British policy concerning the Treaty of St Germain devolved from Prime Minister David Lloyd George. In developing war aims during the Great War, the British looked to maintain Austria-Hungary as a post-war Great Power, admittedly diminished, to balance between Germany and Russia. This goal evaporated by October 1918 as the Habsburg Monarchy collapsed and successor states arose in Central-Eastern Europe. The Allies handled Germany’s settlement, the Treaty of Versailles, first at the Paris Peace Conference. Its three-part focus – territorial adjustments, reparations, and disarmament – provided the model for British policy towards Austria. A key to Lloyd George’s ideas – his pragmatism obviated clear strategy – was to avoid future British military commitments for European security. Arthur Balfour, the foreign secretary, and Eyre Crowe, a Foreign Office mandarin, received responsibility for negotiating St. Germain; they played a major role in giving new Austria sensible borders and reasonable security. Doing so, however, they followed Lloyd George’s dictates about military commitments. The British subsequently used effective economic diplomacy to assist Austria’s financial reconstruction that allowed influence over its shape and democratic – that is capitalist – structure.

Keywords: 1914–1920 – Austria – Arthur BALFOUR – Eyre CROWE – Great Britain Foreign Policy – David LLOYD GEORGE – Treaty of St. Germain – Treaty of Versailles

British policy concerning the Treaty of St. Germain came from David Lloyd George, the prime minister after December 1916, who dominated all dimensions of the country’s statecraft. His efforts towards Austria had three dimensions: developing war aims, intra-Allied negotiation of Germany’s peace settlement, the Versailles Treaty, and, with Versailles as a model, policy towards Austria at the Paris Peace Conference. Austria’s settlement saw British reluctance to commit militarily to post-war Central-Eastern Europe. For Lloyd George, the German question at Paris had utmost importance; St. Germain was secondary. Because of military defeat and the rise of nationalism in Central-Eastern Europe, the Habsburg Empire splintered in October 1918 when its subject peoples proclaimed liberation from Vienna.

When the peacemakers fashioned the German settlement, the small successor states, including Austria, competed for territory, population, and Great Power support.

As prime minister, Lloyd George kept foreign policymaking at Downing Street, not the Foreign Office.1 After 1914, the Foreign Office dealt largely with neutral Powers and managed the economic-naval blockade against them. Though the main Cabinet existed, Lloyd George created a five man War Cabinet to run the war: the foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, was not a member. Needing speedy decisions, this body and the ministries dealing with finance, trade, munitions, and the fighting services directly dealt with the Allies without the Foreign Office. With Lloyd

1 CASSAR, Lloyd George at War; FRENCH, Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, especially Chapter 1.
George and his deputies in control after December 1916, policy emerged largely at the government’s apex and decisions passed down. Always pragmatic in domestic and foreign policy, Lloyd George rose to political prominence by making deals with allies and adversaries. For instance, domestically in 1910, as Chancellor of the Exchequer in Herbert Asquith’s Liberal ministry, he helped work with the party to end aristocratic control of the House of Lords. In December 1916, conversely, he led dissident Liberal-Conservatives to overthrow Asquith and energize Britain’s war effort. Foreign policy saw the same pragmatism. An opportunist, Lloyd George thought rarely in strategic terms – like supporting Britain’s tradition of maintaining the continental balance of power. The deal was most important. So it was with British policy concerning St. Germain. Lloyd George’s attitudes varied about Austria-Hungary and, after October 1918, postwar Austria. During the war, British war aims looked for Austria-Hungary with some changes to remain a Great Power; after Habsburg Central Europe shattered, Lloyd George saw Austria as simply another successor state. It had lost importance – although not for some other ministers and the Foreign Office. It was not that Lloyd George ignored the intra-Allied negotiation of St. Germain, but he let the professional diplomats shape it based on the model he established at Versailles. So, British policy towards Austria-Hungary developed initially in shaping war aims. Entering the war, Britain looked to avert German continental hegemony to give Britain influence in postwar Europe. But when the war bogged down into bloody attrition, other aims gained importance, but articulating them proved desultory. Only in summer 1916 did serious consideration first occur: neutral America pushed for a negotiated peace, France was seriously considering its objectives, and the war looked to favor the Allies – the Russians briefly broke through in the East, and Romania joined the Allies. Asquith called for peace terms. Thus, on the eve that Lloyd George rose to Downing Street, London began considering what its fighting should achieve; the Admiralty, Imperial General Staff [IGS], and Foreign Office produced assessments for the Cabinet, and for the first time, postwar Austria-Hungary received serious attention. Balfour, then first lord of the Admiralty, accepted “the principle of nationality” respecting the desires of Central Power subject peoples to break from Berlin and Vienna. The IGS reckoned both Central Powers were needed to contain “the power of Russia and the Slav States”. Still, each wanted a smaller Austria-Hungary to continue as major Power. The Foreign Office supported “the principle of nationality” in Central-Eastern Europe but sanctioned Habsburg demise, the strategic objective to enfeeble Germany by removing its chief ally and, with smaller states from Habsburg lands, better safeguard Europe’s future balance. Although unduly optimistic – ignoring nationalist antagonisms in Central-Eastern Europe – a voice now existed in London for sundering the Dual Monarchy.

