, but not the capacity to contain water which is common to all jars. It is clear that, in this respect, the understandings of modern scholars should be corrected. Haribhadra Sūri, a Jaina philosopher, made a similar misunderstanding. See n. 15. The expression with the word višeṣa is also found in the commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s works. See VNTV 25,27–28: bhavāḥ rūpānabhaṇja-rasasparśā udakadhāraṇaviśeṣādi-kāryavarttanasaṃkarthaviśeṣaḥ / PVA 98,21: yatah saṁniveseṣeṣaḥ udakadhāraṇaviśeṣaḥ /

26 PVSV 68, 13–18: tatra ghaṭasya rūpādayo iti api ghaṭasvabhāvāḥ rūpādaya udakadhāraṇaviśeṣādi-kāryasamartāḥ iti yāvat / sāmānyakāryasvabhāvahānarasiddhātmanāḥ rūpādiśabdaḥ prasiddhāḥ višeṣakārya-sādhanāḥ višeṣeṇa višeṣās a evam ucyante / na punar atrānyat kimcid yathāvarṇi-
A jar should be regarded as a complex of multiple atoms, and not as a single whole. Each of the constituent atoms of the jar is differentiated from its respective homologues and heterologues. However, the atoms are all equally differentiated from atoms that are not constituents of the jar, in respect to their contributions to the production of the same single effect. Therefore, the constituent atoms are conventionally regarded as non-different, and are referred to by the single word “jar.”

Moreover, the word rūpādayah (the color and so on) refers to those atoms that have different causal powers to produce their specific effects, such as visual perception. These causal powers are common to other atoms that are not constituents of the jar. But in the expression ghaṭasya rūpādayah, the atoms are identified by the specification indicating that they can produce another effect, e.g. containing water, and the atoms that are meant are those which are the constituent atoms of a jar.

It should be noted that Dharmakīrti mentions here another reason why the singular word ghaṭaḥ is used. He adds that the usage of words is dependent on verbal conventions. This solution seems preferable to him. In this respect, it is not absolute that words correspond to the causal capacity of objects. This point will be examined again below.

The theory of the two kinds of causal capacity is clearly found in these passages of PVSV. There, unlike what we find in PV II, an effect such as visual cognition is regarded as a common effect (sāmānyakārya) in that it is common to atoms of the same kind that do not constitute the jar, and an effect such as “containing water” is regarded as a specific effect (viśiṣṭakārya) in that it is not common to other atoms that do not constitute the jar. However, what he intends to explain here is the same as in PV II.

In the Hetubindu (HB), Dharmakīrti illustrates the two different aspects of causal capacity using the example of the production of a jar. It should be noted that here he argues about the causes of the production of a jar, viz. a lump of clay, a potter, strings, etc., and not about the constituents of a jar, such as the color atoms.

[8] [Objection:] If a single effect [i.e. a visual sensation] is produced by the cooperative causes, viz. a visual organ and so on, each of which is differentiated from others in its essence, then effects would not differ in accordance with the difference of the cause. [Answer:] There is no such fault, because the specific features effectuated by the contribution of causes cannot be mixed together since the causes differ amongst themselves according to their respective essences and separately contribute to different features of the [effect].
For example, a jar, made by some cooperative causal factors, viz. a lump of clay, a potter, strings, etc., has [the following different features given by them]: [Firstly, the jar has] the essential feature [of being made of clay], by which it is differentiated from non-clay things such as trees. This feature is given by its material cause, i.e. a lump of clay. [Secondly,] the jar, a product of clay, has another essential feature, a certain characteristic form, by which it is differentiated from other [products of clay]. This second feature is given by its maker, i.e. the potter. [Thirdly,] the jar, which is a product of clay and has a characteristic form, has still another essential feature by which it is differentiated from other clay things having a characteristic form, such as a jar made with a potter’s wheel. This third feature is given by its instrumental cause, i.e. the strings. In this way, [there is no confusion of effects]. The essential feature of being made of clay is [given by the clay], not by the potter. The essential feature of a characteristic form is [given by the potter], not by the clay. Moreover, although the scope or range of the specific efficiencies of these two, i.e. clay and a potter, are different from each other, a certain individual thing affected by them, i.e. a certain jar, is [identical, but] not different in its essence. For if it were not identical, a specific form and clay [of the same jar] would not appear together because they would be essentially different from each other.28

A jar is produced by the contribution of causal factors, viz. a lump of clay, a potter, strings, etc. Each of them contributes to the production of the same jar in one way or another. In this respect, they all have the same single effect. However, each causal factor has its own scope or range as well. For example, a lump of clay contributes to the jar’s feature of being made of clay. The potter contributes to the jar’s feature of a specific form. In this respect, every causal factor has its own specific effect as well. Thus, in the case of a causal complex, every cause has two aspects: one is that it produces the same single effect cooperatively with others, and another is that it produces its own specific effect. These two aspects are also illustrated using the example of a visual perception.29

Here Dharmakīrti explains that, in the case of a causal complex, each cause has two kinds of capacity. This is close to the explanation that each constituent atom of a jar has two kinds of causal capacity, or rather his explanation of atoms’ two kinds of causal capacity is based on his theory of causal complexes. It is clear that he regards aggregated atoms as a kind of causal complex.

The common capacity of aggregated atoms is explained in the Vādanyāya (VN) as follows:

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28 HB 9, 13–10, 4: bhinnasvabhāvebhyāḥ caḥsarāḥbhāḥ sakṣurāḥbhāḥ sahakāriḥbhāḥ ekakāriṣṭaśc na kāraṇabhādā kāryabhādah syād iti cet, na yathāsvaṃ svabhāvabhādāna tadviśeṣopayogatas tadayogakāryavabhāvāviśeṣāsanākarāt, yathā mṛtplibālakālasūtrāsaṅkarāt, yathā mṛtpiṇḍād amṛtsvabhāvebhyo vṛksādhibhyo bhinnah svabhāvah kalādā tasya eva mṛdāmanah sataḥ samsthānaviśeṣāsāyād tadyayebhyo bhinnah sūtāt tasya eva mṛtsaṃsthānaviśeṣāsāyād cakrāner viśeṣabhedo 'pi tajjanīta-viśeṣabhedasya kāryasya svabhāvabhedaḥ; tad evam na kalādā mṛtsvabhāvatā, na mṛdaḥ samsthānaviśeṣaḥ; na ca tayoḥ saktiviśeṣavaisya dhādati tayoḥ viśeṣaḥ vṛkṣādhibhyo bhinnah svabhāvo bhavati; tad evam na kalādā mṛtsvabhāvatā, na mṛdaḥ samsthānaviśeṣaḥ; na ca tayoḥ saktiviśeṣavaisya dhādati tayoḥ aparapiṣṭhānaviśeṣaḥ kāryasya svabhāvabhādā, mṛtsaṃsthānāyor apratibhāvasaṃsthānaviśeṣaḥ / This passage is examined and translated in Katsura 1983: 104–105.

Moreover, only the multiple [atoms], including color [atoms], that cooperatively produce a single effect [e.g. containing water] should be referred to by the single word ghaṭaḥ. There is no need to assume an object other [than the atoms as being a referent of the word ghaṭa]. This is because even multiple things can produce a single effect, as is seen in the case of visual organs and so on. In that case, if we, referring to multiple things that contribute toward the same purpose collaboratively or separately, use one word in order to express that they are such things, what kind of problem would occur? Because an aggregate word (samudāyaśabda) is used to mean their causal capacity [to produce a single effect], there is no inconsistency in the singular form. The one and the same (eka) causal power belongs to the things that accompany each other, but not to the things that are separate from each other. Therefore, when an aggregate word is used to refer to one aggregate, the singular word ghaṭaḥ is [used for the referent].

The constituents of the same jar operate simultaneously and produce a single effect, such as containing water. All of them contribute to the single effect in one way or another. This type of causal capacity of the constituents is considered similar to the capacity of a causal complex to produce a visual perception. To express that they are such things, one uses the single word ghaṭa in the singular form. It is considered an aggregate word (samudāyaśabda).

The words saha prthag vā are understood in various ways by the commentators. In Viññadeva’s understanding, these words mean the two different kinds of causal capacity, viz. the common capacity and the specific capacity (see VNT D164b3–6, P59b1–4). However, in this understanding, the words prthag vā seem incompatible with the word ekaprayojanāḥ. In contrast, in Śāntarakṣita’s understanding, Dharmakīrti has added the words prthag vā due to his intention of saying that “every” component of a complex contributes to producing a single effect. (See VNT 31,8–30. Here Śāntarakṣita mentions two different understandings and refutes both.) In this understanding, the words seem compatible with the word ekaprayojanāḥ, but Śāntarakṣita dares to ignore the contrasting meanings of the two words, viz. saha and prthag. My tentative understanding is that Dharmakīrti intends to say here that multiple things can collaboratively produce a single effect and can separately contribute to the different features of that single effect.

The word ghaṭa is a jātiśabda (generic term) under certain circumstances. See n. 11. In the Vādanyāya, Dharmakīrti explains that jātiśabda is related to causal capacity as well. The plural word vrkṣāḥ (trees) is used for plural trees to mean the different causal powers of trees for producing different effects, whereas the singular word vrkṣaḥ (a tree) is used for the same trees to mean the causal power of trees for cooperatively producing a single effect. See VN 7,5–7. Śāntarakṣita refers to ekapratyavamarśa as the single effect produced by the plural trees. See VNT 32,17–18.

In the Vādanyāya, while explaining that conceptual cognition and verbal expression cannot establish any real existence of the objects corresponding to them, Dharmakīrti points out that some words are
As we have seen, the theory of two kinds of causal capacity is clearly found in Dharma-kīrti’s works. He consistently argues that each cause of a causal complex has two different kinds of capacity.34

We are now at the stage of evaluating earlier studies. The following points should be made: First, in the case of a jar, the common capacity is the causal capacity of the constituent atoms to produce a single effect cooperatively with each other, but not the causal capacity of the jar, which is common to all jars.35 On the other hand, the specific capacity is the causal capacity of each constituent atom to produce its own specific effect, such as visual perception, but not the causal capacity of the jar to produce its own perception, which is not common to other jars. Second, these two kinds of causal capacity both belong to the same element of a complex, for example, in the case of a jar, to the same constituent atoms, such as the color atoms. Therefore, it is not incorrect to say that these two belong to the respective things. Third, when discussing the expression “the color and so on of a jar,” Dharmakīrti introduces the theory of two kinds of causal capacity in order to explain the usage of such expressions without admitting a whole. Therefore, he can never say that a common capacity belongs to a conventional existent (samvṛtisat), such as a whole. Fourth, it has been reported that whereas a specific capacity belongs to real things,

34 Haribhadra Sūri attributes the theory to “ancient masters” (pūrvācārya). See n. 13. According to his auto-commentary, the expression “ancient masters” refers to Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, and so forth. AJPSV Vol. II, 36,23: … pūrvācāryaiḥ dharmapāladharmakīrtiyādibhiḥ … Mikogami (1978: 3, 1979: 81–82) refers to the relevant passage of the Cheng Weishi Lun. However, it seems to me that this passage is irrelevant to this theory. After Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla deal with the theory of two kinds of causal capacity in criticizing the Jaina view of the two aspects of ātman, viz., ādraya (substance) and paryāya (mode). See TS 323; TSP 154,6–1. (Cf. HBT 98,14–102,18.) There, Kamalaśīla explains that aggregated atoms have two different causal powers: the causal power to cooperatively produce a common effect such as containing water, and the causal powers to separately produce different effects such as coloring clothes. It is noted that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla use the word arthakriyā here. In this context this word seems to be used simply to mean “producing effect.” See Inami 2014: Appendix I.

35 The capacity of multiple things to cooperatively produce a single effect should be rigorously distinguished from their capacity to produce similar effects separately. The resemblance of the different effects is conceptually constructed. (Cf. PVSV 56,12–14: yad api udakāharanādikam ekam ghatūdikāryam tad api pratidravyam bhedād bhidyata eveti naikam bhedānāṃ kāryam asti l) Of course we may think, as Dharmakīrti explains in PVSV, that the different effects can produce a single result, i.e. “a single comprehensive judgement” (ekapratyavamarśa), namely, that there is no difference among them. (Cf. PVSV 57,1–3: tad api pratidravyam bhidyamānam api prakṛtyakapratyavamarśasyābhedāvaskandino hetur bhavad abhinam khyātī l) However, as long as the single effect is the judgement that there is no difference among them, non-difference is judged by the conceptual cognition. Thus Dharmakīrti mentions that each effect appears as if it were not different from other effects (abhinam khyātī). The concept of ekapratyavamarśa is introduced to interpret the commonality or identity of different things by pointing out that they have a common single effect (ekakaryatā). But it should be noted that the single effect, ekapratyavamarśa, is in itself the conceptual judgement of identity. In addition, the term ekapratyavamarśa has been understood by some scholars to mean “a judgement of sameness.” But eka- does not mean “sameness,” but instead means “single” or “one and the same.” Here Dharmakīrti intends to say that different things produce a single effect.
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viz. particulars (svalakṣaṇa), momentary things (kṣaṇa) and so on, a common capacity belongs to conceptually constructed things, viz. common characteristics or universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), the continuum (santāna) and so on. However, it is clear that these both belong to real things. Conceptual construction does not have any causal capacity. Fifth, the “fulfillment of a human’s purpose,” which is reported to be the meaning of the word arthakriyā, is not mentioned in Dharmakīrti’s explanation of common capacity. Common capacity and specific capacity are both causal capacities to produce an effect.

4. Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya (-vṛtti) I 4cd

As is shown above, the specific capacity (pratiniyatā śaktiḥ) is, for instance, the causal power of the color atoms of a jar to produce a visual perception, or the causal power of the smell atoms of the same jar to produce an olfactory perception. However, the single atom or the atoms separately situated can never produce a sense perception. Only when gathered together can homologous atoms produce sensations, which is their single effect. Hence, in this respect, an atom’s capacity for producing a sense perception collaboratively with other homologous atoms can be regarded as a kind of common capacity (sāmānyā śaktiḥ).

As is well known, such commonness or similarity of the aggregated atoms is referred to by Dignāga in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and in his auto-commentary (PS(V)). He defines perception as cognition that is free from conceptualization and insists that its object is the particular (svalakṣaṇa). This leads to the following two questions: (1) Why is sense perception, which grasps aggregated atoms as one, free from conceptualization? (2) Why is it stated in the Abhidharma treatise that sense perceptions do not have particulars

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36 A continuum does not have any capacity to produce an effect because it is nothing but a conceptual construction. Of momentary elements arising in a series, the element immediately before its effect, affected by the preceding elements, is regarded as producing the effect. Or, rather, all momentary elements arising in a series are thought to contribute to producing a single effect. In the latter case, the multiple momentary elements arising in a series share the ability of producing a single effect. This leads us to understand that these momentary elements also can be regarded as a kind of causal complex. They are, so to speak, a complex of the multiple causes situated in different times. Such different momentary elements share a commonality in that they collaboratively produce a single effect, not that the effects of momentary elements resemble each other. The resemblance of different things is due to a conceptual judgement. It should be added that the momentary elements arising in a series have a commonality in that they all are based on the same single cause or on the same single complex of causes. Dharmakīrti explains that the momentary rice plants arising in a series share a commonality in that all of them are dependent on the same single seed, and therefore they are mentioned in a single word śāli (a rice plant) in accordance with the verbal convention. Thus, many different things can have a commonality, either in their having a single common effect (ekakāryatā) or in their having the same single complex of causes (ekasāmāgryadhīnatva). This is also true for the commonality of spatially different things. But, care must be taken not to conclude that Buddhists regard united things as a single entity. They do not mean that multiple things can be regarded as a single entity, but simply that such multiple things have a single effect or a single cause. Cf. PVSV 68, 18–21: tathā ye hetuphalavīśesabhūtāḥ kimcid ekam sādhayanti sādhyan te te ’pi sakṛt pratrayārtham virhāyidesabhalī kṛtasamaketāḥ kathyanta iti pūrvavad vācyam //; PVA 188,7: ekasāmāgryadhīnatvat sanudāyupakalpane / ekakāryatvayogena yatra taretī kalpanā //
as their object with respect to the particular characteristics of the substantial elements (dravyasvalakṣaṇa)?

[10] [Objection:] If you insist that aggregated atoms are not conceptually accepted as one by perception, then why is it stated [in the Abhidharma treatise] that five groups of sensation have aggregated [atoms] as their objects? And besides, why is it stated [in the Abhidharma treatise] that these [groups of sensation] have particulars as their object with respect to the particular characteristics of the sense spheres (āyatanasvalakṣaṇa), but not to the particular characteristic of the substantial elements (dravyasvalakṣaṇa)? [Answer:]

In the [above Abhidharma passages], [perception that is directed] toward its particular object [in respect to the particular characteristic of the sense sphere] is stated to have a sāmānyā as its object [with respect to the particular characteristic of the substantial elements], because it is produced by many substantial elements [i.e. atoms]. (4cd)

[Perception that occurs] in its own sense sphere is stated to have a sāmānyā as its object [with respect to the particular characteristic of the substantial elements], because it is produced by many substantial elements [i.e. atoms], but not because the different [atoms] are conceptually accepted as non-different from each other.

Answering the two questions, Dignāga explains that sense perception is produced by multiple atoms. According to him, sense perception is said to have aggregated atoms as its object not because it conceptually grasps aggregated atoms as one, but because it is produced by the aggregated atoms. Therefore, it is free from conceptualization. Moreover,

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37 Cf. AKBh¹ 7,20–21 = AKBh² 7,22–24 ad AK I 10d: *nanu caivaṃ samastālambanatvāt sāmānyāvisayāḥ pañca vijnānakāyāḥ priṇupunti na svalakṣaṇavisayāḥ / āyatanasvalakṣaṇam praty ete svalakṣaṇavisayāḥ iyānte na dravyasvalakṣaṇam ity adosāḥ /; Vibhāṣā 655a26–b7: 阇十一觸中極多緣幾發生身識。有作是説、一一別緣發生身識、以十一種相用増故。有餘師言、極多緣五發生身識、謂四大種滑等隨一。復有說者、總緣十一、亦生身識。問豈不五識取自相境耶。答自相有二種、一事自相、二處自相。依事自相説緣十一種緣身緣自相。依處自相説緣五識身取自相境。是故無過。如是説者、緣十一事亦生身識。如緣色處二十種事亦、生眼識。此亦應爾。故五識身遇緣締別而無五識取自相過。多事自相一識能緣然不明了。; 65a12–15: 問雲何身識緣共相境以五識身緣自相故。答自相有二種、一事自相、二處自相。依事自相説緣十一種緣身緣自相。依處自相説緣五識身取自相境。是故無過。如是説者、緣十一事亦生身識。如緣色處二十種事亦、生眼識。此亦應爾。故五識身遇緣締別而無五識取自相過。多事自相一識能緣然不明了。; 65a12–15: 問雲何身識緣共相境以五識身緣自相。答自相有二種、一事自相、二處自相。依事自相説緣十一種緣身緣自相。依處自相説緣五識身取自相境。如依處自相説則五識唯緣自相。如依處自相説則五識唯緣自相。See Sakurabe 1969: 154.

38 PS(V) I 4cd: *katham tarhi sañcitālambanāḥ pañca vijñānakāyāḥ yadi tad ekato na vikalpayanti / yac āyatanasvalakṣaṇam praty ete svalakṣaṇavisayā na dravyasvalakṣaṇam iti / tatrānekārthajanyatvāt svārthe sāmānyagocaram // 4 // aneka dravyotpādyatvāt tat svāyate sāmānyavisayaṃ uktam, na tu bhinnesv abhedalakṣanat / Dharmakirti explains this passage of PS(V) as follows: “Owing to the connection with other things, [i.e., other atoms], atoms that are different [from their own previous moments] arise. They are said to be ‘aggregated’ (sañcita). They are causes of the production of [sensual] cognition [unlike previous ones]. Such a special characteristic of the atoms does not occur with other atoms [connected with them]. Therefore, since the object is not limited to a single [atom], [but rather to aggregated atoms], the perceptual cognition is said to have a universal [in the sense of aggregated atoms] as its object.” (PV III 194–196.) Cf. PST 44,12–45,5; PST 45,11–1. See Hattori 1968: 26–27, 88–91; Tosaki 1979: 294–298; Dunne 2004: 98–113; Chu 2008: 212–215; Yoshida 2011: 152–156, etc.
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its object is said to be *sāmānya* in respect to *dravyasvalakṣaṇa*, not because it has a conceptualized object, but because it is produced by aggregated atoms rather than by a single atom.

The idea that multiple things cooperatively produce a single effect is basically the same as the idea of *sāmānyā śaktiḥ*. Consequently, it is reasonable to suppose that the atom’s efficiency in producing a sense perception collaboratively with other homologous atoms can be regarded as a kind of common capacity.

It should be noted that the aggregated atoms that produce a single sense perception are called *sāmānya* here. The word means neither universals nor commonness in this context. It is being used in a similar fashion as is the word *sāmānya* in the compound *tatsāmānya* (PV II 102b. See [2]). The aggregated atoms themselves that commonly have the *sāmānya śaktiḥ* can also be called *sāmānya*.

Moreover, it is significant that Dignāga refers here to two kinds of particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*): particulars concerning the sense spheres (*āyatanasvalakṣaṇa*) and particulars concerning substantial elements (*dravyasvalakṣaṇa*). The aggregated atoms are regarded as *svalakṣaṇa* with respect to the former, and as *sāmānya*, which as mentioned above means “aggregate,” with respect to the latter. The aggregated atoms have two different aspects. In the first aspect, for example, the color atoms are differentiated from other types of atoms such as smell atoms. The color atoms never produce olfactory sensations. The ability of the aggregated atoms is limited and separately defined in each type. This ability is nothing but the specific capacity (*pratiniyatā śaktiḥ*) mentioned by later Buddhists. On the other hand, in the second aspect, the aggregated atoms are differentiated from a single atom that cannot produce any sense perception by itself. This group’s ability of cooperatively producing a single effect can be regarded as a kind of common capacity, as mentioned above. In this way, Dignāga’s idea that the aggregate becomes the object of sense perception can be interpreted in relation to the theory of two kinds of causal capacity. However, he does not directly mention the two different kinds of causal capacity of atoms. We can safely say that the groundwork for the theory of the two kinds of causal capacity was prepared by Dignāga.

In fact, Dharmakīrti’s argument concerning the two kinds of causal capacity in PV II arises in the context of the explanation that aggregated atoms have special features for producing their own cognition, unlike a single atom or atoms that are situated separately.

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39 In Tibetan logic, the word *spyi* is considered to have three different meanings: 1) *tshogs spyi*, 2) *rigs spyi*, and 3) *don spyi*. Of these, 1) *tshogs spyi* seems to be related to the aggregate called *sāmānya* by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. See Dreyfus 1997: 107–109.

40 Jinendrabuddhi (and perhaps Dignāga as well) regards a single atom as *dravyasvalakṣaṇa*, unlike Yaśomitra, who explains that the *dravyasvalakṣaṇa* means, for example, specific colors, such as blue. See PST 45,14–46,3; AKV 28,10–16.

41 Before Dignāga, it was debated in the Abhidharma tradition whether multiple things can be perceived at once through a single cognition. See Vibhāṣā 63c22–25; 64a11–25. Dignāga insists in this respect that aggregated atoms are grasped at once through a single perception. Following Dignāga’s insistence, Dharmakīrti holds that even different aggregates of atoms are grasped through a single cognition. Not only color atoms of the same kind (e.g. blue atoms) are grasped through a single cognition, but also color atoms of different kinds (e.g. blue, yellow and red atoms). This is how Dharmakīrti develops his argument of *citrādvaita* in PV III.

The theory of causal complex, according to which multiple things can cooperatively produce a single effect, seems to be one of the most important foundations for his epistemology and ontology.

5. Is causal capacity absolute?

As we have seen above, Dharmakīrti additionally remarks in P VS V (7) that the usage of words is dependent on verbal conventions. Judging from this, it is not absolute that words must correspond to the causal capacity of objects. There are similar comments in his other works. For example, in the Vādanyāya, after explaining the correspondence between words and causal powers, Dharmakīrti states the following:

[11] However, we [Buddhists] never stick to [our explanation of the relationship between words and causal powers] because [words simply] operate to denote or connote their objects fixed by a verbal convention as the verbal convention governs.

This passage clearly shows that Dharmakīrti does not overly stress his theory of two kinds of causal capacity. It is not absolute for him. He ultimately thinks that words are dependent only on verbal conventions.44

In PV I and P VS V Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the relationship between words and objects is not intrinsic but extrinsic because it is based only on the verbal conventions established by humans. According to him, the different forms of words do not have any relation to external objects. For example, the words dārāḥ (pl., wife), ṣaṇṇagarī (sg., six cities) and so on do not correspond to their referents in number.45 Dharmakīrti also makes a sarcastic comment about the false view that words are strongly connected to external objects as follows:

[12] Words, which can produce no appearance of external things and which can merely be causes of conceptual cognition in accordance with preceding repeated experiences, operate to denote or connote objects, depending only on human intentions. Nevertheless, [some linguists and philosophers seriously] consider the application of words to objects, and determine real things separately in accordance with words. They just display their own ignorance.46

43 VN 7, 8–9: asmākan tu sāṃketikesy artheṣu sāṃketavāśād vṛttir ity anabhinīveśa eva / 44 See VNṬV 32.25–26: sāṃketavaśāc chadbānām bahuvacanānāṁ dārāḥ sikatāḥ pādā gurava ityādīnaṁ 'saty api bhūtasya vṛttīḥ | tathā saty api anekatve ṣaṇṇagarī śaṭpūlī vanam ityādīnakāvacanānāṁ vṛttir ity anabhinīveśa eva | ko hi nāma sacetanāḥ puruṣābhāpūramātārdhānaṃ vṛttīṣu šabdān abhinīveśaṃ kartum utsahata iti bhāvah / Cf. PV IV 116a–c: saṃketasaṃśrayāḥ śabdāḥ sa ca icchāmātrasaṃśrayah / nāsiddhiḥ śabdasiddhānām… 45 See PV I 67: dārāḥ ṣaṇṇagarīyādau bhedābhādavyavasthiteḥ / khasya svabhāvah khatvaṃ cety atra vā kim nibandhanam / 46 PVSV 36, 9–12; vācyeṣu puruṣāyattvāt vṛttīṇām śabdānām avastusamdarśīnāṁ yathābhāyāsaṃ vikalpa-prabhodhahetūnāṁ pravṛtticintā tadvāśād vastuvyavasthāpanaṁ ca kevalaṁ jādyakhāyāpanam /
In the ultimate sense, words themselves do not have any direct relation to external objects. Words can be used to denote or connote objects and are dependent only on the speaker’s will. Words can also produce no appearance of external things. Nevertheless, many thinkers attempt to find the applications of words in external objects, and to determine external objects in accordance with words. According to Dharmakīrti, they should feel deep regret for their follies. Interestingly, in this context, he presents the objection that a singular word can be used to refer to multiple things because it signifies their causal capacity to produce one and the same effect. He refutes this objection by pointing out that capacity never exists apart from real being.

We should notice that what is refuted by Dharmakīrti here is exactly the same as his own theory of sāmānyā śaktiḥ. Here he has turned around and is criticizing the causal capacity. According to this passage, causal capacity never exists in reality, it can only be a conceptual construction. Dharmakīrti denies the realistic view of causal capacity. This reminds us of the fact that he denies causal capacity from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth in PV III.

The theory of two kinds of causal capacity cannot ultimately contribute to satisfactorily explaining the application of words to referents. It is only used as a conventional theory for the philosophical argument. Dharmakīrti presents his argument only by tentatively

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47 A similar argument is found in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha. TS 570: ṣaṣṭhīvacanabhedādi vivakṣamātrasamphavī tato na yuktā vastūnāṃ tatsvarūpavyavasthitāḥ // See Inami 2014: Appendix II.

48 Prajñākaragupta also argues that there is no exact correspondence between words and external objects, pointing out that every language has inconsistencies in grammatical rules. Furthermore, he severely criticizes those who insist that Sanskrit is the only perfect language. Cf. PV A 99,3–12. See Inami 2014: note 22.

49 PVSV 37, 9–14: tathābhūtānāṃ kvacid arthe ’bhinnā śaktir asti sā nimittaṃ iti cet / na / śakter vasturatīṣṭvatirekāḥ / vyatireke vānapakārasya pārātantrītyāgogāḥ / upakāre vā śaktyupakārīṇāḥ api śakter vyatireka ity anavasthitāḥ apratipatīti / tadavyatireke vā ādyāvān api prasāṅga iti yat kimcid etat /

50 As is well known, Dharmakīrti denies the realistic view of the relation in the same manner in Sambandhaparikṣā. See SP vv. 4–5.

accepting that words have some relation to the external world. From the viewpoint of the ultimate truth, he holds that how words are used depends merely on verbal conventions established by humans and never reflects reality. Furthermore, he rejects the realistic view of causal capacity. Several concepts are introduced to explain worldly affairs and these concepts have some consistency. However, they are just conceptual constructions and are not absolute. We should not adhere to them.\footnote{Cf. PV III 209: \textit{idam vastubalāyātaṃ yad vadanti vipaścitaḥ / yathā yathā 'rūhāś cintyante viśīryante tathā tathā // 209 //}}

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to state the following five points:

1. In the example of a jar, two kinds of causal capacity belong to the constituent atoms of the jar, such as the color atoms, but neither to the jar as a whole (\textit{avayavin}) nor to the jar as a continuum (\textit{santāna}).
2. In the case of the color atoms of the jar, common capacity (\textit{sāmānyā śaktih}) is their causal capacity to produce a single effect, such as containing water, cooperatively with other kinds of atoms of the same jar; specific capacity (\textit{pratiniyatā śaktih}) is their causal capacity to produce their own specific effect, such as visual perception.
3. The capacity of the color atoms to produce a visual perception is regarded as the specific capacity in comparison to other kinds of atoms, such as smell atoms. However, it can be regarded as the common capacity in the sense that only aggregated atoms can have this capacity.
4. The theory of two kinds of causal capacity is advocated by Dharmakīrti throughout his works. The groundwork for this theory was prepared by Dignāga.
5. When discussing the expression “the color and so on of a jar,” Dharmakīrti introduces the theory of two kinds of causal capacity in order to explain the expression without admitting a whole. However, he does not stick exclusively to this theory. He finally abandons the theoretical explanation of the relationship between words and objects and adopts the view that words are just dependent on the verbal conventions established by humans. From the viewpoint of the ultimate truth, causal capacity is also merely a conceptual construction.
Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ


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PVV(R) *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (Ravigupta) ad PV II*, Tibetan translation. D No. 4224; P No. 5726.

Two Kinds of Causal Capacity: *sāmānyā śaktiḥ* and *pratiniyatā śaktiḥ*


**Vibh** Vibhūticandra’s Note to Manorathanandin’s PVV. Sanskrit text edited in the footnotes of the Appendix to the Śāṅkṛtyāyana’s edition of PVV (M).

**Vibhāṣā** Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāstra, Chinese translation (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論). Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (大正新修大藏経), vol. 27, No. 1545.


**VNṬ** Vādanyāyatīkā (Vinītadeva), Tibetan translation. D No. 4240; P No. 5737.


Jñānaśrīmitra on viparyayabādhakapramāṇa

by

Kyo Kano

Introduction

It was really a new attempt when Dharmakīrti introduced sādhyaviparyaye[hetoh]bādha-
kapramāṇa (hereafter VBP) as a methodological device with reference to svabhāvahetu,
especially with respect to the proof of momentariness of all existence, in his logico-
epistemological system.1 Dharmakīrti’s followers discussed the role and logical content of
VBP in the pramāṇa system mainly in the context of the proof of kṣanabhaṅga.

With reference to the theory, several studies have brought into focus its impact on the
whole logico-epistemological theory of later Buddhist logicians.2 Above all Tani, in his
great work, focuses on the relation between VBP and prasaṅgal/prasaṅgaviparyaya and
their roles, and discusses how Dharmakīrti’s followers evaluate them in their proof of
momentariness.3 This theory, in fact, raised new complications with respect to the structure
of the means of valid cognition and its logical and epistemic base.4

One of these complications is the relation between VBP and establishing anvaya-(vyāpti)
as well as vyatireka-(vyāpti). It seems unclear in both traditional and contemporary inter-
pretations whether VBP is valid for establishing either affirmative concomitance (anvaya)
or negative concomitance (vyatireka), or whether it is valid for both at the same time. It is of
course not easy to find a direct answer to this question by an Indian logician. But in an effort
to do so, this paper will begin by focusing on Jñānaśrīmitra’s descriptions of VBP, especially
in the vyatireka section of the Kṣanabhaṅga chapter of the Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali
(JNA). At the beginning of this chapter, an opponent called viparyayabādhakapramāṇānava-
din appears, whose claims are criticized by Jñānaśrīmitra. By analyzing the relevant texts,
we may be able to discern where Jñānaśrīmitra stands on the issue.

As a preliminary observation, it may help us to keep in mind that anvaya-vyāpti and
vyatireka-vyāpti are accepted as logically equivalent, at least by the thinkers after Dharmakīrti.
In the epistemic process, however, we cannot simply presume their equivalence, since

3 Tani’s understanding of the VBP’s interpretations by Dharmakīrti’s followers, such as Dharmottara and
Prajñākaragupta, are scattered throughout his work (1999), but are found in chapter 3 in particular.
4 For instance: First, VBP is sometimes identified with or regarded as being based on vyāpakadharma-
anupalabdhi, at least by Dharmakīrti and some logicians after him. Is VBP an inference based on
vyāpakānumpalabdhi or it cannot necessarily be identified with such an inference? Second, how is VBP
related to prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya? If VBP is different from these, what is the difference
between prasaṅgal/prasaṅgaviparyaya and VBP formally, logically, and content-wise? Or is the latter
the same as the former, especially prasaṅgaviparyaya, since both of them have the same style of proof
formulation. The late Prof. Kajiyama assessed the matter as follows: “I think that Kamalaśīla was quite
right when he identified viparyayabādhakapramāṇa with a prasaṅga. … With Kamalaśīla, I also
regard bādhakapramāṇa as prasaṅga in essence” (Kajiyama 1999: 37). He did not, however, mention
the passage upon which his estimation depends.
it depends on what kind of independent pramāṇa or other subsidiary means of cognition the determination of anvaya or vyatireka is related to or based upon, as will be discussed in the following. We can suppose this is one of the reasons Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti treat them separately in their discussion on the proof of momentariness.

Jñānaśrīmitra’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya consists of three pādas. In the first pāda, pakṣadharmādhikāra, the theme is that in the formula “yat sat tat kṣaṇikaṃ yathā jaladharāḥ, santas tu bhāvā ime” (Whatever is existent is momentary, for instance a rain cloud. And these things are existent. [Therefore, these things are momentary.]), the reason sat/sattva is not “unestablished” (asiddha). In the second pāda, anvayādhikāra, it is not incompatible (viruddha). And in the third pāda, vyatirekādhikāra, which I take up in the following, it is not inconclusive (anaikāntika).

1. The relation between two kinds of pervasion, anvaya and vyatireka

The critique of the viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin in Jñānaśrīmitra’s vyatirekādhikāra begins with the following argument:

(A) There is also no suspicion that [the reason “being existent” might be] inconclusive, because the proof is given based on the pervasion that comprises all [individual instances] (sarvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteḥ).

〈Opponent, i.e., viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin〉 The pervasion is established by virtue of “the means of valid cognition that annuls [the reason] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven]” (viparyayabādhakapramāṇa). Therefore, we do not find any additional information (vārtā) by introducing it (i.e. the pervasion that comprises all individual instances). Then, why do you say that the pervasion is [already] established?

…

〈Opponent〉 In this way, there must only be an affirmative concomitance (anvayamātram). Then, how can we obtain the conclusive exclusion [of the reason] from the dissimilar domain?

〈Jñānaśrīmitra〉 It is because the pervasion is exactly established.

〈Opponent〉 How is the pervasion of the negative exclusion itself established?5

5 JNA p. 60, 3–10: nāpy anaikāntikaśaṅkā, sarvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteḥ prasādhanāt. nanu viparya-yabādhakapramāṇa-vāśād vyāptiśidhīḥ, tasya ca nopanyāsāvārtāt. tat katham vyāptih prasādhītety ucyate? …nau evam anvayamātram astu, vipakṣāt punar ekāntena vyatireka iti katham labhyam iti cet. vyāptiśiddher eva. vyatireke vyāptisiddhīr eva katham iti cet. (Ci’ RNA p. 70, 9–11 and 15–16: na cāyam anaikāntikaḥ, atraiva sādharmyavati drṣṭānte sarvopasaṃhāravatyā vyāpteḥ prasādhänāt. nanu viparyayabādhakapramāṇabālād vyāptiśiddhīḥ, tasya copanyāsavārāpi nāsti. tat katham vyāptih prasādhītieti cet. … nau evam anvayamātram astu, vipakṣāt punar ekāntena vyāyrtitir iti kuto labhyata iti cet. vyāptiśiddhīr eva. vyatirekasandehe vyāptiśiddhīr eva katham iti cet.) [Different readings are in bold font.]
From the description above, we first notice that Jñānaśrīmitra evaluates sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti in the anvya-vyatireka context of their symmetrical roles, while the opponent, viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin, does not. This is one of the crucial points dividing Jñānaśrīmitra’s position from that of the viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin. I will come back to this point again in a later section. Jñānaśrīmitra then formally differentiates and defines the two pervasions, anvayarūpā and vyatirekarūpā.

(B) Jñānaśrīmitra No, the pervasion is in fact of two kinds. One is that which has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (anvayarūpā) and is a property of the subjective element (kartṛdharma). It is the inevitable presence of that which is to be proven in the property-possessor that has the proving [property]. And the other is that which has negative concomitance as its essential characteristic (vyatirekarūpā) and is a property of the objective element (karmadharma). It is the inevitable absence of the proving [property] when that which is to be proven is absent. This is because the following is a sound logic: The pervasion is such that the pervader presents there (i.e., in the pervaded) without fail, or else the pervaded presents only there (i.e., in the pervader).

We do not find any original element in Jñānaśrīmitra’s definition of anvaya-vyāpti and vyatireka-vyāpti except the introduction of the expressions kartṛdharma and karmadharma. As to these terms, taking the sādhana-sādhya relation into consideration, I tentatively interpret kartṛ and karman as corresponding to sādhana and sādhya, respectively. If my understanding is correct, then it follows that Jñānaśrīmitra regards a proof as a kriyā, of which sādhana and sādhya are constituent elements. Then, he refers to the relation between anvaya-vyāpti and vyatireka-vyāpti as follows:

(C) And the establishment of one of these two inevitably (niyamena) hints at the understanding of the second (i.e., the other). This is because otherwise even one of them cannot be established. The practical activity of the valid means of cognition is carried out only directly (sākṣāt) with reference to one [of them], and one can gain an understanding of the other as [logically] immediate (nāntaryakatayā). The expression “one [of the two]” is employed just as far as they are [related to each other in this way]. And in such a case, even if suspicion about one of these two arises before a valid means of cognition of the other functions, the suspicion will be expelled by it afterwards. Just as for those who advocate
“the means of valid cognition that annuls [the reason] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven] (viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin),” affirmative concomitance, even though it is suspected, since the suspicion is expelled by virtue of the conclusive exclusion [of the property] from the dissimilar domain (vipaksād ekāntena vyāvyrtitabalā), concludes that the “being existent,” which never happens at all in [the things] that are not momentary, is really restricted by [the property of] momentary perishing.

Accordingly, there is no difference in content (na kaścid arthato bhedaḥ) between them; viz., the conclusive exclusion of the proving [property] in the absence of [the property] to be proven, and the inevitable concomitance of [the property] to be proven when the proving [property] is present [in the subject of the thesis].

Here Jñānaśrīmitra stresses the incorporation of the understanding of anvaya and vyatireka into the epistemic process. In the last part of the passage cited above, he says that there is no difference in content between them. Here, we must draw attention to the underlined portion. According to Jñānaśrīmitra’s description, the VBP-vādin claims that the suspicion of anvaya can be expelled by the exclusion [of the property] from dissimilar domain. That is, VBP-vādin prioritizes vyatireka over anvaya.

Jñānaśrīmitra then adds:

(D) As to the function (vyāpāra) of the means of valid cognition, however, its practical activity (vyavahāra) is of two kinds, principally (mukhyato) and implicatively (arthataḥ).

On the level of daily performance, however, we find two kinds of practical activities of the valid means of cognition, principally (mukhyato), or directly (sākṣāt), and implicatively (arthataḥ), which follows direct cognition as [logically] immediate (nāntarīyakatayā). For Jñānaśrīmitra, the difference between anvaya and vyatireka is sometimes expressed as arthāpattyā. If one is proven, the other is automatically understood by arthāpatti. That is, either of these two is logically implied in the other. Jñānaśrīmitra’s expression arthataḥ accords with this idea.

9 JNA p. 60, 13–18 and 61, 2–3: *enayoś caikasiddhir niyamena dvitiyapraśītim ākṣipati. anyathā ekasyāpy asiddheḥ.*

10 JNA p. 61, 3–4: pramāṇavyāpāras tu mukhyato ’rthataś ceti dvidhā vyavahāraḥ.

2. sādhakapramāṇa and viparyayabādhakapramāṇa

Then Jñānaśrīmitra presents an argument of sādhaka- and viparyayabādhaka-pramāṇa.

(E) Precisely therefore, in every reasoning, if one seeks “the means of valid cognition that annuls the reverse of that which is to be proven” [and if there is such a means of valid cognition], there is an affirmative concomitance [of the reason] with that which is to be proven, in the case where the proving [property] (i.e., the reason) is present [in the subject of the thesis]. One should know that seeking “the means of valid cognition that establishes [that which is to be proven] (sādhakapramāṇa),” is implied (upalakṣita) by that (i.e., seeking VBP). Furthermore, [when one introduces VBP] both [of these two pramāṇas, namely, sādhakapramāṇa and bādhakapramāṇa,] are really integrated (ubhayasaṃgraha eva) by the term “annulling the reverse” (viparyayabādhaka).12

If we try to prove the pervasion by VBP, we should know that sādhakapramāṇa is implied in VBP, and accordingly, we should know that both pramāṇas are integrated in the concept bādhakapramāṇa. The ubhaya of ubhayasaṃgraha can also be interpreted as anvaya and vyatireka, but it seems more likely that Jñānaśrīmitra regards sādhakapramāṇa as corresponding to anvaya and bādhakapramāṇa to vyatireka. The above-quoted passage, however, throws into question any simple opposition between adopting sādhakapramāṇa and adopting bādhakapramāṇa. Though the two positions are ostensibly opposed, his argument makes little distinction between them. Rather, he seems to take an integrative or synthetic stance toward sādhakapramāṇa(vādin) and viparyayabādhakapramāṇa(vādin), even if he thinks one of them is prior to the other in a particular case. Then, the question arises what kind of pramāṇa is intended by the term sādhakapramāṇa? We can surmise that Jñānaśrīmitra’s answer is given in the subsequent discussion, so let us examine what follows.

3. Two kinds of viparyayabādhakapramāṇa13

Jñānaśrīmitra continues by explaining the latter position:

(F) In fact, with reference to the pervasion that has negative concomitance as its essential characteristic, [there is a means of valid cognition which] annuls the proving [property] in the reverse of that which is to be proven. (In the proof of momentariness, it annuls “being existent” in those that are not momentary.) With reference to [the pervasion] that has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic, on the other hand, it annuls “the reverse of that which is

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12 JNA p. 61, 4–6: ata eva yatra yatra sādhya viparyaye bādhakapramāṇaparyesanā, tatra sādhune sati sādhyānvayaḥ, sādhakapramāṇaparyesanāpi tayopalakṣitā vedītavyā. viparyayabādhakasabdena punar ubhayasaṃgraha eva.

13 At the last Dharmakīrti conference in 2005, Shiraishi drew attention to this passage. Regrettfully, his paper, titled “Jñānaśrīmitra’s two interpretations of bādhakapramāṇa” was not included in the proceedings of the conference, Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis, 2011.
to be proven” [in the proving property] in the case where the proving property is present [in the subject of the thesis]. (anvayarūpāyāṃ tu sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakam sādhane satīti) (It annuls “not being momentary” in those that are existent.) If these two [kinds of VBP] are absent (ubhayābhāve), the inevitable connection of the proving [property] with that which is to be proven would be impossible. The above is intended.\(^{14}\)

According to Jñānaśrīmitra’s understanding, VBP proves not only vyatireka but anvaya as well, that is, it can be introduced in two ways. Furthermore, for anvaya, VBP annuls “the reverse of that which is to be proven” in the proving [property]. This is a new interpretation of the viparyayabādhakapramāṇa.

As is well known, in his Hetubindu, Dharmakīrti first refers to ‘sādhyaviparyayaye hetoḥ bādhakapramāṇa’ as follows:

\[
\text{anvayaniścayo ‘pi svabhāvahetava sādhyadharmaṃ vastutas tadbhāvatavya sādhanadharmaḥbhabhavāntānubhandhasiddhī. sādhyaviparyayaye hetor bādhakapramāṇavṛttiḥ, yathā yat sut tat kṣaṇikam eva, aksaṇikatve ‘rthakriyāvirodhat tallaksanam vastutuṃ hiyate.}^{15}\]

From the description, it is ambiguous whether or not Dharmakīrti was conscious of the relation between ‘sādhyaviparyayaye hetor bādhakapramāṇa’ and the proof of anvavyāpti or vyatireka-vyāpti. It seems that Dharmakīrti introduced ‘sādhyaviparyayaye hetor bādhakapramāṇa’ as a subsidiary method for supporting the establishment of the inevitable connection of anvaya, stated as anvayaniścayo ‘pi, but remained strongly conscious of the logical equality of anvaya and vyatireka, an equality that is presupposed by the relation of the contradiction (virodha) between sādhyā and sādhyā-viparyaya. Logically, it is clear that sādhyaviparyayaye hetor (i.e., sādhanasya) bādhakapramāṇa can be understood as expressing vyatireka, since it proves that where sādhyaviparyaya is present, that is, where sādhyā is absent, hetu is absent.

According to Jñānaśrīmitra’s understanding, however, VBP also annuls “the reverse of that which is to be proven” in the proving [property] (sādhane sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakapramāṇa).\(^{16}\) This is a new interpretation of VBP, based on the interpretation

\(^{14}\) JNA p. 61, 6–8: vyatirekarūpavyāptau hi sādhyaviparyayaye bādhakam sādhunasya, anvayarūpāyāṃ tu sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakam sādhane satīti. tadubhayābhāve sādhanasya sādhyapraitibhandhānupattir ity ayam arthah. Cf. Shiraishi 2005: 6ff.


\(^{16}\) We should also not overlook the expression sādhane satī. The expression is presumably intended for those who claim that pakṣadharmanāt is not necessarily required, such as Ratnakaraśānti. AVS p. 86, 2–4: bādhakāt sādhyasiddhiḥ ced vyartho hetvantaragrahāḥ, bādhakāt tadasiddhiḥ ced vyartho dharmyantaragrahāḥ.
of the compound (viparyayabādhakapramāṇa) as a genitive tatpuruṣa (hereafter VBP₂), which is in contrast to the original interpretation of the compound as a locative tatpuruṣa (hereafter VBP₁). According to Jñānaśrīmitra, at least, VBP₁ annuls the reason “being existent” (i.e., hetos) in “those that are not momentary” (i.e., sādhyaviparyaye). That is, VBP₁ principally or directly proves that if something is not momentary, it is non-existent, namely, vyatireka. It also proves that if a subject of a thesis is existent, it is momentary; that is, it proves anvaya indirectly, because being momentary and not being momentary are contradictory (virodha). In the second new interpretation, however, VBP₂ annuls “being not momentary” (i.e., “the reverse of that which is to be proven”) in that which “is existent” (i.e., the proving property). It proves principally or directly that if a subject of a thesis is existent, it is momentary, that is, anvaya. Therefore, according to his understanding, not only vyatireka but also anvaya can and should be proven by VBP (VBP₁/VBP₂). In the descriptions above, however, we do not concretely find both of these bādhakapramānas, such as vyāpakānupalabdhī introduced by Dharmakīrti and other logicians. Moreover, in the above passage, Jñānaśrīmitra emphasizes not only the logical equivalence of anvaya and vyatireka, but the methodological equivalence of sādhakapramāṇa and bādhakapramāṇa as well. By ubhayābhāve does he indicate that both of these VBPs are necessary? In the next paragraph, he states, “Those who present a proof should seek for both of these (i.e., anvaya and vyatireka) alternatively (vikalpena).” In other words, if one wants to prove a pervasion by VBP, one should introduce not only VBP₁ but also VBP₂, which principally establishes the anvaya relation. It is likely that what he really wants to emphasize is the latter, VBP₂.

He continues:

(G) Otherwise, even though one cannot directly (sākṣāt) obtain the means of valid cognition that determines negative concomitance, if one shows a means of valid cognition that establishes the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance (anvayaniyama) of the proving [property] with that which is to be proven, then what is its (=the proving property’s) inevitable connection with reference to the establishment of that which is to be proven? It is because [the means of valid cognition that establishes the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance] hints at the ability of negative concomitance as well (that is, there is no inevitable connection of affirmative concomitance that is independent from the ability of negative concomitance.)

17 Cf. Steinkellner 1982: 2; 1991: 318. After Dharmakīrti, for instance: HBT p. 44, 24: etac ca bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ vyāpakānupalabdhirūpam uttaratvāvasaraprāptam svayam eva vaksyati, VNT p. 10, 27–28: idam uktam bhavati, vyāpakānupalabdhī eva sahabhāvam bādhate heitoḥ sādhyābhāvena. RNA p. 83, 8: na ca viruddhānākaṃ byākare, vyāpakānupalambhātaṃ viparyaye bādhakapramāṇena vyāpteḥ prasādhanāt. TBh(M) (Kajiyama 1966: 115, n. 309) … zhes pa khyab byed mi dmigs pa'i mthshan nyid can bzlog pa la gnod pa can gyi tshad mas (... iti vyāpakānupalabdhilakṣaṇa(rūpa)viparyayabādhakapramāṇena...) [This part is dropped in the Sanskrit text to which we have access. The Sanskrit above has been reconstructed by Kajiyama.]

18 JNA p. 61, 8–10: anyathā vyatirekanisācayakapramānasya sāksād alāhhe 'pi yadi sādhanaṃ sādhye-nvayaniyamaprādhaṃ pramānaṃ upadarsayet, kas tsas saṃbhaviddhau prabhandaḥ vyatirekasyāpi* sāmarthāyekṣeṇāt. [*Corrected with Ms.; JNA: vyatirekasyānvayasyāpi.] Concerning the last part, various readings are possible. The difference in the interpretation of the sentence lies in the
Otherwise [that is, if the means of valid cognition that establishes the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance is only able to establish affirmative concomitance, irrespective of the inevitability of negative concomitance], it would ensue that the proof formulation of similarity should not really be presented, since the proof does not directly express [the inevitability of] negative concomitance.

Accordingly, even though [an inevitable connection], the ability of which one can understand, does not have negative concomitance as its essential characteristic, exactly insofar as “wherever the proving [property is present], that which is to be proven [is also present]” [is the essence of pervasion], if there is the proving [property in the subject of the thesis], a wise person who is provided with the expectation of that which is to be proven [being established] achieves his purpose.

This is because, in fact, when the proving [property] is present [in the subject of the thesis], even if [a property that is to be proven] is absent when it (i.e., the proving property) is absent, if the [property] that is to be proven is inevitably present when it (i.e., the proving property) is present, then it is fruitful to accept the proof. Hence, a proponent who presents a proof should seek even for both of these (i.e., anvaya and vyatireka) alternatively (vikalpena), and even in either of these styles [a proof] which is established by a means of valid cognition must be shown by a proponent. In the proofs of the opponent, however, even an affirmative concomitance as having inevitability, is really difficult to be obtained, as a negative concomitance is. We should know in this way.\footnote{From the above description, the position of the opponent, the viparyayabādhasākṣāta, seems to be that VBP should be introduced for the proof of vyatireka and it is the only way to prove the pervasion, while Jñānaśrīmitra equates VBP of vyatireka with that of anvaya, which is the substance of his new interpretation. Here, Jñānaśrīmitra claims that it is needless to state both of the means of valid cognition that prove anvaya and vyatireka; that the statement of either one is enough because they are logically connected to each other. Therefore, if the pervasion of anvaya is proven, it is unnecessary to state the proof of vyatireka. The final statement above is particularly noteworthy. Jñānaśrīmitra points out a disadvantage in the opponent’s view: according to the opponent’s proof by VBP, the relation between anvaya and vyatireka is not clear. The point of his criticism lies not in VBP itself but understanding of “tasya śādhyasiddhat” [tasya: (a) śādhanasya, (b) pramāṇasya, śādhyasiddha: (a) when … is proven, (b) with reference to śādhyasiddhi].}

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as a methodical device, but in the opponent’s position whereby the proof of vyatireka by VBP₁ is the one and only way to prove a pervasion.

According to Jñānaśrīmitra’s understanding, the difference between his position and that of the VBP-vādin is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin</th>
<th>Jñānaśrīmitra’s interpretation of viparyayabādhakapramāṇa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>anvaya</td>
<td>sādhanē sādhyaviparyayasya bādhakapramāṇa (VBP₂) or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vyatireka</td>
<td>sādhyaviparyaye hetoh bādhakapramāṇa (VBP₁)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

We can say that the position of the opponent, viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin, is a propounder who claims VBP₁ has the exclusive ability to establish pervasion only through proving the vyatireka-vyāpti by VBP₁. Meanwhile, Jñānaśrīmitra regards VBP (VBP₁/ VBP₂) as having the synthetic ability to prove pervasion.

3. Priority of prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya

Jñānaśrīmitra continues:

(H) However, for us, with reference to the discussed proof, affirmative concomitance with inevitability (niyamavān anvayaḥ) is really shown by prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya prior [to other means of valid cognition] (paurastyābhyāṃ). And even if both are applied to the cloud presented as a similar example, if one thing (A₁) has the essential property of creating another (B₁), the former (A₁) inevitably produces the latter (B₁), and one thing (A₂) does not produce another (B₂), then the former (A₂) does not have the essential property of creating the latter (B₂). Thus, [anvaya and vyatireka], which are functioning in this way, show that all [entities], indeed, that are endowed with the ability of activity (kriyāśaktiyuktaṃ) are restricted to being momentary. Therefore, comprising all cases (sarvopasaṃhāro) is the ground for hinting at negative pervasion (vyatirekākṣepabījaṃ), such as smoke and the like. 21

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20 As to the usage of ākṣepa in the context of the relation between anvaya and vyatireka, see RNA 67.4: ākṣiptavyatirekā yā vyāptir anvayarūpiṇī / sādharmyavati drṣṭānte sattvahetor ihocayate // [The pervasion that has anvaya as its essential characteristic and by which [its] vyatireka is hinted at …]; 83.4: vyatirekātmikā vyāptir ākṣiptānvayarūpiṇī / vaidharmyavati drṣṭānte sattvahetor ihocayate // [The pervasion that has vyatireka as its essence and has the essential characteristic that [its] anvaya is hinted at …] It seems that these two verses, which appear at the beginning of each chapter of Ratnakīrti’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, in the anvaya and vyatireka chapters, respectively, and have symmetrical construction, were composed by the author (Ratnakīrti or someone else) (see Woo 1999: 141), being strongly conscious of the discussion of the relation between anvaya and vyatireka, which Jñānaśrīmitra makes here.

21 JNA p. 61, 18–22: asmābhīs tu prakṛtasādhane niyamavān anvayaḥ prasaṅgaviparyayābhīyāṃ paurastyābhīyāṃ darśita eva, tau ca yady api sapakṣikrte jalabhṛti pravartītau, tathāpi yo yatkarṇaṃsvabhāvāḥ
Against the VBP-vādin, Jñānaśrīmitra argues for the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance (anvayaniyama) first and foremost through prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya. In the above statement, the first point to note is the expression paurastyaḥ; the second is that the statement is not concerned with pervasion in general, including vyatireka(-niyama), but only with anvayaniyama. As to the first point, the term paurastya means “prior to,” “first,” or “preceding,” which suggests that he does not necessarily exclude the logic of VBP, but insists only that prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya should be introduced before introducing VBP. That is, for Jñānaśrīmitra, prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya are enough for establishing affirmative concomitance with reference to the proof of momentariness, whereas the VBP-vādin considers VBP to be the sole means for establishing the pervasion. Moreover, the “comprising [of] all [individual instances] (sarvopasaṃhāra)” as a concept having a connecting function between anvaya and vyatireka is highly esteemed by Jñānaśrīmitra. According to him, “if anvaya is established by prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya,” sarvopasaṃhāra is regarded as “the grounds for hinting at negative pervasion (vyatirekākṣepabījaṃ),” whereas the VBP-vādin does not make much of this. The VBP-vādin’s low evaluation of sarvopasaṃhāra suggests that, according to his/their view, vyatireka can be proven independently (concerning each subject of the thesis) as having inevitability and is sufficient for establishing a pervasion.

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the basic difference between Jñānaśrīmitra and the VBP-vādin is the evaluation of efficacy of the proof based on the pervasion that comprises all [individual instances] (sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti). The opponent, the VBP-vādin, apparently takes a negative stance toward sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti. On this point it is likely that the opponent, the VBP-vādin, is not Ratnākaraśānti, because Ratnākaraśānti takes a positive stance toward the significant role of the sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti for the proof of momentariness and his antarvyāpti-theory. He says, for instance, “as this pervasion comprises all [individual instances], it depends upon the universal,”22 and, “for pervasion comprising all [individual instances] is in fact an indispensable constituent (aṅga) of the establishment of that which is to be proven.”23

4. Priority of anvaya over vyatireka

Furthermore Jñānaśrīmitra argues:

(1) Then, in this way, [the essence of] the pervasion [is that] “the pervading [property] is inevitably present in those which have the [property of being] pervaded.” And the establishment of momentary perishing cannot be repudiated on account of the efficacy itself of the reason “being existent” brought about by such a pervasion as that which has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (anvayarūpā) and which is a property of the subjective element. Thus, it is considered “what is the use of introducing the means of

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22 AVS p. 64, 4: sā ca sarvopasaṃhārāt sāmānyam avalambate
23 AVS p. 66, 3: sarvopasaṃhāravatī hi vyāptiḥ sādhyasiddher aṅgaṃ.
valid cognition that annuls [the proving property] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven] in this case? (kim atra viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopanyāseneti)" Precisely for this reason, even the impossibility of introducing this (=the means of valid cognition that annuls [the proving property] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven]) does not hurt [the inference].

This is because that which is to be proven is established by [the means of valid cognition] that annuls nothing but [the existence of] the reverse [of that which is to be proven in the proving property] (viparyayasyaiva bādhakena). Even in the texts of our tenets, . . . , the pervasion that has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (anvayarūpā) is established in detail, appearing as excluding the inconclusiveness [of the proving property], as with seeds and the like…

Here we see Jñānaśrīmitra’s efforts to defend the affirmative relation, namely, anvaya.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Viparyayabādhakapramāṇavādin</th>
<th>Jñānaśrīmitra’s interpretation of viparyayabādhakapramāṇa</th>
<th>Jñānaśrīmitra’s position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>anvaya</td>
<td>sādhanē sādhyaviparyavyasya bādhakapramāṇa (VBP₂) or prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya (=?)</td>
<td>sādhanē sādhyaviparyavyasya bādhakapramāṇa (VBP₂)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vyatireka sādhyaviparyaye hetoh bādhakapramāṇa (VBP₁) (independent)</td>
<td>sādhyaviparyaye hetoh bādhakapramāṇa (VBP₁)</td>
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5. Concluding remarks

A cursory glance at the passages cited above seems to suggest that Jñānaśrīmitra criticizes the VBP maintained by the VBP-vādin. A detailed examination of the passage as a whole, however, leads us to the conclusion that the difference between his position and that of the VBP-vādin lies, in fact, above all in their evaluation of sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti rather than of VBP itself. Both of these issues are, of course, closely related to each other, at least in Jñānaśrīmitra’s theory. The VBP-vādin’s low evaluation of sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti suggests that the VBP-vādin is not Ratnākaraśānti, because Ratnākaraśānti takes a positive stance toward the significance of the sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti. Secondly, with reference to VBP itself, Jñānaśrīmitra claims the priority of prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya over VBP, whereas for the VBP-vādin VBP₁ is the only way to establish pervasion. Here Jñānaśrīmitra tries to avoid the VBP-vādin by prioritizing prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya over VBP. This approach is consistent with his interpretation of sarvopasaṃhāravyāpti as essential for establishing pervasion.

24 JNA p. 63, 10–14: tad evam vyāptir vyāpakasya vyāpyavatī bhāva eveti kartṛdharmānvayarūpavyāptisaṃpāditasamarthīya eva sattvahetoḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhī apratihati kim atra viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopanyāsenetī samarthisam? ata eva tudapanyāsāsākyatāpi na pīḍayati, viparyayasyaiva bādhakena sādhyasya siddhatvāt, sāstre ‘pi prathā[māni??]yame ca vyāptir anvayarūpā bijādivad anekāntaparihāravyājena vistarataḥ prasadhitā. …
interpret VBP as a more synthetic and interrelated theory by expanding his interpretation of VBP (such that VBP is not only used for the proof of vyatireka but for that of anvaya as well). So it would seem that in all of his argumentation on VBP examined above, Jñānaśrīmitra seeks to establish the superiority of anvaya over vyatireka.

By this interpretation, we can easily understand and accept his positive statement concerning VBP in other contexts. For instance, in his Vyāpticarcā, after criticizing the bhūyodarśana of the Naiyāyikas, he says:

However, nothing but the viparyayabādhakapramāṇa, an inference, should be inducted (unneyam). If it (i.e., viparyayabādhakapramāṇa) is absent, it would be impossible to negate the occurrence (vṛtti) [of reason] in the dissimilar domain (vipakṣa).25

In the above statement, where the determination of causal relations is discussed, Jñānaśrīmitra really evaluates VBP. In the Īśvara discussion as well, he states:

The means of valid cognition that establishes a pervasion is of only two kinds: perception and non-cognition or viparyayabādha, because both of these have perception and inference as their essential characteristics.26

In these passages Jñānaśrīmitra accepts the role of VBP, even if he regards it as a having a limited secondary function.

As to the relation between VBP and prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya, Jñānaśrīmitra gives priority to the latter over the former in the proof of the affirmative concomitance of momentariness. Is VBP, as a genitive tatpuruṣa, different from prasaṅga or prasaṅgaviparyaya? If so, in which aspects is it different? And if the VBP-vādin is not Ratnākaraśānti, who might he be? These issues require further investigation.

References and abbreviations

Primary literature

HBṬ Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa, with the sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra, ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jinavijayaji. Baroda 1949.
JNA Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ, ed. Anantalal Thakur. Patna 1959,
NMu Nyāyamukha (因明正理門論). Taisho 1628.
PSṬ Pramāṇasamuccayāṭīkā.

25 VC p. 33*, 7–9: viparyayabādhakam eva tu pramāṇam anumānam unneyam, tadabhāve vipakṣavṛttiṃ-śedhayāśkyatvāt,....
26 JNA p. 293, 1: tac ca pramāṇam vyāptisādhaḥdvividham eva. pratyakṣāṇupalambham vā, viparyayabādhakaḥ vā, anayoḥ pratyakṣānumānasvabhāvatvāt,....


Secondary literature


Steinkellner 1967 See HB.


How Does One Cognize a Cow? A Dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga

by
Kei Kataoka

1. An unknown Jain ‘distinctionist,’ a Vaibhāgika

In PS 5.39–44 Dignāga defends his theory of apoha in reply to a Sāṃkhya theorist. PSV ad 5.39 begins with the words yas tv āha; the commentator Jinendrabuddhi identifies this theorist as Vaināśika, i.e. “the destroyer.” As Pind (2015: II Appendix 13) comments, this theorist must be the famous Sāṃkhya theorist Mādhava, who is elsewhere often called Sāṃkhyanāśaka, the destroyer of the Sāṃkhya system, because his unique views often deviate from orthodox Sāṃkhya tenets. As Pind observes, it seems that Mādhava criticizes the theory of apoha by quoting from a lost work of Dignāga, probably either the Sāṃkhyparīkṣā or the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. The main scenario of PS 5.39 can be depicted as follows:

1. Dignāga has criticized Sāṃkhya views in an earlier work.
2. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s theory of apoha.
3. Dignāga replies to Mādhava’s criticism in the Pramāṇasamuccaya.

PS 5.41ab refers to a certain view, namely, that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of a dewlap, and so on (sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ). Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516) ascribes this view to “an unknown Jain ‘distinctionist,’ a Vaibhāgika,” on the basis of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktam. Further, he ascribes the view presented in PS 5.41d (bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ) to Mādhava. In the following the present author reexamines the relevant material, i.e. PS(V) and PST, and shows that the first view should not be ascribed to a Jain Vaibhāgika but to Mādhava, and the second view not to Mādhava but to Dignāga.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pind</th>
<th>Kataoka</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS 5.41ab: sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ</td>
<td>Jain Vaibhāgika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS 5.41d: bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ</td>
<td>Mādhava</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 For Mādhava, see Pind 2015: Appendix 13; and Kataoka 2011: 497–498, n. 707.
3 Pind 2015: II 154, n. 518.
2. Vaibhāgika and Vaināśīka

It seems that the sole evidence on which Pind ascribes the first view to a Jain Vaibhāgika is Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary. The edited text in Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516) reads as follows:

PSṬ Ms. B 233a7–233b2: \textit{tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktam}. \textit{yasya darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati, tadyathā sāsnādidarśanād go-pratyayo bhavati}. sāsnādaya eva gaur. ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ. tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇīti.\textsuperscript{4}

Here the passage \textit{vaibhāgikenoktam} indicates that the subsequent paragraph quoted with \textit{iti} in the end is a quote from a Vaibhāgika. But the corresponding Tibetan translation suggests that the original reading was not \textit{vaibhāgika} but \textit{vaināśīka}.\textsuperscript{5}

Hattori 1982: 210, 11–12: \textit{de la ’jig pa smar ba pa yis brjod pa}

The Tibetan translation suggests that the original reading is \textit{tatra hi vaināśikenoktam}. This \textit{vaināśīka} is also mentioned previously in PSṬ ad 5.39, where the Sanskrit text reads as follows (Pind 2015: II Appendix 13):

PSṬ Ms. 232a2: \textit{anvayavītoktisamanantaraṃ vaināśikenoktaḥ}\textsuperscript{6}

The same opponent is also called Sāṅkhya in the following explanation of PSṬ (Pind 2015: II 150, n. 508, B232a6). Regarding the paragraph of PSV ad 5.39 beginning with \textit{yas tv āha}, Pind observes as follows:

This paragraph introduces a lengthy discussion, covering § 56 through § 60, with the Sāṅkhya-vaināśīka Mādhava, who, as it appears, addresses Dignāga’s criticism of his proof of the existence of \textit{pradhāna}, in connection with his own rebuttal of the \textit{apoha} theory. Dignāga now answers his criticism. According to Jinendrabuddhi, Mādhava addresses Dignāga’s objection immediately after dealing with the direct proofs of the continuous connection of the particulars with primordial materiality (Pind 2015: II Appendix 13).

\textsuperscript{4} The translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516): “For in this context the Vaibhāgika has stated: ‘In this world whatever cognition is due to the observation of whatever thing: this is such and such a thing only. For instance, the cognition ‘cow’ is due to the observation of dewlap, etc. A cow is only dewlap, etc. And the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things. Therefore the nature of some things are nothing but the non-existence of the nature of other things.’”

\textsuperscript{5} The Tibetan translation ’jig pa, as also shown in the next example, means perishing (\textit{vināśa}) and not dividing (\textit{vibhāga}). If one wanted to support Pind’s reading \textit{vaibhāgika}, one would have to explain how ’jig pa can mean vibhāga, which is usually translated as \textit{dbye ba}.

\textsuperscript{6} \textit{vaināśikenoktaḥ} at PSṬ Ms. B 232a2 is translated as ’jig pa ņid du brjod de (Hattori 1982: 208, 10–11).
As Pind remarks here, Jinendrabuddhi’s expression *anvayavītānoktam* indicates the location of the text quoted by Dignāga in PSV ad 5.39. It is a quote from Mādhava’s work, in which the precise location is “immediately after the statement of *anvayavīti*.” This suggests that *tatra* in *tatra hi vaināśikenoktam* in PSṬ ad 5.41 also indicates the same context in the same text: “For in the same context it is stated by Mādhava.”

Thus, we can conclude that the quotation Pind ascribes to an unknown Jain Vaibhāgika should be ascribed to Mādhava by correcting the reading *vaibhāgikenoktam* to *vaināśikenoktam* on the basis of the Tibetan translation. The main scenario of PS(V) 5.41 is the same as that of PS(V) 5.39. The argument is between Dignāga and Mādhava in both cases.

### 3. The cognition of a cow due to the observation of a dewlap, etc.

It is now clear that the quote in PSṬ following *vaināśikenoktam* is a quote from Mādhava’s text. In order to clarify its content, let me quote the entire PSṬ ad 5.41ab, which reads as follows:

> A. *tatra hi vaināśikenoktam.*
>
> B. *yasya khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati.*

> C. *etena yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati.*

> D. *atra sāṃkhyena pratividhānam uktam.*

> E. *yadi sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati (1), evaṃ sati yad uktam ātmāntarābhavadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavatīti (2), tad ayuktam iti.*

> F. *ātmāntarābhāvanimittasarvapratyayābhivyupagame katham sāsnādinimittatyām gopratyayasyeti yāvat.*

> G. *ātmanābhyanupetahānir uktā, drṣṭānte svapakṣatyāgāt.*

--- *

According to information provided by Horst Lasic, the relevant passage of the manuscript can be read as *vaibhāshikeno* and surely not *vaibhāgikeno*. The reading *vaibhāgikeno* is probably a mistake arisen in two steps: *vaināśikenoktam* → *vaibhāshikenoktam* → *vaibhāgikoktam*. First the original *nā* was probably mistaken by an Indian scribe as *bhā*. Then the modern transcriber who prepared the transcript that Pind uses mistakenly copied *śi* as *gi*. We can conclude that the reading *vaibhāgikoktam* is a modern invention. Furthermore, the immediately following passage which Pind reads as *yasya darśanād* has something in between in the manuscript. Probably the entire passage can be read as *yasya khalv api darśanād*, although the manuscript seems to read *kha sva vi* instead of *kha lva pi*.

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This citation is based on Pind’s edited text with slight modifications of *sandhi* and punctuation, etc. See Pind 2015: II 153–154, n. 516.
Paragraph A (vaināṣikenoktam) indicates that the subsequent paragraph B is a quote from Mādhava’s text. Paragraph B constitutes a syllogism: udāharaṇa (vyāpti + dṛṣṭānta), upanaya, nigamana. Paragraph C, in which the nigamana part is missing, is almost identical to B. By adding the words etena … iti kāryam āha Jīnendrabuddhi seems to classify the reason (hetu) in the syllogism B as kārya-hetu.9 Paragraph D (atra sāṃkhyaṇa pratividhānām uktam) indicates that the subsequent paragraph E is the Sāṃkhya’s rebuttal (pratividhāna) to the view given in B. This Sāṃkhya theorist seems to be Mādhava, because there is no other candidate in this context. Paragraph F restates the main point of E with the expression iti yāvat. In order to clarify Mādhava’s intention in these paragraphs, let me start by examining the easier paragraph F.

F. ātmāntarābhāvanimittasarvapratyayābhyaupagame kathaṃ sāsnādīnimittavam gopratyayasyeti yāvat.

It means: If it is accepted that all cognitions are caused by the non-existence of non-X, how then could the cognition of a cow be caused by a dewlap, etc.?10

Here Jīnendrabuddhi explains Mādhava’s intention. Mādhava is criticizing someone as being inconsistent because he has stated something that goes against his own view. The main view that this someone accepts is that all cognitions of X (sarvapratyaya) are caused by the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāva). This is exactly what Dignāga insists on as his theory of apoha. A cow is cognized by means of the exclusion of the non-cow. This view is formulated in E2 as follows:

E2: ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.

The cognition of X is due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X.11

9 Cf. PST I 10, 6–10: yo ’nanyasattvaneyasyāabhārati-pūrva hinaśthānapa-rigrāhah, sa ’tmasne-havato duḥkhasukhagyāpātvi-vācāprvakah, tad yathā maksikānām abhiratipūrva kac sācisthānapa-rigrāhah, ananyasattvaneyasyābhāratipūrva kac garbhadhi-nāsthi-haṇapa-rigrāhah prānina iti kāryam; PST I 11, 9–11: yo yadviparītasvabhāvah, sa tasya pratipakṣaḥ, tad yathā vāyuviparītasvabhāvah taisaṃ vāyoh, ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ca na rātmyadarśanām iti svabhāvah; PST I 11, 12–13: yo yavindānaviruddhaḥ, sa tasya bādhahah, yathā vātikasasya vyādhes taitānindānaviruddham taisaṃ ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ca na rātmyadarśanām iti svabhāvah; PST I 157, 8–9: kalpanājñānam api nāmeti because he has stated something that goes against his own view. The main view that this someone accepts is that all cognitions of X (sarvapratyaya) are caused by the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāva). This is exactly what Dignāga insists on as his theory of apoha. A cow is cognized by means of the exclusion of the non-cow. This view is formulated in E2 as follows:

E2: ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.

The cognition of X is due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X.11


This view is incompatible with the view that the cognition of a cow is caused by observing the dewlap, etc. This view is formulated in E1 as follows:

E1: sāśnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati.

The cognition of a cow is due to the observation of the dewlap, and so on.\(^\text{12}\)

In paragraph E (yaudsuktam ... tad ayuktam), as restated by Jinendrabuddhi in F (katham), Mādhava criticizes Dignāga for stating the incompatible views E1 and E2. Mādhava’s intention is summed up by Jinendrabuddhi in paragraph G as follows:

G. ātmanābhyupetahān iruktā, drṣṭānte svapakṣatāyāgāt.

You yourself have formulated the abandonment of what you have accepted, because you give up your own thesis in the example.\(^\text{13}\)

Dignāga’s own view (svapakṣa) is E2, i.e. the view that the cognition of X is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X. This is what he has accepted (abhyupeta). But Dignāga, according to Mādhava, abandons this when he states E1 as an example.

svapakṣa/abhyupeta (E2): ātmāntarābhāvadarsanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.

drṣṭānta (E1): sāśnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati.

These analyses confirm the main scenario. Dignāga first refers to E1 as an example adduced in another work of his that is now lost. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga as being inconsistent, because this E1 is incompatible with Dignāga’s theory of apoha, which can be summarized as E2. But where does Dignāga state E1? A candidate is easily found in paragraph C.

C. etena yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati(1). tad yathā sāśnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati, sāśnādaya eva gauḥ(2). ātmāntarābhāvadarsanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavatūti(3) kāryam āha.

With this [paragraph B] he speaks of an effect [as a reason]: If the cognition of X arises by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. For example, the cognition of a cow arises due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. A cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. And the cognition of X arises due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X.\(^\text{14}\)

The passage in C “yaddarśanād ... bhavati,” i.e. C1, C2 and C3, seems to be a reformulation of B’s syllogism by Jinendrabuddhi in accordance with the Dharmakīrtian style: udāharaṇa (vyāpti + drṣṭānta) and upanaya (i.e. hetu, which shows pakṣadharmatā). Here the syllogism can be analyzed into three parts as follows:

C1 (vyāpti): yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati.


\(^{13}\) My translation; cf. the translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516).

\(^{14}\) My translation. This passage is quoted but not translated in Pind 2015: II 153–154, n. 516.
C2 (dṛṣṭānta): tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ.
C3 (upanaya): ātmāntarābhāvadarsanāc cātmāntare pratrayayo bhavati.

C1 states an invariable concomitance (vyāpti): If X is cognized by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. C2 gives an example (dṛṣṭānta): One cognizes a cow by observing the dewlap, etc. Therefore, a cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. In other words, a cow is nothing but the aggregate of the dewlap, etc.15 C3 presents the application (upanaya) of this invariable concomitance to his theory of apoha: One cognizes X by observing the non-existence of non-X. The conclusion, which is not stated in C, is obvious: ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi (Xs are nothing but the non-existence of non-X).16 This missing part is explicitly stated in paragraph B, which reads as follows:

B. yasya khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati(1). tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ(2). ātmāntarābhāvadarsanāc cātmāntare pratrayah(3). tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi(4).

In this world, as is also well known, if the cognition “X” arises by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. For example, the cognition of a cow arises due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. A cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. And the cognition of X is due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X. Therefore, Xs are nothing but the non-existence of non-X.17

B1, B2 and B3 are almost identical with C1, C2 and C3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. yasya khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati</td>
<td>1. yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ</td>
<td>2. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ātmāntarābhāvadarsanāc cātmāntare pratrayah</td>
<td>3. ātmāntarābhāvadarsanāc cātmāntare pratrayayo bhavati.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main difference lies in B4, which clarifies the unstated conclusion (nigamana). In paragraph C Jinendrabuddhi reformulates the syllogism of B in accordance with the Dharmakīrtian style and classifies the reason as kāryahetu.

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15 Cf. PST B 233b5: sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ, quoted by Pind 2015: II 154, n. 520.
16 With the plural form ātmāntarāṇi Dignāga intends, for example, cows in general. See, e.g. his usage in PSV ad 5.36d (Pind 2015: I 45): śābdo ‘ṛthāntaranivrūttivyāśan eva bhāvā āha; cf. also PST Ms. B 238b5–6 quoted in Pind 2015: II 179, n. 604: yathā ṛṣaśabdaḥ śimśapādin viśeṣān abhedenābhidadhat śāmānyavācī tathā…
17 My translation.
C. *etena* “C1, C2, C3 (=B1, B2, B3)” *iti kāryam āha*

With this [paragraph B quoted above] he speaks of an effect [as a reason, for which the entire syllogism is reformulated as] C1, C2, C3.

But who has composed this syllogism in paragraph B? As suggested in paragraphs E, F, G, the syllogism of B must have been originally formulated by Dignāga. Then it is quoted by Mādhava, either literally or not literally, as a *pārvapakṣa*, as Jinendrabuddhi’s opening remark *tatra hi vaināśikenoktam* indicates. Thus, it is surmised that paragraph B (which Jinendrabuddhi explains as C) is Mādhava’s quote from a lost work of Dignāga and that Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s view in E (which Jinendrabuddhi explains in F and G). Recapitulating these analyses, the main scenario can be reconstructed as follows.

1. First a syllogism was stated by Dignāga in a work that is now lost.
2. Mādhava quotes Dignāga’s statement as B, which Jinendrabuddhi reformulates with classification as C.
3. In paragraph E, which follows D (*atra sāṃkhyaṇa pratividhānam uktam*), Mādhava points out Dignāga’s inconsistency with the words *yad uktam … tad ayuktam*. The issue at stake raised by Mādhava is that the example Dignāga mentions does not fit with the theory of *apoha*, because the cognition of a cow (*gopratyaya*), according to the theory of *apoha*, should be based on the exclusion of the non-cow (*agovyavaccheda*) and not on the dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādī*). By referring to, and thereby admitting the example, Dignāga amounts to having abandoned his own tenet that the cognition of X (e.g. a cow) is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (e.g. the non-existence of the non-cow).

4. Dignāga’s intention in referring to the example

Although there are uncertainties here and there regarding the reconstruction of PSV ad 5.41, the main argument of the following part is more or less certain.  

PSV ad 5.41: *yasya hy [agonivṛtagopratyayah, tasya katham sāsnādidarśa-nanimittah].*  

PSṬ B 233b5: *yasya hīy apohavādinaḥ.*

As an *apoha* theorist (*apohavādin*), it is inappropriate for Dignāga to state that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc., because according to the theory of *apoha*...
apoha it is based on the exclusion of the non-cow. Here Dignāga seems to accept Mādhava’s claim of inconsistency. The example sāsnādisamūha gopratyayaḥ is indeed incompatible with the theory of apoha. PS 5.41ab amounts to saying, using the word katham: How could an apoha theorist accept the example? But then how can Dignāga defend his reference to the example? The subsequent passage clarifies his strategy.

It is not easy to reconstruct the original text of PSV, because the two Tibetan translations differ from each other. Nonetheless the main argument can be summarized as follows: the example (drṣṭāntaḥ), although it is incompatible with the Buddhist view (svamataviruddho ’pi), is presented by provisionally accepting (abhypagamyā) your view, i.e. the Sāṃkhya’s view.

Sāṃkhya: sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayaḥ (→sāsnādaya eva gauḥ)
Dignāga: ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayaḥ (→ātmāntarābhāva eva ātmāntarāṇi)

It is clear from this that the view referred to by Dignāga as an example is a Sāṃkhya view. The Sāṃkhya holds the view that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayaḥ), and that a cow is nothing but the aggregate of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ). Dignāga refers to this view by accepting it only provisionally (abhypagamyā). Therefore, there is no inconsistency in Dignāga’s statements, because he does not wholeheartedly accept the Sāṃkhya view. Dignāga consistently keeps his doctrine of apoha, i.e. the view that the cognition of X (e.g. a cow) is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (e.g. the non-existence of the non-cow), i.e. ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayaḥ. Therefore, X is nothing but the non-existence of non-X for Dignāga (ātmāntarābhāva eva ātmāntarāṇi). For him the cognition of a cow is caused by the non-existence of the non-cow and not by the dewlap.
etc. The two things, i.e. a cow and a dewlap, etc., have a different scope of exclusion. It is obvious for Dignāga that the words “cow” and “dewlap, etc.” have different objects to be excluded (apohya). The expression “dewlap, etc.” (sāsnādi) communicates the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādiṣu) by excluding the non-dewlap, etc. (asāsnādi). The word “cow” (gauḥ) communicates a cow (gavi) by excluding the non-cow (agauḥ). This is Dignāga’s own view. The fundamental view of apoha is consistent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>apohya</th>
<th>pratyaya</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“sāsnādi”</td>
<td>asāsnādi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“gauḥ”</td>
<td>agauḥ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The view that the two different words have different scopes of exclusion is explicitly expressed in PS 5.41d, which runs as follows.

Pind 2015: I 51: bhinnāpohyās tu te mithah.22

PSṬ: asmanmatena tu bhinnāpohyās tu te mitho gosāsnādayaḥ, bhinnam apohyam esv iti kṛtva.

Here Pind’s reconstruction of PS 5.41d is strongly supported by PST. However the reconstruction and interpretation of PS 5.41abc are a bit problematic.23

PS 5.41abc, Pind 2015: I 51: sāsnādidarśanād <gopratyayo yo 'yam udāḥṛtaḥ / so> viruddho bhavanmatyā.

PSṬ: sāsnādidarśanād ityādi … viruddha iti siddhāntavirodhāt. bhavanmatyeta. bhavato hi sāsnādaya eva gaur iti matam.

Considering the meter, it would be better to change the word order of PS 5.41abc to the following:

Kataoka: sāsnādidarśanād yo ’yam gopratyaya udāḥṛtaḥ / sa viruddho bhavanmatyā

It is true that viruddho bhavanmatyā can be interpreted as Pind translates, “is in conflict with your own theory.” K’s translation supports Pind’s interpretation. But this interpretation does not fit the entire context. Here bhavat clearly refers to the Sāṃkhya, as Jinendrabuddhi clarifies by stating, “For it is your view that a cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. (bhavato hi sāsnādaya eva gaur iti matam).” As we have already confirmed, this view should be ascribed

22 V (Hattori 1982: 142, 6): phan tshun tha dad dag yod kyaṅ; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 0): tha dad sel la de log pa; Pind 2009: 110: “On the contrary, they have mutually different excluded referents.”

23 V (Hattori 1982: 142, 7–9): nog la sog pa mthoṅ ba las / de’i brol dper bzhod ’gal ba de / khyed kyi lugs la rten pa yin /; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 7–9): lhog saf la sog pa mthoṅ phyir gaṅ / ba laṅ rtsogs pa’i dper byas pa / de ni khyod kyi ’dod pa’ / gal /; Pind 2015: II 153–154: “The example [you have] adduced, namely that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of dewlap, and so on, is in conflict with your own theory.”
to the Sāṃkhya and not the Buddhist. Then *viruddho bhavanmatyāḥ* would mean that the example is in conflict with the Sāṃkhya view. But what we expect here is the opposite: The example is in conflict with the Buddhist view. Taking into consideration V’s translation of *bhavanmatyāḥ* as *khyed kyi lugs la rten pa yin* (resorting to your view), it seems more appropriate to interpret *bhavanmatyāḥ* as being separate from the preceding word *viruddhaḥ*. Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary also supports this interpretation, because he comments on *viruddha* separately from *bhavanmatyāḥ*, and states *viruddha iti siddhāntavirodhāt*. Considering that the opponent *bhavat* is the Sāṃkhya in this context, the opposite *siddhānta* (i.e. *svamata*) must refer to the Buddhist view (cf. *svamata-viruddha* in PSV ad 5.41). Therefore, the main argument in PS 5.41abc can be reconstructed as follows:

The example (*dṛṣṭāntaḥ*) that the cognition of a cow (*gopratyayaḥ*) is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādidarśanāt*) is presented (*udāḥṛtaḥ*) by me in my earlier work. This example is indeed incompatible with the Buddhist view (*viruddhaḥ*), as you, Mādhava, claim. But it is mentioned by me only by provisionally resorting to your Sāṃkhya view (*bhavanmatyāḥ*). Therefore, there is no fault of abandoning my thesis.

5. Positive and negative methods of cognizing a cow

The conflict of opinion between Mādhava and Dignāga is clear. Mādhava holds the view that a cow is cognized positively, i.e. by observing the dewlap, etc., whereas Dignāga holds the view that a cow is cognized negatively, i.e. by excluding the non-cow. For Dignāga any X, inasmuch as it is cognized in a general form, is cognized by observing the non-existence of non-X. A dewlap, etc. are no exception. They, too, are cognized by excluding the non-dewlap, etc. This is explicitly stated in PSV ad 5.42 as follows:

Pind 2015: I 52: *sāsnādiṣu hi <sāmānyarūpam> arthāntarābhāvanirapekṣam na bhavatīti pūrvam evopapāditam.*

Mādhava holds that X (*ātmāntara*) is cognized positively, without dependence on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (*ātmāntarābhāvadarśana*). This view of Mādhava is criticized by Dignāga in PS 5.42ab as follows:

PS 5.42ab, Pind 2015: I 52: *so ‘napēkṣa <city etat tu> svavikalpavi<nirmitam> /

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24 V (Hattori 1982: 142, 18–19): *nog la sogs pa la spyi’i no bo dañ ldan pa gzhan med pa mi ltos pa ni mi srid do žes snar bsdad zin to l;* K (Hattori 1982: 143, 9–20): *lkog šal la sogs pa rnam s la spyi’i no bo bdag ŋid gzhan med pa la bhlos pa med par srid pa ma yin no žes snar bstan pa yin no l;* Pind 2015: II 156: “For it has previously been demonstrated that the general form in a dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādiṣu*), does not exist without dependence upon the non-existence of other referents (*sāmānyarūpam arthāntarābhāvanirapekṣam na bhavati*).”

25 V (Hattori 1982: 142, 14–15): *de mi ltos šes pa’i di ni l rañ gi rnam rtog spros par zad l;* K (Hattori 1982: 143, 15–16): *de ltos med phyir ‘di yañ ni l rañ gi rnam par rtog pas sprul l;* Pind 2015: II 155: “The idea, however, that this [namely the cognition of one thing (*ātmāntara*)] is not dependent [upon the observation of non-existence of other things], is created out of your own imagination.”
According to Dignāga, Mādhava holds that the cognition of X is independent (so ‘napekṣah), i.e. does not depend on the exclusion of the other. A cow is cognized as such in a positive way (vidhirūpeṇaiva). But Mādhava’s idea is a mere fancy, because a general form is never cognized without exclusion of the other, as Dignāga has implied in PSV ad 5.34: vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam. The individual form (svarūpa), i.e. the particular form (svalakṣaṇa), is beyond the scope of language and therefore inexpressible (anabhilāpya). Thus, the individual form is not the object of everyday communication (vyāvahārika). This is stated by Dignāga in PSV ad 5.42 as follows:

PSV ad 5.42 (Pind 2015: I 52): svarūpaṃ tu tenāvyāvahārikam> anabhilāpyatvāt.26

According to the Sāṃkhya, the individual form is denotable. Therefore, the word “cow” refers to the aggregate of the dewlap, etc., in a positive way. For Dignāga, by contrast, the particular form is not denotable. It is the object of perception and not inference. Words communicate things in a general form only by excluding the other. Our cognition of a cow is not independent but always dependent upon the non-existence of the non-cow.

6. Conclusion

1. The crucial passage in PST vaibhāgikenoktam should be corrected to vaināśikeno-ktam.
2. The argument in PS(V) 5.41 is not between a Jain Vaibhāgika and Mādhava but between Vaināśika Mādhava and Dignāga. The scenario is similar to that of PS(V) 5.39. The Jain ‘distinctionist’ that Pind postulates does not exist.
3. The view that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. should be ascribed to the Sāṃkhya, not a Jain Vaibhāgika.
4. Dignāga refers to the Sāṃkhya view in an example in an earlier work that is now lost. Dignāga’s text quoted by Mādhava is quoted by Jinendrabuddhi in paragraph B and modified as in C.
5. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s view as being inconsistent, because Dignāga abandons his thesis by admitting the Sāṃkhya example. Mādhava first quotes Dignāga’s earlier work (paragraph B) and then criticizes it (paragraph E).
6. Dignāga defends his earlier statement by insisting that his mentioning of the Sāṃkhya example that is incompatible with his thesis is not wholehearted acceptance, but only a provisional acceptance (abhypagamyam). For Dignāga the cognition of a cow is due to the exclusion of the non-cow (agovyavaccheda) and not due to the observation of

26 V (Hattori 1982: 142, 19–20): raṅ gi ṅo bo ni brjod par bya ba ma ya in pa’i phyir de’i sgo nas ths siad du bya’o /; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 20–21): raṅ gi ṅo bo ci brjod par bya ba ma ya in pa’i phyir de tha dad mi bya’o /; Pind 2015: II 156–157: “The individual form, however, (svarūpaṃ tu) is not denotable (*vyāvahārikam [sic]) in this (tena) [form] because it is inexpressible (anabhilāpyatvāt).”
the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādidarśana). His main thesis of *apoha* that the cognition of X is based on the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayaḥ), is consistent. For him a cow is essentially the non-existence of the non-cow and not the aggregate of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādaya eva gauḥ; sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ). X is essentially the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāni).

**References and abbreviations**

**Corr.** Correction by the present author.


**K** Kanakavarman’s translation of PS(V).


**Ms.** Manuscript.


**V** Vasudhararaksita’s translation of PS(V).
Śāntarakṣita on Two Kinds of Arguments for Self-Awareness: 
*saḥopalambhāniyama* and *saṃvedana*

by 
Hiroko Matsuoka

**Introduction**

In the last part of the *Pratyakṣa* chapter of his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PVin I 39,13–43,7), Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660) presents two kinds of arguments to prove self-awareness (*svaṃvedana*). Since the theory of self-awareness that a cognition is aware of itself presupposes that an object and the cognition thereof are non-different; and hence the cognition of an object is nothing but the cognition of the cognition itself, the former is established on the basis of the fact that both are necessarily perceived together (*saḥopalambhaniyama*); the latter is established on account of its essential nature of being a cognition (*saṃvedana*).

Following Iwata (1991), I am going to call these two arguments the *saḥopalambhaniyama* and *saṃvedana* arguments, respectively.

What led Dharmakīrti to develop these arguments? Concerning the *saḥopalambhaniyama* argument, Iwata (1991: 20–24) examines how the argument could have been derived directly from the view that is presented by Dignāga (c. 480–540) in *Ālambanaparīkṣā* v. 6 and the *Vṛtti* thereon, namely, that an object-support (*ālambana*) for a cognition is a form within the cognition itself (*antarjñeyarūpa*). Taber (2010) argues that crucial elements of the argument are found in the *Śūnyavāda* chapter of Kumārila’s (c. 600–650) *Ślokavārttika* vv. 31–34. Concerning the *saṃvedana* argument, on the other hand, no attempts have yet been made to determine the details of its provenance.

The aim of this paper is to explore both of these issues equally, at the same time, namely with the help of the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā* chapter of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*. In this,

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1. PVin I 54ab: *saḥopalambhāniyamād abheda ni lātaddhiyoh* // See also PV III 332–336; 387–397.

2. PVin I 42,3: *saṃvedanam ity api tasya tādāmyāt tathāprathanam, na tad anyasya kasyacid ātmasaṃvedanavat / tato ’pi na tad arthāntare yuktam /* See also PV III 326–329.

Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788), while discussing the sahopalambhaniyama and samvedana arguments, directly references Kumārila’s arguments aimed at proving that a cognition has an external entity for its object. In particular, I hope to provide evidence in favor of Śāntarakṣita’s view that Dharmakīrti was responding directly to Kumārila. In order to do this, I will first present Kumārila’s arguments in section 1, and then, in section 2, I will discuss the corresponding details of Śāntarakṣita’s refutation, which follows but also builds upon the arguments of his predecessor, Dharmakīrti. With this foundation in place, section 3 will provide one final piece of evidence in favor of Śāntarakṣita’s view, namely, that he sees in the dual nature of Dharmakīrti’s argumentation an attempt to refute the nirākāravādin’s view rather than to simply improve Dignāga’s theory of self-awareness.

1. Kumārila’s refutation of self-awareness

Kumārila is only one among many concerns for Śāntarakṣita. The Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapter of the latter’s TS is meant to establish the vijñānavāda theory of vijñaptimātratā or “mind-only.” According to Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795), author of the panjiča commentary, this chapter is divided into two parts: in the first part, Śāntarakṣita establishes that an external object cannot exist independently of cognition (arthāyoga) (TS 2 1964–1997); in the second part, he proves that cognition is devoid of the characteristics of being either grasped or grasper (grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavādha), that is, that cognition consists in self-awareness (ātmasaṃvedana) (TS 2 1998–2083). In this second part, Śāntarakṣita proceeds in three steps: first, he posits his own arguments denying the existence of external objects (bāhyārthaniṣedhaka) (TS 2 1998–2049); secondly, he refutes arguments formulated by various realists such as Śubhagupta, Uddyotakara and Kumārila, to establish the existence of such objects (bāhyārthasādhaka) (TS 2 2050–2077); and lastly, he presents the fundamental (maula) argument for establishing vijñaptimātratā (TS 2 2078–2083).

While refuting the realist arguments, Śāntarakṣita cites verses from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā of Kumārila, corresponding to ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–177ab, which contain seven arguments for proving the existence of external objects (bāhyārthasādhaka) (TS 2 2063–2067). In ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–177ab, after first presenting them earlier in the same chapter (verses 5–17), Kumārila then refutes vijñānavāda, more precisely, Dignāga’s arguments for self-awareness,5 by moving through the series of arguments in the same order as before.6 It is these seven arguments that we will examine in the current section 1. They can be classified into two groups according to the theses (pakṣa) that they support:

1. An object and its cognition are different (bhinna) from each other.
2. A cognition neither cognizes a part of itself (svāṃśa) nor is cognized by a part of itself.

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4 For discussions of quotations from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā in the TS(P), see Frauwallner 1962, Taber 1986–1992, Krasser 1999: 216 and Kataoka 2011: 25–27. See also the invaluable contribution of Yoshimizu (2007) showing that the Bṛhaṭṭīkā is earlier than the PV, thus refuting Frauwallner’s influential hypothesis.

5 See section 1.1.2.

These two groups closely relate to Dharmakīrti’s *sahopalambhaniyama* and *saṃvedana* arguments, respectively, as I will demonstrate below. The first group is discussed in section 1.1, and the second in section 1.2.

1.1 Arguing for the difference between an object and its cognition

The four arguments in this first group can be labeled as follows:

1. The *tatsaṃvitti-asamvitti* argument;
2. The *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* argument;
3. The *itaretarāparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa* argument;
4. The *aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna* argument.

These arguments will now be discussed individually in the following sections.

1.1.1 The *tatsaṃvitti-asamvitti* argument

The *tatsaṃvitti-asamvitti* argument reads as follows:  

The grasper (grāhaka) of color is different from the grasped [color] (grāhya) because the former is not perceived when the latter is perceived (*tatsaṃvittāv asaṃvitteḥ*), like the grasper of flavor, etc.

In ŚV Śūnyavāda 79, Kumārila explains that the *tatsaṃvitti-asamvitti* argument is based on the Bhāṣya of Śabara (6th c.), where it is stated that it is only an object connected with the external world (*bahirdeśasambaddha*) that is perceived by sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*).

1.1.2 The *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* argument

The *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* argument is as follows:

The grasped [color] is different from [the cognition] that grasps it because the former is not necessarily recollected by one who recollects the latter, like the grasper of flavor, etc.

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7 ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–173ab: *tasmād yad grāhakaṃ rūpe tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā // tatsaṃvittāv asamvitteḥ* yathā // TS₂ 2063: *atha yad grāhakaṃ rūpe tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā // tatsaṃvittāv asamvitteḥ* yathā // (tasmād *SV*: *atha* TS; grāhakaṃ *SV₅, SV₇, TS*: bhāsakam *SV₇, rūpe TS*: rūpaṃ *SV₅*.) Here as well as in the following, “SV” is in the reporting of variants used as a shorthand for all three editions ŚV₀, ŚV₇, and ŚV₅.

8 ŚV Śūnyavāda 79: sa bahirdeśasambaddha ity (*SBh 28,17 on 1.1.4. See n. 9.) anena nirūpyate / grāhyākārasya samvittir grāhakānumbhavād rte // TS₂ 2069: sa bahirdeśasambaddha ity anena nanūcyate / grāhyākārasya samvittir grāhakānumbhavād rte // (nirūpyate *SV*: nanūcyate TS.) Anena nirūpyate is here emended to *tathā* following *SV₇*.

9 SBh 28,17 on 1.1.4: syād etat – evan yady arthākāra buddhiḥ syāt / nirākāra tu no buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo ’rthah / sa hi bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ pratyaṣaṃ upalabhyaḥ /

10 ŚV Śūnyavāda 173cd–174ab: *grāhyam tadgrāhakād bhinnam tatparāṃśatā yathā // na parāmṛṣyate ’vāṣyam rasāṣṭrajrāhakām yathā / TS₂ 2064: grāhyam tadgrāhakād bhinnam tatparāṃśatā yathā // na parāmṛṣyate ’vāṣyam rasāṣṭrajrāhakādīv at // (-kād bhinnam *SV₅*: -kāc caiva *SV₇*, TS: -kāc caiva *SV₇*: yathā SV*: kādiyat TS) As for TS₂ 2064, the reading -kāc caiva attested in TS₁ and TS₀ (and also chosen for the editions TS₁ and TS₂) is here emended to *bhinnam* following *SV₅*. 

According to ŚV Śūnyavāda 82–85, the tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument is also based on Śabara’s Bhāṣya. Śabara argues that there are cases where one remembers a cognition that occurred in the past, without at the same time remembering what one cognized.

The tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument is undoubtedly directed against a point made by Dignāga in Pramāṇasamuccaya I v. 11cd and the Vṛtti thereon. There, Dignāga argues that a cognition has both characteristics (dvirūpātā), namely, both the characteristic of being the grasped and that of being the grasping, and that such a cognition is cognized by itself (svasaṃvedyatā). He claims that these two points are to be accepted on the basis of the empirical fact that both grasper and grasped are remembered afterwards (smṛter uttarakālaṃ PS I 11c).

1.1.3 The itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa argument

The itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa argument is as follows:

The two (i.e., the grasped and the grasper) are mutually different (bhīnna) [because one is not recollected when the other is recollected (itaretaraparāmarśa itaretarāparāmarśāt)], like flavor [and color], etc.

Pārthasārathi (10th c.) comments that each of the two is remembered by excluding the other (parasparaparāhēraṇa). The point is that the recollection of an object cannot simultaneously be the recollection of its cognition and vice versa. Whatever is an object is not a cognition, and whatever is a cognition is not an object. These two properties are not the same object. These two properties are not an object. These two properties are not an object.
1.1.4 The aikarūpyaṇa-ajñāna (bhedopalambhana) argument

The aikarūpyaṇa-ajñāna argument is as follows:

[The two (i.e., the grasped and the grasper) are mutually different] because they are not perceived as identical (aikarūpyenaṣājñānāt), like another [mental] continuum (santānāntara) and the cognition thereof.

Importantly, this aikarūpyaṇa-ajñāna argument is reformulated by Umbeka (8th c.) as follows:

Blue and the cognition thereof are different (bheda) from each other because they are perceived separately (bhedopalambhanāt).

Here Umbeka is drawing a contrast between the aikarūpyaṇa-ajñāna argument and Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument, the latter of which is formulated as follows:

PVin I 54ab:

sahopalambhaniyamād abheda nilataddhiyoh /

Blue and the cognition thereof are not different (abheda) [from each other] because they are necessarily perceived together (sahopalambhaniyamāt).

According to Umbeka, Kumārila’s aikarūpyaṇa-ajñāna argument is thus a counter-argument to Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument. This represents the opposite of Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation, namely that the latter argument of Dharmakīrti is actually responding to the former by Kumārila. We will return to this point later.

1.2 Arguing against self-awareness

Kumārila goes on to formulate the following arguments of the second group to establish that a relation between the grasped and the grasper never exists within a cognition.

1. The jñāna-utpattī argument against a cognition grasping a part of itself;
2. The jñāna-utpattī argument against a cognition being grasped by a part of itself;
3. The jñānatva argument.

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18 ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: aikarūpyaṇa vājñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat / TS2 2065cd: aikarūpyena vājñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat / (vājñā- TS : cājñā- ŚV M : vijñā- ŚV T, ŚV V : aikarūpyena TS1, ŚV : ekarūpyena TS9, also adopted in the editions TS1 and TS2.)

19 Cf. Kā 163,15 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: grāhyaṃ grāhakād bhinnaṃ tena sahaikarūpyenaṣājñānāt / “The grasped is not different from the grasper because the former is not perceived as identical with the latter.”

20 TT 282,9 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: nilabuddhyor iti dharmitvam, parasparenā bheda iti sādhyo dharmāḥ / nilam idam iti bhedopalambhanād iti hetuḥ /

21 TT 282,11 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: abhedasādakakasya sahopalambhasya, paroktasya vā sahopalambhaniyamād ity āsāṁśiddhatām amenāha /

22 TT 282,12 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175cd–177ab: idānīm ekavijñānasambandhīnār dhammayor grāhyāgraḥakabhāvo nāstīti yad uktam, tatra prayogam āha – jñānam svāṃśaṃ na grāhīti /
1.2.1 The two jñāna-utpatti arguments

These two arguments have a same logical reason and are thus treated as a pair.

The jñāna-utpatti argument against a cognition grasping a part of itself is as follows:²³

A cognition does not grasp a part of itself (svāṃśa) because it is produced from a cognition (jñānotpatteḥ), like a power of [cognition] itself (svaśakti).

The jñāna-utpatti argument against a cognition being grasped by a part of itself is as follows:²⁴

A cognition is not grasped by a part of itself because it is produced from a cognition, like a power of [cognition] itself.²⁵

Within the framework of the vijñānavāda,²⁶ one may say the following: What is meant by the word svaśakti is a latent impression (vāsanā).²⁷ The latent impression is produced from a cognition (jñāna-utpatti) and devoid of both the property of being grasped and that of being grasper.²⁸ Now, a cognition arises from its immediately preceding condition, which

²³ ŚV Śūnyavāda 175cd (quoted in TS 2 2066ab): jñānam svāṃśam na grhrṇāti jñānotpatteḥ svaśaktivat //

²⁴ ŚV Śūnyavāda 176ab (quoted in TS 2 2066cd): grhavatvapratśedhas ca dvayahī nā hi vāsanā // (grhavatvaprati- TS; grhavatvaprati- ŚV; grhavatvam prati- ŚV; hi vā- ŚVM TS; dvivā- ŚVT ŚV) “[For the same reason,] there is also the negation of [a cognition] being grasped [by a part of itself]. For, a latent impression (vāsanā) is devoid of both [the property of being the grasped and that of the grasper].”

²⁵ See TSP 705,11 on TS 2 2066c: tadathā – jñānāṃśo na jñānagrahyah // jñānād utpannatvāt / tadat vāsanāvat // “A part of cognition is not grasped by the same cognition because it is produced from a cognition, like that [power of itself], namely, like a latent impression.”

²⁶ According to Sucarita (10th c.), Kumārila formulates the jñāna-utpatti arguments from the standpoint of the “old” Buddhist who regards a latent impression (vāsanā) as distinct from a cognition (jñānātiriktavāsanā). On the other hand, the “modern” Buddhist holds that a latent impression is not distinguished from the immediately preceding cognition (samanantarajñāna) itself. Kā 163,27 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175cd–176ab: etac ca ciraṇtana-buḍḍhāḥ prajñākaragupta (c. 750–810), a latent impression is not the power produced from the preceding cognition (pūrvavijñānajanitā śaktiḥ), but the immediately preceding cognition itself (samanantaravijñānaṁbhūtā). PVA 356,6,8: vāsanetī hi pūrvavijñānajanitāṃ śaktim āmananti vāsanāvīymāṇah // PVA 356,23: [na ca] samanantaravijñānātmabhūtā vāsanēṣyate // As Kobayashi (2001: 327) has pointed out, Yamāri (c. 1000–1060) refers to a discrepancy in the views of Dharmottara (c. 740–800) and Prajñākaragupta on whether a latent impression is distinct from the immediately preceding cognition or not. PVATS II (D 259a4; P 347b7): de latar na re zhig slob dpon chos mchog la / sos pas ’dod pa’i bag chags kyi phogs la yang pha rol pos brjod pas nyes pa bsal nas rang gi ’dod pa brjod pa ni de ma thag pa’i ches bya ba’o // See also PVin I 43,14–44,2 for Dharmakīrti’s theory of the latent impression.

²⁷ TT 282,14 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175d: šloke svaśaktisadbena vāsanām āha //

²⁸ Kā 163,25 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 176b: na ca sādhyavikalo drṣṭāntaḥ / dvayahīnavāsanābhypsagamātm / buḍḍhānāṃ hi svāṃśam na grhrṇāti / na ca tena grhyan te / NR 316,17 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 176b: vāsanāvīm / sā hi svāṃśam na grhrṇāti, nāpi svāṃśena grhyate iti / TSP 705,12 on TS 2 2066cd: katham asmin anantare prayogadvaye (emendation following TSP; prayogadvaye TSP; TSPa, also adopted in TSP); cf. gtaṅ tshigs gnyis po... la T) ’pi sādhyadharmānvīto drṣṭāntaḥ siddha ity āha – dvayahīnā hi vāsaneti / dvayena grhāyagrāhakatvena /
is a cognition (samanantarapratyaya). Whatever arises from a cognition can neither be grasped nor grasper, so that a cognition can neither be grasped or grasper with respect to a part of itself (svāṃśa).

1.2.2 The jñānatva argument

The jñānatva argument is as follows.

The cognition of Caitra does not cognize the grasped part of the cognition occurring in [Caitra] himself because it is a cognition [itself] (jñānatvāt), like [the cognition] occurring in another body [e.g., of Maitra].

It is clear that the cognition of Maitra does not apprehend the cognition of Caitra, which also implies that the cognition of Maitra does not apprehend a part of the cognition of Caitra. In the same manner, the cognition of Caitra does not apprehend a part of the cognition of Caitra himself. This is attributed to the fact that the respective cognitions of Caitra and Maitra equally have the property of being cognitions.

In other words, this argument is based on what it means to be a cognition (jñānatva). This will also be of importance for understanding the development of Dharmakīrti’s saṃvedana argument and will be taken up again below.

2. Śāntarakṣita’s defense of self-awareness

Let us now examine how Śāntarakṣita rebuts all the arguments Kumārila formulated in ŚV Śūnyavāda 172cd–177ab.

2.1 The sahopalambhanyama argument

Śāntarakṣita commences his refutation of the first group of arguments as follows:

TS₂ 2068:

apṛthag vedanāt pūrvaṃ tasyaiva pratipādītā //
aiKarūpyāparijñānaparyanteṣu na siddhatā //

ŚV Śūnyavāda 175d:

jñānotpatter iti hetuḥ / tad dhi samanantarapratyayaud utpadyata iti bauddhā manyante /

ŚV Śūnyavāda 176cd–177ab (quoted as TS₂ 2067):

caitrajñānam tadudbhūtajñānāṃśagrāhyabhodhakam // jñānatvān na bhaved yadvat tasya dehāntarodbhavam //

ŚV Śūnyavāda 176cd–177ab:

caitrajñānam dharmi // taccaitrodhibhuto yo jñānāṃśo grahyas tasya bodhakam na bhavatīti sādhyam //

TSP₂ 705,15 on TS₂ 2067:

yadvat tasya caitrajñānodbhūtajñānāṃśasya maitrādidehāntarodbhavam jñānam //

tasyaiva em. (de nyid T) : tadatra TS₁, TS₁₄ (adopted in TS₁ and TS₂).
Since [the non-difference between an object and its cognition]\textsuperscript{34} has already been explained as based on [the logical reason of] not being separately cognized, [all the reasons] up to the reason “not being perceived as identical” have [the fault of] being unestablished.

According to Kamalaśīla,\textsuperscript{35} with the expression \textit{apṛthag vedanāt} “because they are not cognized separately,” Śāntarakṣita refers to the reason sahopalambhaniyamāt “because they are necessarily perceived together,” of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyamā argument. Since this argument establishes the non-difference between an object and the cognition thereof, all the four reasons in Kumārila’s first group of arguments are to be considered unestablished (\textit{asiddha}).

It is to be noted, in passing, that Śāntarakṣita reformulates the sahopalambhaniyamā argument earlier in the TS as follows:\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{TS}_2 2029–2030:

\begin{verbatim}
yatsaṃvedanam eva syād yasya saṃvedanaṃ dhruvam //
tasmād avyatiriktaṃ tat tato vā na vibhidyate //
yathā nīladhiyāḥ svātmā dvitiyoḥ vā yatthoḍuṇāḥ //
nīladhīvedanaṃ cedaṃ nilākārasya vedanam //
\end{verbatim}

If a cognition of X is necessarily a cognition of Y, X is not different from Y, or Y does not differ from X. Just as the cognition’s own essence [is not different from the cognition of blue, or the cognition of blue does not differ from the cognition’s own essence], or just as the second moon [is not different from the first one, or the first moon does not differ from the second one]. And this cognition of the form of blue (\textit{nīlākāra}) is [necessarily] a cognition of the cognition of blue (nīladhī). [Therefore, the form of blue is not different from the cognition of blue, or the cognition of blue does not differ from the form of blue.]

As noted by Umbeka, Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyamā argument basically has the reverse factors of the aikarūpyena-ajināna argument. Namely, the property to be proved (\textit{sādhyadharma}) is “being non-different [from each other]” (\textit{abheda}) rather than “being different [from each other]” (\textit{bhinna}), and the logical reason is “being necessarily perceived together” (sahopalambhaniyamā) rather than “not being perceived as identical” (aikarūpyena-ajināna) or “being perceived separately” (bhedopalambhana). In Dharmakīrti’s treatment, this is the main argument corresponding to Kumārila’s first group, meaning that, if Dharmakīrti’s treatment is later than Kumārila’s, then the aikarūpyena-ajināna argument is being taken to imply or speak for the other three arguments of the first group,

\textsuperscript{34} TSP\textsubscript{2} 705.20 on TS\textsubscript{2} 2068: \textit{abhedasya nilataddhiyoh prasādhitatvāt}… / See n. 58.

\textsuperscript{35} TSP\textsubscript{2} 705.18 on TS\textsubscript{2} 2068: \textit{apṛthag vedanād iti nilataddhiyoh sahopalambhaniyamāt / apratyaksopala-}lambhasyasya nārtadhastīṃ prasādhyati // (= PVin I 54cd) ity atah svasamvitprāśasādhanaṃ pratipādītād abhedasya nilataddhiyoh prasādhitatvād aikarūpyāparijñānamaparyantarāḥ hetavā na siddhāḥ // (For nilata-}ddiyoḥ sahopalambhaniyamā in the quotation TSP cf. PVin I 54ab.)

\textsuperscript{36} See Matsuoka 2011 for the interpretation of TS\textsubscript{2} 2029–2030.
namely, the *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti*, *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa*, and *itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa* arguments.

### 2.2 Refutations of the *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* and *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* arguments

After collectively refuting Kumārila’s first group of arguments, Śāntarakṣita discusses the *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* and *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* arguments individually.

#### 2.2.1 Refutation of the *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* argument

To begin with, the logical reason of this argument is unestablished (*asiddha*). In order to show this, Śāntarakṣita cites PVin I 54cd with slight modification and further argues.\(^{37}\)

\[TS_2 2073:\]
\[
aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittiḥ prasidhyati /\]
\[
tan na grāhyasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavād rte //\]

For someone whose perception is not established, the cognition of the object is not established. Therefore, there is no cognition of the grasped without an experience of the grasper.

The point is that an object can be established, in Dharmakīrti’s words, as perceived only when the cognition of an object is perceived. It cannot be the case that the cognition is not perceived when its object is perceived.

In the *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* argument, Kumārila has increased the scope of the reason that a cognition is not cognized when its object is cognized on the basis of the statement in Śabara’s *Bhāṣya* that only an object as connected with the external world (*bahirdeśasambadha*) is perceived. In connection with this statement, Śāntarakṣita points out that what is perceived is not always an external object, and thereby argues that Kumārila’s reason is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*).

\[TS_2 2074:\]
\[
\text{asvasthalocanair } \text{dṛṣṭaṃ } \text{tathā } \text{pūḍḍy } \text{avekṣyate /}\]
\[
\text{vispaṣṭam}^{40} \text{ } \text{grāhakāṃśac ca samvedyaṃ na tathā } \text{param //}\]

[Unreal objects like] yellow, etc., that are seen by someone with an eye-disease are vividly (*vispaṭṭam*) perceived in that way [i.e., connected with the external

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\(^{37}\) See Kellner 2011 for a comparison of the two different arguments for self-awareness that are presented in PS(V) I 11d–12 and PVin I 54cd.

\(^{38}\) This is a quotation of PVin I 54cd, with *aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittiḥ* TS: *aprayakṣopalambhasya nārthavṛtiḥ* PVin, which reads “For someone who does not perceive perception, the perception of the object is not established either” (trans. Kellner 2011: 420). For the further discussion with PVin I 54cd as Dharmakīrti’s argument of infinite regress, see Kellner 2011.

\(^{39}\) grāhyasya... // TS; ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 79cd.

\(^{40}\) *vispaṭṭam* em. (*gsal por* T, *vispaṭṭam* TSP) : *nīkṛṣṭaṃ* TS₁, TS₉ (adopted in TS₁ and TS₂).
and they are not perceived [separately (niṣkṛṣṭam)] from the grasping part. Likewise for another [i.e. yellow as seen by someone with healthy eyes].

Needless to say, in the case of an erroneous cognition, someone with an eye-disease perceives an object that is not externally existent.

2.2.2 Refutation of the tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument

In attacking the tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa argument, Śāntarakṣita begins by saying the following:

TS₆ 2075:

alakṣitaviśeṣā ca grāhyarūpe⁴⁴ ca sā śmṛtiḥ /

sarvato bhinnarūpe tu na sābhyaśādasyasambhavāt //

A recollection by which a particular is not observed occurs with respect to an object to be grasped. But it does not occur with respect to an object distinguished from all others since habituation (abhyāsa) and the other [causal factors for ascertainment] are not possible.

According to Kamalaśīla, an individual entity cannot be remembered because recollection (śmṛti) is not capable of having an individual for its object, unlike perception. A perception of an individual entity can cause the perceiver to determine (adhyavasāya) that the object is an individual if one of several causal factors for ascertainment (niścayahetu) is present:

41 TSP 706,23 on TS₂ 2074: vispaṣṭam ity atra chedaḥ /

42 TSP 706,25 on TS₂ 2074: grāhakāṃśāc ca saṃvedyaṃ neti chedaḥ /

43 TSP 707,7 on TS₂ 2074: tathā param iti satyābhimatam api piśād /

44 TSP 707,14 on TS₂ 2075cd: etad uktaṃ bhavati – na tāvad vikalpasya yathāvasthitavastugrahanāsāmarthyaṃ /

45 TSP 707,15 on TS₂ 2075: yatraivāt tathābhūtapadārthābhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyaṃ pravṛttieṃ (gsal bo ba T) : bāhyarūpe TS₁, TS₂₅, (adopted in TS₁ and TS₂).

The editions TSP₁ and TSP₂ read -ābhyāsapāṭavādar apratyāsattitāratamyaḥ, TSP₂₇, T reads goms pa gsal bo gzhan myur ba dang ches myur ba la sogs pa”. The emphasized part corresponds to PVin II 46,7: svapratibhāse ‘narthe ‘rthādhyavasāyaṃ pravṛttieṃ. See also PVSV 31,16–32,12 on PV I 58 for Dharmakīrti’s explanation of causal factors for ascertainment (niścayapratyaya). I referred to Kellner’s (2004) descriptions of PVSV 32,5–12 for the translations of niścayahetu, tathāvidhābhyaśa, pāvava, pratyāsattitāratmya.
a [state of] habituation due to similar situations (tathāvidhābhyaśa), acuity [of cognition] (pāṭava), or the [difference in] degree of proximity (pratyāsattitāratamya). There are no such causal factors for ascertainment in the case of recollection, which means that its objects will always be determined as universals instead of particulars.

Now, if recollection has only a universal character for its object, how could the object be remembered?

Śāntarakṣita answers the question by saying the following:

TS2 2076:

\[ gṛhīta \text{ iti ko } 'py evaṁ nānyathā smaraṇaṁ bhavet / \]
\[ śuddhasphaṭikasāṅkāše vidyate\text{ smaraṇaṁ na ca } \]\n
Otherwise, there could be no recollection as in the form “Something was grasped.” And there is no recollection [of a grasper] like a pure crystal.

There is no recollection of a cognition like a colorless transparent crystal that is not marked with the form of its object. Even if there is a case where, after cognizing a certain object, one cannot remember the object in a specific way, it does not follow that one is remembering a cognition which grasped no object.

Śāntarakṣita concludes that the logical reason presented in PS I 11c is established whereas that of the tatparāmarśa- aparāmarśa argument is not.

2.3 The saṃvedana argument

Śāntarakṣita then continues on to refute the arguments of group 2 as follows:

TS2 2077:

\[ kambupīṭādivijñānair hetvoḥ\text{ paścimayor api } / \]
\[ anaikāntikatā vyaktaṁ dig eṣānyatra sādhane } \]

In view of the cognition of a yellow conch-shell and the like, the latter two logical reasons are clearly inconclusive (anaikāntika). This is the way to deal with the other reasons [to prove the existence of an external object, too].

Like in TS2 2074, Śāntarakṣita here gives as an example of an erroneous cognition in order to point out that the logical reasons of the two jñāna-utpatti arguments and of the jñānatva argument are all inconclusive.

