Russia’s war against Ukraine has brought immense suffering to the Ukrainian population. Direct aggression has killed tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians, and countless others have died due to indirect causes, such as lack of medical care, disease and malnutrition. The threat of violence has led to the largest displacement in Europe since World War II, both inside and outside the country. The scale of the refugee flow has been staggering – as of January 2023, eight million people had left the country, which is more than the entire population of Norway or Finland (UNHCR, 2023). Another six million people had been internally displaced, with most fleeing to western or central Ukraine (IOM, 2023). Such conditions have also undoubtedly led to a sharp decline in fertility, as childbearing has been postponed indefinitely. These factors have created a vortex of population decline, exacerbating a population process that had been long underway.

Although Ukraine’s population crisis is clearly evident now, the process of depopulation has been unfolding for decades (Coleman, 2022; Romaniuk and Gladun, 2015). Ukraine has had one of the highest rates of population decrease in Europe, with only Latvia and a few Balkan states recording similar declines (Eurostat, 2022). However, unlike most countries experiencing extreme population decline, Ukraine’s population is relatively large. In 2020, Ukraine was the eighth largest country in Europe (sixth if Russia and Turkey are not included). Ukraine’s population peaked at 52 million around 1993, and has been steadily declining since; however, due to the lack of an accurate census, the exact size of the population remains unknown. Ukrainian demographers have long been concerned about all three factors impacting the population structure (e.g., Chuiko, 2001; Steshenko, 2001); a phenomenon that we call the “triple burden of depopulation”: low fertility, high mortality and significant emigration. Population decline has also been a subject of media reports (e.g., Golub, 2018; Kramar, 2019), and has even been satirised in the movie “Deserted Country” (Gritsyuk, 2020). However, little is known about whether the Ukrainians themselves have been aware of depopulation or consider it to be a problem.

Ukraine is also one of the few countries with low fertility to experience war. Even before Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukraine had experienced eight years of armed conflict. In 2014, fighting broke out in eastern Ukraine, which led to the effective secession of two areas of the “Donbas” region where three million people reside. These territories were unknown entities and no international recognition until Russia recognised them in February 2022. The war in the Donbas forced 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) to leave their homes and flee to other regions of Ukraine or Russia (Mykhnenko et al., 2022). Although some IDPs settled permanently in other parts of Ukraine and others returned home, many were caught in a situation of “protracted displacement” that continued for many years. Thus, Ukraine’s population has been declining not only due to natural decrease, but also in the context of conflict and substantial population displacement.

Although population decline in Ukraine has been widely acknowledged, demographic research on the country has been largely missing from the academic discourse, partially due to the lack of reliable and conventional statistical indicators. Thus, alternative approaches are needed to understand population decline in Ukraine. In this study, we used focus group methodology to investigate general perceptions of low fertility and depopulation. Focus group research aims to explore social norms and attitudes in greater depth than possible with surveys, yielding insights into how people think about social processes. The conversational format allows for multiple opinions and perspectives to emerge, which can then feed into explanations for why population change is occurring (Perelli-Harris and Bernardi, 2015).

Our focus groups took place in July 2021, eight years after the start of the original conflict in eastern Ukraine. Working with a Ukrainian research agency, we conducted 16 focus groups online. The groups were divided by gender and took place in urban and rural areas. We were particularly interested in the experiences of individuals who fled the conflict. Thus, we conducted six focus groups with IDPs and six focus groups with residents of regions bordering the conflict area. We also had the unique opportunity to conduct four online focus groups with residents of Donetsk, the largest city in the Donbas. Although focus groups have conventionally been conducted in person, the online methodology provided several advantages. First, we would not have been able to conduct face-to-face focus groups in Donetsk, because neither we nor the Ukrainian survey agency were allowed to visit this area. Second, because many people had become accustomed to online communication during the pandemic, we found that the participants were comfortable participating in the discussions and sharing their attitudes. The discussions were lively and informative, providing a glimpse into everyday life in these regions.

Our study explored whether and how Ukrainians perceived population decline, their stated reasons for the decline, and whether they thought it had negative social and economic consequences. We aimed to answer the following general research questions: (1) Had the focus group participants perceived a change in their local surroundings over the past few years? (2) Did the participants’ perceptions differ depending on whether they were living in rural or urban areas? (3) How did the participants in Donetsk, in the Russian-backed separatist territory, view population change in their city? (4) Was population decline in Ukraine seen as a problem? (5) How did the participants perceive the causes of population decline, and its consequences for the country? Although anthropologists have attempted to describe and find meaning in the emptiness of shrinking settlements in eastern Europe (see, for example, Dzenovska’s project on Emptiness, 2018, 2022), few studies have approached the topic through a demographic lens. Doing so can help us better understand whether and how a society recognises population dynamics, and the challenges associated with population decline.