After early 1917, following Karl I taking the Habsburg throne and despite Foreign Office, IGS, and other advice, Lloyd George believed the Allies could separate Berlin and Vienna, crucial to bettering British war making. For him, secret peace initiatives in 1917 engineered by Karl through his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus, suggested possibly removing the Monarchy from the war. The initiative proved futile, as did one by

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3 Rubinstein, Twentieth-Century Britain 85–87.
4 Still valuable is Calder, Britain and the Origins.
6 Fry, Fortune Fled 119–25.
Pope Benedict XV. The IGS cautioned the War Cabinet “Our arrangements with Rumania and Italy whereby all Transylvania and a large part of Hungary are to be ceded to the former, while Istria, Dalmatia and parts of other Austro-Hungarian provinces fall to the latter, make any arrangement with Austria impossible.”

Continued fighting on every front, the March 1917 Russian revolution, and coordinating Allied strategy with America once it entered the war in April delayed consideration of war aims. Then, after the Bolshevik coup d’etat, Lloyd George’s government was forced publicly to articulate British objectives. Moscow published secret tsarist treaties, notably the April 1915 London Treaty bringing Italy into the Allied alliance: it promised Rome the Austrian Tyrol and western Balkans lands and, perhaps, portions of the Ottoman Empire. This treaty constituted ‘old diplomacy’ – secret commitments – that ran counter to Woodrow Wilson’s ‘new diplomacy’: open diplomacy, arbitrating international disputes, and collective security through a yet to be created League of Nations. The London Treaty indicated amorality – even immorality – and Lloyd George had to respond to show its American ally and British voters burdened by total war that his government had moral ambitions.

Lloyd George spoke publicly on 5 January 1918 on why Britain was fighting, outlining general rather than specific aims – the better to do a deal at an eventual peace conference. In Cabinet, he opined that the issue involved declaring “our war aims which went to the extreme limit of concession, and which would show to our own people and to our Allies, as well as to the peoples of Austria, Turkey, and even Germany, that our object was not to destroy the enemy nations”. While enfeebled Germany was primary, for the Dual Monarchy, “Some reference ought to be made in our statement to such races as the Italians, Croats, Slovaks, Czechs, &c, who are under Austrian rule, and who seek some form of autonomy”. To his audience and a wider one in Britain and abroad, he outlined general aims: support for a multilateral organization to resolve international disputes, the inviolability of treaties, and a just peace built partially on the principle of nationality. Respecting Habsburg domains, he declared, “though we agree with President Wilson that the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for the removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened its general peace.”