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46 TSP2 707,22 on TS2 2076: syād etat – katham avasīyate grāhyādhyavasāyo 'trāsti smṛter ity āha – gṛhīta ityādī /
47 vidyate em. following yod pa T : vedyate TS1, TSPa (adopted in TS1, TS2).
48 TSP2 707,24 on TS2 2076: na cāpi kevalo grāhyākārānāṁkāmūrtitayā grāhakah śuddhasphaṭikasāṅkāśaṁ smaryate /
50 TSP2 708,10 on TS2 2077d: eṣā dig ity anyatrapī bahirarthasādhane paropanyaste eṣā dīṣaṇadik /
51 See section 2.2.1.
To explain, suppose that there occurs a cognition of yellow with reference to a white conch-shell. The erroneous cognition cognizes the form (ākāra) of yellow, which is a part of the cognition and which has no counterpart in the external world. If a continuum of cognitions is accepted, then the erroneous cognition must be presumed to arise from an immediately preceding cognition. Alternatively, the cognition, which is identical with the form of yellow, is cognized by the grasping part of the erroneous cognition.

It is to be noted that, according to Kamalaśīla, the other (anyat) cognition, that is, the non-erroneous cognition, also deviates from “not cognizing a part of [cognition] itself.” Even the cognition of a white conch-shell or that of someone with healthy eyes also cognizes a part of the cognition, which means that every cognition cognizes itself.

This reminds us of Dharmakīrti’s samvedana argument which was reformulated by Śāntarakṣita as follows:

TS₂ 2032:

\[
\text{samvedanam idam sarvam na cārthāntaragocaram} \\
\text{samvedanasvabhāvatvāḥ svātmasyaṃ yathā}
\]

Every cognition does not have for its object anything other [than the cognition itself] because it has the essential nature of a cognition, like the cognition of one’s own self.

According to Dharmakīrti as well as Śāntarakṣita, no cognition cognizes any object distinct from the cognition itself because its essential nature is that of a cognition.

For both Dharmakīrti and Kumārila, the essential nature of a cognition is being that which illuminates (prakāśaka). What is illuminated, however, differs for each: the cognition itself or an external object, respectively. Therefore, the same logical reason “being a cognition itself” or “having a cognition as its essence” will yield opposite implications; for Kumārila, a cognition never cognizes a part of the cognition (svāṃśa), whereas for Dharmakīrti, it never cognizes anything different from the cognition.

Thus, in the same way as was the case with the aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna and sahopala-mbhantiyama arguments (cf. section 2.1), here too, Dharmakīrti seems to have reversed only the properties to be proved of the jñānatva argument and then let this imply the other two jñāna-utpatti arguments of the second group.

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52 TSP₂ 708.6 on TS₂ 2077: ṭathā hi – yathā yadi pūtaśankhādijñānam jñānato pannam api sat svāṃśaṃ pūtaśankhārāṃ grāhyāḥ / (ṭathā hi yathā TSP; yathā TSP₂: ‘di ltar na T; n.e. TSP₆, TSP₁.)

53 TSP₂ 708.7 on TS₂ 2077: yathā ca jñānam api sat jñānāṃśasya pitāder grāhyasya bodhakam bhavati /

54 TSP₂ 708.7 on TS₂ 2077: tathānyad api yāvabhiçārtā hetvoh /

55 For samvedanasvabhāvatvāḥ TS₁, TSP₆ (adopted in TS₂, cf. also rig pa’i rang bzhin nyid kyi phyir TSP₆, rig pa’i rang bzhin nyid rig TSP₂), TS₁ emends to samvedanam ca nilaṣṭa.

56 PV III 329: prakāśānāmas tadātmyāt sa-paripāṣa prakāśakah / yathā prakāśo abhīmatas thāthā dhīr ātmavedinī /; TS₂ 2081a: vijñānatvam prakāśatvam ... / ŚV Śūnyavāda 187ab quoted in TS₂ 2017ab: prakāśakatvam bāhye ’rthe śaktyabhāvāḥ tu nātmāni /
3. Against nirākāravāda

Lastly, let us consider how Śāntarakṣita regards the function of the sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana arguments.

After reformulating the saṃvedana argument, he states:

TS₂ 2034:

śuddhasphaṭikasaṅkāśam arthākārair anañkitam /

yair iṣṭam vedanaṃ kaiścid idaṃ tān prati sādhanam //

Both⁵⁷ of these [arguments] are addressed to those who maintain that a cognition is not marked with the form of its object, being like a pure crystal.

That is, according to Śāntarakṣita (as understood by Kamalaśīla, see n. 57) both the sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana arguments are meant to prove self-awareness (svasaṃvid), which, stated from a different perspective, is the same as proving that a cognition is marked with the form of its object (sākāratā).⁵⁸ Those who claim that a cognition is not marked with the form of its object (nirākāratā) are none other than nirākāravādins represented by Kumārila.

Thus, according to Śāntarakṣita, Dharmakīrti’s aim in including both of these arguments is not to prove svasamvid or sākāratā yet again after it had already been proved (siddhasādhanam) by the other of the two, as suggested by Śubhagupta;⁵⁹ indeed, it would not be appropriate, given the rules of debate, for Dharmakīrti to offer two arguments for the same thing only for the sake of improving upon the position laid out by Dignāga. Rather, as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla helpfully point out, these two arguments must be meant for refuting nirākāravāda; after all, in refuting an opposing position, it is indeed permitted to adopt as many approaches as might be necessary.

4. Concluding remarks

According to Śāntarakṣita, the reason Dharmakīrti developed his arguments is to defend Dignāga’s theory of self-awareness against the attack by Kumārila. In order to counter Dignāga’s arguments for dvirūpatā and svasamvedyatā respectively, Kumārila had argued that an object and its cognition are different from one another on the basis of the fact that they are perceived differently (bhedopalambhana), and, secondly, that a cognition never cognizes a part of itself on the basis of its essential nature of being a cognition (jñānatva).

⁵⁷ TSP₂ 696,14 on TS₂ 2034d: idam iti dvividham api sādhanaṃ nirākāravādinam prati yatas tena na siddhasādhyatā /

⁵⁸ The logical reasons sahopalambhaniyama and saṃvedana are collectively called svasaṃvitrātisādhana or sākāratāsiddhārṣādhana by Kamalaśīla. TSP₂ 695,14 on TS₂ 2032: dvividhātān api sākāratāsiddhaye sādhanam ita – samvedanas idam ityādi / TSP₂ 705,20 on TS₂ 2068: ataḥ svasaṃvitrātisādhana eva pratipātitaḥ abhedasya nīlattaddhiyoh prasādhipravattāt / See n. 34.

⁵⁹ In BASK 87 Śubhagupta points out that the saṃvedana argument is not valid because it proves what is already proved (siddhasādhanam) by the sahopalambhaniyama argument. BASK 87 is quoted in TSP₂ 696,11 on TS₂ 2034: sākārājñānapakṣe ca tannirbhāsasya vedyatā / tasyābheda ca saṃsādhye siddhasādhanatā bhavet //
Accordingly, Dharmakīrti formulated the *sahopalambhaniyama* and *samvedana* arguments as counter-arguments against these arguments by Kumārila.

Although it is unacceptable to the ŚV-commentators such as Umbeka, Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation of the relation among the various arguments given in PS I, ŚV *Śūnyavāda* and PVin I is reasonable. This is because, although it is clear that Kumārila, in his exhaustive detail, was attempting to refute Dignāga’s arguments from multiple perspectives, it should also be apparent from the dual nature of Dharmakīrti’s argumentation that he himself was also responding to a challenge. To do so, Dharmakīrti simply reversed the factors of the *aikarūpyaṇa-ajñāna* and *jñānatva* arguments in particular, implying that – from his perspective – these two arguments would also cover the other five arguments which Kumārila employed. If Dharmakīrti thereby successfully boiled down these discussions to their essential issues, this could then represent a rather elegant response to Kumārila’s detailed challenge.

**References and abbreviations**

**Primary sources**

**BASK** Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā: See Mikogami 1986.


**NR** Nyāyaratnākāra: *Mīmāṃsāslokavārttikam*. Varanasi: 1898.


**PSV** Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti: See PS I.

**PV I** Pramāṇavārttika, ch. 1 (Svārthānumāṇa): See PVSV.

**PV III** Pramāṇavārttika, ch. 3 (Pratyakṣa): See PVV.


**PVAṬS II** Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāratiṃkā Supariṣuddhā, ch. 2 (Pratyakṣa): Tibetan translation, D 4226 me 1–328a7; P 5723 me 1–436a8 (Vol. 135, pp. 77–252).


ŚBh  Śābarabhāṣya: See Frauwallner 1968.
ŚV  Ślokavārttika: ŠV<sub>V</sub>=ŠV<sub>T</sub>=ŠV<sub>M</sub>.
ŚV<sub>M</sub> Ślokavārttika: See TT.
ŚV<sub>T</sub> Ślokavārttika: See Kā.
ŚV<sub>V</sub> Ślokavārttika: See NR.
T  Tibetan translation of TS(P) (in cases where D and P have identical readings).
TS(P)<sub>1</sub> Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā: Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, ed. E. Kṛṣṇamācārya. 2 vols. Baroda 1926.
TS<sub>D</sub> Tattvasaṅgraha, Tibetan translation, D 4266 ze 1–133a6.
TS<sub>P</sub> Tattvasaṅgraha, Tibetan translation, P 5764 ’e 1–159a5.
TSP<sub>D</sub> Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, Tibetan translation, D 4267 ze 133b1–’e 331a7.
TSP<sub>P</sub> Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, Tibetan translation, P 5765 ’e 159b2–ye 495a7 (Vols. 138–139, pp. 200–164).

Secondary literature

Śāntarakṣita on Two Kinds of Arguments for Self-Awareness


Watanabe 2014  T. Watanabe, Buddhist Critiques of the Sāṅkhya Theory of Causality: Dharmakīrti and His Predecessors. Paper presented at the XIIth Congress of the
International Association of Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna, 18–23 August, 2014.


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Prajñākaragupta’s Argument for Two Means of Valid Cognition

by

Patrick McAllister

1 Introduction

The Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition starting with Dignāga (ca. fifth to sixth century CE) accepts only two means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*): perception and inference. Whilst many aspects of *pramāṇa* theories have been studied carefully by modern scholars, the history of the arguments that are used to prove that only inference and perception are *pramāṇas* has not been investigated in great detail. The analysis usually offered is that there are, first, two means of valid cognition since there are two objects, but that, second, really only the particular is the object of a valid cognition.

For example, Franco and Notake (2014) characterize PV III 1–63 as follows, Franco and Notake 2014: 4:

[The] argumentative structure is clear: There are two *pramāṇas* because there are two *prameyas*, and there are two *prameyas* because of the four criteria that distinguish between universals and particulars.

In their comments (Franco and Notake 2014: 30, n. 2) on PV III 1, they add that,

[…] in the final analysis, for Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta it cannot be said that the fact that there are two kinds of object is the reason for there being two kinds of means of knowledge, but that two modes of cognition of the same thing are the reason for there being two kinds of objects of knowledge (*prameya*).

Such a paraphrase of the two arguments for inference and perception is in no way the result of misunderstanding what Dharmakīrti said. He does certainly say this. The question is, rather, how the two arguments cohere.
That there is a tension between the two statements can be seen by contrasting PV III 1, the opening verse of the pratyakṣa chapter, and PV III 53:

PV III 1: pramāṇaṃ dvividhaṃ meyadvaividhyāc chaktyaśakti-tah
arthakriyāyāṃ keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣataḥ ||

The means of valid cognition is twofold because that to be cognized [by it] is twofold; for [that to be cognized by it] is [either] capable [or] incapable of fulfilling an aim; an illusory object like hair and so on is not an object [that is to be cognized by it], because one does not apply [oneself to it] as an object.5

This corresponds exactly to the first part of the view of Franco and Notake (2014) quoted above: there are two means of valid cognition because there are two objects of valid cognition. This view is already endorsed by Dignāga.6

The verse corresponding to the second statement is this:

PV III 53d: …meyaṃ tv ekaṃ svalakṣaṇam ||

There is, however, [only] one [thing] to be validly cognized, the particular.

So according to the first argument, there are two means of valid cognition because there are two objects of valid cognition. Here, however, Dharmakīrti maintains that there is only one object of valid cognition. Dharmakīrti continues, giving the reason that there is only one object:

PV III 54: tasmād arthakriyāsiddheḥ sadasattāvicāraṇāt |
tasya svapararūpābhāyaṃ gater meyadvayaṃ matam ||

For one examines the existence and non-existence [of the particular], since the fulfilment of an aim is accomplished [only] due to this [particular]. [We] think7 that there are two [objects] of valid cognition, because this [particular] is cognized through [its] own nature and through another nature.

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4 The term arthakriyā is here translated as referring to the usefulness something can have in conventional, human activity. It is also a technical term in Buddhist pramāṇa theory (cf. Nagatomi 1967–1968, Dunne 2004: 256–260). In the current instance it can be taken in both ways: a thing fulfills a person’s aim, or, in the technical sense, it is able to cause an effect. In this article, I will render it as a technical term (by “causal efficacy”, or similar), when I think it is referring to the property of a real thing independently of that thing’s use by another being.

5 For adhimokṣa, and also abhiniveśa (a term relevant below), see Kobayashi 2010: n. 23.


7 Franco and Notake (2014: 140) take the subject of matam to be Dignāga, translating “It is held [by Dignāga] …”, referring to PVV 132, 8–9, where an opponent asks whether PV III 54d–55b does not contradict Dignāga’s statement that “there is no [object] to be validly cognized apart from the particular and the universal” (cf. PS I 1, 19 and Hattori 1968: 24). I agree, but think the impersonal matam here carries the additional notion that, at least in a revised way, this is still maintained to be the case. The “we” I have added here is therefore meant to include Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Also Prajñākaragupta relates this to Dignāga, see below.
So the difference of the objects of valid cognition is due to the same object being understood in two different ways: either it is understood through the characteristic particular to it, as it is apprehended by direct perception, or it is indirectly understood through another, general aspect, which is how a conceptual cognition comprehends its object. This argument broadly separates the field into two parts: it specifies perception and “something else”; this other is conceptual cognition, of which inference is only a subclass.⁸

Prajñākaragupta lets an opponent use the tension between the two arguments for an attack in the following passage, immediately after the citation of PV III 54ab:

_PVABh₂ 213, 4–8:_ yadi svalakṣaṇam eva dvābhyaṁ api viṣayikriyate ekaviṣayatvād ekam eva māṇaṁ prasaktam. athaikaviṣayatve ’pi sāmagraiṣbhedāt pramāṇabhedaḥ. evaṁ sati prameyadvaivyad iti virudhyate. uktaṁ cācāryena yasṁāl lakṣaṇadvayaṁ prameyam iti. sāmagraiṣbhedena ca pramāṇabhede ca-kṣurādivijñānānām api bhedaḥ sāmagryā iti tāvanti pramāṇāni bhaveyuh.

[Opponent:] If only the particular is made an object by all two, [then], because there is [only] one object, only a single means follows.

[Proponent:] Now, even though there is only one object, there is a difference of the means of valid cognition because of a difference of the causal complex.

[Opponent:] If that is so, then [the statement] “because there are two [objects] to be validly cognized” (PV III 1) is contradicted, as well as what the teacher [Dignāga] said: “[There are two means of valid cognition] because the [object] to be validly cognized has two characteristics, [i.e., one particular to it and one that it has in common with other things].” (PS I 2bc)

But if there were a difference of the means of valid cognition because of the difference of the causal complex [generating a cognition], [then] also [different types of] cognitions such as visual [cognition] and so on would be differentiated [from each other] due to [their] causal complex. So there would be as many means of valid cognition [as there are different causal complexes].

In this passage, the opponent addresses the most important difficulties in maintaining both PV III 1 and PV III 53d–54ab. The core of the criticism can be explicated like this:

1. Given that there is only one object of valid cognition, the particular, and given the argument in PV III 1 that the number of objects is the reason for the number of means, it results that one means of valid cognition, perception, would be sufficient: Dharmakīrti would thus be contradicting the position that there are two means, expressed in PV III 1.

2. If the duality of the means of valid cognition is to be maintained, but for a reason other than the number of objects that are to be validly cognized, then Dharmakīrti

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⁸ The difference between conceptual cognition in general and inference in particular is a separate argument and is not discussed here.
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is contradicting both the reason he himself gave in PV III 1, “because the object of valid cognition is twofold”, as well as Dignāga’s reasoning in PS I 2bc.

3. In addition to this, if the new reason for the duality of the means of valid cognition should be that each valid cognition’s specific set of causes is different, then one will have to assume that there are as many means of valid cognition as there are variations in the causal complexes.

The argument in PV III 53d–54ab is thus problematic in various respects: it contradicts Dharmakīrti’s previous statement, and it contradicts the tradition Dharmakīrti claims to uphold. Furthermore, if the actual reason for the differentiation of means of valid cognition lies in the difference of their causal complexes, then this reason does not prove what it is supposed to prove (according to this opponent, it could prove that there is either only one or that there are very many means of valid cognition).

In the following, I will focus on Prajñākaragupta’s strategy in answering this objection. The most relevant passages in this regard are his commentary on PV III 1–2 and on PV III 53d–58.

2 Prajñākaragupta on PV III 1–2: a conventional criterion of validity

Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of the argument in PV III 1, which is clearly influenced by the later argument found in PV III 53d–54, is as follows:

\[
\text{PVABh}_i, 36, 25–27: \text{viṣayasya caikasyaiva dvaividyhyām pratipattiprakāra-
\text{syā dvaividyhyāt | pratipattibhedaś ca pramāṇabhedaḥ | sa eva ca viṣayabheda-
daḥ |}
\]

And the object, which is only one, is twofold, because the manner of [its] cognition is twofold. And the difference of means of valid cognition is [this] difference of cognition. And exactly this [difference of the means of valid cognition] is the difference of the object.

Prajñākaragupta is here interpreting PV III 1 in the light of the later argument: the object of valid cognition is only one, but we think it is twofold because it is apprehended in two different ways.

9 There is a a slight textual variation in the text as quoted here and PV III 1: (pra)meyadvaiṣidyāt.

10 The term caṇḍurādvijñāna suggests that a visual and an auditory cognition would have to be taken as different types of means of valid cognition because at least one element in each causal complex, the sense organ involved, is different. This is contrary to the Buddhist classification of both as a single means of valid cognition, perception.

11 Kobayashi 2011 has presented a concise analysis of two elements that are important to Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti explored in the following sections: first, Kobayashi 2011: 1257–1259 shows that, against Dharmottara, Prajñākaragupta maintains that the object of activity which any means of valid cognition directs a person towards is always a future particular (bhāvivastu), and that this is the single meya that Dharmakīrti is referring to; second, Kobayashi 2011: 1259–1260 illustrates that, according to Prajñākaragupta, both perception and inference can be said to be erroneous with regard to this future object.

Before examining the later verses in the light of Prajñākaragupta’s commentary, it is necessary to understand a few of the programmatic points of his commentary on PV III 1–2: for it is here, in the opening section of the pratyakṣa chapter, that he describes the purpose and scope that he considers the chapter to have, and therefore these statements help in interpreting his later arguments.

The commentary on these two verses, up to PVABh 44, 27, is too long to be discussed here, and I will therefore limit myself to two issues that are central to Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s argument: the role that self-awareness and everyday activity have in establishing that there are two means of valid cognition, and Prajñākaragupta’s characterization of the relation between inference and perception.

2.1 Self-awareness and everyday activity

Prajñākaragupta’s general answer to why one can say there are two objects of valid cognition is as follows.\(^\text{14}\)

\begin{quote}
PVABh 39, 6–9: atrocyate | viṣayadvividyāṃ pratyakṣata eva siddham |
sadrśāsadṛśapratītir hi pratītēr eva dharmah |
sa ca svasaṃvedanapratyakṣasiddhah |
na ca pratītih svarūpe bhrāntisaṅgatā |
tatra bhrāntīsāṅkāyāṃ avyavahāra eva bhaved anavatārahetur vā vādiprativādiprāśnikavacanasya |
\end{quote}

To this [we] respond: That there are two [kinds of] object [for cognition] is established solely from perception. For the cognition of [something as] similar [to other things or as] dissimilar [to everything else] is a property only of cognition; and this [property] is established by the perception [that is cognition’s] awareness of itself. And cognition cannot be mistaken about [its] own form. If there is a suspicion about [the possibility of] an error with regard to that [form of cognition itself], there would be no everyday activity at all, or there would be no reason for the talk of [either] the proponent, opponent, or questioner to take place.

In other words, the fact that there are two objects of cognition is evident. A cognition of something can occur in two modes: it can be cognized as similar or dissimilar to something else—that is, it can be cognized as something that has something in common with other things, as a universal in the broadest sense of the term; or as being dissimilar from everything else, as a unique thing. These two modes are qualities of cognition, not of the object. As we will repeatedly see below,\(^\text{15}\) it is the distinct (spaṣṭa) or indistinct (aspaṣṭa) appearance of the object that differentiates the two types of cognition. This appearance as such is directly

\(^{13}\) The term “self-awareness”, which renders the Sanskrit svasaṃvedana, here “… refers to the idea that all mental states and the factors like passion or feelings that accompany them are aware of themselves.” (Kellner 2010: 204) I will below also use the phrase “cognition’s awareness of itself” for svasaṃvedana to make it clear that it means that here the object of cognition is cognition itself.

\(^{14}\) Franco and Notake (2014: n. 2, p. 31) point out that Manorathanandin makes a similar argument. Prajñākaragupta’s argument here is also quoted and refuted in NBhūṣ 382, 3–9.

\(^{15}\) Cf. section 4, n. 56, and n. 48.
perceived by the awareness that every cognition has of itself, and doubt about this aspect of cognition would end all conventional activity, as well as make any debate impossible.

In explaining this, Prajñākaragupta emphasizes that the duality of means of valid cognition is only conventional. This becomes especially clear in the following passage, where he addresses the overall aim of the pratyakṣa chapter:

PVAbhIn II 20–21, and 39, 20–24: pratītibheda evāstu mānabheda
dah katham bhavet |

nanu prasiddham mānatvam pūrvaṃ sāmānyalakṣanāt ||


tadbhedavyavahārō 'yam idānīṃ sādhyatāṃ gataḥ |
savikalpakam adhyakṣam eṣo 'gniriti yo vadet ||

[Opponent:] There certainly may be a difference of cognitions. 
[But] why would there be a difference of means of valid cognition? 
Well, the state of being a means of valid cognition was well established earlier, from [its] general characteristic. 

[Proponent:] Now, this everyday activity [of ours that treats] the means of valid cognition as different, has come to be what is to be established, 
as someone might proclaim a conceptual perception, [like] “This is a fire.”

… On the basis of everyday activity, [that is], from the characteristic of engagement or nonengagement [with an object], what it is to be a means of valid cognition has been well established in the first chapter [the \textit{pramāṇasiddhi} chapter of the PV, but] only according to [its] general characteristic.

Now, [in this chapter, what it is to be a means of valid cognition] has become what is to be established only [insofar as] it is commonly treated as differentiated [into two types]; [the explanation] “this [means of valid cognition] is twofold” [is given by Dharmakīrti] for that [person] who would say about this [means of valid cognition] that there is only a single conceptual perception, for example, “This is a fire, from it the attainment of a desired aim is brought about.”; [this is said to him] because the form of cognition is differentiated.
In these statements Prajñākargupta is contrasting the scope of the first (pramāṇasiddhi) chapter and the current chapter: in the first chapter, validity was established in its general form—as a definition applicable to all kinds of valid cognitions. Moreover, validity was established there conventionally—that is, in relation to the engagement in some activity (or abstention from an activity) that a means of valid cognition facilitates in a way that makes that activity successful.\footnote{For Prajñākargupta’s general analysis of cognition’s validity and its relation to activity, see Ono 2000 and Franco 2004. The explicit equation of “being a means of valid cognition” with enabling or motivating successful activity derives from PV M II 1–5, and was already elucidated by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi (see Dunne 2004: 253–256). We find it fully developed as one of a number of equal definitions of validity in Dharmottara’s work, cf. Krasser 1995: 247–248, Franco 1997: 52.} On this background, Prajñākaragupta continues, an opponent might object: conceptual perception is compatible with this criterion of validity, and, in fact, it is the only (ekam eva) means of valid cognition that has to be assumed. It is compatible with this definition of validity because, if conceptual perception is possible, it could contain the ascertainment “This is a fire, it can fulfil my aim.” This is not acceptable to Dharmakīrtians. Therefore, a further argument is necessary to show that there is not only one combined means of valid cognition, a perception containing a conceptual cognition, but rather that there are different means of valid cognition.

In other words, the pramāṇasiddhi chapter does not answer the question of which means of valid cognition there are, but only of what a means of valid cognition is. The pratyakṣa chapter will however deal exactly with this question: what are the different means of valid cognition? In addition, Prajñākaragupta qualifies this with the statement that that which is to be established now is bheda-vyavahāra-mātraka: it consists exclusively in the conventional talk of a division of the means of valid cognition as defined in the pramāṇasiddhi chapter.

The importance of noting this lies in the fact that Prajñākaragupta separates two elements: the capacity for leading to successful activity, the general criterion of any cognition’s validity, and what cognitions are like (in particular, whether they are conceptual or perceptual), which is the basis for distinguishing the types of valid cognitions and is evident in any cognition’s awareness of itself. In a conventional sense, a cognition can be considered ‘valid’ if it allows one to act successfully; it is not important for its validity what type of cognition it is. And vice versa, the general mark of validity is not important for distinguishing the types of these cognitions.

2.2 The relation of inference and perception

Prajñākaragupta then discusses which means of valid cognition can lead to successful activity, or, in other words, conforms to the conventional and general criterion of validity. First, an opponent, apparently a Buddhist,\footnote{Cf. Yamārī, (PVATS, 103, 37): ‘on te zhes bya ba la sogs pas ni rang gi phyogs pa’i rtos dp a slong ba’o/ Yamārī goes on to describe a position held by these others (explicitly excepting Bhaṭṭārca), on which a conceptual cognition that has an object that accomplishes some end is different from perception, and therefore not a means of valid cognition. Inami et al. (2002: 26, n. 35) give more details.} raises this objection:
Prajñākaragupta’s Argument for Two Means of Valid Cognition

PVABh$_m$ 39, 30–32: atha pratyakṣam eva pravartakam nāparam | tat tu mano ‘ntaram$^{18}$ bhavad api na pramāṇam | na hi saha tena yāvad bhave tāvat pramāṇam | sarīrabhūtalādīnām api prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt |

Now, perception alone is what causes activity, nothing else. That other cognition, though it exists, is not a means of valid cognition. For, [something] is not a means of valid cognition to the extent that [it] exists together with [a means of valid cognition], because it would result that even the body, the earth, and so on [which might all co-exist with a means of valid cognition] would be means of valid cognition.

Prajñākaragupta answers that perception is not, in and of itself, capable of letting a person act:

PVABh$_m$, II 23: anvayavyatirekābhyām upayogītarasthitiḥ | na ca kevalam adhyakṣam tadabhāve pravartakam ||

[Something] is determined as assisting [something else] or not through the positive and negative concomitance [of that which assists and that which it assists].

But perception by itself is not, when that [which assists it, i.e., conceptual cognition], is absent, what causes activity.

Without the introductory passage explaining that the topic here is the conventional difference of perception and inference, this would of course be in stark contrast to Dharmakīrti’s well-known position that, in activity following upon perception, only the perception is a means of valid cognition, but not the conceptual cognition that perception needs to be followed by in order to cause a person to act.$^{19}$

But, given that the discussion has here been restricted to the question about the difference of means of valid cognition, the verse says that it is not possible that perception alone—only a cognition with an object that is distinct (spaṣṭa)—can cause activity. The statement thus emphasizes that the general and conventional characteristic of a means of valid cognition, that it prompts activity, cannot be upheld if one wishes to also bind it to only one type of cognition—the perceptual one. That would immediately land one in an untenable position. In other words, to take perception alone as a means of valid cognition in this conventional sense is impossible: it will only work if one grants that status also to a conceptual cognition (or at least some conceptual cognitions).

This is then elaborated in the following, where Prajñākaragupta examines the relationship between inference and an activity following upon perception. Even in the case of complete habituation—a state in which a being is able to act upon a perception without intervening conceptual cognition—conceptual cognition is involved: for, so Prajñākaragupta,

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$^{18}$ PVABh-msB 84a5 reads mano‘ntaram, which I think is possible: it could be understood as ‘another cognition’, which corresponds to the Tibetan translation. Inami et al. (2002) correct to mānāntaram based on the Tibetan. Prof. Inami informs me that the tat tu is missing in his edition only due to an unfortunate misprint, and it is represented in his Japanese translation.

$^{19}$ See Katsura 1993 for a study of this “perceptual judgement” in Dharmakīrti’s writings.
the fact that there is a habituation presupposes an inferential cognition on whose basis the
habit must initially have been formed. To hold otherwise, so PVABhIn II 24, would be as
clever as thinking, because one contracts a disease the first time one goes somewhere, it is
unsafe to go there the first time, but safe thereafter. In this sense, inference can be said to be
the main element (pradhāna) even in purely habitual activity, which the opponent would
like to see as the main support for the claim that perception can promote activity without
conceptual aid. We can now investigate Prajñākaragupta’s comments on the later verses.

3 Prajñākaragupta on PV III 53d–54: one object known in two ways

In this section of the PVABhIn, Prajñākaragupta is presenting a discussion in which, as we
will see, the following argumentative aims are intertwined:

1. He needs to resolve and explain the possible contradiction between PV III 1 and PV
   III 53d (described above).
2. He has to prepare for the proof that perception and inference are the only means of
   valid cognition.
3. He has to prove that perception and inference are different means of valid cognition.
   (Points 2 and 3 together make it possible to maintain that there are two, and only
   two, means of valid cognition.)
4. He has to uphold cognition’s awareness of itself as the central cognitive faculty, in
   the sense that in reality perception and inference are two forms of this, and can only
   be conventionally separated.

Prajñākaragupta starts his commentary on PV III 53d (see above, section 1) as follows:

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20 See section 5 for how this position is taken up again in showing how inference and perception depend
on each other.

21 See the following passage: PVABhIn II 28: uktam atra vinābhıyāsān na pratyakṣe pramāṇatā | tato
   ‘numānam evātra pradhānam iti ganyatām || (It was explained that without habituation there is no
   means of valid cognition in a perception. Therefore it must be understood that inference alone is the
   main element here.)

22 McCrea (2011) has analyzed this section. Whilst he makes many valid points, he does not take the
overall argumentative context that is carried over into this section from the beginning of the pratyakṣa
chapter into due account. This results in attributing the following positions to Prajñākaragupta, which
directly contradict Dharmakīrti:

1. that perception is not free from error (McCrea 2011: 327)
2. that it is not perception, but rather the following moment of conceptual awareness that is a
   means of valid cognition (McCrea 2011: 323)

I do not agree with these attributions. Point one, though indeed Prajñākaragupta does make it, cannot
be taken out of its context (see section 6 and n. 54). Point two is a position that the opponent is being
forced into and cannot accept (see section 4).

Another issue that McCrea (2011: 323) discusses is that the conceptual awareness following perception
does not have the fault of gṛhitgraṇaha, or that this fault is not a reason to not be a means of valid
cognition. The discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this article (see the comment in n. 40).
Prajñākaragupta’s Argument for Two Means of Valid Cognition

\[ PVABh_2 \, 212, \, 29–30: \, na \, hi \, sāmānyam \, nāma \, prameyam, \, yathākalpanam \, ayo-gāt \, | \, svalakṣaṇam \, eva \, paramārthatah \, prameyam \, | \, tasyaiva \, sadasattvenāv-bedhasya \, prayajanatvāt \, | \, kuta etat | \]

\[ tasmād \, arthakriyāsiddheḥ \, sadasattāvicāraṇāt | \]

\[ arthakriyākārino \, hi \, padārthasya \, sattvāsa-tvābhhyām \, arthitā \, prekṣāvatām \, | \, tadavabodhāya \, ca \, pramāṇam \, anvisyate \, | \, anyathā \, pramānāparīkṣānaṃ \, aprē-kṣāpūrvakriyāva \, bhavet \, | \, tasmād \, arthakriyākāripadārthabhbhabbhāvavīśayi-karaṇasamartham \, arthavat \, pramāṇam \, | \, tasmāt \, dvābhhyām \, api \, pratyakṣānumā-nābhhyām \, svalakṣaṇam \, eva \, viśayikartavyam \, | \, anyathā \, pramānānāvīṣyogāt | \]

For the so-called universal is not an object of valid cognition, since it is not possible as it is imagined. In reality, only the particular is [the object] to be validly cognized, because the knowledge of the existence or non-existence of it alone is of use. Why is that?

Because one examines the existence and non-existence [of the particular], since the fulfilment of an aim is accomplished [only] due to it. (PV III 54ab)

For, judicious beings are intent upon [whether] the object that produces the fulfilment of [their desired] aims exists [or] not. And for [the purpose of] knowing that, [i.e., whether that objects exists or not], a means of valid cognition has to be sought for. Otherwise, the investigation by a means of valid cognition would be an entirely injudicious activity. Therefore, a means of valid cognition has an object [insofar as] it is capable of making the existence or non-existence of a thing that produces the fulfilment of an aim [its] object.

Therefore, by all two [means of valid cognition], perception and inference, only the particular is to be made the object, because otherwise it would be incoherent that [they should] be means of valid cognition.

So perception and inference are each a means of valid cognition only insofar as they direct a person to the successful accomplishment of a purpose. In order to do this, they have to reliably let a person attain a particular, since only that is capable of causing the desired effect. From this perspective, the particular alone is the object that is to be validly cognized, the prameya. The opponent immediately raises the objection that, if there is only one object of valid cognition, then one means would be enough, too.

Prajñākaragupta just remarks that this is wrong, since it is due to the differences in the respective causal complexes that two types of valid cognition can be assumed—implying that it is not because there are two objects.\(^\text{23}\)

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\(^{23}\) This idea of differences in the causal complex already appears in the analysis of PV III 2, most explicitly in PVABh\_2 II 49, and the accompanying prose, especially this passage: \[ PVABh_2 \, 44, \, 16–18: \, na \, hi \, sarvadā \, pramāṇadvitayaṃ \, prameyadvitayāt \, sādhyate \, | \, api \, tu \, sāmagrīśambhavād \, iti \, vayam \, brāmaḥ | \]
It is after this statement that the opponent delivers the main objection, presented above in section 1, and it should now be clearer what the exact direction of that objection is. McCrea (2011: 322 f.) has characterized it well, along with the main defence that Prajñākaragupta uses:

… the opponent attempts to find some way to distinguish perception from inference as a more direct or immediate mode of awareness, so that he can still deny the validity of inference without similarly condemning perception. In each case, Prajñākaragupta demonstrates that the opponent’s purported distinction is spurious, and that perception and inference are similarly indirect, such that one could not accept one as a pramāṇa without accepting the other as well.

In the current context, the problem concerns the causal complex of the means of valid cognition. The opponent distinguishes the object (prameya), which is the main factor in the causal complex, and the other, secondary factors in his criticism:

\[
\text{PVABh}_2 \text{ II 229: } \text{paramārthaprameyatve syād anantaprameyatā} \mid \apekṣākṛtabhedatve paramārtho na lakṣaṇam \mid
\]

If the object of valid cognition were real, there would be infinite objects of valid cognition. If [the object] is differentiated in dependence [on some other factor], reality is not a characteristic [of the object so differentiated].

This verse sums up the two sides of the opponent’s attack: if the particulars are the objects of valid cognition, then there would be infinitely many different objects. In other words, if the main factor in the causal complex generating a cognition were the real thing, there would be very many such cognitions, each a proper and separate means of valid cognition. So the Buddhist position expressed in PV III 53d, that there is only one object of valid cognition and that it is real, would be incoherent since this object’s reality implies its multiplicity. Alternatively, the opponent continues, the proponent might claim that the objects of valid cognition are differentiated in dependence on some other factor in the causal complex (as claimed in PV III 54cd); this, however, would mean that the difference maintained for the objects of valid cognition would not belong to the objects themselves, but would be external to them. Again, this consequence would violate what is endorsed in PV III 53d, namely that the object of valid cognition is real. In other words, one cannot

\[
\text{sāmagrīsambhavan ca paścāt pratipādayissāmah} \mid \text{("For that there are two means of valid cognition is not always established from there being two objects of valid cognition. Rather, we say that [two means are established] because [they each] arise from [a specific] causal complex. And we will later explain [this] arising from a causal complex.")}
\]

The context there is an opponent’s argument that, if one takes the two objects of valid cognition and the two means of valid cognition as, respectively, cause and effect, the inference proving the two means of valid cognition would be an inference from cause to effect, and therefore not certain. Prajñākaragupta’s answer is that in this case the inference is possible, because the effect is inferred not from an individual cause, but from the causal complex, one factor of which is the object of valid cognition.
maintain both that the object of valid cognition can be defined as real (paramārtho na lakṣaṇam) and that it is only one (anantaprameyatā), both of which are asserted, however, in PV III 53d: meyam tv ekaṃ svalakṣaṇam.

The immediately following excursion leads up to PV III 55. For our purposes, a look at its conclusion is sufficient:

\[ \text{PVABh}_2 \text{ 215, 4–9: } \text{katham tarhi meyāntaram} | \text{tasyaiva pararūpena pratiṣṭhēḥ} | \text{tathāpratīyamānāṃ dṛṣṭāntasādhāraṇena rūpena meyāntaram} | \text{pratipatti-bhedena tadrūpāropān na paramārthataḥ} | \text{evam tarhy apekṣākṛtatvān na paramārthataḥ} | \text{satyam avastu sāmānyam iti pratipāditam eva} | \text{nedam api-rvam ucye} | \text{vastusamvādadvāreṇa vyavahāriḥbir alakṣitanānātvair vastv iti vyavahṛyate} | \text{tena tadapekṣayedam ucye prameyadvaividhyam} | \]

How then is there another object of valid cognition? Because of a cognition of exactly that [same object of valid cognition] with another nature. [In as far as the particular is] being cognized in this way with a form that it has in common with the example [in an inference], there is another object of valid cognition; [in other words, there is another object] because that form [which the particular has in common with the example] is superimposed [on it] due to a difference in cognitions; [but there is] not [another object of valid cognition] in reality.

[Opponent:] In that way, then, because it is made in dependence [on something else, this other object of valid cognition] is not real.

[Answer:] That is true. Indeed it was taught that the universal is not a real thing.\(^2\)\(^6\) [But] this is not said without precedent. [For], in virtue of [a universal] cohering well with a real thing, [people] engaged in everyday activity commonly act [with regard to a universal] by [considering it] a real thing, [in as far as] they do not take note of the fact that [the particulars they are acting towards are different. Therefore, it is in dependence on this [real thing that appears in two forms in everyday activity] that the duality of the object of valid cognition is spoken of.

The heart of the passage rephrases a part of PV III 54, namely the cognition of a particular in an indirect way (literally, “with another nature”; tasya svaparāpūpāḥgyat gater meyadavāṃ matam). Prajñākaragupta is again making the notion of the duality of the object of valid cognition depend on an everyday understanding of the matter: normal people, when inferring something, think about the object of that cognition as “the real thing,” even though what they are actually cognizing—the proper object of the valid cognition—is a future real thing; and it is this which is not directly cognized, but only by means of a feature that it shares with the example. If a fire on the hill is being inferred from smoke, it, the

\(^{24}\) Read paramārthataḥ with PVABh-msB 106b2, PVABh-msE 210b5 against paramārthaḥ PVABh₂.

\(^{25}\) The last line, vyavahāri° ... prameyadvaividhyam, is repeated in PVABh₂. This must be a printing error, it is not found in either PVABh-msB 106b2 or PVABh-msE 210b6.

\(^{26}\) Franco (2012) and Franco and Notake (2014: 4–17) discuss how unreal things can be the objects of valid cognition.
actual fire that could cook our food if we reach the place on the hill soon enough, is being
cognized, not as it is in itself, but as similar to a kitchen fire previously seen. This similarity
cannot be a phenomenal one, of course: the fire on the hill does not appear.

With this, the scene is set for the discussion of how inference can be a means of valid
cognition. The main points to bear in mind in reading this discussion, in addition to those
previously stressed in Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on PV III 1, are as follows:

1. That there are two means of valid cognition, as well as two objects of valid cognition,
is only a concession to everyday activity. This is, essentially, the justification for the
tension between PV III 1 and PV III 53d–54.
2. Only the real thing is the object of valid cognition.
3. There are two ways in which the real thing is known: through its own nature, and
   through another nature.
4. Perception is dependent on inference because inference initiates what becomes
   habitual. Without habituation, and thus without inference, perception does not cause
   a person to act.

The main controversy discussed in the following passages of PVABh₂ is about how to
understand item 2. The question is whether the statement in PV III 53d is true conventionally
or in reality. Depending on the answer, the consequences vary. When this statement is taken
to express a convention, the opponent’s claims are very strong: the tension between, on the
one hand, inferring “there are two means of valid cognition because there are two objects
of valid cognition, a real thing and an unreal one”, and, on the other hand, maintaining that
“there is only one object of valid cognition, the real thing” can hardly be contained if the
term “real thing” is here taken in the same sense. If the latter statement is, however, taken
as expressing a fact of reality (and the former one not), then the opponent’s attacks lose
most of their power; but this forces us to reconsider in what sense the particular is the only
object of valid cognition.²⁷

4 Prajñākaragupta on PV III 55–58: saving inference

This section asks how inference can be considered a means of valid cognition, even though
it is mistaken because it has an imagined universal, not a real thing, as its object. This
problem is raised in PV III 55cd, and Dharmakīrti’s answer is given in PV III 56–58.²⁸

Prajñākaragupta opens this exchange with the following objection:

PVABh₂ 215, 18–19: kathaṃ tarhi paramārthasya viṣayīkaraṇād bhedaḥ |
svarūpasākṣāt karaṇe hi pratyakṣātāvā bhavet | tadasaṃsparśe kathāṃ tadvī-
ṣayatā |

²⁷ We will see in section 4 that no present particular is the object of valid cognition: it is the future
   particular, both for perception and inference. In other words, to take PV III 53d as a statement that
   accords with reality means that the object of valid cognition mentioned there is neither of the two
   objects in PV III 1–3, the present particular or the universal.

²⁸ PV III 56 is: ayathābhiniveśena dvitiyā bhrāntir iṣyate | gatiḥ cet pararūpeṇa na ca bhrānteḥ pra-
mānatā || abhiprāyāvīsāmvaṭad api bhrānteḥ pramānatā | gatir api anyathā dṛṣṭā pakṣaḥ cāyaṃ
How, then, is there a difference [between perception and inference], since [they both] make a real thing [their] object? For if [a cognition] directly presents the nature [of something], then [it] is just perception. [But] if [a cognition] does not touch that [nature], how is that [nature] the object [of that cognition]?

The opponent is here engaged in a variation on McCrea’s schema quoted above (in section 3). Even one takes it seriously that there is only one object of valid cognition, and concludes that there is no difference between cognitions of that object, or one takes the position that one cognition has that object and the other does not. This latter position implies that the cognition is not correct (that it is an error or bhrāntī); this means, in the eyes of the opponent, that it cannot have the status of a valid cognition.

Here, and in the following discussion, the opponent’s general position will be that the difference between validity and invalidity hinges on the contact of cognition with reality: if the cognition is in direct contact with a real thing, it is valid; if not, then it is invalid. In this way, we can read the debate as not only being about what differentiates inference from perception, but also as being about the implicit criterion that constitutes the validity of a cognition. As we will see, Prajñākaragupta maintains quite simply that the contact with the real thing is not what makes a cognition valid: neither perception nor inference are valid for this reason.

Prajñākaragupta first explains (PVABh 215, 21–23) what it means that a cognition is erroneous in the sense that the opponent is using in his argument: it means that a cognition does not have the actual particular as its object, and can thus not be said to conceive of its object as it is. The opponent immediately counters that then this cognition cannot be considered to have the status of a means of valid cognition, presenting the gist of PV III 55cd, as follows:

PVABh 215, 26–27: yadi pararūpena gatiḥ katham tasya gatiḥ | pararūpasayavāsau gatiḥ | tatrānyasya prāptau bhrāntir eva | bhrānteś ca na pramānatā

If there is a cognition [of something] with another nature, then how is [this] a cognition of that [thing]? This is a cognition only of another nature. When

29 It would be interesting to know who the opponent is, exactly. It seems that it is someone who—like Prajñākaragupta, and Dharmottara before him—accepts that ‘prompting activity’ (pravartaka) is a central criterion for being a means of valid cognition, but links this capacity to the fact that the cognition has for its object something real as it is. If one, reasonably, assumes that only the Cārvākas would argue against inference as a means of valid cognition, then one could infer that they recognized pravartkatva as an important criterion for being a means of valid cognition.

30 There are two textual difficulties here. First, for pararūpasayavai: PVABh-msB reads pararūpasayavāsau, but this is not completely clear, and PVABh-msE reads pararūpasayāsau. Both seem possible, and the vā could easily have gotten lost. Since PVABh-msB is really not clearly legible here, I think one should follow Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s reading.

The second problem is with prāptau bhrāntir eva: PVABh-msB originally read prāntireva and was then corrected, but the marginal addition is now illegible. PVABh-msE supports prāptau bhrāntir eva. The printed bhrāntau bhrāntir eva (PVABh 215, 26–27) must be due to either Sāṅkṛtyāyana misreading the correction here or a misprint. Both prāptir and prāptau seem possible. I prefer the latter, in accordance with PVABh-msE, and probably PVABh-msB post correctionem.
one attains another [thing, there is] simply an error with regard to that [thing which was cognized]. And an error is not a valid means of cognition.

The argument of the opponent can be analyzed as follows:

1. There is a cognition of something (X) in a form other than its own (Y), e.g., the cognition of a particular fire in the form of the general concept ‘fire’.
2. So this “cognition of X” is, in fact, a cognition only of something else, Y.
3. If one acts upon this cognition of Y, one attains X. 31
4. But the cognition of Y is an error with regard to X (because X is not cognized as it really is).
5. An error cannot be a means of valid cognition.
6. So the cognition of X in the form of Y cannot be a means of valid cognition.

Dharmakīrti answers this in PV III 56. Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of this verse is indeed, as McCrea (2011: 321) has noted, striking in “… the overall similarity, indeed the virtual identity, of perception and inference” that the verse is said to imply. The first passage runs as follows:

\[
PVABh_2 \; 215, \; 30\text{–}216.2: \text{anyatrāpi} \; yathārthābhiniveśaḥ \; katham \; avagantavyaḥ \; | \text{abhiprāyāvisamvādād eva} | \text{sa cātrāstīti nāyathārthābhiniveśaḥ} \; | \text{idam tu vāsanābalaj jñānam pratibhāsabhedato bheda iti naivaṃ vyavahāriṇo vida-}n-ti \; | \text{vyākhyātṛpratītir eveyam} |
\]

Even in the other [case, that of perception], how is [this] “determination [of the object] as the object is” to be understood? Only on [the basis that determination] does not belie [a person’s] intentions. And this is the case here [in the case of inference as well]. So there [is, in fact], no determination that is not according to [the] object [in the case of inference either].

But [people] engaged in everyday activity do not know that this cognition [has, in fact, originated] in virtue of the impressions [left by previous experiences, and] that there is a difference [of perceptual and conceptual cognition only] due to the difference in the appearance [of an object to cognition]. This is only the insight of those [people] who explain [things].

Prajñākaragupta is here basing his argument on the expression ayathābhiniveśena of PV III 55a, by which Dharmakīrti means to say that inference does not determine its object correctly (lit., “as [it] is”). It is this element that Dharmakīrti lets the opponent criticize in PV III 55cd: if inference is not correct in that it does not determine its object correctly—Prajñākaragupta’s opponent here taking “correctly” as “how the object really is”—then how can it be a means of valid cognition? Prajñākaragupta turns the question around, and simultaneously gives the more precise interpretation of “determines [its object] as [that] object [really] is” (yathārthābhiniveśena) to Dharmakīrti’s formulation: what, he

31 It could also be that one attains some altogether different element, Z. But the important thing is that Prajñākaragupta has to concede that one does not attain Y.
asks the opponent, is the meaning of the qualifier “determine something as it really is” in the case of perception?

Prajñākaragupta adds an important qualification: normal people do not understand that cognition—which I take here to include both perception and inference—is not due to different causes (it is always generated by mental imprints, not external objects), and that cognitions are different on account of how something appears in them, not, one must understand, essentially. ‘Philosophers’, on the other hand, do know that this is the case.

It is therefore justified to say that Prajñākaragupta, as in the interpretation of PV III 1–2 and 53d (section 2 and section 3), again distinguishes two levels on which one can differentiate perception and inference, in this passage and in the following ones: one respect in which they follow the everyday usage of normal people, who say that they directly perceive some things, and indirectly cognize others (correctly, when by inference); and one respect, corresponding to reality, in which the cognitions are distinguished only on account of how an object appears in them.

Now, there might be a problem: if Prajñākaragupta says that ayathārthābhiniveśa is not the case in inference, then PV III 55ab, ayathābhiniveśena dvitīyā bhrāntir iṣyate, would seem to be contradicted; there, Dharmakīrti obviously accepts that the second kind of cognition, inference, is an error because it does not conceive of its object as it really is.

This alerts us to a further point in Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of PV III 55ab: it stresses the provisional character of that statement. In order to avoid the contradiction to Dharmakīrti, the sentence governed by the verb iṣyate (“it is assumed”) must not be understood as expressing something endorsed by Dharmakīrti, but as a general statement of fact about what people normally take to be the case. Relying on this aspect of Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation, one might then want to translate this sentence as “The second [kind of cognition, inference], is [commonly] assumed to be an error since there is no determination [of an object] as it is.” And the implied agent of the sentence then would be “by people engaged in everyday activity.” In other words, that the criterion ayathārthābhiniveśa, which makes a cognition an error, is applied to inference is something usually done by ‘normal people’. This is an important interpretative move, because now Prajñākaragupta has created enough room to say that it is, in fact, not the case that this assumption is correct. It leaves open three directions in which Dharmakīrti might have continued to argue: First, he could have tried to argue that inference is in fact not an error according to the criterion of ayathābhiniveśa (in its common sense), a path that was not chosen. Second, that inference is, unlike perception, an error, but that this does no harm to its status as a means of valid cognition; this is perhaps the simplest interpretation, upon which the statement “inference is assumed to be an error” is taken as implying that perception is not. Third, that not only is inference an error according to the criterion of ayathābhiniveśa, but also perception; on this reading, the statement “inference is assumed to be an error” entails an insufficiency: inference is assumed to be so by people, but they forget that perception is also like that. We will see that, with some caveats, this is the road that Prajñākaragupta presents Dharmakīrti as having chosen.

To understand iṣyate like this does not preclude that Dharmakīrti himself did indeed take inference to be an erroneous cognition, cf., e.g., PVin 2 1cd: …bhrāntir api sambandhataḥ pramā || The point is rather that to take inference like this has no bearing on the question of whether it is a pramāṇa or not; likewise, for perception, its not being erroneous is irrelevant for its status as a means of valid cognition.
He then continues to explain the general equality of inference and perception in terms of their being means of valid cognition. Having said that yathārthābhīniveśa, insofar as it results only from abhiprāyaḥvisamvāda, is not different for them, he analyzes the next acknowledged criterion for being a means of valid cognition, the fact that it leads to (successful) activity:33

\[ PVABh_2 \text{ 216, 2–7: } \text{sa evābhiprāyaḥ katham anyadarśāṇād iti cet } | \text{na vikālpānāṃ vastupratiniyamābhavāt} | \text{anādivāsanāsāmarthyaṃ evaitat } | \text{tataḥ katham aparicchinnatattvas tatra pravartata iti na codyam etat } | \text{drṣte ca nānupaptisambhavāḥ } | \text{pratyakṣe ’pi katham pravartate} | \text{tatrāpi naiva prāpta-vyarūparicchedah sannihitamātrasya paricchedāt } | \text{pratyuta}\text{34} \text{pratyakṣam evāpravartakaṃ sannihitamātrasya pariprāpteh } | \text{tatrāpi tadekatvādhyavasāyād eva vyrtī bhāvini vastuni } | \text{tato ’numāne ’py evam eva vyrtīḥ } | \text{katham asamānatayekṣyate } | \]

[If one asks:] How can there be exactly this intention from seeing something [completely] different?

[Then we answer:] It is not [because of seeing something that there is this intention], because conceptual cognitions are not restricted to real things. Such is simply the capacity of beginningless impressions. It must not be criticized how, because of this [capacity, someone] who has not discerned reality can act towards it. But if [this activity] is observed, [its] not being the case is impossible.

Also in [the case of] perception [one could ask the same question:] how does one act? Not only is there, in this [perception], no discerning of the nature that is to be attained, because only that which is [immediately] present is discerned, but perception as such [also] does not make [a person] act, because only that which is present is completely attained [by perception].

In that case [of perception] too [a person] acts towards a future real thing only because there is a determination [of it] as identical [with what is perceived]. Therefore activity is exactly the same also in the case of inference. [So] why [are they] regarded as not being the same [by you]?

The explanations here underpin the main point of the previous discussion: the opponent holds that inference cannot enable a person to act because it ‘does not discern reality’, i.e., it does not put the person in direct contact with the real thing that successful activity must be directed at—contrary, so the opponent still assumes, to perception. Prajñākaragupta’s answer to this is double sided: first, activity arising from inference can be observed, and can therefore not be impossible. Prajñākaragupta then turns the question around: how can one act in the case of perception? The opponent’s criticism of inference would be

33 A part of this passage is also translated and discussed in McCrea 2011: 321–322.
34 I follow McCrea (2011: 322, n. 8) in reading the marginal addition to pratyuta, kiṃ tv arthe, as a gloss rather than as a correction or addition.
applicable there too: perception knows nothing of the object that is capable of fulfilling one’s aims (since what one perceives is a present, momentary object). And as such it can enable activity towards a future real thing only through a determination of the thing it has directly perceived and the future thing as identical; one must think that the thing’s existence is temporally extended. And in this respect, it would be just like inference.\footnote{As McCrea (2011: 322) notes, already Dharmottara considered “this implication of the theory of momentariness for [...] perception.” See Krasser 1991, 1995; McCrea 2011; McCrea and Patil 2006.}

Again, the situation described by McCrea is found: Prajñākaragupta is applying the opponent’s statement about inference to perception, and the opponent cannot accept the consequences. If the opponent insists that the attainment of something that was not cognized is an error (item 4), then the exact same thing has to be said for perception: it too grasps only the present thing, yet acting upon it a person will attain a future thing; and it does, by itself, not actually make a person act.

A concise summary of this approach is found in PVABh$_2$ II 234 and the following prose explanation:

\begin{quote}
PVABh$_2$ II 234: \begin{tabular}{l}
pravartako vikalpaś ced avastugrahaṇe katham |  
tathāpi vartayaty etad anumāne na kiṁ matam ||
\end{tabular}

PVABh$_2$ 216, 21–22: \begin{tabular}{l}
yadi hi vikalpaṇanadvāreṇa pratyakṣam pravartakaṃ |  
āyātāṃ tarhi vikalpasya pravartakatvāt pramāṇatvam |  
tathā saty anumāṇasya prāmāṇyam avyāhatam eva |
\end{tabular}
\end{quote}

If [you say that in the case of perception] a [following] conceptual cognition prompts [a person] to act, how [does it do that] without grasping a real thing?

If [you say that it] prompts [a person] to act nevertheless, then why is this not assumed in [the case of] inference?

For, if perception prompts activity by means of generating a conceptual cognition [that makes a person act], then one has arrived at [the position] that conceptual cognition, because it prompts activity, [would be] a means of valid cognition. [And] if it is so, it has not been rejected at all that inference is a means of valid cognition.

This passage is exemplary for Prajñākaragupta’s defence of the difference between inference and perception: given that perception itself does not prompt activity, it must be the following conceptual event. But that conceptual cognition, like inference, does not grasp anything real (being conceptual, it has a universal, not a particular, as its object). The alternatives are dire: if the opponent were to insist on his position, not only would the state of being a means of valid cognition be a quality of the conceptual cognition following perception, but also the fact that inference is a means of valid cognition—the point that the current debate is actually about—would not have been fended off. This would be a bad defeat for the opponent.\footnote{My interpretation here diverges from the interpretation of the prose part of this passage by McCrea (2011: 323), who takes it as expressing Prajñākaragupta’s own position. I think one has to read the
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The implied consequences are unacceptable to the opponent, who wishes to link what it is to be a means of valid cognition to this criterion of knowing a real thing as it is: he has to admit either that neither perception nor inference has a claim to being a means of valid cognition, or that both have.

The following discussion continues in much the same way. We can skip to the end of the discussion, and consider its summary:

\[ PVABh_2 218, 2–8: \textit{tasmād gatīr api} \textit{pratyakṣābhimatā 'nyathā drṣṭā para-rūpeṇaiva} \]

Therefore, also [that] cognition, [namely, the one] that is considered to be perception, is observed [to be] otherwise, [that is], only [to cognize an object] with another nature. As regards the object of activity, [that] is not cognized at all with its own nature; but concerning another, [be it] the nature of the real thing or the nature of cognition, all two, [perception and inference], cognize [it]. So what difference is there with regard to the future object?

This shows in what sense Prajñākaragupta takes perception and inference to be parallel: neither apprehends the future object directly, obviously impossible; but both do apprehend something else directly: what this is, Prajñākaragupta can still leave open at this point in the discussion, content to call it either the form of an (external) real thing (vasturūpa) or the form of cognition itself (svarūpa).

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Note that Kobayashi 2011: 1257–1258 identifies Dharmottara as the opponent in the statements that follow the passage just quoted and translated.

That the following passage contains a summary was first suggested by McCrea (2011: 325). Apart from clearly rephrasing PV III 56c, \textit{gatīr apy anyathā drṣṭā}, this is also explicitly stated by Yamāri, PVATs.; 103, 279–280: \textit{de ltar rnam pa gzhan gyis kyang rtoqs pa mthong} zhes bya ba'i rgya cher bshad nas mjug sūd pa ni \textit{de'i phyir} zhes bya ba'ol ("Having explained [the verse] \textit{gatīr ... drṣṭā} in detail, [Prajñākaragupta] states the summary [of this explanation] with [the word] \textit{tasmāt}.")

The bold words are lifted from PV III 56, the text this is a comment on. Read \textit{pararūpeṇaiva} PVABh-msB 108a3, PVABh 218, 2, against \textit{pararūpeṇeva} PVABh-msE 213b6. Yamāri explains, PVATs.; 103, 280: gzhan gyi rang bzhin du zhes bya ba ni thob par bya ba las gzhan gyi rang bzhin du'o'l ("... with another nature, [meaning] with a nature other than what is to be obtained.")

See Kobayashi 2011: 1259–1260 for another translation and short discussion of this passage, alongside two others in which Prajñākaragupta presents alternative interpretations of Dharmakīrti’s phrase \textit{gatīr apy anyathā drṣṭā}. I follow Kobayashi 2011: 1259–1260 here as far as the future object is concerned.

McCrea (2011: 323, n. 13) notes in this context that Prajñākaragupta does not think that a conceptual cognition following perception grasps what is already grasped, and therefore accepts it as a means of valid cognition. In this claim, Prajñākaragupta would be in direct contradiction to Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. (For Dharmakīrti, see the summary in Kellner 2004b: 9–10, referring to these two passages: HBs 2, 18 ff., and a prose passage to PVin 3 k. 48. For Dharmottara, see Krasser 1995: 248–249.)

To understand Prajñākaragupta’s argument here, one has to take into account his discussion of the second \textit{pramāṇa} definition in PVIII 5c, \textit{ajñātārthaprakāśa} vā, where \textit{ajñātārthaprakāśa} excludes \textit{grhitagrahaṇa}. Franco (1997: 50) translates an important passage of it (corresponding to Ono 2000: 79,
5 Jewels and keyholes

In the next section of the PV ABh, Prajñākaragupta comments on a famous example given by Dharmakīrti. According to Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation, the example is supposed to show that a cognition, though mistaken, can be a means of valid cognition; this is possible because even a mistaken cognition can lead to the attainment of an intended aim.41

Dharmakīrti’s illustration of this involves two very similar situations: two people, thinking that they have seen a jewel, proceed to get that jewel. What they have seen is, however, not in fact a jewel, but only the shine of something: one of them has seen the shine of an actual jewel (spilling through a keyhole, according to Prajñākaragupta), the other the shine of a lamp. For Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of this example, the following points are important:

1. The cognition “A jewel!” is the same in both cases.
2. It is also wrong in both cases, since both persons only see the shine of something, never the jewel itself.
3. There is a difference in that one person will attain a jewel, and the other will not.
4. Based on this difference, one does not say that cognitions are mistaken in the same way.

In a first step, Prajñākaragupta explains how this example shows the possibility that inference, though mistaken, can mean of valid cognition:42 it is actually not due to it

15–19): “This, (i.e., illumination of an unapprehended object) is the definition of the means of knowledge relating to absolute reality, whereas the previous one (i.e., a cognition that does not belie) is a definition of [the means of knowledge] relating to the conventional (sāmyavahārika).” It would thus not be surprising if, in the current context of discussing the conventional difference of means of valid cognition, the problem of gṛhītagrahaṇa were to play a secondary role. A full analysis is, however, beyond the scope of the current article.

41 Cf. the introduction of the passage by Prajñākaragupta, PV ABh 218, 28: avisamvādāt pramāṇatve ‘pi bhrāntatāṃ darśayati (“Dharmakīrti explains that [a cognition], even though [it] is a means of valid cognition because it does not belie [a person’s intentions], is erroneous.”)

42 McCrea (2011: 321) stresses the point that Prajñākaragupta takes the example of a jewel’s and a lamp’s shine as exemplification of both inference and perception. This is true, especially if one reads the later passages, but the initial analysis of these verses by Prajñākaragupta does talk only about inference (and what is not really an inference), PV ABh 219, 2: tadvat anumānatadābhāsayor api tata eva pramāṇetarate (“Like that [example of the jewel and the lamp], also inference and what [only] seems to be an [inference] are, just because of that, a means of valid cognition and something else.” The phrase ‘just because of that’ refers to what makes the difference in the case of the jewel and the lamp: the difference in attainment of what is desired.) Prajñākaragupta does, then, at least start off with what can be taken as Dharmakīrti’s intent in these verses. The “abrupt reversal of this emphasis” (McCrea 2011: 321), that is, of this example being only for inference, is actually not very abrupt: Prajñākaragupta analyzes the example of the jewel and the lamp first in terms of inference, then (as we will see shortly) makes the point that inference and perception are interdependent, and only then goes on to defend Dharmakīrti’s position, that inference and pseudo-inference have the same relation as the cognitions of the people in the example, by showing that, if one were not to accept this argument about inference, also perception would be vulnerable to the same problem. Rather than seeing Prajñākaragupta break sharply with the intent of Dharmakīrti’s example, we could thus equally well speak of his careful explication of it, perhaps with a view to opponents that had been trying to use the example against the Buddhist epistemologists.
being a cognition, but rather to factors external to the cognition. Though everything about
the two people’s cognitions is the same, the circumstances in which they have them is not.
And this is what differentiates an erroneous and non-erroneous cognition.

A further explanation of the varying degrees of erroneousness centers on whether an
error can belong to the causes that give rise to a means of valid cognition. It is in the
context of this explanation that Prajñākaragupta again introduces everyday activity as an
important factor in determining what a means of valid cognition is, and which means of
valid cognition there are:

\[ PVABh_2 \text{ II 244–245: } \text{vinānumānaṁ pratyaksam na pravartakam} \]
\[ \text{āditaḥ} | \]
\[ \text{tathānumānaṁ pratyaksam vineti pratipāditam } || \]
\[ \text{viśeṣas tv ayaṁ evātra kvacit pūrvaṁ kvacit param } | \]
\[ \text{anumānāt param nākṣam nākṣāt pūrvānumeṣyate } || \]

Without inference perception does not, at first, prompt [a person] to act; likewise inference without perception. This was explained.

[There is], however, certainly this distinction here, [that] in some cases [one
is] earlier, in some cases later. One does not assume a perception following
upon inference, nor an inference prior to perception.

In these two verses, Prajñākaragupta is stating that inference and perception are de-
pendent on each other: perception would never allow a person to act if there were not—
temporally prior to it—an inference that ascertains the connection between what is seen and
what is acted towards. The important thing to note here is the qualifier \text{āditaḥ}, “at first” or
“the first time”, which alludes back to the point that Prajñākaragupta made at the beginning
of the chapter, namely, that habituation, the necessary prerequisite for perception’s directly
leading to activity, cannot happen without inference.\(^{43}\) And the same holds for inference: it
does not prompt a person to act without perception, and could hence not be considered a
means of valid cognition without perception.\(^{44}\)

In PVABh\(_2\) II 245, Prajñākaragupta admits to a difference between the two different
types of means of valid cognition: sometimes one is earlier, sometimes one is later;\(^{45}\) and,
as a kind of loose reason given for this difference, he puts forward what is not commonly
held to be the case: that perception follows upon inference, or, in other words, that inference
precedes perception. Implied, we must understand, is that the usually held view is correct,
but has to be augmented by this other case. The commonly held difference of perception
and inference is made with reference to cases where perception precedes inference (as

\(^{43}\) Cf. n. 21, and the paraphrase of PVABh\(_2\), II 24 above, section 2.2.

\(^{44}\) I am not yet quite sure how exactly to understand this point.

\(^{45}\) Jayanta explains concisely, PVAT-t: 101, 97: \text{la lar dang por} zhes bya ba ni mngon sum mam rjes su dpag par yang ngo/ (“\text{In some [cases] earlier}, [that is], in [the case of] perception or also in [the case
of] inference.”)
in the usual case where a person sees smoke and infers ‘There’s a fire!’), and inference follows perception.\textsuperscript{46}

6 The final position: self-awareness, perception, and inference

After the opponent states that, whereas inference does depend on perception, perception can occur without inference, Prajñākaragupta further clarifies his position:

\begin{quote}
PVABh\textsubscript{2} II 246–248: pratyakṣam anumāṇena vinā mānaṃ svave-
dane |
vyavahāras tathā nāsti pramāṇatve ’pi kiṃ bhavet ||
svasamvedanāmātre ca pratyakṣe ’ṛthāprasiddhitāḥ |
bhedasya ca na kimcit syād advaitam avaśiṣyate ||
tasmād arthasya bhedasya nādhyākṣasādhaṃvinā |
anumāṇaṃ tatas tasya pramātvaṃ nānumāṇaṃ vinā ||
\end{quote}

Perception without inference is a means of valid cognition concerning the awareness [any cognition has] of itself.\textsuperscript{47} In that way, [however], there is no everyday activity. So even though it is a means of valid cognition, what should happen?

Furthermore, in a perception [that is] merely self-awareness, an [external] object is not established, nor a difference; so there would be nothing at all; [only] non-duality remains.

Therefore, perception does not establish an object [or] a difference without inference. Therefore, this [perception] is not a means of valid cognition without inference.

These three verses for the first time present the final position that Prajñākaragupta has had in view throughout the whole debate.\textsuperscript{48} The two main points are:

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\textsuperscript{46} One of the standard uses of inference is to clear up wrong notions that arise after a perception, cf. Kellner 2004b: 6–9.

\textsuperscript{47} I have taken the locative \textit{svavedane} here as signifying the object of perception, or what perception applies to. The locative could also state the condition for the main clause, “In [the case of] the [perceptual] awareness [that every cognition has] of itself, perception is a means of valid cognition without inference.” This does not commit Prajñākaragupta to a particularly difficult position. But in the light of Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on PV III 63 (PVABh\textsubscript{2} 223, 19–20, discussed in n. 48), I prefer to take the locative as expressing the object of perception.

\textsuperscript{48} That this is his accepted position can be seen from his commentary on PV III 63, which marks the end of the discussion of how two objects are the reason for two means of valid cognition (see Franco and Notake 2014: 23):

\begin{quote}
PVABh\textsubscript{2} 223, 19–21: prameyam pramāṇena sidhyati | pramāṇasvarūpaṃ tu svasamve-
danaḥkārasiddheḥ | jītānākāra eva ca svasamvedanaḥ svasāṃśāya avyopalaḥ śyāmānaḥ |
pratyakṣaṃānumāṇaṃāvīṣaya ity uktam | viṣayadvaidhīyād ākārādvaśādvyād ity arthaḥ |
svākāračvayasaṃvedane hi naikam iti yuktam ||
\end{quote}
1. Perception is a means of valid cognition in and of itself, but only as far as its own appearance to itself is concerned.

2. However, in order to count as a means of valid cognition in the conventional sense, i.e., as a cognition that allows a person to reliably attain a desired aim in interaction with external objects, it has to be supplemented by inference.

It is this distinction between perception in the sense of direct awareness of consciousness itself and the direct awareness of an external object that has been driving, and sometimes confusing, the discussion.

Prajñākaragupta is not prepared to admit that perception, taken as a cognition that reliably leads to activity, can be given the status of a means of valid cognition without also granting that status to inference. The reason for this is that perception, whilst in and of itself a means of valid cognition, does not let a person act. The only object that it can be considered to be a means of valid cognition for is its own appearance to itself. Any other object, or quality of an object, must be ascertained by another type of cognition. If one still insists, as the opponent does, that perception does reliably cause successful activity, then one must include a cognitive element which is not perception itself, and hence has lost the argument that only perception is a means of valid cognition.

To close, let us look at how this interpretation fits in with the example of the lamp and the jewel. Prajñākaragupta explain the errors that are involved in this situation:

PVABh2 221, 1–3: manipratibhāsas tu maṇau maniprabhāyāṃ ca samāna eva | tatra kvacid deśabhṛantih | kvacid svarūpabhrāntih | kvacid ubhayam | kvacid anubhayam | maniprabhāyāṃ manijñānasya deśabhṛantir | maṇāv eva prāpyasvarūpabhrāntih | sāmānyānumānasyobhayabhṛantih | svasaṃvedanasya nobhayathāpīti prakāraḥ |

The appearance of a jewel [to cognition], however, is exactly the same in [the case of] a jewel and in [the case of] the shine of a jewel. In this [situation], the object of valid cognition is established by the means of valid cognition. The own nature of the means of valid cognition, however, [is established] on [the basis of] the establishment of the form of [cognition’s] awareness of itself. And it was stated that [this] awareness [that cognition has] of itself, the very form of cognition [itself], is the object of perception [or] inference, [depending on whether] it is being apprehended as being [only] itself or common [also to other things]. [To say] “because there are two [types of] object” means “because there are two [types of] form [of cognition].” For, given [cognition’s] awareness of two forms of itself, it is incoherent [to say:] “There is one [object of valid cognition].”

This passage is also discussed and partially translated in Franco and Notake 2014: 149–150 (note that they emend °ākārasiddheḥ to °ākārasiddham).

I was unable to find an exact quote of the explanation referred to in this passage, but the differentiation made here is closely parallel to that made repeatedly for the distinct and indistinct forms of cognition, see n. 15, PVABh3 39, 6–9 (discussed section 2.1), and PVABh3 36, 25–27 (discussed section 2). The viśayadvaividhyāt rephrases the expression “prameyavadvitvena” in tasmāt prameyadvitvena pramāṇadvi- tvam īṣyate (PV III 63cd), which in turn might echo the expression “meyadvaidhyāt” of PV III 1 (cf. Franco and Notake 2014: 23).
there is, in some respect, an error about the place; in some respect, an error about the proper nature; in some respect, both; in some respect, neither.

As regards the shine of a jewel, the cognition of a jewel is wrong about the place; for the actual jewel, there is an error about the nature of the [thing] to be obtained; the inference, [concerned with] a general property, is wrong about both [the place and the nature of the obtained thing]; [cognition’s] awareness of itself is wrong about neither. This is the manner [in which one has to understand this].

There are thus quite a few different respects in which the cognition of a jewel can be mistaken:

1. When one perceives not the jewel itself, but the shine of the jewel, the jewel cognition is wrong about the place of the thing that will be attained on account of this cognition.
2. When one is actually perceiving a jewel, the jewel cognition is still wrong about the essential nature of the object that will be attained (because the present jewel is not identical with the jewel that will be attained).
3. An inference is wrong about both the place and the nature of the attained thing.
4. The jewel cognition’s awareness of itself is wrong about neither the place nor the nature of what will be attained (though it is of little practical value that the gleam-of-a-jewel-appearance is of the same nature as the gleam-of-a-jewel-appearance that will be attained).

After having presented this analysis, Prajñākaragupta can make the first part of his closing statement:

PVABh 221, 4–7: tato yad uktam yā gatiḥ sā svarūpeṇaiva yathā prayakṣā gatiḥ | yat pramāṇam tad abhrantam yathā prayakṣam tad ayuktaṃ | prayakṣāpi gatī na svarūpeṇa | na cābhrāntaṃ prayakṣam asti | svarūpe ca yathā prayakṣam abhrāntam tathā 'numānam apy anye ca bhrāntābhimataḥ prayayā iti na tathā bhrāntatā pratipādanaṁ kvacid upayogi |

If my interpretation is correct, this error would also apply to the situation described in the previous point. It would further imply that inference has (at least) the same two errors as that perception of the shine of a jewel: it is mistaken about the place of the inferred thing, and also about the nature of what will be obtained. This would actually suit Dharmakīrti’s example (an inference likened to a ‘slightly wrong’ perception). But Prajñākaragupta’s formulation of these different errors is not quite clear on this point: is each error specific to each case (but not the only one that is applicable), or is it the only error in each case? If the latter, it would contradict my understanding.

It is wrong about the nature because the thing to be attained is not its object; an inference does not have particulars as its object at all, but only general concepts. It is wrong concerning the place because an inference cannot say exactly where the inferred thing is placed: cf. PVABh 2 249, where it is explained that one can infer only the general existence of a fire behind a wall, but not its specific location.
Therefore, what was said: 51 “That is a cognition which [cognizes something] according to [the thing’s] own nature, like perceptual cognition. What is a means of valid cognition is not erroneous, like perception.” is incorrect.

Even if it is perceptual, a cognition is not according to [the thing’s] nature. Nor is there a non-erroneous perception.

But as perception is non-erroneous with regard to [its] own nature, so also inference is [non-erroneous], as well as other cognitions which are assumed to be erroneous. 52 So an explanation as being erroneous in these ways is of no use in any case.

Prajñākaragupta is here succinctly restating the main points of his commentary on the example of the jewel and the lamp, which in turn exemplifies the points made in the section starting from PV III 53d: the whole section has been aimed at refuting an opponent who claims that ‘being erroneous’ is the criterion by which to differentiate what is a means of valid cognition from what is not. 53 And as Prajñākaragupta has made abundantly clear, this is not how means of valid cognition can be identified, at least not if one simultaneously wants to uphold that perception is such a means of valid cognition: one would have to admit that inference, and actually also other types of cognition which are generally held to be erroneous, are ‘erroneous’ and ‘non-erroneous’ in the exact same way as perception. All are wrong concerning the object to be attained (though they might be wrong in different ways), 54 and all are correct concerning their direct awareness of themselves. That they are wrong in some respect is a necessary condition for enabling everyday activity; that they are necessarily correct in terms of self-awareness might be a nice philosophical insight, but one that is not useful for normal people at this point. 55

51 I was not able to identify a statement that corresponds to this literally, but the same argument was made in the context of Prajñākaragupta’s comment on PV III 55cd, PVABh 2 215, 26–27, discussed above, section 4: there too, an opponent makes non-erroneousness a criterion of validity, and maintains that cognizing a thing with a form other than its own cannot be valid.

52 Cf. the quotation in TBh 2 19, 7: svarūpe sarvam abhrāntaṃ pararūpe viparyayaḥ. (“Every cognition is non-erroneous regarding its own nature, but wrong concerning another nature.”) Kajiyama (1998: 52, n. 118) notes that the quote is not identified, and refers to PVABh 3 331, 13–14 which expresses the same idea. I thank Birgit Kellner for alerting me to this passage.

53 Yamāri points out that the opponent here is “Cārvāka and so on”, PVATS: 103, 295: ’dis ni tshu rol mdzes pa la sogs pa gsal ba ma yin no zhes mjug sdud pa ni/ des na zhes bya ba’o/

54 From the list given above (section 6), it follows that the erroneousness of perception consists in not grasping the nature of what is to be obtained by it (prāpyasvarūpabhṛṅti, PVABh 2 221, 2–3). The observation by McCrea (2011: 327)—that “[...] Prajñākara is [...] flatly contradicting one of the most fundamental claims that Dharmakīrti himself made about perception” by saying that “perception is not free from error”—has to be modified: even according to Prajñākaragupta it is non-erroneous with regard to the present thing; but it is erroneous with regard to what is to be obtained by the activity that it could lead to. Taken in this sense, the contradiction to Dharmakīrti vanishes. Prajñākaragupta is only clarifying that pratvākṣa is not a means of valid cognition because it is non-erroneous.

55 In a soteriological context, however, cognition’s awareness of itself is a central issue, especially in Prajñākaragupta’s discussion of PV M II 1–6, edited in Ono 2000. To illustrate this with just one passage, cf. Franco 2004: 168: “Means of knowledge is only self-awareness, the single [type of] perception; there is no other, because the multiplicity (prapañca) [of the means of knowledge taught by the Buddha merely] follows [the needs of] the people to be trained.” See also Arnold 2012: 187–88.
In the second part of the closing statement for this section, we can see that the direct awareness a cognition has of itself is essential for the differentiation of two, and only two, means of valid cognition, the other central point that was at issue:

\[ PVABh_2 \ 221, \ 7–10: \text{evaṃ tarhi kathaṃ pratyakṣumānāmayor laksanābhed-dāḥ | uktam atra spaṣṭetarapatribhāṣabhedād iti | sa eva pratibhāṣabhedas tathā kuto bhavati | yasya svatantram grahaṇaṃ tatra spaṣṭapratibhāsa-tā | yasyānyathā tad aspaṣṭapratibhāsaṃ atīndriyaṃ parokṣam |} \]

[Opponent:] If it is so, how [can there be] a different definition for perception and inference?

[Proponent:] To this [question] it was said that [it is] due to a difference in the appearance as distinct [or] not.\(^{56}\)

[Opponent:] Exactly this different appearance in such a way, what does it come from?

[Proponent:] In the case of that which is grasped independently [from any form other than its own], there is a distinct appearance. That [which is grasped] in another way has an indistinct appearance, is beyond the senses, is remote.

With this, Prajñākaragupta has restated the main reason (as he saw it) for the differentiation of two types of valid cognitions: it is wholly ‘intrinsic’ to the content of the cognitions, and has nothing to do with the correctness or erroneousness of the respective cognitions.\(^{57}\)

7 Conclusion

I have tried to show that Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on PV III 53d–57 is carefully composed and consistently argued in view of his commentary on PV III 1–2: the same central concerns underlie many arguments, and it can sometimes be misleading to focus on one particular segment of the text in isolation from its wider context.

The main points from Prajñākaragupta’s discussion, as I have analyzed it here, can be restated as follows:

1. To be a means of valid cognition is here being considered as making activity according to a cognizer’s expectations possible (pravartaka-tva is the main criterion for validity in these passages).
2. Under that definition, there are two such means of valid cognition, perception and another, based on the two ways in which objects appear in awareness: distinctly and indistinctly.

\(^{56}\) There are various passages this could be referring to. The most likely candidate, in my opinion, is the last statement before the example of the jewel and the lamp is introduced, PVABh₂ 218, 26: tasmāt paṇokṣaśvaśyapraṇavartakatve ‘pi spaṣṭāspaṣṭabhedāt pramāṇadvitayam eva | See also n. 15.

\(^{57}\) Note also that, whereas this is a sufficient criterion for the distinction of perception and non-perception, it is certainly not a sufficient one for the distinction of inference and conceptual cognition. But Prajñākaragupta is here trying to show only that there must be perception and at least one other type of valid cognition. For this, the argument is sufficient.
3. Both means are erroneous about the object that they enable a cognizer to obtain: that object does not appear in perception (which grasps a present thing), and the other type operates without particulars, one of which will be obtained.

4. Using any notion of “correspondence to an object” other than making successful activity possible, in order to distinguish what is and what is not a means of valid cognition, is doomed to failure, because to be a means of valid cognition implies non-correspondence to the very object to which it facilitates everyday activity; that object is never present to it.

Prajñākaragupta thus resolves the tension between PV III 1 and PV III 53d—that the two means of valid cognition result from two objects of valid cognition, but that there is in fact only one such object—on the basis of a complex argument that works on two levels: if everyday activity is to be possible, the duality of the means of valid cognition must be accepted; perception by itself cannot support this activity. That only the particular is sought for in this activity does not change this: perception and inference cannot be distinguished in their erroneousness about this future thing, and the main argument of PV III 1 has therefore to be understood to mean that there are two means of valid cognition because this particular, the future object of successful activity, is cognized in two ways, distinctly or indistinctly. Alternatively, it is possible to maintain that only perception is a means of valid cognition. Only the perception of cognition by itself exists in reality: this does, however, not support everyday activity, is not the topic of the pratyakṣa chapter, and is not acceptable to the opponent.

Quite a few factors make the interpretation of Prajñākaragupta’s work as difficult as it is interesting: its sheer extent and the unreliability of its edition are two major ones; they are compounded by Prajñākaragupta’s style of writing, nearly colloquial in its flow of arguments, and his skill in letting multiple threads run throughout long exchanges that shift in their main focus: the question of a cognition’s correctness, the general definition of a means of valid cognition, the distinction of the means of valid cognition acceptable to the participants in Prajñākaragupta’s debate, the relation between cognition’s accordance to an object and the definition of a means of valid cognition, and a number of assumptions that in the end turn out to entail unwanted consequences and have to be discarded.

I have here presented one example of such an exchange, taking care to weigh the arguments in respect to their dialectical context, in terms both of their content and of the commitment with which they are made. I believe this is the best way to come to a clearer understanding of the claims that Prajñākaragupta is actually making.

References and abbreviations


Recent years have witnessed much debate about the best way to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s apparent diversity of philosophical positions regarding the status of mind-independent objects: at some times he appears to argue in ways that presuppose the existence of such objects, while at others he argues against them. Several approaches have been proposed to account for this apparent contradiction in Dharmakīrti’s various statements regarding ontology. Most famously John Dunne (2004), building on earlier interpretive strategies suggested by Georges Dreyfus (1997) and Sara McClintock (2003), has suggested that we should see such positions as ranged along a “sliding scale” of hierarchically arranged stances, in which “more accurate descriptions of what we perceive and think supersede less accurate ones.” He finds in the Pramāṇavārttika four such levels of analysis: “The Views of Ordinary Persons,” “the Abhidharma Typology,” “External Realism” and “Epistemic Idealism.” Each of these levels is said to give way to the next through a specific kind of “mereological” transition argument, which shows that certain entities accepted as real on a given ontological level cannot be accounted for either as unitary or as multiform – as “one or many” – forcing one to abandon this ontology and ascend to the next, higher level of analysis.

Dunne’s views have provoked much discussion and several significant critiques. I will mention here specifically only Kellner (2011) Arnold (2008). Kellner challenges the uniformity of the “mereological” model for ascending the levels, among others discussing a specific idealist argument of Dharmakīrti, showing that there is no way to satisfactorily distinguish definitionally between the supposedly external object of a cognition and the immediately preceding cognition (samanantara-pratyaya) that gives rise to it, since both are causes of the awareness, and resemble it in form. Arnold questions whether the third, external realist level is philosophically viable, even as a theoretical alternative to the “epistemic idealist” level, to which he believes it inevitably reduces. But neither of them, or any other critic of the sliding scale so far as I know, questions the hierarchy itself – in particular the idea that the idealist or Yogācāra position set forth at certain points in the Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇaviniścaya is meant to be presented as clearly and unambiguously preferable to the external realist, “Sautrāntika” or bāhyārthavāda level. It is this widespread assumption I wish here to call into question.

On Dunne’s view, the external realist or “Sautrāntika” arguments Dharmakīrti often relies upon are there only as preliminary, conditional positions—as stepping stones which invariably give way through a specific kind of “transition argument” to the more accurate and more soteriologically beneficial idealist or Yogācāra position which represents Dharmakīrti’s real view. Dunne characterizes the interpretive strategy that leads him to this conclusion as one of a “hermeneutics of charity.”¹ As Dunne explains this,
If... a well-articulated passage or position clearly contradicts some other, equally well-articulated passage or position, then the general principle of hermeneutical charity we have adopted will prompt us to rank these positions along a hierarchical scale; the lower position, while contextually expedient, is superseded by the higher position that, by virtue of passing a rational test that the lower position fails, conforms more closely to Dharmakīrti’s version of ultimate truth (Dunne 2004: 239, n. 24).

But should we take it as a given that there can be no reason why a philosophical author might choose to present multiple, genuinely alternative points of view, or alternative explanations of the phenomena he is attempting to account for, without falling prey to charges of incoherence? It is not in fact difficult to imagine motives that might prompt such an approach. For example, Vincent Eltschinger (2010, 2014) has recently stressed the importance of the Buddhist epistemological tradition as foregrounding for apologetic purposes a “supersectarian” identity “aimed at defending Buddhism as a whole against Brahmanical hostility” (2010: 399; see also Eltschinger 2014: 174ff.). Taking this into account, one can easily see how it might have seemed desirable to formulate a broad-based, “big tent” defense of Buddhism which could accommodate defenders of somewhat different Buddhist positions within a largely common epistemological framework. I will later mention one more way (apart from the “sliding scale”) in which we might make sense of Dharmakīrti’s apparent accommodation of multiple ontological stances.

At this point I would like, instead, to point out one obvious counterexample to Dunne’s line of thinking on this question—one which has not, so far as I know, been discussed in connection with the vexed question of Dharmakīrti’s ontology and his argumentative method and goals. I am thinking of Dharmakīrti’s own primer on Buddhist logic and epistemology, the Nyāyabindu. It has long been a commonplace among commentators and subcommentators on this work (stretching back at least to Vinītadeva in the 8th century) to view the Nyāyabindu as a work designed to conform to both a realist and an idealist ontology (usually labelled as “Sautrāntika” and “Yogācāra,” respectively). Certain commentators observe that, at a few specific points in the text, these two contrary ontological perspectives necessarily diverge, and the question is sometimes raised as to whether some point advanced in the text is incompatible with either the Yogācāra or the Sautrāntika positions. But the idea that the text on the whole is meant to accommodate both ontologies is widely shared, and nowhere, I think, seriously disputed.

What I would like to suggest, simply put, is that both of Dharmakīrti’s major systemic treatises on Buddhist logic and epistemology, the Pramāṇavārttika and the Pramāṇaviniścaya, are, like the Nyāyabindu, designed to accommodate and to accord, as seamlessly as possible, both with an idealist, Yogācāra, “mind-only” ontology and with that specific variety of external realism which later doxographers designate as “Sautrāntika” – what is sometimes known as the anumeya-bāhyārthavāda, the “inferred external object” view. There may well be – indeed there certainly is – reason to believe that, between these two views, Dharmakīrti regarded the Yogācāra position as philosophically (and perhaps

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2 See Vinītadeva ad Nyāyabindu 1.1 and 1.3 (Nyāyabinduṭīkā, pp. 4 and 7): iṣṭaś ca prakaraṇārabhah sautrāntikayoṣyācāro bhavanāyānudhāvanārtham. See Dharmottarapradīpa, pp. 42–44 and 61 for additional references.
soteriologically) preferable, but, as we shall see, he nevertheless goes out of his way on multiple occasions to present these two positions as viable alternative philosophical paths.

Once we abandon the presupposition that discerning Dharmakīrti’s own preferred position on the question of objects and discerning what he intends to argue for in his works are necessarily equivalent, it becomes much easier to account for certain aspects of the way he juxtaposes the *vijñānavāda* and *bāhyārthavāda* positions at several key points in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. One important reason it is difficult to read Dharmakīrti’s key statements of the *vijñānavāda* position as an unambiguous ontological step up from the *bāhyārthavāda* position is that it is often *after* having developed what seem to be, and have generally been accepted as, his definitive *vijñānavādin* arguments that Dharmakīrti advances his most fully developed *bāhyārthavādin* arguments. Indeed, it seems to be Dharmakīrti’s regular, and perhaps even invariable, practice (as I will demonstrate), to follow his fullest and seemingly most conclusive arguments for the *vijñānavādin* position with a corresponding and parallel argument defending a specific version of the *bāhyārthavādin* position. It is difficult to see why he would adopt this approach if his ultimate philosophical and soteriological strategy were designed to bring his readers up to the highest, idealist, level and leave them there.

**Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58**

The most striking passage of this kind, and the one that seems to have garnered the most attention from later chroniclers and critics of the Sautrāntika position, is one for which the original Sanskrit text has only recently become fully available, and has not yet, I think, received the attention it deserves – that is, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.58 (the final *kārikā* in the chapter on perception), along with its accompanying *vṛtti*. The passage occurs just after Dharmakīrti has presented his famous *sahopalambha-niyama* (“necessary co-apprehension”) argument – that “there is no distinction between blue and the awareness of blue, because they are necessarily co-apprehended.”3 Having advanced this claim as part of his defense of the *vijñānavāda* position, Dharmakīrti now turns to consider its relevance to the *bāhyārthavādin* position:

Because of this, even if there is an external object, there is no difference between the appearing object and the awareness of it. (1.58ab)

Even if an external object does exist, the non-differentiation between the appearing object (“blue,” or the like) and the awareness of it is established by the co-apprehension and co-awareness of the two.

Therefore, the awareness has a double form.

Therefore it is established that awareness has a twofold form, since it bears the form of both object and awareness. [Pūrvapakṣin:] *If the appearing object is not differentiated from the awareness, then how can one think that it is something different?*

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3 PVin 1.54 (p. 39): *sahopalambhatiṣṇyāmād abheto niḥśataddhiyoḥ*
There can be proof of an external object on the basis of disjunction [vya-tireka]. (1.58cd)

The fact that awareness [sometimes] does not arise when all other causes capable of producing it exist indicates the lack of some other cause; this could be the external object.¹

Even if we accept that all that is phenomenally apparent to us in any awareness is the awareness’s own form, we may still be able to infer an external object as a cause of what appears to us. We do not, for example, see “blue” at all times and, in the absence of any evident factor in our immediately prior awareness that determines whether we do or not see blue at any particular moment, we may legitimately infer an additional, extra-mental cause for the occasional appearance of, e.g., blue in our visual awareness. This is clearly presented as a positive argument in favor of the bāhyārthavādin position, and has invariably been interpreted as such by later authors, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist (for whom Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 and its attendant vṛtti become, indeed, the classic statement of the Buddhist bāhyārthavādin or Sautrāntika position).²

It is hard to see why, if the defense of bāhyārthavāda (conditional or otherwise) is meant to be a stepping stone on the path to Dharmakīrti’s ultimate stance of vijñānavāda, he should choose, after directly presenting his most fully developed argument in defense of this vijñānavāda, to then deliberately step backwards, or downwards, to the “lower,” supposedly philosophically less tenable and soteriologically less useful level of external realism. Moreover, even if we were able to find some motive for this return to defense of the bāhyārthavādin position after the supposed transition to “epistemic idealism” has already been effected, there is no way what we see in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 can be read as a step backward to a more primitive, more naive, or less fully developed position than the vijñānavādin view that precedes it. On the contrary, it is presented explicitly as a sequel to, and an outgrowth of, the purportedly vijñānavādin analysis that immediately precedes it. It builds on, and entirely presupposes, the dvairūpya of perceptual cognitions that Dharmakīrti has just argued for, and the validity of the sahopalambhaniyama argument that formed its centerpiece. Indeed, in the light of the way Dharmakīrti constructs the bāhyārthavādin argument in 1.58, and the way he connects it with the preceding argument, one must in fact recognize that the sahopalambhaniyama argument, despite the way it has so often been characterized by both premodern and modern expositors of Dharmakīrti’s thought, is in fact not an idealist argument at all. That is to say, it is fully consistent with the final versions of both the vijñānavādin and bāhyārthavādin positions as Dharmakīrti develops them in both the Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 and the parallel passage of the Pramāṇavārttika

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¹ PVin 1.58 (p. 43): bāhye 'py arthe tato 'bheda bhāsamānārthatadvikāt / (1.58ab) saty api bāhye 'ṛthe sahopalambhavedānābhāvyam bhāsamānasya nilādes tatsamvādā cāvivekāh siddhāh. dvairūpyaṃ tad dhiyaḥ (1.58c) viṣayañānārūpābhāvyam ato dvirūpā buddhiḥ siddhā bhavati. yadi bhāsamāno viṣayākāro buddher abhinnaḥ, tato bhinnam asitī kutaḥ? bāhyasiddhiḥ syād vyatirekataḥ // (1.58cd) satsu saumartheṣu anyeṣu hetuṣu jñānakāryānispattīḥ kārānāntaraavaiṅkalyāṃ sūcayati. sa bāhyo 'ṛthah syāt.

discussed below. Rather than an argument for the non-reality of mind independent objects, the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument is designed to establish only that the phenomenal content of perception, its grasping and grasped aspects, are artificially abstracted parts of a single cognitive image. Establishing this is a necessary prerequisite for defending a *vijñānavādin* position, but does not require one to adopt such a position, as Dharmakīrti’s own discussion in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.58 explicitly shows.6

While the final *kārikā* of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* chapter on perception thus presents us with a viable avenue for the defense of the existence of extra-mental objects, Dharmakīrti does not leave us with a definitive endorsement of this position over the *vijñānavādin* stance developed earlier. This new *sahopalambhaniyama*-consistent argument for extra-mental objects is immediately followed by a further remark that rehabilitates the *vijñānavādin* position but, again, as a viable alternative path, not as a decisive victor over the *bāhyārthavādin* position:

> Unless one can say that this disjunction of effect is produced by the absence of a specific material cause [upādāna, i.e. the *samanantara-pratyaya*].7

The idealist might try to account for the occasional appearance of images such as blue in our awareness by positing, instead of an extra-mental object, a specific (but unperceived) factor in the immediately prior awareness (*samanantara-pratyaya* – which is the material cause of any given awareness-moment) that causes us to see blue on some occasions and not others. So, we are left with two possible ways of explaining the occasional appearance of specific images in our perceptual awareness, both of which require us to postulate something not itself phenomenally evident – either a putative extra-mental object, or an unperceived causal factor in our prior awareness – whose presence or absence accounts for our perception containing a given image at some times but not others. But there is, notably, no explicit indication of whether either of these views is to be preferred over the other, nor even the suggestion of an argument or a criterion that would enable one to choose between them. Far from attempting to compel us to move “up” from the external realist to the epistemic idealist level, Dharmakīrti seems almost to be going out of his way to display ambivalence: there “can be proof” of the external object, “unless someone were able to say” that the disjunction in effect is produced by a difference in the *samanantara-pratyaya*. He does not say explicitly whether the object is proven in this way, or whether the *vijñānavādin* is or is not able to explain the occasional appearance of the effect in this way. We are simply left with two ways of accounting causally for the appearance of specific images in our perceptual awareness, with no indication of how (or whether) we should decide between them.

Having set forth this pair of parallel accounts, the *Pratyakṣa* chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* concludes with one further objection against and response in support of the *vijñānavādin* view:

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6 I am not in fact the first to take note of the fact the *sahopalambha-niyama* argument is consistent with both the *vijñānavādin* and *bāhyārthavādin* positions as Dharmakīrti ultimately develops them. Matsumoto (1980: 26) makes the same point and Alex Watson (2010: 311, n. 46) has recently drawn attention to this point as well.

7 *PV* in ad 1.58cd (p. 43): *yady atra kaścid *upādānaviśeṣābhāvavṛttaṃ kāryavyatirekaṃ na bruyāt.*
[Objection:] But how then could this person [i.e. the vijñānavādin], while denying objects for all awarenesses, nevertheless say that a confused awareness is not a pramāṇa while an unconfused one is, since there would be no difference between them? [Reply:] Seeing that, even for someone who is not fully awakened, activity sometimes proves to be untrustworthy, due to the fault of being connected with karmic traces of confusion, one can say that one sort of awareness is not a pramāṇa; seeing that, in other cases, this activity has dependable consequences which persist as long as sāṃsāra does, being based on firmly established karmic traces, one can say that this other sort of awareness is a pramāṇa, in consideration of its non-disparity with [other] worldly activity. What is stated here is the form of conventional pramāṇas. Others are confused even about this, and draw people into disagreements. Those who devote themselves to the wisdom consisting in thought (cintāmayī prajñā), however, turn their attention toward the ultimate pramāṇa, which is faultless through the discrimination of error and free from decay. This too is slightly hinted at.⁸

This explanation of how pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa can be distinguished in an object-free world does redress the opponent’s objection, and rehabilitates vijñānavāda, but only as a possibility, not as a position to which we are compelled. It leaves in place the unresolved ambiguity of Dharmakīrti’s prior treatment of the two as alternatives. Furthermore, it rehabilitates the idealist position even as a possible stance only by bracketing both the vijñānavādin and bāhyārthavādin positions as less than the ultimate truth. Again, at least within the realm of “conventional pramāṇas,” we are left not with a decisive argument that forces us to move from an external realist to an idealist stance (or vice versa); these two basic ontological stances are both left on the table as Dharmakīrti ends his discussion of perception.

**Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 391–398**

The basic features of this ambiguous back and forth between the vijñānavādin and bāhyārthavādin positions in PV in 1.58 and its accompanying vṛtti are all in fact prefigured in what is clearly the parallel passage in the Perception chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika:

Therefore it is unavoidable that the object, which appears at the same time as the awareness, is not distinguished from the awareness. There could be an inference of a difference in the cause [of one’s awareness],

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⁸ PV in ad 1.58 (pp. 43–44): so 'pi katham sarvajñānānāṃ višayam vyatirecayann upapavetarayoh pramāṇetaratāṃ brūyād, vīśeṣābhāvāt? upaplavavāsanāvisandhidosād aprabuddhasāpy anāśvāsikam vyavahāram utpaśyann ekam apramāṇam ācakṣīta, apraṃārthikam aviśiṣṭānubandham dṛḍhavāsanatvād iha vyavahāravāsāvyavāikapsya pramāṇām. sāṃvyavahārikasā caitat pramāṇaṣya rūpaṃ uktam. atrāpi pare mūḍhā viśiyāvādayanti lokam iti. cintāmāyīm eva tu praṇām anuśilayanto vi-bhrvavavekavālmalam anapāyī pāramārthikapramāṇam abhimukhikurvanti. tad api leśataḥ sācitaṃ eveti.
due to the absence of [specific] perceptual awarenesses even when all the other causes are present. Unless one can state a restriction based on the immediately preceding awareness.  

Here too we have, immediately following an argument for the nondifferentiation of the awareness from its object, the claim that one may nevertheless infer an extra-mental object as a cause for the occasional occurrence of specific images in our awareness. And here again we have the possibility of an unrecognized causal factor in our immediately prior awareness suggested as an alternate explanation of these occasional images. The phrasing is extremely close to that of *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.58, and again we have the same juxtaposed optative construction: “There could be an inference… unless one can say…,” leaving us with a similar ambiguity on the external object question. But there is one significant difference between this passage and the (later) *vṛtti* on *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.58. There Dharmakīrti presented the *vijñānavādin* and *bāhyārthavādin* as hypothetical alternative stances without ultimately indicating a preference for one over the other. Here, on the other hand, Dharmakīrti does at least indirectly indicate such a preference (PV, *Pratyakṣa* 398):  

This [vijñānamātra view] is the doctrine of the wise; but this dual nature of awareness [as *grāhya* and *grāhaka*] is [also] established in reliance on an external object, due to the rule of co-awareness.

Labelling the *vijñānavādin* view as “the doctrine of the wise” does certainly suggest that Dharmakīrti considers this view to be preferable (whether philosophically or soteriologically). But it is important to note that this offhand indication of preference does not come coupled with any sort of argument that would justify it. Here too, as in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.58, we are left with two philosophically viable accounts of perceptual images, one which posits the reality of extra-mental objects, and one which denies them, but with no clear argument for preferring one over the other.

If, then, as it seems, Dharmakīrti does not wish to present any compelling argument that forces his readers to abandon the external realist position in favor of an idealist one, what is he trying to do here? If, as the label “doctrine of the wise” would at least seem to suggest, the *vijñānavādin* position is Dharmakīrti’s preferred view, why should he present it and the parallel *bāhyārthavādin* account in such careful equipoise (as he later does, without a similar indication of preference, in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*)? Both available Sanskrit commentaries on this passage of the *Pramāṇavārttika* address the question directly. Prajñākaragupta comments on *Pratyakṣa* 398 as follows:

[Pūrvapakṣin:] Why then did the Teacher [Dignāga] explain that [the awareness has] a dual form even if the external object exists? Vijñānavāda alone is the correct position. In response to this, he [Dharmakīrti] says:

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9 PV, *Pratyakṣa* 391–392: *tasmañ arthaṣasya durvāraṃ jñānakālāvabhāsīnāḥ / jñānād avyatirekitvām hetubhedānumā hāve / 391 abhāvād aksābuddhīnāṃ satav apy anyesu hetuṣu / niyamaṃ yādi na brāyāt pratayāt samanantarāt / 392
10 The intervening verses (PV, *Pratyakṣa* 393–397) parallel the objection against the *vijñānavādin* account of *prāmāṇya* and the *vijñānavādin* response given in the *vṛtti* on PV in 398, but in more detail.
11 PV, *Pratyakṣa* 398: *asti eṣa viduṣāṃ vādo bāhyam tv āśritya varṇyate / dvairūpyam sahasāṃvittiniyamāt tac ca sidhyate / 398
This [vijñānamātra view] is the doctrine of the wise: but this dual nature of awareness [as grāhya and grāhaka] is [also] established in reliance on an external object, due to the rule of co-awareness.

The dual form [of awareness] is explained with provisional acceptance of the external object, in consideration of others [who hold opposing views]. But wise people accept vijñānavāda alone.\textsuperscript{12}

Manorathanandin, whose comment on the verse closely mirrors that of Prajñākaragupta, explains further:

This is the doctrine “of the wise,” i.e. the Yogācārins who understand reasoning, which explains that there is nothing but consciousness in all conditions. The teacher [Dignāga] has also explained the duality of form of awareness relying on the external object accepted by the Sautrāntikas. And this duality of form is established “due to the rule of co-awareness,” i.e. due to the rule of co-apprehension [sahopalambha-niyama] since, even if there is a difference [between the awareness and the object], this [rule of co-apprehension] still exists.\textsuperscript{13}

As Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin both rightly point out, Dignāga in his investigation of the objects of perception in his Pramāṇasamuccaya (on which the Pramāṇavārttika is ostensibly a commentary) similarly offers parallel vijñānavādin and bāhyārthavādin accounts without indicating a preference for one over the other:

\textit{If the awareness together with its content is the object,} then what one apprehends is an object in the form of one’s own self-awareness, which may be either desirable or not. \textit{If, however, the thing to be known is an external object,} then

\textbf{The pramāṇa for this is simply that it has the form of the object.}

For then, setting aside the [awareness’ own] form, even though this is what is cognized by the awareness, the pramāṇa for this [awareness] is simply that it has the form of the object, since that object is known through this. 9 (emphasis mine)\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{13} Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti on Pratyakṣa 398 (PVV, p. 142): \textit{asty eṣa sarvavyavasthitāḥ viṣṇāpātmaścāḥ śivātma kiṣṇātma cārthām āśritya jñānyāsa dvairūpam ācāryeṇa varṇyate. tac ca dvairūpyam saahasamvedaniyamāt sahopalambhānti yamāt sidhiyati bhede ’pi sati tadbhāva | corr. tadabhāva}.

\textsuperscript{14} Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.9cd (PS, p. 4): \textit{yadā hi saviṣayaṃ jñānam arthaḥ, tadā svasaṃvedanānuśām artham pratipadayata iṣṭam anīṣṭāṃ vā. yadā tu bāhyam evārthah prameyāh, tadā viṣayābhāsataivāviṣya pramāṇam tada hi jñānasvamvedyaṃ api svarūpam anapekṣyārtābhāśataivāvyam pramāṇam, yasmāt so ’rthaḥ tena miyate // 9 //}
The connection these commentators posit between Dharmakīrti’s practice and Dignāga’s thus makes sense, though it simply pushes the basic question back one step further: It is plausible to suggest that Dharmakīrti’s parallel presentation of the vijñānavāda and bāhyārthavāda as viable alternatives is meant to conform to Dignāga’s practice, but this does not explain why Dignāga himself would have adopted this approach in the first place. A basic gesture of inclusiveness towards others in the Buddhist camp is presumably intended by Prajñākaragupta’s “in consideration of others” (parāpekṣayā) and Manorathanandin’s reference to “the external object accepted by the Sautrāntikas.” In any case, both clearly acknowledge that both Dharmakīrti and Dignāga, while themselves personally inclined toward the vijñānavādin stance, are seeking in these passages to accommodate (and precisely thereby not to supersede) the bāhyārthavādin/Sautrāntika position.

**Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 223–224**

I will close by briefly examining one further passage in which Dharmakīrti appears to balance the vijñānavādin and bāhyārthavādin positions in this way: verses 194–224 of the Pratyakṣa chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika. This passage deals with the problem of citra-tā – “multicoloredness,” or more generally “multiplicity” of any kind in a cognitive image. When we perceive a multicolored object, or any object that appears to have multiple properties of any kind (such as a spatially extended object that appears to exist at more than one point), how is it that we have an impression of the “oneness”? Does it exist only in our minds, or is there some way that external, atomic objects can be aggregated into what is in some sense a “single” object? This is an absolutely key passage for both Dunne’s and Dreyfus’s analyses, as both see it as marking Dharmakīrti’s crucial transition from the external realist to the idealist level of analysis (i.e. from the third to the fourth level in Dunne’s “sliding scale”). It is with reference to this passage that Dunne says:

> Finally, in moving from the third to the fourth level of analysis, the inability to specify whether the image in perception is single or multiple is the primary argument against the existence of extra-mental objects (Dunne 2004: 63).

> In response to the intractable problem of the cognitive image’s variegated singularity, Dharmakīrti abandons External Realism in favor of Epistemic Idealism (Dunne 2004: 112).

Dreyfus similarly sees Dharmakīrti’s exploration of the problems posed by the multiformality of perceptual images as setting the stage for a definitive transition from external realism to idealism. As he says:

> This denial of the reality of external objects is where Dharmakīrti finds a solution to the dilemma created by an impression of a solid extended object produced by atoms, which do not have any extension by themselves. The

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15 The link between Dharmakīrti’s treatment of the external object question and Dignāga’s is reinforced by Jinendrabuddhi, who, in explaining the version of the bāhyārthavādin view set forth by Dignāga in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, quotes PVin 1.58cd and closely paraphrases the following vṛtti (PS, p. 68).
problem is solved by rooting out its source, the assumption that objects exist external to consciousness as a result of atomic aggregation. The Yogācāra view that objects exist only as reflections of consciousness is Dharmakīrti’s answer to the problem created by extended objects (Dreyfus 1997: 103).

The problem with both Dunne’s and Dreyfus’s reading of this passage of the Pramāṇavārttika is that here too, as in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58, we find, as a coda to what they take to be Dharmakīrti’s conclusive argument driving the shift from the “external realist” to the “epistemic idealist” stance, a return to the defense of the external realist (or, at any rate, an external realist) position. Dharmakīrti’s response to the problem of citratā (Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 209–224) is too complex to analyze in detail here. He offers in fact there three different ways to account for multiform appearance in awareness, apparently presented as parallel, alternative lines of argument: one which denies that multiformity can really exist either externally or within awareness (209–219), a second that accepts the existence of multiformity in cognitive images (ākāra) but denies that it can exist externally (220–222), and a third that, accepting the stricture that multiformity can exist only in awareness, nevertheless asserts that multiple, real external objects can give rise to a single, multiform awareness (223–224). Obviously it is the third position here that is of most interest for my argument, as it represents yet another retrospective rehabilitation of the external realist position. The relevant verses run as follows:

On the other hand, what contradiction is there if many [atoms] which have this special causal capacity [collectively] do not separately cause the awareness, just as is the case with the self, the sense organ, and so on. To be “grasped” is nothing other than to be a cause. When the awareness has the same appearance as something [that causes it], one says that this thing is grasped by the awareness.  

On the Nyāya view of perception a group of factors – self, sense organ, mind, object, etc. – are said to collectively cause perceptual awareness, while any of these factors individually will not do so. In the same way, there is no contradiction in asserting that multiple “blue” atoms in appropriate spatial proximity can collectively cause an awareness of blue, even though no single atom could cause such an awareness by itself.

The commentator Prajñākaragupta says that these three alternative lines of argument are offered “in accordance with the reasoning of the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras, and the Bāhyārthavādins” (mādhyamikayogācārabāhyārthavādinayena – PVA, p. 288). Steinkellner, with good reason, questions Prajñākaragupta’s use of the label “Mādhyamika” here (1990: 76–78 and p. 86, n. 35). The first position seems closer to what later becomes known as the nirākāravādin position (that cognitions are in reality “without form;” or, in Dreyfus’s terms, the “False Aspectarian” position) – Dreyfus in fact straightforwardly labels it as such, plainly recognizing the divide between the nirākāravādin view argued for in Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 210–219 and the sākāravādin view advanced in 220–222 (but not, as far as I can see, taking heed of the third, bāhyārthavādin, position on offer in 223–224 – see Dreyfus 1997: 103–104 and 490).

Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 223–224: ko vā virodho bahavah samjātātiśayāḥ prthak / bhaveyuyā kāraṇam buddher yadi nātmendriyādibhavat // 223 hetubhāvād rte nānyā grāhyatā nāma kācana / tatra buddhir yadābhāsā tasyāś tād grāhyam ucyate // 224 Dunne does recognize that these verses form part of Dharmakīrti’s discussion of the citratā problem, and translates them (2004: 411), but does not appear to consider their implications for his “sliding scale” analysis.
That Dharmakīrti is here transitioning to an alternative line of argument is clearly marked in the text (“On the other hand”) and, as in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58, there is nothing to indicate whether this line of argument or the one that precedes it is to be preferred for any reason. On Dharmakīrti’s own explicit analysis, then, the problem of citratā explored in this passage does not compel us, or even forcefully nudge us, toward an idealist stance. He offers the reader answers to the citratā problem that work just as well whether one accepts external objects or rejects them. It is true that the alternative resolution of the citratā question presented in the final two verses of this passage only opens the door to bāhyārthavāda as a possibility; the claim is that multiple atoms can act as external causes for a single multicolored mental image, not that such external causes must exist. Nevertheless, taken seriously, these verses undo much of the supposed work done by the earlier portion of the passage, on both Dunne’s and Dreyfus’s accounts. The external realist position is certainly not definitively abandoned here, and the move from realism to idealism cannot reasonably be described as “Dharmakīrti’s answer” to the citratā problem, but (at best) one of several possible answers.

Conclusion

In the light of the treatment of the bāhyārthavādin position in all of the passages discussed above, it seems difficult to maintain that Dharmakīrti was seeking in his major epistemological works to push readers to ultimately adopt a vijñānavādin stance. Whatever his personal position on the status of extra-mental objects, he seems deliberately to have written in such a way that either vijñānavādin or bāhyārthavādin readers could comfortably adopt his epistemology. He in fact developed what came to be some of the most influential arguments in support of Buddhist bāhyārthavāda. This helps to explain why later doxographers, when seeking to delineate the “Sautrāntika” view, so often turned precisely to Dharmakīrti’s statements, and specifically to PVin 1.58, as the classic textual formulation of this position. The specific variety of “external realism” set forth in PVin 1.58 is not a preexisting philosophical position that Dharmakīrti (or Dignāga) adopted as a heuristic device or a stepping stone to draw readers along to his “real” idealist position; it is, rather, explicitly presented as an outgrowth of his own analysis of the phenomenology of perception. It is not only that one can be a “Sautrāntika” in the sense recognized by the later doxographers and still be a Dharmakīrtian. Rather, one can be a Sautrāntika, in the doxographers’ sense of this term, only if one is a Dharmakīrtian. That is, the externalist argument as set forth in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 and, more briefly, in Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 223–224 and 398 grows specifically out of the analysis of the dvirūpatā of all perceptual cognitions – the artificial division what is really a unitary cognitive image into a “grasping” and “grasped” form (grāhaka and grāhya ākāra) – and fully presupposes the validity of the arguments on which this analysis is based. That is, the epistemology and phenomenology of perception elaborated by both Dharmakīrti and Dignāga is entirely shared between the vijñānavādin and the bāhyārthavādin position as they elaborate them.

Arnold is entirely right to stress this in his discussion of Dunne’s “sliding scale.” Whether he is right in suggesting that such a phenomenology (which takes the only “object”
directly accessible to awareness to be its own image) tends by its nature to force one into an idealist rather than a bāhyārthavādin position is less obvious. This is in fact precisely the question at issue between the bāhyārthavādin and the vijñānavādin as Dharmakīrti finally represents them: given that we have immediate cognitive access only to the ākāras of our own awareness, can we or can we not legitimately infer an extra-mental cause for the occasional appearance of particular ākāras? Obviously if Arnold were right in this claim, and if Dharmakīrti held a similar view of the question, this would tend to support Dunne’s model of the sliding scale, as it would leave us with a Sautrāntika position deliberately designed to collapse into a Yogācāra one. But, as I have already said, this makes Dharmakīrti’s regular return to defense of the bāhyārthavādin position after presenting his seemingly ultimate vijñānavādin arguments hard to explain.

So, the same general pattern recurs in Dharmakīrti’s works, seemingly whenever he presents his ultimate versions of the vijñānavāda and bāhyārtha positions in explicit contrast to one another. We first find an argument for how the phenomenology and epistemology of perception function on the vijñānavāda view (in one case only, PV, Pratyakṣa 398, accompanied by a fairly clear suggestion that this is Dharmakīrti’s preferred view), followed by a defense of the bāhyārtha position, adopting precisely the same phenomenology of perception, but taking it to imply the existence of an extra-mental cause for the images that appear in our awareness.

Is Dharmakīrti, then, contradicting himself? Is there anything problematic in developing a set of views regarding perception that accommodates and accords with two conflicting ontologies? Must we, in charity, seek to forcibly extract from his works one definitive stance on the external object question, even when he himself seems to be trying carefully to avoid doing so? I think Dreyfus himself makes a very important observation, when considering the question of Dharmakīrti’s possible self-contradiction in his seemingly inconsistent position on bāhyārthavāda. To quote:

Suffice to say that I take Dharmakīrti’s essential preoccupation to be epistemology not metaphysics. His interest in defining the nature of reality is to ontologically ground his epistemology… The exact nature of real entities (whether, for example, they are ultimately mind independent or not) is a lesser concern (Dreyfus 1997: 105).

I think this quite nicely sums up and makes sense of Dharmakīrti’s method here. The real matter Dharmakīrti wishes to stress, and does stress, is precisely the account of the epistemology and phenomenology of perception that is common to his final versions of both the vijñānavādin and the bāhyārthavādin positions. This is what he argues for consistently, forcefully, and without ambiguity.

An interesting side-question here is whether, and if so how, Dharmakīrti sees the final bāhyārthavādin argument in PV in 1.58 as escaping the earlier samanantara-pratyaya argument already discussed by Kellner. She notes that this argument is directed against what she describes as “the theory that Dharmakīrti first adopts and then abandons: that external objects produce a perception which has their form (ākāra), or which resembles them” (Kellner 2011: 294 – emphasis mine). The samanantara-pratyaya argument basically hinges on the problem of discriminating exactly what part of the causal complex producing
an awareness would count as the “object.” If one defines the object as that which both causes an awareness and bears the same or a similar form, then one will in many cases have to consider the samanantara-pratyaya, the awareness immediately preceding the one in question, to be its object; if one has a continuous awareness of, say, blue, then any later moment of this stream will have as part of its causal complex its samanantara-pratyaya, which also contains a blue image, and hence will meet the test for being an “object.” The consequent inability to define an “object” in a way that distinguishes it from the samanantara-pratyaya is presented as a crippling flaw in this version of the external realist theory. In connection with this, it is interesting to note that the positive arguments for the bāhyārthī position presented in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 (after the samanantara-pratyaya argument has been presented) and in the parallel passage of the Pramāṇavārttika make no reference to any resemblance of form between the inferred extra-mental object and the image contained in the cognition it produces. In connection with this, it is interesting to note that the positive arguments for the bāhyārthī position presented in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 (after the samanantara-pratyaya argument has been presented) and in the parallel passage of the Pramāṇavārttika make no reference to any resemblance of form between the inferred extra-mental object and the image contained in the cognition it produces. In PV, Pratyakṣa 224, Dharmakīrti still refers to the awareness having the appearance (ābhāsa) of the aggregated atoms which are “grasped” by it, and it seems that this position should therefore fall prey to the samanantara-pratyaya argument. But the later treatments of the bāhyārthī position say nothing about a shared image or appearance between the atomic external objects and the macroscopic image they produce in our awareness (which, perhaps intentionally, renders the samanantara-pratyaya argument moot). Instead, the external object is postulated purely as an extra-mental cause which explains the appearance of an image such as “blue” at some times but not at others. This is then something like a Kantian Ding an sich, the “thing in itself,” something we can know of as the cause of particular manifestations in our own awareness, but of which we can know nothing more that it causes these manifestations. On this understanding blue atoms would be “blue” only in the sense that they cause in us an awareness containing a blue image. There is no sense in which the atoms can be thought of as “blue” in and of themselves, when not producing an awareness, and consequently there could be no question or resemblance between the atoms and the image they produce in our awareness.

The avoidance of this question of resemblance in the presentation of the Sautrāntika position in Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.58 and the parallel portion of Pramāṇavārttika may or may not represent a deliberate departure from the discussion in Perception 223–224 in the Pramāṇavārttika, but in any case we can still see a basic continuity of approach to the question of external objects in both of Dharmakīrti’s major works, and for that matter in Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya as well. In all of these works, as in the Nyāyānubhīd, it seems that, even though Dignāga clearly held vijñānavādin views, and Dharmakīrti seems to indicate (at least in Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa 398) that this was his preferred position as well, both authors sought to produce an account of Buddhist epistemology that was consistent with either a vijñānavādin or a bāhyārthavādin stance, and hence could be adopted by people of varied ontological persuasions.

There is a larger context to the claim I am making here about Dharmakīrti’s treatment of the Sautrāntika or bāhyārthavādin view in the Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇaviniścaya. As I have argued elsewhere,20 there is actually quite strong evidence to indicate that some followers of Dharmakīrti were in fact bāhyārthavādins, most notably the highly influential commentator Dharmottara. It was precisely Dharmakīrti’s consistently guarded and careful

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balancing of the *vijñānavādin* and *bāhyārthavādin* positions that made it possible for his followers to adopt either of these ontological stances while still presenting themselves as loyal adherents of the Dharmakīrtian tradition.

In the light of Dharmakīrti’s own seemingly ambivalent treatment of the status of mind-independent objects in his major epistemological works, a full understanding of the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition as it developed in India in the wake of Dharmakīrti’s work would seem to call for a significant reevaluation of the role and status of the *bāhyārthavādin* position within it.

**References and abbreviations**


**Kāśikā** Śucaritamiśra, Kāśikā. See Śāstrī 1927–1943.


PVA Prajñākaragupta, Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Varttikālaṅkāra, ed. Rahula Sankrityayana. Patna 1943.


PVV Manorathanandin, Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti. In PV.


Ślokavārttīka See Śāstrī 1927–1943.


The Concept of vyavaṣṭhā in Dharmottara’s and Prajñākaragupta’s Explanation of pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

by
Mai Miyo

Introduction

My paper will examine the concept of vyavaṣṭhā (“to differentiate, establish, fix”) in the context of the theory of the non-distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala. This theory is characteristic of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school and criticized mainly by Brahmanical philosophers. Dharmakīrti expounds the relevant notions in the chapters on perception (pratyakṣa) of his Pramāṇavārttika (PV III), Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin I) and Nyāyabindu (NB I), more specifically, at PV III 301–319, at PVin I 34–37 with prose,¹ and NB I 18–21. My focus, however, are the divergent interpretations of vyavaṣṭhā given by Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta. Firstly, by way of an introduction I shall briefly present Dharmakīrti’s theory of the non-distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala, how the concept of vyavaṣṭhā is introduced in this context, and how it was interpreted by his followers. Secondly, I will investigate the interpretations of Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta, which differ from each other in quite obvious ways; this confirms the conclusions of other scholars that these thinkers are adversaries on many topics.² The central point of their controversy in the present context is whether or not the function of vyavaṣṭhā involves ascertainment (niścaya) or conceptual construction (vikalpa). Dharmottara affirms this, while Prajñākaragupta denies it.