Six months after our focus groups were held, Russia invaded Ukraine, destroying the homes and lives of our focus group participants. When originally choosing our research sites, we deliberately focused on eastern Ukraine, which was close to the contact line, and the region where the majority of IDPs had settled. As of the time of writing in November 2022, these areas have been severely impacted by Russia’s aggression. Kharkiv is under constant shelling, and half of the city’s 1.5 million residents have fled. The villages along the edge of the previously frozen conflict have become the front line in battles reminiscent of World War II. Mariupol has been completely obliterated in one of the most protracted and heinous assaults of the war. Thus, although we do not know the fate of our participants, we assume that all have had their lives turned upside down and have been forced to leave their homes, some for the second time in their lives.

In this study, we use qualitative methods to delve into the reasons why fertility is low and depopulation is occurring in Ukraine. Focus group research is intended to elicit social perspectives, which are essential for understanding context-specific phenomena and generating research hypotheses (Morgan, 1998). A focus group is a small group of individuals (usually 6–8 people) that discusses topics organised around a central theme, with the discussion facilitated by a trained moderator. Because focus groups rely on purposive sampling techniques, they are not representative of the population.

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic and continued fighting in the Donetsk region, it was impossible to hold conventional in person focus groups; thus, the focus groups had to be conducted online using Zoom. The online format resulted in a relaxed atmosphere, as participants were able to join the discussion from the comfort of their home. We employed a survey agency, the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology, to recruit respondents in local public areas (e.g., marketplaces, bus stations), from a database of prior participants, and through snowball methods. The agency conducted an online screening interview to ensure that participants met the criteria (i.e., were aged 18–45) and the quotas for each group: men and women; IDPs and locals. We divided the groups by gender because we wanted participants to feel comfortable discussing attitudes towards partnership formation and childbearing, which often differ by gender. We also divided them by displacement status, because we asked the IDPs direct questions about their experiences with fleeing armed conflict and integration. Four focus groups took place in Kharkiv, a large, well-off city in eastern Ukraine; four were held in Mariupol, a medium-sized city in Donetsk oblast near the contact line; four took place in rural areas in Donetsk oblast, which are also near the contact line; and four were held in Donetsk. Because travel to Donetsk was not permitted, the agency used Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing to assist with recruitment. Because the majority of residents in eastern Ukraine speak Russian at home, all focus groups were conducted in Russian. Sometimes the participants inserted sentences or words in Ukrainian. The preference for the Russian language did not signify any political views. The participants received a small compensation for taking part in the focus groups. All the names of the participants and their detailed locations (villages and streets) were anonymised. In the translation of the quotes, we used the original spelling used by the participants; e.g., Kharkov instead of Kharkiv. Outside of the quotes, for reasons of consistency throughout the paper, we used Ukrainian spellings of the cities: i.e., Kharkiv, Mariupol, Kyiv, etc. The ethics for the study were approved by the University of Southampton (ERGO ID: 54481.A1).

Each focus group consisted of 8–9 participants; in total, 134 people participated across the 16 focus groups. The discussions were guided by a set of open-ended questions about population decline at national and local levels; partnership formation; and childbearing intentions. The discussions started with questions about the participants’ general problems in the past year and their experiences with the conflict in the Donbas or as an IDP. We then asked the participants who had remained in the Donbas about population decline to gauge their perceptions of depopulation in this area. Subsequent questions delved deeper into how the population around the participants had been changing, both in their local area and in Ukraine as a whole. We specifically asked whether they saw population decline in their country as a “problem.” The following questions about partnerships and childbearing also added to our understanding of why population had been declining. We probed into whether the participants thought the number of children born in the country was too low, too high or just right, and about the ideal family size in Ukraine. The discussions around what factors influence childbearing decisions provided insights into how micro-level decisions aggregate up to macro-level population processes.