His problem was that three days later, Wilson announced specific war aims – the “Fourteen Points”. In Central-Eastern Europe, Poland would be re-born, and “the people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development”. The Anglo-Americans now publicly advocated a peace based solely on their terms – no negotiated agreement – and determined to restructure Austria-Hungary after Allied victory.

For London, the idea of a restructured Austria-Hungary died in 1918. The first casualty involved Britain’s rebuke of Count Ottokar Czernin, Karl’s

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7 STEVENSON, 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution Chapter 9.
8 Robertson, “Addendum to the Note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff” [GT 326], 12. 2. 1916, CAB 24/9.
9 BUNYAN, FISHER, Bolshevik Revolution 242-44.
10 This and the next quote, WC 312 (1918) 9, 3. 1. 1918, CAB 23/5.
foreign minister, for peace talks. Two Downing Street advisors, Jan Smuts and Philip Kerr, met with Vienna’s former ambassador at London, Count Albert von Mensdorff, in Switzerland in December 1917 to lay the ground. Smuts reported favorably if guardedly, but after Lloyd George’s and Wilson’s January speeches—despite France’s premier, Georges Clemenceau, seeing no problem—Lloyd George balked at meeting Czernin. The option of Smuts continuing discussions remained, but the course of the war after March 1918 militated against it. In October 1918, the Habsburg Empire disintegrated and, on 4 October, Karl appealed for an armistice. The Peace Conference would settle matters.

Britain, France, America, and Italy dominated the Conference that began at Paris in January 1919. German diplomats were excluded, as were representatives of the other defeated regimes. Nonetheless, four general aims guided Lloyd George’s deal-making at Versailles—reparations, removing Germany’s threat to postwar European security by reducing its territory and neutering its naval and military power, limiting British continental commitments in West and East, and bolstering the Empire. In Europe—Turkey’s peace was another question—Lloyd George proved the most successful of the Big Four. A General Election returned his government to power in December 1918 in a landslide with a full franchise, Britain’s first experience in mass democracy. Apart from cementing Lloyd George’s political authority just before the Conference, voters demanded retribution against Germany. And beyond the League, open diplomacy, disarmament, and rejecting armed force to resolve international problems, opinion wanted to limit Britain’s European commitments.

At Versailles, some major issues were resolved with little difficulty. Creating the League was not contentious—Wilson accepted a British plan for the organization. The British, British Empire, and Japanese wartime conquests of Germany’s overseas colonies by diplomatic deftness transformed into supposed League mandates. Finally, given Allied public opinion, little problem existed in asserting German war guilt: the legal basis for reparations codified in Article 231 of the Treaty. However, other matters proved fractious. Reparations were unresolved. With the British wanting the highest German payments, the French inflexible over a total, and Americans only pursuing Allied debt payments owed them, Lloyd George engineered a deal to establish a postwar Reparations Commission to determine enemy liabilities, a final total, and the means of payment. It was a short-term solution and, with the German economy in shambles by 1922, did not see resolution until 1924. However, Lloyd George defended British economic interests, establishing policies for the former enemy Powers.

13 WC 318a(18), 18. 1. 1918, CAB 23/16.
14 Foreign Office memorandum [GT 5976], “The Diplomatic Situation Created by the German Request for an Armistice and Negotiations of the 4th Oct 1918”, 26. 10. 1918, CAB 24/66; “Armistice with Austria-Hungary. Military agreement regarding execution of certain clauses” [GT 6256], 7. 11. 1918, CAB 24/69.
16 DOCKRILL, GOOLD, Peace without Promise 181–252
17 BALL, Advent of Democracy; COOK, STEVENSON, History of British Elections 118–23.
18 EGERTON, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations; SMUTS, The League of Nations.
20 Meeting XIV, 1. 4. 1919, in LINK, BOEMEKE, Deliberations of the Council of Four 1105–11; Meeting XXII and Appendix ( Anglo-American Text), Point 1, both 5. 4. 1919, Ibid., 154–61; Meeting XXV, 8. 4. 1919, Ibid., 187–95.
21 Council of Four, Meeting X, 29. 3. 1919, Appendix [ Anglo-French agreement], Ibid., 78–79; Meeting XXII, 5. 4. 1919 and Appendix, Point 1, Ibid., 154–61; Wilson to Lloyd George, 5. 5. 1919, LINK, Papers of Woodrow Wilson 446–48.
22 GOMES, German Reparations 141–65.
to pay for war losses and pensions for veterans, their families, war-widows, and orphans.