¹ For an edition of the Sanskrit text of PV III and a critically annotated Japanese translation, see Tosaki 1979: 394–413. For German and Japanese translations of PVin I based on the Tibetan translations, see Vetter 1966: 79–87 and Tosaki 1991, respectively. An edition of the Sanskrit text of the first two chapters of PVin was made by Ernst Steinkellner (see PVin I, II).
² See, above all, Ono 1995.
1. Dharmakīrti’s theory of the non-distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

1.1 The meaning of the terms pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

As is well known, the term pramāṇa has two main meanings in epistemological discourse. The first meaning is “means of valid cognition,” according to the nirvacana-analysis of the term as deriving from the verb pravṛtta (“to cognize”), and formed with the suffix -ana in the meaning of an instrument (karaṇa). The second meaning is “valid cognition,” that is, not the means of valid cognition, but the cognition itself. In this respect pramāṇa is used synonymously with samyagjñāna. We can detect this second meaning in the so-called first definition of pramāṇa in the first verse of the pramāṇasiddhi chapter of PV (PV II), according to which pramāṇa is non-belying cognition (avisamvādi jñānam).

Dignāga attempts to resolve the confusion arising from this dual meaning by arguing that the valid cognition is metaphorically designated, by way of upacāra, as the means of valid cognition. Dharmakīrti seems to use the term pramāṇa in a broader sense which encompasses both meanings. Regardless, we can ascertain that in the cases where the two terms pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala are used as a pair pramāṇa means “means of valid cognition,” and pramāṇaphala means “valid cognition.”

The word pramāṇaphala is normally analyzed as a genitive tatpurusa, i.e. as pramāṇasya phalam. Given that pramāṇa here refers specifically to a means of valid cognition,
pramāṇaphala literally translates as “the result of a means of valid cognition,” and by consequence refers to the valid cognition itself, as a resulting cognition. Dharmakīrti does not distinguish the action of cognizing (i.e. the action of knowing) from the resulting cognition (i.e., knowledge); rather, he denies the action of cognizing which has active sense and argues that only a resulting momentary cognition arises. This becomes most evident in PV III 307cd–308, the passage that is central for the concept of vyavāśthā:

\[\text{dadhānaṃ tac ca tām ātmany arthādhigamanātmānā} \parallel \]
\[\text{savyāpāram ivābhāti vyāpāreṇa svakarmaṇī} / \]
\[\text{tadvāsāt tadvyavasthānād akārakam api svayam} \parallel \]

Moreover, the [cognition] which possesses the [property of having the form of the object] (meyarūpatā) in itself appears as if it performs an activity toward its object through the activity whose nature is the understanding of the object, because the [understanding of the object] is differentiated (vyavasthāna) by the [property of having the form of the object] even if [the cognition] does not act by itself.

In PV III 307–309, Dharmakīrti mainly expounds Dignāga’s point in PS I 8cd and the prose thereon, using the same metaphor, but he also adds the new idea of vyavāśthā to characterize the relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala.

1.2 Specific referents of pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

What are the specific referents of pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala? The theory of the means and the result of valid cognition is not only applicable to perception, but also in the case of inferential cognition (anumāna), but we shall limit the discussion to perception here. Moreover, we may also confine ourselves to how Dharmakīrti explains means and result on the assumption of an external object (bāhyārtha). According to Dharmakīrti, we do not perceive external objects directly. Rather, the object projects its own form onto the cognition and we perceive the form or image of the cognition. Dharmakīrti changes his position from this type of representationalism (Sautrāntika) to idealism (Yogācāra) in the latter part of the pratyakṣa chapters of the PV and PVin, according to a “sliding/ascending scale of analysis,” where self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) plays a key role. The resulting complications are, however, outside the scope of this paper. In Dharmakīrti’s representa-

\[\text{For example, Katsura 2007: 409 and Moriyama 2010: 263 use this translation.} \]
\[\text{See NB II 4: pramāṇaphalavasyavasthārāpi pratyakṣavat} \parallel \] (“The distinction between a means of valid cognition and [its] result is here too [i.e., in the case of inference for oneself] the same as in the case of perception.”) PVin II 46.4: pratyakṣavad asya phalavikalpo vijñeyah (“The differentiation of the result of this [i.e., inference for oneself] should be known just like in the case of perception.”) The latter passage is also translated in Steinkellner 1979: 26.
\[\text{PV III 247: bhinnakālaṃ katham grāhyam iti ced grāhyatāṃ viduḥ / hetutvam eva yuktiṅha jñānā-} \]
\[\text{kārārpanakṣamam} \parallel (“[Objection:] How could [an object] which exists at a different time [from its cognition] be grasped [by that cognition]? [Answer:] People who know reasoning understand that to be grasped is to be a cause which is able to project [its own] form onto the cognition.”) Also translated in Tosaki 1979: 346.
\[\text{For this issue, see Dreyfus 1997: 83, Kellner 2011, and others.} \]
\[\text{We may leave the details to Murakami 2008, Kobayashi 2009, Kataoka 2011, Kellner 2011, and others.} \]
The Concept of vyavaṣṭā in Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta

tionalist theory, pramāṇa refers to the cognition’s property of having the form of the object (jñānasya meyarūpatā), or its similarity to the object (arthaśārūpya), and pramāṇaphala refers to the cognition’s function of understanding the object (prameyādhigati or arthapratīti).

1.3 The relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

Both meyarūpatā and prameyādhigati belong to one and the same perceptual cognition. Accordingly, they are distinguished only as properties (dharma) or aspects of the cognition, and not as real entities (vastu). This is the main point of Dharmakīrti’s theory of the non-distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala.

There are many ways in which the relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala is characterized in Dharmakīrti’s works. Most prominently, they are referred to as sādhana and sādhya, what establishes and what is established, and as karaṇa and kriyā, instrument and function. Moreover, Dharmakīrti does not limit himself to the general understanding of pramāṇa given by Dignāga, which does not go beyond the commonly used grammatical derivation. Instead, Dharmakīrti maintains that pramāṇa is something which “differentiates” (vibhid, vṛbhaj, vyavaḥstā) pramāṇaphala. This means that a cognition of an object like blue or yellow is differentiated by the cognition’s own property of having the form of the object, e.g., blue or yellow.

The differentiating function of pramāṇa is stressed in various places in PV and PVin: “[only the factor] which is uninterrupted (antyaṃ) toward and differentiating (bheda) for the [function (kriyā)] is regarded as the most effective establishing factor (sādhakatama),”

14 See PV III 306ab (= PV I 35ab): tasmāt prameyādhigateḥ sādhanaṃ meyarūpatā // (“Therefore, what establishes the understanding of the object of valid cognition is [the cognition’s] property of having the form of the object.”)

15 See NB I 10: arthaśārūpyam asya pramāṇam // (“The means of valid cognition is the [cognition’s] similarity to the object.”) PVin I 31,10–11: na ceyam arthagrahaṇārthaśārūpyāḥ anyato jñānasya sambhavati (“And this connection of the cognition to the object cannot be performed by anything other than its similarity to the object.”) Dharmakīrti demonstrates why meyarūpatā is pramāṇa more elaborately in this part of the PVin than in the PV. See Miyo 2008.

16 See n. 14.

17 See NB I 18–19: tad eva ca pratyakṣam jñānam pramāṇaphalam // arthapratītirūpatvāt // (“And this perceptual cognition itself is the result of the means of valid cognition because it has the property of understanding the object.”)

18 See PV III 318: kriyākaraṇayor aikyavirodha iti ceṣat / dharmabhedābhhyapaganād vastv abhimam itisyate // (“[Objection:] It is contradictory that action and instrument are one. [Reply:] [That is] not true because a distinction of properties is admitted. We assent that the real entity is not distinguished.”)

19 See PS(V) I 4,11–12: ... arthaḥbhāṣataivāvaya pramāṇam. yasmāt so ’rthāh tene miyate (9d)” (“... the means of valid cognition is exactly its [i.e., the cognition’s] having the appearance of the object, for the object is cognized by means of it [i.e., cognition’s having the appearance of the object].”) The same kind of interpretation is found in Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyaśāstra’s 91,2–3 on NS 1.1.3: upalabhdiśādhānanā pramāṇāni samākhyaṇarvacanasāmarthvād bodhāyaṃ. pramāṇyate ’neneti karanārthābhīdhāno hi pramāṇasabdaḥ (“It should be known that, by a nirvacana-explanation of the term, pramānas are what establishes cognition, because the word pramāṇa expresses the meaning of instrument by means of which [the object] is cognized.”)

20 See PV III 311cd: yad anyaṃ bhedaḥ tasyās tat sādhvatām ataram //

15 See NB I 20: arthaśārūpyam asya pramāṇam // (“The means of valid cognition is the [cognition’s] similarity to the object.”) PVin I 31,10–11: na ceyam arthagrahaṇārthaśārūpyāḥ anyato jñānasya sambhavati (“And this connection of the cognition to the object cannot be performed by anything other than its similarity to the object.”) Dharmakīrti demonstrates why meyarūpatā is pramāṇa more elaborately in this part of the PVin than in the PV. See Miyo 2008.
is differentiated (vibhajyate) according to the object,”21 or “the understanding of the object (arthādhigama as pramāṇaphala) is differentiated (vyavasthāna) by the property of having the form of the object (meyarūpatā as pramāṇa).”22

1.4 Vyava√sthā in the relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

Commentators on Dharmakīrti’s works use words derived from vyava√sthā to interpret his definition of pramāṇa, referring to pramāṇa as differentiator (vyavasthāpaka) and pramāṇaphala as that which is differentiated (vyavasthāpya).23 The relationship between differentiator and differentiated (vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāva) is contrasted with the causal relationship between producer and product (janyajanakabhāva) as which certain opponents analyze the relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala. For example, the contact between the senses and the object (indriyārthasannikarṣa) and the cognition of the object (arthavijñāna) have such a causal relationship, and Naiyāyikas assume them to be related as pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala. Dharmakīrti’s successors attempt to justify the theory of non-distinction by keeping these two relationships clearly separate. If one supposes pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala to be related as producer and product, then the two factors must be distinct from each other, because producer and product are two different entities occupying different moments in time; they are non-contemporaneous. But if it is accepted that pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala are related as vyavasthāpaka and vyavasthāpya, so that the means differentiates the result and, at the same time, is the result’s own nature, then both belong to one and the same cognition, and they cannot be distinguished as real entities. Of course, they are then also simultaneous.

Dharmottara is thought to be the most authoritative commentator on these two relationships by modern scholars, but their distinction is also found in other commentaries, such as Manorathanandin’s Pramāṇavārttikāvṛtti.24 Moreover, Dharmottara’s remarks in the Nyāyabinduṭīkā (NBṬ) are actually not as simple as one might expect. As Oki 1993 pointed out, his explanation includes not only the two aspects of perceptual cognition, but also, as a third factor, an ascertaining cognition (niścayaprâtayaya) that arises immediately after the perceptual cognition. Moreover, as we shall see, Prajñākaragupta criticizes Dharmottara’s view in his Pramāṇavārttikālankāra (PVA). It is to this controversy that we now turn.

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21 PV III 302cd: bhāvyam tenāmanā yena pratikarma vibhajyate //
22 PV III 308c: tadvaśāt tadvyavasthānād ... //
23 For example, Tosaki 1979: 397 abstracts this understanding from the Nyāyabinduṭīkā.
24 See PVV 213,15–16 on PV III 315: nāsty atra kāryakāraṇatātmakaḥ (PVVMS; kāryakāraṇatāmakah PVV) kriyākaraṇabhabhāvah, kim tu vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvah (“In this case, the relationship between instrument and action does not have the nature of the relationship between producer and product, but is the relationship between differentiator and what is differentiated.”) Devendrabuddhi also refers to the relationship between janaka and janya, but does not use the words vyavasthāpaka and vyavasthāpya. See PVDP 216a3–4/P 253a8–253b2 on PV III 301: ’o na ci yin zhe na / gang las ’bras yin / gang yin pa’i las de bya ba de ni de i sgrub byed / de sgrub par byed pa las chod pa med par tha snyad la brten pa’i sgo nas rab tu ’grub pa thob par ’gyur gyi / bskyed par bya ba skyed par byed pa’i dngos po (D; pos P) ni ma yin te / de’i bya ba ni de nyid yin no //
2. Dharmottara’s explanation of vyavasthā as involving an ascertaining cognition

2.1 Two kinds of relationships and vyavasthāpaka as vyavasthāpanahetu

After commenting on the individual words of NB I 21, Dharmottara justifies the non-distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala in the way we have outlined above. The text reads as follows:

na cātra janyajanakabhiḥvanibhandhanah sādhyasādhanabhāvah, yenaikasmin vastuni virodhah syāti, api tu vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvena, tāta ekasya vastunah kiñcid rūpaṃ pramāṇam kiñcit pramāṇaphalam na virudhyate. vyavasthāpanahetur hi sārūpyam tasya jñānasya, vyavasthāpyaṃ ca niśasamvedanarūpaṃ.

In the case of [pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala], the relationship between what establishes (i.e., pramāṇa) and what is established (i.e., pramāṇaphala) is not based on the relationship between producer and product. If it were, [then the relationship would result in a] contradiction in one and the same real entity (i.e., a momentary cognition). Rather, it is [given] in terms of the relationship between differentiator and differentiated. Therefore, it is not contradictory that a certain property of one real entity [i.e., cognition] is the means of valid cognition and a certain other [property of the same cognition] is the result of the means of valid cognition. For, the cause for differentiation (vyavasthāpanahetu) is the similarity (sārūpya) of cognition [to the blue object], and what is differentiated is the property of the awareness of blue (niśasamvedanarūpa).

Dharmottara attempts to counter the objection that there would be a contradiction if pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala belonged to the same cognition. In addition to introducing the contrast between the two kinds of relationships, he characterizes cognition’s similarity to the object (sārūpya) as cause for the differentiation of the property of the awareness of the object (niśasamvedanarūpa). The point I wish to emphasize is that the word vyavasthāpaka is here explained as vyavasthāpanahetu. This word vyavasthāpaka is problematic, and in fact, Malvania changes this reading, which appears in all the manuscripts, to vyavasthāpana, apparently following Durvekamiśra’s suggestion in the Dharmottarapradīpa (DhPr) subcommentary. However, the reading vyavasthāpaka that all manuscripts used by Malvania contain should be kept, because Durvekamiśra himself confesses that the reading vyavasthāpana contradicts what will be stated, by which he probably refers to vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāva in NBṬ 83,2. Moreover, it seems more reasonable that Dharmottara would explain vyavasthāpaka as vyavasthāpanahetu, whereas it appears less plausible that he would apply the same explanation to vyavasthāpana. Durvekamiśra’s commentary is nevertheless helpful for understanding the meaning of the word: vyavasthāpaka

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25 NB I 21: tadvaśād arthapratītisiddher iti // (“For, the understanding of the object is established through the force of that [i.e., cognition’s having the form of the object].”)

26 -vyavasthāpaka- MSS. (reported in NBṬ); -vyavasthāpana- NBṬ. See below.
is the cause for differentiating, with the -aka suffix having the sense of instrument (karaṇa), and vyavasthāpanahetu is the cause for the function of differentiation.  

2.2 The ascertaining cognition as the third factor

Dharmottara next goes on to explain the relationship between vyavasthāpaka, vyavasthāpanahetu, and vyavasthāpya in more detail.

NBT 83,2–84,1: vyavasthāpyavavyavasthāpakabhāvo28 ꞌpi katham ekasya jñānasyeti cet. ucyate. sadr̥ṣam29 anubhūya tadvijñānam yato nīlasa grāhakam avasthāpyate niścayapratyayena. tasmāt sārūpyam anubhūtaṃ vyavasthāpanahetuḥ, niścayapratyayena ca tajjñānam nīlasamvedanam avasthāpyamānāṃ vyavasthāpyam. ... vyavasthāpakaś ca vikalpapratyayah pratyakṣabaltoppano draṣṭavyah.

[Question:] How does the relationship between differentiator and differentiated, for its part, exist for one and the same cognition?

[Answer:] We say: having experienced (anubhūya) a likeness [to the external blue object] (nīla)sadr̥ṣa, i.e., the blue form of the cognition), the [perceptual] cognition is ascertained (avasthāpyate)30 to be grasping blue by the [subsequent] ascertaining cognition (niścayapratyayata) (“I perceive blue”).

27 DhPr 83,14–17: vyavasthāpyate viśiṣṭenātmanā niyamyate ‘neneti vyavasthānimittam vyavasthāpanam abhipretam. vyavasthāpanabhaṇeṇe ayam pātho vakyamānāvirodhi. yadā tu vyavasthāpakabhāvene pātho drśyate, tadā karane kartarbhāvavivakṣayā tathā draṣṭavyam. sadhvasiś chinattīti yathā (“In NBT according to Durvekamīra’s reading: vyavasthāpyavvyavasthāpanabhaṇeṇa,] vyavasthāpana is intended to be the factor for differentiating, by means of which [the property of the awareness of blue] is differentiated, that is, limited by [its] distinct nature. This reading vyavasthāpanabhaṇeṇa contradicts what will be stated [by Dharmottara in NBT 83,2]. When on the other hand the reading vyavasthāpakabhāvena is observed, [the word vyavasthāpakabhaṇa] should be taken in the same way [as the word vyavasthāpana] with the intention to express agency (-aka suffix) in the sense of instrument (-ana suffix); for example, an excellent sword cuts”); DhPr 83,24–25: vyavasthāpanam vyavasthākāraṇanam, vyavasthāyāṃ prayojakavyāpayā iti yāvat, tasya hetur nimittam (“vyavasthāpabhaṇa [in the phrase, vyavasthāpanahetu] is the function of differentiating, to be precise, the activity causing differentiation. Its [i.e., vyavasthāpanabhaṇa’s] cause [means] factor.”)

Oki 1993: 136, n. 23 suggests to change vyavasthāpaka to vyavasthāpana in accordance with Malvania’s earlier emendation. But now that Malvania’s emendation has been rejected, this change is also unnecessary. It is true that Oki’s modification solves the problem of two meanings in one word in this passage, which seems to be mentioned by Durvekamīra, but it produces the same problem for the word vyavasthāpana in the earlier passage.

sadr̥ṣam MSS. (reported in NBT); nīlasadr̥ṣam NBT. Malvania adds nīla according to DhPr, but this seems to be an addition by Durvekamīra. I have not incorporated it into Dharmottara’s text, in accordance with all the manuscripts reported in NBT and the Tibetan translation.

avavasthā, in causative, is a function of the ascertaining cognition and explained using the verbs niśyam (DhPr 84,15) and niścī (DhPr 84,17), so I translate it as “to ascertain.” Nevertheless, I am not sure about the difference between the meanings of avavasthā and yaavavasthā – both in causative – here. They seem to be almost the same, so the meaning “differentiate” for avavasthāpayati is also possible.

See DhPr 84,10: niścayapratyayetāni. niścayāmakaññenottarakālabhāvinā (“[Answer:] By the ascertaining cognition. [This means] by the cognition whose nature it is to ascertain, and which arises at a subsequent time.”)

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Therefore, the similarity which has been experienced is the cause for differentiation, and the [perceptual cognition] is what is differentiated, being ascertained, by the ascertaining cognition, to be the awareness of blue. ... Moreover, it is to be observed that the conceptual cognition (vikalpaprataaya, i.e., the ascertaining cognition), which arises due to the [preceding] perception, is the differentiator (vyavasthāpaka, i.e., the agent of differentiation).32

In this section Dharmottara uses the term vyavasthāpaka in two different senses. In the question, it is used in the same sense as before, i.e. as the cause for differentiating (vyavasthāpanahetu), and it indicates pramāṇa understood as similarity. On the other hand, in the answer, the term vyavasthāpaka is used in the sense of “agent of differentiation,”33 referring to the ascertaining cognition which arises immediately after the perception.

The argument, now, runs as follows. First of all, Dharmottara presupposes that the cognitive process consists of two stages in different moments: In a first moment the perceptual cognition (pratyakṣaṃ jñānam, anubhava) experiences a likeness to the external blue object (nīlasadrśa, i.e., the blue form of the cognition), and in a second moment there arises the ascertaining cognition, “I perceive this very blue” (nīlam evānubhavāmi).34

The preceding perceptual cognition’s similarity to the blue object here is the cause for differentiating (vyavasthāpanahetu, vyavasthāpaka 1) because the succeeding ascertaining cognition carries out the function of ascertaining (avasthāpayati) due to the fact that the preceding cognition experiences (anubhūt) the blue form in cognition. The preceding perceptual cognition – the awareness of blue (nīlasaṃvedana) – is what is ascertained (vyavasthāpya) because it is ascertained to be grasping blue by the succeeding cognition. The succeeding ascertaining cognition, for its part, is the agent of differentiation (vyavasthāpaka 2). This ascertaining cognition is also characterized as a conceptual cognition (vikalpaprataya) because it accomplishes its function of ascertaining by the exclusion of others (anyavyāvṛttyā).35

3. Prajñākaragupta’s refutation of Dharmottara’s interpretation

Prajñākaragupta explicitly denies the intervention by the ascertaining cognition that Dharmottara assumes. A dialogue at the end of the PVA on PV III 31136 clearly illustrates

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32 This vyavasthāpaka does not mean the cause for differentiating, but the agent of differentiation. See below.
33 See DhPr 84,25: vyavasthāpayatī vyavasthāpakah (“It differentiates [the perceptual cognition], so [it is] the differentiator.”)
34 See DhPr 83,29–30: na tu nīlasadrśam anubhavāmīti niścayo 'sti, api tu nilam evānubhavāmīti nīlasya grāhakam avasthāpyate.
35 See NBṬ 83,5–6: tasmād asārūpyavyāvṛttyā sārūpyam jñānasya vyavasthāpanahetub. anīlabodhavyā-vṛttyā ca nīlabodharūpatvaṃ vyavasthāpyam (“Therefore, the [perceptual] cognition’s similarity [to the object] is the cause for differentiating by the exclusion of something which is not the similarity, and the [cognition’s] property of awareness of blue is what is ascertained by the exclusion of that which is not the awareness of blue.”)
36 This numbering of the verse follows Tosaki 1979. Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s numbering in PVA is mistaken.
this point.\textsuperscript{37} The opponent, whom the subcommentator Yamāri identifies as Dharmottara,\textsuperscript{38} first says:

\begin{quote}
PVA 345,9f. on PV III 311: \textit{tadākāratāyām api niścayāḥ parah pratiniyata-vyavasthāyām apeksyata iti cet.}
\end{quote}

[Objection:] Even if [a cognition] has the form (ākāra) of that [object], ascertaining (niścaya),\textsuperscript{39} which is different [from the cognition’s property of having the form], is required for the differentiation [of the cognition/object] as being limited in each case (pratiniyatavyavasthā).\textsuperscript{40}

According to the opponent’s view, ascertaining (niścaya) intervenes between the cognition’s property of having the form of the object (i.e., pramāṇa) and cognition’s differentiation according to the object (i.e., pramāṇaphala). We can see how this opponent’s view corresponds to that of Dharmottara as discussed above.

Prajñākaragupta refutes this position as follows:

\begin{quote}
PVA 345,10–12: \textit{na, pratyakṣaprāmāṇyaprastāvāt. abhyāsasambhave hi pratyakṣam pramāṇam. tadākāramātrād eva ca tadā pravartanaṃ\textsuperscript{x} niścayam antareṇāpi. yadā tu niścayāpeksā, tadānumānām pramāṇam. tasyāpy ākāra-mātrād eva pravṛtteḥ nāparāpeksā. tasmād ākārān nāparaṃ karaṇam.}
\end{quote}

No. For, the relevant subject is perception’s being a valid cognition. To explain: perception is the \textit{pramāṇa} when there is habituation (abhyāsa). And then, [perception] prompts [the cognizing person] to act (pravartana), only due to its form (ākāra), even without ascertaining (niścaya). On the other hand, inference (anumāna) is the \textit{pramāṇa} when [the person] depends on ascertaining [in order to act]. [However, he/she] also acts only due to the form of that [inference], so the [inference] does not depend on anything other [than its form for prompting him/her to act]. Accordingly, there is no other instrument (karaṇa, i.e., pramāṇa) apart from the [object’s] form [in direct perception or inference].

Prajñākaragupta introduces a new topic here regarding \textit{pramāṇa} in the broader sense, i.e., valid cognition and human action, thus broadening the scope of the discussion. As Dharmakīrti claims in PV II 3cd, valid cognition is the main cause (pradhāna) for human

\textsuperscript{37} See Miyo 2013 for a critical edition of the whole Sanskrit text of PVA on PV III 311, a Japanese translation, and additional information.

\textsuperscript{38} Y (D 251a3, P 337b1–2): \textit{da ni slob dpon chos mchog gi lugs sun phyung ba’i don du nye bar ’god pa ni l de’i ru na pa yang zhes bya ba’o l/ (“In order to criticize the teacher Dharmottara’s theory, [Prajñākaragupta] states here that even if [the cognition] has the form of the [object,] and so on.”)\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{39} It is also possible to interpret niścaya here as “ascertaining cognition,” as in the NBT.

\textsuperscript{40} The interpretation of this compound involves some difficulties. We have a synonym for it, \textit{pratiniyata-rthavyavasthā}, cited in n. 46. I tentatively interpret it according to PVA 346,23–24: \textit{yadi sa tathābhūta ākāro na syāt, na kaścit pratiniyataṃ artham vyavasthāpayet (“If such a form did not exist, nothing would differentiate the object as being limited in each case.”)}

\textsuperscript{x} pravarttanaṃ PVA\textsubscript{MS} [‘jug pa yin no T (D 15a4, P 18a7)]; pravarttana- PVA.
action (pravṛtti) toward an object that is to be obtained or avoided. If one interprets this statement strictly speaking, perception as valid cognition, or more precisely, its object-form, should directly prompt the cognizing person to act without ascertaining. But if perception could cause the action only through ascertaining, then the ascertaining cognition would be the pramāṇa. It is important to note that Prajñākaragupta here adopts the concept of “habituation” (abhyāsa) as a powerful device that guarantees perception’s ability to cause action. He clearly separates perception and inference in accordance with the presence or absence of habituation, so the range of perception as a pramāṇa is limited to those particular cases that directly cause human action based on habituation. Consequently, perception causes human action only through its object-form without ascertaining. On the other hand, inference is the pramāṇa if the person acts depending on ascertainmet, but inference does not depend on subsequent ascertaining; rather, inference itself is the ascertaining cognition. Therefore, the object-form is the means of valid cognition in both cases, perception and inference, and the ascertaining cognition which is different from them does not have any influence on them.

A detailed discussion of Prajñākaragupta’s views on the relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala, as well as an examination of his unique terminology for explaining the aspects of cognition that are involved, must be left to another occasion. But for the present context we may note that according to Prajñākaragupta, a cognition’s aspect of understanding (i.e., pramāṇaphala) is completely identical with its aspect of having the object’s form (i.e., pramāṇa), so there is no room for a third factor that might intervene to differentiate the understanding; rather, it must be differentiated by another aspect of the very same perception.

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42 See PV II 3b’–d: dhīpramāṇatā / pravṛttes tatpradhānatvād dheyopādeyavastuni // (“Cognition is the pramāṇa because it is the main cause for [human] action toward an object that is to be obtained or avoided.”) The verse is also translated in Dunne 2004: 262. As Katsura 1989: 541 points out, it is a distinctive feature of Dharmakīrti’s thought, in contrast to Dignāga’s, to formulate pramāṇa theory as concerning the whole of the cognitive process including the action toward the object.

43 However, Dharmakīrti accepts that some other factors intervene between perception and the action that it prompts. Dharmottara justifies this intervention by paraphrasing “what prompts to act” (pravartaka) as “what indicates the object of the action” (pravṛttiviṣayapradarśaka) and Durvekamiśra interprets it introducing the concept of “capable of action” (pravṛttiyogya). Therefore, we can say Prajñākaragupta makes a radical interpretation here. On this subject, see Miyo 2014.

44 The concept of atyantābhyāsa is already used by Śākyabuddhi in the same context, as seen, among others, in Inami 1993: 96 and Krasser 2003. This issue may relate to the topic of yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa).

45 For other instances demonstrating the same idea, see PVA 55,15–56,1 on PV II 3b’ed: na ca cakṣurā-dikāt pravartate jñānam antareṇa, vikalpam antarenūpī tv abhāyāt pravrta. tato heypādeyavaiṣaye dhīr eva pūrvikā pravartanāt pramāṇam, na vikalpādayah. yatra tu nābhyāsah, tatrānumānam eva pratyabhijnānādayah, dealt with in Ono 1993: 110–111; PVA 218,6–8 on PV III 56: yatra bhāvīgatis tatrānumānam mānam īṣyate / vartamāne ‘timātraṇaḥ adhyāksanānāmaḥ //240// vratyantābhāyā-sād avikalpayato ‘pi pravartanam, tatra pratyakṣam pramāṇam. anyathā vikalpasya pramāṇāntarata prāptā. yadi yatra vikalpas tatraiva pratyakṣam pravartakaḥ pramāṇam ceti.

46 Some examples for his unique terminology are: pratiniyatākāratā (PVA 345,3), andākāraviśeṣa (PVA 345,7) for pramāṇa; and arthaparicchedhayavasthā (PVA 345,1), niyatārthavyavasthā (PVA 345,2), arthavyavasthiti (PVA 345,6), and pratiyātārthavyavasthā (PVA 345,4–5) for pramāṇaphala.

47 PVA 345,6: akāraniyamah siddha yadi sārthavyavasthitā (em.; -vyasthitī PVA) / akāraṇam parah (PVA MS; śaraḥ PVA) siddhe prāptāḥ kim iti poṣyate // (618) (“If the limitation of the form has been
4. Conclusion

As we have shown, for Dharmottara the ascertaining cognition (niścayapratyaya), which arises immediately after a perceptual cognition, plays an important role even in his discussion of perception. This ascertaining cognition works as the agent of differentiation (vyavasthāpaka), and the perception’s similarity to the object is merely the cause for differentiating (vyavasthāpanahetu). Prajñākaragupta, on the other hand, denies this kind of intervention by an ascertaining cognition. He excludes it from the discourse on perception by taking recourse to the idea of habituation (ābhyāsa). According to Prajñākaragupta, a cognition’s aspect of understanding the object (i.e., pramāṇaphala) is completely identical with its aspect of having the object’s form (i.e., pramāṇa), so one aspect of cognition is simply differentiated by another aspect of the very same cognition. This difference in the two commentator’s interpretations also results in a difference in their usage of derivatives of vyavasthā. Dharmottara uses these only in cases where the function of ascertaining, or conceptual construction, is involved. On the other hand, Prajñākaragupta uses them even in cases where conceptual construction is not concerned.

Why do Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta present us with such divergent opinions on the influence of the conceptual construction on perception? While this topic calls for further in-depth studies, I would like to highlight three points that seem to be of special interest. The first is the position of the form or image in a cognition. Prajñākaragupta emphasizes the unity of the form and cognition, which easily leads to a negation of the intervention by conceptual construction, while Dharmottara does not. A second point worthy of note is the kind of cognition they are thinking about when discussing perception as a pramāṇa. Dharmottara thinks mainly about mundane cognition, such as perception by the sense faculties, but Prajñākaragupta seems to think more about supramundane cognition, such as yogic perception up to a Buddha’s cognition. This soteriologically relevant cognition should be free from the influence of conceptual construction. As a last and final point, I would like to highlight that already the earlier commentaries on the Pramāṇavārttika by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi show a faint indication of the same controversy.

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48 See also the passage discussed in n. 47.
49 These two different views on cognition’s form are the basis of the two sub-schools of Yogācāra, i.e., sākāravāda and nirākāravādalīkākāravāda. See, among others, Iwata 1991: 211–231, Funayama 2007.
50 As Ono 2012: 166; 170–173 points out, Dharmottara takes mundane cognition into account in his discussion of the definition of pramāṇa, but on the other hand Prajñākaragupta regards the Buddha as the supreme pramāṇa (param pramāṇam) whose nature is perception. PVAO 84,1–2 on PV II 7a: tathāgato hi bhagavān tadādīn kṛtvā pratyakṣaṁ upa bhagavān pramāṇam, translated in Ono 1993: 84.
51 Devendrabuddhi probably assumes that perception prompts the cognizing person to act after it brings forth the ascertaining cognition. However, Śākyabuddhi divides human action based on perception into two types, the first instance and habituated instances, and he states that the fully habituated perception with a vivid form ascertains its validity by itself. This could mean that habituated perception prompts.
Thus, a satisfactory understanding of the dissimilarity of views held by Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta will emerge only after comprehensive investigation into its epistemological and historical roots.

References and abbreviations


human action directly because of its vivid form of the object. PVP D 5a5/P 5b7: ‘on kyang bzung ba’i rnam pa gang yin pa dag la yang nges pa skyed par byed pa de la ’jug par byed pa’i phyir tshad ma nnyid du ‘dod kyi / gzhin du ni ma yin no //; PVṬ(Ś) D 72a5–7/P 87a5–87b2: mngon sum ni rnam pa rtag pa med pa nnyid kyi phyir nges pa ma yin mod kyi ‘on kyang der snang bar skyes pa tsam yin no // ... mngon sum gyi rten can gyi ‘jug pa ni rnam pa gnyis te dang po nnyid dang goms pa can no // de la goms pa dang ldan pa gang yin pa de la shin tu goms pa gsal (D; bsal P) ba can gyi mngon sum skyes pa na ji lta ba bzhiin du goms pa’i rnam par ’khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan spangs pa can nnyid kyi yongs su bcdad nas skye ba dang / de lta bur guur pa’i phyis ‘byung ba’i nges pa skyed par byed pa’i phyir de la skyes bu ’jug par byed do // This passage is translated in Inami 1993: 95–96.


NB Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti): see DhPr.

NBṬ Nyāyabindutīkā (Dharmottara): see DhPr.

NS Nyāyasūtra (Aṣṭapāda Gautama): see NBh.


The Concept of vyavāśṭā in Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta


PS I Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter I (Dignāga): see PS(V) I.

PV Pramāṇavārttika (Dharmakīrti).
PV II Pramāṇavārttika, chapter II (Dharmakīrti): see PVV.
PV Vin Pramāṇavinīścaya (Dharmakīrti).
PVP Tibetan translation of Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (Devendrabuddhi): D 4217 (che), P 5717(b) (che).
PVTŚ Tibetan translation of Pramāṇavārttikāṭikā (Śākyabuddhi): D 4220 (nye), P 5718 (nye).

**Y** Tibetan translation of Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhi (Yamāri): D 4226 (me), P 5723 (me).

Dharmakīrti’s Apoha Theory: Perceptual Judgment and the Lack of Superimposition (samāropaviveka)  

by  
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Introduction

In the Apoha section in the Svārthānumāna chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti starts by characterizing apoha as the difference (bheda) among real entities from an ontological point of view (PV I.40–42), and then as the exclusion of superimposition (samāropavyavaccheda) from an epistemological point of view (PV I.43–58). He defines as a determinate cognition (niścayajñāna) an inference (anumāna) and a perceptual judgment, of which the latter is the conceptual cognition that follows a perceptual cognition (pratyakṣaprtyahabāvivikalpa), and argues that both have the exclusion of superimposition as their object. It is important to note that what Dharmakīrti means by the term samāropavyavaccheda “exclusion of superimposition” differs for inference and perceptual judgment. In the case of an inference, the term in question signifies the function of excluding superimposition (samāropavyavaccheda) that is carried out by the inference when there is an erroneous cognition with respect to the subject of the inference. In the case of a perceptual judgment, on the other hand, it means “lack of superimposition” (samāropaviveka). This latter point is made by Dharmakīrti in PV I.48.

PV I.48: kvacid dṛṣṭe 'pi yaj jñānaṃ sāmānyārthaṃ vikalpakam /  

asamāropitāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram //

Katsura (1984, 1989, 1993) and Kellner (2004), when dealing with Dharmakīrti’s concept of perceptual judgment, refer to the exclusion of superimposition. Katsura (1984: 226), relying on PV I.48–49, says: “Apart from provoking a practical activity, another important function is to prevent wrong judgement from arising.” In addition, Kellner (2004: 41) explicitly states that “ascertainment which follows immediately after perception, serves to keep error and doubt away and for this reason also has an ‘exclusion’ as its object.” Their view of perceptual judgment is quite acceptable. But to my knowledge, no studies have ever tried to show how perceptual judgment is linked to the exclusion of superimposition. The aim of this paper is thus to show how Dharmakīrti establishes that a perceptual judgment has “exclusion” as its object.

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1. Arguments in PV I.43–47: samāropavyavaccheda

Before entering into the main task, let us look at the preceding arguments Dharmakīrti brings forward in PV I.43–47. Dharmakīrti introduces PV I.43 by saying the following:

PVSV ad PV I.43 (G25.26–26.1, M17.1–2): kathaṃ punar etad gamyate – vyavacchedah śabdaliṅgabhyaṃ pratipādyate vidhīnaḥ na vasturūpaṃ eveti pramāṇāntarasya śabdāntarasas ca pravṛtteḥ /

[Objection] But how can this be understood: it is exclusion (vyavaccheda) and not a real thing in a positive form that is understood from a word and an inferential mark?

[Answer] [This is reasonable] because another word occurs [with respect to one and the same real thing] and because another valid cognition occurs [with respect to one and the same real thing].

Dharmakīrti here cites Dignāga’s well-known statement: vyavacchedah śabdaliṅgabhyaṃ pratipādyate vidhīnaḥ na vasturūpaṃ eva.¹ According to Dharmakīrti, the fact that different words or different valid cognitions can occur with reference to one and the same real thing shows that what is understood from a word or an inferential mark is not the real thing itself but exclusion (vyavaccheda). In order to demonstrate this point, Dharmakīrti starts to develop arguments.

In PV I.43–44, to begin with, Dharmakīrti says the following:

PV I.43: ekasyārthasvabhāvasya pratyakṣasya sataḥ svayam / ko ‘nyo na drṣṭo bhūgaḥ syād yah pramāṇaiḥ pariṃśyate //

PV I.44: no ced bhrāntinimittena saṃyojyeta guṇāntaram / śuktau vā rajatākāro rūpasādharmyadarśanāt //

When the single essential nature of an object is perceived as it is, what part could be left unseen separately from it? To be sure, if a part is left unseen, it is examined through valid cognitions.

[But the condition must be imposed:] “On the condition that a quality foreign to the object is not connected with it by cause of an erroneous cognition (bhrāntinimitta), unlike the case where the form of a piece of silver is connected with mother of pearl due to the perception of the similarity in form between them.”

PVSV ad PV I.44 (G26.18–27.2, M17.16–21): tasmāt paśyan śuktirūpaṃ viśiṣṭam eva paśyati / niścayapratyayavaikalyāt tv aniścinvan tatsāmānyam

¹ This translation of Dignāga’s statement is based on Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation. According to Karmakagomin, the statement is interpreted as follows: It is exclusion in a positive form and not a real thing that is understood from a word and an inferential mark. On the different interpretations, see Kellner 2004: 5, n. 3. On this statement of Dignāga’s, see Pind 2015: II 127, n. 431.
Therefore, a person, when seeing the form of mother of pearl, is to see it precisely as what is differentiated [from a piece of silver]. But, due to the deficiency of causes of a determinate cognition, the person, without determining the form, conceives: “I see a property common to them.” Consequently the person superimposes [the image of] silver [on mother of pearl]. Similarly, to a person who does not recognize the difference between moments since there arise similar moments in sequence, there arises the erroneous cognition: “This is [temporally] persistent” because of the superimposition of identity (tadbhāvasamāropa).

If an entity has a certain number of foreign properties, that number of properties is what arises from causes [of erroneous cognitions] according to each case and is superimposed on the entity. Therefore, valid cognitions which arise to exclude what is superimposed must be fruitful.

But, it is not the case that the [valid cognitions] bringing about the exclusion take place in order to make known the part of a real thing which has not been understood. For the [part for which valid cognitions take place] has been perceived. Indeed, it is not proper to say that something indivisible is partially perceived.

It is important to note that Dharmakīrti accepts the following points:

1. On the condition that no erroneous cognition (bhrānti) arises with respect to a real thing, when a real thing is perceived, all its parts are perceived.
2. An erroneous cognition can arise with respect to a real thing.
3. When a person does not recognize the difference between moments, the person superimposes identity between them, and erroneously cognizes “this is permanent.” (The non-recognition of the difference between

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2 According to Dharmakīrti, the causes of a determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment are: acuity of a cognition (buddhipāṭava), a state of habituation to the imprint of this (tadvāsanā- bhyāsa), situation-context (prakaraṇa), and others. PVSV ad PV I.58 (G32.3–8, M20.29–21.1): yady api amśaratihāt sarvato bhinnasvabhāvo bhāvo 'nubhūtas tathāpi na sarvabhededu tāvatā niścayo bhavati / kāraṇāntarāpekṣyatvāt / anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhāyaṃ niścayapratyayān āna jayati / yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe 'pi kunapakāminibhaksyavikalpāḥ / tatra buddhipāṭavaṃ tadvāsanābhāyaśaḥ prakaranaṃ ityādayo 'nubhāvād bhedaniścayatpattisahkārināḥ / On the concept of the causes of a determinate cognition, see Kellner 2004: 19–32.

3 Karnakagomin glosses tadbhāva as sattā “the property of continuing to exist.” PVSVṬ 123.28: tadbhāvasamāropāt sattasamāropā. But the term tadbhāva, synonymous with tattva, can be taken as meaning “identity,” as opposed to “difference” (nānātva).
moments or the observation of the similarity between moments \([bhrāntinimitta] \rightarrow \text{superimposition of identity} \[samāropa] \rightarrow \text{an erroneous cognition} \[bhrānti]\).)

4. A valid cognition (\(pramāṇa\), i.e., an inference, is resorted to in order to exclude the superimposition.

5. This superimposition must take place with reference to the part which has been perceived.

Dharmakīrti here explains the basic structure in which a valid cognition brings about the exclusion of superimposition.

In PV I.45,\(^4\) which is a recapitulating verse (\(samgrahaśloka\)), he goes on to argue that when a real thing is perceived, all its qualities are perceived; but when an erroneous cognition arises with reference to that real thing, these qualities are not determined. Thus one must resort to an inference in order to determine them.

Moreover, in PV I.46\(^5\) he states that if an inference were to grasp a real thing, then it would follow that once one property of it is determined, all properties are determined; and that if an inference has exclusion (\(apoha\)) as its object, the undesirable consequence does not follow. It is in commenting this verse that Dharmakīrti makes an important point: an inference brings about the exclusion of superimposition (\(samāropavyavaccheda\)). He states:

\[
\text{PVSV ad PV I.46 (G27.13–15, M18.1–3): } \text{yadā punar anumānena samāropavyavacchedah kriyate tadā naikasamāropavyavacchedād anyavyavacchedah kṛto bhavatītī tadartham anyat pravartate} /
\]

However, when [it is assumed that] the exclusion of superimposition is brought about by an inference, then [it can be said that] since the exclusion of a different [superimposition (non-B)] is not brought about just because the superimposition (non-A) is excluded by one [inference (A)], another [inference (B)] takes place in order to [exclude the different superimposition (non-B)].\(^6\)

Here Dharmakīrti assumes that, with reference to sound, two superimpositions arise: (non-A) the superimposition of the property of not being produced (\(akṛtakasamāropa\)), and (non-B) that of the property of being permanent (\(nityasamāropa\)). Also, two inferences take place: (A) the inference to prove the property of being produced (\(kṛtakānumāna\)) and (B) that to prove the property of being impermanent (\(anityatvānumāna\)). He supposes that when a real thing is perceived, a property which the real thing does not bear is superimposed on it and that an inference is performed in order to exclude such a superimposition.

\(^4\) PV I.45: tasmād dṛṣṭasya bhāvasya dṛṣṭa evākhilo guṇaḥ / bhrānter niścīyate neti sādhanam sampravartate /

\(^5\) PV I.46: vastugrahe 'numānac ca dharmasyaikasya niścaye / sarvadharmagraho 'pohe nāyam doṣaḥ prasajyate /

\(^6\) PVSVṬ 125.23–25: tadaikena kṛtakānumānenaikasyaākṛtakasamāropasya vyavacchedād anyasya nityasamāropasya vyavacchedah kṛto na bhavatītī kṛtvā tadartham anyasamāropavyavacchedārtham anyad ity anityatvādyanumānam pravartate /
In PV I.47, which is also a *saṃgrahaśloka*, he states that it is due to the reason stated in PV I.46 that Dignāga declares an inference to have exclusion as its object; if an inference did not have exclusion as its object, it would follow that when the subject of an inference is known, it would be knowns in its entirety, and therefore there would be no part left to be inferred.

All these points make the following clear: In PV I.43–47 Dharmakīrti develops an argument to establish that an inference has for its object exclusion and not a real thing. It is in this connection that, in PV I.48, Dharmakīrti introduces an argument to establish that a perceptual judgment also has exclusion as its object.

**2. PVSV on PV I.48**

**2.1** Now let us look closely at what Dharmakīrti says in PVSV on PV I.48. He comments on the verse as follows:

**A:** PVSV G28.8–9, M18.15–16: *yad rūpādidarśanānantaram aliṅgaṃ niścaya-yajñānam bhavati, tat katham asati samārope bhavad vyavacchedaviṣayaṃ bhavatī*

[Objection] A determinate cognition that arises immediately after the perception of an entity like color is not an inferential cognition (*aliṅga*). Therefore, how is it that such a determinate cognition, arising when superimposition is absent (*asati samārope bhavat*), has exclusion for its object?\(^7\)

**B:** PVSV G28.10–11, M18.16–17: *samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt / yatra hy asya samārope yathā sthirāh sāmaka iti vā, na tatra bhede niścayo bhavati /*

[Answer] For the very reason that the [determinate cognition] does not arise with respect to an object of superimposition (*samāropaviṣaya*), [it is proper to say that it has for its object the exclusion of superimposition]. Indeed, a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to the difference (*bheda*) on which something is superimposed by the cognizer (*asya*), as in the case where [one has an erroneous cognition such as] “[this is] permanent” or “[this has] an Ātman.”\(^11\)

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\(^7\) PV I.47: *tasmād apohaviṣayam iti liṅgāṃ prakīrtitam / anyathā dharmanāḥ siddhāv asiddhāṃ kim ataḥ param //*

\(^8\) PVSVṬ 129.21–24: *yad ityādinā ślokāṃ vyācaṣṭe / ādiśabdāḥ chabdādiparigrahaḥ / nāsya liṅgāṃ astity aliṅgāṃ rūpādikāṃ (aliṅgāṃ rūpādikāṃ Ms; iliṅgarūpādikāṃ S.) etad iti niścayajñānam / asati samārope bhavati / na hi pratyaksadṛṣṭe rūpādu tādāmi viparītakārasamāropo ’sti / tat katham vyavacchedaviṣayam bhavatī / iyāṭā ślokasya pūrvarddho vyākhyātaḥ /*

\(^9\) *samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt G; samāropaviṣaye ’bhāvāt M. PVSVt and PVṬ: sṛgṛ ma bṭags pa’i yul la yod pa’i phyir ro (’asamāropitaviṣaye bhāvāt). G’s reading is supported by PVSVṬ: samāropaviṣaye tasya niścayajñānasvēbhavāt (see note 11). In PVṬ ad PV I.48 we find a passage parallel to G’s reading:* de ni sgru ’dogs pa’i yul la med pa’i phyir (see 2.3.1).

\(^10\) bhede G; bhedo M.

\(^11\) PVSVṬ 129.25–28: *uttarārddhaṃ vyākhyātum āha / samāropaviṣaye tasya niścayajñānasvēbhavāt tadyavacchedaviṣayam bhavatī prakṛtena sambandhaḥ / etad evāḥa / yatra bhede ’sya puṃsah samārope na tatra bhede samāropaviṣaye niścayo bhavaty asthiro nirātmaka iti vā //*
In A Dharmakīrti makes two points. First, immediately after the perception of color there arises a determinate cognition (niścayajñāna) which is not an inference. Needless to say, this determinate cognition is what we call perceptual judgment. Second, a perceptual judgment arises when there is no superimposition (asati samārope bhavad), and thus, unlike an inference, the perceptual judgment cannot have the exclusion of superimposition as its object. This second point is extremely important because it is a strong indication that a perceptual judgment arises when superimposition is absent. Let us note here that Dharmakīrti holds that if the “exclusion” (vyavaccheda) is that of superimposition as in the case of an inference, then the exclusion certainly does not obtain; but if it is not, then it does obtain.

In B Dharmakīrti argues that perceptual judgment does have the exclusion of superimposition as its object, because a perceptual judgment does not arise with respect to an object of superimposition (samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt). To explain. First of all, an object of superimposition (samāropaviṣaya) is bheda “difference.” With respect to the bheda on which (yatā) something is superimposed, there is no determinate cognition. The superimposition leads to the erroneous cognition “this is permanent” (sthira). Thus the superimposition in question is that of the property of being permanent. We should, however, have the determinate cognition “this is impermanent.” Accordingly, what is meant by the term bheda here must be the property of being impermanent. We must note that Dharmakīrti holds the property of being permanent to be superimposed on the property of being impermanent. A real thing has differences (bheda) from all other things, such as the property of being impermanent. Suppose that a person superimposes the property of being permanent on the property of being impermanent, resulting in the erroneous cognition “this is permanent.” In this case the person has no determinate cognition with respect to the property of being impermanent. In contrast, suppose that a person has a determinate cognition with respect to the latter property. In this case, the person clearly has no superimposition with respect to the property of being impermanent. This is how the determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment is said to have the exclusion of superimposition as its object. According to Dharmakīrti, one is justified in saying that the exclusion of superimposition forms the object of a perceptual judgment only insofar as the perceptual judgment arises only when a superimposition is absent.

2.2 In the latter half of the verse Dharmakīrti says: asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram. It is important to note here that what Dharmakīrti means by the word aṃśa “part” in PV I.48 is a difference (bheda) such as the property of being impermanent. Naturally it follows that that which has parts is an object to be perceived, referred to by the phrase kvacid drṣṭe in the verse.

If we accept that the phrase asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram can be paraphrased as asamāropitānyāṃśe niścayajñānā, the expression asamāropitānyāṃśa must refer to the difference (bheda) that is the object of a determinate cognition. If the difference is the property of being impermanent, the term anyāṃśa “a different part” must refer to the property of being permanent, which is different (anyā-) from the property of being impermanent. According to Dharmakīrti, the property of being permanent can be superimposed on the property of being impermanent. Therefore, the expression asamāropitānyāṃśa, as a
The compound \textit{asamāropitānyāṃśa} is a \textit{bahuvrīhi} formed from \textit{asamāropita} and \textit{anyāṃśa}, referring to an image (\textit{rnam pa}, *ākāra) (image \(x\)). The latter part of the compound, \textit{anyāṃśa}, signifies “a different part,” which refers to “an image contradictory to the image” (\textit{zla bo rnam pa}, *pratiyogyākāra) (image non-\(x\)). Thus the compound in question means

\[ (a) \text{ The compound asamāropitānyāṃśa is a bahuvrīhi, referring to \textquotedblleft an image (x) on which a different part, i.e., an image (non-x) contradictory to the image (x), is not superimposed.\textquotedblright} \]

\[ (b) \text{ The [cognition] which arises with respect to the [image (x)], too, has for its object the exclusion only of that, i.e., the exclusion only of the part (non-x) which is not superimposed.} \]

\[ (c1) \text{ [What Dharmakīrti means to say] is this: It is not the case that a conceptual cognition arising immediately after perception excludes a superimposition which occurred before [this conceptual cognition].} \]

\[ (c2) \text{ On the contrary, it is seen that the [conceptual cognition] does have exclusion as its object because it does not arise with respect to the object of superimposition.} \]

\[ (c3) \text{ If the conceptual cognition arose as what establishes a real thing, then it would follow that [the conceptual cognition] determines all forms [of the real thing].} \]

This is what was explained by the teacher.
“an image (x) on which an image (non-x) contradictory to it is not superimposed.” The demonstrative *tad* in *tanmātra* refers to the image which is not superimposed (image non-x).

### 2.3.2 Karṇakagomin

PVSVṬ ad PV I.48cd (128.4–12): (A) *asamāropitāḥ anyāṃśaḥ* pratiyogyā̄kāro yasmin viṣaye sa tad / tatra pravarttamānaṁ tad api *tanmāṭrāpohagocaram*/ tenāyam artho bhavati / samāroparahaṅtaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ svākārabhedena *graṇḍad*13 víkalpaṃ jñāṇaṃ bhrāntatvāt tatsuṃāroparaḥhitabāhyādhyavasāya eva na tu bāhyasvarūpaprāhaṅkaṃ / atas *tanmātram eva* nītabāhyāvāsāya evvāṃsa samāropasyāpohagocaraṇī víkalpaṃ jñāṇaṃ /

(B) yadvā *asamāropitaś* cāsāv anyāṃśaś ca tasmin sati víkalpaṃ jñāṇaṃ pravarttamānaṁ *tanmāṭrāpohagocaram/ yo 'sāv asamāropito 'nyāṅśas ta-nmāṭravyavacchedaviṣayaṃ bhavati /

(A) [First interpretation:]

(a) The compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa* is a bahuvrīhi, denoting “an object (viṣaya) on which a different part, i.e., an image contradictory to it (pratiyogyākāra), is not superimposed.”

(b) The [cognition], which arises with respect to the [object], too, is spoken of as *tanmāṭrāpohagocara “the cognition whose part is of that [i.e., an external object] and whose object is exclusion.”

(c1) Therefore, [by the present verse] is meant the following: Since [a conceptual cognition] grasps an individual (svalakṣaṇa) that is devoid of superimposition (samāroparahaṅta) through its own image, it is an erroneous cognition. Therefore, the conceptual cognition is a mere judgment about the external object that is devoid of superimposition and does not grasp the external object in itself.

(c2) Accordingly, [the cognition] is a conceptual cognition in the form of [a cognition] that has a part related to the [external object] (tanmātram eva), i.e., in the form of a judgment about a specific external object (nītabāhyāvāsāya eva), whose object is the exclusion of what is other, i.e., superimposition.

(B) [Second interpretation:]

(a) Or, the compound *asamāropitānyāṃśa* is a karmadhāraya, meaning “that part (non-x) which is different [from what is to be determined] and which is not superimposed.”

(b) When there is such a part (non-x), a conceptual cognition arises. Accordingly, the conceptual cognition has for its object the exclusion only of such a part (non-x). That is, [the conceptual cognition has] for its object the exclusion only of such a part (non-x) which is different [from what is to be determined] and which is not superimposed.

13 *graṇḍad* Ms; *graṇḍan* S.
Karṇakagomin offers two interpretations for the compound asamāropitānyāṃśa: as a bahuvrīhi and as a karmadhāraya. In the bahuvrīhi interpretation the compound refers to an object (viṣaya) on which an image contradictory to the object is not superimposed. The object is an individual (svalaksana), which is said to admit of no superimposition. The expression tanmātra refers to adhyavasāya “judgment,” which is said to be that whose part (mātrā), i.e., an image, is related to the object.

In the karmadhāraya interpretation the compound refers to a different part that is not superimposed, i.e., the part (non-x) that is different from the part (x) to be determined and that is not superimposed on the latter part (x). The demonstrative tad refers to this putative part (non-x). When such a different part is present (sati), that is, when a different part is not superimposed on the object with respect to which determination takes place, a perceptual judgment arises as what excludes only the different part. Accordingly, perceptual judgment is said to have the exclusion only of the different part as its object.

2.3.3 Manorathanandin

PVV ad PV I.48 (305.11–15): nanu kvacina niḍādāv asamāropito ’ryo viparīṇāṃśo yasmin tasmin pratyakṣena dṛṣṭe yaj jñānam aliṅgajaṃ vikalpakamaṃ sāmānyaviṣayam bhavati, tad āropabhāvāt kathāt anyāpohaviṣayam tā atmanāt viṣayamātāyāṃśaṃ apaho viṣayāḥ vyaavrtytāṁ vyaavacchedaḥ sa gocaro yasya tat tathā / niḍāvikalpasyāṇi niḍāviṣayovyaavaccheda eva vīṣayā ity arthāḥ ।

[Objection] When a certain [entity], say, blue, on which a part foreign to it, i.e., a part contradictory to it, is not superimposed is cognized through perception, there arises a cognition (jñāna) which is not based on an inferential mark, which is conceptual, and which has a universal as its object. How could it be that such a cognition has exclusion as its object, since no superimposition occurs?

[Answer] [Dharmakīrti] answers [this objection by stating]: The cognition is spoken of as “that whose object is the exclusion only of that, i.e., the exclusion only of non-blue; exclusion means the exclusion (vyāvṛtti = vyavaccheda) of an entity of a dissimilar class.” The conceptual cognition “this is blue” has as its object only the exclusion of non-blue. This is what is meant by the verse.

According to Manorathanandin, the compound asamāropitānyāṃśa refers to a perceived, real blue on which a part foreign to it is not superimposed. The expression tanmātrāpoha means the exclusion of non-blue. We must say that his interpretation strays quite far from the earlier interpretations. Manorathanandin fails to grasp the point made by Dharmakīrti that in the context of a perceptual judgment, the exclusion of superimposition forms the lack of superimposition.

3. PV I.49 and PVSV

In PVSV B, Dharmakīrti states that a determinate cognition does not exist with respect to an object of superimposition (samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt). This means, as shown
in 2.1, that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to the property of being
impermanent on which the property of being permanent has been superimposed. In PV
I.49ab, the reason for this point is given.

3.1 bādhyabādhabhāva

Dharmakīrti states the following:

\[ C (=PV \text{ I.49ab}): \]
\[ niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhabhāvataḥ / \]

Because the relation of what is to be blocked and what does the blocking
obeys between a determinate cognition and a superimposing cognition.14

According to Dharmakīrti, the relation of what is to be blocked and what does the blocking
obeys between the determinate cognition “this is impermanent” and the erroneous cogni-
tion “this is permanent,” which is based on superimposition. Because of this relationship,
it is said that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to the property of being
impermanent on which the property of being permanent is superimposed. This point is
explained in PVSV as follows:

\[ D: \text{PVSV G28.13–14, M18.19–20: na hi sarvato bhīnno drśto 'pi bhāvas}
tathaiva pratyabhijñāyate / kvacid bhede vyavadhānasambhavāt / yathā śukteḥ śukitve / \]

Indeed, even if an entity has been perceived as something differentiated from
all others, it is not recognized as it really is. For there can be an impediment
to a certain difference [being cognized], just as there is [an impediment to the
cognition of] mother of pearl’s property of being mother of pearl[, if mother of
pearl is erroneously cognized].15

\[ E: \text{PVSV G28.15–16, M18.20–21: yatra tu pratipattur bhṛntinimittaṁ nāsti}
tadderānāviśeṣe 'pi smārto niścayo bhavati / \]

With respect only to the [difference] about which a cognizer has no cause
to have an erroneous cognition, a determinate cognition[, i.e., a perceptual
judgment,] arises for the cognizer based on remembrance even if [all the]
differences have been equally perceived.16

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14 PVSVṬ 130.9–10: kiṁ kāraṇam / niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhabhāvataḥ (bhāvataḥ Ms; bhāvah S.) / niścayajñānasya tadviparītasamāropajñānasya ca bādhyabādhabhāvataḥ /

15 PVSVṬ 130.10–15: bādhyabādhabhāvam eva sādhayann āha na hitī / sarvataḥ sajātiyād vijātiyāc ca bhīnno drśto 'pi bhāvas tathaiveti yathādṛṣṭena sarvēkaṇāreṇa pratyabhijñāyate niścīyate na hitī sambhandhā / kiṁ kāraṇam / kvacid bhede kṣanikatvādike vyavadhānasambhavāt / *bhṛntinimittataḥ (read; bhṛntinimittasambhavāt) / yathā śukteḥ sarvato vyūvṛtāyā darśane 'pi śukitkādīte rajatāsādhāranyasya bhṛntinimittasasya sambhavān na niścayāḥ / *PVT: 'khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan srid pa’i phyir ro.

16 PVSVṬ 130.15–17: yatra tv ākāre bhṛntinimittaṁ nāsti tatraivāsya pratipattur anubhavottarakālābhāvī smārto niścayo bhavati / tadderānāviśeṣe 'pi sarvasvākāresu pratyakṣasyāviśeṣe 'pi / smārta iti smṛtirūpaḥ /
D. An entity that is differentiated from all others is a real thing (svalakṣaṇa). A real thing has differences relative to all other things. Such a real thing, even if it has been perceived, is not recognized as it really is through a perceptual judgment. This is because a certain difference of the real thing can be blocked from being cognized.

E. Recall that, according to Dharmakīrti, when a person does not recognize the difference between moments, the person superimposes identity between them and so has the erroneous cognition “this is permanent.” That a cognizer has no cause of an erroneous cognition with respect to a difference of a real thing means that the cognizer recognizes the difference as it is. Therefore, when the cognizer has no cause of an erroneous cognition with respect to a difference, there is no chance of superimposition arising with respect to the difference. The point Dharmakīrti makes here is that a determinate cognition arises only with respect to the difference on which nothing is superimposed.

Now we can see the following. A real thing has differences (bheda) from all other things, which can also be conceptually posited as parts (aṃśa) of that real thing. On the condition that no erroneous cognition arises with respect to a real thing, when the real thing is perceived, all its differences are perceived. A determinate cognition arises only with respect to a difference that is not erroneously cognized. For instance, the determinate cognition “this is impermanent” arises only with respect to the property of being impermanent, which is not the object of an erroneous cognition. When the property of being permanent is superimposed on the property of being impermanent, the latter property is said to be the object of an erroneous cognition. Thus it is clear why Dharmakīrti says that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to an object of superimposition (samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt).

3.2 samāropaviveka

3.2.1 In PV I.48d Dharmakīrti speaks of a determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment as tanmātrāpahagocara. The next step is to consider how this expression should be interpreted.

Consider the following passage:

**F1**: PVSV G28.16–19, M18.22–24: samāropaniścayayor bādhyabādhashakabhāvāt/niścayasya

samāropaviveke 'sya pravṛttir iti gamyate // [49cd]

tadviveka eva cānyāpohaḥ /

Because there obtains the relation of what is to be blocked and what does the blocking between superimposition and a determinate cognition, it is understood that the determinate cognition occurs when there is a lack of superimposition (samāropaviveka). [49cd]

And this very lack of [superimposition] is the exclusion of others (anyāpoha).\(^{17}\)

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\(^{17}\) PVSVṬ 130.20–24: yataś ca pratyaksāviśeṣe 'pi samāroparahita eva viśaye niścayo bhavati tasmāt samāropaniścayayor bādhyabādhaṁkhāvāvo gamyate / tato bādhyabādhaṁkhāvāvāt kāvanāt samāropavi-
According to Dharmakīrti, a determinate cognition arises when there is a lack of superimposition (samāropaviveka). The reason for this is that a determinate cognition and superimposition are incompatible with each other.

3.2.2 The term samāropaviveka can be paraphrased as samāropabhāva “absence/negation of superimposition.” It is proper to say that viveka is an equivalent for abhāva “non-existence, absence.” In PV I.56–57a Dharmakīrti, having introduced an opponent’s position that, after a real thing is grasped in its entirety by a conceptual cognition, a valid cognition arises to remove an erroneous cognition which prevents one from determining the real thing as it is, says the following:

PV I.56–57a: yadi bhrāntinivṛttyarthaṃ gṛhīte 'pi anyad iṣyate /
  tad vyavacchedaviṣayam siddham tadvat tato 'param //
  asamāropaviṣaye vrteḥ

If it is accepted that even if an entity is grasped in its entirety [by a determinate cognition (C1)], another [valid cognition (C2)] occurs to remove an erroneous cognition [that prevents one from determining the real thing as it is], it is established that the [valid cognition (C2)] has exclusion as its object. Like the [valid cognition (C2)], it is established that the [cognition (C1)] different from the [valid cognition (C2) has exclusion as its object]. For [cognition (C1)] occurs with respect to an object that has no superimposition (asamāropaviṣaya).

In PVSV Dharmakīrti explains:

F2: PVSV ad PV I.56cd–57a (G31.12–15, M20.14–16): tat tarhi bhrāntinivṛttyartham pravṛttam pramāṇam anyasamāropavyavacchedaphalam21 iti siddham anyāpohaviṣayam / tadvat anyad api / asamāropaviṣaye vrteḥ / yatrāsya samāropo na tatra niścaya iti samāropābhāve22 vartamāno 'nyāpohaviṣayaḥ siddhaḥ /

(a) In that case, it is established that the valid cognition which occurs to remove an erroneous cognition, which occurs to remove the superimposition

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18 In PVSV Dharmakīrti states that existence is viveka of non-existence, while non-existence is viveka of existence. PVSV ad PV I.291 (G154.10–11): bhāvābhāvayor anyonyavivekarūpatvāt /

19 PVSVṬ 139.18–19: yadītyādinā parābhiprāyam āśaṃkate / ekena niścayajñānaṃ sarvātmanā gṛhīte 'pi vastu niścayajñānaṃ tad api vyavacchedaviṣayam /

20 PVSVṬ 139.23–26: yady evam ityādinā siddhāntavādī / yat tad bhrāntinivṛttyartham uttaram pramāṇam iṣyate tad vyavacchedaviṣayam anyāpohaviṣayam siddham pūrvoktena niścayajñānaṃ tad api pūrvakāla-bhāviniścayajñānaṃ tad api vyavacchedaviṣayam /

21 anyasamāropavyavacchedaphalam G; anyavyavacchedaphalam M.

22 samāropābhāve G; samāropābhāve ca M.
of a different [image] (vyavacchedaphala), has as its object the exclusion of others (anyāpoha).

(b) In the same manner, it is established that, like the [valid cognition], another [cognition], [i.e., the preceding determinate cognition,] also [has as its object the exclusion of others]. For it occurs with respect to an object which is devoid of superimposition.

(c) Since a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to an object on which something is superimposed by a cognizer, it is established that the determinate cognition, occurring when there is an absence of superimposition (samāropābhāva), has as its object the exclusion of others.23

An opponent makes the following points. First, a conceptual cognition grasps a real thing in its entirety. Second, a valid cognition can arise in order to remove an erroneous cognition that is assumed to occur with respect to the real thing. According to Dharmakīrti, in this case it can be said that the valid cognition has exclusion as its object, since the valid cognition brings about the exclusion of the superimposition of something foreign to the real thing. What is important is that Dharmakīrti points out that, like a valid cognition, a perceptual judgment can also be said to have exclusion as its object. It is imperative to note here that the reason the perceptual judgment is said to have exclusion as its object is held to be that it occurs with respect to an object which is devoid of superimposition, or that it occurs when there is absence of superimposition with respect to the object. In this connection, let us recall the passage in B: samāropaviṣaye tasyābhāvāt. There it was said that no determinate cognition arises with respect to an object of superimposition which consists in a difference. In the above-cited passage (F2b), on the other hand, it is stated that a determinate cognition arises with respect to an object which is devoid of superimposition. It is clear that the reason a perceptual judgment is described as having exclusion as its object must be found in the way the object of the perceptual judgment should be: the object is far from being what something is superimposed on. To put it in another way, it is because its object lacks superimposition that the perceptual judgment is defined as having exclusion as its object.

3.3 tanmātra

In PV I.48 Dharmakīrti has defined a determinate cognition as tanmātrāpohagocara instead of defining it as anyāpohaviṣaya. A question arises: What is meant by the term tanmātra? The following passage offers a key to solving this problem.

**G**: PVSV ad PV I.49cd (G28.19–22, M18.24–26): tasmāt tad api tanmātrāpo-hagocaram / na vastusvabhāvanīscayāmakam / tathā hi kasyacin niścaye ’py anyasyāpratipattidarśanāt / tatsvabhāvanīscaye ca tasyāyogāt /

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23 PVSVṬ 140.11–15: tat tarhītyādinā ślokaṃ vyācaṣṭe / anyasyākārasya yaḥ samāropas tad vyavacchedaphalam iti krtvā siddham anyāpohaviṣayam utpitusamāropanisedhavārena / tadvad anyad api pūrvaṃ api niścayeṣaṃ ananyāpohaviṣayam / kim kāranaṃ / avidyamānasamārope visaye vrteḥ / etad evāḥa / yatprākāre ’syā *pratipatteḥ (read: pratipattuḥ) / iti hetoḥ samāropābhāve vartamānāḥ purastyo niścayo ’nyāpohaviṣayāḥ siddhaḥ // *PVṬ: ‘di’i zhes bya ba ni rtogs par byed pa po’i’o. **
Therefore, the [determinate cognition in the form of a perceptual judgment] also has as its object the exclusion only of that [putative specific difference]. It does not consist in a determinate cognition which determines the real thing in itself. For [the determinate cognition is defined] in that manner because it is seen that, even if a certain difference is determined, another difference is not understood and because, when the real thing in itself is determined, it is improper to say that [another difference is not determined].

It is clear that the term mātra makes a restriction on the differences the real thing has. In B it has been stated that a determinate cognition does not arise with respect to a difference on which something is superimposed, and in E that a determinate cognition arises only with respect to a difference which does not fall under the scope of an erroneous cognition. In PV I.48c it is stated that a determinate cognition occurs with respect to the part on which a part different from it is not superimposed.

All this makes the following clear: Suppose that a given real thing has the property of being impermanent as its part or difference. When a determinate cognition occurs with respect to this property, the property is that on which the property of being permanent is not superimposed, that is, what has no superimposition of this latter property. Thus the absence of superimposition must be that of the superimposition only of this property. What is meant by the expression tanmātrāpoha is the absence (viveka, abhāva) of the superimposition only of that part or difference which is different from the part or difference to be determined. There is no doubt that the demonstrative tad in tanmātra- refers to the part which is different from the part to be determined (anyāṁśa).

4. PV I.48: reinterpretation

Now we are in a good position to interpret PV I.48.25

This verse has already been interpreted as follows: Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964: 108: “Now when in respect of a perceived datum a determinate judgement arises (in its trail) referring to a conceptualized construction without the obtrusion of the opposite misconception, it also serves to eliminate the unperceived misconception (or doubt) of the opposite of that very datum.” Steinkellner 1971: 199, n. 71: “Die vorstellende Erkenntnis, welche ein Allgemeines zum Gegenstand hat, richtet sich, wenn irgendein [Ding] wahrgenommen wurde, ohne daß [auf dieses Ding] ein Teil eines andern [Dinges] übertragen worden ist, bloß darauf, diesen [fremden Teil] fernzuhalten …” Zwilling 1976: 96: “Even in the absence of an opposing misconception the determinate cognition which follows the direct cognition of some real and whose prime object is a [constructed] general nature nevertheless has for its sphere of operation the elimination of just that [absent misconception.]” Okada 2007: 4, 6: [シャーキヤブッディ解釈] 知覚された何らかのものに関しても、およそ（直接知覚の後に生じる）認識は、普遍を対象としており、別を有している。他の部分（＝対立項の形象）が付託されていない （形象）に対して（働くその認識は）、それ（＝付託されていない他の部分）のみを排除
PV I.48: kvacid drṣte ‘pi yaj jñānam sāmānyārthaṃ vikalpakam / asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram //

Even when a certain [real thing] has been perceived, a cognition which has a universal as its object and which is conceptual arises; [this cognition, arising] with respect to the [real thing’s part (x)] on which a part (non-x) different [from it] is not superimposed, [is characterized as] what has as its object the exclusion only of that [part non-x].

Dharmakīrti is saying this: A conceptual cognition arising immediately after the perception of a real thing, that is, a perceptual judgment, has for its object only one part or difference of that real thing, say, the property of being impermanent (x); if this part or difference is determined, then it is one on which a putative part or difference contradictory to it, say, the property of being permanent (non-x), is not superimposed. In this case the perceptual judgment is said to have as its object the exclusion of the superimposition only of the putative part or difference, or, in other words, the exclusion only of the putative part or difference.

Thus the reason that a perceptual judgment is described as that which has exclusion as its object lies in the fact that the object of the perceptual judgment is what is devoid of the superimposition that gives rise to an erroneous cognition with respect to that object. We may say that Dharmakīrti establishes that perceptual judgment has exclusion as its object...
from the point of view of the object of a perceptual judgment. By contrast, he establishes that inference is said to have exclusion as its object from the point of view of how one can remove an erroneous cognition which can occur with reference to a real thing.

5. Conclusion

In PV I.48 Dharmakīrti tells us that in the case of a perceptual judgment, the occurrence of determination implies the absence of superimposition. To put it in another way, perceptual judgment and superimposition are incompatible with each other. Unlike in the case of an inference, in the case of a perceptual judgment there is no chance of a prior superimposition.

Dharmakīrti defines a perceptual judgment as having exclusion as its object in the sense that the perceptual judgment arises with respect to the difference which a real thing is supposed to bear and on which no putative contradictory difference has been superimposed. According to Dharmakīrti, a perceptual judgment is described as “what has exclusion as its object” because its object is devoid of superimposition. In Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception, perceptual judgment plays a critical role in sustaining the practical efficacy of a perceptual cognition. By defining perceptual judgment as having as its object the absence of superimposition, he tries to show that perceptual judgment, distinguished from a mere erroneous cognition, is a trustworthy cognition (avisamvādiñīna). The great significance Dharmakīrti attaches to perceptual judgment is clearly seen in his interpreting apoha as “lack of superimposition.”

References and abbreviations

Miyuki Nakasuka


PV I Pramāṇavārttika, Chapter 1 (Śvārthānumāna): See PVSV.


PVSVr Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (Tib.): D 4216, P 5717.


PVṬ Pramāṇavārttikatīkā (Tib.): D 4220, P 5718.


Dharmakīrti’s Notion of Permanence and Its Impact on the Tibetan Buddhist Doctrine of Buddhahood

by

Hiroshi Nemoto

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence (nitya), as found in his Pramāṇavārttika II 204cd, and its impact on the Tibetan Buddhist doctrine of Buddhahood. As is well known, Dharmakīrti holds the view that whatever exists is momentary (yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva), which literally means that everything is impermanent. This view is accepted by later Indian commentators, as well as by many of his Tibetan successors like Sa skya paṇḍita (1182–1251) and Glo bo mkhan chen (1456–1532), who belong to the Sa skya pa. However, Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa (1357–1419), the founder of the Dge lugs pa, and his followers have a different opinion. They consider that Dharmakīrti himself admits the existence of the permanent when he says: “Wise men speak of the thing that itself does not disintegrate as the permanent” (PV II 204cd: nityam tam āhur vidvānśo yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati). Moreover, the Dge lugs pa scholars assert that to be permanent (rtag pa) does not necessarily mean to be always existing (dus thams cad pa), and hence that there are permanent entities that exist only temporarily (res ‘ga’ ba). Such an idea of permanence is peculiar to Tsong kha pa and his followers, and it plays an important role especially in their analysis of Buddhahood or the Nature Body (svābhāvikakāya; ngo bo nyid sku) of a Buddha.

In what follows, I would like to discuss how Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence has survived in the Dge lugs pa’s exposition of Buddhahood. After a short remark about the Indian concept of permanence, I will give an analysis of the Dge lugs pa’s idea of permanence, together with the interpretation of Pramāṇavārttika II 204cd as found in the Dbu ma rgyan zin bris, Tsong kha pa’s memorandum on the Madhyamakālaṃkāra. I will then move on to examine the Dge lugs pa’s analysis of the Nature Body, which is given in their commentaries on Chapter VIII of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra.

1 The concept of permanence in India

The concept of permanence (nitya) is found in ancient Indian thought. For instance, Patañjali (2nd cent. BCE), in his Mahābhāṣya, defines permanence in several ways. Patañjali says that

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1 The Dge lugs pa’s concept of “permanence” (rtag pa) is briefly discussed in Nemoto 2009. The aim of this paper, then, is to show how the concept plays an important role in their analysis of Buddhahood.


3 The title of the text is given as: Dbu ma rgyan gyi zin bris rjes rang gis gnang ba, which means “A memorandum on the Madhyamakālaṃkāra given by the Lord [Tsong kha pa] himself,” so that we may tentatively assume that the text was written by Tsong kha pa himself.
the term *nitya* is applied to immovable (*kūṭastha*), or invariable things (*avicālin*); and he says that it also means continued repetition (*ābhīkṣṇya*). Furthermore, he remarks: “That in which its identity is not destroyed is also permanent” (*tad api nityam yasminś ca tattvaṁ na vihanyate*). We notice here that what is expressed by the last definition is almost the same as what Dharmakīrti says in *Pramāṇavārttika* II 204cd. It is highly likely that Dharmakīrti was fully aware of the definition of permanence as found in the *Mahābhāṣya*.

In Buddhism, specifically in the Abhidharma tradition, factors (*dharma*) are classified into two categories, the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) and unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), of which unconditioned factors are considered to be permanent. Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa* teaches that there are three unconditioned factors: space (*ākāśa*), extinction through discernment (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), and extinction not through discernment (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*). According to Yaśomitra’s commentary, these three factors are “permanent since they do not pass through the [three] time periods [of future, present, and past]” (*adhvasamcārabhāvaḥ nityāḥ*).

In the Mahāyāna tradition, the concept of permanence plays an important role, especially in the doctrine of Buddhahood and the Buddha Body. The *Uttaratantra* says that Buddhahood (*buddhatva*) is permanent and already present in every sentient being. Concerning this, the *Vyākhyā* explains that Buddhahood is “permanent because it is free from origination” (*utpādavigamān nityam*). In the same vein, Vasubandhu’s *Sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* states that a Buddha’s Nature Body is essentially permanent (*prakṛtyā nityatā svābhāvikasya*). According to Sthiramati’s commentary, this is because the Nature Body

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4 MBh I, 6.17f.: *nityaparyāyavācī siddhaśabdaḥ / katham jñāyate / yat kūṭastheṣv avicāliṣu bhāveṣu varatate* / (“The word *siddha* is a synonym of *nitya*. How is it understood? It is used to refer to things which are immovable and invariable”); MBh I, 7.3f.: *ayaṃ khalv api nityaśabdo nāvaśyaṃ kūṭastheṣv avicāliṣu bhāveṣu varatate / kiṃ tarhi / ābhīkṣṇye ‘pi varatate* / (“Furthermore, the word *nitya* is not always used to refer to things which are immovable and invariable. Then what does it mean? It is also used to refer to continued repetition”).

5 MBh I, 7.22.

6 AK I 48b: *nityā dharmā asaṃskṛtāḥ* / (“Unconditioned factors are permanent”).

7 AKV I, 90.23: *asaṃskṛtā eva nityā ity avadhāraṇam / adhvasamcārabhāvaḥ nityāḥ* / (“It is ascertained that only unconditioned [factors] are permanent. [They are] permanent since they do not pass through the [three] time periods [of future, present, and past]”).

8 UT 84.7ff. (II 29): *acintyaṃ nityaṃ ca dhruvam atha śivaṃ śāśvatam atha praśāntaṃ ca vyāpi vyapagātivikalpaṃ gaṇanavat / asaktam sarvatvātpratibhuvanasyaśaktivagatam na drśyaṃ na grahyam sūbhām api ca buddhatvam amalam / (“Buddhahood is inconceivable, permanent, stable, quiescent, everlasting, calm, all-pervading, free from conceptualization, and akin to space; it has neither attachment nor hindrance in all respects and is devoid of rough sensation; it cannot be perceived or grasped; furthermore, it is auspicious and immaculate”).

9 UT 84.20 (II 34).

10 MSA Bh 46.12ff. (ad MSA IX 66): *tesu ca triṣu kāyeṣu yathākramam trividhā nityatā viditavyā yena nityakāyās tathāgatām bhūtā / prakṛtyā nityatā svābhāvikasya svābhāvena nityatvāt / asramāsanā sāmbhogikāsya dharmasaṃbhogāvicchedāt / prabhandhena nairmāṇikasyāntardhāya* *punah punar nirmanadarsanat / (“It is to be understood with respect to these three bodies, respectively, that there are three types of permanence, on account of which Tathāgatas are said to have permanent Bodies. [1] The Nature Body is essentially permanent because it is permanent by nature. [2] The Enjoyment Body is [permanent] in terms of non-cessation because its enjoyment of good qualities is devoid of rough sensation; it cannot be perceived or grasped; furthermore, it is auspicious and immaculate”).
is free from origination and cessation. Thus, apart from the fact that the Buddha teaches the doctrine of impermanence of all conditioned phenomena, these Buddhist thinkers hold that there do exist unconditioned factors, which are permanent.

2 Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on permanence

But turning to the pramāṇa school, we find that both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti take a different position on the issue. It is true that Dignāga speaks of permanent things, such as space, when he gives examples of various formulations. This, however, does not mean that Dignāga himself acknowledges the existence of the permanent. For example, let us look at the following formulation given by Dignāga:

(Proposition:) Sound is impermanent.
(Reason:) Because it is produced by human effort.
(Similar example:) Whatever is produced by human effort is impermanent, just like a pot.
(Dissimilar example:) Whatever is permanent is not produced by human effort, just like space.

One may suspect that the last statement presupposes the existence of permanent entities. But Dignāga clearly says that the sentence showing a dissimilar example should be interpreted as a non-affirming negation (prasaṣṭyapratiśedha), and not as an implicative negation (paryuḍāsa), so that the sentence does not imply the existence of permanent entities. Therefore, he says that a dissimilar example is established without needing to accept the existence of permanent entities. It seems that Dharmakīrti takes a similar position on this issue. He says:

11 VBh D 138a7f.: de la rang bzhin rtag pa ni chos kyi sku ste / chos kyi sku ni rang bzhin gyis skye 'gag med pa'i rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir ro l/ (“Among them, what is essentially permanent refers to Nature Body, since Nature Body is an entity that is free from origination and cessation by nature”).
12 See Katsura 2004: 143, n. 16: sādharmyeṇa tāvad anityaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnāntarīyakatvāt / yad dhi prayatnāntariyakam tad anityam drṣṭam yathā ghaṭa iti / vaidharmyena nityam aprayatnāntariyakam drṣṭam yathākāsaṃ iti l/.
14 See Sa paṇ’s comments on this issue. Rigs gter rang ’grel 100.26ff.: chos kyi grags pas skabs ’ga’ zhig tu nam mkha’ rtag par gsungs pa ni l / ti ka byed pa kha cig na re rdul phrun dang l / nam mkha’ rtag par gsungs pa la sogs pa rang nyid mi bzhed pa de dag phal che ba gzhon gyi bsam pa la dper brjod pa yin no l / zhes gsungs la l / de llar yang ’gal ba med kyi ’on kyang mi rtag po log pa tsam la rtag par sgro btags nas gsungs kyi rtag pa nyid ni ma yin te l/ (“Concerning the fact that Dharmakīrti in some places speaks of the permanence of space, a certain commentator [lit. a certain author of the ṭīkā] explains as follows: ‘Most of the statements about the permanence of atoms, space, and so forth, which are not acknowledged by himself, are what illustrate [permanence] in accordance with the thoughts of others.’ Although there is no contradiction in such an explanation, [we think that] he speaks of them by reifying permanence upon the mere absence of impermanence, and that he never [speaks of] permanent things themselves”).
Dharmakīrti here refutes the Vātsīputrīya’s notion of the pudgala, the personal entity that performs action and that receives pleasure and pain. The Vātsīputrīya school asserts that the pudgala is neither permanent nor impermanent. Dharmakīrti then argues that, if the pudgala were not impermanent, it would be free from disintegration, which implies that the pudgala is permanent since wise men consider that which does not disintegrate to be permanent. Thus, Dharmakīrti applies hypothetical reasoning to refute the Vātsīputrīya’s view. He never questions whether permanent entities really exist or not.

3 Tsong kha pa on permanence

Tsong kha pa, however, regards the passage in question as conveying Dharmakīrti’s own view on permanence. According to Tsong kha pa, Dharmakīrti not only affirms the existence of permanent entities but also gives the clear definition as approved by wise men (mkhas pa rnams), which is contrasted with the one accepted by foolish men (skybo blun po). Let us first examine the foolish men’s view on permanence. Tsong kha pa summarizes their view as follows:

\[de\text{ yang} \text rtag \text par ‘dod \text phyin \text chad \text dus \text snga \text ma } \{na\}^* \text yod \text tshad \text gang \text yin \text dus phyi \text ma} \text na’ang \text yod \text par ‘dod \text pa \text ni } \text / \text mu \text stegs \text kyi ‘dod \text pa’i \text rtag \text pa’i \text don \text yin la } \text / \text skye \text bo \text blun \text po’i \text rtag \text par ‘dzin \text tshul \text yang \text de \text yin \text te \text rtag \text pa’i \text don ‘di \text itar byed \text pa } \text ni \text rang \text sde \text la } \text bye \text brag \text tu \text smra \text ba } \text ma } \text gtogs \text pa } \text / \text mdo \text sde \text pa \text dang sems \text tsam \text pa \text dang } \text / \text dbu } \text ma } \text pa } \text su } \text yang \text mi } ‘dod \text do } \text // (Dbu \text ma \text rgyan \text zin \text bris 13b4ff.) \{ni \text Zhöl; \text read } \text na.\]

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16 Cf. Thar lam gsal byed 187a4f.: gnas ma bu pa na re / kho bo cag la nyes pa med de / gang zag de rtag mi rtag gang du yang brjod du med par ‘dod pas so zhe na / (“The Vātsīputrīya says: There is no fault in our opinion, since we assert that the pudgala cannot be expressed as either permanent or impermanent”).
17 Cf. Thar lam gsal byed 187a5ff.: gang zag gang de ni chos can / […] rtag pa yin par thal / bcings grol gyi gzhi gang zhig ‘jig med yin pa’i phyir / khyab par thal / rang gi rang bzhin ‘jig pa med pa’i chos de la mkhas pa rnams rtag pa zhes brjod pa’i phyir / ‘dis ‘jig pa log pa’i rang bzhin gcig rtag par ‘thad pa bstan nas rtag pa yin na dangos pos khyab pa dang / gzhi ma grub rtag par ‘dod pa legs par bkag go // (“It follows that the subject, the pudgala, is permanent because it is the support for bondage and liberation and because it is devoid of disintegration. It follows that there is entailment because wise men speak of the factor that itself does not disintegrate as the permanent. Through this [statement, Dharmakīrti], by saying that it is proper to consider the nature of the absence of disintegration to be permanence, correctly refutes the assertion that if something is permanent, it must necessarily be a functioning thing, and the assertion that what is not existent [lit. ‘what is not established as a basis’] is permanent”).
Furthermore, with respect to whatever is considered to be permanent, [some people] assert that whatever existed formerly exists at a later time, too. But [what is stated here] is the meaning of “permanence” as asserted by non-Buddhist schools. And this is nothing but the way foolish men apprehend [the meaning of] “permanence.” Apart from the Vaibhāṣika, others in our [Buddhist] schools – the Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Madhyamaka schools – never assign such a meaning to “permanence.”

What Tsong kha pa has in mind here is Śāntarakṣita’s argument in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra 2–3, where the unity of permanent entities, as postulated by the Vaiśeṣika and the Vaibhāṣika, is negated. The Vaiśeṣika school asserts īśvara to be a single permanent entity. The Buddhist Vaibhāṣika school asserts that unconditioned factors are permanent and indivisible. Both the Vaiśeṣika and Vaibhāṣika schools consider that to be permanent means to be always existent without losing unity or singularity, as represented by Tsong kha pa’s phrase: “whatever existed formerly exists at a later time.” However, according to Tsong kha pa, this is nothing but the way foolish men understand the meaning of “permanence.” He says that such a view on the permanent is not acceptable to the Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka schools.

Then Tsong kha pa moves on to explain the wise men’s view on permanence. He says as follows:

\[
des na rnam 'grel las \langle J \rangle \text{ gang gi rang bzhin 'jig med pa // de la mkhas rnams rtag ces brjod l ces gsungs pa ltar 'jig pa med pa'i chos ni rtag pa'i don yin gyi sngar ltar mi 'dod do // (Dbu ma rgyan zin bris 13b6f.)}
\]

Therefore, the meaning of “permanence” is identified with the property of not being subject to disintegration, as stated in the Vārttika: “Wise men speak of the thing that itself does not disintegrate as the permanent.” [The meaning of that] stated before is, on the contrary, not accepted [by wise men].

Here Tsong kha pa, citing the passage from the Pramāṇavārttika, gives another definition of permanence, which he says is accepted by the Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka schools. In short, Tsong kha pa says that to be permanent means to not be subject to disintegration. To make this point clear, let us consider the example of “emptiness” (stong nyid). By definition, emptiness is immutable and unchangeable. It is not subject

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19 MAI vv. 2–3: ‘bras bu rim can nyr shyor bas // rtag rnams gcig pu'i bdag nyid min // 'bras bu re re tha dad na // de dag rtag las nyams par 'gyur // bsgoms las byung ba'i shes pa yis // shes bya 'dus ma byas smra ba'i // lugs la'ang gcig min de dag ni // rim can shes dang 'brel phyir ro // (“Permanent things cannot have a single nature, since they bring about effects in succession. Suppose that their effects existed at different moments respectively, then the [Vaiśeṣika’s] assertion that they are permanent would be inappropriate. Even those objects known by the cognition arisen from meditation, which are [said to be] unconditioned factors according to the [Vaibhāṣika’s] doctrine, cannot be unitary since they are related to a series of cognitions arising in succession”).

20 Cf. Thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan [cha–ka] 80b2f. (Klein 1991: 144); Gcig du bral gyi rnam bzhag 21a1f.
Dharmakīrti’s Notion of Permanence

to disintegration, so that it is permanent. To be sure, the emptiness possessed by \( p \) exists only when the property-possessor \( p \) exists; and the emptiness of \( p \) disappears when the property-possessor \( p \) disappears. But, according to Tsong kha pa, it does not follow that the emptiness possessed by \( p \) is impermanent. He remarks:

\[
\text{rang bzhin rnam dag gi dbang du byas na chos can snga ma'i stong nyid chos de log pa na ldog pas l cho de med pa'i dus na med pas dus res 'ga' ba yin kyang mi rtag par mi 'gyur te l dgag bya rnam par bcad tsam gyi med dgag yin pa'i phyir dang l khyad gzhi log pa na khyad chos ldog pa'i phyir ro l} (\text{Dbu ma rgyan zin bris 14a3ff.})
\]

With reference to [the emptiness, which is] innately pure, [we can point out the following things]: The emptiness of a property-possessor \([p]\) that existed before disappears when the factor \([p]\) disappears, and it is nonexistent when that factor \([p]\) is nonexistent; therefore, it exists only temporarily. However, it does not follow that it is impermanent because it is a non-affirming negation that is [recognized] merely by eliminating an object of negation, and because [it is natural to say that] the attribute should disappear when the basis of the attribute disappears.\(^{21}\)

To sum up, Tsong kha pa says that the emptiness possessed by \( p \) is permanent because it is a non-affirming negation \((\text{med dgag})\). But what does it mean to be a non-affirming negation? Tsong kha pa uses the term “non-affirming negation” to refer to a thing that is posited as present only by way of eliminating an object of negation \((\text{dgag bya})\), without affirming the existence of other factors.\(^{22}\) The emptiness of \( p \) is recognized only by eliminating an object of negation, that is, \( p \)’s intrinsic existence. Nothing else is affirmed to be present through that process of negation. It is for this reason that emptiness is said to be a non-affirming negation.

This brings us to the second point. The emptiness of \( p \) as such cannot be perceived directly, but it is cognized only by means of eliminating another factor, \( p \)’s intrinsic existence; it has a secondary existence imputed by conceptual consciousness. In other words, the emptiness of \( p \) is a conceptual construct devoid of origination and disintegration. It is true that the attribute, emptiness, disappears when the basis of the attribute \( p \) disappears. But it

\(^{21}\) Cf. \text{Thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan [cha–ka] 81a1f. (Klein 1991: 145); Geig du bral gyi rnam bzhag 21a3f.}\n
\(^{22}\) 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa defines \( \text{dgag pa} \) and \( \text{med dgag} \), respectively, as follows. \text{Bsdus chen gyi rnam bzhag 28b5 (cf. Sras bsdus grwa 295.7ff.): rang dngos su rtogs pa'i blos rang gi dgag bya dngos su bcad nas rtogs par bya ba'i chos de dgag pa'i mtsphan nyid l ("A negative phenomenon \([p]\) is defined as a factor that is recognized only after having directly eliminated its object of negation by the mind that directly knows \([p]\)"); Bsdus chen gyi rnam bzhag 31b5f. (cf. Sras bsdus grwa 295.14ff.): rang dngos su rtogs pa'i blos rang gi dgag bya dngos su bcad nas rtogs par bya ba gang zhig l rang dngos su rtogs pa'i blos rang gi dgag bya bkag shul du chos gshan ma yin dgag dang sgrub pa gang rung mi 'phen pa de med dgag gi mtsphan nyid l ("A non-affirming negation \([p]\) is defined as the thing that is recognized only after having directly eliminated its object of negation by the mind that directly knows \([p]\), and that does not make known another factor – whether it is an affirming negative or a positive phenomenon – through the process of negating its object of negation by the mind which directly knows \([p]\)). See also Klein 1991: 107ff.}\
is not the case that the emptiness loses its identity over the course of time. Consequently, Tsong kha pa argues, the emptiness of \( p \) is permanent irrespective of the fact that it exists only at a particular moment.

4 The Dge lugs pa’s exposition of the Nature Body

Tsong kha pa applies the same reasoning to other unconditional factors such as nirvāṇa (mya nган las ’das pa), extinction through discernment (so sor brags ’gog; Skt. pratisamkhya-nirodha), the truth of cessation (’gos bden; Skt. nirodhasatya), the true nature of things (chos nyid; Skt. dharmaṭā), and so on, all of which pertain to religious attainments. Tsong kha pa holds that these factors are permanent even if they may occur only at a particular moment. By now it is not surprising that Tsong kha pa’s disciple, Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432), offers a similar analysis with respect to a Buddha’s Nature Body, which is permanent but not always existent. In his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Dar ma rin chen says as follows:

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\text{dag pa gnyis ldan gyi sku de nyid thog ma med pa nas sens can gyi rgyud la med par sangs rgyas pa’i dus ’ba’ zhiq tu ’byung na mi rtag par ’gyur dgos so snyam pa ni l mkhas rmongs la grags pa’i rtag pa’i khyad par dang l dngos po res ’ga’ ba dang ’das ma byas res ’ga’ ba’i khyad par ma phyed pas nongs so l} \quad (\text{Rnam bshad snying po rgyan 311b6ff.})
\]

Someone might claim: “If [a Buddha’s Nature] Body endowed with twofold purity is not present in the continuum of sentient beings since beginningless time and will occur only at the moment of enlightenment, then it must necessarily be impermanent.” But this is an error due to confusion between [the concept of] permanence accepted by wise men and that accepted by the foolish, and also it is due to confusion between functioning things occurring at a particular moment and unconditioned things occurring at a particular moment.

Dar ma rin chen interprets the eighth chapter of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra in terms of the fourfold Buddha Bodies, i.e., the Nature Body, the Gnostic Dharma Body, the Enjoyment Body, and the Manifestation Body.\(^23\) He identifies the Nature Body with the twofold purity. The first is the innate purity (rang bzhin rnam dag), which again is identified with a Buddha’s mind and body being empty of intrinsic existence. The second is the purity from adventitious stains (glo bur rnam dag), i.e., the cessation of all obstructions including afflictive obstructions (nyon sgrib) and obstructions to the knowable (shes sgrib).\(^24\) The Nature Body characterized as such is the quintessence of Buddhahood.

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\(^23\) Tsong kha pa, as well as other Dge lugs pa scholars including Dar ma rin chen, accepts Haribhadra’s four-kāya interpretation, instead of the three-kāya interpretation by Āryavimuktisena, Ratnākaraśānti, and Abhayākaraṇ Gupta. For further details, see Makransky 1997: 289ff.

\(^24\) Rnam bshad snying po rgyan 311b5: gzugs kyi sku dang ye shes chos kyi sku ’i glo bur rnam dag gis khyad par du byas pa ’i rang bzhin rnam dag gi cha dang / de ’i steng gi glo bur rnam dag gi cha ni ’dus ma byas kyi sku dang / ngo bo nyid kyi sku zhes bya la l (“The following elements are said to be the Unconditioned Body or Nature Body: the element of innate purity that is characterized by the purity from adventitious stains on the Form Body and Gnostic Dharma Body; and that of purity from adventitious stains on them”).
The point to observe is that the Nature Body is embodied only at the moment of supreme enlightenment; for, otherwise, it would absurdly follow that every sentient being is already enlightened without requiring any effort. Therefore, it must be said that a Buddha’s Nature Body is a thing occurring at a particular moment (res ‘ga’ ba). But this fact does not invalidate the assumption that the Nature Body is permanent. In this connection, let us look at the argument given by ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson’ grus (1648–1721):

He [namely, a certain opponent] says: “It follows that the Nature Body occurs in the continuum of sentient beings simultaneously with enlightenment, because there is the moment in which it occurs in their continuum, and because it is not the case that it exists since beginningless time […] If you accept the root thesis (rtsa ba), then it follows that it occurs at a particular moment because you have accepted that [it occurs simultaneously with enlightenment]. If you accept this, it follows that it is impermanent because you have accepted that [it occurs at a particular moment].”

[We reply:] “There is no entailment.”

[The opponent says:] “It follows that there is entailment because if something occurs at a particular moment, it must necessarily be a thing which has a cause, for the Vārttika says: ‘It is established that this suffering has a cause since it occurs [only] at a particular moment’.”

[We reply:] “There is no entailment because what is meant here is that, if something is an effective thing occurring at a particular moment, it must be something that has a cause.”

We notice that ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa tries to modify the meaning of PV II 179, which explicitly says that suffering has a cause since it occurs only at a particular moment (res ‘ga’ ba). The exact meaning of the verse, according to ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, is that suffering has a cause and hence is impermanent since it is an effective thing occurring only at a particular moment (res ‘ga’ ba’i dngos po). Instead of saying that a thing occurring at a particular moment is impermanent, ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa suggests the idea that an effective thing occurring at a particular moment is impermanent, which implies that there exist permanent, non-effective, and causeless things which occur at a particular moment. What he means to say is that the Nature Body of the Buddha is a permanent (non-effective

\[\text{PV II 179cd (cf. Vetter 1984: 82): } \text{kādācitkatayā siddhā duḥkhasyāsa sahetutā} /\]
and causeless) thing, despite the fact that it is present only at the moment of enlightenment and absent prior to that time. The wise men’s definition of the permanent must be recalled here. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa says:

res ’ga’ mi ’byung la res ’ga’ ’byung ba ’di mi rtag pa’i don ma yin par thal / […] mkhas pa rnam s res ’ga’ ba yin min tsam la mi byed par chos gang gi rang bzhin la ’jig pa yod med kyis mi rtag par dang rtag par ’jog pa’i phyir te / (Mi pham zhal lung [skabs brgyad pa] 40a3ff.)

It does not follow that the meaning of “impermanence” is defined as being present at a certain time and absent at another […] because wise men posit [a factor] either as impermanent or permanent in accordance with whether or not the factor itself is subject to disintegration, without needing to consider whether or not it is present only at a certain time.

This is a paraphrase of Pramāṇavārttika II 204cd. A thing that itself is not subject to disintegration is permanent irrespective of its presence or absence at a certain time. The Nature Body, then, is just the mere absence of intrinsic existence and obstructions; it is a conceptual construct that never arises from causes, and that never undergoes disintegration. Hence, it is concluded that the Nature Body is permanent. This of course does not imply that the Nature Body is always existent, nor does it mean that it is a positive and independent reality (sgrub pa rang dbang ba’i bden grub), as conceived of by the Jo nang pa school. Rather, that the Nature Body is permanent means that it is something that is ascertained through a simple negation of disintegration.26

5 Concluding remarks

This is how the Dge lugs pa scholars interpret the meaning of “permanence” especially within the context of the theory of Buddhahood. They identify the quintessence of Buddhahood with the Nature Body, which again is characterized as the mere absence of intrinsic existence and obstructions. The Nature Body so identified is a conceptual construct imputed on the mere absence of the object of negation. It is free from origination and disintegration so that it satisfies the condition of being permanent.

The important point to note here is that these Dge lugs pa scholars refer to Dharmakīrti’s hypothetical definition of permanence in order to justify their theory of Buddhahood. They assume that Dharmakīrti himself admits the existence of the permanent and defines it as

26 See Mi pham zhal lung [skabs brgyad pa] 37b1ff.: kun mkhyen jo nang na re / rang bzhin rnam dag gi char gyar pa’i ngo bo nyid sku de sgrub pa rang dbang ba’i bden grub yin pa rgyud bla ma dang dus ’khor lugs zer na / ’o na / rtag pa rnam s ’jig pa rnam par bcad tsam la mi ’jog par thal / dam bca’ ’thad pa’i phyir / ’dod mi nus te / mdo sde pa yan chad kyi lugs la rtag dngos med pa’i phyr te / (“The omniscient scholar of the Jo nang [i.e., Dol po pa,] says: ‘The Nature Body which is the element of innate purity is a positive independent reality; this is the doctrine of the Uttaratantra and also that of the Kālacakra.’ Then it follows that the mere absence of disintegration is not posited as the permanent, because [according to you] your thesis is true. But you cannot accept this because, according to the higher doctrine of the Sautrāntika [Yogācāra and Mādhyamika schools], there does not exist a thing which is both permanent and functioning”).
“the thing that itself does not disintegrate” in its own right. Such a concept of permanence, which goes back to ancient Indian thought as seen in the *Mahābhāṣya*, functions forcefully to explain why the Nature Body is permanent in spite of the fact that it is not always manifested in an individual being.

It is also interesting to note that the Dge lugs pa carefully avoid the two extreme positions held by other Tibetan thinkers. First, unlike Ša skya paṇḍita and Glo bo mkhan chen, Tsong kha pa and his successors strongly assert that permanent things do exist, as they think that otherwise the state of emptiness and the attainment of Buddhahood would be inexplicable. Secondly, the Dge lugs pa reject the Jo nang pa position that the innate purity of the Nature Body is a positive and independent reality (*sgrub pa rang dbang ba’i bden grub*); the Dge lugs pa say instead that the innate purity is a non-affirming negation imputed on the mere absence of disintegration. Thus, we see that Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence survived in the Dge lugs pa’s theory of Buddhahood and enabled them to give the most plausible explanation of the Nature Body without falling into the two extreme positions.

**References and abbreviations**

**Works in Sanskrit and Tibetan**

**AK** Abhidharmakośa (Vasubandhu). See AK Bh.


**Bsdus chen gyi rnam bzhag** *Bsdus chen gyi rnam bzhag rigs lam gser gyi sgo ’byed lung dang rigs pa’i gan mdzod blo gsal yid kyi mun sel skal ldan dad pa’i ’jug ngogs* (*’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa nag dbang brtson ’grus*), Bkra shis ’khyil ed. Ba.

**D** Derge (*sde dge*) edition of the Buddhist canon (*tripiṭaka*) in Tibetan.

**Dbu ma rgyan zin bris** *Dbu ma rgyan gyi zin bris rje rang gir nang ba* (Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa), Zhol ed. Ba. Tohoku No. 5407.


**MAI** Madhyamakālaṃkāra (Śāntarakṣita): *Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita with his own Commentary or Vṛtti and with the subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla*, ed. M. Ichigo. Kyoto 1985.


**Mi pham zhal lung** *Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i mtha’ dpyod ’khrul sel gang ga’i chu rgyun mi pham zhal lung* (*’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa nag dbang brtson ’grus*), Bkra shis ’khyil ed. Nya.

**MSA** Mahāyānasūtrakārā ("Maitreya"). See MSABh.

PSV$_K$ Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga), Tibetan Peking ed. *gtan tshigs rig pa* Ce. Otani No. 5702.


*Rigs gter rang 'grel* Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi rtsa ba dang ’grel pa (Sa skya paññita kun dga’ rgyal mtshan). Beijing 1989.

*Rnam bshad snying po rgyan* Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyn pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi ’grel pa don gsal ba’i rnam bshad snying po’i rgyan (Rgyal tshab rje dar ma rin chen), Zhol ed. Kha. Tohoku No. 5433.

*Sras bsdus grwa* Tshad ma’i dgongs ’grel gyi bstan bcos chen po rnam ’grel gyi don gcig tu dril ba blo rab ’bring tha ma gsum du ston pa legs bshad chen po mkhas pa’i mgul rgyan skal bzang re ba kun skong (Thugs sras ngag dbang bkra shis). Beijing 1985.

*Thar lam gsal byed* Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa (Rgyal tshab rje dar ma rin chen), Zhol ed. Cha. Tohoku No. 5450.


VBh D Sūtraśāstra dge ‘tus (Sthiramati), Tibetan Sde dge ed. *sems tsam* Mi. Tohoku No. 4034.

Works in western languages


Dignāga on the View of a Generic Term as Denoting a Relation

by

Hideyo Ogawa

Introduction

Like grammarians, Dignāga bases his linguistic theory, which is well known as the apoha theory, on actual usage of language. His observation of the fact that the word go “cow” is not found to be used in actual usage to convey the meaning of the word aśva “horse” leads him to build up the apoha theory, which is constructed out of three factors: a word’s own meaning (svārtha), the meaning to be conveyed by another word (arthāntara, anyasyabdārtha), and the exclusion of the latter (apoha, nivṛtti, vyāvṛtti, vyavaccheda). These three factors are connected with one another in such a way that the word go brings about the understanding of its meaning as qualified by the exclusion of the meaning of another word, say, the word aśva (arthāntaranivṛttivīśiṣṭabhāva). Dignāga assumes that from the word go one understands nothing else but the cow, and not simply the cow. When he says that anyāpoha “exclusion of others” is the meaning of a word, he wishes to imply that anyāpoha is a meaning of a word as a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) of the word’s own meaning, or as the occasioning ground for the use of the word (pravṛttinimitta).

In the Apoha chapter of his Pramāṇasamuccaya Dignāga argues that a generic term (jātiśabda) like sat “being, existent” cannot denote an individual (bheda), a generic property (jāti), a relation between the two (yoga, sambandha), or an individual qualified by a generic property (tadvat). In the latter half of the second kārikā, he, relying on the observation of utterances such as sad dravyam “A substance is existent,” in which the item sat is supposed to be co-referential with a co-occurring item for an individual, states his view that the generic term cannot denote a relation.

PS V.2cd: [na jātiśabo] vācako yogātyor vā bhedārthair aprthakśruteḥ /
Nor does the generic term denote a relation or a generic property, since it refers to the same entity (aprthakśruti) as [words] signifying individuals.

The third kārikā of the Apoha chapter is devoted to adducing the conclusive reason for the view. The kārikā goes as follows:

1 I deeply respect Dr. Ole Holten Pind, whose epoch-making achievement is represented by Pind (2009, 2015). The present paper owes much to the work, without which I could not even have stood on the threshold of Dignāga’s apoha theory. Editor’s note: This contribution contains changes that the author has left to the editor’s discretion.

2 Pind 2015: II 14 (§ 4): “(vācakaḥ) neither the general property nor the inherence relation, because it is not ‘heard apart’ (aprthakśruteḥ) from [words] whose referents (bhedārthaiḥ) are particular [general properties].”

And in this context it is explained that the connection is denotable through the property of the relatum (sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate). That is, it [viz. the connection] is denoted on the assumption that it is a state of action (bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ); and a state of action is connected with the other [relatum] (bhāvaś cănyena yujyate).

Pind’s interpretation of the kārikā is well grounded. But I have to say that, resting even on Pind’s interpretation, it is almost impossible to fathom what Dignāga intends to say in the kārikā.

Dignāga here simply brings out the point Bhartṛhari makes about the denotation of a relation. According to Bhartṛhari, there is no nominal (nāman) that denotes a relation qua relation; a nominal such as sambandha “relation” cannot denote a relation in its own property (svadharmeṇa) but simply as a substance (dravya), because an act (bhāva) denoted by an action noun (bhāvasādhana) is treated like a substance (dravyavat).

The aim of this paper is to give a plausible interpretation of the kārikā by taking into consideration arguments Bhartṛhari brings forward about the denotation of a relation in his Vākyapadiya and thereby to show clearly the reason for Dignāga’s argument that a generic term cannot denote a relation. It will be shown that the same approach to everyday speech (lokavyavahāra) as Dignāga takes for the purpose of establishing anyāpoha as a word meaning (padārtha) is found in his arguments about the denotation of a relation.

Before turning to a closer examination of the question at issue, a few remarks should be made concerning Dignāga’s apoha theory. It is extremely important to note that Dignāga accepts the abstraction (apoddhāra) theory which is known as forming the pivot of Bhartṛhari’s linguistic theory.

Consider PS V.46, where Dignāga introduces the concept of the abstraction of words from a sentence.

[A] PS V.46: apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vikalpitaḥ / vākyārthah pratiḥbāhkhyo 'yaṃ tenādāv upajanyate //</n

When a word is abstracted from a sentence, this [i.e., anyāpha] is conceptually posited (vikalpita) as the meaning of the word. This sentence meaning called pratiḥbāh “a flash of knowledge” is brought about by means of [the grasping of] that [word meaning] at the outset [when one has not familiarized oneself with the sentence].

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3 Pind 2015: II 166 (§ 61): “the referent of the syntactical word (padasya) is imagined (vikalpita) when abstracted (apoddhāre) from the sentence (vākyā). Yet the referent of the sentence which is called intuition (pratiḥbā) is in the beginning (ādau) produced by that [namely the syntactic word].” According to Jinendrabuddhi, the pronominal ayam “this” in pāda a refers to anyāpoha. PSṬ Ms B 236b1 (Pind
Dignāga comments on the first half of the kārikā as follows:

[B] PSV on PS V.46 (Pind 2015: I 55–56): (a) padasyāsato ʻpī vākyād apoddhṛtasya yathāgamaṁ utprekṣayārtho vyavasthāpyate kevalasyāprayogagāt prakṛtipratyayayavat.4 (b) sā cōtprekṣānyēṣv āgāmeṣv āyuktaṛthagrahaṇī tasmād idam arthāntaram utkṣiptam,5

(a-1) A word or a syntactic unit (pada) is abstracted from a sentence (vākya). (a-2) The word is unreal (asat) because it is not used in isolation [in the realm of actual communication], just like a base (prakṛti) and an affix (pratyaya) that are abstracted from a word. (a-3) Nonetheless, [a certain entity is] posited as its meaning through invention (utprekṣā) in accordance with tradition (yathāgamaṁ). (b-1) And the invention based on other traditions is that through which a [word] meaning that is logically invalid (ayuktārtha) is conceived of. (b-2) Therefore, this [word] meaning [called anyāpoha], which is different from entities posited as [word] meanings by other traditions, has been brought forward here.6

As Pind (2015: II Appendix 14) has pointed out, [B](a) presents a striking parallel to Bhārtṛhari’s Vṛtti.7 Let us take note of (a-3): A word meaning is an invented entity (padasaṁ ... utprekṣayaṁ ... artho vyavasthāpyate). The invention is conditioned by tradition (yathāgamaṁ). There are different inventions according to different traditions. As mentioned earlier, regarding the question of what a generic term denotes Dignāga tries to reject four views: an individual, a generic property, a relation between the two, and an individual...
qualified by a generic property. Entities posited as the word meaning in these views are inventions according to traditions.

It is important to note [B](b-1) and [B](b-2), which clearly show that anyāpoha is posited as a word meaning through invention in accordance with the Buddhist tradition. According to Dignāga, the assumption that anyāpoha is a word meaning is more reasonable than the others. That is, this assumption is not only based on the Buddhist tradition (āgama) but also is well grounded on logical reasoning (yukti). But in terms of what is the assumption reasonable? Consider the following Vṛtti.

[C] PSV on PS V.37b (Pind 2015: I 46): (a) tasmād asmābhir api 〈loka-vyavahārā naimitikā vā〉 pāribhāṣikā 〈vā〉 bhūtārthatvena na mrśyante, (b) lokavad evānugamyante. (c) siddhaś ca rūpaśabdo loke nīlādiṣv eva, na rasādiṣu.

(a) Therefore, we, too, do not cling (mrśyante) to everyday speech (lokavyavahāra), whether it has a basis for application or comes from a scientific field, as related to a real entity (bhūtārtha). (b) Just as the world follows (anugamyante) everyday speech, so do we. (c) And in everyday usage it has been established that the word rūpa “color” denotes only (eva) blue and the like and not taste and others.

Let us take note of [C](b): Dignāga makes the point that he follows everyday speech, just as does the world. Clearly what this implies is that he holds that his apoha theory can most reasonably account for everyday speech. Moreover, when he states [C](c), he intends to imply that the apoha theory is constructed on the basis of the fact found in everyday speech such that the word rūpa denotes only (eva) blue and the like and not taste and others. It may be said without much exaggeration that Dignāga’s theory of apoha is meant for reasonably explaining the fact of speech that a certain linguistic item occurs only in the domain of a certain meaning and not in the domain of another meaning.

In [C](a) it is stated that Dignāga does not suppose that everyday speech must be related to a real entity. Naturally this suggests that he stands far apart from realism according to which language reflects reality.

Interestingly and importantly, Dignāga’s approach to established everyday usage, which is shown in [C](b), is not different from Bhartṛhari’s. Bhartṛhari asserts that he accepts things as they are spoken of, without making an ontological commitment to them. Relevant to this point is Bhartṛhari’s following remark:

8 Jinendrabuddhi says: PST Ms B 237a1–2 (Pind 2015: II 168, n. 561); yasya (scil. padasya) ya āgamaḥ: keśāṃ cid bhedaḥ vācyāḥ, pāreśāṃ jātir, anyeśāṃ sambandhāḥ, keśāṃ cit tadvad iti padasyārtha ity āgamaḥ. (“That which is the tradition as to a word is the tradition such that this is the meaning of a word: some have a tradition that individuals (bheda) are to be denoted by words; some have a tradition that a generic property is to be denoted by a word; others have a tradition that a relation between a generic property and its bearer is to be denoted by a word; some have a tradition that an individual qualified by a generic property is to be denoted by a word.”)

9 On the meaning of mrśyante, see Pind 2015: II 142, n. 468.

10 In the Sādhanasamuddeśa Bhartṛhari says of the power of functioning as agent (kartṛtva) the following: VP 3.7.38: tattve vā vyatirekā vā vyatirikṭam tadbacyate / sabdapramāṇako lokah sa śāśrtenānugamyate // (“The property of being an agent, whether it be identical with its bearer or different from the latter, we declare that it is different from its bearer. The world holds usage as their standard. The science of
The world (loka) achieves verbal communication by resorting to conceptual word meanings. In the science [of grammar] the word meanings commonly known to the world (laukika) are divided [into actions (kriyā), substances (dravya), qualities (guna), and others] for the sake of [grammatical] operations.12

Thus, if we accept that in constructing his linguistic theory Dignāga takes the same position as Bhartrhari, namely that the usage common in the world is taken as the standard that is to be followed, we may say the following: Dignāga conceptually posits anyāpoha as the word meaning in order to establish a linguistic theory that holds up in the universe as the world speaks of it and believes it to be real. The universe as such is not spoken of, it is only a conceptual construct.

Now let us consider how Dignāga argues against the assumption that a relation between a generic property and its bearer is denoted by a generic term. Here I will consider the Vṛtti on PS V.3. To begin with, I will give the text of the Vṛtti and its translation by Pind.

[E] PSV on PS V.3: sambandhanam hi sambandhah. 〈so ’nyena yujyate rāgādivat〉. tasmāt sambandhidharmena sambandho vācya iti kṛtvāṣaṅkitam svadharmeṇa tu nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabda ity idam tat prati nāsti. ato naivasya (sic) jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapadyate.

For connection means “state of connecting;” it [namely the state of connecting] is connected to the other [relatum] in the same way as the state of colouring (rāgādivat), etc. Therefore, assuming (iti kṛtvā) that the connection is denotable through the property of the relatum, doubt (āśaṅkitam) about (prati) the claim grammar follows them.”

Iyer 1971: “As to whether it (power) is identical with or different from (its substratum), it is held that it is different. For the world, the word is the authority and the śāstra (that is, Grammar) follows it too.” The point made here is that, without examining the ontological question of whether the agent-power is identical with or different from its bearer, grammarians favor the view commonly accepted by the world that the agent-power is different from its bearer. I need not elaborate on Bhartrhari’s concept of power here. See Ogawa 2009.

12 Iyer 1971: 119: “Verbal communication in the world is done with meanings of words fashioned by the mind and in the science of grammar, it is the meanings adopted in the world on the basis of which the work (of explaining the forms) is done.” Houben 1995: 321; 424: “But verbal usage of everyday life [takes place] by means of conceptualized meanings of words. In grammar (śāstra) the word meaning of everyday usage is separated [from the sentence meaning] for the sake of grammatical operations.” (Houben’s interpretation of pravibhajyate “… is separated [from the sentence meaning]” is far-fetched.) According to Helārāja, that which is framed out of word meanings (padārthaprakriyā) and which is well established in the world is to be accepted as it is in the science of grammar. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.88 (181.9–10): tad atra lokaprasiddhatva padārthaprakriyā samāśrayaṇā … / Note that the word laukika is derived from loka with the taddhita thān by A 5.1.44 lokasarvalokathāthān, signifying “known in the world” (“known in X” [tatra viditaḥ]).
(idan tat) that a word, on the other hand, does not denote the connection by its own property (svadharman) is meaningless (naṣti). Consequently (ataḥ) its [viz. the connection’s] denotability (vācyatvam) by a general term is not at all (naiva) justified (upapadyate). (Pind 2015: II 20)

2.1 Let us first look at the following introductory sentence.

[F] PSṬ Ms B 195a5 (Pind 2015: II 20, n. 44): “In grammar, just as, with reference to a finite verb form, its divisions are fictitiously assumed respectively to denote something to be brought to accomplishment and something to bring to accomplishment, so, with reference to items ending in affixes like ghañ, an action is conveyed as something to be brought to accomplishment on the basis of a verb, while the action’s status of being a substance is

13 SK, sarvasamāsaśeśaprakarana (II.215): kṛttaddhitasamāśeśaparārthābhidhāturūpaḥ paica vṛttayah / parārthābhāvyahānam vṛttih / vṛtyarthābhāvyahānam vākyaṃ vṛgahāḥ / MBh on A 1.3.1 (I.256.20): kah punar bhāvah / bhavateḥ svapadārtho bhavanam bhāva iti / Pradīpa on MBh to A 1.3.1 (II.186): bhavanam bhāva iti vṛgahāḥ kartṛkārthābhāvyahāḥ /

14 Here and in the following, bold letters are used to signify the term sambandha, which shows that this term is bhāvasādhana, that is, the item that is formed from a verb with a kṛt affix signifying bhāva. The term sambandha is derived from the verb bandh preceded by the preverb (upasarga) sam with the kṛt affix ghañ, meaning “connecting, connection, relation.” The term sambandhana is derived from the same string with the kṛt affix lyuṭ. Jinendrabuddhi properly notes that the term sambandha is an item that denotes bhāva, or what is called an action noun.

15 In Pāṇini’s grammar, bhāva as signified by a kṛt affix is to be distinguished from bhāva as signified by an L-affix (as in āśya devadattena “Devadatta is sitting:” A 3.4.69 lahaṃ karmani ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ): the former is an act in the abstract, something that has been brought to accomplishment (sidhel), termed bāhyabhāva “external bhāva,” while the latter is an act in process, which is the significand of a verbal base itself (prakṛtyartha) and hence something that is to be brought to accomplishment (sādhya), termed ābhyantarabhāva “internal bhāva.”