Note that although the discussions flowed freely and the participants seemed to speak openly about their problems and opinions, the political context may have curtailed truly open discussions. While criticism of the “government” was rampant, few participants explicitly expressed support for Ukraine or Russia, and none blamed Putin or the Russian government for the war in the Donbas. One participant noted that people had stopped talking about the war, as it had led to deep divisions between friends and families. This self-censoring was acute in Donetsk, as participants were wary about who might be listening, whether American, Ukrainian or Russian. Although the participants complained about transport, hospital care, obtaining documents and other problems of everyday life, they rarely blamed the separatists or local government, possibly because any protests could compromise their security. In Donetsk, stories circulate about people who have been interrogated or tortured in “basements” for expressing anti-secessionist views (Verini, 2022). Thus, while the narratives below appear to be open and honest, they may have only scratched a superficial surface, while the participants’ deeper opinions remained hidden.

Because our main aim was to explore the extent to which people can gauge or understand population change based on personal observation, we asked each focus group the following questions: “How has the population changed in your hometown/village in the past years?” and “Is this change positive or negative?”² To the participants residing in Kharkiv, Mariupol and Donbas villages, we also asked a follow up-question concerning the whole of Ukraine: “Do you think that population decline is a problem, and why yes or no?”³ Note that by July 2021, when the focus group research took place, Covid-19 restrictions in Ukraine had been relaxed, and although vaccinations were only just becoming available, Covid-19 infections were relatively low. The increased activity after Covid-19 lockdowns inevitably influenced how people perceived their surroundings. Finally, although we asked the IDPs about their experiences with displacement, it is important to remember that the IDPs may have moved seven or eight years previously; thus, their observations were more likely to reflect the present situation.

We started the discussions about population change by focusing on the participants’ perceptions of the situation in their local area. Initially, some focus groups struggled to answer our questions, as they did not understand what we meant by “population change”. Instead, some participants described the general disposition of local people by, for example, opining that recently people had become “meaner”, more “closed” or prone to disorderly behaviour and alcoholism. Once the question had been clarified, the participants described, sometimes in great detail, the population changes they observed, often using metaphors or references to demographic knowledge from the media, Wikipedia and even conspiracy theories. In general, we did not observe differences in perceptions of population based on IDP status or gender, which were the primary characteristics by which the FGDs were split. Instead, perceptions differed by location, reflecting urban-rural differences, and whether the local area had experienced an influx of IDPs or, conversely, depopulation. Below we present the analysis of the participants’ discussions of local and population changes based on locality: the urban areas of Mariupol and Kharkiv, rural Donbas, and separatist-occupied Donetsk.

For several decades, demographers have recognised that Ukraine is facing a “depopulation crisis” (Chuiko, 2001; Steshenko, 2001), and this trend has been the subject of media and news reports (Golub, 2018; Kramar, 2019). Our online focus groups have demonstrated that average Ukrainians have also been aware of this crisis. It thus appears that knowledge of this issue has trickled down to popular consciousness, and has been reinforced through personal observations. The conversations about national population decline were often bleak, permeated by a sense of doom about the future of the country. Depopulation has had dire consequences for Ukraine, as it has led to a shrinking labour force, severe ageing and a general lack of development. The participants also identified the triple burden of depopulation. The main concern raised was about a lack of births, especially of second or third children, as young people were “refusing” to give birth. Participants complained about the toll that high emigration was taking, with the most active young people leaving. Mortality was also mentioned, but it was the least recognised factor in population decline, despite the high number of excess deaths from Covid-19 that had occurred over the previous year (Our World in Data, 2022).

Our focus groups also recognised that the decline in population was uneven across the country, and that even if the nation’s total population was declining, certain cities could still be expanding. Participants in all focus groups contrasted the growth in urban areas with the deterioration of conditions in rural areas, and made the direct link between people moving out of villages and into cities. The discourse of the decline of the rural areas in contrast to the growth of neighbouring urban areas is familiar throughout much of Europe (Benassi et al., 2023; Collantes and Pinilla, 2011; Copus et al., 2021). Predictably, our participants complained about the degradation of infrastructure and the lack of resources in rural areas. The rural residents recognised that the decline was due not only to outmigration, but also low to birth rates. They observed that childcare centres were closing and schools from different villages had to be merged. Economic conditions in rural areas prevented residents from wanting more than one child. Rural participants also spoke of high death rates due to older and impoverished residents being unable to obtain adequate health care, along with the devastating impact of Covid-19. Many mentioned they had lost relatives recently, even though the majority of deaths from Covid-19 were yet to come in the winter of 2021–22 (Ourworldindata.org, 2022). Thus, it was clear from the participants’ comments that the effects of the triple burden of depopulation in rural areas, combined with poverty and neglect, were more severe in Ukraine than in many parts of rural Europe.