Except for returning Alsace-Lorraine to France and giving Eupen-Malmédy to Belgium, Germany’s territorial settlement became enmeshed in French demands for postwar security. Lloyd George thought other French demands extreme. Ultimately, the Rhineland was demilitarized and the Saarland under League control would allow French exploitation of its coal and iron reserves for 15 years. As a tradeoff, Lloyd George and Kerr maneuvered between the French and Americans by proposing an Anglo-American guarantee of French security. For Wilson, the guarantee would be a separate undertaking needing Congressional endorsement. To evade guaranteeing France unilaterally should problems arise with America, Lloyd George won Britain’s right to sanction the agreement only if Washington did so. In both cases, given the General Election and British voters wanting no more war, Lloyd George limited British security obligations on the continent.

The eastern territorial settlement in Versailles was both easy and difficult. It was easy as victor Powers recognized the successor states forming in East-Central Europe – for instance, Bohemia became the core of new Czechoslovakia. Difficulty involved fluid borders and ongoing military action to secure territory by some successor states one against the other – the Czechs and Poles in 1919–1920 – and some States against the Bolshevists – a Russo-Polish war broke out in January 1919. Difficulty also involved what Lloyd George’s War Cabinet called “the principle of self-determination of races [in] the settlement of the New Europe” in preparing the premier’s war aims speech. Decidedly anti-Polish, Lloyd George ignored expert Foreign Office advice for a large Poland – he sought a smaller one that by restricting German and Russian territorial losses would in future allow for improved relations with both Powers. Although Clemenceau and Wilson preferred a large Poland – Wilson tied to his “Fourteen Points” – Lloyd George won the debate for a smaller Poland with a corridor to the sea that separated East Prussia from a diminished Germany.

Disarming the enemy Powers became a “leitmotif” of peacemaking. Other than Britain acquiring the “Kaiserliche Marine”, Allied war aims did not consider disarmament seriously until after November 1918; the armistice agreement said nothing about permanent German disarmament. After German surrender, however, the situation changed. As Britain and its Allies were already demobilizing, the German Army needed cutting. British opinion believed that ‘the war to end all wars’ had been fought. Given views that Germany had started the war, a large German army was a danger. Along with French desires to hobble Germany, Lloyd George’s Cabinet believed that reducing Germany’s offensive capacity

24 Meeting XXV, 9. 4. 1919, Meeting XXVII, 9. 4. 1919, Council of Four, 1195–97–97, 204–08.
25 See Meeting VII, 27. 3. 1919, Meeting XLIII, 22. 4. 1919, both ibid., 39–42, 317–19.
26 Headlam Morley minute, paragraph 3, 18. 3. 1919, FO 608/11/231.
28 Howard diary, 3.–8. 2. 1919, DHW 1/5; Howard memorandum for Hardinge [FO permanent under-secretary], 2. 2. 1919, FO 608/58; Meeting VI, 27 Mar 1919, Council of Four, I, 37–38; Howard to Lloyd George, 10. 4. 1919, Lloyd George F/57/6/1; cf. McKERCHER, Esme Howard 197–233.
29 Conditions of an Armistice with Germany, 11. 11. 1918, Miscellaneous Parliamentary Publications 25 (London, 1918); STEVENSON, Britain, France 199–201.
30 Cf. DICKINSON, Disarmament; WOOLF, International Government.
would reinforce European security, reduce British defense spending, and allow more funding for reconstructive social programs demanded by a majority of newly enfranchised voters. In sometimes disputatious debate, the Big Three – Orlando was tangential – and their military advisors reached agreement on most issues, chiefly that Germany needed enough troops for domestic stability and resisting Bolshevism. The German fleet would surrender to Britain. The result was a German army of 100,000; no conscription; no heavy weapons; a small officer corps; no general staff; destruction of fortresses and no new ones; no air force; restricted arms industries; a coastal navy of 15,000 and small ships; and Allied verification. For Lloyd George, Germany’s disarmament stymied the possibility of its future aggression.