16 PST Ms B 195a5 (Pind 2015: II 20, n. 44): bhāvayatam asya darśayaṇi. Grammatical rules we have to take into consideration here are the following: A 3.3.18 bhāve and A 3.3.115 lyuṭ ca. A 3.3.18 and A 3.3.115 provide respectively for introducing ghañ and lyuṭ after a verb on condition that an act in the abstract (bhāva) is to be signified.

17 MBh on A 3.3.19 (II.145.16–18): nanu coktaṃ vihitah pratayyāt sārthe bhāve ghañ itiṇī / anayā sa bhāvo bhāve nyukṣyāḥ prakṛtyarthaḥ / anenedāniḥ abhyantarare bhāve sātī / kah punar etayor bhāvayor višeṣah / ukto bhāvabhṛdo bhāyaye // See PWT 297. In the Kṛiṣṇamūdeśa Bhartṛhari states: VP 3.8.47: āhyāticāde bhāgāhyah yādāyābhāvānadvartitā / prakalpitā yathā śāstre sa ghanādyas api kramah // (“In grammar, just as, with reference to a finite verb form, its divisions are fictitiously assumed respectively to denote something to be brought to accomplishment and something to bring it to accomplishment, so, with reference to items ending in affixes like ghañ also, the same analysis is given”); VP 3.8.48: sādyayatvaṃ kriyā tatra dhāturūpaṇibhandhanaḥ / satvaḥ ghanāvāyas tu yas tasyāḥ sa ghanāṇīdhībandhanaḥ // (“In those items ending in affixes like ghañ, an action is conveyed as something to be brought to accomplishment on the basis of a verb, while the action’s status of being a substance is
2.1.2 The external bhāva is denoted by an item ending in a kṛt affix (kṛdanta), while the internal bhāva is denoted by an item ending in a verbal ending (tiṅanta). Both bhāvas have in common the property of being an action. They have the following distinguishing characteristics:

1. kṛdabhihito bhāvo dravyavad bhavati /
2. The external bhāva behaves like a substance (dravya). It functions as what brings an action to accomplishment (sādhanā, kāraka).
3. tiṅabhihitena bhāvena kālapurusopapraghā abhivyajyante /
4. Time (kāla), person (puruṣa), and aspect (upagraha) are manifested by the internal bhāva.
5. tiṅabhihito bhāvah kartrā samprayuyjate /
6. The internal bhāva is connected with an agent.
7. ayam api višeṣah syāl lingakṛtaḥ sankhyākṛtaś ceti /
8. The external bhāva is capable of being connected with gender and number.

Thus what Dignāga means by the statement in question ([F]) is clear: The sambandha in question is a relation as signified by the action noun sambandha.

2.2 Next let us take up the second sentence.

[G] PSV on PS V.3: (b) 〈so ’nyena yujyate rāgādivat〉.

2.2.1 In mentioning the term rāga, Dignāga might have had the following rule in mind.

[H] A 6.4.27 ghaṇi ca bhāvakaraṇayoh //

By this rule we have rāga “coloring, dye” as follows: ranj-ghaṇi → raj-a → rāj-a (A 7.2.116) → rāga (A 7.3.52).21 Rule A 3.3.121 halaś ca accounts for raṅga “paint, place of conveyed on the basis of affixes such as ghaṇ”); Iyer 1974: 27–28: “Just as Grammar divides a verb into two parts, one expressive of a process (sādhya) and the other of a thing (sādhana), the same can be done to a word ending in a primary suffix like ghaṇ;” “The expression of action as a process depends upon the root and its aspect as a thing depends for its expression on suffixes like ghaṇ.”

21 This rule provides that the penultimate n of ranj “dye, color” is deleted in a stem followed by ghaṇ introduced on condition that an action in the abstract (bhāva) or an instrument (karaṇa) is to be signified (A 3.3.18–19).
public amusement,” in which ghāṇ signifies an instrument (karaṇa) or a locus (adhiṃkaṇa) and which is used as an appellation (samjña) to denote a particular thing. Thus we may say that the item rāga is an apt example of an action noun.

2.2.2 The expression so ’nyena yujyate must be separated from the phrase rāgādivat, which has to be construed with the previous sentence. The expression corresponds to PS V.3d: bhāvaś cānyena yujyate, which Jinendrabuddhi glosses as bhāvaś cānyena sambandhinā yujyate. 22 The act of connecting in the abstract, which is denoted by the nominal sambandha that is an item ending in the kṛt suffix ghāṇ, is to be treated like a substance. Thus what Dignāga means by the expression is that the entity relation denoted by the nominal sambandha is related to the other relatum through another relation, which implies that a relation (sambandha) itself becomes a relatum (sambandhin): to be precise, a relation behaves like a relatum.

2.2.3 In the situation in which a relation behaves like a relatum, the term which denotes such a relation is a sambandhiśabda “relative term.” At this point, it is important to note what a sambandhiśabda is. According to Patañjali, the item called sambandhiśabda implies (ākṣipati) a relatum. One uses the utterance mātari vartitavyam “One should obey a mother” instead of svasyāṃ mātari vartitavyam “One should obey one’s own mother.” The word mātṛ “mother” is a sambandhiśabda. By virtue of a relation, the mother is understood to be the mother of a certain person. 23 Similarly, when the term sambandha is used, a relation signified by this term behaves like a relatum, so that it implies a relatum on the basis of another relation. 24

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22 PST Ms B 68b7 (Pind 2015: II 18, n. 41): sambandhanam hi sambandha iti bhavarūpena sambandhaśabdenābhidhānāt. bhāvaś cānyena sambandhinā yujyata iti. sambandhyantarākāṅkṣā jāyate: kasya sambandha iti. tatas ca bhavatīta na svarūpena sambandho ’bhidhiyate.

23 MBh on A 3.1.19 (II.27.14–16): sambandhiśabdaśa ca punar evamātmakāḥ yaduta sambandhinam ākṣipanti / tadyathā / mātari vartitavyam pitari suśrūṣitavyam iti / na cocyate svasyāṃ mātari svasmā vai pitarī / sambandhāc caitad gamyate yā yaśa mātā yaś ca yaśa piteti /

24 Jinendrabuddhi illustrates this point by taking as an example the term samuccaya “connection” which is supposed to convey a meaning of the particle (nipāta, A 1.4.57) ca “and.” PST Ms B 195a1–3 (Pind 2015: II 19, n. 43): iha kaścic chabdārthaḥ kenacic chabdenābhidhiyamānaḥ sambandhyantarākāṅkṣopajanahetuḥ. tathā hi samuccayaḥ samuccayasābhidhiyānāmābhidhiyanāh. sa eva cādyupādānāḥ kasyeti ākāṅkṣāṃ nopajananyati (em: ākāṅkṣāṃ upajananyati Pind). bhāvaś ca bhāvasādhunāḥ sambandhāc caitad gamyate yā yasya mātā yaś ca yaśa piteti /
2.3 The next step is to consider the remaining passage.

[I] PSV on PS V.3: (c) tasmāt sambandhidharmena sambandho vācyā iti krtvāsānkītaṃ svadhamena tu nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabda iti idam tat prati nāsti. ato naivasya jātiśabdēna vācyatvam upapadyate.

2.3.1 Let us note the statements sambandhidharmena sambandho vācyah and svadhamena nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabdaḥ. Strangely enough, Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi do not specify what the terms sambandhidharmā and svadhamā mean, which seems to be self-explanatory for them. In this connection it will be useful to consider what Bhartṛhari says in the Sambandhasamuddeśa.

[J] VP 3.3.4: nābhidhānaṃ svadhamena sambandhayāsti vācakam / atyantaparatratrāvād rūpaṃ nāsyāpadiṣyate //

There is no term which denotes a relation qua relation [lit. “a relation as characterized (upalaksita) by its own property”]. Since a relation is absolutely dependent, its form is not spoken of [by any particular nominal term].

A relation’s own property (svadharma) is that of being absolutely dependent (atyantaparatratra). According to Bhartṛhari, a power (śakti) and a quality (guṇa) are of a dependent nature; a relation is a power that even powers have and a quality that even qualities have.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25} As to the term svadharma Pind (2015: II 20, n. 48) says: “The term applies to any given noun that is not subject to the grammatical operation of introducing the sixth triplet that denotes the relation …” I cannot understand his point here.

\textsuperscript{26} Helārāja takes the third-triplet ending of svadhamena to denote a characteristic that makes known something as having acquired a certain aspect (A 2.3.21 itthāṃbhūtalakṣaṇe). Prakāśa on VP 3.3.4 (128.10–11): tatra svena asādhāraṇena dharmena svabhāvenopalakṣitasya vācakaḥ pratyāyakam, abhidhānaṃ ṣaṣṭhīvyatiriktaṃ nāsti, idamāyā svarūpānavadhāraṇāā //

Bhartṛhari states the following kārikā. VP 3.3.5: upakārāt sa yatārāṣṭi dharmas tatrānugamyate / śaktinām api sā sākṣīr guṇānām apy asau guṇah // (“Where, by virtue of one thing rendering service (upakāra) to another, there is the relation, there the property of being absolutely dependent is recognized. It [i.e., the relation] is a power even of powers; it is a quality even of qualities”); Iyer 1971: 81: “Where there is service rendered, there an attribute (that is, relation) is understood. It is the power of powers, it is the attribute of attributes”; Houben 1995: 170; 341: “Where this [relation] is, because some service is rendered [from one thing to another, or: from signifier to signified and vice versa], there one arrives at a property (viz. dependence). Even for capacities [dependent on that which has the capacity] it is a capacity, even for qualities [dependent on that which has the quality] it is a quality [so it is extremely dependent].” According to Bhartṛhari, when a certain entity is seen to render service to, i.e., help (upakāra), another, there obtains a relation between them. A power and a quality are what renders service to an entity: a power helps the entity to bring about a certain result and a quality helps the entity to be differentiated from other entities. A power is also to be served by a certain thing in order to be determined both to abide in a locus and to bring about a specific result. Such a thing is a relation that the power has with respect to its locus (āśrayāśrayibhāva) and to its result (kāryakārānabhāva), and the relation can consequently be viewed as a power in that it helps the power to abide in a locus and to bring about a specific result. The reason that, with regard to qualities, a relation is called a quality is that it is viewed as meant for a quality (parārtha) because it serves to determine the quality abiding in a specific substance. On these points, see Ogawa 2009.
2.3.2 It is proper to say that an entity cannot at the same time both be a relation (sambandha) and not be a relation, or be a relatum (sambandhin). We must say accordingly that in a certain context a relation’s own property is that of being absolutely dependent. What is meant by the term sambandhidharma is just opposite to this property. In order to make these points clear, it is useful to consider the Vṛtti on VP 2.439. On the assumption that contact (samyoga) and inherence (samavāya), which are relational concepts of the Vaiśeṣika school, are a relation, Bhartṛhari says:

[K] VP 2.439: sambandhidharmā samyogaḥ svasaṭabdenābhidhīyate / sambandhaḥ samavāyaś ca sambandhitvena gamyate // Contact, even if it is a relation, is conveyed as something whose property (dharman) is like that of a relatum by its own word [i.e., the word samyoga]. Inherence, even if it is a relation, is also understood as a relatum [from its own word samavāya].

In his Vṛtti Bhartṛhari comments as follows:

[L] Vṛtti on VP 2.439 (312.17–22): (a) aṅgulyoḥ samyoga iti sambandho ’pi samyogāḥ samvijñānapadena svatantro ’bhidyamānaḥ puruṣādivat sambandhidharmābhidhīyate //

28 The following kārikā is useful in considering what it means to say that an entity has a property which is like that of another entity. VP 3.3.6: taddharmaṇos tu tācchabdyaḥ samyogasamavāyayoh / tayor apy upakārārthā niyatās tadupādhayaḥ // (“But, contact (samyoga) and inherence (samavāya) are termed sambandha because they have the property which is like the property of that [i.e. the relation]. Even those two have specific factors which delimit that [i.e., the relation] and which serve to render service to the relation”); Iyer 1971: 81: “Conjunction and inherence are called relations because they have the attribute thereof. They have definite conditions the purpose of which is to render service,” Houben 1995: 176: 341: “As regards samyoga (connection) and samavāya (inherence), they (are tacchabdāḥ) are called by that word (sc. ‘relation’), because they have (as it were) that property (sc. dependence). Even these two have restricted functions of rendering service, with this [relation] as limiting factor.” A relation that is delimited by a specific factor, such as the property of residing only in a substance (dravyaikaniyatatva) or its being related to being as a quality (guṇatvena satīsambandhaḥ), is termed samyoga; a relation that is delimited by a specific factor, such as the property of its relata being inseparable (ayutasiddhi), is termed samavāya. Prakāśa on VP 3.3.7 (130.5–6): tathā ca dravyaikaniyatatvaṃ guṇatvena satīsambandhah samyogasyopādhir iti tatropakāraḥ /; Prakāśa on VP 3.3.8–11 (131.11): anena cāyutasiddhiḥ samavāyasamvāyopādhir uktaḥ / According to Bhartṛhari, contact and inherence, which the Vaiśeṣikas posit as relations, do not fit the definition of a relation given by him. Suppose that the defining feature of a relation is to be dependent; contact and inherence have this feature with respect to substances and qualities, so that the term sambandha is used for them. The point is that contact and inherence are dependent entities but not absolutely dependent entities. They are metaphorically spoken of as relations. An important thing to note is Bhartṛhari’s use of the phrase taddhamaranāḥ “those two whose property is like the property of that [i.e., the relation],” which is an uṣtramukha “camel-faced” type of bahuvṛti. MBh on A 1.1.70 (1.180.18–19): uṣtramukham iva mukham asya so ’yan uṣtramukhaḥ / The bahuvṛti uṣtramukha signifies someone who has a face (mukha) like (iva) that of a camel (uṣtra).

29 Iyer 1977: 187: “The relation called contact is expressed as that which is related (sambandhin) by its own word (namely, samyoga); similarly, inherence is also expressed as that which has inherence.”
(b) sambandhisambandhas tu śaṣṭhyā nimittatvāya kalpate /

(c) yadi śāstrāntaradarśanam avaśyam abhyupagantavyam etad āśrīyate sanvyogasamavāyaśaṣṭhyāvishaya (read: sanvyogasamavāyāḥ śaṣṭhyāvishaya) iti /

(d) samavāye 'pi ca sanvyogasamyoginoḥ samavāya iti sati vyapadeśe sambandhitvena samavāye 'bhidhiyamāne bhavitavyam sambandhaitareṇa /

(e) yadi tu śāstravapadeśa evāyaṃ lokavyavahārāṇupāti tatra pratipādanārtham upacārenāṃ samvyavahāraḥ kriyate //

(a) In the utterance aṅgulyoḥ sanvyogāḥ “There is contact related to two fingers,” contact (sanvyoga), even if it is a relation, is conveyed as something independent (svatantra) by a saṃvijñānapada “a conveying word” like sanvyoga, just like the servant in the utterance rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ “the king’s servant.” The contact is conveyed here as that which has the property that is like the property of a relatum (sambandhidharmā).

(b) In the same utterance, on the other hand, the relation with the contact as a relatum becomes the cause for the occurrence of a sixth-triplet ending.

(c) If another philosophical doctrine is necessarily to be accepted, this is admitted: [in the utterance in question] inherence-relation with the contact enters the domain of [A 2.3.50 śaṣṭhī seṣe that provides for] the occurrence of a sixth-triplet ending.

(d) And in the case in which the expression sanvyogasamyoginoḥ samavāyaḥ “There is inherence related to the contact and its bearer” is used of the inherence, too, there must be another relation since the inherence is conveyed as a relatum.

(e) If, however, this very expression used in a scientific field follows everyday speech, the inherence is metaphorically spoken of as a relatum in order to afford an understanding of it.32

In [L](a) it has been shown that contact, if it is denoted by the term sanvyoga, is conveyed as something independent (svatantra). The property of a relatum (sambandhidharmā) is that of being independent. In addition, in [L](e) it is stated that in the utterance sanvyogasamyoginoḥ samavāyaḥ the inherence denoted by the term samavāya is metaphorically (upacāreṇa) spoken of as a relatum.33

30 On the concept of sanvijñānapada, see Ogawa 2010.
31 On A 2.3.50, see PWT 251.
32 See n. 28. [L](e) suggests that there is a twofold relatum: primary and metaphorical.
33 Punyarāja says that in the utterance sanvyogadrayayoh “There is contact between two substances” contact is understood from the term sanvyoga as something that has been brought to accomplishment (pariniṣṭhasvabhāva), that is, as a substance. Tīkā on VP 2.439 (173.5–10): sanvyogāsabdāt sanvyogadrayor iti yathāvat pariniṣṭhasvarūpāḥ [read: pariniṣṭhasvarūpāḥ] tatra sambandhisvabhāvah pratīyate, na ca tasya tadrūpam / evam sanavāyasabdāt samavāyah pratīyata ity āha – sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ ityādī / sambandhitvena sambandhisvabhāvapavirahena samavāyaḥ ity asmāt pratīyate / athavā yadā sanvyogasabdās cāsaṃ sambandhaḥ svatantraḥ bhidhiyate tadā tatra samavāyah sambandhatvena gamyata iti yadā sambandhatvena iti pāṭhas tadaivaṃ yojaniyam // Punyarāja tells us that there is a variant reading of pāḍa d: sambandhatvena gamyate. Given this reading, the kārikā is interpreted as arguing that in the utterance sanvyogadrayayoh the inherence-relation is understood as a relation to be denoted by the sixth-triplet endings.
Now we are in a good position to give an interpretation of statement A: *sambandhidharmaṇa sambandho vācyāḥ* and statement B: *svadharmena nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ*. Recall that the third-triplet ending both in *sambandhidharmaṇa* and in *svadharmena* can be taken as *itthambhūtalakṣaṇa-trītiyā* (A 2.3.21).

Thus, A and B respectively mean:

A: “A relation as characterized by the property of a relatum is to be denoted [by a generic term];”

B: “There is no nominal which denotes a relation as characterized by its own property.”

2.3.3 In PSV on PS V.3 (c) ([I]) as it is given by Pind, we find the expression *idaṃ tat prati*, which can be deleted from the text. We must note the following comments by Jinendrabuddhi:

[M] PST Ms B 195a5–195b1 (Pind 2015: I 4, n. 15): [(a)] [sambandhanaṃ hi sambandha iti ... rāgavat ... tasmāt sambandhidharmaṇa sambandho vācyā iti kṛtvāśaṅkitam iti ... svadharmena tv iti. svarūpeṇa nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabda iti.]

[(b)] *idaṃ tad iti pratyavamarśāyogyatvam āśaṅkaiva nāsti.*

(a) omitted. (b) A relation is not a substance (sattva) since it is incapable of being reflexively grasped as “this” or “that;” therefore, there never arises a suspicion that [a generic term] denotes a relation *per se*.

The terms *dravya*, *sattva*, and *vastu* are synonymous with one another in the context of grammar. According to Helārāja, a substance (dravya) has the following properties (dravyadharma):

1. the property of being capable of being reflexively grasped as “this” or “that” (*idaṃ tad iti pratyavamarśayogyatvam*);
2. the property of having been brought to completion (*pariniṣpannatā*);
3. the property of being independent (*svātantrya*);
4. the property of taking on a fixed gender and number (*liṅgasamkhyāyoga*).
The first property is what Bhartṛhari explains in the *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa*.

[N] VP 3.4.3: \[vastūpalakṣaṇaṃ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate / dravyam ity ucyate so ’rtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ //

That object, with reference to which a pronoun that refers to an entity (*vastu*) is used, is called *dravya* when it is intended to be conveyed as something to be differentiated (*bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ*).\(^{38}\)

The point is that whatever the pronominals *idam* or *tad*, grammatically assigned the name *sarvanāman*,\(^{39}\) can refer to is called a substance (*dravya*).\(^{40}\)

3 Now let us turn to PSV on PS V.3. I will propose the following reading of the text.

[O] PSV on PS V.3: (a) *sambandhanaṃ hi sambandhāḥ / 〈rāgādivat / (b) so ’nyena yujyate〉 / (c) tasmāt sambandhidharmena sambandho vācyat iti kṛtvāsaṅkitam / (d) svadharmaṇa tu nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabda iti nāsti / (e) ato naiśāya jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapadyate //

(a) Indeed, the word *sambandha* is a word derived in the sense of an action in the abstract, such as the word *rāga* “coloring” and the like, meaning “relating, relation.”

(b) The [relation as denoted by the word *sambandha*, forming one relatum], is connected with the other [relatum].

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\(^{38}\) Iyer 1971: 123: “That in reference to which a pronoun can be used is substance, presented as something to be differentiated.”

\(^{39}\) A 1.1.27 *sarvādīni sarvanāmanāni* // See PWT 53.

\(^{40}\) This concept of a substance (*dravya*) forms a pair with that of a quality (*guna*), which Bhartṛhari defines as follows: VP 3.5.1: \[samsargi bhedakam yad yat savyāpāram pratyayate / gunatvam paratanatratvāt tasya sāstra udāyṛtam // (“Whatever is related [to a certain thing] and differentiates the thing [from others] is regarded as *guna* when it activates the function [of differentiating], because it is something dependent. This is what has been illustrated in grammar”); Iyer 1971: 126: “Whatever rests on something else (*samsargi*) differentiates it (*bhedaṅka*), and is understood in that function (*savyāpāra*), is, being dependent, called ‘quality’ in the *sāstra*.” A quality is defined as something dependent (*paratantra*), from which a substance related to the quality must be something independent.
(c) Therefore, assuming that a relation as characterized by the property of a relatum can be denoted [by the word sambandha], the proponent has a suspicion that a generic term denotes a relation.

(d) However, considering there is no nominal which denotes a relation as characterized by its own property, such a suspicion does not arise.

(e) Accordingly, it is absolutely improper to say that the relation is to be denoted by a generic term.

On the basis of this text of the Vṛtti and its interpretation, I will also propose the following reading of the third kārikā.

[P] PS V.3: sambandhaś cātra sambandhidharmaṇa vācya ucyate / tathā hi bhāva ity ukto bhāvaś cānyena yujyate //

The question arises: what does the word atra “here” in pāda a refer to? Consider the immediately preceding passage.

(Q) PSV on PS V.2 (Pind 2015: I 3–4): (a) tathā hi 〈sad dravyam, san guṇah, sat karmeti bhedārthair dravyādiśabdaḥ〉 sāmānādhikaranyam na sāt. tac ca drṣṭam.

(b) na hi sattā 〈tadyogo vā〉 dravyaṃ guṇo vā bhavati, kim tarhi, dravyasya guṇasya vā.

(c) āha ca:

vibhaktibheda niyamād guṇagunyabhidhāyinoḥ
sāmānādhikaranyasya prasiddhir dravyaśabdayoh.

(a) To explain. [If a generic term denoted a relation or a generic property,] the generic term sat could not be co-referential with words like dravya “substance” which signify individuals in the utterances sad dravyam “A substance is existent,” san guṇah “A quality is existent,” and sat karma “An action is existent;” but, in reality, this is observed.

(b) Indeed, the generic property being or the relation to it is not a substance or a quality. [Question] Then what? [Answer] They are something related to a substance or a quality.42

41 I have emended bhāvah kṛtvoktaḥ to bhāva ity ukto. Jambūvijayajī reconstructs this portion as bhāvikrt-tyocayate. NC 607: sambandho ‘py atra sambandhidharmaṇa vācyaḥ 〈bhidhiyate / tathā bhāvikrttyocayate bhāvo ‘py ananya yujyate / Pind reports: Ms 195a5: bhāvah kṛtvokta iti (Pind 2015: I 4, n. 14); Ms B 195a5: bhāva ity abhiprayenoktaḥ (Pind 2015: II 19, n. 42). It is hard to justify bhāvah kṛtvoktaḥ grammatically. To be sure, in view of the pratīka given by Jinendrabuddhi, we can assume bhāvikṛtyoktaḥ “[the relation is] said to be [a significand of the generic term] after treating it as bhāva.” But, in this case, we have a vipulā “irregular”–anuṣṭubh. With bhāva ity ukto, on the other hand, we have a pathyā “regular”–anuṣṭubh (5th, 6th, 7th syllables of pāda c: short, long, long). I gratefully acknowledge helpful discussions with Dr. Yūto Kawamura on this point.

42 Pind 2015: II 14–16: “That is (tathā hi), there would be no co-reference (sāmānādhikaranyam na sāt) with words like ‘substance’ (*dravyādiśabdaḥ) whose referents are particular [general properties]
(c) Thus he [i.e., Bhartṛhari] says:

“The items that denote respectively something principal (guṇin) and something subsidiary (guṇa) take different nominal vibhaktis because of a restriction (niyama) [such that a sixth-triplet ending occurs only after an item whose significand serves as something subsidiary]. Two words, each of which denotes a substance, are established to be co-referential with each other, so that the principal-subsidiary relation is not known from an utterance consisting of the two words.”

Note the statement “They are something related to a substance or a quality” (dravyasya guṇasya vā) [Q(b)]. What is meant by this statement is that when the term sat denotes the generic property being or a relation, it becomes a sambandhiśabda because a generic property implies its bearer (jātimat) and because a relation implies its relatum. This is how one has to have the utterance *sad dravyasya which is paraphrased as sattā dravyasya or sambandhah (yogah) dravyasya.

It is important to note that Dignāga quotes VP 3.14.8. In rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ “the king’s servant,” the significand of the nominal base rājan “king” is a qualifier (viśeṣana) with respect to the significand of the nominal base puruṣa: what is a qualifier is subsidiary to what is a qualificand (viśeṣya). In the utterance sambandhah dravyasya “the relation of the substance” the relation behaves like a substance and serves as a qualificand with respect to the substance, just as the quality white does in the utterance paṭasya śuklah “the white of the cloth.”

(*bhedārthaiḥ), like, for instance, ‘existent substance’ (*sad dravyam), ‘existent quality’ (*san guṇah), and ‘existent action’ (*sat karma); but this is observed (tac ca drṣṭam). For existence (sattā) or its inherence relation (tadyogah) is neither a substance (dravyam) nor a quality (guṇah), but is rather (kiṃ tarhi) of a substance (dravyasya) or of a quality (guṇasya).”

Here the term vibhakti signifies a nominal ending (sup: A 1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca).

Of this restriction Bhartṛhari says the following. VP 3.7.157: dviṣṭho ‘py asau parārthatvād guṇeṣu vyatiricyate / tatrābhidhīyamānaḥ san pradhāne ‘py *upayujyate /* (“Even if the relation resides in two entities (dviṣṭha), it becomes something additional in entities that are subsidiary because of being intended for others. The relation which resides in the subsidiary entity, when it is denoted [by a sixth-triplet ending], is, as something residing in the principal entity also, of use to the latter.”) Iyer: upabhyujyate. I have followed Rau’s reading. Iyer 1971: 237: “Even though it (the śeṣa relation) rests on both it brings about a distinction in what are secondary because of their being subordinate to something else. Being expressed there (that is, in what are secondary), it touches what is primary also.”

VP 3.14.8. Iyer 1974: 125: “The two words expressive of the secondary and the primary have necessarily different case-endings. Where they have the same case-endings, both express substance;” Pind 2015: II 16–17: “It is, moreover, explained that (dīha ca) [a word] denoting a quality and one denoting the bearer of that quality (guṇagunayabhidhāyinoḥ) have different case affixes (vibhaktibhedah) because of a restrictive rule. However, for two words that denote a substance (dravyaśabdāyah) co-reference is acknowledged (sāmānādhiśambhāvanā prasiddhiḥ).” Iyer takes the terms guṇa and guṇin respectively as meaning “the secondary” and “the primary,” which I think is suited to the given context. Prakāśa on VP 3.14.8 (154.1–8): paṭasya śukla iti dravyagunābhidhāyipadaprayoge sābdo guṇapradhānabhāvah / ... víraḥ purusaḥ iṣyādu tu sāmānādhiśambhane visaye dvāv api dravyāśabdābdu svaṃsiśham svārtham ācaksate / tathā ca prathamaiva / sāmārthyanibandhanas tu guṇapradhānabhāvā ukto viśeṣyam syād anirññātām iṣyādu / evaṃ ca saty api guṇapradhānabhāve śabdāśabdāvarttvāro viśeṣaḥ sāmānādhiśambhāvenābhavā // On the relation of the subsidiary and the principal between word meanings, see Ogawa 2017.
Thus in the given context the word *atra* refers to the utterance *sad dravyasya* that is equivalent to *sambandhaḥ dravyasya*. On this assumption, therefore, we can interpret PS V.3 as follows:

In addition (*ca*), it is said (*ucyate*) that, in this utterance [*sad dravyasya* as paraphrased by *sambandhah* (*yogah*) *dravyasya* (*atra*)], a relation as characterized by the property of a relatum (*sambandhidharmeṇa sambandhaḥ*) is to be denoted (*vācyā*) [by the generic term]. That is to say (*tathā hi*), a relation, on the assumption that it is *bhāva* [i.e., what is denoted by an action noun such as *sambandaḥ*],

is said [to be something to be denoted by a generic term] (*bhāva ity uktah*); but (*ca*), [a relation as] *bhāva* [i.e., a relation as denoted by such an action noun, forming one relatum,] is connected (*yuṣyate*) with the other [relatum] (*anyena*).

What is crucial for understanding the present *kārikā* is that a generic term, insofar as it is a nominal (*nāman*), cannot denote a relation qua relation and that a relation which is denoted by a nominal cannot claim to be a relation *per se*.

### 4 Conclusion

A relation is posited as a word meaning through invention in accordance with some tradition. For Dignāga, who accepts the *apoddhāra* theory, a relation, which is a conceptual construct, is posited as the meaning of a nominal such as *sambandha* on the one hand and as a meaning of a sixth-triplet ending on the other. As is clear from [O], he accepts that a relation is a meaning of the sixth-triplet ending. In the everyday world one not only uses the sixth-triplet ending to convey a relation but also speaks of a relation by using the nominal. He is aware that one has expressions such as *aṅgulyoḥ saṃyogaḥ* and *saṃyogasaṃyoginoḥ samavāyaḥ* as well as those such as *rājñaḥ puruṣah*. According to Dignāga, however, the same observation of everyday usage reveals that the nominal cannot denote a relation qua relation. Thus a generic term, being a nominal, has no possibility of denoting the relation *per se*. We must pay deep attention to the fact that the basis for his arguments about a relation is everyday speech, just as it is the basis for his arguments for positing *anyāpoha* as the word meaning. It is no accident that he enters into the arguments about relations by grammatically analyzing the term *sambandha*, which is commonly used in everyday speech. Dignāga knows that grammar is grounded on everyday speech.

### References and abbreviations


Ogawa forthcoming H. Ogawa, On a bias for doxographical accounts in later commentaries on the Vākyapadiya of Bhartrhari: With special reference to pratibhā. (Forthcoming.)

Paddhati Vṛṣabhadeva’s Paddhati: See VP (c).


Pradīpa Kaiyaṭa’s Pradīpa: See MBh (a).

Prakāśa Helārāja’s Prakāśa: See VP (b) and VP (d).

PS Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya: See Pind 2015.

PST Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā: See Pind 2009.

PSV Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti: See Pind 2009.


Ṭīkā  Punyarāja’s Ṭīkā. See VP (e).[References are to pages and lines.]


Vṛtti  Vākyapadīya Vṛtti. See VP (c) and VP (e). [References to kārikās, pages, and lines.]
Communication between a Speaker and a Listener as the Seeing of a Double Moon — In Light of the Apoha Theory of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla

by

Kensho Okada

Introduction

We experience the practical use of words in our everyday activities 1) when a person understands/grasps an object through a word, and 2) when one person tells another something. The latter case is a person-to-person interaction in which a speaker intends to make a listener understand something by speaking word(s), while the listener infers the speaker’s intention by hearing and interpreting them. Communication is said to be established between the speaker and listener only when they are both present. People are, however, quite distinct from one another. Hence, even if the speaker and listener are present in the same time and space, they perceive altogether different things/images respectively. How can they communicate with each other under such circumstances? Also, what is the way in which they engage in conversation with one another?

Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788) and Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795) present an explanation of this issue in the Śabdārthaparīkṣā chapter of their Tattvasaṃgraha (TS) and its pañjikā (TSP). This paper aims to examine their view to clarify how they answer the question at hand.

As is well known, Śāntarakṣita offers a threefold classification of the theory of the “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha):

1. Nominally bound negation/Implicative negation (paryudāsa)
   a) Exclusion having cognition as its essence (buddhyātmāpoha)
   b) Exclusion having a referent as its essence (arthātmāpoha)

2. Verbally bound negation/Non-affirmative negation (prasajyapratiṣedha)¹

Of these three exclusions, two of the paryudāsa variety and one prasajyapratiṣedha, Śāntarakṣita asserts that the exclusion having cognition as its essence (= reflection, pratibimba) is the principal referent denoted by a word, and that the other two are understood by implication. In this way, when reflection is admitted to be the principal referent, the aforementioned question regarding communication arises, for reflections manifest entirely differently in the cognition of individuals. How do Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla resolve this issue?

¹ Editor’s note: This contribution contains changes that the author has left to the editor’s discretion.

Cf. TS 1003, 1010, and 1014cd.

1. Impossibility of verbal convention-setting

First, let us examine Śāntarakṣita’s statement, which is the origin of the question we seek to answer. In TS 870, he asserts that the 5 categories of particulars, genus, connection to genus, particulars qualified by genus, and the form of cognition are, ultimately, not suitable as the referent denoted by a word.² To begin with, arguing over particulars Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla state the following:

\[
\text{tatra svala\kṣaṇam tāvan na śabdaiḥ pratipādyate} / \notag \\
\text{saṃketa vavahārāiptakālāvyāptiviyogatā} / \text{TS 871} //
\]

Of these, first of all, particulars cannot be understood by words. Because [particulars are] devoid of the pervasion of the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity, [convention cannot be set with regard to particulars].³ (871)⁴

TSP 341, 14–17 ad TS 871:

\[
etad uktaṃ bhavati – samayo hi vyavahārārtham kriyate, na vyasanitayā / 
tenā yasyaiva saṃketa vavahārāiptakālāvyāptatvam asti, tatraiva samayo vyavahārīṇāṁ yuktā, nānayatra / na ca svala\kṣaṇasya saṃketa vavahārāiptakālāvyāptatvam asti / tasmān na tatra samaya iti /
\]

[By this,] the [following] is said: Indeed, verbal convention is made for [use at the time of] verbal activity,⁵ not through [mere] desire for [it]. Therefore, it is suitable to [set] verbal convention only with regard to that which pervades the time pervaded by verbal convention and verbal activity for [people] living daily [with use of language], not on anything else. And particulars do not pervade the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity. Therefore, verbal convention [can]not be [set] with regard to them [i.e., particulars].

Here, from the viewpoint of verbal convention (saṃketa) and verbal activity (vyavahāra), Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla examine whether particulars are suitable to be the referent denoted by a word and indicate that particulars cannot be the target of verbal convention. In the following verses, Śāntarakṣita asserts that (1) convention-setting with regard to particulars is useless for verbal activity⁶ and that (2) it is impossible to make verbal

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² Cf. TS 870: yatāḥ svala\kṣaṇam jātī tadyoyo jātīmāṁ tathā / buddhyākāro na śabdārthe ghaṭām aṅca tattvataḥ, McAllister 2011: 181–182.
³ Cf. TSP 341,13–14 ad TS 871: na tatra svala\kṣaṇe samaya iti śeṣāḥ /
⁴ Cf. PV I 92: śabdāḥ saṃketa tātā prāhur vyavahārāya sa smṛtaḥ / tadā svala\kṣaṇam nāsti saṃketa tena tatra na // “Words express something upon which verbal convention has been agreed and it [i.e., verbal convention] is recalled for the purpose of verbal activity. At the time [of verbal activity] the particular [with regard to which verbal convention is set] no longer exists. Therefore, verbal convention is not set with regard to the particular.”
⁵ According to Śākyabuddhi’s commentary, Dharmaśīla asserts that the purposes of verbal convention are 1) the understanding of form of cognition and 2) the apprehension of particulars. Cf. PVṬ D127a7–b5/ P15a3–b ad PV I 110d and PVSV 57,15–19.
⁶ Cf. TS 873: tasmat saṃketa rṣito 'rtho vyavahāre na drṣyate / na cāgṛhitasaṃketa gamyate 'nya (gamyate 'nya G; bodhyetā)nyā B) iva dhvaneḥ // “Therefore, the thing perceived [at the time of]
convention in regard to particulars.\(^7\) In both cases, on the grounds that particulars cannot be something on which verbal convention is established, Śāntarakṣita criticizes the view that particulars are the referent denoted by a word. In the same way, genus, connection to genus, particulars qualified by genus,\(^8\) and the form of cognition are not accepted as the word-referent due to the impossibility of convention-setting.\(^9\)

2. Opponent’s criticism

In the final part of the Śabdārthaparīkṣā chapter of TS/TSP, the impossibility of setting verbal convention and the uselessness of it are discussed once again.\(^10\)

As previously mentioned, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla admit that the principal referent denoted by a word is the reflection manifesting in cognition. Therefore, for them, the very reflection is the referent which sets with regard to verbal convention. Criticizing their view, an opponent indicates that the impossibility of making [verbal convention], [the setting of verbal convention] is impossible, [Śāntarakṣita] states ‘aśakyam’ and so on.\(^7\)

\(^7\) Cf. TSP 344,1–3 ad TS 875–876: *evaṁ tāvat svalakṣaṇe vyavahārānupapatteḥ samayavaivyarthaprasangān na samayah sambhavatīti pratipāditam / sāmpratam aśakyakriyāvād eva na sambhavatīti pratipādayann āha – aśakyam ityādī / “In this way, because verbal action toward particulars is impossible, it would follow that verbal convention is useless, [Therefore, the setting of] verbal convention with regard to particulars is impossible. This is, firstly, understood. Next, in order to explain that, because it is impossible to make [verbal convention], [the setting of verbal convention] is impossible, [Śāntarakṣita] states ‘aśakyam’ and so on.”

\(^8\) Cf. TS 882: *jātisambandhayoh pūrvam vyāsataḥ pratiṣedhanāt / nānantarāḥ prakalpyante śabdārthās trividhāḥ pare / “Because genus and connection have been already rejected in detail before, the other three [which are enumerated] immediately after [particulars] are not supposed to be the referent of a word.” TSP 348,7–8 ad TS 882: *evaṁ tāvat svalakṣaṇe samayāsambhavam pratipādyā jātyādiṣu trisu samayāsambhavam pratipādayann āha – jātisambandhayor ityādī / “In this way, to begin with, the impossibility of [setting] verbal convention with regard to particulars is explained. After this, in order to explain the impossibility of [setting] verbal convention with regard to three things – that is, genus and so on on [Śāntarakṣita] states ‘jātisambandhayor’ and so on.”

\(^9\) Cf. TS 884: *buddhyākāro hi tādātmyena buddhāv evāvasthita iti nāśau tadbuddhisvarūpavat pratipādayam arthaṃ buddhyantarāṃ vānugacchati / tataḥ ca samketavyavahārāhārākālāvāpakātvāt svalaṃśaṇavan na tatrāpi samayah sambhavati / “… Therefore, [the setting of] verbal convention with regard to it [i.e., form of cognition] is also impossible, because it does not pervade the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity, just as particulars.”

\(^10\) Cf. TS 1206ab: *samketāsambhavo hy atra bhedādau sādhitah purā / “Indeed, the impossibility of [the setting of] verbal convention with regard to particulars and so on has already been proved before.” TSP 446,8–10 ad TS 1206ab: *aśakyasamayatvād ananyabhāktvāc ceti pūrvam svalaṃśaṇādau samketāsambhavasya samketaśaṁbhalpalāsyas ca prasādhitāvāt / “It is because the impossibility of [setting] verbal convention and the uselessness of it with regard to particulars and so on have already been proved in such ways as ‘because [the setting of] verbal convention is impossible’ and ‘because of having no connection with the others.’”
of it are also applied to the reflection that they accept as the object of convention. The opponent says the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
nanu \text{cāpohapakṣe } & \text{‘pi katham samketasambhavah }/ \\
sāphalyam ca katham tasya na dvayoḥ sa hi siddhyati & // TS 1207 // \\
vaktṛśrotor na hi jīnānaḥ vedyate tat parasparam & / \\
\text{sāmkete na ca tad drṣṭaṁ vyavahāre samīkṣyate } & // TS 1208 // \\
\end{align*}
\]

[Objection:] Even in the apoha theory, (1) how can convention[-setting] be possible? (2) How can it be useful, either? (1) For it [i.e., the apoha as reflection] cannot be established between two [persons, i.e.,] a speaker and listener [in the same way]. It is because [they can] not mutually cognize [one another's] cognition. (2) And, that [reflection] which was perceived at the time of [setting the] verbal convention is not seen [any longer] at the time of verbal activity.

Here, adopting the same method as Śāntarakṣita, the opponent indicates that it can be neither possible nor useful to set verbal convention with regard to a reflection.

As far as the impossibility of the setting of verbal convention with regard to a reflection is concerned, according to the opponent, the speaker never cognizes the reflection manifesting in the listener’s cognition, nor does the listener cognize the reflection manifesting in the speaker’s cognition. Therefore, it cannot be established that their reflections are one and the same. This is the reason for the impossibility of the setting of verbal convention with regard to such reflections.

Regarding the uselessness of verbal convention-setting, the opponent asserts that, because the reflection perceived at the time of verbal convention and the one perceived at the time of verbal activity are totally different, it follows that setting verbal convention with regard to a reflection is not useful for ordinary verbal usage.

11 With regard to the former question, Kamalaśīla explains as follows:

TSP 447,1–7 ad TS 1208’ab:

\[
\begin{align*}
kasmād ity āha – & \text{na hi jīnānam ityādi }/ \text{pratyātmasaṃvedaniyam evārvāgda-} \\
ršanānāṁ jīnānam & / \text{na hy anyadyajnānam aparo } ‘\text{paradārśanaḥ samvedaya-} \\
te / \text{jīnānāv avyatiriktaś ca paramārthataḥ pratibimbātmakalakṣanāpohaḥ } / \\
\end{align*}
\]

Commenting on the opponent’s view, Kamalaśīla explains the uselessness of the setting convention with regard to reflections as follows: Cf. TSP 447,7–11 ad TS 1208ced: ānarthhakāyam ca pratipādayam āha – samkete na ceyādi / yat samketakāle pratibimbakam anubhūtam śrotā vaktrā va, na tad vyavahārakāle ’nubhūyate, tasya kṣanākṣayitvena ciraniruddhatvāt / yac ca vyavahārakāle ’nubhūyate na tat samketakāle drṣṭām, anyasyaiva tādānīm anubhūyamānatvāt / na cānyatra samketākāle anyatra vyavahārō yuktāḥ, atiprasaṅgād inī / “In addition, in order to explain the uselessness [of setting convention with regard to reflection, the opponent] states ‘samkete na ca’ and so on. Some reflection has been experienced by a listener or by a speaker at the time of the verbal convention. [However, ] that [reflection] cannot be experienced at the time of verbal activity. This is because that [reflection], being momentary, has ceased to existence long before [the time of the verbal activity]. Moreover, that which is experienced at the time of the verbal activity cannot be that which has been perceived at the time of verbal convention. This is because a very different [reflection] is experienced at that time (= at the time of verbal activity). And, it is untenable that verbal activity regarding Y is [established] on the basis of verbal convention [set with regard to] X. This is because [otherwise] an absurd consequence would follow.”
Why? [Objection:] “[They can]not [cognize one another’s] cognition” and so on. Ordinary persons can only cognize something to be cognized by themselves, for, being an ordinary person, no one knows the cognition [represented in] another’s [mind]. Moreover, the exclusion, having a reflection as its own nature, is ultimately not different from the cognition. Therefore, [the following question arises:] With regard to what [object] can the convention be set [by a speaker]? In what [object] can the convention be comprehended [by a listener]? It is because the same object is not established as the target of verbal convention at all between the two persons—that is, the speaker and listener. Indeed, if nothing real is established, the speaker cannot make any convention; nor can the listener comprehend it. This is because [if such a thing were possible,] an absurd consequence would follow. Namely, the listener would comprehend the reflection of an object manifesting in his own cognition; but the speaker would be unable to cognize it. The listener cannot comprehend what the speaker cognizes. This is because [each] cognizes only his own manifestation.

Here, the argument encounters difficulty when a reflection is regarded as the object with regard to which verbal convention is set. Reflections are different for each individual. An ordinary person can only cognize the reflection manifesting in his own cognition. It is impossible for a reflection to move from one person’s cognition to another’s. Therefore, in reality, one can neither tell the content of his cognition to another, nor perceive that of another’s cognition. As a result, it may follow that there is not any object of verbal convention that a speaker and listener share at the time of verbal convention, and thus, the verbal convention itself cannot be established.

3. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s reply

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla sought to address this issue. How do they explain the manner of establishing verbal convention? Śāntarakṣita says the following:

svasya svasyābhāsasya vedane ’pi sa vartate /
bāhyārthādhyavasāyo14 yo15 dvayor api samo yataḥ // 1209 //
timirophatākṣo hi yathā prāha śaśivayam /

---

12 īśā, nāpi B; īśāno ‘pi G.
13 śrotā em. (cf. nyan pa pos D, P); śrotā G, B.
14 “ādhyavasāyo em. (cf. zhen pa D, P; bāhyārthādhyavasāyas tulya eva TSP 477,18); “ādhyavasāye G, B.
15 yo em.; yad G, B; yad om. D, P.
It is because, although [a speaker and listener] cognize their respective manifestations, they both equally determine [their respective manifestations] to be an external object. Just as one [person] whose eyes are affected by eye disease says to [another person] like himself “there is a double moon,” all verbal activities are thought to be the same. That [i.e., reflection] is accepted as being such a pervader, [i.e., being that which pervades the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity,] on the basis of [persons] determining [so]. In actuality, these notions brought about by word(s) are [nothing more than] something manifesting erroneously.

Commenting on TS 1209, Kamalaśīla states the following:

TSP 447,12–448,3 ad TS 1209:

Indeed, ultimately, the form of cognition is also not admitted to be the referent denoted by words, so that the impossibility of [setting] convention with regard to it [i.e., the form of cognition] would be criticized. It is because all verbal activities are admitted to be something erroneous, just as in the case of two persons affected by eye disease [both] seeing double moons in accordance with their respective manifestations. Merely by awakening of the latent disposition which [is deposited] through objectless discourse, only conceptual [cognitions], by which [a manifestation] is determined as being an object, are produced by words. [Hence,] on the grounds that [conceptual cognition is] produced
That reflection [of conceptual cognition] is said to be the referent denoted by words; not on the grounds that [the reflection is, in reality, the referent denoted by a word]. That being the case, although a speaker and listener ultimately only cognize their respective manifestations, they still both equally determine [their respective manifestations] to be external objects, because [they] share the cause of the error, just as in the case of two persons affected by eye disease [both seeing a double moon]. Even so, the speaker thinks, “He [i.e., the listener] also understands the object that I understand.” So does the listener.18

[Question:] How can the speaker and the listener know that they are determining the same object?

[Reply:] Although they ultimately cannot know [it], such a verbal activity, which is nothing but erroneous, [is still established between them] in accordance with their respective manifestations, because [they] share the cause of the error, just as the case of the two persons affected by eye disease. It has already been explained. Therefore, it is quite possible that verbal convention is made by the force of [people] determining [their respective manifestations] to be the same.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla accept that, in reality, a speaker and listener cognize only their own respective manifestations. According to them, however, a speaker and listener determine their own manifestations as external things in the same way. This same determination is the reason for the establishment of verbal convention. That is to say, a convention is established on the basis of the thinking that “we perceive the same thing.” Based on this erroneous determination, two persons can communicate.

Moreover, there would appear to be no difference between the verbal activity of persons affected by eye disease and that of ordinary persons, given that all people cognize only their own respective manifestations. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla therefore assert that all verbal activity is erroneous.

4. Causal relation between word and intention

It is found that Kamalaśīla uses this example of “two persons affected by eye disease seeing a double moon in the same way” also in the Śābdavicāra section of the Pramāṇāntaraparīkṣā chapter and Śrutiparīkṣā chapter of the TSP. There, Śāntarakṣita denies that there is an invariable connection between a word and an external thing, and suggests that a causal relation is established between a word and speaker’s intention.19 While commenting on

18 Kamalaśīla has already stated the same thing in the following portion. Cf. TSP 358.9–12 ad TS 908: etad uktam bhavati – paramārthataḥ svapratibhāsānubhave ’pi vaktur evam adhyavasāyo bhavati – mayā ’smai bāhya evārthah pratipādayate i śrotur apy evam bhavati – mamāyam bāhyam eva pratipādayati ī / atas taimirikadvayadvicandradasanavad ayam sarvaḥ śābdo vyavahāra ī (cf. sgra las byung ba’i tha snyad ’di thams cad de lta bu yin no D, P) /

19 Cf. TS 1512 (Śābda): vacasāṃ pratibandho vā ko bāhya eva vā upajayati vā pratipādayatām tāni venaśāṃ syāt pramāṇatā (i.e., “How can be there any invariable connection between words and external things?” If
such statements by Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla gives explanations with use of the example of “two persons affected by eye disease.”

Here, let us consider the views of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as presented in the Śābdavicāra section of the TS/TSP. There, as mentioned above, rejecting an invariable connection between a word and an external thing, Śāntarakṣita explains the manner in which verbal cognition is meant to be included in the inference.

\[
vacabhṛyo nikhitabhṛyo \ 'pi vivakṣaiśānumīyate / \\
pratyakṣānupalambhābhṛyo taddhetuḥ sā hi niścitā // TS 1514 // \\
\]

From all words it follows that [speaker's] intention is inferred. For it [i.e., intention] is ascertained to be the cause of a word through perception and non-perception.

Here, Śāntarakṣita states that an invariable connection having causality as its character is established between a word and an intention, and suggests that a word is a valid cognition with regard to intention. In some cases, however, an intention and an uttered word are known to be different. That is to say, it is just as in the case of some speaker uttering the word “X” erroneously while intending to speak about “X.” In this case, it is assumed that the fallacy lies not in the word but in the erroneous speaker. Furthermore, with respect to a word’s deviation from a particular intention, Kamalaśīla gives explanatory statements as follows:

\[
[v\text{invariable connection were to be admitted}], \text{words expressing them [i.e., external things,] would be valid cognition.} \text{TS 2618 (Śruta): } \text{sākṣāc chabdā na bāhyārthapratibandhavivekataḥ / gamayantīti ca proktam vivakṣāsūcakās tv amā / }"\text{It has already explained that words do not make [external things] known directly, because there is no invariable connection between external things [and words]. And, these [i.e., words,] are [nothing but] something indicating [the presence of the speaker’s] intention.” TSP 854,1–3 ad TS 2618: vivakṣām api na vācyatayā pratipādayanti, kim tarhi, liṅgatayā sūcayanti / ata eva sūcakā ity uktaṃ / tathā hi – sābdād uccaritād arthādhyavasāyī vikalpo jāyate, na vivakṣādhyavasāyī / “[Words] do not express [the speaker's] intention as something denoted [by words]. How then? [Words merely] indicate [the speaker’s intention] as a logical mark. Therefore, [words are] said to be something indicating. That is to say, [when] a word is uttered, there arises a conceptual cognition which judges an [external] thing, not [a conceptual cognition which] judges [the speaker’s intention.”}
\]

In his TS 2620, Śāntarakṣita asserts that only when a person has already cognized a causal relation, can he know a speaker’s intention through words. Against this, the opponent objects that verbal convention cannot be a means for knowing a particular intention of a speaker. In response, Kamalaśīla criticizes the opponent’s view with use of the example of “two persons affected by eye disease seeing a double moon.” Cf. TSP 854,12–22 ad TS 2620.

\[
\text{Objection: It is found that as for an erroneous person, his statement and intention are different. Therefore, it [i.e., his statement] cannot be made in accordance with intention. [Reply:] There is clearly a difference between words used by an erroneous person and those used by a non-erroneous person. [However,] clever men [definitely] discern [this difference] through context and so son. The fallacy lies not in the logical mark, but in the persons who do not notice the difference among them [i.e., these words] due to difference of their causes.”}
\]

20 In his TS 2620, Śāntarakṣita asserts that only when a person has already cognized a causal relation, can he know a speaker’s intention through words. Against this, the opponent objects that verbal convention cannot be a means for knowing a particular intention of a speaker. In response, Kamalaśīla criticizes the opponent’s view with use of the example of “two persons affected by eye disease seeing a double moon.” Cf. TSP 854,12–22 ad TS 2620.

21 Cf. TS 1515–1516: bhṛntasyānyavivakṣāyāṃ vākyāṃ ced anyad īkṣyate / yathāvivakṣam (yathāvivakṣam B; tathā vivakṣam G) apy etat tasmān (etat tasmān B; etattakṣāsāmanye ta?ismān G [sic]) naiva pravartate // bhṛntābhṛntapravuktānāṃ vailaṃkṛṣyāṃ parisphuṭam / vidagdhdā prakṛtādbhṛyo niścinvanti girām alam // vailaṃkṛṣyena hetūnāṃ viśeṣaṃ tāsū ye na tu / avagacchanti doso ‘yam teṣām liṅgasya nāsti tu // “[Objection:] It is found that as for an erroneous person, his statement and intention are different. Therefore, it [i.e., his statement] cannot be made in accordance with intention. [Reply:] There is clearly a difference between words used by an erroneous person and those used by a non-erroneous person. [However,] clever men [definitely] discern [this difference] through context and so son. The fallacy lies not in the logical mark, but in the persons who do not notice the difference among them [i.e., these words] due to difference of their causes.”
Furthermore, when all verbal activity is accepted to be erroneous due to dependence on [respective] manifestations of one’s own, just as two persons affected by eye disease see a double moon [in the same way], how can [a word/verbal cognition] be invalid on the basis of pointing out the deviation from a particular intention [of speaker]. For it is not accepted that [a word/verbal cognition has] ultimate validity with regard to a particular intention of speaker. The same thing is stated as follows: A word (/verbal cognition) is said to be an inference just when it is taken into consideration that a word makes manifest [an object] with dependence on verbal convention, not when with dependence on real truth.22

Here, from the standpoint that all verbal activity is erroneous, Kamalaśīla implicitly indicates that the validity of words/verbal knowledge is not ultimate but conventional. Thus, as long as the erroneousness of verbal knowledge is considered, it follows that the validity of a word/verbal knowledge depends only on verbal convention, and has nothing to do with real truth.

For example, when one taimirika (person affected by eye disease) says to another taimirika “there is a double moon in the sky” and the latter agrees with the former, it follows that based on this agreement, verbal convention is established between them. In this case, in reality, the so-called “double moon” does not exist, and the word “double moon” would be nonsense. However, to the two taimirika the word “double moon” is thought to be useful.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, when reflection is admitted to be the referent denoted by a word, a speaker and listener cannot share the same real object, because they only cognize different reflections manifesting in their respective cognitions. They, however, think/believe that they perceive the same thing by the force of determination. Based on this same determination, the setting of convention is established. Therefore, according to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, all verbal activity is erroneous, as it is the same as when two persons affected by eye disease both see a double moon.

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22 The source for this citation is uncertain.
Supplemental remarks

As discussed above, bearing in mind that a person cognizes only his own representation, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla suggest that all verbal activity is established in the same ways as two persons with eye disease equally see a double moon. Interestingly enough, similar views have been presented by Dharmakīrti in his Santānāntarasiddhi (SS) and by Vinītadeva in his Santānāntarasiddhiṭīkā (SST). Dharmakīrti and Vinītadeva state the following:

For your information, similar descriptions can also be found in Śubhagupta’s Anyāpohavicārakārikā (AVK) and Karnakagomin’s Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiḥ (PSVT), as far as treatises on apoha theory are concerned. Cf. Mikogami 1993. Cf. AVK D198a1–2: rang gi blo la snang ba ni // rig pa yin yang phyi rol dang // gcig par ’dzin pa’i nga rgyal skye // rab rib can du mthungs blo bzhin // “Although [persons] cognize their own [respective] manifestations, they [erroneously] think ‘We comprehend the same external thing,’ just as the cognitions of persons suffering from same eye disease.” This verse is quoted in Anekāntajayapatākā (AJP 338,6–7 svabuddhipratibhāsasya saṃvittāv api jāyate / bahi-rarhatagrahā mānas tulyatimabuddhivat //); PSVT 60,26–61,1: … pratipattā pratipattim anusṛtya ēte vyākā īti svaparavikalpeṣv ekapratibhāsān ādārśya vikalpavijñāne vyavasthitas tadvijñānāhetūn bhedena pratipadyetety uktim atidhetubhyyo bhede nityākī. “… [One who makes the setting of a verbal convention] applies a word to what is excluded from those which are not its causes with the following hope: The cognizer [for whom the verbal convention is made such as ‘tree’] would be able to understand that these are trees [when he hears the word ‘tree’] in accordance with his understanding of himself and others, although being dependent [solely on his own conceptual cognition], by differentiating the causes of this [concept from others].” PVSṬ 241,10–21 ad PVSV 60,27: nanu vyāvṛttasya vavalaṣaṇasya vyavahārakāle ’nugamo nāsti. naïpī vikalpapravitthasīnaḥ sāmānyākārasya svajñānabhinnatvād vikalpāntare ’nvayo ’stt. naïpī vaktrṣambhandhinas tasya śrōtūḥ śrōtrṣambhandho vā vaktūḥ pratīthi, anyacetodharatvēṇānāṁvṛtiḥvat, na cāpratipanne samam pratipādyparatipādakābyāṁ samketaḥ sambhavatīty atā āha — svaparetāyā. … etad uktam bhavati — yathāikas taitimrīkō dvicandram dvicāryaṇāyasyānākārapakṣito vavapadātāt, na na pravēśam. … [By this,] the following is said: When some person affected by eye disease sees a double moon and tells this to another person affected by eye disease, he describes only that which is perceived by himself, not that which is perceived by anyone else. This is because he cannot perceive what anyone else perceives. And he thinks ‘I explain it to him.’ Also, another person, understanding the form of the double moon that belongs to his own mind, thinks ‘I understand what he has explained to me.’ In the same way, although the forms of cognition, which are determined to be an external thing, are different between someone explaining [i.e., speaker] and someone to be explained [i.e., listener], conventions are made [on the forms of cognition] by the force of the determination of [these forms] being the same. And, it [i.e., the form of cognition] is cognized at the time of verbal activity, because the [form of cognition at the time of verbal activity is] determined to be the same [as that at the time of verbal convention].” (There is no corresponding description in Śākyabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikā.)
Kensho Okada

SS 65 48.5–10:

bdag dang gzhan la rang rang gi snang ba nyams su myong mod kyi / rab rib can gnyis kyis zla ba gnyis mthong ba bzhin du rnam par shes pa de lta bu’i rgyu’i bag chags skye ba’i rang bzhin gyi khyad par thog ma med pa’i dus las don gcig ’dzin par nges pa’i phyir ro //

[A representation is called a manifest action (vijñapti).] It is because although each person [i.e., a speaker and listener.]24 experiences his own representations, just as two persons with eye-disease perceive a double moon [in the same way], it is determined that the same thing is grasped by a special nature, which has as its nature the arising of the latent disposition [produced by] the cause of such cognition, from beginningless time.

SST 49,17–50,18 ad SS 65:

’di ltar smra ba po yang ’di snyam du bdag gis smras pa gang yin pa ’di nyan pa pos rtogs par ’gyur ro snyam du sms pa la / nyan pa po yang ’di snyam du ’dis smras pa gang yin pa de ni bdag gis rtogs so snyam du sms par ’gyur te / … … ’di skad du smra ba po dang nyan pa po dag rang rang gi snang ba nyams su myong mod kyi / ’on kyang de gnyis kyi bya ba dang tshig gi rnam pa can gyi shes pa rgyu gcig las ’byung ba gang dag yin pa de dag don gcig tu shes par nges pa’i phyir rnam par rig byed du tha snyad ’dogs par byed do / don gcig tu ’dzin par nges pa ni nram par shes pa de lta bu’i rgyu’i bag chags skye ba’i rang bzhin gyi khyad par thog ma med pa las byung ba’i phyir ro // ’dir dpe ni rab rib can gnyis kyis zla ba gnyis su mthong ba bzhin te / rab rib can gcig gis rab rib can gnyis la ltos zhes zla ba gzan zhig ston pa las des mthong ngo zhes smras pa na / de la ni ston pa po yang ’di snyam du bdag gis ’di la bstan to snyam du nga rgyal byed par ’gyur la nyan pa po yang ’di snyam du ’dis bdag la bstan to snyam du sms mod kyi / ’on kyang de gnyis ni rang rang gi snang ba so sor nyams su myong bar zad do //

That is to say, the speaker thinks “the listener will understand what I say.” The listener, in his turn, thinks “I have understood what he said.” … Although the speaker and the listener both experience their respective representations, cognitions having the form of action and speech appear in both from the same cause, and these [cognitions] determinately grasp the same thing. Therefore, it is called manifest action (vijñapti) metaphorically. Because there exists a special nature, which has as its nature the arising of the latent disposition [produced by] the cause of such cognition, from beginningless time, the same thing is determinately grasped. “Just as in the case that two persons see a double moon” is the example [demonstrating] this. If a person affected by eye disease (A) indicates another moon and says to another person affected by eye disease (B) “Look!” and he (B) says “I see [it],” then, the speaker thinks “I have indicated it to him,” and the listener thinks “he indicated it to me.” Even so, they both only cognize their respective representations.

24 Cf. SST 48,13–14: bdag dang gzhan zhes bya ba ni smra ba po dang nyan pa po’o //
References and abbreviations


**AVK** Anyāpohavicārakārikā (Śubhagupta): D4246, P5744.


**PV I** Pramāṇavārttika, chapter I (Dharmakīrti): See PVSV.


**PVṬ** Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Śākyabuddhi): D4220, P5718.


**SSṬ** Saṃtānāntarasiddhitīkā (Vinītadeva): See SS.

**TS** Tattvasaṃgraha (Śāntarakṣita): See TSP (G) and TSP (B). The verse-numbers follow TSP (B).

**TS (D)** Tattvasaṃgraha (Śāntarakṣita). Tibetan: D4266.

**TS (P)** Tattvasaṃgraha (Śāntarakṣita). Tibetan: P5764.

**TSP** Tattvasaṃgraḥapaṇḍitīkā (Kamalaśīla): See TSP (G) and TSP (B). Page- and line-numbers are given in accordance with TSP (B).


**TSP (D)** Tattvasaṃgraḥapaṇḍitīkā (Kamalaśīla). Tibetan: D4267.

**TSP (P)** Tattvasaṃgraḥapaṇḍitīkā (Kamalaśīla). Tibetan: P5765.
Introduction

In the maṅgalaśloka of the Pramāṇasamuccaya (=PS), Dignāga (ca. 480–540) describes the Buddha-Bhagavat by five epithets. Among these epithets, the term pramāṇabhūta is remarkable because this compound word includes the word pramāṇa (i.e., means of cognition; valid cognition) in its former part. The term is a key concept to explain the relationship between pramāṇa as knowledge and the Bhagavat as pramāṇa in the Buddhist Pramāṇa-school.\(^1\)

Tilmann Vetter showed that the term in Dignāga should be translated as “who is a pramāṇa,” by indicating that the translation “who has become a pramāṇa” based on the interpretation by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660) cannot be justified in Dignāga.\(^2\) However, even if pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga means “who is a pramāṇa,” the following question remains open: How can the Buddha as a person be called a pramāṇa, which is supposed to mean valid cognition?\(^3\)

In response to this question, D. Seyfort Ruegg, by investigating exhaustively the use of the term pramāṇabhūta and the compound words x-bhūta in Sanskrit literature, proposed to translate pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga as “who is like (i.e., similar to) a pramāṇa.”\(^4\) His

This paper is a revised English version of the Japanese one presented at the 63\(^{\text{th}}\) conference of the Japanese association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Tsurumi University, June 30–July 1, 2012. The proceedings of this conference have been already published (cf. Ono 2013). I would like here to express my gratitude to Prof. Hideyo Ogawa for many kind comments and suggestions on the previous Japanese paper. I am also grateful to Dr. Patrick McAllister, who kindly checked my draft and corrected my English.

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1 Cf. pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣine praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine / pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ // (PS maṅgalaśloka) Masaaki Hattori’s translation in Hattori 1968: 23 is as follows: “Saluting Him, who is the personification of the means of cognition, who seeks the benefit of [all] living beings, who is the teacher, sugata, the protector, I shall, for the purpose of establishing the means of valid cognition, compose the [Pramāṇa]-samuccaya, uniting here under one head my theories scattered [in many treatises].”

2 Cf. Vetter 1984: 14, note 6. Vetter has previously translated the word in the same way (cf. Vetter 1964: 32,17). Ernst Steinkellner agreed with Vetter’s view as follows: “Tilmann Vetter gives the reason for his translation of the term pramāṇabhūta from the maṅgala of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya as ‘who is a means of valid cognition’ (‘der Erkenntnismittel ist.’): the interpretation that the Buddha has become a means of valid cognition (as if the text read pramāṇībhūta) which does not figure at all in Dignāga’s own explanation of the verse and can, therefore, hardly be based on the term pramāṇabhūta, was added by Dharmakīrti, … Since the compound pramāṇabhūta does really not have a cvi-formation, … Vetter is certainly right in asking for an interpretation of bhūta as the equivalent of the copula serving the simple adjectivization of the first member” (cf. Steinkellner 1989: 180).


view was thereafter criticized by Eli Franco and Helmut Krasser. In my opinion, however, Ruegg’s interpretation is worth reconsidering. This paper aims to provide new materials for supporting Ruegg’s view and, furthermore, to show that his view is meaningful from the historical viewpoint of the Buddhist Pramāṇa-school by elucidating the change of the meaning of the word pramāṇabhūta from Dignāga, through Dharmakīrti, to Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810).

1. The meaning of pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga

1.1. Ruegg’s view

Ruegg pointed out that Patañjali (ca. 150 BCE) called “the teacher (ācārya)” pramāṇabhūta in his Mahābhāṣya (=MBh), and considered this the apparently earliest use of the word pramāṇabhūta in Sanskrit literature. Kaiyāṭa (11th c.), a later commentator on the MBh, analyzed this compound word as prāmāṇyaṃ prāptaḥ. According to Nārāyaṇa, a subcommentator on the MBh, this explanation serves to avert both interpretations of pramāṇabhūta as “pramāṇa-like” and as “has become a pramāṇa.” Thus, the established theory by commentators on the MBh seems to be that the word pramāṇabhūta means “being authority.”

On the other hand, grammarians explain in some cases that bhūta in the compound x-bhūta has a meaning of “like (i.e., similar).” According to Ruegg, Yāska (4th c. BCE)


6 Cf. MBh I 39,10f. ad Vārttika 1,1,1,7: pramāṇabhūta ācāryo darbhapavitrapānīḥ suçāv avakāśe prāṁuṣkha upaviśyā mahatā prayatntena sūtrāṇi pranayati sma (cf. Ruegg 1994a: 309; 1995: 820f.).


8 Nāgeśa (17th c.), a subcommentator to the MBh, tries to justify Kaiyāṭa’s interpretation of the word pramāṇabhūta as meaning prāmāṇyaṃ prāpta as follows: “If (the teacher) were supposed to have become what he was not previously (abhūtatadbhāva) since the verb bhū means ‘become,’ there should be the form pramāṇībhūta with cvi-suffix. On the other hand, …” (cf. MBhPrU 126,7ff.: nanu bhavater janmārthatvenābhūtaudbhāvapratītyā cvau sati pramāṇābhūta iti syāt, tadavivakṣāyáṃ tu pramāṇam ácāryah prakārāntarenā bhūta ity arthah syād atá áha – pramāṇam iti; Ruegg 1994a: 310,7ff.; note 31). Nārāyaṇa also tries to justify Kaiyāṭa’s interpretation as follows: “If the word bhūta means similarity (apamāṇārthatve) just as in the case of the word pīṭhṛtāḥ etc., it would follow that the trustworthiness of the teacher is not stated as primary. (On the other hand) if (the word pramāṇabhūta) means that the teacher has become what he was not previously (abhūtpabdurbhāvā), it would follow that there should be the cvi-suffix just like (in the expression) aṅkurībhūta etc. …” (cf. MBhPrN 232,26ff.: pīṭhṛtāḥ ityādvid vēdhāsvadasyopamāṇārthatve mukhyam pramāṇāṃ acāryasya noktam syat, aṅkurībhūta ityādvid abhūtāpdurbhāvāvavicē tadvad eva cviṃprasāṅgah, …, ato vyācāṣe – pramāṇam iti; Ruegg 1994a: 310,23ff.).

9 Cf. Ruegg 1995: 820.27f. Ruegg also pointed out the uses of the word pramāṇabhūta in the Mahāyāna-sūrālāṃkārabhāṣya (cf. Ruegg 1994a: 306f.; 1995: 821f.). Also in this case, the word pramāṇabhūta can be understood as “being authority” by interpreting bhūta as the equivalent of the copula. Further, Ruegg pointed out the use of the word in the Lalitavistara. Regarding this use, however, Hakamaya and Silk indicated that the word pramāṇabhūta extant in the Sanskrit text may have been added in a later period, based on a comparison to the Chinese translation (cf. Hakamaya 2000: (14); Silk 2002: 113f.).
gives such an explanation in his Nirukta, and Bhartṛhari (5th c.) explains in his commentary on the MBh that \textit{bhūta} in the expression \textit{sāmānyabhūta} has the meaning of “like.”\textsuperscript{10} Thus, Ruegg paid attention to the fact that the use of the expression \textit{x-bhūta} in the meaning “like” was already established before Dignāga.\textsuperscript{11} He further asserted that “the use of \textit{bhūta} in the meaning ‘like’ … is found even in some of the post-Dharmakīrti commentaries.”\textsuperscript{12}

By interpreting \textit{bhūta} in \textit{pramāṇabhūta} as meaning “like,” Ruegg suggested that the whole compound \textit{pramāṇabhūta} in Dignāga may be translated as “who is like a \textit{pramāṇa}.” He summed up the issue as follows: “If understood in this way, there will be no conflict with Dignāga’s own doctrine that only \textit{pratyakṣa} and \textit{anumāna} are \textit{pramāṇas.”}\textsuperscript{13}

\subsection*{1.2. Krasser’s criticism}

Krasser criticized this view of Ruegg. At first, he classified scholars’ interpretation of the word \textit{pramāṇabhūta} in Dignāga into three types: “1) \textit{pramāṇa} should be understood either 1A) in an extended sense, as authority, or 1B) metaphorically, or 2) \textit{bhūta} should be understood in the sense of a comparison.”\textsuperscript{14} Among these, the interpretation 2) is attributed to Ruegg, and Krasser’s own position seems to be identical with 1B).

By examining new Sanskrit material of Jinendrabuddhi’s (8th c.) \textit{Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā} (=PSṬ), Krasser indicated that the PSṬ, in contrast to Ruegg’s assertion, does not explain that \textit{bhūta} in \textit{pramāṇabhūta} means “like,” but rather that the former part, i.e., \textit{pramāṇa}, implies the meaning of “like.”\textsuperscript{15} Namely, Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation \textit{bhagavān pramāṇam iva pramāṇam} (the Bhagavat is valid cognition [inasmuch as he is] like a valid cognition) shows the interpretation that the mere expression \textit{bhagavān pramāṇam} implies the meaning \textit{bhagavān pramāṇam iva}.\textsuperscript{16} Krasser concluded: According to Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation, “the word \textit{pramāṇa} is applied to the Buddha not in an extended sense but metaphorically and it does not require any qualification in order to be understood as metaphor …, and it is also clear that his explanation does not support the interpretation of \textit{bhūta} as ‘like’.”\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{11} Cf. Ruegg 1995: 821,5f.
\textsuperscript{12} Cf. Ruegg 1994a: 311ff.; 1995: 820ff. This argument was thereafter criticized by Krasser. See below.
\textsuperscript{13} Cf. Ruegg 1995: 315; 1995: 822,9ff. This argument was thereafter criticized by Krasser. See below.
\textsuperscript{14} Cf. Krasser 2001: 173,17ff. Here, the subdivisions of the type 1) in Krasser’s paper are called 1A) and 1B) respectively, for convenience of explanation.
\textsuperscript{16} Cf. Krasser 2001: 179; PVṬ(P) 86b6; (D)71b7: \textit{tshad ma’i} sgra dpe dpa’ng du ’das pa can yin no zhes bya ba’i don to l//
\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Krasser 2001: 176,25–177,5. Further, Krasser pointed out that the Tibetan expression \textit{tshad ma dang ‘dra} bas in the PVP by Devendrabuddhi (ca. 630–690) is the Tibetan equivalent to the Sanskrit \textit{pramāṇam iva}, and that Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation \textit{bhagavān pramāṇam iva pramāṇam} is derived from Devendrabuddhi (cf. Krasser 2001: 177,6ff.; PVṬ(P)2a1ff.; (D)1b2f. ad PV II 1a: \textit{tshad mar gyur pa} zhes bya ba ni tshad mar ’khrungs pa’o l/ tshad ma dang ’dra bas na tshad ma ste bcom ldan ’das so l/).
Thus, Krasser elucidated that Ruegg’s assertion can be substantiated neither in the PSṬ nor the Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (=PVP). Nevertheless, on the basis of this fact, one cannot necessarily conclude that the expression pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga does not mean “pramāṇa-like.” Krasser does not seem to intend to deny entirely Ruegg’s interpretation of the word pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga as meaning “pramāṇa-like.”

1.3. New materials supporting the interpretation of pramāṇabhūta as “pramāṇa-like”

In my opinion, it is not so relevant which part of the compound word pramāṇabhūta has the meaning of “like.” What is important for interpreting Dignāga’s thought is, rather, the difference between the view 1A) of Krasser’s classification that the word should be translated as “being authority” by understanding the word pramāṇa as having a extended sense and bhūta as the equivalent of the copula, and the view 1B) or 2) that the compound pramāṇabhūta as a whole means “pramāṇa-like,” independently of which part has the meaning of “like.” Both materials which Ruegg and Krasser showed seem to support the latter view.

1.3.1. The interpretation mentioned by Jayanta and Yamāri

The interpretation of the compound pramāṇabhūta as “pramāṇa-like” is indeed attested in the literature of the later Buddhist Pramāṇa-school. Namely, there are at least two such passages in the commentaries by Jayanta (10th c.) and Yamāri (ca. 1000–1060) on Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (=PVA).

First, Yamāri, in his remark on PVA’s first maṅgalaśloka, presents two different interpretations of pramāṇabhūta. The following interpretation is the second one of them:

Yamāri [Phe] (D)190b2f.; (P)228a5f.: yang na tshad ma dang 'dra bas (D: tshad ma dang 'dra bas lacking in P) tshad mar gyur pa ste / ci litar mgon sum la sogs pa ma rtogs pa'i don bsal bar byed pa nyid kyis tshad ma yin pa de bzhin du bcom ldan 'das kyang 'phyags pa'i bden pa bzhī la sogs pa ma rtogs pa'i don *gsal bar byed pa'i (D: *gsal ba'i P) phyir tshad ma yin no /; Ms 11b2 (cf. Li, Chu and Franco 2017: 82).

18 Krasser mentioned that a remark of Vibhūticandra’s suggests that there are those who interpret bhūta as “like.” For, Vibhūticandra, after having explained the interpretation of the word bhūta according to Dharmakīrti by paraphrasing Jinendrabuddhi’s statement, states the following: “(Dharmakīrti) will indicate that the (word bhūta) does not have the meaning (‘like’) because the meaning ‘like’ is understood by implication” (cf. Vibhūti 519.3: ivārthas tu sāmarthyagata iti na tadārahat tad etad iti vatsyate; Krasser 2001: note 16).

19 Whether such interpretation is grammatical or not is another question (cf. Franco 1997: 16f., note 3: “On the other hand, even if -bhūta did not mean ‘similar,’ once authoritative treatises state that it does, it acquires this meaning for the readers who are acquainted with these treatises”).

20 The Sanskrit manuscript of the first chapter of Yamāri’s commentary has been discovered recently, and a series of diplomatic editions of its beginning portion (folios 3a1-20a5) has been published by Xuezhu Li, Junjie Chu and Eli Franco (cf. Li and Chu 2016; Li, Chu and Franco 2017; Li, Chu and Franco 2018) after this paper was written. Since all three portions of Yamāri’s commentary that this paper discusses are included in the mentioned diplomatic editions, I indicate the location in the respective edition after quoting the text of the Tibetan translation. Although my assumptions about the Sanskrit corresponding
[= Or, (the Bhagavat is) **pramāṇabhūta**, inasmuch as he is like pramāṇa (*atha vā pramāṇam iva pramāṇabhūtah*).\(^{21}\) Just as direct perception is a pramāṇa because it reveals an unknown object, also the Bhagavat is a pramāṇa because he reveals an unknown object like the four noble truths.\(^{21}\)

This is really the interpretation that the compound **pramāṇabhūta** as a whole means “pramāṇa-like” without specifying the part of the compound which means “like.”

The next case, that of Jayanta, is more interesting. Jayanta comments on Prajñākara-gupta’s view that the Bhagavat as **pramāṇabhūta** is necessary, although every purpose of human beings can be established on the basis of conventional means of cognition (**sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa**),\(^{22}\) as follows:

Jayanta[De] (D)39b7f.; (P)46a5ff.: *der yang mngon sun la sogs pa nyid tshad ma’i gtso bo yin te l rtogs pa’i *bdag nyid can (D: *gtso bo dag P) yin pa’i phyir ro l bcom ldan ‘das ni tshad ma dang ’dra bas tshad mar gyur pa yin no zhes bya ba’i bsam pas dogs pa la / *khyab par byed pa (D: *khyab par byed par byed pa P) rtogs pa’i bdag nyid yin pa’i phyir l bcom ldan ‘das kho na tshad ma’i gtso bo yin la / gzhan ni de dang mthun pa nyid kyi gtso bo ma yin no zhes bstan to l

[= Supposing the view: “In that case too, the actual direct perception etc. are primary pramāṇas, because they are of the nature of cognition. The Bhagavat is, on the contrary, pramāṇabhūta, inasmuch as he is like a pramāṇa (*bhagavān pramāṇam iva pramāṇabhūtah*),” (Prajñākaragupta) indicated that the very Bhagavat is a primary (*mukhya) pramāṇa, because (he) is of the nature of pervading cognition; other (pramāṇas such as cognition) are (however) similar to the (Bhagavat) and not primary.\(^{22}\)]

According to Jayanta, Prajñākara-gupta indicates here, by stating that “the pervading concomitance cannot be grasped by those who are not omniscient (*na ca saṃbandho vyāpy asarvavidā grahitum sākyah*),” that the Bhagavat is the primary (*mukhya) pramāṇa, and this statement is aimed against the fallacious view that pramāṇa as knowledge is primary and the word **pramāṇabhūta** means “pramāṇa-like.”

Thus, Jayanta also presupposes the possibility of the interpretation that the compound word **pramāṇabhūta** means “pramāṇa-like.” It should be noted that this interpretation is to the Tibetan translation, or even my interpretations based on the latter, sometimes seem to deviate from the diplomatic edition of Sanskrit manuscript. I have not changed my expositions according to the diplomatic edition; this is because, in my opinion, it is an open question whether the present diplomatic edition does not need to be emended. A more detailed investigation remains as a task for the future.

\(^{21}\) In this case too, *tshad ma dang ’dra bas* is probably the rendering of pramāṇa iva (cf. note 17 in this paper).

\(^{22}\) For direct perception does not function in terms of transcendent objects, and inference ultimately does not function without the cognition of the pervading concomitance (**sambandho vyāpy** by the omniscient being (cf. PVĀO 12,12ff.: *nāu pramāṇabhūtena bhagavatā ko ‘rthaḥ, sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇād eva sarvaparāśrīthasiddheḥ, naitad asti. […] na tāvat pratyakṣam paralokādau pravartate, tasya svārubhāva-grahāṇād iti pratipādayissate. anumānam tu saṃbandhagrahaṇanam antareṇa nāsti, na ca saṃbandho vyāpy asarvavidā grahitum śākyah*).
equated by him with the view that the Bhagavat is not a primary pramāṇa. This reminds us of Nārāyaṇa’s above-mentioned interpretation.23

1.3.2. The expression x-bhūta in the introduction of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Ruegg considered that Bhartṛhari’s use of x-bhūta to express likeness could have been familiar to Dignāga, and regarded it as supporting evidence for his interpretation of pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga.24 Also concerning Vasubandhu’s use of x-bhūta in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (=AKBh), we may point out the same possibility.

The beginning of the AKBh could have been familiar to Dignāga, because the PS’s maṅgalaśloka and its explanation in the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (=PSV) seem to be influenced by the AKBh. Previous studies have already indicated that three of the Bhagavat’s four epithets besides pramāṇabhūta in the PS’s maṅgalaśloka correspond to the three characteristics describing the trustworthiness of an authoritative person (āpta) in the Nyāyabhāṣya (=NBh).25 However, we must recognize that the PS’s description of the Bhagavat is probably influenced not directly by the NBh, but via the AKBh or, rather, directly by the AKBh. For, the maṅgalaśloka of the AKBh is as follows:

yaḥ sarvathāsarvahatāndhakāraḥ saṃsārapaṅkāj jagad ujjahāra /
tasmai namaskṛtya yathārthaśaśtre śāstraṃ pravakṣyāmy abhidharmakośam ll

[= Saluting Him who has averted the darkness regarding everything by every manner and means, who emancipates living beings from a morass of reincarnation, who teaches reality as it is, I will teach the treatise named Abhidharmakośa.]26

Further, it is to be noted that the compound word saṃsārapaṅka in this maṅgalaśloka is explained by Vasubandhu himself as follows:

AKBh 1,17: saṃsāro hi jagadāsaṅgasthānatvāt duruttaratvāc ca paṅkabhūtaḥ.

[= Namely, reincarnation is like a morass, because it is the place to which living beings cling, and from which (living beings) hardly escape.]27

23 Cf. note 8 in this paper.
24 Cf. Ruegg 1994a: 309,20ff.; 1995: 821. Ruegg seems to consider that the attestation of the word x-bhūta meaning “x-like” in Bhartṛhari is relevant because his writing had great influence on Dignāga.
25 Cf. Vetter 1984: note 6; Franco 1997: 28ff. Namely, Pakṣilasvāmin (5th c.) enumerated three characteristics establishing the trustworthiness of the āpta, i.e., 1) having direct knowledge of reality (sākṣātkṛtadharmatā), 2) having compassion towards living beings (bhūtadayā), and 3) having the desire to teach reality as it is (yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣā) (cf. NBh 565,6ff.). These correspond respectively to the sugata, the tāyin or the jagaddhitaiṣin, and the śāstṛ in the PS.
26 sarvathāsarvahatāndhakāraḥ corresponds to sugata, saṃsārapaṅkāj jagad ujjahāra to tāyin or jagaddhitaiṣin, and the saṅstṛ in the PS. The Bhāṣya explains the phrases sarvathāsarvahatāndhakāraḥ, saṃsārapaṅkāj jagad ujjahāra, and yathārthaśaśtre by the words ātmahitapratipattisaṃpad, parahitapratipattisaṃpad, and parahitapratipattapiṣā respectively (cf. AKBh 1.8ff.).
27 Cf. AKBhVy 5,30ff.: saṃsāraḥ paṅka iva saṃsārapaṅkāḥ panākṣādāṁhaṃyāt. ata āha – saṃsāra hi jagadāsaṅgasthānatvād duruttaratvāc ca paṅkabhūta iti. [= (Vasubandhu said:) “a morass of reincarnation,” because the reincarnation is like a morass, since it is similar to a morass. Therefore, he said: “Reincarnation is like a morass, because it is the place, to which living beings cling to, and from which (living beings) hardly escape.”]
Dignāga who depended on the AKBh in writing the *maṅgalaśloka* and the introduction of the PSV could have understood the expression *paṅkabhūta* as meaning “*paṅka*-like.”

1.4. The meaning of *pramāṇabhūta* and Dignāga’s purpose of writing the PS

From the above, it is likely that the word *pramāṇabhūta* in Dignāga means “who is like *pramāṇa* (as knowledge),” as Ruegg suggested. This interpretation not only serves to avoid the difficulty in considering *bhūta* as the equivalent of the copula. The crucial point is, rather, that it corresponds well to Dignāga’s thought about the relationship between *pramāṇa* as knowledge and the Bhagavat.

As is well known, Dignāga, in contrast to Dharmakīrti, did not talk much about the Bhagavat and Buddhist ontology at least in his logical works. The explanations in the PS, except for the *maṅgalaśloka*, are almost entirely restricted to establishing *pramāṇa* as knowledge. In this sense, *pramāṇa* as knowledge is primary (*mukhya*), and the Bhagavat as *pramāṇa* is secondary in the PS. In the closing section of the PSV, Dignāga says the following:

Thus, this (treatise) has been undertaken only for turning around (*vyāva-rtana*) those people who cling to the (opponent’s views), not for introducing (them) to the Tathāgata’s teaching, because his teaching is not the object of reasoning. Those who have turned away (from clinging to the fallacious views), however, can easily comprehend the essence of the teaching which is perfectly manifested, after having listened to it, because (our logic and the logic of the opponents) are at different degrees of distance (from the truth).

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29 Cf. Krasser 2004: 134f. I give here my tentative translation according to the following reconstruction of this part which is a result of the joint research workshop on the PST chapter VI held by Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe (Kokugakuin University), Dr. Yasutaka Muroya (Austrian Academy of Sciences) and myself under the support of Prof. Franco, Prof. Chizuko Yoshimizu and Dr. Krasser: *iti tadāsaktānāṃ vyāvarta- nārtho ’yam ārambhā, na tv iyatā tathāgataśāsanānupraveśārthāh, tadharmasyātarkacaravāt, vyāvṛ-tās tu paripātāṃ dharmatām upāsrutīyatnatenaiva pratipatsyante, viprakṛṣṭāntaratvāt. tarkamātrabalās tīrthyāḥ so ’py anirdīṣṭalakṣaṇāḥ / svaprayogaviruddhaḥ ca na ceṣṭāhprasādhah ॥ 23 ॥ sudūranaṣṭās tāthāgataśāsanānupraveśārthaḥ / tathāpi tāthāgataḥdharmaṃ parīkṣayanti ye tarkapathena dharmatāṃ / tathāpi tāthāgataḥdharmaṃ parīkṣayanti yady upaśyati vikriyām ॥ 24 ॥ (Italics are used for words retranslated from the Tibetan translations, whereas normal script is used for the words taken from the PST manuscript.)
30 Krasser interpreted the word *viprakṛṣṭāntara* as Dvandva, i.e., “remote” and “near” (cf. Krasser 2004: 133f.). However, his interpretation is not supported by PSV’s Tibetan translations, and the PST does not necessarily seem to support it. Regarding the word *viprakṛṣṭāntara*, Kumārila’s use is worth considering (cf. the *Ślokavārttika*, *śabdanityatādikaraṇa*, v.168–169ab: *tadantarādhikātmā ca bhāti tenāgrataḥ sthītaḥ / viprakṛṣṭāntarāṇāṃ ca stokadeśe ’pi drśyate // Siddharthānāgraḥdeśānāṃ dārāde- sasamānātā / // *Ganganath Jha’s translation in Jha 1983: 437: “Even in the case of an object which is comparatively much nearer to us (than the Sun really is), we find that persons, – residing at places that are at different degrees of distance from that object, and consequently having their fronts decidedly different from one another, – mistake that distant object to be at equal distances from themselves”); I would like to thank Dr. Ryō Sasaki for his informing me of this passage). In my opinion, the word *viprakṛṣṭāntara* can be meaningfully understood only by relating it to the following two verses. Jine-mātrabuddhi’s interpretation of this word seems to have somewhat deviated from Dignāga’s original intention.
The opponents depend only on (their) logic. But this very (logic) is one in which (correct) characteristics are not indicated, is one that contradicts its own syllogism, and cannot establish the intended object. (k.23) On the other hand, those who lead (the people) to the essence of the teaching by way of logic, have (also) deviated very far from the teaching by the king of saints. Nevertheless, the essence of the Tathāgata’s teaching is to be considered (by logic) if (it) undergoes a change. (k.24)

Needless to say, it does not mean that Dignāga did not give importance to the Bhagavat. I agree with Krasser in that Dignāga as a pramāṇavādin is definitely Buddhistic.31

2. Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of pramāṇabhūta

Dharmakīrti paraphrases the word pramāṇabhūta in his PV II as follows:

PV II 7 abc’: tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavān abhūtavīnīrvartaye / bhūtoktiḥ

[= The Bhagavat is a pramāṇa like that (pramāṇa as knowledge) (tadvat). The expression bhūta serves to avert those who have not become (abhūta) (a pramāṇa, like Īśvara and the Veda).]

On the basis of this statement, Śākyabuddhi etc. interpret the word pramāṇabhūta as a compound meaning “he is a pramāṇa, and he has become.”32 However, it is not necessarily clear whether such an interpretation matches Dharmakīrti’s own intention. At least it is obvious that Dharmakīrti did not reinterpret the word pramāṇabhūta in order to use it in his own philosophy. For, unlike in the case of Prajñākaragupta, the word was never really used in Dharmakīrti’s treatises.33 Dharmakīrti uses the word pramāṇa instead of pramāṇabhūta to designate “the Bhagavat as pramāṇa.” He seems to intend to only deconstruct this compound.

Now, how did he understand the original meaning of pramāṇabhūta in Dignāga, so that he did not use this word? In order to answer this question, we need to reconsider Devendrabuddhi’s expression pramāṇam iva pramāṇam (tshad ma dang ‘dra bas na tshad ma ste) which is referred to by Krasser as the evidence for refuting Ruegg’s interpretation of °bhūta as “like.” This expression first appears in Devendrabuddhi’s introductory remark on PV II 1, where he explains Dignāga’s usage of the word pramāṇabhūta:

32 Cf. PVP(D)1b2; (P)2a1: tshad mar gyur pa zhes bya ba ni tshad mar ’khrungs pa’o; PV(T)71b5f.; (P)86b4f.: tshad mar ’khrungs pa zhes bya bar (D: ba P) gyur pa’i sgra ni ’khrungs pa’i don to // tshad ma yang de yin la gyur pa yang de yin pas na tshad mar gyur pa’o (cf. Vibhūti 521,27: pramāṇajāta [em. in Krasser 2001: 178: pramāṇaṃ jāta] iti bhūtaśabdaḥ prādurbhāvārthaḥ; PST 2,7: pramāṇaṃ cāsau bhūtaś ceti pramāṇabhūtaḥ; note 15 in this paper). The Tibetan translation tshad mar gyur pa is also derived from such interpretation (cf. Hakamaya 2000: (10)f.).
33 As a matter of fact, the translation “who has become a pramāṇa” can be applied only to the word pramāṇabhūta found in the treatises of Dharmakīrti’s followers. Furthermore, whether such a translation is appropriate depends on the context. For example, in Dharmottara’s case, where the word appears in his Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā’s maṅgalaśloka, it may be, contrary to Krasser’s view (cf. Krasser 2001: note 44), appropriately translated as “pramāṇa-like” in Dignāga’s sense, because pramāṇa as knowledge is primary in this treatise, just as in the case of the PS. Regarding Prajñākaragupta, see below.
PVP (D)1b2f.; (P)2a1f.: *tshad mar gyur pa* zhes bya ba ni tshad mar 'khrungs pa'o // tshad ma dang 'dra bas na tshad ma ste bcom ldan 'das so //

[= The compound *pramāṇabhūta* (means) “who has become a *pramāṇa*."

The Bhagavat is a *pramāṇa* (inasmuch as he is) similar to a valid cognition (*bhagavān pramāṇa iva pramāṇam*).]^{34}

The statement *pramāṇam iva pramāṇam*, which means that the expression *bhagavān pramāṇam* implies the meaning *iva*, is, according to Śākyabuddhi, the reply to the question “The *pramāṇas* are direct perception and inference. Thus, how can the Bhagavat who is not of their nature be said to be *pramāṇa*?”^{35} Note that this statement appears immediately after the explanation of the compound *pramāṇabhūta* according to PV II 7bc’. This fact seems to show that such a statement became necessary owing to the Dharmakīrtian interpretation of *bhūta*. Namely, it is possible that Devendrabuddhi interpreted *bhūta* as meaning “has become” and, as a consequence, had to transfer the meaning which the compound *pramāṇabhūta* as a whole originally had in Dignāga to the part *pramāṇa*. If this is the case, it means that *pramāṇabhūta* in Dignāga was understood as meaning “*pramāṇa*-like” by Devendrabuddhi.

I think that his understanding derives from Dharmakīrti. Devendrabuddhi’s remark on PV II 7a shows it:

PVP (D)6b5; (P)7b2f.: *de bzhin bcom ldan tshad ma nyid* (PV II 7a: *tadvat pramāṇam bhagavān*) // 'di tshad ma dang yang ci zhig mtshungs na / gang gis na tshad ma dang 'dra bas tshad ma nyid yin tshad ma'i mtshan nyid rnam pa gnyis nyid dang mtshungs pa yin no //

[= The Bhagavat is a *pramāṇa* like that (*pramāṇa* as knowledge). In what way is he like a *pramāṇa*? He is like (a *pramāṇa*) in having the twofold defining characteristic of *pramāṇa* so that, he is (said to be) *pramāṇa*, inasmuch as he is like a *pramāṇa*.].^{36}

According to Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti shows by the expression *tadvat* that the Bhagavat’s likeness to *pramāṇa* as knowledge means that the Bhagavat has the same twofold defining characteristic that *pramāṇa* as knowledge has (but not that the Bhagavat is secondary to *pramāṇa* as knowledge). Further, Dharmakīrti calls the Bhagavat, not *pramāṇabhūta*, but a *pramāṇa* meaning *pramāṇam iva*, because both the Bhagavat and *pramāṇa* as knowledge are said to be *pramāṇa* in having the twofold defining characteristic.


^{35} Cf. PVṬ(P)86b5f.; (D)71b6f.: mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pa ni tshad ma yin pa de bas na / ji ltar na bcom idan 'das de'i rang bzhin can ma yin pa la de skad da ce ne tshad ma dang 'dra bas na tshad ma ste zhes bya ba smos te; Inami 1994: note 2; Krasser 2001: 178f. I follow Krasser’s translation.

^{36} Cf. Krasser 2001: 182f. I follow Krasser’s translation in terms of Devendrabuddhi’s remark with some modifications. However, I cannot agree with his view that Devendrabuddhi understood –*vat* in *tadvat* in a possessive sense and the Tibetan translation *de bzhin* to *tadvat* was a misunderstanding (cf. Krasser 2001: 183). In my opinion, *tadvat* must carry the meaning “like that (*pramāṇa* as knowledge)” in this context, because *tadvat* is nothing but the paraphrase of the word *pramāṇabhūta*. Nevertheless, it is possible that *tadvat* was understood as an intentionally ambiguous expression (a kind of śleṣa in Sanskrit rhetoric) by Devendrabuddhi.
I think Devendrabuddhi is right. What Dharmakīrti is doing here is interpreting the word *pramāṇabhūta*; and the Bhagavat’s likeness to *pramāṇa* as knowledge is nothing but what is meant by the word *pramāṇabhūta* in Dignāga. Thus, the word *pramāṇabhūta* in Dignāga is probably understood as meaning “pramāṇa-like” by Dharmakīrti himself.

3. Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of *pramāṇabhūta*

3.1. *pramāṇabhūta* as a purpose of the PVA

Prajñākaragupta calls the Bhagavat *pramāṇabhūta* in the first *maṅgalaśloka* of his PVA, following Dignāga, and adopts this term as a key concept of his philosophy. However, the meaning of this term in Prajñākaragupta is different from that in Dignāga. The opening paragraph of the PVA, immediately after the *maṅgalaślokas*, clearly shows this difference. In this paragraph, Prajñākaragupta follows the opening section of the PSV with some modifications. Among these modifications, the following two are relevant for our issue:

(1) PSV I 1.3f.: *atra bhagavato hetuphasamapattyā pramāṇabhūtatvena stotrabhidhānam prakaraṇādau gauravotpādanārtham.*

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37 I would like to thank Prof. Inami for the following suggestion expressed by E-mail on the 27. Sept. 2013: “It is possible that Dharmakīrti also understands *bhūta* in *pramāṇabhūta* as meaning ‘like’ by stating *tadvat* in PV II 7a. From PV II 7a onwards, Dharmakīrti apparently begins to explain the word *pramāṇabhūta*, even if commentators would not support it.” (English translation is mine.)

38 The first *maṅgalaśloka*, whose first half is identical to that of the PS, states the purpose of writing the PVA (cf. *pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣite praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine kutakasambrāntajanānukanampayā pramāṇasiddhir vidhivad vidhiyate /). See Iwata 2001: (48)ff.

39 Cf. PSV I 1.3–13: *atra bhagavato hetuphasamapattyā pramāṇabhūtatvena stotrabhidhānam prakaraṇādau gauravotpādanārtham.*

40 Regarding the importance of the addition *sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇāpekṣayā* after the sentence *atra hetur aśayaprayogasampat* for Prajñākaragupta’s thought, see Iwata 2001: (48)ff.

41 Hattori’s translation: “At the beginning of the treatise, here [in this verse], I express praise in honor of the Worshipful [Buddha] in order to produce in [the hearts of] men faith in Him who, because of His perfection in cause (*hetu*) and effect (*phala*), is to be regarded as the personification of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa-bhūta*).”
3.2. The identification of the Bhagavat as pramāṇabhūta with pāramārthikapramāṇa

Dharmakīrti uses the word sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa, meaning direct perception and inference, in the closing paragraph of the Pramāṇaviniścaya’s first chapter. However, the word pāramārthikapramāṇa in the same paragraph does not necessarily mean the Bhagavat.\footnote{Cf. PVin I 44,2ff.: sāṃvyavahārīkā pramāṇa rūpam uktam, atrāpi pare mūḍhā visaṃvādyati lokam iti, cittamāyām eva tu prajñām anuśīlayanto vibhramavivekanirvāmam anāpāyi pāramārthikapramāṇam abhimukhikurvanti. tad api leṣataḥ sūcitam eveti.}
Prajñākaragupta, however, clearly identifies the Bhagavat with pāramārthikam pramāṇam. He calls the Bhagavat paraṃ pramāṇam too.

The word pramāṇabhūta qualifying the Bhagavat in the PVA can be regarded as a synonym of these terms. The term pāramārthikapramāṇa is used by Prajñākaragupta in the sense that the Bhagavat is the ‘ultimate’ pramāṇa insofar as the trustworthiness of his direct perception is ascertained by itself, whereas ordinary direct perception and inference are conventional pramāṇas. According to Prajñākaragupta, the Bhagavat as pramāṇabhūta is by nature a direct perception (pratyakṣarūpa). It is clear from this point that Prajñākaragupta interprets pramāṇa in pramāṇabhūta literally.

3.3. Blo ldan shes rab’s rendering of pramāṇabhūta as tshad ma yang dag (pa)

As is well known, sKal ldan rgyal po and Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109) translate the word pramāṇabhūta qualifying the Bhagavat in the PVA as tshad ma yang dag (pa), i.e., “true pramāṇa,” while rendering the same word qualifying cognitions etc. in the same text as tshad mar (’gyur pa). Although the translation of bhūta as yang dag (pa) is not impossible in itself, it can be regarded as reflecting Prajñākaragupta’s usage of the word.

However, Prajñākaragupta himself does not give any analysis of the compound by which such a translation can be justified. His new interpretation that the sentence abhūtavinnyātaye bhūtōkiḥ (PV II 7bc’) means “the Bhagavat tells the truth in order to...

45 Cf. PVA 67,12f.; Ms2b6a8: bhagavān eva ca paramārthathaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāve pāramārthikam pramāṇam vyāpyanayayatirekagrahānād iti pratipādātatre. (cf. PVA 12,12ff.; note 22 in this paper).
46 Cf. PVA 83,15ff.: bhagavatas tariḥ katham prāmāṇyam. pratyakṣānumānāyor hi vyavahāramātrenā prāmāṇyam. na bhagavataḥ. tad dhi param prāmāṇam. atrocycante – tadvat prāmāṇam bhagavān (PV II 7a).
47 Insofar as the trustworthiness of ordinary direct perception can be ascertained only in a conventional sense and inference postulates the omniscience of the Bhagavat in order to be universally right (cf. note 22 in this paper; Ono 1994; 2012; 2014).
48 Cf. PVA 84,11f.: tathāgato hi bhagavān tadvān iti krtvā pratyakṣarūpā eva bhagavān prāmāṇam.
49 It corresponds to the fact that Prajñākaragupta interprets the word tadvat in PV II 7 in the possessive meaning (cf. Krasser 2001: 181, and note 36 above).
50 Cf. Hakamaya 2000: (11). The rendering tshad ma yang dag (pa) is attested many times also in the Tibetan translation of Yamārī’s commentary on the PVA by Sumati and Blo ldan shes rab. Many examples of this appear in Yamārī’s remark on the maṅgalaśloka and the introductory paragraph of the PVA. In the Tibetan translation of Jayanta’s commentary on the PVA by Śrī Dipāṃkararaksita and Byang chub shes rab, the rendering tshad ma yang dag (pa) is attested only once, whereas the rendering tshad mar gyur pa is attested many times.
51 The word pramāṇabhūta qualifying cognitions or treatises etc. is also attested in the PVA (cf. PVA 385,11f.: pramāṇabhūtapratyakṣam; PVA 494,9f.: śaṣṭrād eva pramāṇabhūtāḥ; PVA 568,6f.: pramāṇabhūtāḥ pratyayāḥ; PVA 619,26f.: pramāṇabhūtāḥ pratrayapratyipādyāḥ). In those cases, bhūta can be understood as the equivalent of the copula without problems and the Tibetan equivalent of it is almost tshad mar (’gyur pa. In Yamārī’s commentary as well, the rendering tshad mar gyur pa is attested many times. Most of them qualify Veda, Niyoga, words, cognitions etc. But some of them qualify the Bhagavat. Among them we can find some interesting examples, as we shall see later.
52 Cf. Ruegg 1994a: note 44; Hakamaya 2000: 324ff.; Steinkellner 2003: note 15. Interestingly, Jonathan A. Silk found the Chinese equivalent 真實稱量 for pramāṇabhūta in the Chinese translation of the Śikṣāsāṃucchaya (大乘集菩薩學論) (cf. Silk 2002: note 26); there bhūta is rendered as 真實, i.e., true or real, just like in the case of tshad ma yang dag (pa).
53 As far as I am aware, Yamārī refers to the word bhūta in pramāṇabhūta as follows: “Further, supposing the question ‘why is only the Bhagavat pramāṇa (in the true sense) and others not?’” (Prajñākaragupta)
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avert error”\textsuperscript{54} appears to justify the translation \textit{tshad ma yang dag (pa)} because the word \textit{bhūta} means the contrary concept of “error” (\textit{bhrānti}), i.e., “truth” or “true” in this context. What Prajñākaragupta really intends here is, however, not to interpret the word \textit{bhūta} in \textit{pramāṇabhūta}, but to justify his own usage of the word \textit{pramāṇabhūta} by interpreting Dharmakīrti’s word \textit{bhūtoki} as not referring to \textit{bhūta} in \textit{pramāṇabhūta}.

### 3.4. Yamāri’s interpretation of the compound \textit{pramāṇabhūta}

Then, how should we interpret the compound \textit{pramāṇabhūta} in Prajñākaragupta? Yamāri’s commentary provides us with an important clue to Prajñākaragupta’s understanding. Among Yamāri’s two different interpretations, the second interpretation explaining \textit{pramāṇabhūta} as “pramāṇa-like” has been mentioned above. The first one, which can be regarded as Yamāri’s own interpretation, is as follows:

Yamāri [Phe] (D)188b5f.; (P)226a3f.: ‘\textit{di} rtsom pa yang ci zhi byas nas yin zhe na / bshad pa phyag \textit{chal} nas te rab tu btud cing lus phul nas so (D: song P) // su la zhe na / tshad ma yang dag gam tshad mar gyur pa la’e\textsuperscript{55} // tshad mar gyur pa ni tshad mar red pa ’am tshad mar thob pa’o //; Ms 10b1–2 (cf. Li, Chu and Franco 2017: 80)

[= (Question:) Further, what has been done before beginning to write this (treatise)? (Prajñākaragupta) replies: “saluting,” i.e., bowing his head and throwing his body on the ground. (Question:) To whom? (Prajñākaragupta replies:) To \textit{pramāṇabhūta}. (The compound) \textit{pramāṇabhūta} means “who has reached the means of cognition (*pramāṇaṃ gataḥ),” in other words, “who has attained trustworthiness (*prāmāṇyaṃ prāptaḥ).”]

By comparing this with Śākyabuddhi’s explanation of the compound \textit{parabhāvabhūta} found in the \textit{Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti}, one can assume that the Sanskrit equivalent of the sentence \textit{tshad mar gyur pa ni tshad mar red pa}\textsuperscript{56} is probably \textit{*pramāṇaṃ gataḥ pramāṇabhūtaḥ}, and it is also clear that this sentence shows the interpretation of \textit{bhūta} as the equivalent of the copula.\textsuperscript{57} Further, \textit{tshad mar thob pa} is most likely the rendering of \textit{prāmāṇyaṃ}


\textsuperscript{55} I assume that \textit{gam tshad mar gyur pa} is a kind of gloss. The rendering should be merely \textit{tshad ma yang dag}, insofar as the word \textit{pramāṇabhūta} qualifies the Bhagavat in this case, but the general translation \textit{tshad mar gyur pa} is added here to the semantic translation, probably because the interpretation of the compound itself is talked about (cf. Ms 10b2; Li, Chu and Franco 2017: 80).

\textsuperscript{56} The Tibetan \textit{tshad mar red pa} literally means “being pramāṇa.”

\textsuperscript{57} Commenting on the compound \textit{parabhāvabhūta} in the PVSV, which cannot but be understood as a pleonastic expression, Śākyabuddhi explains it as \textit{gzhan gyi ngo bor red pa}, the Sanskrit equivalent...
prāptaḥ,\(^58\) which is the same as Kaiyāṭa’s explanation of Patañjali’s pramāṇabhūta and therefore means “being pramāṇa” as well. Thus, Yamāri shows here the interpretation of pramāṇabhūta as “being pramāṇa.”\(^59\)

Further, in commenting on Prajñākaragupta’s above-mentioned statement “because (the Bhagavat is) the purpose of the treatise” (śāstrārthatvāt), Yamāri says as follows:

Yamāri [Phe](D)198b5f.; (P)237a6ff.: gal te ’o na bcom ldan ’das mngon sum gyi khyad par gyi rang bzhin yin mod / gang gi bstan bcos kyi don yin pas bstan bcos blang byar ’gyur ba de tsam gyis (D: gyi P) bdag cag la nye bar mkho ba ni ma yin no // tshad ma yang dag pas zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos so // tshad mar gyur pa ni tshad mar red pa zhes bya ba’i don to // ma byung ba las byung ba ni yin yang brjod par mi ’dod pa’i phyir rtsi ba’i rkyen med do // dper na “au pa las yang man (D: u tpa las yan P) ni rang gi rgyu las so” zhes bya ba ’dir / Pa tan dzi lis bshad pa “de la phan pa ’jig pa ni / sna tshogs pa’i phyir ro // des na (D: na lacking in P) de la phan pa ma byas so” zhes bya ba de bzhin du ’dir yang lta’o (D: bīta P) //; Ms 16a4–5 (cf. Li, Chu and Franco 2018: 44)

\[= \text{(Objection:) Then, even if the Bhagavat is by nature a special direct perception, it is so far not helpful for us in accepting the treatise because (the Bhagavat) is the purpose of the treatise. (Prajñākaragupta) replies: “(the very Bhagavat) as pramāṇabhūta” etc. (The compound) pramāṇabhūta means “who has reached the means of cognition (*pramāṇaṃ gataḥ).” Namely, the suffix meaning “become” (*cvipratyaya) does not exist (in the expression pramāṇabhūta) because, even though (the Bhagavat) has become what he was not previously, it is not intended to mention (it). Also in this case, one should consider (it) according to Patañjali who explains: “The operations of taddhita are manifold and hence the taddhita-suffix is not found (vicitrās taddhita-vṛttayo nātas taddhita utpadyate)” regarding (Pāṇini 1.3.56:) “After the verb yam- preceded by upa-, when used in the sense of ‘espousing,’ (ātmanepada is employed) (upād yamḥ svakaranē).”]\]

Although this paragraph is not easy to understand, it is at least clear that Yamāri presents here again the interpretation of pramāṇabhūta as “being pramāṇa” and mentions that the expression pramāṇabhūta does not mean “has become what he was not previously” (*abhūtatadbhāva)\(^60\) since the cvi-suffix does not exist in it. At the end of this paragraph, of which is parabhāvan gataḥ, as found in Karṇakagomin’s commentary (cf. PVṬ(D)37b3; (P)44b5: gzhan gyi (D: gyis P) Ngo bor gyur pa ni gzhan gyi ngo bor red pa ste; PVSVṬ 72,16f.: parabhāvan gataḥ parabhāvan gataḥ).

\(^58\) This assumption can be ascertained by the Sanskrit manuscript (cf. Ms 10b2; Li, Chu and Franco 2017: 80). The explanation prāmāṇyaṃ prāptaḥ is referred to also by Vibhūticandra (cf. note 62 in this paper).

\(^59\) In Yamāri’s case, however, “being pramāṇa” does not mean “being authority,” as in the case of grammarians, but “being valid cognition.” See above, section 1.1 in this paper.

\(^60\) The Sanskrit equivalent of ma byung ba las byung ba is normally abhūtābhāva (Mahāvyutpatti 2182). But, abhūtadadhāva or abhūtapradurdhāva is also possible (cf. note 8 in this paper). The meaning is not different in any case. Cf. Ms 16a5; Li, Chu and Franco 2018: 44.
Yamāri tries to reinforce his argument by referring to Patañjali’s explanation to Pāṇini-sūtra 1.3.56.61

Thus, we can find some parallels between Yamāri’s statements including his reference to the interpretation pramāṇyaṃ prāptaḥ and the explanations of pramāṇabhūta by MBh-commentators.62 It is noteworthy that the time of Yamāri’s activity (ca. 1000–1060)63 seems to be close to that of Kaiyaṭa.64 The parallel between the grammarians and the Buddhist Prajñā-school which Ruegg suggested may be a result of actual influence of one on the other.65

In any case, it is clear from the above that Yamāri interprets the compound pramāṇabhūta as meaning “being pramāna,” while presupposing the existence of other interpretations like “pramāna-like” and “who has become a pramāṇa.” In my view, Yamāri’s interpretation is not contradictory to either Prajñākaragupta’s identification of the word with pāramārthikapramāṇa, or to Blo Idan shes rab’s translation tshad ma yang dag (pa). Rather, among various interpretations of the word, only the interpretation “being pramāṇa” can be in harmony with Prajñākaragupta’s usage of the word. For, the expression “who is A” can carry the meaning “who is the true A” or “who is A in the true sense.”66

Taking the above into consideration, I would like to propose the translation “who is a pramāṇa in the true sense” for the term pramāṇabhūta when qualifying the Bhagavat in Prajñākaragupta.

4. Conclusion

The results of the above consideration are summarized in Table 1.

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61 Commenting on Pāṇini 1.3.56 which prescribes that ātmānepada should be employed after the verb upa-yam- in the sense of “espousing,” Patañjali states the following: “(Question:) How does (the active voice) not appear here, like in the sentence ‘he holds (upayacchati) the end of his cloth’? (Answer:) (the active voice) should appear where one makes one’s own what was not previously one’s own (like in the case that one has illicit intercourse with another’s wife). (However) if so, it follows that the word in the Sūtra should be svikaraṇe (instead of svakaraṇe according to Pāṇini 5.4.50: [abhūtatadbhāve] kṛbhvastiyoge sampadyakartari cvih). The operations of taddhita are manifold (i.e., the cvi-suffix does not appear if one does not wish to say that one makes one’s own what was not previously one’s own) and hence the taddhita-suffix is not found (cf. MBh I,284,10–12: iha kasmān na bhavati – svam śājakāntam upayacchatīti, asvam yadī svam karo, tadā bhavitavyam, yady evam svikarṣa iti prāpnoti. vicitrās taddhitavṛttayaḥ, nātas taddhita upadyate).” Concerning the identification of Yamāri’s citation, I would like to thank Prof. Vincent Eltschinger, Prof. Hiroshi Nemoto, Dr. Junjie Chu and Dr. Yasutaka Muoya for their valuable suggestions.

62 Cf. notes 7 and 8 in this paper. In addition, we can find the following notable sentences in Vibhūticandra’s remark (cf. Vibhūti 521.29ff.: pramānaśabdo jñāne mukhya itaratra tu kena sādharmyenopamānopa- meyatvam ity āha – avisamvādīti, prāptivācī tu bhavatih spaṣṭārtha ity asau na viyṛtaḥ pramāṇyaṃ prāptaḥ pramāṇabhūta iti). Their meaning is unfortunately not entirely clear for me.


### Table 1: The interpretations of pramāṇabhūta

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<td>Commentator’s expl-</td>
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<td>*pramāṇam gataḥ pramānab-</td>
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<tr>
<td>nation of the compound</td>
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<td>bhūtaḥ; pramāṇabhūtaḥ. (Yamāri)</td>
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<td>māṇa and the Bhagavat</td>
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</tbody>
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†pramāṇa means “valid cognition” in all cases
References and abbreviations

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Mahāvyutpati Bonzōkannwa Shiyakutaikō Honyaku Meigi Taishū. Tokyo 1917.
PS Pramāṇasamuccaya (Dignāga).
PSV Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga).
PVA Pramāṇavārttikālāṃkāra (Prajñākaragupta): Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālāṃkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika), ed. Rahula Sankṛtyayana. Patna 1953.
PVAo See Ono 2000.

PVSV Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (Dharmakīrti): The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, ed. R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.


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Towards the end of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika (= PV II) Dharmakīrti examines various non-Buddhist theories about how to attain liberation. In this context, he discusses the function of the ritual of dīkṣā, “initiation,” in attaining the elimination of the soul’s sins or impurities and, thus, the liberation from the cycle of transmigrations.

An original point-by-point refutation of the Buddhist opinion represented in Dharmakīrti’s text is expounded – as Attilia Sironi has indicated2 – by Kṣemarāja (approximately 1000–1050 CE)3 in his commentary on Svavchandatantra V.88, where he provides a survey of different views on initiation. In this way, the target of Dharmakīrti’s critique is confirmed as corresponding to the followers of tantric4 ideas and practices who advocate a Śaiva type of salvific initiation. Indeed, as observed by Alexis Sanderson and Raffaele Torella, PV II.259ab5 refers to an initiate who is lighter than before the performance of the initiation,6 very likely alluding to the tulādīkṣā, a ritual characterized by the use of a balance (tulā). More generally, dīkṣā is described in Śaiva sources as the action that removes all the bonds (pāśas) or innate impurity (mala) which causes rebirth and, therefore, is the necessary step to be made in order to attain liberation.7 The special type of ritual that includes a balance is widely attested in Śaiva sources, from the early Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā,8 from

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1 Research for the present article, which was completed in 2015, was generously funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in the framework of the stand-alone project “Indian Buddhist epistemology and the path to liberation” (P 26120–G15), based at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna. I would like to thank Diwakar Acharya and Patrick McAllister for their careful reading of this article and their very helpful observations.

2 Attilia Sironi, assisted by Raniero Gnoli, has published an Italian translation of the Uddyota passage here under consideration and the relevant part of the PV (Sironi 1988).


4 As it is not clear when the term tantra became a standard designation for texts of tantric revelation (see Niśvāsa, pp. 30f.), it might be anachronistic to speak of “tantric” ideas and practices in Dharmakīrti’s time.

5 The numbering of the kārikās accords to that established in Vetter 1964: 116f.

6 Sanderson 2001: 10f., n. 7. Raffaele Torella’s identification of the ritual as a Śaiva type of initiation is reported in Franco 2001, n. 24.

7 See, for example, Sanderson 1988: 662, 664ff. and 691; Sanderson 1992: 285; and Acharya 2014: 16f., with nn. 25 and 27.

8 Niśvāsa, Mūlasūtra 7.15ab: tulayā śodhayet pāpam ātmanasya parasya vā; see also Niśvāsa, p. 324, Acharya 2014: 16, and Eltschinger 2014: 123, n. 102.
sometime between 450 and 550 CE,\(^9\) to later works of eminent authors such as Sadyojoyotis and Abhinavagupta.\(^10\)

In what follows I will analyse the PV section on initiation and the related response of Kṣemarāja. The skillful use of rhetorical means seems to shape both texts, in the former adding a sarcastic nuance to the refutation of the opponents’ view, in the latter covertly minimizing the long past Buddhist attack. This investigation will contribute to our understanding of Dharmakīrti’s engagement in discussing contemporary soteriological ideologies and, on the other hand, to our understanding of how his thought reverberated in a later and different intellectual environment such as the Śaiva one.\(^11\)

In this study I take Manorathanandin’s *Vyrtti* (PVV) as the guiding commentary. The indicators typical of commentarial phraseology (e.g., nanu, cet, and syād etat) show that, in his opinion, PV II.257–267 forms a section in which Dharmakīrti addresses the followers of the Scriptures of the Lord (*īśvarāgama*) with regard to salvific initiation (hereafter “section on initiation”).\(^12\) The two subsequent *kārikas*, kk. 268–269, present a discussion of the existence of the self that can be regarded as continuing the refutation of the previous soteriological view; however, it does not display any explicit indications with regard to it.\(^13\)

The section on initiation consists of six short thematic units:\(^14\)

- **a)** K. 257, where, against those who claim the salvific effects of an initiation, Dharmakīrti argues that they explain such an effect by resorting to the authority of the Scriptures only – which is not satisfactory.
- **b)** Kk. 258–259, where, showing the undesired consequences of their claim, he argues that a ritual such as initiation is not sufficient to stop rebirth and that bad deeds are not something that can be embodied.
- **c)** Kk. 260–261, where Dharmakīrti presents the Buddhist view of how to attain liberation, especially focusing on the role of *karman* in the perpetuation of rebirths.
- **d)** Kk. 262–264, which concern the nature of karmic impulses (*samskāras*). These are related to the unseen force (*adṛṣṭa*) of merits and demerits for the upholders of salvific initiation, but to *cetanā* for the Buddhists.
- **e)** Kk. 265–266, which explain the role of the mind and the nature of mental faults with regard to the cognitive faculties’ agency and rebirth.
- **f)** K. 267, where Dharmakīrti explains that the nature of the mind cannot be permanent.

After stating the unacceptability of resorting to Scriptures to argue for salvific initiation, Dharmakīrti points out that, when urged to prove the efficacy of initiation, the followers of

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\(^9\) Goodall & Isaacson 2007: 6. Some further remarks concerning the *Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā* are provided in Sanderson 2001, n. 2, item 7; nn. 5–6; pp. 22f. and 29–31, with notes therein.

\(^10\) See TAK III, s.v. *tulādīkṣā*.

\(^11\) See Torella 1992 for some reflexions on the relationships between Pratyabhijñā thought and the Buddhist logical-epistemological system.

\(^12\) PVV 98.17: *nanūktam īśvareṇāgame ’sty ātmā mokṣaś cāsya dīkṣāvidhineti* and 100.15f.:… *syād etad ātmano ’pi garbhagatatakanādiṇānane vyāpāraḥ sa eva dīkṣāya niruddha iti na punarjanmety*

\(^13\) The Tibetan tradition represented in dGe’دن grub pa’s topical outlines (*sa bcad*) takes the kk. 264–269 as one thematic unit within the section that begins at k. 257 (*dbang phyug pa’i grol lam dgag pa – “Refuting the path to deliverance of the devotees of *īśvara*;” see Inami & Tillemans 1986: 133f. and 140, items 166–171). Note that the word *dbang* denotes special rituals such as initiation.