Unlike most other depopulating regions of Europe, the area we studied was also affected by war and years of “frozen conflict”. These events visibly shaped the larger regional cities at the expense of population losses in rural Donbas and Donetsk. Although most of the participants in Kharkiv and Mariupol acknowledged that their cities benefited from the influx of specialists and experts, some argued that the increased population was straining infrastructure and resources. While internally displaced persons were usually portrayed in a positive light, some participants, particularly those in Mariupol, were wary of additional population pressures. These discussions are a reminder that even though a country may be depopulating overall, certain regions, and especially urban areas, may still be growing, often due to unexpected migration processes.

We also had the unprecedented opportunity to conduct focus groups with people in the separatist-occupied territory of Donetsk; an area that has been nearly inaccessible to western, or even Ukrainian, researchers. Although this area has been physically cut off from the rest of the world, the online discussions revealed how virtually connected the regions are through the internet, Zoom and social media (although these areas had been increasingly falling under Russian media control). The participants described the types of people who had left Donetsk or who had stayed behind, and how ordinary people were still living. The discussions corroborated the observations of the people who were living in Kharkiv and Mariupol: i.e., that those who remained behind were primarily elderly people, or were individuals who were caring for older people, lacked funds and networks outside of Donetsk, or, in some cases, were financially benefiting from the Russian occupation. Overall, the Donetsk residents acutely felt the population decline in their apartment buildings, on the streets, and in their social networks. They recognised that the shrinking population had led to less diversity and fewer younger people, drastically changing the age structure of the population. Indeed, the participants who remained seemed “displaced in place”, with little hope for the future (Rimpiläinen, 2022). As one participant put it, “We are dying out here”.

Although our participants often had strident opinions about population change, they also expressed uncertainty in their answers mixed with a lack of trust in statistics and the Ukrainian government. To some extent, these anxieties were warranted, as Ukraine had not had a census in two decades, and the political situation had long been unstable. However, we were surprised at the pervasiveness and the power of global conspiracy theories in the discussions, which had spread even to rural Ukraine. Statements such as “those who are doing this, they are doing it on purpose” reflected the participants’ lack of agency as events such as war, the pandemic, inflation and the economic crisis buffeted their lives. Although our participants described their own individual decisions – e.g., to move or have a child – it was clear they recognised the impact of macro-level shocks on population composition and size, even if they had no explanation for why they occurred.

In conclusion, although our research is not representative of the population of Ukraine, or even of the population of the regions where we conducted the focus groups, the discussions provide evidence that Ukrainians have been aware of population change at both the local and the national level, and that individuals can perceive how major events shape populations. It is important to note, however, that concerns about depopulation were not at the top of our participants’ list of problems. Rising costs, under-employment, Covid-19 lockdowns and children’s education were considered far more important in Kharkiv, Mariupol and the villages. In Donetsk, curfews, difficulties in obtaining official documents, lost contact with relatives and deteriorating infrastructure were the participants’ main grievances (Perelli-Harris et al., 2022). Overall, the participants blamed economic stagnation, government ineptitude, the Covid-19 pandemic and the political impasse for their woes, but not population decline per se. Nonetheless, although population decline was not considered to be the most important issue in Ukraine, when we posed the question to the focus groups directly, the participants recognised that population decline was both a cause and a consequence of Ukraine’s larger problems.

To our great sadness, the horrible events of the past year have accelerated Ukraine’s population decline in ways scarcely imaginable in July 2021. Ukraine’s people have experienced immense turmoil and trauma, especially in the regions where our focus groups took place. Kharkiv, described in our focus groups as a vibrant, bustling and rapidly growing city, has had half of its population move away and is still shelled daily. Mariupol, which residents said would develop and thrive in the coming years, has been completely obliterated. The villages where our focus groups took place are currently occupied by Russians or are experiencing hell on the front line. Their plight is now indicative of the extreme desolation that will occur throughout the Donbas and south-east Ukraine as these regions turn into near-empty wastelands. Most importantly, we must remember the voices of our focus group participants, who have had their lives directly threatened by violence. They have been displaced, destitute, detained, forcibly deported, conscripted into the Russian army or worse. We can only hope that the war will end soon so that Ukraine and its people can rebuild, regenerate and stop the inimical spiral of depopulation.