Bolshevism had been a problem since November 1917, which the War Cabinet understood as the war emasculated the Wilhelmine and Habsburg economies and created social unrest. Lloyd George held, “Bolshevik doctrines were beginning to spread even in this country, they had undoubtedly spread in Austria”. His solution had several strands: economic and social policy creating a “land fit for heroes” at home, materially supporting anti-Bolshevik armies in Russia, and undermining Bolshevik appeal via the peace settlements to bring political and economic stability to Eastern-Central Europe – concern existed about defeated Germany and Bolshevist Russia combining. After the brief Bolshevik success in Hungary in March 1919, Lloyd George told his colleagues, he was very much afraid that a united Russia would be a great menace to them in the East. Still, he opposed direct British military involvement in East-Central Europe.

Containing Bolshevism says much about British policy and the settlement in Central-Eastern Europe. In March 1919, Lloyd George gained support in Paris to send Smuts to Budapest to seek a truce between warring revolutionary Hungary and Romania. This mission proved barren: Romanian forces overthrew the Bolshevik regime and, by summer, established a Hungarian social democratic government. Seeing Bucharest sympathetic to their interests, France reached out – and to other successor states. From this crisis, Lloyd George and his advisors gained three perceptions of emerging Central-Eastern Europe. Intensely nationalist, the new states and former enemy Powers were mutually antagonistic, mainly over territory. The region’s nascent regimes needed staunch pro-Western – democratic and anti-Bolshevik – governments. Finally, Paris began aligning with pro-French Powers like Romania as they established their borders to construct a buffer vis-à-vis Russia – and Germany. This was the situation as the Allies turned to Austria; it is unsurprising that Versailles became a diplomatic template for St. Germain. For the British, it required reparations, eliminating any Austrian menace to post-war security by territorial

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32 For British concern, Kerr, “Present position of Conference. Peace Preliminaries with Germany”, to Lloyd George, 3. 3. 1919, LG F/ 89/2/38. Then, for example, Council of Ten, 3. 3. 1919, FULLER, Foreign Relations 183–84.
33 JAFFE, Abolishing War 43–44.
34 Cf. WC 341(18)11, 8. 2. 1918, CAB 23/5; WC 500b(18)5, 11. 11. 1918, CAB 23/14.
36 WC 599(19)3, 25. 7. 1919, CAB 23/11.
38 BAKIC, Britain and Interwar 7–30; SANDU, Système de sécurité, Chapter 2.
readjustments, weakening its military potential, avoiding a military commitment, and ensuring nothing diverted resources from Imperial defense. When Lloyd George left Paris after signing Versailles on 28 June, Balfour led the British Delegation. His chief advisor was Eyre Crowe, the Foreign Office prewar German expert and author of the classic defense of the balance of power.\(^{40}\) Still, Lloyd George ensured his stamp on handling Austria. In fact, the Cabinet secretary admiringly recorded Lloyd George’s thinking in December 1920: “he alluded to our traditional policy of aloofness from the affairs of central Europe, only intervening at long intervals when our safety compelled it, as in the late war and in the Napoleonic wars”.\(^{41}\)

Balfour and Crowe handled British policy towards postwar Austria, starting before the signature of Versailles. The vital issue was that they did so within strictures imposed by Downing Street about avoiding military commitments. Even so, within these parameters, they established a strategically cohesive Austria with sensible borders and a basis for a sound economy as part of new Eastern-Central Europe that could help maintain a firm regional balance against either Russia or Germany. Their goal: a liberal democratic state tied to capitalism, a wrinkle being successor state rapaciousness; but as Crowe argued earlier about the region, “I incline strongly to infringing as little as possible with the Principle of Non-Interference in the internal affairs of another country”.\(^{42}\) Such transgressions would include frontier changes.