\(^14\) For the text and translation, see the Appendix.
the Scriptures of the Lord adduce arguments which lead to prasaṅga. For they compare the efficacy of initiation with the efficacy of rituals applied to physical objects and consider the initiate’s weighing less after the performance of the ritual a proof of the initiate’s elimination of sins and attainment of liberation.

Dharmakīrti explicitly identifies the former alleged proof as implying the undesired consequence that one would then have to believe in the salvific power of other rituals, too, such as oil massage or scorching oneself with fire. A human being would be like a seed: if treated with oil or burnt by fire, it does not generate a sprout (k. 258cd). Further, Dharmakīrti covertly suggests that the opponents’ proof implies a prasaṅga; for, saying that even the initiates’ loss of their entire weight would not be a proof of their loss of sins (k. 259c), he alludes to the eventual implication that liberation corresponds to having no weight at all. To this he adds the inference “sin is not heavy because it is not embodied” (k. 259d), which refutes the opponents’ implicit inference that is based on the reason “because sin is embodied” – a reason that may be indicative of another fact such as the loss of sins after initiation only within a physicalist view of sins. Although Dharmakīrti does not expand on this, his audience can go back to the refutation of the materialist view on rebirth explained in a previous part of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, where, showing that the mental does not depend on the corporeal, he argued for the non-physicality of faults that prevent living beings from attaining liberation.

The opening of Dharmakīrti’s critique of salvific initiation seems to be designed to persuade the audience, before any demonstration, of the evident implausibility of a soteriological method based on a ritual ceremony. In fact, the examples of an oil massage and a ritual with a balance easily remind one of magical treatments and freak shows. Mentioning them, Dharmakīrti seems to be adopting a rhetorical strategy that reinforces the prasaṅgas with which his refutation begins: he intentionally exposes the simplicity of the opponents’ soteriological proposal and the unsophisticatedness of their proof, also evoking the unreliability and negligibility of the latter.

His refutation continues with a more general assertion, at kk. 260–261, concerning the causes of rebirth from the Buddhist point of view. The content of the text is quite similar to the idea expounded at PV II.81 and 189, where Dharmakīrti states that rebirth is rooted in misjudgement and thirst, and it is thirst rather than karma that ultimately effects the setting in motion of the continuum of the five skandhas. Arguing against salvific initiation, he not only reasserts the primacy of cognitive and emotional experience, but also emphasizes the subordinate role of karma in the Buddhist discourse on liberation. Moreover, he elaborates on the nature of ignorance and thirst by saying that they are cetanā (“intention,” or “volition”) and are connected with karma (te cetane svayam karmety – k. 261c). His formulation refers to a notion that appears in canonical and Abhidharmic sources – famously in AN III.415 and in AK 4.1ab, where it is said that the manifold

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15 See, in particular, PV II.34–53. For a study and English translation of the text, see Franco 1997, chapter 4 and pp. 159–258, and Taber 2003.
17 See Heim 2013 for a comprehensive study of cetanā as presented in relevant Pāli sources.
18 “It is volition (cetanā), monks, that I call karma. Having willed (cetayitvā), one performs an action (kammaṇ karoti) by body, by speech, by mind” (Harvey 2011: 182).
world is caused by karma, which is characterized by intention (karmajan lokāvacaityrman cetanā tat tattca tat).

The subsequent text features a more committed Dharmakīrti, who explains why salvific initiation is considered problematic and takes into serious account his opponents’ argument. In a Buddhist soteriological perspective, he states, it is the series of seeds continuously generating mental faults that has to be stopped, but initiation, as a ritual, does not have any impact on mental faults.

Upholders of salvific initiation can argue against this stance focussing on the nature and role of karma. Their main argument is concerned with the nature of saṃskāras, “karmic impulses,” which in their view are linked to adṛṣṭa (“the unseen”), a latent force from which physical and mental actions ultimately derive and which is eliminated through initiation. From a Buddhist point of view, however, the saṃskāras are connected to cetanā, which performs its function as long as the sense faculties exist. Therefore, a ritual performance such as initiation, which does not affect the sense faculties’ capacity of being operative, cannot hinder their capacity of generating physical and mental activity (kk. 262–264).

The two positions are based on antithetic doctrinal views. Dharmakīrti takes the opportunity to discuss them as regards their implications in view of rebirth, shifting the focus to the causes of rebirth, i.e., mental faults. He has the upholders of salvific initiation point out that if actions are linked to the mind only, the absence of mind – which is the case at the time of death – would also imply the absence of rebirth. The Buddhist reply to this is that mental impurities are what links the mind to another birth; therefore, one could accept initiation as a means to liberation only if such a special ritual affected this capacity of the impurities. But the Buddhists do not believe that a ritual performance can determine the results of future actions, since it cannot affect the series of mental faults which arise from their own seeds, and whose capacity and perpetuation depends on the presence of what nourishes them, i.e., the view of a self (kk. 265–266).

However, the mention of bījas in the present context seems to be parallel to the example of a bīja in k. 258, where Dharmakīrti refers to the special treatment of a seed that hinders the seed’s capacity of generating a sprout. Thus, the discussion of the effects of initiation seems to be intentionally enclosed between two references to bījas which, given their difference, amplify the polarization of the debate over the causes of rebirth. On the Buddhist side, the metaphor of the seed (bīja) in relation to the series of faults is linked to the traditional view of causation referred to in texts such as the Śālistambasūtra and the AK, where the stock example is the arising of a sprout from a seed and other causes. It should be noted that this metaphor is not predictable in Dharmakīrti’s work. In fact, it piles up especially in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter and occurs in a few places of the Svārthānumāna and Pratyakṣa chapters of the Pramāṇavārttika, suggesting that Dharmakīrti mentioned the example of the seed in order to show how his philosophical discourse linked to the Abhidharmic tradition.

The informed discussion of salvific initiation presented in the PV confirms that materials relating to groups of Śaiva worshippers were available to Dharmakīrti and his audience

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As observed by D. Keown, saṃskāras “designate the transformative effect that moral action has upon the character of the agent” and “Phalas (referred to in Buddhism as karma-vipāka) denote not the end product of a transpersonal causal chain but the effect of saṃskāric change as experienced by the actor” (Keown 1996: 336f.). Dharmakīrti’s text can be taken as evidence for Keown’s statement that “a coherent account of karma can be given purely in terms of saṃskāras” (ibid., p. 337).
as significant parts of their religious and intellectual environment. Further, although the intellectual apparatus of the tantric communities was very likely still quite thin, these groups were probably well aware of the necessity of having their soteriological programme legitimized at various levels. The fact that they provide a physical proof of the validity of their ritual procedure is indeed telling about their programmatic effort of gaining a place in society for their soteriological proposal. When Dharmakīrti specifically refers to the tuṇḍākṣa, he is not only arguing against another way of attaining liberation, but also, or primarily, against the demonstrative value attached to a ritual performance, as if liberation from suffering could be equated to a reduction of bodily weight. The tuṇḍākṣa was a perfect example to this end, namely casting a bad light on the tantric proposal for liberation.

However, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to specify the identity of Dharmakīrti’s target, whether he was addressing various groups that shared some basic ideas based on their belief in īśvara, or practitioners whose ideology was represented in a particular tantric work. Some key terms in the section on initiation point to ideas and practices that correspond to those attested in the Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā, testifying to early forms of concepts that will develop and appear in later tantric texts in different forms and sometimes under different names. A case in point is the idea of impurity, which is referred to as pāpa (“bad deed” or “sin”) in the Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā and in the PV section on initiation. The term pāpa mentioned at k. 259 refers to an imperceptible material substance (dravya) and is contrasted with mala (k. 265), which Dharmakīrti uses to designate mental impurity within a Buddhist discourse, as can be seen in PV II.208–209 and 212. Thus, the PV section on initiation bears witness to a stage of the development of tantric doctrines earlier than that attested in the Śvāyambhavasūtrasaṅgraha (not later than the middle of the seventh century),22 where the term mala, together with pāśa (bonds), denotes three distinct types of impurities that cover the soul. Indeed, D. Acharya has argued that strong criticism from the Buddhists urged the Śaivas to reformulate their claims on the removal of sin through initiation. It is to be noted that the tantric doctrinal development reflected by the use of the term mala in extant written sources does not correspond to a change in the role of initiation, which maintains its function of making Śiva intervene in the initiand’s life and allowing the initiand to eventually attain liberation.23

The concept of impurities features prominently in section V.88 of Kṣemarāja’s Uddyota on Svacchandatantra (SvaTU), which concludes the chapter concerning tantric initiation. In the pūrvapakṣa he has the Buddhists (saugatāḥ) dispute tantric purification and its four possible objects, which are the self, the mind, actions, and impurities such as the view of a self.24 Also, at the beginning of his response to the Buddhist criticism he explains the

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20 See Eltschinger 2014: 125ff. for a consideration of the mention of tantric works in the Svārthānumāna chapter of the PV, and Bisschop 2010: 483–486 for some considerations about the presence of the Pāśupata movement around the middle of the first millennium.

21 On these kārikās see Pecchia 2015: 148–153 and the respective sections in Part 3, “Comments upon the Kārikās ...”.


24 SvaTU 73.10–13: tad atrā dīkṣāyām eva pratyaavatisthante saugatāh – iha dīksayā kim ātmanāḥ sam-skāraḥ kriyate buddher vā? kim ātmagrahādīnāṃ malānāṃ, kiṃ vā karmaṇāṃ?
Śaiva typology of impurities which cover the self. In both cases, he seems to be blissfully unaware of earlier articulations of the tantric concept of impurity.

The Buddhists mentioned by Kṣemarāja, as Sironi has shown, can be easily identified with Dharmakīrti and followers of his ideas, since most of the arguments in the pūrvapakṣa consist in a free paraphrase of formulations found in the PV section on initiation. Also, the uttarapakṣa includes citations from the same passage. The following issues from the pūrvapakṣa, in particular, can be linked to the PV:

1. If the mind were not capable of moving the senses after initiation, the senses of an initiate could not be active (SvaTU 75.1f. → PV II.265cd).
2. Mental faults together with their karmic impressions do not disappear in an initiate (SvaTU 75.2f. → PV II.266cd).
3. If the mind were eradicated immediately after initiation, the body would dissolve and there would not be any activity (SvaTU 75.3ff. → PV II.264d–265a).
4. The āgama as a valid means of cognition (SvaTU 75.10f. → PV II.257).
5. If actions could be destroyed only by initiation because they are not embodied, they would not possess any power even in the case of an oil massage or scorching oneself with fire; also, if the initiation with scales (dhaṭadīkṣā) makes the initiate lighter, sin should be embodied (SvaTU 75.11–76.1 → PV II.258–259).

In his discussion Kṣemarāja avails himself of the devices elaborated in a centuries-long reflection within non-dualist Śaiva thought. However, while arguing from a coherent and mature perspective, he also seems to employ a rhetorical strategy aiming to neutralize the negative nuance covertly generated by Dharmakīrti’s remarks on initiation. As can be seen in Table 1, he in fact reverses the PV sequence of arguments. The segment PV II.258–259, which presents a prasaṅga and Dharmakīrti’s sarcastic remarks against initiation, appears only at the end of Kṣemarāja’s pūrvapakṣa and is split in two parts in the uttarapakṣa, where k. 258 is discussed at the very beginning and k. 259 towards the end, followed by a defense of the validity of the Śaiva Scriptures.

In his response, Kṣemarāja first states that Dharmakīrti’s critique concerning the undesired consequence of ritual initiation in fact reveals the risibility of the Buddhist point of view. He then adduces the argument of mantras, which, given their inconceivable power, also possess the capacity of eliminating bonds.
Table 1: Arrangement of PV II.257–267 (on ritual initiation) in Kṣemarāja’s Uddyota on Svachchhata tantra V.88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PV kārikās grouped in thematic units according to the PVV</th>
<th>PV kārikās in the SvaTU pūrvapakṣa</th>
<th>PV kārikās in the SvaTU uttarapakṣa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>257</td>
<td>265cd (75.1f.)</td>
<td>258 (77.5f.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258–259</td>
<td>266cd (75.2f.)</td>
<td>266cd (77.15f.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260–261</td>
<td>264d–265a (75.3ff.)</td>
<td>262a–c, 264 (80.14f., 18f.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262–264</td>
<td>257 (75.10f.)</td>
<td>259e (81.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265–266</td>
<td>258ac–259 (75.11–76.1)</td>
<td>257 (82.7f.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267</td>
<td>[256 (82.10f.)]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Page and line numbers of the SvaTU edition are given in brackets.

One of his main concerns, however, is the nature of faults and the means for their final elimination. The view expounded in PV II.266, in particular, engages him in a longer analysis aiming to demonstrate, first, that the cleansing of impurities is not distinct from that of the self and, second, that initiation can hinder the arising of faults because it has the capacity of eventually effecting the purification of the self. In this connection, Kṣemarāja argues again for the special powers of mantras. Even if they cannot cancel the karman that supports the present body and its related passions, they are able to hinder any future arising of bonds (pāśas). Their way of operating is exemplified by the case of an ugly man who by means of mantras obtains a very beautiful wife, although his ugliness is not cancelled.29

Kṣemarāja’s emphasis on the force of mantras in connection with karman and impurities points out his commitment in holding onto the tradition and providing evidence for its tenability. A similar commitment is shown when he explains the loss of weight after initiation, which he regards as being due to the elimination of the cause of weight, namely tamas. A quite different attitude was possible, though, as is evident from Abhinavagupta’s consideration of the tulādīkṣā as a means to give confidence to deluded people.30

It is worth noting that in both the pūrvapakṣa and the uttarapakṣa Kṣemarāja does not refer to contents of the PV section on initiation which focus on the role of karman (PV II.260–261) and in the pūrvapakṣa he also omits to mention Dharmakīrti’s remarks on the nature of karmic impulses (PV II.262–264a). Rather, in his response, Kṣemarāja elaborates on the view of the self according to a non-dualist Śaiva doctrine and the value of its purification through initiation:

But in truth liberation is the viewing of the self in that which has the nature of truth, which is made of consciousness, and is admitted as the ultimate reality

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29 SvaTU 78.1–5: yathā hi virūpasya vairūpyam anivartyāpi lokottararāmaṇam mantraiḥ kriyate, tadvad dehārambhikāramāśodhanāt vartamānadehe rāgādyanivṛttav api bhāvipraptaḥ pratirodhānaṃ pāśānām kurvataṁ mantraṁ mantrāṇāṁ kim āvātām.
of any form of action and cognition because it is the ultimate reality of the I-awareness. From any point of view, … liberation is just the manifestation of being Śiva. And in this regard the performance of initiation is for the sake of realizing that one attains that everything is of the same essence after knowing it.

This forms a stark contrast with the Buddhist approach to the way of attaining liberation, which Kṣemarāja describes in the concluding part of the pūrvapakṣa:

Therefore, liberation is nothing but the insight of selflessness preceded by the meditative practice on momentariness and so forth.\(^{31}\)

His statement shows how a late representative of the Indian intellectual tradition perceived Dharmakīrti’s soteriological stance and can be taken as an answer from within the tradition to the question “Are Buddhist Pramāṇavādins non-Buddhistic?,” which Helmut Krasser asked and discussed in an article of 2004. The SvaTU presentation of Dharmakīrti’s critique on initiation as a method to attain liberation suggests that Kṣemarāja regarded such a critique as being part of a soteriological approach in which typically Buddhist concepts such as momentariness are considered instrumental to practices that lead to liberation according to a Buddhist point of view, namely meditative practices that lead to the realization of selflessness.

Appendix

Text and translation of PV II.257–267

The Sanskrit text and footnotes presented in this appendix are not a critical edition of the PV kārikās, but only a provisional presentation of them, as they are transmitted in the available witnesses in Sanskrit, i.e., K\(\text{H}\), the manuscript bearing the PV kārikās; A\(\text{Sa}\), the manuscript bearing Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on the PV, which includes the kārikās; and V, which indicates the kārikās as reflected in Manorathanandin’s commentary on the PV. The text in Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s printed edition of the latter does not deviate from the text in the manuscript. It is to be noted that the PV kārikās in the PVV result from Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s reconstruction of the PV.\(^{32}\)

\((257)\) āgamasya tathābhāvanībandhanam apāsyatām / 
   muktim āgamamātreṇa vadan\(^{33}\) na paritoṣakṛt // 
   One who, based on the Scripture alone, proclaims liberation, does not satisfy

\(^{31}\) SvaTU 76.1f.: tasmāt kṣanākatvādibhāvanāpūrvikā nairātmyadṛṣṭir eva mokṣa iti.
\(^{32}\) For details about these witnesses, see Pecchia 2015, chapter 9. A critical edition of the PV kārikās here under examination and Manorathanandin’s commentary thereon is under preparation in the framework of the FWF project “Indian Buddhist epistemology and the path to liberation” (see first note). For a German translation of this section of the PV, see Vetter 1990; for some considerations, see Eltschinger 2014: 122ff. My translation of kk. 258–59 and 262–265 only slightly differs from the translation provided in Acharya 2014: 14ff.
\(^{33}\) vadan K\(\text{H}\) V: bruvan A\(\text{Sa}\).
those who do not see the reason why the Scripture is of that kind [i.e., reliable with regard to its content].

(258) nālāṃ bijādisaṃsiddho vidhiḥ punsām ajanmane /
taillāhyangāgniḍāhāder api muktprarasāgatah //
The rite [of initiation] validated by the example of a seed et cetera is not sufficient for the absence of rebirth of embodied souls, because there would be the undesired consequence of liberation even due to an oil massage, scouring [oneself] with fire, and the like.

(259) prāg guror lāghavāt paścān na pāpaharaṇam kṛtam /
mā bhūd gauravam evāya na pāpaṃ gury amūrtitah34 //
That a man who weighed heavier before becomes lighter after [initiation] does not mean that his sin is removed. Let it [even] be the case that he has no weight at all; [but] sin is not heavy because it is not embodied.

(260) mithyājñānatadudbhūtatarṣasaṃcetanāvāsāt /
hīnasthānagatir janma tenā35 tacchin na jāyate //
It is due to intentional mental acts associated with false cognition and the craving arising from it that there is rebirth, which is going to an inferior place [such as a womb]. Therefore, one who cuts them is not reborn.

(261) tayor eva hi sāmarthyaṁ jātau tanmātrabhāvah /
te cetane svayam karmety36 akhandam janmakāranaṁ //
Indeed, these two alone are capable of causing rebirth, because the latter occurs only due to them. Those two [types of] intentional mental acts are by themselves karma. Therefore, the cause of rebirth is not fragmentary (i.e., defective, in our description).

(262) gatiprattiyoḥ karanaṁ37 āśrayas tāny adṛṣṭataḥ /
adṛṣṭanāśād agatis38 tat samśkāra na cetanā //
[Ob.]: The sense faculties are the basis of [instances of] cognition and motion; they are due to the unseen force.
Because the unseen force is destroyed, there is no motion. This [force] is the karmic impulse, not an intentional mental act.

(263) sāmarthyaṁ karoñotputter bhāvabhāvānuvṛttitāḥ /
dṛṣṭaṃ buddher na cānyasya santi tāni na yanti kim39 //
[Re.]: The capacity of arising that belongs to [the activity of] the sense faculties is observed in connection with the presence or absence of the mind, and nothing else. When these [faculties] exist, why should they not continue [to be operative]?

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34 amūrtitah Aṣa V: amūrttataḥ Kṛ.
35 tāna Kṛ Aṣa: tatas V.
36 karmety Kṛ V Aṣa (post correctionem): karmmāty Aṣa (ante correctionem).
37 The reading karanaṁ is attested in Kṛ Aṣa V, but the printed edition of Prajñākaragupta’s commentary has kārānaṁ.
38 agatis Kṛ V: na gatis Aṣa.
39 santi tāni na yanti kim Kṛ V: tāni santi na santi kim Aṣa.
(264) dhāraṇaprerāṇakṣobhanirodhāś cetanāvaśāḥ 
na syus teśām asāmarthye tasya dikṣādyantarāṃ //
Concentrating, moving, being agitated or withdrawing are due to intentional mental acts.
These [actions] would not occur if those [faculties] were not possessed of any capacity immediately after one’s initiation et cetera.
(265) atha buddhes tadā 'bhāvān na syuh sandhīyate malaiḥ / buddhis40 teśām asāmarthye jīvato ’pi syur aksamāḥ //
[Ob.:] If [actions] were due to the mind, they would not occur, because then (i.e. after initiation) [the mind] would not be there. [Re.:] Because of impurities the mind is linked [to other births]. If [impurities] were not possessed of any capacity [to impel action after initiation], even in the case of an [initiated] living being they would be unable [to produce any effect].
(266) nirhrāsātiśayāt puṣṭau pratipakṣasvapakṣayoḥ /
doṣāḥ svabijasantānā dikṣīte ’py anīvāritāḥ //
Since they decrease or increase according to the degree of prosperity of what hinders or favours them, mental faults, whose series arise from their own seeds, are unimpeded even in one who is initiated.
(267) nityasya nirapekṣatvāt kramotpattir virudhyate /
kriyāyāṃ akrīyāyāṃ ca kriyayoḥ41 sadṛśatmanah //
The successive arising of something permanent is contradictory because of the independence of the latter—
[something permanent which is] of the same nature in the case of action and non-action [of the faculties etc.] in both times (e.g., before death and after death).

References and abbreviations


40 buddhis KHV V (see PVV 101.3): buddhes AŚa (and Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s reconstruction of the pāda in his edition of the PVV).

41 kriyayoḥ KHV V: kriyā ca AŚa.


PV Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti, in PVV and ASa.

PV II Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the PV.


V  Pramāṇavārttika kārikās as reflected in the PVV.


Dharmottara on the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* and *trairūpya* in Dharmakīrti’s *sattvānumāṇa*

by

Masamichi Sakai

**Introduction**

It goes without saying that Dharmakīrti’s new approach of inferring momentariness (*kṣaṇikatvānumāṇa*) – i.e., the *sattvānumāṇa*, the inference of momentariness based on the inferential reason property “existence” (*sattva*) – had a decisive impact on the later development of this kind of Buddhist inference. At the same time, it is also true that the *sattvānumāṇa* generated a number of interpretative tasks for Dharmakīrti’s successors.

The problem is that the *sattvānumāṇa* seems to contain many aspects that threaten to shake the foundation of the traditional Buddhist logic in place since Dignāga.1 Prof. Katsumi Mimaki gives a clear synopsis of the problems confronting later Buddhist logicians, basing himself mainly on the works of Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti, Ratnākaraśānti, and Mokṣākaragupta, who constitute the last phase of Buddhist philosophers.2 I agree with Prof. Mimaki’s contention that the problems they dealt with did not arise suddenly at that time, but rather had been developing gradually over the course of history.3 I have shown for example that one of the most crucial problems of the *sattvānumāṇa* – namely that the “example” (henceforth: *dṛṣṭānta*) is of no use, which seemingly forces the Buddhist to discard the second *trairūpya* condition (*sapakṣa eva sattvam*; henceforth T2) – was argued by Arcaṭa with a keen awareness.4

Arcaṭa’s pupil, Dharmottara, shares his teacher’s awareness of the problem. In line with Arcaṭa’s argument, he also asks whether or not the *dṛṣṭānta* in the *sattvānumāṇa* is necessary. However, Dharmottara goes even further, contesting the necessity of the inferential reason property “existence” itself, thereby deepening the problem and developing the argument.

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I am very grateful to Mr. Tyler Neill (PhD candidate, Leipzig University) for correcting and improving my English. Through the conversation with him, I could also improve this essay as a whole. With my deepest gratitude, I dedicate this article to my beloved Teacher Dr. Helmut Krasser, who privileged me to be a member of his project of editing the *codex unicus* of Dharmottara’s *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*.

1 It is interesting that Dharmakīrti himself presents the *sattvānumāṇa* as if there were no conflict between the logic underlying the *sattvānumāṇa* and the traditional Buddhist logic in place since Dignāga. For now I cannot make any judgments about whether Dharmakīrti himself thinks that the logic of the *sattvānumāṇa* does not deviate from the traditional Dignāgean logic, but his followers’ activities make me think this is unlikely.


4 I read a paper on this topic at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Vienna 2014; see Sakai 2015. In Arcaṭa’s argument, we can see a direct link with the *antarvyāpti* theory advocated by Ratnākaraśānti and reported by Mokṣākaragupta in comparison with the *bahirvyāpti* theory (cf. TBh 47,1–6).
The aim of this article is to introduce and clarify Dharmottara’s arguments for solving the problematic nature of the *sattvānumāna*, by shedding light on what the exact problem is that Dharmottara inherits from his teacher, and how he addresses and develops it. In doing so, I attempt to properly locate Dharmottara’s contribution within the larger interpretative history of the *sattvānumāna*.

1 Arcaṭa and Dharmottara: sharing the problem of the *dvṛśṭānta* and the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*

1.1 Arcaṭa’s argument: the *dvṛśṭānta* is useless and redundant

Arcaṭa’s greatest concern, as well as his pupil’s, is the relation between the threefold characteristic of a good reason property, i.e., *trairūpya*, and the so-called *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* in the *sattvānumāna*.

In Dharmakīrtian logic, the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* in the *sattvānumāṇā* plays a critical role of demonstrating the essential connection (svabhāvataprabandha) or the pervasion (vyāpti) between the inferential reason property (henceforth: *hetu* “existence”) and the target property (henceforth: śādhyadharma) “momentariness.”

In the *Hetubinduṭīkā* (HBT), Arcaṭa argues that, in the case of *kṣaṇikatvānumāṇā*, since its śādhyadharma “momentariness” is imperceptible by nature, it is therefore impossible to find and show a *dvṛśṭānta* via perception (*pratyakṣa*). Generally speaking, in Dignāgean inference, in order to say that a *hetu* satisfies T2, one must exhibit at least one thing that possesses the *hetu* as well as the śādhyadharma and that is ontologically different from the site of inference (śādhyadharmin; henceforth: *pakṣa*). However, in the *kṣaṇikatvānumāṇā*, it is in fact impossible to find any momentary thing at all via perception. How then can one find a momentary thing to serve as *dvṛśṭānta*? Concerning this problem, Arcaṭa is of Perceiving the importance of Dharmottara’s arguments, Prof. Tadashi Tani was early in exploring them as they appear both in Dharmottara’s *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (KBhS) and *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, second chapter (PVinṬ 2). See Tani 1997 and Tani 2000. At that time, however, the Sanskrit manuscript of the latter was unavailable. But now, the situation has changed, and I am lucky in a position to consult the codex unicus of the PVinṬ 2 (for the project of editing the codex unicus of the PVinṬ, see https://www.oeaw.ac.at/ikga/forschung/buddhismuskunde-sinologie/schwerpunkte/pramanaviniscayatika/), which covers the entirety of the important portion in which Dharmottara discusses the problem of the *sattvānumāṇā* most intensively. The Sanskrit original surely enables us to grasp Dharmottara’s arguments with more clarity.

Dharmakīrti’s first use of this defeating source of knowledge (*bādhakapramāṇa*) for the *sattvānumāṇā* is in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, second chapter (cf. PVin 2 80,1–8), and also in his later works, the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya* (cf. HB 4,9–12, VN 2,1–4, respectively). He puts forward the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* as the method of proving the essential connection for the *sattvānumāṇā*. Its basic and simple form can be demonstrated as follows: “Given that there is no-momentariness, since there is the inconsistency with purpose fulfillment*, the being-real which is characterized as that [i.e., purpose fulfillment,] is abandoned” (HB 4,11-12: aksaṇikatve ‘arthakriyāvirodhāt tallakaṇḍaṃ vastavatvam hiyata iti.). For a German translation, cf. Steinkellner 1967: 37. “My understanding of the word *arthakriyā* is based on Dharmottara’s elucidation in his PVinṬ and the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*. Cf. PVinṬ 2 Ms 89a2–3 (PVinṬS 17,11): arthaḥ prayojanaṃ, tasya kriyā nispatiḥ; NBṬ 76,3–4: arthasya prayojanasya kriyā nispatiḥ.

This paragraph is a summary of Sakai 2015: 284–289 (sections 3.1.–3.2.).
the opinion that, since the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa can prove the essential connection, it can also prove that whatever possesses the hetu has the sādhyadharma. Thus, if one applies the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa to something possessing the hetu and ontologically different from the pakṣa, one can show that the hetu satisfies T2. In the final analysis, however, Arcaṭa sees this activity of finding a dṛṣṭānta as nonsensical, given the natural objection in favor of directly applying the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa to the pakṣa. That is, the logical method used to find something momentary as a dṛṣṭānta can also be used to prove that the pakṣa is momentary. With this in mind, Arcaṭa views the dṛṣṭānta as being redundant and of no use in the case of the sattvānumāna. He asserts that T2 in the case of the sattvānumāna should be understood to be fictitious (kālpanika).

1.2 Dharmottara’s treatment of the dṛṣṭānta

Dharmottara takes the same position as Arcaṭa, namely that what proves the momentariness of a dṛṣṭānta is the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa and not any other source of knowledge, and that the same viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa can also be used to prove that the pakṣa is momentary. Given this position, the dṛṣṭānta seems to be of no use, according to Arcaṭa. However, in the Pramāṇaviniścayatīkā (PVinṬ), Dharmottara elucidates a positive significance of, and role for, the dṛṣṭānta in the case of the sattvānumāna. The following series of arguments in the PVinṬ is strongly influenced by Arcaṭa’s position, and it seems here that Dharmottara, in an attempt to preserve some kind of raison d’être for the trairūpya, tries to overturn Arcaṭa’s conclusion.

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8 In other words, the dṛṣṭānta never contributes in any way to a proof that the pakṣa has the sādhyadharma. This is so in the sense that the dṛṣṭānta cannot play even the Dhammakīrtian role of conveying the essential connection (svabhāvapratibandha) to those who do not remember or do not know it, since without the functioning of the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, one can never know that the dṛṣṭānta possesses the sādhyadharma “momentariness.” Given that momentariness itself can never be perceived, there is no difference between the dṛṣṭānta and the pakṣa. For the difference between the Dhammakīrtian and the Dignāgean role of dṛṣṭānta, see Steinkellner 2004.

9 In the KBhS, Dharmottara asserts that even if there can be dṛṣṭāntas, namely things whose momentariness is accepted, it cannot thereby be proved that the pakṣa too is of that nature, and this is because a mere similarity with such dṛṣṭāntas cannot conclusively prove that the other thing is also momentary. Thus, Dharmottara requires, in order to prove the momentariness of the pakṣa, the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa to be applied to the pakṣa. Cf. KBhS² 223,15–17, 21–23: ‘di la dpe ni yod kyang chos mthun pa tsañ ‘ba’ zhig gis (‘ba’ zhig gis KBhS²: ‘ba’ zhig gi KBhS²) dgos po gshan dag de’i rang bzhin du gyur ba rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin no / ... gal te yang dpe la skad cig mar ’jig pa yod na (’jig pa yod na KBhS²: ’jig pa KBhS²) / de la na yang khyab pa rab tu sgrub pa’i (rab tu sgrub pa’i KBhS²: rab tu bsgrubs pa’i KBhS²) tshad mar rab tu bstan pa nid las skad cig mar ’jig par grub bo / “In this case [i.e., when momentariness is to be proved], even if there are dṛṣṭāntas, it is not tenable that other things are [also] of that nature [i.e., = of the nature of momentariness] due to a mere similarity [with dṛṣṭāntas]. ...even if there can be perishing within a moment in dṛṣṭāntas, nevertheless it is only on the basis of showing the source of knowledge which in fact demonstrates pervasion (i.e., the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa) that perishing within a moment is proved.” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 241.

10 In both the KBhS and the PVinṬ, Dharmottara discusses various logical problems with the sattvānumāna, and although many of these discussions are common to both works, it is only in the PVinṬ that Dharmottara cares about the positive aspect of the dṛṣṭānta.
1.2.1 dṛṣṭānta’s role and significance

In the PVinṬ, Dharmottara states:

If impermanence [i.e., momentariness,] is to be proved, what is a dṛṣṭānta, where the relation between that which is to be pervaded and that which pervades [it] should be demonstrated? And he [i.e., Dharmakīrti] will declare [later, in PVin 3 128,1–131,5] that, “One should not take up a hetu, relying on scriptural doctrine (samaya/gzhung PVinṬ).” And, when an opponent who does not adhere to [any] settled doctrine (siddhānta) objects to momentariness, in that case, he should be forced to provisionally accept the momentariness of a certain thing even by receiving bribes (utkoca). This is because, otherwise, owing to the lack of a dṛṣṭānta, there would be no hetu. Therefore, there is no [dṛṣṭānta] at all whose sādhyadharma has already been well established [for such an opponent].11

First, in asking himself what to make of the dṛṣṭānta in the inference of momentariness, Dharmottara refers to Dharmakīrti’s discourse on the antinomic reasons (viruddhāvyabhicārīhetu) in the third chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya. There Dharmakīrti argues that his three kinds of hetu – essential feature (svabhāva), effect (kārya), and non-perception (anupalabdhi) – can never be antinomic. This is because they are all based on real things (vastu). According to him, any hetu based on scriptures (āgama) are antinomic, since they do not issue from the force of seeing real things (avastudarśanabalapravṛttam).12 With respect to this position of Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara sees a role for a dṛṣṭānta. Namely,

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11 PVinＴ 2 Ms 99a3–6: athānityatve sādhye ko dṛṣṭāntah, yatra vyāpyavyāpakabhāvah sidhyeta. “na ca samayam āśriya hetur upādeyā” iti vakyati. anāśritasiddhāntakaś ca paro yadā kṣaṇikatvam (ksaṇikatvam emended [cf. skad cig ma nyid PVinṬ]; kṣaṇikam Ms) pratī pratyavatisthate, tadāśāv utkocādānenāpi kasyacit padārthasya kṣaṇikatvābhuyapagamam (padārthasya kṣaṇikatvā emended: padārthākṣaṇikatvā Ms) kārayitavyah. “itaraḥ hi dṛṣṭāntābhāvād dhetur na syāt. tasmān na prasiddhādhyadharmah kaścit.” For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 167. + “To my understanding, the bold part is Dharmottara’s short summary of PVin 3 128,1–131,5, where Dharmakīrti details antinomic reasons (viruddhāvyabhicārā). I have not yet been able to find an exact passage in the PVin. For the Tibetan translation corresponding to PVin 3 128,1–131,5, which has been translated into Japanese with a clear analysis, see Ono 2010: 136–139. + + + For this part, the Tibetan version reads as follows: PVinṬ, P305b3;D253a3: de lta ma yin na dpe med pas gstan tshigs ma yin par ’geu ro lI de’i phyir bsgrub par bya ba’i chos ma grub pa na ni dpe ’ga’ yang med do lI “Otherwise, because there is no dṛṣṭānta, [a relevant reason property] would not indeed be a reason property. Therefore, with regard to [a reason property] whose sādhyadharmah is not well established (*aprasisddhādhyadharmam* asidddhādhyadharmam), there is no dṛṣṭānta at all (*na kaścit dṛṣṭāntah*).” For me, the content of this Tibetan translation is difficult.

12 Cf. PVin 3 128,2–5: na hi sambhavo ’sti kāryasvabhāvahoy auktalaksanavoy anupalambhāvahoy viruddhāvyabhicāritāyān. na cānya ’vyabhicārī. tasmād avastudarśanabalapravṛttam āgamaśrayam a-numānam āśriya tadarthaviacrāreṇa viruddhāvyabhicārī sādhanaśoṣa uktah, Śāstrakārāṇām artheṣu bhṛtyāy viparītasvabhāvopasaṃhitārasambhavāt. na hi asti sambhavo yathāvasthitavastusthitisy ātma-kāryānupalambheṣu.
Dharmottara regards a *dṛṣṭānta* as a place where it is guaranteed that a relevant *hetu* is based on a real thing and not on scripture.\(^\text{13}\)

Then, Dharmottara imagines a certain situation in which a *dṛṣṭānta* is needed: Suppose there is an opponent who is open-minded, i.e., free from any dogmas, but who never accepts momentariness. In that case, an advocate of momentariness must force that opponent into provisionally accepting (*abhi-upa-śgam*) the momentariness of a certain thing – this ‘certain thing’ is a *dṛṣṭānta*. Otherwise, not only could he not present the *sādhyadhárma* to him, but he could not present even the *hetu*. That is, for such an opponent a certain thing serving as *dṛṣṭānta* would be the first place where both the *sādhyadhárma* and the *hetu* coexist. Therefore, with this *dṛṣṭānta* the proponent can first establish both for that opponent. So, the proponent must employ the following procedure: first, force the opponent into provisionally accepting the momentariness of a certain thing, and second, make it known to him that the *hetu* is also there. After that, he can eventually move on to a proof of the momentariness of the *pakṣa*. However, at this point, the *sādhyadhárma* of that *dṛṣṭānta* has not yet been proved.

1.2.2 Definition of the *dṛṣṭānta* in the case of the sattvānumāna

In this line of argumentation, Dharmottara defines the *dṛṣṭānta* in the inference of momentariness as follows:

Moreover, with regard to this “grasping/holding of a *dṛṣṭānta* [in a proof],” mentioned here and there, the following is the meaning: It is by depending on the fact that the *hetu* exists in a thing that is different from the *pakṣa* that one can make the defeating source of knowledge function, not in a different manner. Therefore, the *dṛṣṭānta* is an object 1) which is a sphere (*viṣaya*) where *hetu* is established and 2) which is a place where the defeating source of knowledge is shown. For an opponent in turn, however, [*dṛṣṭānta*] is not [yet] proved as being caused to be bound to the *sādhyadhárma*, [i.e., momentariness], [until the defeating source of knowledge is made to function there].\(^\text{14}\)

One aspect of this is that Dharmottara confirms that the *hetu* should be established on the basis of reality and that it is in the *dṛṣṭānta* that this takes place. Another aspect is that the *dṛṣṭānta* is a place where the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* should be shown, since

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\(^{13}\) In the *sattvānumāna*, the *hetu* as “existence” refers to “purpose fulfillment,” and this is of course established on the basis of seeing real things – for example, in the case of a pot as the *dṛṣṭānta*, its purpose fulfillment, holding water etc., is established by observation.

\(^{14}\) PVinṬ 2 Ms 99a6–7: *yaḥ puras tatra tatra dṛṣṭāntaparigraha utkāḥ, tatrayam abhiprāyāḥ (abhiprāyāḥ emended [cf. dgongs pa PVinṬ]: *a*[prav]ā{[ā]}yāḥ Ms) – sādhyadharmiyavāriktē vastuntē hetotē sattvam āśrityā bādhakāṃ pramānāṃ vyāpārayitum sākyam, nānyathā, tasmād dhetor vidhivisayo bādhakā- pramānānapradarśanagocaro (“pradarśanā” emended [cf. rab tu ston pa’i PVinṬ]; “darśana”) ’rtho dṛṣṭāntah, na tu pratīvadīnāḥ sādhyadharmasambandhitaḥ siddhāḥ. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 168.
otherwise, the proponent cannot prove the drṣṭānta’s momentariness, which has been only forcibly and provisionally accepted by the opponent.\textsuperscript{15}

2 The crucial problem of the hetu sattva: No need for the trairūpya condition as a whole

However, the position that the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa establishes as proved the provisionally accepted momentariness of a drṣṭānta evokes the very crucial problem, which, to the best of my knowledge, was first propounded by Arcaṭa, and which equally confronted later Buddhist logicians.

Dharmottara introduces the following, seemingly rhetorical pūrvapakṣa:

[Objection 1:] If the defeating source of knowledge does not require [a drṣṭānta] of which the sādhyadharma is already admitted, then, in this manner, when the defeating source of knowledge shows the pervasion of [a property] “being produced” by [a property] “being impermanent” in a property possessor as drṣṭānta, this very same defeating source of knowledge will prove the impermanence in the pakṣa too. Thus, it is in every case the defeating source of knowledge that is capable of proving the sādhyadharma. For this reason, there is the undesirable consequence that the hetu, which is of the essential feature type, is not a real hetu (ahetutvaprasaṅga). [Objection 2:] Moreover, even if the following is the case: “Defeating (bādhaka) itself does not occur without depending upon [the hetu] ‘being existent’ and ‘being produced,’ therefore, [the hetu] ‘being existent’ should be needed,” it is nevertheless only on the basis of pakṣadharmatva [i.e., the fact that the hetu is a property of the pakṣa], which is accompanied by the defeating source of knowledge, that the sādhyadharma is proved. Thus, there is the undesirable consequence that there is not a threefold condition [as a whole, namely because only the first condition is needed].\textsuperscript{16}

The points of this objection are:

\textsuperscript{15} It should be noted here that in the KBhS Dharmottara does not mention the role and significance of drṣṭānta in the case of the sattvānumāna that he discusses in the PVinṬ (cf. the text portions of the PVinṬ 2 cited in nn. 11 and 14 above).

\textsuperscript{16} PVinṬ 2 Ms 99a7–99b3: *yadi badhakam pramāṇam na siddhasādhyadharmāpekṣam, evam tarhi yenaiva bādhakaḥ pramāṇena āśrayate tenaiva pramāṇena sādhyadharmaḥ ayaḥ anuvartate ‘‘ṣaṃkṛṣṭatvaḥ saṃkṛṣṭatvam anuvartatvaḥ saṃkṛṣṭatvam adhyātiśayaḥ. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 168–169.  a–a For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS. Cf. KBhS\textsuperscript{F} 223,23–25: gal te de šgrub pa bya ba’i chos can nyid lha khyab pa (khyab pa KBhS\textsuperscript{P}) sgrub pa’i išad ma skad cig ma nyid du śgrub na yod pa žhes bya ba’i tshigs nye bar blangs pa don med par ’gyur ro zhe na l “’Objection:’ If, in this way [i.e., as it is in the drṣṭānta], the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion proves momentariness just in the pakṣa itself, it should be useless to take/employ the hetu called satṭva [in an inference].” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 241–242.
1. Given that the \textit{viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa} can in fact prove the \textit{drṣṭānta}'s momentariness, it can prove the \textit{pakṣa}'s momentariness too. It follows then that the \textit{hetu sattva} in the \textit{sattvānumāna} is not a real \textit{hetu} that can in fact prove \textit{sādhyadharma} – the real \textit{hetu}, i.e., reasoning, is the very \textit{viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa} instead.

2. It may be the case that defeating does not occur without this \textit{hetu} – since what is defeated by the \textit{viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa} is this \textit{sattva} in the case where non-momentariness is supposed\textsuperscript{17} – and so, in this sense, the \textit{hetu} seems to be needed.\textsuperscript{18} Nevertheless, it should actually be the case that only the \textit{pakṣadharmanā} – the fact that the \textit{hetu} is a property of the \textit{pakṣa} – is needed. This is because the \textit{viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa} can function in the \textit{pakṣa} if and only if that \textit{pakṣa} possesses \textit{sattva}, so that its possession of the \textit{sādhyadharma} can be proved by it. In this case, what is needed for a sound inference is only the first \textit{trairūpya} condition (henceforth: T1). Thus, the \textit{trairūpya} condition considered as a whole would be useless.

It is this same second point of this objection on the basis of which Arcaṭa discards the necessity of T2.

\textbf{2.1 Counterexample and the second \textit{trairūpya} condition}

To respond to these undesired consequences on behalf of the \textit{trairūpya} theory, Dharmottara appeals to the concept of a ‘counterexample’ in a possible debate with opponents:

[Answer:] [To this objection,] we say (ucyate): What has been said, namely that, “[It is sufficient that] there is pervasion only in the \textit{pakṣa}, and so what can be gained by grasping other property possessors [other than the \textit{pakṣa}]?” is not tenable. This is because it is not possible to show the defeating source of knowledge in a single locus [i.e., in the \textit{pakṣa}], after setting aside visible objects that are different from the \textit{pakṣa}. Suppose the defeating source of knowledge should be shown in the following manner: “If there were not the momentariness of a sound, there would not be even [its] existence.” If an opponent were to say, “Just as a visible thing, such as a pot etc., though not momentary, achieves purpose fulfillment, this sound too must be so,” [then] those visible [things], such as pots, should also in the same manner [i.e., like in the case of a sound] be brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge. And, with regards to those [visible things such as a pot and the like] that have [already] been brought into the scope [of the defeating source of knowledge], he [i.e., the opponent] may respond: “A certain invisible thing, though it achieves purpose [fulfillment], should be (bhaviṣyati) non-momentary, and these visible [things, the pot and so on] are like this.” Therefore, [this] invisible thing that has in turn been put forth as a [counter]example by the opponent should be brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge. Therefore, why is it the

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. n. 6 above.

\textsuperscript{18} In other words, this position refers to the view that the \textit{hetu sattva} and the property “being existent” defeated by the \textit{viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa} are the same.
case that the defeating source of knowledge is shown only in the specific and single pakṣa?¹⁹

Dharmottara’s point is this: Even though the proponent applies the viparyaye bādhaka-pramāṇa directly to the pakṣa and thereby completes the proof of its momentariness, his

¹⁹ PVinṬ 2 Ms 99b3–7: ucyate – yaḥ uktaḥ – sādhyaḥkarminy eva vyāptih, tat kim dharmyantaraparigrah-ñeti, tad ayuktam, yasmād drṣṭān sādhyaḥkarminvātiriktaṇ bāhviṇā pariṣṭayaḥ naikasmin dharmiṇi bādhakam pramāṇam śākyam darśayitum. yadi kṣanikatvam na syāc chābhasya, sattvam eva na syād ity evam bādhake pramāṇe darśayitave yadi paro brūyāt – yathā ghaṭādir drṣṭo bhāvo ‘kṣanikatve ‘py arthakriyākāri, tadvad ayam śābdo ‘pi syāt iti, evam te ‘pi drṣṭā ghaṭādayo bādhakapramāṇavisayikar-tavyāh. tesu ca visayikrteṣu punarbrūyāt (punarbrūyāt emended: punarbrūyāt Ms) – adṛṣṭo bhāvah kaścid arthakārya api aksanika bhāvīṣyati, tadvac cāmi drṣṭā iti punah parena drṣṭāntikṛto ‘drṣṭo bhāvo bādhakapramāṇavisayikartavya iti (‘kartavya iti emended [bya dgos pa ‘i phyir PVinṬ]; ‘kartta iti Ms) katham ekasmin eva sādhyaḥkarminī bādhakapramāṇapradarśanam. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 169–170. For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS (the exact literal parallel is the part a–a). Cf. KBhS²²³,25–224,17: ‘chos can nyid la khyab pa sgrub par byed pa’i (khyab pa sgrub par byed pa’i KBhS²: khyab par sgrub par byed pa’i KBhS²) tshad mar rab tu bstan par ni nus pa ma yin te ‘li di liar khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma ni ‘di liar bstan par bya ste ‘i gal te sgru riag par gyur na rim dang cig car dag gis don bya la bya nye bar sbyor bar mi ‘gyur ro zhes so ‘li ‘di la ni pha rol pos kyang ji liar bum pa skad cig ma ma yin yang rim dang cig car dag gis mngon par ‘dod pa’i ‘bras bu bsgrub par nus pa de bzhiin du sgru yang ‘gyur ro zhes brjod par nus so ‘li ‘di la yang lan l bum pa yang ngs gned par byed pa’i tshad ma’i yul du byas pa nyid do zhes brjod dag gos so ‘li des na ram grangs ‘di pha rol gyi nye bar bkod pa mthong ba’i dngos po mtha’ dag rgl bas (rgol bas KBhS²: gol bas KBhS²) gned par byed pa’i tshad ma’i yul du byas pa bya yin no ‘li gal te pha rol po dngos po ‘ga’ zhis skad cig ma ma yin par rim dang cig car gyis (rim dang cig car gyis KBhS²: rim dang cig car gyi KBhS²) don byed pa’i nus pa de bzhiin sgra yang yin no zhes ma mthong ba yang dogs par byed na (dogs par byed na KBhS²: dags par byed na KBhS²) de la yang gal te ‘ga’ zhis der gyur na skad cig ma ma yin pa des kyang rim dang cig car dag gis don byed par mi nus so zhes spīr brjod par bya o ‘li des na srid par byas pa’i ma mthong ba de yang gned par byed pa’i tshad ma’i yul nyid du khas blang bar bya ba nyid do ‘lø de tla yin pa mthong ma mthong ba’i dngos po mtha’ dag la (dngos po mtha’ dag la KBhS²: dngos po mtha’ dag KBhS²) khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma bstan par nram par gnas pa na (nram par gnas pa na KBhS²: nram par gnas pa dang KBhS²) / gang dag bsgrub par bya ba’i chos can las (bsgrub par bya ba’i chos can las KBhS²: bsgrub sgrub par bya ba’i chos can las KBhS²) tha dad pa’i dngos po de dag dpe’i dngos la brten pa’i phyir bsgrub par bya ba’i chos can las that da dad pa’i dang dag la (gang dag la KBhS²: gang la KBhS²) gtan tshigs yod pa de dag ni dpe yin te / bsgrub par bya ba’i dngos po nges pa ni (nges pa ni KBhS²: nges pa na KBhS²) khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma la rag las pa’i phyir ro ‘li “[Answer:] It is not possible to show the source of knowledge proving pervasion only in the pakṣa alone. This is because the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion should be shown in the following manner – ‘If a sound [i.e., the pakṣa] were permanent, it would be employed in fulfilling a purpose neither in a gradual nor in a simultaneous manner.’ [A proponent says] so. Against this, [his] opponent in turn can retort – ‘Just as a pot, though being non-momentary, can bring about an expected effect in a gradual or simultaneous manner, so too must a sound be.’ Against this too, the reply should be stated [as follows] – ‘A pot too is by all means brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge by me [i.e., the proponent].’ Thus, every visible thing proposed (*upanyasta) by the opponent through such an enumeration is brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge by the disputant [i.e., the proponent]. If the opponent doubts even an invisible [thing], saying that, ‘A certain thing, being non-momentary, can fulfill a purpose in a gradual or simultaneous manner, and a sound is so too,’ then, against this too, it should be generally stated – ‘If there were to exist a certain [thing, and if it were] not momentary, it also would be incapable of fulfilling a purpose, whether in a gradual or in a simultaneous manner.’ Therefore, this invisible [thing] too, which has been hypothetically assumed [by the opponent], is necessarily provisionally accepted as the object of the defeating source of knowledge. And when in this manner it is established that the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion is
opponent might bring other existing things as ‘counterexamples’ which are thought to be non-momentary but capable of purpose fulfillment. Theoretically speaking, for any existent things including even invisible things (adṛśya), it is not until the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa functions that their momentariness is proved, since only it is capable of proving momentariness. In this sense, the opponent has the right to present counterexamples to which the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa has not yet been applied, so as to invalidate the pakṣa’s momentariness. Dharmottara insists that, in order to rebut such counterexamples, the proponent must show the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa in counterexamples. This activity amounts to the fact that the opponent needs to hold T2, in that such counterexamples will be ontologically different things from the pakṣa. In this regard, it is not the case that the trainūpya condition in its totality is useless. Rather, it is an indispensable condition for a sound inference of the pakṣa’s momentariness. In this way, Dharmottara, although basically inheriting Arcaṭa’s view, asserts the significance of T2.

2.1.1 Omni-applicability of the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa

In theory, the opponent can pose an infinite number of counterexamples including even invisible things. Therefore, the proponent must apply the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa to each and every case according to the situation. In other words, the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa must be such a source of knowledge as should and in fact can be applied to all counterexamples brought forth by the opponent. In this regard, Dharmottara calls Dharmakīrti’s viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa “that whose scope is a collection of all things” (sarvapadārthopasamhāraviṣayam).

And for this very reason, for the Teacher [i.e., Dharmakīrti], which demonstrates the relation between that which is to be pervaded and that which pervades [it, i.e., the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa,] is intended to have the scope of a collection of all things, as [he] has said [in the PVin 2 76,3–4]: “whatsoever is produced is impermanent.” And he does not accept the pervasion which is subject to distinctions among the pakṣa and the like. Therefore, the logical mark, whose scope is in fact all things, is ascertained to be pervaded by its own target [property], which is proved by the defeating source of knowledge.20

As the reason for the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa’s omni-applicability, Dharmottara refers to an essential feature of the hetu “existence” (sattva), which is a part of the viparyaye

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20 PVinT 2 Ms 99b1–100a1: *ata eva ca sarvapadārthopasamhāraviṣayam vyāpyavyāpakhāvāsādhakam ācāryasya, yat āha – yat kiñcit kṛtakam, tat sarvam anityam īti* (cf. PVin 2 76,3–4: *yat kiñcit kṛtakam tat sarvam anityam...*). pakṣādipravibhāgāpekṣāṃ ca vyāptim nechatt, tasmāt sarvapadārthaviṣayam eva līṅgam bādhakena pramāṇena sādhitaśvasādhvavyāptikam avasātvayam. For Tani’s Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 172.
bādhakapramāṇa: namely, that it pertains to all things. Thus, the pervasion ascertained by the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa functioning with this special property is not subject to distinctions between pakṣa and non-pakṣa. In short, the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa proves that all things are momentary.

3 Problem of the first trairūpya condition

However, the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa’s omni-applicability prompts a further crucial problem for the advocate of trairūpya, namely that T1 (= pakṣadharmatā) is useless. Given that the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa proves that all things are momentary, then, since the pakṣa is already included in the sphere of everything, its momentariness is proved solely by the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. Thus, it is useless to particularly point out, in an inference, the pakṣa’s possession of the hetu “existence.” Arcaṭa does not discuss any problem of this kind in his HBṬ.22

The relevant objection in the PVinṬ reads:

[Objection:] But, given that the pervasion is shown [by the defeating source of knowledge] as encompassing all things, a sound [as the pakṣa] too, which is included in all [things], is proved to be momentary. Thus, there is no benefit to including a property of the pakṣa [in the arguments].23

21 In the PVinṬ, Dharmottara differentiates the logical scope of the inferential reason property “being existent” (sattva) from that of the inferential reason property “being produced” (kṛtakatva). For the Buddhists, their ontological scopes are the same, but it might be the case that there are some opponents for whom this is not the case. According to Dharmottara’s explanation, Dharmakīrti is taking such a possibility into account when he introduces this hetu. The scope of the former includes something that has a cause, i.e., is produced, but which is not included in the category of the five aggregates (pañcaskandha), i.e., invisible, incognizable. Cf. Sakai 2010: 143–144.

22 Cf. Sakai 2015: 291–292 (section 4.2.). Durvekamiśra elucidates where Arcaṭa sees the significance of T1 in the sattvānumāna. He reports (HBṬĀ 261.23–262.2) that Arcaṭa’s way of recognizing the necessity of T1 is rejected by Dharmottara and the like who have a different view on the same issue. According to Durvekamiśra, Arcaṭa requires T1, so that one can indicate the object to which the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa is applied in a relevant inference. On the other hand, Dharmottara’s reason for needing T1 is so that one can ascertain the pakṣa’s being real (tattva). For this interesting controversy, cf. Sakai 2019.

23 PVinṬ 2 Ms 100a1–2:  manoe ca sarvapadārthopamāraṇavā vyāpitarārāṣāne ārdo ’pi sarvāntar-rhūtah kṣanikah siddhā iti na pakṣadharmopamāhārasya phalam. For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS. Cf. KBhS² 224,18–22: gal te dngos po mtha’ dag gi yul la (yul la KBhS⁵: yul can la KBhS⁵) khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma srid na l’o ni des na ji ltar dpe dag la bsgrub bya nges pa’i khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma dang ’bre lpa de bzhin du bsgrub bya’i cho en la yang rjes su ’gro ldog rab tu grub pa dag la mngon par ‘dod pa grub pas phyogs kyi cho nye bar bstan pas ci bya che na l’ “[Objection:] If the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion is applicable to the sphere of all things, then, on the basis of this [fact], with regard to examples, ascertainment of the target [property] is subject to the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion. In the same manner, with regard to the site too, the desired [property, i.e., momentariness] is proved due to the positive and negative concomitances that are in fact established [by the source of knowledge that demonstrates pervasion]. Thus, what can be gained by pointing out a property of the site?” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 242–243.
Dharmottara rebuts this by strictly distinguishing the ascertainment of pervasion from that of whether or not the relevant pakṣa actually exists, i.e., in reality. That is, the ascertainment of pervasion by the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa that everything, including the pakṣa, is momentary belongs to a theoretical level; on the other hand, the ascertainment of whether the pakṣa actually exists belongs to an actual, epistemological level. He says:

[Dharmottara:] Well then, is it the case that a hare’s horn is known to be existent to a person who has already ascertained that “Whatever is existent is momentary?” [Objector:] Since a hare’s horn does not exist, it is not known [to him]. But a sound does exist. [Dharmottara:] Then, this [i.e., the existence of a sound] should be known by means of another source of knowledge, [since], if this is known, it can be understood that a sound is not like a hare’s horn. Therefore, though a sound is generally [i.e., without its individuality,] included in [all things] when pervasion is [demonstrated by the defeating source of knowledge], its [i.e., a sound’s] existence should be individually known by means of another source of knowledge in order to ascertain [its own] momentariness.²⁴

The ascertainment of pervasion and that of the pakṣa’s actual existence are totally different and independent issues. Knowledge of the former does not imply the latter. Otherwise, once pervasion is demonstrated, it would be proved that not only a sound, but also a hare’s horn is momentary. But this is not the case, since a hare’s horn does not exist in reality. According to Dharmottara, the pakṣa’s actual existence must be ascertained by another source of

²⁴ PVinṬ 2 Ms 100a2–4: tat kim idānīṃ yat sat, tat sarvam kṣanikam iti niścītavato ‘pi punah śaśavisānam sad iti jñātām. śaśavisānyāsixattvād ajñātām. śabdasya tu sattvam. tat tarhi pramāṇāntarāj jñātāvyam, yasmāṃ jñāte na śaśavisānyavac chabda ity avāgamyeta. tasmāt sāmānyenaśrūbhitasyāpi śabdasya vyāptikāle kṣanikatvaṁścāyārtham viśeṣena sattvam pramāṇāntareṇa jñātāvyam. For this part too we have a parallel argument in the KBhS. Cf. KBhS²²⁴,222–225.2: bden mod kyi ’on kyang drgos po ’i tshogs ni mtha’ yas la khyab pa bsgrub pa (khyab pa bsgrub pa KBhS²²⁴: khyab pa sgrub pa KBhS²²⁴) yang drgos po mtha’ dag gi yul can yin pa des na sgra med kyang bsgrub bya sgrub byed dag gi (sgrub byed dag gi KBhS²²⁴; sgrub byed dag gi sgrub KBhS²²⁴) khyab pa ni drgos po gzhon niyid las rab tu grub pa kha na’o (rab tu grub pa kha na’o KBhS²²⁴; rab tu grub tu grub pa kha na’o KBhS²²⁴) // des na ji ltar ri bong gi rwa med par khyab pa grub pa de bzhin du sgra med par rab tu ’grub pa niyid do // de las khyab pa mi ’grub pa ’i phyīr na sgru’i yod pa ni ji ltar yang phan ’dogs pa byed pa niyid ma yin no // de lta yin dang khyab pa ’grub pa la khas ma blangs pa’i byed pa can sgra’i yod pa niyid ni tshad ma gzhon kha no las rtags par bya ba yin no // des na nges pa tshad ma gzhon la lag las pa sgru’i yod pa niyid ni sgru mi rtag par bsgrub par nus pa’i phyīr phyogs kyi chos nye bar bsdu bar bya ba (anye bar bsdu bar bya ba KBhS²²⁴; nye bar bsu bar bya ba KBhS²²⁴) kha na’o // “[Answer:] This is right. But, a collection of things is infinite, and [the source of knowledge] demonstrating pervasion can be applied to all things (*sakalapadārthaviśayam). Therefore, even if a sound were not to exist, pervasion between the target property and the reason property would surely be realized on the basis of other things [other than a sound]. Thus, just as pervasion is established without the existence of a hare’s horn, so [pervasion] is surely established without the existence of a sound. Since pervasion is not established on the basis of that [i.e., a sound], the existence of a sound in no way brings benefits [to the establishment of pervasion]. And it is on the basis of another source of knowledge that the existence of a sound, whose functioning is not accepted in this way when pervasion is proved, has to be understood. Thus, since the existence of a sound, whose ascertainment requires another source of knowledge, is in position to prove the impermanence of that sound, a property of the site must by all means be included [in the arguments of a proof].” For Frauwallner’s German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 243.
knowledge other than the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. Showing T1 in an inference amounts to the fact that the actual existence of the pakṣa is epistemologically ascertained by another source of the knowledge.\textsuperscript{25} In this way, Dharmottara insists on the indispensability of T1.

4 Concluding remarks

In short, while absolutely relying on the logical universality of the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, Dharmottara strives not for a formal, but rather for a substantial raison d’être of trairūpya. Furthermore, this reliance is well founded, given that he is basing himself on Dharmakīrti’s position as expressed in his Hetubindu and Vādanyāya.\textsuperscript{26} For the discussions of the kṣanikatvānumāna in these works, Dharmakīrti depends exclusively on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. At the same time, however, his formulation includes T1 and T2.\textsuperscript{27} It appears that under this logically ambiguous circumstance, Arcaṭa steers his course of interpretation toward stressing the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, judging Dharmakīrti’s retention of the trairūpya to be a mere formality, and Dharmottara, in turn, makes efforts toward harmonizing the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa with trairūpya.

To the best of my knowledge, in the larger interpretative history of the sattvānumāna, Dharmottara’s argument examined above is the first systematic defense of the significance of trairūpya taken as a whole, which well represents the Buddhist logical standpoint of being neither antarvyāpti nor bahirvyāpti.\textsuperscript{28} What’s more, this seems to remain the only way for traditional Buddhists to maintain their argumentative identity until the innovation by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti of proving the momentariness of a drṣṭānta via the combination of prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya,\textsuperscript{29} itself a strategy that avoids exclusive reliance on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{25} Namely, perception (pratyakṣa). In the previous part of the PVinT (= PVinT 2 Ms 98b1–99a3) Dharmottara already discussed how and by which source of knowledge the inferential reason property “existence” is established (siddha). There is also a parallel argument in the KBhS (= KBhS F 221,7–16 [pūrvapakṣa], 231,7–232,13 [uttarapakṣa]). For a detail of the arguments, see Sakai 2013, where I have translated these texts and analyzed their contents.

\textsuperscript{26} For now I am uncertain whether Dharmakīrti, in PVin 2, absolutely relies on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa for establishing the pervasion of the reason property “being produced” (kṛtakatva) by the target property “being impermanent” (anityatva), though in this work he introduces the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa in its complete form. This is because Dharmakīrti also introduces other arguments for establishing pervasion other than the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. Cf. Sakai 2014.

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. HB 6,9-10: yat sat, tat sarvam kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭādayah, samś ca sābda iti..., VN 1,13–14: yat sat kṛtakam vā, tat sarvam anityam, yathā ghaṭādiḥ, san kṛtako vā sābda iti.

\textsuperscript{28} Cf. Ono 2004: 481–488.

\textsuperscript{29} Cf. Mimaki 1984: 239.

\textsuperscript{30} See, for example, Vācaspatimiśra, one of the most renowned representatives of the Brahmanical side, who probably flourished before the time of Jñānaśrīmitra (for the date of Vācaspatimiśra, cf. Acharya 2006: xviii–xxii. Dr. Yasutaka Muroya recently suggested a new chronological relationship between Vācaspatimiśra and Jñānaśrīmitra in Muroya 2011). In his Nyāyakāṇikā and Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, he summarizes and then introduces as pūrvapakṣa Dharmottara’s argument defending the Buddhist trairūpya theory considered as a whole in the case of the sattvānumāna. Cf. NKaṇ 509,7–511,9 (=NVTT 515,3–13): “nāksanikasāyārthahkriyāvirodhād (nāksanika) conjecture; na ksaniṣaka NKaṇ; na ca ksaṇika” NVTT) asadhāraṇatā hetoh, na ca sādhyaḥdharmini drṣṭāntāṃ śabdādau vyāptiprasādhanādh (“prasādhanād NKaṇ; “śādhanād NVTT) eva sādhyaśiddher asādhanāṅgaṃ hetuvacanam, na khalu
References and abbreviations


KBhS Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (Dharmottara) (Tibetan), ed. E. Frauwallner: In: Frauwallner 1935.

KBhS P Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (Dharmottara) (Tibetan): Peking No. 5751.

sarvopasaṃhāraṇaḥ vyāptir drṣṭamātravasīya bhavitam arhati. śaṅkyaḥ hi śaṅkitaḥ parenādṛśya-mānānāṃ sattvam aṅkaṅkānāṃ na vyāvartitaṃ tvayeti sattvam anenāṅkaṅkānāṃ kṣaṇikatvasādhanāḥ iti. tasmād yad drṣṭān aṅkaṅkānāṃ na vyāvartitaṃ tvayeti sattvam anenāṅkaṅkānāṃ kṣaṇikatvasādhanāḥ iti. tasmād yad drṣṭān aṅkaṅkānāṃ na vyāvartitaṃ tvayeti sattvam anenāṅkaṅkānāṃ kṣaṇikatvasādhanāḥ iti.

It is not the case that, since there is the inconsistency with purpose fulfilment for a non-momentary [thing], the inferential reason property [of being existent] is unique/specific. Nor is it the case that, since the target [property, i.e., momentariness] is proved solely on the basis of the fact that the pervasion is well established with regard to the pakṣa, i.e., a sound and the like, which is seen, the statement of the inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof. It is indeed impossible for the pervasion that encompasses all [things] to have as its object seen [things] only. This is because the opponent has the right to doubt [this] in the following manner: ‘By you [i.e., the proponent] the property of being existent belonging to unseen [things] is not excluded from a non-momentary [thing]. Thus, the [inferential reason] property of being existent is indeterminate in the proof of momentariness.’ Therefore, [in order to rebut such doubt,] the pervasion should be shown in the following way: ‘Whatever a thing is, i.e., whether seen or unseen, it is exclusively momentary.’

[If one says:] even if this is so, the statement of the inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof, [something that] is the case when a sound and the like about which there is a dispute is proved to be momentary only by virtue of showing the pervasion, [then, we answer:] it should not be like that [for the logical reason sattva]. The pervasion that encompasses all [things] is established in such a way that, even if a hare’s horn and the like does not exist, that which exists, whether seen or unseen, is all/exclusively momentary. And it is not the case that a hare’s horn and the like too are momentary. In this way, even if a sound and the like which becomes the subject of dispute exists, [its] momentariness is not proved, even when the pervasion is established. Therefore, in order to prove their momentariness [i.e., that of a sound and the like], their existence must necessarily be shown in full. Thus, it is not the case that the statement of inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof.

The part a–a, in terms of content, corresponds to Dharmottara’s defense of T2 examined above (cf. section 2.1.), the part b–b to the discussion examined in section 3. The part b–b has a parallel in the Tattvasamīkṣā by the same author. Cf. TSam 36,29–35: na ca sarvopasaṃhāraṇavāyādvyāptisādhanād eva pramānāt sarvamadhyapātinām vividāspadādinām sādhanānām api kṣaṇikatvasādhanāḥ (r asādhanāngam hetuvacanam iti) sāṃpratam. yathātva hi gaganalnāmānām āsādhanānām api kṣaṇikatvasādhanāḥ (r asādhanāṅgāṇaḥ hetuvacanānām iti) sāṃpratam. yathātva hi gaganalnāmānām āsādhanānām api kṣaṇikatvasādhanāḥ (r asādhanāṅgāṇaḥ hetuvacanānām iti) sāṃpratāṃ prasādhyataḥ pramāṇasya v[i]ro[ḥ] dhah, tathaiva vividāspadāṣe śābdādiṣu kas tasya virodhah, sattvasādhanah tu syād iti tatsādhanāya hetur upanetavyo vacanena, samā ca vividāspadābhūtaḥ śābdādi[ṛ i] (ti svabhāvatetahuḥ).


PVinṬ 2 Ms Sanskrit Manuscript of the second chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* of Dharmottara: see PVin 2: Introduction xxx–xxxi.


PVinṬ T Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Dharmottara) (Tibetan): Peking No. 5727, Derge No. 4227.


**TBh**  Tarkabhāṣā (Mokṣākaragupta), ed. H.R. Rangaswami Iyengar. Mysore 1944.


Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya and the History of Conceptions of
Debate in Indian Logic

by

Ryo Sasaki

1. Introduction

Throughout the history of Indian thought in the classical period, the method of debate has been a subject of investigation side by side with philosophical ideas. A conception of “debate” can already be found at an early stage, notably in the medical treatise Caraka-saṃhitā (CaS). After passing through the Fangbianxinlun (*Upāyahṛdaya, UH, 方便心論), an early Buddhist debate treatise, the conception of debate was more systematically approached in the Nyāyasūtras (NS), and further expanded and elaborated in Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya (NBh) and Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārttika (NV).

In the Vādanyāya (VN), Dharmakīrti redefined a traditional Nyāya concept related to debate, namely the idea of a “condition of defeat” (nigrahasthāna), a criterion that determines victory or defeat in a debate. In the Vādanyāya’s redefinition of nigrahasthāna, Dharmakīrti presented a new conception of debate, i.e., the “debate of well-educated people” (satāṃ vādaḥ). By doing so, he appears to have reacted to traditional ideas found in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya. His ideas in turn influenced the presentation of debate in later Nyāya works, as will be discussed below with a focus on the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (NBhū) of Bhāsarvajña and the Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (NVTṬ) of Vācaspati Miśra.

Prets 2000, Kang 2003, Preisendanz 2009 and others have analyzed the ancient Indian exposition of debate in the Caraka-saṃhitā. Pertinent ideas in the *Upāyahṛdaya were investigated by several Japanese researchers (Ui 1925, Kajiyama 1984, Ishitobi 2006). The more systematic exposition of debate in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya was studied in detail especially by Matilal 1998, Preisendanz 2000, and Nicholson 2010.Steinkellner 1988 pointed out Dharmakīrti’s new conception of debate. Much’s translation and critical

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1 G. Tucci suggests Upāyahṛdaya as the original Sanskrit title of Fangbianxinlun, while E. Frauwallner suggested Prayogasāra. At the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (IABS) in 2014, Prof. Shōryū Katsura proposed a third possibility: Prayogahṛdaya.

2 See VN 1,4–5: asādhanāṅgavacanaṃ adosodbhāvam adosodbhāvanaṃ dvayaḥ nigrahasthānam, anyat tu na yuktam iti nesye //11 “Asādhanāṅgavacana and adosodbhāvana are the conditions of defeat for the two (debaters, i.e. a proponent and an opponent, respectively). However, other [conditions of defeat that the Nyāya school and the like explain] are not correct, hence [they are] not accepted.” Here Dharmakīrti presents his original idea of dividing “the condition of defeat” into asādhanāṅgavacana (the condition of defeat for a proponent) and adosodbhāvana (the condition of defeat for an opponent). This compels us then to conclude that a proponent is judged to be defeated when his behavior corresponds to asādhanāṅgavacana and an opponent is judged to be defeated when his behavior corresponds to adosodbhāvana, according to the terms of debate set up in the VN. However, based on the descriptions supplied in the VN, this conclusion must in fact be wrong. See section 5 for details.

3 As for nigrahasthāna as presented in the Nyāyasūtras, see Vidyabhusana 1921: 84–90. With regard to nigrahasthāna as defined in the Vādanyāya, see Much 1986 and 1991; Chinchore 1988; Gokhale 1993; Sasaki 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, and 2014b.
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 edition of the Vādanāya in 1991, together with his comprehensive presentation of results of the Vādanāya research up until that point, mark a significant contribution to research on this work. Ono 2004 and 2006 examined Udayana’s views on debate, and Chinchore 1990 studied reactions to the Vādanāya by Naiyāyikas active after Udayana.

While several studies have thus been conducted on Indian debate, little attention has been given to how the Vādanāya marks a historical transition in the conception of debate. This paper therefore aims to place the Vādanāya in the context of expositions of debate in the above-mentioned texts, and to thereby clarify its significance.

2. Jalpa in the Carakasaṃhitā

As the first step in our analysis, we will examine the idea of debate in the Carakasaṃhitā because it is one of the earliest works in which the concept of debate is introduced in detail, even though it was not exactly explained in a systematic manner. In the Carakasaṃhitā, the parts of the eighth chapter of the Vimānasthāna dealing with debate can be divided into two sections: the section on colloquy (ṣaṃbhāṣā) in CaS 8.8.15–26 and the section on disputation (vāda) in CaS 8.8.27–66. In the latter section, vāda is defined as follows:

CaS 8.8.28: tatra vādo nāma sa yat pareṇa saha śāstrapūrvakaṃ vigṛhya kathayati. sa ca dvividhaḥ samgraheṇa – jalpaḥ, vitanḍā ca. tatra pakṣāśritayor vacanaṃ jalpaḥ, jalpaviparyayo vitanḍā. yathā – ekasya pakṣah punarbhavo ’stīti, nāstīty aparasya; tau ca svasvapakṣahetubhiḥ svasvapakṣam sthāpayataḥ, parapakṣaḥ udbhāvayataḥ, eṣa jalpaḥ. jalpaviparyayo vitanḍā. vitanḍā nāma parapakṣe doṣavacanamātram eva.

Of these [44 technical terms], disputation (vāda) is [debate] in which one discusses with another in a hostile manner (vigṛhya), based on scriptures. In brief, this [disputation] is of two kinds: wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitanḍā). Of these, wrangle is the statement of two [disputants] who depend on [their respective] positions. Cavil is the opposite of wrangle. For instance, one holds the position that rebirth exists [while] the other holds [the position] that [rebirth] does not exist. In addition, both [disputants] establish their positions on the basis of logical reasons for their positions [and] point out [the fault in] the other’s position. This is wrangle. Cavil is the opposite of wrangle. Cavil is merely “indicating the fault in the other’s position.”

Disputation (vāda) is here defined as a “[debate] in which one discusses with another in a hostile manner (vigṛhya).” There are two types of vāda: wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitanḍā). As discussed below in section 4, this classification differs from the one in the Nyāyasūtras. Let us note that jalpa here involves hostility to the other disputant, and that it consists of individual assertions of a proponent and opponent, and mutual ripostes between them.

While the vāda section of the Carakasaṃhitā provides a brief account of vāda in which jalpa occurs as a subcategory of vāda, the concept of jalpa, the action of √jalp, as well as

the idea of a hostile (vigrhya) verbal confrontation are already introduced in the *saṃbhāṣā* section.\(^5\)

CaS 8.8.15: *saṃbhāṣāvidhim ata ārdhvam vyākhāśyāmaḥ – bhiṣag bhiṣajā saha saṃbhāṣeta. tadvidyasamāṃbhāṣā hi jñānābhīyogasamharśakarī bhavati, vaiśāradyam api cādhinirvartayati, vacanaśaktim api cādhatte, yaśas cābhidipayati, … yac cācāryah śiśyāya śuśrūṣave prasannah kramenosadīśati guhayāhimatam arthajātaṃ tat parasporeṇa saha jalpan piṇḍena vijigīṣur āha saṃharsāt, tasmāt tadvidyasamāṃbhāṣām abhipraṃsanti kuśalāḥ.

CaS 8.8.16: dvividhā tu khalu tadvidyasamāṃbhāṣā bhavati – saṃdhāyasamāṃbhāṣā, vigrhyasamāṃbhāṣā ca.

Hereafter, we shall describe the method of colloquy. A physician should discuss with a physician. Colloquy with experts (*tadvidyasamāṃbhāṣā*) increases the pleasure of the application of knowledge, provides dexterity [in debate], gives skill of speech, illuminates fame (*yaśas*). … Besides, the teacher who is pleased with the disciple desirous of hearing [teachings] teaches things intended to be kept secret in an orderly manner. [The same teacher] who disputes with another [disputant] in wrangle (*jalpa*) excitedly states [the secret] in one breath in order to gain victory (*vijigīṣu*). Therefore, the wise highly praise colloquy with experts.

One should know (*khalu*) that colloquy with experts (*tadvidyasamāṃbhāṣā*) takes two forms: friendly colloquy and hostile colloquy.

The *saṃbhāṣā* section describes the method and purpose of colloquy with experts (*tadvidyasamāṃbhāṣā*) more concretely and vividly than the brief definitions of *vāda*, or *jalpa* or *vitaṇḍā* in the *vāda* section. Although the relationship between *saṃbhāṣā* and * jalpa* is problematic, it is likely that *vigrhyasamāṃbhāṣā* and * jalpa* are the same or at least very similar concepts, considering such expressions as *vigrhyasamāṃbhāṣāyāṃ jalpet* (CaS 8.8.18).\(^6\)

Here “the person who disputes in wrangle” (*jalpat*) is considered to be desirous of victory (*vijigīṣu*). Hence, we can say that one purpose of wrangle (* jalpa*) is victory. This purpose deserves careful attention for two reasons: (i) the *Nyāyabhāṣya* adopted the same idea and (ii) the *Vāḍanyāya* criticizes the purpose of victory. Both points will be examined in more detail later.

Fame is another of the purposes listed in connection with *saṃbhāṣā*. It must be noted that fame or something akin to fame is not considered to be the purpose worth accomplishing in the context of debate in the *Upāyahṛdaya*, the *Nyāyasūtras*, several commentaries of the *Nyāyasūtras*, and the *Vāḍanyāya*. This point will be examined later again.

Regarding the means of debate, acts by a disputant such as ridiculing the opponent are also allowed in a *saṃbhāṣā*:

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5 For *jalpa* or * jalpa*, cf. CaS 8.8.15, CaS 8.8.18, CaS 8.8.20, CaS 8.8.21. As Preisendanz 2009: 268 pointed out, the word *vāda* is also already introduced in the *saṃbhāṣā* section.

6 Matilal 1998: 38–41 also points out that Caraka divides the “hostile debate” (*vigrhyasamāṃbhāṣā*) into two main types, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. Matilal calls the first the “j-type” hostile debate and the second the “v-type” hostile debate.
There are two types of congregations: the intellectual [congregation] and the ignorant congregation. Even though [the congregation] takes two forms, the very same [congregation can be divided into] three kinds through the following classification based on [different] grounds – the friendly congregation, the neutral congregation and the prejudiced congregation. Among these, the prejudiced congregation consists of persons endowed with the ability to learn, understand, speak and reply, and of ignorant ones; those who [should] in no way be involved in wrangle (jalpa) with anyone else. However, in the friendly congregation or the neutral [congregation], which consists of ignorant persons, one [should] work on wrangle with [another who is] devoid of the ability to learn, understand, speak and reply, does not illumine fame (yaśas) and is hated by great men. Furthermore, while disputing with such a person, one should dispute by means of long sentences mingled with distorted and long holy scriptures and should not give the opportunity to the [opposing] speaker by ridiculing another (i.e., the opposing speaker) in high spirits again and again and making gestures in the presence of the congregation. Furthermore, [one should say,] “while [the opponent] makes a mischievous remark, he does not say what he should say,” or indeed “Your (i.e., the opponent’s) thesis has been abandoned.” Again, when [the opponent] challenges [the disputant], [the disputant] should reply, “You should learn for another year,” “You have not yet honored [your] preceptor,” or “That’s enough of your [talking]!” If [the opponent] is condemned to be defeated even once, [people will] say that he is defeated and, therefore, will lack the ability to concentrate on what he is saying. Besides, some say that one should talk in a hostile manner (vigṛhya) with a superior [opponent] in the same way, but [to begin with] the wise does not recommend the discord with a more excellent [opponent] in this manner.

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7 For cāhvayāmanāḥ, CaS prints cāhā(ḥva)yamānaḥ.
Here we should note that a disputant is recommended to use incomprehensible sentences and ridicule an opponent when engaging in wrangle with a friendly but ignorant congregation, a neutral but ignorant congregation, or sometimes a superior congregation. Such a hostile manner of debate is also allowed in wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā) defined in the *Nyāyasūtras and in the *Nyāyabhāṣya; on the other hand, in the *Vādanyāya, acts such as embarrassing others (parapamsana), which are regarded as bad deeds (asadvyavahāra), are not considered to be an admissible method of debate.

3. The discussion of the composition of a treatise (造論) in the *Upāyahṛdaya

Having discussed the conception of debate in the Carakasamhitā, we will now consider debate in the *Upāyahṛdaya.⁸ There is no Sanskrit text of the *Upāyahṛdaya, but the extant Chinese translations permit to conclude that the *Upāyahṛdaya contains remarkable ideas that can be connected with the *Nyāyasūtras.

UH (T1632) 23b14–24: 答曰不然。今造此論不爲勝負利養名聞。但欲顯示善惡諸相故造此論。世若無論迷惑者衆；則爲世間邪智巧辯所共誑惑、起不善業、輪迴惡趣、失眞實利。若達論者則自分別善惡空相、衆魔外道邪見之人、無能惱壞作障礙也。故我爲欲利益衆生造此正論。又欲令正法流布於世。如爲修治菴婆羅果、而外廣植荊棘之林爲防果故、今我造論亦復如是、欲護正法不求名聞故。汝前説長諍論者是事不然。爲護法故、故應造論。

I will answer that [this is] not so. Now, I have not composed this treatise (造此論) for the purpose of victory, profit, or reputation (勝負利養名聞). I compose this treatise because I only wish to reveal diverse good and bad features [of debate]. If the world had no treatise [of debate], there would be many confused people. Then, [the confused] people would be deceived by the world’s perverse ideas, and wily rhetoric would give rise to bad deeds, which would be reborn in an evil world and would lose real benefits. If debate (論) is understood, [its] good, bad, and useless features are distinguished as a matter of course. [Then], evildoers, non-Buddhists, and adherents of perverse views would not be able to harm [people] and obstruct [their nirvāṇa]. Therefore, to benefit people (利益衆生), I compose this correct treatise.⁹ Furthermore, I wish to disseminate the true teaching [of Buddha] (正法) to the world. Just as in order to cultivate the fruits of mango trees one plants a thicket of thorns (荊棘之林) widely around them, so now I will compose [this] treatise in the same way because I wish to protect the true teaching [of the Buddha] and I do not seek [to enhance my] reputation. You explained earlier that [I am] good

⁸ Kajiyama 1984 assumes that the author of the *Upāyahṛdaya is Nāgārjuna.

⁹ The same basic point is argued by Candrakīrti in the Madhyamakāvatāra as follows, MA 6.118 (p. 231): bstan bcos las dpva’d rtshod la chags pa’i phyir // ma nzas rdam grol phyir ni de nyid bstan // gal te de nyid rdam par bshad pa na // gzhan gzhung ’jig par ’gyur na nyes pa med // Cf. Uryuzu and Nakazawa 2012: 214. I am indebted to Dr. Shenghai Li for having provided this useful information.
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at debate (諍論), [but] this is not true. In order to protect the teaching [of the Buddha], I must compose [this] treatise.\(^{10}\)

Compared with claims made in the Carakasamhitā about jalpa or sambhāśā, the way in which the *Upāyahṛdaya explains the purposes and methods of composing a treatise can be summed up as follows:

1. The purpose is not “victory;”
2. The purpose is not “(self-)profit” or “reputation;”
3. The purpose is the “benefit of people;”
4. The purpose is “protection of the true teaching [of the Buddha];”
5. The method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”

According to the author’s intention, the *Upāyahṛdaya was composed in order to protect the true teaching of the Buddha. This means of protection is metaphorically explained as planting a thicket of thorns around mango trees. As will be seen in the following section, a similar expression appears in the Nyāyasūtras.

4. Jalpa and vītaṇḍā in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya

With these considerations in mind, we will now examine the concept of debate in the Nyāyasūtras and Nyāyabhāṣya in order to trace conceptual changes in the idea of “debate.” In NS 1.2.1–3, the concept of debate is classified into three categories, namely, vāda, jalpa and vītaṇḍā, while jalpa and vītaṇḍā are presented as subcategories of vāda in CaS 8.8.28. On the other hand, NS 4.2.47–51 proposes three types of debate: samvāda, jalpa, and vītaṇḍā. Although this discrepancy in terminology and classification is problematic,\(^{11}\) we will not discuss this and rather concentrate on jalpa and vītaṇḍā, which are explained with the help of metaphors as follows:

NS 4.2.50: tattvādhyavasāyasamrakṣānārthaṃ jalpavītaṇḍe bijaprarohasamrakṣānārtham kaṇṭakaśākhāvarṇañava //
Just as thorny branches cover [seeds] for the purpose of protecting seed germination, so wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vītaṇḍā) [are undertaken] for the purpose of protecting the ascertainment of truth.\(^{12}\)

As pointed out in Preisendanz 2000: 236, Kang 2003: 36–37 and Ishitobi 2003, this sentence parallels the very beginning of the *Upāyahṛdaya discussed above. It can be assumed that the Nyāyasūtras adopted the metaphor of “thorns” from the *Upāyahṛdaya, or that both the Nyāyasūtras and *Upāyahṛdaya drew on another text which is their origin. In the same context of explaining jalpa and vītaṇḍā, Vātsyāyana commented on the sūtra as follows:

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\(^{10}\) Ishitobi 2006: 42–44 and Eltschinger 2012: 471–472 translate this passage and analyze the motives and aims of treatise or debate presented in the *Upāyahṛdaya.

\(^{11}\) Preisendanz 2000 considered this problem in detail.

\(^{12}\) Cf. NBh 1099.4: anutpannatattvajñānānām aprahānadoṣāṇām tadarthaṃ ghāṭamānānām etad iti; NV 1099.8: anutpannatattvajñānenaitat kartavyam iti sūtrārthāḥ.
By means of these two, [i.e., the wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā),] hostile (vigṛhya) dispute [is undertaken].

“Hostile” (vigṛhya) is [equivalent to] “by a desire to win” (vijigīṣayā); [however] is [this] not [equivalent to] “by a desire to know truth.” This [hostile dispute is undertaken] for the purpose of defending expertise (vidyā), [but] is not [undertaken] for the purpose of profit, honor, or reputation.\footnote{Cf. NV 1099,10–2000,4: tābhyāṃ jalpavitaṇḍābhīyāṃ vigṛhyeti vijigīṣayā, na tattvabubhutsayeti. vidyāpālanārtham cañcat, na lābhāpjākhyātyartham iti.}

As to the purpose of, respectively, jalpa/vitaṇḍā and the composition of a treatise (造論), both NBh and UH exclude (self-)profit and endorse the protection of their own doctrine. On the other hand, the presentation in the Nyāyabhāṣya is different from that in the *Upāyahṛdaya in terms of whether the desire for victory is approved of as a legitimate purpose.

The main points regarding purpose and method of jalpa and vitaṇḍā according to the Nyāyabhāṣya can be summed up as follows:

1. The purpose is “victory;”
2. The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “honor” or “reputation;”
3. The idea of “benefit of people” is not mentioned;
4. The purpose is “defense of expertise;”
5. The method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”

5. The concept of debate in the Vādanyāya

As Ruegg 2000: 137–138, n. 41 acutely pointed out, Nāgārjuna, Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti, and probably also Vasubandhu, reject jalpa or vitaṇḍā. Here we limit the discussion to Dharmakīrti’s criticism of jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Dharmakīrti does not mention the thorn metaphor used in the Nyāyasūtras. However, Śāntarakṣita quotes NS 4.2.50 in his commentary on the Vādanyāya, the Vādanyāyaṭīkā Vipaṅcīrthā (VA):

\begin{quote}
VA 70,25–26: yathoktaṃ tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣanārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bijaprarohasaṃrakṣanārtham kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavad iti.
\end{quote}

This quotation occurs in a context where Dharmakīrti criticized the traditional concept of debate – particularly wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā) – and instead promoted his own original conception.
5.1 The “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ) in the Vādanyāya

First, Dharmakīrti criticizes jalpa and vitandā by considering these two concepts to mean “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ).

VN 22,8–16: chalavyavahāre ’pi vijigīṣūṇāṃ vāda iti cet, na, durjanavipratri-pattyadhiikāre satām śāstrāpravṛttaḥ. na hi parānugrahaprayṛttā mithyāpra-lāpārāmbhātmotkarsparapamśanādīn asadvayavahārān upadaśī. na ca paravipamansanena lābhasatkāraslokapārjanam satām acāraḥ. nāpi tathāpravṛtteenā svahastadānena prāṇinām upatāpanaṃ satsammatānām śāstra-kārasabhāsadāṃ yuktaṃ. na ca nyāyasāstrāṇi sadbhīr lābhādyupārjanāya pranīyante. tasmān na yogavihitaḥ kaścid viṣiṣṭvādāḥ nāma.

(Objection:) Even if distortion (chala) is used, the “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ) [is undertaken]. (Answer:) [This is] not [so] because well-educated people are not engaged in the doctrinal system in consideration of bad people’s evil deeds (vipratipatti).14 That is to say, [well-educated] people who are engaged in the benefit of others do not teach bad deeds (asadvyavahāra), such as boasting and embarrassing others through beginning incoherent speech. Besides, winning profit, reverence, or praise by disgracing others is not [suitable] behavior for well-educated people. Furthermore, troubling [other] people by giving a [helping] hand to those who are engaged in this manner [i.e., disgracing others] is not suitable for those who are considered to be well-educated people, i.e., those who are participants in the meeting of learned men (śāstrakārasabhāsad). Additionally, well-educated people don’t compose methodically written works for the purpose of gaining profit and the rest. Because of these [evil deeds, such as distortion (chala)], a so-called “debate of people with a desire to win” is not reasonable (yogavihita)15 at all.

On the surface, it would seem that Dharmakīrti does not directly explain the characteristics of “debate of people with a desire to win,” but merely states evil deeds that are not appropriate for well-educated people. However, Dharmakīrti here comes to the conclusion that “debate of people with a desire to win” is not reasonable. From this viewpoint, one may say that the “evil deeds” should be considered to be precisely the behavior exhibited in a debate of people with a desire to win.

Dharmakīrti does not use the terms jalpa or vitandā.16 However, according to the explanation in the Nyāyasūtras,17 “distortion” (chala) is the hostile method used in jalpa and vitandā. Additionally, with the passage of time, the terms vijigīṣukathā18 or viṣiṣṭvāda

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14 See VA 70,19–21: durjanānāṃ vipratipattir aśobhano vyavahārah tasmān na yogavihito nyāyāḥ kaścid viṣiṣṭvādāḥ1)nāma, yac chalā dibihhih kriyata ity adhyāhāraḥ. (11) viṣīṣtu em.: viṣīṣtu.
15 McClintock 2010: 70, n. 169 has pointed out that Much uses the inappropriate translation “regellos” for the yogavihita in Much 1991: 51,2.
16 Vītād is criticized in VN 61,1–2: etenaiva vītād pratyuktābhuyapamābhāve vivādābhāvāt.
17 See NS 1.2.2: yathoktopamāṇaṃ chalajātādīntigrahasthāṇāsdhānapālambo jālaḥ //
18 Cf. SDS 30: vīṣīṣtkathā1)yā tā chalajātayādīsānaḥ / sa jālaḥ, sā vītādā tu yā pratipakṣavajjītā // (11) viṣīṣtu em.: viṣīṣtu.
came to be considered alternative expressions for *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that Dharmakīrti criticizes the characteristics of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* in these phrases.

Let me summarize the purposes and methods of “debate of people with a desire to win” presented in the *Vādanyāya* as follows:

1. The purpose is “victory;”
2. The purpose is “(self-)profit,” “reverence” or “praise;”
3. The purpose is not “benefit of others;”
4. The idea of “defense of expertise” and the like is not mentioned;
5. The method is “evil deeds,” “distortion,” “embarrassing others” and so forth.

5.2 The “debate of well-educated people” (*satāṃ vāḍaḥ*) in the *Vādanyāya*

After criticizing the debate of people with a desire to win, i.e., wrangle and cavil, Dharmakīrti presents his original conception of debate, namely, “debate of well-educated people” (*satāṃ vāḍaḥ*).

VN 22,16–21: *parānugrahapravṛttās tu santo vipratipannaḥ pratipādayanto nyāyam anusareyuḥ satsādhanābhidhānena bhūtadosodbhāvanānaḥ, sākṣi-pratyakṣam tasyaivaṃuprabodhāya. tad eva nyāyānusaranam satāṃ vāḍaḥ, ukte nyāye tattvārthī cet pratipadyeta, tadapratipattāv apy anyaḥ na vipratipadyetēti.*

On the other hand, when [well-educated people] persuade one who has fallacious notions, well-educated people who aim at the benefit of others (*parānugraha*) would abide by the reasonable rule (*nyāya*) by stating a correct piece of proof or pointing out a real fault for making him (i.e., the one who has fallacious notions) notice [his fault] in the presence of witnesses. The debate of well-educated people (*satāṃ vāḍaḥ*) is precisely that, i.e., abiding by reasonable rules if [an opponent] seeking the truth were to properly understand the logical argument (*nyāya*) stated [by the proponent,] and even if [he] does not understand it, others [in proximity] were not to misunderstand it.

Elsewhere, Dharmakīrti claims that the proper means for a proponent is “stating a piece of correct proof” (*satsādhanābhidhāna*), while the means for an opponent is “pointing out a real fault” (*bhūtadosodbhāvana*). The means of “debate of people with a desire to win” are described as “evil deeds” (*vipratipattīsādvyavahāra*). Dharmakīrti compared the former to the latter in the following passage:

VN 22,22–23,6: *tattvārtham sadbhūr upahartavyam eva chalādi vijigishaḥḥ bhūti iti cet, na, nakhacetaśasstraśprahārādipanādhībh priti vaktavyam.*

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**Notes:**

19 *vipratipadyeta* em. [D337a6/P377b8: mi rto gs pa; VA 70,24: vipratipadyeta] : pratipadyeta* VN.

20 See VA 70,21–22: *ukte sati nyāye tattvārthī cet pratīvādī pratipadyeta tam artham nyāyopetam. *

21 See VA 70,22–24: *atha svapaksarāgasya balīyastvā ukte ’pi nyāye na pratipadyeta. tadā tena pratīvādinā tasya nyāyasvārthāśayatā pratipattīv anyah*19 *sāmpavartyaśajjājo janakāya na vipratipadyetēti kṛtvā nyāyānusāraṇam eva satāṃ vāḍa iti vartate. (1) anyah VA<sub>MS</sub> em. : anyah* VA.)
Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya and the History of Conceptions of Debate

tasmān na jyāyān ayaṃ tattvarakṣanopāyaḥ. sādhanaprapkhyāpanaṃ satāṃ tattvarakṣanopāyaḥ sādhanābhāsadiśaṇaṃ ca, tadabhāve mithyāpralāpād atra paropatāpavidhāne ‘pi tattvāpratīṣṭhāpanāt. anyathāpi nyāyopavaraṇane vidvatpratīṣṭhānāt. tasmāt parānugrahaḥ tattvakyāpanaṃ vādino vijayaḥ, bhūtadosadarśanena mithyāpratīṣṭhānavartanaṃ pratīvādinaḥ.

(Objection:)22 Well-educated people with a desire to win have to offer a distortion (chala) and so forth23 in order to protect truth (tattvarakṣaṇa). (Answer:) No, [this is not true]. [If that were to be so,] it would have to be said that [well-educated people with a desire to win have to protect truth] even by attacking [an opponent] with fingernails, an open palm, or weapons, or by setting [the opponent] on fire. Therefore, this means of protecting truth [used by people with a desire to win] is not superior [to the means of protecting truth used by well-educated people]. The means of protecting truth [used by] well-educated people are the explanation of proof (sādhanaprakhyāpana) and the refutation of pseudo-proof (sādhanābhāsadūṣaṇa) because there is no establishment of truth without them (i.e., these two means)24 even if [the well-educated people] trouble others with incoherent speech in this case [and] because there is firm ground for the learned men in case that they tell a logical argument (nyāya) even if [they] do not [begin incoherent speech].25 Hence, the victory of a proponent is the explanation of truth (tattvakhyāpana)26 for the purpose of benefitting others (parānugraha); [on the other hand, the victory] of an opponent is the removal of misapprehension (mithyāpratīṣṭhānavartana) by showing the real fault [of the proponent’s proof].

It is important to consider the following features of “debate of well-educated people” when comparing it with the definition of “debate of people with a desire to win:”27

1. Dharmakīrti does not consider the concept of “victory” in the usual sense of the word to be the purpose of debate of well-educated people, and instead reinterprets this concept. In a debate of well-educated people, a proponent is victorious when

22 The Tibetan translation of the Vādanyāya gives the lines a different reading. Cf. D337a6–7/P377b8–378a1: gal te de kho na nyid brsung ba ’i don du dam pa rmaṃ kyang rgyal bar ’dod pa sgyl pa la sogs pa dag gis tshar gcad (D; bcad P) par bya ba yin no zhe na l ma yin te khu tshur dang l thal lcag dang l mtshon chas bsun (D; bsnap P) pa dang l me la sogs pa dag gis kyang zhes brjod par bya na l (1) sgyu D337a7/P377b8.

23 The word ādi seems to imply jāti or nigrahasthāna. Cf. NS 1.2.2: yathoktopapannā chalajātānimgraha-sthānasādhanapalāmbho jalpaḥ //

24 See VA 70.27–28: tadabhāva iti sādhanaprapkhyāpanasādhanābhāsadiśaṇaṇyor abhāve.

25 See VA 70.28: anyathāpyī mithyāpralāpādyabhāve ’pi.

26 Steinkellner 1988: 1441–1442 pointed out that [satāṃ-]vādah has to serve the investigation of truth (tattvacintā VN 21,22) and the explanation of truth (tattvakhyāpana VN 23,5). In the discussion at the conference, Prof. Steinkellner made the important remark that tattva in the case of tattvacintā should mean “true reality.”

27 As for the difference between Dharmakīrti’s satāṃ vādah and the notions of vāda, jalpa or vitandā as defined in the Nyāyasūtras, see Much 1991: Einleitung 2.2 and Gokhale 1993: Introduction, pp. xv–xvii.
he “explains truth [to others]” and an opponent is victorious when he “removes misapprehension [of others].”

2. The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “reverence” or “praise.”

3. Dharmakīrti considers the concept of “benefitting others” (parānugraha) to be the purpose of debate of well-educated people. The Nyāyasūtras, Nyāyabhāṣya, and Nyāyavārttika do not propose this concept to be the purpose of jalpa or vitanḍā, at least not in the context of debate.

4. The purpose is “protection of truth.”

5. The proponent’s method is “the explanation of proof” or “stating a piece of correct proof” and the opponent’s method is “the refutation of pseudo-proof” or “pointing out a real fault.”

Regarding the first point, we must draw attention to the condition of defeat (nigrahasthāna) and victory as constructed systematically by Dharmakīrti in the Vādanyāya. In Dharmakīrti’s theory, neither a proponent nor an opponent are to be defeated, even if they act solely within the guidelines of the nigrahasthāna. On the basis of Figure 1, which shows the flow chart of the conditions of victory or defeat defined in the Vādanyāya, the following situation serves as an example: in the beginning, a proponent intends to prove his statement using correct proof, i.e., the proof-action is not the case of nigrahasthāna. An opponent then tries to refute the proof of the proponent, but what the opponent points out is a pseudo-fault, not a real fault. If the proponent does not refute the pseudo-fault, neither proponent nor opponent will win or lose, in spite of the fact that the proponent’s proof is correct. The reason why Dharmakīrti regards the winner and the loser as undecided in this situation is that the victory of the proponent is defined to be the explanation of truth, but the proponent does not achieve this, since he fails to correct the opponent’s mistake. This reinterpreted idea of victory is consistently maintained throughout the entire text of the Vādanyāya.

6. Responses to Dharmakīrti’s ideas in the Nyāya school

It remains to be studied how different Naiyāyikas accepted or refuted the ideas on debate from the Vādanyāya. In this paper, we shall concentrate on Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (NVTT) and Bhāsarvajña’s Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (NBhū).

6.1 Jalpa and vitanḍā in the Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā

Vācaspati Miśra explained wrangle and cavil as follows:

NVTT 1099,15–2000,11 (ad NS 4.2.51): na kevalaṃ tadartham ghaṭamānāṃ jalpavitanḍe, api tu vidyānirvedādibhiś ca pareṇāvajñāyamānasya; tāḥbhīṃ vigṛhyakathanam iti sūtram. yas tu svadarśanavilasitamithyājñānāvadapadurvidagdhatayan sadvidyāvairāgyad vā bhekupūjakhyāyatarthitayā khetubhir iśvarānāṃ janādhārānāṃ purato vedabrāhmaṇaparalokādīdiśaṇa-pravṛttah, taṃ prati vādī sāmicinādiśaṇaṃ apratibhayāpaśyan jalpavitanḍe
Figure 1: The conditions of victory or defeat defined in the Vādanyāya. (This figure has been presented in Sasaki 2013a)
Wrangle (jalpa) and cavil (vitaṇḍā) [take place] not only between those who strive for it (i.e., protecting the ascertainment of truth) but also between those who are derogatorily considered to disregard expertise by others. [According to the Nyāya-śūtra (i.e., NS 4.2.51), “by means of these two, [i.e., wrangle and cavil,] the hostile dispute [is undertaken].” However, the debater who doesn’t find an appropriate objection against the [following] person introduces (avatārya), namely, divides (vigrhya) wrangle and cavil and then makes statements about truth through wrangle and cavil for the purpose of defending expertise. The [above-mentioned] person is engaged in objecting to Veda, Brahman, the future world and the rest in the presence of the Gods held firm by people through fallacious logical reasons because of a false conception, haughtiness, or unsophisticatedness that appears in his own view or [because of] a desire for profit, honor, or reputation on account of aversion to the true expertise. This (i.e., defending expertise) is also the purpose of the wrangling and the cavil. However, profit, reputation and the like are considered to be neither [the purpose of the wrangling nor the cavil] because the extremely compassionate sage who is engaged in the welfare of others (parahita) does not teach obvious methods for deceiving others.

Vācaspati seems to reinterpret the traditional definition of jalpa and vitaṇḍā by introducing a new concept in the Nyāyāvatīrtakatātparyatīkā. The main points of his reinterpretation can be summarized as follows:

1. Vācaspati reinterpreted vigrhya in NS 4.2.51 as avatārya, while Vātsyāyana interpreted vigrhya as vijigīṣayā. It is assumed that Vācaspati intended to change the traditional idea that debaters seek victory in jalpa and vitaṇḍā. This probably indicates his acceptance of Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijīṣṭam vāḍaḥ). However, according to Thakur’s edition, this interpretation is problematic because he reads avatārya vijigīṣayā tam vigrhya. Therefore, I would like to avoid drawing a definitive conclusion here.

2. The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “honor” or “reputation.”

3. Vācaspati introduced the idea of “welfare of others” (parahita). He does not clearly describe this concept as the purpose or motivation of jalpa or vitaṇḍā. However, it is likely that Vācaspati integrated the Vādanyāya’s idea of “benefit of others” (parānugraha) into his own approach.

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28 avatārya vigrhya NVTT(CSS), NVTT(KSS); avatārya vijigīṣayā tam vigrhya NVTT(Thakur).
29 See NS 4.2.50: tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣanārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe… // “The wrangling (jalpa) and the cavil (vitaṇḍā): [are undertaken] for the purpose of protecting the ascertainment of truth.” See section 4 for details.
30 See NVTP 558,2–3: vidyānirveda ity asya vivaraṇāṃ sadvidyāvairāgyād iti. adīgraṇaḥavivaraṇāṃ lābhapūjeti.
31 See section 4 for details.
4. The purpose is “defense of expertise.”
5. The method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”

Although there remain some uncertainties as to how Vācaspati Miśra responded to the ideas on debate presented in the Vādanyāya, it seems clear that he adopted some of these ideas to fit his own concept of debate.

6.2 Jalpa and vītaṇḍā in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa

In the case of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, an influence from the Vādanyāya is more evident than in the case of the Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā.

NBhū 332,11–23: yatra tu vijigīṣunā saha lābhāṣājāthī lokkāmā jayārthi pravartate, sā vijigīṣukathā. nanu ca mokṣamārgaviruddhatvā lābhāṣājāthī pravartita stingārē pratiyajana kathā na yuktiti, satyam; neyam mumukṣunā kartavyā, kim tu jñātvā varjanīyeti nīrūpīta. yadā tu viśālāgo vijigīṣunāksiptā kathām pari-hartum paroparodhān na śaknoti, tadāsau viśālāgas tena vijigīṣuṇā saha pari-nugrāhārthām jñānānukuraraśaṇārthām ca tām eva caturāṅgām kathām kuryāt… svātmāni śiśyādītmani cītappanā tattvādhyavasāyānukurāḥ śākyā- dimrgair bhāṣyetāpi yadi jalpavāntaṃbhāyiṁ kaṇṭakaśākṣāhābhāyām āvāranāḥ na kriyeta, ye cānupannatatvajñānāḥ śiśyādītayaḥ, teśam pratīvādinaś cānugrāhārthāviśālāgenāpi jalpādu pravartityavām ity utkam. anugrahaḥ ca mokṣāśāstācārīyādīṣu śraddhotpattidvāraṇaḥ bhavati.

However, when those who long for profit, honor, or reputation undertake a certain [debate] for the purpose of victory with those [disputants who are] desirous of victory, the [debate] is the “dispute of people with a desire to win” (vijigīṣukathā). (Objection:) Because the acquisition of profit and the rest is contrary to the path to liberation, the dispute that has it (i.e., victory) as its purpose is not appropriate. (Answer:) Yes, [you are correct]. It is determined that those who desire liberation ought not to do this (i.e., the disputation whose purpose is victory), but rather ought to avoid [such a disputation] after becoming aware of [such a disputation]. However, unless a person without passion who is provoked by a person with the desire to win can repel the dispute by troubling others, this passionless person will undertake the very dispute, which consists of four component parts with this person with a

32 Cf. NVTṬ 1099,13–14 (ad NS 4.2.50): tattvādhyavasāyānukurāḥ jayārthāpya saṁraśmāraśaṇarthaṃ viśālānucchātābhāryaḥ svātṛtāḥ. tad vyācaṣṭe – anutpannatatvajñānānām iti.

33 Basically, in the Nyāya school viśālānakathā corresponds to vāda, and vijigīṣukathā corresponds to jalpa or vītaṇḍā. Bhāṣarvajña, however, shows another interpretative possibility – that viśālānakathā and vijigīṣukathā are divided into four sub-types: (i) apratipakṣā viśālānakathā, (ii) apratipakṣā vītaṇḍā, (iii) apratipakṣā vijigīṣukathā, and (iv) apratipakṣā vijigīṣukathā. See NBhū 332.7–11: vītaṇḍāpi divedhā bhavati – viśālānakathāpi vāpratipakṣā(1) ca…. evam cāvāntaratvādavāsākṣāyām catsrāḥ kathā bhavanti, na tisra iti. vyāhāras tu viśesasamjñānaśrayenaivāvāstū tiṣra eva viśesasamjñāna uddīśāḥ, atha vā tiṣra eva bhavantu, vādi ‘pi hi pratiṣṭhino vītaṇḍāvārte vākṣyāmaḥ. (1) vāpratipakṣā em.: vā pratiṣṭhī. “The dispute of people without passion (vītaṇḍā) also has two types: [the dispute
desire to win for the purpose of benefitting others (*parānugrahārtham*) and for protecting the sprout of knowledge…. The sprout of the ascertainment of truth that surfaces in [a debater] himself and in his disciples would be eaten by savage animals, such as Buddhists, if [the sprout] were not covered by thorny branches, i.e., the wrangling and the cavil. Furthermore, it is said that even the person without passion has to undertake the wrangling and so on for the purpose of benefitting (*anugrahārtham*) disciples and the rest who have no knowledge of truth and for [benefitting] an opponent. Additionally, the benefit [of others] occurs through having faith in the masters [who teach] the doctrine of liberation and the like.

As in Vācaspati’s text cited above, Bhāsarvajña also proposes a new interpretation of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. The main points are summarized as follows:

1. Bhāsarvajña considers that a person without passion (*vītarāga*) has to participate in the “dispute of people with a desire to win” (*vijigīṣukathā*) when he is provoked by a person with the desire to win (*vijigīṣu*). Even in that case, *vītarāga*, as its name suggests, is free from passion, such as the desire to win. Therefore, in the case of *vijigīṣukathā* carried out by *vītarāga*, it seems that Bhāsarvajña intends, like Dharmakīrti, to remove the idea of victory as the purpose of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. In other words, both *vītarāga* in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* and *sat* in the *Vādanyāya* have no desire to win (*vijigīṣā*). It seems quite probable that the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*’s view is influenced by the *Vādanyāya*.

2. The purpose is not “(self-)profit,” “honor,” or “reputation” for those who desire liberation (*mumukṣu*).

3. Bhāsarvajña introduced the idea of *parānugrahārtham* “for the purpose of benefitting others” as the motivation behind *vītarāga* in the context of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. Being engaged in *parānugraha* “benefitting others” is common among *vītarāga* in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* and *sat* in the *Vādanyāya*. One may say that Bhāsarvajña covertly imported Dharmakīrti’s idea of *parānugrahāya*.

4. The purpose is the “protection of the sprout of knowledge [of the ascertainment of truth].”

5. The method is expressed using the metaphor of “thorns.”

Judging from the above, we can be fairly certain that Bhāsarvajña adopted the viewpoint and concept described in the *Vādanyāya* to his own notion of debate, presented in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*.

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that] has an opposing view and [the dispute that] has no opposing views…. Furthermore, when one wishes to express the division [of the disputes] in this way (i.e., based on the existence or nonexistence of opposing views) respectively, there are four types of disputes, not three. On the other hand, it is [already] taught that there are only three particular names (i.e., *vāda, jalpa*, and *vitaṇḍā*) because there is conventional usage only by the three particular names. We, however, will state as follows: if only the three [particular names] exist, the debate (*vāda*) that has no opposing views is also a cavil (*vitaṇḍā*).”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose (Motivation) of debate or treatise</th>
<th>CaS’s jalpa</th>
<th>UR’s composition of the treatise (opposition)</th>
<th>NS’s jalpa and vītuṣṭa</th>
<th>NBhā’s jalpa and vītuṣṭa</th>
<th>VN’s vījūgāvāda</th>
<th>VN’s svatātya vīduṣṭa</th>
<th>NVTJ’s jalpa and vītuṣṭa</th>
<th>NBhā’s jalpa and vītuṣṭa</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>victory (vijigita)</td>
<td>victory (vijigita)</td>
<td>victory (vijigita)</td>
<td>victory (vijigita)</td>
<td>the explanation of truth (sattvadhyayopasa) and the removal of misapprehension (mityāpratipātikāvanavartana) = reinterpreted “victory”</td>
<td>victory (vijigita)</td>
<td>victory (vijigita)</td>
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<tr>
<td>self-profit (dāhaka)</td>
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<td>self-profit (dāhaka)</td>
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<tr>
<td>fame (yalai)</td>
<td>honour (pajāti), reputation (khyāti)</td>
<td>reverence (sakkāra), praise (lokā)</td>
<td>reverence (sakkāra), praise (lokā)</td>
<td>honour (pajāti), reputation (khyāti)</td>
<td>honour (pajāti), reputation (khyāti)</td>
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<tr>
<td>benefit of people (parājñāgaha)</td>
<td>benefit of others (parājñāgaha)</td>
<td>benefit of others (parājñāgaha)</td>
<td>welfare of others (parakhita)</td>
<td>benefit of others (parājñāgaha)</td>
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<tr>
<td>protection of the true teaching (dhamma)</td>
<td>protection of the ascertainment of truth (sattvādhyayavivekamukṣa)</td>
<td>defence of expertise (vidyāpālana)</td>
<td>protection of truth (sativarana)</td>
<td>defence of expertise (vidyāpālana)</td>
<td>protection of the uprooting of knowledge (jñānātmakarama)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ridicule another (apabhadra parantesa)</td>
<td>thorns (kajajaka)</td>
<td>thorns (kajajaka)</td>
<td>thorns (kajajaka)</td>
<td>evil deeds (vijayapattam / asadyavahāra), distortion (chala), embarrass others (parapamsana)</td>
<td>thorns (kajajaka)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* These purposes and method have interpretative problems. See section 2 for details.

*Note:* A crossed line indicates rejection. For example, the "Upājaśastra" rejects "victory" as the purpose of debate.

*Note:* The rejection of concept of "victory" in the Nyāyaśāstraṇāsūntakopūrṇaḥ is problematic. See section 6.1 for details.

*Note:* The "welfare for others (parakhita)" is not clearly described as the purpose of jalpa or vītuṣṭa in the Nyāyaśāstraṇāsūntakopūrṇaḥ. See section 6.1 for details.

*Note:* The negation of the purpose of victory and the affirmation of the purpose of "benefit of others" is attributed to the case of vītuṣṭa. See section 6.2 for details.

Figure 2: The comparison of conceptions of debate in Indian Logic
7. Concluding remarks

The comparison of “debate” concepts in the sources examined in this paper is presented in Figure 2. In addition, this comparison yields the following main points:

1. In the *Carakasamhitā* the term *jalpa* is employed to refer to a type of hostile debate conducted for the purpose of victory.
2. In the *Upāyahṛdaya* the composition of a treatise (造論) is explained using the metaphor of thorns (荊棘). The same metaphor is used in the Nyāyasūtras. Either it was adapted from the *Upāyahṛdaya* or from another text upon which both the Nyāyasūtras and the *Upāyahṛdaya* draw. In the Nyāyasūtras the metaphor is used to explain *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*, technical terms that are also employed in the Carakasamhitā.
3. In the Nyāyabhāṣya both *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are interpreted as forms of debate for the purpose of victory. As for *jalpa*, this interpretation is similar to that found in the Carakasamhitā.
4. In the Vādanyāya Dharmakīrti criticized the purpose of victory attributed to *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* in the Nyāyabhāṣya, presenting instead the idea of *parānugraha* “benefitting others,” as the purpose of debate. Dharmakīrti’s negation of the purpose of victory and the affirmation of the purpose of “benefit of others” is similar to the position found in the *Upāyahṛdaya*.
5. From among the later Naiyāyikas, at least Bhāsarvajña, in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, accepted implicitly Dharmakīrti’s construction of the debate concept in the Vādanyāya by adopting the idea of “benefitting others” and rejecting the idea of “victory.” It is possible that the same might be said of Vācaspati’s Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā as well, although the text is not explicit.

We may reasonably conclude that the Vādanyāya marked a turning point in the historical transition of the concept of debate. Dharmakīrti criticized the earlier concept of debate in the Nyāya school as “debate of people with a desire to win” (vijīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ) and created a new one, i.e., “debate of well-educated people” (satāṃ vādaḥ). His new understanding of the nature of the debate affected the later Nyāya school and led some Naiyāyikas to modify their approach. However, the extent to which the Vādanyāya influenced later works in the Nyāya school remains a matter for further research. An extended examination of the Vādanyāya’s commentaries, such as Śāntarakṣita’s Vipaścītartha, as well as more comprehensive studies on later Nyāya literature, are needed to more fully understand these relationships.

References and abbreviations

**Primary sources**

D sDe dge edition of the Tripitaka in Tibetan.
NBh Nyāyabhāṣya. See NV.
NS Nyāyasūtras. See NV.
NV Nyāyavārttika. See NVTT.
P Peking edition of the Tripiṭaka in Tibetan.
T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō. (Taishō edition of the Tripiṭaka in Chinese.)
UH *Upāyahṛdaya. See T [Vol. 32, No. 1632].
VA_MS Vipaṅcitārthā: Photostat copy of the Sanskrit manuscript in the library of Georg-August-Universität Göttingen. (Color photostat copies of the same manuscript: 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a are contained in 尼瑪旦增編，『羅布林卡珍藏文物輯選』，中国藏学出版社，2011.)

Secondary sources


The Meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s Theories of Inference

by

Kiyokuni Shiga

1. Introductory remarks

In an earlier paper, “Remarks on the Origin of All-Inclusive Pervasion” (henceforth Shiga 2011b), I proposed the hypothesis that the theory of all-inclusive pervasion (sarvopasaṃhāra-ravyāpti), considered to have been created by Dharmakīrti, in fact originated in Dignāga’s theory of inference. The statement of Dignāga’s in question, which appears in the third chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (henceforth PSV), is the following:

To be more precise, the co-existence [of a logical reason] with such an [object to be proved] is understood by means of two [types of] exemplification based on similarity or dissimilarity, [in] which [the property to be proved] is associated1 with external things[s] that respectively have the proving property (bāhyārthopasaṃhṛtena).²

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¹ As we will see below, Jinendrabuddhi understands the word upasaṃhṛta or upasaṃhāra as forming part of the compound bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta or bāhyārthānupasaṃhāra as upadarśita (PST D185b3; P211a7; Skt. B146a2), upanayana or prakāśana (PST D230a3; P260b5; Skt. PST B185a2). Moreover, he interprets the word upasaṃhāra as “associating/bringing the [property] to be proved with/near all the proving [properties]” elsewhere in the same chapter (PST D227b1: P257b7f.: nye bar bsdu ba ni med na mi ‘byung ba nyid de[ste P] / thams cad du sgrub par byed pa la bsgrub par bya na ye bar bsdu ba ste / nye bar ’dren pa'o // Skt. B182b6f.: upasamhāro ‘vinābhāvitvam, sarvatra sādhane sādhyasopasamharanam upanayah). Therefore, it would be more appropriate in this case to translate upasaṃhṛta as “associated,” “applied” or “brought near” than as “summed up” (Shiga 2011b: 525 with n. 14) or “included,” as in the case of Dharmakīrti’s term sarvopasaṃhāra (HB 5*, 21), which could be translated as “including” or “summing up [the property to be proved] in all the [property-bearers that respectively have the proving property]” (HBṬ 62, 18–20: sarvasmin sādhanadharmavati dharmiṇi, na drṣṭāntadharmiṇya eva, sādhyadharmasopasamharanam upasamhāra dhaukanam …). Meanwhile, it should be noted here that Arcaṭa glosses upasaṃhāra as dhaukana (“brining [the property to be proved] near [all the property-bearers that respectively have the proving property]”). Taking this interpretation into consideration, it is probable that the word upasaṃhāra, even in the compound sarvopasaṃhāra, could mean “associating” or “applying” rather than “summing up” or “including.”

² According to Jinendrabuddhi, bāhyārtha is to be understood not as a single and particular individual (PST D215a4f.; P244b2; Skt. B171a2f.: … ekatraiva vyaktivise pradarśanasya prādhānyaśrāsa param draṣṭayam), but as a whole assembly of things (PST D215a3; P244a8f.; Skt. B171b7: sāmānyena sarvo yathoktadṛṣṭāntalaścaro ‘rthaśrāsr drṣṭāntah, na tu ghaṭa eva) or the generalized property-bearer as opposed to the particular property-bearer to be proved (PST D185b3; P211a7; Skt. B146a2: dharmaṇaḥ paksikṛtād viśeṣād anyatra sāmānye …).

³ PSV(K) P138a6f.: de 'dra ba'i lhan cig rgyu ba nyid ni phyi rol gyi don nye bar sdu par byed pa chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa'i dpe gnyis po dag gis rtogs pa yin te / PSV(V) D51a7–b1;
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This statement coincides with Dharmakīrti’s formulation of all-inclusive pervasion in his \textit{Hetubindu} \(^4\) (henceforth HB). Considering various factors, I concluded that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti shared the idea that pervasion is established or confirmed by taking individual cases \(^5\) into account. \(^6\)

As I mentioned in Shiga 2011b, the term \textit{bāhyārtha} also appears several times in the fourth chapter of the \textit{Pramāṇasamuccaya} (henceforth PS) and the PSV in the expressions \textit{bāhyārthānupaṃsaṃhāra}, \textit{bāhyārthapradarśana}, \textit{bāhyārthāpekṣā}, as well as \textit{bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta}. These examples of its use need to be examined in a new light to clarify the relationship between \textit{bāhyārtha} and \textit{drṣṭānta}. This paper aims to further investigate various issues that were not settled in Shiga 2011b, including the following: (1) What do Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi mean by the term \textit{bāhyārtha} used in logical contexts, mainly in the PS and PSV 4? (2) Does it literally denote “an external object,” that is, “a thing in the external world as an object of cognition,” or does it denote “something external to the subject or the property-bearer to be proved,” as Jinendrabuddhi understands it? (3) In this case, does Jinendrabuddhi deviate from Dignāga’s original intention by adopting Dharmakīrti’s theories when he interprets Dignāga, or are his comments on the term \textit{bāhyārtha} in keeping with Dignāga’s intention? (4) What is the relationship between the terms \textit{bāhyārtha} and \textit{bahirvyāpti}?  

2. Usage examples for the term \textit{bāhyārtha} in the PS/PSV 4

2.1. Regarding the role of \textit{drṣṭānta}\(^7\)

First, we will observe an example of Dignāga’s use of the term \textit{bāhyārtha} in PS/PSV 4, where he defines the role of \textit{drṣṭānta}. \(^8\)

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\(^4\) HB 5*, 18–22: \textit{tasya dvividhā prayogaḥ; sādharmanāna vaidharmyeṇa ca, yathā yat sat tat sarvam kṣanikam yathā ghaṭādayaḥ, samś ca sabda iti; tathā kṣanikatvābhāve sattvābhāvaḥ, samś ca sabda ity amavayavatirekābhyāṃ sarvasamāhāreṇa vyāptipradarśanālakṣaṇaraṇaḥ sādharmanāna vaidharmyaprayogau.}

\(^5\) While Dignāga states “external case[s]” (\textit{bāhyārtha}), Dharmakīrti refers to “all cases” (\textit{sarva}).

\(^6\) See Shiga 2011b: 532f.

\(^7\) In Dignāga’s system of logic, the word \textit{drṣṭānta} has two different meanings: an actual example or a thing (\textit{artha}, \textit{abhidheya}) and an exemplification or a statement (\textit{vacana}, \textit{abhidhāna}). (See Katsura 2004: 141f.)

\(^8\) See Shiga 2011b: 527. In PS 4.2 \textit{drṣṭānta} is defined differently as follows: \textit{sādhyenānugamohetoh sādhyābhāve ca nāsitita l̃̄ khyāpyate yatra dṛṣṭāntah sa sādharmyetaroh dvidhā l̃̄} (See Jambuvijaya 1966:133. This verse is quoted in \textit{Daśavaikālikasūtra} \textit{cīrāhārdhīrvṛtti} 34b. Cf. \textit{NMuk} 11.) “The example is a [thing] in which it is conveyed that a logical reason is accompanied by what is to be proved and that [the logical reason] is absent when what is to be proved is absent. This is in two forms: [the example on the basis of] similarity and the other (= the example on the basis of dissimilarity).” (See also Katsura 2004: 141 with n. 11.)
Reconstructed text\(^9\) of PSV on PS 4.3 (= Appendix [2]):\(^{10}\)

evaṃ tarhi ghaṭo ‘nudāharaṇam. tatra hi yathā hetuḥ sādhyānugataḥ, tathā sādhyam api hetvanugatam iti cet. na, avivakṣitatvāt [yathā]\(^{11}\) krtakatvavi-šeṣasya hetutvena, tathā ghaṭe sādhyānugamasya. bāhyārthapradarśanam hi nidarśye pradhānam.\(^{12}\)

[Question:] If so (= if the example on the basis of similarity is defined as a thing in which a logical reason is accompanied by what is to be proved),\(^{13}\) a pot would not [constitute a valid] exemplification, because in the [pot], just as a logical reason is accompanied by what is to be proved, what is to be proved is [also] accompanied by the logical reason.

[Answer:] This is not [right], because just as being produced as a particular property is not intended to be the logical reason, what is to be proved is [not intended to be] accompanied [by the logical reason] in a pot[, which is a particular thing, even though that is the case],\(^{14}\) for the primary [role] of exemplification is to indicate external thing[s].\(^{15}\)

Jinendrabuddhi comments on the term bāhyārtha as follows:

\(^9\) Words in roman type are found in the PST or in the fragments, whereas those in \textit{italics} are reconstructed. The Sanskrit reconstructions of the Tibetan translations of PS/PSV 3 and 4 cited in this paper, other than a few passages, are part of the achievements of the PST seminar organized and led by Prof. Shōryū Katsura at Ryūkoku University. I would like to specially thank all the participants of this seminar, especially Dr. Yasuhiro Okazaki, who made Sanskrit reconstructions and editions of PS/PSV/PST 4; Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe, who checked and corrected Dr. Okazaki’s draft; Prof. Diwakar Acharya for his valuable comments and suggestions on the Sanskrit reconstructions; and Prof. Katsura for permission to use these results and other relevant materials. Any errors that remain are my own.

\(^{10}\) No equivalent in PSV(K).

\(^{11}\) See also Shiga 2011b: 527 with n. 21–24.

\(^{12}\) PSV(K): P148b4–6: ‘on te de ltar na bum pa dper mi bya ste l de la ni ci ltar gtan tshigs bsgrub bya’i rjes su ‘gro ba de bzhin du l bsgrub bya yang gan tshigs kyi rjes su ‘gro ba yin no zhe na l ma yin te l byas pa’i khyad par gan tshigs su brjod par ‘dod pa ma yin pa bzhin du bum pa la bsgrub bya rjes su ‘gro ba brjod pa ma yin pa’i phyir ro // phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no // PSV(V) D60b1–3; P64a6f.: gal te ‘di llar bum pa dper brjod pa de lta na ni ji llar gan tshigs bsgrub bya dang ldan pa de llar bsgrub bya gan tshigs dang ldan par ‘gyur ro zhe na ma yin te / brjod par mi bya’i phyir te / bum pa ni gang bsgrub bya’i rjes su ‘gro ba can gyis[gyi P] byas pa nyid kyi khyad par du byas pa brjod par bya’i phyir ro // ngag gi don bstan pa ni nges par bstan pa’i don gtso bo yin no // (See also Katsura 2004: 155 with n.28.)

\(^{13}\) PSṬ D214b5f.; P244a2f.: ‘o na de lta na zhes pa l gal te gang du gan tshigs bsgrub byas rjes su ‘gro ba yin pa de chos mthun pa nyid kyi dpe’o zhes pa mtshan nyid yin na l (Skt. B171b3: \textit{evaṃ tarhī} yadi hetoh sādhyānaya yatra sa sādharmyadṛṣṭānta iti lakṣaṇam.)

\(^{14}\) PST D214b7; P244a4f.: \textit{ma yin te brjod par mi ‘dod pa nyid kyi phyir} zhes pa bsgrub bya’i gan tshigs kyi rjes su ‘gro ba yod kyang / brjod par ‘dod pa yod ma yin te l (Skt. B171b4: \textit{nāvivakṣitatvād} iti. sann api sādhyasya hetunāṅgamo na vivakṣyate.)

\(^{15}\) Cf. Katsura 2004: 143: “Dignāga clearly states that the main purpose of an example statement is to indicate an external object (bāhyārtha) as an example. This seems to suggest that as long as he is discussing logic and epistemology, he is assuming external reality.” Also cf. Katsura 2004: 155: “He (= Dignāga) further states that the main purpose in referring to a particular object like a pot is to indicate some positive support in external reality.”
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External thing[s] mean [those things] in general that are [similar] in kind to what is to be proved, which are [external] to a particular [thing, that is, a particular property-bearer] such as a pot. [The expression bāhyārthapradarśanam, i.e.] “to manifest external thing[s]” means to generally manifest the pervasion of a logical reason by what is to be proved in the [external things in the following way:] “Whatever is produced is all necessarily impermanent.”

Here, Jinendrabuddhi interprets bāhyārtha differently from how he commented on the phrase bāhyārtha (-upasamhrta) in the third chapter, where he interpreted bāhyārtha as “elsewhere than in a particular [property-bearer] that is made to be the subject, i.e., the [property-bearer] in general” (dharmiṇah pakṣiśeṣād višeṣād anyatra sāmānye). This gloss shows the contrast between the inside and the outside of the subject (pakṣa), and the contrast between particular and generalized property-bearers.

The above quotation, on the other hand, suggests that the term bāhyārtha does not mean a particular thing such as a pot, which is one of similar examples, but the generality of things that are similar in kind to what is to be proved (sādhyajātīyasāmānya). In this case, particularity (= an internal thing) is contrasted to generality (= external things). Jinendrabuddhi focuses on the division between an example as an individual thing and a generalized example, but not on the division between a thing inside the subject and things outside the subject.

Next, let us look into the compound bāhyārthapradarśana. According to the Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā, the first half bāhyārtha is to be interpreted in the locative sense, i.e. as “in external thing[s],” and the word vyāpti is complemented as an object of the last half -pradarśana. Thus, the compound as a whole means “indicating the pervasion in external thing[s].” Elsewhere in the same chapter, Jinendrabuddhi presents another interpretation with regard to bāhyārtha. He understands drṣṭānta as meaning an assembly of things (artharāśi), but not as a particular individual thing (vyaktiviśeṣa). And that particular individual

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16 PST D215a1f.; P244a6f.: bum pa la sogs pa’i khyad par las / bsgrub bya’i rigṣ can gyi spyi ni phyi rol gyi don no[to D] / de la spyir gang cung zad byas pa zhes bya bo de[de’i P] thams cad mi rtag pa kho na’o zhes bsgrub byas gien tshig la khyab pa gsal bar byed pa ni phyi rol gyi don gsal bar byed pa’o ll (Skt. B171b5f.: ghaṭāder viśeṣāt sādhyajātīyasāmānyām bāhyo ‘rthaḥ, tatra sāmānyena yan nāma kincit kṛtakaṃ tait sarvam anityam eveti sādhyena hetor vyāptiprakāśanam bāhyārthaprakāśanam.)

17 PST D185b2–4; P211a7f. (= Appendix [1]): phyi rol gyi don nye bar bsdus pas zhes pa l phyoogs su byas pa’i chos can gyi khyad par las gzhan du spyi la nye bar bstan pas zhes pa’i don to / spyi yang khyad par yongs su mi spong pa’i phyi / bsgrub par bya ba’i chos can yang der nang du ’dus pa kho na ste / bsgrub bya’i chos can khyo na la med na mi ‘byang ba nyid ston pa bsal ba lhun len pa ni phyi rol gyi don smos pa’o ll (Skt. B146a1–3: bāhyārthopasaṃhṛtena. dharmiṇah pakṣiśeṣād višeṣād anyatra sāmānyāya upadarśātinīgnye arthāḥ. sāmānyasya ca višeṣāparityāgātā, sādhyadharmy eva tatrāntargata eva. sādhyadharmy evāviniḥbāhyārthopradarśānirāpaṇam tu bāhyārthagrahanam.) [The phrase] bāhyārthopasaṃhṛtena means ‘by [means of two types of examplification based on the similarity or dissimilarity, in which the inseparable relation] is indicated elsewhere (anyatra) than in the particular [property-bearer] that is made to be the subject, i.e. in the [property-bearer] in general.” And because the general does not abandon a particular, the property-bearer to be proved is also included in it (= the property-bearer in general). The word bāhyārtha, on the other hand, is mentioned for the purpose of negating the indication of the inseparable relation only in the property-bearer to be proved.” See also Shiga 2011b: 525f. with n. 18. It is to be noted that Jinendrabuddhi paraphrases the word bāhyārtha to anyatra here.
thing is described as being included in the assembly of things. For Jinendrabuddhi, the term bāhyārtha means “something external to a single and particular individual thing,” or “an assembly of similar things.”

It is worth mentioning in passing that an opponent paraphrases this role of dṛṣṭānta as: “This exemplification depends on external thing[s]” (*bāhyārthāpekṣam idaṃ nidarśanam). Jinendrabuddhi paraphrases this as “pervasion that depends on external thing[s].”

3. Examination of the instances in PS/PSV 1

As Katsura (2004) points out, there is still a possibility that the term bāhyārtha in bāhyārthapradarśana means “an object in the external world” and implies “some positive support in external reality.” The expression bāhyārtha is used at least nine times in PS/PSV 1. An examination of these instances (PSV 1 4, 8; 18, 13; 18, 25; 19, 2; 19, 6; 19, 11; 19, 15; 19, 16; 19, 18) reveals that all of them mean “an external object” or “an object in the external world.” It is easily understood that the counterpart of bāhyārtha is “an internal thing,” such as cognition, knowledge or the mind.

However, if the term bāhyārtha, which is used in logical contexts in PS/PSV 3 and 4, means “an external object,” we encounter certain difficulties. First, Dignāga uses the example buddhi in his formulation of this inference: “Sound is permanent, because it is intangible, like cognition.” It is obvious that this buddhi is not a so-called ‘external object."

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18 PST D215a3–5; P244a8–3:

19 PSṬ D217a6; P246b7f.:

20 PSV on PS 4.4 (K) 149b1–3; (V) D60b5f.; P64b2f.

21 See Katsura 2004: 143; 155.

22 The expression bāhyārthapasaṃhāra is found in PSṬ 1 160, 7–9: yadi tāvad viṣaye pravartamānaṃ mana indriya-vrttikāram anugrahāṃ nāpeśate, evam satīndriyānāṃ sarvathāvairānāh kṣayam, manasaiva bāhyārthopasaṃhārāt puruṣāsasyaspahbhogasiddheḥ. In this case, bāhyārthopasaṃhāra means ‘to comprehend/cover objects in the external world.’

23 PSV(K) P125b3f. (Kitagawa 1965: 474, 2–5): dper na sgra ni rtag[em. : mi rtag P/Kitagawa] ste / reg bya ma yin pa’i phyir blo bzhin no / de bzhin du mig gi gzung bar bya ba yin pa’i phyir mi rtag zhes bya ba ‘di yang bsgrub byar dstan pa’i phyir dam bca’ ba thob po // PSV(V) D41a5f.; P43b8–44a1 (Kitagawa 1965: 474, 2–5): dper na sgra rtag ste / reg par bya ba yin pa’i phyir blo bzhin no zhes bya ba dang l de bzhin du mig gzung bya yin pa’i phyir mi rtag ces bya ba ‘di yang bsgrub bya dstan...
Although the formulation that contains the example buddhi is presented as fallacious, this is not because buddhi is not “an external object,” but because buddhi is a pseudo-example that does not have the property to be proved (nityatva).

Furthermore, if we take a close look at the expression bāhyārtha, the word artha itself can mean “an actual thing” with some factual basis. So it is likely that the word bāhya is used in the sense of “outside” or “external [to the subject]” and artha is used in the sense of “actual example” or a thing that can be verbally expressed or named, i.e., in the sense of padārtha.

4. The expression bāhyārtha-upasaṃhāra or -anupaṃsaṃhāra

4.1. A usage example found in the criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of exemplification (udāharaṇa)

Next, we shall examine cases where the word upasaṃhāra or anupaṃsaṃhāra comes after bāhyārtha.

[Even] if [an opponent states that] the example is qualified by the first half [of the definition of udāharaṇa in NS 1.1.36], the similarity or dissimilarity to the [property-bearer] to be proved does not need to be mentioned [as a part of the definition of example], because:

[If] so, it (= the example) is not seen as what conveys the knowledge [of what is to be proved]. (PS 4.19b)

To wit, when [the example] does not associate [the property to be proved] with external thing[s that respectively have the proving property] (bāhyārthānupaṃsaṃhāre), the example does not convey the knowledge of the property to be proved. Alternatively, for that reason, [the necessity of mentioning similarity or dissimilarity] is not established, [because similarity and dissimilarity are not always necessary for a dissimilar example to have a substratum].

pa`i phyir dam bea` bar thal bar `gyur ro // (Skt. reconstruction: *tad yathā nityāḥ śabdāḥ, asparśatvāt, buddhivat, evam anityāḥ śabdāḥ, cākṣusatvāc ceto etat api śādhanirdeśāt pratijñā prasajyate. Cf. NV 274, 4f.) Cf. NP 8, 9: sādhyadharmāsiddhidh yathā nityāḥ śabdō `mārtavād buddhivat.

[102x285] NP 8, 10f.: yad amārtam vastu tan nityam drṣṭām yathā buddhir iti. buddhau hi sādhanadharma `mārtavām asī, sādhyadharmo nityatvam nāsti, anityatvād buddher.

Also cf. PV 1.26: tasmād vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte neṣto `vaśyam iḥśrayaḥ / tadbhāve ca tan neti vacanād api tadgathe // This is Dignāga’s view on the substratum (āśraya) of vaidharmyadrṣṭānta, which is indirectly quoted by Dharmakīrti. They both think that it is not always necessary for a dissimilar example to have a substratum.

Cf. Hetumukha (?) sarva evāyaṃ anumānānumeṣaḥ avahāro buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharmibhedena, [na bahih sadāsatvam apekṣate NVTṬ]. (Quoted in PVSV 2, 22–3, 1; NVTṬ 51, 11f.; 162, 28f.) See also Frawallner 1959: 164.

The entire Naiyāyika definition of udāharaṇa is as follows. NS 1.1.36–37: sādhyasādhyamāt taddhar- mabhāvi drṣṭānta udāharaṇam, tadviparyayād vā vipariṭam. “The exemplification is an [actual] example that [is supposed to] have [another] property (i.e., the property to be proved) of it (= the property-bearer to be proved) due to the [example’s] similarity (i.e., the proving property) to the [property-bearer] to be proved. The counter-example is [an actual example that is not supposed to have another property (i.e., the property to be proved) of the property-bearer to be proved) due to its opposite (i.e., the similarity to what is to be proved).”
implied] just by [the qualifier:] “having the property of the [property-bearer to be proved]” (taddharmabhāvitvena).28

This is found in the criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of the exemplification (udāharaṇa) in the paramata-section of PS/PSV 4. Dignāga asserts that if drṣṭānta “does not associate [the property to be proved] with external thing[s that respectively have the proving property],”29 such drṣṭānta cannot prove what is to be proved. This suggests that bāhyārthopasamḥāra is an indispensable condition for drṣṭānta to prove what is to be proved. Just before this assertion, he also states that if drṣṭānta is treated as separate from the content of the logical reason, a fallacy would occur: a certain thing (e.g. space) could become both a similar and dissimilar example because of its similarity (e.g. being existent) and dissimilarity (e.g. being inaudible) to the property-bearer to be proved (e.g. sound).30

Jinendrabuddhi comments on the use of the words bāhyārtha and upasamḥāra in the above quotation as follows:

[The word] bāhyārtha in [the phrase] na hi bāhyārthaṇupasamḥāre means another thing that is different from mere similarity or dissimilarity. Furthermore, it (= bāhyārtha) [actually] means a pervasion or inseparable relation (avinābhāvitva). The association (upasamḥāra) of it (= bāhyārtha = avi-nābhāvitva) means applying (upanayana), i.e. manifesting (prakāśana), that [bāhyārtha] is an object to be explained. When it (= upasamḥāra) is not present, the example is not what conveys the knowledge [of what is to be proved]. ...31

PSV(K) P153b6–8: gal te dpe snga mas khyad par du bya ba yin na bsgrub bya dang chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa smos par mi bya ste l gang gi phyir, de ltar go byed de ma mthong l (PS 4.19c) phyi rol gyi don rjes su ma bs dus pa la dpes bsgrub bya’i chos rtogs pa ni yod pa ma yin pa’i phyir de’i chos rtogs pa nyid du ma grub pa kho na yin no // PSV(V) D64a7–b1; P68a6–8: gzhon yang gal te dpe[de yis P] sngon du khyad par du bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba’i chos dang mthun pa dang l chos dang mi mthun par ’dcin pa yin[ma yin P] te l go byed du de mthong ma yin // (PS 4.19c) phyi rol gyi don rjes thogs su ma smos pa’i dpes ni bsgrub par bya ba’i chos la go bar bya ba yin no zhes chos de rtogs pa nyid du yang mi ’grub po // (Skt. reconstruction: *yadi pūrveṇa dṛṣṭānto viśeṣyate, na sādhyasadānyavaidhānyagranānam kartavyam. yasmāt, naivām sa gamako dṛṣṭaḥ (PS 4.19b) na hi bāhyārthāṇupasamḥāre drṣṭaṁtasya sādhyadhamagamakṛtvam) asitī tadādharabāvitvenaiva vāśiddham.)

PSV(K) 153b5f.: ’di la yang gal te gan tshigs kyi don las dpe tha dad pa yin na dpe gan tshigs kyi don la ’brel pa nyid du gdon mi za bar brjod par bya bar mi ’gyur ro // de lta na yang byas pa’i phyir mi rtag ste nam mkha’ bzhin zhes bya ba yang dper ’gyur te yod pas yod pa’i phyir dang l mnyan bya ma ma yin pa’i phyir zhes bya ba ’di la bsgrub par bya va dang chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa yod pa yin no // PSV(V) D64a6f.; P68a5f.: de yang[de yang om. P] gal te gan tshigs kyi don las dpe logs shig pa yin na ni dpe gan tshigs kyi don dang rjes su ’brel par brjod par mi bya bar ’gyur ro // de bzhin du byas pa’i phyir mi rtag pa ste l nam mkha’ bzhin no zhes bya bar yang dper ’gyur ro // de’i phyir bsgrub par bya ba’i chos dang mthun pa dang l chos dang mthun pa ni yod pa dang mnyan bya nyid dag la sogs pa la yang yod pa[yod pa om. P] yin no // (Skt. reconstruction: *atraṇi yadi hetvarthāt prthag drṣṭāntah, na drṣṭānto hetvarthāṅgata evaśaṃ yācayā sam. tathā ca kṛtakatvād anitya ākāśavād ity api drṣṭāntah syāt. astī hy asya sādhyena sādharṇyam vaidhānyam ca sattvaśrayanavatādī.)

PSṬ D230a2f.; P260b4–6 (= Appendix [4]): phyi rol gyi don nye bar ma bs dus pa zhes pa chos mthun pa nyid dang chos mi mthun pa nyid tsam las gzhon pa’i don ni phyi rol gyi don te l de yang khyab pa ste l med na mi ’byung ba nyid do zhes pa’i tha thig go // de’i nye bar bs dus pa ni rtogs par bya

28 PSV(K) P153b6–8: gal te dpe snga mas khyad par du bya ba yin na bsgrub bya dang chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa smos par mi bya ste l gang gi phyir, de ltar go byed de ma mthong l (PS 4.19c) phyi rol gyi don rjes su ma bs dus pa la dpes bsgrub bya’i chos rtogs pa ni yod pa ma yin pa’i phyir de’i chos rtogs pa nyid du ma grub pa kho na yin no // PSV(V) D64a7–b1; P68a6–8: gzhon yang gal te dpe[de yis P] sngon du khyad par du bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba’i chos dang mthun pa dang l chos dang mi mthun par ’dcin pa yin[ma yin P] te l go byed du de mthong ma yin // (PS 4.19c) phyi rol gyi don rjes thogs su ma smos pa’i dpes ni bsgrub par bya ba’i chos la go bar bya ba yin no zhes chos de rtogs pa nyid du yang mi ’grub po // (Skt. reconstruction: *yadi pūrveṇa dṛṣṭānto viśeṣyate, na sādhyasadānyavaidhānyagranānam kartavyam. yasmāt, naivām sa gamako dṛṣṭaḥ (PS 4.19b) na hi bāhyārthāṇupasamḥāre drṣṭaṁtasya sādhyadhamagamakṛtvam) asitī tadādharabāvitvenaiva vāśiddham.)

29 Or “does not associate [the pervasion or inseparable relation of the proving property with the property to be proved] with external thing[s],” according to Jinendrabuddhi.

30 PSV(K) 153b5f.: ’di la yang gal te gan tshigs kyi don las dpe tha dad pa yin na dpe gan tshigs kyi don la ’brel pa nyid du gdon mi za bar brjod par bya bar mi ’gyur ro // de lta na yang byas pa’i phyir mi rtag ste nam mkha’ bzhin zhes bya ba yang dper ’gyur te yod pas yod pa’i phyir dang l mnyan bya ma ma yin pa’i phyir zhes bya ba ’di la bsgrub par bya va dang chos mthun pa dang mi mthun pa yod pa yin no // PSV(V) D64a6f.; P68a5f.: de yang[de yang om. P] gal te gan tshigs kyi don las dpe logs shig pa yin na ni dpe gan tshigs kyi don dang rjes su ’brel par brjod par mi bya bar ’gyur ro // de bzhin du byas pa’i phyir mi rtag pa ste l nam mkha’ bzhin no zhes bya bar yang dper ’gyur ro // de’i phyir bsgrub par bya ba’i chos dang mthun pa dang l chos dang mthun pa ni yod pa dang mnyan bya nyid dag la sogs pa la yang yod pa[yod pa om. P] yin no // (Skt. reconstruction: *atraṇi yadi hetvarthāt prthag drṣṭāntah, na drṣṭānto hetvarthāṅgata evaśaṃ yācayā sam. tathā ca kṛtakatvād anitya ākāśavād ity api drṣṭāntah syāt. astī hy asya sādhyena sādharṇyam vaidhānyam ca sattvaśrayanavatādī.)

31 PST D230a2f.; P260b4–6 (= Appendix [4]): phyi rol gyi don nye bar ma bs dus pa zhes pa chos mthun pa nyid dang chos mi mthun pa nyid tsam las gzhon pa’i don ni phyi rol gyi don te l de yang khyab pa ste l med na mi ’byung ba nyid do zhes pa’i tha thig go // de’i nye bar bs dus pa ni rtogs par bya
Jinendrabuddhi understands  bāhyārtha as “another thing that is different from mere similarity or dissimilarity,” then regards it as “pervasion” or “inseparable relation.” These interpretations are unique, in that he takes bāhya in the sense of “different” and then identifies it as pervasion.

In any case, regarding the word bāhyārtha, Jinendrabuddhi calls attention to the fact that drṣṭānta does not consist of the combination of an actual example (e.g. a pot) and its mere similarity (e.g. being produced) or dissimilarity (e.g. not being produced) to the subject (e.g. sound), but instead the combination of drṣṭāntadharmin and the inseparable relation of a logical reason (e.g. being produced) with what is to be proved (e.g. impermanence).

### 4.2. Usage examples regarding the Naiyāyika definition of the application (upanaya)

Here we will examine the uses of bāhyārtha and bahiḥ found in the criticism against the Naiyāyika definition of the application (upanaya).

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**Note:** The text contains a mix of traditional script and digitized text. The digitized text is provided for clarity and readability. The traditional script is retained for authenticity and the original context.

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### 4.2. Usage examples regarding the Naiyāyika definition of the application (upanaya)

Here we will examine the uses of bāhyārtha and bahiḥ found in the criticism against the Naiyāyika definition of the application (upanaya).
On the other hand, the application [of the property to be proved and/or the proving property] to [a dissimilar example such as] space [in the inference: “Sound is impermanent, because it is produced”] by depending on external thing[s] is correct, because, unlike space [and so on], there is nothing that is produced [and] permanent outside [the subject, i.e. sound], whereas, like a pot [and so on], there is something [produced] and impermanent [outside the subject, i.e. sound]. Therefore [sound that is produced] is impermanent. Hence, [the application] is [valid only when it is made] with regard to certain external case[s].

As we have already seen, both Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi recognize “associating [the property to be proved or inseparable relation] with external thing[s]” (bāhyārthöpasaṃhāra) as an essential factor of drṣṭānta for a valid inference. And here “external thing[s]” (bāhyārtha) are restated as being “outside” (bahiḥ), and space and a pot are given as actual examples. According to Jinendrabuddhi, common absence (vyatireka) is indicated in space, whereas common occurrence (anvaya) is indicated in a pot. And the word bahiḥ is men-
to the examples: [the subject] is like [the similar example] or [the subject] is unlike [the dissimilar example].” It should be noted in passing that Viśvanātha glosses the word upasaṃhāra as “placing near” (upanyāsa) in his Vṛtti 313, 26 on NS 1.1.38. Cf. YD 91, 3: sādhyadṛṣṭāntayor ekakriyopasaṃhāra upanayat. “The association, i.e.,...”
tioned “for the purpose of negating the dependence on the mere [fact that the property to be proved and/or the proving property] is present only in a pot and absent only in space,” which implies that bāhyārtha does not refer to a single case, but plural cases. Indeed, on the basis of this passage alone, we cannot decide whether bāhyārtha means “an object in the external world” or “external things outside [the subject],” but at least Jinendrabuddhi’s comments consistently support the meaning of “external thing[s] outside [the subject].”

5. bāhyārtha and the term and notion of bahirvyāpti

As I observed in Shiga 2011b, the expression anyatra, which means “in another place [than the location of the property-bearer to be proved],” is found in PS 2.11. Dignāga himself presents comments on this word, presenting a remarkable idea. He introduces the concept of “the generalized substratum” (ādhārasāmānya). Jinendrabuddhi glosses the words anyatra as “generally (sāmānyena) in all cases, e.g. a kitchen.” He also uses the words anyatra and sāmānya when he comments on the expression bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta in PST 3. From this fact, we can safely say that Jinendrabuddhi, for one, sees the terms bāhyārtha and anyatra as referring to substantially the same thing: that is, property-bearer[s] of the example outside the subject. It is worth noting that he also states that a logical reason (e.g. smoke) is inseparably related not only with the property to be proved (e.g. fire), but also with the generalized substratum (e.g. any place that has fire), because a property-bearer depends on its property, and the property to be proved is particularized by the generalized substratum.

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42 Cf. PST D185b2–4; P211a7f. (Skt. B146a1–3).

43 PS 2.11: lingasyāvyabhicāras tu dharmenānyatra darśyate / tatra prasiddhaṃ tadyuktam dhāmiṇaṃ gamayiṣyati // See also Shiga 2011b: 528–532.

44 This is paraphrased as “the generalized property-bearer” (dharmisāmānya) by Jinendrabuddhi.

45 PSV(K) P112b5 (Kitagawa 1965: 461, 11f.): spyi dang 'di bstan pa nyid yin te gang na du ba yod pa de na me yod do zhes rab tu bstan phyir ro // PSV(V) D30b1; P31b1 (Kitagawa 1965: 461, 11f.): gzhi thun mong ba nyid du bstan pa ste gang na dud pa yod pa de na me yod [de na med P] do zhes bstan pa'i phyir ro // (Skt. reconstruction: *ādhārasāmānya tu pradarśita eva, yatra dhūmas tatrāṅginī iti pradarśanāt.)


47 PST D185b2–4; P211a7f. (Skt. B146a1–3).

48 PST 2.45, 6: anyatreti sāmānyena sarvatra mahānasadāu. Jinendrabuddhi glosses the word anyatra in the PSV as “the generalized place that has smoke” (PST 2.45, 10: dhūmāvatpradāsāsāmānye).
If these observations thus far are valid, it follows that bāhya in the term bāhyārtha and bahir- in the term “external pervasion” (bahirvyāpti) have the same logical value. Dignāga is sometimes described as a “typical” bahirvyāptivādin by modern scholars, presumably because he constructed the system of inference, especially the theory of trairūpya, which requires presenting the similar (sapakṣa) and the dissimilar (vipakṣa) as separate from the subject (pakṣa).⁴⁹ Nevertheless, Dignāga does not declare himself a proponent of bahirvyāpti. In Buddhist treatises on logic and epistemology, the term bahirvyāpti first appeared in Arcaṭa’s HBṬ 62, 9; 62, 23; 62, 27.⁵⁰ Sāntaraksita uses both bahirvyāpti and antarvyāpti in his VNT 5, 30–6, 7. It should be noted here that Arcaṭa and others understand bahirvyāpti as “pervasion that is indicated ‘only’ outside the property-bearer to be proved, that is, ‘only’ in a property-bearer of the example,” but this is different from Dignāga’s view. Dignāga does not state that pervasion is indicated ‘only’ outside the property-bearer to be proved. Rather, he devised the notion of “the generalized property-bearer” (ādhārasāmānya), which can implicitly include the property-bearer to be proved (sādhyadharmin, pakṣa).⁵¹

Pātrasvāmin (7–8 cent.),⁵² a Jaina logician who is considered to have been the first to advocate the theory of the single characteristic (ekalakṣaṇa) of a logical reason, which is virtually identical to the theory of antarvyāpti,⁵³ states that the inseparable relation (avinābhāvitva) asserted by Buddhists is acknowledged outside sādhyas or in drṣṭānta, whereas “being otherwise impossible” (anyathānapannatva) is only acknowledged in the property-bearer to be proved.⁵⁴ Pātrasvāmin’s view was followed by other Jaina

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⁴⁹ We can describe the relationship between trairūpya and bāhyārthopasaṃhāra as follows: to confirm the three characteristics of a logical reason (hetu), i.e., its being the property of the subject, its being present in sapakṣa (which is similar to the subject in that it has the property to be proved [sādhyadharma]) and its not being present in vipakṣa (which is dissimilar to pakṣa because it does not have sādhyadharma), means to check whether the logical reason is valid, when or after the inference in question is made or formulated. This could be called “the process of applying the logical reason to those cases other than the subject” or “the process of inference from the perspective of hetu.” bāhyārthopasaṃhāra, on the other hand, means to associate/apply the property to be proved (sādhyadharma) with/to external things (≡ drṣṭāntadharmin), having the proving property (sādhanadharma) in the exemplification (drṣṭānta) as a member of proof, when or after the inference in question is made or formulated. This could be called “the process of applying the property to be proved to those cases other than the subject” or “the process of inference from the perspective of sādhyadharma.”

⁵⁰ Cf. HBṬ(V) D117a3f.; P145b2f.: ji ltar gzhan dag χis bsgrub par bya ba’i chos can yongs su spangs nas khyab pa gzhan rab tu ston pa lta bu ni ma yin te / thams cad smos pa[p] ni khyab pa gzhan dgag pa’i phyir ro // (For this passage, see also Funayama 2001.)


⁵² For the detail of Pātrasvāmin, see Shiga 2011a: 423–426.

⁵³ See Shiga 2011a: 425f.

⁵⁴ TSP 500, 13f. and PST 2 2, 13f.: vinā sādhyād adṛṣṭasya drṣṭānta hetutesyate / parair mayā punar dharmīṇy asambhāṣnori vinināmā // PST 2 2, 10f.: avinābhāvitvaḥ hi sādhyād bahir īṣyate, anyathānapannatvaṃ tu dharmīṇy eva sādhyā eveti; 2 3, 4: avinābhāvitvaḥ hi pariḥ sādhyād bahir īṣyata iti, eṣo ‘dhyāropāḥ. Cf. HBṬ 62, 27–63, 2: na hi sa śyāmaḥ, tatputrāvāt, paridṛṣṭāyamānaputtravad iti
The Meaning of bāhyārthā in Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s Theories of Inference

logicians such as Akalaṅka. They regarded themselves as proponents of antarvyāptī and the Buddhists as proponents of bahirvyāptī. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that Arcaṭa and other successors of Dharmakīrti did not intend to criticize Dignāga’s view directly, but rather to point out that Dignāga was allegedly credited with creating the theory of the so-called bahirvyāptī.

6. Conclusion

We can safely state that, as long as we do not disregard Jinendrabuddhi’s annotations, when Dignāga uses the term bāhyārthā in connection with upasamhāra, pradarśana or apekṣā in the context of inference, he does not mean “an external object” or “an object in the external world,” but “external thing[s] outside the subject.” It is possible to suppose that Dignāga was well aware of the division between the inside and outside of the subject or property-bearer to be proved.

More specifically, the term bāhyārthā found in PS/PSV 3 and 4 refers to (1) “[external] things, that is, the generalized [property-bearer], which is other than a particular [property-bearer] that is made to be the subject” (PSṬ B146a2, Appendix [1]); (2) “the generalized [property-bearer] that is similar in kind to what is to be proved, which is external to a particular [property-bearer] such as a pot” (PSṬ B171b5, Appendix [2]); (3) “an [external] thing that is different from mere similarity or dissimilarity,” that is, “pervasion or inseparable relation” (PSṬ B185a2, Appendix [4]); (4) more than simply a single example such as a pot or space (PSṬ B190a3, Appendix [8]). Apart from (3), Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretations do not seem to deviate from Dignāga’s original intention.

Due to his triairūpya-theory, Dignāga is often regarded as the proponent of bahirvyāptī. What he intended to maintain, however, might not be the so-called position of bahirvyāptī that means, according to Arcaṭa, the pervasion that is to be grasped or observed ‘only’ in a property-bearer of the example, that is, outside the subject. Rather, it is probable that Dignāga, like Dharmakīrti, assumed some sort of generality or universality regarding pervasion and its substratum.

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55 See SVin 5.15cd: antarvyāptāv asiddhāyāṃ bahirvyāptir asādhanam // PSaṃ 32cd: avinābhāvvasa-mbandhe ‘py antarvyāptyāvatiṣṭhate // PSaṃ 50cd: antarvyāptāv asiddhāyāṃ bahirangam anartha-kam //

56 Cf. NA 20: antarvyāptyaiva sādhyāsya siddher bahirudāhṛtiḥ // Vyarthā syat tudasadbhāve ‘py evam nyāyavido vidīḥ // See also NAV 401, 10f. on bahirudāhṛtiḥ: bahir vivakṣitadharmino ‘nyatra drṣṭāntadharminy udāhṛtīḥ vyāptidarśanarūpa ...

57 Indeed Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation may have been influenced by Dharmakīrti’s thoughts, but it is also problematic to think that Jinendrabuddhi always comments on the PS/PSV by adopting and following Dharmakīrti’s theories. There may be cases where Jinendrabuddhi’s comments conform to Dignāga’s original intention. (Cf. Steinkellner 2004: 227f. with n. 5.)

58 We cannot find passages that positively support the meaning of “an object in the external world” in Dignāga’s statements on inference either.
As for pervasion, on the other hand, Dignāga asserts the logical predominance of the common absence (vyatireka) over the common occurrence (anvaya),\(^{59}\) and states that vyatireka can be grasped or understood by mere non-observation (adarśanamātra).\(^{60}\) Indeed, the pervasion based on Dignāga’s system appears to be hypothetical, because pervasion would not be valid if even a single counter-example is found, but it is likely that he thought that pervasion should be universal once it was established.\(^{61}\) We can assume that Dignāga thought that this universal pervasion should be applied to external cases outside the subject. In addition, since the subject is supposed to be implicitly included in those external cases, it is possible to apply the pervasion to the subject and infer what is to be proved.

### Table 1: Dignāga’s usage of bāhyārtha in logical contexts, with Jinendrabuddhi’s comments (PS/PSV/PST 3 and 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Dignāga</th>
<th>Jinendrabuddhi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 3.36b: (^{62}) tādṛksāhabhavyam hi sādharmyena vaišāharmyena vā bāhyārthopasamhṛtena drṣṭāntadadvayaena gamyate. (PSV(K) P138a5–7; PSV(V) D51a6–b1; P54b5–7)</td>
<td>PST B146a1–3: darminah pāksīkṛtād vi-śeṣād anyatra sāmānya upadarṣītenety arthah. sāmānyasya ca viṣeṣāparītyā- gāt, sādhyadharma api tatrāntargata eva. sādhyadharminy evāvānābhāvitvapradarśananimśaparāpya bāhyārtha- grahaṇam.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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59 PST 2 47, 16–18: sarvatrānaganau na draṣṭa ity anena vyatirekasya prādhānīyaṃvipākṣe sarvatrādārṣā- nena khāyāpayati. anyatāpi ca draṣṭa iti. apiṣabdena kvacin na draṣṭo ‘pīti dyotayann anvayasyāpīraṃprādhā- nyam. (See also Pind 2015: II 232.)

60 See PS/PSV 5.34 and Pind 2011: 70–73.


62 Words in italics are not attested in the PST or other texts.
### The Meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s Theories of Inference

Table continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>Jinendrabuddhi</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[3]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 4.4: bāhyārthāpekṣam idam nidarśanam. (PSV(K) P149b3; PSV(V) D60b6; P64b3)</td>
<td>No direct comment. Cf. PST B173b6: na hi sadbhāvamātradarśane bāhyārthāpekṣatvam nidarśānasya yuyātē; PST B173b6–174a1: tataś ca ghaṭe ‘nityatvam prayatnānantarīyakatvam ca drṣṭam iti kṛte hetoh sapakṣe gamyata eva sadbhāvamātram iti kim atra bāhyārthāpekṣayā vyāptyaiveti ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[4]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 4.19: na hi bāhyārthānupasaṃhāre drṣṭāntena sādhyaadharmo gamyate. (PSV(K) P153b7; PSV(V) D64b1; P68a7)</td>
<td>PST B185a1–3: na hi bāhyārthānupasaṃhāra iti sādharmyavaidharmyamātrad anyo ‘ṛtho bāhyārthāḥ. sa punar vyāptir avinābḥaivitvam iti yāvat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[7]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 4.20: bāhyārthāpekṣayā tv ākāśasyopanayo yuktaḥ. (PSV(K) P155b4f.; PSV(V) D66a1f.; P70a1f.)</td>
<td>No direct comment. See the example [8].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[8]</td>
<td>PSV on PS 4.20: yasmād ākāśavad bhāhiḥ, na hi kīṃcincityāntaṃ kṛtakam anityatvam cāsti ghātavat. tasmād anityam iti kvacīd bāhir asti. (PSV(K) P155b5f.; PSV(V) D66a2; D70a2f.)</td>
<td>PST B190a2–3: kathām bāhyārthāpekṣa ity āha: yasmād ityādi. kevalaḥghaṭākāśasadasattvamātrāpekṣatvanirāsaṃ bāhiringrahaṇam. See also PST B190a3–5: anvayayatirekam cāpekyata tatpradarśanārtham ākāśavat ghātavac cety ekadeṣa udāhāranamātram upaniyate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### References and abbreviations

**Primary Sources**


HBṬ(V) Hetubinduṭīkā (Vinītadeva): (Tib.) D4234, P5733.


NAvi Nyāyāvatāraṇavivṛty (Siddhārṣi): See NA.

NB Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti): See NBṬ

NBṬ Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara): Paṇḍita Durvekamiśra’s Dharmottarapradīpa [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu], ed. Dalsukhbhai Malvania. Patna 1971.

NMukh Nyāyamukha (Dignāga): See Katsura 1981.


NV Nyāyavārttika (Uddyotakara): See NS.

NVTṬ Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā (Vācaspatimiśra): See NS.

PS Pramāṇasamuccaya (Dignāga): See PSV.

PS/PSV 1 Pramāṇasamuccaya/Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga), chapter 1: See Steinkellner 2005.


PSṬ Vīśālalavati Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā (Jinendrabuddhi): (Tib.) D4268; P5766.


PSV(K) Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga) translated by Kanakavarman: (Tib.) P5702. See also Kitagawa 1965: 440–579.

PSV(V) Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga) translated by Vasudhararakṣita: (Tib.) D4204; P5701. See also Kitagawa 1965: 440–579.

PV Pramāṇavārttika (Dharmakīrti): See PVSV.


The Meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jñendrabuddhi’s Theories of Inference


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CLOSING A GAP IN THE INTERPRETATION OF DHARMAKĪRTI’S LOGIC

by

Ernst Steinkellner

Dedicated to Hans Lenk in gratitude.¹

It is the ontic character² of Dharmakīrti’s logic that allows us to consider his method for ascertaining the necessary concomitance (vyāpti) of the concept of an “effect” as logical reason (kāryahetu) with that of a “cause” as its consequent (sādhya) to be a method for ascertaining a causal relation (kāryakāraṇabhāva) as well.

Scholars have long examined the formulation of this method from various perspectives, seeing it as two different topics, one causal, the other logical. I will begin by taking a closer look at the first, the causal. In my opinion, it was separated from the second due to its focus on causality, and moreover, its proper understanding was also impeded by a weighty interpretational mistake. Although the second topic, the logical one, fared better, its systematic purpose in the context of Dharmakīrti’s work has not been clarified sufficiently.

Three papers presented in Vienna at the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference in 1989 are my starting point: one by Brendan Gillon, who criticized Dharmakīrti’s proposed method for ascertaining a causal relation or, in other words, for solving the induction problem (Gillon 1991), and the papers by Tadashi Tani (1991) and myself (Steinkellner 1991). The reason for this dedication to the German philosopher Hans Lenk is my assumption that certain basic Buddhist epistemic and ontologic conceptions, such as vikalpa, vāsanā, anāditva, can fruitfully be stimulated by his epistemological thought: Grasping as acting on various levels of interventional interpretations on the basis of schemata that are bio-genetically determined on all levels. For some concise introductions to Lenk’s thought, cf. Lenk 1998 and 2003; the collection of articles Global TechnoScience and Responsibility: Schemes Applied to Human Values, Technology, Creativity, and Globalisation, 2007; and chapters III and IV in Lenk and Paul 2014: 71–117.

² While, as a strict nominalist, Dharmakīrti is not bothered by a correspondence principle for the relationship between concepts or words and their referents in reality, his theory of concepts and their generation (apohaśvāda) provides, nevertheless, a link to reality via actual experiences. Actual experience gives some additional precision to the general profile of the concepts which are inherited from a past without beginning and continuously transported as residual impregnations in the continuum of cognition. Experience gradually reduces the innate erroneous misrepresentation of what there is in these impregnations. As for the concepts themselves, Dharmakīrti thinks that they can be more or less closely related to reality. In order to cope with a world of universal dissatisfaction, what is needed is a way to distinguish concepts that are closer to reality from those that are less or not at all related to reality. The former can be considered sound or true because they can be relied on in activities. To determine their truth is the task of logic, a method for deriving the truth of one concept from its necessary concomitance with another concept whose truth is already established or generally accepted. With Dharmakīrti, in this respect going beyond Dignāga’s logical conceptions, the result of distinguishing sound or true concepts from others is possible because their relationship is grounded in relations that are considered real, such as factual identity and causality. It is this idea that makes for nothing less than an ontic character of Dharmakīrti’s logic. Yet, even if Dharmakīrti admits at the same time that factual identity and causality, too, are only conceptual constructs, he considers them as the only reliable constructs that satisfyingly function when applied in worldly affairs and with the ambition to transgress the world of suffering.

1991), which dealt with Dharmakīrti’s proposal of how to ascertain concomitance (vyāpti) in the case of a svabhāvahetu.

Tadashi Tani, on his part, was able to show that in Dharmakīrti’s first work (that is, the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika with the Vṛtti usually called *Svavṛtti), a prasaṅga assumes this function. In my own paper, I examined the meaning of Dharmakīrti’s later formulation of this device, in the Vādanyāya, as viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. Dharmakīrti developed this method on the basis of the sattvānumāna, and by means of an experiment I was able to show that it is applicable to all svabhāvahetu inferences, such as the one of the designation “tree” from the designation “Śiṃśapā.” The question left open at the time I wrote my paper was “… whether the different treatments of the svabhāvahetu and the kāryahetu in this respect were not also resolved in a certain sense in order to design a homogeneous logical system, or at least, whether there are no indications to be found in Dharmakīrti’s work that he was aiming in this direction” (Steinkellner 1991: 323).

Based on PV 1.23’cd and passages from the Hetubindu, Tani in fact already answered this question affirmatively, summarizing: “The kāryahetu too can be interpreted by the same model …” and “The necessary relation can be determined by SVB-pramāṇa.” Yet, he added: “Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti did not explicitly explain so” (Tani 1991: 337).

In fact, Tani only very closely missed the mark. The passage he refers to (PV 1.23’cd–24ab with PVSV 17,5–7) belongs to a section of the Vṛtti in which Dharmakīrti establishes the essential relation (svabhāvapratibandha) as the fundament of a reason’s non-deviation from the property to be proved (PVSV 10,13–20,13). It is, however, only in the section beginning with PV 1.34ab (from PVSV 21,24 to the end of the work) that Dharmakīrti actually deals with the question of how, in the case of the two types of acceptable reasons, such an essential relation can be ascertained. And it is here, in PV 1.34 with PVSV 22,2–4 and 6f, that Dharmakīrti’s answer is clearly spelled out in regard to the kāryahetu. It is this clarification that links my present paper to both Tani’s explanation and Gillon’s critique.

I will start with Gillon, because only with a more exact view of the object of his critique are we in a position to see that Dharmakīrti did, in fact, already in this first work of his, provide everything needed for designing a comprehensive and consistent logical system, even if he did not use the later and subsequently traditional term viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa.

In his 1991 paper, Gillon demonstrated that “Dharmakīrti’s solution” to the problem in his formulating a method for ascertaining a causal relation “can be seen not to work” (Gillon 1991: 57). As far as I can see, Gillon’s critique seems invalid with regard to Dharmakīrti’s statement as it has been interpreted until now by all who have set their minds to it, including myself.\footnote{For the historical position of this work, cf. Frauwallner 1954: 144–148 and 152, where Frauwallner tentatively names it *Hetuprakaraṇa; for its character, cf. Steinkellner 2013: I xxviii.}

\footnote{Tani 1991: 332–338. Tani refers to prasaṅga as “hypothetical negative reasoning.”}

\footnote{Gillon’s observations were later refined in two papers by Horst Lasic, who closely analysed the cog-nitional process implied in the steps of this method (1999) and interpreted it as serving another aim, namely, that of justifying a vyāpti already ascertained (2003: 194). But the existence of an induction problem remained unquestioned; this was finally also affirmed by John Dunne (2004: 191–192) and Tom Tillemans (2004: note 25; cf. below).}
I must admit that I could not approve when, in 1989, I heard Dharmakīrti being charged with such a blunder, or with not having seen the pitfalls implied in his proposed method. This irritation lingered on: While on one hand, Dharmakīrti’s fallacy seemed evident, on the other hand, it did not coincide with my appreciation of the acuteness of his thinking and expression. Yet it was only after my retirement that I had the leisure to look at the issue again in the hope of being able to disperse my qualms. So that is what I did. The fault may lie, after all, not in the interpreted object but in the interpreter’s perception. The results of my re-examination have already been published (Steinkellner 2013), and are reflected in three sentences of translation and 25 pages of notes. Alas, all in German!6

I will, therefore, first remind you of Gillon’s critique, which, on the basis of Kajiyama’s translation, is directed against Dharmakīrti’s earliest formulation. Then I will indicate the crux of all earlier translations and summarize the main points of my new understanding.7 Finally, I will draw support for this interpretation from Dharmakīrti’s last work, the Vādanyāya.

The formulation at stake consists of three sentences that belong together. So far, everyone has only dealt with the first sentence (except for John Dunne, who includes the second but misunderstands it, and Gillon and Richard Hayes, who include the third but jump over the second). These sentences are:

1. yeṣāṁ upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdham yad upalabhyate, tatrāi-kābhāve ’pi nopalabhyate, tatasya kāryam.
2. tac ca dhūme ’sti.
3. sakṛd api tathādarśanāt kāryaḥ siddhaḥ, akāryatve ’kāraṇāt sakṛd apy abhāvāt (PVSV 22,2–4 and 6f).8

The salient point of Gillon’s critique9 has been made quite clear by Tom Tillemans:

6 The conclusion of these notes (II.209f) also finds support from Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṅgraha 1695–1697, where the causality relation and non-existence are similarly seen: in both cases only the respective verbal usage (vyavahāra) is inferred, not a real entity as such (cf. Steinkellner 2019: 68-69).
7 In this section, I repeat parts of a paper delivered at the Lumbini conference in 2013 (cf. Steinkellner 2015).
8 Kajiyama translates the first: ‘If a thing (E) which, having perceptible characteristics, was not perceived, is perceived when other things (Cs) have been perceived, and if, when even one thing (C) among these has disappeared E is not perceived, then E is the effect of C …’” (Kajiyama 1963: 2f; E = effect, C = cause). Other samples of translations are: “If a previously unperceived thing defined as perceptible is later perceived when other things are perceived, and if that thing is not perceived when one among those other things is absent, then it is the effect of that thing. That kind of definition of an effect applies to smoke” (Dunne 2004: 335). “That which, not having been apprehended, is apprehended, when its conditions have been apprehended, [but] is not apprehended, when even one of them is absent, is [ascertained] to be their effect. … An effect is established because of being observed even once in that way, because, if it were not an effect, it would not arise even once from what is not its cause” (Gillon and Hayes 2008: 353 and 398).
9 In his paper, Gillon only concludes: “… Dharmakīrti seems to believe that a sequence of five simple non-relational observations results in relational knowledge. … The problem is that this sequence cannot discriminate between genuine causes and spurious correlations. … Moreover, further observations will
The root of the problem of determining causality is that people just have no way of knowing definitely when they have correctly isolated the true cause from the myriad of other background things. Using Mill’s method or that of Dharmakīrti, there can always be the doubt that, in spite of something being thought to be the cause, the presence of *that* circumstance was not in fact what was actually responsible for the effect and *its* absence was not what brought about an absence of the effect – some other hidden factor that we didn’t know about, didn’t think about and perhaps didn’t see at all was first present and then absent at the key stages of our tests (Tillemans 2004: note 25).

The following is my present translation. The italicized words indicate deviations from my earlier ones.

1. That (entity) (*tat*) which (*yat*) as unperceived (at first), although (on principle) perceptible, is perceived on the perception of which (*other entities present*) (*yeṣām*), and again is not perceived when even a single (entity) among these (*other entities*) (*tatra*) is absent, is the effect of this (single other entity that is absent).

2. And this [fact of being conditionally known through perceptions and non-perceptions] does occur in the case of smoke.

3. From being observed in this way even once (something, such as smoke,) is established as that which is to be effected (*kāryaḥ*) (by something else, such as fire); for, were it not (that which is) to be effected (by this), it would not even once occur on account of that which is not (its) cause.

In terms of mere translating, this new version is roughly the same, with the exception of some added phrases, as all those earlier ones that evoked Gillon’s critique. My interpretation of the italicized items, however, differs in the following ways:

1. Hitherto almost everyone has assumed the pronoun *yeṣām* to refer to the many different individual entities as causes that, by coming together, constitute a single causal complex (*hetuṣāmagrī*). I now consider the plural pronoun, in the light of Dharmakīrti’s concept of “cause,” which always means a causal complex, to refer to different causal complexes and not different individual causes that together constitute a single causal complex.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^\text{10}\) “Conditionally,” in this context, is short for “in respect to the fact of the presence or absence of something else.”

\(^\text{11}\) The exception being Horst Lasic who already in 1999: 237 and 238 clearly excluded an interpretation of *yeṣām* as referring to the constituents of a single causal complex when he paraphrases with “a perception of everything present at the place of observation.” In my note (2013: 354) I overlooked this paraphrase. Mind, however, that in my opinion Lasic’s “things” should also be understood as causal complexes.

2. The process of cognition described in the first sentence consists of several perceptions and non-perceptions under certain conditions, namely, the presence and absence of another entity, and it refers to a specific case of two different entities. In order to generalize the cognition derived from a specific case, Dharmakīrti uses a reductio ad absurdum argument, a prasaṅga, when he says, in the third sentence: “Were (something, say smoke,) not to be effected (by another thing, say fire,) it (could) not even once occur on account of that which is not (its) cause.” This second step indicates an unwanted consequence, should the truth of the cognition gained by observing a specific concrete case not be accepted. It thereby is supposed to provide the qualities of necessity and general validity for this cognition. In other words, the prasaṅga “transforms,” so to speak, the formulation into one of a necessary concomitance (vyāpti), and in this function of justifying a specific common presence and absence as being necessary in general, the prasaṅga is an integral part of the proposed method.

3. Thus, the three cited sentences belong together. Together they make for a veritable proof formula (prayoga): The first sentence states a specific cognition of the common presence and common absence (anvayavyatireka) of the property “being conditionally perceived and non-perceived” as the logical reason (hetu) with the property to be established, the consequent (sādhya), namely, “being the effect of a certain other entity.” This cognition of a mere anvaya and vyatireka is transformed into, i.e. established as, a generally valid vyāpti by the third sentence, the prasaṅga. And the second sentence states the presence of the reason (“being conditionally perceived and non-perceived”) in the locus of smoke (pakṣadharmatā).

In this way, I think, Dharmakīrti tried to overcome the problem of an incomplete induction. I consider his completing the concomitance formulation with a prasaṅga, whose function is to justify that formulation, to be a veritable stroke of genius. Whether he really succeeded or only shifted the problem to yet another level is a question beyond the scope of this article.

Dharmakīrti actually modified this early formulation in his later works, the Hetubindu and the Vādanyāya. In these, the prasaṅga argument is either not included, as in the Hetubindu’s first passage (HB § 3.32), which is focussed on the formal aspects of inference and proof, or it is present in a more elaborate form, as in the Hetubindu’s second passage (HB § 4.22) and in the Vādanyāya.

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13 PVSV 22.6f: akāryatve 'kāraṇāt sakṛd apy abhāvāt.
14 Dharmakīrti expressly states this to be the function of the prasaṅga in PVin 3. 4.7–9 (cf. Watanabe, this volume: § 2.3).
15 It was repeated with only syntactic adaptions in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin 2. 85.6–8).
16 For the differences of these formulations from the earlier ones, cf. Steinkellner 2013: II 193–198; for a synoptic survey of the formulations, see Steinkellner 2013: II 197.
17 Throughout the later tradition, it was particularly the formulation offered in the first passage of the Hetubindu that was adopted as the authoritative Dharmakīrtian statement on the issue. In my study of 2013, much to my shame, I completely forgot the prasaṅga-related passages in his later works and judged this wrongly asserted lack of a prasaṅga argument as a set-back in Dharmakīrti’s theory (Steinkellner 2013: II 204). I now see that Dharmakīrti did not (!) change his conception of ascertaining a causal relation, but rather further elaborated on the original version in his later works with the purpose of strengthening exactly this prasaṅga.
We can thus jump straight to the Vādanyāya, his last work, where Dharmakīrti’s awareness of the induction problem is most clearly revealed. Already in the Vṛtti (PVSV 22,10–23,6 with PV 1.35), Dharmakīrti deals with the issue that an effect, say, smoke, does not deviate from fire as its cause (avyabhicāra) by parrying the idea that it may have “another cause,”18 such as a termite hill.19 In his answer there, Dharmakīrti repudiates the opponent’s proposal by clarifying that this deviating item is only something similar to smoke, but not one of “such type” (tādṛśa) that it is the product of something that is “such,” namely, being able to produce real smoke.20

In the Vādanyāya, however, where Dharmakīrti demonstrates how “effect” as a means of proof (sādhanāṅga) is justified (samarth-), the notion of “another cause” is given a more stringent meaning. The relevant passage in the Vādanyāya (VN 4,2–10) consists of two parts: One is Dharmakīrti’s last formulation (VN 4,2f) of the content to be ascertained, a causal relation; the other is his answer to an alternative, in a sentence nicely resembling Tilleman’s conclusion cited above: “Another (entity) may be capable in regard to (the production of) this (effect); because of the absence of that (other entity) this (effect) did not come about” (anyat tatra samartham. tadabhāvāt tan na bhūtam, VN 4,6f).

The formulation in the Vādanyāya is as follows: “This (entity) comes to be, when that (other entity) is present, (and) even if the (various) causes of this (entity) which are different from that entity (and) capable (of producing its perception) are present, (this entity) does not come about in the absence of that (entity).”21 Here, the problem seen by Gillon in the earlier formulation is still present.

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18 PVSV 22,10: anyahetukatvān nāhetukatvam iti cet.
19 Cf. PVṬ, 60a7 = PVSVṬ 100,12. When summarizing his argument, Dharmakīrti refers to the termite hill (śakramūrdhan) again: “If a termite hill is of fiery nature, it is surely fire. If it is not of fiery nature, how can smoke come about there?” (agnisvabhāvaḥ śakrasya mūrdhā yady agnir eva sah / athānagnisvabhāvo 'sau dhūmas tatra kathāṃ bhavet // PV 1.36). To understand this example of the termite hill, I can offer a quite plausible physical explanation that I gratefully received from the entomologist Dominique Zimmermann of the Natural History Museum Vienna: Temperature and humidity in termite structures are kept constant by means of ventilation systems (which maintain the temperature at around 30 degree Celsius). The air that escapes through the central chimney can be up to 15 degrees warmer and also more humid than the surrounding air. Given the appropriate conditions, the escaping air, through effects of condensation, can become visible as vapour. Zimmermann could not find any references to this phenomenon in scientific publications. She sees this as possibly due to the fact that biologically it is irrelevant whether the air escaping from a termite hill is visible as vapour or not. But since a termite hill is used as an example by our philosopher, we can safely assume that this sort of smoke-like vapour from termite hills was commonly known in India.

20 PVSV 22,14f: tādṛśaḥ dhi bhavat sa tādṛśaḥ syät. And tādṛśa is “something with a certain nature when it comes about through nothing but its own cause,” as he states later in the Hetubinda (yo hi yasya svabhāvah, sa svahetor evotpadayamānas tādṛśo bhavati, HB 11,7f).

21 idam asmin sati bhavati, satas api tadanyesa samartheṣu tadāhetuṣu tadabhāve na bhavati (VN 4,2f). In this formulation, a form was chosen the proximity of which to the Venerable’s description of a causal relation in the short formula at the beginning of the pratītyasamutpāda is obvious and seemingly intended. For the aḍī-formula of the pratītyasamutpāda: asmin satidam bhavati, asyotpadād idam utpadyate (“If that is present, this comes to be; on account of the arising of that this arises”), cf. La Vallée Poussin 1913: 49–51.
But then, Dharmakīrti considers the option of “another cause,” not of something similar to smoke, but of smoke as such.\textsuperscript{22} And in order to indicate the unwanted consequence should the above justification not be acknowledged, he adds:

Otherwise, (i.e.) if only (the proposition) “(this) is not present in the absence of that” \textit{(tadabhāve na bhavati)} were communicated, the (causal) capacity of the latter would be in doubt, since also another (entity) is absent there (where the latter is absent). Another (entity, then) may be capable in regard to (the production of) this (effect); because of the absence of that (other entity,) this (effect) did not come about. (In this case) moreover, the absence (of the effect) in the absence of that (cause) would be (nothing but) a fortuitous conformity \textit{(yādṛcchāsaṃvāda)}, just like the absence of a date palm that grows in regions where mother marriage is customary in the absence of mother marriage in other regions.\textsuperscript{23}

By introducing a \textit{prasaṅga} into his proof of a causal relation and by this final elaboration of the \textit{prasaṅga}’s function, Dharmakīrti seems to have solved, for his own specific purposes\textsuperscript{24} and historical context, the problem of induction found in the need to know, with indisputable certainty, the common absence of reason and consequence as a necessary feature of a good reason.

Now, induction in a modern, post-Baconian sense is a method for acquiring knowledge. This was certainly true for Dharmakīrti as well. There is, however, possibly a limitation to this comparison due to the fact that Dharmakīrti deals with it only in connection with the need in Dignāga’s system of logic to ascertain the knowledge of the common absence of two properties \textit{(vyatireka)}. This problem was already realized by Dharmakīrti’s teacher Īśvarasena, who felt motivated to increase the number of characteristics of a good logical reason to six, instead of the three as defined by Dignāga.\textsuperscript{25} It is for this reason that I believe the “taste” of the induction problem in the Indian context to be different. The important remaining questions are not only whether indeed different concepts of induction and its problem are at stake, but also whether Dharmakīrti actually succeeded in working out a solution to the induction problem as such, and if not, where exactly he failed under the new interpretation presented. Yet, with much curiosity I will have to leave it to better equipped and interested philosophers to find answers to questions such as these.\textsuperscript{26}

We can now shift to the same statement as a logical topic:

The three sentences we dealt with so far from the perspective of being a method for ascertaining causality must also be seen, in terms of the central purport of Dharmakīrti’s

\textsuperscript{22} VN 4,6f: \textit{anyat tatra samartham, tadabhāvāt īta na bhūtam}.

\textsuperscript{23} VN 4,5–10: \textit{anyathā kevalaṃ tadabhāve na bhavatīty upadaśane ’nyasyāpi tatrābhāve sandīgdham asya sāmarthyam, anyat tatra samartham, tadabhāvāt īta na bhūtam, etanīvṛttau punar nivṛttir yadṛcchāsaṃvādah, mātrvivihitadeśajānmanaḥ piṇḍakharjūraśya deśāntareṣu mātrvivāhābhāve ’bhāvavat}.

\textsuperscript{24} Such as to avoid the insufficiencies of Īśvarasena’s \textit{adarśanamātra}-theorem (cf. Steinkellner 1966 and 2013: note 180) or his increasing Dignāga’s three characteristics of a good reason to six (cf. HB § d., Steinkellner 1967: 70–78 with notes, and Steinkellner forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{25} On Īśvarasena’s \textit{sādakṣaṇa hetu}, cf. HB 40,1–47,7 and Steinkellner 1967: 70–78; 1979: note 475; as well as Tillemans 2000: note 335.

\textsuperscript{26} See the appendix.
work, from the logical perspective. As said above, the three sentences amount to a proof that consists of a vyāpti formulation, the indication of a pakṣadharmatā and a prasaṅga to establish the vyāpti, because the section of PV 1.34–38 (PVSV 21,24–24,7) is dedicated to the question of how the essential relation that a kāryahetu presupposes can be ascertained.\\footnote{This section is followed by PV 1.39 (PVSV 7–15), where the same question is answered for the svabhāvahetu.}

The question is then whether we can identify, also in this case, the prasaṅga component applied for establishing the vyāpti of a kāryahetu, as in the case of the svabhāvahetu (Steinkellner 1991: 319ff.), as structurally constituting or being equivalent to a sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. I think we can. Again, however, only by way of an experiment because – as Tani has said – he “did not explicitly explain so.”

According to Dharmakīrti’s later work, the bādhakapramāṇa is the non-perception of a pervading property (vyāpakadharmanupalabdhi, VN 8,6) through which the absence of the reason in the contradictory opposite (viparyaya) of the consequent (sādhyya) can be inferred.

In this experiment, the principal uncertainty lies in determining the pervading property (vyāpaka). If Dharmakīrti had a pre-formation of the later term for this structure in mind, as I think he did, this property should not be one that is referred to in the proof itself, but one that should nevertheless be referred to in his prasaṅga. As far as I can see, the only candidate to offer itself is the property of “being observed in this way at least once” (*sakṛttathā-dṛṣṭatva).\\footnote{I derive this hypothetically constructed property from sakṛd api tathādaryanāt (PVSV 22,6).} Under this hypothesis, we may conclude that the property *sakṛttathādṛṣṭatva, which pervades the reason “being conditionally perceived and non-perceived,”\\footnote{A property derived from bhāvābhāvasādhanapramāṇābhyām (VN 4,1f).} is not perceived and thus is negated in the locus of the contradictory opposite of the property to be proven, i.e., the property of “not being the effect of that” (*atatkāryatva).

Moreover, I think we can discover this structure in the words Dharmakīrti uses to complete the prasaṅga establishing the vyāpti, namely: “For, were it not (that which is) to be effected (by this), it would not even once occur on account of that which is not (its) cause,”\\footnote{akāryatve ‘karaṇāt sakṛd apy abhāvāt (PVSV 22,6f).} when he continues with the words “If an effect, however, would occur without its cause, it would not have a cause at all,”\\footnote{kāryasya ca svakāraṇam antareṇa bhāve ’hetumattaiva syāt (PVSV 22,7f).} and to this adds, with the pepper of irony, a proof formula in corroboration of this last statement: “That, namely, is not a cause of this, which occurs without that; and smoke occurs without fire; therefore this (smoke) would not have that (fire) as (its) cause.”\\footnote{na hi yasya yam antareṇa bhāvaḥ, sa tasya hetur bhavati; bhavati ca dhūmo ‘gnim antareṇa; tan na taddhetuḥ syāt (PVSV 22,8–10).}

To conclude: If my experiment can be considered sound, it means that Dharmakīrti applied the structure of the later (sādhyya)viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa already in his first work, and at the appropriate place in his work, that is, where the ascertainment of a logical concomitance as based on essential relations is the subject matter. Already in his first work, then, Dharmakīrti seems to have given a comprehensive and consistent account of all the basic constituents of his new logic, even if he did not yet use the terminology he coined later.

27 This section is followed by PV 1.39 (PVSV 7–15), where the same question is answered for the svabhāvahetu.
28 I derive this hypothetically constructed property from sakṛd api tathādaryanāt (PVSV 22,6).
29 A property derived from bhāvābhāvasādhanapramāṇābhyām (VN 4,1f).
30 akāryatve ‘karaṇāt sakṛd apy abhāvāt (PVSV 22,6f).
31 kāryasya ca svakāraṇam antareṇa bhāve ’hetumattaiva syāt (PVSV 22,7f).
32 na hi yasya yam antareṇa bhāvaḥ, sa tasya hetur bhavati; bhavati ca dhūmo ‘gnim antareṇa; tan na taddhetuḥ syāt (PVSV 22,8–10).
At this point we also have to pay attention to the wider context of Dharmakīrti’s logical thought and to follow up on some more questions that need answers. For I think there is yet another way to get to grips with Dharmakīrti’s “failure” to solve the induction problem beyond being possibly satisfied with the solution presented above. And this line of interpretation will have to be elaborated, too, although I do not think it will make for a substantial difference in respect to the induction issue. Here I can only indicate the general direction of the way.

Right at the beginning, when he introduces the new theorem of the three kinds of logical reason (trividhā hetu) for the first time, Dharmakīrti cites a statement that is possibly from Dignāga’s lost Hetumukha (cf. Frauwallner 1959: 103f.):

All this dealing with inference and what can be inferred is entirely based on a distinction between properties and a bearer of properties, (a distinction) that is mounted on the mind (buddhyārūḍha).

(sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhena dharma dharmabhṛhedena, PVSV 2.22–3.1).

These words express, above all, the trivial acknowledgement that a logician is dealing with concepts and linguistic items, also when cause and effect and their relation are at stake. This means that Dharmakīrti is clear about the fact that inference, as resulting knowledge, belongs to the realm of concepts which are inherited from a beginningless past. As such, it is also erroneous because it does not truly represent reality as it is (yathābhūta). But the application of logical rules and his specific theory of concept formation (apohavāda) allow for a differentiation between concepts that can be considered true, i.e., referring to real (sat) entities, and false, i.e., referring to unreal (asat) entities. Exactly this differentiation, then, is the task of inference when it attributes or excludes properties from entities, and its success is the reason for judging inferential cognition as valid (pramāṇa), meaning reliable when adopted in any kind of activity, be it worldly or aiming beyond.

Moreover, by purging false concepts, inference is essential for weeding out all those misapprehensions that are the cause for being bound to continuous suffering existence (samsāra), the cause of which is for Dharmakīrti, above all, the belief in a permanent self (ātman), tantamount to nescience (avidyā).

Terms such as “cause,” “effect,” and their “relation” refer to concepts and as such have no referent in reality. This is clearly spelled out in Dharmakīrti’s Sambandhaparīkṣā, a short work that I believe was composed in close proximity to his first work on logic. If it is necessary, as I said at the beginning, to identify causes and what effects they have in order to act successfully as a worldling or as someone already on the Buddhist path, one must clarify what a cause and what an effect are. In other words: On what grounds can we attribute the word or concept of “cause” or “effect” to a certain entity? Or: Why can we correctly say that something is the “effect” of something else as its “cause”?

The answer to such questions is Dharmakīrti’s yeṣām upalambhe-formula presented above. It offers no less than a logical model that determines exactly in what sense the concepts or terms of “cause” and “effect” can be correctly applied, for it provides a reason
on account of which something can be conceived and named as being the effect of a specific cause.

Not being a post-Baconian scholar, causality as a natural phenomenon may not have been Dharmakīrti’s concern. Yet what he laboured over was also not a mere “language game.” On the contrary, his examination had the most serious purpose of uprooting the false conceptions that constitute impediments for the mind in its progress towards liberation from suffering.34 In the same manner as his elaborations on the inference from essence as reason (svabhāvahetu), which is based on the common acceptance of linguistic conventions (tathāprasisiddhi, PVSV 16,30f), Dharmakīrti’s thought on causality and on the inference from effect as reason is grounded in the very core of the Buddhist world view.35

References and abbreviations


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PV 1 See PVSV.


PVSVṬ Ācārya-Dharmakīrtēḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumāna-paricchedaḥ) svopajñāvṛttyā, Karṇakagomiviracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Ilāhābād 1943.

PVṬ1 Pramāṇavārttikāṭikā (Śākyabuddhi), Kapitel 1 – P 5718, Je 1b–348a8, Ōe 1b–85b2.


Appendix

Having seen my paper of 2015, Claus Oetke sent me a mail (November 26, 2016) on the subject of induction with its different aspects that I consider valuable sharing in the hope to make the present contribution more interesting to philosophers. Claus Oetke says (in my translation from the German):

There are (at least) four variants of problems related to induction that are reflected by the following questions:

1. How is it possible, a) to distinguish between causal and merely accompanying states of affairs and b) to find out which (preceding) states of affairs are causes of (later) appearing facts and which are not?
2. How is it possible to justify that for a certain (type of) fact only a certain other (type of) fact can be the cause?
3. How is it possible to ascertain that a regularity given within certain framing conditions must also be given within alternative framing conditions?
4. How is it possible to ascertain that in the world of experience there are causal regularities (at all) and that laws referring to causality must be valid?

… Regarding Dharmakīrti, he apparently offers a plausible answer to 1), while it looks as if he was aware of questions 2) and 3) yet did not offer a cogent solution. Against this the problematic question of 4) seems to be altogether beyond his sense of problems, while it is, seen philosophically, the perhaps most significant question.
Philosophical Reflections on the sahopalambhaniyama Argument

by

John Taber

Introduction

In 1991 the Japanese scholar T. Iwata published a masterful study of the sahopalambhaniyama argument. In his work he carefully traces the development and interpretation of the argument throughout the entire Buddhist epistemological tradition, from Dignāga to Jñānaśrīmitra, and also surveys responses to the argument from a variety of Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents. He is not, however, primarily concerned with evaluating the argument philosophically – though questions of logic inevitably arise when interpreting the argument – and, it would seem, not at all with assessing it as a piece of philosophical reasoning independently of its historical context. That is what I would like to do in this essay. In what follows I shall construct a version of the sahopalambhaniyama (henceforth SUN) argument and attempt to judge its strengths and weaknesses as an argument, in particular, its formal validity and the defensibility of what I shall represent as its premises. Although I shall indeed allow myself to be prompted by the statements of Dharmakīrti (as well as other classical authors), and will even at the beginning touch on the question how Dharmakīrti might have used the argument – what it was supposed to prove – I make no claim that the version of the SUN argument I will be considering was Dharmakīrti’s. Aside from the fact that other scholars are much more qualified to ascertain that than I,1 that is, tell us how the SUN argument as presented by Dharmakīrti should be understood, I wish to be relieved of the burden of historical accuracy in this essay in order better to focus on the logical and philosophical features of my reconstruction of it.

I believe it is worthwhile extracting the SUN argument from its historical and textual context and considering it in isolation just as an argument for at least two reasons. First, I believe that the version of the argument I shall devise is an argument for idealism unknown to Western philosophers. One could call it a ‘new’ argument for idealism if there were any traffic these days in arguments for idealism!2 Although it is not the case that idealism is a hotly contested view now and a ‘new’ argument might just push it over the top, so to speak – that is, bring it within the range of plausible or at least defensible philosophical positions – any argument for it that is not obviously fallacious is of inherent interest. For philosophers remain interested in the possibilities of reason. An argument that purports to prove so unexpected a thesis as that nothing can exist outside of consciousness represents, in the first instance, a bold claim about what philosophical reasoning can accomplish.

1 In addition to Iwata’s study see Arnold 2008, Ratié 2014, and Kellner 2017. Kellner’s study is, to date, the most penetrating.
2 I know of only two defenders of idealism among contemporary philosophers: S. Rickless (2013) and J. Foster (2008).
Second, although I would hesitate to say that I consider the argument a viable one, it does not, as far as I can tell, have any obvious flaws. It is valid, and its premises appear to be at least tenable. I believe it is a strong argument – which is not to say, of course, that I think it is conclusive.

I should say at the outset that I believe that the usual prejudice against idealism, the opinion that there could not possibly be any good arguments for it, is wholly unphilosophical. For what is it based on? Merely, as far as I can tell, the unshakeable conviction that we live in a world populated by mind-independent, physical objects. The very thrust of any argument for idealism, however, is to call this very conviction into question on the basis of common observations about the nature of our experience. Typically – we will consider an exception later – those who would see any argument for idealism as a non-starter, as already refuted by perception, are simply begging the question.

Perhaps one final remark is in order to reinforce the value of investigating the SUN philosophically as well as historically. Despite the interest in aspects of Indian philosophical thought that are contiguous with contemporary analytic philosophy, one cannot deny that many of the greatest Indian thinkers – such as Nāgārjuna, Dharmakīrti, and Śaṅkara – were attempting to demonstrate views about the nature of reality that are radically opposed to those of contemporary philosophers. In particular, they held that the empirical world is an illusion. As some scholars now seem to recognize, in order to give a balanced picture of Indian thought we should take Indian arguments for anti-realism just as seriously as arguments concerning topics in philosophy of logic, epistemology, and philosophy of language.3

### The SUN argument as an argument for idealism

Thus far I have referred to the SUN argument as an argument for idealism. But was it really meant to prove that? Here, I would like tentatively to explore this admittedly historical question – though still in a philosophical way – which will set up the examination of the argument itself. Iwata 1991 (henceforth “Iwata”) I, 18–20 suggests that Dharmakīrti, at least, used it to prove only dvirūpatā: the thesis that a cognition includes within itself two aspects, the object-form (arthākāra) and the subject-form (grāhakākāra, i.e., the cognition itself as the “grasper”), hence that the immediate object of experience is the form within cognition. Iwata cites as his main evidence the fact that, when presenting the SUN argument both in his Pramāṇavārttika (PV 3.387–397) and his Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin 1.54–58), Dharmakīrti either directly states or implies that the conclusion of the argument – namely, that object or object-form and cognition are not different – holds even if there is an external object.4 Thus, evidently, he believed that the argument would be acceptable even to a Sautrāntika, who postulates something outside of cognition as the cause of the object-form. The SUN argument is thus intended to refute the bāhyārthavādin who is also

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3 I have in mind J. Westerhoff in particular. See, e.g., Westerhoff 2009 and 2010.
4 PVin 1 43,4–5: saty api bāhye 'rthe sahopalambhavedanābhīyān bhāsamānasya nilades tatsamvidāv cāvivekah siddhah. In PV 3.387–397 this is implied when Dharmakīrti, after developing the argument in vv. 387–390c, concedes apparently to the Sautrāntika that one could infer an external object as the cause of the arising of a perceptual cognition were it not possible to explain it as the effect of the immediately preceding cognition (390d–391).
a nirākāravādin, that is, in modern terminology, the ‘naive’ or ‘direct’ realist who holds that we directly perceive physical objects. It does not rule out the existence of an external object by itself.

Nevertheless, while some of Dharmakīrti’s successors followed him in viewing the argument as a proof of dvirūpatā, hence in the first instance as a refutation of the nirākārājñānavāda, others, Buddhists and Brahmins alike, saw it as a proof of vijñaptimātratā, mere-cognition: the thesis that there are no uncognized objects or that nothing exists outside of cognition. Iwata notes how the argument might have been seen by Dharmakīrti himself as practically amounting to a proof of mere-cognition. If what we are directly experiencing are only forms in cognition, that is to say, if our experience of a world that seemingly contains physical objects can be accounted for solely in terms of changes taking place within cognition itself, then it becomes superfluous to postulate physical objects at all. As Iwata puts it, “Insofar as the external object, in the sense in which it is postulated in Sautrāntika … is fundamentally imperceptible, that is, it can only be represented by means of inference, there is no longer any reason for it to be presupposed as the object of knowledge” (Iwata I, 6). Thus, the external object becomes “epistemologically completely superfluous” (Iwata I, 6). But perhaps that meant for Dharmakīrti that it does not exist at all? Although Dharmakīrti has moved beyond the direct refutation of the possibility of physical objects that Vasubandhu appears to undertake in his Vimśikā – when arguing that the Buddha could not have literally meant there are such things when he referred to the āyatana5 – he might still have been in sympathy with the overall strategy for proving vijñaptimātratā in that text, as Kellner/Taber 2014 have now explained it. Namely, there are no objects outside of cognition because there is no evidence for them. This strategy tacitly appeals to the epistemological principle, employed in Indian philosophy prior to Vasubandhu and still widely used for centuries after him (and after Dharmakīrti), that something exists if there is a pramāṇa for it, and something does not exist if there is not.6 Kellner (2017: 29–31) is quite right to emphasize (contra Ratié 2014) that the constraints of his logical theory would have prevented Dharmakīrti from devising a formal anumāna based on an anupalabdhihetu demonstrating that objects outside of cognition do not exist. Yet he surely must have known that when asking questions like, “If the cognition has the form of blue, etc., what is the pramāṇa for an external object?”7 – implying that in light of arguments like the SUN which undermine perception as evidence for external objects and the lack of conclusive inferential evidence, there is no reason to postulate them – he was coming as close as he could to asserting that they do not exist, and that is what most of his readers would probably take away.8

5 See Arnold 2008. Although Manorathanandin, in one passage, recommends that one who demands a proof that there is no external object even after it has been shown that the object is never experienced independently of cognition should consult Vasubandhu’s mereological arguments, I don’t think one can conclude that Dharmakīrti, who nowhere mentions them, endorsed them too. See Ratié 2014: 358–362.

6 Or, something does not exist anupalabdheḥ, “because it is not apprehended.” See Kellner/Taber 2014: 727–734.

7 dhiyo nilādirūpatve bāhyo ‘rthaḥ kimpramāṇakaḥ / PV 3.432ab. Or PV 3.333: “[Objection:] If an external object were experienced, what mistake would there be? [Reply:] None at all! Only this [remains to be asked:] Why would it be said that an external object is perceived?” Kellner 2017: 24.

8 Thus, Ratié 2014 shows that Abhinavagupta understood the SUN in this way while adapting it to his own purposes: “…For the Śaivas the epistemic argument is not confined to a demonstration that there is
Iwata generally presupposes that when arguing for the two-fold nature of cognition (dvirūpatā) Dharmakīrti is in dialogue with the Sautrāntika or Buddhist ‘externalist’ (as some prefer). There is good evidence for this. The framework of the initial discussion of dvirūpatā in both PV 3 and PVin 1 is the identification of self-awareness as the result (phala) of the pramāṇa perception, and Dharmakīrti wants to show that his solution is acceptable to both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra. If the immediate result of the SUN argument, however, is the demonstration of dvirūpatā, then the logical opponent against whom it is directed would be, as I’ve already suggested, a bāhyārthavādin who is also a nirākāravādin, rather than a Sautrāntika. Indeed, as is well known, much of the time in his works Dharmakīrti is arguing against a Mīmāṃsaka, an incorrigible direct realist who thinks that perception by itself establishes the existence of external objects. Especially in this case – if the SUN targets a direct realist – it would be tantamount to a proof of vijñaptimātratā. For the direct realist, unlike the representationalist (the Sautrāntika), does not think we can infer the existence of physical objects; we just see them. Once it has been shown to such a person, by proving dvirūpatā, that what he is seeing is really just the form in cognition, then what he thought were external objects are eliminated and he has nothing else, no inferred entities, with which to replace them.

Thus, the SUN argument, even when seen as a proof of dvirūpatā, could also be seen as amounting to a proof of vijñaptimātratā if supplemented by a further step – whether or not this was Dharmakīrti’s actual intention – namely, the claim that if there is no reason to believe in objects outside of cognition, then it is reasonable to assume that there are none. Or else it could be seen as amounting to a proof of vijñaptimātratā if one stipulates that it is meant to be deployed in a specific dialectical situation: for the direct realist, if what we are perceiving are not mind-independent objects, then there are none at all. On neither of these readings would the proof of mere-cognition be a rigorously deductive one. On the former, the conclusion that there are no uncognized objects is, in the final stage of the argument, in effect offered as the best explanation for the lack of any evidence for them. Thus, it is strictly something that could only be presumed, not asserted. On the latter, insofar as the argument is context-bound, it will not be persuasive for all interlocutors (for instance, non-Mīmāṃsaka representationalists).

What I would like to do, then, is develop a third reading of the SUN argument according to which it is rigorously deductive: that objects do not exist outside cognition will follow immediately from the conclusion of the argument, that object and cognition are not different. Some of Dharmakīrti’s opponents apparently perceived the argument in this way, as sufficient by itself for proving cognition-only. Consider, for instance, Śaṅkara’s presentation of it in his Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya:

Moreover, a cognition arises having mere experience as its common nature.

The inclination (paksapāta) it has in regard to a particular object, so that it is

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no argument proving the existence of an external object; or rather, the very demonstration that there is no sādhaka whatsoever in favour of the external object constitutes a bādhaka, an argument refuting its existence” (364). Kumārila seems to understand the strategy of the argument he is refuting similarly. See ŚV, Śūnyavāda 7–9. If the ākāra we perceive belongs to the cognition, “then there is not the supposition of an [external] object” (8d). In the context of the problematic of the Śūnyavāda that means that it does not exist. See Taber 2010: 283.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla would agree with this assessment, as Iwata I, 25–27 interprets them.
the cognition of a pillar, the cognition of a wall, or the cognition of a pot – that is not possible without some difference that belongs to the cognition [itself], so that necessarily the cognition’s similarity with the object must be assumed. And that being assumed, since the object-form is obtained (avaruddha) just by the cognition, the postulation of an external object is pointless. Moreover, the non-difference of object and cognition results from their invariable co-apprehension; for it is not the case that there is the apprehension of the one when there is no apprehension of the other. And this is not possible if there is a difference of [their] nature, since there is no [other] cause [of their co-apprehension] consisting in a connection. For that [reason] as well, there is no [external] object.10

It is clear from this passage that Śaṅkara understands the proof of the fact that cognition bears the form of the object, which is essentially dvirūpata, as distinct from the proof of the non-difference of object and cognition from their invariable co-apprehension. From the cognition’s bearing the object-form within itself it follows only that an external object is ‘pointless’ – that is, there is no reason to postulate one; but from the invariable co-apprehension of object and cognition it follows that there is no external object.11

Therefore, one may even be historically justified in seeing the SUN argument as proving viñaptimātratā directly, without any additional, non-deductive step or specification of the dialectical environment – hence as rigorously deductive. I shall now attempt to reconstruct the argument explicitly along such lines.

**The strongest formulation of the argument**

We may take as our point of departure Dharmakīrti’s classic statement of the argument at PVin 1.54ab:

Because they are invariably apprehended12 together, blue and the cognition of it are not different.

sahopalambhaniyamād abheda nīlataddhiyoh.

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10 BSBh 544,1–6: api cāmabhavamātreṇa sādhāraṇātmano jñānasya yo ’yam prativiṣayam pākaṇḍaḥ stambhajñānam kadyajñānam paṭaṇjānam iti nāsau jñānāgaṭavivīśam antaunopapapdyata ity avaṣayaṃ viṣayasārūpyam jñānasyaṅgikartavyam, angikte ca tasmin viṣayākāraṣya jñānaṇaḥvāyavarmudvād apārthikā bāhyaśādahāvākalkanā, api ca sahopalambhaniyamād abheda viṣayavijñānayor āpata. The first sentence of this passage closely follows PV 3.302; the penultimate sentence almost verbatim corresponds to PVin 1 40,2–4. Thanks to B. Kellner for pointing this out.

11 But the final sentence of the passage, “For that [reason] as well (api), there is no external object,” may suggest that Śaṅkara also thought that showing it is ‘pointless’ amounted to proving that it does not exist. Such a proof, however, would involve an additional step. To say that something is pointless is obviously not the same as saying it is nonexistent.

12 Although upalalabhi often means specifically perception, it also has the broader meaning of an apprehension by any pramāṇa, which I prefer to follow in my treatment because I think it is more suitable for what I shall reconstruct as the first or major premise of the argument.
I shall not be following Iwata’s method of examining the argument according to the terms of an Indian anumāna: What is the dharmin, the hetu, and the sādhya, and so forth? I shall rather be formulating the argument in the modern way, as a set of statements consisting of premises and a conclusion following from them that could be translated into predicate calculus if one wanted (though I shall not do that); for I believe that putting the argument in this form makes it more accessible to philosophers. Nevertheless, what is normally referred to as the subject of the argument (dharmin), that about which non-difference is being demonstrated, should be clarified at the outset. Normally, blue and the cognition of blue or, more generally, an object and the cognition of the object, are taken as the subject of the argument, and what is being proved about them by the argument is that they are not different. What is important to keep in mind when investigating the argument is that, in order for it to be able to establish vijñaptimātratā, the status of blue, or the object, must be undecided at the outset: it could be either not different from cognition or different from it. That is to say, it must be left undecided whether blue is something occurring inside or outside cognition. If one assumed at the outset that “blue” refers to an aspect of the cognition itself, that is, to the so-called object-form (arthākāra or grāhyākāra), then one would not prove anything very interesting or significant by demonstrating that it is not different from the cognition. In fact, one might even in that case object that, if the subject of the inference is interpreted in that way, and the purpose of the argument is to prove vijñaptimātratā, then the argument would be assuming what it is supposed to prove. If, on the other hand, the status of blue is left open, the argument immediately becomes much more interesting. For it then establishes (if it is successful!) that what one might very well have taken to be something external to cognition – a mind-independent object – turns out in fact to be something that is not different from it. The achievement of the argument would be, in effect, to bring everything that one is naively inclined to suppose exists outside of cognition inside cognition itself, and that would be a rather spectacular result indeed.

Our initial task in evaluating the SUN argument is to formulate it in the best possible way as a series of premises and a conclusion so as to avoid obvious prima facie objections. Now some statements of the argument by Dharmakīrti himself suggest that what in Western logic would be taken as the minor premise of the argument should be formulated as follows:

A. Whenever there is an apprehension of an object, there is an apprehension of cognition and vice versa.

Thus, PV 3.387:

In what way can an object, which is invariably experienced at the same time together with cognition, be shown to be different from that?  

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13 He also asks, more specifically of the hetu, sahopalambhaniyamāt, what is the meaning of saha and what is the meaning of niyama.

14 See Iwata I, 41–44.

15 Though Galen Strawson might disagree. See below. Precisely this point is made by Śubhagupta BSKā 87.

16 sakṛt saṃvedyamānasya niyamena dhiyā saha / visayasya tato ‘nyatvam kenākāraṇa siṣṭhyati \// Unlike for Pramāṇaviniścaya 1, we do not have a critical edition of Pramāṇavārttika 3. I’ve used the edition of Tosaki.
Here, Dharmakīrti seems not to be talking about the cognition specifically of blue, as he seems to be in PVin 1.54ab, but of cognition in general. That is, he is saying: whatever object we happen to be aware of, that is not different from cognition.

Consider, however, a specific object, say blue, and the statement:

B. Whenever there is an apprehension of blue, there is an apprehension of cognition and vice versa.

This statement, especially the conjunct implied by the phrase “and vice versa,” is clearly false.\(^{17}\) We are conscious of many other things besides blue, namely, red, yellow, brown, sweet, bitter, rough, smooth, and so on. Awareness in general is not invariably accompanied by blue.

This point was very clearly stated by G. W. Moore in his famous essay “The Refutation of Idealism:”

We all know that the sensation of blue differs from the sensation of green. But it is plain that if both are sensations they also have some point in common. What is it that they have in common? And how is this common element related to the points in which they differ? I will call the common element ‘consciousness’ without yet attempting to say what the thing I so call is. We have then in every sensation two distinct terms, (1) ‘consciousness,’ in respect of what all sensations are alike; and (2) something else, in respect of which one sensation differs from another. It will be convenient if I may be allowed to call this second term the ‘object’ of a sensation: this also without attempting to say what I mean by the word. (Moore 1922: 17)

Precisely because the object in consciousness varies while consciousness remains constant, Moore goes on to say, we believe that consciousness is one thing, the object another.

In fact, we needn’t rely on a modern Western author to appreciate this point. It was already effectively stated by Śaṅkara in his critique of the SUN argument:

Moreover, when there is a cognition of a pot [then] a cognition of a cloth, there is a difference of the two qualifiers pot and cloth but not of the thing qualified, the cognition; just as when there is a white cow [then] a black cow, there is a difference of the whiteness and the blackness, but not of cowness. And a difference of the one from the two is [thereby] established, and of the two from the one. Hence, there is a difference of cognition and object.\(^{18}\)

Thus, with B as a counterexample – the statement has now been shown to be false – it seems, on the face of things, that A cannot be true.

\(^{17}\) That is to say, B is really the conjunction, “Whenever there is an apprehension of blue there is an apprehension of cognition, and whenever there is an apprehension of cognition there is an apprehension of blue.”

\(^{18}\) BSBh 550,1–3.
On the other hand, it does seem plausible to suggest that blue and the cognition, specifically, of blue are invariably apprehended together, as the wording of PVin 1.54ab implies.

Now, if we take together all (presumably true) statements such as,

Blue is invariably apprehended together with the cognition of blue.
Red is invariably apprehended together with the cognition of red.
Etc.

then one can derive the universal generalization:

C. For every object X and every cognition of the object Cx, one apprehends X if and only if one apprehends Cx,

which could also be stated as,

C\(^1\). Any object and the awareness of that object are invariably apprehended together.

And C\(^1\) looks very much like A above.\(^{19}\) Dharmakīrti does not make this clarification himself, but it is not inconsistent with his statements. Indeed, when he says things like, “For even though they have separate appearances, there is no nature of blue that is a different thing from the experience,”\(^{20}\) (in his prose explanation of PVin 1.54ab), he could very well mean by “experience” (\textit{anubhava}) that particular type of experience, namely, an experience of blue.

Thus, a general formulation of the minor premise of the SUN argument, with the terms “object” and “cognition,” seems appropriate after all, such as PV 3.389:

Neither an object without awareness nor awareness without an object is ever observed being experienced. Therefore, they are not distinct.\(^{21}\)

Taking C\(^1\) as the minor premise of the argument, then, the following suggests itself as the major premise:

D. Two things that are invariably apprehended together are not different.

Putting together D and C\(^1\) as the major and minor premises, we get the following formulation of the argument.

\(^{19}\) Chakrabarti 1990: 32–33 comes up with virtually the same solution to this problem.

\(^{20}\) \textit{na hi bhīṁnāvabhāṣīte ’py arthāntaram eva rāpaṁ nilasāyubhavāt...}, PVin 1 40,1. Cf. Iwata I, 110–111.

\(^{21}\) \textit{nārtho ’sambedanāḥ kaścit anarthaṁ vāpi vedanaṁ / drīḍhām samvedyamānaṁ tat tayor nāsti vivekāt //}
Premise 1 (major premise): Two things that are invariably apprehended together are not different.

Premise 2 (minor premise): Any object and the cognition of that object are invariably apprehended together.

Conclusion: Therefore, any object and the cognition of that object are not different.

I maintain that the following statements are obvious corollaries of the argument:

In general, object and awareness are in some sense the same thing.\(^{22}\)

There is no object external to/without cognition.

(For an object cannot exist unless there is awareness of it; hence, *esse est percipi.*)

The world of objects that are experienced is “nothing but cognition.”

Thus, with the SUN argument formulated as suggested above, *vijñaptimātratā* follows from it immediately.

**Examination of premise 1**

The SUN argument as formulated above is a logically valid argument: the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. To evaluate the argument further we must determine whether the premises are true.

Now, one of the classic objections raised against the SUN argument is that what is construed in Indian logic as the “reason” or *hetu*, namely, “because they are invariably apprehended together,” is a “contradictory reason” (*viruddhahetu*); that is to say, it actually proves the opposite of the desired conclusion. For when we say that things are apprehended “together,” we obviously imply that they are different things. Thus,

I saw the *ācārya* walking together with his student,

and

I see the stars together in the sky,

prima facie suggest that one has to do, not with one thing, but with more than one thing.\(^{23}\)

A related objection is that the reason “because they are invariably apprehended together”

\(^{22}\) For the purposes of my reconstruction of the SUN argument it is not necessary to specify whether “not different” means merely not different or, taken as “non-different,” implies sameness. As far as I can tell, either way the argument would go through and would amount to a proof of idealism. For Buddhist defenders of the argument the debate about the precise meaning of *abheda* was driven by other doctrinal issues, especially the problems of the unity and reality of the object-form. See Iwata I, 110–215.

\(^{23}\) See Iwata I, 93–94, referencing Jaina authors, e.g., Prabhācandra, and others (Iwata II, 84, n. 95). The objection may have been raised first by the Vaibhāṣika (?) Śubhagupta; see BSKā 71, cited by Kamalaśīla TSP 692,2–3. The example of the teacher and his student is from Yāmuna’s *Ātmasiddhi*; see Mesquita 1990: 38. I regret that Saccone 2018 was not yet available for me to take into consideration in this essay; to do so would have required substantial revisions.
is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*); it does not reliably indicate that the things in question are not different. However, it does not mean that they are different, either. An inconclusive reason is not the same as a contradictory one. Thus, although the stars of a constellation are invariably seen together, they are different.\(^{24}\)

In my formulation of the argument these objections constitute challenges to the truth of the first, major premise – which expresses what in Indian logic is the “pervasion” (*vyāpti*) of the reason by the property-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). Thus, the question arises, How should one interpret the first premise so that it is not vulnerable to these sorts of objections? Here, there are at least two strategies one could follow. (1) One could stipulate a specific meaning of the word “together.” (2) One could stipulate a specific meaning of the word “invariably.” I shall discuss these suggestions in order.

Suggestion 1: The first strategy for defeating the sorts of objections raised above is to suggest that one should understand “together” correctly. It does not mean simply juxtaposed or simultaneous, but completely together, that is, inseparable like water and milk. Proposals quite similar to this were in fact made by different Buddhist authors in response to the objection that *sahopalambhaniyamāt* is a contradictory or inconclusive reason.\(^{25}\)

This proposal is not without problems, however.\(^{26}\) For one thing, it would seem to disqualify the example Dharmakīrti himself gives in support of his reason, “like two moons” seen by a person afflicted by an eye disease. For the two moons, presumably, can be clearly distinguished.\(^{27}\) Another problem with interpreting Premise 1 in this way, namely, as saying that two things that are invariably apprehended as inseparable are not different, is that it now sounds an awful lot like: two things that are invariably apprehended as not different are not different. Thus, the non-difference of entities would already be given with their invariant co-apprehension, so that by assuming, with Premise 2, the invariant co-apprehension of object and cognition, one is assuming what one is supposed to be proving – their non-difference. The argument becomes a *petitio principii*.\(^{28}\)

More generally, however, it is difficult to come up with examples of two things invariably seen together, as inseparable, that are the same thing. Consider:

the Commander-in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces and the President of the United States

\(^{24}\) See Iwata II, 84, n. 98; BSKā 68. The *anaikāntikatā* objection is generally thought to apply if *saha* is understood specifically to mean “at the same time.”

\(^{25}\) Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, for instance, interpret *saha* as *eka*, so that *sahopalambha* = *ekopalambha* or *abhedopalambha*, an apprehension as united, or an apprehension as not different (Iwata I, 67–71). Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Dharmottara interpret *sahopalambha* as *eka evopalambhah*, a single apprehension [of both]. (See Iwata I, 84–88 on Dharmottara and 88–89 on Kamalaśīla. Cf. Matsumoto 1980: 284–283. See n. 33 below.) For a schematic presentation of the different options for construing *saha* see Iwata I, 66–67, and the entire section, 66–103, for a comprehensive discussion.

\(^{26}\) Bhāsarvajña neatly refutes most of the Buddhist maneuvers to evade these objections, NBhū 132–135.

\(^{27}\) Dharmakīrti himself says, PVin 1 40.1–2, that blue and its experience have separate appearances “like two moons, etc.:” *na hi bhinnāvabhāsitve ’py arthāntaram eva rūpaṃ nilasyānubhavāt tayoḥ sahopalambhaniyamād dvicandrādivat*. I am not aware of this criticism being raised by a classical author, but the literature is vast.

\(^{28}\) This is essentially the objection, raised by some classical opponents against the interpretation of *sahopalambhanah* as *ekatvenopalambhanah*, that in that case the *hetu* would not be different from the *sādhyā*, resulting in *siddhasādhanatā*, “proof of what is already established.” See Iwata I, 94; BSKā 76.
an Indian-Head Nickel and a Buffalo Nickel

a duck-rabbit

It seems that the latter two cases in particular, where it is a question of a thing with different visual aspects, are akin to the cognition of blue and blue. But are they seen together as inseparable? Indeed, both aspects are not seen at the same time – seeing the Indian head, one must turn the nickel over to see the buffalo and vice versa, and one can only shift from seeing the duck to seeing the rabbit and back –, so it is difficult to understand how they could be seen as inseparable or as one.

Thus, it becomes doubtful that Premise 1, even with a stronger construal of “together” as “inseparable,” would have any basis in observation – unlike the major premise of most syllogisms. We are confident in saying, “Where there is smoke, there is fire,” because we have observed many times that something that is smoking is on fire and have never observed that something that is smoking is not on fire, but that would not be the case here.

Suggestion 2: The second strategy for removing obvious challenges to the truth of the first premise is to suggest that one has to understand “invariably,” which translates niyama, correctly. Namely, one should take it modally, as meaning necessarily. Thus, sahopalambhaniyamāt would mean “because they are necessarily apprehended together.” One way of interpreting this would be that one cannot imagine apprehending one and not apprehending the other.

I am not aware of any Buddhist authors making this move in response to the objections of viruddahetutva and anaikāntikahetutva. Dharmakīrti himself does not formulate the relation between the apprehension of an object and the apprehension of a cognition modally. Rather, he typically says things like, “For it is not the case that, when there is not the apprehension of one form, there is apprehension of the other” (PVin 1 40,2–3). He does not use modal language like “there could not be apprehension of the other.” We do, however, find something like a modal formulation in the Tattvasaṅgraha:

That (X) whose awareness would necessarily (dhruvam) be the awareness of that (Y), is non-different from that (Y) or does not differ from that.

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29 An American Indian-Head nickel was a five-cent coin minted in the United States from 1913 to 1933, now a collector’s item. By definition, the nickel shows an Indian on the ‘heads’ side and a buffalo on the ‘tails’ side.

30 Iwata translates niyama as “ausschließlich.”

31 Mesquita 1990 for instance translates it as “notwendigerweise,” Matsumoto 1980 as “necessarily.”

32 Iwata’s discussion of niyama is relatively short. It would seem that the interpretation of niyama was not a matter of major concern in the debate over the SUN argument.

33 TS 2029: yatsamvedanam eva sāyād yasya samvedanam dhruvam / tasmād avyatiriktaṃ tat tato vā na vibhidyate // See Matsuoka, this volume, for a different translation. This verse, however, represents the view that sahopalambha implies that there is just one apprehension of X and Y: eka evopalambah. See TSP 692,23–24: na hy atraikenaivopalambha ekopalambha ity ayam artho 'bhipretha, kim tarhi? jñānañāyayoḥ parasparam eka evopalambah, na prthag itti. This is different from what I am suggesting, and I think is attended by the sorts of problems brought out by Bhāsarvajña. See above, nn. 25 and 26.
We also have the statement of Dharmottara:

Apprehension of the knowable [arises] only having the nature of the apprehension of the cognition, not otherwise; and apprehension of the cognition has only the nature of the apprehension of the knowable.\textsuperscript{34}

Let us, then, replace Premise 1 with

\textbf{Premise 1’}: Two things that are necessarily apprehended together are not different.

Premise 1’ seems a priori justified. That is to say, the generalization expressed by Premise 1’ – the \textit{vyāpti} of the traditional SUN argument – is not based on observation but is a truth of reason, if you will.

In support of this claim I refer to a recent article by Galen Strawson, “What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience?” from his collection \textit{Real Materialism}.\textsuperscript{35} In this essay Strawson argues that for any occurring experience \(e\), \(e\) cannot exist without a subject of the experience \(s\); the subject of the experience \(s\) cannot exist without an experiential content it is experiencing, \(c\); and the experience \(e\) also cannot exist without an experiential content \(c\) and vice versa. Thus we get

\[ e \Leftrightarrow s \Leftrightarrow c, \]

where “\( x \Leftrightarrow y \)” means “if \( x \) then necessarily \( y \), and if \( y \) then necessarily \( x \).”

Strawson does not appeal to invariable co-apprehension to support the equivalences \( e \Leftrightarrow s \Leftrightarrow c \); rather, he notes certain conceptual relationships. For instance, in arguing for \( e \Leftrightarrow s \) he writes, “There cannot be an experience without a subject of experience simply because experience is necessarily experience \textit{for} – for someone-or-something. Experience involves experiential ‘what-it-is-likeness,’ and experiential what-it-is-likeness is necessarily what-it-is-likeness for someone-or-something.”\textsuperscript{36} In arguing for the equivalence \( e \Leftrightarrow c \) Strawson offers observations such as, “Evidently there can’t be concretely occurring experiential content without there being an experience of some sort which the content is the content of,”\textsuperscript{37} and, “For surely this very experience couldn’t have had a different content and still be the experience \textit{it} is?”\textsuperscript{38} Thus, Strawson’s method for establishing equivalences for \( e, s, \) and \( c \) is different from that of the SUN argument – which of course is only concerned

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{34} \textit{jñeyopalambho jñānopalambhātmaka eva nānyathā I jñānopalambho ‘pi jñeyopalambhātmaka eva II}, from Dharmottara’s \textit{Pramāṇaviniścayatīkā}. See Iwata I, 107–108 and II, 89, n. 15.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Strawson 2008. Thanks to Mark Siderits for bringing this article to my attention.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Strawson 2008: 153. It should be noted that the type of subject Strawson conceives of as necessary for experience is a ‘thin’ subject, which is not ontologically distinct from the experience but only its subjective pole and which is different from one experience to the next. Thus, it is not incompatible with a Buddhist view of consciousness which involves no self distinct from cognition but includes a subjective factor, namely, the \textit{grāhakākāra} or subject form. See esp. Strawson 2008: 182–183, also 167–168.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Strawson 2008: 153.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Strawson 2008: 177.
\end{itemize}
with the necessary equivalence $e \Leftrightarrow c$. Moreover, Strawson takes $c$ to be the content of an experience, an “experiential content;” it is “internal,” “phenomenological.” Thus, it belongs to the experience at the outset. Its status is not initially undetermined, as merely the knowable that might or might not belong to the cognition, as it is on my interpretation of the SUN argument. Nevertheless, Strawson’s reflections become particularly useful for us when he suggests that one can move from

$$e \Leftrightarrow s \Leftrightarrow c$$

to

$$e = s = c$$

by force of the following principle, which he borrows from Descartes:

There is a real distinction between two phenomena … if and only if they can possibly “exist apart,” and a merely conceptual distinction between them if and only if they are conceptually distinct, like trilaterality and triangularity, but cannot possibly exist apart.\(^{39}\)

Strawson (and Descartes) accept this as an a priori principle. Following them, then, it seems a priori justified – that is, not based on any observational data – that

Two things that are necessarily apprehended together are not different,

which is our Premise 1’. Of course, to say that two things are necessarily apprehended as co-occurring is slightly different from saying that two things necessarily co-occur, but it seems the difference is so slight as to be negligible. The only way to know that things are a certain way is by apprehending them as being so. I shall, however, return to this point below.

Before moving on to consider Premise 2, it may be helpful to clarify how Strawson is not proving the same thing as the SUN argument in the way I am interpreting it. Indeed, it would seem that by arguing for $e = c$ Strawson is arguing for what the Buddhists referred to as \textit{dvirūpatā}, essentially, the non-difference of the object-form from the cognition (cognition, that is, has two aspects: the cognition and the object), which I have distinguished from \textit{vijñaptimātratā} above. Strawson of course is not interested at all in the thesis of idealism; however, he believes that $e = s = c$, hence $e = c$, is “a deep truth.”\(^{40}\) He believes it is particularly significant that $s$ and $c$ cannot exist apart, hence that they must be identical in some sense – the content of the experience is the subject. Why? The main reason appears to be that Strawson, as a physicalist or materialist, believes that all of $e$, $s$, and $c$ are not just correlated with, but are physical entities: portions of “process-stuff” in the nervous system,

\(^{39}\) Strawson 2008: 168. Strawson cites Descartes 1985: I, 213–215 (\textit{Principles of Philosophy}). See also Strawson 2008: 181: “…Let me now formally endorse the principle that if there is at most a conceptual distinction between two apparently distinct (concrete) particulars, if they cannot possible exist apart, then they are not really two but only one…”

\(^{40}\) Strawson 2008: 180.
which will eventually be pinpointed by neuroscience. The equivalence \( e = s = c \), then, predicts that the neuroscientists will someday discover that the neurological process-stuff that is \( e \) ‘just is’ the neurological process-stuff that is independently identified as \( s \), and that \( s \) ‘just is’ the neurological process-stuff that is independently identified as \( c \). Here we have – though Strawson does not exactly say this – a priori philosophy proposing a specific research program in brain science! Be that as it may, in the end Strawson’s essay offers nothing for the Buddhist; for materialism is just as much a non-starter for the Buddhist – at least for Dharmakīrti – as idealism is for the contemporary analytic philosopher.

It seems that in light of this examination of Premise 1’ it is safe to say that the first premise of the argument, for now, looks quite solid. Thus, having established that the argument is valid, that is, commits no logical mistake, and that its first premise appears true, it would seem that the best hope for defeating it is to show somehow that the second premise is false.

**Examination of premise 2**

Is it true that object and cognition are necessarily apprehended together? Well, it seems uncontroversial that one cannot possibly apprehend a cognition of blue without apprehending what it is a cognition of – blue. What seems, and was for Indian philosophers, much more controversial is the other half of the equivalence: that one could not apprehend blue without apprehending the cognition of it. Dharmakīrti is clearly attempting to establish this with the second half of PVin 1.54:

\[
\text{The seeing of an object is not established for someone for whom the apprehension is not evident.}^{43}
\]

The idea is that a cognition that does not reveal itself cannot reveal an object. Dharmakīrti continues,

For there is not an apprehending of an object due to the presence of the object, but rather due to the presence of the apprehension. And if that [presence] is not known by a pramāṇa it does not attach itself to/conform to [verbal, conceptual, and corporal forms of] behaviour that presuppose existence. If that [apprehension] were not established, there would be no establishing of the object either, so everything would disappear; for if it were not established, even though it exists, it cannot be treated as existing. Therefore, someone who does not apprehend the awareness of something is not aware of anything.\(^{44}\)

\(^{41}\) Strawson 2008: 183–185.

\(^{42}\) See Taber 2003.

\(^{43}\) apratyāksopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭih prasidhyati // Iwata I, 106.

Dharmakīrti seems to be saying that apprehending something, but not being aware that one is apprehending it, is as good as not apprehending it at all.

Despite the strong prima facie appeal of this view it was aggressively attacked by opponents of Yogācāra anti-realism. One of the most forceful critiques is by Kumārila, who in the Śūnyavāda chapter of his Ślokavārttika is taking on an argument that anticipates the SUN, which was already known to the Vṛttikāra: if the form (ākāra) that appears in a cognition can be shown to belong to the cognition itself, then there is no reason to postulate an object.\(^\text{45}\) In arguing for the possession of the form by the cognition the pūrvapakṣin offers, among other reasons, that for something to illumine or manifest anything it has to be apprehended itself: “… the object which is to be illumined is not ascertained when the appearance of the cognition is not apprehended, because its illumination is dependent on that, like a pot when there is the light of a lamp.”\(^\text{46}\) The opponent even says that the cognition must reveal itself. We fail to be aware of something only because either a source of illumination is lacking or there is something obstructing it. When a cognition arises, however, neither is the case: nothing obstructs it, and it itself is the source of illumination.\(^\text{47}\) Moreover, if a cognition necessarily apprehends itself, it must apprehend itself as having some form. Thus, the ākāra must belong to the cognition.\(^\text{48}\)

Kumārila’s refutation of this argument in his siddhānta is extensive and complex. A better understanding of it awaits a new edition and translation of the Śūnyavāda. Nevertheless, it is clear that it involves at least the following three elements. (1) In fact we are not aware of both object and cognition at the same time. Usually we are only aware of the object. “…When one cognizes the object (grāhya), the form blue and so forth, one does not at that time ever observe an awareness having the form of the subject (grāhaka).”\(^\text{49}\) And sometimes one is just aware of the subject without the object, for instance when one remembers experiencing something but cannot remember what it was.\(^\text{50}\) (2) It is not necessary for the cognition itself to be apprehended in order for it to cognize an object. The senses provide a counterexample: we apprehend things by means of them without apprehending them themselves.\(^\text{51}\) (3) There is no example of something that illuminates itself as it illuminates other things. Fire and so forth illumine other objects without their own natures being revealed. When they are apprehended, it is the sense that apprehends them.\(^\text{52}\) In general, Kumārila seems to subscribe to the principle that something cannot act on itself: an axe cannot cut itself, a finger cannot touch itself, and so on.

Obviously, we cannot adjudicate this dispute here – essentially, the debate about the truth of the second premise of the SUN argument – which continued for centuries after Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. We should note, however, that there is widespread support in modern philosophy, in both the analytic and continental traditions, for the thesis that some

\(^{45}\) See Taber 2010.
\(^{46}\) ŚV, Śūnyavāda 22.
\(^{47}\) ŚV Śūnyavāda 23–24.
\(^{48}\) Taber 2010: 284–287.
\(^{49}\) ŚV Śūnyavāda 74.
\(^{50}\) ŚV Śūnyavāda 82cd–83.
\(^{51}\) ŚV Śūnyavāda 179cd–180ab.
\(^{52}\) ŚV Śūnyavāda 64–66.
kind of self-awareness or reflexivity is essential to consciousness. Consider the following précis of Sartre’s position by the contemporary phenomenologist Dan Zahavi.

Sartre, probably the best-known defender of a phenomenological theory of self-consciousness, considered consciousness to be essentially characterized by intentionality. He also claimed, however, that each intentional experience is characterized by self-consciousness. Thus, Sartre took self-consciousness to constitute a necessary condition for being conscious of something. To perceive a withering oak, a dance performance, or a red pillow consciously without being aware of it, that is, without having access to or being acquainted with the experience in question was, for Sartre, a manifest absurdity. This line of thought is elaborated in the important introduction to L’être et le néant, where he claimed that an ontological analysis of intentionality leads to self-consciousness since the mode of being of intentional consciousness is to be for-itself (pour soi), that is, self-conscious. An experience does not simply exist; it exists for itself, that is, it is given for itself, and this self-givenness is not simply a quality added to the experience, a mere varnish, but it rather constitutes the very mode of being of the experience. As Sartre wrote: “This self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as the only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of something.”

Thus, it seems obvious that Premise 2, if not actually true, is at least defensible – many philosophers of different traditions have held and defended it. The main point to be made here in favor of the SUN argument is this, that if one accepts Premise 2, as it appears many do, then, given that Premise 1 already looks quite strong, the argument will go through.

Further objections?

With the strategy of refuting the SUN argument decisively by contesting its premises not looking very hopeful, one is challenged to come up with other ways to attack the argument.

(1) Perhaps one can ask, Does the argument really establish vijñaptimātratā as its conclusion? Is the non-difference of object and cognition really tantamount to the idealist thesis that esse est percipi – an object cannot exist unless there is an awareness of it – as I maintained above?

Consider in this connection the one-liner the Vṛttikāra throws out at the end of his refutation of the Buddhist argument that cognition is ‘empty,’ that is, without any objective

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53 Zahavi 2005: 12. Note Zahavi’s claim about the ubiquity of this view: “One should not overestimate the homogeneity of the phenomenological tradition; like any other tradition, it spans many differences. Although phenomenologists might disagree on important questions concerning method and focus, and even about the status and existence of a self, they are in nearly unanimous agreement when it comes to the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. Literally all the major figures in phenomenology defend the view that the experiential dimension is characterized by a tacit self-consciousness” (11). Kellner 2017: 21, interestingly enough, also refers to Sartre’s view of consciousness when discussing the so-called samvedana argument and cites Zahavi’s treatment of it, but she warns that the conclusion Dharmakīrti draws, that cognition cannot be of an external object, “is one that phenomenologists shun.” My point is simply that the SUN argument would force them to accept it.
support, because the form (ākāra) we are aware of belongs to the cognition, hence object (artha) and cognition (buddhi) are one:

Moreover, if one likes, if there is sameness of nature [of the object and the cognition], then it is the cognition that doesn’t exist, not the object, which is [after all] perceptible.\(^{54}\)

That is to say, if one proves the non-difference of object and cognition, then what is the true nature of the (one) thing they both are? Is it the object or the cognition? It seems that there is no way to decide this question. Hence, it would be illegitimate to draw the idealist conclusion, that it is only the cognition that is real, and that the object, although it appears to be something distinct from the cognition, is really just the cognition!\(^{55}\)

The Vṛttikāra, in posing this question, seems to be presupposing that the object has some determinate nature that the cognition could also turn out to have; presumably, it is physical in nature. In doing so, however, he ignores the stipulation I made at the beginning of my exposition of the SUN argument – but which should hold for any argument for idealism – that the status of the object must be left undecided at the outset in regard to whether it is an aspect of the cognition or not. For, once again, if one assumes that it is merely the object-form, then the argument proves very little; but equally, one cannot assume that it is, say, a physical object that could exist unperceived – the very opposite of what the argument is supposed to prove. Given that the SUN argument establishes that object and cognition are not different, the independent existence of the object – as, say, something physical – is ruled out by the argument itself and the only remaining possibility is that it belongs to the cognition. In other words, were it shown (by some other argument) that the object does exist independently of the cognition, then one might conduct an investigation into its nature, whether for instance it is something physical. Having proven, on the other hand, that object and cognition are not different, and the nature of the cognition as something internal and phenomenal being beyond doubt, the object acquires that nature as well.

(2) A different approach – one historically attempted by certain Brahmin authors – is to claim that the very thesis (pratijñā) of the argument is contradicted by perception. This objection probably originated with Kumārila but it is very forcefully stated, once again, by Śaṅkara:

\(^{54}\) Frauwallner 1968: 30,10–11: api ca kāmam ekarūpatve buddher evābhāvo, na tv arthasya pratyakṣasya sataḥ.

\(^{55}\) Ernst Steinkellner presented this objection to me after I delivered a preliminary version of this paper at the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference, in Heidelberg, in August, 2015. He did not refer to the passage in the Śābarabhāṣya, and I suspect he came up with it on his own. He went on to say, with a mischievous twinkle in his eye, that whenever he tries to think about the philosophical problems the Buddhist epistemologists are concerned with he finds himself faced with similar conundrums – and that is why he prefers not to think about them. The Buddha, perhaps, would have said the same thing. It was in order to avoid a similar problem that some Buddhist interpreters of the argument, e.g., Dharmottara, suggested that “non-difference” (abheda) should be understood to connote just the negation of difference and not also the affirmation of identity, that is, as a prasajyapratisedha rather than a paryudāsa. Otherwise, if cognition and object were the same, then the object-form being unreal (as some believed), the cognition would become unreal. See Matsumoto 1980: 281–278; Iwata I, 173–183.
Philosophical Reflections on the sahopalambhaniyama Argument

The non-existence of an external object certainly cannot be ascertained. Why? Because it is apprehended (upalabdheḥ).²⁶ For, for each cognition an external object is apprehended, as [for instance] a post, a wall, a cloth, [or] a pot. And something that is apprehended cannot not exist. Just as if someone who is eating, experiencing the satisfaction produced by the food for himself, were to say, “I am not eating,” or “I am not satisfied,” so if someone apprehending for himself an external object by means of contact with his sense faculty were to say, “I do not apprehend it, and it does not exist” – how could we take his statements seriously?²⁷

In other words, perception itself reveals to us objects outside consciousness. The externality of the object, the fact that it exists independently of being perceived, is given as part of the content of perception itself. As Kumārila puts it, the idea that arises, upon perceiving something, that one’s cognition has an external support, is never overturned – unlike, say, dreaming cognitions. Therefore, by implicit appeal to the principle of intrinsic validity that a cognition is true unless and until it is overturned by another, that idea is correct.