Some crucial decisions about St. Germain occurred in negotiating the German settlement. Austria’s representatives were denied access to the deliberations – and the victor Powers ignored written and verbal protests of the republican regime when bargaining among themselves. Thus, St. Germain was another “diktat”. Austria’s armed forces faced significant cuts: a 30,000 volunteer army and no conscription; no navy – obvious for a now landlocked state; no air force; and armament and munition restrictions. Given their state’s withered form and devastated economy, Austrian leaders apparently visualized the now almost solely German-speaking polity in a federal relationship with Germany. They requested the Big Four consider St. Germain in terms of Point Ten in Wilson’s war aims: “The people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.”\(^{43}\)

Some consideration was given to a Danubian federation, but the other regional Powers disagreed.\(^{44}\) For London, Austria’s inclusion in Weimar Germany might balance against Prussia, the “bête noire” of German militarism-aggression. Predictably, the French and Italians opposed any increase in German strength, even minimally, and both Czechoslovakia and Switzerland saw potential danger if German territory surrounded them.\(^{45}\) The British then reckoned that an “Anschluss” might embolden Weimar to seek a pan-German solution to weaken Versailles by appealing to national self-determination.\(^{46}\) Austria could not be a tool of German revanchism. As James Headlam Morley, a German expert advising Crowe, argued earlier: “We do not wish to encourage these large units of Government on the Continent [...]. Quite apart from questions of balance of power we have enough nationalism and

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\(^{40}\) Crowe “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany”, 1. 1. 1907, with Grey minute, 28 Jan 1907, FO 371/257/73/73. A copy was printed for Foreign Office use during the Peace Conference: FO 881/8882X.

\(^{41}\) ROSKILL, Hankey 209.

\(^{42}\) Crowe minute, 17. 3. 1918, FO 608/151/4116.

\(^{43}\) Wilson’s Fourteen Points

\(^{44}\) Crowe minute, 8. 4. 1919, FO 608/9/198.

\(^{45}\) For Swiss views, see FO despatch (2215) to Paris, 14. 4. 1919, FO 608/9/199.

\(^{46}\) Crowe minute, 22. 2. 1919, Hardinge minute, no date, Balfour minute, no date, all FO 608/9/210; Crowe minute, 19. 3. 1919, FO 608/9/191.
we want the tide flowing in the other direction.”

Three days before, the Territorial Commission at Paris had endorsed independent Austria sharing the borders existing with Germany before 1914. Accepting this proposal, the British evaded French demands for a clause in both Versailles and later St. Germain that made this frontier permanent and compelled the victor Powers to oppose a future “Anschluss” militarily. The peacemakers relied on the League via a purposely ambiguous reference in St. Germain to future revision – Art. 88: “The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the League of Nations.” While pan-German nationalism remained, the Allies expected that once political and economic stability returned to Austria, its people would favor independence.

Balfour and Crowe began their tasks at St. Germain with a nascent Austria constrained by German national self-determination, uneasy successor states neighbors and Switzerland, and Allied resolve that Austrians support a sovereign state. And British armed strength could not underpin St. Germain. Balfour and Crowe understood that lacking the military dimension, they would rely almost completely on political and economic initiatives. Vienna and Belgrade were already in dispute over largely German-speaking Klagenfurt, a transportation hub, and its hinterland. In November 1918, Yugoslavs had occupied the city. Vienna protested, seeking redress. Balfour and Crowe found that the Italians supported Austria – of course, Rome acquired the Tyrol in line with the London treaty – opposing Yugoslav control of rail lines in that sector. Crowe reckoned that Austrian control of Klagenfurt would assist the new republic economically and strengthen Vienna in the emerging north Balkan balance of power. Working with the Italians, Balfour won Franco-American support – although Wilson saw the Italians as especially grasping in their territorial ambitions that violated national self-determination. The Allies decided on a plebiscite – it occurred in 1920 – where a majority in Klagenfurt region voted to remain in Austria.

Equally disputatious was the Burgenland, a Habsburg territory in what had become the western reaches of Bolshevik Hungary. Based on a prewar census, most of the population was German. Austria held that on ethnic and economic criteria, the region should revert to its control. Still, initial victor Power objections to a handover emerged: it might exacerbate Austro-Hungarian tensions. By April 1919, however, to weaken Hungary, Crowe became convinced of acceding to Vienna. Retaining the Burgenland would aid Austrian survival. For the British, ideology did

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47 Headlam Morley minute, 18. 3. 1919, FO 608/9.
48 ‘Report on Central Committee on Territorial Questions to Supreme Council’, 15. 3. 1919, FO 608/9/212.
51 Crowe minute, 29. 4. 1919, Balfour minute, no date, both FO 608/9/199.
52 Headlam Morley memorandum, 28. 5. 1919, Crowe minute, 29. 5. 1919, both FO 608/19/308.
53 For instance, on limiting Italian influence in the region, see Crowe minute for Balfour, 19. 6. 1919, FO 608/6/118; Crowe minute for Balfour, 19. 6. 1919, FO 608/16/277.
54 See Supreme Council decision, 21 and 23. 6. 1919 [defining the Klagenfurt Basin and for a plebiscite], FO 608/16/276.
55 THRONTEIT, Power Without Victory. 281.
56 Leeper minute, 15.–16. 5. 1919, FO 608/41/10100; KAPITAN, Self-determination 1–22.
57 K.K. Statistische Zentralkommission, Allgemeines Verzeichnis.
58 Crowe minute, 10. 4. 1919, FO 608/220/6304.
not define this course – although they crassly talked about national self-determination as a justification; cold realism did. Democratic Austria could help the emerging regional balance, including against an inchoate Hungary whether communist or not. With France backing Romania’s invasion of Bolshevik Hungary, Balfour won Allied support to ignore Hungary and assign Burgenland to Austria. Delay occurred in concluding St. Germain in summer 1919. A key issue concerned “war guilt” that, like Versailles, meant new Austria’s liability for reparations owed the Allies. By August, Vienna contested Austrian culpability: German Austrians had not alone supported going to war in 1914 – Bohemians and other subject peoples also had. Concurrently, the Austrian government denounced its territorial losses and the unspecified reparations being debated in Paris. This reaction divided the British experts. Headlam-Morley proposed modifying the treaty’s final draft. His core argument was that as a new polity, Austria was not the Power that had fought with Germany after 1914: it should not pay reparations. Reparations experts differed. But given territorial and other decisions already encased in the draft treaty, suffused by French obduracy, Balfour and Crowe opposed revision. In the wider European settlement, little advantage would accrue from antagonizing France over what it saw as an enemy responsibility.

Despite St. Germain being a “diktat”, Austria realized some benefits. It could join the League after signing the Treaty – it did so in December 1920. With Lloyd George’s Cabinet already considering economic and financial assistance for Vienna with trade and aid – but not cash – its economic strictures would be loosened. And Burgenland’s transfer was seen as conceding to Vienna. Postwar Austria would be essential to the balance of power in the region. As a Foreign Office assessment for the Cabinet in August 1919 argued: “If we obtain a strong position in Vienna we immediately strengthen our position in Bohemia, in Hungary, and even in Jugo-Slavia.” With all avenues blocked and militarily and economically weak, Austria signed the Treaty on 10 September 1919.