Moreover, the notion that a cognition has an external object is true, for it is a notion devoid of any contradiction, like the cognition [one has upon waking] that contradicts a dream.²⁸

This argument is more sophisticated than the mere prejudice against idealism that I dismissed as question-begging at the beginning of this essay, for it is an actual argument that provides us with a reason for believing that our conviction that we are perceiving things outside us is true.²⁹ Nevertheless – and very briefly – I do not think this is a fatal objection to the SUN argument. Even if our conviction in the externality and independence of the objects we experience is firm and never overturned, there is still no explanation for how such a conviction could be true. We would, somehow, have to be able to step outside our minds – adopt a “God’s-eye view” – and observe that our perceptions are really being caused by physical objects. Needless to say, that is impossible.³⁰

²⁶ This glosses BS 2.2.28: nābhāva upalabdheḥ. This by itself suggests that the Brahmanical understanding of the purport of Buddhist arguments against the existence of external objects was that they do not exist because they are not apprehended (anupalabdheḥ). They understood the Buddhist arguments against the existence of a self in the same way. See Kellner/Taber 2014: 726–727; 731–732.

²⁷ kathām upādeyavadacanaḥ syāt. BSBh 547,4–548,4. See the continuation of the passage. Śaṅkara points out, among other things, that when the Buddhist says the object-form appears as if it were an external object, he tacitly admits that perception itself reveals to us that the objects we experience are external.

²⁸ bāhyārthālambanā buddhir iti saṃyak ca dhīr iyam // bādhakāpetabuddhītvād yathā svapnādibādhīdhiḥ / ŚV T Nirālambanavādā 79cd–80ab. ŚV M reads svapnādibāhyadhīdhiḥ in 80b.

²⁹ Kumārila, ŚV Nirālambanavādā 79ab, introduces this as a counter-proof (pratisādhana) that renders the reason or thesis of the idealist’s anumāna defective (he is considering a different one in the Nirālambanavāda). The reason would become, technically, a viruddhāvyabhicāritetu, or else the argument’s thesis would be disproven by another inference (78cd).

³⁰ Ratiē 2010: 444–445, n. 23 and 2011: 484–486 shows how Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, and apparently certain Viśiṇāvādins, used this type of argument to refute the Sautrāntika: we cannot infer the existence of external objects as the cause of our perceptual experiences, because we cannot perceive them independently of cognizing them, in order to establish a causal relationship between them and our
Having exhausted two initially promising avenues of attack against the SUN argument we are compelled to return to its premises and scrutinize them one last time. I do think that Premise 2, though not proven, is certainly defensible, and so I shall not attempt to investigate it further. There was, however, a point that came up at the end of my discussion of Premise 1’ that I did not pursue.

It certainly seems indisputable that if one thing can possibly be apprehended without the other, they are different. This is equivalent to the statement

If two things are not different, then they are necessarily apprehended together.

But is the converse, which is Premise 1’, true?

If two things are necessarily apprehended together, then they are not different.

I have offered in support of this principle the examples of the President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces and an Indian Head Nickel and a Buffalo Nickel, but ended up doubting that it could be established a posteriori. I proposed that it be accepted as a priori justified instead, and appealed to the principle Galen Strawson (relying on Descartes) articulates in asserting the identity of experience, subject, and content of experience, namely (in one of its formulations):

If two things cannot possibly exist apart, so that there is only a conceptual distinction between them, then they are one.

The wording of this principle, however, is slightly different from Premise 1’ above. Premise 1’ refers to the apprehension of two things, whereas Strawson’s principle refers to the existence (or occurrence) of two things. Now, the question arises: Does this difference in wording constitute an important difference?

It seems that an opponent of the SUN argument could claim that it does. It may be the case that one never apprehends an object without apprehending the cognition that apprehends it, and that it is even inconceivable that one could. But why, exactly? It could indeed be because one can only apprehend an object by means of a cognition, and – as we have seen Sartre argue – all cognitions are self-aware, so that whenever one is aware of an object one is also aware of one’s cognition. Similarly, one can see an object by means of light, and light also illumines itself; when one sees an object one is aware of both the object and the illumination. Yet the object is different from the light that illuminates it.

The word “apprehension” in Premise 1’, then, introduces a condition that guarantees that object and cognition will seem invariably to co-occur. Precisely because it qualifies the co-occurrence of two things as their apprehended co-occurrence, then, Premise 1’ does not rule out categorically that an object could occur without a cognition. Indeed, that is precisely the possibility that the realist thinks she envisions.

experiences. As Abhinavagupta puts it, “…Since the external object is not an object of perception, one cannot establish any causal relation between this [external object] and anything else; as a consequence, the cognition [of this or that object] is not a kāryahetu in regard to this [object] to be inferred” (Ratié 2011: 485, slightly adjusted).
Again, it is Śaṅkara who states the problem about as succinctly as one could: “For this reason also, it is to be assumed that invariable co-apprehension, too, is caused by cognition and object being means and what is assisted (upāyopeyabhāvahetuka), not by their non-difference.” Here he is taking advantage of an opening left by Dharmakīrti himself. In his prose discussion of PVin 54ab Dharmakīrti clarifies that the invariable co-apprehension of object and cognition establishes the non-difference of their nature, “because there is no [other] cause [of their co-apprehension] consisting in a connection” (pratibandhakāraṇābhāvāt). In the case of visible form and light, on the other hand, there is a connection consisting of the object’s acquiring the capacity to produce a cognition of visible form, or else the arising of a capacity of the sense to cognize it. It is this connection, and not their non-difference, that accounts for their co-apprehension – the light enables the apprehension of visible form.

What is most interesting is that Dharmakīrti does not think that there is any other factor that determines the invariable co-apprehension of object and cognition other than their non-difference. The question is, Why not? Why couldn’t, as Śaṅkara suggests, their co-apprehension be due to the fact that the cognition is what enables us to apprehend the object?

I believe that this is the most serious objection that can be leveled against the SUN argument. Unfortunately, I do not have space to develop an adequate response to it, which would take us deep into difficult philosophical issues (especially in philosophy of mind) – and also, of necessity, back to the texts. For the Buddhists themselves, of course, were aware of this problem, which may have been first formulated by Śubhagupta: the invariable co-apprehension of object and cognition may be due, not to their non-difference, but to the fact that the preceding causal complex causes them to arise at the same time as grāhya and grāhaka, respectively. And Dharmakīrti already indicates the line of response later Buddhist epistemologists will take: “The other object, however, which arises simultaneously [with the cognition] does not shape [the cognition], because it does not influence it; how would [the object] be manifest, which the cognition [in turn] does not shape with its own form?” That is to say, simultaneously arising entities cannot stand in a causal relationship to each other, any more than, say, “the right and left horns of a cow.” But more generally, and independently of the historical development of the arguments, the question is: How can there be any causal relation between cognition and physical object at all? That is, How can
consciousness illumine an object? Even if the (questionable) assumption that object and cognition arise simultaneously is abandoned, the realist has a lot of explaining to do! The defender of the SUN argument can defend the first premise simply by shifting the burden of proof: Explain to me how cognition, which is experienced as being non-material and non-spatial, can influence a physical thing to bring about the quality of its being manifest to us, or how could a physical object impose its form upon cognition?68

In summary, the SUN argument appears to be a strong one. It is not invalid; there is evidence in support of its premises; and initial, and even secondary, objections to the premises can be answered. Even though one may not be convinced by it, it is not easy to refute.69

References and abbreviations


BS Brahmasūtra. See BSBh.


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68 This is essentially what Jñānaśrīmitra does in his Advaitabinduprakarana. His line of investigation strikes one as an elaboration of the thought behind what is known as the samvedana argument: awareness is by nature just the “appearing in a certain way,” and like the awareness of awareness, can only be of awareness. See Kellner 2017: 20–22.

69 I believe that Berkeley’s arguments for idealism, for instance, are easier to refute.


The Truth, the Buddha’s Words, and Inference: Bhāviveka’s Theory of Two Truths

by
Masaki Tamura

Introduction

The Buddhist truth, which was directly realized by the Buddha, is beyond verbalization in itself. For it is precisely his personal, direct experience of reality. The Buddha, fully aware that the truth is ineffable, taught it to us by resorting to words. No Buddhist can deny the authority of the Buddha’s words. But the critical problem has arisen that they are susceptible to divergent interpretations. The following serves as an example. In the Daśabhūmikasūtra the Buddha states that the three realms are mind-only (cittamātra).

According to Bhāviveka, the Yogācāra school interprets the statement to mean that an external object does not exist independently of the mind, while the Mādhyamika school interprets the same statement to mean that the self (ātman) serving as agent of an action and as enjoyer of the fruit of the action does not exist independently of the mind. The question comes up: What is the means for arriving at a real understanding of the Buddha’s statement? According to Bhāviveka, it is scripturally based inference or the inference (amunāna) which follows the Buddhist scriptures (āgamānuvidhāyin).

Bhāviveka argues that the truth is beyond the reach of inference and that inference plays the role of removing the misconception about the truth which arises from the Buddha’s statement. The aim of this paper is to show how Bhāviveka considers the determination of the truth to be linked with its self-realization (pratyātmavedya) within the framework of the two truths theory.

It is to be noted that Bhāviveka uses the term anumāna “inference” without making a clear distinction between svārthānumāna “inference for oneself” and parārthānumāna “inference for others,” a distinction established by Dignāga. In this paper, accordingly, I will also render the term anumāna used by Bhāviveka as “inference” without specifying what the term means in a given context.

1 DBhS 98.8–9: cittamātram idam yad idam traidhātukam /
2 ViṃśV 3.2–4: mahāyāne traidhātukam vijñaptimātram vyavasthāpyate / cittamātraṃ bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtrā / … / mātram ity arthapratīṣṭhārtham /
3 MHK V 28cd: sūtreṣu* cittamātroktiḥ kartṛbhokṛtiṣedhataḥ**// (*sūtreṣu | L1, L2, Ec; sūtre ca H, S; Ā[b]streva SG; śastreva Ms, **cittamātroktiḥ kartṛbhokṛtiṣedhataḥ ) L2, H, S, SG; cittamātroktikartṛ- bhokṛtiṣedhataḥ L1, Ec, Ms.)
4 It is well known that Dharmakīrti divides inference into two types: inference which functions by the force of reality (vastubalapravṛttānumāna) and inference which is based on scripture (āgamāśritānumāna). While the former is the inference whose object is imperceptible (parokṣa), the latter is the inference whose object is completely imperceptible (atyantaparokṣa). What Bhāviveka means by the term āgamānuvidhāyanumāna is the inference which functions only within the framework of the Buddhist āgama and which is in perfect accordance with it. On Dharmakīrti’s concept of āgamāśritānumāna, see Tillemans (1986; 1990: 23–35; 1999).
1. When to use inference

1.1 Bhāviveka begins the fifth chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā by giving the outline of the Yogācāras’ view of the nectar-like truth as emptiness of the grasped-grasper duality. After expounding the theories of “mind-only” (cittamātra), of asallakṣaṇānupra-veśopāya, and of the three natures (trisvabhāva), Bhāviveka states the following kārikā.

MHK V 7: prajñāpāramitānītir iyam sarvajñatāptaye / na tūtpādanirodhādipratiṣedhaparo nayah5 //

This doctrine propounded by the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras [as interpreted by the Yogācāras]6 leads to the attainment of omniscience, while the doctrine as it is taken to intend to deny arising, cessation, and so forth does not.

An important point to note here is: Bhāviveka states that the Yogācāras’ view of emptiness and the Mādhyamikas’ view of emptiness are equally derived from the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, which consist in the words of the Buddha. The Yogācāras might argue that only their view of emptiness can lead to the attainment of omniscience and that the Mādhyamikas misunderstand the Buddha’s words.

1.2 To this objection, Bhāviveka answers as follows:

MHK V 8–9: atrocyate pramāṇam naḥ sarvaṃ tāthāgatam vacaḥ / āptopadeśaprāmāṇyāḥ bhadro hi pratipadyate // nāgamāntarasaṃdigdhaviparyastamatih parah // 
tasmāt tatpratipattyartham tanmṛgyo yuktimannayah //

We will answer to this objection as follows. Since the teaching of a credible person (āpta) is authoritative, all the words of the Tathāgata[, who is a credible person,] are authoritative for us [Buddhists]. Indeed, a good person (bhadra) accepts all the words of the Tathāgata, while our opponent does not. For, the latter, under the influence of other traditions, holds that [what the Tathāgata states is] doubtful and wrong.7 Therefore, the [good person] must seek for a reasonable argument so that the opponent may accept the [Tathāgata’s words].

5 -pratiṣedhaparo nayah ] H, S, SG, Ms; -pratiṣedhaparāyaṇā L1, L2, Ec.
6 The Tarkajvālā explains how the Yogācāras’ doctrine is derived from the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras. TJ ad MHK V 7 [D202b1; P222b4–5]: sems de ni sems ma yin no zhes gsums pa des ni gzung ba dang ’dzin pa med par bstan to // (“The statement ‘That mind is not the mind’ (*tac cittam acittam*) means that there does not exist [the duality of] the grasper and the grasped (*grāhyagrāhakābhāva*).”) APS 3.18: tac cittam acittam /
7 Previous studies render the term āgamāntarasaṃdigdhaviparyastamatih as follows. Iida 1966: 83: “[Our] opponent, whose judgement is confused and perverted by other āgama(s).” Hoornaert 2000: 90: “Others who have doubts and erroneous ideas from other scriptures.” Eckel 2008: 227: “the opponent, whose mind is confused and misled by other traditions.” Krasser 2012: 546: “The other one, whose mind is in doubt and confused by other scriptures.”
There are a few points to note here. First, the Tathāgata is characterized as a credible person (āpta) and hence his teaching must be authoritative.

Secondly, there are two types of hearers of the Tathāgata’s words: one is “a good person” (bhadra) and the other is a person who is dubious of what the Tathāgata states and who conceives of it as wrong. The latter is under the influence of āgamas other than the Buddhist. It is important to note in this connection that Bhāviveka uses the term bhadra, which refers to a Bodhisattva who confers a benefit on others. According to the Tarkajvālā, Buddhist disciples are classified into four groups: (1) those who properly understand their own āgamas; (2) those who doubt what they state; (3) those who incorrectly understand what they state; (4) those who have insufficient intelligence to understand what they state. A Bodhisattva called bhadra belongs to the first group. Interestingly, Bhāviveka professes to be a bhadra who is bound to lead the second and third groups to the Great Enlightenment (mahābodhi), treating Yogācāra Buddhists as such groups of disciples.

Thirdly, the bhadra is said to be requested to seek for a reasonable argument (yukti-mannaya) in order to lead the disciples of groups (2) and (3), referred to by the word para “opponent” in the kārikā and characterized as those who are dubious of what the Tathāgata states and who conceive of it as wrong, to a correct understanding of the Tathāgata’s statement. The reasonable argument, according to the Tarkajvālā, consists in a three-membered inference, comprised of a thesis (pakṣa), a reason (hetu), and an example (drṣṭānta). The Tarkajvālā says:

TJ ad MHK V 9 [D203a1–2; P223a6–8]: de’i phyir de dag sgrub tu gzhug pa’i phyir / smra ba po rigs¹¹ pa dang ldan pa’i tshul phyogs dang / gtan tshigs dang / dpe’i skyon med pa gzhan gyis smras pa’i nyes pa’i gnas su ma gyur pa’i mtha’i rigs pa’i lam btsal bar bya’o //

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⁸ See, for example, AvŚ I.184.2–4.

⁹ In MHK IX 155 Bhāviveka makes the same point. MHK IX 155: skyon med rjes su dpag pa yis // rigs sam mi rigs ma dpysad par // blo ni gzhan gyis bskyed pa’i phyir // lung gzhan dag la the tshom za // (Lindtner 1999: 295: “If one does not investigate what is logical and what is not logical by means of an anumāna free from faults, then one’s understanding will be formed by other [traditions] and therefore one will be in doubt about other traditions (āgama).”) TJ ad MHK IX 155 [D317a7–b2; P363a5–8]: slob ma ni rnam pa gsum yod de / lung gzhan mthong na ‘di ltar yin nam / ma yin zhes the tshom za ba’i blo can dang / lung gcig la rab tu zhugs shing zhen par gyur nas gzhan la sens kyis (D; kyi P) sdang (D; ldang P) bar gyur cing phyin ci log tu zhugs pa’i blo can dang / lung thams cad la the rigs pa yin nam / rigs pa ma yin zhes dpysad par mi nus pa’i riogs pa dang bral ba’i blo can no // de la rigs gzhan gyis (D; gyi P) the tshom bskyed pa’i mthong ci log tu zhen par gyur ba’i blo gang la yod pa de dag ni rjes su dpag pa med par rigs sam / mi rigs zhes dpysad par nus pa ma yin no //

⁰ Krasser 2012 argues that the word para here refers to Dharmakirti for the reason that the concept of āgama introduced by Bhāviveka (i.e., āptopadesaprāmānya, which echoes Dignāga’s definition of āgama: āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānātā) is not shared by Dharmakirti. I do not agree with him. This is still being debated, though. See also Hoornaert 2000: 90, n.1. There is no question that in the fifth chapter of the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā Bhāviveka focuses on refuting the Yogācāra doctrine propounded only by Asanga, Vasubandhu, and Dignāga. Incidentally, Krasser 2012: 546 gives the following translation of the kārikās in question: “To this (pārvapaksa of the Yogācāra) we reply: All the words of the Tathāgata are authoritative [pramāṇa] for us, because the teachings of a reliable person are authoritative. A good one puts (these) into practice. The other one, whose mind is in doubt and confused by other scriptures, does not. Therefore the path of reasoning [yukti-mannaya] should be followed by him in order to put these into practice.”

¹¹ rigs J; rig P.
Therefore, for an opponent to accept the Tathāgata’s words completely, a proponent must seek for a reasonable argument, that is, a final logical method which has no faults in the thesis, the reason, and the example, and with which others find no fault.12

Needless to say, the argument in question is of the type parārthānumāna. The following is an instance of such a reasonable argument:

MHK V 36: tasyālambanatā ceṣṭā tadābhamatihetutaḥ / rāgavad bādhyaite tasmati pratijñā te 'numānataḥ //
[Thesis:] The [color and form in the form of an aggregation of atoms] are an objective basis;
[Reason:] because they are the cause of a cognition in which they appear;
[Example:] like in the case of desire.
Therefore, your thesis is refuted through this inference.

Bhāviveka here intends to refute the theory of “mind-only” which the Yogācāra school establishes by means of introducing counter-arguments against the atomic theory.13 In this connection, it is important to note that, according to Dignāga, parārthānumana is what makes what one has seen known to others (svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśana), and what serves to give true information to others.14

2. Role of inference

Then what role can inference play in this context? First of all, Bhāviveka specifies that the truth is beyond the sphere of inference.

MHK V 104: tattvasyātarkagamyatvā / nātas tarkeṇa dharmāṇaṁ gamyate dharmateti cet //
[Objection:] The truth is not realized through logical reasoning (tarka). [For] it is said [in the āgama] that the real nature (dharmatā) of existential factors is not realized through logical reasoning. Accordingly, there does not occur the understanding of the [truth] through inference.

12 See also MHK V 109.
13 According to the Tarkajvālā, the theory is also contradicted by the Buddhist āgama. TJ ad MHK V 36 [D210a1; P232a4]: rnam par shes pa’i tshogs lnga’i gnas dang / dmigs pa ni bsags pa yin no zhes gsungs pa’i lung dang yang ’gal lo // (“[Your thesis] contradicts the scripture also which says that the supporting faculties and the objective basis of the five sense consciousnesses are aggregations [of atoms].”)
14 PS III 1ab: parārtham anumānam tu svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśanam / -tvāt ] L1, L2, H, S, Ec; -tvā SG, Ms.
According to Bhāviveka, the truth cannot be understood through inference. Nonetheless, Bhāviveka does not absolutely deny that inference plays a certain role in understanding the truth. Referring to the Buddhas, he states:

MHK V 105–106: ihānumānān nirdosād āgamānuvidhāyinah /
kalpitāśeavividhavikalpaughanirākrteḥ\[^{16}\] //
sakalajñeyayāthātmyam\[^{17}\] ākāśasamacetasaḥ /
jñānena nirvikalpena buddhāḥ paśyanty adarśanāt //

[Answer:] In our [Mādhyamikas’] view, the Buddhas, after negating a flood of conceptions of what has been conceptually constructed, through inference which has no fault and which accords with the Buddhist āgama, become those who have a mind like space.\[^{18}\] Then they see, by way of non-seeing, the true nature of all objects to be cognized, by means of a non-conceptual cognition.

Bhāviveka here shows the process through which the Buddhas come to get an intuitive insight into the real nature of things. According to Bhāviveka, there are two stages. At the first stage the Buddhas resort to inference in order to get rid of a flood of conceptualizations. The inference is with no defects and accords with the Buddhist āgama. At the second stage they, with minds pure as space,\[^{19}\] intuitively, by way of non-seeing, grasp the real nature of things.

An important point to note is that Bhāviveka introduces inference in this way in the context of the realization of the truth. Clearly, for Bhāviveka inference, which consists in being svārthānumāna, has as its object not the truth itself but conceptualizations of what has been conceptually constructed. Hence he says the following:

MHK V 107: ato ‘numānaviṣayaṃ na tattvam pratipadyate /
tattvajñānavipakṣo yas tasya tena nirākriyā //

For this reason, the truth is not understood to be within the sphere of inference. That which is opposed to the knowledge of the truth is removed through inference.

Bhāviveka here specifies the role of inference. The role of inference is to rule out the opposite of the knowledge of the truth, that is, the conceptualizations of what has been conceptually constructed.

Suppose that one makes the assertion “A certain thing is such and such” and another the assertion “The thing is not such and such.” If the two assertions obtain, there arises a doubt about the thing: Which assertion is true? Thus one must resort to inference.

\[^{16}\] -nirākrteḥ | L1, L2, H, S, Ec, SG; -nirākrte Ms; bsal mdzad nas Tib (TJ: bsal bar mdzad nas de ’i ’og tu).

\[^{17}\] sakala- | L1, L2, H, S, SG. Ms; akala- Ec.

\[^{18}\] The mind which is free from conceptual construction is likened to space in pureness. See Tamura 2013.

\[^{19}\] See the footnote above.
MHK V 109: pratijñāmātrakeṇeṣṭā\textsuperscript{20} pratipakṣanirākriyā /
aniṣiddhe vipakṣe ca nirvikalpā matiḥ kutaḥ //

How can one admit that what is opposed to [the knowledge of the truth] is
negated by mere assertion? In addition, if what is opposed to [the knowledge
of the truth] is not negated, how can there arise a non-conceptual cognition
[of the truth]?

The structure envisaged by Bhāviveka is such that, when different understandings of the
truth arise from the Buddha’s words, its real understanding is arrived at by means of
removing its unreasonable understanding through inference; what is assumed to be a real
understanding of the truth is simply its conceptual understanding, so that it must be denied
to get an intuitive insight into the truth.

The following kārikā is interesting in that Bhāviveka explains why Buddhists, who
follow the Buddha’s teaching, can have different views concerning the truth.

MHK V 108: āgamāntarabhedena bhedāyātāsu buddhiṣu /
abhede ‘py āgamasyānyah\textsuperscript{21} kah pariśākṣamo\textsuperscript{22} vidhiḥ //

Even if there is no difference in āgama among Buddhists, they have different
understandings by the influence of a variety of āgamas other than their own.
In this case, what else than inference could be the means to investigate the
truth?

Buddhists follow the Buddhist āgama. But, if they are influenced by āgamas other than
their own, they may have different views. In order to deny an opposite assertion, one must
resort to inference; otherwise, a doubt about the truth could not be banished. The inference
in question is one that is effective among those who accept the same āgama, that is, it is
the inference that is scripturally based.

3. The truth, the Buddha’s words, and inference

3.1 Two truths

In this way, an assertion different from one’s own is refuted by means of resorting to
inference, and thus one’s own assertion turns out to be justified. Even then, the assertion
obtains only in the sphere of conceptualization. For the assertion reflects only a conceptual
understanding of the truth. Therefore Bhāviveka continues to bring in the viewpoint of the
two truths theory.

MHK V 110: satyadvayam ataś coktaṃ muninā tattvadarśinā /
vyavahāraṃ samāśritya tattvārthādhigamo yataḥ //

\textsuperscript{20} pratijñāmātrakeṇeṣṭā ] em.; pratijñāmātrakā neṣṭā L1, L2, H, S, Ec, SG, Ms; dam bcas tsam gyis ji ltar ’dod (*pratijñāmātrakeṇeṣṭā kutaḥ) Tib.
\textsuperscript{21} -ānyah ] L1, L2, H, S, Ec; -ādyaḥ SG, Ms.
\textsuperscript{22} -kṣamo ] L1, L2, H, S, Ec; -kṣayo SG, Ms.
And, since the truth is realized in reliance on verbalization (vyavahāra), the Muni, who sees the truth, taught two truths.

The given context clearly reveals that the term vyavahāra refers to the Buddha’s verbalization of the truth, that is, the Buddha’s words about the truth, or the Buddha’s statement of the truth. The Buddha taught two truths. This must mean that there is one truth beyond and one within language.

Bhāviveka goes on to state that the understanding gotten from the statement of the truth is false since it has the truth for its objective basis.

MHK V 111: sālambanatvād vitathā tathatālambanāpi dhīḥ / svapnādidhīvat tadgrāhyam nātas tattvaṃ ca yujyate ||

[Thesis:] A cognition that has thus-ness as its objective basis (ālambana) is erroneous;

[Reason:] because it has an objective basis (sālambanatvāt);

[Example:] like a dream-cognition and so forth.

Thus, it is not tenable that the truth is what is grasped by such [a cognition].

In Bhāviveka’s view, a cognition which has an objective basis is a conceptual cognition, and is thus based on the dichotomy between a cognition and its object, and consists in judging.

The following kārikā is important in that Bhāviveka points out that the Buddha himself denies the truth within language.

MHK V 112: agrāhyo ’nabhilāpyaś ca dhīpracāravivarjitaḥ / dharma ukto munīndreṇa sa caivaṃ sati bādhyate ||

The truth (dharma), which is beyond the sphere of cognitive activities, cannot be [conceptually] grasped or expressed in words. But the great sage speaks of the truth. This being the case, it is denied [by himself].

The reason that the Buddha denies the truth as it is spoken of is that the cognition stemming from the verbalization of the truth is merely conceptual, so that it grasps the truth only partially and not in its entirety. In reality the truth is beyond conceptualization and language.

3.2 The Buddha’s words and the Mādhyamikas’ understanding of the truth

The main intention of the fifth chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā is to oppose the Yogācāras’ understanding of the Buddha’s words about the truth. Bhāviveka ends the fifth chapter as follows:

23 Hoornaert 2003: 168 and Eckel 2008: 296 render the term vyavahāra here as “conventional [truth]” and “conventional usage,” respectively. I do not think that they catch the point.
24 tathatālambanāpi dhīḥ ] L1, H, S, Ec, SG, Ms; tathatālambanād api L2.
MHK V 113: 

\[ \text{ato yuktīgāmapetam tattvam yat prāgudāhṛtam /} \]

\[ \text{parikṣyamanāṃ yuktīavaiṃ tad evāvāyha tam sthitam //} \]

For this reason, the truth which has been described before\(^2^6\) and which is well founded on logical reasoning and āgama remains undenied even if it is investigated through logical reasoning in this way.

Let us note that there are two different domains where we are involved in the understanding of the truth. In one domain logical reasoning based on āgama works and in the other the truth is beyond conceptualization and language and independently realized by way of non-seeing. Bhāviveka states here that in the former domain the truth as conceived of by the Mādhyamikas cannot be invalidated.

It is important to note in this connection that the \textit{Tarkajvālā} cites MHK III 266 in commenting on the present kārikā.

MHK III 266: 

\[ \text{jñeyasya sarvathāsiddher nirvikalpāpi yatra dhīḥ /} \]

\[ \text{notpadyate tad atulyam tattvam tattvavido viduḥ //} \]

Those who know the truth call “the unequalled truth” the truth with reference to which there does not arise even a non-conceptual cognition since an entity to be cognized is absolutely not established.

The Buddha verbalized the truth into which he had achieved intuitive insight. From the Buddha’s statement referring to the truth the Mādhyamikas, though at a conceptual level, correctly understand the truth, which is well founded on logical reasoning and āgama. To the extent that the truth as the Mādhyamikas understand it accords with the truth as the Buddha speaks of it, the Mādhyamikas’ view of the truth cannot be disputed by the Yogācāras. Needless to say, the truth which the Buddha saw directly consists in svabhāvaśūnyatā, namely that all existential factors are empty of an intrinsic essential nature.\(^2^7\)

4. Conclusion

Buddhism originated in the Buddha’s verbalization of the truth that he directly experienced. This is why for Buddhism the two truths theory, that there is one truth beyond and one within language is a logical necessity.

In common to all Buddhists is the acceptance of the Buddha’s words. But it is not always the case that the same statement brings about the same understanding of its meaning. According to Bhāviveka, a Buddhist, even if following the Buddhist āgama, is subject to the influence of āgamas other than the Buddhist. Thus Buddhists have different understandings of what the Buddha stated. The Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools hold different views of the truth, emptiness, even though both base themselves on the Buddhist āgama. Bhāviveka explicitly states that he feels it is necessary to give the Yogācāras a clear understanding

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\(^2^6\) According to the \textit{Tarkajvālā}, Bhāviveka describes the Mādhyamika truth in the third chapter of MHK. See TJ ad MHK V 113 [D227a5–6; P253b4–6].

\(^2^7\) MHK III 115: svabhāvaśūnyatābodhān ... /
of what the Buddha states (*pratipattyartham*), and that there is no other means than inference for achieving this purpose. In his view, the function of inference is just to rule out misunderstandings of the Buddha’s statements and not to give an intuitive insight into the truth. Bhāviveka never says that inference is a means to know directly the Buddhist truth of emptiness. If the Yogācāras’ understanding of the Buddha’s statement is refuted, the Mādhyamikas’ understanding of it alone will remain as the only one true to the Buddhist āgama. Furthermore, it is said that in Bhāviveka’s time a sectarian consciousness began to develop among Buddhists. It is in this context that Bhāviveka brings in the concept of āgamānuvidhāyyanumāna, the inference which works within the framework of the Buddhist āgama.

References and abbreviations


**Iida 1966** Sh. Iida, Āgama (Scripture) and Yukti (Reason) in Bhāvaviveka. In: *Kanakura Hakushi Koki Kinen Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Ronshū* (1966) 79–96.


MHK Madhyamakahrdayakārika.
MHK (Ee) M.D. Eckel, ed. See Eckel 2008.
MHK (L1) Chr. Lindtner, ed. See Lindtner 1995.
MHK (L2) Chr. Lindtner, ed. See Lindtner 2001.
MHK (Ms) Manuscript of MHK. See Jiang 1991.
MHK (S) A. Saito, ed. See Saito 2007.
MHK (SG) V.V. Gokhale’s Copy of MHK (Ms). See Bahulkar 1994.
1. Introduction

In his article “More on parārthānumāna, theses and syllogisms” ([1991] 1999), Prof. Tom J. F. Tillemans gave us a brief account of the interpretation of sādhana (means of proof) in Dharmakīrti’s works as well as in the tradition following him. In this article, he showed us, on one hand, the development concerning this concept in Dignāga’s thought from the NMū to the PS, and on the other hand, insightfully explained the theoretical significance of this development through a comparison with the Aristotelian syllogism. In short, in Vasubandhu’s logical works as well as in Dignāga’s NMū, the sādhana was identified with the linguistic expression of the three members, i.e., the thesis (pakṣa), the reason (hetu) and the example (drṣṭānta). In Dignāga’s PS as well as in Dharmakīrti’s tradition, it was identified only with the reason and the example. This exclusion of the thesis-statement from sādhana highlights a particular Buddhist conception of what is decisive for the acceptability of an argument, one which contrasts with the principles governing the Aristotelian syllogism. The decisive or probative factor in an argument, according to this new conception of sādhana, is the truth of the premises, and not merely the logical form of an inference.

The present paper, as an extended observation based on Tillemans’ abovementioned article as well as on an earlier seminal article of Prof. Masahiro Inami, will show that in the Chinese tradition of Buddhist logic, the concept of sādhana (neng li 能立) was consistently interpreted as the reason-statement together with the statements of the positive and negative example, or directly as the trairūpya, the triple characterization of a correct reason. This interpretation of sādhana was explicitly ascribed to Dignāga himself as one significant innovation over earlier masters. Although the Chinese tradition appears to have proclaimed its theoretical exploration as exclusively based on the NP and the NMū, its novel interpretation of sādhana in fact only finds support in the PS. Like the tradition following Dharmakīrti, Chinese interpreters following Dignāga also took to various hermeneutic strategies in order to harmonize their new interpretation with the old one from the NP and the NMū, which is also found in various pre-Dignāgan Buddhist texts on logic.

In Chinese sources one also comes across the view that Indian Buddhist logicians after Dignāga held the new interpretation instead of the old one. Moreover, these logicians were reported in Chinese sources to have interpreted the “incompleteness” (nyūnatā) of

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an argument as referring to the incompleteness of the three characteristics, and not as indicating the incompleteness of the three statements that constitute a proof. This new interpretation of nyūnatā together with the above new interpretation of sādhana was inherited by Chinese logicians. In light of this new interpretation of nyūnatā, the present paper tries to demonstrate once more, “from a slightly different angle” than Tillemans, that it does not just reveal a terminological difference, but that it points to more fundamental issues at stake and indicates “how logic works”\(^2\) for Buddhist thinkers.

2. The twofold meaning of sādhana in the NP and the NMu

The literal meaning of sādhana is “means of proof.” As we know, sādhana is one of the eight topics in the basic framework of the NP. The eight topics are: (1) demonstration (sādhana), (2) refutation (dūṣaṇa, neng po 能破), (3) pseudo-demonstration (sādhanābhāsa, si neng li 似能立), (4) pseudo-refutation (dūṣaṇābhāsa, si neng po 似能破), (5) perception (pratyakṣa, xian liang 現量), (6) inference (anumāna, bi liang 比量), (7) pseudo-perception (pratyakṣābhāsa, si xian liang 似現量) and (8) pseudo-inference (anumānābhāsa, si bi liang 似比量):

NP 1: sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇam caiva sābhāsaṃ parasaṃvide / pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca sābhāsaṃ tv ātmasaṃvide //

NP\(ch\) 11a28–29: 能立與能破 及似唯悟他，現量與比量 及似唯自悟。

Demonstration (sādhana), refutation (dūṣaṇa) and their pseudo-forms (ā-bhāsa) are for the understanding of others. Perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and their pseudo-forms are for the understanding of oneself.\(^3\)

The sādhana is the foremost among the eight topics. The sections on sādhana and sādhanābhāsa are the most extensive ones in the whole text of the NP. In this context, the term sādhana refers to a three-membered argument and stands in contrast with dūṣaṇa (lit. “means of refutation”). While the former is aimed at proving a view, the latter serves the purpose of refutation. Therefore, we could translate the term sādhana when used in this sense as “demonstration” or rather “argument,” i.e., the linguistic expression of a proof.\(^4\)


\(^3\) Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 120.

\(^4\) The anumāna/sādhana distinction in the NP (cf. above NP 1) comes approximately to the inference/argument distinction in today’s logic. I discussed this in Tang 2020: 414–416. In short, by inference we mean nowadays “a process of linking propositions by affirming one proposition on the basis of one or more other propositions.” By argument we mean “a structured group of propositions, reflecting an inference” (Copi and Cohen 2005: 7). The working of an inference does not necessitate the medium of certain linguistic expressions. An inference is only a process of pure thinking, regardless of whether or not it is expressed linguistically. However, the working of an argument necessitates the medium of certain linguistic expressions. An argument should spell out an inference in certain linguistic forms which are suitable to be understood by others. Hence, I suggest “argument” as an alternative translation of sādhana in addition to the traditional translation “demonstration.” A three-membered sādhana is called a three-membered argument throughout this paper.
The three members or statements making up a sādhana are the thesis (pakṣa, zong 宗), the reason (hetu, yin 因) and the example (dṛṣṭānta, yu 喻). The last one normally consists of two parts, the positive example (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta, lit. “example by similarity,” tong fa 同法喻) and the negative example (vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta, lit. “example by dissimilarity,” yi fa yu 異法喻):

NP 2: tatra pakṣādivacanāni sādhanam / pakṣahetudṛṣṭāntavacanair hi prāśnikānām apratīto 'ṛthaḥ pratipādyata iti //

NPCh 11b1–3: 此中宗等多言名為能立，由宗、因、喻多言開示諸有問者未了義故。

Here [among the eight topics,] the sādhana is the [three] statements consisting of the thesis and the other [two factors, i.e., the reason and the example], because the object [yet] unknown to the questioners is made known by these [three] statements consisting of the thesis, the reason and the example.5

NP 2.4: eṣāṃ vacanāni parapratyāyanakāle sādhanam / tadyathā / anityah śabda iti pakṣavacanam / kṛtakatvād iti pakṣadharmavacanam / yat kṛtakam tad anityam dṛṣṭam yathā ghaṭādir iti sapakṣānugamavacanam / yan nityam tad akṛtakam dṛṣṭam yathākāśam iti vyatirekavacanam // etāny eva trayo 'vayavā ity ucyante //

NPCh 11b19–23: 如是多言開悟他時, 說名能立。如說聲無常者, 是立宗言; 所作性故者, 是宗法言; 若是所作, 見彼無常, 如瓶等者, 是隨同品言; 若是其常, 見非所作, 如虛空者, 是遠離言。唯此三分, 說名能立。

The statements having these [factors, i.e., the thesis, reason and example, made] on the occasion of convincing others, are the demonstration. For instance, “sound is impermanent” is the statement of the thesis. “Because of being produced” is the statement of the property of the subject [i.e., the statement of the reason]. “Whatever is produced is observed to be impermanent, like a pot, etc.” is the statement of the positive concomitance with the sapakṣa [, i.e., the statement of the positive example]. “Whatever is permanent is observed to be not produced, like ether, etc.” is the statement of the negative concomitance (vyatireka) [i.e., the statement of the negative example]. Only these three members are stated [to be the demonstration].6

A three-membered sādhana can consequently be written in its full form as follows:

5 Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 120.
6 Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 121–122. The phrase in the last square brackets is added in the Chinese translation.
Proof (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis:</th>
<th>Sound is impermanent,</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reason:</td>
<td>for sound is produced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive example:</td>
<td>Whatever is produced is observed to be impermanant, like a pot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative example:</td>
<td>Whatever is permanent is observed to be not produced, like ether (ākāśa).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the NMu, the three-membered sādhana together with its various pseudo-forms is also the foremost topic. The same idea of sādhana as in the NP is found in the exposition of the basic theoretical framework in NMu 1, together with the autocommentary:

NMu k. 1a: pakṣādivacanāni sādhanam

宗等多言說能立。

The sādhana is the [three] statements consisting of the thesis and the other [two factors, i.e., the reason and the example].

NMu 1.1: 由宗、因、喻多言，辯說他未了義故，此多言於《論式》等說名能立。又以一言說能立者，為顯總成一種能立性 (sādhanam iti caikavacanairdeśāḥ samastasādhanatvakhyaśpanārthaḥ), hence this should be understood that the lack [of any of these statements] is called a fault of the sādhanā.³

Since the object [yet] unknown to someone else is made evident [to that person] by these [three] statements consisting of the thesis, the reason and the example, these [three] statements are said to be the sādhana in the Vādavidhāna and other [logical works of Vasubandhu]. Now, the expression “sādhanam” [here in k. 1a] is in singular form so as to show that the sādhanā is a united [whole, even though it is comprised of three statements]. Thus it should be understood that the lack [of any of these statements] is called a fault of the sādhanā.⁸

In all the passages cited above, the grammatical phenomenon that the word vacana (statement, yan 言) appears in plural form (vacanāni/vacanair, duo yan 多言) betrays the view of the NP and the NMu that a sādhanā has more than two members, that is, specifically three.

In both the NP and the NMu, the term sādhanā is also used in a more limited sense for the reason(-property), i.e., the predicate of the reason-statement, in the above proof “producedness” or “being produced” (kṛtakatva). Now, the sādhanā is in contrast with sādhya (suō lī 所立), the property to be proved or the inferable property, i.e., “impermanent” in the above proof. The former property possesses the force of proving and the latter property is to be proved by it to be present in the subject, i.e., “sound.” In this sense, the term sādhanā, when used as a substantive, can be translated as “means of proof;” when used as an adjective, it can be rendered as “proving.” The translation of sādhanā as probans and sādhya as

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probandum, which is frequently encountered, is also suitable for the present context. This meaning of sādhana can be found in the NP’s classification of four types of contradictory reason (viruddha, xiang wei 相違), and as well as in that of ten types of pseudo-example (drṣṭāntābhāsa, si yu 似喻):

NP 3.2.3: viruddhaś catuḥprakāraḥ tadyathā / (1) dharmasvarūpa-viparīta-sādhanaḥ / (2) dharma-viśeṣaviparītasādhanaḥ / (3) dharmisvarūpaviparīta-sādhanaḥ / (4) dharma-viśeṣaviparītasādhanaḥ ceti //

NP Ch 12a15–16: 相違有四，謂法自相相違因，法差別相違因，有法自相相違因，有法差別相違因等。

The contradictory [reasons] are of four kinds, as follows: (1) the [reason] proving the opposite of the own form of the [inferable] property, (2) the [reason] proving the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the [inferable] property, (3) the [reason] proving the opposite of the own form of the property-possessor, and (4) the [reason] proving the opposite of [some] specific attribute of the property-possessor.  


NP 3.3–3.3.2: drṣṭāntābhāso dvividhaḥ / sādharmyena vaidharmyena ca // tatra sādharmyena āvad drṣṭāntābhāsah pañcaprakāraḥ tadyathā / (1) sādhanadharmaśididah / (2) sādhyadharmāsiddah / (3) ubhayadharmāsiddah / (4) anavatā / (5) viparīta-vāvayā / ceti … vaidharmyena drṣṭāntābhāsaḥ pañcaprakāraḥ tadyathā / (1) sādhyāvāyāvṛtaḥ / (2) sādhanāvāyyāvṛtaḥ / (3) ubhayāvāyāvṛtaḥ / (4) avyāyāvṛtaḥ / (5) viparītayāvṛtaḥ ceti //

NP Ch 12b1–4: 似同法喻有其五種: 一、能立法不成, 二、所立法不成, 三、俱不成, 四、無合, 五、倒合。似異法喻亦有五種: 一、所立不遣, 二、能立不遣, 三、俱不遣, 四、不離, 五、倒離。

The pseudo-example is of two kinds, by similarity or by dissimilarity. Of these, first, the pseudo-example by similarity is of five kinds, as follows: (1) [an example where] the proving property (sādhanadharma) is not established, (2) [an example where] the inferable property (sādhyadharmā) is not established, (3) [an example where] both [properties] are not established, (4) [an example] without [the statement of] positive concomitance and (5) [an example where] the positive concomitance is reversed. … Second, the pseudo-example by dissimilarity is of five kinds, as follows: (1) [an example where] the inferable property is not excluded, (2) [an example where] the proving property is not excluded, (3) [an example where] both [properties] are not excluded, (4) [an example] without [the statement of] negative concomitance and (5) [an example where] the negative concomitance is reversed.  


In the Chinese translation of the name for each contradictory reason, the word sādhana is consistently rendered as “reason” (yin 因). The Indian commentator Haribhadra also follows the same technique in glossing this word as hetu (reason). When commenting on the first kind of contradictory reason, i.e., the dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana, he says:

NPṬ 39,4–5: *atra dharmasvarūpaṃ nityatvam / ayaṃ ca hetus tadviparītaṃ nityatvam sādhayati tenaivāvinābhubhūtatvāt / *

Here the own form of the [inferable] property is permanence. Now, this reason (*hetuḥ*) proves (*sādhayati*) the opposite (*viparīta*) of that [own form of the inferable property (*dharmasvarūpa*)], i.e., impermanence, because [it] is invariably concomitant only with that [opposite property].

When commenting on the word *sādhanadharmāsiddha* as the name leading the NP list of pseudo-examples, Haribhadra says:

NPṬ 44,5–11: *sādhanadharmo hetur asiddho nāstīti bhanyate / tataś ca sādhanadharmo 'siddho 'smin so 'yaṃ sādhanadharmāsiddhaḥ / ... evaṃ sādhyobhayadhmāsiddhayor api bhāvanīyam /

That is to say, the proving property, the reason, is not established, i.e., does not exist. Hence, this *sādhanadharmāsiddha* is that in which the proving property is not established. ... With regard to the *sādhyadharmāsiddha* and *ubhayadharmāsiddha*, it should also be thought in this manner.

Haribhadra analyzes the term *sādhanadharmāsiddha* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, and identifies the *sādhanadharma* (proving property) with *hetu* (reason). On the term *sādhanadharma*, the NPVP explains further that: “This is both *sādha* and property. Thus *sādhanadharma*. What does it mean? The reason.” Here, the *sādhanadharmāsiddha* is analyzed as a *karmadhāraya* compound. It refers to the property which is resorted to as the means of proof (*sādha*) in an argument and therefore possesses the force of proving.

When commenting on NP 3.3.1.(4) on *ananvaya*, Haribhadra directly glosses *sādha* as *hetu*:

NPṬ 46,7–9: *vinānvayena vinā vyāptidarśanena sādhyasādhanayoḥ sādhyasādhanayor ity arthah sahabhāva ekatraytritīmātram / pradarśyate kathya ākhāyat / na vipṣayā sādhyānugato hetur iti /

The meaning is: without [the statement of] positive concomitance, i.e., without the presentation of the pervasion, [merely] the co-occurrence, i.e., merely the occurrence in one place, of the inferable and the *sādha*, i.e., of the inferable and the reason (*hetu*), is indicated, i.e., is stated or announced, [but] not the reason as followed by the inferable in accordance with the requirement of pervading.

In the NMu classification of the pseudo-example, the name *sādhanadharmāsiddha* is replaced by *sādhanāsiddha*, hence *sādhanadharma* by *sādha*. Here, the *sādha* is also used in the sense of reason(-property):

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11 See also NPṬ 47,9; 47,18: *sādhanadharmo hetuḥ /
12 NPVP 109,21–22: *sādhanam cāsa dharmas ca sādhanadharmo / ka ity aha – hetur iti /
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NMu 5.3: 「餘此相似」 (k. 11d) 是似喻義。何謂此餘? 謂於是處所立、能立及不同品，雖有合、離而顛倒說。或於是以不作合、離，唯現所立、能立俱有，異品俱無。如是二法或有隨一不成、不遣，或有二俱不成、不遣。

That “all other [kinds of example] different from them are pseudo-[examples]” means the pseudo-example. Which are those other [kinds] different from them? They are [examples] where there is [the statement of] the positive concomitance or [of] the negative concomitance with regard to sādhyā, sādhana or asapākṣa (i.e., an individual used as negative example),14 nevertheless, it is stated in reversed manner; or [examples] where only the co-occurrence of sādhya and sādhana or [only] the co-absence [of sādhyā and sādhana] from vipakṣa is indicated, [but] without the statement of the positive concomitance or of the negative concomitance. [Pseudo-examples also include such cases where] with regard to these two properties [i.e., the sādhyā and the sādhana], either (anyatara) [of them] is not established (asiddha) or not excluded (avyāyṛtta), or both (ubhaya) are not established or not excluded.15

The word sādhana (sgrub pālsgrub par byed pālsgrub byed) does not occur in the corresponding PS IV kk. 13–14, nor in the PSV on these verses:16

The pseudo-form of that [i.e., example] is [an example where] the reason (gtan tshigs), the sādhyā or both are not established in or not excluded from the asapākṣa (mi mthun phyogs), or [where] the concomitance is reversed in two ways [i.e., in either positive or negative fashion], or [where] the concomitance is absent. (k. 13)

[An example where] the [inferential] sign (rtags) is not found and so on, or [where] the positive concomitance or the other [i.e., the negative concomitance] is reversed, is not a [correct] example. The [mere] aggregation [of two properties in one place] is not a [logical] connection, because the [logical] connection is [yet] not explicated. (k. 14)17

The term sādhana has here been completely replaced by the words gtan tshigs (hetu) and rtags (liṅga = hetu); the above cited passage NPṬ 46,7–9 also demonstrates that these terms are synonymous. Therefore, we can see that the terms sādhanadharma, sādhana and hetu are interchangeable as referring to the reason-property.

17 K 152a5–6, 152b4–5: gtan tshigs bsgrub bya giś ldan min // rjes 'gro llog pa giś dag ste // de'i mi mthun phyogs bsal dan // rjes 'gro med pa der snaṅ ba'o // (k. 13) rtags med sogs dan rjes 'gro sogs // phyin ci log pa dpe ma yin // ñe bar bsdu ba ma 'brel ba // 'brel pa rab tu ma bstan phyir // (k. 14); V 63a3–4, 63a7–b1: gtan tshigs bsgrub bya giś ka med // mi mthun phyogs las med ma byas // rjes 'gro phyin log rnam pa giś // luar snaṅ rjes 'gro med pa'a'n yin // (k. 13) rtags med sogs dan dpe med dan // rjes 'gro phyin ci log la sogs // 'brel par ma bstan pa yi phyir // ņer 'jal 'brel pa can ma yin // (k. 14) (Kitagawa 1965: 527,12–15; 529,5–8)
In the NMu, the term *sādhanahetu (neng li yin 能立因) must be considered as another relevant term relating to sādhana:

NMu 8: 「餘所說因生」(k. 15b)\(^\text{18}\)者，謂智是前智餘。從如所說能立因生，是緣彼義。

The sentence “[the inference (anumāna)] which is different [from perception] is derived from the reason as presented [above in the discussion of sādhana]” means that the [inferential] cognition is different from the above [perceptual] cognition. It is derived from the *sādhanahetu as presented above. That is to say, it is based on that [*sādhanahetu].\(^\text{19}\)

Although I have found no Sanskrit material to confirm a karmadhāraya interpretation of this term, it is highly probable that it, if it were in Sanskrit, must be construed in the same way as the term sādhanadharma: the former refers to a reason which possesses the force of proving, while the latter refers to a property which possesses the same force. Both terms refer to the reason(-property). The PS has a corresponding definition of inference for oneself (svārthānumāna):

PS II k. 1a–b: svārtham trirūpāliṅgato 'rthadṛk \(^\text{20}\)

[Inference] for oneself consists in observing an object through a triply characterized sign.\(^\text{21}\)

Here, the term *sādhanahetu has been replaced by liṅga,\(^\text{22}\) and liṅga is just another name of hetu. Now, we have a series of synonyms: sādhanā, sādhanadharma, *sādhanahetu, hetu and liṅga. All of them refer to the reason(-property) in this connection.

With this survey, we have exhausted almost all the occurrences of sādhana in the NP and the NMu. In both texts, the term sādhana sometimes refers to a “demonstration,” i.e., a three-membered argument, and at other times the reason(-property). There is no third option.

3. The new interpretation following the Pramāṇasamuccaya

Therefore, it seems surprising or even strange to some critical thinkers\(^\text{23}\) that Chinese classical commentators consistently proclaim the sādhana to be the reason-statement


\(^{19}\) Cf. Tucci 1930: 52; Katsura [5]: 91.

\(^{20}\) Katsura [5]: 92.


\(^{22}\) See also NP 4: anumānāṁ liṅgād arthadarśanaṁ / liṅgāṁ punas trirūpam uktam / NP Ch 12b29–c2: 言比量者，謂藉衆相而觀於義。相有三種，如前所說。“Inference is the observation of an object through an [inferential] sign. The sign has been said [above] to have three characteristics.” Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 128. The word *sādhanahetu is also recurrent in NMu 10.14 on prāptyaprāptisama and ahetusama. In the corresponding PSV passage, it has been replaced completely by gyan tshigs (hetu). Cf. Katsura [7]: 46, nn. 3–4.

together with the positive and negative example-statements, or directly to be the *trairūpya* （*yin san xiang* 因三相), the triple characterization of a correct reason. Since the statements are three, and the characteristics of a correct reason are also three, the nature of *sādhana* as being three-membered is still perfectly preserved in this interpretation. Moreover, this interpretation of *sādhana* is ascribed to Dignāga himself as one significant innovation over earlier masters. Kuiji 窺基 (632–682 CE) says:

YMDS 37–38 / 93a29–b2: 陳那能立，唯取因、喻，古兼宗等。...宗由言顯，故名能立。

The *sādhana* of Dignāga only includes the reason and the example, while in early times the thesis and others are also included. ... The thesis is elucidated through the statements [of the reason and two examples]. Therefore, [the reason-statement and two example-statements] are named *sādhana*.

YMDS 50 / 93c28–94a3: 古師又有說四能立，謂宗及因、同喻、異喻。世親菩薩《論軌》等說能立有三：一宗、二因、三喻。以能立者，必是多言。多言顯彼所立便足，故但說三。

The early masters also talk about four [members of] *sādhana*. They are the thesis, the reason, the positive example and the negative example. The Bodhisattva Vasubandhu in the *Vādavidhi* and other treatises says that there are three [members of] *sādhana*, i.e., (1) the thesis, (2) the reason and (3) the example. This is because the *sādhana* is necessarily comprised of more than two statements, and [sādhana of] more than two statements is already adequate for elucidating that which is to be proved (*sādhya*). Therefore, only three [members] are asserted [by him].

YMDS 52 / 94a14–17: 今者陳那因、喻為能立，宗為所立。自性、差別二並極成，但是宗依，未成所諍。合以成宗，不相離性，方為所諍，何成能立？故能立中，定除其宗。

Now, Dignāga [asserts that] the reason and the example are means of proof (*sādhana*), and the thesis is what is to be proved (*sādhya*). Both the subject (*svabhāva, zi xing 自性) and the property (*viśeṣa, cha bie 差別) [i.e., the qualificand and the qualifier in the thesis-statement,] have been well established (prasiddha, ji cheng 極成) [i.e., accepted by both the proponent and the opponent]. They are merely two substrata of the thesis-statement (*pakṣāśraya,*

24 Note, Vasubandhu’s concept of *sādhya* is different from that of Dignāga in that only the inferable property but not the whole thesis-statement is said to be what is to be proved. Moreover, Vasubandhu’s concept of *pakṣa* is also slightly different from that of Dignāga in that only the subject is said to be *pakṣa*. Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 33, frg. 1–3: pakṣo vicāranāyām īṣo ‘rthaḥ, sādhyābhidhānaṃ pratijñeti pratijñālakṣaṇam, meḍaḥ sa bhūtā mi rtog pa’i niid du mṅon par bya ba niid du dper brjod pa’i phyor chos tsam rjes su dpag par bya ba niid du mṅon par ’dod do žes rtogs par bya’o. “The *pakṣa* is the object one wishes to investigate. The definition of proposition (pratijñā) is that the proposition is the expression of what is to be proved (sādhya). Examples for the definition of what is to be inferred (*anumeya* = sādhya) is said to be fire, seed and impermanence. Hence, it shall be understood that only the property (dharma) is intended [here] as the definition of *anumeya.*” Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 16.

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zong yi 宗依), but not [by themselves] the point under disputation. Only when [they are] combined together so as to produce a thesis-statement, the invariable concomitance (avīnābhāva, bu xiāng lì xīng 不相離性) [of the subject with the property as expressed in the whole thesis-statement] then constitutes the point under disputation. So, how can these [two substrata] be the sādhana? Therefore, the thesis shall certainly be excluded from the sādhana.

Here, the reason-statement together with the example-statement is identified as sādhana. This time, the sādhana is in contrast with sādhya, the thesis-statement, in that the reason and the example are means of proof and the thesis is merely what is to be proved. Although the sādhana here is also in contrast with sādhya, the sādhana and the sādhya here are different from the interpretation of the NP and the NMu where they are taken only as the reason-property and the inferable predicate. The hetu in Indian logic can mean either the whole reason-statement or only the reason-predicate in that statement. Hence, the exegetical movement from the reason-predicate to the whole reason-statement is not prima facie breaking news. Nevertheless, the implied significance of this movement is very important. It concerns not a mere terminological shift, but a shift of perspective in the basic consideration of what makes a good argument good. When used in this new sense, the term sādhana may be translated as “probative factor.”

In order to harmonize this new interpretation with the NP and NMu passages where the sādhana is clearly said to have more than two statements – i.e., three members – the example is carefully counted as two members, i.e., the positive example and the negative example. The reason together with these two example-statements can then easily be interpreted as the three members of the sādhana. Kuiji continues:


Question: However, according to Sanskrit grammar (śabdavidyā, sheng ming 聲明), a single statement is called vacanam, a pair of statements is called vacane, [and] more than two statements are called vacanāni. Here, the sādhana is mentioned in the form vacanāni. Since it is of more than two statements, why do you only assert the reason-statement and the example-statement, these two, as sādhana? Reply: Dignāga explains that the reason has three characteristics, i.e., the reason and the two examples. Aren’t they three statements [in all]? It is not required that there shall be three separate substrata (san ti 三體)? Hence, the thesis shall be definitely asserted to be [merely] what is to be proved (sādhya).

Furthermore, when commenting on the last sentence in the NP 2.4 passage cited above (唯此三分，說名能立), Kuiji says:

26 See the above cited passages NP 2, NMu k. 1a and NMu 1.1.
27 The transcription of vacanāni given by Zenju 善珠 (723–797 CE) is po da na ni 婆達那膩 (IRMS 237a28) instead of the po da 婆達 given in this passage. po da 婆達 must be a corruption of po da na ni 婆達那膩. The IRMS is a running commentary on Kuiji’s YMDS.
The NMu says: “and in an inference, only the following rule is to be observed: when the [inferential] sign (liṅga, xiang 相 = hetu) is ascertained in the subject of inference (anumeya, suo bi 所比), that is, the reason is pervasively a property of the subject (pakśadharmatva, bian shi zong fa xing 遍是宗法性), and in cases other than [the subject], we remember its being [certainly] present in cases similar to that [subject possessing the inferable property], that is, the reason is certainly present in similar instances (sapakṣe sattvam, tong pin ding you xing 同品定有性), and its being [pervasively] absent where that [inferable property] is absent, that is, the reason is pervasively absent from dissimilar instances (vipakṣe 'sattvam, yi pin bian wu xing 異品遍無性), then knowledge of this [subject] is generated.” This means the same as [when it] is [claimed] here that only three [members of] a sādhana are presented.

Here, the three members of sādhana are further identified with the three characteristics of a correct reason, the alleged basic criteria for a good argument in Buddhist logic. The presupposition made here is that the reason-statement and especially the positive and negative example-statements are nothing but the expression of the three characteristics, in the sense that these three statements are true if and only if the three characteristics are fulfilled.

This kind of interpretation of sādhana, though without being supported in the NP and the NMu, can indeed be supported from the PS, Dignāga’s magnum opus and his final work. Recent studies by Tom J. F. Tillemans have already showed that although in the NMu, Dignāga did consider the thesis-statement to be a member of sādhana, “in PS Dignāga did not consider the thesis-statement as being a sādhana, but nevertheless he most likely allowed its presence in a parārthānumāna.”

As pointed out by Tillemans, one passage from PS fits quite well with the intention to exclude the thesis-statement from sādhana while nonetheless letting it remain in the arrangement of a proof:

PSV ad PS III k. 1cd: tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvarthaviṣayo mataḥ // (k. 1cd)
yan lag rnams la rjes su dpag par bya ba bstan pa gaṅ yin pa de ni kho bo cag gi sgrub byed niṅ du bstan pa ni ma yin te de niṅ las the tsom skye ba’i phyir


Cf. Tucci 1930: 44; Katsura [4]: 74. The adverbs “certainly” (ding 定) and “pervasively” (bian 遍) qualifying “being present” (astītva, you 有) and “being absent” (nāstītva, wu 無) respectively are probably added in the Chinese translation. Cf. the parallel passage in PSV IV (K 150b5–7): rjes su dpag par la yan tshul 'di yin par mthoṅ ste I gal te ttags 'di rjes su dpag par bya ba la nes par bzuñ na / gzan du de dahn mthun pa la yod pa niṅ daṅ / med pa la med pa niṅ dran par byed pa de’i phyir 'di'i nes pa bskyed par yin no // (Kitagawa 1965: 521,8–13)

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In this regard, the presentation of what is to be inferred (anumeya) is held to concern the goal of the reason. (k. 1cd)

Among the members, the presentation of what is to be inferred is not presented by us to be the sādhana, because doubt will arise from it. However, because it concerns the goal of the reason, it [i.e., the thesis,] is to be established by that [i.e., the reason].

Besides the exclusion of the thesis-statement from sādhana, the equivalence of the sādhana with the expression of three characteristics can also be found in the PS:

PSV ad PS III k. 1: trirūpalingākhyānam parārthānumānam.

Inference for others (parārthānumāna) is the communication of a triply characterized sign (liṅga).

The idea of assigning the reason together with the positive and negative examples to express the three characteristics can be found in the NMu as well as in the PS:

NMu 5.6: 若爾喻言應非異分,顯因義故。事雖實爾,然此因言唯為顯了是宗法性,非為顯了同品、異品有性、無性,故須別說同、異喻言。

[Objection:] If so, then the example-statement must not be a separate member [from that of the reason], because it is [designed] to express the implication of the reason. [Reply:] Although the fact is actually so, yet the statement of the reason is only meant to express [the reason’s] being a property of the subject, but not to express [the reason’s] being present in similar instances and being absent from dissimilar instances. Therefore, it is necessary to express the positive and negative examples separately [from the reason-statement].

PSV ad PS IV k. 7: 'on te de lta na dpe’i tshig kyañ tha dad par mi ’gyur te gtan tshigs kyi don bstan pa’i phyir ro // … gtan tshigs ni mtshan ŋid gsum pa can yin la / bsgrub bya’i chos ŋid ni gtan tshigs kyi tshig gis bstan pa yin no // de las gtan tshigs lhag ma bstan par bya ba’i don du dpe brjod pa ni don dain bcas pa yin no // (K 151a2–4, Kitagawa 1965: 522,7–523,2)

[Objection:] However, if so, even the example-statement will not be separated [from the reason], because it is [designed] to express the implication of the reason. [Reply:] … Since the reason possesses three characteristics, [only the reason’s] being a property of the subject (sādhya = pakṣa) is expressed by the

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32 Kitagawa 1965: 126, n. 154. The parārthānumāna is a verbalized inference and corresponds to the sādhana in the terminology of the NP and the NMu.
statement of the reason. In order to express the remaining [characteristics of the] reason other than that [first characteristic], it is meaningful to express the example.

Combining this idea with the PS’s claim that the sādhana is nothing but the expression of the triple characterization of a correct reason, it is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that only the reason and example are sādhana, and not the thesis. To preserve the nature of the sādhana as being three-membered, counting the example as two members may suggest itself. The separation of positive and negative examples naturally results from the idea that the second and third characteristics of a correct reason are to be expressed by them respectively. At the same time, the statement of thesis is always preserved in an inference, even though it is no longer recognized as a member of sādhana. This is also Dignāga’s attitude as mentioned above.34

Therefore, the Chinese conception of sādhana as the reason together with two examples or being exactly the triple characterization of a correct reason can be regarded as a natural movement from Dignāga’s late thought, and may to some extent reflects Indian views following Dignāga when Xuanzang was taught there. Although the Chinese tradition is alleged to have only the NP and the NMu as its root texts, the ideas presented in the Chinese commentarial literature on these two short treatises need not be limited to Dignāga’s early views. On certain occasions, and to a certain extent, ideas in Chinese literature are even more probably based on his later views, as well as on Indian interpretations that were produced shortly after Dignāga and were not yet influenced by the revolutionary contributions from Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660 CE). However, clues for gaining certainty on this hereto unknown historical relation might always remain ambiguous, since no special reference to the subtle differences between earlier and later stages in Dignāga’s thought could so far be found in the Chinese tradition. In this regard, recent studies on Dharmakīrti and his successors as well as on Dignāga himself will surely prove to be relevant to an improvement in our understanding of Chinese hetuvidyā.35

34 Cf. n. 30.
35 Unlike Dharmakīrti (Tillemans [1991] 1999: 72–73), Chinese tradition consistently retains the thesis-statement. The idea that the thesis-statement can be known by “implication” (arthā, yi 義) or by “presumption” (arthāpatti, yi zhun 義准) is absent from Chinese sources. Nevertheless, like the tradition following Dharmakīrti, the Chinese tradition also pays a lot effort and takes a roundabout hermeneutic strategy so as to explain away the word pakṣa which always takes place at the beginning of the definition of sādhana in the NP and the NMu (cf. n. 26). The gist of such a strategy is to say that this word is so placed as to indicate exactly the aim or the object of sādhana. For details, see YMD (54–56 / 94a21–b13) ad NP 1; YMD (86–94 / 96c11–97b7) ad NP 2; For Wengui 文軌 (early 7th century)’s similar discussion, see ZYS (1.4b–5b) ad NP 2 and ZYS (2.2a–3a) ad NP 2.4; For Kuji’s ambiguous comment on NMu k. 13cd = PS IV. k. 6cd, see YMD (305 / 113c6–10) ad NP 2.4. Shentai 神泰 (early 7th century), the author of the only extant commentary on the NMu, says nothing on relevant passages in the NMu. On one hand, he makes reference to his commentary on the NP, which however has been lost, and on the other hand, he misleadingly ascribes this new interpretation even to Vasubandhu, see YZMS (1.3b) ad NMu 1.1. Nevertheless, he has said something on nyūnatā (incompleteness), see below, n. 38. Furthermore, the author of the NP, Śaṅkarasvāmin, who was said to be a disciple of Dignāga, did know the PS. There are certain elements in the NP which can be found only in PS, e.g. NP 3.1(9): eṣāṃ vacanāni dharmasvarūpaṁpunārākaranamukhena NP Ch 11c7–8: 如是多言, 是遮諸法自相門故 = PSV ad PS III k. 2 (K 125a5–6): ’di yaṅ chos kyi raṅ gi ńo bo daṅ ’gal bas sel ba’i sgo tsam žig bstan
4. The “completeness” of an argument and the identification of the probative factors

As brought into light in Tillemans’ 1991 article, the above reinterpretations are not merely terminological issues, but reach deeper into the nature of “how logic works.” The theoretical implication of these new interpretations can be clarified if we look at the matter from a different angle, and take into account the reinterpretation of the fault called “incompleteness” (nyūnatā, que jian guo xing, 缺減過性), which results from the new interpretation of sādhana. In NMu 1.1 Dignāga defined sādhana to be a three-membered argument, comprised of the thesis, the reason and the example. The lack of any one of these members results in the fault called “incompleteness.” However, in the PSD Dignāga says:

PSV ad PS III k. 1ab: `dir yañ tshul gañ yañ ruñ ba cig ma smras na yañ ma tshañ ba brjod par `gyur ro // (V 40b2, Kitagawa 1965: 470,7–8)

Here [in saying that inference for others is the communication of a triply characterized reason], it shall also be called incomplete when any characteristic [of the three characteristics] is unstated.
This understanding changes not only how the fault called “incompleteness” as handed down from the early phase of Indian logic is understood, but also the conception of what kind of factor contributes to the “completeness” of an argument, in the absence of which the argument becomes “incomplete” or unsound. We are now inclined to call them the “probative factors.” Indeed, a number of elements can be regarded as being capable of contributing to the “completeness” of an argument. At first, there should be certain linguistic expression with certain ideas the proponent would like to communicate to the opponent. This expression should be capable of explicating ideas in accordance with certain semantic conventions. Even the intelligence of the opponent could be presupposed as part of the necessary prerequisites for an argument to be practically adequate, since he should be intelligent enough to pick out the meaning as being the one the proponent intended to convey. In addition, one might also include the overall situation of the debate as being one where arguments from each side are to be evaluated only according to principles for thinking rationally. But not all factors which are necessary for a rational exchange to occur contribute to the soundness of an argument in the same way. Therefore, by “probative factors,” we do not mean all the necessary conditions for an argument to be “complete” in a general sense, which are nearly infinite, but only those factors which were actually selected by thinkers in the history of logic to be in the focus of their theorization of argument. The notion of a “probative factor” is therefore just a meta-logical concept, not a logical one in the usual sense. This is a concept only used to represent or recapture the main concern of a logician in his theory of argument. In fact, we are bound to select only a limited number of elements for reflecting on the soundness of a sound argument in a theoretical manner. This does not prevent us from recognizing the fact that there must be other elements remaining untheorized in our present framework, or even yet unobserved.

The mere illustration of probative factors contributes to a theory of argument just as little as a good intuition of what a sound argument may look like; it is not yet a theory of logic. The key feature of a theory is that the probative factors identified in it are at the same time considered to be the criteria for discriminating in a general way a sound argument from an unsound one. Theories of argument can be based on different approaches to the identification of different kinds of probative factor, and as a result yield different systems of criteria for sound argument. In short, different identifications of probative factors betray different conceptions of argument, which may lead to different theories of argument, or even different logical theories.

Now, let us return to the historical account as given in the Chinese literature, which is in line with PS’s new interpretation of “incompleteness.”

YMDS 57 / 94b17–21: 世親菩薩，缺減過性，宗、因、喻中，闕一有三，闕二有三，闕三有一。世親已後，皆除第七。以宗、因、喻三為能立，總闕便非。既本無體，何成能立？有何所闕而得似名？

[According to] the Bodhisattva Vasubandhu, [there are seven cases of] incompleteness (nyūnatā). [Of them,] three are the lack of [only] one [statement] among the thesis, the reason and the example, three are the lack of two [statements among them], and one is the lack of all the three [statements]. [Scholars] after Vasubandhu all exclude the seventh case. Since the thesis, the reason and the example, as three [members], form a sādhana, it is impossible for
all of them to be lacking [and there is still an argument]. Since then, there would be no substratum (wu ti 無體) at all, what could be an argument (sādhana) and what [kind of argument] could be called faulty on account of being incomplete?

According to this view, logicians before Dignāga identified the probative factors with the statements of the thesis, the reason and the example. When one of these factors is lacking, the whole argument has the fault of incompleteness. A point that remains unclarified here is that the linguistic expression itself could contribute to the “completeness” or soundness of an argument in two ways. On one hand, the linguistic expression could be probative in representing a certain form of valid reasoning. On the other hand, it could be probative in that the reason-statement together with the example-statement is or is accepted to be true. According to contemporary logical theory, an argument is sound if and only if all its premises are true and the whole argument represents a certain form of valid reasoning. Therefore, if the identification of probative factors with the linguistic expression itself does not merely represent a good intuition of what a sound argument looks like, but is actually taken as resting upon a solid theory, it could possibly provide the Buddhist logicians with two different options in theorizing the “completeness” of an argument.

We name the first option the “formalist approach” in that the logical form itself is identified as the probative factor, forms the focus of theorization, and becomes the criterion for discriminating sound arguments from unsound ones. For the second option that takes the truth of premises to be the foremost criterion for finding sound arguments, we will speak of an “epistemic approach” or “dialectic approach,” depending on the interpretation of “truth” that is chosen. If we interpret a true statement as being approved by ascertained evidences (*niścayaprasiddha), we have an “epistemic approach.” If interpreting a statement’s being true as merely being accepted to be true, i.e., being equally accepted by both sides in debate (*abhyaupagamaprasiddha, gong xu ji cheng 共許極成), we have a “dialectic approach.”

Our text continues:

YMDS 57–58 / 94b21–26: 陳那菩薩, 因一喻二, 說有六過, 則因三相六過是也。闕一有三, 闕二有三, 無闕三者。大師至彼六十年前, 施無厭寺有一論師, 名為賢愛, 精確慈悲, 特以貫世, 因明一論, 時無敵者, 亦除第七。自餘諸師, 不肯除之。因一喻二, 即因三相。
Mingjun Tang

As is reported in the above passage, Buddhist logicians following Dignāga identified the factors contributing to the “completeness” of an argument directly with the three characteristics of a correct reason, the alleged basic criteria for a good argument in Buddhist logic. As a detailed account of the trairūpya formulae according to the Chinese tradition is not in place here, we can make no decision as to whether the “epistemic approach” or the “dialectic approach” was actually adopted by those Chinese logicians following Dignāga. Still, the evidence from our text clarifies that the “formalist approach” was not chosen. Towards this end, we just point out that the “incomplete” or unsound arguments which are to be ruled out by the three characteristics represent the same logical form with that of the above proof (1), which is typically a sound argument in Buddhist logic, regardless of its variety. Indeed, it is not difficult for us to abstract the following form from the above proof (1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis:</th>
<th>Sp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reason:</td>
<td>Hp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive example:</td>
<td>(x) (Hx ⊃ Sx)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative example:</td>
<td>(x) (¬Sx ⊃ ¬Hx)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{41}\) In fact, Kuiji is also unwilling to exclude the seventh possibility. Just a few lines after this passage, he says: 又雖有言，三相並闕。如聲論師，對佛法者，立「聲為常，德所依故，猶如擇滅。諸非常者，皆非德依，如四大種」。此「德依」因，雖有所說，三相並闕，何得非似？由此第七亦缺減過。

(YMDS 58–59 / 94b28–c3) “Again, there is also the case where the statement is complete but all the three characteristics are lacking. For example, an upholder of the permanence of sound (śābdika, sheng lun shi 聲論師), against a Buddhist, claims that ‘sound is permanent, because of being a substratum of qualities (guṇāśraya, de suo yi 德所依, cf. NP 3.2.1(4)), like cessation through analytical meditation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha, ze mie 擇滅). Whatever is impermanent is not a substratum of qualities, like the four great elements (caturmahābhūtā, si da zhong 四大種).’ Although there is an argument from the reason ‘being a substratum of qualities,’ it lacks all the three characteristics. How can it not be faulty? Hence, the seventh case should also be counted as incomplete.” That is to say, there could be some linguistic expressions in which all the three characteristics are lacking, although expressions of this kind have no probative force at all. Huizhao 慧沼 (650–714 CE) gives a much clearer example for the seventh possibility: 如立「聲常，眼所見故」，虛空為同，盆等為異，三相俱闕。

(YMDS 753 / 141c21–22) “For example, ‘sound is permanent, because of being visible.’ [Here,] ether is the similar instance. A dish, etc., are dissimilar instances. [The argument] lacks all the three characteristics.”
Moreover, if we regard the negative example as merely the contraposition of its positive counterpart, we could just skip it. Then, the whole process of reasoning can be considered as beginning from the statement of the positive example and ending with the thesis-statement. If the formalization is correct, the above process clearly represents a valid reasoning.

When commenting on the NP passage on refutation (dūṣaṇa, NP 6), Huizhao has provided each one of these seven possibilities with an example. Here, we just concern the first three where only one characteristic is lacking respectively:

YMDS 752 / 141c12–16: 闕一有三者：如數論師，對聲論立：「聲是無常，眼所見故」，聲無常宗，瓶、盆等為同品，虛空等為異品，此但闕初而有後二；聲論對薩婆多立：「聲為常宗，所聞性故」，虛空為共同品，瓶、盆等為異品，闕第二相；「所量性」因，闕第三相。

The three [kinds of incomplete argument where only] one [characteristic] is lacking [respectively] are for example: (1) When a Sāṅkhya, against a Śābdika, claims that "sound is impermanent, because of being visible (cākṣuṣatva, yan suo jian 眼所見)." The thesis (pakṣa) that sound is impermanent has a pot and a dish, etc., as similar instances (sapakṣa, tong pin 同品), and has ether, etc. as dissimilar instances (vipakṣa, yi pin 異品). The [argument] lacks only the first [characteristic] but has the last two [characteristics]. (2) When a Śābdika, against a Sarvāstivādin (sa po duo 薩婆多), claims that “sound is permanent – thesis, because of being audible (śrāvaṇatva, suo wen xing 所聞性).” Here, ether is the similar instance equally [accepted by both sides] (gong tong pin 共同品). A pot and a dish, etc., are dissimilar instances. [The argument] lacks [only] the second characteristic. (3) The reason “being cognizable (prameyatva, suo liang xing 所量性)” [for the thesis “sound is permanent”] lacks [only] the third characteristic.

If we present all the three arguments in a “syllogistic” manner with subject-predicate statements, skip the negative example and all the individual cases cited and refer to the “positive example” just as “example” for the sake of convenience, we end up with the following three proofs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proof (2)</th>
<th>Proof (3)</th>
<th>Proof (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thesis:</td>
<td>Sound is impermanent, for sound is visible.</td>
<td>Sound is permanent, for sound is audible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason:</td>
<td>Whatever is visible is impermanent.</td>
<td>Whatever is audible is permanent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42 See n. 38.
43 The YMDS from the commentary on NP 3.3.1(1) to the end is actually written by Huizhao after the death of his teacher Kuiji, see Zheng 2010: 605.
44 See YMDS 752–753 / 141c11–22.
It is not a surprise to find out that all the unsound arguments illustrated here and the above proof (1) as a sound argument share the same logical form. The differences are only as follows:

In proof (2), the reason-statement “sound is visible” is not true, in that sound is clearly not visible. Here, the proposition \( Hp \) is false. In this case, only the first characteristic \( \text{pakṣadharmanvam} \), i.e., the reason’s being (pervasively) a property of the subject \( \text{bian shì zōng fā xīng} \) 遍是宗法性), does not obtain or is not fulfilled.\(^{45}\)

In proof (3), the example-statement “whatever is audible is permanent” is not true. It cannot be instantiated in existent individuals apart from the subject “sound,” since only sound is audible. Here, the positive example should be interpreted as a statement with existential import, like \((\exists x) (x \neq p & Hx \& Sx)\).\(^{46}\) The whole conjunction is false just because the last conjunct is false. In this case, only the second characteristic \( \text{sapakṣe sattvam} \), i.e., the reason’s being (certainly) present in similar instances \( \text{tōng pīn dīng yǒu xīng} \) 同品定有性) is not fulfilled, since no similar instance or nothing permanent apart from sound itself instantiates the reason-property “being audible.”\(^{47}\)

In proof (4), the example-statement that “whatever cognizable is permanent” is also not true. There certainly are impermanent things which are not only cognizable but also different from sound, say a pot. Here, the first conjunct in the above conjunction is false. Hence, the whole conjunction is false. In this case, only the third characteristic \( \text{vipakṣe 'sattvam} \), i.e., the reason’s being (pervasively) absent from dissimilar instances \( \text{yī pīn biān wú xīng} \) 異品遍無性) is not fulfilled, since the dissimilar instances, things not “being permanent” apart from sound itself, also have the reason-property “being cognizable,” like a pot.\(^{48}\)

In all the three cases, a valid form of reasoning does not perform a role in discriminating sound arguments from unsound ones. Arguments are considered as unsound only on account of the lacking of this or that characteristic. The “probative factor” is in this theory not

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\(^{45}\) Cf. NP 3.2.1(1): \( \text{śabdānityatve sādhye cākṣuṣatvād ity ubhayāsiddhaḥ // NP}_{\text{Ch}} \) 11c12–13: 如成立聲為無常等，若言是眼所見性故，両俱不成。 “When one is to prove that sound is imperfect, \[the reason\] ‘because of being visible’ is not established for both (ubhayāsiddha).” Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 123.

\(^{46}\) Oetke 1994: 24, ES_{evw}4.

\(^{47}\) Cf. NP 3.2.2(2): \( \text{asādāraṇaḥ śrāvanatvān nitya iti / tad dhi nityāṇityapakṣabhīyām vyāvṛttatvān nityāṇityaviniṃnkṛtya cānṛayaśāmah bhīvāt saṃśāvat māyāḥ saṃśāvatam iti // NP}_{\text{Ch}} \) 11c22–24: 言不共者，如說聲常，所聞性故，常、無常品皆離此因，常、無常外非有是猶豫因，此所聞性其難何等？‘An uncommon (asādāraṇa) [reason] is: \[Sound is\] permanent, because of being audible.’ For, since this [reason] is [certainly] excluded from both the permanent and impermanent kinds (\( \text{pakṣa, pin} \)) [apart from the subject ‘sound’], and since anything else which is different from permanent and impermanent is impossible, this [reason] is a cause for doubt. \[The question remains:\] ‘What kind of [thing] has audibility?’ For translation and discussion, see Tachikawa 1971: 124; Oetke 1994: 33–35.

\(^{48}\) Cf. NP 3.2.2(1): \( \text{śādāraṇaḥ sābdah prameyatvān nitya iti / tad dhi nityāṇityapakṣayoh śādāraṇatvād anaikāntikam / kim guhaṁv at prameyatvād anityaḥ śādāḥ āhosvid ākāśavat prameyatvān nitya iti // NP}_{\text{Ch}} \) 11c19–22: 共者，如言聲常，所量性故，常、無常品皆此因，是故不定。為如瓶等，所量性故，聲是無常；為如空等，所量性故，聲是其常？‘A common (śādāraṇa) [reason] is: ‘Sound is permanent, because of being cognizable.’ For, since this [reason] is common to both the permanent and impermanent kinds [apart from the subject ‘sound’], it is inconclusive (anaikāntika). \[The question remains:\] ‘Is sound impermanent because of being cognizable, like a pot, or permanent because of being cognizable, like ether?’” Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 124.
the logical form, but the set of the three characteristics, just as the three characteristics are proclaimed by logicians following Dignāga as sādhana, means of proof. Therefore, in identifying the three characteristics as the probative factor, the “formalist approach” is not the approach actually stepped on by Buddhist logicians.

Moreover, each case above where one characteristic is lacking or is not fulfilled can be reduced to the scenario where one premise in the argument, either the reason-statement or the example-statement, is not true. In this sense, the three characteristics concern nothing formal. They are only the definition of the truths of the reason-statement and the example-statement, i.e., the definition of the truths of the premises in an argument, in the sense that all the premises are true if and only if all the three characteristics are fulfilled. Therefore, in identifying the three characteristics as probative factor, the implied intention is that the essential factors or criteria for discriminating a sound argument from unsound one should be the truths of the premises. The theory of traśūrya is only a theorization of this implied intention. It is only in this sense that the reason together with the positive and negative examples is also proclaimed to be a “probative factor,” the sādhana. Whether the emphasis is put on the three characteristics or on the reason and the examples is only a matter of the level on which this implied intention is to be presented, the level of the meta-language or that of the object-language.

However, one might argue in favor of a formalist interpretation of Buddhist logic that: Since at least the statement of the reason and that of the example are recognized as sādhana in this new interpretation following PS, there is certainly an awareness of the logical form of an argument coming to the core in Buddhist theorization of argument. In this sense, the “formalist approach” has not been totally neglected by Buddhist logicians following this new interpretation of sādhana. As a matter of fact, what is actually at stake in this new interpretation is not the form of these two members, but their truth. As we have said above, on the one hand, a good intuition of what a sound argument looks like does not by itself amount to a theory of argument, let alone to a “formalist” theory. The Buddhist view of the three-membered argument is just a representation of this good intuition. Moreover, there is only one form which is actually elaborated in this form of Buddhist theory of three-membered argument. It is nothing but a linguistic standard for all the arguments to follow. At any rate, a formal logic does not come about when there is only one form of reasoning, which is neither compared with other equally valid forms of reasoning, nor with other invalid ones. On the other hand, to adopt an approach other than a “formalist” one and to take some factors other than the logical form itself as the theoretically most significant does not necessarily imply that the other equally necessary factors, esp. the logical form, are rejected or considered to be irrelevant to the “completeness” of an argument. To adopt

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This is partly demonstrated by the constant practice of transforming a negative statement into its affirmative counterpart, cf. NP 2.3: vaidharmyenaṇāpi / … tadyathā / yan nityam tad akṛtam dṛṣṭam yathākāśam iti / nityaśabdenātrānityatvasyābhāva ucyate / akṛtakāshadennāpi kṛtakatvasyābhāvah / yathā bhāvabhāvo 'bhāva iti // NPCh 11b15–18: 异法者，…，謂若是常，見非所作，如虛空等。此中常言非無常，非所作言表無所作，如有非有說名非有。“[The example] by dissimilarity [i.e., the negative example] is … for instance, ‘whatever is permanent is observed to be non-produced, like ether.’ Here, the negation (abhāva) of being impermanent is said by the word ‘permanent,’ and the negation of being produced is said by the word ‘non-produced,’ like non-being (abhāva) is the negation (abhāva) of being (bhāva).” Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 121.
one particular approach just concerns the focus of theorization and relegates other possible candidates for a “probative factor” to a position at the edge of the horizon of a given framework, not outside of it.\footnote{Indeed, there are other minor faults beyond the scope of trairūpya which concern the logical form of a statement, cf. NP 3.3.1(5): viparītānvayo yathā / yat kṛtakaṃ tad anityam ārām śat iti vaktavye yad anityam tat kṛtakaṃ drṣṭam iti bravīti // NPCh 12b14–15: 倒合者，謂應說言，諸所作者，皆是無常，而倒說言，諸無常者，皆是所作。“[An example where] the positive concomitance is reversed is that: One states ‘whatever is impermanent is observed to be produced,’ when he should say ‘whatever is produced is observed to be impermanent’;” NP 3.3.2(5): viparītānvayuṭtreko yathā / yad anityam tat mūrtaṃ drṣṭam iti vaktavye yan mūrtaṃ tad anityaṃ drṣṭam iti bravīti // NPCh 12b25: 倒離者，謂如說言，諸質礙者，皆是無常。“[An example where] the negative concomitance is reversed is that: one states ‘whatever is corporeal (mūrta, zhi ai 質礙) is observed to be impermanent,’ when he should say ‘whatever is impermanent is observed to be corporeal’.” Cf. Tachikawa 1971: 127, 128.}

Therefore, to interpret the Buddhist three-membered argument merely on its face value as some Indian equivalence to the Aristotelian syllogism might well be an overinterpretation.\footnote{This is exactly the conclusion of Tillemans’ 1991 article (Tillemans [1991] 1999: 78–81), where he clearly shows that the thesis or conclusion constitutes “an integral part of the syllogism,” but not of the Buddhist sādhana, and that this fact foreshadows the “fundamental incommensurability” between syllogism and sādhana. To certain extent, my treatment of the concept of sādhana in Chinese literature could be regarded as presenting the matter “from a slightly different angle.”} For such an interpretation, the thesis or conclusion has to be taken into account so that a form representing the complete process of reasoning can be available for further considerations concerning its being valid or not. However, this is obviously not the intention of logicians following Dignāga, in that the thesis is explicitly excluded by them from “probative factors” and from their fundamental considerations concerning an argument’s being tenable or not.

5. Conclusion

In the development from Vasubandhu to Dignāga and the latter’s Indian and Chinese followers, and in the new interpretation of sādhana as the triple characterization of a correct reason (trairūpya) instead of the linguistic expression of a three-membered argument, what comes to the fore is a gradually clearer conception of what is essentially decisive for an argument to be good or sound. In identifying the decisive factor as the trairūpya or the truth of premises, Dignāga and his followers lead the Buddhist theory of argument to an approach that sharply different from that of the formal logic of their European colleagues.

A crucial problem that remains undecided, however, is whether the “epistemic approach” or the “dialectic approach” was adopted in further historical development after Dignāga in India and China. As we have said, we leave the answer open at the present stage. I believe that a solution will come about with a comparative study of the interpretation of trairūpya by Chinese logicians and that by Indian Buddhist logicians after Dignāga, e.g. Dharmakīrti.\footnote{I have made some preliminary attempts in this direction, esp. on the concept of sapakṣa and vipakṣa in Chinese Buddhist logic, and on a logical reading of the second characteristic under the Chinese interpretation, see Tang 2015: 289–307, 323–336. For the most extensive and profound analysis of the “epistemic operator” in Indian logic and of the trairūpya, see Oetke 1994.}
References and abbreviations

Primary sources

IRMS Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō 因明論疏明燈抄 (Zenju 善珠) : T68, no. 2270.
NMu Dignāga, Nyāyamukha. See Katsura [1]–[7].
NPch Chinese translation of NP: Yin ming ru zheng li lun 因明入正理論, T32, no. 1630.
PS(V) Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti), Tibetan translation. See Kitagawa 1965.
YMDS Kuiji 窺基, Yin ming da shu 因明大疏. See Zheng 2010; also T44, no. 1840.

Secondary sources


A Causeless Liberation? Kṣemarāja’s Response to Dharmakīrti’s Critique of Initiation

by

Somadeva Vasudeva

1 Who are Dharmakīrti’s Śaivas?

Kṣemarāja (active around 1000–1050 CE), a Kashmirian exegete of the non-dualist Śaiva Mantramārga, has supplied, as an appendix to his commentary on the Svacchandatantra, a short Prakaraṇa style tract defending the theory that Śaiva ritual initiation, or dīkṣā, is capable of bestowing final liberation. Kṣemarāja begins with a Buddhist pūrvapakṣa built on ten and a half verses of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, namely the Pramāṇasiddhi 257cd–267.¹ Before proceeding to analyze Kṣemarāja’s work, it is helpful to establish the identity of Dharmakīrti’s original opponent. What kind of Śaiva views is Dharmakīrti attacking, and how do these views compare to what Kṣemarāja is defending?

As Acharya (2014) has shown, Dharmakīrti addresses the doctrines of the early dualist Śaivasiddhānta, that is, groups who accepted the authority of revealed scriptures such as the Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā, the Kiraṇatantra, and the Śvāyambhuvasūtrasaṃgraha. The Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā, the earliest work of this school that has come down to us, is tentatively dated to around 450–550 CE. It is in this work that we see the first defense of the new doctrine that was to become the hallmark of the Śaiva Mantramārga: The claim that dīkṣā, or initiation, is sufficient cause for the end of rebirth. We are asked to believe that this is possible because Śaiva mantras have an unimaginable power (acintyavibhava)² capable of excising the substantial defilements that lead to incarnation. The early Śaivasiddhānta makes the claim that this excision can be empirically verified in a ritual of weighing, the tulādīkṣā, or dhaṭadīkṣā, “Initiation with the scales.” Dharmakīrti responds to this kind of a claim in the Pramāṇasiddhi section of the Pramāṇavārttika:

PV Pramāṇasiddhi 258cd–260ab:

nālam bijādisaṃsiddho vidhiḥ puṃsāmajanmane //258//
tailābhyāṅgāgnidāhāder api muktiprasangataḥ /

¹ PV Pramāṇasiddhi, 257cd–267 (Edmi).
² For the Śaivas mantras are souls appointed by the cause deity Śiva to enable various effects. Mataṅga-pārameśvaravṛtti of Rāmakaṇṭha to Vidyāpāda 7.40cd–42ab: ...śabdātiriktā ātmaviśeṣā eva mantrāḥ syuh..., “Mantras are specific souls, different from sounds.” Similarly, Mataṅgapārameśvara Vidyāpāda 7.42cd–43: vācyavācakabhedo ‘yam suprasiddho mahāmune / moksārhatam suṇyuktānām vācyānām kāraṇecchaya / nīyuktā vācakatvena varṇāḥ śāstre śivodaye, “O great sage, this dichotomy of denoted and denoter is well-known. In Śaiva scripture, [certain] phonemes have, by the will of the cause-deity (Śiva = kārana-), been prescribed as denoters of commissioned mantra[-souls], for the purpose of liberation.” Scil., both the mantra souls that are the vācyas, and the phonemes used that are the vācakas (sometimes also: śabdas), are considered to be mantras.
A ritual admitted as effective for seeds and so on is not sufficient to end rebirth for persons, because of the undesirable consequence that liberation could also [be brought about] by rubbing with sesame oil, or by burning with fire, and so on.

A removal of sin is not established by [the initiand’s] prior heavier weight and subsequent lighter weight. Let him become even weightless [after initiation]! [It proves nothing:] Sin has no weight because it is formless.

Dharmakīrti objects here to the Saiddhāntika claim that mantras possess the power to liberate. The intended inference is probably something like the following: “An initiatory mantra-procedure is sufficient cause for the end of rebirth. Because sin-seeds are burnt. Just as in the case of other burnt seeds.” Here the reason is a type of viruddahetu called dharmaviśeṣaviruddha. That is to say, it establishes an undesired additional property (dharmaviśeṣa) for the probandum, namely that an end of rebirth can also be achieved by other things that stop seeds from sprouting, such as heating or rubbing with oil. Both parties actually accept that mantras can bring about other effects, such as destroying the capacity of seeds to sprout and neutralizing snake-poison (perhaps the most common practical application of mantras). For Dharmakīrti, as Eltschinger (2001: 86) explains: “…les mantra possèdent, en vertu de leur propre nature (svabhāva, svarūpa), une efficacité naturelle (*bhāvaśakti) dont le mode d’opération demeure inexplicable.” For the Śaivas, the efficacy of mantras – understood as souls6 appointed to this high office by Śiva – derives from the “virility of mantras” (mantravīrya). These minor supernatural effects supposedly prove that mantras can indeed perform also their primary function of effecting liberation through initiation. Dharmakīrti’s prasaṅga then asserts that if mantras can block rebirth, then other methods used to prevent seeds from sprouting should also be capable of blocking rebirth.

3 Prajñākaragupta: atha tailābhyaṅgasya tāvamātraṃ eva sāmāṇyām tathā / Manorathanandin: dīkṣāyāḥ prāg guroḥ paścāl lāghavād dīkṣayā na pāpaharaṇam asya dīkṣita-sya kim tu gauravam evāsya kṛtaṃ sat mā bhūd iti kasmāna na kalpate / lāghavaṃ hi gauravaviruddhi dṛṣṭyamānaṃ tadadhāvam eva gamayen na pāpabhāvaṃ / pāpam eva gurv iti cen na pāpam gurv amūrtito mūrtatvābhāvāt /

4 For this translation see Acharya 2014.

5 Subject: [dīkṣā-/mantra-/vidhiḥ, property to be proven: alam ajanmane, reason: dagdhpāpa[bīja]tvā, example: dagdhabījavat.

6 Mataṅgapārameśvaravṛtti of Rāmakaṇṭha to Vidyāpāda 7.40cd–42ab: śabdātiriktā ātmaviśeṣā eva mantrāḥ syuḥ, “Mantras are specific souls, different from sounds.”

7 For an authoritative, early, Saiddhāntika exposition of mantravīrya see Mataṅgapārameśvara Caryāpāda 5.13cd–16 with Rāmakaṇṭha’s commentary. The history of the concept of mantravīrya has not yet been written. Kṣemarāja and his non-dualist co-religionists have settled on defining mantravīrya as pūrṇāhaṃtāvimarśa an awareness of the plenary self. See Śivasūtravārttika 1.20: mantravīryam iti proktam pūrṇāhaṃtāvimarśanam, also Triṃḍalokaviveka 5.137: mantrayati svātmāḥ prāpsaṃśataḥ mantrah, paraḥ pramātā. For pūrṇāhaṃtāvimarśana, see Upaladeva’s Ajaya-pramātsiddhi 22: yā saṃvidhā svātmāḥ prāpsaṃśatān, na eva pūrṇāhaṃtāvimarśaśvabhāvo ‘hambhāvo ’ṛthayavasthāpako gīyate. On pūrṇāhaṃtā see Kṣemarāja’s Netrodhyota 7.16 avataṇṭikā: ahaṃ bhūvā dehādipramātṛtā-prāśanamanuḥ pūrṇāhaṃtāṁ aviśyety arthaḥ.
Since other methods used to sterilize seeds are not capable of blocking rebirth, there is no reason to believe that mantras are capable of doing so. The notion that mantras have the power to nullify the ability of karmic seeds to sprout is also a topos of the early, dualist Śaivasiddhānta Kiraṇatantra:

The action of many existences has its seeds burnt, so to speak (iva), by mantras [in initiation]. Future [action] too is blocked; [but] that by which this [body is sustained can be destroyed only] by experience. (trans. Goodall).

Dharmakīrti then refutes the Śaiva claim that weighing the initiate before and after initiation, and seeing that he weighs less afterwards, demonstrates that mantras have removed his sins. Beyond the scriptural sources, the two earliest exegetes of this tradition to whose ideas we still have access are Brhaspati (ca. 650–750, of whose work, however, only a few fragments survive) and Sadyojyotis (ca. 675–725). Of these two, Sadyojyotis is explicit on the probative value of the initiation with the scales (tulādīkṣā, dhātadīkṣā):

[By initiation] on the scales, [the initiate] is purified of great sins such as brahmicide. One may know that his bonds have been destroyed through direct evidence, just as the destruction of poison [by Gāruḍa-mantras is proved by visible evidence].

Very similarly, Sadyojyotis speaks of the ritual destruction of sin being “perceived” (dṛṣṭa) in his Nareśvaraparikṣā 3.83. Other scriptures, such as the Sārdhatriśatikālottara, classified the ‘evidence’ of the ritual of the scales as the fourth of a list of eight pratyayas, which it understood as faith-inspiring miracles, a position the Śaiva non-dualists were subsequently to develop further.

The example of poison is possibly also what Dharmakīrti intended by the force of his -ādi. Poison was a stock example for the Saiddhāntikas. In the Sarvaśajñānottara we read:

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8 Dharmakīrti criticises the Saiddhāntika’s extension of the observable blocking of the power to sprout in ordinary seeds, to invisible, karmic ‘seeds’ as unwarranted. If the two cases were really completely congruent, then actions such as burning etc. should also have congruent effects. Pakṣa: [Dīkṣā-/mantra-jvidhi, sādhyā: pāpaharaṇakṛt, hetu: prāg guror lāghavāt paścāt. Here, the idea that sin or karma has weight is anyatarāsiddha; it is only accepted by the Saiddhāntika.

9 For the compound dagdhabījam see Śāyambhuvasūtrasāṃgraha 3.15a and Rauravasūtrasāṃgraha 4.51c.

10 Kiraṇatantra 6.19: anekahāvikaṃ karma dagdhabījam ivānabhiḥ / bhaviṣyad api saṃruddham yene- dam tad dhi bhogatāḥ //

11 For the dates of these authors see Sanderson 2006.

12 Tattvasaṃgraha of Sadyojyotis 38: sudhiṃ vrajati tulāyāṃ dīkṣāto brahmahatyatato mukhyāt / pratya- yato jāniyād bandhanavigamaṃ visakṣayavat //

13 Nareśvaraparikṣā 3.83: subhayā kriyāyā vede kṣayaḥ pāpasya coditaḥ / drṣṭaś ca tatkṣayaḥ śaive kriyayaiva tulādinā. Rāmakanṭha, ad loc., is perhaps also more cautious, as he calls this claim a “supporting argument” (yukti) and not a “proof”: “ihāpi dhatadīkṣāyām evamvidhiḥ yuktir asty eveti na niryuktikāḥ kriyāyā karmasamksayo gadita iti.

14 According to Śārdhatriśatikālottara 21 these are: [1.] burning without fire, [2.] killing and reviving trees, [3.] stunning, [4.] removing the major sins, proven by weighing on a scale, [5.] neutralizing poison, [6.] rendering infertile, [7.] removing possession, [8.] quelling a fever.

15 See the entry to pratyaya 2 in TĀK III.
Just as the toxicologist\(^{16}\) \((\text{viṣavaidya})\), through the power of visualizations and seed-mantras, effects the removal of poison, so the ācārya effects a disjunction with the bonds through Saiva [initiation] rituals.\(^{17}\) Just as a suppression of poison [takes place] by the power of mantras and herbs, so there takes place a suppression of all bonds through initiation.\(^{18}\)

It is uncertain whether Dharmakīrti knew scriptures such as the \textit{Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā}\(^{19}\) or the \textit{Rauravasūtrasaṃgraha} or, whether he was merely attacking a popular idea. It is possible that he personally consulted these earliest Śaiva scriptures, though in view of their archaic language it seems unlikely that he would have rated them as credible opponents.\(^{20}\)

A more plausible candidate, however, is the post-Diṅnāga \textit{Mataṅgapārameśvara}, which aspires to a more śāstraic presentation and diction, and which engages in polemics. In its yoga section, in the context of the rite of weighing, the \textit{Mataṅgapārameśvara} does indeed claim that \textit{dīkṣā} removes \textit{pāpa}, exactly the claim that Dharmakīrti attacks:

\[\text{[The fire concentration (āgneyī dhāraṇā)],}\]

intense with a raging conflagration of flames, deployed [through visualization] in the ritual of mounting the scales, can render a person free from defilement, [because he is now]\(^{22}\) possessed of a body from which sin (\textit{pāpa-}) has been burnt away.\(^{23}\)

Commenting on this, the tenth century Kashmirian Saiddhāntika commentator Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha defends the idea that sin (\textit{pāpa}) has mass and that the “body really becomes heavier, because sin is a function of \textit{tamas}, and so has mass.” He corroborates this by citing Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s \textit{Sāṃkhyakārikā} 13c, where it is said that, “the factor \textit{tamas} is heavy and it conceals.”\(^{24}\) The \textit{Yuktidīpikā} (ca. 680–720 CE) explains this heaviness as a dullness of the

\(^{16}\) This is how Aghoraśiva interprets the verse (…\textit{yathā viṣavaidyo mantrasāmarthyena dhyānādinā ca karmaṇā viṣaharaṇam karoti…}). It would also be quite natural to take the ācārya as the subject. While Aghoraśiva might not approve of the idea that an ācārya should engage in low status activities such as curing snake-bite, it is plausible that this is the intention of the \textit{Sarvajñānottara}. \textit{ayam abhiprāyaḥ / prāyaścitakarmanu dusktrethyo mokṣasrayavani anaiśkantiket itat / tataḥ ca yatā viṣavaidyo mantrasāmarthehyena dhyānādinā ca karmanā viṣaharaṇam karoti tathācāryo ‘pi sivaśaktypabṛṃhitena dīkṣāhyena karmanā mahādīkṣāviśleṣaṃ karotity avirodhaḥ.}

\(^{17}\) \textit{Sarvajñānottara Vidyāpāda 8: viṣāpahāraṃ kurute dhyānabījabalair yathā / kurute pāśaviśleṣaṃ tathācāryaḥ śivaśaktyupabṛṃhitena dīkṣāhyena karmanā mahādīkṣāviśleṣaṃ karotity avirodhaḥ.}

\(^{18}\) \textit{Sarvajñānottara Vidyāpāda 9: mantrauṣadhabalair yadvat sannirodho viṣasya tu / tathā hi sarvapāśānām sannirodhas tu dīkṣāyā /}

\(^{19}\) \textit{Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā Mūlasūtra 7.15ab: tulayā śodhayet pāpam ātmanasya parasya vā /}

\(^{20}\) \textit{Rauravasūtrasaṃgraha 8: 3: yathā sūryodayaṃ prāpya tamaḥ kṣipraṃ vinaśyati / evam dīkṣām samāśadya dharmadharmair vimucye / “As darkness gets instantly destroyed after having reached the time of sunrise, in the same way one is freed from merits and demerits as soon as he receives initiation.” (Trans. Acharya 2014: 16.)}

\(^{21}\) The fire concentration is one of the four (or five) \textit{dhāranās} common in Saiddhāntika \textit{ṣaḍaṅgayoga}, see Vasudeva 2004: 297–299.

\(^{22}\) \textit{Mataṅgapāremeśvara Yogapāda 2.48–9ab: tulārohavidhāne ca prayogatīthe balotkāṭaḥ / vegavadbhih karālāśair mayūkhaiḥ saṃprayojitāḥ / karotity avirodhaṃ sadahpataṇam naram /}

\(^{23}\) \textit{Sāṃkhyakārikā 13c: guru varanakam tamah.} \textit{Yuktidīpikā} ad loc.: \textit{tatra gurutvaṃ kāryasyādhogamahetur dharmah, karaṇasya vṛttimandatā / varanam api kāryagaṭam ca dravyāntaratirodhānām / karaṇagatā cāsvuddhiḥ prakāśapratidvand[vī] bhūtā /}
internal instrument that causes downward motion of the effect (kārya). This shifts the focus away from sin to the Sāṅkhya guṇa of tamas, a material constituent of primal matter; but for Dharmakīrti this claim still would remain anyatarāsiddha.

A significant problem in assuming that Dharmakīrti knew the Mataṅgapārameśvara as we now know it, is that the Mataṅgapārameśvara’s Vidyāpāda also teaches a more developed theory of mala as opposed to the simpler idea of pāpa found in the Yogapāda.25 There is, however, no evidence that Dharmakīrti knew the theory of a material mala. As Goodall (2013: s.v. pāśa) notes, it may be a later development:

In a number of the earliest surviving Siddhāntatantras, “impurity” (mala) is noticeable by its absence: we find no mention of it in the Ni, in the non-eclectic recensions of the Kālottara, such as the SārK, in what survives of the RauSS or even in the SJU(G) (in which, pace Aghoraśiva, the word mala is used to refer to karman). The first surviving Siddhānta in which “impurity” figures may be the SvāSS.

It is conceivable, therefore, that Dharmakīrti knew only the Mataṅgapārameśvara’s Yogapāda, or, since this reference to sin (pāpa) in the Yogapāda is an archaic throwback, it is also possible that Dharmakīrti had access to the archetype. It is relevant, in this context, that the Mataṅgapārameśvara’s Yogapāda also elsewhere evidences Śaivas engaging with the Buddhist Pramāṇa tradition. Mataṅgapārameśvara Yogapāda 4.15cd–16a paraphrases Diṅnāga’s definition of pratyākṣa: anirdeśyam asaṃdigdhaṃ kalpanāpoḍhagocaram / pratyakṣam, “Sense-knowledge is unobjectifiable, free of doubt, and free of imagination.” If the Mataṅgapārameśvara’s Yogapāda section itself appears to be in dialogue with the Buddhist Pramāṇa tradition, it becomes more likely that a Buddhist response can be expected. Until a more reliable critical edition of the Mataṅgapārameśvara has been published, any chronological layering of the text remains speculative. We may conclude that it is possible that Dharmakīrti is responding to a text as late as the Mataṅgapārameśvara’s Yogapāda.

2 After Dharmakīrti

Dharmakīrti’s critique of initiation may have had a noticeable impact on the Saidadhāntikas. Acharya (2014: 14–16) notes that Dharmakīrti’s Śaivas speak of initiation removing sin (pāpa) or unseen, yet still weighty, demerit (adṛṣṭa), an idea that he traces back to the Śaivasiddhānta’s foundational scripture, the Nīṣvāsatattvasaṃhitā. This he contrasts with the post-Dharmakīrti Śaiva doctrine that initiation removes a defilement (mala), an imperceptible substance (dravya) that acts on the soul from outside.26 Acharya has posited that this development was motivated by Buddhist criticism of the early Śaiva Mantramārga, and that Dharmakīrti provides us with a concrete example of what this criticism looked like.27

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25 Especially in chapter 6, the Puṃpāśeśvaraprakaraṇa.
27 “The Śaiva Mantramārga believed that all accumulated sin is removed by the rite of initiation, and also that this rite alone can remove it. But already in an early phase of the development of Śaiva ideology, the Pāśupata-Śaiva belief that initiation removes sin, permanently or otherwise, was met with strong criticism from the Buddhists, and they had to readjust their theory. For this, the Śaivas apparently
The causes of liberation

If it is initiation that removes the defilements that cause bondage, then why does not everyone seek Śaiva initiation? Is there some other factor that prompts individual to seek Śaiva initiation. Both the dualists and non-dualists held that a salvific divine contact called the descent of grace (śaktipāta) had to occur before a bound soul developed an interest in seeking initiation. In a sense this was the most significant event in the spiritual career of a Śaiva. But what, we may ask, caused the descent of grace?

Within the dualist fold two rival schools of thought emerged. One of the earliest ideas was that the descent of grace was caused by a karmic equilibrium (karmasāmya) caused by two simultaneously maturing karmas of equal strength. In the ensuing logjam, God needs intervene to maintain the regular working of karmic retribution, but any divine contact inevitably changes the individual in a profound way. A later idea, promoted by Sadyojyotis, was the theory of the maturation of defilement (malaparipāka), a kind of ripening of mala that renders it fit for removal.

The non-dualists rejected both of these narratives and held that God was completely free in his bestowal of grace (nirapekṣa).

The history of these developments is somewhat difficult to trace in our available sources. After Sadyojyotis and Brhaspati there follows a long gap of more than two hundred years in our record of the Saiddhāntika theorists until their tradition was revived by later Kashmirians such as Nārāyaṇakanṭha and Rāmakanṭha, authors who have been described as scriptural fundamentalists who wished to return to the original positions of Sadyojyotis. In this apparent interregnum, it appears that rival theories of the causes and processes that lead up to liberation gained currency. We have evidence that there existed other early Saiddhāntika exegetes who rejected Sadyojyotis’ interpretation of the processes that lead to initiation and thence to liberation, objecting specifically to the idea that Śiva needs to take karma into account, and espousing instead a radical karmanirapekṣavāda, as did the later non-dualist Śaivas. Abhinavagupta, for example, reports, approvingly, that a certain Aniruddha, apparently an early commentator of the Mataṅgapārameśvara, held that the descent of liberating grace was in no way dependent on karma.

Tantrāloka 13.293cd–295ab: śrīmatāpy Aniruddhaṇa śaktim unmīlinīṃ vibhoḥ // vyācakṣāṇena mātaṅge varnitā nirapekṣatā // sthāvarānte ‘pi devasya svarūponmīlanātmikā // saktiḥ patantī sāpekṣā na kvāpīti suvistarāt. “The venerable Aniruddha too has taught that [Śiva’s liberating power] is autonomous when commenting on the Lord’s ‘power that awakens’ in the Tantra of Mataṅga [the Mataṅgapārameśvara, Vidyāpāda 4.44], explaining at great length that when the power of the Lord descends it is beholden to nothing, being an unfolding of the nature of the self that can take place even in the extreme case of immobile life-forms.” (Trans. Sanderson 2006: 81-82 n. 54)
operation of Śiva’s descent of grace (śaktipāta) to what he considered meritorious human beings.30

For Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, the cause of rebirth is fully explained by the influence of two kinds of conscious intention (samcetanā), one being false knowledge (mithyājñāna-) and the other being the craving that arises from it (tadudbhūtatarpaśa-).31

**PV Pramāṇasiddhi 2.260cd–262ab:**

\[
\text{mithyājñānataadudbhūtatarpasamcetanāvaśāt} / \\
\text{hināsthānagatir janma tena}^{32} \text{ taccchin}^{33} \text{ na jāyate} / \\
\text{tayor eva hi sāmarthyaṃ jātau tanmārabhavataḥ} / \\
\text{te cetane svayaṃ karmety}^{34} \text{ akhaṇḍam janmakāraṇam} / \\
\]

Birth is to enter an inferior mode of existence,35 under the influence of [two kinds of] conscious intention, [one instigated by]36 false knowledge and [the other instigated by] the craving that arises from it. Therefore, one who severs these two is not born [again], for they alone, by their mere presence, are sufficient [causes] for [re]birth. These two kinds of intention are of themselves motivated action, and so constitute the complete cause of [re]birth.37

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30 *Kiranavṛtti* on Vidyāpāda 6.11cd–12.
31 For a discussion of Dharmakīrti’s proof of rebirth see Franco 1997.
32 tena] Edma Edpra, tatas Edma.
33 taccchin] Edna Edpra, tac chin Edmi (understand as: te (du.) chinattīi tacchid).
34 karmety] Edmi Edma, karmāry° Edpra.
35 A gati is a rebirth destination, see Franco 1997: 69.
36 Manorathanandin: tadudbhūtas tarṣo mithyājñānaprabhavā āryaḥ / tāḥhyāṃ samprayukte cetane tadvaśād yā hānsthānagatīs taj jamānay utam.
37 See also the discussion of this passage in Bodhicaryāvatārapāṇijā 9: nanu ca satyadarśanād avidyādi prahiyate, tatprahānāt saṁskārādiprahānākramaṇaḥ trṣāpyi prahiyate / trṣāviparyāyāsamatī ca
After Dharmakīrti, or, in different Śaiva traditions not known to him, the Śaivas had developed the idea that initiation removed not pāpa, but the three substantial impurities (mala): āṇava, māyīya, kārma.38 The non-dualists inherited this theory, but, on the authority of the Mālinīvijayottara, they re-interpreted the defilements as three forms of ignorance.39 A standardized set of expansions for the three defilements becomes commonplace (see e.g. Netratantrodhodhayota 16.56): [1.] āṇava = apūrṇammanyatā, erroneous belief that one is incomplete, [2.] kārma = śubhāśubhādisamskāra, positive and negative karmic latencies, [3.] māyīya = bhinnavedayaprathā, manifestation of differentiated objects of cognition.

It is not impossible, here (see table 1), to see a parallel between Dharmakīrti’s false knowledge and the non-dualist’s erroneous belief that one is incomplete, and between Dharmakīrti’s craving that arises from false knowledge and the non-dualists positive and negative karmic tendencies. The third mala, that accounts for the differentiation of the objects of cognition, is something Dharmakīrti might have included also under mithyājñāna. It may be this closeness that leads Kṣemarāja to adopt at times a conciliatory tone, pointing out that the only difference of opinion is that the Buddhists refuse to accept that mantras have enough power to liberate.

Table 1: The causes of bondage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early Śaivasiddhānta</th>
<th>Dharmakīrti</th>
<th>Later Dualist Śaivasiddhānta</th>
<th>Śaiva Non-dualists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innate pāpa or adṛṣṭa</td>
<td>Two kinds of conscious intention: 1. mithyājñānasamcetanā 2. trṣṇāsaṃcetanā arising from mithyājñāna</td>
<td>Three substantial defilements (mala): 1. āṇava, 2. māyīya, 3. kārma</td>
<td>Three forms of ignorance (mala): 1. āṇava = apūrṇammanyatā, 2. kārma = śubhāśubhādisamskāra, 3. māyīya = bhinnavedayaprathā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 The process of liberation

What happens to the initiand after the binding defilements are nullified with Śaiva mantras? An overview of the possible processes and outcomes described in the Mālinīvijayottara is given in figure 1. At time T+0 the bound soul is affected by a descent of grace (śaktisaṃbandha). This occurs at a certain time of self-reflection (kālavēṣe) and is dependent

punarbhavat分公司mitte / tataś ca tayor abhāvā tuṣaraḥsaṃsrayas bijāsyeva karmanah sadbhāve ’pi na kimcid vihānyate iti / taduktaṃ – mithyājñānataṣṭabadbhitātatsamcestanāvāsāt / hīnasthānagatī janma tyaktvā caitan na jāyate // iti / The reading of 261b is quite different: “Having given up this (most naturally etad here refers to janma, though logically we would expect a reference to ajñāna and trṣṇā) one is not born again.”

38 See Vasudeva 2004: 164–166, and the respective entries in the Tāntrikābhidhānakośa for definitions of these.

39 See Mālinīvijayottara 1.24ab.
Figure 2: The default case: liberation after death

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{death} & \oplus & \ominus & \oplus \\
\hline
\text{dikṣā} & - & - & - \\
\hline
\text{birth} & \text{PJ} & \text{PA} & \text{BA} & \text{Mu} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[\begin{align*}
\text{PJ} &= \text{pauruṣaṁ jñānam (=svavarūpa)} \\
\text{PA} &= \text{pauruṣam ajñānam (=puruṣanīthapātaka)} \\
\text{BA} &= \text{bauddham ajñānam (=bhedabuddhi)} \\
\text{Mu} &= \text{mukti}
\end{align*}\]

on the fitness of the candidate. If the descent of grace is of the rare, extremely intense variety (tīvratīvra), souls are liberated immediately (\textit{mu}1). For others, at T+1, ignorance (\textit{ajñāna}) is loosened and there arises a desire to go to a Śaiva guru (\textit{yiyāsā}). At T+2 the guru performs the ritual intervention of initiation using efficacious Śaiva mantras. Liberation can take place either immediately afterward, or after death (\textit{mu}2, \textit{mu}3).\footnote{\textit{nīlāṃ bijādisamsiddho} \footnote{Abhinavagupta interprets this passage slightly differently in his \textit{Tantrāloka}.} \textit{vidhīḥ puṃsām ajanmane} / \textit{tailābhyaṅgāgānīdādāv} \footnote{Kṣemarāja in \textit{Svachchandoddyota} 5.88, p. 76: \textit{diyate jñānasadbhāvah kṣīyante paśuvāsanāḥ} / \textit{dānakṣa-panasanyuktā dīksā tenaeha kīrtiḥ.}} \textit{api muktiprasaṅgataḥ} \footnote{\textit{śamsiddho} Ed\textsubscript{mu} Ed\textsubscript{ma}, \textit{śamsiddhau} K\textsubscript{ed} S\textsubscript{1}.} \textit{api} muktiprasaṅgataḥ \footnote{\textit{tailābhyaṅgāgānīdādāv} K\textsubscript{ed}, \textit{tailābhyaṅgānīdādāv} S\textsubscript{1}, \textit{tailābhyaṅgānīdādāder} Ed\textsubscript{mu} Ed\textsubscript{ma}.} (\textit{Pramāṇa-vārttika} 2.258cd–259ab) and charges Dharmakīrti with failing to take this aspect into account:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Svachchandoddyota} 5.88, S\textsubscript{1} 149v: yat tu
\end{quote}
But their claim: A ritual admitted as effective for seeds and so on is not sufficient to end rebirth for persons, because of the undesirable consequence of liberation also [being brought about] by rubbing with sesame oil, or by burning with fire, and so on, only makes them objects of derision. For, in the case of a poison of either immobile, mobile, or artificial type, mantras quell its power to bring about its natural effect just as in the case of the seed, and this objection [of rubbing with oil] can [therefore] also be raised in that case. However (atha), anointing with oil etc. can only obstruct a capacity of the seed, but it is not able to add anything distinct, but it is said that mantras can do so. Therefore, because they have an inconceivable power, why can you not accept that they are also capable of neutralizing the bonds.

What kind of knowledge is this special kind of gnosis that is conferred by initiation? To determine this, Abhinavagupta proceeds with an heuristic evaluation in the opening section of his Tantrasāra. Knowledge, he says, is the cause of liberation, because it is the opposite of ignorance, which is the cause of bondage. Ignorance can be of two kinds, one present in the intellect (buddhigata) and the other implicit in individuality itself (pauruṣa). The former (buddhigata) is non-ascertainment (doubt) or wrong ascertainment (error). The latter (pauruṣa) is individualized differential cognition (vikalpaśvabhāva) which causes samsāra. This pauruṣa form of ignorance is removed by initiation. But initiation cannot take place while intellectual ignorance persists. Intellectual ignorance is removed by cultivating the discernment (adhyavasāya) of what must be cultivated and what must be rejected. Figure 2 shows these forms of knowledge and ignorance in relation to initiation and death. To this can be added the idea of the jīvanmukta who develops gnosis before death, a theory not discussed here.

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45 svakāryakaraṇa°] Kṣed, svakāryakāraṇa° S1.
46 višeṣaśakti|vam] Kṣed, višeṣa° S1.
47 tu] Kṣed, na tu S1.
48 The three sources of poison are toxic plants, venomous animals, and artificial or processed derivatives of these such as camphor. See Manoramāṭīkā to Tantrarāja 3.37.
49 The proposed inference is: [1. pakṣa:] A mantra-procedure [2. sādhyā:] is sufficient to quell poison, [3. hetu:] because it suppresses the innate power to produce the normal effect. [4. dṛṣṭānta:] just as in notes case of a seed.” ([1] mantravidhiḥ [2] viṣapraśamanakṛtat, [3] svakāryakaraṇaśaktintrodhaśakti, [4] bijavat. Here the reason should be again dharmaviśeṣaruddha, yet Dharmaśrītī does not disavow the medical use of mantras. As we see Kṣemarāja adduces a different hetu: acintyaprabhāvatvāt, “because they have inconceivable power.” This alludes to a famous list (manimantaḥsadha) of non-ordinary substances that can cancel the innate capacities of things. For example there exists a non-ordinary gem (maṇi = asbestos?) that can cancel fire’s capacity to burn, etc.
2 Kṣemarāja and the Saiddhāntikas

Kṣemarāja’s own teacher Abhinavagupta had placed little value on such supernatural displays as he does not subscribe to the probative view of initiation with the scales. He went as far as claiming that such pratyaya-miracles occurring during initiation with the scales are meant to give comfort to the simple-minded (mūḍhajana).