British ratification of St. Germain bogged down over winter 1919–1920. The Cabinet waited to complete the three remaining treaties before approaching Parliament; while the Bulgarian treaty was signed in November, those for Hungary and Turkey waited until the New Year. Lord Curzon, the new foreign secretary, put his concerns before the Cabinet on 12 February 1920: “The most urgent need of South-Eastern Europe to-day is peace, which is at the same time the greatest interest of the British Empire in those countries.” Intelligence reports showed that political stability had yet to appear in Austria. In December 1919, Lloyd George and his ministers learnt: “The existing Government in Austria seems to be powerless outside Vienna, but the Communist parties are not considered to be a serious menace. The Monarchists are not making progress in Austria, and in Hungary, where they are stronger, there is a tendency to await events.”

While Bolshevism taking root in Austria worried London after November 1917, the danger was melting away by late 1919. Further intelligence

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59 Cf. Crowe minute, 26. 5. 1919, FO 608/19/304; Crowe minute, 11. 6. 1919, FO 608/13/253.
60 VARES, Question of Western Hungary 65.
62 Cf. Chamberlain [Chancellor of the Exchequer] to Lloyd George, 17. 4. 1919, Lloyd George, F/7/2/17; Lloyd George to Smuts, 26. 5. 1919, Lloyd George, F/45/9/37.
63 FO memorandum, “The advantages, commercial and political, of giving financial assistance to German Austria” [GT 6111], 15. 8. 1919, CAB 24/68.
64 Directorate of Intelligence, “A Monthly Review of Revolutionary Movements in Foreign Countries” [CP 308], Dec 1919, CAB 24/95.
indicated, “the Social Democratic Party has resolved that it will be impossible at present for the State to carry out the party’s policy for the socialisation of industry on any large scale, as Austria depends upon foreign capital”.65 Whereas a military obligation to preserve Austria was a non-starter, economic and financial commitments were not. London’s way forward was economic diplomacy, and Austria proved vitally important for British policy in Central-Eastern Europe – reinforcing notions that “Vienna had long been the banking centre of Southern Central Europe, and any collapse on a large scale must have widespread effects”.66 This diplomacy did not involve unilateral British initiatives, but they could buttress stability and ensure that the Successor States could balance amongst themselves and against Germany and Russia. It meant working through the League and with Powers like America and France. When St. Germain came into force in July 1920, Britain used food aid and unspent relief loans to fuel Austrian trade.67 With surplus stores in Britain, including fish, Austria and other regional Powers could get them through long-term credits. Conceding that Austria lost property by St. Germain, the Allies relieved Austria of reparations payments in 1921. While this stage of Anglo-Austrian relations involves issues subsequent to negotiating St. Germain, the British were already using powerful elements of finance to bolster a liberal democracy in the state they played a major role creating.

Lloyd George largely charted the course of British handling defeated Austria-Hungary – first, during the war and then, following the German precedent, at St. Germain. Although Balfour and Crowe negotiated in Paris, the premier’s desire to remain aloof from military commitments dominated diplomacy towards Austria. For Balfour and Crowe, postwar Austria did not exist in a vacuum. Thus, St. Germain largely conformed to British designs about stability: it aided a hopefully liberal democratic Austria and the other Successor States to balance among themselves and against Germany and Russia. It also meant that through the League and with other major Powers, the British helped in Central-Eastern Europe’s financial reconstruction in a way that allowed for some influence over its shape and democratic – that is capitalist – structure.

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65 Ibid.
66 CC 80(20)6, 30. 12. 1920, CAB 23/23.
67 MCKERCHER, Democratization of Europe 331–58.
Abkürzungen:

CAB Cabinet Records, The National Archives, Kew
CC Cabinet Conclusion
CP Cabinet Paper
DHW Lord Howard of Penrith Papers, Cumbria County Record Office, Carlisle
FO Foreign Office Records, The National Archives, Kew
GT War Cabinet Paper GT Series
IGS Imperial General Staff
WC War Cabinet

Siehe auch das allgemeine Abkürzungsverzeichnis: [http://www.rechtsgeschichte.at/files/abk.pdf]

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