While both the dualists and the non-dualists accepted that a descent of grace was a prerequisite for liberation, they differed fundamentally on its underlying cause. The non-dualists refused to admit any causal factors at all, for to do so would have compromised their doctrine of divine autonomy (svātantryavāda). Kṣemarāja therefore refutes the rival Saiddhāntika theories of a karmic equilibrium and a maturation of defilement at great length. The Saiddhāntikas, in turn, charged the non-dualists with a similarly specific catalogue of false doctrines:

1. Īśvara would act without deliberation when he punishes and rewards souls without cause or motivation.
2. Īśvara would have to create all realities at once.
3. Īśvara would have to bestow all karmic rewards to all at once.
4. Souls would lose their true form during liberation and would be reborn.
5. The scriptural statement that defilement is substantial would make no sense.

To get an overview of the structure of Kṣemarāja’s central argument we can look to his own brief summary of it that he included in his commentary to Stavacintāmaṇi of Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa (late 9th to early 10th cent. CE). This pair of hymns reposed the question of grace as a dilemma: does the individual need to pacify the mind before liberating grace can enter, or is a calm mind the result of liberating grace?

Stavacintāmaṇi 117–118:

I waver –
O Lord, do you enter awareness when it is pellucid,
or does it become pellucid because you have entered?

Tantrāloka 20.1cd: atha dīkṣāṃ brave mūḍhajanāśvāsapradāyinīn //
Svacchandoddyotou p. 96.

Stavacintāmaṇi 117–118: vitatya caitan mayaiva śrīsvacchandavivṛtau pañcamapaṭalānte dīkṣā-
samarthanāvāsare vicāritam, “I myself have analyzed this in detail in my Svacchandavivṛti, at the end of the fifth chapter in the context of justifying initiation.”

The verses are introduced with the assertion that the descent of divine grace is not beholden to anything (nirapekṣa), Stavacintāmaṇi 117–118: idānīṁ nirapekṣo bhavacchaktipāta eva cidānandaghana-

The verses are introduced with the assertion that the descent of divine grace is not beholden to anything (nirapekṣa), Stavacintāmaṇi 117–118: idānīṁ nirapekṣo bhavacchaktipāta eva cidānandaghana-

Kṣemarāja glosses this as “preside over with your power:” niviśase – svaśaktyadhiṣṭhānāṁ karosī.

Kṣemarāja: manasi – samvedane.

Kṣemarāja expands this to subsume the two theories of the Saiddhāntikas, the ripening of impurity (malaparipāka) and karmic equilibrium (karmasāmya); prasanne – paripakvamale sanjāta-karmasāmye vā sati (sati) Ed, manasi sati J, R.

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50 Tantrāloka 20.1ed: atha dīkṣāṃ brave mūḍhajanāśvāsapradāyinīn //
51 Svacchandoddyotou p. 96.
52 Stavacintāmaṇi 117–118: vitatya caitan mayaiva śrīsvacchandavivṛtau pañcamapaṭalānte dīkṣā-
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53 The verses are introduced with the assertion that the descent of divine grace is not beholden to anything (nirapekṣa), Stavacintāmaṇi 117–118: idānīṁ nirapekṣo bhavacchaktipāta eva cidānandaghana-

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56 Kṣemarāja expands this to subsume the two theories of the Saiddhāntikas, the ripening of impurity (malaparipāka) and karmic equilibrium (karmasāmya); prasanne – paripakvamale sanjāta-karmasāmye vā sati (sati) Ed, manasi sati J, R.
But this is how the question can be resolved:

Your controlling presence is itself the pellucidity of awareness.

It is perfection, it is the highest level.57

Neither option spelled out in the first stanza is acceptable to the non-dualists, for in either case Śiva remains beholden (sāpekṣa-) to some extrinsic factors or conditions necessary to trigger the descent of grace. Bhāṭṭanārāyaṇa’s second stanza presents the non-dualists solution: He identifies the active entrance (praveśa-) by Śiva’s liberating power of grace as Śiva’s controlling presence (tvadadhiṣṭhāna-), which is then reified as nothing other than the pellucid awareness that is the essence of the liberated state. Kṣemarāja explains the cpd. as follows: “Your controlling presence is nothing other than the unveiling of your autonomous powers by suspending immersion into the concealment of your true form.”58

Kṣemarāja’s commentary then rehearses his main attacks against the Saiddhāntikas. If they argue that the descent of liberating grace is caused by either the ripening of impurity (malaparipāka) or by a karmic equilibrium (karmasāmya) then we need to ask: What causes either of these two phenomena?59 If the answer is that they are controlled by Śiva’s superintending power, then they are redundant, and we should just admit that power as the autonomous agency responsible for liberating grace. If the answer is that there is no cause, then we need to ask why the descent does not take place for everyone all at once.60 If it is said that it takes place after a specific amount of time for each person, then how is it not the same as establishing a fixed time, since bondage61 is for everyone beginningless?62 If the answer is that for any given soul it eventually takes place somehow, at some unspecified time, then, unless we adduce some other dissimilar and sentient cause, we have the incoherence of impurity – unequivocally insentient because its intrinsic power is that of obstruction – producing a heterogeneous, sentient, effect in the form of maturation.63 If it is claimed that the time we are talking about acts as an auxiliary cause, then, when asked what this time might be, no answer is forthcoming.64 If it is argued that impurity gradually transforms into a different, mature form, then, unless we adduce another dissimilar cause such as heat65 in the case of milk transforming into yoghurt, we have the incoherence of an impossible

57 Stavacintāmaṇi 117–118: prasanne manasi svāmin kiṃ tvam nivīśase kim u / tvatpraveśāt prasīdet tad iti dolāyate janaḥ // niścayāḥ punar eṣo 'tra tvadadhiṣṭhānam eva hi / prasādo manasaḥ svāmin sā siddhis tat paraṃ padam //


Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti 117–118: tathā hi yadi malaparipākaḥ śaktipātaḥaḥ hetuḥ karmasāmyāḥ vā, tad api tarhi kimhetukah? samadhiṣṭhāti bhagavacchaktir iti taddhetukah iti cet alan tena, bhagavacchaktir eva svatantrānugrāhikā bhavisyati.

59 Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti 117–118: tathā hi yadi malaparipākaḥ śaktipātaḥaḥ hetuḥ karmasāmyāḥ vā, tad api tarhi kimhetukah? samadhiṣṭhāti bhagavacchaktir iti taddhetukah iti cet alan tena, bhagavacchaktir eva svatantrānugrāhikā bhavisyati.

60 Ibid.: ahetukah iti cet sarvasya yugapat kim na bhavisyati.


62 Ibid.: kasmīṃ cit kāle bhavaiti cet sarvesām bandhakoṭeḥ anādītīvāt kālaniyamaḥ kim na kṛtaḥ.

63 Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti 117–118: tat kadā cit kasya cit katham cit bhavaiti cen malasya svaśaaktyā nirodhakatvenāvasthātasya jadasya vijāṭyakārānānapraveṣaṃ vinā paripākalaksanavilaksanakārāya-nānānapaṭṭāh //

64 Ibid.: kaś cid eva kālo 'tra sahakārāramah iti cet, ko 'sau iti prāśne nortamāraḥ labhyate //

65 Milk needs to be maintained for several hours at a temperature of 110–120 degrees F to produce dadhi. See Vedamuthu (2006: 298ff.).
transformation into something heterogeneous. Kṣemarāja then makes the Saiddhāntika approximate the non-dualist position:

If you [dualist Saiddhāntikas] say: “This [transformation] will happen just in the same way as it does in the theory of [you] proponents of autonomous descent grace, for whom the variety of experiences due to karma, and also liberation, occur at a particular time, and for whom the relation of cause and effect relates māyā, time etc. in the universe which has god as the only agent,” then an instance of the principle of tenuous connection is at hand.

For Kṣemarāja the attempted rapprochement is unworkable, for the Saiddhāntikas do not accept the identity of Śiva (the liberator) and the bound soul (the one to liberated):

Because in the non-dualist’s theory, the lord himself, freely assuming the appearance of contraction, just as he appears as the various principles, so he also appears as [their] relation of cause and effect, that is to say as their fixed order, and also as the diversity of the respective experiences determined by karma which thus appear to be temporally sequentialized, but in all of this there is no individually [independent] reality for any of these temporal moments or karmas etc. Since [Śiva] projects in this way both the diversity of experience, as also, out of his autonomy, the diversity of [liberating] grace, there is no other here who is being punished or favored, and so this theory is faultless.

Kṣemarāja subverts the charge of divine bias by explaining that in a non-dualist system there exists no ‘other’ who is more or less favored or punished. A significant factor in

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66 Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti 117–118: pariṇamanmalaḥ pariṇākātmakaṃ viśeṣam etīti ced atrāpi dugdhada-dhiparīṇāma iva ṛṣṇaparīṇāya virodhināh kāraṇasya ananupraveṣe vilaksanaparināmānaparīṇām /
67 Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti 117–118: yathā svatantraśaktipātavādipakṣe karmadhavaivacitryasya mukti ca kālaṇyanemana, bhagavadekakartrke ca jagati māyākālādināṃ kramaṇa kārayakāraṇabhāvah, tathaiva etad bhaviṣyatīti cec cāṣa-paṇcāśanyāya āyātah.
68 For the maxim of tenuous linkage see Kataoka 2010: 72–76 on Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s expression: na cāṣaṇa paṇcāśadh bhavitum arhati. He explains: 1. cāṣa and paṇcāśad both share the same sound cāṣa (=cāśa). 2. paṇcāśad means fifty in number. Therefore cāṣas, i.e. a flock of the blue-jay (cāṣāṇāṃ samūhaḥ), are fifty in number. We could consider emending our passage to cāṣa-paṇcāśanyāya, but the expression cāṣa-paṇcāśanyāya with the palatal sibilant is well attested in Kashmirian works, so we may also rather consider cāśa an orthographical variant for cāṣa.
69 Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti 117–118: yatas tatpakṣe bhagavān eva svātāntrāyād gṛhītasamkocābhaḥ yathā tantattavātmānaḥ bhūti, tathā tadgataniyatapaurśārvaprayāmaka kārayakāraṇabhāvābhāvāāsātmānaḥ niyata-karmamatphalavacitryātmānaḥ kramabhāsāsamayena, na tv atra kālakarmādeḥ kasyāpi nijam tattvam astiḥ yathāśayā svaragumāvatyaivacitryam abhāsavatya, tathā svavātānyād anugrahavacitryam apīti nātra nigrahānugrahābhāḥ kaś cid anyo 'stīti nirāvadya evāyaṁ pakṣah /
70 Ibid.: idam atra tattvam, yac cītātśakīra bhagavāti svavātāntrāyād gṛhītasamkocā cittabhūmim sam- sāyātmārāpāṃ bahuṣaḥkām abhāsavatya, punah svecchāyaiva kvacet samkocam prāsamasya, pārnatayā sphurāty eva tat param padam. “This is the truth here: when the blessed power of consciousness out of her own autonomy accepts contraction and diffuses into the level of cīta and makes herself appear to possess many offspring, and then again out of her own autonomy loosens the contraction in some region and flashes forth as full, that is the highest state.”
this perspective, is that causation in the world of transmigration is itself nothing but an apparent phenomenon manifested by Śiva out of his free will. Abhinavagupta therefore distinguishes the causal relationship into two types: an absolute, or non-artificial causal relation (pāramārthikaḥ), and an artificial causal relation (kalpitaḥ). In the absolute causal relation Śiva is the only existing cause and agent. This is so because true agency (kartṛtva) can only be grounded in autonomy (svātantrya). The artificial causal relation of everyday experience is merely an appearance, amounting to no more than a belief in personal agency, as discussed in Vasudeva (2012–2014: 213–215). Even in the standard example of a potter who makes pots, Abhinavagupta claims that Śiva is the actual, underlying agent. In the sense that all artificial causation is merely apparent anyway, liberation is not really caused by any of the factors adduced by the Saiddhāntikas. Or rather, it is caused by the same absolute cause as everything else, Śiva’s will.

References and abbreviations


K See Svachchandoddyota.


Manoramāṭīkā See Manoramāṭīkā.


Mataṅgapāremeśvaravṛtti See Mataṅgapāremeśvara.
Nareśvaraparīkṣā  Nareśvaraparīkṣā: Nareśvaraparīkṣā of Sadyojyotis with the commentary (-prakāśikā) of Bhaṭṭa Rāmakanṭha, ed. Madhusūdan Kaul Shāstrī. Srinagar 1926.


Netrodhyāt  See Netratantradhyota.


PV Edpra  Pramāṇavārttikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikam, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.


Śivasūtravārttika  Śivasūtravārttika: Śivasūtravārttika of Varadarāja, also called Kṛṣṇa-dāsa, ed. Madhusudan Kaul. Srinagar 1925.

Stavacintāmanī  Stavacintāmanī: Stavacintāmanī of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa with the commentary (-vivṛti) of Kṣemarāja, ed. Mukunda Rāma Shāstrī. Srinagar 1918.

Stavacintāmanī J1  Stavacintāmanī, Jammu ORL1329. Śāradā on paper. Contains marginal glosses drawn from Kṣemarāja’s commentary.
Stavacintāmaṇi  R1  Stavacintāmaṇi, Raghunath Temple MS. 9632. Śāradā on paper. Contains marginal glosses drawn from Kṣemarāja’s commentary.

Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti  Stavacintāmaṇivivṛti: See Stavacintāmaṇi.


TĀK III  Tāntrikābhidhānakośa: See Goodall 2013.


Tantrālokaviveka  See Tantrāloka.


Introduction

For Buddhist philosophers the logical fallacy called āśrayāsiddha (a pseudo-logical reason whose basis is not established) is an intractable problem when dealing with something whose existence is not accepted by Buddhists as the subject of a thesis of their own, such as the Śāṅkhya’s pradhāna (primordial matter) or the Vaiśeṣika’s eternal ākāśa (space) and so on. Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school, presented different approaches to this issue in his two works, the Nyāyamukha and the Pramāṇasamuccaya. In his earlier work, the Nyāyamukha, when proving the non-existence of the Śāṅkhya’s pradhāna through the logical reason “not being perceived,” he permitted pradhāna to be placed as the subject of the thesis by seeing pradhāna as a conceptually constructed object (kalpita), in order to allow the logical reason to be a property of the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharma). However, in the Pramāṇasamuccaya he does not use this method, but addresses the problem in a different way. According to his new method, the Buddhist proponent can put forth the Śāṅkhya’s pradhāna as the subject of the thesis when he formulates a reductio ad absurdum kind of argument (prasaṅga) to refute (dūṣaṇa/parihāna) the adversary’s tenets. For the sake of convenience I shall refer to this technique for avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha as the “method of hypothetical assumption.”

As Tom Tillemans has pointed out, Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660 or 550–650?) also provides two ways to deal with this issue: The first is based on Dignāga’s solution found in the Nyāyamukha. In his Svavṛtti on Pramāṇavārttika 1.205–206 Dharmakīrti explains the word kalpita mentioned in the NMu as referring to an image that appears in the cognition and that it thus can exist as the subject of the thesis. This first method is designated by Tillemans as the “principle of conceptual subjects.” The second method is mentioned in PV 4.136–148, where Dharmakīrti comments on the word svadharmiṇi in Dignāga’s definition of a thesis (pakṣa) given in Pramāṇasamuccaya 3.2. According to this second method, when the Buddhist proponent places ākāśa, for example, as the subject of a thesis, what is intended by the word ākāśa is not the eternal entity postulated by the Vaiśeṣika opponent, but any other entity called ākāśa whose existence is recognized not only by the Buddhist proponent, but also by ordinary people. Tillemans calls this “the method of paraphrase.”

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In the third chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya, Dharmakīrti also adopts Dignāga’s second method as presented in the PS, i.e., the “method of hypothetical assumption.” As a result, a total of three methods – two from Dignāga and one developed by Dharmakīrti – coexist within Dharmakīrti’s system of logic in order to prevent the problem of āśrayāsiddha. How then does he harmonize these three, especially the two methods adopted from Dignāga? If the “principle of conceptual subjects” is applied, the “method of hypothetical assumption” seems to be no longer necessary. Moreover, it is reported by Takashi Iwata that Dharmakīrti’s commentators, such as Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta, have views on prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya that are different from how they are discussed by Dharmakīrti in PVin 3. The difference of their opinions depends on which of Dharmakīrti’s methods they ascribe more importance to.

The aim of this paper is, therefore, to examine Dharmakīrti’s explanation of how to avoid the problem of āśrayāsiddha and to clarify its historical development from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti and on to his successors.

1. Dignāga

1.1 The Nyāyamukha: the principle of conceptual subjects

In the NMu, Dignāga explains the general rule that in an inference – be it an inference-for-oneself (svārthānumāna) or an inference-for-others (parārthānumāna) – one property of the subject (i.e., sādhya-dharma/property to be proved) is known through another property of the same subject (i.e., sādhana-dharma/proving property). In this explanation, Dignāga refers to an opponent (probably a Sāṅkhya) who insists that this rule cannot cover every instance because in some cases the subject (dharmin) itself is proved to be existent or non-existent. As an example this opponent gives the following reasoning, which uses pradhāna as the subject of the thesis:

\[
\text{(Prayoga 1)} \\
\text{[Thesis:]} \ [\text{pradhāna}] \text{ does not exist;}
\]

Just prior to (Prayoga 1), Dignāga refers to another reasoning (prayoga) that also has pradhāna as the subject of the thesis: [Thesis:] pradhāna exists (asti pradhānam); [Reason:] because in various individuals homology (anvaya) concerning the three constituents, i.e., pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), and confusion (moha) is observed (bhedānām anvayadarśanāt). (NMu [Katsura 1978: 110] T. 1628 1b29: 有成立最勝爲有。現見別物有總類故) His answer to this is: The thesis should be formulated as “The various individuals certainly possess one and the same cause [i.e., pradhāna].” [If so,] the [existence of] pradhāna is not established [directly]; hence, there is no error [of the violation of the above-mentioned general rule]. (NMu [Katsura 1978: 110] T. 1628 1c1–2: 此中但立別物定有一因為宗、不立最勝、故無此失。) Dignāga criticizes this prayoga by pointing out that its thesis is not formulated properly. The subject of the thesis should be “various individuals,” since otherwise the logical reason “homology” cannot be a pakṣadharmā. Although earlier studies (Tillemans 1999: 175 and Yao 2009: 386–387) regard this explanation by Dignāga as similar to the method of paraphrase applied by Dharmakīrti in PV 4.136–148, there is a fundamental difference. While Dharmakīrti’s method, as will be explained below, § 2.2, just rephrases the subject of the thesis pradhāna into “pleasure, etc.” the existence of which is accepted by the Buddhists, Dignāga’s method mentioned above changes the subject from pradhāna to “various individuals” in order to give pakṣadharmatva to the logical reason “homology.” Thus Dignāga’s critique is not aimed at avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha.
[Reason:] because it is not perceived. (Cf. PVSV 105,15: na santi pradhānā-dayaḥ, anupalabdheḥ.)

To this, Dignāga gives the following answer:

When the non-existence [of pradhāna] is proved [on account of its not being perceived], “non-perception” is a property of a conceptually constructed object (i.e., pradhāna) (假安立不可得法/*kalpityānupalabdhir dharmaḥ); hence, there is also no error of [proving] the subject of the thesis [with the logical reason].

Here, in order to ensure the pakṣadharmatva for the logical reason “non-perception,” Dignāga gives a certain status of existence to pradhāna by seeing it as a conceptual construction (kalpita). In this way, any pseudo-entity can be accepted as a substratum of the logical reason, and the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha can be thereby avoided. This strategy, following Tillemans, is called the “principle of conceptual subjects.” At the time of the NMu this was the only means for avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha. In this connection, it should be noted that Dignāga shows here that using this principle enables Buddhists to put pradhāna as a subject of the thesis in a proper proof (sādhana), i.e., a proof that is put forth by Buddhist proponents themselves, even though they do not accept such pseudo-entities in reality.

1.2 The Pramāṇasamuccaya: the method of hypothetical assumption

In the third chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, while Dignāga deals with a reasoning that has the same thesis as the ⟨Prayoga 1⟩, i.e., nāsti pradhāna, he discusses it in a different context, i.e., a discussion about the reductio ad absurdum kind of argument (prasaṅga).

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4 See NMu (Katsura 1978: 110) T. 1628 1c1: 或立為無。不可得故。

5 See NMu (Katsura 1978: 110) T. 1628 1c2–4: 若立為無、亦假安立不可得法、是故亦無有有法過。
Dignāga refutes the Sāṅkhya’s proof of the existence of pradhāna, bhoktṛbhogyayor guṇāgunaṇatvaprasyāṅgam ... iti. sa katham āvīta iti cet. na hy ayam āvītaḥ. yasmāt

prasāṅgo ’pakṣadharmatvād anyo hetupratijñayoh //16//
doṣoktyā dūṣanam jāātam pūrvatropagame sati /

[Objection:] Like [the Sāṅkhyas], some [Buddhists] also speak of another reductio ad absurdum reasoning (prasāṅga) [as follows:]

⟨Prayoga 2⟩ It is not the case that pradhāna exists, because [if the pervasion (vyāpti) you presuppose in your proof of the existence of pradhāna were to be accepted,] it would follow that both the enjoyer (i.e., puruṣa) and that which

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6 Words in roman typeface are attested in Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary (PST) or in fragments, whereas those in italics have been reconstructed. The Sanskrit reconstruction of the PS and PSV used in this paper is a result of the PST seminar organized and led by Prof. Shōryū Katsura at Ryukoku University. Through his kindness, I have been able to use their reconstruction. As for the number of kārikās in PS 3, it is to be noted that recently the editorial team of the PST 3 has adopted a different way of counting them than was hitherto widely adopted by scholars, e.g., Kitagawa 1965 and Katsura 2009, etc. While the earlier counting regards k.7 as consisting of only a half verse (i.e., 7ab), the new counting includes the following half verse into k.7. That is, in the new counting k.7 consists of 7ab and 8ab of the earlier counting. Therefore, the new number of the kārikās in PS 3 shifts back by half from k.7. In this paper I use the new way of counting. The reading of k. 16cd–17ab I have adopted here is a modified version of that presented in Katsura 2009: 158; there it reads as follows: prasāṅgo ’pakṣadharmatvāt pūrvatropagame sati / hetupratijñayos teśam (or tatra) doṣoktyā dūsaṇam gatam // Cf. K (P129b3–6): de itar na ‘ga’ḥiṣ gtső bo ni yod pa ma yin tē / longs spyod pa po dang langs spyod par bya ba dag yon tan dang yon tan med pa’i (yon tan med pa’i em) (see P129b8–130a1): yon tan can gyi P) rang bzhin du thal ba’i phyir ... zhes thal bar ’gyur ba gzhon brjod par byed pa de ci itar bsal te ‘ongs pa ma yin zhe na i’ di ni bsal te ‘ongs pa ma yin tē / gang gi phyir / thal ’gyur phyogs chos can min phyir / sngon du khas blues yod na ni / rtags dang dam bca’ gzhon dag la // skyon brjod sun ’byin shes par bya //; V (D44b1–3, P47a8–47b2): yang ’dir thal ba gzhon brjod pa gtső bor yod pa ma yin tē / longs spyod pa po dang langs spyod par bya ba dag yon tan dang yon tan can nyid du thal bar ’gyur ba’i phyir ro zhes pa ... zhes bya ba de ji itar bsal te ‘ongs pa yin ‘di ni bsal te ‘ongs pa ma yin tē / gang gi phyir / thal ’gyur phyogs chos can min phyir / khas blues stock sun da song ba las // de gzhon (de gzhon P vīm.: de bsghin D vīm.: D Kānka) rtags dang dam bca’ yi (yi D vīm.: yis D Kānka) // skyon brjod sun ’byin du shes bya //

7 Dignāga refutes the Sāṅkhya’s proof of the existence of pradhāna through the following process: First the Sāṅkhya puts forth (Prayoga A) for proving the existence of pradhāna. (Prayoga A) Pradhāna exists because in various individual things homology (anvaya) [concerning three constituents, i.e., sukha, duḥkha and moha] is observed. (asti pradhānam, bhedānām anvayadarśanānāt.) (2) In order to ensure the pakṣadharmatvā of the logical reason “homology,” this (Prayoga A) is rewritten as (Prayoga A’). Various individual things possess one and the same cause because homology is observed. (bhedānām ekakāraṇatvam, anvayadarśanānāt.) (3) The Sāṅkhya adds the following reasoning in order to prove (Prayoga A’), because otherwise the opponent, such as Buddhists, does not accept that pleasure etc. are commonly shared by various individual things. (Prayoga B) In various individual things homology is observed because they have common effects such as joy (priti). (4) Dignāga’s refutation: if (Prayoga B) is held to be true, the following vyāpti relation must be accepted. (Vyāpti:) Whatever brings about common effects, such as joy, etc., has a homology concerning three constituents. (yasas pritiyādā kāryām drṣṭam, tasya guṇānātvaṁ.) (5) However, because even a soul (pruṣa), which cannot be accepted in the Sāṅkhya system as consisting of three constituents, can bring about an effect such as joy if it is used as an object of meditation by adherents of the Sāṅkhya, the logical reason “having common effects” in (Prayoga B) would be inconclusive (anaikāntika). (6) Suppose that, on the contrary, the Sāṅkhya does
is to be enjoyed (i.e., vyakti) consist of [three] constituents (guna), or do not consist of [three] constituents.

… Why is this an āvīta reasoning? [Of course it is not.]

[Answer:] Actually, this is not an āvīta reasoning because,

since [its logical reason is] not the property of the subject of the thesis, the reductio ad absurdum reasoning is different [from the āvīta reasoning]. [Instead, this reductio ad absurdum reasoning is] understood as a refutation (dūṣaṇa) because [it] points out the failure of the [adversary’s] logical reason or of his thesis after accepting [them].

Just before this passage, Dignāga rejects the Sāṅkhya view that in the āvīta reasoning—a type of prasaṅga argument—the logical reason can prove the Sāṅkhya’s proposition without its being a property of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva), and he explained that if the pakṣadharmatva of the logical reason in the viṭa reasoning for proving the existence of pradhāna is accepted (at least) by the Sāṅkhya proponent, then the logical reason in the āvīta reasoning can also be regarded as possessing pakṣadharmatva because it can be reduced to the logical reason in the viṭa reasoning.8

The Sāṅkhya raises an objection against this explanation: In spite of the fact that for the Buddhists the ⟨Prayoga 2⟩ must consist in sound reasoning, the logical reason cannot possess pakṣadharmatva because the existence of the subject of the thesis in ⟨Prayoga 2⟩, i.e., pradhāna, is not accepted by Buddhists. As a result, it cannot be held that every sound logical reason must be a property of the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharma).

In his reply, Dignāga, unlike in the case of the NMu, does not try to ensure the pakṣadharmatva of the logical reason in the ⟨Prayoga 2⟩. He rather agrees that the logical reason does not possess pakṣadharmatva. This does not mean, however, that he relinquishes the soundness of the ⟨Prayoga 2⟩. He is able to do this by distinguishing the logical reason in a proper proof (sādhana) from the logical reason in a refutation (dūṣaṇa). While the former should possess pakṣadharmatva (and a vyāpti relation with the property to be proved), the latter does not. According to Dignāga, a refutation is simply a means of denying the soundness of the adversary’s reasoning by pointing out the undesired consequences which occur when the adversary’s thesis or logical reason (which necessarily includes a vyāpti relation) is accepted.9 And since in the refutation what is to be investigated is the logical consequence derived from the adversary’s thesis or reasoning, the existence or non-existence of the subject of the thesis does not become a topic of discussion. Therefore, the problem of āśrayāsiddha does not occur in the refutation. Since the prasaṅga argument is formulated

8 See Watanabe 2013.
after hypothetically assuming the opponent’s system of philosophy, this method can be called the “method of hypothetical assumption.”

2. Dharmakīrti

2.1 Dharmakīrti’s version of the principle of conceptual subject – PV 1 and PVin 3

In PV 1.205–212 and his own commentary on these verses, Dharmakīrti explains Dignāga’s previously mentioned ⟨Prayoga 1⟩ (“pradhāna does not exist because it is not perceived”) presented in the NMu, developing Dignāga’s principle of conceptual subjects from the point of view of the theory of apoha. In the following verses, he explains why in the ⟨Prayoga 1⟩ the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha does not occur.

PV 1.205–206 = PVin 3.53–54:

\[
\begin{align*}
anādivāsanodhūtavikalpaparinisṭhitah & / \\
śabdārthas trividho dharmo bhāvābhāvobhyāśrayaḥ & \text{(205)} / \\
tasmin bhāvānapādāne sādhye syānupalambhanam & / \\
tathā hetur na tasyaivābhāvaḥ śabdaprayogataḥ & \text{(206)} / \\
\end{align*}
\]

The verbal object (śabdārtha), which is completely derived from conceptualisation proceeding from beginningless karmic tendencies, is a dharma of three kinds: based on something existent, something non-existent or both. When this [verbal object, such as pradhāna, etc.], which is without any existent substratum, is being proven, then the non-perception of this as being in such a way [i.e. as existing externally] is the logical reason. The non-existence of this very [śabdārtha] itself is not, for we do use words [like ‘pradhāna,’ etc.].

(Tillemans 1999: 176)

Following Dignāga’s description in the NMu, Dharmakīrti here explains that the subject of the thesis pradhāna is a conceptual construction and that this pradhāna does not have any external basis. But why can this conceptual construction be accepted as a proper subject of the thesis? This is explained as follows:

PVSV 105,26–27 = PVin 3 68,1–3:

\[
\begin{align*}
vaktuḥ śrotuḥ ca tadvikalpabhājah, yathā- \\
pratibhāsāvastupratipādanasamīhāprayogāt, tadākārvikalpajanān ca.
\end{align*}
\]

And both speaker and listener share such a conceptual cognition (i.e., a conceptual cognition coming from a beginningless imprint) because [the former]

\[^{10}\] This method corresponds to “the principle of propositional attitude,” as it has been called by Zhihua Yao. In his article (Yao 2009: 393–396) he states that this principle was developed by Chinese Buddhist logicians, such as Kuiji, and is merely implied by Dignāga and the Indian Buddhists. However, as we have seen, this principle can clearly be traced back to Dignāga’s description in PS 3.

\[^{11}\] As Shinya Moriyama has pointed out in his presentation at the 17th IABS conference (21 Aug. 2014), Dharmapāla (T. 1571 188b12–14) also applies the same triple typology. The difference between Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti is that the former applies it to the classification of the logical reason, but the latter to the conceptual construction in general.
uses [words] according to the intention to convey a thing as it appears [to his conceptual cognition] and because [the latter, by hearing the speaker’s words,] brings about the conceptual cognition which has the same form [as that of the speaker].

Although the conceptually constructed pradhāna does not have an external basis, it exists as an image appearing to the cognition, that is, it has an internal basis. Moreover, since this internal image is considered to be common to the speaker and listener, i.e., the proponent and opponent, it can be a proper subject of the thesis.

In this way, Dharmakīrti develops Dignāga’s “principle of conceptual subjects” further by providing an ontological basis. He first advocated this view in his PVSV, and in his later work it is included in PVin 3 without any changes.

2.2 Method of paraphrase – PV 4

Dharmakīrti’s second method for avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha is, in the words of Tillemans, the “method of paraphrase.” This method is employed by Dharmakīrti in his PV 4.136–148, where he comments on the word svadharminī that appears in Dignāga’s definition of the thesis in PS 3.2. An example dealt with in the relevant passage of PV 4 is a Buddhist proof of the impermanence of space and so forth (khādi or vyomādi) through the logical reason “not producing sound, etc., all at once” (sakṛc chabdādyahetutvā). The Vaiśeṣika opponent raises the objection that if this reasoning is held to be true and is aimed at negating the Vaiśeṣika understanding of space as an eternal entity, it then follows that, because this reasoning negates the nature of space as understood by the Vaiśeṣika and hence the existence of that space cannot be accepted, the logical reason is categorized as dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana. Dharmakīrti replies to this objection by introducing the distinction between svadharmin (the subject intended by the proponent) and kevaladharmin (a thing that is not related to the subject intended by the proponent). In the case of the reasoning of impermanence of space, the subject put forth by the Buddhist proponent is not eternal space as postulated by the Vaiśeṣika opponent, but a certain entity called “space” whose existence is widely accepted by ordinary people. Therefore, even though the existence of eternal space is negated by the reasoning, no invalidation of the Buddhist proponent’s thesis can occur. Although Dharmakīrti himself does not mention here the problem of āśrayāsiddha directly, this method is applicable to our relevant problem. Hence

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12 According to Dharmakīrti, although in reality the internal image held by the speaker must differ from the internal image held by the listener, these two are regarded as the same. For this fundamental problem of Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha, see Kataoka 2010: 267–269.

13 See PV 4.141abcd: yathā parair anutpādyāpūrvarūpaṃ na khādikam | sakṛc chabdādyahetutvā ity ukte. “For example, when [the Buddhist] states that space, etc. do not have a novel nature unproduced by other [conditions] because they are not causes for [producing their qualities such as] sound, etc. all at once …” (Tr. Tillemans 2000: 202.)

14 See PV 4.141d’–142ab: prāha dūṣakaḥ // tadvad vastusvabhāvo ‘san dharmi vyomādir ity api l “… then the [Vaiśeṣika] adversary might say that in a similar way the subject, space, etc., would also not have the nature of a real entity.” (Tr. Tillemans 2000: 202.)

15 See PV 4.142cd: naivam iṣṭasya sādhyasya bādhā kācana vidyate // “In this fashion [even though the subject is invalidated], there is in fact no invalidation of the intended [proposition] to be proved (sādhyā) at all.” (Tr. Tillemans 2000: 202.)
the logical reason “not producing sound, etc., all at once” is accepted to be a property of the subject of the thesis because the *svadharmin* of this reasoning is a certain entity called “space.”

2.3 Dharmakīrti’s version of the method of hypothetical assumption – PVin 3

In PVin 3, Dharmakīrti speaks about *prasaṅga* arguments formulated by relying on what is accepted only by the opponent. There, in order to avoid the problem of *āśrayāsiddha*, he also adopts the method of hypothetical assumption presented by Dignāga in PS 3. Dharmakīrti begins his discussion as follows:

PVin 3 4,4–9: *yas tu paraparikalpitaḥ prasaṅgaḥ, yathā deśakālāvāśthāviśe-
ṣaniyataikadṛavyasaṁsargāvyavacchinnasvabhāvāntarvirahād anekavṛttter
eksya na deśādīvīśeṣavatānyena yogāḥ, tathābhūtasvabhāvasya virodhād
bhinnadeśādvadīyogena, sa ekadharmopagame ’paradharmopagamasandarśa-
nārthaḥ, tadanabhīyupagame cobrahyaniyṛttih, viveksya kartum aṣākyatvāt,
tasyānāt vakṣalataḥ pratibandhāt.*

On the other hand, a *reductio ad absurdum* kind of argument (*prasaṅga*) [is formulated] by means of [things] postulated by the opponent, as for instance:

⟨Prayoga 3⟩

[Thesis:] A single entity (*eka*), [although] it is [regarded by the opponent as] occurring in several things, is not united with others which have differences in terms of place, etc.

[Reason:] because it is devoid of another essential property which is not ob-
structured (*avyavacchina*) by the unification (*samsarga*) with a single substance
restricted by a particular place, time and state.

For it is incompatible that a thing that has such a nature (i.e., singularity) is
united with those which are different in place, etc.

The purpose of such [an argument] (*saḥ*) is to show that when one property X
is accepted, the other property Y is [also] accepted. To the contrary, when Y
is not accepted, both are negated because [Y] cannot be distinguished [from
X]. This is because Y is in reality bound to the other (i.e., X).

I will discuss the entire structure of this ⟨Prayoga 3⟩ below. What I would like to focus
on here is the passage beginning with the relative pronoun *saḥ*. In this part Dharmakīrti
explains the purpose of the *prasaṅga* argument. According to him, the *prasaṅga* argument
is set forth in order to show that a *vyāpti* relation between the logical reason and the property
to be proved is established.

To this explanation, however, a Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika opponent raises an objection by regard-
ing this ⟨Prayoga 3⟩ as a proper proof (*sādhana*). If ⟨Prayoga 3⟩ proves the non-existence of
a single entity, i.e., a universal (*sāṁanya*) which is taken by the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika opponent
as occurring in several things, then the logical reason of ⟨Prayoga 3⟩ cannot escape the
fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*, because for the Buddhist proponent the existence of the subject,
i.e., the universal, cannot be accepted as real existence. Or if, relying on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the Buddhist proponent accepts the existence of the universal as the subject of the thesis, then, because the consequence of this (Prayoga 3) is incompatible with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tenets, the invalidation of the thesis would occur. To this objection, Dharmakīrti replies as follows:

PVin 3 5,1–2: nanu tathāpy asiddhir hetoḥ pratijñāyāś cābhhyupetādīdīdhā, svayam abhyupagamāntarāvasthānāt. na, parīkṣākāle kasyacid abhyupagamaṁ.

[Objection:] Even then, the logical reason is unestablished and the thesis is invalidated by that which is accepted [by the proponent], etc., because [the proponent] bases himself on a different acceptance.

[Dharmakīrti:] This is not the case. For, at the time of the critical examination (parīkṣā) [of dogmatic ideas], any particular [dogmatic views] are not accepted [as its basis].

According to Dharmakīrti, a prasaṅga argument is used for the critical examination of a dogmatically accepted notion and any critical examination should be done without relying on particular tenets. In other words, a critical examination only concerns the logical consequence that is necessarily derived from certain characteristics postulated by the opponent as belonging to the subject of the thesis. Therefore, in a prasaṅga argument, the ontological status of the subject of the thesis is left out of consideration. As a result, the purpose of a prasaṅga argument is merely to show the vyāpti relation.

PVin 3 5,7–8: nāpy asiddhyādayah, yady evam idam api syān na vobhayam iti dharmayoḥ sambandhopadārṣanāt. ekāntaparigrahe syād eṣa dosah.

Moreover, there is no [fault of] the unestablished etc. because [in the prasaṅga argument] the relationship between two properties is shown as follows: if X were the case, then Y would also follow; or [otherwise, if the latter is not accepted], then both [X and Y] could not exist. [But if] the firm conclusion (ekānta) is grasped [through the prasaṅga argument], such a fault would occur.

As far as the purpose of the prasaṅga argument is restricted to show the vyāpti relation, there is no fault of āśrayāsiddha because in this case the first characteristics of a proper logical reason, i.e., paksadhartavata, is not needed. But if the prasaṅga argument is set forth for proving a property with regard to the subject of the thesis, then since the existence of the subject of the thesis is not accepted by the proponent himself, the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha cannot be avoided.

In this way, although he basically follows Dignāga’s method of hypothetical assumption, Dharmakīrti, by restricting the purpose of the prasaṅga argument to present the vyāpti relation, can successfully explain the reason why the problem of paksadhartavata is eliminated in the case of the prasaṅga argument.
2.4 Dharmakīrti’s theory of prasaṅga and the relationship between his three methods for avoiding āśrayāsiddha

Just after the passage in PVin 3 cited above, Dharmakīrti seems to link the principle of the conceptual subject or the method of paraphrase to the prasaṅga argument.

PVin 3 5.8–6.1: na vā satī hetau, yuḥtiprāptasyāvaśyaṃ parigrahārhatvat, .... asati tu hetau maulasya hetor vyāpyavyāpakabhāvasādhanaprakāra eṣaḥ, na viparyayasādhanam, hetor apramāṇatvat.

Or no [fault would occur] when the proper logical reason exists [in the prasaṅga argument] because what is obtained by rational reasoning is necessarily grasped [through such a logical reason]. … On the contrary, when the proper logical reason does not exist [in the prasaṅga argument], this (i.e., the prasaṅga argument) is a type of [reasoning] which proves, for the original logical reason (i.e., the reason in the ⟨Prayoga 3⟩), the relationship between what is pervaded and what pervades. [But it is] not a proof of the opposite [of the opponent’s view] because [its] logical reason is not [established by] valid cognition.

In the first sentence of this passage, Dharmakīrti suggests that there is a possibility of the transformation from the prasaṅga argument to a proper proof (śādhanā).

When the vyāpti relation between the logical reason and the property to be proved is acknowledged, one can turn the reasoning into a proper proof (śādhanā), if both the proponent and the opponent accept the following two things:

1. the existence of the subject of the thesis,
2. the logical reason’s being a property of the subject.

If one of these two conditions is not fulfilled, the reasoning remains a prasaṅga argument that does not prove anything with regard to the subject, but simply demonstrates the vyāpti relation. But if these two conditions are fulfilled, the reasoning becomes a proper proof (śādhanā) and hence no fault of asiddha occurs.

To fulfil the first of these two characteristics, the principle of conceptual subject and the method of paraphrase must be used. When we take ⟨Prayoga 3⟩ as an example, the method of paraphrase has probably been applied. That is, when the subject of the thesis “a single entity” (eka) is not taken to mean the universal (sāmānya) which occurs in several things, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent insists, but just a single entity like a form (rūpa), then the existence of the subject of the thesis is acceptable for both the Buddhist proponent and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent. Therefore, it can be said that in Dharmakīrti’s system of logic, the principle of conceptual subject and the method of paraphrase play an important role also for the conversion from the prasaṅga argument to a proper proof.

In this connection, the relationship between the principle of conceptual subject and the method of paraphrase must be considered. If we compare these two, it is obvious that the former has a wider range of application. To wit, when the proponent proclaims the non-existence of the subject (i.e., “X does not exist”), the latter cannot be applied to the subject because in the case of the method of paraphrase the subject “X” is paraphrased...
by a thing that is accepted by everybody as existing externally. Since the principle of conceptual subject alone seems enough to avoid the problem of āśrayāsiddha, why then does Dharmakīrtī add the method of paraphrase? Although Dharmakīrtī does not address this problem, it is likely that he restricts the application of the principle of conceptual subject to negating the existence of metaphysical things such as pradhāna, etc. in the form of “pradhāna does not exist,” using the method of paraphrase as widely as possible. Otherwise the inference-for-others (parārthānumāna) might lose touch with external objects.

3. Dharmakīrti and his successors on prasaṅgaviparyaya and another way to avoid the problem of āśrayāsiddha

As I have mentioned above, a prasaṅga argument is formulated by the proponent on the basis of the opponent’s assumption with regard to some subject. Therefore, even after the existence of the subject of the thesis is accepted, the second condition for avoiding the problem of asisiddha, i.e., the logical reason’s being a property of the subject, should not be fulfilled. However, in the case of ⟨Prayaoga 3⟩ the logical reason “being devoid of another essential property which is not obstructed (avyavacchinna) by the unification (samsarga) with a single substance restricted by a particular place, time and state,” i.e., “being devoid of multiplicity” (*anekatvaviraha) is accepted as a property of the subject of the thesis, i.e., a single entity, by both the Buddhist proponent and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent. Therefore, it is understood that this ⟨Prayaoga 3⟩ is more than just a normal prasaṅga argument. That is, this prasaṅga argument has already undergone some alterations. This is the process, I believe, that one can understand as Dharmakīrti’s formulation of prasaṅgaviparyaya.

Let’s present the vyāpti relation of property “A” by the property “B” as “A → B,” and describe the establishment of the vyāpti with regard to a subject “S” as “S: A → B.” Although Dharmakīrti himself did not explain the structure of prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya, we can describe it, following his commentators, as follows (here the sign “¬” means negation):

\[
\text{prasaṅga} \quad S : A \rightarrow B \\
\text{prasaṅgaviparyaya} \quad S : \neg B \rightarrow \neg A
\]

If this description is applied to the ⟨Prayaoga 3⟩, the main structure of the ⟨Prasaṅga 3⟩ would be expressed as follows:

\[
⟨\text{Prayaoga 3-1}⟩ \quad \text{eka} : *\text{anekatvaviraha} \rightarrow \text{nānyena yoga}
\]

This structure of ⟨Prayaoga 3⟩ corresponds perfectly to the prasaṅgaviparyaya described by Dharmottara, if the expressions anyena yoga (i.e., no negation of nānyena yoga) and anekavṛtti are regarded as having the same meaning:16

\[
⟨\text{Dharmottara’s prasaṅga}⟩ \quad \text{sāmānya : anekavṛttitva} \rightarrow \text{anekatva} \\
⟨\text{Dharmottara’s prasaṅgaviparyaya}⟩ \quad \text{sāmānya : anekatvaviraha} \rightarrow \text{nānekavṛttitva}
\]

16 See Iwata 1993: 50.
Moreover, Prajñākaragupta also gives a similar interpretation of ⟨Prayoga 3⟩ as his second interpretation:\(^{17}\)

\begin{align*}
\langle \text{Prajñākaragupta's prasaṅga} \rangle & \text{ sāmānya } [= \text{ rūpādi }]: \text{ vyāpitva } \rightarrow \text{ naikavyaktiniṣṭhatayopalambha} \\
\langle \text{Prajñākaragupta's prasaṅgaviparyaya} \rangle & \text{ sāmānya } [= \text{ rūpādi }]: \text{ ekavyaktiniṣṭhatayopalambha } \rightarrow \text{ avyāpitva}
\end{align*}

Although these two commentators differ in how they express the logical reason in the prasaṅgaviparyay, i.e., Dharmottara uses a negative expression and Prajñākaragupta uses an affirmative expression, the contents conveyed by both are roughly the same. Therefore, it can be said that both commentators understand Dharmakīrti’s ⟨Prayoga 3–1⟩ as an example of prasaṅgaviparyay. When we take their interpretations into consideration, it can be seen that Dharmakīrti’s ⟨Prayoga 3⟩ consists of the following prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya:

\begin{align*}
\langle \text{Dharmakīrti’s prasaṅga} \rangle & \text{ eka } : \text{ anekavṛtti } \rightarrow [^*\text{anekatva}] \\
\langle \text{Dharmakīrti’s prasaṅgaviparyaya} \rangle & \text{ eka } : ^*\text{anekatvaviraha } \rightarrow \text{nānyena yoga } (= \langle \text{Prayoga 3–1} \rangle)
\end{align*}

That is, ⟨Prayoga 3⟩ describes the following process of reasoning:

Step 1 (prasaṅga): Following the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, the property anekavṛtti is assumed with reference to the subject eka, and from it anekatva is logically derived although it is not stated in ⟨Prayoga 3⟩.

Step 2 (prasaṅgaviparyaya): But it is not the case that this anekatva is accepted by both the Buddhist proponent and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent, and it should be negated because it contradicts the subject eka. Therefore, anekatvaviraha is assumed to be a property of the subject, as is accepted by both. From this nānyena yoga, which for the opponent is an undesired consequence, is proved.

Despite the fact that the main structure of the ⟨Prayoga 3⟩ is a prasaṅgaviparyaya, which is in fact a proper proof (sādhana), Dharmakīrti presents this ⟨Prayoga 3⟩ as an example of a prasaṅga argument. Perhaps the reason for this is that he thinks prasaṅgaviparyaya can also be called prasaṅga in that both bring undesired consequences for the opponent.

Be that as it may, forming a prasaṅgaviparyaya is a method for ensuring that the logical reason is a property of the subject of the thesis, enabling Dharmakīrti, sometimes in connection with the principle of conceptual subject or the method of paraphrase, to transform a prasaṅga argument into a proper proof.

Now I would like to mention briefly how Dharmakīrti’s successors try to solve the problem of āśrayāsiddha. In commenting on ⟨Prayoga 3⟩, Dharmottara presents another way of avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha. According to him, if the logical reason consists of non-existence (abhāva), it is established in the subject of the thesis, as for

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\(^{17}\) See Iwata 1993: 72.
example the universal, whose existence is not accepted by the Buddhist proponent. As earlier research has shown, this method is also adopted by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi in their commentaries on PV 4.136–148. Dharmottara presents this view on the basis of the following statement of Dharmakīrti:

\[
\text{PV 1.26ab (≈ PVin 2 100,8): tasmād vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte neṣṭo 'vaśyam ihā-śrayah} / \\
\text{Therefore, a (factual) basis (āśraya) [i.e., a real locus] in the case of the dissimilar example is not assumed to be necessary here [in the tradition that follows Dignāga]. (Steinkellner 2004: 236)}
\]

Since Dharmakīrti’s statement is based on Dignāga’s explanation of vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta in PS(V) 4.3bcd, the “method of simple negation” can be traced back to Dignāga. However, since neither Dignāga nor Dharmakīrti mention this method in the context in question, it might be said that in some way this method was invented by the commentators to solve the problem of āśrayāsiddha. In contrast to Dharmottara, etc., Prajñākaragupta, when explaining (Prayoga 3) in his commentary on PV 4.12, does not adopt this method; instead, he adopts the method of paraphrase, that is, he paraphrases the subject of the thesis “universal” (sāmānya) as “form, etc.” (rūpādi). In his commentary on PV 4.136–148, he uses the principle of conceptual subjects and then, as a second interpretation, again employs the method of paraphrase. It is thus likely that he chooses the method of paraphrase as his final view. Therefore, as far as the problem of āśrayāsiddha is concerned, Prajñākaragupta’s view, when compared to that of the other commentators, is more similar to Dharmakīrti’s.

4. Concluding remarks

As seen above, whereas in the NMu Dignāga avoided the problem of āśrayāsiddha by applying the principle of conceptual subject, in the PS he avoids the same problem by employing the method of hypothetical assumption. This raises the question: Why doesn’t Dignāga use the strategy employed in the NMu, i.e., the principle of conceptual subjects, in the PS as well? It is likely that the difference in his two works of how the thesis is defined has played a role in his shift of position. The two definitions run as follows:

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19 Tillemans 1999 does not distinguish this method from the “principle of conceptual subjects.” However, as Yao (2009: 391) has pointed out, these are two different things.
21 PS(V) 4.3bcd: sādhye 'sati tv asat / (4.3b) vaidharmyena tv avaśyam sādhyābhāve tasyaiva hetor abhāvo dārsāitavyah. paryuddāso niṣedhāḥ ca tathā sati vilaksāne //3// tathā ca sati pūrvatra paryudāsāh, aparatra tu prasajyapratisēdaḥ ity uktam. evam ca nityānabhuyapagame 'pi vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntah siddhah. Cf. NMu §5.1 (Katsura 1981: 63): 由是雖対不立実有太虚空等、而得顕示無有宗処無因義成。
Comparing these two, one of the most significant differences is the word svadharmin in PS 3.2d. This word seems to stipulate that, in the proponent’s own thesis, not only the property to be proved, but also the subject of the thesis (svadharmin) should not be opposed. Therefore, once a thesis is defined in this way, a Buddhist proponent cannot place pseudo-entities, such as pradhāna, into the position of the subject of his own thesis, even if he intends to prove the non-existence of such a thing.

But this does not answer the question of why Dignāga does not repeat the principle of conceptual subjects in the PS, for he could have also defined the thesis without using the term svadharmin. Unfortunately, no decisive clue can be found to solve this question. However, some possible reasons can be raised.

(i) Weakness of the NMu’s argument against the Śāṅkhya’s proof

In the NMu, even though the pakṣadharmaṭva of the logical reason in ⟨Prayoga 1⟩ is ensured by employing the principle of the conceptual subject, the Śāṅkhya does not accept the logical reason as necessarily negating the existence of pradhāna since for the Śāṅkhya, pradhāna is, by definition, not perceived, but is to be inferred. For this reason, Dignāga may have thought that to negate pradhāna, it is easier to refute the Śāṅkhya’s proof than to explain ⟨Prayoga 1⟩ more convincingly to the Śāṅkhya.

(ii) Avoiding unnecessary expansion of his ontological framework

In the NMu, Dignāga posits a kind of existential status on pradhāna by using the principle of conceptual subjects. But in the PS, he provisionally accepts the Śāṅkhya’s tenet of the existence of pradhāna (along with the vyāpti relation). Basing himself on this provisionally accepted tenet, he points out the defectiveness of the Śāṅkhya’s proofs. He may have thought this strategy to be more preferable because, unlike the case of the principle of conceptual subjects, it does not need any expansion of his own ontological framework. It is likely that one or both of these reasons made Dignāga shift his position.

Unlike in the case of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti is able to overcome these two weak points by his new anupalabdhi theory and apoha theory. Therefore, the principle of conceptual subjects again becomes available as a way to avoid the problem of āśrayāsiddha. He not only inherits two methods from Dignāga, but also adds a third, i.e., the method of

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24 NMu (Katsura 1977: 109) T. 1628 1a8–9: 是中、唯隨自意樂為所成立説名宗。非彼相違義能遣。“Of them (viz. thesis, reason and example), a valid thesis (pakṣa) is [precisely] one which is intended (iṣṭa) by [the proponent] himself as something to be proved (sādhyā) and which is not opposed (anirākṛta) by incompatible states of affairs.” (Tr. Katsura 2004: 119.)

25 “[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (iṣṭa) by [the proponent] himself (svayam) as something to be stated (nirdesya) in its proper form alone (svarūpenaiva) [i.e., as something to be proved (sādhyā)]. With regard to [the proponent’s] own subject (svadharmin), it is not opposed (anirākṛta) by perceptible objects (pratyakṣārtha), by inference (anumāna), by authorities (āpta) or by what is commonly recognized (prasiddha).” (Tr. Tillemans 2000: 4–5.)
paraphrase. Then he tries to connect these three methods in the discussion of prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya. When the prasaṅga argument is used for refuting the opponent’s view, thanks to the method of hypothetical assumption, the problem of āśrayāsiddha does not occur. But when the proponent wants to formulate a proper proof, i.e., prasaṅgaviparyaya, from the prasaṅga argument, the method of paraphrase or the principle of conceptual subject is employed in order to avoid the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha in the case of the proponent not accepting the existence of the subject of the thesis. After that, the contrapositive (viparyaya) of the vyāpti relation in the prasaṅga argument is made in order to avoid the logical reason being an asiddha. As I have shown elsewhere, Dignāga has already indicated the possibility of reformulating a prasaṅga argument into prasaṅgaviparyaya.\footnote{See Watanabe 2013.}

It is, however, Dharmakīrti who establishes this theory by using the methods for avoiding the problem of āśrayāsiddha.

**Note**

After having finished my paper, I received Yoshimizu Chizuko’s article “Dharmakīrti’s Statement of Consequence (prasaṅga) in the Third Chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya” (Yoshimizu 2016). She takes, contrary to my understanding, the \langle Prayoga 3 \rangle to be a prasaṅga argument. The difference between our interpretations comes from how we understand the role of anekavṛtti in the \langle Prayoga 3 \rangle. While Prof. Yoshimizu takes both eka and anekavṛtti as being properties of the subject of the thesis (Yoshimizu 2016: 1248), I understand eka as the subject of the \langle Prayoga 3 \rangle and regard anekavṛtti as just a subsidiary element of eka that has been added to explain the opponent’s assumption. In the passage discussed above, anekavṛtti is presented in apposition to eka. However, as Prof. Yoshimizu has also pointed out (Yoshimizu 2016: 1253, note 5), Dharmakīrti refers to almost the same argument with \langle Prayoga 3 \rangle in the subsequent part without referring anekavṛtti and gives only eka as its subject. See PVin 3 6,6–7: ekasya tu yathoktasyabhāvāntaravirahopagamād eva bhinnadeśādibhir yogābhāvah.

**References and abbreviations**

D Derge edition of Tibetan Tripitaka.


K PS(V) translated by Kanakavarman and Dad pa’i shes rab.


P Peking edition of Tibetan Tripitaka.

PS(V) Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti). See n. 6.

PST Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. See n. 6.


P VinT Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā.

PV SV See PV 1.


V PS(V) translated by Vasudararakṣita and Seng rgyal.


Another Look at avinābhāva and niyama in Kumārila’s Exegetical Works

by
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu

Introduction

In one of my recent papers (K. Yoshimizu 2007a) I argued that in a fragment quoted by Karṇakagomin from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā (BṬ), which I call the ‘avinābhāva fragment,’\(^1\) Kumārila (ca. 560–620)\(^2\) states that avinābhāva, the inseparability of the reason (hetu) from the thing to be inferred (sādhya), is not sufficient for a valid inference because it would even justify an inference by asādhāraṇahetu, which has no positive examples. In another fragment from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā, which I call the ‘niyama fragment,’ Kumārila designates niyama, natural restriction, as the foundation of inference, illustrating this by means of causality (kāryakāraṇabhāva).

In the avinābhāva fragment, however, Kumārila does not deny the necessity of avinābhāva for a valid inference. In the niyama fragment, avinābhāva is considered to have a sound footing in reality by means of niyama, which means that in the real world the existence of one thing is spatiotemporally determined by another thing, and therefore the existence of the latter is invariably inferred from the confirmation of the former’s existence. Inasmuch as the inseparability of one thing from another is considered to require substantiation in reality, it follows that this inseparability is reflected in the consciousness.

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\(^2\) Franco (2019) convincingly demonstrates that Dharmakīrti’s dates, which were assumed by Frauwallner as ca. 600–660, cannot be moved back to the sixth century. I surmise that Kumārila passed away about 620 CE (K. Yoshimizu 2015a: n. 1), before coming to know about young Dharmakīrti, whereas Dharmakīrti wrote his first work, the first chapter of the PV refuting the Mīmāṃsā view of the intrinsic relation between a word and its meaning, by thoroughly remodeling the idea of Kumārila advocated in the BṬ that niyama is the foundation of avinābhāva. Because Dharmakīrti made use of this idea in order to attack the Mīmāṃsā theory of word and meaning, we may rightly assume as follows: If Kumārila, a hard-core Mīmāṃsaka, had first come to be informed of this idea through Dharmakīrti, he would have held it too provocative to be adopted into his own philosophical system, contrary to the assumption of Frauwallner (1962). See the appendix of the present article. Moreover, showing that PV 1.335cd is a quotation from the BṬ, Franco (2019: 132–137) corroborates young Dharmakīrti’s acquaintance with the BṬ. Following Frauwallner’s unacceptable assumption of the relationship between Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, Kataoka (2011: 47–60) errs in assuming Kumārila’s date as ca. 600–650.

of human beings. Therefore, the *avinābhāva* in the BT might rightly be called ‘epistemic inseparability’ in distinction from physical inseparability. In the present paper, I would like to elucidate how, before composing the BT, Kumārila attempted to substantiate *avinābhāva* through *niyama* by collecting from the *Tantravārttika* (TV) as many cases as possible in which he presents the invariable transition from one concept to another on the basis of the relation between two things in reality. In other words, I would like to reinforce the conclusion of another paper of mine (K. Yoshimizu 2011), that Kumārila was not indebted to Dharmakīrti for this idea, as assumed by Frauwallner (1962).

I. The conceptual transition modeled upon causality

1.1 Authorization of customs by assuming the existence of Vedic injunctions

In Mīmāṃsā, it is required that all provisions of man-made (*pauruṣeya*) scripture (*smṛti*), as well as traditional customs (*sadācāra*), if they pertain to religious duties (*dharma*), be based on the Veda. If the Vedic corpus one has inherited has no injunction that can be deemed as testifying these *smṛti* or customs, then it is, unlike in modern philology, allowed to assume the existence of corresponding Vedic injunctions in one way or another,\(^5\) insofar as they are sanctioned by learned people (*śiṣṭa*), namely, by those who have received the cultural inheritance of the Vedic tradition.\(^6\) The popular festivals celebrated by the common peoples of different regions belong to those Mīmāṃsā topics where authority was discussed. The opponent in Śabarasvāmin’s *Bhāṣya* (*ŚBh*) lists the names of three popular festivals held in east, south, and north India\(^7\) and states that the authority of the Vedic injunctions assumed to prescribe these festivals is limited to the respective regions, in the same way

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\(^4\) For the chronological order of Kumārila’s works, see K. Yoshimizu 2007b: 213–219. We can outline the change of Kumārila’s attitude towards Dignāga’s theory of logic as follows: In his early years, Kumārila adopted it as a theory more excellent than those advocated in Brahmin schools. He proudly demonstrated his proficiency in this innovative logic in the *Anumānapariccheda* of the *Ślokavārttika* (*ŚV*), which holds formal logic to be neutral and separate from the religious conflict between Brahmanism and Buddhism. In his middle years, however, having become active as a leading Mīmāṃsaka and defending orthodox Brahmanism, in the Smṛtipāda of the TV he criticized Buddhism as a heresy (cf. K. Yoshimizu 2015a). In his later years, Kumārila finally directed his attack to Dignāga’s theory of logic, and in the BT even attempted to find fault with “the three characteristics for a valid reason” (*hetutrairūpya*), the basis of this logic, as I argue in K. Yoshimizu 2007a: 1084–1096.

\(^5\) In early Mīmāṃsā, this problem was solved by assuming that the Vedic text containing the needed injunctions had disappeared. Kumārila, however, rejected this view in order to prevent heretics from making use of this excuse to claim orthodoxy. Instead, he proposed assuming that a corroborating injunction was preserved somewhere in other branches of the Veda. Cf. K. Yoshimizu 2012a: 650–654.

\(^6\) Cf. K. Yoshimizu 2015a, section III.

\(^7\) *ŚBh* 243,5–244,2: *anumānāt smṛter ācārāṇāṃ ca prāmāṇyam iṣyate. yenaiva hetumā te pramāṇam, teneiva vyavasthāt prāmāṇyam arhanti. tasmād holākād[ya]ḥ prācyavriva kartavyāḥ, āhnīnai-bukādayo dākṣiṇātyair eva, udvṛṣabhayajñādaya udīcyair eva.* “Man-made scripture and traditional customs are regarded as authoritative on the basis of the assumption [of corroborating injunctions of the Veda] On account of this very reason to make them authoritative, they (i.e., traditional customs) have authority only in respective (regions). Therefore, Holākā, etc., are to be performed only by easterners, Āhnīnaibuka, etc., only by southerners, and Udvrṣabhayajñā, etc., only by northerners.”
as the authority of the Vedic injunctions assumed to prescribe the number of topknots arranged on one’s head is limited to one’s own kinship group.8

1.2 Difference in authorization between regional festivals and the customs of kinship group

Despite its conservative position, the Mīmāṃsā school never considers the Veda as forcing human beings to comply with its injunctions unconditionally. Vedic injunction urges only those who satisfy appropriate conditions (nimitta) of entitlement to perform duties. With regard to these conditions, however, one’s living place does not matter at all if one lives in the so-called “homeland of Aryans” (āryāvarta). No matter where someone was born among the four geographical quarters, they are not endowed with a generic property (jāti) distinguishing them from people who live in other quarters.9 The generic properties recognized as real, at least by Mīmāṃsakas, such as humanness (manusyatva) and Brahmin-ness (brāhmaṇatva) never change regardless of where one lives, even if one moves to another country.10 Therefore, even if Vedic injunctions existed that were deemed as testifying popular festivals, their authority could not be limited to a particular quarter because one’s living place has no effect on one’s social affiliation.

In contrast, regarding the traditional customs of kinship groups, Kumārila adduces some examples of ritual details prescribed in the Śrautasūtras specifically for people of particular kinship groups, adding that it is actually observed that such rituals are performed by these groups.11 On the evidence of these explicit regulations given in ritual tradition, Kumārila

8 ŚBh 244.2–3: yathā śikhākalpo vyavatiṣṭhate, kecit triśikhāḥ, kecit pañcaśikhāḥ iti. “Just as [the number of] topknots one arranges [on one’s head] is regulated in respective (families), for example, some (families) keep three, some five.” For the śikhā to be arranged at the cūḍākaraṇa for the children of a twice-born (dvija) family, see Pandey 2006: 94–101.
9 TV 246,10–11: na tāvat prācyatvadākṣiṇātyatvādijātīḥ pratīcyodīcyādīvyaktivyāvṛttā sarvapraśyā- 
divyakṣīs anugatā kācid upapadyate, yadvacanam upapadaṃ holākādyadhikāraṃ viśiṃṣyāt. “First, easterners or southerners do not have any generic properties which would be separate from every westerner or every northerner and inhere in every easterner [or in every southerner], and which would be denoted by an accompanying word, if any, that qualifies the entitlement to Holākā, etc.”
10 TV 246,12–13: yās tu manuṣyatvabrāhmaṇanatvādijātayaḥ teṣu vidyante tāḥ sarvadeśavāsivyaktisy 
aviśiṣṭā iti nācārānurūpaviśeṣaṃ samarthatvena jñāyante. “On the other hand, the generic properties found in them, such as humanness, Brahmin-ness, and so on, are equally inherent in all individuals who live in any region. Therefore, no [generic properties] are recognized as able to qualify [the assumed Vedic injunction] to correspond to the [localized] customs.”
11 TV 248,23–25: yathāiva pañcāvatam tu bhṛgūnāṃ, vasisṭha-śunaka-atri-vadhryaśva-kāṇva-samkṛti- 
rājanyānām “nārāśaṃso dvitīyas pratyayās tanūnapād anyeṣāṃ” ity anvayaato vyatirekatas copalakṣa- 
naśaṃbhavād vyavasthitavidhavṣaṇām. “For example, the pañcāvatta is prescribed for the members of the Bhṛgu family.* For the members of the families of Vasiṣṭha, Śunaka, Atri, Vadhryaśva, Kāṇva, Samkṛti, and royal families, the second prayāya [verse that begins with] narāśaṃsa is prescribed whereas that [which begins with] tanūnapā is prescribed for the others.** As we observe [these details performed] in this way through association (anvaya) [of practice with prescription] and dissociation (vyatireka) [of practice with the absence of prescription], we conclude that there are [Vedic] injunctions differentiated [by these kinship groups].” *Among the offerings in the new- and full-moon sacrifices, the aśvabhāga (ghee-portion) scooped four times should be offered for Agni and Soma, respectively. But in the case of the sacrifices of the Jamadagni family, the portion scooped five times (pañcāvatta) should be offered. Cf. ĀpŚS 2.18.1; BhārŚS 2.17.7; HirŚS 2.2: 190; MānŚS 1.3.2.5. Jamadagni is compared to Bhṛgu in Jaiminiyabrāhmaṇa (JB) 1.152. Cf. Bodewitz 1990: 85 and 256, n. 22; Atharvavedasamhitā
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concludes that with regard to traditional customs, if one observes a life-style restricted (*niyata*) to a caste or Brahmin lineage (*pratijātigotra*), then one can infer the existence of Vedic injunctions restricting each life-style to the corresponding kinship group.\(^{12}\)

This argument reveals Mīmāṃsaka’s conservative view that one’s birth into a particular kinship group is just as deeply engraved in one’s identity as the generic properties of a natural species. This crystallization of one’s inborn social affiliation leads to the assumption that the life-style of Aryan kinship groups is regulated by the Veda, which has no regional difference in validity, just as the characteristics and the behaviors of natural species are regulated by their nature and not by where they live. Considering that this argument is modeled upon the laws of nature, Kumārila refers to a sort of rationale (*nyāya*)\(^{13}\) found in causality, namely that effect is compliant to its cause (*kāraṇānuvidhāyikāryanyāya*), and uses this rationale to infer that when observing an effect it must have a conformable (anurūpa) cause (*avaśyam upalabhyānakāryānurūpakāraṇānumānānair bhavitavyam*).\(^{14}\)

In this statement, the laws of nature regulating the behavior of individual entities through their generic properties are said to have universal validity because generic properties are not affected by the place where these entities are located or when they exist. Moreover, the effect (*kārya*) is said to occur passively as regulated by the cause (*kāraṇa*); the effect becomes the logical reason that actively leads to the existence of the cause.\(^{15}\) This reversal

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\(^{12}\) TV 248,25–26: *tathāva pratijātigotraniyatātriṣikhaśikhādikalpavyavasthitavidhiviśeṣānumānopaṭṭir asītī.* *In the same way, from the fact that whether one arranges three topknots or one topknot is restricted (*niyata*) to each caste and each Brahmin lineage (*pratijātigotra*), it is appropriate to infer the existence of a particular injunction differentiated [by the respective kinship group].’*

\(^{13}\) The first of the proponent *sūtra* (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* [MmS] 1.3.16: *api vā sarvadharmaḥ syāt, tannyāyatvād vidhāna*) asserts that a Vedic injunction, if it exists, must be a norm issued to all people (*sarvadharma*) irrespective of where they live. To assert this, however, this *sūtra* merely adds the tautological reason that it is reasonable (*tannyāyatva*) to consider that Vedic injunction works (*vidhāna*) in this way. Kumārila mentions the Kāṇva and the Samkṛti families. RV 10.110 is a hymn of Jamadagni, and RV 7 is the collection of Vasiṣṭha’s hymns. See Th. Aufrecht’s “Verzeichnis der angeblichen Hymnendichter gemäß der Anukramaṇikā” appended to his edition of the RV.

\(^{14}\) TV 245,14–15: *īha smṛtir ācārāṃ copalabhya mūlaśrutiṃ anumānāṃ asītī kāraṇānuvidhāyikāryanyāyaṃ veda upalabhyānakāryānurūpakāraṇānumānānair bhavitavyam.* *When one, having observed some man-made scriptures and customs in this world, attempts to assume the corroborating injunctions [of the Veda], one should invariably infer the cause that is conformable to the effect one has observed, following the rationale that the effect is compliant to its cause."

\(^{15}\) On another occasion, Kumārila remarks that unlike effect, cause does not work as an indicator (*gamaka*) because in many cases it is inconclusive (*vyabhicārabhutva*), namely, when auxiliary conditions are not fulfilled, it fails to indicate the occurrence of its effect. TV 544,20–21: *kāryaḥ kāramaḥ gamakaḥ vyabhicārabhutvā yathā kāryam.* This remark is made immediately after the argument that the inference from *kṛtakatva* to *anityya* is not based upon causality. Cf. n. 41.
of direction from cause to effect in reality and from effect to cause in cognition anticipates the formulation given by Kumārila in the niyama fragment from the BT\(^{16}\) and reminds us that Dharmakīrti assigns only the effect, not the cause, as the logical reason based on the causality between a cause and its effect (PVSV 3.11–16 on PV 1.2abc).

II. The conceptual transition from species to genus

2.1 Various relations in reality between two epistemically inseparable things

In the TV we find various cases in which Kumārila assumes epistemic inseparability (aviniṭṭhāva) between two things. Illustrating the relation that makes one thing epistemically inseparable from another, Kumārila adduces the relation between cause and effect (kāryakāraṇa), between owner and owned (svasvāmin), and the accompaniment (sahacarabhāva) of two particular things.\(^{17}\) To illustrate the last, Kumārila says that if the constellation kṛttikā appears in the night sky, the rohiṇī will soon appear.\(^{18}\) As regards the relation between owner and owned, this might be considered a typical example of the relation between a substrate and its properties, both essential ones and those that are accidental.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{16}\) PVSVṬ 87,29–30: niyamamśnaratāḥ samayag niyamyaikāṅgadarśanāt / niyāmakāṅgavijñānam anumānam tadāngisu // “If one who correctly remembers the restriction sees one member [of the restriction-relation], (namely) the restricted (member) (niyamya), the resultant cognition of the (other) member which is the restricting (niyāmaka) is an inference in regard to such (entities) that possess these (two) members [i.e. pakṣas].” (Tr. Steinkellner 1997: 634, n. 28.)

\(^{17}\) TV 139,13–14: atha vodāhṛtaviṣayahetulakṣaṇam etat* avinābhāvo hy aneka-kāryakāraṇa- svasvāmi-sahacarabhāvādi-prabhedabhinnaḥ. “Or, this [merely] characterizes the logical reason given in the quoted ‘example sentence of exegesis’ (viṣaya). For, the epistemic inseparability differentiates according to the difference of the relation between cause and effect, that between owner and owned, the accompaniment, and so on.” Cf. Kanazawa 1983: 933; Harikai 2006: 307, n. 10. In view of the context of the section in question (MmS 1.2.26–30), this portion of the TV is included in the part of the pūrvapakṣa that construes śūrpeṇa juhoti, tena hy annam kriyate as a reason justifying the use of a winnowing basket (śūrpa) for an offering. For the contents of this section, see Harikai 2006. * This etat refers to the kāryakāraṇabhāva in ŚBh 139,1: nam aprasiddhe kāryakāraṇabhāve na hetūpadeśah. “[Some people] may contend that the presentation of a logical reason is made impossible unless a causal relationship is established [between the reason and the thing to be proved].”

\(^{18}\) TV 139,8–9: tat* tv ayuktam. akāryakāraṇabhāvānām api kṛttikādīnām avīrtikādīnām anumānam tadāngisu // “Some people, [hearing] that he has a vajra makes one infer that [the deity concerned is] Indra” (ṬṬ 1614,25–1615,15: yathā vajrītīndram anumāpayati) is used by Kumārila as a simple example of the exegetical inference from a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) mentioned in a text to the sacrifice qualified (viśeṣya) by it. ṬṬ 1614,24–25: ahadhābdo yāgaviśeṣavacane śrutam api viśeṣyam anumāpayati. “The word ‘day,’ which expresses a particular sacrifice [in the text concerned, that is, Pañcaviṃśabrāhmaṇa (PB) 22.9.1*], makes one infer the [sacrifice] qualified [by it] even if [the sacrifice] is not directly expressed. This qualifier cannot occur [in the text] without the sacrifice.” * Cf. PB 22.9.1: catvāri trīrynty ahāny agniṣṭomamahāday prajñēti jyotiṣṭoma tīrātthā “Four nine-versed (trīṛṇ) days, the first of which is an agniṣṭoma (the three others being uktivas); a Viṣvajit-day; a mahāvrataye day, (and) a jyotiṣtoma as over-night-rite.” (Tr. Caland 1982: 578.) This is the breakdown of a seven-day-sacrifice called janakasaptarātra (cf. Caland 1982: 578, n. 1). Moreover, Kumārila considers the restriction of parts by the whole (samudāya) as the basis for the conceptual transition from a piece of text to the entire text by which it is restricted (niyamya), in
Moreover, Kumārila considers *avinābhāva* to include any kind of necessary condition when he distinguishes *avinābhāva* from the relationship between the subordinate means and the primary purpose (*śeṣa-śeṣi-bhāva*), one of the Mīmāṃsā topics that is exegetically determined from ritual texts. For example, the study of the Veda (*adhyayana*), the installation (*ādhāna*) of sacred fires, the cultivation (*kṛṣi*) of crops for oblations, and the earning of money (*dravyārjana*) for rewards to be paid to priests are all necessary for the performance of sacrifices (*kratu*). But although a sacrifice cannot be performed without them (*vinā-asambhava*), they are not exegetically subordinate (*śeṣa*) to a sacrifice because they are not prescribed in the text of the sacrifice.

As a further instance of a necessary condition, Kumārila applies *avinābhāva* to his theory of human action and Vedic injunction. In the Mīmāṃsā position, the ending of a finite verb (*tiṄ*) denotes the general form of intentional action called “bringing into being” (*bhāvanā*). Fully aware of the Pāṇinian rule that *tiṄ* in the active voice and the middle voice denotes the agent (*kartṛ*), Kumārila maintains that the agent is invariably cognized from *bhāvanā* on account of *avinābhāva* because if there is no agent, no action can be performed.

other words, to which it belongs. See n. 47. In addition, we may also classify the inference from an accidental property (*guna*) to its substrate into this type. Kumārila offers the example that one can infer the existence of a substance (*dravya*) from the cognition of color. Cf. ṬṬ 1368,15–18: *yathā śuklādiguṇo dravyena vinā na bhavatīty avinābhāvād dravyaṃ lakṣayati, naivam iha*; Kanazawa 1983: 932.

TV 654,10–15: *ayuktam evaṃ śeṣatvam avinābhāvalakṣaṇam / vyabhicārāt tathāhīdam aśeṣeṣv api dṛśyate // sarvadā hy avinābhūtā rūpasparśādāyaḥ kṣitau / na caiṣāṃ tulyakalpatvād bhavaty anyonyāsēṣatā // svāmin ca vinā dāsā na bhavati kadācana // / tathā gṛhādayas teṣāṃ śeṣaḥ svāmī ca nhasyate // “It is not right to say that subordination is defined as epistemic inseparability on account of inconclusiveness, for we find this also in those cases that are not subordinate. As a matter of fact, color, touch and other [qualities of elements] are always inseparable from one another in earth, but among them, there is no [quality of elements] because they are equally arranged [in earth]. Without a master, moreover, there can never be a slave, a house, and so on, but the master is not deemed to be subordinate to them.” Cf. Kanazawa 1983: 932–933.

TV 654,20–21: *etenādhyayanādānakṛṣidravyārjanādiṣu / vācyaṃ prasaṅgiśeṣa (IO 2157, 6b6: *śeṣa*; Ānandāśrama ed.: *śeṣi*) tvaṃ tair vinā kratvasaṃbhavāt / “By this (i.e., assuming *avinābhāva* to be the definition of subordination), one would have to say that Vedic study, fire installation, cultivation, earning money, and so on, come to be subordinate because without them the performance of a sacrifice is impossible.” Moreover, Kumārila finds inseparability in the hierarchy of social order, saying that when a king is invited somewhere, all the subordinates who are inseparable from him must follow him. TV 486,23–26: *loke 'pi ca yat pradhānaṃ rājaprabhṛti kvacīna nīyate tātāṃ rājanāvati śeṣi bhṛtyānāṃ amātyā-dīny ātigāny apy aśeṣānāṃ aksipati. Yadā tu kaścid bhṛtyānāṃ kvacīna gacchati tadā tadasaṃbandhīni bhṛtyāntarāṇi padam api na calanti. “Even in this world, a chief person, for example, a king, when invited to some place, mobilizes all the subordinate people who are inseparable from him, for example, ministers, etc. On the other hand, when one of the servants goes somewhere, the others do not take even a single step because they are not connected to that (servant).”

For the reason why Mīmāṃsakas insist on denoting *bhāvanā* through verbal endings, in defiance of the Pāṇinian rule, see K. Yoshimizu 2012b: 555–557.

A 3.4.67: *kartari kṛt; 69: laḥ karmanī ca bhāve cākarmākebhayaḥ.*

TV 914,1–2: *yādṛśas ca gubhābhūtā kartārāvagamyate na tādṛśena vinā bhāvanopapadyata ityarthā- pattyānunāmane vā śāktā gamayitum. “No matter in whichever manner an agent that is subordinate [to the action] is cognized in this (finite verb), *bhāvanā* is impossible without an agent. In this way, [*bhāvanā*] is able to make [an agent] known through logical derivation or through inference.”
2.2 The inseparability of species from generic properties, and causality as its ontological background

Whereas an agent is indispensable for any action, action in many cases requires other kārakas in addition to agent. According to Kumārila, bhāvanā can bear relations with kārakas other than an agent without breaking the relation with the agent. To illustrate this, he refers to the following simile: When one sees a tree and notices that it is a simśapā, one can also optionally realize the same object in other ways – as a tree (vrksa), an earthen thing (pārthiva), a substance (dravya), or a being (sat) – without denying that it is a simśapā. This is because the specific property of a simśapā, simśapātva, exists only in an entity in which generic properties of its genus such as tree-ness and so on invariably exist. Kumārila expresses the inseparability (avinābhāva) of a species from each level of its genus by saying that simśapātva is not inconclusive (na ... anaikāntikatvam) in the sense that it never loses its ability (pratāyānaśakti) to make the existence of the generic properties known.

Owing to this inseparability, simśapātva can be compared to bhāvanā in the theory of action. Upon hearing a finite verb, one may comprehend many things, such as bhāvanā, action, agent, time and other ideas. If the verbal root or the tense changes, the action or the time also changes; if the verbal ending remains the same, the comprehension with regard to the agent remains the same. According to Kumārila, however, we do not have to assume the agent to be the meaning of the verbal ending because, once bhāvanā is confirmed, it is invariably known that there is an agent. This can be explained by analogy with deriving the concepts of genus from the names of species; that is, we do not have to assume that the word simśapā denotes any generic properties of a genus, such as tree-ness, because a tree is invariably known to be referred to when an object is called simśapā, if it is accepted that the word simśapā denotes only simśapātva. According to Kumārila, simśapātva is

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25 TV 914,7–8: yas tv anyatāpi vartamānah pūrvāvagatasambandhyaprātyāyānenaiva vartate yathā simśapa-pātvam vrksatvapārthivatvadrayatvasattvesu. “On the other hand, there is a case in which a thing does not renounce the formerly cognized relation with another thing, even if it has come into the relation with something else. For example, [when an object is cognized as simśapā] the simśapā-ness remains [in one’s cognition] even if [the object is cognized as having] the generic properties of tree, earthen thing, substance, and being.”

26 TV 914,8: na tasyānaiśāntikatvam, sarvesu pratāyānaśaktivāyāvihāṭat. “It (i.e., simśapātva) is not inconclusive in the sense that it never loses its ability to make [the existence of] all of them known.”

27 TV 913,16–18: tad iha pacatādāśabdodoccāranād ityanto ‘rthā gamyante, bhāvanādāhāvarthakartṛta-tsamkhyāpurusopagrahakālavīṣāḥ. teṣām tu kaḥ śabdād ko ‘rthād iti vibhāgo na jñāyate. ‘bhandaṁ caitāvad yo ‘rthān na gamyate sa śabdārtha iti. “Now, when hearing the word pacati, etc., pronounced, one cognizes so many things, such as bhāvanā, the meaning of the verbal root (i.e., an action), agent, its number, the grammatical person, grammatical voice, and a certain time. Among them, however, it is not yet ascertained which one is known directly from the meaning of the word and which one is from the meaning [of the word], and the meaning of a word is merely defined as that which cannot be cognized through anything else that is assumed to be the meaning [of that word].” Cf. Ogawa 1993: 1052–1053.

28 TV 940,12–14: simśapāsabdha hi na tāvad vrksatvapārthivatvadrayavatvasattāprameyavajñeyatvānām abhidhāyako ‘tha ca tāvīsēm eva simśapātvam(*-pātvam; IO 2158, 39(152) b2 & Ānandāśrama ed.: -pām) abhidhatte. “For the word simśapā does not denote tree-ness, nor earthen-ness, nor substance-ness, nor being-ness, nor the property of being correctly known, nor the property of being known, but it denotes only their particular form, namely, simśapā[-ness].” Cf. TV 982,10–13; TV 1048,15–16.
inseparable from tree-ness because \( \text{śīṃśapātva} \) is restricted by tree-ness (\( \text{vrkṣatvaniyata} \)) in its nature.\(^{29}\)

Here, Kumārila seems to refer to the hierarchical relationship between two generic properties, taking into account the Apoha chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS)\(^{30}\) as well as Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya. Aṣṭādhyāyī (A) 2.2.30, upasarjanam pūrvam, lays down that the subordinate item (upasarjana) forms the first part of a compound. Anticipating this rule, A 2.1.57, \( \text{viśeṣanam viśeṣyena bahulam} \), lays down that whether a qualifier (\( \text{viśeṣana} \)) and the item qualified (\( \text{viśeṣya} \)) do or do not form a tatpurusa compound (2.1.22) including karmadharāya is determined according to the cases (bahulam).\(^{31}\) In his commentary on this sūtra, Patañjali comments that the compound \( \text{kṛṣṇatila} \) (black sesame) has \( \text{krṣṇa} \) before \( \text{tīla} \) because \( \text{krṣṇa} \) is subservient to \( \text{tīla} \); \( \text{krṣṇa} \) qualifies the object as black sesame by excluding white sesame and sesame of other colors.\(^{32}\) In this context, Patañjali additionally remarks that the compound "\( \text{vrkṣaśīṃśapā} \) is impossible because \( \text{vrkṣa} \) does not qualify \( \text{śīṃśapā} \) as a particular kind, for there is no \( \text{śīṃśapā} \) that is not a tree (\( \text{avrkṣa} \)).\(^{33}\)

In this argument, Patañjali merely deals with the semantic connotation of tree by \( \text{śīṃśapā} \) without going into the ontological background, but we can say that Kumārila implies an ontological relation between \( \text{śīṃśapātva} \) and \( \text{vrkṣatva} \) in the phrase “\( \text{śīṃśapātva} \) is restricted by tree-ness (\( \text{vrkṣatvaniyata} \)),” for in his Ślokavārttika (SV) he has already discussed the idea that a species is ontologically restricted by a generic property. In the SV, Kumārila affirms that specific entities are endowed with generic properties through their own nature (\( \text{svābhāvika} \)); to possess them they do not need any cause (\( \text{na hetumān} \)).\(^{34}\)

\(^{29}\) TV 932,16–18: \( \text{nābhīdhātā kartṛkarmanoh pacatāyidīśabdas tadāyatantāvinābhhūtārthābhidhāyitvā, yo yadāyatantāvinābhhūtārthābhidhāyī sa tasya na vācakah, yathā śīṃśapāsābdo vrkṣatvaniyatasaṃśa-}

\(^{30}\) pātvasya. “The word ‘pacati,’ etc., does not denote agent or object because it denotes a meaning that is completely inseparable from them. If a word denotes something that is completely inseparable from something else, then the word does not denote the latter, just as the word \( \text{śīṃśapā} \) [denotes only] \( \text{śīṃśapā} \)-ness, which is restricted by tree-ness.” Cf. Kanazawa 1983: 929.

\(^{31}\) Kumārila may have collected the essential predicates applicable to a \( \text{śīṃśapā} \) from PS 5.355: \( \text{vrkṣatpār-}

\(^{32}\) rthvadrayasajjīneyāḥ pratilomyataḥ / catustridvyeka sandehe nīcayate ’nyathā / ‘treeless,’ ‘earthen,’ ‘substance,’ ‘existent,’ and ‘knowable’ are [each] a cause of doubt, in reverse order, about four, three, two, and one [properties]. In opposite order they serve the purpose of ascertainment.” (Tr. Joshi/Roodbergen 1971: I 125.)

\(^{33}\) The case in which a compound is obligatory, such as \( \text{krṣṇasarpa} \) (cobra = “black snake”), is an exception to the governing rule (adhdārasūtra), A 2.1.11: “optional” (\( \text{vibhāṣā} \)). Cf. Katre 1989: 121.

\(^{34}\) VMBh I, 399: 3–15: anyatarasya pradhānabhāvāt tadvīsēṣakatvāc cāparasyasaharajanasamajjā bhavi-

\(^{35}\) spyati. yadāsya tīlāḥ pradhānyena vivakṣitā bhavanti krṣṇo viśeṣanatvena tadā tīlāḥ pradhānām krṣṇo viśeṣa.

\(^{36}\) “(Therefore,) since one of the two is the main (word) and since the other functions as the qualifier of that, the designation upasarjana will apply. When the sesame seeds are intended as the main thing by somebody, and black as the qualifier, then (the word) tīlāḥ becomes the main (word) and (the word) krṣṇāḥ (becomes) the qualifying word.” (Tr. Joshi/Roodbergen 1971: 140.)

\(^{37}\) VMBh I, 399: 25–26: kāthām tarhīmau dvau pradhānāsadbhād evaṃ vinārtham arthe yugapad avārdhye vrkṣah śīṃśapeti. nāyataur āvāṣyakah samāvēsah, na hy a vrkṣah śīṃśapāsti. “Then in what way can these two main words \( \text{vrkṣah śīṃśapā} \) ‘the tree \( \text{śīṃśapā} \)’ be locked up together to refer to one and the same object? The co-usage of these two words in the order \( \text{vrkṣah śīṃśapā} \) is not necessary, because there is no \( \text{śīṃśapā} \) which is not a tree.” (Tr. Joshi/Roodbergen 1971: 147–149.)
Kumārila regards generic properties as a kind of intrinsic ability (śakti) of an individual entity.\textsuperscript{35} Generally speaking, entities of a certain kind are, by nature, invariably equipped with their own particular abilities, which can never be shared with entities of other kinds.\textsuperscript{36} Moreover, because they are equipped with these abilities by nature, they start up their own activity of their own accord once they have been brought into existence.\textsuperscript{37}

Taking his own remarks into account, Kumārila maintains that there must be some causes for an individual entity to be brought into existence, but in addition to these causes, nothing is required for possessing generic properties. Once an entity is brought into existence as an instance of a certain species (viśeṣeṣv eva labdheṣu keṣucit), no external condition is required (nānyavāñchana) for its acquisition of the generic property of its genus. What is required for this acquisition is only a cause to that extent (tāvanmātrapratīkṣaṇa), a cause that brings about the individual as an instance of some species or other that belongs to the genus.\textsuperscript{38} In other words, an animal has already been equipped with the generic property of a cow when it is caused to be born as an instance of śābaleya, bāhuleya, or any other specific kind of a cow, by a pair of cows, male and female, of the respective species. This view is very close to Aristotle’s idea of “universals in the thing (in re)” (cf. K. Yoshimizu 2015b).

\textsuperscript{35} ŚV, Ākṛtivāda, vv. 17–18: bhinnā viśeṣaśaktibhyah sarvtrāṇugatāpi ca / pratyekam samavetā ca tasmāj jātir apiṣyatām // tenātmadharmo bhedānām ekadhiśiṣayo 'sti nah / sāmānyam ākṛtir jātiḥ śaktir vā so 'bhidhiśiyatām // “[This generic ability (śakti) of an individual] is different from specific abilities; [it] recurs everywhere [in all individuals] and completely inheres in each individual, and thus should be accepted as a generic property [called cow-ness]. Therefore, in our position, entities are endowed with an essential property that is the object of the cognition of the same kind, and one may call it universal, form, generic property, or ability.”

\textsuperscript{36} ŚV, Ākṛtivāda, vv. 28–29ab: bhinnatve 'pi hi kāsāñ cic chaktiḥ kāś cid aśaktikāḥ / na ca paryayunyogo 'sti vastuṣakteḥ kadā ca / vahnir dahati nākāśaṃ ko 'tra paryanuyujyatām // “Although [all individuals are] different from one another, some of them have a particular ability and others do not, and one should never bring the ability of a real thing into question. Who would be questioned about the fact that fire burns but the ether does not?”

\textsuperscript{37} ŚV, Ākṛtivāda, v. 33: vad vā naimitikatve 'pi tāvanmātrapratīkṣaṇāḥ / viśeṣeṣv eva labdheṣu keṣucin nānyavāñchanaṃ // “Even if [assumed to be] dependent on a certain cause, [the relation between an individual and its generic property] merely requires [a cause] to the following extent: once [an instance of] any species has been brought into existence, nothing more is required.”

\textsuperscript{38} ŚV, Ākṛtivāda, v. 47cd–48: na hi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate // ātmālābe ca bhāvānām kāraṇāpekṣātā bhavet / labdhaḥmaṇaṃ svakāryeṣā pravṛttiḥ svayam eva tu // “For any ability that would not be intrinsic [in an entity] cannot be produced by something else. When coming into existence, entities may call for [their own] cause. Once having been brought into existence, however, they start up their own activity of their own accord.”

needed. It is not denied that an individual is innately related with this (particular generic property) in the same way that [it is innately] equipped with some abilities.”

With “a cause to the following extent” (tāvanmāra), Kumārila may exclude the Vaiśeṣika’s idea that inherence (samavāya) must exist between two things that are inseparable (ayutasiddha), such as substance and quality, individual and universal. In ŚV, Pratyakṣasūtra, vv. 146–148, Kumārila criticizes this idea as follows: the assumption that two things have already been established (niṣpanna) as inseparable would make inherence useless, whereas the assumption that two things require inherence for their inseparability leads to a regress (avyavasthā) of further intermediary (see Taber 2005: 108–109).
2.3 Kumārila’s reference to the proof of the impermanence by nature

In criticizing the Jaina theory that the soul (jīva), that is, the self (ātman) in transmigration, has the size of one’s body, Kumārila assumes the case that the soul consists of many parts (avayava), and from this assumption, he leads to the absurd consequence that the soul (jīva) would perish like a pot (ghaṭa) at some time because, he says, all forms of conjunction (saṃyoga) are inseparable from disjunction (viyogāvinābhūta). Considering the production and the perishing of a pot adduced as an example, we can substitute produced-ness (kṛtakatva) for the conjunction of the parts that form a whole, and impermanence (anityatva) or perishing (vināśa) for the disjunction of conglomerated parts from one another.

In another place (MmS 2.2.25), Kumārila briefly discusses the ontological relation that enables the inference of impermanence (anityatva) from produced-ness (kṛtakatva). Here Kumārila holds this type of inference to be different from those based on causality. Presenting this inference, he remarks that even between two things that are not cause and effect (akāryakāraṇabhūta), it is well known that in some cases one thing indicates the other (gamyagamakabhāvaprasidhēti).

Moreover, in the ŚV chapter on the permanence of words (Śabdanityatādhikaraṇa), Kumārila enumerates three kinds of permanent elements (asamskṛta-dharma) in the Buddhist Abhidharma, namely, “cessation [of the occurrence of a dharma] by means of reflection” (pratisaṃkhyānanirodha), “cessation [of the occurrence of a dharma] without

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39 TV 403,1–5: sarve hy avayavasadbhāvādayaḥ pratyakṣādyaviṣayāḥ santa utprekṣāmātreṇa kalpyante. te śabdavac cehāpi pratyākhyeyāḥ. śārayāvātadhikānāṃ caiva utprekṣitum apy ānantyād asākyam, na caiva dravatvādīnām vinā kaścit samśeṣaḥetur vidyate. na cāsaṃśliṣṭānām ekājāvārambhasamārtham. sarvasaṃyojanām ca viyogāvinābhūtātvaḥ ghaṭāditulyaḥ kadācij jīvasya pradhvaṃso bhavet. “Since all these (assumed things, cf. TV 402,27–30), namely, the existence of the parts [of the soul], etc., are not the object of perception, they are assumed only by imagination and are to be rejected here just like the parts of a word [in the sense of phonemes (varṇa) as rejected in Śphoṭavāda vv. 11–13 of the ŚV]. Because they are boundless, one can never imagine that they are limited to the extent of the body. Without some fluid substances, moreover, there cannot be any ground for their conglomeration, and they are unable to bring about a life unless conglomerated. Besides, because all sorts of conjunction are epistemically inseparable from disjunction, the soul would suffer perishing at some time in the same way as a pot.”

40 The logical inseparability of kṛtakatva and sāvayavatva from vināśatva has already been mentioned in ŚV, Anumānapariccheda vv. 20cd–21ab: kṛtasāvayavatvādiprayuktā ca vināśitā // prayatnānantaraṣayānasadṛśair na prayujyate // “Perishability is caused [to be known] by produced-ness, composite-ness, etc., but it is not caused [to be known] by the fact of being cognized immediately after exertion, etc.”

41 TV 544,18–20: aito vacanāti kāryakāraṇayor eva gavyagamakabhāvābhāva bhāyakārābhāvapratītā tīs kecīnapari kāraṇabhūtām apy anityatvākāryakāratvādīnām gavyagamakabhāvaprasisdhe. “Some people assume from this statement that the author of the Bhāṣya has the idea in mind that only a cause and its effect have the relation between them of logical indicator and the thing to be indicated. This is, however, not correct. Even between two things that are not a cause and its effect, it is well known that in some cases one thing indicates the other, for example, between impermanence and produced-ness.” * This vacana refers to ŚBh 544,2–4: yad dhi yasya kāraṇabhūtāṃ dṛṣṭam siddhe, tāc cet sādhiyā ’pi kāraṇabhūtām ity avagamayē. bhavati tāyā sādhiyā. “As a matter of fact, when A has already been found to be in a well-known example, and if in the subject of inference, too, A is found to be the cause, then A is the logical reason for inferring [the existence of] B [in the subject of inference].” As regards causality, Kumārila, unlike Śabara and like Dharmakīrti, remarks that an inference from cause to effect is inconclusive. Cf. n. 15.
reflection” (apratisamkhyānanirodha), and the ether (vyoman).

Thereafter, without distinguishing between Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika, Kumārila refers to the Buddhist theory that things are destined to perish (vināśa) through their own nature (svabhāvasiddha) without any external cause (ahetuka).

Then adding two examples, he compares generation with perishing in terms of whether or not an external cause is needed. When something new is immediately generated after the perishing of an old thing, an extraneous cause is necessary. For example, a piece of fuel is changed into ashes when connected to fire, and a pot is changed into fragments when struck by a hammer. However, perishing is not produced (akriyamāna) within individual entities afterwards; rather it has been in progress from the beginning in a subtle form (sūkṣma) without being noticed; it manifests (abhivyajyate) in a gross form (sthūla) upon meeting a heterogeneous cause (vilaksanahetu) such as fire or a hammer.

In short, perishing is the essential nature of an entity (svabhāvika) and is already established insofar as the entity is brought into existence (jātamātrapratiṣṭhita).

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42 ŚV, Sabdanityatādikarana, vv. 22–23ab.
43 ŚV, Sabdanityatādikarana, vv. 23cd–24: tau ca dvāv apy anāśītvād iṣṭāv akṛtakāv api // dhūṃ svabhāvasiddhaṃ hi te vināśam ahetukam / hetur yaya vināśo ’pi taṣya drṣṭo ’nkurādivat // “And both of them (i.e., pratissamkhyānanirodha and apratisamkhyānanirodha) are considered not to be produced because of their imperishability. For they (i.e., Buddhists) say the perishing [of an entity] is established by nature without [extraneous] cause because anything that has a cause is also observed to be perishable, just like sprouts, etc.” I am indebted to Dr. Taisei Shida for telling me about this reference by Kumārila to the Buddhist proof of impermanence without extraneous cause in the Sabdanityatādikarana.

44 ŚV, Sabdanityatādikarana, vv. 25cd–29: bhavati hy agnisambandhāt kāṣṭād aṅgārasantatiḥ // mudgarādhīhatāc cāpi kapālam jāyate ghaṭāt / svabhāviko vināśas tu jātamātrapratiṣṭhitah // sūkṣmaḥ sadṛśasantānavṛttataṃ apunapalakṣitaḥ / yada vilaksanā hetuḥ paṭet sadṛśasantaṭaḥ // vilaksanena kāryena sthūlo ’bhivyajyate tadda / tenasadṛśasantāno hetoh saṅjāyate yatath / tenadākrīryamāno ’pi nāsō ’bhivyajyate sputaḥ / sa mudgarapraḥārādiprayatvatmānantariyakaḥ // “The temporal succession of embers proceeds from the fuel if it is connected to fire; and when a pot is struck by a hammer, a fragment is born from that (pot). The perishing [of the fuel and the pot], however, is based on their own natural disposition and established insofar as they are produced. [The inborn perishing] in subtle form is imperceptible on account of their existence in homogenous succession. When a heterogeneous cause happens to the homogenous succession, then [the inborn perishing] is manifest in gross form by means of heterogeneous efficacy. In this manner, there occurs a heterogeneous succession on account of the (heterogeneous) cause. By means of this (cause), the perishing, despite not being produced, is manifest in explicit form. This [explicit perishing] appears as soon as one makes an effort, for example, to hit a hammer [on a pot].” Kumārila’s explanation of spontaneous perishing seems to be based on Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh) 193.5–7: samśkritasyāvaśyaṃ “gyāyāt” (AK 4.2d). akasmiko hi bhāvānām vināśah [The momentariness of everything is established] because the conditioned entity necessarily ‘perishes.’ For the destruction of things is spontaneous” (tr. von Rospatt 1995: n. 397), because the simile of the contact of the fuel with fire is applied in AKBh 194.1–6: yadi ca kāṣṭhādīnām agnīyādīskṛtyāh hetukko vināśah syād evam sati pākajānām guṇānām pakvataratvamopattau “hetuḥ syāc ca vināśakah” (AK 4.3b). hetur eva ca vināśakah syāt. “And if the destruction of firewood etc. was caused by the contact with fire etc., this being so, in the case of the more and more progressed origination of the qualities borne from burning (pākaja) ‘the cause [for these qualities] would be [the factor] destroying [them],’ [that is,] precisely [their generative] cause would be the [factor] destroying [them].” (Tr. von Rospatt 1995: n. 402.)

45 Kumārila insists, however, that the proof of impermanence cannot be applied to words (sābda) because words are not produced but only made manifest by means of an utterance. Cf. ŚV, Sabdanityatādikarana, v. 39ab: vyājñākābhyātataḥ śābe ṣ ‘py abodho badhirādivat / “As regards words, too, if there is no cause of manifestation, one cannot perceive them just like deaf people;” vv. 40cd–41: saṃn eva sādhanaḥbhāvāč chabdho naivopalaḥbhaye // kṣaṇikam sādhanaṃ cāsya buddhīr apy anuvartate / meghānākārāscharvāryāṁ vidyujanatadṛṣṭvat // “In spite of existing, a word is never perceived insofar
The phrase jātamātrapratiṣṭhita, which conforms to tāvanmātrapratīkṣaṇa (ŚV, Ākṛtivāda, v. 33), anticipates Dharmakīrti’s definition of the svabhāva to be proved by a svabhāvahetu, namely, bhāvamātrānurodhin (PV 1.2d & 39b).

III. Limits of logical formulation in exegetical works

From the abovementioned examples, we may say that in the TV Kumārila has already conceived the gist of the niyama fragment from the BT as stating that if one thing is restricted (niyāmaka) in nature, namely, brought into existence under the control of another thing (niyamya) in reality, then the confirmation of the former becomes the logical indicator (gamaka) of the existence of the latter thing (gamyā) in cognition. He also had the idea of the invariable one-way transition in the concept from an effect to its cause, and from the existence of a thing to its generic properties on the basis of causality. He was even aware that the inference of impermanence from produced-ness is an example of the latter type of conceptual transition.\(^{46}\) However, because every section of the TV deals with exegesis of scriptures, Kumārila refers only sporadically to the invariable transition from one concept to another on the basis of the natural restriction of various types.\(^{47}\) Unlike Dharmakīrti, he never attempts to reduce various types of niyama to fundamental ones and relate them to each other. Moreover, in another exegetical work by Kumārila, the Ṭupṭīkā (ṬṬ), we find some cases in which the object to be known from an indicator that is inseparable (avinābhūta) from it is called “restricted” (niyata), instead of “the agent of restriction” (niyāmaka).

When one hears the Vedic injunction “One who wishes for heaven should perform a sacrifice” (svargakāmo yajeta), one may first, urged by the verb in the optative, feel obliged to perform a sacrifice. However, one usually performs an action in order to achieve a purpose one has set up in advance. The general form of action called “bringing into being” (bhāvanā) is, therefore, said to be inseparable from the motivation to achieve a purpose (prayojyādibhir avinābhūtā). Then, paying attention to another word in this injunction that describes the entitled person (adhikārin), “one who desires heaven” (svargakāmaḥ),

\(^{46}\) Cf. n. 41.

\(^{47}\) Based on a holistic view that the whole pervades (vyāpaka) its parts and parts are restricted (niyamya) by the whole they form, Kumārila maintains an exegetical principle that a word that directly refers to a Ṛgveda verse (ṛc) indirectly indicates the whole text of the Ṛgvedasamhitā. Cf. TV 807,17–18: vedaś ca vyāpakatvād ahetulakṣaṇayuktah san na śāknoty evāvāvasvām lakṣayitum. rgādayas tu niyamayatvāt samudāyam lakṣayantī. “Because [an entire text of] the Veda pervades [all of its parts], it is not fit for the definition of a logical reason. Therefore, it cannot indirectly denote its part. The verses of rc, etc., on the other hand, indirectly denote the whole [text of the Ṛgvedasamhitā] on account of being restricted [by the whole].”
one may come to be aware that the purpose to perform the sacrifice is a particular kind of something valuable for a human being (puruṣārtha), namely, heaven (svarga). In this way, focused on the verb in the optative at first, one may simply feel one’s duty to perform a sacrifice (yāgasya kartavyatā), but this sense of unconditional duty is suspended and replaced by the motivation to achieve heaven by performing a sacrifice.

However, accepting that the performance of a sacrifice is motivated by something valuable for human beings, Kumārila calls this goal of conceptual transition “restricted” (niyata-puruṣārtha-prayojyatva), instead of calling it the agent of restriction (niyāmaka) in view of the causa finalis. Nor does he consider the performance of a sacrifice to be the niyāmaka in view of the causa efficiens, for he assumes that the efficacy of a sacrifice is based on nothing other than the Vedic injunction (vidhi).

In the case of Dharmakīrti’s logic, the arising of an effect (kāryotpāda) is inferred from the “complete cause” (kāraṇasāmagrī), in other words, when all the necessary conditions are fulfilled in addition to the existence of the main cause (PVSV 6,22–7,12 on PV 1.7–8). Although Kumārila analogically compares the performance of a sacrifice to ordinary activities such as farming for a harvest, it is impossible to consider the performance of a sacrifice a “complete cause” (kāraṇasāmagrī) for attaining a result such as heaven.

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48 ṬṬ 1352,16–18: ānantaryaśrutā yāgasya kartavyatā. pratayayaḥ punah svārthe bhāvanāyāṃ puruṣam pravartatati. sā ca prayaṣyāddhibhir avinābhūtā, tena yan niyamitaṃ tad eva puruṣārtham prayaṣyatyavet-nākāṅkṣati, na yāgam. “No sooner than one has heard the injunction, one recognizes that the sacrifice is to be performed. The ending [of the verb in the injunction], however, prompts one to exert oneself for bhāvanā, its own meaning. And this (bhāvanā [of one’s activity]) is inseparable from its purpose, etc. [that is, purpose (sādhyā), means (sādhanā) and the mode of performance (ittikartavyatā)]. For its purpose (prayaṣya), [the bhāvanā] requires only the things valuable for a human being insofar as they are restricted (niyamita) by that (injunction), not the sacrifice itself.” Kumārila distinguishes two kinds of bhāvanā (cf. TV 378,20–21). The bhāvanā discussed in this context is the “intentional force for activity” (arthātmabhāvanā/arthībhāvanā), the general form of one’s action that requires a purpose to be achieved by the one who performed the action, but not the “verbal force for activity” (abhidhābhāvanā/sabdībhāvanā), which is the function of the verbal ending of an injunction to urge one to exert one’s bhāvanā.

49 ṬṬ 1352,23–25: tasmān naiva kacācād yāge pratayaya upaniyatati saty evānantarye. aṭa yatra kartavya-tāvacanaṃ tatra puruṣārthāḥ sāksāt pāramparpyena vāvinābhiḥ, tasmād yāgasya kartavyatā prāptā, sā bhāvanāsābdayasā niyatapuruṣārthhaprayojyatvād bādhyaṭe. “Therefore, the verbal ending never happens to be directed to the sacrifice even though it is immediately cognized. Thus, no matter in what statement a duty is enjoined, something valuable for a human being is inseparably connected [to that duty], whether directly or indirectly. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the sacrifice is to be performed [for its own sake], this assumption is given up because the word that [urges the hearer to exert his] bhāvanā has [the hearer’s] purpose [in performing the sacrifice] restricted [by the injunction] to something valuable for a human being.”

50 In his commentary on the ṬṬ, Pārthasārathimiśra remarks that what Kumārila refers to by the pronoun tena, by which the purpose in performing the sacrifice is restricted to a particular puruṣārtha (ṬṬ 1352,17: tena yan niyamitaṃ tad eva puruṣārtham prayaṣyatyavet-nākāṅkṣati), is not the action of sacrifice but the injunction (vidhi) that prompts human beings by nature (puruṣapratvartanāmaka). Cf. TR 390,10–13.

51 TV 395,3–6: laukikam cāpi yat karma phale kālāntarodgatau tatrāpi sākṣī dūnam evasteta t v api ápavāvan thasyate iti yāpi api ca laukikāni kṛṣṇaṁ kṣīṁyāpyo dhvanyadṛṇāpya prabhrītriḥ karmāni kālāntarodgatasteṣām api svarūpāsthānāsambhāvaṁ samskāraṇā eva tisthaddhibhir vyavahārasiddhitāḥ. “Even in worldly activities, there must remain an ability that brings about its result later on, but [such ability] is not recognized as apūrva in this (science of exegesis, mīmāṃsā). Such worldly activities as cultivation, drinking ghee, and study are accepted to have their result later on. Because they do not continue to
because we cannot clarify why or how a sacrifice can bring about a result by empirically investigating its mechanism. This is because in Mīmāṃsa it is firmly presupposed that the Veda alone has authority over religious duties (dharma); there is no need to resort to empirical knowledge.

Conclusion

Despite assuming human rationality to be subordinate to Vedic authority as far as religious duties are concerned, Kumārila never advocates an extreme fundamentalism in which human beings are incapable of acquiring any knowledge without Vedic revelation. On the contrary, Kumārila clearly states that there are many fields to be investigated on the basis of empirical observation, giving many examples concerning the man-made scriptures (smṛtis) and the sciences ancillary to the Veda (vedāṅgas). Accordingly, we may safely conjecture that after having completed the Ślokavārttika, Kumārila continued to study logical reasoning while compiling such exegetical works as the Tantravārttika and the Tuṭpīkā. Finally, in the Brhaṭṭīkā, he declared natural restriction (niyama) to be the foundation of epistemic inseparability (avinābhāva).

References and abbreviations

A Aṣṭādhyāyī.
AK Abhidharmakośa. See AKBh.

exist in their own form [until the time of the appearing of the result], these ordinary activities are accomplished through certain dispositions that continue [until then].”

Cf. TV 166,27–28: *tatra yāvad dharmamokṣasambandhī tad vedaprābhavaṃ. yat tv arthasukhaviṣayaṃ tal lokavyavahārapūrvaṃ iti vivektavyam “Among those (smṛti texts), the portions have their origin in the Veda insofar as they pertain to duties and emancipation, but those concerned with profit and pleasure are to be distinguished because they are based on worldly activities;” 166,29–167,1: *yat tu prthihiivivibhāgaḥkathānām tad dharmādharmasādhanaphalopahogapradēśavivekāya kincicīd dārānapūrvaṃ kincicīd vedamūlam, vaṃśānukramanaṃ api brāhmaṇaṣaṣṭriyajātijāgottajānārthān dārānasmarapramānamūlam “The reports of the various parts of the earth are partly based on observance and partly on the Veda, for the purpose of distinguishing the regions appropriate for receiving the reward for having performed dharma and adharma. In addition, the chronicles of genealogies, which serve to know the caste and lineage of Brahmins and Kṣatriyas, are based on observance and legends;” 167,4: *aṅgavidyānām api kṛtabhārthopārārthapraptipādaṃ lokavedapūrvakatvānaṃ vivektavyam “Also in the ancillary sciences [of the Veda], one should distinguish between the portions based on the Veda for informing what is valuable for the sacrifice, and the portions based on the ordinary world for informing what is valuable for human beings.”

See appendix for a reply to Ernst Steinkellner.
BT Bṛhaṭṭīkā.


HirŚS Hiranayakesīrautasūtra (= Satyāṣāḍhaśrautasūtra). Poona 1907.


Another Look at *avinābhāva* and *niyama* in Kumārila’s Exegetical Works


MmŚ  *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*. See TV.


PS 5  Pramāṇasamuccaya, the fifth chapter. See Pind 2015: Appendix 1.

PV 1  Pramāṇavārttika, the first chapter. See PVSV.


ŚBh  *Śābarabhāṣya*. See TV.


In his PVSV on PV 1.1, after having concisely explained the three kinds of logical reason (PV 1.1b: hetus tridhaiva saḥ), namely, effect (kārya), essential property (svabhāva), and the absence of the perception (anupalabdhi) of a perceptible thing, Dharmakīrti summarizes that the first two are reasons for affirmation (vastusādhanau) and the last one for negation (pratiṣedhahetuḥ) (PVSV 2,19). Then, in order to briefly answer why logical reasons must be one of these three kinds, he introduces svabhāvapratibandha, which takes either one of the two forms: tādātmya (PVSV 2,21: tadātmatva), that is, the relation between an essential property (bhāva) and another essential property (svabhāva) of one and the same thing; or tadutpatti (PVSV 3,4), that is, causality between two different (anyā) things.

Then, after a short interlude, he briefly explains how an inferential cognition can be a pramāṇa on account of its non-deviation (avyabhicāra) from its object, saying “Because, between the [two] things one of which is not dependent on the other, there is no restriction [that would account] for an invariable occurrence [of the latter] with [the former]” (PVSV 3,9: anāyattarūpāṇām sahabhāvaniyamābhāvāt). This phrase can be considered the logical inverse (¬P→¬Q) of the general law (P→Q) given in PVSV 2,19–20: “Because, if [one thing] is bound [by nature] to the other, the former does not deviate from the latter” (svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho arthaṃ na vyabhicarati). If P and Q are logically equivalent, the conditional sentence “P→Q” as well as its inverse “¬P→¬Q” holds good (cf. Oetke 1992: 198–199). What is called āyatta is something A whose essence (rūpa, i.e., svabhāva) is dependent on (āyatta), in other words, bound (pratibaddha) by, the other thing B.54 Sahabhāva, that is, the invariable occurrence (bhāva) of B with (saha) A, is logically equivalent to its contraposition, namely, avinābhāva, that is, the never-occurrence (a-bhāva) of A without (vinā) B, which can be paraphrased as artho (A) artham (B) na vyabhicarati. Thus, sahabhāvaniyama is said to be the restriction of A’s nature by B for making the conceptual occurrence of B with A invariable; but it is unlikely that in this

54 For the synonymy between āyatta and pratibaddha, see Y. Fukuda’s article in the present volume.
context *sahabhāva* is said to be restricted (*niyata*) to the three modes in accord with the three kinds of logical reason including non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) that leads to non-existence, because what is argued about is the cognition of the two kinds of object to be affirmatively inferred (PVSV 3,5: *etāv dvāv anumeyapratyayau*), namely, *svabhāva* and *cause* (*kāraṇa*).

In the PVSV on PV 1.2a–c, in which *kāryahetu* is defined, *niyama* is the name of the state of real affairs in which the production of effect is regulated by its cause (3,11–12: *tadututtiniyama*; 3,16: *tatkāryatvaniyama*). Later, concerning an inference of one thing from another different (*anya*) thing that is neither its effect nor its cause (PVSV 7,12: *akāryakāraṇabhūta*, cf. Steinkellner 2013, vol. I: 19), Dharmakīrti repeats the content of the phrase *anāyattarūpāṇām sahabhāvaniyamābhāvāt* in PVSV 8,12–13: *apratibaddha-svabhāvasya* *avinābhāvaniyamābhāvāt*, in which *sahabhāvaniyama* is explicitly replaced with *avinābhāvaniyama*. As regards the immediately preceding sentence, “Hence there is no other logical reason that makes [it] known” (PVSV 8,12: *tena nānyo hetur gamako ‘sti*), Karṇakagomin glosses “no other” (*nānyo*) with “nothing other than a *hetu* of [either one of] the three kinds” (PVSVṬ 49,14: *trividhād dhetor nānyo*; 50,6: *hetutrayavyatirekena nānyo*). But this gloss is off the mark. What is intended here with “no other” is “nothing other than a *kāryahetu*,” because this sentence is Dharmakīrti’s own comment on the last part of PV 1.10, *tat kāryaliṅgajā*, which concludes that the inferential cognition from a particular taste (*rasa*) to a particular color (*rūpa*) arises from the epistemic application of a special type of causality that brings about two effects simultaneously. In the rest of his commentary on PV 1.10 and from PV 1.11 onwards, Dharmakīrti goes on arguing about how to apply causality in inference.

Moreover, in the PVSV on PV 1.2cd, which defines *svabhāvahetu*, it is said that what is not spatiotemporally present (B) in the presence of something (A) is not restricted to its later presence (4,3: *tadbhāve ‘bhūtasya paścād bhāvaniyamābhāvāt*), in other words, will not necessarily appear later on. With this lack of *paścādbhāva-niyama* in case of the absence of something B when another thing A is present (tadbhāve ‘bhūtasya), Dharmakīrti formulates the contraposition (¬Q→¬P) of the general law (P→Q), *svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho (A) artham (B) na vyabhicarati*, in the case of pseudo *tādātmya*. On the other hand, as mentioned above, he formulates the inverse (¬P→¬Q) arguing the lack of *avinābhāvaniyama* in the case of pseudo *tadutpatti* in PVSV 8,12–13: *apratibaddhhasva-bhāvasya* *avinābhāvaniyamābhāvāt*.

In all these cases of PVSV 3,9, 4,3 and 8,12–13, the “restriction” (*niyama*) that enables *sahabhāva*, *tadbhāve-bhāva*, and even *avinābhāva* between two concepts is completed within either one of the two binominal forms of *svabhāvapratibandha*, *tādātmya* or *tadutpatti*, respectively. For the spatiotemporal occurrence in reality, the nature of one thing is determined by another thing that is either its own essential property or its cause. Later, Dharmakīrti refers to this ontological restriction with the term *svabhāvaniyama* (cf. Steinkellner 1971: 188f.). In all of these three cases, however, *niyama* does not restrict the total number of the types of epistemic inseparability: It is not discussed how many modes there are of the invariable transition from one concept to another.

Seeking Dharmakīrti’s own paraphrase of *avinābhāvaniyamāt* (PV 1.1c) in his PVSV on PV 1.1, we find only *anāyattarūpāṇām sahabhāvaniyamābhāvāt* (PVSV 3,9) as an approximate phrase in the inverse form. If the *avinābhāvaniyama* in PV 1.1c is paraphrased
as sahabhāvaniyama in PVSV 3,9, and this sahabhāvaniyama is replaced with avinābhāvaniyama in PVSV 8,12–13, then the avinābhāvaniyama in PV 1.1c, too, cannot be the restriction “of” avinābhāva in three modes in accord with the three kinds of logical reason, because anupalabdhihetu does not require its own ontological restriction for conceptual transition. Dharmakīrti does not separately assume a third form of svabhāvapratibandha for anupalabdhihetu because this kind of logical reason is based on the tādātmya of the complete cause (kāraṇasāmagrī) of the perception of a visible thing (cf. PVSV 105, 1–3; Steinkellner 1991: 712). The state of real affairs presupposed in applying an anupalabdhihetu is that the complete cause of perception including the existence of a visible thing is restricted by, or, naturally equipped with, their essence (svabhāva), which is the fitness (yogyatā) to bring about its perception as their effect. It is only on an epistemic level that one can, seeing an existing empty purse, infer the non-existence of money from its non-perception on the grounds of the non-existence of the impediments of its perception, because the existence of money in a purse without impediments naturally possesses the fitness to be perceived.

That being the case, we may construe even the avinābhāvaniyama in the c-pāda of PV 1.31, which Dharmakīrti inserts as one of the two “intermediate (or, transitive) verses” (antaraślokau) after finishing a discussion about anupalabdhihetu (PVSV 19,23–20,13 on PV 1.29–30). He does this in order to introduce a new section, referring to the ontological restriction in either one of the two positive forms, but not the epistemic restriction “of” avinābhāva to the three modes of conceptual transition. This is because in the ab-pādas of the same verse Dharmakīrti declares avinābhāvaniyama to be brought into existence in “either” (vā) one of the two positive forms: kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt, as I argued in K. Yōshimizu 2007a: n. 62. Accordingly, as far as PV 1 and the PVSV are concerned, we may conjecture that Dharmakīrti uses niyama in the compound avinābhāvaniyama “[natural] restriction [that accounts] for [epistemic] inseparability” as an ontological term allied with svabhāvaniyama and svabhāvapratibandha when he concisely asserts that the restriction of the nature of things in either one of the two positive forms brings about epistemic inseparability.

Finally, let me quote the final phrase of K. Yōshimizu 2007a: 1100:

Dharmakīrti revises Kumārila’s concept of niyama as advocated in the BṬ by ontologically confining it to two kinds, tādātmya and tadutpatti, both of which he later asserts not established between a word and its meaning (PV I v. 336) in order to disprove the Mīmāṃsā doctrine that a word is intrinsically (autpattika) related to its meaning.

55 See also Ch. Yōshimizu 2011, Appendix 1.
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